1 00:00:01,740 --> 00:00:03,629 Patrick . Thanks so much . It's a 2 00:00:03,629 --> 00:00:05,740 privilege to be here . It's certainly 3 00:00:05,740 --> 00:00:07,907 an exciting time , not just across the 4 00:00:07,907 --> 00:00:10,073 defense and enterprise , but certainly 5 00:00:10,073 --> 00:00:12,296 national security enterprise . And with 6 00:00:12,296 --> 00:00:14,462 all going on in space today , not just 7 00:00:14,462 --> 00:00:16,573 course , but you talk about what NASA 8 00:00:16,573 --> 00:00:18,296 is doing , What's going on the 9 00:00:18,296 --> 00:00:20,407 commercial market . It's a great time 10 00:00:20,407 --> 00:00:20,040 to be part of this field . Looking 11 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:22,262 forward to the profession today . Thank 12 00:00:22,262 --> 00:00:24,373 you . Thank you very much , General . 13 00:00:24,373 --> 00:00:26,318 Yes , it is a big area of a lot of 14 00:00:26,318 --> 00:00:28,540 excitement for a lot of our readers and 15 00:00:28,540 --> 00:00:30,707 and listeners out there A swell of the 16 00:00:30,707 --> 00:00:32,484 whole world and , uh , covering 17 00:00:32,484 --> 00:00:34,707 emerging technology . Uh , space is one 18 00:00:34,707 --> 00:00:36,762 area where you see so much happening 19 00:00:36,762 --> 00:00:39,150 votes in terms of the culmination of 20 00:00:39,150 --> 00:00:41,150 lots of emerging technologies being 21 00:00:41,150 --> 00:00:43,372 relevant to that field . But also , you 22 00:00:43,372 --> 00:00:45,428 know , it is the final frontier . So 23 00:00:45,428 --> 00:00:47,920 with that , um , Space force very new . 24 00:00:48,130 --> 00:00:51,120 I want I wonder if you could tell me a 25 00:00:51,120 --> 00:00:54,580 little bit about the demand signal that 26 00:00:54,580 --> 00:00:56,747 you're seeing for the space force from 27 00:00:56,747 --> 00:00:59,560 other portions of the military . Uh , 28 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:02,151 are they calling on you for satellite 29 00:01:02,151 --> 00:01:04,429 images for analysis for communications ? 30 00:01:04,429 --> 00:01:06,484 What ? Give us a sense of the demand 31 00:01:06,484 --> 00:01:08,762 signal that you're facing , right ? Um , 32 00:01:08,762 --> 00:01:10,651 sure . Thank you . First of all , 33 00:01:10,651 --> 00:01:12,651 you're absolutely right . The Space 34 00:01:12,651 --> 00:01:14,873 forces a brand new , uh , new service , 35 00:01:14,873 --> 00:01:17,207 effective 20 December of last year . Um , 36 00:01:17,207 --> 00:01:19,760 but as you know , what we we have been 37 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:21,816 doing in national security space for 38 00:01:21,816 --> 00:01:24,410 decades is not new . And the vast 39 00:01:24,410 --> 00:01:26,890 majority of the space force today is 40 00:01:26,890 --> 00:01:28,946 built on the foundation . What we've 41 00:01:28,946 --> 00:01:31,168 done in the past , um , that demand has 42 00:01:31,168 --> 00:01:33,334 been there in the past . In fact , the 43 00:01:33,334 --> 00:01:35,557 focus of the past 20 years or so in the 44 00:01:35,557 --> 00:01:37,668 the challenges we faced in the Middle 45 00:01:37,668 --> 00:01:40,350 East , we've had the opportunity to 46 00:01:40,360 --> 00:01:43,050 integrate tightly with the rest of the 47 00:01:43,050 --> 00:01:45,200 Joint Force A Z . You know , we do 48 00:01:45,200 --> 00:01:47,690 things like where the provider GPS So 49 00:01:47,690 --> 00:01:49,790 precision navigation timing , which 50 00:01:49,790 --> 00:01:53,080 allows the forces thio operate globally , 51 00:01:53,090 --> 00:01:56,180 allows them thio plan and strike with 52 00:01:56,180 --> 00:01:58,570 precision Legality . We've been flying 53 00:01:58,570 --> 00:02:00,792 the GPS constellation for a long time . 54 00:02:00,792 --> 00:02:03,430 We've been providing global ballistic 55 00:02:03,430 --> 00:02:06,060 missile warning for decades . The you 56 00:02:06,060 --> 00:02:08,171 know , whether it's test launches out 57 00:02:08,171 --> 00:02:10,330 of North Korea or the recent attack 58 00:02:10,330 --> 00:02:12,410 from Iran and the outside air base , 59 00:02:12,420 --> 00:02:14,364 we've got a group of folks who fly 60 00:02:14,364 --> 00:02:17,630 consolation that provides 24 73 65 of 61 00:02:17,630 --> 00:02:20,380 the Globe text launches types Launches 62 00:02:20,380 --> 00:02:23,570 determines whether a threat , um forces 63 00:02:23,570 --> 00:02:25,459 to friendly nations or the United 64 00:02:25,459 --> 00:02:27,760 States and reports that out we're the 65 00:02:27,760 --> 00:02:30,080 ones that provide global communications 66 00:02:30,080 --> 00:02:32,670 for chips a T . Come on , the move and 67 00:02:32,670 --> 00:02:34,614 desserts all the way up to nuclear 68 00:02:34,614 --> 00:02:37,520 command and control . A swell as the 69 00:02:37,530 --> 00:02:40,500 organization that provides , uh , space 70 00:02:40,500 --> 00:02:42,722 domain awareness for the world were the 71 00:02:42,722 --> 00:02:44,667 ones to keep track of those 20,000 72 00:02:44,667 --> 00:02:46,889 objects . Ines Base . Determine whether 73 00:02:46,889 --> 00:02:49,111 they pose a threat , thio each other or 74 00:02:49,111 --> 00:02:51,450 somebody else is , um , satellite and 75 00:02:51,450 --> 00:02:53,561 provide that warning . And so , while 76 00:02:53,561 --> 00:02:55,561 the space Force's knew a lot of the 77 00:02:55,561 --> 00:02:57,617 capabilities and a lot of the people 78 00:02:57,617 --> 00:02:59,870 and units that have that are forming 79 00:02:59,870 --> 00:03:02,160 the space force have been in place have 80 00:03:02,160 --> 00:03:04,570 been there for years . Andi have 81 00:03:04,570 --> 00:03:06,681 increasingly , year in and year out , 82 00:03:06,681 --> 00:03:08,737 constantly improved our capabilities 83 00:03:08,737 --> 00:03:10,903 and our ability to provide them to the 84 00:03:10,903 --> 00:03:13,126 joint force . And I'll tell you , and I 85 00:03:13,126 --> 00:03:13,070 think we'll probably talk about it more 86 00:03:13,070 --> 00:03:15,380 later when we talk about where we're 87 00:03:15,380 --> 00:03:18,600 going in the future . This idea of on 88 00:03:18,600 --> 00:03:20,489 Inter Connecticut can I'm sorry , 89 00:03:20,489 --> 00:03:23,040 interconnected network of sensors and 90 00:03:23,040 --> 00:03:25,350 platforms and shooters and decision 91 00:03:25,350 --> 00:03:28,930 makers and an analyst , Thio , operate 92 00:03:28,930 --> 00:03:31,097 on a global scale . It's gonna have to 93 00:03:31,097 --> 00:03:33,263 happen in many ways and shapes reforms 94 00:03:33,263 --> 00:03:35,152 through space . So the demand for 95 00:03:35,152 --> 00:03:37,152 information that man for data , the 96 00:03:37,152 --> 00:03:41,080 demand for connectivity , um that 97 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:43,247 is done through space is only going to 98 00:03:43,247 --> 00:03:46,230 grow as we move into . Okay , Uh , and 99 00:03:46,240 --> 00:03:48,450 one of the other , I guess reasons why 100 00:03:48,450 --> 00:03:50,660 the space Force's , uh , Congress and 101 00:03:50,660 --> 00:03:52,827 others have said is so important right 102 00:03:52,827 --> 00:03:55,540 now . Eyes Because , yes , the U . S 103 00:03:55,540 --> 00:03:57,350 military has been having these 104 00:03:57,350 --> 00:03:59,183 capabilities performing them and 105 00:03:59,183 --> 00:04:02,020 managing them for a very long time . 106 00:04:02,030 --> 00:04:05,340 But something that's new is that the U . 107 00:04:05,340 --> 00:04:07,562 S . Isn't has alone in space cases . It 108 00:04:07,562 --> 00:04:10,860 was for so long . There's no more 109 00:04:10,870 --> 00:04:12,592 Soviet Union . But we face new 110 00:04:12,592 --> 00:04:15,320 competitors in space . Eso with that ? 111 00:04:15,380 --> 00:04:17,491 Back in June , the Defense Department 112 00:04:17,491 --> 00:04:19,920 put out a summary of a new space 113 00:04:19,920 --> 00:04:23,470 strategy . The summary calls for being 114 00:04:23,470 --> 00:04:26,900 able to win wars that extend into space . 115 00:04:26,900 --> 00:04:29,740 I think is the quote eso big on winning . 116 00:04:29,760 --> 00:04:32,880 But it was a little shy on the how How 117 00:04:32,880 --> 00:04:35,610 do we win wars in space ? Eso I wonder 118 00:04:35,610 --> 00:04:37,770 if you could tackle that . How does 119 00:04:37,780 --> 00:04:40,002 winning a war in space . What does that 120 00:04:40,002 --> 00:04:42,930 look like ? Sure . And you're 121 00:04:42,930 --> 00:04:45,152 absolutely right . You know , space has 122 00:04:45,152 --> 00:04:47,330 been an arena of competition since the 123 00:04:47,330 --> 00:04:49,330 dawn of the space age , right ? The 124 00:04:49,340 --> 00:04:51,284 United States and the Soviet Union 125 00:04:51,284 --> 00:04:53,451 began competing in space immediately . 126 00:04:53,740 --> 00:04:56,390 But as you said , the new what has has 127 00:04:56,390 --> 00:04:58,760 been new in the last several years is 128 00:04:59,140 --> 00:05:01,900 increasing access by a broad , broader 129 00:05:01,900 --> 00:05:05,660 group of governments and commercial 130 00:05:05,660 --> 00:05:07,860 activities and commercial agencies and 131 00:05:08,340 --> 00:05:11,480 recognition from potential adversaries . 132 00:05:11,490 --> 00:05:13,710 What we do in space , how well it 133 00:05:13,710 --> 00:05:16,610 supports us economically , commercially 134 00:05:16,620 --> 00:05:18,953 in terms of public safety and certainly , 135 00:05:19,140 --> 00:05:22,740 uh , military operations that we now 136 00:05:22,740 --> 00:05:25,890 have Those , um , potential adversaries 137 00:05:25,890 --> 00:05:27,723 looking to deny or uses based in 138 00:05:27,723 --> 00:05:29,723 conference . And that's really what 139 00:05:29,723 --> 00:05:32,001 drove has driven it now to become , ah , 140 00:05:32,001 --> 00:05:34,057 potential domain of conflict and the 141 00:05:34,057 --> 00:05:36,590 need for a service focused on 142 00:05:36,590 --> 00:05:38,750 protecting those capabilities and 143 00:05:38,750 --> 00:05:41,640 ensuring that they remain part of joint 144 00:05:41,640 --> 00:05:44,630 operations , enjoy forces into the um 145 00:05:44,640 --> 00:05:46,751 so what that means . So it's a little 146 00:05:46,751 --> 00:05:48,640 bit more about what that means is 147 00:05:48,640 --> 00:05:50,862 absolutely the first thing that we have 148 00:05:50,862 --> 00:05:53,930 to do . We certainly recognize based on , 149 00:05:53,940 --> 00:05:56,107 you know , behavior over a decade that 150 00:05:56,107 --> 00:05:58,162 both Russia and China are developing 151 00:05:58,162 --> 00:05:59,884 systems to take away our space 152 00:05:59,884 --> 00:06:02,107 capabilities in in content . And so our 153 00:06:02,107 --> 00:06:04,273 first job is to be able to protect and 154 00:06:04,273 --> 00:06:06,420 defend them . Um , and what I'll tell 155 00:06:06,420 --> 00:06:08,531 you is we can protect and defend them 156 00:06:08,531 --> 00:06:10,753 and should protect them and defend them 157 00:06:10,753 --> 00:06:12,864 in ways that we do other capabilities 158 00:06:12,864 --> 00:06:14,980 across many domains , right ? We may 159 00:06:14,980 --> 00:06:18,500 want to affect , um , we want may want 160 00:06:18,500 --> 00:06:22,170 affect space . I'm sorry . Offensive 161 00:06:22,170 --> 00:06:24,360 space weapons on the ground . We wanna 162 00:06:24,740 --> 00:06:26,962 maybe affect their commanding control . 163 00:06:26,962 --> 00:06:29,129 We may want to affect their ability to 164 00:06:29,129 --> 00:06:31,240 collect and target . And ultimately , 165 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:33,351 we may want to employ features on the 166 00:06:33,351 --> 00:06:35,518 ground in the air , through cyberspace 167 00:06:35,518 --> 00:06:38,240 and in fact , in space that , um , 168 00:06:38,250 --> 00:06:40,410 defeat an attack on those systems 169 00:06:40,410 --> 00:06:43,250 either either by any number of ways , 170 00:06:43,260 --> 00:06:45,920 the second thing that we have to do And 171 00:06:45,920 --> 00:06:47,940 frankly , ah , lot of our focus is 172 00:06:47,940 --> 00:06:50,970 build systems and architectures and 173 00:06:50,970 --> 00:06:53,780 design a force that is inherently more 174 00:06:53,780 --> 00:06:56,040 resilient because we haven't been under 175 00:06:56,040 --> 00:06:58,207 direct threat with these based systems 176 00:06:58,207 --> 00:07:00,207 for so long . We haven't really had 177 00:07:00,207 --> 00:07:02,318 defense ability and resilience from a 178 00:07:02,318 --> 00:07:04,540 threat and attack perspective in mind . 179 00:07:04,540 --> 00:07:06,762 And so what we want to do is we need to 180 00:07:06,762 --> 00:07:09,080 redesign , create a new force design , 181 00:07:09,080 --> 00:07:10,969 create new force structure that's 182 00:07:10,969 --> 00:07:13,136 inherently resilient , that inherently 183 00:07:13,136 --> 00:07:15,580 degrades gracefully under attack and 184 00:07:15,580 --> 00:07:17,980 can contribute to its own defense . And 185 00:07:17,980 --> 00:07:20,160 so that's the second aspect of that is 186 00:07:20,160 --> 00:07:22,890 the ability toe operate systems in the 187 00:07:22,890 --> 00:07:24,900 face of that threat . And then the 188 00:07:24,910 --> 00:07:27,440 final is . Others are looking at us 189 00:07:27,450 --> 00:07:29,506 understanding how effectively we use 190 00:07:29,506 --> 00:07:31,900 space capabilities and our building and 191 00:07:31,900 --> 00:07:34,370 fielding their own based systems to do 192 00:07:34,370 --> 00:07:36,370 the same . And we have to now begin 193 00:07:36,370 --> 00:07:38,592 looking at what approaches we might use 194 00:07:38,592 --> 00:07:40,703 to be able to deny their use in space 195 00:07:40,703 --> 00:07:43,670 and conflict . Um , let me just if I 196 00:07:43,670 --> 00:07:46,650 can one more quick point . All of that 197 00:07:46,660 --> 00:07:50,070 first focused on recognition and 198 00:07:50,070 --> 00:07:51,903 understanding from our potential 199 00:07:51,903 --> 00:07:55,240 adversaries that , um , attempts to 200 00:07:55,240 --> 00:07:57,450 attack us in space will fail . So the 201 00:07:57,450 --> 00:07:59,617 first thing we're looking at is not to 202 00:07:59,617 --> 00:08:02,110 extend to fight the space . Our first 203 00:08:02,110 --> 00:08:04,950 desire and objective is deter attacks , 204 00:08:04,950 --> 00:08:07,220 deter attacks in generally , but 205 00:08:07,220 --> 00:08:09,331 certainly deter potential adversaries 206 00:08:09,331 --> 00:08:12,230 from attacking us in space because they 207 00:08:12,230 --> 00:08:14,341 understand they fail to achieve their 208 00:08:14,341 --> 00:08:16,452 objectives based on the resilience of 209 00:08:16,452 --> 00:08:18,563 robustness and our ability to protect 210 00:08:18,563 --> 00:08:20,397 and provide those capabilities . 211 00:08:20,397 --> 00:08:22,563 Despite their attempt , okay , there's 212 00:08:22,563 --> 00:08:24,674 a time to impact in there . Thank you 213 00:08:24,674 --> 00:08:26,730 for going into such detail on that . 214 00:08:26,730 --> 00:08:28,786 One of the things that you mentioned 215 00:08:28,786 --> 00:08:30,897 that I write about and that I think a 216 00:08:30,897 --> 00:08:32,952 lot of people are very curious about 217 00:08:32,952 --> 00:08:34,730 you mentioned at some point . I 218 00:08:34,730 --> 00:08:36,897 understand you're very limited in what 219 00:08:36,897 --> 00:08:36,570 you can say on this , But I want to 220 00:08:36,580 --> 00:08:38,691 push you to that boundary of what you 221 00:08:38,691 --> 00:08:40,413 can say , because I think it's 222 00:08:40,413 --> 00:08:42,302 fascinating and I think it really 223 00:08:42,302 --> 00:08:44,302 showcases where we out right now in 224 00:08:44,302 --> 00:08:46,302 terms of technology , you mentioned 225 00:08:46,302 --> 00:08:48,413 moving towards a capability for those 226 00:08:48,413 --> 00:08:50,413 satellites to protect themselves in 227 00:08:50,413 --> 00:08:53,480 space . Uh , give us a sense of the 228 00:08:53,490 --> 00:08:55,900 near term future of what you're you're 229 00:08:55,900 --> 00:08:57,289 thinking about . There's 230 00:08:57,289 --> 00:08:59,190 maneuverability are their counter 231 00:08:59,190 --> 00:09:01,412 effects that you're thinking about what 232 00:09:01,412 --> 00:09:04,240 is on the table right now that , uh , 233 00:09:04,250 --> 00:09:08,150 you can talk about eso . In fact , you 234 00:09:08,150 --> 00:09:10,094 actually went down the path that I 235 00:09:10,094 --> 00:09:12,317 would encourage many folks to go down . 236 00:09:12,317 --> 00:09:14,428 First of all , first . Well , I would 237 00:09:14,428 --> 00:09:16,780 say from a conceptual standpoint , when 238 00:09:16,780 --> 00:09:20,130 you think about what makes platforms 239 00:09:20,130 --> 00:09:23,100 and units and capabilities and systems 240 00:09:23,100 --> 00:09:25,540 hard to attack in other domains , what 241 00:09:25,540 --> 00:09:28,210 makes Surface Action group in the Navy 242 00:09:28,210 --> 00:09:30,210 what makes you know whether it's an 243 00:09:30,210 --> 00:09:33,070 aircraft or its attack , you know ? Ah , 244 00:09:33,080 --> 00:09:35,830 Mission task force in the air maneuver 245 00:09:35,830 --> 00:09:37,830 forces on the ground , the kinds of 246 00:09:37,830 --> 00:09:41,570 things and technique and features you 247 00:09:41,570 --> 00:09:43,681 might employ to make yourself hard to 248 00:09:43,681 --> 00:09:46,240 find , hard to target , hard to hit and , 249 00:09:46,240 --> 00:09:49,030 in fact , then protect yourself . If if 250 00:09:49,030 --> 00:09:50,863 in fact you are . Those were the 251 00:09:50,863 --> 00:09:52,974 similar sorts of things that you have 252 00:09:52,974 --> 00:09:56,110 to and we do look at now in space . Can 253 00:09:56,110 --> 00:09:58,770 we maneuver ? First of all , can we 254 00:09:58,770 --> 00:10:00,550 introduce enough doubt into the 255 00:10:00,550 --> 00:10:02,772 adversaries kill chain that they're not 256 00:10:02,772 --> 00:10:04,994 sure they know where we are ? They know 257 00:10:04,994 --> 00:10:07,161 how we operate and they know that they 258 00:10:07,161 --> 00:10:09,161 can . They can attack with effect . 259 00:10:09,161 --> 00:10:11,383 Then you look at things like maneuver . 260 00:10:11,383 --> 00:10:13,050 You look at other things that 261 00:10:13,050 --> 00:10:14,994 introducing uncertainty into their 262 00:10:14,994 --> 00:10:17,217 targeting system . And then you look at 263 00:10:17,217 --> 00:10:19,439 ways specifically focused on what's the 264 00:10:19,439 --> 00:10:21,494 threat ? What's its capability ? How 265 00:10:21,494 --> 00:10:23,550 does it perform ? It's mission , and 266 00:10:23,550 --> 00:10:25,772 what specific features might you employ 267 00:10:25,772 --> 00:10:27,606 to defeat its ability to do that 268 00:10:27,606 --> 00:10:29,661 mission ? And you're right . I can't 269 00:10:29,661 --> 00:10:31,883 talk about it too much more in detail . 270 00:10:31,883 --> 00:10:33,883 But you know many of the principles 271 00:10:33,883 --> 00:10:35,994 that applying in other domains If you 272 00:10:35,994 --> 00:10:38,217 look at it through a space lens and the 273 00:10:38,217 --> 00:10:40,550 physics and the operating of the domain , 274 00:10:40,550 --> 00:10:42,661 you could certainly imagine the types 275 00:10:42,661 --> 00:10:44,772 of things we would be considering toe 276 00:10:44,772 --> 00:10:46,828 protect and defend ourselves and our 277 00:10:46,828 --> 00:10:49,010 capabilities . Okay , e wanna go back 278 00:10:49,010 --> 00:10:51,010 to something that you said on spend 279 00:10:51,010 --> 00:10:53,121 just a little bit , Uh , more time on 280 00:10:53,121 --> 00:10:55,177 both resilience thing in the defense 281 00:10:55,177 --> 00:10:57,180 thing because you mentioned the GPS 282 00:10:57,180 --> 00:11:00,040 constellation so super important I had 283 00:11:00,050 --> 00:11:03,350 a knopper to nitty back long time ago . 284 00:11:03,350 --> 00:11:06,300 It seems now 2015 go out to Schriever 285 00:11:06,310 --> 00:11:09,810 Air Force Base and see the room at the 286 00:11:09,810 --> 00:11:13,480 time where they were steering the GPS 287 00:11:13,480 --> 00:11:15,369 constellation . And I was I was a 288 00:11:15,369 --> 00:11:17,091 little bit surprised . The GPS 289 00:11:17,091 --> 00:11:19,202 constellation is hugely important for 290 00:11:19,740 --> 00:11:22,810 so many things in this room was there 291 00:11:22,810 --> 00:11:25,020 were about six chairman at the time , 292 00:11:25,030 --> 00:11:27,960 Um and their average age was about 21 293 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:30,850 and some of them were working on , like , 294 00:11:30,860 --> 00:11:33,082 compact monitors that were a little bit 295 00:11:33,082 --> 00:11:35,170 older than them . They kept the room 296 00:11:35,170 --> 00:11:37,520 kind of cool because the machines were 297 00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:39,631 like running so hot because they were 298 00:11:39,631 --> 00:11:41,798 old . And if you look up in the corner 299 00:11:41,798 --> 00:11:44,000 of the room , there was a TV that it 300 00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:46,222 looked like one of those TVs you see in 301 00:11:46,222 --> 00:11:48,389 an off track betting office . You ever 302 00:11:48,389 --> 00:11:50,500 been in one of those ? And then there 303 00:11:50,500 --> 00:11:52,611 was , ah , couple of , like , two bit 304 00:11:52,611 --> 00:11:54,944 illustrations of of dots and Aaron said , 305 00:11:54,944 --> 00:11:57,167 Oh , that's the GPS constellation . And 306 00:11:57,167 --> 00:11:59,278 when one of those is acting funny , I 307 00:11:59,278 --> 00:12:01,389 make sure that they're okay . So that 308 00:12:01,389 --> 00:12:03,500 was steering the GPS constellation in 309 00:12:03,500 --> 00:12:06,090 2015 Constellation . That's a Z you 310 00:12:06,090 --> 00:12:08,610 mentioned essential to not only all 311 00:12:08,620 --> 00:12:10,509 earth navigation but actually all 312 00:12:10,509 --> 00:12:12,398 financial transactions that exist 313 00:12:12,398 --> 00:12:14,564 because there's a timing function that 314 00:12:14,564 --> 00:12:16,120 now they get off of the GPS 315 00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:18,120 constellation . So five people in a 316 00:12:18,120 --> 00:12:19,953 cold room we're steering the GPS 317 00:12:19,953 --> 00:12:22,009 constellation for the whole planet . 318 00:12:22,009 --> 00:12:24,450 What does that look like today in 2021 ? 319 00:12:24,940 --> 00:12:27,640 Maintaining and steering and defending 320 00:12:27,640 --> 00:12:29,790 that constellation ? And what does it 321 00:12:29,790 --> 00:12:31,660 look like in 2025 ? 322 00:12:33,240 --> 00:12:36,360 Um , so So it has changed a bit since 323 00:12:36,360 --> 00:12:38,930 2015 . We've done some some upgrades , 324 00:12:38,930 --> 00:12:41,097 you know , it's it probably looks like 325 00:12:41,097 --> 00:12:43,319 a little more modern version of the off 326 00:12:43,319 --> 00:12:45,486 track betting a TV than what you saw . 327 00:12:45,486 --> 00:12:48,340 Um , it's still so so I'll say a couple 328 00:12:48,340 --> 00:12:51,890 things first of all , it's still run 329 00:12:51,900 --> 00:12:55,120 by a group of very young but very 330 00:12:55,120 --> 00:12:57,064 talented and incredibly passionate 331 00:12:57,064 --> 00:13:00,820 young space professionals who who , 332 00:13:00,830 --> 00:13:03,470 among all the things we have and do our 333 00:13:03,470 --> 00:13:05,692 key to our effectiveness today and will 334 00:13:05,692 --> 00:13:07,914 be in the future . So that's not good . 335 00:13:07,914 --> 00:13:10,081 That's not gonna change . Um , what we 336 00:13:10,081 --> 00:13:12,026 need to do and we'll do and in the 337 00:13:12,026 --> 00:13:14,192 process of doing , is being more agile 338 00:13:14,192 --> 00:13:16,860 and responsive in quick in terms of 339 00:13:17,440 --> 00:13:20,360 developing , deploying , upgrading and 340 00:13:20,360 --> 00:13:23,850 ensuring they have , uh , modern 341 00:13:23,850 --> 00:13:26,017 capabilities , using modern techniques 342 00:13:26,017 --> 00:13:28,680 on top of a modern infrastructure and 343 00:13:28,680 --> 00:13:31,170 platform . To be able to do that 344 00:13:31,170 --> 00:13:33,000 command and control one of the 345 00:13:33,000 --> 00:13:35,150 challenges we face far too long in 346 00:13:35,150 --> 00:13:38,940 space . Um is we've gotten to the 347 00:13:38,940 --> 00:13:41,280 point now where our space systems are 348 00:13:41,280 --> 00:13:43,330 incredibly capable and they're 349 00:13:43,330 --> 00:13:46,420 incredibly complex , but they are built 350 00:13:46,430 --> 00:13:49,880 on such an old platform . They're so 351 00:13:49,890 --> 00:13:52,540 complex , and the things they do are so 352 00:13:52,540 --> 00:13:56,270 critical . We exercise an abundance of 353 00:13:56,270 --> 00:13:58,381 caution , perhaps in some cases these 354 00:13:58,381 --> 00:14:00,880 days and over abundance of caution in 355 00:14:00,890 --> 00:14:03,740 upgrading them . But it's now time to 356 00:14:03,740 --> 00:14:07,200 move to 21st century approach to 357 00:14:07,200 --> 00:14:09,200 designing them , to fielding them , 358 00:14:09,200 --> 00:14:11,460 operating them and upgrading them , and 359 00:14:11,460 --> 00:14:13,710 so you'll see we're going through the 360 00:14:13,710 --> 00:14:15,654 process and we're bringing on some 361 00:14:15,654 --> 00:14:17,580 great capabilities to command and 362 00:14:17,580 --> 00:14:19,950 control and adjust to the GPS threats 363 00:14:19,950 --> 00:14:22,172 that will absolutely be in place in the 364 00:14:22,172 --> 00:14:24,061 next 18 months . And so , by 2025 365 00:14:24,061 --> 00:14:26,570 they'll be there . But moving forward . 366 00:14:26,580 --> 00:14:29,450 What you will see is , um , 367 00:14:29,840 --> 00:14:33,300 probably a small , you know , on a 368 00:14:33,300 --> 00:14:36,490 satellite by satellite basis , uh , 369 00:14:36,500 --> 00:14:38,880 larger numbers of less complex 370 00:14:38,880 --> 00:14:41,460 satellites built using 21st century of 371 00:14:41,460 --> 00:14:44,640 production techniques that we can build 372 00:14:44,640 --> 00:14:48,070 that field , that we fly mawr like , 373 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:51,760 um , you know , we don't fly , I'll say 374 00:14:51,760 --> 00:14:53,871 manually , but used more more machine 375 00:14:53,871 --> 00:14:56,120 to machine kind activity to fly . And 376 00:14:56,120 --> 00:14:58,410 the operator is gonna b'more on that 377 00:14:58,410 --> 00:15:00,770 commanding control loop . Um , and we 378 00:15:00,770 --> 00:15:02,950 will continue will upgrade them in the 379 00:15:02,950 --> 00:15:06,790 process of a few years rather than 380 00:15:06,790 --> 00:15:08,846 upgrading them on a decade by decade 381 00:15:08,846 --> 00:15:12,590 process that's coming . We we have 382 00:15:12,590 --> 00:15:14,812 finally , I think , started to turn the 383 00:15:14,812 --> 00:15:17,300 corner Thio go that direction . Okay , 384 00:15:17,310 --> 00:15:19,310 well , that's very reassuring . And 385 00:15:19,310 --> 00:15:21,532 that gets , uh , the other thing that I 386 00:15:21,532 --> 00:15:23,866 wanted to ask you about in that context . 387 00:15:23,866 --> 00:15:25,921 Eso covering this space . One of the 388 00:15:25,921 --> 00:15:28,143 things that's very exciting about it is 389 00:15:28,143 --> 00:15:27,990 three convergence of all of these new 390 00:15:27,990 --> 00:15:30,480 emerging technologies in just the 391 00:15:30,490 --> 00:15:34,080 general , uh , exploration and 392 00:15:34,090 --> 00:15:36,257 movement into space . Three D printing 393 00:15:36,257 --> 00:15:38,810 is a big one for not only designing 394 00:15:38,810 --> 00:15:41,430 rocket engines and bringing down the 395 00:15:41,430 --> 00:15:43,541 cost of launch . I know that that's a 396 00:15:43,541 --> 00:15:45,760 huge part of what's basics does if you 397 00:15:45,760 --> 00:15:47,538 look at their designs three D , 398 00:15:47,538 --> 00:15:49,760 printing those , but also , uh , some , 399 00:15:49,760 --> 00:15:51,927 uh , startups that many people haven't 400 00:15:51,927 --> 00:15:53,927 heard of . They're gonna play a big 401 00:15:53,927 --> 00:15:56,093 role in the future . Like Rocket Lab's 402 00:15:56,093 --> 00:15:58,149 three D printing plays a big role in 403 00:15:58,149 --> 00:16:00,149 their business of bringing down the 404 00:16:00,149 --> 00:16:01,704 cost of launch . Artificial 405 00:16:01,704 --> 00:16:03,816 intelligence is another one . Can you 406 00:16:03,816 --> 00:16:05,982 give us a sense between those two will 407 00:16:05,982 --> 00:16:07,871 start their of three D printing , 408 00:16:07,871 --> 00:16:10,038 artificial intelligence . What role do 409 00:16:10,038 --> 00:16:12,640 they play in the future of the space 410 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:14,807 Force ? In terms of what you're seeing 411 00:16:14,807 --> 00:16:17,150 and what you're looking at ? Sure , let 412 00:16:17,150 --> 00:16:19,317 me talk . What I'll do is I'll talk to 413 00:16:19,317 --> 00:16:22,470 both of them in the context of , um , 414 00:16:22,480 --> 00:16:24,720 one of the key tenants of our 21st 415 00:16:24,720 --> 00:16:26,970 century military service , and that is 416 00:16:26,970 --> 00:16:29,700 making it a digital , a digital service 417 00:16:29,700 --> 00:16:32,340 and and you and perhaps others . And 418 00:16:32,340 --> 00:16:35,010 yet I have heard that probably from 419 00:16:35,010 --> 00:16:37,510 some of our leaders several times . Um , 420 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:39,687 and there are some fundamental tenants 421 00:16:39,687 --> 00:16:41,980 of that digital service . The first is 422 00:16:42,340 --> 00:16:45,000 it has to start with a digitally fluent 423 00:16:45,010 --> 00:16:47,200 workforce . And for us , that means it 424 00:16:47,200 --> 00:16:48,980 doesn't matter whether you're a 425 00:16:48,990 --> 00:16:51,046 military member in uniformed doesn't 426 00:16:51,046 --> 00:16:53,110 matter whether you're a government 427 00:16:53,110 --> 00:16:55,680 civilian servant beside us or , um , 428 00:16:55,690 --> 00:16:57,746 for those in industry who we need to 429 00:16:57,746 --> 00:17:01,010 work with . Um , the first part of that 430 00:17:01,010 --> 00:17:03,010 is really building a background and 431 00:17:03,010 --> 00:17:05,310 education and training so that they are 432 00:17:05,310 --> 00:17:07,310 skilled and understand and ready to 433 00:17:07,310 --> 00:17:10,450 operate day to day in the digital world 434 00:17:10,460 --> 00:17:13,500 and understanding of networks and I t 435 00:17:13,500 --> 00:17:16,960 infrastructure and data management and 436 00:17:16,960 --> 00:17:19,750 computing . And just let's just say 437 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:21,871 some basic and foundational knowledge 438 00:17:21,871 --> 00:17:24,093 that you wouldn't necessarily expect of 439 00:17:24,093 --> 00:17:25,760 the average individual in any 440 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:28,030 organization . We're going to expect 441 00:17:28,040 --> 00:17:30,410 that from the members of our service 442 00:17:30,410 --> 00:17:32,632 because of the environment . We operate 443 00:17:32,632 --> 00:17:34,854 what we see in the future and our focus 444 00:17:34,854 --> 00:17:37,580 on mission acquisition , intelligence 445 00:17:37,580 --> 00:17:39,890 and cyber ship . So that's the first 446 00:17:39,890 --> 00:17:42,057 thing . And oh , by the way , it's not 447 00:17:42,057 --> 00:17:44,057 just going to be across the force . 448 00:17:44,057 --> 00:17:46,160 General Raymond , our chief of space 449 00:17:46,160 --> 00:17:49,280 operations , has already set in motion . 450 00:17:49,640 --> 00:17:53,060 Um the need for and the demand for , um , 451 00:17:53,440 --> 00:17:55,980 hard core cyber expertise in a small 452 00:17:55,980 --> 00:17:57,980 group of those professionals . That 453 00:17:57,980 --> 00:18:00,202 means a return to people who understand 454 00:18:00,202 --> 00:18:02,410 how to code built , code used code on 455 00:18:02,410 --> 00:18:05,320 the fly . No kidding . Hard core 456 00:18:05,330 --> 00:18:07,420 operators , defenders . And in some 457 00:18:07,420 --> 00:18:09,330 cases , people understand threat 458 00:18:09,330 --> 00:18:11,870 vectors and what cyber space systems 459 00:18:11,870 --> 00:18:14,330 look like under attack so that we can 460 00:18:14,330 --> 00:18:16,552 defend that we can respond as well as a 461 00:18:16,552 --> 00:18:19,260 deep understanding of the best means 462 00:18:19,260 --> 00:18:21,316 from cradle to grave of how to build 463 00:18:21,316 --> 00:18:24,470 cybersecurity . And then finally , um 464 00:18:25,640 --> 00:18:28,310 ah , I'm sorry I lost my train of 465 00:18:28,310 --> 00:18:30,610 thought for a second . Oh , digital 466 00:18:30,620 --> 00:18:33,670 digital processes and digital strategy . 467 00:18:33,670 --> 00:18:37,140 And that is , um , making sure all data 468 00:18:37,150 --> 00:18:40,300 is , um , making sure all data is 469 00:18:40,310 --> 00:18:43,520 exposed and available and can be moved 470 00:18:43,520 --> 00:18:45,298 and could be fused and could be 471 00:18:45,298 --> 00:18:48,100 exploited and can be connected and 472 00:18:48,100 --> 00:18:50,940 provided to those who need it and put 473 00:18:50,940 --> 00:18:53,162 together in a meaningful manner to make 474 00:18:53,162 --> 00:18:55,273 decisions to do analysis . And that's 475 00:18:55,273 --> 00:18:57,384 where the key connection to AI starts 476 00:18:57,384 --> 00:18:59,440 to come in is to make sure that that 477 00:18:59,440 --> 00:19:02,100 whether it's in in acquisition 478 00:19:02,100 --> 00:19:03,767 engineering , whether it's an 479 00:19:03,767 --> 00:19:05,378 operations , whether it's an 480 00:19:05,378 --> 00:19:07,600 intelligence , that's the first part of 481 00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:09,822 the make sure the data is all available 482 00:19:09,822 --> 00:19:11,878 on exposed and then start using data 483 00:19:11,878 --> 00:19:13,711 mining strategies and artificial 484 00:19:13,711 --> 00:19:15,767 intelligence and machine learning to 485 00:19:15,767 --> 00:19:18,100 better understand and exploit that data . 486 00:19:18,100 --> 00:19:20,156 That's the second element is sort of 487 00:19:20,156 --> 00:19:19,930 what I'll call the did the digital 488 00:19:19,930 --> 00:19:21,986 strategy and underlying processes it 489 00:19:21,986 --> 00:19:24,208 supports . And the third is , ah , move 490 00:19:24,208 --> 00:19:26,041 to digital engineering . This is 491 00:19:26,041 --> 00:19:28,240 clearly into the line of design , 492 00:19:28,240 --> 00:19:30,296 development , manufacturing . And as 493 00:19:30,296 --> 00:19:32,351 you talked about one element of that 494 00:19:32,351 --> 00:19:34,730 being three , um , as many of you know , 495 00:19:34,730 --> 00:19:36,990 we you know , we're now stepping into 496 00:19:36,990 --> 00:19:39,120 that world of digital engineering 497 00:19:39,120 --> 00:19:42,180 digital design , digital twins that 498 00:19:42,190 --> 00:19:45,060 enable , uh , move to production the 499 00:19:45,060 --> 00:19:48,380 ability to upgrade quickly mawr a rapid , 500 00:19:48,380 --> 00:19:50,713 more rapid ability test more thoroughly . 501 00:19:50,713 --> 00:19:53,490 General Hammond , and working with the 502 00:19:53,500 --> 00:19:55,880 Air Force acquisition of executive Dr 503 00:19:55,880 --> 00:19:59,620 Will Roper , has already said every new 504 00:19:59,620 --> 00:20:01,620 system in the space force from here 505 00:20:01,620 --> 00:20:03,842 forward will be built on the foundation 506 00:20:03,842 --> 00:20:05,953 of a digital engineering enterprise , 507 00:20:05,953 --> 00:20:08,231 and we'll go back to those old systems , 508 00:20:08,231 --> 00:20:10,760 the GPS and others on see how they can 509 00:20:10,760 --> 00:20:12,816 be adapted in the future . So that's 510 00:20:12,816 --> 00:20:14,982 that's sort of the context under which 511 00:20:14,982 --> 00:20:17,038 we're going to get after a I machine 512 00:20:17,038 --> 00:20:18,982 learning and digital engineering . 513 00:20:18,982 --> 00:20:21,038 Three D printing . Do you envision a 514 00:20:21,038 --> 00:20:23,530 role for three D printing ? Perhaps a 515 00:20:23,530 --> 00:20:26,330 board future satellites in space is 516 00:20:26,330 --> 00:20:28,441 part of a repair . Function is That's 517 00:20:28,441 --> 00:20:30,386 because it's so difficult to reach 518 00:20:30,386 --> 00:20:32,600 things , I would say , and and in that 519 00:20:32,600 --> 00:20:34,711 sense , I would talk about it is sort 520 00:20:34,711 --> 00:20:36,767 of , uh , let's speculate about what 521 00:20:36,767 --> 00:20:38,822 the future might look like . I would 522 00:20:38,822 --> 00:20:40,933 say Apple , really , Um , and I would 523 00:20:40,933 --> 00:20:42,933 say that , you know , perhaps going 524 00:20:42,933 --> 00:20:45,156 forward . That's something that a space 525 00:20:45,156 --> 00:20:48,660 Force might want to exploit as a as a 526 00:20:48,660 --> 00:20:51,980 service procured from someone in very 527 00:20:51,990 --> 00:20:54,101 in the very near future there . There 528 00:20:54,101 --> 00:20:56,157 are several things that I would tell 529 00:20:56,157 --> 00:20:58,770 you , Um , we look with great hope 530 00:20:58,770 --> 00:21:02,150 toward the commercial sector . Perhaps 531 00:21:02,150 --> 00:21:05,020 they can . Those capabilities and those 532 00:21:05,020 --> 00:21:07,242 business cases and those use cases will 533 00:21:07,242 --> 00:21:09,353 develop because we love to be able to 534 00:21:09,353 --> 00:21:11,520 use them in the service . One of those 535 00:21:11,520 --> 00:21:14,330 might be exactly that . The let's call 536 00:21:14,330 --> 00:21:16,620 it three D printing and ability for on 537 00:21:16,620 --> 00:21:19,080 orbit repair . I would tell you , even 538 00:21:19,080 --> 00:21:21,191 before that , what I'll call a little 539 00:21:21,191 --> 00:21:23,247 more maybe a little more standard on 540 00:21:23,247 --> 00:21:25,358 orbit service , you know , Is there a 541 00:21:25,358 --> 00:21:27,580 non orbit tug that can move a satellite 542 00:21:27,580 --> 00:21:29,747 from one orbit to another . Can you do 543 00:21:29,747 --> 00:21:31,524 refueling ? If , in fact , ah , 544 00:21:31,524 --> 00:21:33,691 satellites had a failure of its own in 545 00:21:33,691 --> 00:21:35,524 an attitude control system or is 546 00:21:35,524 --> 00:21:37,770 approaching end of life can can , uh , 547 00:21:37,780 --> 00:21:40,002 commercial service provider come in and 548 00:21:40,140 --> 00:21:42,362 and provide that stability to keep that 549 00:21:42,362 --> 00:21:44,418 satellite mission for a little while 550 00:21:44,418 --> 00:21:46,084 longer ? Or can we count on a 551 00:21:46,084 --> 00:21:48,251 commercial provider to help us dispose 552 00:21:48,251 --> 00:21:50,418 at the end of life ? Can we help ? Can 553 00:21:50,418 --> 00:21:52,550 we save on size and costs and perhaps 554 00:21:52,830 --> 00:21:55,230 maneuverability to save for defensive 555 00:21:55,230 --> 00:21:58,210 purposes by asking our commercial tug 556 00:21:58,210 --> 00:22:00,210 to move us from one orbit another . 557 00:22:00,210 --> 00:22:02,250 Those are all things that we see we 558 00:22:02,250 --> 00:22:04,417 hope for in the future . We have great 559 00:22:04,417 --> 00:22:06,528 anticipation and expectation for it . 560 00:22:06,528 --> 00:22:08,528 In some cases , there may be direct 561 00:22:08,528 --> 00:22:10,750 applications . We want to consider that 562 00:22:10,750 --> 00:22:12,861 a lot of cases , if it's a commercial 563 00:22:12,861 --> 00:22:15,083 service and capability and we see value 564 00:22:15,083 --> 00:22:17,660 in it absolutely will be looking . This 565 00:22:17,660 --> 00:22:19,271 is something that I see very 566 00:22:19,271 --> 00:22:21,540 consistently in , uh , always be 567 00:22:21,550 --> 00:22:23,606 talking and their strategy documents 568 00:22:23,606 --> 00:22:26,820 about space . Is this increasing 569 00:22:26,820 --> 00:22:29,660 reliance on a very fast growing 570 00:22:29,670 --> 00:22:33,330 commercial space activity ? Um , 571 00:22:33,340 --> 00:22:35,540 and yet I wonder if There might be a 572 00:22:35,540 --> 00:22:37,373 bit of a problem there precisely 573 00:22:37,373 --> 00:22:40,040 because Cove in 19 has had some bad 574 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:42,410 effects and some space startups . One 575 00:22:42,410 --> 00:22:44,132 Web , which was very promising 576 00:22:44,132 --> 00:22:46,354 satellite startup , declared bankruptcy 577 00:22:46,354 --> 00:22:48,100 Intelsat , Another big space 578 00:22:48,110 --> 00:22:50,740 communications company . Uh , not a 579 00:22:50,740 --> 00:22:52,629 startup . Very well established , 580 00:22:52,629 --> 00:22:54,684 declared bankruptcy . I've talked to 581 00:22:54,684 --> 00:22:56,796 different folks about it . Uh , space 582 00:22:56,796 --> 00:22:59,500 is the sort of long distance bet that a 583 00:22:59,500 --> 00:23:02,460 lot of folks in , uh , venture capital 584 00:23:02,460 --> 00:23:04,682 are a little bit worried about . That's 585 00:23:04,682 --> 00:23:06,849 not exactly a fast turnaround for your 586 00:23:06,849 --> 00:23:08,849 return on investment in space . Eso 587 00:23:08,849 --> 00:23:10,849 understanding that you work for the 588 00:23:10,849 --> 00:23:12,738 United States military and not JP 589 00:23:12,738 --> 00:23:15,560 Morgan . When you look out across the 590 00:23:16,040 --> 00:23:18,630 private space world that exists right 591 00:23:18,630 --> 00:23:20,686 now , the money that's going into it 592 00:23:20,686 --> 00:23:22,741 the money that's , uh , not reaching 593 00:23:22,741 --> 00:23:25,090 return fast enough for some investors 594 00:23:25,090 --> 00:23:27,620 through the , um , unpredictability 595 00:23:27,620 --> 00:23:29,990 there that exists right now . How would 596 00:23:29,990 --> 00:23:33,810 you characterize the state of private 597 00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:36,970 space enterprise right now ? And is it 598 00:23:36,970 --> 00:23:40,390 a concern ? Um , it is . Let me let me 599 00:23:40,390 --> 00:23:42,612 talk a little bit about sort of where I 600 00:23:42,612 --> 00:23:44,668 thought we were prior to cove it and 601 00:23:44,668 --> 00:23:46,834 then maybe a little bit about where we 602 00:23:46,834 --> 00:23:48,946 are today , which it's certainly much 603 00:23:48,946 --> 00:23:51,001 more uncertain and speculative , but 604 00:23:51,001 --> 00:23:53,334 also greatly concerned . Um , I thought , 605 00:23:53,334 --> 00:23:55,446 you know , let's say a year ago today 606 00:23:55,446 --> 00:23:58,400 we were potentially on the cusp of an 607 00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:01,010 explosion . Um , in terms of what I'll 608 00:24:01,010 --> 00:24:03,130 call opportunities presented by the 609 00:24:03,140 --> 00:24:05,590 creativity and the energy and the 610 00:24:05,600 --> 00:24:07,933 ingenuity and the commercial space Mark , 611 00:24:07,940 --> 00:24:10,090 let's talk about small launch . We 612 00:24:10,090 --> 00:24:12,090 could we could talk about even even 613 00:24:12,090 --> 00:24:14,090 what I'll call routine launch as we 614 00:24:14,090 --> 00:24:16,034 know it today . Um , we could talk 615 00:24:16,034 --> 00:24:18,034 about small launch . Certainly talk 616 00:24:18,034 --> 00:24:20,680 about thes proliferated constellations 617 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:22,791 that provide the opportunity for data 618 00:24:22,791 --> 00:24:25,310 relay and connectivity and and remote 619 00:24:25,310 --> 00:24:27,880 sensing and other things . Um , as is 620 00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:29,713 often the case , while you would 621 00:24:29,713 --> 00:24:32,170 certainly not expect , um , 622 00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:35,280 everything to survive and thrive . 623 00:24:35,280 --> 00:24:37,502 There was so much activity , there's so 624 00:24:37,502 --> 00:24:39,447 much potential . There was so much 625 00:24:39,447 --> 00:24:41,920 investment that I felt like we were on 626 00:24:41,920 --> 00:24:45,590 the the the custom oven opportunity . 627 00:24:45,590 --> 00:24:48,760 An example I used it similar is let's 628 00:24:48,760 --> 00:24:50,660 talk about smartphones , right 629 00:24:50,660 --> 00:24:52,771 smartphones and wireless technology . 630 00:24:52,771 --> 00:24:54,938 If you look at all of that today , the 631 00:24:54,938 --> 00:24:58,200 underlying research Onda Technologies 632 00:24:58,200 --> 00:25:00,490 associate ID over that were built over 633 00:25:00,490 --> 00:25:02,900 years and and perhaps a decade or two 634 00:25:02,910 --> 00:25:04,854 as part of a national security and 635 00:25:04,854 --> 00:25:07,077 defense enterprise . But it really took 636 00:25:07,077 --> 00:25:09,188 the investment and the creativity and 637 00:25:09,188 --> 00:25:11,560 the ingenuity of entrepreneurs and the 638 00:25:11,560 --> 00:25:13,560 commercial market to take all those 639 00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:15,282 technologies and put them into 640 00:25:15,282 --> 00:25:17,282 something like the cell phone . I'm 641 00:25:17,282 --> 00:25:19,282 sorry , the smartphone that we have 642 00:25:19,282 --> 00:25:21,282 today that was probably never truly 643 00:25:21,282 --> 00:25:23,410 envisioned when those underlying 644 00:25:23,410 --> 00:25:25,632 technologies were first developed . But 645 00:25:25,632 --> 00:25:27,799 I felt like we were on the potentially 646 00:25:27,799 --> 00:25:29,521 on the verge of that sort of a 647 00:25:29,521 --> 00:25:32,020 blossoming in space in commercial space 648 00:25:32,030 --> 00:25:34,720 and and one of the things we're 649 00:25:34,720 --> 00:25:36,760 posturing to do . And we may talk a 650 00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:38,927 little bit about the space development 651 00:25:38,927 --> 00:25:41,093 in Syria . A few minutes was posturing 652 00:25:41,093 --> 00:25:42,982 to do a couple of things . One is 653 00:25:42,982 --> 00:25:45,204 exploit that . But the other thing that 654 00:25:45,204 --> 00:25:47,260 we need to do and need toe work on , 655 00:25:47,260 --> 00:25:49,316 and this is work for us yet to do is 656 00:25:49,316 --> 00:25:50,970 understand how to be able to 657 00:25:50,970 --> 00:25:53,630 communicate to that sector . What our 658 00:25:53,630 --> 00:25:55,741 needs are , what our requirements are 659 00:25:55,741 --> 00:25:57,852 and what they could expect of us as a 660 00:25:57,852 --> 00:25:59,741 business . And let me give you an 661 00:25:59,741 --> 00:26:01,686 example . They're part of US based 662 00:26:01,686 --> 00:26:04,150 forces . The commercial , um , sat com 663 00:26:04,150 --> 00:26:06,760 office up in Fort Meade . Um , that 664 00:26:06,760 --> 00:26:09,030 office transition in the first Air 665 00:26:09,030 --> 00:26:11,252 Force base , man , The US based force a 666 00:26:11,252 --> 00:26:13,419 couple years back . Um , we are in the 667 00:26:13,419 --> 00:26:15,474 process right now trying to finalize 668 00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:19,300 the agreements that allow us to 669 00:26:19,300 --> 00:26:22,360 purchase , um , data relay and 670 00:26:22,360 --> 00:26:24,660 communications and other services from , 671 00:26:25,140 --> 00:26:28,310 um , any Siris of commercial 672 00:26:28,320 --> 00:26:31,080 providers in low earth orbit . Um , 673 00:26:31,090 --> 00:26:33,201 what we ought to be able to do is put 674 00:26:33,201 --> 00:26:35,146 those vehicles in place and send a 675 00:26:35,146 --> 00:26:37,368 signal to that commercial market sector 676 00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:39,807 that year and year out of the x number 677 00:26:39,807 --> 00:26:41,473 of years , you can expect the 678 00:26:41,473 --> 00:26:43,584 Department of Defense , including the 679 00:26:43,584 --> 00:26:46,240 US based force , to be buying this'll 680 00:26:46,240 --> 00:26:48,407 certain amount of services out of that 681 00:26:48,407 --> 00:26:50,462 market so they can count on it a zey 682 00:26:50,462 --> 00:26:52,462 potential revenues . We ought to be 683 00:26:52,462 --> 00:26:55,030 able to say the same thing to a small 684 00:26:55,030 --> 00:26:57,086 lunch , uh , market , you know , And 685 00:26:57,086 --> 00:26:59,480 they should anticipate that that over 686 00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:01,591 the Siris of years , we're gonna have 687 00:27:01,591 --> 00:27:04,850 ah demand for a certain number of small 688 00:27:04,850 --> 00:27:07,017 launch services year , and we ought to 689 00:27:07,017 --> 00:27:09,072 be able to provide . All of that was 690 00:27:09,072 --> 00:27:11,183 what I would say is is the ability to 691 00:27:11,183 --> 00:27:13,870 exploit leverage directly and send 692 00:27:14,240 --> 00:27:16,800 right consistent signal to those 693 00:27:16,800 --> 00:27:18,744 commercial sectors as to what they 694 00:27:18,744 --> 00:27:20,911 could count on in terms of partnership 695 00:27:20,911 --> 00:27:23,022 and revenue stream from US based four 696 00:27:23,022 --> 00:27:25,078 State Department . Um , with cove it 697 00:27:25,078 --> 00:27:27,450 Now it's your right , it's it's It's a 698 00:27:27,460 --> 00:27:29,460 much tougher case , and part of the 699 00:27:29,460 --> 00:27:33,210 reason is , um , um , while we don't 700 00:27:33,210 --> 00:27:35,488 expect to be anchor tenants and we can , 701 00:27:35,488 --> 00:27:37,432 we can commit to being a part of a 702 00:27:37,432 --> 00:27:39,543 business based . A lot of the rest of 703 00:27:39,543 --> 00:27:41,543 the business base has dried up a za 704 00:27:41,543 --> 00:27:43,670 result of the contractions that have 705 00:27:43,670 --> 00:27:45,670 occurred in the face of Covic . I'm 706 00:27:45,670 --> 00:27:47,892 very concerned about , especially those 707 00:27:47,892 --> 00:27:49,892 small , innovative companies . Um , 708 00:27:49,892 --> 00:27:52,059 certainly the defense space sector has 709 00:27:52,059 --> 00:27:54,281 its challenges , but we're still here . 710 00:27:54,281 --> 00:27:56,226 We still need to capabilities they 711 00:27:56,226 --> 00:27:58,281 provide . They can count on us for a 712 00:27:58,281 --> 00:28:00,392 large portion of what we need them to 713 00:28:00,392 --> 00:28:02,448 do . But it's so small entrepreneurs 714 00:28:02,448 --> 00:28:04,900 that depend on us . But others I'm not 715 00:28:04,900 --> 00:28:07,122 sure yet . If we have figured out a way 716 00:28:07,122 --> 00:28:09,400 toe , ensure part of that will survive . 717 00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:11,630 If we do , it will service greatly . If 718 00:28:11,630 --> 00:28:14,620 not , it may take us years to recover 719 00:28:14,630 --> 00:28:16,852 back to the point where I think we were 720 00:28:16,852 --> 00:28:18,908 a party on . I want to get to all of 721 00:28:18,908 --> 00:28:21,074 these great great questions . Audience 722 00:28:21,074 --> 00:28:23,297 really showed up with great questions . 723 00:28:23,297 --> 00:28:25,519 But before I do one last one on exactly 724 00:28:25,519 --> 00:28:25,480 the point that you mentioned in terms 725 00:28:25,480 --> 00:28:28,130 of showing up those , uh , innovative 726 00:28:28,130 --> 00:28:30,740 startups . What are you looking at 727 00:28:30,740 --> 00:28:32,684 right now ? Is there ? Ah , direct 728 00:28:32,684 --> 00:28:34,907 investment vehicle that might help , Is 729 00:28:34,907 --> 00:28:36,780 there ? Ah , uh , profit sharing 730 00:28:36,790 --> 00:28:38,957 vehicle that might help . What are you 731 00:28:38,957 --> 00:28:41,012 looking at in the near term ? Yeah , 732 00:28:41,012 --> 00:28:43,123 first of all , I I do need to be very 733 00:28:43,123 --> 00:28:44,901 clear . We're a partner in this 734 00:28:44,901 --> 00:28:47,068 activity , but it is being led , first 735 00:28:47,068 --> 00:28:48,901 of all by the department defense 736 00:28:48,901 --> 00:28:50,957 through the division of Act Justin . 737 00:28:50,957 --> 00:28:53,179 Sustained statement . Secretary Lord in 738 00:28:53,179 --> 00:28:55,940 the Air Force being led by our 739 00:28:55,950 --> 00:28:57,950 assistant secretary for acquisition 740 00:28:57,950 --> 00:29:00,117 Doctor Will Roper and his team . So So 741 00:29:00,117 --> 00:29:02,228 they've been doing an admiral a great 742 00:29:02,228 --> 00:29:04,339 job of understanding where the issues 743 00:29:04,339 --> 00:29:06,560 are , where the concerns are , and and 744 00:29:06,560 --> 00:29:09,170 frankly , what we have been doing with 745 00:29:09,170 --> 00:29:12,800 them is sharing ideas of , um , 746 00:29:12,810 --> 00:29:16,250 how , first of all , how to incentivize 747 00:29:16,260 --> 00:29:18,720 and provide perhaps revenue streams and 748 00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:21,350 investment specifically in areas that 749 00:29:21,350 --> 00:29:23,700 we need . Second of all , in areas that 750 00:29:23,700 --> 00:29:25,950 allow that don't automatically demand 751 00:29:25,950 --> 00:29:28,172 that we pick a winner , but allow those 752 00:29:28,172 --> 00:29:30,061 who are still out there trying to 753 00:29:30,061 --> 00:29:32,117 compete , um , to be able to compete 754 00:29:32,117 --> 00:29:34,172 for it so that we get an advantage . 755 00:29:34,172 --> 00:29:36,172 The challenge right now , I think , 756 00:29:36,172 --> 00:29:38,394 though , is , um then then all of those 757 00:29:38,394 --> 00:29:40,506 ideas , first of all , compete inside 758 00:29:40,506 --> 00:29:42,617 the Department of Defense for all the 759 00:29:42,617 --> 00:29:44,783 ideas and other sectors . Then compete 760 00:29:44,783 --> 00:29:47,010 with the rest of the sectors of the 761 00:29:47,010 --> 00:29:49,040 economy and civil society in the 762 00:29:49,040 --> 00:29:52,450 defense sector , Um , Thio turn into 763 00:29:52,460 --> 00:29:54,571 funding stream through Congress . And 764 00:29:54,571 --> 00:29:56,620 right now , it not sure where we're 765 00:29:56,620 --> 00:29:58,960 going as a nation in that regard , we 766 00:29:58,960 --> 00:30:01,182 have absolutely been engaged , first of 767 00:30:01,182 --> 00:30:03,238 all with Dr Roper and Secretary Lord 768 00:30:03,238 --> 00:30:05,600 and their teams Thio ensure that the 769 00:30:05,600 --> 00:30:07,322 process of data collection and 770 00:30:07,322 --> 00:30:10,570 proposals includes opportunities like 771 00:30:10,570 --> 00:30:12,737 that . And as the nation decides where 772 00:30:12,737 --> 00:30:14,737 it's going to go in this recovery , 773 00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:17,096 make sure that those air foremost in 774 00:30:17,096 --> 00:30:19,040 the minds of them and our national 775 00:30:19,040 --> 00:30:21,151 leaders as to the value importance of 776 00:30:21,151 --> 00:30:24,730 supporting that commercials . Okay , uh , 777 00:30:24,740 --> 00:30:26,629 great . Let's go to some of these 778 00:30:26,629 --> 00:30:29,300 questions . Uh , from Kevin Baron . 779 00:30:29,440 --> 00:30:31,662 You've previously said there was almost 780 00:30:31,662 --> 00:30:33,950 zero chance space force professionals 781 00:30:33,950 --> 00:30:36,630 would be actual astronauts . But this 782 00:30:36,630 --> 00:30:38,950 week , another , uh , United States 783 00:30:38,960 --> 00:30:41,790 Space Force official , Major Gen . Shaw 784 00:30:41,800 --> 00:30:44,390 said they would eventually be 785 00:30:44,390 --> 00:30:46,990 astronauts . Is that true ? Yes . How 786 00:30:46,990 --> 00:30:49,290 far are we from sending us troops into 787 00:30:49,290 --> 00:30:51,660 space ? And for what purpose ? Yeah , 788 00:30:51,670 --> 00:30:55,100 so ? So the first thing I'd say is , um , 789 00:30:55,110 --> 00:30:58,520 those those two comments are not is 790 00:30:58,520 --> 00:31:00,853 much of a conflict , as folks might see . 791 00:31:00,853 --> 00:31:04,670 Uh um uh , s 792 00:31:04,670 --> 00:31:08,020 O the best and most direct route for 793 00:31:08,020 --> 00:31:10,242 any member of the United States based , 794 00:31:10,242 --> 00:31:12,409 forced to go personally and physically 795 00:31:12,409 --> 00:31:14,631 into space today . That remains what it 796 00:31:14,631 --> 00:31:17,120 has been for decades , which is for 797 00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:19,430 decades , NASA , in selecting 798 00:31:19,430 --> 00:31:21,970 astronauts , goes to a variety of 799 00:31:21,970 --> 00:31:24,870 places , including , um , the United 800 00:31:24,870 --> 00:31:27,203 States military . For years , it's been , 801 00:31:27,203 --> 00:31:29,426 you know , we've got Air Force officers 802 00:31:29,426 --> 00:31:31,481 and and the Navy and the Marine Corn 803 00:31:31,481 --> 00:31:33,759 Army . All part of the astronaut corps . 804 00:31:33,759 --> 00:31:35,870 Um , if we have a member of the Space 805 00:31:35,870 --> 00:31:37,926 Force today who wants to go to space 806 00:31:37,926 --> 00:31:40,130 their best bet and remain a military 807 00:31:40,130 --> 00:31:42,297 members to apply through the astronaut 808 00:31:42,297 --> 00:31:45,770 program in NASA to get , um , when do 809 00:31:45,770 --> 00:31:47,770 we have ? When do we expect to have 810 00:31:47,770 --> 00:31:50,740 boots on the moon ? No idea . You know ? 811 00:31:50,740 --> 00:31:52,740 Certainly not . Certainly not in my 812 00:31:52,740 --> 00:31:56,620 career . Um , but , uh , the fact is 813 00:31:56,620 --> 00:31:58,670 it possible and certainly expected 814 00:31:58,670 --> 00:32:01,530 someday in the future , members of the 815 00:32:01,530 --> 00:32:03,419 United States based force will go 816 00:32:03,419 --> 00:32:05,586 physically , directly and personally . 817 00:32:05,586 --> 00:32:08,580 The space I was absolutely , um , we're 818 00:32:08,580 --> 00:32:10,802 probably talking , you know , But we're 819 00:32:10,802 --> 00:32:12,802 not talking , you know , five or 10 820 00:32:12,802 --> 00:32:15,080 years , we're talking decades from now , 821 00:32:15,080 --> 00:32:17,191 Almost certainly . But just as , um , 822 00:32:17,191 --> 00:32:19,358 you know , just as I'll say , first of 823 00:32:19,358 --> 00:32:21,370 all , the nation and the human race 824 00:32:21,740 --> 00:32:25,260 grows and expands and heads out , First 825 00:32:25,260 --> 00:32:27,260 of all , back toward the moon , out 826 00:32:27,260 --> 00:32:29,316 into the solar system , towards Mars 827 00:32:29,316 --> 00:32:31,316 and beyond , you know , as the need 828 00:32:31,316 --> 00:32:33,482 arises . Certainly United States based 829 00:32:33,482 --> 00:32:35,760 force will play whatever role it needs . 830 00:32:35,760 --> 00:32:37,600 But but a plan , a program , an 831 00:32:37,600 --> 00:32:40,040 expectation that that were preparing to 832 00:32:40,040 --> 00:32:43,510 send us Space Force units and people 833 00:32:43,520 --> 00:32:45,400 into space in any way other than 834 00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:47,456 through the NASA astronaut program . 835 00:32:47,640 --> 00:32:50,140 Certainly not anywhere in the Okay , 836 00:32:50,150 --> 00:32:52,520 well , let me . I have a question that 837 00:32:52,530 --> 00:32:54,530 is a little closer to Earth , quite 838 00:32:54,530 --> 00:32:57,170 literally , but related because you 839 00:32:57,170 --> 00:32:59,281 talked about the need to defend space 840 00:32:59,281 --> 00:33:01,281 assets from threats including , and 841 00:33:01,281 --> 00:33:03,448 especially those that emerged from the 842 00:33:03,448 --> 00:33:05,670 ground . So in the event that there was 843 00:33:05,670 --> 00:33:07,614 some ground based threat thio some 844 00:33:07,614 --> 00:33:09,670 important space asset , maybe it's a 845 00:33:09,670 --> 00:33:13,120 new anti satellite mobile launcher or a 846 00:33:13,130 --> 00:33:16,320 cyber , uh , facility that exists on 847 00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:18,320 the ground somewhere in the world , 848 00:33:18,320 --> 00:33:21,040 we've got forward operating troops that 849 00:33:21,040 --> 00:33:23,570 could go and deal with that . What ? Is 850 00:33:23,570 --> 00:33:26,400 there any role for Space Force as part 851 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:28,456 of those boots that are on the earth 852 00:33:28,456 --> 00:33:31,290 ground to deal with physical threats 853 00:33:31,330 --> 00:33:33,490 that exist to space systems that here 854 00:33:33,500 --> 00:33:36,690 that are here on earth . So I would say 855 00:33:36,690 --> 00:33:39,120 yes . In a couple of ways . Uh , the 856 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:41,940 first is So the capabilities will bring . 857 00:33:41,940 --> 00:33:43,884 We're gonna integrate with a joint 858 00:33:43,884 --> 00:33:45,829 force , and and probably first and 859 00:33:45,829 --> 00:33:49,580 foremost is to ensure space experts , 860 00:33:49,590 --> 00:33:52,050 US based force members and we've got a 861 00:33:52,060 --> 00:33:54,116 space expertise in the army in other 862 00:33:54,116 --> 00:33:55,950 areas as well are integrated 863 00:33:55,950 --> 00:33:58,990 effectively with the joint force . Um , 864 00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:02,620 so they understand , um , the threats 865 00:34:02,620 --> 00:34:04,731 that air posed by these systems , the 866 00:34:04,731 --> 00:34:06,731 importance of the systems they hold 867 00:34:06,731 --> 00:34:08,787 under threat and then work with that 868 00:34:08,787 --> 00:34:11,730 force in ways to defeat the threat . It 869 00:34:11,730 --> 00:34:13,897 might be physical attack . It might be 870 00:34:13,897 --> 00:34:15,952 cyber attack . It might be things we 871 00:34:15,952 --> 00:34:18,008 can do on the ground , in the air in 872 00:34:18,008 --> 00:34:20,430 space . And so the first thing it is is 873 00:34:20,430 --> 00:34:23,450 that expertise forward to help you know , 874 00:34:23,450 --> 00:34:25,672 soldiers , sailors , airmen and Marines 875 00:34:25,672 --> 00:34:27,950 understand what they need to do to help 876 00:34:27,950 --> 00:34:30,172 defeat . That . Second thing is , we do 877 00:34:30,172 --> 00:34:31,728 have forward deployed space 878 00:34:31,728 --> 00:34:34,320 capabilities today that contribute to 879 00:34:34,320 --> 00:34:36,970 the fight . Um , not long ago , we 880 00:34:36,970 --> 00:34:39,303 start making public the fact that the U . 881 00:34:39,303 --> 00:34:41,810 S . Based force has units that deployed 882 00:34:41,810 --> 00:34:44,110 forward to engage in space electronic 883 00:34:44,110 --> 00:34:47,220 warfare , right , the jamming of of 884 00:34:47,220 --> 00:34:49,790 space links that pose a threat to our 885 00:34:49,790 --> 00:34:51,846 forces and help degrade and deny the 886 00:34:51,846 --> 00:34:53,734 capability the adversary . That's 887 00:34:53,734 --> 00:34:56,080 another means by which today space 888 00:34:56,080 --> 00:34:58,180 forces might forward , deploy , 889 00:34:58,190 --> 00:35:00,412 contribute to the fight and help defeat 890 00:35:00,412 --> 00:35:02,740 either space threats or potentially 891 00:35:02,740 --> 00:35:06,260 also threats . Thio forces on the 892 00:35:06,260 --> 00:35:08,482 ground forces that seeing forces in the 893 00:35:08,482 --> 00:35:10,593 air and so on and so forth . So those 894 00:35:10,593 --> 00:35:12,482 are a couple that are immediately 895 00:35:12,482 --> 00:35:12,110 available day accessible in the way 896 00:35:12,110 --> 00:35:15,770 that we would for Okay . Question from 897 00:35:16,140 --> 00:35:18,610 Kourtney Alvin great reporter covering 898 00:35:18,610 --> 00:35:20,590 the space highly recommend reading 899 00:35:20,590 --> 00:35:23,420 Courtney album stuff . Has OSD approved 900 00:35:23,430 --> 00:35:25,790 the space Force's plan for which Army 901 00:35:25,790 --> 00:35:27,846 and Navy assets will transfer to the 902 00:35:27,846 --> 00:35:29,990 service as expected ? Can you give us 903 00:35:29,990 --> 00:35:32,620 an idea of what the plan looks like and 904 00:35:32,620 --> 00:35:34,676 what feedback you have received from 905 00:35:34,676 --> 00:35:37,410 the Army and Navy on that plan . Yeah , 906 00:35:37,420 --> 00:35:39,930 so I can't go into a whole lot of 907 00:35:39,930 --> 00:35:42,520 detail , mostly because the absolutely 908 00:35:42,520 --> 00:35:44,687 final decision had been made . And I'm 909 00:35:44,687 --> 00:35:46,631 not , You know , I'm certainly not 910 00:35:46,631 --> 00:35:48,687 going to speak for the Department of 911 00:35:48,687 --> 00:35:48,350 Defense or the leadership of the Army 912 00:35:48,350 --> 00:35:50,461 and Navy . I will say , Here's what I 913 00:35:50,461 --> 00:35:52,683 will say . We have been engaged in this 914 00:35:52,683 --> 00:35:55,600 process for several months now . We're 915 00:35:55,600 --> 00:35:58,360 getting close to the decisions that 916 00:35:58,370 --> 00:36:00,426 need to be made in terms of transfer 917 00:36:00,426 --> 00:36:01,981 some of those functions and 918 00:36:01,981 --> 00:36:04,880 capabilities . Um um , there is a 919 00:36:04,880 --> 00:36:08,640 tremendous amount that the Space Force 920 00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:10,807 and the Air Force and the Army and the 921 00:36:10,807 --> 00:36:13,029 Navy working together with us , he have 922 00:36:13,029 --> 00:36:14,807 already agreed on agreed on two 923 00:36:14,807 --> 00:36:17,210 accounts . One is the capabilities and 924 00:36:17,210 --> 00:36:19,266 forces that will stay in place where 925 00:36:19,266 --> 00:36:20,988 they are to continue to do the 926 00:36:20,988 --> 00:36:23,266 activities that air space related , um , 927 00:36:23,266 --> 00:36:25,690 the set of activities that are prepared 928 00:36:25,690 --> 00:36:27,579 to move over . And then there's a 929 00:36:27,579 --> 00:36:30,310 couple . There's a few units and 930 00:36:30,310 --> 00:36:32,477 functions left that we haven't reached 931 00:36:32,477 --> 00:36:34,532 full agreement on , and we're in the 932 00:36:34,532 --> 00:36:38,350 process of finalizing the data and the 933 00:36:38,350 --> 00:36:40,128 information that will allow the 934 00:36:40,128 --> 00:36:43,600 decision makers to decide the final 935 00:36:43,600 --> 00:36:45,767 disposition position , whether they'll 936 00:36:45,767 --> 00:36:47,767 stay or whether they'll move to the 937 00:36:47,767 --> 00:36:50,044 space . So a lot of work has been done . 938 00:36:50,044 --> 00:36:51,878 You know , a whole lot agreement 939 00:36:51,878 --> 00:36:53,989 already . The last few decisions need 940 00:36:53,989 --> 00:36:57,060 to be made before we're public and the 941 00:36:57,070 --> 00:36:59,181 D o . D . And the Army , the Navy and 942 00:36:59,181 --> 00:37:01,840 the space Force announced how , uh 943 00:37:01,850 --> 00:37:05,270 clear . Sorry . Sorry . Wait . Did this 944 00:37:05,270 --> 00:37:07,400 process with the U . S . Air Force 945 00:37:07,410 --> 00:37:10,150 earlier this spring ? Um , have already 946 00:37:10,150 --> 00:37:12,270 completed that work we identified 947 00:37:12,280 --> 00:37:15,380 either in whole or part 23 units and 948 00:37:15,380 --> 00:37:17,830 and functions , network transfer to the 949 00:37:17,830 --> 00:37:21,680 Space Force have concluded the planning 950 00:37:21,680 --> 00:37:23,902 and execution of a lot of that transfer 951 00:37:23,902 --> 00:37:27,160 work . Already , we we identified two 952 00:37:27,530 --> 00:37:29,697 additional units that were tied to the 953 00:37:29,697 --> 00:37:31,641 intelligence community , and we're 954 00:37:31,641 --> 00:37:33,808 currently working on planning with the 955 00:37:33,808 --> 00:37:35,752 intelligence community to transfer 956 00:37:35,752 --> 00:37:37,919 those forces over . And we've actually 957 00:37:37,919 --> 00:37:40,030 identified two additional units since 958 00:37:40,030 --> 00:37:41,697 we did our this work has been 959 00:37:41,697 --> 00:37:43,863 transferred over as well . So a lot of 960 00:37:43,863 --> 00:37:45,974 great work in that regard . I hope at 961 00:37:45,974 --> 00:37:48,030 some point we'll all collectively be 962 00:37:48,030 --> 00:37:47,810 able to come out in the near term and 963 00:37:47,810 --> 00:37:51,440 say here the units that , um 964 00:37:51,450 --> 00:37:53,617 will remain behind to do the work that 965 00:37:53,617 --> 00:37:55,783 they need to in those services and and 966 00:37:55,783 --> 00:37:57,894 here are the ones that will will move 967 00:37:57,894 --> 00:37:59,783 When you say near term can we say 968 00:37:59,783 --> 00:38:02,740 before election day ? Um uh , 969 00:38:04,120 --> 00:38:06,500 perhaps , let's just say the target 970 00:38:06,500 --> 00:38:08,556 that the leadership in the D . O . D 971 00:38:08,556 --> 00:38:10,778 has given us is , um , we wanna be able 972 00:38:10,778 --> 00:38:12,611 to make decisions so that we can 973 00:38:12,611 --> 00:38:15,160 execute planning in fiscal year 2021 974 00:38:15,590 --> 00:38:17,757 begin facilitating the moves in 2022 . 975 00:38:17,757 --> 00:38:20,450 So that absolutely means near term . 976 00:38:21,420 --> 00:38:23,642 Let's just say , you know , between now 977 00:38:23,642 --> 00:38:25,753 and the end of the year is probably a 978 00:38:25,753 --> 00:38:27,920 good time line . Okay . Questions from 979 00:38:27,920 --> 00:38:30,142 Theresa Hitchens , also big fan Theresa 980 00:38:30,142 --> 00:38:32,031 Hitchens . Many Space Force Space 981 00:38:32,031 --> 00:38:34,190 Command leaders have complained that 982 00:38:34,190 --> 00:38:36,610 space is overly classified , but 983 00:38:36,610 --> 00:38:38,721 nothing changes . There's a couple of 984 00:38:38,721 --> 00:38:40,166 different questions about 985 00:38:40,166 --> 00:38:42,332 classification on why so much stuff is 986 00:38:42,332 --> 00:38:44,554 classified now . That wasn't classified 987 00:38:44,554 --> 00:38:46,332 before , so why and what is the 988 00:38:46,332 --> 00:38:50,200 roadblock ? So I would so 989 00:38:50,200 --> 00:38:52,520 first of all absolutely correct spaces 990 00:38:52,530 --> 00:38:56,230 is way too over classified . Um , I 991 00:38:56,230 --> 00:38:58,286 would argue we're actually getting a 992 00:38:58,286 --> 00:39:00,174 little bit better , but we're not 993 00:39:00,174 --> 00:39:02,397 getting better enough fast enough . One 994 00:39:02,397 --> 00:39:05,210 example . I just pointed out the the 995 00:39:05,220 --> 00:39:06,887 space electronic warfare Cape 996 00:39:06,887 --> 00:39:10,070 capability that was residents in the 997 00:39:10,070 --> 00:39:12,237 Air Force for years . And now resident 998 00:39:12,237 --> 00:39:14,181 in space Force , used to be highly 999 00:39:14,181 --> 00:39:16,348 classified . We've we've recently gone 1000 00:39:16,348 --> 00:39:18,760 through the process in order to work 1001 00:39:18,760 --> 00:39:20,760 effectively with the joint force in 1002 00:39:20,760 --> 00:39:22,816 order to work effectively with their 1003 00:39:22,816 --> 00:39:24,871 allies in order to truly acknowledge 1004 00:39:24,871 --> 00:39:26,593 that Look , this is an area of 1005 00:39:26,593 --> 00:39:28,760 potential conflict . And to be able to 1006 00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:30,871 do things like have the conversations 1007 00:39:30,871 --> 00:39:33,090 we need to deter , have have 1008 00:39:33,090 --> 00:39:36,460 adversaries , Understand ? Um um , 1009 00:39:36,820 --> 00:39:39,153 what our position is what our policy is , 1010 00:39:39,153 --> 00:39:41,264 What what they're likely to encounter 1011 00:39:41,264 --> 00:39:43,431 if they if they intend to attack us in 1012 00:39:43,431 --> 00:39:45,042 space . We have got to start 1013 00:39:45,520 --> 00:39:49,260 declassifying basic facts about 1014 00:39:49,270 --> 00:39:52,050 somebody's give . Um , you've actually 1015 00:39:52,050 --> 00:39:54,050 seen is take some some aggressive , 1016 00:39:54,050 --> 00:39:56,106 I'll say , a great , more aggressive 1017 00:39:56,106 --> 00:39:58,272 steps recently , Um , Russians and the 1018 00:39:58,272 --> 00:40:00,494 Chinese in the last several months have 1019 00:40:00,494 --> 00:40:02,439 been engaged in what we would call 1020 00:40:02,439 --> 00:40:04,661 unprofessional , unsafe and provocative 1021 00:40:04,661 --> 00:40:07,060 and hazardous behavior in space . And 1022 00:40:07,060 --> 00:40:09,700 at the time General J . Raymond he was 1023 00:40:09,700 --> 00:40:12,040 He was both the chief space operations 1024 00:40:12,040 --> 00:40:14,350 and U S space Command commander at the 1025 00:40:14,350 --> 00:40:16,572 time in his role as U . S Space Command 1026 00:40:16,572 --> 00:40:18,739 commander , he specifically called out 1027 00:40:18,739 --> 00:40:20,700 that behavior . It's the 1028 00:40:20,710 --> 00:40:22,877 unacceptability that behavior and what 1029 00:40:22,877 --> 00:40:25,670 it means to , um our ability to operate 1030 00:40:25,670 --> 00:40:28,100 effectively , safely and in a conflict 1031 00:40:28,110 --> 00:40:31,580 free sentence base . Um , in the 1032 00:40:31,580 --> 00:40:33,920 past , we have been reticent to talk 1033 00:40:33,920 --> 00:40:35,753 about any of that and discuss it 1034 00:40:35,753 --> 00:40:37,642 because we're concerned about the 1035 00:40:37,642 --> 00:40:39,198 potential compromise of our 1036 00:40:39,198 --> 00:40:41,476 understanding , our space capabilities . 1037 00:40:41,476 --> 00:40:43,750 We're moving in that direction . Um , 1038 00:40:43,790 --> 00:40:47,690 senior leaders above me understand the 1039 00:40:47,690 --> 00:40:50,320 need to drive , um , the 1040 00:40:50,330 --> 00:40:52,386 classifications discussion and we're 1041 00:40:52,386 --> 00:40:54,330 moving that direction asked me six 1042 00:40:54,330 --> 00:40:56,497 months from now and if we have a whole 1043 00:40:56,497 --> 00:40:58,552 lot more to talk about , I will tell 1044 00:40:58,552 --> 00:41:00,770 you we've been very successful in that 1045 00:41:00,770 --> 00:41:03,450 regard . If not , then we're continuing 1046 00:41:03,450 --> 00:41:06,230 to see obstacles of what I'll just call , 1047 00:41:06,240 --> 00:41:08,960 um , people whose perspectives were 1048 00:41:08,960 --> 00:41:10,738 built in a different world in a 1049 00:41:10,738 --> 00:41:12,904 different time that were struck by the 1050 00:41:12,904 --> 00:41:15,980 help over eso on that . I think what 1051 00:41:15,980 --> 00:41:17,536 you're referring to is this 1052 00:41:17,536 --> 00:41:19,702 announcement that the Space Force made 1053 00:41:19,702 --> 00:41:21,869 Russia had launched a satellite that's 1054 00:41:21,869 --> 00:41:24,440 basically like a space based gun . I 1055 00:41:24,440 --> 00:41:26,662 mean , it's kind of shoots a projectile 1056 00:41:26,662 --> 00:41:28,329 out . They can ram into other 1057 00:41:28,329 --> 00:41:30,140 satellites . Andi and everyone 1058 00:41:30,140 --> 00:41:32,362 responded to that with great alarm . It 1059 00:41:32,362 --> 00:41:34,473 was a great story to get blood drudge 1060 00:41:34,473 --> 00:41:36,660 for a day or whatever . I wonder , 1061 00:41:36,670 --> 00:41:38,860 based on the amount of activity that 1062 00:41:38,860 --> 00:41:42,660 you see , how many give us a 1063 00:41:42,660 --> 00:41:46,170 sense of how space threat activity from 1064 00:41:46,170 --> 00:41:49,930 Russia and China has ramped up 1065 00:41:49,940 --> 00:41:51,920 over the over the last few years . 1066 00:41:52,040 --> 00:41:54,207 Because that's like an example of just 1067 00:41:54,207 --> 00:41:56,570 one thing you can talk about . How big 1068 00:41:56,570 --> 00:41:58,570 a proportion of stuff is there that 1069 00:41:58,570 --> 00:42:01,810 they're doing that you can't talk . So 1070 00:42:02,200 --> 00:42:04,311 yeah , so So I guess there's a couple 1071 00:42:04,311 --> 00:42:06,478 of ways to talk about it . First , let 1072 00:42:06,478 --> 00:42:08,589 me encourage folks , whether it's the 1073 00:42:08,589 --> 00:42:10,589 National Air and Space Intelligence 1074 00:42:10,589 --> 00:42:12,756 Center and Air Force Center that has a 1075 00:42:12,756 --> 00:42:14,978 an unclassified space threats summary . 1076 00:42:14,978 --> 00:42:17,410 That's about a year old defense . Intel 1077 00:42:17,420 --> 00:42:19,587 Intelligence Agency has been a similar 1078 00:42:19,587 --> 00:42:21,809 document . Both are excellent documents 1079 00:42:21,809 --> 00:42:23,990 that talk in detail about the threats 1080 00:42:24,000 --> 00:42:26,111 in an unclassified sense . But let me 1081 00:42:26,111 --> 00:42:28,620 tell you this . A couple of first of 1082 00:42:28,620 --> 00:42:31,830 all , um , over the last 1083 00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:35,760 decade , from a Chinese perspective , 1084 00:42:35,770 --> 00:42:39,010 we have seen them expand rapidly into 1085 00:42:39,020 --> 00:42:41,242 kinetic effects , non kinetic effects , 1086 00:42:41,242 --> 00:42:43,131 testing and trialing all sorts of 1087 00:42:43,131 --> 00:42:45,890 regimes , rapidly fielding of space 1088 00:42:45,890 --> 00:42:49,310 capabilities . We while we can't say 1089 00:42:49,310 --> 00:42:52,100 that they do it today , what you'll see 1090 00:42:52,100 --> 00:42:53,767 in some of those unclassified 1091 00:42:53,767 --> 00:42:55,878 assessment basically says within this 1092 00:42:55,878 --> 00:42:57,878 decade we expect them to be able to 1093 00:42:57,878 --> 00:42:59,656 threaten our space capabilities 1094 00:42:59,656 --> 00:43:03,050 genetically or uh , non kinetically 1095 00:43:03,050 --> 00:43:05,050 reversible or irreversible and just 1096 00:43:05,050 --> 00:43:07,161 about everything . That's how quickly 1097 00:43:07,161 --> 00:43:09,328 they're moving now , for what I'll say 1098 00:43:09,328 --> 00:43:11,550 about Russia is , you know , they have 1099 00:43:11,550 --> 00:43:13,772 a long history of operating effectively 1100 00:43:13,772 --> 00:43:15,883 in space . They kind of slowed down a 1101 00:43:15,883 --> 00:43:17,994 bit , you know , with with the follow 1102 00:43:17,994 --> 00:43:20,217 the Wall and in a couple of intervening 1103 00:43:20,217 --> 00:43:22,328 years . But they , too , in about the 1104 00:43:22,328 --> 00:43:24,439 last 10 years have suddenly picked up 1105 00:43:24,439 --> 00:43:27,300 there primarily their research and 1106 00:43:27,300 --> 00:43:29,550 development , and are on the cusp of 1107 00:43:29,550 --> 00:43:31,772 being able to produce and field similar 1108 00:43:31,772 --> 00:43:33,828 weapons and similar . So I encourage 1109 00:43:33,828 --> 00:43:36,050 your your listeners to go look at those 1110 00:43:36,050 --> 00:43:38,383 documents . They're moving very quickly . 1111 00:43:38,383 --> 00:43:40,439 They're doing a tremendous amount of 1112 00:43:40,439 --> 00:43:42,920 research , development , testing . And , 1113 00:43:42,920 --> 00:43:45,260 like I said in the next decade , will 1114 00:43:45,260 --> 00:43:47,670 be able to threaten us pretty much in 1115 00:43:47,670 --> 00:43:51,000 all regime with both direct Connecticut , 1116 00:43:51,010 --> 00:43:52,954 non Connecticut and reversible and 1117 00:43:52,954 --> 00:43:56,370 irreversible system . I see Well , next 1118 00:43:56,370 --> 00:43:58,481 time you see a space gun , you know , 1119 00:43:58,481 --> 00:44:01,140 call may , uh , Sandra Irwin asks , 1120 00:44:01,150 --> 00:44:03,370 When will the space systems command be 1121 00:44:03,370 --> 00:44:05,037 stood up ? And will the Space 1122 00:44:05,037 --> 00:44:07,148 Development Agency be part of it . So 1123 00:44:07,148 --> 00:44:09,259 you wanted to talk a little bit about 1124 00:44:09,259 --> 00:44:11,690 SDA earlier Space systems command and 1125 00:44:11,690 --> 00:44:14,740 future work with SDA too . And so So 1126 00:44:14,740 --> 00:44:18,430 space systems command , um , eyes is 1127 00:44:18,790 --> 00:44:20,980 part is the planning for that is 1128 00:44:20,980 --> 00:44:24,060 ongoing right now . Um , we anticipate 1129 00:44:24,070 --> 00:44:26,014 I'm gonna tell you . We anticipate 1130 00:44:26,014 --> 00:44:29,490 standing that up in 2021 probably 1131 00:44:29,490 --> 00:44:31,323 sooner rather than later . We're 1132 00:44:31,323 --> 00:44:33,434 working on those final details . Um , 1133 00:44:33,434 --> 00:44:35,657 really . The planning work that we have 1134 00:44:35,657 --> 00:44:39,160 in place helps us in regard to their 1135 00:44:39,160 --> 00:44:41,327 still planning work . We're doing with 1136 00:44:41,690 --> 00:44:43,746 the Army . The Navy in terms of what 1137 00:44:43,746 --> 00:44:45,801 capabilities ? They're coming over . 1138 00:44:45,801 --> 00:44:45,490 And that's gonna have a role in space 1139 00:44:45,490 --> 00:44:48,120 systems command . By law , Space 1140 00:44:48,120 --> 00:44:50,540 Development Agency will move into the 1141 00:44:50,540 --> 00:44:53,130 space force . I'm going to say not not 1142 00:44:53,130 --> 00:44:55,840 later than October 1st , 2022 if I 1143 00:44:55,850 --> 00:44:59,140 remember my fax correctly . And so one 1144 00:44:59,140 --> 00:45:01,460 of the reasons we're moving quickly , 1145 00:45:01,460 --> 00:45:04,710 but not as as quickly as we have with 1146 00:45:04,710 --> 00:45:08,700 the other commands is , um the links to 1147 00:45:08,710 --> 00:45:11,110 and the need to do that organization 1148 00:45:11,110 --> 00:45:14,410 that stand up or tied as much too . How 1149 00:45:14,410 --> 00:45:16,560 the Space Development Agency . How 1150 00:45:16,560 --> 00:45:18,910 those navy and Army systems that may 1151 00:45:18,910 --> 00:45:22,580 move in work together . How and how are 1152 00:45:22,580 --> 00:45:24,747 existing organizations work together ? 1153 00:45:24,747 --> 00:45:27,070 So that's why we're not moving as 1154 00:45:27,070 --> 00:45:29,126 quickly to stand up . We're spending 1155 00:45:29,126 --> 00:45:31,640 more time trying to thoughtfully . Okay , 1156 00:45:31,650 --> 00:45:33,483 there's another reason as well , 1157 00:45:33,483 --> 00:45:36,180 because we absolutely want the right 1158 00:45:36,180 --> 00:45:38,347 approach and part of the consideration 1159 00:45:38,347 --> 00:45:40,590 of the right approaches . How all of 1160 00:45:40,590 --> 00:45:42,646 these organizations and what they do 1161 00:45:42,646 --> 00:45:44,590 today and how they do it today fit 1162 00:45:44,590 --> 00:45:46,590 together , how they complement each 1163 00:45:46,590 --> 00:45:48,701 other , how they don't duplicate each 1164 00:45:48,701 --> 00:45:50,980 other , how they provide , how they 1165 00:45:50,980 --> 00:45:53,091 support each other , but in some ways 1166 00:45:53,091 --> 00:45:55,960 potentially how they compete with with 1167 00:45:55,970 --> 00:45:58,920 each other in certain ways to come up 1168 00:45:58,920 --> 00:46:00,920 with new approaches , new operating 1169 00:46:00,920 --> 00:46:03,142 concepts and new ideas about meetings . 1170 00:46:03,142 --> 00:46:05,198 Basically , and that's a lot of what 1171 00:46:05,580 --> 00:46:07,802 we're expecting and planning out of the 1172 00:46:07,802 --> 00:46:09,858 space development agency . In fact , 1173 00:46:09,858 --> 00:46:11,913 that's what the Space of Development 1174 00:46:11,913 --> 00:46:11,310 Agency has said . They're going to do 1175 00:46:11,880 --> 00:46:14,300 Derek tour near you know , he's a great 1176 00:46:14,300 --> 00:46:16,633 leader . He's also been a great partner . 1177 00:46:16,633 --> 00:46:18,780 His job is to exploit that technology 1178 00:46:18,780 --> 00:46:20,920 based on the commercial market . His 1179 00:46:20,920 --> 00:46:24,130 job is to be a 1180 00:46:24,140 --> 00:46:26,930 constructively disruptive right to be 1181 00:46:26,930 --> 00:46:29,030 ableto bring in , disrupt disruptive 1182 00:46:29,030 --> 00:46:31,086 technologies and ideas and operating 1183 00:46:31,086 --> 00:46:33,940 contest in a concept in a constructive 1184 00:46:33,940 --> 00:46:37,100 way and to understand where we say , 1185 00:46:37,880 --> 00:46:39,936 Um , hey , this is something we want 1186 00:46:39,936 --> 00:46:42,090 SDA to do . Here's something we want 1187 00:46:42,090 --> 00:46:44,201 Space and Missile system Center to do 1188 00:46:44,201 --> 00:46:46,146 Here is something we want to space 1189 00:46:46,146 --> 00:46:48,368 Rapid capabilities office to do in some 1190 00:46:48,368 --> 00:46:50,534 cases but specifically identifying the 1191 00:46:50,534 --> 00:46:52,479 Delgado . But there there are some 1192 00:46:52,479 --> 00:46:54,950 instances where we might say , Hey , um , 1193 00:46:54,960 --> 00:46:56,960 Space missile system center Give us 1194 00:46:56,960 --> 00:47:00,320 your idea for a network layer for 1195 00:47:00,330 --> 00:47:03,290 a B . M . S S d a . Same 1196 00:47:04,080 --> 00:47:07,750 um , SMC how would we do optical 1197 00:47:07,760 --> 00:47:10,000 communications globally ? SDA where 1198 00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:12,111 you're right , So they're areas where 1199 00:47:12,111 --> 00:47:14,056 we're not going to duplicate . But 1200 00:47:14,056 --> 00:47:15,944 we're certainly interested in the 1201 00:47:15,944 --> 00:47:17,833 energy that comes from completely 1202 00:47:17,833 --> 00:47:20,160 competing ideas and competing designs 1203 00:47:20,160 --> 00:47:22,440 and competing approaches to a problem . 1204 00:47:22,450 --> 00:47:24,617 So that's kind of where we are and why 1205 00:47:24,617 --> 00:47:26,839 Why were going on the timeline ? Yeah , 1206 00:47:26,839 --> 00:47:29,061 so , yeah , I think it's a good point . 1207 00:47:29,061 --> 00:47:31,006 And if if you're out there and you 1208 00:47:31,006 --> 00:47:33,061 really like your organizational flow 1209 00:47:33,061 --> 00:47:35,750 charts , nice and complex , uh , space 1210 00:47:35,750 --> 00:47:37,850 force is able to accommodate you in 1211 00:47:37,850 --> 00:47:40,072 that regard . Very complex flow chart . 1212 00:47:40,072 --> 00:47:42,183 With that , in my great question here 1213 00:47:42,183 --> 00:47:44,128 from George Ingram , what does the 1214 00:47:44,128 --> 00:47:46,294 upper echelon of the organization look 1215 00:47:46,294 --> 00:47:48,517 like today . And also how maney to tack 1216 00:47:48,517 --> 00:47:50,517 on to that . How many people are in 1217 00:47:50,517 --> 00:47:54,320 space force right now ? Okay , um , so 1218 00:47:54,320 --> 00:47:56,264 how many people are in space Force 1219 00:47:56,264 --> 00:47:59,690 right now ? Um , with 1220 00:47:59,700 --> 00:48:03,580 the so with the confirmation 1221 00:48:03,590 --> 00:48:05,590 yesterday , the Senate approved the 1222 00:48:05,590 --> 00:48:08,570 transfer scrolls for majors lieutenant 1223 00:48:08,570 --> 00:48:10,681 colonels and colonels from the United 1224 00:48:10,681 --> 00:48:12,792 States Air Force in the United States 1225 00:48:12,792 --> 00:48:14,737 based Force on . And I should have 1226 00:48:14,737 --> 00:48:16,903 those numbers exactly at the tip of my 1227 00:48:16,903 --> 00:48:20,400 tongue . So with the 639 1228 00:48:20,870 --> 00:48:23,650 excuse me that were added yesterday . 1229 00:48:23,650 --> 00:48:25,890 We're now up on the order of about 20 1230 00:48:25,900 --> 00:48:29,900 to 2300 total . And all of those . 1231 00:48:30,270 --> 00:48:33,120 Sorry . Just a minute . All right . All 1232 00:48:33,120 --> 00:48:35,640 of those are what I'm gonna call core 1233 00:48:35,640 --> 00:48:37,980 space operators , though , whether they 1234 00:48:37,980 --> 00:48:41,940 were , uh I'm sorry , whether they 1235 00:48:41,940 --> 00:48:44,260 were officers or enlisted members who 1236 00:48:44,270 --> 00:48:46,048 operate satellites whose core , 1237 00:48:46,048 --> 00:48:48,048 especially space operations , every 1238 00:48:48,048 --> 00:48:50,270 single day . Um , later this month , we 1239 00:48:50,270 --> 00:48:52,603 anticipate we're going to announce , um , 1240 00:48:52,603 --> 00:48:55,110 the next list of transferees from what 1241 00:48:55,110 --> 00:48:58,500 we call common specialties intelligence 1242 00:48:58,510 --> 00:49:01,880 officers and professionals , engineers , 1243 00:49:01,880 --> 00:49:03,769 acquisition officers , cyberspace 1244 00:49:03,769 --> 00:49:05,880 operators and cybersecurity experts . 1245 00:49:05,880 --> 00:49:07,920 There's a we need about as many of 1246 00:49:07,920 --> 00:49:11,290 those again and other 2 3000 folks 1247 00:49:11,870 --> 00:49:13,926 to come into the space force we went 1248 00:49:13,926 --> 00:49:15,703 through , Ah , volunteer and an 1249 00:49:15,703 --> 00:49:17,870 assessment and a selection process for 1250 00:49:17,870 --> 00:49:19,980 them . Uh , will probably announce 1251 00:49:19,980 --> 00:49:22,091 those results here later this month . 1252 00:49:22,091 --> 00:49:24,258 They'll transfer early next year . And 1253 00:49:24,258 --> 00:49:26,036 so , by the time they are in as 1254 00:49:26,036 --> 00:49:28,590 military members , we'll be approaching 1255 00:49:28,590 --> 00:49:30,950 will be somewhere north of about 6000 1256 00:49:30,950 --> 00:49:34,610 to 7000 people there . In addition 1257 00:49:34,610 --> 00:49:38,460 to , um , about as many again who are 1258 00:49:38,460 --> 00:49:40,690 civilians . Officially , they're 1259 00:49:40,690 --> 00:49:42,912 civilians that work in the department , 1260 00:49:42,912 --> 00:49:45,079 the Air Force assigned to the US Space 1261 00:49:45,079 --> 00:49:47,023 Force and perhaps another . And so 1262 00:49:47,023 --> 00:49:50,680 about another 3000 U S Air Force 1263 00:49:50,680 --> 00:49:53,050 members who will be assigned to the US 1264 00:49:53,050 --> 00:49:55,530 based force . They're still wearing Air 1265 00:49:55,530 --> 00:49:57,641 Force uniforms , but they're assigned 1266 00:49:57,641 --> 00:49:59,950 to the US based force doing things like 1267 00:49:59,950 --> 00:50:02,500 providing security at our bases . Um , 1268 00:50:02,510 --> 00:50:05,860 providing medical support , uh , Jags 1269 00:50:05,860 --> 00:50:08,120 personnel lists civil engineers who 1270 00:50:08,120 --> 00:50:10,450 make sure that the power infrastructure 1271 00:50:10,450 --> 00:50:13,520 and etcetera running So So all 1272 00:50:13,520 --> 00:50:17,040 told both today . All told , we've got 1273 00:50:17,040 --> 00:50:20,050 over 16,000 people either transferred 1274 00:50:20,050 --> 00:50:22,161 into or assigned to the space force . 1275 00:50:22,161 --> 00:50:25,560 Right now that's about 2002 to 3000 1276 00:50:25,560 --> 00:50:28,310 assign . Um , that number will double 1277 00:50:28,310 --> 00:50:31,860 here soon and get a little bigger . And 1278 00:50:31,860 --> 00:50:34,830 the upper echelon looks well , I mean , 1279 00:50:34,840 --> 00:50:36,618 how many people are ? Would you 1280 00:50:36,618 --> 00:50:38,840 describe his upper echelon ? Well , eso 1281 00:50:38,840 --> 00:50:41,150 let me I guess I'll let me say it this 1282 00:50:41,150 --> 00:50:44,540 way . We , um we are absolutely 1283 00:50:44,540 --> 00:50:46,890 committed to be in lean and agile . 1284 00:50:47,260 --> 00:50:49,850 Blame is important . We have very much 1285 00:50:49,850 --> 00:50:52,390 mission focus . We deal in operations , 1286 00:50:52,760 --> 00:50:54,871 we develop , we deal in development , 1287 00:50:54,871 --> 00:50:56,482 acquisition and fielding and 1288 00:50:56,482 --> 00:50:58,538 sustainment . We deal in things like 1289 00:50:58,538 --> 00:51:00,760 intelligence . We deal in cybersecurity 1290 00:51:00,760 --> 00:51:02,871 and we count on the Air Force for the 1291 00:51:02,871 --> 00:51:06,340 rest of arson . That means we have a 1292 00:51:06,340 --> 00:51:08,562 total of 21 general officers the United 1293 00:51:08,562 --> 00:51:12,430 States based okay , the the , 1294 00:51:13,160 --> 00:51:15,320 uh , both the Air Force and the Army 1295 00:51:15,320 --> 00:51:17,690 and Navy . Those services all have 1296 00:51:17,700 --> 00:51:19,850 bordering the numbers vary between 1297 00:51:19,850 --> 00:51:22,128 services , but they're approaching 200 . 1298 00:51:22,860 --> 00:51:26,230 We have 17 senior 1299 00:51:26,230 --> 00:51:28,341 executives in the U . S . Based force 1300 00:51:28,341 --> 00:51:30,563 and again probably 10 times in the many 1301 00:51:30,563 --> 00:51:32,619 other service . So we're very , very 1302 00:51:32,619 --> 00:51:35,540 focused on being lean , and we 1303 00:51:35,540 --> 00:51:38,580 absolutely believe part of being agile 1304 00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:41,830 is being lean . If you're not a large 1305 00:51:41,830 --> 00:51:44,750 bureaucracy , you can't do the things 1306 00:51:44,750 --> 00:51:47,240 that large bureaucracies do . And so by 1307 00:51:47,240 --> 00:51:50,020 that nature , you're agile your mawr 1308 00:51:50,020 --> 00:51:53,930 agile . He is having enough mass 1309 00:51:53,930 --> 00:51:56,041 to be able to do what you need to and 1310 00:51:56,041 --> 00:51:58,550 enough processes in place to make sure 1311 00:51:58,550 --> 00:52:02,430 you're doing it . Okay . On DWI , as I 1312 00:52:02,430 --> 00:52:04,486 predicted , didn't get to all of the 1313 00:52:04,486 --> 00:52:06,652 great question that we had , including 1314 00:52:06,652 --> 00:52:06,510 many of my own , because there's just 1315 00:52:06,510 --> 00:52:08,621 so much to cover here . We are out of 1316 00:52:08,621 --> 00:52:10,677 time . Uh , General Thompson , thank 1317 00:52:10,677 --> 00:52:12,621 you so much for joining us today . 1318 00:52:12,621 --> 00:52:14,677 We're going to be back with our next 1319 00:52:14,677 --> 00:52:16,788 panel of experts on the future of the 1320 00:52:16,788 --> 00:52:18,566 space Force . Caitlin Johnson , 1321 00:52:18,566 --> 00:52:20,566 associate director of the Aerospace 1322 00:52:20,566 --> 00:52:22,510 Security Project at the Center for 1323 00:52:22,510 --> 00:52:24,621 Strategic and International Studies . 1324 00:52:24,621 --> 00:52:26,566 Brian Weeden , director of program 1325 00:52:26,566 --> 00:52:28,899 planning at the Secure World Foundation , 1326 00:52:28,899 --> 00:52:30,788 and Sarah Manero , adjunct senior 1327 00:52:30,788 --> 00:52:32,677 fellow of defense programs at the 1328 00:52:32,677 --> 00:52:34,788 Center for New American Security . We 1329 00:52:34,788 --> 00:52:36,732 have some messages first , so stay 1330 00:52:36,732 --> 00:52:38,899 tuned and we'll see you back here very 1331 00:52:38,899 --> 00:52:40,954 shortly . Thanks so much , general . 1332 00:52:40,954 --> 00:52:43,010 Appreciate your time to absolutely a 1333 00:52:43,010 --> 00:52:44,788 pleasure talking to you and and 1334 00:52:44,788 --> 00:52:45,190 engaging with you all today .