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allies and partners think tanks and 

2
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industry , all under the banner of 

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ensuring a resilient and agile defense 

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industrial base . I want to thank the 

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United Kingdom for CO moderating this 

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year's event with us . At this time , 

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it is my great pleasure to introduce 

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our first keynote speaker of the day , 

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The honorable Ellen M . Lord . Miss 

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Lord serves as the undersecretary of 

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defense for acquisition sustainment . 

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In this capacity , she is responsible 

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to the secretary of defense for all 

14
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matters pertaining to acquisition and 

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sustainment , and works closely with 

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all the service departments and 

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military agencies . Prior to 

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disappointment , Under Secretary Lord 

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served as the president and chief 

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executive officer of Textron Inc . 

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Under Secretary Lord has more than 30 

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years of experience in the defense 

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industry , is a former vice chairman of 

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the National Defense Industrial 

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Association and has held numerous other 

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positions on boards exterior groups 

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throughout her career . Milord , 

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welcome . The floor is yours . 

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Good morning . And thank you , Mike , 

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for that introduction . I'm truly 

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honored to join you all today at such 

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an important event , The calm death 

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forum is a vital opportunity for 

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representatives from the U . S . 

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Government industry as well as partners 

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and allies to convene an address . Some 

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of the greatest challenges in modern 

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defense . As you know , the focus for 

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this year's forum is ensuring a 

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resilient , an agile defense industrial 

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base . This theme aligns well with the 

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mission of the office of the 

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undersecretary of defense for 

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Acquisition and sustainment , or A and 

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S . Our mission is to enable the 

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delivery and sustainment off secure and 

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resilient capabilities to the 

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warfighter and our international 

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partners quickly and cost effectively . 

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We have six goals under the framework 

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of our mission . The second is building 

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a safe , secure and resilient defense 

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industrial base . Today , I would like 

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to take the opportunity to discuss our 

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effort to meeting this goal , 

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particularly in terms of what we're 

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doing to address supply chain 

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fragilities , exacerbated by Cove in 19 

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our industry outreach efforts , 

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including industrial based cooperation 

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and our progress in terms of agile 

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acquisition efforts . The Department of 

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Defense has three priorities . Joined 

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the coronavirus pandemic one protect 

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our service members , their families 

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and our civilian co workers to 

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safeguard our national security 

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missions , and three support the 

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administration's whole of government 

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approach . In addressing this national 

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health emergency , one of our first 

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actions was to ensure that the defense 

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industrial base was essential and 

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designated as critical infrastructure . 

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We quickly took measures thio , 

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increase communication and gain greater 

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insight into potential delivery and 

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production challenges . In March , I 

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established the Cove in 19 Joint 

80
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Acquisition Task Force , or Jad , if 

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the jet was tasked with developing 

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processes , Toe enable the U . S . 

83
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Department of Health and Human Services , 

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or HHS , and the Federal Emergency 

85
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Management Agency or FEMA to quickly 

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and effectively access D o D 

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acquisition , workforce expertise and 

88
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authorities in support of the Cove in 

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19 response . More specifically , 

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giraffes goals included bringing 

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analytic program management and 

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contracting expertise from the services 

93
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and D O D agencies to quickly respond 

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to demand from FEMA and HHS , utilizing 

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d o d supply chain expertise toe 

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forecast gaps and identify 

97
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opportunities for the industrial base 

98
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expansion . And prioritizing solutions 

99
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from industry to connect suppliers to 

100
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FEMA or HHS , including industrial base 

101
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expansion efforts from its inception , 

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the jet . If leverage , nearly 300 d o 

103
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d . Acquisition and supply chain 

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experts toe enable FEMA and HHS to more 

105
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rapidly scale and modify their 

106
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acquisition efforts for both 

107
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procurement of medical supplies and 

108
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expansion of the domestic industrial 

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based for critical medical resource is 

110
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at the height of our effort . 800 d o d . 

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Individuals were involved . D o d 

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expertise and logistics and movement of 

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goods , material and personnel enabled 

114
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FEMA's Project Air Bridge to rapidly 

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provide resource is toe areas in 

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greatest need during the initial phases 

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of the cove in 19 response . The JAT if 

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directly supported FEMA's National 

119
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Crisis Coordination Center and the 

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Supply Chain Task Force as they 

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determined how the U . S government 

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would meet urgent demands with 

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available supply . The Jets 

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understanding of reliance on foreign 

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suppliers often many tears down in the 

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supply chain , and the impact of that 

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reliance on on quickly producing it 

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scale has allowed HHS to better plan 

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for strategic national stockpile or SNS 

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replenishment . The Coronavirus Aid 

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Relief and Economic Security or Cares 

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Act authorized and provided Resource is 

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for Title three of the Defense 

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Production Act or D P . A . To address 

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impacts to the dib caused by Cove in 19 . 

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It did so by directly offsetting 

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financial distress and providing 

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investment to regions most severely 

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impacted in order to sustain essential 

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domestic industrial base capabilities 

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and spur local job creation . D . O . D 

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is using approximately $690 million of 

143
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The Cares Act funding to retain 

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critical defense . Industrial based 

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companies significantly impacted by 

146
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Cove in it is also dedicated $100 

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million to support implementation off 

148
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Executive order 13 9 to to execute the 

149
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D P . A Title three loan program in 

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collaboration with the International 

151
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Development Finance Corporation , or 

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DFC , in order to re sure 

153
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critical healthcare manufacturing 

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capability . About $215 million was 

155
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used to increase capacity and 

156
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throughput for the healthcare supply 

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chain . Over the last six months , D . 

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O . D . Has invested nearly $640 

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million in industrial base expansion 

160
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efforts to support increased capacity 

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in the areas of screening and 

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diagnostics , and 95 respirators and 

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filter media injection technology , 

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ventilated or media and supply chain 

165
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gloves , surgical masks and blood 

166
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plasma technology . About 

167
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$410 million of the industrial base 

168
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expansion efforts come from HHS Cares 

169
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Act funding , and about $18 million 

170
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come from the Healthcare Enhancement 

171
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Act . Looking ahead , 2021 the JAT if 

172
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will permanently continue under our 

173
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existing joint rapid acquisition cell 

174
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or J Rack leadership as the defense 

175
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assisted or D A . Two . Because we need 

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lots of acronyms here d o d cell as the 

177
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jet of transitions from its current 

178
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structure toe , Um , or permanent 

179
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operation under the J Rack , the Jack F 

180
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and J Rack teams with partners across 

181
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the department are developing a 

182
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playbook to document the processes 

183
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authorities and resource is needed for 

184
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this and any future public health 

185
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crises to which the department responds , 

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the D A . To sell will continue to 

187
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support our d . O d and interagency 

188
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partners . So the Cove in 19 Crisis and 

189
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also served as D . O . D s first line 

190
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for acquisition support in the event of 

191
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future national emergencies . The J 

192
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Back team will remain engaged with D . 

193
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O . D . And Interagency Partners to 

194
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deliver acquisition solutions at the 

195
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Speed of Relevance . In March , based 

196
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on DHS , the Department of Homeland 

197
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Security Guidance DPC issued a 

198
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memorandum titled Defense Innovation 

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Based Contract Considerations , which 

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identified contractors as critical 

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infrastructure . DPC also issued a 

202
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memorandum advising contracting 

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officers toe work with their 

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contractors to provide as much 

205
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flexibility for teleworkers possible as 

206
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long as it did not degrade the mission , 

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regardless of specific contract 

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language not allowing for teleworking , 

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D . O . D provided liquidity to the 

210
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industrial base by raising the progress 

211
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payment rates from 80 to 90% for large 

212
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businesses and 90 to 95% for small 

213
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businesses via March 20th class 

214
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deviation . In August , DPC also issued 

215
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a class deviation providing policy and 

216
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guidance to contracting officers for 

217
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reviewing and processing contractor 

218
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requests for reimbursement of paid 

219
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leave costs under the authority of 

220
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Section 36 10 off the Cares Act , the 

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entire s workforce , including 

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industrial policy , defense pricing and 

223
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contracting , and the Defense Contract 

224
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Management Agency and the Defense 

225
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Logistics Agency , continue toe work 

226
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toe , identify Cove in 19 impacts and 

227
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to mitigate thumb . In March , the 

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industrial policy team began hosting 

229
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daily calls between key D O D 

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stakeholders and industry association 

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leaders to rapidly identify the most 

232
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pressing issues across the Dibb and to 

233
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discuss areas where D O D could help . 

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While the calls are no longer held is 

235
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frequently , they have reached 15 

236
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industry associations which 

237
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collectively represent three million 

238
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companies around the world . They are 

239
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an important conduit of information 

240
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both to and from the private sector the 

241
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team applies information gathered 

242
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during these calls to address issues 

243
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such a small business impacts , safe 

244
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passage and work stoppage , and the 

245
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importance of flowing liquidity into 

246
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the hands of sub tier suppliers . We 

247
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will continue to hold these calls twice 

248
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a month to keep lines of communication 

249
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open and information flowing from all 

250
00:10:43,020 --> 00:10:46,340
stakeholders . Kofi , 19 has given the 

251
00:10:46,340 --> 00:10:48,650
department greater visibility into 

252
00:10:48,650 --> 00:10:51,340
major fragilities in our supply chains , 

253
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both domestically and with foreign 

254
00:10:53,580 --> 00:10:56,700
suppliers . The pandemic has reinforced 

255
00:10:56,700 --> 00:10:58,700
the importance of securing and dirt 

256
00:10:58,700 --> 00:11:01,140
diversifying our supply chains , 

257
00:11:01,240 --> 00:11:03,580
especially when partnering with allied 

258
00:11:03,590 --> 00:11:06,000
or partner nations to utilize or 

259
00:11:06,000 --> 00:11:08,370
develop capabilities overseas . 

260
00:11:09,740 --> 00:11:13,020
Building Off Cove in 19 lessons learned 

261
00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:16,210
the Executive order 13 806 report 

262
00:11:16,220 --> 00:11:19,330
issued in 2018 and the recently 

263
00:11:19,330 --> 00:11:22,480
published F Y 2000 and 19 Industrial 

264
00:11:22,480 --> 00:11:25,610
Capabilities report . We're focusing on 

265
00:11:25,610 --> 00:11:27,950
reassuring critical capabilities such 

266
00:11:27,950 --> 00:11:30,430
as microelectronics , rare earth , 

267
00:11:30,430 --> 00:11:33,200
minerals and unmanned aerial systems . 

268
00:11:33,320 --> 00:11:36,280
In particular , the US microelectronics 

269
00:11:36,280 --> 00:11:39,150
domestic capacity in manufacturing , 

270
00:11:39,200 --> 00:11:41,970
packaging and testing capabilities 

271
00:11:42,140 --> 00:11:44,660
continues to be in a state of decline . 

272
00:11:45,040 --> 00:11:47,540
US . Manufacturing of microelectronics 

273
00:11:47,550 --> 00:11:50,610
sits at just 12% currently , while only 

274
00:11:50,610 --> 00:11:53,360
a minuscule 3% of packaging and testing 

275
00:11:53,360 --> 00:11:57,360
occurs in the United States . 75% 

276
00:11:57,370 --> 00:12:00,270
off microelectronics manufacturing and 

277
00:12:00,270 --> 00:12:03,720
98% of packaging and testing is now 

278
00:12:03,720 --> 00:12:07,230
performed in Asia . However , 52% of 

279
00:12:07,230 --> 00:12:09,670
the intellectual property is generated 

280
00:12:09,680 --> 00:12:12,530
in the United States , while the US 

281
00:12:12,530 --> 00:12:15,000
continues to serve as the leader in 

282
00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:16,667
microelectronics research and 

283
00:12:16,667 --> 00:12:18,830
development . R Lack of ability to 

284
00:12:18,830 --> 00:12:21,910
manufacture , package and test has 

285
00:12:21,910 --> 00:12:24,440
resulted in the loss of employment 

286
00:12:24,450 --> 00:12:27,320
opportunities , economic growth and the 

287
00:12:27,320 --> 00:12:29,460
lack of ability to fulfill D o D 

288
00:12:29,460 --> 00:12:32,640
requirement , rapid growth in global 

289
00:12:32,640 --> 00:12:35,360
commercial microelectronics markets and 

290
00:12:35,360 --> 00:12:37,890
the substantial reliance on offshore 

291
00:12:37,890 --> 00:12:40,440
semiconductor manufacturing , packaging 

292
00:12:40,440 --> 00:12:42,910
and testing . Strange D . O . D s 

293
00:12:42,910 --> 00:12:45,320
ability to acquire and sustained 

294
00:12:45,320 --> 00:12:47,980
microelectronic components embedded in 

295
00:12:47,980 --> 00:12:50,170
systems critical to our national 

296
00:12:50,170 --> 00:12:53,180
defense Experts within A and S and 

297
00:12:53,180 --> 00:12:55,530
throughout the O . D are working to 

298
00:12:55,530 --> 00:12:58,490
develop a microelectronic strategy to 

299
00:12:58,490 --> 00:13:01,430
ensure currently fielded and future d o 

300
00:13:01,430 --> 00:13:05,090
D systems have secure components . The 

301
00:13:05,090 --> 00:13:07,260
strategy requires novel business 

302
00:13:07,260 --> 00:13:09,510
concepts such as public private 

303
00:13:09,510 --> 00:13:11,620
partnerships , allowing d o d . The 

304
00:13:11,620 --> 00:13:13,842
leverage commercial market advancements 

305
00:13:13,842 --> 00:13:16,170
and demand in order to re sure 

306
00:13:16,170 --> 00:13:18,650
microelectronics production and testing 

307
00:13:19,440 --> 00:13:21,218
the United States . Competitive 

308
00:13:21,218 --> 00:13:23,820
advantage is not on Lee a result of our 

309
00:13:23,830 --> 00:13:26,430
unrivaled warfighters state of the art 

310
00:13:26,430 --> 00:13:29,790
weapon systems and material , but also 

311
00:13:29,790 --> 00:13:32,270
our unmatched network of alliances and 

312
00:13:32,270 --> 00:13:35,420
partnerships . Three . US military 

313
00:13:35,420 --> 00:13:37,840
works every day to strengthen and 

314
00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:40,160
expand its alliances and partnerships , 

315
00:13:40,170 --> 00:13:42,820
enabling security and prosperity for 

316
00:13:42,820 --> 00:13:45,390
millions around the world . Working 

317
00:13:45,390 --> 00:13:48,260
with our closest allies and partners is 

318
00:13:48,260 --> 00:13:50,680
an increasingly important tool for D . 

319
00:13:50,680 --> 00:13:53,620
O . D . To mitigate shared industrial 

320
00:13:53,620 --> 00:13:56,630
base risks . Strategic partnerships 

321
00:13:56,630 --> 00:13:59,000
focused on international cooperation 

322
00:13:59,010 --> 00:14:02,010
and acquisition enable the department 

323
00:14:02,020 --> 00:14:04,900
tow obtain advanced technologies from 

324
00:14:04,900 --> 00:14:07,370
the global defense industrial base 

325
00:14:07,840 --> 00:14:09,784
within the national technology and 

326
00:14:09,784 --> 00:14:11,640
industrial base or in TIB . 

327
00:14:11,650 --> 00:14:14,230
Collaborative activities with Australia , 

328
00:14:14,240 --> 00:14:17,690
Canada and the UK include discussions 

329
00:14:17,690 --> 00:14:20,190
on cyber security measures , five g 

330
00:14:20,190 --> 00:14:23,180
concerns , economic statecraft and 

331
00:14:23,190 --> 00:14:25,450
adversarial investment , as well as 

332
00:14:25,450 --> 00:14:27,360
critical chemicals and strategic 

333
00:14:27,360 --> 00:14:30,330
materials such as rare earth elements . 

334
00:14:30,550 --> 00:14:32,772
In the two years since the expansion of 

335
00:14:32,772 --> 00:14:35,210
the in TIB to include Australia and the 

336
00:14:35,210 --> 00:14:37,630
UK , the group has achieved a number of 

337
00:14:37,630 --> 00:14:40,550
successes that directly support shared 

338
00:14:40,560 --> 00:14:43,580
national security objectives . Projects 

339
00:14:43,580 --> 00:14:45,650
include addressing interoperability 

340
00:14:45,660 --> 00:14:48,690
before equipment gets fielded , joint 

341
00:14:48,690 --> 00:14:50,660
projects on co development and co 

342
00:14:50,660 --> 00:14:53,160
production of critical technologies AH , 

343
00:14:53,160 --> 00:14:55,600
mechanism to resolve specific supply 

344
00:14:55,600 --> 00:14:58,020
chain problems and adoption and 

345
00:14:58,020 --> 00:15:00,580
harmonization of measures to protect 

346
00:15:00,590 --> 00:15:03,370
against adversarial foreign investment . 

347
00:15:04,240 --> 00:15:07,350
A and S s lead eating the department's 

348
00:15:07,350 --> 00:15:09,560
efforts to deepen engagement on 

349
00:15:09,570 --> 00:15:11,830
acquisition matters with our allies and 

350
00:15:11,830 --> 00:15:14,720
partners and s continues to engage with 

351
00:15:14,720 --> 00:15:16,540
our international partners to 

352
00:15:16,540 --> 00:15:18,710
encouraged improved acquisition 

353
00:15:18,710 --> 00:15:21,690
processes . Engagement topics focus on 

354
00:15:21,700 --> 00:15:24,290
acquisition best practices , including 

355
00:15:24,300 --> 00:15:26,270
our initiatives to develop and 

356
00:15:26,270 --> 00:15:28,490
implement the adaptive acquisition 

357
00:15:28,490 --> 00:15:30,950
framework . One of my teams most 

358
00:15:30,950 --> 00:15:33,160
significant accomplishments has been 

359
00:15:33,160 --> 00:15:36,200
rewriting what we call the 5000 Siri's 

360
00:15:36,210 --> 00:15:39,110
the overarching policy on D . O D . 

361
00:15:39,110 --> 00:15:42,130
Acquisition . Our objective continues 

362
00:15:42,130 --> 00:15:45,140
to be to design a business process that 

363
00:15:45,140 --> 00:15:47,750
encourages fresh , original thinking 

364
00:15:47,940 --> 00:15:50,630
what I call creative compliance So our 

365
00:15:50,630 --> 00:15:53,050
program managers and decision makers 

366
00:15:53,060 --> 00:15:55,280
can assess risk and design and 

367
00:15:55,290 --> 00:15:59,020
acquisition strategy tailored thio each 

368
00:15:59,030 --> 00:16:02,680
specific program . The 5000 rewrite 

369
00:16:02,690 --> 00:16:05,590
achieves that objective by decomposing 

370
00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:08,810
ah , large policy document into six 

371
00:16:08,820 --> 00:16:11,740
clear and separate pathways . Notice 

372
00:16:11,740 --> 00:16:13,870
the adaptive acquisition framework . 

373
00:16:15,240 --> 00:16:18,230
Each pathway is tailored to the unique 

374
00:16:18,240 --> 00:16:20,690
characteristics off the capability 

375
00:16:20,690 --> 00:16:23,820
being acquired . The six a f pathways 

376
00:16:23,820 --> 00:16:27,050
include urgent capability , acquisition , 

377
00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:30,260
middle tier of acquisition , major 

378
00:16:30,260 --> 00:16:33,150
capability , acquisition , software 

379
00:16:33,160 --> 00:16:35,320
acquisition , defense , business 

380
00:16:35,320 --> 00:16:38,060
systems and acquisition of services . 

381
00:16:38,440 --> 00:16:41,390
The A F streamlines traditional 

382
00:16:41,390 --> 00:16:43,740
acquisition process is providing our 

383
00:16:43,740 --> 00:16:46,580
combatant commands and warfighters with 

384
00:16:46,580 --> 00:16:48,470
greater lethality on the modern 

385
00:16:48,480 --> 00:16:52,010
battlefield . Simply said it allows 

386
00:16:52,010 --> 00:16:54,340
program managers and contracting 

387
00:16:54,340 --> 00:16:56,700
officers multiple ways to field 

388
00:16:56,700 --> 00:16:59,600
capability much faster . That's what 

389
00:16:59,600 --> 00:17:02,650
our job is . On September 8 

390
00:17:02,660 --> 00:17:06,470
2020 Deputy Secretary of Defense David 

391
00:17:06,470 --> 00:17:09,840
Norquist signed into effect D . O . D . 

392
00:17:09,840 --> 00:17:13,320
Directive 5000.1 The Defense 

393
00:17:13,330 --> 00:17:16,670
Acquisition System . This overhaul is 

394
00:17:16,670 --> 00:17:19,170
the most transformational change toe 

395
00:17:19,180 --> 00:17:22,370
acquisition policy in years . In fact , 

396
00:17:22,380 --> 00:17:25,550
in decades and an effort that we have 

397
00:17:25,940 --> 00:17:29,160
expectations toe have a long lasting 

398
00:17:29,160 --> 00:17:31,990
positive effect . The acquisition 

399
00:17:31,990 --> 00:17:34,380
policy rewrite includes D O D . 

400
00:17:34,380 --> 00:17:36,640
Instructions for each acquisition 

401
00:17:36,640 --> 00:17:40,190
pathway and functional area . These 

402
00:17:40,190 --> 00:17:42,410
subordinate functional areas are 

403
00:17:42,420 --> 00:17:45,120
engineering test and evaluation , 

404
00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:47,850
analysis of alternatives , cost 

405
00:17:47,850 --> 00:17:50,820
estimate . Tech and program protection , 

406
00:17:50,830 --> 00:17:53,970
human systems integration , information 

407
00:17:53,970 --> 00:17:56,320
technology and our newest functional 

408
00:17:56,320 --> 00:17:58,810
areas . Acquisition , intelligence , 

409
00:17:58,820 --> 00:18:01,770
intellectual property and cybersecurity . 

410
00:18:02,240 --> 00:18:04,440
Before closing , I'd like to take a 

411
00:18:04,440 --> 00:18:06,590
moment to discuss our ongoing 

412
00:18:06,590 --> 00:18:09,330
cybersecurity efforts to ensure 

413
00:18:09,330 --> 00:18:12,420
cybersecurity is also foundational for 

414
00:18:12,420 --> 00:18:14,310
our partners in industry . The 

415
00:18:14,310 --> 00:18:17,000
department created the cybersecurity 

416
00:18:17,010 --> 00:18:20,070
maturity model certification or C M . M . 

417
00:18:20,070 --> 00:18:23,460
C . See . MMC is a scalable , 

418
00:18:23,530 --> 00:18:26,720
auditable and repeatable cybersecurity . 

419
00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:29,900
Standard industry partners will be 

420
00:18:29,900 --> 00:18:32,240
required to obtain depending on the 

421
00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:34,730
level of cybersecurity required in a 

422
00:18:34,730 --> 00:18:37,260
specific contract . This morning , the 

423
00:18:37,260 --> 00:18:39,100
cybersecurity maturity model 

424
00:18:39,100 --> 00:18:42,660
certification Defar Rule was posted on 

425
00:18:42,660 --> 00:18:45,030
the U . S . Federal registry As an 

426
00:18:45,040 --> 00:18:47,230
interim rule , the public will be 

427
00:18:47,230 --> 00:18:49,452
allowed to make comment on the rule for 

428
00:18:49,452 --> 00:18:51,960
60 days . At the end of the 60 day 

429
00:18:51,960 --> 00:18:54,770
period , the rule will go into effect , 

430
00:18:55,140 --> 00:18:58,260
thereby requiring all D o D contracts 

431
00:18:58,270 --> 00:19:01,830
by October 21 2025 

432
00:19:01,840 --> 00:19:05,070
5 years from now . Toe have some level 

433
00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:08,380
of CMM see in them in each of those 

434
00:19:08,380 --> 00:19:11,050
contracts . Katie Arrington , our chief 

435
00:19:11,060 --> 00:19:13,400
information security officer , will be 

436
00:19:13,400 --> 00:19:15,567
speaking to you all later this morning 

437
00:19:15,567 --> 00:19:18,340
regarding the C M M C accreditations , 

438
00:19:18,350 --> 00:19:20,600
the phase rollout and the current 

439
00:19:20,600 --> 00:19:22,840
status . With that , I want to thank 

440
00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:25,320
you for the opportunity to speak today . 

441
00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:27,320
And I'll turn it back over to you , 

442
00:19:27,320 --> 00:19:29,376
Mike , for Q and A thank you again . 

443
00:19:35,040 --> 00:19:37,151
Thank you , ma'am . Have time for one 

444
00:19:37,151 --> 00:19:39,890
question . Onda , looking at the 

445
00:19:39,900 --> 00:19:42,067
question period in the chat here , the 

446
00:19:42,067 --> 00:19:44,360
see level related to co vid and our 

447
00:19:44,360 --> 00:19:46,980
engagement global particles . Given the 

448
00:19:46,990 --> 00:19:49,290
increasingly global supply chain . So 

449
00:19:49,290 --> 00:19:51,234
one of you could talk a little bit 

450
00:19:51,234 --> 00:19:54,050
about what DNS did to help address even 

451
00:19:54,050 --> 00:19:56,050
sure minimize disruptions in global 

452
00:19:56,050 --> 00:19:58,106
supply chains and our thoughts Maybe 

453
00:19:58,106 --> 00:20:00,161
going forward , how critical that is 

454
00:20:00,161 --> 00:20:02,640
work together . Absolutely . We 

455
00:20:02,650 --> 00:20:04,440
actually extended what we did 

456
00:20:04,440 --> 00:20:07,080
domestically in the US , um , to our 

457
00:20:07,090 --> 00:20:09,290
international partners . So in other 

458
00:20:09,290 --> 00:20:12,980
words , when we had problems with our 

459
00:20:12,980 --> 00:20:16,570
supply chain that extended ATO multiple 

460
00:20:16,570 --> 00:20:19,240
countries where I would call our 

461
00:20:19,250 --> 00:20:22,410
embassies talkto our ambassadors get 

462
00:20:22,410 --> 00:20:24,930
their help to release products , the 

463
00:20:24,930 --> 00:20:27,250
same thing happened with many of our 

464
00:20:27,250 --> 00:20:30,170
national armaments directors calling us 

465
00:20:30,180 --> 00:20:32,980
be it about defense , industrial based 

466
00:20:32,980 --> 00:20:35,036
goods that needed to flow into their 

467
00:20:35,036 --> 00:20:36,980
countries or whether it be medical 

468
00:20:36,980 --> 00:20:39,910
supplies that needed toe flow in . So 

469
00:20:39,910 --> 00:20:41,840
the fact that we had personal 

470
00:20:41,840 --> 00:20:44,350
relationships that we work together , 

471
00:20:44,360 --> 00:20:47,470
we were allowed to go in and really 

472
00:20:47,470 --> 00:20:49,980
unstick , um , some of those parts that 

473
00:20:49,980 --> 00:20:51,980
were stuck in the flow . So I think 

474
00:20:51,980 --> 00:20:54,091
it's really a great example of how we 

475
00:20:54,091 --> 00:20:56,202
leverage the infrastructure we have , 

476
00:20:56,202 --> 00:20:58,360
how we all meet and talk about our 

477
00:20:58,360 --> 00:21:00,670
common problems and how we can lean 

478
00:21:00,670 --> 00:21:02,614
forward to help one another said , 

479
00:21:02,614 --> 00:21:03,837
thank you very much . 

480
00:21:07,540 --> 00:21:09,651
Thank you , ma'am . And I know you're 

481
00:21:09,651 --> 00:21:11,984
scheduled to have a hard stop right now , 

482
00:21:11,984 --> 00:21:13,873
but I would like to thank you for 

483
00:21:13,873 --> 00:21:15,929
joining us kicking off the session . 

484
00:21:15,929 --> 00:21:17,762
And I will turn over to Lowes to 

485
00:21:17,762 --> 00:21:19,762
introduce a Sir Simon . Thank you , 

486
00:21:19,762 --> 00:21:19,560
ma'am . Thank you 

487
00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:30,630
blanks Mike and a really fascinating 

488
00:21:30,640 --> 00:21:33,060
opening speech by Under Secretary Lord , 

489
00:21:33,540 --> 00:21:35,651
and it's now my turn to introduce the 

490
00:21:35,651 --> 00:21:38,900
second of our keynote speak speeches on 

491
00:21:38,900 --> 00:21:41,210
It's My absolute Pleasure to introduce 

492
00:21:41,210 --> 00:21:44,300
to use his Simon Bollen . So Simon was 

493
00:21:44,300 --> 00:21:46,670
appointed chief executive officer in 

494
00:21:46,670 --> 00:21:48,559
the Defense Equipment and Support 

495
00:21:48,559 --> 00:21:51,570
Organization in the U . K in May 2018 . 

496
00:21:52,140 --> 00:21:53,973
In this role , he is the U . K s 

497
00:21:53,973 --> 00:21:56,770
national armaments director on As the 

498
00:21:56,770 --> 00:21:59,550
accounting officer for D Unis , he is 

499
00:21:59,550 --> 00:22:02,020
directly responsible to UK Parliament 

500
00:22:02,180 --> 00:22:04,069
for the stewardship of the unions 

501
00:22:04,069 --> 00:22:07,240
resources he served in . The ref is an 

502
00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:11,020
engineering officer for 35 years on his 

503
00:22:11,030 --> 00:22:13,160
final appointment was as chief off 

504
00:22:13,160 --> 00:22:17,070
material , Air Indiana's and also the 

505
00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:20,550
refs . Chief engineer on the R F board . 

506
00:22:21,780 --> 00:22:23,900
He retired from the R F in 20 April 

507
00:22:23,900 --> 00:22:27,330
2016 . He was appointed as companion of 

508
00:22:27,330 --> 00:22:29,441
the most Honorable Order of the Order 

509
00:22:29,441 --> 00:22:32,760
of Bath . In 2011 he became a fellow 

510
00:22:32,770 --> 00:22:34,992
off the Royal Academy of Engineering in 

511
00:22:34,992 --> 00:22:37,880
2012 On was made a knight commander in 

512
00:22:37,880 --> 00:22:40,860
Her Majesty the Queen 2016 New Year's 

513
00:22:40,860 --> 00:22:44,190
honest fist , Sir Simon , a very warm 

514
00:22:44,190 --> 00:22:46,357
welcome . And could I now hand over to 

515
00:22:46,357 --> 00:22:48,412
you for your keynote address . Thank 

516
00:22:48,412 --> 00:22:52,240
you . So good morning to you and Good 

517
00:22:52,240 --> 00:22:54,720
afternoon , Thio . All those of us , uh , 

518
00:22:54,730 --> 00:22:57,540
darling in from Europe , a great 

519
00:22:57,540 --> 00:23:00,060
pleasure Thio be at this prestigious 

520
00:23:00,060 --> 00:23:03,320
conference on duh to be able to provide 

521
00:23:03,330 --> 00:23:06,130
one of the keynote addresses . So the 

522
00:23:06,130 --> 00:23:08,860
thing for me is about agile procurement , 

523
00:23:09,440 --> 00:23:13,280
and it almost goes without saying that 

524
00:23:13,640 --> 00:23:17,060
we live in turbulent on uncertain times . 

525
00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:20,660
Although , I say almost because I see 

526
00:23:20,660 --> 00:23:23,690
quite a lot of the same behaviors that 

527
00:23:23,690 --> 00:23:25,857
does not acknowledge the radical shift 

528
00:23:25,857 --> 00:23:28,650
of thinking that is may be required to 

529
00:23:28,650 --> 00:23:32,010
tackle the issue of becoming mawr agile 

530
00:23:32,020 --> 00:23:34,680
and getting ahead of the threat . The 

531
00:23:34,680 --> 00:23:36,791
strategic landscape we find ourselves 

532
00:23:36,791 --> 00:23:39,270
in Today it's multi dimensional and 

533
00:23:39,270 --> 00:23:42,070
intersected with levels of complexity 

534
00:23:42,080 --> 00:23:44,940
and challenge that would have been 

535
00:23:44,940 --> 00:23:46,770
thought unprecedented , not 

536
00:23:46,770 --> 00:23:49,880
contemplated a generation ago . The 

537
00:23:49,880 --> 00:23:52,540
increasing globalization , the growth 

538
00:23:52,550 --> 00:23:55,040
in global population on the 

539
00:23:55,040 --> 00:23:57,760
corresponding depletion of natural 

540
00:23:57,760 --> 00:24:00,040
resources , coupled with the speed of 

541
00:24:00,040 --> 00:24:03,450
technology logical advancement have led 

542
00:24:03,450 --> 00:24:05,500
to states having significantly less 

543
00:24:05,500 --> 00:24:08,730
time to plan for and to respond to 

544
00:24:08,730 --> 00:24:11,640
global and regional events that emerged 

545
00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:14,680
rapidly . We've seen this firsthand in 

546
00:24:14,680 --> 00:24:17,630
the widespread on devastating effects 

547
00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:21,140
of CVI 19 defense faces the 

548
00:24:21,140 --> 00:24:23,890
same diverse challenges for national 

549
00:24:23,900 --> 00:24:26,710
and international security . We're now 

550
00:24:26,710 --> 00:24:29,420
seeing the resurgence of state on state 

551
00:24:29,420 --> 00:24:31,840
competition on state sponsored 

552
00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:34,290
terrorist attacks , including the use 

553
00:24:34,290 --> 00:24:37,270
of proxies and cyberattacks Azaz . Well 

554
00:24:37,270 --> 00:24:39,640
as a continued proliferation of 

555
00:24:39,640 --> 00:24:42,750
extremist non state actors such as 

556
00:24:42,750 --> 00:24:46,610
terrorists on organized crime , the bar 

557
00:24:46,610 --> 00:24:49,020
spectrum of actors is likely to develop 

558
00:24:49,030 --> 00:24:52,740
ever higher levels of leaf ality to 

559
00:24:52,740 --> 00:24:55,020
counter our protection systems and 

560
00:24:55,020 --> 00:24:57,390
target our forces across multiple 

561
00:24:57,390 --> 00:25:00,840
domains , they'll increasingly use 

562
00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:04,010
innovative architects , then exploit 

563
00:25:04,020 --> 00:25:05,870
our inherent vulnerabilities , 

564
00:25:06,150 --> 00:25:09,280
including any institutional inertia . 

565
00:25:10,440 --> 00:25:13,130
Indeed , as technology changes continue 

566
00:25:13,130 --> 00:25:16,260
to accelerate , it underpins the need 

567
00:25:16,270 --> 00:25:20,170
for a shift off thinking . So the 

568
00:25:20,170 --> 00:25:22,440
UK is in the midst of an integrated 

569
00:25:22,440 --> 00:25:25,740
review . The Integrated Review , its 

570
00:25:25,740 --> 00:25:28,210
associated spending , A review on the 

571
00:25:28,210 --> 00:25:30,560
defense and security industrial 

572
00:25:30,560 --> 00:25:34,010
strategy is that Mr Most radical 

573
00:25:34,020 --> 00:25:37,360
review of Britain's foreign Security 

574
00:25:37,370 --> 00:25:41,340
defense on development policy since the 

575
00:25:41,340 --> 00:25:45,150
end off the Cold War ? This is a unique 

576
00:25:45,150 --> 00:25:47,040
moment for defense to evolve , to 

577
00:25:47,050 --> 00:25:49,730
outmatch future threats and to set the 

578
00:25:49,740 --> 00:25:52,670
direction for defense for years to come . 

579
00:25:53,440 --> 00:25:57,370
We misuse allocated funding better 

580
00:25:57,840 --> 00:26:00,930
undertake a technology logical upgrade 

581
00:26:00,940 --> 00:26:04,310
about national security capabilities so 

582
00:26:04,310 --> 00:26:06,180
that we could be ahead of future 

583
00:26:06,180 --> 00:26:09,310
adversaries on development integrated 

584
00:26:09,320 --> 00:26:12,250
on interoperable plan for all forces 

585
00:26:12,260 --> 00:26:16,060
engaged in security . To 

586
00:26:16,060 --> 00:26:19,050
that end , we've got to understand what 

587
00:26:19,050 --> 00:26:22,150
our future capability must be now on 

588
00:26:22,150 --> 00:26:25,000
identify equipment and capabilities 

589
00:26:25,110 --> 00:26:27,760
that require upgrading or replacing 

590
00:26:27,770 --> 00:26:31,720
before they become obsolete . None of 

591
00:26:31,720 --> 00:26:35,010
this is new . All of my NATO colleagues 

592
00:26:35,020 --> 00:26:36,680
are probably making similar 

593
00:26:36,690 --> 00:26:39,200
observations and seeking to move 

594
00:26:39,200 --> 00:26:42,610
forward towards embracing innovative on 

595
00:26:42,610 --> 00:26:45,520
agile procurement in order to deliver 

596
00:26:45,520 --> 00:26:48,370
this . But equally , we've got to 

597
00:26:48,370 --> 00:26:51,150
acknowledge the parole , your challenge 

598
00:26:51,160 --> 00:26:53,450
that his government service , what he 

599
00:26:53,450 --> 00:26:55,520
will not be able to move at the same 

600
00:26:55,520 --> 00:26:57,650
pace as a digital starts up , for 

601
00:26:57,650 --> 00:27:00,490
instance . And we all have to manage a 

602
00:27:00,490 --> 00:27:02,560
balance between the need for riel 

603
00:27:02,560 --> 00:27:05,220
entrepreneurial spirit on the need for 

604
00:27:05,220 --> 00:27:07,164
prudence and committing government 

605
00:27:07,164 --> 00:27:10,390
money . However , there's a recognition 

606
00:27:10,480 --> 00:27:12,760
that acquisition decision making 

607
00:27:12,770 --> 00:27:15,620
processes commercial policy on 

608
00:27:15,620 --> 00:27:18,630
industrial relationships must evolve to 

609
00:27:18,630 --> 00:27:21,430
keep pace with rapid technological 

610
00:27:21,430 --> 00:27:23,970
innovation . On global strategic 

611
00:27:23,970 --> 00:27:26,560
threats across aled domains . 

612
00:27:28,540 --> 00:27:30,651
In our quest to be able to combat new 

613
00:27:30,651 --> 00:27:32,818
threats and to keep pace with evolving 

614
00:27:32,818 --> 00:27:35,040
technology , it's clear that we need to 

615
00:27:35,040 --> 00:27:37,096
speed up our procurement timelines . 

616
00:27:37,340 --> 00:27:39,910
Question is how , because I've already 

617
00:27:39,910 --> 00:27:42,610
alluded Thio Innovation is key on 

618
00:27:42,620 --> 00:27:45,310
innovation is so much about changing 

619
00:27:45,310 --> 00:27:48,220
mindsets as it is about developing the 

620
00:27:48,220 --> 00:27:51,550
Kit Defense Innovation 

621
00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:54,460
Priorities Document noted that 

622
00:27:54,470 --> 00:27:56,600
innovative behaviors must be 

623
00:27:56,600 --> 00:27:59,330
incentivized within the M . O . D . On 

624
00:27:59,330 --> 00:28:02,090
there must be a willingness , indeed , 

625
00:28:02,090 --> 00:28:05,780
expectation , to accept risk on 

626
00:28:05,780 --> 00:28:08,590
responsibility across the enterprise on 

627
00:28:08,590 --> 00:28:12,570
into DNS defense equipment support 

628
00:28:12,860 --> 00:28:14,710
we have committed to embracing 

629
00:28:14,710 --> 00:28:16,770
innovation . It's what we've done 

630
00:28:16,770 --> 00:28:19,700
successfully over many years to deliver 

631
00:28:19,710 --> 00:28:22,410
urgent operational requirements . It's 

632
00:28:22,410 --> 00:28:25,030
what we've done recently in support of 

633
00:28:25,030 --> 00:28:28,770
wider government with ppd procurement 

634
00:28:28,780 --> 00:28:31,390
on ventilator innovation , which I'll 

635
00:28:31,390 --> 00:28:33,960
talk about MAWR later on . In this 

636
00:28:33,960 --> 00:28:36,750
presentation , I've recently 

637
00:28:36,750 --> 00:28:38,972
established a small future capabilities 

638
00:28:38,972 --> 00:28:41,400
group toe identify on exploit 

639
00:28:41,410 --> 00:28:43,440
innovative solutions to defense 

640
00:28:43,440 --> 00:28:46,280
requirements . But more widely , we've 

641
00:28:46,280 --> 00:28:49,760
invested a significant amount into new 

642
00:28:49,770 --> 00:28:51,970
technologies Viable Defense Innovation 

643
00:28:51,970 --> 00:28:54,890
Fund to shape our future capabilities 

644
00:28:55,020 --> 00:28:57,850
from a bottom up approach , endeavoring 

645
00:28:57,970 --> 00:29:00,720
to instill a culture of innovation 

646
00:29:00,730 --> 00:29:03,740
within the defense enterprise , the M . 

647
00:29:03,740 --> 00:29:05,962
O . D is looking to engage more closely 

648
00:29:05,962 --> 00:29:08,490
with defense contracts and to broaden 

649
00:29:08,490 --> 00:29:11,730
the Net to interface with SMEs and 

650
00:29:11,730 --> 00:29:14,690
startups . Delivery agents and front 

651
00:29:14,690 --> 00:29:17,680
line users will be more joined up on 

652
00:29:17,680 --> 00:29:20,140
our warfighters more closely involved 

653
00:29:20,140 --> 00:29:22,920
in technology experimentation at the 

654
00:29:22,930 --> 00:29:26,380
free concept face so two recent 

655
00:29:26,390 --> 00:29:28,960
examples of deeds engagement with 

656
00:29:28,960 --> 00:29:31,220
industry on the user to find out 

657
00:29:31,220 --> 00:29:34,050
innovations to threats on the resultant 

658
00:29:34,060 --> 00:29:36,930
effect on procurement . Firstly , I'd 

659
00:29:36,930 --> 00:29:39,152
start with my Future Capability Group , 

660
00:29:39,152 --> 00:29:41,940
which is spearheaded a counter US 

661
00:29:41,940 --> 00:29:44,700
program to protect UK air bases on 

662
00:29:44,700 --> 00:29:48,060
civilian transport hubs . The county US 

663
00:29:48,060 --> 00:29:50,090
programs have established a rapid 

664
00:29:50,100 --> 00:29:52,550
innovation cell , which is defined an 

665
00:29:52,560 --> 00:29:54,700
open architecture er , a message 

666
00:29:54,700 --> 00:29:57,510
exchange format , enabling seamless 

667
00:29:57,510 --> 00:30:00,350
integration of coat components from a 

668
00:30:00,350 --> 00:30:03,980
variety of supplies . This , in turn , 

669
00:30:03,980 --> 00:30:06,200
will support spiral development to 

670
00:30:06,200 --> 00:30:08,810
evolve the capability as the threat 

671
00:30:08,810 --> 00:30:11,630
evolves , a vital component for our 

672
00:30:11,640 --> 00:30:14,610
platforms going forward . My second 

673
00:30:14,610 --> 00:30:17,620
example is the by and trying its scale 

674
00:30:17,630 --> 00:30:20,530
case . Study on this is a new , agile 

675
00:30:20,530 --> 00:30:23,180
commercial model to rapidly by an 

676
00:30:23,180 --> 00:30:26,200
experiment with novel technology in the 

677
00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:28,760
hands of the users . The future 

678
00:30:28,760 --> 00:30:31,860
capability Greek have piloted bats in 

679
00:30:31,860 --> 00:30:35,160
delivering the NATO , the Army Man Oh , 

680
00:30:35,170 --> 00:30:38,390
a systems transformation project , not 

681
00:30:38,390 --> 00:30:40,980
an easy acronym . This has resulted in 

682
00:30:40,980 --> 00:30:44,040
buying 120 systems and testing in the 

683
00:30:44,040 --> 00:30:46,010
hands of the user nine different 

684
00:30:46,010 --> 00:30:48,920
products in three months . So as I see 

685
00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:51,580
it , the benefits of bats are that it 

686
00:30:51,580 --> 00:30:54,790
improves technology exploitation by 

687
00:30:54,790 --> 00:30:58,280
using an Najar route to market . The 

688
00:30:58,280 --> 00:31:02,100
simple framework contract creates a 

689
00:31:02,100 --> 00:31:04,440
broad collaborative community of 

690
00:31:04,440 --> 00:31:07,590
interest with industry , stimulating 

691
00:31:07,590 --> 00:31:10,710
the market and maximizing exploitation 

692
00:31:10,710 --> 00:31:13,410
opportunities of nondefense market 

693
00:31:13,410 --> 00:31:17,410
suppliers . The spiral experimentation 

694
00:31:17,420 --> 00:31:20,290
approach enables multiple products to 

695
00:31:20,290 --> 00:31:23,230
be tested in the hands of the user to 

696
00:31:23,240 --> 00:31:26,090
iterate on refine the requirement , 

697
00:31:26,100 --> 00:31:28,560
ensuring the customer achieves the 

698
00:31:28,560 --> 00:31:31,670
optimal capability . And finally , 

699
00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:35,200
future procurement timelines reduce as 

700
00:31:35,210 --> 00:31:38,090
industry are involved in developing the 

701
00:31:38,090 --> 00:31:41,250
requirements . So as we continue to 

702
00:31:41,250 --> 00:31:43,880
develop our technologies , we've got to 

703
00:31:43,880 --> 00:31:46,670
do so with interoperability in mind , 

704
00:31:47,140 --> 00:31:49,220
ensuring that our armed forces can 

705
00:31:49,220 --> 00:31:51,220
fight with our allies and coalition 

706
00:31:51,220 --> 00:31:55,150
partners seamlessly . We must also look 

707
00:31:55,160 --> 00:31:57,990
at our innovation enablers , including 

708
00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:00,560
the advantage of digital technologies . 

709
00:32:02,340 --> 00:32:05,070
We must identify and exploit how these 

710
00:32:05,070 --> 00:32:08,500
can change processes to tailor approval . 

711
00:32:08,500 --> 00:32:11,310
Roots make the extra position system 

712
00:32:11,310 --> 00:32:13,890
cheaper , shortened decision making 

713
00:32:13,900 --> 00:32:17,200
reduce program length on Dr Greater 

714
00:32:17,210 --> 00:32:19,830
productivity without compromising 

715
00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:23,580
safety . So let me turn to 

716
00:32:23,580 --> 00:32:27,440
co vid Onda from the outset . Three 

717
00:32:27,440 --> 00:32:31,270
UK government's coded 19 response M . O . 

718
00:32:31,270 --> 00:32:33,980
D . Worked with our supplies to support 

719
00:32:33,980 --> 00:32:36,360
the defense industry right through the 

720
00:32:36,360 --> 00:32:38,900
supply chain , especially the SMEs , 

721
00:32:38,910 --> 00:32:41,370
which produced some considerable 

722
00:32:41,370 --> 00:32:43,592
success , is in supporting our national 

723
00:32:43,592 --> 00:32:46,150
efforts . One of The main lessons we 

724
00:32:46,150 --> 00:32:49,020
identified was that defense can adapt 

725
00:32:49,030 --> 00:32:50,974
to these difficult and challenging 

726
00:32:50,974 --> 00:32:53,030
circumstances . We've proved that we 

727
00:32:53,030 --> 00:32:55,460
can operate remotely and still deliver 

728
00:32:55,470 --> 00:32:57,740
on our existing promises and even on 

729
00:32:57,740 --> 00:32:59,851
new priorities that we could not have 

730
00:32:59,851 --> 00:33:02,930
predicted . It's a team game on . The 

731
00:33:02,930 --> 00:33:05,050
crisis has brought defense closer 

732
00:33:05,050 --> 00:33:08,440
together in pursuit of our shared goals 

733
00:33:08,450 --> 00:33:10,960
across government . The skill sets 

734
00:33:10,960 --> 00:33:13,510
precision on expertise that were in 

735
00:33:13,510 --> 00:33:15,580
evidence on projects like Our 

736
00:33:15,580 --> 00:33:17,610
Ventilator Challenge show how 

737
00:33:17,610 --> 00:33:20,530
effectively deep defense experts can 

738
00:33:20,530 --> 00:33:23,070
work together to come up with 

739
00:33:23,080 --> 00:33:24,980
innovative solutions to defense 

740
00:33:24,980 --> 00:33:28,160
requirements . They also provide us 

741
00:33:28,160 --> 00:33:30,160
with insight into the health of our 

742
00:33:30,160 --> 00:33:32,870
supply chain . There's been widespread 

743
00:33:32,870 --> 00:33:36,190
market volatility considering Kobe 

744
00:33:36,190 --> 00:33:39,160
19 but we're in regular discussion with 

745
00:33:39,170 --> 00:33:41,270
all of our strategic suppliers to 

746
00:33:41,270 --> 00:33:44,230
monitor their performance on financial 

747
00:33:44,230 --> 00:33:46,420
health , and this is something that we 

748
00:33:46,420 --> 00:33:49,450
will carry forward into a normal 

749
00:33:49,450 --> 00:33:51,840
business . We take the health the 

750
00:33:51,840 --> 00:33:53,910
resilience of supply chains very 

751
00:33:53,910 --> 00:33:56,460
seriously , and we have dedicated 

752
00:33:56,460 --> 00:33:59,640
supply chain risk and impact processes , 

753
00:33:59,650 --> 00:34:02,510
which include a supply chain impact 

754
00:34:02,510 --> 00:34:05,650
working group on an M o d wide supply 

755
00:34:05,650 --> 00:34:08,770
fragility monitoring team . We work 

756
00:34:08,770 --> 00:34:10,992
across government to share intelligence 

757
00:34:10,992 --> 00:34:12,930
and data on to make decisions 

758
00:34:12,930 --> 00:34:16,500
accordingly So while the defense supply 

759
00:34:16,500 --> 00:34:18,910
chain is facing challenges , it's 

760
00:34:18,910 --> 00:34:21,200
adapting to mitigate the worst impacts . 

761
00:34:21,200 --> 00:34:23,940
Wherever possible , these lessons will 

762
00:34:23,950 --> 00:34:26,140
add value to the M . O . D . Going 

763
00:34:26,140 --> 00:34:28,980
forward , assisting in identifying how 

764
00:34:28,980 --> 00:34:31,470
we can enhance our strategic approach 

765
00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:33,730
to ensuring the competitive , 

766
00:34:33,740 --> 00:34:37,190
innovative on world class defense . I'd 

767
00:34:37,190 --> 00:34:39,560
like to finish up by talking about a 

768
00:34:39,560 --> 00:34:42,110
couple of key programs that we've been 

769
00:34:42,110 --> 00:34:44,480
working on in the UK alongside 

770
00:34:44,490 --> 00:34:47,150
international partners and looking at 

771
00:34:47,150 --> 00:34:50,120
our ability to work innovatively while 

772
00:34:50,130 --> 00:34:53,730
ensuring interoperability . So , taking 

773
00:34:53,730 --> 00:34:57,320
a cue from the U . S s work on robotics 

774
00:34:57,330 --> 00:34:59,900
on autonomous systems , several of our 

775
00:34:59,900 --> 00:35:02,122
services , including the British Army , 

776
00:35:02,122 --> 00:35:04,650
have launched experimentation programs 

777
00:35:04,660 --> 00:35:06,950
to inform future concepts . 

778
00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:10,170
Organizations on record on requirements , 

779
00:35:10,840 --> 00:35:12,840
the Army warfighting experiment , 

780
00:35:12,840 --> 00:35:15,610
Siri's has been ongoing for the last 10 

781
00:35:15,610 --> 00:35:18,020
years . It has consistently delivered 

782
00:35:18,020 --> 00:35:20,240
high quality evidence for the Army and 

783
00:35:20,240 --> 00:35:22,370
invaluable military feedback to 

784
00:35:22,370 --> 00:35:26,110
industry . A W E 18 code 

785
00:35:26,110 --> 00:35:28,930
named Autonomous Warrior saw more than 

786
00:35:28,930 --> 00:35:31,970
50 companies from large primes to one 

787
00:35:31,970 --> 00:35:34,930
man garden shed innovators engage the 

788
00:35:34,930 --> 00:35:37,520
defense equipment and support in a bid 

789
00:35:37,520 --> 00:35:40,200
to secure opportunity to showcase their 

790
00:35:40,200 --> 00:35:44,020
products to the military . A W 20 

791
00:35:44,220 --> 00:35:47,390
will surpass that both in scale on 

792
00:35:47,390 --> 00:35:49,920
level of industry engagement , focusing 

793
00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:52,380
on command , control and communications 

794
00:35:52,380 --> 00:35:55,730
systems in a maritime domain . We're 

795
00:35:55,730 --> 00:35:58,250
looking to exploit advances in 

796
00:35:58,260 --> 00:36:01,460
automation with our European partners . 

797
00:36:04,330 --> 00:36:06,390
In an alliance with palace and 

798
00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:09,550
cooperation with BAE Systems , 

799
00:36:10,330 --> 00:36:13,900
a car awarded Tallis a contract for the 

800
00:36:13,900 --> 00:36:17,350
Maritime Mine Countermeasures Program , 

801
00:36:17,630 --> 00:36:20,180
which developed a prototype autonomous 

802
00:36:20,180 --> 00:36:23,020
system for detection and neutralization , 

803
00:36:23,030 --> 00:36:26,980
a seal lines and underwater IEDs . This 

804
00:36:26,980 --> 00:36:29,360
program is designed to be adaptable in 

805
00:36:29,360 --> 00:36:31,980
order to exploit rapid learning and to 

806
00:36:31,980 --> 00:36:34,310
keep pace with future technological 

807
00:36:34,310 --> 00:36:37,030
development by providing a route for 

808
00:36:37,030 --> 00:36:40,310
subsystem update on replacement into an 

809
00:36:40,310 --> 00:36:43,420
evolving system . Architectural Now 

810
00:36:43,420 --> 00:36:46,160
critically , the Royal Navy will use 

811
00:36:46,160 --> 00:36:48,780
the opportunity presented by putting 

812
00:36:48,780 --> 00:36:51,030
the capability into the hands of the 

813
00:36:51,030 --> 00:36:54,030
operator well , in advance of the main 

814
00:36:54,040 --> 00:36:57,540
investment decision . MM CM 

815
00:36:57,540 --> 00:36:59,940
production systems will be deployed in 

816
00:36:59,940 --> 00:37:03,840
the UK and in the Gulf from 2023 for 

817
00:37:03,840 --> 00:37:07,630
this purpose . So to conclude uncertain 

818
00:37:07,630 --> 00:37:10,690
world on a great opportunity to engage 

819
00:37:10,690 --> 00:37:12,910
with technology differently , get 

820
00:37:12,910 --> 00:37:15,330
capability into the hands off the 

821
00:37:15,330 --> 00:37:18,020
warfighter early . No , it's actually 

822
00:37:25,330 --> 00:37:27,552
thank you very much . Assignment . That 

823
00:37:27,552 --> 00:37:29,774
was really excellent . Are you going to 

824
00:37:29,774 --> 00:37:31,997
stay on for the next session , which is 

825
00:37:31,997 --> 00:37:34,219
a fireside chat with Mr Greg cows now , 

826
00:37:34,219 --> 00:37:36,470
So , uh , to move quickly on . And 

827
00:37:36,470 --> 00:37:38,470
without further ado , I'll hand you 

828
00:37:38,470 --> 00:37:40,692
over to the moderator . Possession . My 

829
00:37:40,692 --> 00:37:43,100
boss , Mr Edward Ferguson . Minister , 

830
00:37:43,100 --> 00:37:44,970
Counselor Defense in the British 

831
00:37:44,970 --> 00:37:46,803
Embassy . Over to you , Edward . 

832
00:37:53,730 --> 00:37:55,897
Brilliant . I think I could see myself 

833
00:37:55,897 --> 00:37:58,008
so hopefully you can all see and hear 

834
00:37:58,008 --> 00:38:00,360
me , Aziz . Well , good morning to 

835
00:38:00,360 --> 00:38:02,416
everyone in the United States . Good 

836
00:38:02,416 --> 00:38:04,582
afternoon to everyone elsewhere in the 

837
00:38:04,582 --> 00:38:06,804
world . I'm really delighted to be part 

838
00:38:06,804 --> 00:38:09,027
of conduct this year . I took part last 

839
00:38:09,027 --> 00:38:11,193
year as well on this huge impressed by 

840
00:38:11,193 --> 00:38:13,138
it on Thank you , everyone for for 

841
00:38:13,138 --> 00:38:15,249
joining us today is Lois said I'm the 

842
00:38:15,249 --> 00:38:17,360
minister , counselor for defense here 

843
00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:19,638
at the British Embassy in Washington D . 

844
00:38:19,638 --> 00:38:21,416
C . Which means I had the great 

845
00:38:21,416 --> 00:38:23,360
privilege Thio oversee the work of 

846
00:38:23,360 --> 00:38:25,193
about 1000 military and civilian 

847
00:38:25,193 --> 00:38:27,304
personnel right across the U . S . On 

848
00:38:27,304 --> 00:38:29,416
also to try and leave and drive these 

849
00:38:29,416 --> 00:38:31,527
strategic developments of our defense 

850
00:38:31,527 --> 00:38:33,693
relationship with the United States on 

851
00:38:33,693 --> 00:38:33,330
these issues that we're talking about 

852
00:38:33,340 --> 00:38:35,880
over the next few days are absolutely 

853
00:38:35,880 --> 00:38:38,210
central Thio , our strategic priorities 

854
00:38:38,210 --> 00:38:40,550
and our business with the United States . 

855
00:38:40,560 --> 00:38:44,270
Eso I have the delight off leading this 

856
00:38:44,270 --> 00:38:46,492
next session which is the first off our 

857
00:38:46,492 --> 00:38:48,390
fireside chats . Lois has already 

858
00:38:48,390 --> 00:38:50,334
introduced assignment and you just 

859
00:38:50,334 --> 00:38:52,168
heard from him . Eso I will just 

860
00:38:52,168 --> 00:38:54,279
briefly introduce Mr Greg Cab Mr Greg 

861
00:38:54,279 --> 00:38:57,500
Kosner , who is currently the executive 

862
00:38:57,500 --> 00:38:59,910
director for international cooperation 

863
00:38:59,910 --> 00:39:02,132
in the Office of the Undersecretary off 

864
00:39:02,132 --> 00:39:04,340
Sensible Acquisition on sustainment 

865
00:39:04,720 --> 00:39:07,950
before taking on this role . Hey waas 

866
00:39:07,950 --> 00:39:10,061
for three years a deputy , the deputy 

867
00:39:10,061 --> 00:39:11,894
director of the Defense Security 

868
00:39:11,894 --> 00:39:14,220
Cooperation Agency on . Before that , 

869
00:39:14,230 --> 00:39:16,341
Hay was a senior adviser to the under 

870
00:39:16,341 --> 00:39:18,590
secretary of State or arms control and 

871
00:39:18,590 --> 00:39:21,270
international Security before he 

872
00:39:21,270 --> 00:39:23,270
started state Parliament . Hey also 

873
00:39:23,270 --> 00:39:25,381
worked as a senior professional staff 

874
00:39:25,381 --> 00:39:27,548
member on the Senate Foreign Relations 

875
00:39:27,548 --> 00:39:29,714
Committee . Before that was an officer 

876
00:39:29,714 --> 00:39:31,826
in the U . S . Navy piloting F 14 a f 

877
00:39:31,826 --> 00:39:35,300
18 f aircraft on . So we have a new 

878
00:39:35,300 --> 00:39:37,530
individual here who has really done 

879
00:39:37,540 --> 00:39:40,540
done a bit of everything from military 

880
00:39:40,550 --> 00:39:44,300
to Congress to state and D a d . And so 

881
00:39:44,300 --> 00:39:46,411
I'm looking forward , Thio drawing on 

882
00:39:46,411 --> 00:39:48,522
that wide experience . As we get into 

883
00:39:48,522 --> 00:39:50,522
this conversation , I'm planning to 

884
00:39:50,522 --> 00:39:52,689
cover sort of three particular areas , 

885
00:39:52,689 --> 00:39:54,856
many of which already to build on what 

886
00:39:54,856 --> 00:39:54,700
we've just heard from the keynote 

887
00:39:54,700 --> 00:39:57,620
speeches . Uh , looking at over 19 . 

888
00:39:57,620 --> 00:39:59,740
Some of the implications off that 

889
00:39:59,750 --> 00:40:02,430
position . Looking at innovation on R 

890
00:40:02,430 --> 00:40:05,050
and D and looking acquisition reform 

891
00:40:05,050 --> 00:40:06,939
Just a reminder that you can feed 

892
00:40:06,939 --> 00:40:08,717
questions in on . I will try to 

893
00:40:08,717 --> 00:40:10,772
Sprinkle those as we gaze . So we've 

894
00:40:10,772 --> 00:40:12,772
got about just over half an hour on 

895
00:40:12,772 --> 00:40:15,870
Lett's . We make a crack on with that 

896
00:40:15,880 --> 00:40:19,320
on DSO . Starting off with Kobe 19 . We 

897
00:40:19,320 --> 00:40:21,240
just heard from the Lord in that 

898
00:40:21,250 --> 00:40:24,590
excellent keynote speech . A lot about 

899
00:40:24,600 --> 00:40:28,150
sort of close battle with co vid on the 

900
00:40:28,150 --> 00:40:30,270
extraordinary work that has been done 

901
00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:33,850
by departments events Thio support 

902
00:40:33,860 --> 00:40:37,260
permission off tackling the virus 

903
00:40:37,270 --> 00:40:39,640
on strengthening the industrial base To 

904
00:40:39,640 --> 00:40:42,650
cope with it , I'd like just to ask ask . 

905
00:40:42,660 --> 00:40:44,827
Uh , Greg has decided to look a little 

906
00:40:44,827 --> 00:40:46,938
bit further ahead and perhaps give us 

907
00:40:46,938 --> 00:40:49,104
some thoughts on at the Impact Cove in 

908
00:40:49,104 --> 00:40:51,490
19 on acquisition in the medium term 

909
00:40:51,490 --> 00:40:53,657
over the next five years . What do you 

910
00:40:53,657 --> 00:40:55,712
think of the longer term impacts and 

911
00:40:55,712 --> 00:40:57,823
how are you factoring those into your 

912
00:40:57,823 --> 00:40:59,934
decision making ? Looking ahead . And 

913
00:40:59,934 --> 00:40:59,590
can we start with Greg on this 

914
00:40:59,590 --> 00:41:00,590
something 

915
00:41:03,910 --> 00:41:05,688
Thanks , Edward , for that kind 

916
00:41:05,688 --> 00:41:08,010
introduction , it's a great honor to be 

917
00:41:08,020 --> 00:41:10,131
ah , part of this discussion with Sir 

918
00:41:10,131 --> 00:41:13,620
Simon . Um , thank you for the first 

919
00:41:13,620 --> 00:41:16,210
question . A zit relates toe 

920
00:41:16,220 --> 00:41:19,770
programmatic impacts of cove It , to be 

921
00:41:19,770 --> 00:41:22,240
very blunt . Were still assessing those 

922
00:41:22,240 --> 00:41:26,130
impacts were doing so with the 

923
00:41:26,130 --> 00:41:29,820
scalpel trying Thio understand 

924
00:41:29,830 --> 00:41:31,830
what the short , medium , long term 

925
00:41:31,830 --> 00:41:35,050
consequences are and then appropriately 

926
00:41:35,060 --> 00:41:37,750
reorienting the department's efforts 

927
00:41:37,760 --> 00:41:41,530
through a broad range of of exercises 

928
00:41:41,540 --> 00:41:44,280
to respond accordingly . I wanna anchor 

929
00:41:44,280 --> 00:41:46,530
a little bit on my part of that 

930
00:41:46,530 --> 00:41:48,641
equation or my office is part of that 

931
00:41:48,641 --> 00:41:50,197
equation . Is the executive 

932
00:41:53,010 --> 00:41:54,732
the director for international 

933
00:41:54,732 --> 00:41:58,070
cooperation ? Um , much of what we did 

934
00:41:58,080 --> 00:42:01,930
on our continuing to dio in the context 

935
00:42:01,930 --> 00:42:05,420
of of co vid was share best practices 

936
00:42:05,800 --> 00:42:09,470
with our partners and eso . Miss 

937
00:42:09,470 --> 00:42:13,060
Lord talked about three intense efforts 

938
00:42:13,070 --> 00:42:16,660
of our organization . Um Thio , First 

939
00:42:16,660 --> 00:42:19,960
off , identify our defense industrial 

940
00:42:19,960 --> 00:42:21,571
base is part of our critical 

941
00:42:21,571 --> 00:42:23,610
infrastructure , uh , to improve 

942
00:42:23,610 --> 00:42:26,740
liquidity by accelerating progress 

943
00:42:26,740 --> 00:42:30,730
payments , Andi , and issuing over 

944
00:42:30,730 --> 00:42:34,620
30 some guidance pieces 

945
00:42:34,630 --> 00:42:37,890
which remain active on our website so 

946
00:42:37,890 --> 00:42:40,001
that we could inform our own approach 

947
00:42:40,010 --> 00:42:42,840
to the pandemic . And so what we did in 

948
00:42:42,840 --> 00:42:45,062
the Office of International Cooperation 

949
00:42:45,062 --> 00:42:47,550
is transfer that information and I I 

950
00:42:47,550 --> 00:42:50,770
was lucky to be part of some of those 

951
00:42:50,770 --> 00:42:52,937
conversations with counterparts abroad 

952
00:42:52,937 --> 00:42:55,210
and lucky to be privy of some of the 

953
00:42:55,220 --> 00:42:57,053
very important first discussions 

954
00:42:57,053 --> 00:42:59,940
between Sir Simon and Miss Lord Aziz . 

955
00:42:59,940 --> 00:43:02,180
Things were really ramping up in that 

956
00:43:02,190 --> 00:43:04,023
regard . So the transfer of that 

957
00:43:04,023 --> 00:43:05,912
information But what Mr Lord also 

958
00:43:05,912 --> 00:43:08,079
talked about was the , uh , weaknesses 

959
00:43:08,079 --> 00:43:10,740
that we were able to identify both in 

960
00:43:10,740 --> 00:43:13,110
the domestic and foreign supply chains 

961
00:43:13,500 --> 00:43:16,940
and s o the illumination of those 

962
00:43:16,940 --> 00:43:20,290
weaknesses drove us to a very targeted 

963
00:43:20,300 --> 00:43:22,522
approach which we continue to employ to 

964
00:43:22,522 --> 00:43:25,430
this day . Um , that targeted approach 

965
00:43:25,440 --> 00:43:29,400
had to do with engaging at the highest 

966
00:43:29,400 --> 00:43:31,750
levels of government through diplomatic 

967
00:43:31,750 --> 00:43:34,930
channels . Eso once again , partners 

968
00:43:34,940 --> 00:43:37,780
allies understood our approach but also 

969
00:43:37,780 --> 00:43:40,590
understood the impact of foreign supply 

970
00:43:40,590 --> 00:43:43,300
chain disruption to the U . S . War 

971
00:43:43,300 --> 00:43:45,840
fighter and delicately balancing that 

972
00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:49,240
with a very dynamic , uh , pandemic 

973
00:43:49,400 --> 00:43:51,690
understanding that not every country is 

974
00:43:51,700 --> 00:43:53,940
equally postured to deal with it and 

975
00:43:53,940 --> 00:43:57,230
there were surges in the respective 

976
00:43:57,230 --> 00:44:00,820
crisis . Um , we also 

977
00:44:00,830 --> 00:44:04,400
also worked on a company to company 

978
00:44:04,400 --> 00:44:07,080
basis , which we facilitated through 

979
00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:10,730
diplomatic channels on demand that 

980
00:44:10,740 --> 00:44:12,851
diplomatic engagement took place both 

981
00:44:12,851 --> 00:44:14,851
at state to state levels , but also 

982
00:44:14,851 --> 00:44:17,210
state to ah provincial levels as well 

983
00:44:17,210 --> 00:44:19,360
understanding that some of the 

984
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:23,070
authority , uh , to manage the outcome 

985
00:44:23,080 --> 00:44:26,370
of the pandemic was delegated to the 

986
00:44:26,370 --> 00:44:29,780
state provincial level on Finally , the 

987
00:44:29,780 --> 00:44:31,820
other aspect I think it's worth 

988
00:44:31,830 --> 00:44:35,490
emphasizing is , um , the necessity 

989
00:44:35,500 --> 00:44:37,830
to build in resilience , right ? And 

990
00:44:37,830 --> 00:44:39,497
sometimes that resilience was 

991
00:44:39,497 --> 00:44:41,497
identifying Ah ah , weakness in the 

992
00:44:41,497 --> 00:44:43,608
foreign supply chain and then looking 

993
00:44:43,608 --> 00:44:46,970
toe to shift , uh , to reinvigorate 

994
00:44:46,980 --> 00:44:50,920
another supplier or emphasize 

995
00:44:50,930 --> 00:44:53,390
another supplier , but also , in some 

996
00:44:53,390 --> 00:44:55,740
instances , to re sure critical 

997
00:44:55,740 --> 00:44:58,730
technologies like microelectronics , 

998
00:44:58,730 --> 00:45:01,340
rare Earths , etcetera . That was 

999
00:45:01,340 --> 00:45:04,210
brought into stark contrast by the 

1000
00:45:04,220 --> 00:45:06,450
pandemic areas where we may be 

1001
00:45:06,450 --> 00:45:09,500
vulnerable on on a near peer 

1002
00:45:09,500 --> 00:45:11,840
competitors potential adversary 

1003
00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:14,390
supplies , accelerating our efforts to 

1004
00:45:14,390 --> 00:45:16,501
do some restoring in that regard . So 

1005
00:45:16,501 --> 00:45:20,160
all that work continues now , and I'm 

1006
00:45:20,160 --> 00:45:22,740
sure will continue for the foreseeable 

1007
00:45:22,740 --> 00:45:25,220
future . Thanks very much , Greg and 

1008
00:45:25,220 --> 00:45:27,450
just Thio borrow slightly . Adapted 

1009
00:45:27,450 --> 00:45:29,617
question from Carmelo that's come in . 

1010
00:45:29,617 --> 00:45:31,783
Just follow up on that . Can you say a 

1011
00:45:31,783 --> 00:45:33,950
little bit more about which particular 

1012
00:45:33,950 --> 00:45:36,006
sectors you're you're focusing on in 

1013
00:45:36,006 --> 00:45:38,061
terms of that resilience ? Challenge 

1014
00:45:38,061 --> 00:45:39,561
Lord talks and talks about 

1015
00:45:39,561 --> 00:45:41,783
microelectronics is one that has got to 

1016
00:45:41,783 --> 00:45:43,950
see a looking ahead , but because it's 

1017
00:45:43,950 --> 00:45:46,006
a well , we're looking at resilience 

1018
00:45:46,006 --> 00:45:48,860
across the continuum . Eso there's 

1019
00:45:48,870 --> 00:45:52,020
there's no discrimination net regard on 

1020
00:45:52,020 --> 00:45:53,687
When you think about emerging 

1021
00:45:53,687 --> 00:45:56,080
technologies . The department has been 

1022
00:45:56,080 --> 00:45:59,220
very forthcoming about where it sees 

1023
00:45:59,230 --> 00:46:01,452
future efforts . That's everything from 

1024
00:46:01,452 --> 00:46:03,674
hyper sonics to fully networked command 

1025
00:46:03,674 --> 00:46:05,730
and control . Communication directed 

1026
00:46:05,730 --> 00:46:08,760
energy , cyber space , quantum science , 

1027
00:46:08,760 --> 00:46:10,427
machine learning , artificial 

1028
00:46:10,427 --> 00:46:12,482
intelligence , microelectronics as I 

1029
00:46:12,482 --> 00:46:15,290
mentioned . Autonomy , biotechnology , 

1030
00:46:15,290 --> 00:46:17,870
five g . Those are all areas where 

1031
00:46:17,880 --> 00:46:20,530
we're very focused on in terms of of 

1032
00:46:20,530 --> 00:46:22,720
emerging technologies . Brilliant . 

1033
00:46:22,720 --> 00:46:24,720
Thanks , Greg . Tell me , Sir Simon 

1034
00:46:24,720 --> 00:46:26,998
time . Can I ask you the same question ? 

1035
00:46:26,998 --> 00:46:29,510
Really ? Thio give a longer look ahead 

1036
00:46:29,510 --> 00:46:31,850
in terms of the impact . Okay , 19 . 

1037
00:46:31,850 --> 00:46:34,017
And perhaps also pick up some of those 

1038
00:46:34,017 --> 00:46:36,017
things that Greg was talking around 

1039
00:46:36,017 --> 00:46:37,961
around supply chain resilience and 

1040
00:46:37,961 --> 00:46:40,017
around partnership . And certainly I 

1041
00:46:40,017 --> 00:46:42,239
can I can certainly testified that it's 

1042
00:46:42,239 --> 00:46:44,461
been incredibly helpful . Toe have that 

1043
00:46:44,461 --> 00:46:46,628
dialogue running . Uh , Simon ? Yeah , 

1044
00:46:46,628 --> 00:46:48,850
thanks very much . Ed and Greg . Good . 

1045
00:46:48,850 --> 00:46:51,390
Thio , sit with you on this virtual 

1046
00:46:51,390 --> 00:46:54,850
stage . Quite a lot of what I'll cover 

1047
00:46:54,860 --> 00:46:58,730
does actually dovetail very neatly with 

1048
00:46:58,740 --> 00:47:01,010
what Greg has just outlined . Which 

1049
00:47:01,020 --> 00:47:02,909
shouldn't be really of a surprise 

1050
00:47:02,909 --> 00:47:05,076
because one of the things that we have 

1051
00:47:05,076 --> 00:47:07,770
done successfully throughout this is it 

1052
00:47:07,770 --> 00:47:10,480
is to communicate best practice with 

1053
00:47:10,490 --> 00:47:13,270
all of our close allies , in particular 

1054
00:47:13,270 --> 00:47:16,290
the United States . Andrea Lee . 

1055
00:47:16,300 --> 00:47:19,530
There's plenty of negatives that come 

1056
00:47:19,530 --> 00:47:22,560
out about Liv and what the future of 

1057
00:47:22,560 --> 00:47:25,270
our industrial base looks like . But I 

1058
00:47:25,270 --> 00:47:28,430
just wanna pick out for riel positives 

1059
00:47:28,430 --> 00:47:31,690
that I see coming . Coming from this on 

1060
00:47:31,690 --> 00:47:34,670
the first one is really that 

1061
00:47:34,680 --> 00:47:38,150
relationship with industry . And much 

1062
00:47:38,150 --> 00:47:41,220
like the United States , we had about 

1063
00:47:41,580 --> 00:47:44,790
ah week a block down 

1064
00:47:44,800 --> 00:47:48,000
on Duren . That week it was 

1065
00:47:48,000 --> 00:47:50,770
confirmed on sponsor that senior levels 

1066
00:47:50,770 --> 00:47:53,230
in government , that defense was indeed 

1067
00:47:53,240 --> 00:47:55,990
a national priority . On that , we 

1068
00:47:55,990 --> 00:47:59,660
should find ways to continue with our 

1069
00:47:59,660 --> 00:48:02,510
major programs and provide continuity . 

1070
00:48:02,970 --> 00:48:06,430
I have to say that our our industry 

1071
00:48:06,430 --> 00:48:08,770
colleagues both at home and abroad , 

1072
00:48:08,900 --> 00:48:12,470
responded magnificently . So the point 

1073
00:48:12,470 --> 00:48:16,010
number one really was that it deepened 

1074
00:48:16,020 --> 00:48:18,640
our level of cooperation , increased 

1075
00:48:18,640 --> 00:48:21,870
the frequency of our communication on 

1076
00:48:21,870 --> 00:48:24,640
really , perhaps emphasize that this is 

1077
00:48:24,640 --> 00:48:26,696
something that we haven't been doing 

1078
00:48:26,696 --> 00:48:29,190
enough , uh , in shall I say , normal 

1079
00:48:29,190 --> 00:48:32,140
times . So the 0.1 is about regular 

1080
00:48:32,150 --> 00:48:35,150
corporation on sharing a sharing of 

1081
00:48:35,150 --> 00:48:38,710
issues on rapid solutions . The 

1082
00:48:38,710 --> 00:48:40,790
second was really agility 

1083
00:48:44,870 --> 00:48:47,940
on the second was really agility in 

1084
00:48:47,950 --> 00:48:51,030
production . Andi I've been Really , 

1085
00:48:51,040 --> 00:48:54,020
I've been really gratified by the way 

1086
00:48:54,020 --> 00:48:58,000
industry has responded in terms off 

1087
00:48:58,000 --> 00:49:01,790
taking forward ideas , innovation 

1088
00:49:01,970 --> 00:49:05,210
into into the production area , 

1089
00:49:05,370 --> 00:49:07,259
figuring out how to use new shift 

1090
00:49:07,259 --> 00:49:09,710
systems , how to do distributed work 

1091
00:49:09,720 --> 00:49:13,320
working Andi in some of our high 

1092
00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:15,650
industrial areas , such a shipyards , 

1093
00:49:15,660 --> 00:49:17,882
they've actually been able to recover . 

1094
00:49:17,882 --> 00:49:20,920
Ah , lot of the last time that was 

1095
00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:24,100
incurred during the coded crisis . 

1096
00:49:25,470 --> 00:49:27,770
The third area that I would highlight 

1097
00:49:27,780 --> 00:49:30,930
on Greg has already centered on eyes 

1098
00:49:30,940 --> 00:49:33,780
supply chain illumination . 

1099
00:49:34,970 --> 00:49:37,750
It's true that we have very good 

1100
00:49:37,750 --> 00:49:39,972
relationships , by and large , with all 

1101
00:49:39,972 --> 00:49:42,720
of our major primes , a zoo , all of my 

1102
00:49:42,720 --> 00:49:44,998
colleagues , national Armand directors , 

1103
00:49:44,998 --> 00:49:48,790
do in NATO . But perhaps what we failed 

1104
00:49:48,790 --> 00:49:51,200
to do was to look slightly beyond the 

1105
00:49:51,200 --> 00:49:54,700
primes on into the supply base . Andi 

1106
00:49:54,710 --> 00:49:58,610
here , where where Cove it has impact 

1107
00:49:58,620 --> 00:50:01,650
impacted the workforce production 

1108
00:50:01,660 --> 00:50:05,270
orders . Smaller companies with weaker 

1109
00:50:05,270 --> 00:50:08,760
balance sheets have really found the 

1110
00:50:08,760 --> 00:50:11,620
going tough . So what we were able to 

1111
00:50:11,620 --> 00:50:14,540
dio was to set up a much , much 

1112
00:50:14,540 --> 00:50:17,450
improved network in terms of interface 

1113
00:50:17,450 --> 00:50:21,070
with mid and lower tier suppliers 

1114
00:50:21,080 --> 00:50:24,770
understand the issues on where early 

1115
00:50:24,770 --> 00:50:28,030
payments were required , where prompt 

1116
00:50:28,030 --> 00:50:30,600
payments were required to maintain cash 

1117
00:50:30,600 --> 00:50:33,500
flows . We were able to do that 

1118
00:50:34,460 --> 00:50:38,000
on the final thing . Really was . Was 

1119
00:50:38,010 --> 00:50:40,680
was the one enterprise it the front 

1120
00:50:40,680 --> 00:50:43,200
line . It's the procurement authority . 

1121
00:50:43,210 --> 00:50:46,350
It's government on its industry , 

1122
00:50:46,360 --> 00:50:49,680
working collectively towards a common 

1123
00:50:49,680 --> 00:50:52,850
name . Thank you . Thanks , Simon . 

1124
00:50:52,860 --> 00:50:54,916
Thank you for reminding us that it's 

1125
00:50:54,916 --> 00:50:57,027
not all doing gloom on . There's some 

1126
00:50:57,027 --> 00:50:59,027
positives here that I think you are 

1127
00:50:59,027 --> 00:51:01,027
enduring ones on that we could take 

1128
00:51:01,027 --> 00:51:03,027
forward . I wanna come back some of 

1129
00:51:03,027 --> 00:51:02,810
these issues around supply the supply 

1130
00:51:02,810 --> 00:51:06,680
chain resilience . But just try Dio 

1131
00:51:06,690 --> 00:51:09,860
fix on innovation a little bit on both 

1132
00:51:09,860 --> 00:51:13,150
of you Lord donned Simon , speak about 

1133
00:51:13,150 --> 00:51:14,983
this and , you know , speeches , 

1134
00:51:14,983 --> 00:51:16,817
obviously innovations absolutely 

1135
00:51:16,817 --> 00:51:19,150
critical to winning the strategic 

1136
00:51:19,150 --> 00:51:22,180
competition that is now shaping out 

1137
00:51:22,760 --> 00:51:25,830
on Guy wanted Thio ask really looking 

1138
00:51:25,830 --> 00:51:27,719
ahead And against the backdrop of 

1139
00:51:27,719 --> 00:51:29,886
Covidien this strain and pressure that 

1140
00:51:29,886 --> 00:51:31,997
that is inevitably putting on defense 

1141
00:51:31,997 --> 00:51:34,108
budget federal budgets in the round . 

1142
00:51:34,108 --> 00:51:36,219
How do you see the sort of challenges 

1143
00:51:36,219 --> 00:51:38,163
and opportunities looking ahead to 

1144
00:51:38,163 --> 00:51:41,110
maximize , uh , expenditure on R and D 

1145
00:51:41,120 --> 00:51:43,820
on also to work with some of those SMEs 

1146
00:51:43,820 --> 00:51:45,876
that someone was talking about , but 

1147
00:51:45,876 --> 00:51:47,709
also with nontraditional defense 

1148
00:51:47,709 --> 00:51:49,876
companies . And bring that , uh , sort 

1149
00:51:49,876 --> 00:51:52,098
of broaden the ecosystems you like . So 

1150
00:51:52,098 --> 00:51:52,090
we are really getting access to the 

1151
00:51:52,090 --> 00:51:54,201
widest possible range of innovation . 

1152
00:51:54,201 --> 00:51:56,534
What can I say to you on that one point ? 

1153
00:51:56,960 --> 00:51:59,238
Sure . I just wanna make sure . Edward . 

1154
00:51:59,238 --> 00:52:01,349
Oh , good . My video just popped back 

1155
00:52:01,349 --> 00:52:03,460
up A little interruption there . Um , 

1156
00:52:03,460 --> 00:52:05,682
in the context of cooperative r and D , 

1157
00:52:05,682 --> 00:52:08,370
this is something that my office looks 

1158
00:52:08,370 --> 00:52:11,650
at quite closely . We consider a core 

1159
00:52:11,650 --> 00:52:14,120
competency . And so Thio reaffirm the 

1160
00:52:14,120 --> 00:52:17,740
importance . Um , we recognize 

1161
00:52:17,740 --> 00:52:21,150
that in a time of rapidly evolving 

1162
00:52:21,150 --> 00:52:24,900
technology that , uh , put put 

1163
00:52:24,900 --> 00:52:26,840
simply , we're stronger when we 

1164
00:52:26,850 --> 00:52:30,830
cooperate . Way champion joint efforts 

1165
00:52:30,840 --> 00:52:34,150
across borders and eso . What we look 

1166
00:52:34,150 --> 00:52:37,760
to do through various bilateral forums 

1167
00:52:37,770 --> 00:52:40,600
through ad hoc engagement throughout 

1168
00:52:40,600 --> 00:52:42,600
the department and across the inter 

1169
00:52:42,600 --> 00:52:46,040
agency is identify those areas where we 

1170
00:52:46,040 --> 00:52:49,400
can partner with close allies 

1171
00:52:49,680 --> 00:52:52,840
or burgeoning partners as well . Uh , 

1172
00:52:52,850 --> 00:52:56,260
to advance , uh , something that's 

1173
00:52:56,260 --> 00:52:58,093
going to support the U . S . War 

1174
00:52:58,093 --> 00:53:00,800
fighter . That's something can be , as 

1175
00:53:00,810 --> 00:53:02,900
as a cutting edge is some of those 

1176
00:53:02,900 --> 00:53:05,280
technologies I mentioned before Or it 

1177
00:53:05,280 --> 00:53:07,230
can be , ah , simple exchange of 

1178
00:53:07,230 --> 00:53:09,230
information . And so when you think 

1179
00:53:09,230 --> 00:53:10,897
about international armaments 

1180
00:53:10,897 --> 00:53:13,650
cooperation , in many ways , it z 

1181
00:53:13,660 --> 00:53:16,700
really a paragon of of a broader set of 

1182
00:53:16,700 --> 00:53:20,070
security cooperation where we can do 

1183
00:53:20,070 --> 00:53:21,903
some foundational things such as 

1184
00:53:21,903 --> 00:53:24,680
exchange information exchange personnel 

1185
00:53:24,690 --> 00:53:27,010
to help break down cultural barriers to 

1186
00:53:27,010 --> 00:53:29,340
help facilitate the information flow 

1187
00:53:29,350 --> 00:53:32,960
across borders . But also , as those 

1188
00:53:32,960 --> 00:53:35,260
dialogues , those conversations evolve 

1189
00:53:35,350 --> 00:53:38,420
really tapping , uh , to some discreet 

1190
00:53:38,430 --> 00:53:41,530
expertise resident with allies and 

1191
00:53:41,530 --> 00:53:44,000
partners through cooperative R and D 

1192
00:53:44,010 --> 00:53:46,550
through cooperative production and even 

1193
00:53:46,560 --> 00:53:50,240
some foreign acquisition all 

1194
00:53:50,240 --> 00:53:53,840
which again serve the common purpose of 

1195
00:53:53,850 --> 00:53:57,240
supporting the war fighter . Um , as it 

1196
00:53:57,240 --> 00:54:00,980
relates to tapping in , uh , Thio new 

1197
00:54:00,980 --> 00:54:04,020
technology hubs , new innovation hubs . 

1198
00:54:04,030 --> 00:54:06,270
I think we've also seen a tremendous 

1199
00:54:06,280 --> 00:54:08,420
evolution in that regard as well . 

1200
00:54:08,430 --> 00:54:10,980
Historically , within the department , 

1201
00:54:10,990 --> 00:54:13,730
we have embraced the responsibility of 

1202
00:54:13,730 --> 00:54:16,940
evolving that technology takes place 

1203
00:54:17,240 --> 00:54:19,610
within the services within the service 

1204
00:54:19,610 --> 00:54:21,721
laboratories and that that great work 

1205
00:54:21,721 --> 00:54:24,020
still being championed by our 

1206
00:54:24,020 --> 00:54:26,060
colleagues and our any by our 

1207
00:54:26,060 --> 00:54:28,570
colleagues in the services . But we're , 

1208
00:54:28,570 --> 00:54:31,040
of course , increasingly seeing , uh , 

1209
00:54:31,050 --> 00:54:33,470
the tremendous research and development 

1210
00:54:33,480 --> 00:54:36,190
budgets in the private sector and 

1211
00:54:36,200 --> 00:54:38,270
coupled with the evolution of 

1212
00:54:38,270 --> 00:54:41,490
technology , drives the imperative for 

1213
00:54:41,490 --> 00:54:44,180
the department to tap into that . Andi 

1214
00:54:44,190 --> 00:54:46,190
Sir Simon talked a little bit about 

1215
00:54:46,190 --> 00:54:49,160
this from the UK perspective in his 

1216
00:54:49,160 --> 00:54:51,800
remarks , and we have , Ah , obviously 

1217
00:54:51,800 --> 00:54:54,940
a similar vantage point where we have 

1218
00:54:54,950 --> 00:54:57,280
nodes within the department who are 

1219
00:54:57,280 --> 00:55:00,460
charged almost exclusively with with 

1220
00:55:00,460 --> 00:55:03,630
tapping into this thes technology hubs , 

1221
00:55:03,630 --> 00:55:05,630
so to speak . And one that comes to 

1222
00:55:05,630 --> 00:55:07,741
mind is the Defense Innovation Unit , 

1223
00:55:07,741 --> 00:55:10,560
previously named Defense Innovation 

1224
00:55:10,560 --> 00:55:13,080
Unit Experimental . But it became part 

1225
00:55:13,080 --> 00:55:15,247
of our permanent infrastructure within 

1226
00:55:15,247 --> 00:55:17,358
the department over the course of the 

1227
00:55:17,358 --> 00:55:19,524
past several years . On its mission is 

1228
00:55:19,524 --> 00:55:22,300
Thio tap into commercial technology on 

1229
00:55:22,310 --> 00:55:24,920
also to break down cultural barriers 

1230
00:55:24,920 --> 00:55:28,250
that have historically existed between 

1231
00:55:28,340 --> 00:55:32,130
to two very separate universes . Three 

1232
00:55:32,130 --> 00:55:33,908
universe that exists within the 

1233
00:55:33,908 --> 00:55:36,019
Department of Defense in the universe 

1234
00:55:36,019 --> 00:55:37,908
that exists in some aspect of the 

1235
00:55:37,908 --> 00:55:40,130
private sector . And that's not to take 

1236
00:55:40,130 --> 00:55:42,352
anything away from our our big primes , 

1237
00:55:42,352 --> 00:55:44,352
our traditional defense contracting 

1238
00:55:44,352 --> 00:55:46,760
partners , but just a recognition that 

1239
00:55:47,040 --> 00:55:50,070
some of this really tremendous 

1240
00:55:50,080 --> 00:55:52,440
innovative work , innovative thinking , 

1241
00:55:52,440 --> 00:55:54,800
is being conducted outside of those 

1242
00:55:54,810 --> 00:55:58,450
historical centers of gravity . And so 

1243
00:55:58,450 --> 00:56:00,617
as we continue to extend the tentacles 

1244
00:56:00,617 --> 00:56:02,750
of the department and tap into this 

1245
00:56:02,760 --> 00:56:05,060
break down those barriers , we become 

1246
00:56:05,530 --> 00:56:08,600
better equipped to respond . But I'll 

1247
00:56:08,600 --> 00:56:11,390
tell you , the key to the innovation 

1248
00:56:11,400 --> 00:56:14,450
eyes is not only the innovation itself , 

1249
00:56:14,460 --> 00:56:17,260
but the adaptation of the innovation 

1250
00:56:17,270 --> 00:56:19,270
Thean integration of the innovation 

1251
00:56:19,270 --> 00:56:22,470
because without that it's simply a 

1252
00:56:22,480 --> 00:56:25,560
shiny object . And so what the joint 

1253
00:56:25,560 --> 00:56:28,430
staff is working on eyes joint 

1254
00:56:28,430 --> 00:56:32,130
warfighting concept things notion that 

1255
00:56:32,130 --> 00:56:34,300
we have to break down once again the 

1256
00:56:34,300 --> 00:56:36,480
traditional barriers that exist on the 

1257
00:56:36,490 --> 00:56:38,820
on the battlefield across the continuum 

1258
00:56:38,820 --> 00:56:42,610
of conflict so that there are there are 

1259
00:56:42,610 --> 00:56:45,620
no more stovepipes , um , in time in 

1260
00:56:45,620 --> 00:56:49,260
space and across capabilities . 

1261
00:56:49,530 --> 00:56:52,600
Andi , that is going to be very data 

1262
00:56:52,610 --> 00:56:56,370
intensive , um , and also require 

1263
00:56:56,380 --> 00:56:58,540
unprecedented level of integration , 

1264
00:56:58,540 --> 00:57:00,429
which the department is currently 

1265
00:57:00,429 --> 00:57:02,810
champion . Brilliant . Thanks very much , 

1266
00:57:02,810 --> 00:57:04,921
Greg . And as you say , it's not just 

1267
00:57:04,921 --> 00:57:07,680
what you've got is how you use it on 

1268
00:57:07,680 --> 00:57:09,958
about integration is actually critical . 

1269
00:57:09,958 --> 00:57:12,124
I think particular interesting to hear 

1270
00:57:12,124 --> 00:57:14,347
Simon about some of the this rapid move 

1271
00:57:14,347 --> 00:57:16,402
towards experimentation to try and , 

1272
00:57:16,730 --> 00:57:18,730
you know , shut the process forward 

1273
00:57:18,730 --> 00:57:20,980
from the loud , if you like towards 

1274
00:57:20,980 --> 00:57:22,758
capability of scale and has the 

1275
00:57:22,758 --> 00:57:24,813
warfighters Can I talk to you ? Just 

1276
00:57:24,813 --> 00:57:26,869
thio , maybe expand on that a little 

1277
00:57:26,869 --> 00:57:29,036
bit and again to give a bit of a sense 

1278
00:57:29,036 --> 00:57:30,924
about just how how you feel . The 

1279
00:57:30,924 --> 00:57:32,924
system is grappling with . What you 

1280
00:57:32,924 --> 00:57:34,536
talked about is really ? The 

1281
00:57:34,536 --> 00:57:34,290
requirement for a bit of a culture 

1282
00:57:34,290 --> 00:57:38,170
change on on acquisition . Not 

1283
00:57:38,170 --> 00:57:40,400
just a process one where people really 

1284
00:57:40,400 --> 00:57:42,560
embrace the need for innovation of 

1285
00:57:42,560 --> 00:57:45,270
speed and bringing capability . Thio 

1286
00:57:45,280 --> 00:57:48,300
maturity . Thanks said 

1287
00:57:48,310 --> 00:57:51,750
Andi . Yeah , some great points there 

1288
00:57:51,750 --> 00:57:54,880
from Greg and which , which I'll build 

1289
00:57:54,880 --> 00:57:57,460
on . Um but 

1290
00:57:58,230 --> 00:58:00,770
innovation has very much been at the 

1291
00:58:00,780 --> 00:58:04,530
forefront of what we're I like . 

1292
00:58:04,920 --> 00:58:07,950
Do you hear me ? Yeah . Yeah . Okay . 

1293
00:58:08,320 --> 00:58:10,690
Eso innovation has been at the 

1294
00:58:10,690 --> 00:58:13,920
forefront about thinking in the 

1295
00:58:13,920 --> 00:58:17,050
UK , I would say , particularly over 

1296
00:58:17,050 --> 00:58:21,030
the last 2 to 3 years . Andi , 

1297
00:58:21,030 --> 00:58:23,970
under the defense , uh , innovation , 

1298
00:58:23,980 --> 00:58:27,240
uh , banner . Clear camera . Our 

1299
00:58:27,240 --> 00:58:29,407
director there It's done . It's done a 

1300
00:58:29,407 --> 00:58:33,050
great job in setting up the 

1301
00:58:33,060 --> 00:58:35,560
Defense Innovation Fund on 

1302
00:58:35,570 --> 00:58:39,460
270 projects in it . Andi , 

1303
00:58:39,460 --> 00:58:42,910
it's really encouraged engagement from 

1304
00:58:42,920 --> 00:58:45,660
from the SMEs . I think what we've got 

1305
00:58:45,660 --> 00:58:48,120
to do here is we've let a lot of small 

1306
00:58:48,120 --> 00:58:51,920
fires in a lot of places and to Greg's 

1307
00:58:51,920 --> 00:58:55,810
essential point , we can have lots of 

1308
00:58:55,820 --> 00:58:58,060
shiny things . But unless we understand 

1309
00:58:58,060 --> 00:59:00,550
how we're going to integrate and grow 

1310
00:59:00,550 --> 00:59:04,300
them , then these Fars will die 

1311
00:59:04,300 --> 00:59:06,411
out . And I think this is a challenge 

1312
00:59:06,411 --> 00:59:08,950
not just for UK but for everyone , it's 

1313
00:59:08,950 --> 00:59:11,940
about what is that Growth Paul from a 

1314
00:59:11,940 --> 00:59:14,510
piece of technology that you put in the 

1315
00:59:14,510 --> 00:59:17,400
hands of a war fighter as we've done so 

1316
00:59:17,400 --> 00:59:19,720
successfully as I mentioned that in my 

1317
00:59:19,730 --> 00:59:21,720
owning remarks with the Armand 

1318
00:59:21,720 --> 00:59:24,580
warfighting experiment . But how do you 

1319
00:59:24,580 --> 00:59:28,440
grow that into a capability that a 

1320
00:59:28,440 --> 00:59:31,150
you can sustain over a number of years 

1321
00:59:31,160 --> 00:59:34,330
and be that you can develop thoroughly ? 

1322
00:59:34,720 --> 00:59:38,290
Ah Onda . I was struck by the scale 

1323
00:59:38,300 --> 00:59:40,370
of this in the United States 

1324
00:59:40,380 --> 00:59:44,000
with many discussions . 

1325
00:59:44,000 --> 00:59:46,056
Excellent discussions with Secretary 

1326
00:59:46,056 --> 00:59:49,330
McCarthy , who , uh , introduced me 

1327
00:59:49,330 --> 00:59:51,990
Thio Army Futures Command on Do that 

1328
00:59:51,990 --> 00:59:55,560
for me is innovation on a scale that I 

1329
00:59:55,570 --> 00:59:58,910
can only dream off . But there I felt 

1330
00:59:58,910 --> 01:00:01,740
that there waas there waas the right 

1331
01:00:01,750 --> 01:00:04,750
growth path in terms of new technology , 

1332
01:00:05,110 --> 01:00:08,320
testing it , adapting it production , 

1333
01:00:08,320 --> 01:00:11,410
izing it and then introducing it into 

1334
01:00:11,410 --> 01:00:13,580
service on guess what . We've got to 

1335
01:00:13,580 --> 01:00:15,636
figure out what's that jumped from a 

1336
01:00:15,636 --> 01:00:17,747
nice piece of innovation to something 

1337
01:00:17,747 --> 01:00:20,530
that's sustainable and supportable into 

1338
01:00:20,530 --> 01:00:23,340
the future . The other thing that I 

1339
01:00:23,340 --> 01:00:26,200
think important is accessing to the 

1340
01:00:26,200 --> 01:00:30,090
market for the SMEs . If you 

1341
01:00:30,090 --> 01:00:32,950
like a nontraditional defense suppliers , 

1342
01:00:33,410 --> 01:00:35,354
we've done a lot of work I think , 

1343
01:00:35,354 --> 01:00:38,450
reasonably successfully to look at how 

1344
01:00:38,450 --> 01:00:40,730
we make a market more accessible 

1345
01:00:41,110 --> 01:00:43,780
defense contracting . All nations are 

1346
01:00:43,780 --> 01:00:47,360
contracts are contracts that have many 

1347
01:00:47,360 --> 01:00:49,930
pages , many clauses , um 

1348
01:00:58,910 --> 01:01:02,160
on . We need to make it simpler for 

1349
01:01:02,160 --> 01:01:05,530
small , smaller suppliers who may only 

1350
01:01:05,540 --> 01:01:08,910
have a few people there that they could 

1351
01:01:08,910 --> 01:01:11,310
be . They can have simple template ID 

1352
01:01:11,310 --> 01:01:14,130
contracts that instead of very 

1353
01:01:14,130 --> 01:01:16,130
prescriptive requirements , we have 

1354
01:01:16,130 --> 01:01:18,570
problem statements that allow them to 

1355
01:01:18,570 --> 01:01:21,260
engage with the capability that we're 

1356
01:01:21,260 --> 01:01:24,680
trying to produce on work on producing 

1357
01:01:24,690 --> 01:01:26,930
the solutions . I think we're having 

1358
01:01:26,930 --> 01:01:30,050
some success in that area . We're going 

1359
01:01:30,050 --> 01:01:32,650
to continue to like more of these fires , 

1360
01:01:32,660 --> 01:01:35,030
but joining them up into bigger , 

1361
01:01:35,030 --> 01:01:37,490
sustaining one's eyes . The real 

1362
01:01:37,490 --> 01:01:40,860
challenge ahead . Thanks That thanks . 

1363
01:01:40,860 --> 01:01:42,860
I mean , NBDL , our deputy chief of 

1364
01:01:42,860 --> 01:01:45,027
general staff , was in humor just last 

1365
01:01:45,027 --> 01:01:47,027
week , watching Project Convergence 

1366
01:01:47,027 --> 01:01:48,749
were on future . Started doing 

1367
01:01:48,749 --> 01:01:50,360
extraordinary things on that 

1368
01:01:50,360 --> 01:01:51,749
inspiration side through 

1369
01:01:51,749 --> 01:01:54,820
experimentation . Say I want to just we 

1370
01:01:54,820 --> 01:01:57,042
got about 10 minutes left and I want to 

1371
01:01:57,042 --> 01:01:58,876
sort of switch makers particular 

1372
01:01:58,876 --> 01:01:58,220
specifically to international 

1373
01:01:58,220 --> 01:02:01,930
cooperation . Onda , how you're working 

1374
01:02:01,930 --> 01:02:03,986
together , we can grapple with these 

1375
01:02:03,986 --> 01:02:07,010
challenges , uh , to sort of maximum 

1376
01:02:07,010 --> 01:02:09,760
success on do you know , really 

1377
01:02:09,760 --> 01:02:11,816
building on on a lot of what's being 

1378
01:02:11,816 --> 01:02:13,982
said on two things . One is around the 

1379
01:02:13,982 --> 01:02:17,520
challenges off technology protection 

1380
01:02:18,000 --> 01:02:21,470
in a more competitive environment where 

1381
01:02:21,470 --> 01:02:24,640
r I p is at on the threat . On the 

1382
01:02:24,640 --> 01:02:26,473
second is looking at some of the 

1383
01:02:26,473 --> 01:02:28,490
obstacles to collaboration s a 

1384
01:02:28,500 --> 01:02:30,900
multinational corporation Interpretive 

1385
01:02:30,900 --> 01:02:34,650
innovation . Um , on dso 

1386
01:02:34,660 --> 01:02:38,060
perhaps just on the first one simple 

1387
01:02:38,060 --> 01:02:39,727
question . Our our technology 

1388
01:02:39,727 --> 01:02:42,800
protections hit the purpose against the 

1389
01:02:42,800 --> 01:02:44,860
current environment . What are the 

1390
01:02:44,860 --> 01:02:47,280
areas where we need to further work to 

1391
01:02:47,280 --> 01:02:50,380
tighten up our system ? Um , come to 

1392
01:02:50,380 --> 01:02:54,340
you first . Sure . I think what 

1393
01:02:54,340 --> 01:02:56,780
we've seen once again hearkening back 

1394
01:02:56,780 --> 01:02:59,700
to the theme of rapidly evolving 

1395
01:02:59,710 --> 01:03:03,540
technological landscape is that 

1396
01:03:03,550 --> 01:03:06,570
evolution start to outpace some of our 

1397
01:03:06,570 --> 01:03:10,420
processes within the department on our 

1398
01:03:10,420 --> 01:03:12,890
approach within the department . And so 

1399
01:03:12,900 --> 01:03:15,160
we've we've looked at ourselves through 

1400
01:03:15,160 --> 01:03:17,890
a very critical lens over the course of 

1401
01:03:17,890 --> 01:03:20,380
the past six months . Once again 

1402
01:03:20,380 --> 01:03:23,530
brought in tow stark contrast by co vid 

1403
01:03:23,900 --> 01:03:26,810
What the Secretary has asked us to do 

1404
01:03:27,200 --> 01:03:29,930
eyes to be more agile in that regard . 

1405
01:03:30,400 --> 01:03:33,430
And so what we've kicked off is ah is a 

1406
01:03:33,430 --> 01:03:35,830
defense trade modernization initiative . 

1407
01:03:36,400 --> 01:03:40,290
Which of its key themes is improving 

1408
01:03:40,290 --> 01:03:44,230
our approach technology security and 

1409
01:03:44,240 --> 01:03:46,830
and export ability . Now that's not an 

1410
01:03:46,830 --> 01:03:50,290
indication that we don't take very 

1411
01:03:50,290 --> 01:03:53,830
seriously our role to protect 

1412
01:03:53,840 --> 01:03:57,720
some of the most , um , lethal 

1413
01:03:57,730 --> 01:04:01,320
technology out there . That 

1414
01:04:01,320 --> 01:04:04,050
is , that is a critically essential 

1415
01:04:04,060 --> 01:04:07,430
function of the department in my office , 

1416
01:04:07,440 --> 01:04:10,820
in part . But we also recognize 

1417
01:04:11,190 --> 01:04:14,580
that we have toe bridge the gap between 

1418
01:04:14,590 --> 01:04:17,510
what we're asking our partners to do in 

1419
01:04:17,510 --> 01:04:20,120
the context of contingency ops in the 

1420
01:04:20,130 --> 01:04:23,120
context of coalition operations and 

1421
01:04:23,120 --> 01:04:25,231
what we're willing to provide them in 

1422
01:04:25,231 --> 01:04:28,130
some instances . And this is not a 

1423
01:04:28,140 --> 01:04:30,930
particularly sexy answer , but a lot of 

1424
01:04:30,930 --> 01:04:34,770
that has to do with process on ensuring 

1425
01:04:34,780 --> 01:04:38,210
that we are . We are transferring the 

1426
01:04:38,210 --> 01:04:40,000
demand signal of our combatant 

1427
01:04:40,000 --> 01:04:43,900
commanders off our partners of our 

1428
01:04:43,900 --> 01:04:46,590
allies to the decision makers within 

1429
01:04:46,590 --> 01:04:50,370
the department who are responsible 

1430
01:04:50,380 --> 01:04:53,600
for ensuring technology release in a 

1431
01:04:53,600 --> 01:04:56,670
responsible manner . We're also so 

1432
01:04:56,670 --> 01:04:58,559
that's being more strategic about 

1433
01:04:58,559 --> 01:05:01,650
technology security and foreign 

1434
01:05:01,650 --> 01:05:04,240
disclosure . We're also trying to be 

1435
01:05:04,240 --> 01:05:07,640
more responsive , Um , and that again 

1436
01:05:07,640 --> 01:05:10,760
has to do with our ability to identify 

1437
01:05:10,760 --> 01:05:13,820
a problem set and then coalesce the 

1438
01:05:13,820 --> 01:05:15,770
right stakeholders within the 

1439
01:05:15,770 --> 01:05:18,510
department to address that , that 

1440
01:05:18,510 --> 01:05:21,760
problem said , and in the final aspect 

1441
01:05:21,770 --> 01:05:23,937
in that regard would be anticipatory . 

1442
01:05:24,290 --> 01:05:27,740
So if we can get out ahead or at 

1443
01:05:27,740 --> 01:05:30,510
least get on board with the evolution 

1444
01:05:30,510 --> 01:05:32,820
of technology and recognize that the 

1445
01:05:32,820 --> 01:05:36,000
vast preponderance off US programs of 

1446
01:05:36,000 --> 01:05:38,960
record are ultimately transferred to 

1447
01:05:38,960 --> 01:05:41,182
our allies and partners through various 

1448
01:05:41,182 --> 01:05:44,090
channels , and that we are building the 

1449
01:05:44,090 --> 01:05:46,146
appropriate anticipatory policies in 

1450
01:05:46,146 --> 01:05:48,370
that regard to posture , uh , the 

1451
01:05:48,380 --> 01:05:51,980
department accordingly , and to 

1452
01:05:51,980 --> 01:05:54,700
ensure that anti tamper considerations 

1453
01:05:54,700 --> 01:05:57,690
are addressed at the very outset of 

1454
01:05:57,690 --> 01:06:00,510
program development , we get ahead of 

1455
01:06:00,510 --> 01:06:03,420
the problem set . We become or actually 

1456
01:06:03,420 --> 01:06:05,642
become more responsive in that regard . 

1457
01:06:05,642 --> 01:06:07,809
So the department's taking a very hard 

1458
01:06:07,809 --> 01:06:10,180
look at at those aspects , recognizing 

1459
01:06:10,180 --> 01:06:12,730
that there's not one simple switch , 

1460
01:06:12,740 --> 01:06:16,580
You can flip , uh , to ensure that we 

1461
01:06:16,580 --> 01:06:19,400
have fully exportable systems or ensure 

1462
01:06:19,400 --> 01:06:21,450
that we have , ah , totally new 

1463
01:06:21,450 --> 01:06:23,850
approach to technology security . Um , 

1464
01:06:23,860 --> 01:06:25,990
but with that , with that backdrop 

1465
01:06:25,990 --> 01:06:28,540
against that backdrop , recognizing 

1466
01:06:28,540 --> 01:06:30,318
that there are a lot of process 

1467
01:06:30,318 --> 01:06:32,540
improvements , there's a cultural shift 

1468
01:06:32,540 --> 01:06:34,707
that's necessary within the department 

1469
01:06:34,707 --> 01:06:36,929
and communication barriers that we need 

1470
01:06:36,929 --> 01:06:39,151
to break down . Thanks , Great . Just a 

1471
01:06:39,151 --> 01:06:41,207
follow up on that . I mean , I think 

1472
01:06:41,207 --> 01:06:43,373
what you set out , you know , it makes 

1473
01:06:43,373 --> 01:06:45,707
perfect kind of sense strategically eat . 

1474
01:06:45,707 --> 01:06:47,873
There is obviously a political context 

1475
01:06:47,873 --> 01:06:47,870
in which some of this thinking is being 

1476
01:06:47,870 --> 01:06:51,700
done as well . On DSO strategically 13 

1477
01:06:51,700 --> 01:06:53,700
86 . That's not mentioned it the 

1478
01:06:53,710 --> 01:06:56,330
executive order that highlighted some 

1479
01:06:56,330 --> 01:06:58,330
of the weaknesses of the industrial 

1480
01:06:58,330 --> 01:07:00,163
base and said that collaboration 

1481
01:07:00,163 --> 01:06:59,800
partners was a critical . We're 

1482
01:06:59,810 --> 01:07:01,990
addressing that your nds as allies and 

1483
01:07:01,990 --> 01:07:04,480
partners is the second pillar on DSO on . 

1484
01:07:04,480 --> 01:07:06,591
But on the other hand , you know , in 

1485
01:07:06,591 --> 01:07:08,813
Congress right now , we have , uh , you 

1486
01:07:08,813 --> 01:07:10,813
propose legislative amendments that 

1487
01:07:10,813 --> 01:07:12,758
would essentially say that 100% of 

1488
01:07:12,758 --> 01:07:14,647
major defense acquisition program 

1489
01:07:14,647 --> 01:07:17,880
should be US US . Sources by 2026 . How 

1490
01:07:17,880 --> 01:07:19,824
do you try and how do you see that 

1491
01:07:19,824 --> 01:07:21,936
balance between essentially a sort of 

1492
01:07:21,936 --> 01:07:25,740
political dynamic around Bye America 

1493
01:07:25,750 --> 01:07:27,694
Impressionism dresses that kind of 

1494
01:07:27,694 --> 01:07:30,220
strategic , you know , imperative to 

1495
01:07:30,220 --> 01:07:32,276
work with others . And , of course , 

1496
01:07:32,276 --> 01:07:34,164
some of the big breakthroughs and 

1497
01:07:34,164 --> 01:07:36,331
innovation over the last century . Jet 

1498
01:07:36,331 --> 01:07:35,410
engines , nuclear , other things have 

1499
01:07:35,410 --> 01:07:37,632
come through that kind of international 

1500
01:07:37,632 --> 01:07:40,100
partnership of the simple answer is by 

1501
01:07:40,110 --> 01:07:42,460
by dealing in facts by dealing with 

1502
01:07:42,460 --> 01:07:46,440
data by illuminating theme , the 

1503
01:07:46,450 --> 01:07:49,580
positive impact that collaboration can 

1504
01:07:49,580 --> 01:07:53,430
have both on the battlefield . Andi 

1505
01:07:53,850 --> 01:07:57,460
in the laboratory and through that 

1506
01:07:57,460 --> 01:08:01,040
discussion through those fax sets , we 

1507
01:08:01,040 --> 01:08:04,760
hope to drive um , U s policy in that 

1508
01:08:04,760 --> 01:08:06,900
regard . Thanks . Great . Simon , 

1509
01:08:06,900 --> 01:08:09,122
coming to you on this question that the 

1510
01:08:09,122 --> 01:08:11,233
face again , the balance between kind 

1511
01:08:11,233 --> 01:08:13,233
of technology protection on the one 

1512
01:08:13,233 --> 01:08:15,344
hand , But on the other hand , making 

1513
01:08:15,344 --> 01:08:17,456
sure that we remain sufficiently open 

1514
01:08:17,456 --> 01:08:17,070
Thio International Partnership 

1515
01:08:17,070 --> 01:08:18,070
cooperation 

1516
01:08:24,770 --> 01:08:26,180
do that . Simon County . 

1517
01:08:32,870 --> 01:08:34,926
Have we lost that ? We may have lost 

1518
01:08:34,926 --> 01:08:36,759
Simon increasing on the screen . 

1519
01:08:39,570 --> 01:08:41,681
I still see some , but I can't hear . 

1520
01:08:48,970 --> 01:08:51,192
Can anyone hear me ? Can I just check ? 

1521
01:08:51,192 --> 01:08:54,200
That is not me . He's figured out great . 

1522
01:08:54,200 --> 01:08:56,422
Can you still hear me ? Yes , you can . 

1523
01:08:56,422 --> 01:08:59,700
Okay , super . Um uh , in that case , 

1524
01:08:59,700 --> 01:09:01,922
we just got a company . Simon Simon may 

1525
01:09:01,922 --> 01:09:05,620
manage to rejoin us , but just to 

1526
01:09:05,630 --> 01:09:07,540
finish off Greg , can I ask you a 

1527
01:09:07,540 --> 01:09:09,651
further questioning ? This one's from 

1528
01:09:09,651 --> 01:09:12,580
Araneta . Text me . Um , can you name 

1529
01:09:12,580 --> 01:09:15,100
some specific areas where the US and UK 

1530
01:09:15,110 --> 01:09:16,721
Cannon should deepen defense 

1531
01:09:16,721 --> 01:09:18,777
cooperation in coming years ? Two or 

1532
01:09:18,777 --> 01:09:20,666
three kind of options or specific 

1533
01:09:20,666 --> 01:09:22,777
examples where you see real potential 

1534
01:09:22,777 --> 01:09:25,030
collaboration ? Well , three answer is 

1535
01:09:25,030 --> 01:09:27,780
I can name those , but I'm not going to 

1536
01:09:27,780 --> 01:09:29,900
in this forum because I I very 

1537
01:09:29,900 --> 01:09:32,970
important for us to be able to 

1538
01:09:32,970 --> 01:09:35,570
collaborate at a national level in a 

1539
01:09:35,570 --> 01:09:37,660
discreet fashion in a fashion that 

1540
01:09:37,670 --> 01:09:40,780
preserves our respective processes in 

1541
01:09:40,780 --> 01:09:42,836
terms of , ah , legal and regulatory 

1542
01:09:42,836 --> 01:09:46,830
requirements . And it allows us to make 

1543
01:09:46,840 --> 01:09:49,010
a political decisions about the 

1544
01:09:49,010 --> 01:09:51,066
direction . But I can I can say this 

1545
01:09:51,066 --> 01:09:54,870
with , um , with great certainty . The 

1546
01:09:54,870 --> 01:09:58,550
collaboration , the enduring discussion 

1547
01:09:58,550 --> 01:10:01,480
partnership that we have our UK allies 

1548
01:10:01,480 --> 01:10:05,480
is is , um , one of our cornerstones in 

1549
01:10:05,480 --> 01:10:07,980
the international space . And , uh , 

1550
01:10:07,980 --> 01:10:11,500
and there is active , uh , active 

1551
01:10:11,500 --> 01:10:14,350
informal discussions ongoing Now , 

1552
01:10:14,350 --> 01:10:17,810
between our collective , uh , 

1553
01:10:17,820 --> 01:10:20,810
communities in the context of both are 

1554
01:10:20,810 --> 01:10:22,921
any and acquisition and sustainment . 

1555
01:10:23,160 --> 01:10:26,000
And I'm very proud You're part of those 

1556
01:10:26,010 --> 01:10:29,510
very proud to see real tangible results 

1557
01:10:29,520 --> 01:10:31,810
that spring from those those 

1558
01:10:31,810 --> 01:10:34,050
discussions and exchanges every day . 

1559
01:10:34,060 --> 01:10:38,040
Eso more to follow . Thanks , 

1560
01:10:38,040 --> 01:10:40,040
Greg . Simon , just check once more 

1561
01:10:40,040 --> 01:10:42,040
with you when you're back with us . 

1562
01:10:42,040 --> 01:10:45,850
Sorry . Uh , you , 

1563
01:10:45,860 --> 01:10:49,690
uh do you , uh , 

1564
01:10:50,260 --> 01:10:52,870
the collaboration and information 

1565
01:10:52,870 --> 01:10:56,090
sharing ? Yes . Yes . Please . Yeah . 

1566
01:10:56,560 --> 01:10:58,920
Look , I've been involved in 

1567
01:10:58,930 --> 01:11:02,350
collaborative acquisition programs for 

1568
01:11:02,360 --> 01:11:05,720
tens of years . Um , I know from a 

1569
01:11:05,730 --> 01:11:08,390
NATO on international cooperation 

1570
01:11:08,390 --> 01:11:11,880
perspective that these collaboration 

1571
01:11:11,890 --> 01:11:15,170
enterprises are absolutely vital in 

1572
01:11:15,170 --> 01:11:18,260
terms of warfighting output . their 

1573
01:11:18,260 --> 01:11:21,260
vital in terms of developing the sort 

1574
01:11:21,260 --> 01:11:24,350
of high end technology . I think even 

1575
01:11:24,350 --> 01:11:28,020
the United States , uh , with with 

1576
01:11:28,030 --> 01:11:30,980
the vast industrial resources there , 

1577
01:11:30,980 --> 01:11:33,660
even you would concede that partnering 

1578
01:11:33,660 --> 01:11:37,620
with allies is a key component towards 

1579
01:11:37,640 --> 01:11:41,260
success . So we need to keep that that 

1580
01:11:41,270 --> 01:11:44,810
that open way , we need to make it 

1581
01:11:44,820 --> 01:11:48,520
accessible . Um , on yes , 

1582
01:11:48,530 --> 01:11:51,810
every nation is wrestling with the 

1583
01:11:51,820 --> 01:11:54,130
problem of information security 

1584
01:11:54,140 --> 01:11:57,860
protection of I p against a range of 

1585
01:11:57,860 --> 01:12:00,780
hostile international threats here . 

1586
01:12:01,150 --> 01:12:04,500
But there is a risk that we make this 

1587
01:12:04,500 --> 01:12:07,730
collaboration unnecessarily difficult . 

1588
01:12:07,730 --> 01:12:09,730
There is a risk . I'm not saying we 

1589
01:12:09,730 --> 01:12:12,170
were there , Andi . I think the key to 

1590
01:12:12,170 --> 01:12:15,790
this eyes and I think Greg 

1591
01:12:15,790 --> 01:12:18,330
alluded to the fact that we we mustn't 

1592
01:12:18,330 --> 01:12:20,960
make this such a bureaucratic exercise 

1593
01:12:21,090 --> 01:12:25,090
that progress becomes impossible 

1594
01:12:25,100 --> 01:12:27,267
on dis is a challenge not just for the 

1595
01:12:27,267 --> 01:12:29,267
U . K and the United States , but I 

1596
01:12:29,267 --> 01:12:32,660
collaborate with my colleagues into 

1597
01:12:32,670 --> 01:12:35,830
into Europe on a regular basis . It 

1598
01:12:35,830 --> 01:12:38,970
requires senior level leadership . It 

1599
01:12:38,970 --> 01:12:42,420
requires political leadership because 

1600
01:12:42,430 --> 01:12:44,660
the prize in terms of effective 

1601
01:12:45,050 --> 01:12:48,740
collaboration is absolutely 

1602
01:12:48,740 --> 01:12:52,390
pivotal . Thio good technology 

1603
01:12:52,400 --> 01:12:56,220
on strong defense over brilliant . 

1604
01:12:56,230 --> 01:12:59,400
Thank you very much way are now We are 

1605
01:12:59,410 --> 01:13:01,466
out of time , So I'm going to do you 

1606
01:13:01,466 --> 01:13:03,466
call it there on We have been break 

1607
01:13:03,466 --> 01:13:06,390
until around 10 . 30 and we eso thank 

1608
01:13:06,390 --> 01:13:09,080
you very much . Thio Greg on Sir Simon 

1609
01:13:09,090 --> 01:13:12,620
Andi Lett's take a bit of a break Thank 

1610
01:13:12,620 --> 01:13:15,170
you . Many thanks , 

1611
01:13:23,850 --> 01:13:27,030
Dr Co vid a change of venue , A change 

1612
01:13:27,030 --> 01:13:29,150
of dates and it's in . I can't wait 

1613
01:13:29,150 --> 01:13:31,670
until we're all together again Can and 

1614
01:13:31,670 --> 01:13:33,870
can see each other . Uh , in person . 

1615
01:13:33,880 --> 01:13:35,991
We've got a great panel to talk about 

1616
01:13:35,991 --> 01:13:38,000
this question . Obviously it is an 

1617
01:13:38,000 --> 01:13:40,450
election year . Uh , there's a lot of 

1618
01:13:40,450 --> 01:13:42,506
question about you know what will be 

1619
01:13:42,506 --> 01:13:44,672
continuity , what will not . Our panel 

1620
01:13:44,672 --> 01:13:47,030
is composed the Mackenzie Egland of the 

1621
01:13:47,030 --> 01:13:49,740
American Enterprise Institute , Fred 

1622
01:13:49,740 --> 01:13:52,570
Bartels of the Heritage Foundation , 

1623
01:13:52,580 --> 01:13:54,570
Andrew Hunter of the Center for 

1624
01:13:54,570 --> 01:13:56,681
Strategic and International Studies . 

1625
01:13:56,681 --> 01:13:58,514
And it's also my great honor toe 

1626
01:13:58,514 --> 01:14:01,700
welcome . Edward Ferguson , uh , former 

1627
01:14:01,710 --> 01:14:03,321
British ambassador to Bosnia 

1628
01:14:03,321 --> 01:14:06,400
Herzegovina , who is also the minister 

1629
01:14:06,410 --> 01:14:08,632
of defense minister here of the British 

1630
01:14:08,632 --> 01:14:10,688
Embassy in the United States and who 

1631
01:14:10,688 --> 01:14:12,854
does have , by an order of magnitude , 

1632
01:14:12,854 --> 01:14:15,021
the best backdrop who doesn't wanna be 

1633
01:14:15,021 --> 01:14:16,966
flanked by one of the Royal Navy's 

1634
01:14:16,966 --> 01:14:19,188
great submarines and and as well as the 

1635
01:14:19,188 --> 01:14:21,299
F 35 with With This Is Great Hovering 

1636
01:14:21,299 --> 01:14:23,354
over your head , Ed . So thanks very 

1637
01:14:23,354 --> 01:14:25,632
much for making time , Your Excellency , 

1638
01:14:25,632 --> 01:14:27,860
for making time for us to me , i e 

1639
01:14:27,940 --> 01:14:30,530
We'll take take what you can get . Uh , 

1640
01:14:30,540 --> 01:14:32,990
it certainly is a fascinating time . On 

1641
01:14:32,990 --> 01:14:34,712
the one hand , we have a hotly 

1642
01:14:34,712 --> 01:14:36,879
contested presidential election on the 

1643
01:14:36,879 --> 01:14:38,990
other . Ah , Pentagon . That's been , 

1644
01:14:38,990 --> 01:14:40,879
ah , paragon of of continuity and 

1645
01:14:40,879 --> 01:14:42,823
taking a building block approach , 

1646
01:14:42,823 --> 01:14:45,046
trying to accelerate acquisition and at 

1647
01:14:45,046 --> 01:14:47,157
least try to get capability out there 

1648
01:14:47,157 --> 01:14:49,490
faster . But then there's a big by part . 

1649
01:14:49,490 --> 01:14:51,601
You know , there's bipartisan support 

1650
01:14:51,601 --> 01:14:53,768
for defense , but then questions about 

1651
01:14:53,768 --> 01:14:53,690
some of the specifics of it , right , 

1652
01:14:53,700 --> 01:14:55,500
more people more earnestly or 

1653
01:14:55,500 --> 01:14:58,270
discussing the need to make tradeoffs 

1654
01:14:58,270 --> 01:15:00,159
and to take risks . We heard that 

1655
01:15:00,159 --> 01:15:01,659
message that the Air Force 

1656
01:15:01,659 --> 01:15:03,714
Association's annual conference that 

1657
01:15:03,714 --> 01:15:06,720
was also presented virtually on then 

1658
01:15:06,720 --> 01:15:08,331
we've got sort of leap ahead 

1659
01:15:08,331 --> 01:15:10,442
capabilities that are being developed 

1660
01:15:10,442 --> 01:15:10,410
right . The next generation air 

1661
01:15:10,410 --> 01:15:12,577
dominance airplane went from design to 

1662
01:15:12,577 --> 01:15:14,720
a flying prototype in a year . 

1663
01:15:14,750 --> 01:15:16,917
Extraordinary progress . The September 

1664
01:15:16,917 --> 01:15:20,210
3 joint old domain on battle 

1665
01:15:20,210 --> 01:15:22,390
management demonstration that showed 

1666
01:15:22,630 --> 01:15:25,440
Army artillery being used to intercept 

1667
01:15:25,440 --> 01:15:27,607
incoming cruise missiles , which could 

1668
01:15:27,607 --> 01:15:29,829
potentially be game changing and rather 

1669
01:15:29,829 --> 01:15:29,810
disappointing for companies that make , 

1670
01:15:29,810 --> 01:15:31,866
for example , certain classes of air 

1671
01:15:31,866 --> 01:15:34,580
defense missiles . Um , Mackenzie 

1672
01:15:34,580 --> 01:15:36,802
starts off sort of broadly , you know , 

1673
01:15:36,802 --> 01:15:39,150
where are we ? Where are we going ? Uh , 

1674
01:15:39,160 --> 01:15:41,382
in this in this environment , no matter 

1675
01:15:41,382 --> 01:15:43,493
what happens in November , right ? So 

1676
01:15:43,493 --> 01:15:45,549
when we reconvene in a year's time , 

1677
01:15:45,549 --> 01:15:48,190
where will we be ? So right now where 

1678
01:15:48,190 --> 01:15:50,520
we are is there's bipartisan support 

1679
01:15:50,520 --> 01:15:53,450
for supporting , uh , the domestic 

1680
01:15:53,450 --> 01:15:55,920
response thio coronavirus and propping 

1681
01:15:55,920 --> 01:15:58,300
up struggling families , companies , 

1682
01:15:58,300 --> 01:16:00,630
businesses , etcetera at There's a 

1683
01:16:00,630 --> 01:16:02,852
question on the fourth stimulus , but I 

1684
01:16:02,852 --> 01:16:04,908
think eventually there will be one . 

1685
01:16:04,908 --> 01:16:07,019
There's consensus on the need to fund 

1686
01:16:07,019 --> 01:16:09,241
the government and provide anomalies to 

1687
01:16:09,241 --> 01:16:11,408
the Defense Department in particular , 

1688
01:16:11,408 --> 01:16:13,519
so certain critical programs like the 

1689
01:16:13,519 --> 01:16:13,150
Columbia class nuclear submarine 

1690
01:16:13,150 --> 01:16:15,206
program could move forward even at a 

1691
01:16:15,206 --> 01:16:17,428
spending freeze of last year's levels . 

1692
01:16:17,428 --> 01:16:19,594
Not ideal for the Defense Department . 

1693
01:16:19,594 --> 01:16:21,761
But it's better than the alternative , 

1694
01:16:21,761 --> 01:16:23,983
which was a government shutdown , which 

1695
01:16:23,983 --> 01:16:26,150
has happened in recent years . When it 

1696
01:16:26,150 --> 01:16:28,660
comes to foreign and defense policy , I 

1697
01:16:28,670 --> 01:16:30,892
think there's more consensus than not . 

1698
01:16:30,892 --> 01:16:33,059
There's quibbling over the details and 

1699
01:16:33,059 --> 01:16:35,059
the nuance in the particulars , but 

1700
01:16:35,059 --> 01:16:37,650
broad strokes there's there is a lot of 

1701
01:16:38,030 --> 01:16:41,070
consensus short , but I don't wanna 

1702
01:16:41,080 --> 01:16:43,920
over portray that any extent . But , 

1703
01:16:43,930 --> 01:16:45,874
you know , the pandemic has really 

1704
01:16:45,874 --> 01:16:48,430
broadened the views of Americans that 

1705
01:16:48,440 --> 01:16:50,530
China is a long term competitors and 

1706
01:16:50,540 --> 01:16:52,762
something that has to be dealt with its 

1707
01:16:52,762 --> 01:16:54,873
Harding , those views , in many cases 

1708
01:16:54,873 --> 01:16:56,929
in the center . And you know what we 

1709
01:16:56,929 --> 01:16:58,707
saw at the tail under the Obama 

1710
01:16:58,707 --> 01:17:00,429
administration throughout this 

1711
01:17:00,429 --> 01:17:02,096
administration at the Defense 

1712
01:17:02,096 --> 01:17:04,262
Department , I think we'd see a lot of 

1713
01:17:04,262 --> 01:17:06,373
threats continue to be pulled forward 

1714
01:17:06,373 --> 01:17:08,596
in the next administration , regardless 

1715
01:17:08,596 --> 01:17:10,707
of which candidate it is . Will there 

1716
01:17:10,707 --> 01:17:12,651
be some differences ? You know , I 

1717
01:17:12,651 --> 01:17:14,818
enough treating new start open skies . 

1718
01:17:14,818 --> 01:17:16,929
Would those be revisited ? Yes . Thea 

1719
01:17:16,929 --> 01:17:19,151
Embassy in Jerusalem . No , Some things 

1720
01:17:19,151 --> 01:17:21,318
will be too far gone . US troop levels 

1721
01:17:21,318 --> 01:17:23,318
in Germany remains to be seen if we 

1722
01:17:23,318 --> 01:17:25,318
made commitments to other countries 

1723
01:17:25,318 --> 01:17:28,470
like , um or our allies 

1724
01:17:29,030 --> 01:17:31,086
s So what you're seeing here again , 

1725
01:17:31,086 --> 01:17:33,252
it's really just , uh the framework is 

1726
01:17:33,252 --> 01:17:35,960
the same in generally speaking And what 

1727
01:17:36,330 --> 01:17:38,386
ultimately , the coronavirus has not 

1728
01:17:38,386 --> 01:17:40,920
done waas decreased or diminish certain 

1729
01:17:40,920 --> 01:17:42,976
threats . In fact , I think Pentagon 

1730
01:17:42,976 --> 01:17:44,976
leadership would say it's increased 

1731
01:17:44,976 --> 01:17:47,142
instability around the world on Lee to 

1732
01:17:47,142 --> 01:17:49,364
varying degrees and in different ways , 

1733
01:17:49,364 --> 01:17:51,531
and in fact , I think we could see our 

1734
01:17:51,531 --> 01:17:53,698
transform and have to pay attention to 

1735
01:17:53,698 --> 01:17:53,340
problems that have been on the 

1736
01:17:53,340 --> 01:17:55,950
sidelines like Venezuela , for example , 

1737
01:17:56,030 --> 01:17:57,990
s so it's not a safer world . It 

1738
01:17:57,990 --> 01:17:59,934
doesn't require less security . It 

1739
01:17:59,934 --> 01:18:02,046
requires more safety at home and more 

1740
01:18:02,046 --> 01:18:04,300
security . Andi , there's a sense , 

1741
01:18:04,300 --> 01:18:06,189
right ? Food insecurity will be a 

1742
01:18:06,189 --> 01:18:08,356
problem because of co vid . So that is 

1743
01:18:08,356 --> 01:18:10,689
something that's a destabilizing factor . 

1744
01:18:10,689 --> 01:18:12,522
You have climate where folks are 

1745
01:18:12,522 --> 01:18:12,520
becoming more alarmed because those air 

1746
01:18:12,520 --> 01:18:14,687
then driving the kind of droughts that 

1747
01:18:14,687 --> 01:18:16,520
cause that kind of food security 

1748
01:18:16,520 --> 01:18:18,520
insecurity . I think people fail to 

1749
01:18:18,520 --> 01:18:20,353
realize that the Arab spring was 

1750
01:18:20,353 --> 01:18:22,464
sparked in part by on and also things 

1751
01:18:22,464 --> 01:18:24,631
that happened in Syria were sparked in 

1752
01:18:24,631 --> 01:18:27,190
part by food . Uh , insecurity . Let me 

1753
01:18:27,190 --> 01:18:29,357
just ask us so that everybody else and 

1754
01:18:29,357 --> 01:18:31,579
we can set this up , you know , at what 

1755
01:18:31,579 --> 01:18:33,857
point does that become important again , 

1756
01:18:33,857 --> 01:18:36,450
right ? I mean , we're at the precipice 

1757
01:18:36,450 --> 01:18:40,010
of $27 trillion . That's quite a lot of 

1758
01:18:40,010 --> 01:18:42,710
money . We maintain , ah , three plus 

1759
01:18:42,720 --> 01:18:46,010
percent of GDP in defense , in part 

1760
01:18:46,010 --> 01:18:48,250
because we borrow S o much . So it's a 

1761
01:18:48,250 --> 01:18:50,472
little bit rich when we pressure all of 

1762
01:18:50,472 --> 01:18:52,583
our allies Some of them are listening 

1763
01:18:52,583 --> 01:18:54,472
to this to increase their defense 

1764
01:18:54,472 --> 01:18:56,639
spending when we're borrowing in order 

1765
01:18:56,639 --> 01:18:58,528
to do that as a sad tendency , it 

1766
01:18:58,528 --> 01:19:00,750
appears Republicans care most about the 

1767
01:19:00,750 --> 01:19:02,972
debt when there's a Democrat sitting in 

1768
01:19:02,972 --> 01:19:02,930
the White House . At what point do we 

1769
01:19:02,930 --> 01:19:05,070
have to deal with this debt ? Allah , 

1770
01:19:05,070 --> 01:19:07,350
Bill Clinton , where you have to take 

1771
01:19:07,350 --> 01:19:09,350
some really , really tough action . 

1772
01:19:09,350 --> 01:19:11,517
Obviously , we have more margin . Then 

1773
01:19:11,517 --> 01:19:13,628
I want you to touch on that Mackenzie 

1774
01:19:13,628 --> 01:19:15,961
and then UH , both both Fred and Andrew , 

1775
01:19:15,961 --> 01:19:18,183
if you'll fold that into your responses 

1776
01:19:18,183 --> 01:19:20,406
of cold , would be great . But to start 

1777
01:19:20,406 --> 01:19:22,461
us off , sure , so you know the debt 

1778
01:19:22,461 --> 01:19:24,406
doesn't matter until it does . And 

1779
01:19:24,406 --> 01:19:26,406
there's usually an external forcing 

1780
01:19:26,406 --> 01:19:28,572
function so obviously right . The rise 

1781
01:19:28,572 --> 01:19:31,020
of the tea party after Obama's first 

1782
01:19:31,020 --> 01:19:33,076
election and the midterm elections , 

1783
01:19:33,076 --> 01:19:35,076
which followed , which helped , you 

1784
01:19:35,076 --> 01:19:37,020
know , drive us towards the Budget 

1785
01:19:37,020 --> 01:19:39,131
Control Act after the Super Committee 

1786
01:19:39,131 --> 01:19:41,187
failed . But to your point , Bago in 

1787
01:19:41,187 --> 01:19:43,409
the 19 nineties , interest rates on the 

1788
01:19:43,409 --> 01:19:45,464
federal that were the driving factor 

1789
01:19:45,464 --> 01:19:47,576
behind austerity budgets that Clinton 

1790
01:19:47,576 --> 01:19:49,576
adopted along with Republicans like 

1791
01:19:49,576 --> 01:19:51,798
Newt Gingrich , eso interest rates have 

1792
01:19:51,798 --> 01:19:53,964
spiked and then , you know , there was 

1793
01:19:53,964 --> 01:19:55,687
there was a a push for deficit 

1794
01:19:55,687 --> 01:19:57,853
reduction . But we've had low interest 

1795
01:19:57,853 --> 01:19:59,964
rates since the 19 nineties , and the 

1796
01:19:59,964 --> 01:20:02,187
Fed is using every tool at its disposal 

1797
01:20:02,187 --> 01:20:01,890
right now to continue Thio to keep it 

1798
01:20:01,890 --> 01:20:04,830
low . $3 is still the global currency 

1799
01:20:04,830 --> 01:20:08,290
reserves , so that is helping . But at 

1800
01:20:08,290 --> 01:20:10,401
some point there will be inflationary 

1801
01:20:10,401 --> 01:20:12,512
impacts , which caused interest rates 

1802
01:20:12,512 --> 01:20:14,346
to go up regardless of the Fed's 

1803
01:20:14,346 --> 01:20:16,400
activities . So that could be , you 

1804
01:20:16,400 --> 01:20:18,680
know , continued high debt , low growth 

1805
01:20:18,690 --> 01:20:21,530
across the global economy , a slowdown 

1806
01:20:21,530 --> 01:20:24,330
in globalization where supply chains 

1807
01:20:24,330 --> 01:20:26,386
returned back home . So then there's 

1808
01:20:26,386 --> 01:20:28,386
less productivity for multinational 

1809
01:20:28,386 --> 01:20:30,330
companies and corporations and the 

1810
01:20:30,330 --> 01:20:32,441
disruption of trade with China . This 

1811
01:20:32,441 --> 01:20:34,690
is a big This is where I see these two 

1812
01:20:34,690 --> 01:20:36,579
administrations potentially going 

1813
01:20:36,579 --> 01:20:38,746
different directions . Obviously , the 

1814
01:20:38,746 --> 01:20:40,746
Biden and Trump Administration's in 

1815
01:20:40,746 --> 01:20:43,710
2021 as trades and tariffs . Uh , you 

1816
01:20:43,710 --> 01:20:45,599
know , at the format of the Obama 

1817
01:20:45,599 --> 01:20:47,710
administration , remember , they were 

1818
01:20:47,710 --> 01:20:49,654
true pushing for the Trans Pacific 

1819
01:20:49,654 --> 01:20:51,821
partnership and Ash Carter said , I'll 

1820
01:20:51,821 --> 01:20:54,043
take that over a new aircraft carrier . 

1821
01:20:54,043 --> 01:20:56,154
Uh , so those two issues could really 

1822
01:20:56,154 --> 01:20:58,154
force the hand of policy makers and 

1823
01:20:58,154 --> 01:21:00,154
politicians , even if the feds used 

1824
01:21:00,154 --> 01:21:02,432
every tool at its disposal . Otherwise , 

1825
01:21:02,432 --> 01:21:05,550
uh , let me go to you . Although I will , 

1826
01:21:05,550 --> 01:21:08,740
I will say right on on many issues , Uh , 

1827
01:21:08,750 --> 01:21:11,130
Joe Biden is sounding very Donald Trump 

1828
01:21:11,130 --> 01:21:13,241
like right America Focus . Bring jobs 

1829
01:21:13,241 --> 01:21:16,720
to the United States on And , um , you 

1830
01:21:16,720 --> 01:21:18,720
know , some of the other rhetoric , 

1831
01:21:18,720 --> 01:21:20,831
whether with China or other threats , 

1832
01:21:20,831 --> 01:21:22,998
is a little bit stronger . So there is 

1833
01:21:22,998 --> 01:21:25,164
this consensus that he may be somewhat 

1834
01:21:25,164 --> 01:21:26,998
more consistent than our current 

1835
01:21:26,998 --> 01:21:29,220
president is Fred . Talk to us a little 

1836
01:21:29,220 --> 01:21:31,276
bit about what a trump to would look 

1837
01:21:31,276 --> 01:21:33,164
like , right ? I mean , it's it's 

1838
01:21:33,164 --> 01:21:34,998
pretty certain that we'll have a 

1839
01:21:34,998 --> 01:21:36,776
leadership change likely at the 

1840
01:21:36,776 --> 01:21:40,050
Pentagon . Well , may think that that 

1841
01:21:40,050 --> 01:21:42,217
is . But ultimately , from a budgetary 

1842
01:21:42,217 --> 01:21:44,383
standpoint , a trade offs standpoint , 

1843
01:21:44,383 --> 01:21:46,383
we've not yet seen the hard choices 

1844
01:21:46,383 --> 01:21:48,494
this administration was talking about 

1845
01:21:48,494 --> 01:21:50,828
making yet , and it's always , you know , 

1846
01:21:50,828 --> 01:21:52,883
it's sort of like next year it'll be 

1847
01:21:52,883 --> 01:21:54,883
next year , and that's that's great 

1848
01:21:54,883 --> 01:21:56,939
politically and otherwise . But what 

1849
01:21:56,939 --> 01:21:59,050
walk us through where you think trump 

1850
01:21:59,050 --> 01:22:01,050
to and what Trump to looks like ? I 

1851
01:22:01,050 --> 01:22:03,161
know you don't speak for the campaign 

1852
01:22:03,161 --> 01:22:02,880
anymore , that I'm gonna ask Andrew to 

1853
01:22:02,880 --> 01:22:05,047
talk a little bit about what Biden one 

1854
01:22:05,047 --> 01:22:07,158
would look like if if the former vice 

1855
01:22:07,158 --> 01:22:09,324
president wins . But once you start us 

1856
01:22:09,324 --> 01:22:11,436
off on what your vision would be in a 

1857
01:22:11,436 --> 01:22:13,491
second Trump administration , sure , 

1858
01:22:13,491 --> 01:22:15,658
I'm going to start with one comment on 

1859
01:22:15,658 --> 01:22:17,658
the that that you brought up . Uh , 

1860
01:22:17,658 --> 01:22:20,030
that's the big question that a lot of 

1861
01:22:20,100 --> 01:22:22,100
the domestic people heritage always 

1862
01:22:22,100 --> 01:22:24,100
have . Like , when is that ? That's 

1863
01:22:24,100 --> 01:22:26,322
going to matter . When are people going 

1864
01:22:26,322 --> 01:22:28,378
to realize that you actually need to 

1865
01:22:28,378 --> 01:22:30,540
reform the big ? Why the consumes all 

1866
01:22:30,540 --> 01:22:32,318
the government money , which is 

1867
01:22:32,318 --> 01:22:34,318
entitlement ? Uh , you can point to 

1868
01:22:34,318 --> 01:22:36,429
discretionary spending as much as you 

1869
01:22:36,429 --> 01:22:38,540
want , but if you reduce that to zero 

1870
01:22:38,540 --> 01:22:41,600
and your entitlements , as is , you're 

1871
01:22:41,610 --> 01:22:43,777
still going to have a dad . And that's 

1872
01:22:43,777 --> 01:22:47,010
the problem . Uh , so that's Ah , hope 

1873
01:22:47,010 --> 01:22:49,680
in a wish off a good chunk off the 

1874
01:22:49,690 --> 01:22:51,523
fiscal conservatives that at the 

1875
01:22:51,523 --> 01:22:53,579
Heritage Foundation this toe address 

1876
01:22:53,579 --> 01:22:55,468
that , and to address entitlement 

1877
01:22:55,468 --> 01:22:57,690
reform and interesting heritage , a lot 

1878
01:22:57,690 --> 01:23:01,380
of uh exactly , I didn't want to 

1879
01:23:01,390 --> 01:23:03,557
assume and talked for more people than 

1880
01:23:03,557 --> 01:23:07,430
eso . For me . The way to start 

1881
01:23:07,430 --> 01:23:09,430
understanding what a trump to would 

1882
01:23:09,430 --> 01:23:11,486
look like is to look at the fight up 

1883
01:23:11,486 --> 01:23:13,597
that they have put out and you have a 

1884
01:23:13,597 --> 01:23:16,810
flat future for defense budget . And I 

1885
01:23:16,820 --> 01:23:18,820
think what you see in the next four 

1886
01:23:18,820 --> 01:23:21,760
years it's a smaller variation , 

1887
01:23:21,770 --> 01:23:23,870
uh , smaller variation from the 

1888
01:23:23,870 --> 01:23:25,870
standard deviation . So you're just 

1889
01:23:25,870 --> 01:23:27,870
shrinking . How much of a percent ? 

1890
01:23:27,870 --> 01:23:30,037
It's going up or down , and it's going 

1891
01:23:30,037 --> 01:23:32,800
to fluctuate around that 700 mark a . 

1892
01:23:32,810 --> 01:23:35,430
Maybe sometimes closer to 2 800 maybe 

1893
01:23:35,430 --> 01:23:38,220
sometimes closer , 600 . But that's 

1894
01:23:38,230 --> 01:23:40,910
probably going to be where it all 

1895
01:23:40,910 --> 01:23:44,050
settles at the end . Um , whatever . 

1896
01:23:44,060 --> 01:23:46,630
And it has the The biggest question 

1897
01:23:46,630 --> 01:23:48,830
that needs to answer is what does a 

1898
01:23:48,840 --> 01:23:51,480
post Budget control Act world look like ? 

1899
01:23:51,490 --> 01:23:53,760
For the past 10 years , Congress has a 

1900
01:23:53,770 --> 01:23:55,940
very boilerplate waiting negotiating 

1901
01:23:55,940 --> 01:23:59,050
budget . Uh , I give you a little bit 

1902
01:23:59,050 --> 01:24:01,217
more on the defense side . You give me 

1903
01:24:01,217 --> 01:24:03,494
a little bit on the nondefense side on , 

1904
01:24:03,494 --> 01:24:05,970
we move on and we call it a day . Uh , 

1905
01:24:05,980 --> 01:24:08,147
there are a lot of staffers that never 

1906
01:24:08,147 --> 01:24:10,091
worked with outside of that , that 

1907
01:24:10,091 --> 01:24:12,091
confines so and you you're going to 

1908
01:24:12,091 --> 01:24:14,000
have a great opportunity for the 

1909
01:24:14,000 --> 01:24:16,970
administration or for the new buying 

1910
01:24:16,980 --> 01:24:19,730
team to set up the terms of the debate 

1911
01:24:19,740 --> 01:24:22,840
when they submit a budget in the 

1912
01:24:22,840 --> 01:24:26,410
beginning of 2021 So that is the big 

1913
01:24:26,410 --> 01:24:30,340
unknown and for the for Trump 

1914
01:24:30,340 --> 01:24:32,507
to . I think it's fair to look at what 

1915
01:24:32,507 --> 01:24:34,710
they have planned does are and imagine 

1916
01:24:34,710 --> 01:24:37,720
a flat scenario of continuing to 

1917
01:24:37,720 --> 01:24:39,553
implement what they have started 

1918
01:24:39,553 --> 01:24:42,250
bringing up on the third point that I 

1919
01:24:42,250 --> 01:24:44,840
want to bring up . So it is shorter and 

1920
01:24:44,840 --> 01:24:47,007
snappier is where is the discussion of 

1921
01:24:47,007 --> 01:24:49,670
the 3 to 5% increase that the 

1922
01:24:49,670 --> 01:24:51,837
commission where McCain is he served , 

1923
01:24:51,837 --> 01:24:53,892
assessing that the national strategy 

1924
01:24:53,892 --> 01:24:56,059
talked about it . The national defense 

1925
01:24:56,059 --> 01:24:58,114
itself discusses that a little bit . 

1926
01:24:58,114 --> 01:25:00,170
What does that look like ? What what 

1927
01:25:00,170 --> 01:25:02,114
happens if that's not where we are 

1928
01:25:02,114 --> 01:25:04,650
water , the gaps that we're allowing to 

1929
01:25:04,650 --> 01:25:06,920
exist ? What ? What the hell does that 

1930
01:25:06,920 --> 01:25:09,750
risk then ? Meaning those scenarios and 

1931
01:25:09,750 --> 01:25:12,120
water the trade off that you're 

1932
01:25:12,120 --> 01:25:15,180
actually allowing Thio , you have , ah , 

1933
01:25:15,190 --> 01:25:18,220
capability , gap somewhere , Uh , 

1934
01:25:18,230 --> 01:25:20,400
Andrew let me and And that was a great 

1935
01:25:20,400 --> 01:25:22,567
piece of work . Ambassador Edelman and 

1936
01:25:22,567 --> 01:25:25,470
Gary Ruff , head spearheading that very , 

1937
01:25:25,470 --> 01:25:27,692
very impressive piece of work . Even if 

1938
01:25:27,692 --> 01:25:29,748
folks thought that it was fiscally a 

1939
01:25:29,748 --> 01:25:31,803
little bit the too much of a reach . 

1940
01:25:31,803 --> 01:25:34,026
Although take your point , Andrew , you 

1941
01:25:34,026 --> 01:25:36,890
you don't speak for team Biden at all 

1942
01:25:36,890 --> 01:25:39,720
But you've held key roles in the last 

1943
01:25:39,720 --> 01:25:41,831
administration in the Pentagon . Talk 

1944
01:25:41,831 --> 01:25:43,942
to us a little bit about what ah bind 

1945
01:25:43,942 --> 01:25:46,220
Administration would look like , right ? 

1946
01:25:46,220 --> 01:25:45,600
I mean , the team has been talking a 

1947
01:25:45,600 --> 01:25:48,380
little bit about the broad contour on 

1948
01:25:48,380 --> 01:25:50,310
there is . And and the candidate 

1949
01:25:50,310 --> 01:25:52,588
himself is on the record saying , Look , 

1950
01:25:52,588 --> 01:25:54,754
I'm not gonna be looking at making big 

1951
01:25:54,754 --> 01:25:56,754
defense cuts in order to underwrite 

1952
01:25:56,754 --> 01:25:56,640
social programs , which I'm sure was a 

1953
01:25:56,640 --> 01:25:58,807
disappointment to the left of the to . 

1954
01:25:58,807 --> 01:26:02,060
To his left . What ? What would the 

1955
01:26:02,070 --> 01:26:05,950
plan and the vision be , right ? I mean , 

1956
01:26:05,950 --> 01:26:08,061
what should the expectation be ? What 

1957
01:26:08,061 --> 01:26:10,172
is your expectation ? Yeah , thanks , 

1958
01:26:10,172 --> 01:26:12,228
Fargo . And really happy to join you 

1959
01:26:12,228 --> 01:26:14,339
and happy to see these friendly faces 

1960
01:26:14,339 --> 01:26:16,561
on the screen . Because I've missed you 

1961
01:26:16,561 --> 01:26:18,783
guys so good to be back with you . Good 

1962
01:26:18,783 --> 01:26:17,970
to be back . A calm deaf . It's always 

1963
01:26:17,970 --> 01:26:21,370
a fantastic discussion . Um , yeah . So 

1964
01:26:21,380 --> 01:26:23,324
thank you for clarifying Vargo . I 

1965
01:26:23,324 --> 01:26:25,436
don't speak for the campaign . That's 

1966
01:26:25,436 --> 01:26:27,658
that's very true and needs to be said . 

1967
01:26:27,658 --> 01:26:29,824
But I , you know , obviously have been 

1968
01:26:29,824 --> 01:26:31,936
keeping an eye on the rhetoric in the 

1969
01:26:31,936 --> 01:26:33,936
Democratic primary , something I've 

1970
01:26:33,936 --> 01:26:35,991
observed for many years . As someone 

1971
01:26:35,991 --> 01:26:38,102
who's worked off and on on defense on 

1972
01:26:38,102 --> 01:26:40,102
the Democratic side of the aisle on 

1973
01:26:40,102 --> 01:26:42,269
It's always a fascinating discussion , 

1974
01:26:42,269 --> 01:26:44,800
and I also did a read of the Democratic 

1975
01:26:44,800 --> 01:26:46,578
Party platform , which has some 

1976
01:26:46,578 --> 01:26:48,633
interesting content on defense . For 

1977
01:26:48,633 --> 01:26:50,800
those who haven't had a chance to read 

1978
01:26:50,800 --> 01:26:52,967
it on , I would point out kind of , as 

1979
01:26:52,967 --> 01:26:52,620
you said Vago , that there were 

1980
01:26:52,620 --> 01:26:54,787
candidates in the Democratic Party who 

1981
01:26:54,787 --> 01:26:56,898
explicitly ran on cutting the defense 

1982
01:26:56,898 --> 01:26:56,700
budget that