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first things first , right ? You need 

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to define the requirements because I 

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firmly believe once you make it a 

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requirement that people can say I have 

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I have achieved my certification and 

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I'm compliant . It's much easier than 

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the South . That test station method is 

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to what we currently have about 

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imparting cybersecurity . Um , 

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the how the rule change actually 

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helps small business . Right ? I've 

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talked about this at nauseum over the 

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past 18 months . Currently , the model 

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the way it is , both with our our 

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partners in the UK and in the here in 

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the US all they have to do if they have 

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that particular Defar clause . Now , 

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mind you , there aren't many 

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cybersecurity requirements in all 

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contracts . And and I I I ask anyone 

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to tell me something in your life that 

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does not have a link to cyber today . 

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And I've used the example um , 10,000 

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times . But I'll do it one more . 

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Somebody said an apple , I said , 

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unless that apple magically appeared in 

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front of you , it got there by logistic 

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systems by finance systems , probably 

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genetically altered and modifying seeds . 

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So cyber is in their Andi . We need to 

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have that . That understanding and more 

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importantly , Theo education piece , 

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sir , that you mentioned Key . Right ? 

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But it's more about the critical 

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thinking about for a small business . 

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Why it is essential for your business 

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to endure toe , have cybersecurity as 

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as a foundational layer . You know , 

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your HR , your payroll , everything is 

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running on it . In the Defar rule , we 

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made the leap to say , Okay , self , 

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that test station , You know we trust , 

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but verify . So you're gonna have to go 

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get verified . Um , it will level for 

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small businesses , the playing field . 

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Because right now , for small business , 

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um , is going through and they're 

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testing on the model that that they're 

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doing 110 controls of the next 1 71 . 

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But there are only actually doing 50 . 

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And that delta of 60 isn't reflected in 

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their rate Company B , same technology . 

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Same . You know , bench technical 

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capability . Um , experience , see , 

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pars , but they're actually doing 110 

56
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controls of the NIST . Their rate will 

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be significantly higher when it comes 

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to contract award . They're both 

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technically acceptable and more times 

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often technically acceptable . You're 

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gonna go with the lower price and our 

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adversaries been banking on that . So 

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in this rule change , we've actually 

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done a great deal to ensure that a 

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security is an allowable cost to take 

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into consideration the fact that we're 

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going to need companies to build it 

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into their rate , a clear understanding 

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of what we assume the costs are by our 

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research , which we have supported , 

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and it's out in the rule change . I've 

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talked about this for quite a bit a 

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while that we we did a tremendous 

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amount of economic impact on this , but 

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and I would ask my partner in the UK um , 

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you know , we're losing 600 year in an 

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adversarial X still cyberespionage I p 

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data loss , um , investing , you know , 

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I say 10% in the short game for the 

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long term strategic return on 

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investment . Um , if we can keep space 

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on day and what we're doing there in , 

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um , or protected environment for the 

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next 10 15 20 years , I can't imagine 

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the investments not worth it , Bob . 

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I think because J D are you 

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still speaking ? Okay , so that's a 

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very interesting way for me to Segway 

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to something pretty challenging . Um , 

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you know , in the us . We use the term 

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national security space systems . And 

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because the US enjoyed some 

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technological dominance over a long 

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period of time , you might say that our 

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government got into the habit of 

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extremely high value space systems that 

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took sometimes more than a decade to 

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develop . Cost a fortune relied upon a 

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close supply chain that was highly 

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secure , but not necessarily the best 

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available technology . And then those 

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systems wants put in orbit would remain 

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in service for a very long time . And 

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it proves it's proven to be 

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extraordinarily difficult . Replicate 

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the capability without even larger 

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investments to take even more time . 

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All of this , you know , work in a 

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period where we did not have a near 

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peer competition . But that's not now . 

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And sometimes I'm concerned that using 

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the term near Pier were perhaps not 

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giving as much credit to our 

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adversaries as we should . Um , in some 

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respects , they are peers , or they 

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certainly intend to b'more than peers . 

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And that's why I'm seeing a lot of 

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interest in D . O . D . In looking 

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beyond the traditional models for space 

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system development and deployment into 

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methods that are more agile and that 

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would would reach into the best 

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innovators in the commercial world . 

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Companies who are supporting commercial 

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space , whose technology is rapid , 

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adaptive , agile and resilient , none 

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of whom are used to doing work under 

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the security principles of the 

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department defense . So I'd ask Air 

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Vice Marshals might first , if you 

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could kind of comment on the changing 

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context for national security space 

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systems . Um , the extent to which the 

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UK might be looking thio best in class 

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commercial sources . And then perhaps 

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you could share your thoughts on 

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strategies to approach securing that 

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technology . And then Katie , I'd like 

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your views on the same subject . 

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Absolutely . I thank So I would 

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I observed that UK is not in the same 

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league as the U . S . When it comes to 

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space on you've just described the US 

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space capability of the enterprise in 

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the portfolio . UK is most definitely 

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not there on when you use the phrase 

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near Pier . Uh , we we definitely 

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don't refer Thio . Our potential 

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adversaries is near pier . In fact , 

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they're well in front of us on in this 

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demean . This has been something that I 

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as I'm sure many of you are where we're 

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right in the heart off our integrated 

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defense and security review here of the 

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moment on board a part off that review 

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has has been to very clearly recognize 

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that position that we find ourselves in 

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on our air . Our adversaries of 

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accelerated well ahead of us from a UK 

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perspective that said , we have 

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over again decades through our 

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strong alliances , in particular 

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bilateral relationships with the U . S . 

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We have benefited very visibly from 

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shared data and shared equity in space 

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Man . While it's not necessarily , uh , 

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overly investing in national or cell 

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phone capability , albeit we do have a 

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world class that come a system in the 

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form of scan and and we continue to 

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upgrade that with recent renewal to 

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contrast in the next , the next 

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generation off Skynet coming . But your 

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point is well made . It's interesting . 

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As I've come into this job , I won off 

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the early lessons that I learned was we 

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in defense , especially with my 

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background in doing big aircraft 

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programs like at 35 or our our latest 

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carrier program , time in the Making 

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Andi in the space world . The spaces , 

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we say , have become more 

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commercialized . There are youngsters 

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out there who are popping out of 

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university or college . They're getting 

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150 grand startup Grant . They're 

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producing some brilliant widgets on 

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from good idea to PowerPoint 

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presentation . Toe on orbit is less 

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than a year on their very content that 

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that capability will be . I dated in 

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another year . They'll just let it burn 

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up in low Earth orbit . But they're all 

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feeling the next thing on that 

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much mawr accepting that will invest 

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money on it . The capability that we 

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get , we may burn it up pretty quickly . 

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And that's okay , because it's gonna be 

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I dated anyway on those in the 

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commercial world are much more adapted 

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doing this and much more comfortable at 

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it . On importantly , they're much more 

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comfortable . That may be failing at it . 

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Um , a not scenario where we're still 

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trying Thio to learn . How do we how do 

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we take this forward in an agile , 

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rapid way where we're okay to feel ? 

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Sometimes we want to take some risks , 

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but we need to get our capabilities at 

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the door pretty quickly . Onda were 

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already just through our defense review , 

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looking at better ways of doing 

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acquisition reform that we've set up a 

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Facebook program to look at it . Onda , 

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we're using space is a vehicle to do 

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that . Linking into some of one of our 

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big space clusters is pretty close to 

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where we are here in M E D . Where 

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there's over 100 small startups all 

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just living and thriving off this every 

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day . Aan den we , as the Ministry of 

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Defense , have come lumbering in saying , 

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Please teach us on . You know , for us 

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there's a there's a journey of learning 

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to be had . Um , what's interesting is 

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many of them have huge appetite toe 

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want to work with us . But they have 

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zero experience of working with the 

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military , so it hopes really nicely 

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back to the previous discussion about 

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the education . Better if you're going 

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to come . If we're going to do this 

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together , there may be some extra 

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can't be outsider levied on you is a 

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small start up , but it's worth you 

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investing in it because it's gonna set 

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the foundation for a decent working 

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relationship going forward on one . 

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That means you will be part of a part 

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off the security structure to 

241
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over So , uh , any what ? I what ? I've 

242
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heard I think will resonate with you . 

243
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Namely , um , there's a great interest 

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in space in the U . K . And in space 

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and other domains in the U . S . To 

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have access to the agile , fast moving , 

247
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highly resilient contractors , the 

248
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innovators , the startups , They have 

249
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great ideas , but they may have the 

250
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international partners supporting their 

251
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technology . They could use open source 

252
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software . They could use hardware 

253
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components from anywhere in the world . 

254
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They're faster . Product is great , but 

255
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it doesn't come from a highly secure 

256
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supply chain . And they probably have 

257
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no experience whatsoever in attempting 

258
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to secure their intellectual property 

259
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or controlled technical information . 

260
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So Dia de wants them and we need them . 

261
00:11:06,601 --> 00:11:08,546
But how can you apply ? See MMC in 

262
00:11:08,546 --> 00:11:10,920
similar objectives to securing their 

263
00:11:10,920 --> 00:11:14,660
participation . So I have to say , Vice 

264
00:11:14,660 --> 00:11:17,060
Admiral , huge fan , Um , everything 

265
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you said was exactly spot on . And Bob , 

266
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one of the things that we need to , you 

267
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know , look at right is a in in D . O d . 

268
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Much like in the UK , we've we're doing 

269
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tremendous amount of acquisition reform 

270
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because developing a weapon system or 

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capability that , you know , it takes 

272
00:11:36,400 --> 00:11:38,860
us a long time and development . It's a 

273
00:11:38,870 --> 00:11:41,630
It's an incredibly arduous cycle that 

274
00:11:41,630 --> 00:11:44,150
we need to go through from , you know , 

275
00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:46,600
coming up with the idea to palm ng for 

276
00:11:46,600 --> 00:11:49,170
the money , re sourcing it , getting it 

277
00:11:49,170 --> 00:11:51,114
through all of the testing that is 

278
00:11:51,114 --> 00:11:53,270
needed . Ah , lot of the times . You 

279
00:11:53,270 --> 00:11:55,048
know , five years later , we're 

280
00:11:55,048 --> 00:11:57,130
bringing ah , weapons system our 

281
00:11:57,130 --> 00:11:59,297
capability to bear that . That's , you 

282
00:11:59,297 --> 00:12:01,352
know , the commercial sector just is 

283
00:12:01,352 --> 00:12:03,519
moving in light years , and your point 

284
00:12:03,519 --> 00:12:05,741
about risk and failure are a big deal , 

285
00:12:05,741 --> 00:12:08,019
right ? That is something that we , um , 

286
00:12:08,019 --> 00:12:11,760
culturally don't do a great deal of you 

287
00:12:11,770 --> 00:12:14,500
wear a very risk adverse 

288
00:12:14,510 --> 00:12:17,750
environment ecosystem . Because 

289
00:12:17,940 --> 00:12:21,670
we're the I say that the fiscal 

290
00:12:21,680 --> 00:12:23,680
impact right , but the auditing and 

291
00:12:23,680 --> 00:12:25,736
making sure that you're spending tax 

292
00:12:25,736 --> 00:12:27,791
dollars U S tax dollars in the right 

293
00:12:27,791 --> 00:12:30,300
way and that there's accountability for 

294
00:12:30,300 --> 00:12:32,590
it . So , you know , our acquisition 

295
00:12:32,600 --> 00:12:36,180
system , um , is is 

296
00:12:36,190 --> 00:12:38,940
daunting . No doubt I will commend . 

297
00:12:38,950 --> 00:12:41,061
Actually , Miss Lord , who spoke this 

298
00:12:41,061 --> 00:12:42,900
morning ? Um , Miss Cummings , I 

299
00:12:42,900 --> 00:12:45,300
believe , spoke right before me , Mr 

300
00:12:45,300 --> 00:12:47,510
Fahey . They created something called 

301
00:12:47,510 --> 00:12:49,580
the Adaptive acquisition framework , 

302
00:12:49,590 --> 00:12:53,110
which is , uh , way to enable 

303
00:12:53,110 --> 00:12:55,080
PM's to move faster through the 

304
00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:57,970
acquisition cycle . Um , but in that 

305
00:12:57,980 --> 00:13:00,590
making sure that cyber security is 

306
00:13:00,590 --> 00:13:04,260
foundational to every contract . The 

307
00:13:04,270 --> 00:13:06,340
comment about new or innovative 

308
00:13:06,340 --> 00:13:08,440
companies , You know , the challenge 

309
00:13:08,440 --> 00:13:12,040
the C M . M . C . In the perception it 

310
00:13:12,040 --> 00:13:14,550
puts , but it actually is . If these 

311
00:13:14,550 --> 00:13:16,640
were people who are truly doing the 

312
00:13:16,640 --> 00:13:19,750
innovation right there the the bleeding 

313
00:13:19,760 --> 00:13:23,150
edge in research in universities , I 

314
00:13:23,150 --> 00:13:25,800
can promise you they know full well how 

315
00:13:25,800 --> 00:13:27,911
to protect themselves . They're doing 

316
00:13:27,911 --> 00:13:30,078
it . They know they're they have grown 

317
00:13:30,078 --> 00:13:32,750
up . I mean , I am blissfully 49 years 

318
00:13:32,750 --> 00:13:36,450
old on bond . We this 

319
00:13:36,460 --> 00:13:38,660
our generation Right now , we didn't 

320
00:13:38,660 --> 00:13:40,980
grow up with the , you know , the 

321
00:13:40,980 --> 00:13:44,690
things , the magic stones . Um , it was 

322
00:13:44,690 --> 00:13:46,801
something that was introduced to us . 

323
00:13:46,801 --> 00:13:48,912
So it seems somewhat foreign to think 

324
00:13:48,912 --> 00:13:51,240
about cybersecurity versus people that 

325
00:13:51,250 --> 00:13:53,250
you know . It's like it's been with 

326
00:13:53,250 --> 00:13:55,472
them since the K that the day that they 

327
00:13:55,472 --> 00:13:57,710
were born , they understand security . 

328
00:13:57,720 --> 00:13:59,776
Um , the challenge has been a lot of 

329
00:13:59,776 --> 00:14:01,664
time . Their security is far more 

330
00:14:01,664 --> 00:14:03,553
advanced than what we're actually 

331
00:14:03,553 --> 00:14:06,010
implementing . But the CMM see the 

332
00:14:06,010 --> 00:14:08,460
benefit it gives them . It says clearly 

333
00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:10,790
there's not any ambiguity . This is 

334
00:14:10,790 --> 00:14:13,010
what you need to be doing to protect 

335
00:14:13,020 --> 00:14:16,450
yourself and your into intellectual 

336
00:14:16,450 --> 00:14:18,860
property . Because the adversaries 

337
00:14:18,860 --> 00:14:21,740
getting at these these innovators long 

338
00:14:21,740 --> 00:14:25,490
before they get to the d o d s o a zoo . 

339
00:14:25,490 --> 00:14:27,657
Muchas . They think that they're doing 

340
00:14:27,657 --> 00:14:29,768
They need to be just brought back and 

341
00:14:29,768 --> 00:14:31,990
say Stop and think , you know , Are you 

342
00:14:31,990 --> 00:14:33,990
making your bed every day ? Are you 

343
00:14:33,990 --> 00:14:36,157
doing the basics ? Thio ? Protect your 

344
00:14:36,157 --> 00:14:38,157
your intellectual property , But to 

345
00:14:38,157 --> 00:14:40,240
ensure the continuity of whatever 

346
00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:42,990
you're creating eso , I think the C M m . 

347
00:14:42,990 --> 00:14:45,730
C . Is actually it level sets . It 

348
00:14:45,730 --> 00:14:48,270
makes it understandable on how much you 

349
00:14:48,270 --> 00:14:50,810
should be . Spending on it by by the 

350
00:14:50,810 --> 00:14:53,850
Department of Defense is level . It 

351
00:14:53,850 --> 00:14:56,320
also is a maturity model . The CM EMC 

352
00:14:56,320 --> 00:14:59,600
is security is not one size fits all 

353
00:14:59,610 --> 00:15:01,730
based on the capability or the 

354
00:15:01,730 --> 00:15:03,619
innovation . Um , there's certain 

355
00:15:03,619 --> 00:15:06,240
things that would require a great deal 

356
00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:08,950
more security than they may realize . 

357
00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:12,600
But it's it's that understanding that 

358
00:15:12,610 --> 00:15:14,880
innovative companies , um , that I've 

359
00:15:14,880 --> 00:15:17,140
spoken to , and Bob and and Vice 

360
00:15:17,140 --> 00:15:20,110
Admiral literally traveled prior to co 

361
00:15:20,110 --> 00:15:22,550
vid . I think I'm on my 

362
00:15:22,940 --> 00:15:26,520
300 speaking engagement in 18 months . 

363
00:15:26,530 --> 00:15:28,840
Um , I have yet to find an innovation 

364
00:15:28,840 --> 00:15:31,820
company that didn't say we want to do 

365
00:15:31,820 --> 00:15:34,440
the right thing and we just It's hard 

366
00:15:34,440 --> 00:15:36,662
to understand what you're asking . This 

367
00:15:36,662 --> 00:15:39,500
is a clear example of here we are . Um 

368
00:15:39,510 --> 00:15:42,970
I think for the area that I have a lot 

369
00:15:42,970 --> 00:15:45,070
of conversation about is the 

370
00:15:45,070 --> 00:15:47,970
universities and the research on the 

371
00:15:47,970 --> 00:15:50,430
labs about what type of certifications 

372
00:15:50,430 --> 00:15:53,960
they'll need on do a great deal of us 

373
00:15:53,960 --> 00:15:57,880
universities have leaned in , um , just 

374
00:15:57,890 --> 00:16:00,780
taken my my me by surprise and 

375
00:16:00,790 --> 00:16:04,220
creating , uh , course 

376
00:16:04,220 --> 00:16:07,740
101 entry for freshman level on 

377
00:16:07,740 --> 00:16:09,962
cybersecurity . So that , you know , is 

378
00:16:09,962 --> 00:16:12,296
they're learning how to present a paper . 

379
00:16:12,296 --> 00:16:14,462
They should absolutely be learning the 

380
00:16:14,462 --> 00:16:16,518
basics and cyber hygiene , which are 

381
00:16:16,518 --> 00:16:18,920
universal , how to protect themselves . 

382
00:16:18,920 --> 00:16:21,450
So I I think we're in a We're starting 

383
00:16:21,450 --> 00:16:23,561
in a good , you know , getting to the 

384
00:16:23,561 --> 00:16:27,100
right place . But , you know , we I 

385
00:16:27,100 --> 00:16:29,280
think the barrier to getting that 

386
00:16:29,280 --> 00:16:31,760
really good commercial innovation into 

387
00:16:31,760 --> 00:16:34,540
our both of our our departments is 

388
00:16:34,540 --> 00:16:36,707
going to be the fact that , you know , 

389
00:16:36,707 --> 00:16:39,750
risk aversion , the cost of development . 

390
00:16:39,940 --> 00:16:42,630
And how do we create an environment 

391
00:16:42,640 --> 00:16:45,130
when when we put a satellite up in 

392
00:16:45,130 --> 00:16:47,540
orbit , um , it takes us five years to 

393
00:16:47,540 --> 00:16:49,318
get there versus the commercial 

394
00:16:49,318 --> 00:16:51,373
capability that could do it . As you 

395
00:16:51,373 --> 00:16:53,570
said , sir , you know from idea . Thio 

396
00:16:53,570 --> 00:16:56,660
actually orbit in one year . We have to 

397
00:16:56,660 --> 00:16:58,827
think of new ways . You know , we have 

398
00:16:58,827 --> 00:17:01,450
the new software acquisition pathway 

399
00:17:01,460 --> 00:17:03,630
here in the d . O . D . I think that's 

400
00:17:03,630 --> 00:17:05,686
going to be a game changer , right ? 

401
00:17:05,686 --> 00:17:09,000
Because that allows that capability to 

402
00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:11,470
be developed in an agile environment 

403
00:17:11,470 --> 00:17:13,600
and understand that it may change 

404
00:17:13,610 --> 00:17:16,390
somewhat as it's as it's developing . I 

405
00:17:16,390 --> 00:17:19,670
think that things like dead SEC ops and 

406
00:17:19,670 --> 00:17:22,180
you know , the Air Force . Mr Chalon , 

407
00:17:22,190 --> 00:17:25,150
they have done a good chunk of work 

408
00:17:25,150 --> 00:17:28,920
about dead SEC ops . Um , the Navy and 

409
00:17:28,920 --> 00:17:32,040
and D O . D . Has under Secretary Gertz . 

410
00:17:32,040 --> 00:17:34,800
They've done amazing work as well as 

411
00:17:34,810 --> 00:17:37,160
the Army . I think that as we get 

412
00:17:37,160 --> 00:17:39,216
through that right and getting those 

413
00:17:39,216 --> 00:17:42,540
containers to those innovators in away 

414
00:17:42,540 --> 00:17:44,651
in a secure environment that they can 

415
00:17:44,651 --> 00:17:46,818
build on top of it will Onley expedite 

416
00:17:46,818 --> 00:17:48,670
and and , you know , put our 

417
00:17:48,680 --> 00:17:50,569
acquisition into fast forward and 

418
00:17:50,569 --> 00:17:52,791
maintain that agile development , which 

419
00:17:52,791 --> 00:17:54,860
is critical . I mean , it's tell me 

420
00:17:54,860 --> 00:17:57,193
something that doesn't have cyber in it , 

421
00:17:57,193 --> 00:17:59,416
right ? Well , you know , it's a it's a 

422
00:17:59,416 --> 00:18:01,582
fascinating set of comments . We could 

423
00:18:01,582 --> 00:18:03,693
probably spend the rest of today just 

424
00:18:03,693 --> 00:18:05,916
covering this But sometimes there there 

425
00:18:05,916 --> 00:18:08,170
could be a question about you know , 

426
00:18:08,170 --> 00:18:10,350
the relationship between acquisition 

427
00:18:10,350 --> 00:18:12,380
and operations and on this panel we 

428
00:18:12,380 --> 00:18:15,140
have an operations officer , air vice 

429
00:18:15,140 --> 00:18:17,080
marshal smarter than we have an 

430
00:18:17,080 --> 00:18:19,520
acquisition executive , and I submit 

431
00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:21,187
that it really is through the 

432
00:18:21,187 --> 00:18:23,600
acquisition process , as cumbersome as 

433
00:18:23,600 --> 00:18:25,710
it can be that the operations people 

434
00:18:25,710 --> 00:18:27,780
get the systems that they are too 

435
00:18:28,140 --> 00:18:30,450
conduct their missions with . But it is 

436
00:18:30,450 --> 00:18:32,339
becoming true that acquisition is 

437
00:18:32,339 --> 00:18:34,450
important to protecting the integrity 

438
00:18:34,450 --> 00:18:36,283
of those systems in the design , 

439
00:18:36,283 --> 00:18:38,450
through development and production and 

440
00:18:38,450 --> 00:18:40,617
all the way through sustainment . It's 

441
00:18:40,617 --> 00:18:42,839
an end to end process where if we don't 

442
00:18:42,839 --> 00:18:44,783
protect the supply chain and don't 

443
00:18:44,783 --> 00:18:46,672
protect the cyber security of the 

444
00:18:46,672 --> 00:18:48,894
participants in that supply chain , our 

445
00:18:48,894 --> 00:18:50,839
capabilities can be compromised or 

446
00:18:50,839 --> 00:18:52,839
duplicated by our adversaries , and 

447
00:18:52,839 --> 00:18:55,061
that's sort of gets us into the area of 

448
00:18:55,061 --> 00:18:56,894
the new domains for new areas of 

449
00:18:56,894 --> 00:18:59,172
conflict . Sometimes we hear the terms , 

450
00:18:59,172 --> 00:19:01,228
you know , asymmetric warfare , gray 

451
00:19:01,228 --> 00:19:03,450
zone warfare adversaries , air choosing 

452
00:19:03,450 --> 00:19:06,530
Thio contest our interest in in areas 

453
00:19:06,530 --> 00:19:08,586
where there may not be attribution , 

454
00:19:08,586 --> 00:19:10,252
and there could be no kinetic 

455
00:19:10,252 --> 00:19:12,308
consequence to there , um , to their 

456
00:19:12,308 --> 00:19:14,980
assaults . Um , Admiral Sorry . Air 

457
00:19:14,980 --> 00:19:17,090
Vice Marshal Smith I've read several 

458
00:19:17,100 --> 00:19:19,930
pieces that reflect your interest in 

459
00:19:19,930 --> 00:19:22,152
the integration and coordination of the 

460
00:19:22,152 --> 00:19:24,400
UK armed forces across all five 

461
00:19:24,400 --> 00:19:26,670
conflict domains those air , ground , 

462
00:19:26,670 --> 00:19:29,190
sea , air , cyber and space . And , of 

463
00:19:29,190 --> 00:19:31,468
course , in the U . S . Just this year , 

464
00:19:31,468 --> 00:19:33,246
we stood up the Space Command . 

465
00:19:33,246 --> 00:19:35,468
Obviously , elevating the importance of 

466
00:19:35,468 --> 00:19:38,250
space is an area of conflict . Why ? 

467
00:19:38,250 --> 00:19:41,090
Why is it is this important now ? Um , 

468
00:19:41,100 --> 00:19:43,770
how do alliance relationships figure 

469
00:19:43,770 --> 00:19:46,160
into multi domain strategies ? 

470
00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:52,862
Thanks . Great . Great question . I was 

471
00:19:52,862 --> 00:19:55,084
just just before I try to answer that , 

472
00:19:55,084 --> 00:19:57,251
that that we could definitely talk all 

473
00:19:57,251 --> 00:20:00,300
day about last . But interestingly , 

474
00:20:00,300 --> 00:20:03,250
the way you described us , their asses . 

475
00:20:03,250 --> 00:20:06,270
You introduce this question ? Um , 

476
00:20:06,540 --> 00:20:09,720
my , what's uninterested reflection on 

477
00:20:09,720 --> 00:20:12,180
my career in the way we do it in the UK , 

478
00:20:12,240 --> 00:20:14,407
which is maybe slightly different than 

479
00:20:14,407 --> 00:20:16,240
the US , and I've spent a career 

480
00:20:16,240 --> 00:20:19,170
working very closely with US colleagues . 

481
00:20:19,180 --> 00:20:21,880
We don't necessarily have a bespoke 

482
00:20:21,890 --> 00:20:25,220
acquisition . Career failed you just 

483
00:20:25,230 --> 00:20:27,452
once in and out of it . So I've spent a 

484
00:20:27,452 --> 00:20:30,060
career either on from flying combat 

485
00:20:30,060 --> 00:20:32,620
operations are in . The acquisition 

486
00:20:32,620 --> 00:20:34,760
failed , so I'll spend three years 

487
00:20:34,940 --> 00:20:37,107
flying in Afghanistan doing all that . 

488
00:20:37,107 --> 00:20:39,162
Then will come go to D . C . and B R 

489
00:20:39,162 --> 00:20:41,440
director for the F 35 program in the J . 

490
00:20:41,440 --> 00:20:45,300
PO On we we do with us how we build our 

491
00:20:45,310 --> 00:20:47,720
expertise over 2030 years , certainly 

492
00:20:47,720 --> 00:20:50,070
in the water forces being our approach . 

493
00:20:50,080 --> 00:20:53,020
So even though my last job , I was sat 

494
00:20:53,020 --> 00:20:56,460
in our equivalent of the A C C role for 

495
00:20:56,460 --> 00:20:59,430
the Royal Air Force , now I am in a 

496
00:20:59,440 --> 00:21:02,400
policy strategy acquisition role for 

497
00:21:02,410 --> 00:21:04,520
for Space , and we do just flip flop 

498
00:21:04,520 --> 00:21:06,742
between one and the other . And I think 

499
00:21:06,742 --> 00:21:08,964
that does give us gives our operational 

500
00:21:08,964 --> 00:21:11,360
commanders much more of a feel for the 

501
00:21:11,360 --> 00:21:13,527
pain that our acquisition experts have 

502
00:21:13,527 --> 00:21:15,980
to go through me gives you a really 

503
00:21:15,980 --> 00:21:17,980
good feel for the challenges on the 

504
00:21:17,980 --> 00:21:20,240
commercial side of the ice and how to 

505
00:21:20,240 --> 00:21:22,407
get the money line . How to do the are 

506
00:21:22,407 --> 00:21:24,351
equivalent of palming , etcetera , 

507
00:21:24,351 --> 00:21:26,407
etcetera so that we can actually get 

508
00:21:26,407 --> 00:21:28,629
the capability to the front line in the 

509
00:21:28,629 --> 00:21:30,720
right order in the right time . So I 

510
00:21:30,730 --> 00:21:33,520
just worthy of a little comment there , 

511
00:21:33,520 --> 00:21:35,940
I thought , I think the way we do it , 

512
00:21:35,950 --> 00:21:38,280
perhaps more three locked in judgment 

513
00:21:38,280 --> 00:21:42,000
tends to be quite nicely integrated , 

514
00:21:42,010 --> 00:21:44,180
but when you're small like we are . 

515
00:21:44,740 --> 00:21:47,530
It's easier to do that . Which leads 

516
00:21:47,540 --> 00:21:49,484
leads me to high would answer your 

517
00:21:49,484 --> 00:21:51,484
broader question . And I think when 

518
00:21:51,484 --> 00:21:53,950
you're small like we are , then you've 

519
00:21:53,960 --> 00:21:55,904
got to get the integration piece , 

520
00:21:55,904 --> 00:21:58,650
right ? If you want to be able , Teoh A , 

521
00:21:58,660 --> 00:22:00,771
you know , be greater than the sum of 

522
00:22:00,771 --> 00:22:02,890
the parts on . This is something that 

523
00:22:02,890 --> 00:22:06,810
we've I empowers our strategic 

524
00:22:06,810 --> 00:22:09,020
command . So you will be aware that , 

525
00:22:09,030 --> 00:22:11,660
you know , in in A in many ways , like 

526
00:22:11,670 --> 00:22:13,670
in the US And no , you're not quite 

527
00:22:13,670 --> 00:22:16,320
there anymore . But we have established 

528
00:22:16,330 --> 00:22:19,200
effectively 1/4 service or commander in 

529
00:22:19,200 --> 00:22:21,422
the form of our strategic command under 

530
00:22:21,422 --> 00:22:24,890
four star Commander on Strategic 

531
00:22:24,890 --> 00:22:27,290
commands . Me , an effort is on a multi 

532
00:22:27,290 --> 00:22:29,670
demand integration . Not so big focus 

533
00:22:29,680 --> 00:22:32,360
at the moments they were for quite a 

534
00:22:32,360 --> 00:22:34,470
few years in their early life . All 

535
00:22:34,470 --> 00:22:37,270
about joint Torri on . Actually , they 

536
00:22:37,270 --> 00:22:39,500
would argue , and I would argue , Thio 

537
00:22:39,510 --> 00:22:41,820
that they've taken the next step and 

538
00:22:41,820 --> 00:22:44,360
graduated to step beyond from join 

539
00:22:44,360 --> 00:22:47,510
Torri to integration . And how do you 

540
00:22:47,510 --> 00:22:49,750
become an integrated warfighter rather 

541
00:22:49,750 --> 00:22:53,520
than a joint warfighter on ? We've set 

542
00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:56,320
up our governance systems from 

543
00:22:56,320 --> 00:22:58,264
acquisition all the way through to 

544
00:22:58,264 --> 00:23:01,080
operations so that Strategic Command 

545
00:23:01,080 --> 00:23:03,080
gets oversight of everything that's 

546
00:23:03,080 --> 00:23:05,300
going on in U K defense and has an 

547
00:23:05,310 --> 00:23:09,300
ability to influence how we properly 

548
00:23:09,310 --> 00:23:11,550
ensure that each of the demands are 

549
00:23:11,550 --> 00:23:14,290
properly integrated together . Um , 

550
00:23:14,300 --> 00:23:17,000
that is the absolute theme off their 

551
00:23:17,000 --> 00:23:19,640
proposition for the defense review . At 

552
00:23:19,640 --> 00:23:22,550
the moment , that is the basis for High 

553
00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:25,230
General Patrick , who's that four star 

554
00:23:25,230 --> 00:23:28,260
in charge of of strategic commanders is 

555
00:23:28,260 --> 00:23:30,400
making the case to get his money from 

556
00:23:30,400 --> 00:23:34,050
the Treasury all about M D I ons 

557
00:23:34,050 --> 00:23:36,430
proving that this is the way we need to 

558
00:23:36,430 --> 00:23:38,650
do future business . And it's 

559
00:23:38,650 --> 00:23:41,700
completely whilst on one hand bite , 

560
00:23:41,710 --> 00:23:44,530
you know , sums greater than the parts 

561
00:23:44,540 --> 00:23:47,710
but on the other hand , enabling us to 

562
00:23:47,710 --> 00:23:50,850
deal with potential adversaries who are 

563
00:23:50,850 --> 00:23:53,950
working in the some thresholds who do 

564
00:23:53,960 --> 00:23:56,980
blow from public to private , they do 

565
00:23:56,980 --> 00:23:59,080
Blair from war fighting to sub 

566
00:23:59,080 --> 00:24:02,100
thresholds . Andi . They take great 

567
00:24:02,100 --> 00:24:04,940
pleasure in exploiting that to create a 

568
00:24:04,950 --> 00:24:08,450
to create more confusion . So this idea 

569
00:24:08,460 --> 00:24:10,810
off multi domain integration is 

570
00:24:10,810 --> 00:24:13,550
absolutely key . Thio everything that 

571
00:24:13,550 --> 00:24:15,730
we're doing at the moment on 

572
00:24:15,740 --> 00:24:19,590
interestingly , if you've heard are a 

573
00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:21,711
secretary of State for Defense or our 

574
00:24:21,711 --> 00:24:24,680
chief of defense speak about our 

575
00:24:24,680 --> 00:24:27,450
defense review There's a very public 

576
00:24:27,460 --> 00:24:30,990
recognition that we can't continue as a 

577
00:24:30,990 --> 00:24:34,790
UK defense . Thio fight a conflicts the 

578
00:24:34,790 --> 00:24:36,790
way we fought the last conflict . I 

579
00:24:36,790 --> 00:24:39,210
know we always say that , but actually 

580
00:24:39,210 --> 00:24:41,370
what I'm seeing here in myth Defense 

581
00:24:41,370 --> 00:24:44,340
Review I've been through quite a few in 

582
00:24:44,340 --> 00:24:47,830
my tenure , a za riel . Proper 

583
00:24:47,830 --> 00:24:50,630
recognition that we need to pivot our 

584
00:24:50,640 --> 00:24:53,580
efforts away , perhaps from some of the 

585
00:24:53,580 --> 00:24:56,370
traditional domains , really start to 

586
00:24:56,370 --> 00:24:59,530
concentrate in areas like space like 

587
00:24:59,530 --> 00:25:02,260
cyber and ensure that those efforts are 

588
00:25:02,260 --> 00:25:04,316
still properly integrated across the 

589
00:25:04,316 --> 00:25:07,030
other three areas . We've also been 

590
00:25:07,030 --> 00:25:09,086
doing a hell of a lot of work on the 

591
00:25:09,086 --> 00:25:12,290
undersea I below the ocean 

592
00:25:12,300 --> 00:25:14,670
effort , particularly with what we're 

593
00:25:14,670 --> 00:25:16,892
seeing going on in the North Atlantic , 

594
00:25:16,892 --> 00:25:19,070
which is obviously our backyard . But 

595
00:25:19,080 --> 00:25:21,320
I'll stop there . I could talk about 

596
00:25:21,320 --> 00:25:23,598
this little day when I come back to it . 

597
00:25:23,598 --> 00:25:26,230
If you want . Can I jump on that after 

598
00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,060
so you couldn't be any more spot on 

599
00:25:30,070 --> 00:25:33,290
the the way we do . Acquisition and 

600
00:25:33,290 --> 00:25:35,840
operations don't right now . They don't 

601
00:25:35,840 --> 00:25:38,062
always communicate to each other . It's 

602
00:25:38,062 --> 00:25:40,396
too , you know . We're a big department . 

603
00:25:40,396 --> 00:25:43,220
Ah , lot of moving parts . Um , on my 

604
00:25:43,220 --> 00:25:46,390
day job , you know that Cisco for A and 

605
00:25:46,390 --> 00:25:49,350
S . I'm over the weapons systems , 

606
00:25:49,360 --> 00:25:51,410
right ? That this the security of 

607
00:25:51,410 --> 00:25:53,900
weapon system as a whole , right , All 

608
00:25:53,900 --> 00:25:55,956
the way down to making sure that the 

609
00:25:55,956 --> 00:25:59,020
dib is secure . Andi , one of those 

610
00:25:59,020 --> 00:26:01,076
things that you just mentioned about 

611
00:26:01,076 --> 00:26:03,187
the interoperability and you need the 

612
00:26:03,187 --> 00:26:06,500
have an interoperable command that the 

613
00:26:06,500 --> 00:26:09,140
way we have fought wars prior is not 

614
00:26:09,140 --> 00:26:11,251
the way we will fight in the future . 

615
00:26:11,251 --> 00:26:13,140
And that's , you know , I'm Katie 

616
00:26:13,140 --> 00:26:15,362
Arrington , not the . You know , I I've 

617
00:26:15,362 --> 00:26:17,529
I've never gone to war college , But I 

618
00:26:17,529 --> 00:26:19,418
can tell you it's a heck of a lot 

619
00:26:19,418 --> 00:26:21,751
easier for a non kinetic attack , right ? 

620
00:26:21,751 --> 00:26:23,973
It doesn't cost a lot of money . It can 

621
00:26:23,973 --> 00:26:25,973
be random . It's you . You know you 

622
00:26:25,973 --> 00:26:28,196
won't see the logistics supporting it . 

623
00:26:28,196 --> 00:26:30,410
High impact , low dollar theme . The 

624
00:26:30,420 --> 00:26:33,690
end result of that could , or more 

625
00:26:33,690 --> 00:26:35,746
likely , would be a kinetic action . 

626
00:26:35,746 --> 00:26:37,968
But it's a heck of a lot easier for the 

627
00:26:37,968 --> 00:26:40,023
adversary to go in , um , and turn . 

628
00:26:40,023 --> 00:26:43,490
Let's say the power off or change fuel 

629
00:26:43,490 --> 00:26:46,620
in a suppliers 

630
00:26:46,630 --> 00:26:48,797
database . And , you know , put diesel 

631
00:26:48,797 --> 00:26:50,741
instead of unleaded . I mean their 

632
00:26:50,741 --> 00:26:52,963
multitude of things . But what you said 

633
00:26:52,963 --> 00:26:55,650
about the interoperability is what we 

634
00:26:55,650 --> 00:26:58,130
in the department overheat in . D o d 

635
00:26:58,140 --> 00:27:01,940
um , I would say about 3 to 4 years ago , 

636
00:27:01,940 --> 00:27:04,690
we started really looking at all of the 

637
00:27:04,690 --> 00:27:06,920
component parts that make up a defense 

638
00:27:06,920 --> 00:27:09,142
critical mission , right ? That that it 

639
00:27:09,142 --> 00:27:11,620
is not just the Army , Navy , Air Force 

640
00:27:11,620 --> 00:27:15,180
Marines , that it's the Inter get inter 

641
00:27:15,190 --> 00:27:18,020
inter operability of all of those 

642
00:27:18,020 --> 00:27:21,300
different , um , capabilities and and 

643
00:27:21,300 --> 00:27:23,800
strengths and weaknesses that a 

644
00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:26,500
combatant commander needs to be ableto 

645
00:27:26,500 --> 00:27:29,670
have visibility off from birth to the 

646
00:27:29,670 --> 00:27:31,850
life cycle end of the Decommissioning 

647
00:27:31,850 --> 00:27:34,020
of a weapon system and really 

648
00:27:34,020 --> 00:27:37,080
understand at and you know , you that 

649
00:27:37,090 --> 00:27:40,690
every comment you made ser Vice Vice 

650
00:27:40,700 --> 00:27:44,620
Air Marshal you are spot on that we 

651
00:27:44,620 --> 00:27:47,960
need Thio . Look at that and 

652
00:27:48,340 --> 00:27:50,618
it's it's hard and acquisition , right ? 

653
00:27:50,618 --> 00:27:53,220
Because each of the services and d o d 

654
00:27:53,220 --> 00:27:56,330
get their own funding right and they go 

655
00:27:56,330 --> 00:27:59,150
and they create what they are required 

656
00:27:59,150 --> 00:28:02,130
to dio I commend General Heighten the 

657
00:28:02,140 --> 00:28:04,920
vice Right now he is looking at how we 

658
00:28:04,920 --> 00:28:07,430
do our requirements . What is the 

659
00:28:07,430 --> 00:28:09,750
requirement ? Is it more important to 

660
00:28:09,750 --> 00:28:13,430
say I need a weapon that can shoot 

661
00:28:13,440 --> 00:28:16,340
Ah bullet A to this range and this 

662
00:28:16,340 --> 00:28:20,060
vector or I need the capability in 

663
00:28:20,070 --> 00:28:23,100
this defense critical mission that 

664
00:28:23,100 --> 00:28:26,810
enables my warfighter to have cover as 

665
00:28:26,810 --> 00:28:29,390
they go in on on a Oh , I mean , it's 

666
00:28:29,400 --> 00:28:31,920
it really is . How do you think about 

667
00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:34,140
what you're asking for , which then 

668
00:28:34,140 --> 00:28:37,010
makes it It does it open the aperture 

669
00:28:37,010 --> 00:28:39,740
up to help in modifying how you ask for 

670
00:28:39,740 --> 00:28:41,851
money , right ? And and you , you you 

671
00:28:41,851 --> 00:28:44,600
allow it versus that . You know , one 

672
00:28:44,600 --> 00:28:46,711
for one . I have a requirement that I 

673
00:28:46,711 --> 00:28:48,878
need a weapon that can shoot X , y and 

674
00:28:48,878 --> 00:28:50,933
Z versus I need something to protect 

675
00:28:50,933 --> 00:28:53,420
the war fighter in the A o on the 

676
00:28:53,430 --> 00:28:56,980
tactical level and and not be so , um 

677
00:28:56,990 --> 00:28:59,590
detailed . But more about how do you 

678
00:28:59,590 --> 00:29:01,870
get it into the interoperability of 

679
00:29:01,870 --> 00:29:04,470
that entire mission ? And I commend 

680
00:29:04,470 --> 00:29:06,637
General Heightened and the joint staff 

681
00:29:06,637 --> 00:29:08,637
they're working through that , um , 

682
00:29:08,637 --> 00:29:10,920
it's it's enlightening where we are 

683
00:29:10,920 --> 00:29:13,031
right now , because if you don't have 

684
00:29:13,031 --> 00:29:17,010
cyber in included in your 

685
00:29:17,020 --> 00:29:19,760
the effort , um , it's you're you're at 

686
00:29:19,760 --> 00:29:21,927
a loss already , right ? So you've got 

687
00:29:21,927 --> 00:29:24,093
to get that and and how do you I think 

688
00:29:24,093 --> 00:29:26,510
the bigger question right now is how do 

689
00:29:26,510 --> 00:29:30,230
we juggle the years of of what we 

690
00:29:30,230 --> 00:29:32,230
talked about earlier . We developed 

691
00:29:32,230 --> 00:29:35,220
capability without in graining it in 

692
00:29:35,220 --> 00:29:39,010
cybersecurity and bolting it on and 

693
00:29:39,010 --> 00:29:41,260
the the strength and the weakness that 

694
00:29:41,260 --> 00:29:43,870
provides and balancing that out with 

695
00:29:43,870 --> 00:29:46,370
new technology . And do you put your 

696
00:29:46,370 --> 00:29:48,537
money in cleaning up over here ? Or do 

697
00:29:48,537 --> 00:29:50,760
you put your money in to get a fast ? 

698
00:29:50,760 --> 00:29:53,020
And I think all of us are are in that 

699
00:29:53,020 --> 00:29:55,760
conversation ? I'm sorry , Bob , but 

700
00:29:55,760 --> 00:29:58,560
that was a teacher . No , I appreciate 

701
00:29:58,560 --> 00:30:00,449
it . I mean , there's a There's a 

702
00:30:00,449 --> 00:30:02,727
distinction between sort of , you know , 

703
00:30:02,727 --> 00:30:05,060
initiative and response and their areas . 

704
00:30:05,060 --> 00:30:07,171
Where were the UK or our allies could 

705
00:30:07,171 --> 00:30:06,420
take initiative . But there are other 

706
00:30:06,420 --> 00:30:09,240
areas where actions of adversaries 

707
00:30:09,240 --> 00:30:12,630
require response . And in the area of 

708
00:30:12,630 --> 00:30:14,463
space , we're seeing a number of 

709
00:30:14,463 --> 00:30:16,700
strategic threats and some unfortunate 

710
00:30:16,700 --> 00:30:18,960
developments . Just on July 15th , 

711
00:30:19,440 --> 00:30:22,480
Russia conducted on on orbit , 

712
00:30:22,490 --> 00:30:25,300
uh , test or demonstration of the 

713
00:30:25,300 --> 00:30:27,411
ability not only to maneuver in close 

714
00:30:27,411 --> 00:30:29,810
proximity to other satellites , but to 

715
00:30:29,820 --> 00:30:31,920
launch projectiles from the orbital 

716
00:30:31,920 --> 00:30:34,110
vehicle that potentially could destroy 

717
00:30:34,120 --> 00:30:36,780
a satellite . Well , as as is 

718
00:30:36,780 --> 00:30:39,170
recognized in the recent Space Policy 

719
00:30:39,170 --> 00:30:41,337
Directive five issued by the President 

720
00:30:41,337 --> 00:30:44,220
just on September 4th , we depend on 

721
00:30:44,220 --> 00:30:46,331
space for so many critical assets and 

722
00:30:46,331 --> 00:30:48,610
capabilities across , um , that enable 

723
00:30:48,610 --> 00:30:51,640
missions across all five domains . Um , 

724
00:30:51,650 --> 00:30:54,420
I know Air Vice Marshal Smith that you 

725
00:30:54,420 --> 00:30:57,420
commented in particular about Russia 

726
00:30:57,420 --> 00:30:59,820
antisatellite activities , both those 

727
00:30:59,820 --> 00:31:02,098
that would be ground based in in orbit . 

728
00:31:02,098 --> 00:31:04,098
And I know you've expressed concern 

729
00:31:04,098 --> 00:31:06,098
about China's campaigns in the same 

730
00:31:06,098 --> 00:31:08,750
areas . Could you comment now both on 

731
00:31:08,750 --> 00:31:10,639
why you think those air important 

732
00:31:10,639 --> 00:31:12,910
strategically and what responses are 

733
00:31:12,910 --> 00:31:15,000
available ? Thio commanders and the 

734
00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:17,460
alliance and perhaps the extent to 

735
00:31:17,460 --> 00:31:19,516
which you know there is a systems or 

736
00:31:19,516 --> 00:31:21,682
hardware answer that we need to pursue 

737
00:31:21,682 --> 00:31:25,670
through acquisition . So a great 

738
00:31:25,670 --> 00:31:29,450
question very act at the moment . I , 

739
00:31:29,460 --> 00:31:33,060
as we are actually . So when I called 

740
00:31:33,060 --> 00:31:36,090
ites I our Russian colleagues earlier 

741
00:31:36,090 --> 00:31:39,710
this summer on the cosmos 

742
00:31:39,720 --> 00:31:42,260
activity that you described there 

743
00:31:42,320 --> 00:31:44,542
interestingly , that was the first time 

744
00:31:44,542 --> 00:31:48,130
in UK had had done such an overt a 

745
00:31:48,140 --> 00:31:50,196
comment in the public to me , and we 

746
00:31:50,196 --> 00:31:52,660
have not done that before . On if I 

747
00:31:52,660 --> 00:31:56,400
just just say , reflect on that for a 

748
00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,050
moment . It's been interesting journey 

749
00:31:59,050 --> 00:32:01,220
coming into this new role as UK 

750
00:32:01,230 --> 00:32:03,380
director space because I'm the first 

751
00:32:03,380 --> 00:32:06,510
one in on we've we've done a lot of 

752
00:32:06,510 --> 00:32:08,890
work in space over many years who's not 

753
00:32:08,890 --> 00:32:11,610
necessarily had this co hearing efforts 

754
00:32:11,610 --> 00:32:14,350
going on in the center of government on 

755
00:32:14,350 --> 00:32:17,060
what that has a light is to do is write 

756
00:32:17,060 --> 00:32:19,060
back to my very first comment about 

757
00:32:19,070 --> 00:32:21,900
education . So , like this to very 

758
00:32:21,910 --> 00:32:24,120
coherently do a little bit of an 

759
00:32:24,120 --> 00:32:26,231
education campaign cross government , 

760
00:32:26,231 --> 00:32:28,342
not just within Ministry of Defense , 

761
00:32:28,342 --> 00:32:30,710
but all other departments having a 

762
00:32:30,710 --> 00:32:32,766
discussion around . Do Do you really 

763
00:32:32,766 --> 00:32:34,710
understand just how important this 

764
00:32:34,710 --> 00:32:36,766
demand is to us ? You know , traffic 

765
00:32:36,766 --> 00:32:38,821
lights go green because of satellite 

766
00:32:38,821 --> 00:32:41,043
links . You get your money ahead of the 

767
00:32:41,043 --> 00:32:43,210
hole in the wall of the ATM because of 

768
00:32:43,210 --> 00:32:45,099
satellite links and we've already 

769
00:32:45,099 --> 00:32:47,740
proven if we lose pmt signals to UK , 

770
00:32:47,750 --> 00:32:51,500
it cost boss conservatively 

771
00:32:51,500 --> 00:32:54,350
billion pounds per day and impact to 

772
00:32:54,350 --> 00:32:56,780
the economy so very quickly starts to 

773
00:32:56,790 --> 00:32:58,790
make a covert pandemic look like it 

774
00:32:58,790 --> 00:33:02,180
didn't show up . So there , Once we've 

775
00:33:02,180 --> 00:33:05,050
had those discussions cross government 

776
00:33:05,060 --> 00:33:08,750
a easier to then have a discussion all 

777
00:33:08,750 --> 00:33:11,760
the way up to number 10 around . Oh , 

778
00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:14,462
the lights switched off . Sorry . There 

779
00:33:14,462 --> 00:33:16,573
you go . We've We've probably run out 

780
00:33:16,573 --> 00:33:16,540
of money . 

781
00:33:16,550 --> 00:33:21,090
E 

782
00:33:21,100 --> 00:33:23,100
was indicative of the sitting still 

783
00:33:23,100 --> 00:33:26,480
here . I'm sorry . Eso We , uh 

784
00:33:26,490 --> 00:33:29,900
the the effort thio to do the public 

785
00:33:29,900 --> 00:33:32,122
announcement in this summer . There was 

786
00:33:32,122 --> 00:33:35,770
twofold one to show that I A we knew 

787
00:33:35,770 --> 00:33:38,800
what was going on on that we understood 

788
00:33:38,800 --> 00:33:41,240
the demand , the high enough fidelity 

789
00:33:41,250 --> 00:33:43,710
to be able to confidently and publicly 

790
00:33:43,710 --> 00:33:47,490
make that statement to We did 

791
00:33:47,490 --> 00:33:50,130
it in very close concert with our U . S . 

792
00:33:50,130 --> 00:33:54,100
Ally on through the construct Off I our 

793
00:33:54,100 --> 00:33:56,322
latest initiative and alliances through 

794
00:33:56,322 --> 00:33:59,450
the Combined space , a operations 

795
00:33:59,450 --> 00:34:01,450
initiative deceased Bo Initiative , 

796
00:34:01,450 --> 00:34:03,617
which is the Five Ice Community , plus 

797
00:34:03,617 --> 00:34:06,160
France and Germany , where we are . 

798
00:34:06,170 --> 00:34:08,340
It's not a great analogy , but 

799
00:34:08,350 --> 00:34:11,860
establishing what could be seen as a a 

800
00:34:11,870 --> 00:34:15,610
nascent NATO for space . You know , for 

801
00:34:15,610 --> 00:34:18,510
spacefaring like minded nations to come 

802
00:34:18,510 --> 00:34:21,760
together on do collaborative working co 

803
00:34:21,760 --> 00:34:23,704
development of capability to build 

804
00:34:23,704 --> 00:34:26,380
resilience and , importantly , to 

805
00:34:26,380 --> 00:34:29,460
develop a collaborative on joined up 

806
00:34:29,460 --> 00:34:32,680
thinking on what is acceptable in that 

807
00:34:32,680 --> 00:34:36,070
domain . So when we see a 

808
00:34:36,080 --> 00:34:38,400
nefarious state , actors do things like 

809
00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:41,250
you describe Bob or remover their 

810
00:34:41,250 --> 00:34:43,960
satellites close enough to one of our 

811
00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:46,460
strategic satellites in geo that it is 

812
00:34:46,460 --> 00:34:49,150
on a daily basis , setting off close 

813
00:34:49,150 --> 00:34:51,840
proximity and potential collision 

814
00:34:51,840 --> 00:34:54,840
warmers . That's unacceptable behavior 

815
00:34:54,850 --> 00:34:57,740
were not willing to stand for it and it 

816
00:34:57,740 --> 00:34:59,629
should be discussed in the public 

817
00:34:59,629 --> 00:35:01,710
domain . We wouldn't stand for 

818
00:35:01,720 --> 00:35:04,240
equivalent behavior like that in the 

819
00:35:04,240 --> 00:35:07,090
airways above London Heathrow . We 

820
00:35:07,090 --> 00:35:09,580
wouldn't stand for an equivalent kid . 

821
00:35:09,580 --> 00:35:12,260
I activities like that in the busy 

822
00:35:12,260 --> 00:35:15,370
ceiling at sea . So why would we 

823
00:35:15,370 --> 00:35:17,610
Stanford , in space where it is equally 

824
00:35:17,620 --> 00:35:21,380
as strategically important to us ? So 

825
00:35:21,390 --> 00:35:24,270
our approach here , in many ways 

826
00:35:24,270 --> 00:35:26,381
there's there's a whole debate around 

827
00:35:26,381 --> 00:35:29,230
the whole deterrence approach like we 

828
00:35:29,230 --> 00:35:32,420
have with in the nuclear world on this 

829
00:35:32,420 --> 00:35:34,950
idea off I , you know , deterrence . 

830
00:35:34,950 --> 00:35:37,006
Being absolutely underpinned by your 

831
00:35:37,006 --> 00:35:38,894
ability to communicate , have the 

832
00:35:38,894 --> 00:35:41,061
capability , aunt have the credibility 

833
00:35:41,061 --> 00:35:43,330
to back that up on part and parcel of 

834
00:35:43,330 --> 00:35:45,430
what we have been doing here is this 

835
00:35:45,430 --> 00:35:47,960
idea of communicating on it whilst 

836
00:35:47,970 --> 00:35:50,192
ensuring that through our alliances and 

837
00:35:50,192 --> 00:35:52,980
our partnerships on our defense review 

838
00:35:52,980 --> 00:35:55,600
on our uplifting space capability , we 

839
00:35:55,600 --> 00:35:57,730
have the capabilities to do , 

840
00:35:57,740 --> 00:36:00,320
understand , protect , defend on . We 

841
00:36:00,320 --> 00:36:03,420
also have the credibility Thio utilize 

842
00:36:03,420 --> 00:36:05,364
that if indeed we want to , we may 

843
00:36:05,364 --> 00:36:08,500
respond in another demand completely in 

844
00:36:08,500 --> 00:36:11,830
a integrated across the man 

845
00:36:11,840 --> 00:36:14,850
fashion . So it has been a really 

846
00:36:14,860 --> 00:36:17,990
interesting what just one event that 

847
00:36:17,990 --> 00:36:19,990
one event has opened an interesting 

848
00:36:19,990 --> 00:36:22,530
narrative . Forests and highway . I 

849
00:36:22,540 --> 00:36:25,520
construct our strategy for space in 

850
00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:27,930
total . I would just finish , though , 

851
00:36:27,930 --> 00:36:30,640
by saying the rial strength of that has 

852
00:36:30,640 --> 00:36:33,100
been the hook into our foreign office 

853
00:36:33,110 --> 00:36:35,330
on the work that our foreign officer 

854
00:36:35,330 --> 00:36:38,850
doing on on the soft power side and the 

855
00:36:38,860 --> 00:36:41,930
diplomacy side in table ing at the U . 

856
00:36:41,930 --> 00:36:45,850
N . I . What ? What will be seen as new ? 

857
00:36:46,130 --> 00:36:49,820
A modern fit for purpose space , norms 

858
00:36:49,820 --> 00:36:53,060
of behavior on I'm canvassing with the 

859
00:36:53,060 --> 00:36:56,060
U . N . Body A . From a global 

860
00:36:56,060 --> 00:36:58,171
perspective of these air the sorts of 

861
00:36:58,171 --> 00:37:00,227
norms of behavior . We should all be 

862
00:37:00,227 --> 00:37:02,420
signing up thio , including Russia and 

863
00:37:02,420 --> 00:37:04,730
China , and inviting countries like 

864
00:37:04,740 --> 00:37:07,190
Russia and China to join the debate and 

865
00:37:07,190 --> 00:37:09,540
have the conversation . Because all of 

866
00:37:09,540 --> 00:37:12,150
that helps to mitigate against 

867
00:37:12,160 --> 00:37:15,040
miscalculation . I misjudgments an 

868
00:37:15,040 --> 00:37:18,120
escalation , etcetera . That's , ah 

869
00:37:18,130 --> 00:37:21,060
extremely valuable comment . I suspect 

870
00:37:21,060 --> 00:37:23,180
you would agree that Russia and China 

871
00:37:23,180 --> 00:37:25,790
have shown less than ideal willingness 

872
00:37:25,790 --> 00:37:28,880
to participate in international 

873
00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:31,102
arrangements that would produce genuine 

874
00:37:31,102 --> 00:37:33,102
confidence as opposed to asymmetric 

875
00:37:33,102 --> 00:37:36,250
advantage . Um , in their favor . 

876
00:37:36,730 --> 00:37:38,910
That gets me to perhaps the final 

877
00:37:38,910 --> 00:37:42,230
question I would ask Thio Katie , um , 

878
00:37:42,240 --> 00:37:44,560
in a space is a particularly difficult 

879
00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:46,840
frontier when it comes to security . 

880
00:37:46,840 --> 00:37:49,820
We've just described system enabled 

881
00:37:49,820 --> 00:37:53,070
attacks in on orbit systems that could 

882
00:37:53,070 --> 00:37:55,126
be used to attack other satellites . 

883
00:37:55,126 --> 00:37:57,840
We've talked about , uh , anti 

884
00:37:57,840 --> 00:37:59,618
satellite systems that could be 

885
00:37:59,618 --> 00:38:01,840
launched from the ground Those air huge 

886
00:38:01,840 --> 00:38:04,110
investment vehicles involving demanding 

887
00:38:04,110 --> 00:38:07,620
technology with the kinetic consequence 

888
00:38:07,620 --> 00:38:09,842
potentially upon the systems attacked . 

889
00:38:10,120 --> 00:38:12,120
But unfortunately , there are other 

890
00:38:12,120 --> 00:38:15,090
ways , um , Thio subvert , deny or or 

891
00:38:15,090 --> 00:38:17,930
even destroy space systems . And that 

892
00:38:17,940 --> 00:38:20,700
might be to go through the supply chain 

893
00:38:20,710 --> 00:38:22,900
to make attacks upon hardware or 

894
00:38:22,900 --> 00:38:26,690
software or a solution provider , um , 

895
00:38:26,700 --> 00:38:28,820
or to find a weakness in the supply 

896
00:38:28,820 --> 00:38:31,490
chain to enable a cyber attack . All of 

897
00:38:31,490 --> 00:38:33,712
those things could get through a ground 

898
00:38:33,712 --> 00:38:36,320
station to a space system and prevent 

899
00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:38,320
its operation is intended . Or they 

900
00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:40,042
could attack the ground system 

901
00:38:40,042 --> 00:38:42,700
component itself . Thes air . Daunting 

902
00:38:42,700 --> 00:38:45,850
problems . Uh oh , Katie . And to ask 

903
00:38:45,850 --> 00:38:48,017
you the hard question , how do you see 

904
00:38:48,017 --> 00:38:50,770
the sea MMC initiative coming back full 

905
00:38:50,770 --> 00:38:52,937
circle as kind of helping us deal with 

906
00:38:52,937 --> 00:38:55,470
that span ? Uh , let's call them soft 

907
00:38:55,470 --> 00:38:58,850
gray area attacks intended to , um , 

908
00:38:58,860 --> 00:39:01,730
deny us the crucial functionality of 

909
00:39:01,730 --> 00:39:04,820
both military government and commercial 

910
00:39:04,820 --> 00:39:08,800
space systems . So first Esser for 

911
00:39:08,800 --> 00:39:10,967
your candor earlier this summer . Um , 

912
00:39:10,967 --> 00:39:13,189
sometimes things just need to be said . 

913
00:39:13,189 --> 00:39:16,720
It's hard . Thio , get everyone 

914
00:39:16,720 --> 00:39:20,440
aware of how great a za joint 

915
00:39:20,450 --> 00:39:23,990
a za globe , right ? As as everyone 

916
00:39:23,990 --> 00:39:26,410
coexisting on this planet . We need 

917
00:39:26,410 --> 00:39:28,740
Thio , as you stated out very quickly 

918
00:39:28,740 --> 00:39:31,310
it very succinctly . Um , we have rules 

919
00:39:31,310 --> 00:39:33,430
about maritime . We have rules about 

920
00:39:33,440 --> 00:39:36,000
air Onda , how close you can get and 

921
00:39:36,000 --> 00:39:37,722
what you can and can't do . We 

922
00:39:37,722 --> 00:39:39,889
absolutely should have that in space s 

923
00:39:39,889 --> 00:39:42,490
Oh , it's a hard conversation tohave 

924
00:39:42,500 --> 00:39:45,200
right . It's but not it needed . Right ? 

925
00:39:45,210 --> 00:39:48,450
Timing is everything . And I I 

926
00:39:48,620 --> 00:39:51,690
sometimes you just need thio be blunt 

927
00:39:51,690 --> 00:39:53,801
and say and and bring everyone to the 

928
00:39:53,801 --> 00:39:56,023
awareness . You know , it could be this 

929
00:39:56,023 --> 00:39:58,134
easy , and and these are the things , 

930
00:39:58,134 --> 00:40:00,930
um , to buy down that risk . Um , I 

931
00:40:00,930 --> 00:40:03,220
think there are several things that we 

932
00:40:03,220 --> 00:40:05,220
need to do , right , As we're going 

933
00:40:05,220 --> 00:40:08,110
through this a the open , um , getting 

934
00:40:08,110 --> 00:40:10,300
everyone to the table and saying these 

935
00:40:10,300 --> 00:40:12,860
are the parameters and and these are 

936
00:40:12,860 --> 00:40:15,810
acceptable norms and and processes and 

937
00:40:15,810 --> 00:40:17,930
these air unacceptable . And And to 

938
00:40:17,930 --> 00:40:21,610
define that I you know , it z 

939
00:40:21,620 --> 00:40:23,980
wonderful to have that conversation . 

940
00:40:23,990 --> 00:40:26,101
Um that the challenges your adversary 

941
00:40:26,101 --> 00:40:30,030
may not agree . Um , but 

942
00:40:30,040 --> 00:40:33,030
how do we How do we get ahead of that ? 

943
00:40:33,040 --> 00:40:35,740
Right ? How do you get to the point of , 

944
00:40:35,750 --> 00:40:37,917
you know , if they have the capability 

945
00:40:37,917 --> 00:40:40,940
to deny how do you get I say to the 

946
00:40:40,940 --> 00:40:43,107
left off right ? Do I get there before 

947
00:40:43,107 --> 00:40:45,218
they have the opportunity to deny ? I 

948
00:40:45,218 --> 00:40:47,440
think there are several things that are 

949
00:40:47,440 --> 00:40:49,773
very much in play right now and that as , 

950
00:40:49,773 --> 00:40:51,551
um uh , in industrial base in a 

951
00:40:51,551 --> 00:40:54,500
combined allied the industrial base . 

952
00:40:54,510 --> 00:40:57,490
Um , supply chain illumination is going 

953
00:40:57,490 --> 00:41:01,410
to be incredibly important . And how 

954
00:41:01,410 --> 00:41:04,880
we look at all of the data that we can 

955
00:41:04,880 --> 00:41:08,400
gather the analytics of that data data 

956
00:41:08,410 --> 00:41:10,610
Sorry , did have the indicators in 

957
00:41:10,610 --> 00:41:13,240
warning that either a , the adversary 

958
00:41:13,240 --> 00:41:16,110
is doing something , whether it be a an 

959
00:41:16,110 --> 00:41:18,910
attack , a DDOs attack , a focused in 

960
00:41:18,910 --> 00:41:21,132
event that we can see the indicators in 

961
00:41:21,132 --> 00:41:24,490
a warning and we can share the threat . 

962
00:41:24,500 --> 00:41:27,170
I think that's the key thing here is we 

963
00:41:27,170 --> 00:41:29,970
have to be able to share the threat . 

964
00:41:29,980 --> 00:41:33,720
See , MMC is at the baseline getting 

965
00:41:33,730 --> 00:41:35,840
everybody as prepared as they 

966
00:41:35,850 --> 00:41:39,750
absolutely can be secure as they can be 

967
00:41:40,110 --> 00:41:42,388
to have the critical thinking about it . 

968
00:41:42,388 --> 00:41:45,170
But the threat right is how it's It's 

969
00:41:45,170 --> 00:41:48,170
going to be driven the vector , and we 

970
00:41:48,170 --> 00:41:50,390
need to have that illumination so that 

971
00:41:50,390 --> 00:41:52,612
we could get ahead of it . I think that 

972
00:41:52,612 --> 00:41:55,390
that's the next See MMC is one piece , 

973
00:41:55,400 --> 00:41:57,440
you know for us . The acquisition 

974
00:41:57,440 --> 00:42:00,520
framework describes Thio , the PM's how 

975
00:42:00,520 --> 00:42:02,570
to think critically about cyber in 

976
00:42:02,580 --> 00:42:04,410
their programs and the think 

977
00:42:04,420 --> 00:42:07,100
differently about them . But I think as 

978
00:42:07,100 --> 00:42:09,230
we move forward , those illumination 

979
00:42:09,230 --> 00:42:11,452
tools that are out there to help us get 

980
00:42:11,452 --> 00:42:13,860
to the left of an actual event , what 

981
00:42:13,870 --> 00:42:17,090
is the risk in in those ? What does 

982
00:42:17,090 --> 00:42:19,660
risk mean ? Right so risk to the U . S . 

983
00:42:19,660 --> 00:42:22,510
Navy on a vessel is very different than , 

984
00:42:22,510 --> 00:42:25,440
um , the risk to an F 35 that's in an 

985
00:42:25,440 --> 00:42:28,690
allied partnership , right ? And how do 

986
00:42:28,690 --> 00:42:31,290
you get that ? That visualization ? 

987
00:42:31,300 --> 00:42:34,340
We've done a lot in the past year ? Um , 

988
00:42:34,350 --> 00:42:36,350
I think we have to get to the point 

989
00:42:36,350 --> 00:42:38,572
where we can see each other's Onda have 

990
00:42:38,572 --> 00:42:40,406
an understanding , information , 

991
00:42:40,406 --> 00:42:43,030
sharing about supply chain risks in a 

992
00:42:43,030 --> 00:42:46,060
way that we can clearly share threat 

993
00:42:46,060 --> 00:42:49,020
not just between our intelligence 

994
00:42:49,020 --> 00:42:52,680
community but the defense 

995
00:42:52,680 --> 00:42:54,624
industrial base and the commercial 

996
00:42:54,624 --> 00:42:56,680
entities that support it because the 

997
00:42:56,680 --> 00:43:00,640
likelihood that a vendor in the UK 

998
00:43:00,640 --> 00:43:03,470
working on SAT com development isn't 

999
00:43:03,470 --> 00:43:05,560
going to get hit at the same time of 

1000
00:43:05,560 --> 00:43:08,190
development and the U . S is is slim to 

1001
00:43:08,190 --> 00:43:11,310
none . And we need to get better at 

1002
00:43:11,320 --> 00:43:13,320
getting ahead of that . And I think 

1003
00:43:13,320 --> 00:43:15,542
illumination tools , I think continuous 

1004
00:43:15,542 --> 00:43:17,709
monitoring . But I think the big thing 

1005
00:43:17,709 --> 00:43:20,470
to get over is our barriers on 

1006
00:43:20,470 --> 00:43:23,270
information sharing between government 

1007
00:43:23,270 --> 00:43:25,610
and the I see communities to the 

1008
00:43:25,610 --> 00:43:27,730
industrial base to really help them 

1009
00:43:27,730 --> 00:43:30,380
prepare , because it's hard to say you 

1010
00:43:30,380 --> 00:43:32,380
really need to invest and have this 

1011
00:43:32,380 --> 00:43:34,220
kind of security when you're not 

1012
00:43:34,220 --> 00:43:36,387
getting the intel and understanding of 

1013
00:43:36,387 --> 00:43:39,570
what it is , the threat looks like . So 

1014
00:43:39,580 --> 00:43:41,524
that's the you know , see , MMC is 

1015
00:43:41,524 --> 00:43:43,890
absolutely foundational . I think the 

1016
00:43:43,890 --> 00:43:46,057
next steps that we all need to prepare 

1017
00:43:46,057 --> 00:43:48,730
ourselves for our information sharing 

1018
00:43:48,730 --> 00:43:51,290
regarding threat and the understanding 

1019
00:43:51,290 --> 00:43:53,750
of illumination tools what risk really 

1020
00:43:53,750 --> 00:43:57,470
is and the adjudication between each 

1021
00:43:57,470 --> 00:43:59,137
other that you know , if this 

1022
00:43:59,137 --> 00:44:01,248
commercial tool says it's a risk , is 

1023
00:44:01,248 --> 00:44:03,710
it really a risk ? And we have a lot 

1024
00:44:03,710 --> 00:44:06,940
more to dio , But I can't say enough , 

1025
00:44:06,940 --> 00:44:10,470
sir . I am nowhere near a space expert 

1026
00:44:10,480 --> 00:44:14,100
flight expert . I appreciate your time 

1027
00:44:14,100 --> 00:44:17,610
and education and dedication , Thio 

1028
00:44:17,620 --> 00:44:20,330
defending your country's mission . So 

1029
00:44:20,330 --> 00:44:22,441
an honor and a privilege to be on the 

1030
00:44:22,441 --> 00:44:25,000
panel with you way smarter than I am . 

1031
00:44:25,000 --> 00:44:28,290
But wow . And Bob , I know time is 

1032
00:44:28,290 --> 00:44:30,512
short , and , you know , I appreciate , 

1033
00:44:30,512 --> 00:44:32,512
and I think I speak more frequently 

1034
00:44:32,512 --> 00:44:34,679
about delivered uncompromised . Then I 

1035
00:44:34,679 --> 00:44:37,190
do . My own Children's birth are 

1036
00:44:37,190 --> 00:44:40,540
certain things in our nation's history 

1037
00:44:40,540 --> 00:44:42,596
and in our industrial base that were 

1038
00:44:42,596 --> 00:44:44,890
the things that propelled us forward . 

1039
00:44:44,890 --> 00:44:47,057
And that , sir , was one of the hugest 

1040
00:44:47,057 --> 00:44:49,223
propellants I've ever been around . So 

1041
00:44:49,223 --> 00:44:51,980
thank you , sir . Thank you . Um , that 

1042
00:44:51,980 --> 00:44:54,680
was a terrific answer , Katy . Apart 

1043
00:44:54,680 --> 00:44:56,513
from the compliments , which I'm 

1044
00:44:56,513 --> 00:44:58,140
grateful for , it was really 

1045
00:44:58,140 --> 00:45:00,251
informative and absolutely on point . 

1046
00:45:00,490 --> 00:45:03,230
We're at our time limit . Um , I want 

1047
00:45:03,230 --> 00:45:06,620
to thank Air Vice Marshal Smyth and SCS . 

1048
00:45:06,620 --> 00:45:10,000
Katie Arrington . Um , I think there's 

1049
00:45:10,000 --> 00:45:12,167
a lot more to discuss in these areas , 

1050
00:45:12,167 --> 00:45:13,944
but I do feel that we made good 

1051
00:45:13,944 --> 00:45:15,960
coverage of the ground and space so 

1052
00:45:15,960 --> 00:45:18,950
that others can think further , farther , 

1053
00:45:18,950 --> 00:45:22,700
Better over to you , Lewis . Thanks 

1054
00:45:22,700 --> 00:45:25,510
both like to meet you . Hi , 

1055
00:45:28,290 --> 00:45:32,170
Bob . A VM half . Thank you so much . 

1056
00:45:32,180 --> 00:45:35,580
Just a quick break now where ? While we 

1057
00:45:35,590 --> 00:45:39,520
switch links to the next session 

1058
00:45:39,520 --> 00:45:41,520
which will come up momentarily . So 

1059
00:45:41,520 --> 00:45:43,742
please , please bear with us on . We'll 

1060
00:45:43,742 --> 00:45:45,798
be with you in a couple of minutes . 

1061
00:45:45,798 --> 00:45:47,909
Thank you . Over . Hello , everyone . 

1062
00:45:47,909 --> 00:45:49,964
Uh , eso . The conduct is focused on 

1063
00:45:49,964 --> 00:45:51,964
many of the challenges facing us in 

1064
00:45:51,964 --> 00:45:54,020
this highly competitive and changing 

1065
00:45:54,020 --> 00:45:56,131
landscape on the need that innovative 

1066
00:45:56,131 --> 00:45:58,242
on agile acquisitions . A key part of 

1067
00:45:58,242 --> 00:46:00,760
this key drive is to get the best 

1068
00:46:00,760 --> 00:46:02,593
capability into the hands of our 

1069
00:46:02,593 --> 00:46:05,240
warfighters more rapidly . This session 

1070
00:46:05,240 --> 00:46:08,670
will recover some of those aspects from 

1071
00:46:08,680 --> 00:46:12,010
acquisition perspective . So the 

1072
00:46:12,010 --> 00:46:13,732
session will cover acquisition 

1073
00:46:13,732 --> 00:46:15,288
initiatives , engaging more 

1074
00:46:15,288 --> 00:46:17,343
opportunities that speed . The panel 

1075
00:46:17,343 --> 00:46:19,232
will address the need for speed , 

1076
00:46:19,232 --> 00:46:21,343
agility in key areas of procurement , 

1077
00:46:21,343 --> 00:46:23,510
the harness innovation approaches used 

1078
00:46:23,510 --> 00:46:25,454
in leading commercial activities . 

1079
00:46:25,454 --> 00:46:27,677
Panel will outline part by the projects 

1080
00:46:27,677 --> 00:46:29,850
where there are those available 

1081
00:46:29,850 --> 00:46:32,100
successes , disappointments where 

1082
00:46:32,100 --> 00:46:34,433
international participation is welcomed . 

1083
00:46:34,680 --> 00:46:36,624
It will also include some feedback 

1084
00:46:36,624 --> 00:46:38,970
against a back drop off the cove in 19 

1085
00:46:38,970 --> 00:46:41,040
pandemic where I know acquisition 

1086
00:46:41,040 --> 00:46:42,818
professionals have been heavily 

1087
00:46:42,818 --> 00:46:45,260
involved in rapid acquisition and any 

1088
00:46:45,270 --> 00:46:47,103
lessons will be learnt from that 

1089
00:46:47,103 --> 00:46:50,110
situation . So first of all , let me 

1090
00:46:50,480 --> 00:46:53,200
introduced the panel on the U s we have 

1091
00:46:53,200 --> 00:46:55,340
Stacy Cummings that Stacy is the 

1092
00:46:55,340 --> 00:46:57,562
principal deputy assistant secretary of 

1093
00:46:57,562 --> 00:47:00,250
defense acquisition enablers . Quite a 

1094
00:47:00,250 --> 00:47:02,920
long title . Stacy is a key position in 

1095
00:47:02,920 --> 00:47:04,809
advising , advising the secretary 

1096
00:47:04,809 --> 00:47:06,698
defense to defense acquisition on 

1097
00:47:06,698 --> 00:47:08,587
matters relating to D . O . D and 

1098
00:47:08,587 --> 00:47:10,940
position system while advancing 

1099
00:47:10,940 --> 00:47:13,040
innovative , data driven approaches 

1100
00:47:13,040 --> 00:47:16,510
across the acquisition enterprise 

1101
00:47:18,040 --> 00:47:20,390
and then move on to Kim . So Kim 

1102
00:47:20,390 --> 00:47:22,710
Harrington is the acting principal 

1103
00:47:22,710 --> 00:47:24,432
director , defense pricing and 

1104
00:47:24,432 --> 00:47:27,050
contracting undersecretary of defense 

1105
00:47:27,050 --> 00:47:29,940
for acquisition . Sustainment . Again , 

1106
00:47:29,940 --> 00:47:32,920
quite a long title . Him is the acting 

1107
00:47:33,070 --> 00:47:35,237
principal director . Defense pricing , 

1108
00:47:36,100 --> 00:47:37,878
Contracting . The office of the 

1109
00:47:37,878 --> 00:47:40,100
Secretary of Defense is responsible for 

1110
00:47:40,100 --> 00:47:42,322
contract pricing and procurement policy 

1111
00:47:42,322 --> 00:47:44,720
matters within the d . O . D . And he's 

1112
00:47:44,720 --> 00:47:48,040
responsible for 30,000 contracting 

1113
00:47:48,040 --> 00:47:51,160
professionals who spent over 300 

1114
00:47:51,170 --> 00:47:54,380
billion annually . Kim has extensive 

1115
00:47:54,390 --> 00:47:56,612
industry and background experience as , 

1116
00:47:56,612 --> 00:47:59,870
of course , does Stacy moving on to the 

1117
00:47:59,870 --> 00:48:03,670
UK representative So Mark Stuart Moore . 

1118
00:48:03,670 --> 00:48:06,800
I guess the DNA so defense equipment 

1119
00:48:06,800 --> 00:48:08,960
support , interim director , general 

1120
00:48:08,960 --> 00:48:11,840
commercial , or it has extensive 

1121
00:48:11,840 --> 00:48:13,951
experience of industry and government 

1122
00:48:14,070 --> 00:48:18,020
on a post include via Airbus . She was 

1123
00:48:18,020 --> 00:48:20,580
the acquisition lead for the 2012 

1124
00:48:20,590 --> 00:48:23,660
Olympics , which was a great success on 

1125
00:48:23,660 --> 00:48:25,604
she has worked for the ministry of 

1126
00:48:25,604 --> 00:48:27,049
justice , a wide range of 

1127
00:48:27,049 --> 00:48:29,160
infrastructure acquisition post . And 

1128
00:48:29,160 --> 00:48:31,382
she also sits on the procurement advise 

1129
00:48:31,382 --> 00:48:33,610
you commission committee panel for HS 

1130
00:48:33,610 --> 00:48:36,140
two , which is our high speed to 

1131
00:48:36,260 --> 00:48:38,370
enterprise , which we're looking to 

1132
00:48:38,370 --> 00:48:40,660
contract board in . The UK has been 

1133
00:48:40,660 --> 00:48:43,060
deeply involved in UK defense , trans 

1134
00:48:43,240 --> 00:48:46,040
transformation , acts of activities and 

1135
00:48:46,040 --> 00:48:48,151
bring this considerable experience to 

1136
00:48:48,151 --> 00:48:50,010
DNS onto the panel today . 

1137
00:48:51,970 --> 00:48:55,400
So with no further ado , I would invite 

1138
00:48:55,410 --> 00:48:58,300
Stacy , too Stacy companies to make 

1139
00:48:58,300 --> 00:49:01,210
some opening remarks and summary of 

1140
00:49:01,210 --> 00:49:03,377
what you've been doing in this space . 

1141
00:49:03,377 --> 00:49:05,599
Please , thank you so much . It's great 

1142
00:49:05,599 --> 00:49:08,160
to be here . I appreciate you inviting 

1143
00:49:08,160 --> 00:49:11,320
me to speak on this wonderful panel . I 

1144
00:49:11,320 --> 00:49:14,260
had the opportunity Thio listen to the 

1145
00:49:14,260 --> 00:49:17,460
morning's events a swell as , um Kim 

1146
00:49:17,460 --> 00:49:20,180
and my boss , Miss Lord , talking about 

1147
00:49:20,180 --> 00:49:22,402
some of her priorities this morning and 

1148
00:49:22,402 --> 00:49:24,850
so between Kim and I will be going into 

1149
00:49:24,850 --> 00:49:27,072
a little bit more detail on some of the 

1150
00:49:27,072 --> 00:49:29,670
strategic initiatives that Miss Lord 

1151
00:49:29,670 --> 00:49:33,610
discussed earlier today . So to 

1152
00:49:33,610 --> 00:49:35,760
start off with , I'll talk about the 

1153
00:49:35,760 --> 00:49:38,500
adaptive acquisition framework , which 

1154
00:49:38,510 --> 00:49:41,950
this morning Miss Lord described as one 

1155
00:49:41,950 --> 00:49:45,130
of the most transformational 

1156
00:49:45,140 --> 00:49:48,830
initiatives in defense acquisition in 

1157
00:49:48,830 --> 00:49:51,052
years . And then she said , and even in 

1158
00:49:51,052 --> 00:49:53,580
decades and so proud to be the leader 

1159
00:49:53,580 --> 00:49:57,240
of the team who over the last year 

1160
00:49:57,250 --> 00:50:01,250
has really taken the lead 

1161
00:50:01,250 --> 00:50:04,930
Thio , develop , 

1162
00:50:04,940 --> 00:50:08,340
write , rewrite , update and 

1163
00:50:08,350 --> 00:50:11,520
publish the adaptive acquisition 

1164
00:50:11,520 --> 00:50:15,000
framework through a Siris of D . O d 

1165
00:50:15,000 --> 00:50:18,110
5000 policy documents . As Miss Lord 

1166
00:50:18,110 --> 00:50:21,170
stated , what her overarching objective 

1167
00:50:21,170 --> 00:50:23,950
was is to take what had been a very 

1168
00:50:23,950 --> 00:50:27,690
large , complex document and really to 

1169
00:50:27,690 --> 00:50:30,440
simplify it in a way that it'd 

1170
00:50:30,440 --> 00:50:33,000
flexibility , creative compliance and 

1171
00:50:33,000 --> 00:50:35,390
critical thinking for program managers . 

1172
00:50:35,760 --> 00:50:37,927
So I'm proud to say that over the last 

1173
00:50:37,927 --> 00:50:41,010
year we have published policy documents , 

1174
00:50:41,020 --> 00:50:42,940
all of them permanent , with the 

1175
00:50:42,940 --> 00:50:45,051
exception of our software pop , which 

1176
00:50:45,051 --> 00:50:47,260
is in work to move to a permanent 

1177
00:50:47,260 --> 00:50:50,220
policy . We've published all of them in 

1178
00:50:50,220 --> 00:50:52,730
the last year , and the most recent was 

1179
00:50:52,730 --> 00:50:55,920
the D . O . D . Directive $5000.1 which 

1180
00:50:55,920 --> 00:50:58,290
was signed by the deputy secretary of 

1181
00:50:58,290 --> 00:51:01,370
Defense on the ninth of September and 

1182
00:51:01,370 --> 00:51:04,640
that gave us that overarching framework 

1183
00:51:04,650 --> 00:51:06,650
that our defense acquisition system 

1184
00:51:06,650 --> 00:51:08,539
will operate under and that frame 

1185
00:51:08,539 --> 00:51:10,520
parking the adaptive acquisition 

1186
00:51:10,520 --> 00:51:12,687
framework . So I'm gonna talk to you a 

1187
00:51:12,687 --> 00:51:14,742
little bit about the tenants of this 

1188
00:51:14,742 --> 00:51:17,850
framework , Andi , about how , uh , 

1189
00:51:17,860 --> 00:51:20,410
covitz sort of interrupted or disrupted 

1190
00:51:20,420 --> 00:51:23,280
our aggressive plans for 2020 that 

1191
00:51:23,280 --> 00:51:25,850
we're going to get back into . But then 

1192
00:51:25,850 --> 00:51:28,072
I'm also gonna talk to you about what , 

1193
00:51:28,072 --> 00:51:30,183
Going for the last six months , which 

1194
00:51:30,183 --> 00:51:32,480
is I've been the lead , the director of 

1195
00:51:32,480 --> 00:51:34,590
the D . O D s Cove in 19 Joint 

1196
00:51:34,600 --> 00:51:37,270
Acquisition Task Force providing 

1197
00:51:37,280 --> 00:51:39,169
assisted acquisition to the inter 

1198
00:51:39,169 --> 00:51:41,690
agency and responding to Cove in Esso 

1199
00:51:41,690 --> 00:51:44,460
with that as sort of a new opening for 

1200
00:51:44,470 --> 00:51:47,740
the For the next few minutes , let me 

1201
00:51:47,740 --> 00:51:49,962
tell you about the adaptive acquisition 

1202
00:51:49,962 --> 00:51:52,018
framework and some of the things I'm 

1203
00:51:52,018 --> 00:51:54,810
most proud off . So the six tenants 

1204
00:51:54,820 --> 00:51:57,120
that Miss Lord gave us as we were 

1205
00:51:57,120 --> 00:51:59,180
developing the framework was to 

1206
00:51:59,180 --> 00:52:01,800
simplify acquisition policy , Taylor 

1207
00:52:01,800 --> 00:52:03,940
acquisition approaches , empower 

1208
00:52:03,940 --> 00:52:06,490
program managers , conduct data driven 

1209
00:52:06,500 --> 00:52:10,030
analysis , actively manage risk and to 

1210
00:52:10,040 --> 00:52:13,020
emphasize sustainment . And so we 

1211
00:52:13,020 --> 00:52:16,860
incorporated those tenants into a Siris 

1212
00:52:16,870 --> 00:52:19,960
of smaller , focused documents that 

1213
00:52:19,960 --> 00:52:22,250
would enable a program manager to be 

1214
00:52:22,250 --> 00:52:24,710
able to get a deep the information , 

1215
00:52:24,710 --> 00:52:27,530
the regulations , the policy that was 

1216
00:52:27,530 --> 00:52:30,000
specific to the unique capability that 

1217
00:52:30,000 --> 00:52:32,111
they're deploying , that they've been 

1218
00:52:32,111 --> 00:52:34,420
tasked with acquiring . And so we're 

1219
00:52:34,420 --> 00:52:37,750
really driving in that flexibility that 

1220
00:52:37,760 --> 00:52:40,200
also requires our program managers to 

1221
00:52:40,200 --> 00:52:43,610
critically think because it is not . 

1222
00:52:43,620 --> 00:52:46,630
This is not a one size fits all policy 

1223
00:52:46,630 --> 00:52:48,920
document . In fact , the way that I 

1224
00:52:48,920 --> 00:52:51,730
would put it is that we're moving from 

1225
00:52:51,740 --> 00:52:55,060
a policy that started with a Siris of 

1226
00:52:55,060 --> 00:52:57,580
requirements and asked program managers 

1227
00:52:57,580 --> 00:53:00,320
to decide what they didn't have to dio 

1228
00:53:00,330 --> 00:53:03,810
into a blank sheet approach where we 

1229
00:53:03,820 --> 00:53:06,840
expect our program managers to think 

1230
00:53:06,840 --> 00:53:09,330
critically work with their customers to 

1231
00:53:09,330 --> 00:53:11,770
determine what capability , what is 

1232
00:53:11,770 --> 00:53:14,080
unique and what are the unique risks of 

1233
00:53:14,080 --> 00:53:17,220
the quality there procuring and which 

1234
00:53:17,220 --> 00:53:20,740
pathway in which Siris of documents , 

1235
00:53:20,740 --> 00:53:22,840
reports , analysis and oversight is 

1236
00:53:22,840 --> 00:53:25,650
necessary in order to deliver that 

1237
00:53:25,650 --> 00:53:28,620
capability at the lowest possible 

1238
00:53:28,630 --> 00:53:32,530
acceptable risk . And so what I'm so 

1239
00:53:32,530 --> 00:53:35,170
proud of is that even though , as I 

1240
00:53:35,170 --> 00:53:37,226
said a moment ago , I spent the last 

1241
00:53:37,226 --> 00:53:39,059
six months not talking about the 

1242
00:53:39,059 --> 00:53:41,170
adaptive acquisition framework , this 

1243
00:53:41,170 --> 00:53:43,281
is my first opportunity in six months 

1244
00:53:43,281 --> 00:53:45,281
to talk about it . But the team was 

1245
00:53:45,281 --> 00:53:48,170
able to deliver final products , get 

1246
00:53:48,170 --> 00:53:51,560
them through the process of 

1247
00:53:51,560 --> 00:53:53,727
signature , which in the Department of 

1248
00:53:53,727 --> 00:53:55,630
Defense means collaborating and 

1249
00:53:55,630 --> 00:53:58,270
coordinating across all of the staffs 

1250
00:53:58,270 --> 00:54:00,790
of the secretary's office is as well as 

1251
00:54:00,790 --> 00:54:03,640
the services to get to the ideal set of 

1252
00:54:03,640 --> 00:54:05,862
policies that we could publish over the 

1253
00:54:05,862 --> 00:54:09,380
last six months . One policy that is 

1254
00:54:09,380 --> 00:54:11,420
new and innovative and I'm really 

1255
00:54:11,420 --> 00:54:13,800
excited about is our software 

1256
00:54:13,810 --> 00:54:17,050
acquisition policy . We have previously 

1257
00:54:17,050 --> 00:54:19,161
in the Department of Defense acquired 

1258
00:54:19,161 --> 00:54:21,328
software in the same way with the same 

1259
00:54:21,328 --> 00:54:23,790
policies , with the same processes that 

1260
00:54:23,790 --> 00:54:26,320
we acquired . Hardware and software is 

1261
00:54:26,320 --> 00:54:29,560
unique . We had several 

1262
00:54:29,570 --> 00:54:33,550
reports that industry on bond academia 

1263
00:54:33,550 --> 00:54:37,270
helped us , with one of them being the 

1264
00:54:37,280 --> 00:54:39,613
dip swap , the Defense Innovation Board , 

1265
00:54:39,613 --> 00:54:41,920
software acquisition , uh , software 

1266
00:54:41,930 --> 00:54:44,920
quizzes . And that was really a big 

1267
00:54:44,930 --> 00:54:47,830
driver in the department of dis events , 

1268
00:54:47,830 --> 00:54:49,930
making the decision to have a unique 

1269
00:54:49,930 --> 00:54:53,510
pathway with a unique policy for how we 

1270
00:54:53,510 --> 00:54:56,900
would procure acquire software in a 

1271
00:54:56,900 --> 00:54:59,740
completely different way than we 

1272
00:54:59,750 --> 00:55:02,880
acquire hardware and these different 

1273
00:55:02,880 --> 00:55:05,000
pathways , which this Lord actually 

1274
00:55:05,000 --> 00:55:06,944
spoke about this morning as well . 

1275
00:55:06,944 --> 00:55:09,640
Urgent capability , middle tier major 

1276
00:55:09,640 --> 00:55:12,420
capabilities , software , defense , 

1277
00:55:12,420 --> 00:55:14,364
business system and acquisition of 

1278
00:55:14,364 --> 00:55:17,260
services are meant to be used together 

1279
00:55:17,300 --> 00:55:19,330
again , depending on the size , 

1280
00:55:19,330 --> 00:55:22,210
complexity and risk of the program that 

1281
00:55:22,210 --> 00:55:24,432
you're requiring or the capability that 

1282
00:55:24,432 --> 00:55:27,310
a program manager is acquiring . And so 

1283
00:55:27,310 --> 00:55:30,870
we started out calendar year 2020 with 

1284
00:55:30,870 --> 00:55:33,660
the expectation off traveling the 

1285
00:55:33,660 --> 00:55:35,882
country and talking directly to program 

1286
00:55:35,882 --> 00:55:38,770
managers and program teams and systems 

1287
00:55:38,770 --> 00:55:41,048
engineers and product support managers , 

1288
00:55:41,048 --> 00:55:44,240
and logisticians about how they could 

1289
00:55:44,250 --> 00:55:47,220
embrace and leverage adaptive 

1290
00:55:47,220 --> 00:55:49,920
acquisition framework in their programs . 

1291
00:55:49,920 --> 00:55:53,760
Today , with co vid that clearly made a 

1292
00:55:53,760 --> 00:55:56,110
change certainly to our ability to 

1293
00:55:56,110 --> 00:55:59,400
travel the country , Andi also really 

1294
00:55:59,400 --> 00:56:02,330
did , uh , creates some challenges 

1295
00:56:02,340 --> 00:56:04,530
around training and culture and 

1296
00:56:04,530 --> 00:56:08,420
adoption because just as we needed to 

1297
00:56:08,420 --> 00:56:10,420
stay home closer to home and really 

1298
00:56:10,420 --> 00:56:12,476
protect ourselves and our families , 

1299
00:56:12,476 --> 00:56:14,698
the Defense Acquisition University also 

1300
00:56:14,698 --> 00:56:17,730
needed to shift very quickly from a a 

1301
00:56:17,740 --> 00:56:20,180
balance of online and in person 

1302
00:56:20,180 --> 00:56:22,810
training to really almost basically a 

1303
00:56:22,810 --> 00:56:25,940
100% online training . And so over the 

1304
00:56:25,940 --> 00:56:28,340
next year , we will absolutely be 

1305
00:56:28,340 --> 00:56:30,600
continuing to leverage our virtual 

1306
00:56:30,600 --> 00:56:33,240
environments in order to train uh 

1307
00:56:33,250 --> 00:56:36,180
informed and engaged and really get 

1308
00:56:36,190 --> 00:56:38,390
active feedback from the Defense 

1309
00:56:38,390 --> 00:56:40,550
Acquisition Workforce . We're really 

1310
00:56:40,550 --> 00:56:42,772
looking forward to that and getting all 

1311
00:56:42,772 --> 00:56:45,080
of the wonderful examples of how our 

1312
00:56:45,090 --> 00:56:48,850
innovative and adaptive program 

1313
00:56:48,850 --> 00:56:50,906
managers have already started to use 

1314
00:56:50,906 --> 00:56:54,450
some of these tools as we are packaging 

1315
00:56:54,450 --> 00:56:57,660
them in a way that turns into a sort of 

1316
00:56:57,670 --> 00:57:00,950
overarching training in 

1317
00:57:00,950 --> 00:57:03,070
collaboration with how we're updating 

1318
00:57:03,080 --> 00:57:06,020
acquisition workforce in D . O D . And 

1319
00:57:06,020 --> 00:57:07,964
I've probably talked more than you 

1320
00:57:07,964 --> 00:57:10,131
anticipated , which is always the risk 

1321
00:57:10,131 --> 00:57:12,590
with me . But I did quickly mentioned , 

1322
00:57:12,600 --> 00:57:14,822
um , the Joint Acquisition Task Force . 

1323
00:57:14,822 --> 00:57:17,044
So over the last six months , I've been 

1324
00:57:17,044 --> 00:57:20,020
100% dedicated to supporting the 

1325
00:57:20,030 --> 00:57:23,110
interagency as the single entry point 

1326
00:57:23,110 --> 00:57:25,110
for the D . O D defense acquisition 

1327
00:57:25,110 --> 00:57:28,120
system for Inter eight partners Through 

1328
00:57:28,120 --> 00:57:31,890
the Economy Act , we've accepted and 

1329
00:57:31,900 --> 00:57:35,090
been executing well over $3 billion on 

1330
00:57:35,090 --> 00:57:36,646
behalf of the interagency , 

1331
00:57:36,646 --> 00:57:39,150
specifically HHS , Health and Human 

1332
00:57:39,150 --> 00:57:41,520
Services and FEMA , the Federal 

1333
00:57:41,520 --> 00:57:44,290
Emergency Management Agency . And we 

1334
00:57:44,290 --> 00:57:46,450
have been providing direct support to 

1335
00:57:46,450 --> 00:57:49,130
procure end items . Personal protective 

1336
00:57:49,130 --> 00:57:51,690
equipment . Medical resource is to 

1337
00:57:51,690 --> 00:57:54,600
deliver to Americans while at the same 

1338
00:57:54,600 --> 00:57:58,440
time investing almost $640 million and 

1339
00:57:58,440 --> 00:58:00,607
growing . We're still in the middle of 

1340
00:58:00,607 --> 00:58:03,680
this effort , but we've invested $640 

1341
00:58:03,680 --> 00:58:06,540
million to increase domestic production 

1342
00:58:06,540 --> 00:58:09,340
or to onshore production off critical 

1343
00:58:09,340 --> 00:58:12,160
medical resource is that became scarce 

1344
00:58:12,160 --> 00:58:14,271
when the lines of transportation were 

1345
00:58:14,271 --> 00:58:17,550
cut as the cove , it , um , pandemic 

1346
00:58:17,560 --> 00:58:19,760
hit . Not just clearly . The nation 

1347
00:58:20,120 --> 00:58:23,440
globe really gave us a lot to think 

1348
00:58:23,440 --> 00:58:25,640
about as faras national economic and 

1349
00:58:25,640 --> 00:58:27,710
national security related to medical 

1350
00:58:27,710 --> 00:58:30,830
industrial base . Azaz well , as the 

1351
00:58:30,830 --> 00:58:34,430
risks of for independence for our 

1352
00:58:34,440 --> 00:58:36,662
critical medical resource is again when 

1353
00:58:36,662 --> 00:58:38,718
those transportation lines get cut . 

1354
00:58:38,820 --> 00:58:42,410
Eso with that I will turn it over to 

1355
00:58:42,420 --> 00:58:45,400
Kim Harrington on Can't Wait to hear 

1356
00:58:45,410 --> 00:58:47,577
all the wonderful accomplishments that 

1357
00:58:47,577 --> 00:58:49,688
he has to share today as well . Thank 

1358
00:58:49,688 --> 00:58:51,910
you . Well , thank you , Stacey . And , 

1359
00:58:51,910 --> 00:58:55,220
uh , it really is amazing what Stacey's 

1360
00:58:55,220 --> 00:58:57,950
team did and really moving the needle 

1361
00:58:57,950 --> 00:59:00,940
relative to what we have in our 

1362
00:59:00,950 --> 00:59:03,060
national defense strategy . Really , 

1363
00:59:03,070 --> 00:59:06,390
the term is moving at the speed of 

1364
00:59:06,390 --> 00:59:09,490
relevance . Eso It's not always moving 

1365
00:59:09,490 --> 00:59:12,960
as fast as possible , but it does mean 

1366
00:59:12,960 --> 00:59:15,660
moving at the pace that supports the 

1367
00:59:15,670 --> 00:59:17,559
war fighter in the most efficient 

1368
00:59:17,559 --> 00:59:20,520
manner . Eso from my side of the House . 

1369
00:59:20,520 --> 00:59:22,660
And of course , we're very closely 

1370
00:59:22,660 --> 00:59:24,216
paired with the acquisition 

1371
00:59:24,216 --> 00:59:26,780
professionals in the contracting arena . 

1372
00:59:26,790 --> 00:59:29,470
Uh , and one of the things that has 

1373
00:59:29,470 --> 00:59:31,470
always been true , and I think it's 

1374
00:59:31,470 --> 00:59:34,000
it's well recognized in the acquisition 

1375
00:59:34,010 --> 00:59:37,040
Adaptive acquisition framework is the 

1376
00:59:37,040 --> 00:59:40,140
idea that not every program , not every 

1377
00:59:40,140 --> 00:59:42,362
acquisition , not every purchase is the 

1378
00:59:42,362 --> 00:59:46,180
same . Onda give a sense of that . So 

1379
00:59:46,190 --> 00:59:48,550
in f y 19 and we're almost done with f 

1380
00:59:48,550 --> 00:59:51,080
Y 20 . We've got one more day , but in 

1381
00:59:51,080 --> 00:59:54,810
f y 19 d o d 

1382
00:59:54,810 --> 00:59:57,660
had over 70 

1383
00:59:57,670 --> 01:00:01,490
million separate contract actions or 

1384
01:00:01,490 --> 01:00:05,000
task order awards off those 

1385
01:00:05,000 --> 01:00:08,860
70 million 99% of them were 

1386
01:00:08,860 --> 01:00:12,770
under $10,000 . So so when we talk 

1387
01:00:12,770 --> 01:00:14,881
about , you know that when we address 

1388
01:00:14,881 --> 01:00:16,937
the criticisms about the acquisition 

1389
01:00:16,937 --> 01:00:18,992
systems broken , it takes too long . 

1390
01:00:18,992 --> 01:00:21,159
Well , 99% of this stuff actually goes 

1391
01:00:21,159 --> 01:00:24,580
very fast at the speed of credit card 

1392
01:00:24,580 --> 01:00:27,040
purchases . For the most part , um , 

1393
01:00:27,050 --> 01:00:29,106
then you've got another segment that 

1394
01:00:29,106 --> 01:00:32,120
that goes from 10,000 upto 

1395
01:00:32,130 --> 01:00:35,400
250,000 , which we call , um , are 

1396
01:00:35,400 --> 01:00:37,567
simplified acquisition threshold . And 

1397
01:00:37,567 --> 01:00:40,140
this is where we we have a Congress has 

1398
01:00:40,140 --> 01:00:42,307
given us authorities in the past where 

1399
01:00:42,307 --> 01:00:45,330
we can again move very rapidly on what 

1400
01:00:45,330 --> 01:00:47,770
are even though you know , individually , 

1401
01:00:47,770 --> 01:00:49,659
to any of us , those would be big 

1402
01:00:49,659 --> 01:00:51,437
purchases . But relative to the 

1403
01:00:51,437 --> 01:00:54,270
department , under 250 K is still a 

1404
01:00:54,270 --> 01:00:56,326
pretty small purchase , and those go 

1405
01:00:56,326 --> 01:00:58,548
very rapidly and that actually now gets 

1406
01:00:58,548 --> 01:01:01,780
us to 99.9% of everything that the 

1407
01:01:01,780 --> 01:01:04,810
department buys . So so all of these 

1408
01:01:04,810 --> 01:01:08,090
major program for all the money lies 

1409
01:01:08,100 --> 01:01:12,060
are in that 0.1% annually of 

1410
01:01:12,060 --> 01:01:15,060
what we buy . And and to Stacey's point , 

1411
01:01:15,060 --> 01:01:17,227
that's where we've really put a lot of 

1412
01:01:17,227 --> 01:01:19,449
focus to try to simplify things for our 

1413
01:01:19,449 --> 01:01:22,230
program teams in our acquisition teams 

1414
01:01:22,240 --> 01:01:24,980
on it . Not only is are the things in 

1415
01:01:24,980 --> 01:01:27,036
the adaptive acquisition framework , 

1416
01:01:27,036 --> 01:01:29,870
but it also is the use of other 

1417
01:01:29,870 --> 01:01:32,750
transaction authority or O T s on . 

1418
01:01:32,750 --> 01:01:34,694
We've certainly seen a significant 

1419
01:01:34,694 --> 01:01:38,520
increase in the use of O . T s from f 

1420
01:01:38,520 --> 01:01:41,340
Y 15 . We were under a billion dollars , 

1421
01:01:41,350 --> 01:01:44,410
Aziz . We closed out f Y 19 . We were 

1422
01:01:44,410 --> 01:01:48,170
over seven billion on as we close out f 

1423
01:01:48,170 --> 01:01:51,540
y 20 we're gonna be doubling that again . 

1424
01:01:51,810 --> 01:01:54,080
Onda Lot of that is covert related , 

1425
01:01:54,080 --> 01:01:56,302
and I mentioned that just in a moment . 

1426
01:01:56,302 --> 01:01:58,800
Um , so what I always when I talk to 

1427
01:01:58,800 --> 01:02:00,744
people , I always say D o . D buys 

1428
01:02:00,744 --> 01:02:02,800
everything from hamburger buns , toe 

1429
01:02:02,800 --> 01:02:05,950
aircraft carriers . And so the issue is 

1430
01:02:05,950 --> 01:02:08,370
really trying to figure out not what is 

1431
01:02:08,370 --> 01:02:10,500
the one policy that fits all of those 

1432
01:02:10,510 --> 01:02:13,340
purchases . It's how do you take each 

1433
01:02:13,340 --> 01:02:15,980
of those groupings and make them as as 

1434
01:02:15,980 --> 01:02:18,202
efficient as possible ? And that really 

1435
01:02:18,202 --> 01:02:20,424
gets to the heart of the A f that say , 

1436
01:02:20,424 --> 01:02:22,740
Stacy describe but as well as other 

1437
01:02:22,740 --> 01:02:24,851
things that we can do from a contract 

1438
01:02:24,851 --> 01:02:27,410
policy standpoint . And we certainly 

1439
01:02:27,410 --> 01:02:29,466
want to get to questions and and let 

1440
01:02:29,466 --> 01:02:32,210
our other speaker talk . Um , but one 

1441
01:02:32,210 --> 01:02:34,980
thing I would just note is that I think 

1442
01:02:34,990 --> 01:02:38,110
we've been very successful in seeing 

1443
01:02:38,110 --> 01:02:41,240
pockets of success and reducing lead 

1444
01:02:41,240 --> 01:02:43,220
time , streamlined acquisition , 

1445
01:02:43,300 --> 01:02:46,020
cutting years out of development cycles . 

1446
01:02:46,030 --> 01:02:48,030
The challenge for the department is 

1447
01:02:48,030 --> 01:02:50,610
really to make sure that we can bring 

1448
01:02:50,610 --> 01:02:52,388
that across the entirety of the 

1449
01:02:52,388 --> 01:02:54,630
department because , like I said , we 

1450
01:02:54,630 --> 01:02:57,520
certainly see pockets of success . But 

1451
01:02:57,700 --> 01:02:59,867
But we've got to try toe , really make 

1452
01:02:59,867 --> 01:03:01,756
that occur across the entirety of 

1453
01:03:01,756 --> 01:03:03,589
everything the department does , 

1454
01:03:03,589 --> 01:03:05,367
especially again on those large 

1455
01:03:05,367 --> 01:03:07,422
procurement . And last thing I would 

1456
01:03:07,422 --> 01:03:09,589
just follow up on co vid Um , that has 

1457
01:03:09,589 --> 01:03:12,130
been a real success story in terms of 

1458
01:03:12,130 --> 01:03:14,730
the speed aspect for the department . 

1459
01:03:14,740 --> 01:03:17,610
Um , on 

1460
01:03:17,620 --> 01:03:20,830
average , we have Well , we have placed 

1461
01:03:20,840 --> 01:03:23,990
over $17 billion of covert 

1462
01:03:23,990 --> 01:03:27,610
related contract actions , O . T s . 

1463
01:03:27,620 --> 01:03:30,940
It's split almost half and half between 

1464
01:03:30,940 --> 01:03:33,440
contracts and other transactions . Ah , 

1465
01:03:33,440 --> 01:03:35,440
lot of our vaccine development have 

1466
01:03:35,440 --> 01:03:37,490
been done under o T a s on . Then 

1467
01:03:37,490 --> 01:03:39,800
there's been the industry expansion , 

1468
01:03:39,800 --> 01:03:43,040
and the the capacity expansion that 

1469
01:03:43,040 --> 01:03:46,300
Stacy mentioned is , well , that make 

1470
01:03:46,300 --> 01:03:49,390
up the 17 billion . But on average , 

1471
01:03:49,390 --> 01:03:51,001
we've processed all of those 

1472
01:03:51,001 --> 01:03:53,057
transactions in less than a month in 

1473
01:03:53,057 --> 01:03:56,530
less than 30 days . Uh , now , some of 

1474
01:03:56,530 --> 01:03:59,350
those , we certainly leveraged . You 

1475
01:03:59,350 --> 01:04:03,060
know , just , uh if you will undefended 

1476
01:04:03,060 --> 01:04:05,171
ties , contract action , where we can 

1477
01:04:05,171 --> 01:04:07,282
start quickly , and then we've got to 

1478
01:04:07,282 --> 01:04:09,504
come back and and negotiate price . But 

1479
01:04:09,504 --> 01:04:11,800
it really does show the earth and the 

1480
01:04:12,890 --> 01:04:15,010
I'm being able to quickly get things 

1481
01:04:15,010 --> 01:04:18,660
under contract . So we're gonna let our 

1482
01:04:18,660 --> 01:04:21,220
last Panelist speak , and then we'll 

1483
01:04:21,220 --> 01:04:22,331
get two questions . 

1484
01:04:25,990 --> 01:04:28,320
Thank you . Thank you , Mark . 

1485
01:04:29,590 --> 01:04:31,534
So I'm just going Sorry , I'm just 

1486
01:04:31,534 --> 01:04:32,868
gonna put these , Um um 

1487
01:04:39,190 --> 01:04:42,310
so I'm speak . Can you hear me now ? 

1488
01:04:42,320 --> 01:04:46,260
Yeah , Okay . I'm sorry about that . So 

1489
01:04:46,270 --> 01:04:48,437
it's obviously coming into the evening 

1490
01:04:48,437 --> 01:04:50,990
here in the U . K s . Oh , it's really , 

1491
01:04:51,000 --> 01:04:53,890
really great to hear both station 

1492
01:04:53,890 --> 01:04:56,440
conspiracy . Ince's . They resonate 

1493
01:04:56,440 --> 01:05:00,190
very firmly here , So we 

1494
01:05:00,240 --> 01:05:03,180
look at the same challenges . We have 

1495
01:05:03,190 --> 01:05:05,700
the some of the same problems with 

1496
01:05:06,090 --> 01:05:08,890
fantastic localized success . But how 

1497
01:05:08,890 --> 01:05:11,580
do you system eyes it across the entire 

1498
01:05:11,590 --> 01:05:14,380
acquisition system on How do you get 

1499
01:05:14,380 --> 01:05:16,491
the right expertise in it ? The right 

1500
01:05:16,491 --> 01:05:19,920
places . We've bean looking very much 

1501
01:05:19,920 --> 01:05:21,870
now about the implementation of 

1502
01:05:21,870 --> 01:05:24,200
category management was one of these 

1503
01:05:24,200 --> 01:05:27,490
solutions to that on really trying thio 

1504
01:05:27,500 --> 01:05:29,222
below the prime level into the 

1505
01:05:29,222 --> 01:05:32,950
subsystems to try and get a great 

1506
01:05:32,950 --> 01:05:35,240
commercial deals set up in probably 

1507
01:05:35,250 --> 01:05:37,361
something that's slightly more market 

1508
01:05:37,361 --> 01:05:38,972
facing on some of the really 

1509
01:05:38,972 --> 01:05:41,270
specialized systems integration with 

1510
01:05:41,270 --> 01:05:43,940
our software . I would genuinely love 

1511
01:05:43,940 --> 01:05:46,770
to see your software acquisition policy 

1512
01:05:46,780 --> 01:05:50,740
way struggle with the same things . So 

1513
01:05:50,740 --> 01:05:54,440
it is really difficult Thio have on 

1514
01:05:54,450 --> 01:05:56,672
output specifications for something you 

1515
01:05:56,672 --> 01:05:58,894
don't know what it is you saw . Sort of 

1516
01:05:58,894 --> 01:06:01,172
might know what you want to do with it . 

1517
01:06:01,172 --> 01:06:03,394
But how do you then reconcile that with 

1518
01:06:03,394 --> 01:06:05,450
the demonstration of value for money 

1519
01:06:05,450 --> 01:06:07,339
and really clear sort of treasury 

1520
01:06:07,339 --> 01:06:09,650
guidance ? And so we are looking at how 

1521
01:06:09,650 --> 01:06:12,590
we do that in far more detail about the 

1522
01:06:12,590 --> 01:06:15,950
sort of agile technology we've we've . 

1523
01:06:15,960 --> 01:06:17,849
We've had some success across the 

1524
01:06:17,849 --> 01:06:20,660
system using something called by and 

1525
01:06:20,660 --> 01:06:23,530
try it scale . So we've been able 

1526
01:06:23,530 --> 01:06:26,430
rather than to buy something small , 

1527
01:06:26,440 --> 01:06:28,840
qualify it and then struggle with how 

1528
01:06:28,840 --> 01:06:30,951
we actually implement that across the 

1529
01:06:30,951 --> 01:06:32,784
system we have tried to do it in 

1530
01:06:32,784 --> 01:06:35,800
reverse , which has had some some 

1531
01:06:35,810 --> 01:06:37,977
really good success . Actually , we've 

1532
01:06:37,977 --> 01:06:40,880
looked at setting up such more 

1533
01:06:40,880 --> 01:06:42,991
strategic partnerships . So there's a 

1534
01:06:42,991 --> 01:06:45,720
bit more freedom there in how we buy 

1535
01:06:46,080 --> 01:06:49,150
Onda were kind of currently really , 

1536
01:06:49,150 --> 01:06:52,300
really struggling and trying Thio map 

1537
01:06:52,300 --> 01:06:55,680
our entire supply chain because we with 

1538
01:06:55,690 --> 01:06:57,746
the Brazilians that we've got in our 

1539
01:06:57,746 --> 01:06:59,968
supply chain at the moment given co bid 

1540
01:06:59,968 --> 01:07:02,180
given We've got something for Brexit 

1541
01:07:02,180 --> 01:07:05,220
that you may or may not know that where 

1542
01:07:05,220 --> 01:07:08,610
I'll leave in the U is that our supply 

1543
01:07:08,610 --> 01:07:12,050
chain is really a complex issue at the 

1544
01:07:12,050 --> 01:07:14,106
moment . It probably quite high risk 

1545
01:07:14,106 --> 01:07:16,217
trust . So we're trying to understand 

1546
01:07:16,217 --> 01:07:18,328
how we can map our whole supply chain 

1547
01:07:18,328 --> 01:07:20,690
down to probably tier 4 to 7 so that 

1548
01:07:20,690 --> 01:07:22,857
we've we've got that resilience in our 

1549
01:07:22,857 --> 01:07:26,770
in our delivery . E guess . One 

1550
01:07:26,770 --> 01:07:29,370
thing is , I personally looked at the 

1551
01:07:29,370 --> 01:07:30,926
acquisition and approvals , 

1552
01:07:30,926 --> 01:07:33,037
transformation and lead that for some 

1553
01:07:33,037 --> 01:07:36,030
time is that the one team approach 

1554
01:07:36,030 --> 01:07:38,520
seems to work very well when we can get 

1555
01:07:38,520 --> 01:07:40,730
it working . So when we could get all 

1556
01:07:40,730 --> 01:07:42,674
of the elements of the acquisition 

1557
01:07:42,674 --> 01:07:44,710
system on get the requirement 

1558
01:07:44,710 --> 01:07:46,850
specialists in with this remark , it 

1559
01:07:46,850 --> 01:07:49,760
specialists , then that does work . If 

1560
01:07:49,760 --> 01:07:52,690
we when we really divide the system 

1561
01:07:52,690 --> 01:07:55,150
into our organizational boundaries , 

1562
01:07:55,340 --> 01:07:57,451
that's when things really slow down . 

1563
01:07:57,780 --> 01:07:59,780
So we're trying to do more and more 

1564
01:07:59,780 --> 01:08:01,780
work on that a two moment one of my 

1565
01:08:01,780 --> 01:08:03,780
colleagues and set that up with the 

1566
01:08:03,780 --> 01:08:06,180
Navy of trying Thio really manage an 

1567
01:08:06,180 --> 01:08:08,610
integrated team . Thio get some speed 

1568
01:08:08,620 --> 01:08:12,130
into the system . Um , S O . I think 

1569
01:08:12,130 --> 01:08:14,300
the other things are about 

1570
01:08:14,300 --> 01:08:17,000
proportionate assurance . Associate it 

1571
01:08:17,010 --> 01:08:19,177
with some of the big decisions that we 

1572
01:08:19,177 --> 01:08:21,399
have to make . So as Kim said a lot , a 

1573
01:08:21,399 --> 01:08:23,288
lot of things actually go through 

1574
01:08:23,288 --> 01:08:25,288
pretty quickly . But there are some 

1575
01:08:25,288 --> 01:08:28,500
things that unnecessarily slow down 

1576
01:08:28,770 --> 01:08:30,910
because the assurance , particularly 

1577
01:08:30,920 --> 01:08:34,790
around iittie spend , is quite 

1578
01:08:34,800 --> 01:08:37,470
tightly controlled in the UK on bits , 

1579
01:08:37,470 --> 01:08:39,110
not disaggregated out to the 

1580
01:08:39,110 --> 01:08:42,350
department's . So getting the speed 

1581
01:08:42,350 --> 01:08:44,406
into that because actually have lots 

1582
01:08:44,406 --> 01:08:46,517
and lots of different people involved 

1583
01:08:46,517 --> 01:08:48,683
in the approvals of certain categories 

1584
01:08:48,683 --> 01:08:51,440
of spend s . So I think that's kind of 

1585
01:08:51,450 --> 01:08:53,450
my whistle stop tour . I'm probably 

1586
01:08:53,450 --> 01:08:57,120
better toe answer questions and speak 

1587
01:08:57,120 --> 01:08:59,176
mawr appropriately to whatever it is 

1588
01:08:59,176 --> 01:09:01,287
that you are interested to find out . 

1589
01:09:02,270 --> 01:09:04,970
Mm . Thank you . Thank you . Uh , if 

1590
01:09:04,970 --> 01:09:06,970
I'd like , I'd like to open up with 

1591
01:09:06,970 --> 01:09:08,970
some questions . Actually , uh , to 

1592
01:09:08,970 --> 01:09:10,980
your you've spoken about the people 

1593
01:09:10,980 --> 01:09:12,869
issues and the underlying need to 

1594
01:09:12,869 --> 01:09:15,330
address education and on three up 

1595
01:09:15,330 --> 01:09:17,830
Skilling of the workforce . I know , Uh , 

1596
01:09:17,840 --> 01:09:20,007
when Andrew for Sonic . Whenever we we 

1597
01:09:20,007 --> 01:09:21,784
went to the d A , you were very 

1598
01:09:21,784 --> 01:09:23,896
impressed with the resources you push 

1599
01:09:23,896 --> 01:09:26,940
into this . How have you made me 

1600
01:09:26,940 --> 01:09:28,996
question for the US first , how have 

1601
01:09:28,996 --> 01:09:31,107
you managed the culture change that's 

1602
01:09:31,107 --> 01:09:34,250
required with introducing these new 

1603
01:09:34,250 --> 01:09:38,240
initiatives ? I guess I'll take 

1604
01:09:38,240 --> 01:09:41,010
a Crockett That s o 

1605
01:09:42,770 --> 01:09:46,540
very soon , because we are really at 

1606
01:09:46,550 --> 01:09:49,670
sort of , I'll say the initial part of 

1607
01:09:49,670 --> 01:09:52,420
rolling it out to the force . Right ? 

1608
01:09:52,420 --> 01:09:54,450
So there's been as you referenced . 

1609
01:09:54,450 --> 01:09:56,740
There's been a lot of work between I'll 

1610
01:09:56,740 --> 01:09:58,830
say at the at the leadership in this 

1611
01:09:58,840 --> 01:10:02,300
level with De Au and and we're 

1612
01:10:02,300 --> 01:10:06,250
just now releasing the information and 

1613
01:10:06,250 --> 01:10:09,180
and the and the guidance documents down , 

1614
01:10:09,560 --> 01:10:12,780
do the work force . Um , but I'll take 

1615
01:10:12,780 --> 01:10:15,290
a crack at a prediction , you know , 

1616
01:10:15,290 --> 01:10:17,450
with any change , there's always an 

1617
01:10:17,450 --> 01:10:21,000
immediate , you know , reaction of , 

1618
01:10:21,010 --> 01:10:23,370
you know , this is different . So , you 

1619
01:10:23,370 --> 01:10:25,537
know , I'm gonna just sort of sit back 

1620
01:10:25,537 --> 01:10:27,870
and see what happens . But I do believe 

1621
01:10:27,870 --> 01:10:30,750
that we will see people really embrace 

1622
01:10:30,750 --> 01:10:34,200
it because it it really does A number 

1623
01:10:34,200 --> 01:10:37,590
of things One is is we are scaling back 

1624
01:10:37,600 --> 01:10:41,160
on , uh , the I'll say , the 

1625
01:10:41,170 --> 01:10:43,830
upfront training that we have focused 

1626
01:10:43,830 --> 01:10:46,630
on where , where a t least within the 

1627
01:10:46,630 --> 01:10:49,800
contracting side . We required almost 

1628
01:10:49,800 --> 01:10:53,610
700 hours of training to reach , sort 

1629
01:10:53,610 --> 01:10:55,410
of to reach the top level of 

1630
01:10:55,410 --> 01:10:57,466
certification . We're going to scale 

1631
01:10:57,466 --> 01:11:00,450
that back down to about 250 hours 

1632
01:11:00,460 --> 01:11:04,200
on and simplify the certification 

1633
01:11:04,200 --> 01:11:07,560
process but not lose any of the 

1634
01:11:07,560 --> 01:11:09,750
potential training . It will just be 

1635
01:11:09,750 --> 01:11:11,990
more of a continuous training process 

1636
01:11:11,990 --> 01:11:14,240
over the life of your career rather 

1637
01:11:14,240 --> 01:11:16,570
than getting it crammed in your first 5 

1638
01:11:16,570 --> 01:11:18,920
to 10 years . And then when you get 20 

1639
01:11:18,920 --> 01:11:22,040
years from now and you really need some 

1640
01:11:22,040 --> 01:11:24,950
of those that information well , it's 

1641
01:11:24,950 --> 01:11:27,061
been 20 years , and you forgot it all 

1642
01:11:27,061 --> 01:11:29,390
on that will be delivered at the time 

1643
01:11:29,390 --> 01:11:33,050
of need , as opposed to back jammed in 

1644
01:11:33,050 --> 01:11:34,994
the front part of your career . So 

1645
01:11:34,994 --> 01:11:37,106
that's really only one aspect of it . 

1646
01:11:37,106 --> 01:11:39,272
But that's a really major aspect , and 

1647
01:11:39,272 --> 01:11:41,272
I think when people understand that 

1648
01:11:41,272 --> 01:11:43,161
what we're really trying to do is 

1649
01:11:43,161 --> 01:11:45,383
support a continuous learning model and 

1650
01:11:45,383 --> 01:11:47,494
delivering content when you need it , 

1651
01:11:47,494 --> 01:11:50,300
as opposed to teach you everything you 

1652
01:11:50,300 --> 01:11:52,356
need to know about everything , even 

1653
01:11:52,356 --> 01:11:54,578
though your your first job is just this 

1654
01:11:54,578 --> 01:11:56,830
one small thing that that really is 

1655
01:11:56,830 --> 01:11:59,300
going to be a benefit for the workforce , 

1656
01:11:59,360 --> 01:12:01,527
especially the contracting workforce , 

1657
01:12:01,527 --> 01:12:03,749
but really across all of our functional 

1658
01:12:03,749 --> 01:12:06,680
areas , I could hear , uh , if I could 

1659
01:12:06,690 --> 01:12:10,170
pose a slightly different question . 

1660
01:12:10,180 --> 01:12:12,890
But on the same thing . To Merak , 

1661
01:12:13,950 --> 01:12:16,540
empowerment has been quite a key thrust , 

1662
01:12:16,540 --> 01:12:19,040
I think for the acquisition community 

1663
01:12:19,050 --> 01:12:22,950
in the UK this year , can you tell 

1664
01:12:22,950 --> 01:12:25,117
me how you think that's going and what 

1665
01:12:25,117 --> 01:12:27,580
initiatives you're making to change the 

1666
01:12:27,590 --> 01:12:30,780
culture of people ? Thio Effect Mawr , 

1667
01:12:31,840 --> 01:12:35,510
innovative and rapid acquisition . So 

1668
01:12:35,510 --> 01:12:37,620
you've touched on one of my favorite 

1669
01:12:37,630 --> 01:12:41,270
books topics because I struggled with 

1670
01:12:41,270 --> 01:12:43,437
it , and the reason I struggle with it 

1671
01:12:43,437 --> 01:12:45,750
is that we don't delegate the authority 

1672
01:12:45,750 --> 01:12:47,980
to the people that we are trying to 

1673
01:12:47,980 --> 01:12:51,390
empower eso . We kind of 

1674
01:12:51,400 --> 01:12:54,770
encourage . We use the term empowerment , 

1675
01:12:55,050 --> 01:12:57,520
but for me to be fully empowered , you 

1676
01:12:57,520 --> 01:12:59,600
need to be able to control your 

1677
01:12:59,600 --> 01:13:02,530
resource is and your finances on DSO . 

1678
01:13:02,530 --> 01:13:04,930
That's quite difficult to Dio . So it's 

1679
01:13:04,930 --> 01:13:06,819
actually I think it's led to some 

1680
01:13:06,819 --> 01:13:08,930
frustrations , but it's it's a really 

1681
01:13:08,930 --> 01:13:11,220
positive frustration because it's kind . 

1682
01:13:11,230 --> 01:13:13,341
It's now showing us where some of the 

1683
01:13:13,341 --> 01:13:15,810
tensions are . So instead where people 

1684
01:13:15,810 --> 01:13:17,780
might have just sort of let it lie 

1685
01:13:17,790 --> 01:13:19,679
there now saying No , I am now an 

1686
01:13:19,679 --> 01:13:21,670
empowered seeing the irresponsible 

1687
01:13:21,680 --> 01:13:25,680
owner of this capability on . I 

1688
01:13:25,680 --> 01:13:27,990
need to be able to accelerate my 

1689
01:13:27,990 --> 01:13:30,160
program even if it sits within your 

1690
01:13:30,160 --> 01:13:33,580
organization . So I think that 

1691
01:13:34,250 --> 01:13:36,850
I think I probably didn't like it to 

1692
01:13:36,850 --> 01:13:40,630
start with . I've moved now because in 

1693
01:13:40,630 --> 01:13:43,180
small cases I think that people really 

1694
01:13:43,180 --> 01:13:47,110
feel empowered on where they want to be 

1695
01:13:47,110 --> 01:13:49,110
empowered but can't because of some 

1696
01:13:49,110 --> 01:13:51,200
bureaucracy were now challenging the 

1697
01:13:51,200 --> 01:13:53,367
bureaucracy and saying that that's not 

1698
01:13:53,367 --> 01:13:55,630
acceptable . So it's working . I mean , 

1699
01:13:55,630 --> 01:13:57,852
it's quite incredible , actually , that 

1700
01:13:57,852 --> 01:13:59,797
that cultural shift is starting to 

1701
01:13:59,797 --> 01:14:01,797
happen . Eso I look forward to what 

1702
01:14:01,797 --> 01:14:03,686
it's going to spray . It's hard , 

1703
01:14:03,686 --> 01:14:05,852
though , when you're trying to control 

1704
01:14:05,852 --> 01:14:07,963
all commercial activity across a wide 

1705
01:14:07,963 --> 01:14:10,550
range of people . Thio allow that to 

1706
01:14:10,550 --> 01:14:14,330
happen . Yeah , thank you . My 

1707
01:14:14,400 --> 01:14:17,310
second theme question maybe poses to 

1708
01:14:17,310 --> 01:14:20,380
the U . S . First speed agility 

1709
01:14:20,840 --> 01:14:23,270
also quite often means increased risk 

1710
01:14:23,840 --> 01:14:26,240
on that really brings with it increased 

1711
01:14:26,240 --> 01:14:28,820
risk tolerance . How have you addressed 

1712
01:14:28,820 --> 01:14:31,620
that in terms of , um , your system of 

1713
01:14:31,620 --> 01:14:33,970
acquisition , you know , quite often 

1714
01:14:33,970 --> 01:14:35,692
order just want to come in and 

1715
01:14:36,840 --> 01:14:39,300
criticized after the event , but I 

1716
01:14:39,300 --> 01:14:41,680
think agile , innovative acquisition . 

1717
01:14:41,810 --> 01:14:44,690
Sometimes things will go wrong has us 

1718
01:14:44,690 --> 01:14:47,370
changed its risk tolerance levels . 

1719
01:14:50,540 --> 01:14:53,050
I'll take it 1st , 1st shot at this Kim 

1720
01:14:53,050 --> 01:14:55,161
and then feel free toe . Feel free to 

1721
01:14:55,161 --> 01:14:57,740
jump in as well , I will tell you that 

1722
01:14:57,750 --> 01:14:59,550
managing risk accepting Ricks 

1723
01:14:59,550 --> 01:15:02,660
understanding risk is a a new integral 

1724
01:15:02,660 --> 01:15:05,290
part of the rewrite of the policy 

1725
01:15:05,290 --> 01:15:09,080
documents that we have , um , published 

1726
01:15:09,080 --> 01:15:11,850
over the last year . And many of you 

1727
01:15:11,850 --> 01:15:14,920
may have heard my boss , Mr Kevin Fahey , 

1728
01:15:14,930 --> 01:15:18,820
talk about risk and how if the most 

1729
01:15:18,820 --> 01:15:20,653
critical thing you need to do is 

1730
01:15:20,653 --> 01:15:22,876
understand what your risks are not at a 

1731
01:15:22,876 --> 01:15:24,910
point in time but as they changed 

1732
01:15:24,910 --> 01:15:26,799
throughout the life cycle of your 

1733
01:15:26,799 --> 01:15:29,021
program , and that it is that risk that 

1734
01:15:29,021 --> 01:15:31,610
should be driving the approaches that 

1735
01:15:31,620 --> 01:15:34,340
you are using in order to deliver the 

1736
01:15:34,340 --> 01:15:36,562
unique capability that you as a program 

1737
01:15:36,562 --> 01:15:39,000
manager have been tasked with acquiring 

1738
01:15:39,000 --> 01:15:41,360
and so we really have integrated 

1739
01:15:41,370 --> 01:15:44,510
understanding , risk and using risk to 

1740
01:15:44,520 --> 01:15:47,290
inform your acquisition strategy and to 

1741
01:15:47,290 --> 01:15:49,346
make sure that you're reviewing that 

1742
01:15:49,346 --> 01:15:52,810
risk over time . I think too often , um , 

1743
01:15:52,820 --> 01:15:56,290
b b tend thio document something 

1744
01:15:56,290 --> 01:16:00,070
once , and it becomes static instead of 

1745
01:16:00,070 --> 01:16:02,490
having it be an actual living document 

1746
01:16:02,490 --> 01:16:04,657
that changes throughout the life cycle 

1747
01:16:04,657 --> 01:16:06,546
of the program as the environment 

1748
01:16:06,546 --> 01:16:09,120
changes or as you get more information . 

1749
01:16:09,120 --> 01:16:11,342
And so that is really a critical part . 

1750
01:16:11,342 --> 01:16:13,560
And it does go back to that idea of 

1751
01:16:13,630 --> 01:16:17,170
training our workforce not to follow a 

1752
01:16:17,170 --> 01:16:19,550
checklist , but really to critically 

1753
01:16:19,550 --> 01:16:21,470
think and to leverage creative 

1754
01:16:21,470 --> 01:16:23,930
compliance . As Miss Lord said , um , 

1755
01:16:23,940 --> 01:16:27,090
around understanding risk and applying 

1756
01:16:27,090 --> 01:16:29,020
methodologies to reduce it to an 

1757
01:16:29,020 --> 01:16:31,850
acceptable level . Working closely with 

1758
01:16:31,860 --> 01:16:34,520
the warfighter . Your require your user , 

1759
01:16:34,520 --> 01:16:36,520
the people representing your user . 

1760
01:16:36,600 --> 01:16:38,400
That is especially important in 

1761
01:16:38,410 --> 01:16:41,220
acquisition of software , as we wanna 

1762
01:16:41,220 --> 01:16:44,920
be able to deliver and quickly get 

1763
01:16:44,920 --> 01:16:47,500
feedback and change and re deliver , 

1764
01:16:47,500 --> 01:16:49,940
get feedback and change . You can't do 

1765
01:16:49,940 --> 01:16:52,162
that if you're not willing to take some 

1766
01:16:52,162 --> 01:16:56,090
risk and , um , in dedicating users 

1767
01:16:56,090 --> 01:16:58,280
to provide your feedback but also 

1768
01:16:58,290 --> 01:17:00,512
taking action on the feedback quickly . 

1769
01:17:00,530 --> 01:17:02,730
Um , it is risky , but it's a risk you 

1770
01:17:02,730 --> 01:17:04,730
have to take in order to get to the 

1771
01:17:04,730 --> 01:17:06,397
best possible solution at the 

1772
01:17:06,397 --> 01:17:08,452
appropriate costs in the appropriate 

1773
01:17:08,452 --> 01:17:10,397
time . Speed of relevance , as Kim 

1774
01:17:10,397 --> 01:17:14,240
mention Thank you . 60 s So what ? I 

1775
01:17:14,240 --> 01:17:16,351
would ask , First of all , everything 

1776
01:17:16,351 --> 01:17:19,530
Stacey said was spot on . And I 

1777
01:17:19,540 --> 01:17:21,720
say , You know , the heart of your 

1778
01:17:21,720 --> 01:17:25,560
question is is the US ready to 

1779
01:17:25,570 --> 01:17:28,720
accept that trade in that in that risk 

1780
01:17:28,720 --> 01:17:31,450
profile ? And I would say the 

1781
01:17:31,450 --> 01:17:35,340
acquisition community is and and has , 

1782
01:17:35,350 --> 01:17:37,790
and to a large extent , the department 

1783
01:17:37,800 --> 01:17:41,790
does and is ready . We have 

1784
01:17:41,790 --> 01:17:44,600
other elements within the government , 

1785
01:17:44,610 --> 01:17:47,550
right , that that may have a different 

1786
01:17:47,550 --> 01:17:49,439
view . And you're exactly right . 

1787
01:17:49,439 --> 01:17:52,510
Auditors will come in . Um , General 

1788
01:17:52,510 --> 01:17:54,950
Hole of the Air Force calls them the 

1789
01:17:54,960 --> 01:17:58,420
recrimination society on bond . You 

1790
01:17:58,420 --> 01:18:00,642
know , they'll want to come in and find 

1791
01:18:00,642 --> 01:18:02,531
what's wrong . That's their job . 

1792
01:18:02,531 --> 01:18:05,050
Essentially , um , you know , and so 

1793
01:18:05,060 --> 01:18:07,227
there's always gonna be that tension . 

1794
01:18:07,227 --> 01:18:09,560
But I would say that may be unlike 

1795
01:18:09,560 --> 01:18:12,030
prior times because of the threat that 

1796
01:18:12,030 --> 01:18:15,530
exists and because of the you know , I 

1797
01:18:15,530 --> 01:18:18,070
call it a burning platform that our our 

1798
01:18:18,070 --> 01:18:20,450
national defense strategy put us on . 

1799
01:18:20,460 --> 01:18:22,682
You know , it said our processes do not 

1800
01:18:22,682 --> 01:18:26,600
support the need we have to change on 

1801
01:18:26,600 --> 01:18:29,450
DSO . So I think that the department 

1802
01:18:29,450 --> 01:18:31,283
and the acquisition community is 

1803
01:18:31,283 --> 01:18:34,530
embracing the fact that there are 

1804
01:18:34,620 --> 01:18:37,520
risks that will have to be taken . But 

1805
01:18:37,520 --> 01:18:39,742
you could take them intelligently . You 

1806
01:18:39,742 --> 01:18:41,298
can take them after careful 

1807
01:18:41,298 --> 01:18:43,353
consideration . Sometimes you may be 

1808
01:18:43,353 --> 01:18:45,820
wrong and that's okay and you'll learn 

1809
01:18:45,820 --> 01:18:48,480
from it and you'll go forward . Will 

1810
01:18:48,480 --> 01:18:50,680
people come in after the fact and make 

1811
01:18:50,680 --> 01:18:53,170
a big deal about it ? Yes , all we have 

1812
01:18:53,170 --> 01:18:55,226
to do is pick up the paper every day 

1813
01:18:55,226 --> 01:18:57,281
and we can read about all the things 

1814
01:18:57,281 --> 01:18:59,114
that we've done wrong with . The 

1815
01:18:59,114 --> 01:19:01,337
department has had to deal with that in 

1816
01:19:01,337 --> 01:19:03,392
recent days about a few things , but 

1817
01:19:03,392 --> 01:19:06,080
But I think the mission is so important , 

1818
01:19:06,090 --> 01:19:09,370
and the direction is so correct that 

1819
01:19:09,380 --> 01:19:11,940
that we will keep going down that path 

1820
01:19:11,950 --> 01:19:15,810
even if others don't think that 

1821
01:19:15,820 --> 01:19:17,940
we made correct decisions when they 

1822
01:19:17,940 --> 01:19:20,310
look in the rear view mirror . Thanks , 

1823
01:19:20,310 --> 01:19:22,199
Kevin Wei used to have a saying . 

1824
01:19:22,199 --> 01:19:24,310
Actually , in the UK , the auditors , 

1825
01:19:24,310 --> 01:19:26,532
to the people who come in after the war 

1826
01:19:26,532 --> 01:19:29,860
and being it the wounded Uh yeah , 

1827
01:19:30,220 --> 01:19:32,560
alright , if if they have moved to you 

1828
01:19:32,570 --> 01:19:36,270
on this one . Um , how have you 

1829
01:19:36,280 --> 01:19:39,310
addressed ? Um this tolerance for risk 

1830
01:19:39,310 --> 01:19:42,410
and do you be That's changed now for 

1831
01:19:42,410 --> 01:19:46,010
the UK ? Um , 

1832
01:19:46,020 --> 01:19:48,890
no , I Well , I think it's what my 

1833
01:19:48,890 --> 01:19:51,001
observation is . It's going the other 

1834
01:19:51,001 --> 01:19:54,000
way . Attn . A moment as we've moved , 

1835
01:19:54,000 --> 01:19:56,222
I think has said at the beginning we've 

1836
01:19:56,222 --> 01:19:59,020
moved really quickly on a huge scale of 

1837
01:19:59,030 --> 01:20:01,660
PP procurement , ventilator , 

1838
01:20:01,660 --> 01:20:05,360
procurement . And now I feel that 

1839
01:20:05,360 --> 01:20:07,830
the auditors or the people assessing 

1840
01:20:07,830 --> 01:20:10,080
that the tension is coming in so 

1841
01:20:10,080 --> 01:20:13,640
quickly that it makes me worry that 

1842
01:20:13,650 --> 01:20:16,510
people aren't going t o be comfortable 

1843
01:20:16,510 --> 01:20:19,000
taking the risks . So I think we've got 

1844
01:20:19,000 --> 01:20:22,680
to work out how to structure that on . 

1845
01:20:22,680 --> 01:20:24,847
We are starting to As we're looking at 

1846
01:20:24,847 --> 01:20:26,680
our vaccine procurement , we are 

1847
01:20:26,680 --> 01:20:28,736
starting to structure that in a much 

1848
01:20:28,736 --> 01:20:30,980
better way , which is bounded in the 

1849
01:20:30,980 --> 01:20:33,890
sense off . Some of these may fail on 

1850
01:20:33,890 --> 01:20:36,280
bats , okay , but have that set out at 

1851
01:20:36,280 --> 01:20:38,550
the beginning in the business case so 

1852
01:20:38,550 --> 01:20:41,340
that that's clearly understood rather 

1853
01:20:41,340 --> 01:20:43,770
than we are going down this route that 

1854
01:20:43,780 --> 01:20:45,780
is going to be successful , which a 

1855
01:20:45,780 --> 01:20:47,836
traditional business case might look 

1856
01:20:47,836 --> 01:20:51,080
like . Eso having that balance in there 

1857
01:20:51,090 --> 01:20:54,280
on having the objectives clearly 

1858
01:20:54,280 --> 01:20:57,450
stated at a very outline level . 

1859
01:20:57,910 --> 01:21:00,243
That's the bit that I'm working on with . 

1860
01:21:00,243 --> 01:21:02,466
Treasury is toe how that works with our 

1861
01:21:02,466 --> 01:21:04,743
treasury guidance so that we can do it . 

1862
01:21:04,743 --> 01:21:06,960
I think . I mean , our system works in 

1863
01:21:06,960 --> 01:21:09,390
the way that we can do it . We've just 

1864
01:21:09,390 --> 01:21:11,690
got to be smart enough to bound it in 

1865
01:21:11,690 --> 01:21:14,010
the right way at the beginning . But I 

1866
01:21:14,010 --> 01:21:16,010
do worry slightly that personal . 

1867
01:21:16,050 --> 01:21:18,272
Certainly lower down the organization . 

1868
01:21:18,272 --> 01:21:20,272
People are being more and more risk 

1869
01:21:20,272 --> 01:21:21,994
averse because they see what's 

1870
01:21:21,994 --> 01:21:24,500
happening . So we've just got to manage 

1871
01:21:24,500 --> 01:21:26,444
that . I think there's a country . 

1872
01:21:26,810 --> 01:21:29,850
Thank you . Uh huh . Make it to the U . 

1873
01:21:29,850 --> 01:21:32,070
S . Uh , when the last time Andrew for 

1874
01:21:32,070 --> 01:21:34,292
Sonny come up . We did it . Sure of the 

1875
01:21:34,292 --> 01:21:37,100
U S . In terms of some of the t A . It 

1876
01:21:37,100 --> 01:21:39,700
is . And , uh , so we found that very 

1877
01:21:39,700 --> 01:21:43,420
interesting on you . Uh , explain how 

1878
01:21:43,430 --> 01:21:46,130
we spend on OT Aces increased quite 

1879
01:21:46,130 --> 01:21:49,260
rapidly . Um , how is that going in 

1880
01:21:49,260 --> 01:21:51,800
terms off harnessing innovation , but 

1881
01:21:51,800 --> 01:21:55,180
also engaging nontraditional defense 

1882
01:21:55,260 --> 01:21:59,180
manufacturers or or contractors that 

1883
01:21:59,180 --> 01:22:01,180
seem to be a challenge on there you 

1884
01:22:01,180 --> 01:22:03,180
were looking to get Maybe there's a 

1885
01:22:03,180 --> 01:22:04,958
Silicon Valley type enterprises 

1886
01:22:04,958 --> 01:22:06,810
involved in new and different 

1887
01:22:06,810 --> 01:22:09,710
capability and technology . How's that 

1888
01:22:09,710 --> 01:22:12,550
going for the U . S ? I think it's 

1889
01:22:12,550 --> 01:22:15,250
progressing . We would always wanted to 

1890
01:22:15,250 --> 01:22:18,660
be better . Uh , you know , the 

1891
01:22:18,670 --> 01:22:21,140
department in years past was used to 

1892
01:22:21,140 --> 01:22:23,840
driving the marketplace of innovation 

1893
01:22:23,850 --> 01:22:27,460
on . Now we don't on dso that that 

1894
01:22:27,470 --> 01:22:30,100
that's somewhat discomforting for some 

1895
01:22:30,100 --> 01:22:32,510
people . And so , you know , we are 

1896
01:22:32,510 --> 01:22:34,900
having to try , you know , a bunch of 

1897
01:22:34,900 --> 01:22:37,030
different ways in which to penetrate 

1898
01:22:37,300 --> 01:22:40,680
into technology . But I would say the 

1899
01:22:40,690 --> 01:22:44,300
use of OTC has been a success . Uh , 

1900
01:22:44,310 --> 01:22:46,870
you know , are there things that we 

1901
01:22:46,870 --> 01:22:48,840
need to continue to do ? Yes . Are 

1902
01:22:48,840 --> 01:22:51,440
there , You know , do o . T . S work 

1903
01:22:51,440 --> 01:22:54,480
for every situation ? No , But again in 

1904
01:22:54,480 --> 01:22:56,450
that in that spectrum of buying 

1905
01:22:56,450 --> 01:22:58,283
everything from hamburger buns , 

1906
01:22:58,283 --> 01:23:00,394
aircraft carriers , there are lanes , 

1907
01:23:00,394 --> 01:23:03,440
if you will , where ot uses proper and 

1908
01:23:03,450 --> 01:23:07,050
we have seen program after program 

1909
01:23:07,050 --> 01:23:10,310
able to cut significant time out of 

1910
01:23:10,310 --> 01:23:13,480
their process by leveraging o t s . 

1911
01:23:13,490 --> 01:23:15,700
Some of that is on the front end in 

1912
01:23:15,700 --> 01:23:18,250
terms of getting under contract on DSO . 

1913
01:23:18,260 --> 01:23:21,510
Some of it is in the development period 

1914
01:23:21,510 --> 01:23:23,710
because one of the reasons why you're 

1915
01:23:23,710 --> 01:23:26,330
trying to do an O t usually is to get 

1916
01:23:26,330 --> 01:23:29,280
at technology that exists in the 

1917
01:23:29,280 --> 01:23:31,900
commercial marketplace and and is 

1918
01:23:31,900 --> 01:23:34,380
already reasonably mature instead of 

1919
01:23:34,380 --> 01:23:38,060
having to start from scratch as's faras 

1920
01:23:38,060 --> 01:23:40,700
participation of nontraditional the 

1921
01:23:40,700 --> 01:23:44,420
overwhelming number of R . O . T s have 

1922
01:23:44,430 --> 01:23:46,470
some form of nontraditional 

1923
01:23:46,470 --> 01:23:50,230
participation , which is what it's 

1924
01:23:50,230 --> 01:23:53,320
designed to do , You know , there are 

1925
01:23:53,330 --> 01:23:55,552
There are times where we would probably 

1926
01:23:55,552 --> 01:23:58,130
say we would like mawr . Um , but but 

1927
01:23:58,130 --> 01:24:01,180
we continue to try to refine our 

1928
01:24:01,180 --> 01:24:03,420
process is one of the really nice 

1929
01:24:03,420 --> 01:24:05,642
things about this community , the O T . 

1930
01:24:05,642 --> 01:24:08,200
Community eyes , they all talk to each 

1931
01:24:08,200 --> 01:24:10,820
other . They all share ideas you 

1932
01:24:10,820 --> 01:24:12,820
mentioned de au earlier . We have a 

1933
01:24:12,820 --> 01:24:15,160
community of practice that set up on 

1934
01:24:15,160 --> 01:24:19,000
the D A . You platforms , and we 

1935
01:24:19,000 --> 01:24:21,320
actually recently just had about 100 . 

1936
01:24:21,790 --> 01:24:24,280
The O . T leaders come together for 

1937
01:24:24,280 --> 01:24:27,890
multiple days and the OT guide that we 

1938
01:24:27,890 --> 01:24:31,360
produced in Wana say late 

1939
01:24:31,360 --> 01:24:35,220
2017 . Uh , we're gonna be updating 

1940
01:24:35,220 --> 01:24:38,150
that with the information , data and 

1941
01:24:38,150 --> 01:24:40,150
ideas and recommendations that came 

1942
01:24:40,150 --> 01:24:42,450
from those 100 leaders coming together . 

1943
01:24:42,450 --> 01:24:44,672
So we're excited about that . That will 

1944
01:24:44,672 --> 01:24:47,070
be something that takes place in 

1945
01:24:47,070 --> 01:24:51,060
calendar year 21 so I think 

1946
01:24:51,070 --> 01:24:54,520
we just continue to try to refine three 

1947
01:24:54,520 --> 01:24:57,160
ideas around OT s . The examples , the 

1948
01:24:57,160 --> 01:24:59,850
success stories . What to watch out for 

1949
01:24:59,850 --> 01:25:03,010
etcetera so that we can continue Thio 

1950
01:25:03,020 --> 01:25:06,120
sort of move that forward . Mhm . 

1951
01:25:06,890 --> 01:25:10,650
Huh ? Way had a slight theme earlier 

1952
01:25:10,660 --> 01:25:13,130
about Kobe 19 . In response to that , 

1953
01:25:13,490 --> 01:25:15,850
um , could I maybe start with the UK 

1954
01:25:15,850 --> 01:25:18,430
this time ? What lessons do you think 

1955
01:25:18,430 --> 01:25:20,652
we've learned from Cove in 19 . And now 

1956
01:25:20,652 --> 01:25:22,763
rapid that position in that area that 

1957
01:25:22,763 --> 01:25:26,550
we could we could try to defense a more 

1958
01:25:26,560 --> 01:25:27,910
radical way . 

1959
01:25:29,490 --> 01:25:32,380
Um , so I was asked this quite a lot 

1960
01:25:32,390 --> 01:25:34,900
After the p people killings , we put a 

1961
01:25:34,900 --> 01:25:37,020
lot of our people into that team . 

1962
01:25:37,390 --> 01:25:40,310
We're now doing the same with track and 

1963
01:25:40,310 --> 01:25:44,260
trace as we call it s O . I think 

1964
01:25:44,260 --> 01:25:47,460
that the rial lessons were if everybody 

1965
01:25:47,460 --> 01:25:49,460
focuses on one thing , it's amazing 

1966
01:25:49,460 --> 01:25:53,320
what will happen on Bond . The 

1967
01:25:53,690 --> 01:25:57,040
unbelievable speed that we got both our 

1968
01:25:57,040 --> 01:25:59,151
internal approval . Last Secretary of 

1969
01:25:59,151 --> 01:26:01,680
State Ministerial approvals . I mean , 

1970
01:26:01,680 --> 01:26:05,060
that was happening same day the 

1971
01:26:05,070 --> 01:26:07,800
delegations of authority to when I look 

1972
01:26:07,800 --> 01:26:10,700
at my vaccine colleagues to spend money 

1973
01:26:10,700 --> 01:26:13,640
and approved the spend off money . Um , 

1974
01:26:13,650 --> 01:26:15,870
it's happening in a way again . That's 

1975
01:26:15,870 --> 01:26:19,620
so fast . So I think just 

1976
01:26:19,620 --> 01:26:22,710
that . Incredible focus on a clear 

1977
01:26:22,710 --> 01:26:26,620
sense off purpose , Andi . Freedoms 

1978
01:26:26,630 --> 01:26:29,670
on genuine empowerment . But then I go 

1979
01:26:29,670 --> 01:26:31,726
back to my last statement , which is 

1980
01:26:31,726 --> 01:26:33,837
now . Once we've done that , somebody 

1981
01:26:33,837 --> 01:26:36,500
has to follow that through on Look , a 

1982
01:26:36,510 --> 01:26:39,150
how that all happened on if there were 

1983
01:26:39,150 --> 01:26:41,372
mistakes that were made , which at that 

1984
01:26:41,372 --> 01:26:45,350
speed , it will happen S o e . Then 

1985
01:26:45,350 --> 01:26:47,461
there's the balance . But that's that 

1986
01:26:47,461 --> 01:26:49,572
kind of if you want to be really fast 

1987
01:26:49,572 --> 01:26:51,794
and that child , you have to be allowed 

1988
01:26:51,794 --> 01:26:54,017
to fail . But how do you safely allowed 

1989
01:26:54,017 --> 01:26:56,430
to allow the system to fail on protect 

1990
01:26:56,440 --> 01:26:58,670
public money ? Thank you so much for 

1991
01:26:58,670 --> 01:27:00,370
conundrum . Maybe my American 

1992
01:27:00,370 --> 01:27:02,720
colleagues can answer it . Yes , the U 

1993
01:27:02,720 --> 01:27:05,770
S . Have you got anything you've taken 

1994
01:27:05,770 --> 01:27:08,180
from Kobe that you've now , um , 

1995
01:27:08,190 --> 01:27:10,610
looking to implement in terms of 

1996
01:27:10,620 --> 01:27:14,040
traditional defense acquisition ? So 

1997
01:27:14,040 --> 01:27:15,860
certainly from a from a deity 

1998
01:27:15,860 --> 01:27:18,390
perspective , we've always been very 

1999
01:27:18,390 --> 01:27:22,070
well positioned to support the 

2000
01:27:22,080 --> 01:27:24,740
national emergency response system in 

2001
01:27:24,740 --> 01:27:26,780
terms off , you know , Federal 

2002
01:27:26,780 --> 01:27:29,310
Emergency Management Agency , which has 

2003
01:27:29,310 --> 01:27:32,040
a structure of regional offices that 

2004
01:27:32,040 --> 01:27:34,850
are very well adept at responding to 

2005
01:27:34,850 --> 01:27:38,040
things like hurricanes and earthquakes 

2006
01:27:38,040 --> 01:27:41,790
and fires and things that tend to be , 

2007
01:27:41,800 --> 01:27:45,020
um , regional in nature and really , 

2008
01:27:45,020 --> 01:27:47,480
really good connectivity between our 

2009
01:27:47,480 --> 01:27:49,647
acquisition community to support those 

2010
01:27:49,647 --> 01:27:52,950
types of activities . What we didn't 

2011
01:27:52,950 --> 01:27:54,672
have in place from a structure 

2012
01:27:54,672 --> 01:27:56,580
perspective was really those 

2013
01:27:56,580 --> 01:27:58,940
relationships at the department level 

2014
01:27:58,980 --> 01:28:01,660
that would enable another department , 

2015
01:28:01,670 --> 01:28:03,790
another executive branch department , 

2016
01:28:03,800 --> 01:28:07,370
to come to d . O d for a more complex 

2017
01:28:07,380 --> 01:28:09,630
or more sophisticated level of 

2018
01:28:09,640 --> 01:28:12,300
acquisition support things like supply 

2019
01:28:12,300 --> 01:28:14,860
chain analysis or developing innovative 

2020
01:28:14,860 --> 01:28:17,300
strategies to increase domestic 

2021
01:28:17,300 --> 01:28:19,820
production through strategic contracts , 

2022
01:28:19,820 --> 01:28:21,820
longer term contracts , things like 

2023
01:28:21,820 --> 01:28:24,340
that . And so that was one of the major 

2024
01:28:24,340 --> 01:28:26,720
lessons learned out of this crisis was 

2025
01:28:26,720 --> 01:28:30,170
that D . O . D . With our hundreds of 

2026
01:28:30,170 --> 01:28:33,450
thousands of acquisition professionals , 

2027
01:28:33,460 --> 01:28:35,870
is in a position to respond quickly and 

2028
01:28:35,870 --> 01:28:38,410
robustly . But we do need to have that 

2029
01:28:38,410 --> 01:28:40,640
framework and those relationships and 

2030
01:28:40,640 --> 01:28:43,440
frankly , that trust in place in order 

2031
01:28:43,440 --> 01:28:47,050
to quickly establish the ability 

2032
01:28:47,050 --> 01:28:49,160
to take the authorization and 

2033
01:28:49,160 --> 01:28:51,410
appropriation that another executive 

2034
01:28:51,410 --> 01:28:53,600
branch department receives from 

2035
01:28:53,600 --> 01:28:57,170
Congress . But take advantage of the 

2036
01:28:57,170 --> 01:28:59,448
depth and breadth of capability that D . 

2037
01:28:59,448 --> 01:29:02,760
O . D has to bring to a crisis . And so , 

2038
01:29:02,770 --> 01:29:06,120
to that end , um , lesson learned into 

2039
01:29:06,120 --> 01:29:07,920
a lesson implemented , we are 

2040
01:29:07,930 --> 01:29:10,290
establishing a permanent office within 

2041
01:29:10,300 --> 01:29:12,356
the Department of Defense within the 

2042
01:29:12,356 --> 01:29:14,300
undersecretary for acquisition and 

2043
01:29:14,300 --> 01:29:17,190
sustainment to always be thinking about 

2044
01:29:17,570 --> 01:29:19,920
How do we support the interagency and 

2045
01:29:19,920 --> 01:29:22,740
be that one stop shop to be able to 

2046
01:29:22,740 --> 01:29:25,110
facilitate access to the defense 

2047
01:29:25,110 --> 01:29:27,990
acquisition Workforce when it's needed 

2048
01:29:27,990 --> 01:29:31,340
very quickly on DSO ? We're really 

2049
01:29:31,340 --> 01:29:33,396
excited about that . I am especially 

2050
01:29:33,396 --> 01:29:35,618
excited about that because it allows me 

2051
01:29:35,618 --> 01:29:37,840
to turn over the Joint Acquisition Task 

2052
01:29:37,840 --> 01:29:39,896
Force work Thio another office under 

2053
01:29:39,896 --> 01:29:42,130
the joint Rapid Acquisition Cell s so 

2054
01:29:42,130 --> 01:29:45,990
that I can go back Thio to my position , 

2055
01:29:46,000 --> 01:29:48,056
doing all the things that we've been 

2056
01:29:48,056 --> 01:29:50,278
talking about encouraging and advancing 

2057
01:29:50,278 --> 01:29:52,220
adaptive acquisition and agile 

2058
01:29:52,230 --> 01:29:56,090
acquisition innovation . Okay , 

2059
01:29:58,270 --> 01:30:01,460
uh , I was interested in the UK , I 

2060
01:30:01,460 --> 01:30:03,516
think sent out quite clearly the one 

2061
01:30:03,516 --> 01:30:06,230
team approach and I think more IQ put 

2062
01:30:06,230 --> 01:30:08,810
together the benefits of that one . If 

2063
01:30:08,810 --> 01:30:10,740
I could just have us in terms of 

2064
01:30:10,750 --> 01:30:12,940
military involvement in acquisition is 

2065
01:30:12,950 --> 01:30:16,660
has that increased ? I know 

2066
01:30:16,670 --> 01:30:19,200
you've got quite a military component 

2067
01:30:19,200 --> 01:30:22,030
already included , but are you getting 

2068
01:30:22,030 --> 01:30:24,086
closer relationship between military 

2069
01:30:24,086 --> 01:30:26,252
and acquisition staff to affect Mawr ? 

2070
01:30:26,350 --> 01:30:29,280
Rapid on better acquisition ? 

2071
01:30:30,660 --> 01:30:34,470
Definitely . Um , so , uh , 

2072
01:30:35,060 --> 01:30:37,570
you know when When the When the covert 

2073
01:30:37,570 --> 01:30:41,280
crisis said , uh , all of the 

2074
01:30:41,280 --> 01:30:44,290
military departments immediately made 

2075
01:30:44,290 --> 01:30:47,590
personnel available . They 

2076
01:30:47,600 --> 01:30:51,090
formed , uh , you know , rapid , uh , 

2077
01:30:51,100 --> 01:30:54,160
response type of activity . So So it 

2078
01:30:54,160 --> 01:30:57,990
has been quite a coordinated event . 

2079
01:30:58,000 --> 01:31:00,820
Uh , the Air Force specifically was 

2080
01:31:00,820 --> 01:31:02,980
supporting Stacey , and in terms of a 

2081
01:31:02,980 --> 01:31:06,960
lot of her rapid acquisitions around , 

2082
01:31:06,970 --> 01:31:09,460
uh , increasing capacity within the 

2083
01:31:09,460 --> 01:31:12,920
industrial base . Uh , but but we've 

2084
01:31:12,920 --> 01:31:15,860
seen all of our military departments 

2085
01:31:15,860 --> 01:31:18,290
really , you know , step in on the 

2086
01:31:18,290 --> 01:31:21,440
fight . And the acquisition community , 

2087
01:31:21,440 --> 01:31:23,480
which is made up of civilian and 

2088
01:31:23,480 --> 01:31:26,440
military personnel , really came 

2089
01:31:26,440 --> 01:31:29,230
together . There were uniforms , people 

2090
01:31:29,230 --> 01:31:31,360
on Stacey's team on the giraffe . 

2091
01:31:31,370 --> 01:31:34,740
Onda lot of them really led the 

2092
01:31:34,740 --> 01:31:38,600
charge in becoming going 

2093
01:31:38,600 --> 01:31:40,590
from weapons system experts to 

2094
01:31:40,600 --> 01:31:42,880
ventilator experts . In the course of 

2095
01:31:42,880 --> 01:31:46,840
about a day on dso those that there 

2096
01:31:46,840 --> 01:31:50,840
was a really a really good merging of , 

2097
01:31:50,850 --> 01:31:53,072
of everybody coming together on the one 

2098
01:31:53,072 --> 01:31:55,460
team that more a mentioned , you know . 

2099
01:31:55,460 --> 01:31:57,404
And the other thing I would say in 

2100
01:31:57,404 --> 01:32:01,130
terms of the team is we 

2101
01:32:01,130 --> 01:32:04,600
really got industry engaged . 

2102
01:32:04,600 --> 01:32:06,740
And you could say industry got the 

2103
01:32:06,740 --> 01:32:09,350
department engaged in what was going on 

2104
01:32:09,350 --> 01:32:11,370
and where we needed to focus , Miss 

2105
01:32:11,370 --> 01:32:13,930
Lord , from really at the time she took 

2106
01:32:13,930 --> 01:32:17,400
office , really instituted a 

2107
01:32:17,410 --> 01:32:20,850
much Mawr regular and 

2108
01:32:20,860 --> 01:32:24,480
open dialogue with industry , which as 

2109
01:32:24,480 --> 01:32:26,647
soon as the cove it hit , we were able 

2110
01:32:26,647 --> 01:32:28,660
to leverage that because we weren't 

2111
01:32:28,670 --> 01:32:30,726
starting something new . We're doing 

2112
01:32:30,726 --> 01:32:32,670
something different . We were just 

2113
01:32:32,670 --> 01:32:34,726
doing it more frequently than we had 

2114
01:32:34,726 --> 01:32:37,110
been doing it on DSO in the initial 

2115
01:32:37,110 --> 01:32:39,900
days of Cove it We were meeting every 

2116
01:32:39,900 --> 01:32:43,380
day on the phone with about 

2117
01:32:43,380 --> 01:32:45,760
15 industry associations . So we were 

2118
01:32:45,760 --> 01:32:48,370
covering tens of thousands of companies 

2119
01:32:48,370 --> 01:32:50,610
across the country on even 

2120
01:32:50,610 --> 01:32:53,600
internationally by those by those 

2121
01:32:53,600 --> 01:32:55,500
exchanges . And so we immediately 

2122
01:32:55,500 --> 01:32:58,710
became aware of issues of travel 

2123
01:32:58,710 --> 01:33:01,760
problems in theater in the Middle East . 

2124
01:33:01,760 --> 01:33:04,210
We became aware of cash flow issues , 

2125
01:33:04,220 --> 01:33:05,998
and a lot of our really initial 

2126
01:33:05,998 --> 01:33:08,470
guidance and changes occurred because 

2127
01:33:08,470 --> 01:33:10,990
of that interchange . So it was not 

2128
01:33:10,990 --> 01:33:14,820
only important Thio communicate 

2129
01:33:14,820 --> 01:33:17,050
within the department , but all and 

2130
01:33:17,050 --> 01:33:19,272
with the inter agencies , but also with 

2131
01:33:19,272 --> 01:33:23,020
industry eso . If if I could just 

2132
01:33:23,030 --> 01:33:26,960
jump in and amplify one thing from a 

2133
01:33:26,970 --> 01:33:30,140
co vid 19 response perspective when you 

2134
01:33:30,140 --> 01:33:32,350
talk about one team , one thing that 

2135
01:33:32,350 --> 01:33:35,310
was really um evident is that bringing 

2136
01:33:35,310 --> 01:33:37,532
together the requirements owner and the 

2137
01:33:37,532 --> 01:33:39,910
acquirer's eyes equally important in a 

2138
01:33:39,910 --> 01:33:42,132
covert response as it is in the defense 

2139
01:33:42,132 --> 01:33:44,188
acquisition system . In fact , I was 

2140
01:33:44,188 --> 01:33:46,410
ableto leverage some of our power point 

2141
01:33:46,410 --> 01:33:48,021
slides that describe defense 

2142
01:33:48,021 --> 01:33:50,132
acquisition and the importance of the 

2143
01:33:50,132 --> 01:33:52,188
requirements community participating 

2144
01:33:52,188 --> 01:33:55,700
with the acquiring , um community and 

2145
01:33:55,710 --> 01:33:57,720
restructure those to describe the 

2146
01:33:57,720 --> 01:33:59,831
relationship between health and human 

2147
01:33:59,831 --> 01:34:02,930
services . Who has who was the require 

2148
01:34:02,930 --> 01:34:04,986
er and the funds holder , as well as 

2149
01:34:04,986 --> 01:34:06,597
the authority holder and the 

2150
01:34:06,597 --> 01:34:08,819
acquisition community who just happened 

2151
01:34:08,819 --> 01:34:10,986
to be coming from another department ? 

2152
01:34:10,986 --> 01:34:13,380
So that one team concept , Morag , that 

2153
01:34:13,380 --> 01:34:15,547
was that was a great way of putting it 

2154
01:34:15,547 --> 01:34:17,658
critically important , whether you're 

2155
01:34:17,658 --> 01:34:19,550
in emergency or whether you're 

2156
01:34:19,560 --> 01:34:21,550
delivering innovative and modern 

2157
01:34:21,550 --> 01:34:23,810
software . So that was a I think that 

2158
01:34:23,810 --> 01:34:26,970
was a great way of putting it . There 

2159
01:34:26,970 --> 01:34:29,026
was question post up here . What was 

2160
01:34:29,026 --> 01:34:31,480
that program called Andi ? What ? 

2161
01:34:31,490 --> 01:34:33,379
What's the rollout date of that ? 

2162
01:34:36,940 --> 01:34:40,560
Okay , we'll move on . Uh , Mara , if I 

2163
01:34:40,570 --> 01:34:42,770
turn to you again . You were talking 

2164
01:34:42,770 --> 01:34:44,920
about the one team approach , and 

2165
01:34:44,930 --> 01:34:48,560
certainly I agree with that 

2166
01:34:48,570 --> 01:34:50,930
drive and push . How is that going ? 

2167
01:34:50,930 --> 01:34:52,930
And how is a military involvement ? 

2168
01:34:53,240 --> 01:34:57,170
Working now with defense acquisition 

2169
01:34:57,640 --> 01:34:59,640
is that is that improving ? Is that 

2170
01:34:59,640 --> 01:35:02,470
increasing the dialogue and involvement 

2171
01:35:02,470 --> 01:35:04,760
in the military in terms of you . I 

2172
01:35:04,760 --> 01:35:07,720
think we're expressing the previous 

2173
01:35:07,730 --> 01:35:09,840
situation . We have the use of the 

2174
01:35:09,850 --> 01:35:12,630
final requirement on the acquisition 

2175
01:35:12,630 --> 01:35:14,660
team requiring that 

2176
01:35:15,040 --> 01:35:18,860
you're suggesting a more 

2177
01:35:18,860 --> 01:35:20,971
integrated team approach . I think on 

2178
01:35:20,971 --> 01:35:24,520
that . Yes , eso we're looking at it , 

2179
01:35:24,520 --> 01:35:26,687
particularly in the Navy at the moment 

2180
01:35:26,687 --> 01:35:28,687
on by the team of actually set up a 

2181
01:35:28,687 --> 01:35:31,820
sort of an integrated organizational 

2182
01:35:31,820 --> 01:35:35,390
structure within the Navy on 

2183
01:35:35,390 --> 01:35:38,390
defense support to allow them to do 

2184
01:35:38,390 --> 01:35:40,612
this in a much more collaborative way . 

2185
01:35:40,612 --> 01:35:43,780
Eso I think that that is really 

2186
01:35:43,780 --> 01:35:45,770
starting to improve on what what 

2187
01:35:45,770 --> 01:35:49,370
happens in the UK is often we take 

2188
01:35:49,370 --> 01:35:51,370
people into the sort of procurement 

2189
01:35:51,370 --> 01:35:53,760
part of our organization , which is 

2190
01:35:53,760 --> 01:35:56,860
where I am on . Do they circle through 

2191
01:35:56,860 --> 01:35:58,971
from the military into our system and 

2192
01:35:58,971 --> 01:36:01,660
back again ? So we try and keep that 

2193
01:36:01,660 --> 01:36:05,010
collaboration going . I think he's got 

2194
01:36:05,010 --> 01:36:07,520
a long way to go . I was just as Stacy 

2195
01:36:07,520 --> 01:36:09,409
and Kim were talking . Then I was 

2196
01:36:09,409 --> 01:36:11,576
reflecting . I I'm actually spent four 

2197
01:36:11,576 --> 01:36:14,660
years in the States when I was with B A 

2198
01:36:14,670 --> 01:36:16,980
on a prime contract , so I ran the 

2199
01:36:16,980 --> 01:36:18,980
supply chain for something called M 

2200
01:36:18,980 --> 01:36:20,980
Triple seven , which is lightweight 

2201
01:36:20,980 --> 01:36:23,036
howitzer into the U . S . Record and 

2202
01:36:23,036 --> 01:36:25,147
Actually , I think the program office 

2203
01:36:25,147 --> 01:36:27,313
constructs that you don't know whether 

2204
01:36:27,313 --> 01:36:29,536
you still have it , but amazing . So we 

2205
01:36:29,536 --> 01:36:31,369
had the colonel in charge of our 

2206
01:36:31,369 --> 01:36:33,424
program . We have the commercial guy 

2207
01:36:33,424 --> 01:36:35,536
and we had the program guy and we had 

2208
01:36:35,536 --> 01:36:37,591
our supply chain . So I was in B A . 

2209
01:36:37,591 --> 01:36:39,591
But we were fully integrated into a 

2210
01:36:39,591 --> 01:36:41,990
sort of a program office that was so 

2211
01:36:42,000 --> 01:36:44,450
responsive . And the amount of access 

2212
01:36:44,830 --> 01:36:47,410
that I still use this and I still try 

2213
01:36:47,410 --> 01:36:49,760
and get our guys to do it as well is 

2214
01:36:49,760 --> 01:36:52,580
getting the I mean , it was during the 

2215
01:36:52,590 --> 01:36:55,670
it was just after 9 11 so we were 

2216
01:36:55,670 --> 01:36:59,210
obviously then going into a war . But 

2217
01:36:59,220 --> 01:37:01,276
getting the colonel in charge of the 

2218
01:37:01,276 --> 01:37:03,260
program onto the supply chain shot 

2219
01:37:03,260 --> 01:37:06,260
floors was so powerful Thio really 

2220
01:37:06,260 --> 01:37:08,820
expand that one team approach from 

2221
01:37:08,830 --> 01:37:10,886
absolute customer down to the people 

2222
01:37:10,886 --> 01:37:13,360
who are actually making the kid and the 

2223
01:37:13,370 --> 01:37:16,370
power of the negotiation sort of the 

2224
01:37:16,380 --> 01:37:20,290
negotiation that allowed that 

2225
01:37:20,290 --> 01:37:22,950
sort of that facilitated a negotiation . 

2226
01:37:22,950 --> 01:37:25,172
That was incredible . So what I've been 

2227
01:37:25,172 --> 01:37:27,228
trying to do with our team is expand 

2228
01:37:27,228 --> 01:37:29,440
the one team concept , not just from 

2229
01:37:29,450 --> 01:37:31,990
the people that set the requirements , 

2230
01:37:32,000 --> 01:37:34,610
but to our team is well , but then into 

2231
01:37:34,610 --> 01:37:37,240
the supply chain and really start to 

2232
01:37:37,240 --> 01:37:39,407
try and do that because we are working 

2233
01:37:39,407 --> 01:37:41,462
to a constant objective , even if we 

2234
01:37:41,462 --> 01:37:44,860
got slightly different . Some personal 

2235
01:37:44,860 --> 01:37:47,750
objectives . Well , I'm getting that . 

2236
01:37:48,230 --> 01:37:50,850
No , thank you . Um , just to go back 

2237
01:37:50,850 --> 01:37:54,610
to the title of the the subject 

2238
01:37:54,620 --> 01:37:57,600
we're discussing today one of the 

2239
01:37:57,610 --> 01:38:01,180
key elements off 

2240
01:38:01,190 --> 01:38:03,710
the the way the secessionists was 

2241
01:38:03,720 --> 01:38:05,887
talking about where we could encourage 

2242
01:38:05,887 --> 01:38:08,290
more international collaboration or 

2243
01:38:08,290 --> 01:38:10,910
cooperation . Have you got any views on 

2244
01:38:10,910 --> 01:38:13,710
that ? In terms of linked to innovative 

2245
01:38:13,710 --> 01:38:16,110
and rapid human ? Maybe start with us 

2246
01:38:16,110 --> 01:38:19,240
in terms of international engagement , 

2247
01:38:22,420 --> 01:38:26,140
I'll take the first shot here . So 

2248
01:38:26,720 --> 01:38:29,840
within the last month or so , 

2249
01:38:30,320 --> 01:38:33,740
Secretary Esper has really pushed an 

2250
01:38:33,740 --> 01:38:37,200
initiative . Thio , uh , Thio 

2251
01:38:37,210 --> 01:38:41,110
engage , Uh , you know mawr , you 

2252
01:38:41,110 --> 01:38:44,090
know , military sales and and and 

2253
01:38:44,090 --> 01:38:48,080
exchanges high on his priority list 

2254
01:38:48,090 --> 01:38:51,590
on Dove course . If you read our 

2255
01:38:51,600 --> 01:38:53,920
national defense strategy , there's 

2256
01:38:53,920 --> 01:38:56,142
three lines of effort . The second line 

2257
01:38:56,142 --> 01:38:58,130
of effort is , you know , military 

2258
01:38:58,130 --> 01:39:01,700
cooperation and , uh , working with 

2259
01:39:01,700 --> 01:39:05,390
allies . So it is a key tenet of 

2260
01:39:05,400 --> 01:39:09,050
of us strategy and policy . Uh 

2261
01:39:09,720 --> 01:39:11,942
uh , you know , I you know , I think we 

2262
01:39:11,942 --> 01:39:14,053
have a lot of successes in the past , 

2263
01:39:14,053 --> 01:39:16,387
but we expect to see more going forward . 

2264
01:39:18,320 --> 01:39:20,810
Mara were close to the end . I think of 

2265
01:39:20,810 --> 01:39:23,032
the session . But would you like to add 

2266
01:39:23,032 --> 01:39:24,866
anything on that in terms of the 

2267
01:39:24,866 --> 01:39:28,020
international aspect ? Yeah . I mean , 

2268
01:39:28,020 --> 01:39:30,500
I think as we come into sort of Brexit 

2269
01:39:30,500 --> 01:39:33,530
territory , we're looking obviously 

2270
01:39:33,560 --> 01:39:36,500
what we could do on a kind of global 

2271
01:39:36,510 --> 01:39:40,070
platform and how we help our suppliers 

2272
01:39:40,070 --> 01:39:42,780
and our primes exports is so 

2273
01:39:42,780 --> 01:39:44,947
fundamental to we're a small country . 

2274
01:39:44,947 --> 01:39:47,440
We don't have the same budget , um , as 

2275
01:39:47,440 --> 01:39:50,100
the u . S . And so our supply things 

2276
01:39:50,100 --> 01:39:52,920
are really important to us on their 

2277
01:39:52,920 --> 01:39:55,590
ability to be competitive relies on 

2278
01:39:55,600 --> 01:39:58,990
export of export ability . Eso were 

2279
01:39:59,000 --> 01:40:01,200
absolutely aligned with that as an 

2280
01:40:01,200 --> 01:40:03,311
agenda . Right ? Um , in the interest 

2281
01:40:03,311 --> 01:40:06,260
of prosperity pillar on DWI worked 

2282
01:40:06,260 --> 01:40:08,930
really way try and work extremely 

2283
01:40:08,930 --> 01:40:11,152
closely with our suppliers on achieving 

2284
01:40:11,152 --> 01:40:14,770
that . Okay , we've reached the end of 

2285
01:40:14,770 --> 01:40:17,770
our session Now , unfortunately , I 

2286
01:40:17,780 --> 01:40:19,947
could go on asking questions . I think 

2287
01:40:19,947 --> 01:40:22,169
for a lot longer s o . I'd just like to 

2288
01:40:22,169 --> 01:40:23,947
thank all three of you for such 

2289
01:40:23,947 --> 01:40:27,690
excellent inputs . And certainly your 

2290
01:40:27,690 --> 01:40:30,030
experience in industry on in a 

2291
01:40:30,040 --> 01:40:32,850
government has I think really made this 

2292
01:40:32,860 --> 01:40:35,130
fulfilling sessions . So thank you so 

2293
01:40:35,130 --> 01:40:37,480
much . I'm not gonna hand back to Mike 

2294
01:40:37,480 --> 01:40:40,310
McAra , uh , for some closing comments . 

2295
01:40:40,320 --> 01:40:44,070
Okay . E like to thank Stacey , 

2296
01:40:44,070 --> 01:40:46,014
Kim and Morag for sharing all your 

2297
01:40:46,014 --> 01:40:48,020
thoughts today . Another important 

2298
01:40:48,020 --> 01:40:50,740
topic . Well , we just wrapped up our 

2299
01:40:50,740 --> 01:40:53,120
last session for a day . One of conduct 

2300
01:40:53,610 --> 01:40:55,777
I want to thank . All our speakers and 

2301
01:40:55,777 --> 01:40:57,960
moderators are attendees virtual 

2302
01:40:57,960 --> 01:41:00,940
attendees for participating today . I 

2303
01:41:00,950 --> 01:41:03,172
thought it was a great discussion . You 

2304
01:41:03,172 --> 01:41:05,283
can't replace face to face meetings , 

2305
01:41:05,283 --> 01:41:07,450
but I thought we did a really , really 

2306
01:41:07,450 --> 01:41:07,280
good job in the virtual environment 

2307
01:41:07,280 --> 01:41:09,540
today . Um , so this is the end of day 

2308
01:41:09,540 --> 01:41:11,596
one . Well , we all be back tomorrow 

2309
01:41:11,596 --> 01:41:13,651
for day two , and we look forward to 

2310
01:41:13,651 --> 01:41:15,707
seeing you all . Then thank you very 

2311
01:41:15,707 --> 01:41:15,740
much and have a good day .