1 00:00:00,840 --> 00:00:02,850 good afternoon . I want to offer a 2 00:00:02,850 --> 00:00:04,961 special thank you to Miss Hersman and 3 00:00:04,961 --> 00:00:07,017 the pony team for your invitation to 4 00:00:07,017 --> 00:00:09,183 speak at this year's fall conference . 5 00:00:09,183 --> 00:00:11,294 For those of you that don't know me , 6 00:00:11,294 --> 00:00:13,350 I'm Chazz Richard , commander of U S 7 00:00:13,350 --> 00:00:15,072 Strategic Command . I have the 8 00:00:15,072 --> 00:00:17,128 privilege to lead 150,000 soldiers , 9 00:00:17,128 --> 00:00:18,850 sailors , airman , Marines and 10 00:00:18,850 --> 00:00:21,017 civilians around the world who provide 11 00:00:21,017 --> 00:00:23,128 the nation's strategic deterrence . I 12 00:00:23,128 --> 00:00:25,370 wish is I'm sure all of you do . We 13 00:00:25,370 --> 00:00:27,314 could be there in person and under 14 00:00:27,314 --> 00:00:29,481 different circumstances because one of 15 00:00:29,481 --> 00:00:31,203 the true values of speaking at 16 00:00:31,203 --> 00:00:32,926 conferences like these air the 17 00:00:32,926 --> 00:00:35,148 discussions and the question and answer 18 00:00:35,148 --> 00:00:37,259 sessions that follow . So I hate that 19 00:00:37,259 --> 00:00:38,814 I'm not available for those 20 00:00:38,814 --> 00:00:40,981 opportunities . I saw the list of your 21 00:00:40,981 --> 00:00:43,092 plan panel discussions . Think you're 22 00:00:43,092 --> 00:00:45,259 hitting the mark with your focus areas 23 00:00:45,259 --> 00:00:47,481 as they mirror many of the things we're 24 00:00:47,481 --> 00:00:49,703 exploring . Here it stratcom . So while 25 00:00:49,703 --> 00:00:51,703 you're seeing my address by video , 26 00:00:51,703 --> 00:00:53,703 please no . It's my privilege to be 27 00:00:53,703 --> 00:00:55,870 part of the conference , and I hope my 28 00:00:55,870 --> 00:00:58,148 comments help enhance your discussions . 29 00:00:58,148 --> 00:01:00,259 Now , I last spoke to you all in 2018 30 00:01:00,259 --> 00:01:02,481 as the Deputy commander serving General 31 00:01:02,481 --> 00:01:04,481 Heighten . I reviewed my notes from 32 00:01:04,481 --> 00:01:04,260 that engagement in preparation for 33 00:01:04,260 --> 00:01:06,750 today's video . If you were there , you 34 00:01:06,750 --> 00:01:08,917 might recall that we were on the heels 35 00:01:08,917 --> 00:01:11,028 of the newly released Nuclear Posture 36 00:01:11,028 --> 00:01:12,972 Review . My comments then centered 37 00:01:12,972 --> 00:01:14,861 around reinvigorating the nuclear 38 00:01:14,861 --> 00:01:16,917 deterrence discussion . Well , we've 39 00:01:16,917 --> 00:01:19,028 made progress . My views have largely 40 00:01:19,028 --> 00:01:21,139 remained unchanged . And so I'm gonna 41 00:01:21,139 --> 00:01:23,470 amplify on that message . Today . It's 42 00:01:23,470 --> 00:01:25,692 through that lens that I'll cover three 43 00:01:25,692 --> 00:01:27,914 main topics . First , I'll touch on the 44 00:01:27,914 --> 00:01:29,914 current environment and some of the 45 00:01:29,914 --> 00:01:32,081 challenges we face and where I focused 46 00:01:32,081 --> 00:01:34,248 my command . Then I'll talk about some 47 00:01:34,248 --> 00:01:36,820 of our modernization efforts . As I do 48 00:01:36,820 --> 00:01:39,042 that , though I really want you to take 49 00:01:39,042 --> 00:01:41,280 away the why or the importance of why 50 00:01:41,280 --> 00:01:43,650 we're modernizing last . I'll leave you 51 00:01:43,650 --> 00:01:45,761 with some ideas on how we can perhaps 52 00:01:45,761 --> 00:01:47,539 shape the environment . You are 53 00:01:47,539 --> 00:01:49,710 advantage . Let me start with this 54 00:01:49,710 --> 00:01:53,520 assertion that we have not seriously 55 00:01:53,520 --> 00:01:56,530 considered the possibility of engaging 56 00:01:56,530 --> 00:01:58,910 in competition through crisis or 57 00:01:58,910 --> 00:02:01,930 possible direct armed conflict with a 58 00:02:01,930 --> 00:02:04,830 nuclear capable armed adversary in over 59 00:02:04,830 --> 00:02:08,810 25 years . It is that it is a really 60 00:02:08,810 --> 00:02:11,100 profound thought , and it really should 61 00:02:11,100 --> 00:02:13,630 grab your attention . If you visit my 62 00:02:13,630 --> 00:02:15,920 office here in Omaha , you will notice 63 00:02:15,920 --> 00:02:18,640 that I keep pictures of G . Putin , the 64 00:02:18,640 --> 00:02:21,940 Ayatollah and Kim on my wall under the 65 00:02:21,940 --> 00:02:25,420 words Not today . There are a constant 66 00:02:25,420 --> 00:02:27,642 reminder that we must remain inspection 67 00:02:27,642 --> 00:02:30,390 ready and keep us intently focused on 68 00:02:30,390 --> 00:02:33,060 the threats we face . Given Russia and 69 00:02:33,060 --> 00:02:35,004 China's expanding capabilities and 70 00:02:35,004 --> 00:02:37,090 increasingly aggressive behavior and 71 00:02:37,090 --> 00:02:39,510 those posed by a nuclear North Korea 72 00:02:39,510 --> 00:02:41,560 and possibly Iran , we must 73 00:02:41,560 --> 00:02:44,000 reinvigorate the national conversation 74 00:02:44,010 --> 00:02:45,732 on the importance of strategic 75 00:02:45,732 --> 00:02:48,740 deterrence . During the Cold War , we 76 00:02:48,740 --> 00:02:51,540 were keenly aware of and fully prepared 77 00:02:51,540 --> 00:02:53,484 for , the possibility of a nuclear 78 00:02:53,484 --> 00:02:55,429 engagement because we knew who the 79 00:02:55,429 --> 00:02:57,651 threat waas . We knew what capabilities 80 00:02:57,651 --> 00:02:59,651 they had , and we had at least some 81 00:02:59,651 --> 00:03:01,707 idea of what could potentially drive 82 00:03:01,707 --> 00:03:04,140 them to use a nuclear weapon . We kept 83 00:03:04,140 --> 00:03:06,510 our focus on the threat , ensuring we 84 00:03:06,510 --> 00:03:08,500 possess the necessary readiness , 85 00:03:08,510 --> 00:03:11,100 tactics , techniques and procedures to 86 00:03:11,100 --> 00:03:13,750 deter our adversary . Over the last 30 87 00:03:13,750 --> 00:03:15,970 years , however , we modified that 88 00:03:15,980 --> 00:03:18,410 posture unnecessarily by focusing on 89 00:03:18,420 --> 00:03:20,476 capabilities , based development and 90 00:03:20,476 --> 00:03:22,253 planning . Because there was no 91 00:03:22,253 --> 00:03:25,640 existential threat , Our post Cold War 92 00:03:25,640 --> 00:03:28,810 experiences of operating an uncontested 93 00:03:28,810 --> 00:03:32,430 domains are over . Our adversaries took 94 00:03:32,430 --> 00:03:34,880 advantage of this period , emboldened , 95 00:03:34,880 --> 00:03:36,936 increase their aggressive behavior , 96 00:03:36,936 --> 00:03:38,810 expand their capabilities and 97 00:03:38,810 --> 00:03:41,143 reconsider their tactics and strategies . 98 00:03:41,540 --> 00:03:43,670 Russia , for instance , is still a 99 00:03:43,670 --> 00:03:46,130 pacing threat . They aggressively 100 00:03:46,130 --> 00:03:48,186 engaged in conventional and advanced 101 00:03:48,186 --> 00:03:50,140 development nuclear modernization 102 00:03:50,140 --> 00:03:52,307 efforts , and I'd estimate there close 103 00:03:52,307 --> 00:03:55,140 to 75% complete . They also continue to 104 00:03:55,140 --> 00:03:57,500 violate international law and fail to 105 00:03:57,500 --> 00:03:59,833 follow through on political commitments , 106 00:03:59,833 --> 00:04:02,370 undermining and eroding our rules based 107 00:04:02,370 --> 00:04:04,270 order on our collective influence 108 00:04:04,270 --> 00:04:07,020 within that structure . Then , as 109 00:04:07,020 --> 00:04:09,076 articulating the most recent Russian 110 00:04:09,076 --> 00:04:11,131 policy statement and the rhetoric on 111 00:04:11,131 --> 00:04:13,131 nuclear deterrence and employment , 112 00:04:13,131 --> 00:04:15,020 Russia has expanded the number of 113 00:04:15,020 --> 00:04:17,076 circumstances under which they would 114 00:04:17,076 --> 00:04:19,131 consider the employment of a nuclear 115 00:04:19,131 --> 00:04:20,964 weapon . Or at least they're not 116 00:04:20,964 --> 00:04:23,076 willing to say it publicly . Although 117 00:04:23,076 --> 00:04:25,076 this circumstances distressing , it 118 00:04:25,076 --> 00:04:27,242 should not come as a surprise . Russia 119 00:04:27,242 --> 00:04:29,409 continues to wrestle with its mismatch 120 00:04:29,409 --> 00:04:31,631 between aggressive policies towards its 121 00:04:31,631 --> 00:04:33,576 neighbors and being overmatched by 122 00:04:33,576 --> 00:04:35,420 conventional capabilities . When 123 00:04:35,420 --> 00:04:37,476 coupled with their nuclear expansion 124 00:04:37,476 --> 00:04:39,698 and return to coercive behavior . I can 125 00:04:39,698 --> 00:04:41,531 only conclude the possibility of 126 00:04:41,531 --> 00:04:43,364 deterrence . Failure in crisis , 127 00:04:43,400 --> 00:04:45,550 particularly nuclear deterrence , is 128 00:04:45,550 --> 00:04:47,860 not zero . I acknowledge the likelihood 129 00:04:47,860 --> 00:04:49,971 is small , but it's certainly greater 130 00:04:49,971 --> 00:04:52,570 than zero . China is also a growing 131 00:04:52,570 --> 00:04:54,950 threat , and I encourage each of you to 132 00:04:54,950 --> 00:04:57,740 consider the same . Please do not miss . 133 00:04:57,740 --> 00:04:59,684 Take them as some sort of a lesser 134 00:04:59,684 --> 00:05:02,490 included case when compared to Russia . 135 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:05,262 They're on trajectory to be a strategic 136 00:05:05,262 --> 00:05:07,484 nuclear peer by the end of the decade . 137 00:05:07,484 --> 00:05:09,500 They always go faster than we think 138 00:05:09,500 --> 00:05:11,690 they will . We must pay attention to 139 00:05:11,690 --> 00:05:13,801 what they do and not necessarily what 140 00:05:13,801 --> 00:05:15,740 they say . China's investment in 141 00:05:15,740 --> 00:05:17,851 nuclear triad they're about to finish 142 00:05:17,851 --> 00:05:19,796 building one out and their lack of 143 00:05:19,796 --> 00:05:21,684 transparency and its multi domain 144 00:05:21,684 --> 00:05:23,629 capability makes me question their 145 00:05:23,629 --> 00:05:25,684 motives . Because I recently briefed 146 00:05:25,684 --> 00:05:27,684 our NATO allies and mentioned in my 147 00:05:27,684 --> 00:05:29,684 latest update to the Pentagon press 148 00:05:29,684 --> 00:05:32,310 corps , It seems inconsistent to me 149 00:05:32,380 --> 00:05:34,491 that a country claiming reliance on a 150 00:05:34,491 --> 00:05:36,380 minimum deterrent strategy would 151 00:05:36,380 --> 00:05:38,602 continue to build sophisticated command 152 00:05:38,602 --> 00:05:40,547 and control capabilities and fully 153 00:05:40,547 --> 00:05:42,713 developed a tryout of nuclear forces . 154 00:05:42,713 --> 00:05:44,824 You just don't need all of that for a 155 00:05:44,824 --> 00:05:47,250 minimum deterrent strategy . China also 156 00:05:47,250 --> 00:05:49,230 remains the most active espionage 157 00:05:49,230 --> 00:05:51,530 threat , as modern technology provides 158 00:05:51,530 --> 00:05:53,620 them and others with expanded global 159 00:05:53,620 --> 00:05:55,790 reach and the ability to disrupt or 160 00:05:55,790 --> 00:05:58,390 disable key infrastructure . They 161 00:05:58,390 --> 00:06:00,780 continue to invest heavily in a 162 00:06:00,780 --> 00:06:02,830 comprehensive and a robust array of 163 00:06:02,830 --> 00:06:04,886 counter space . See , forests are in 164 00:06:04,886 --> 00:06:06,663 precision navigation and timing 165 00:06:06,663 --> 00:06:08,940 capabilities as they pursue space 166 00:06:08,940 --> 00:06:11,360 parody with us when coupled with us 167 00:06:11,360 --> 00:06:13,500 growing nuclear stockpile , and it's 168 00:06:13,500 --> 00:06:15,500 increasingly assertive posture over 169 00:06:15,500 --> 00:06:17,760 territorial boundaries . I have no 170 00:06:17,760 --> 00:06:19,950 choice but to view China as a threat . 171 00:06:20,750 --> 00:06:22,806 Then consider Iran's efforts towards 172 00:06:22,806 --> 00:06:24,861 regional destabilization , continued 173 00:06:24,861 --> 00:06:27,050 support of violent extremism and North 174 00:06:27,050 --> 00:06:29,106 Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear 175 00:06:29,106 --> 00:06:30,772 weapons and ballistic missile 176 00:06:30,772 --> 00:06:32,772 technology . These actions not only 177 00:06:32,772 --> 00:06:34,939 endanger our forces and our allies and 178 00:06:34,939 --> 00:06:36,661 partners , but also divert our 179 00:06:36,661 --> 00:06:38,661 attention and resource is away from 180 00:06:38,661 --> 00:06:40,439 other efforts and should not be 181 00:06:40,439 --> 00:06:42,661 neglected . Now look , I recognize that 182 00:06:42,661 --> 00:06:44,772 great power competition doesn't equal 183 00:06:44,772 --> 00:06:47,106 conflict or that we're on a path to war . 184 00:06:47,440 --> 00:06:49,329 But as the commander in charge of 185 00:06:49,329 --> 00:06:51,051 employing strategic deterrence 186 00:06:51,051 --> 00:06:53,051 capabilities for the nation and our 187 00:06:53,051 --> 00:06:55,273 allies , I simply don't have the luxury 188 00:06:55,273 --> 00:06:57,440 of assuming a crisis . Conflict or war 189 00:06:57,440 --> 00:06:59,496 won't happen . I know I've painted a 190 00:06:59,496 --> 00:07:01,662 pretty sobering picture , but I really 191 00:07:01,662 --> 00:07:03,829 want to highlight the reality in front 192 00:07:03,829 --> 00:07:05,551 of us . It's also important to 193 00:07:05,551 --> 00:07:07,384 understand how our modernization 194 00:07:07,384 --> 00:07:09,607 programs support and integrate with our 195 00:07:09,607 --> 00:07:11,773 efforts to rethink how we do strategic 196 00:07:11,773 --> 00:07:14,600 deterrence . Our most important mission 197 00:07:14,600 --> 00:07:17,850 here , its track above all else , is to 198 00:07:17,850 --> 00:07:20,280 deter strategic attack both nuclear and 199 00:07:20,280 --> 00:07:22,620 non nuclear across the continuum of 200 00:07:22,620 --> 00:07:25,720 competition , crisis and conflict . To 201 00:07:25,720 --> 00:07:28,210 be successful , I must have the 202 00:07:28,210 --> 00:07:30,260 capabilities necessary to deliver a 203 00:07:30,260 --> 00:07:32,450 decisive response and do it with a 204 00:07:32,450 --> 00:07:35,340 combat ready force . These capabilities 205 00:07:35,340 --> 00:07:37,330 come from the combined attributes 206 00:07:37,330 --> 00:07:39,497 provided by each leg of our try A that 207 00:07:39,497 --> 00:07:41,800 together . Allow me to execute our 208 00:07:41,800 --> 00:07:44,520 national strategy . I want to be clear . 209 00:07:44,860 --> 00:07:47,300 Each piece of our try . It is essential , 210 00:07:47,480 --> 00:07:49,930 but they're also complimentary . If I 211 00:07:49,930 --> 00:07:52,041 lost any part of the Triad , it would 212 00:07:52,041 --> 00:07:54,860 drive me to ask for a new strategy and 213 00:07:54,860 --> 00:07:57,027 could embolden an adversary to believe 214 00:07:57,027 --> 00:07:58,916 they could employ nuclear weapons 215 00:07:58,916 --> 00:08:01,360 against us . Because our nuclear triad 216 00:08:01,360 --> 00:08:03,138 provides the foundation for our 217 00:08:03,138 --> 00:08:05,990 survival . We must prioritize the 218 00:08:05,990 --> 00:08:08,270 sustainment modernization of our I , C 219 00:08:08,270 --> 00:08:10,270 B . M s bombers , ballistic missile 220 00:08:10,270 --> 00:08:12,890 submarines , weapons complex and our 221 00:08:12,890 --> 00:08:15,001 nuclear command and control systems . 222 00:08:15,040 --> 00:08:17,040 These legacy capabilities air being 223 00:08:17,040 --> 00:08:19,040 maintained well past their intended 224 00:08:19,040 --> 00:08:21,190 service lives . For example , we're 225 00:08:21,190 --> 00:08:23,246 pushing the service life of our Ohio 226 00:08:23,246 --> 00:08:25,870 class submarines from 30 to 42 years 227 00:08:26,090 --> 00:08:28,034 longer than any submarine in naval 228 00:08:28,034 --> 00:08:30,870 history . We'll have flown R B 50 twos 229 00:08:30,870 --> 00:08:33,200 for nearly 100 years before they're 230 00:08:33,200 --> 00:08:35,820 retired and are Minuteman . ICBMs have 231 00:08:35,820 --> 00:08:38,290 been on alert for 40 years past their 232 00:08:38,290 --> 00:08:40,730 intendant service life . Now , this is 233 00:08:40,730 --> 00:08:43,310 a testament to the generations of 234 00:08:43,310 --> 00:08:45,660 professionals who originally designed , 235 00:08:45,670 --> 00:08:47,920 built , operated , sustained and 236 00:08:47,920 --> 00:08:50,730 maintain those weapons systems . But 237 00:08:50,730 --> 00:08:52,674 for years , we've taken additional 238 00:08:52,674 --> 00:08:54,860 operational risk to buy down 239 00:08:54,860 --> 00:08:57,082 programmatic and technical risk because 240 00:08:57,082 --> 00:08:59,138 at the time the consequences of more 241 00:08:59,138 --> 00:09:01,410 operational risks were small . Looking 242 00:09:01,410 --> 00:09:03,243 forward , a zai briefed Congress 243 00:09:03,243 --> 00:09:06,220 earlier this year were simply out of 244 00:09:06,220 --> 00:09:08,860 margin . We've delayed our replacement 245 00:09:08,860 --> 00:09:11,610 programs as long as possible and can no 246 00:09:11,610 --> 00:09:13,190 longer afford delays in our 247 00:09:13,190 --> 00:09:16,100 recapitalization programs . I'm focused 248 00:09:16,100 --> 00:09:18,380 on and fully support our efforts to 249 00:09:18,380 --> 00:09:20,602 maintain the development and production 250 00:09:20,602 --> 00:09:22,824 schedules of the ground based strategic 251 00:09:22,824 --> 00:09:24,713 deterrent to be 21 bomber and the 252 00:09:24,713 --> 00:09:26,547 Columbia class ballistic missile 253 00:09:26,547 --> 00:09:28,670 submarines . These strategic 254 00:09:28,670 --> 00:09:30,837 capabilities , however , are on Leah's 255 00:09:30,837 --> 00:09:32,892 good as our ability to integrate our 256 00:09:32,892 --> 00:09:35,560 communications with those systems . 257 00:09:36,040 --> 00:09:38,550 Much of our N C two and C three nuclear 258 00:09:38,550 --> 00:09:40,810 command and control systems still 259 00:09:40,810 --> 00:09:43,380 utilized 19 seventies designs with 260 00:09:43,380 --> 00:09:46,490 decades old technology putting us at 261 00:09:46,490 --> 00:09:48,800 risk of losing ground our adversaries , 262 00:09:48,800 --> 00:09:51,320 if not addressed , so I'm excited to 263 00:09:51,320 --> 00:09:53,542 see your discussions on N . C . Three . 264 00:09:53,542 --> 00:09:56,560 Sensing an automation in 2018 the 265 00:09:56,560 --> 00:09:58,449 secretary of Defense directed the 266 00:09:58,449 --> 00:10:00,671 commander of U S . Strategic Command to 267 00:10:00,671 --> 00:10:02,782 assume additional duties is the N . C 268 00:10:02,782 --> 00:10:05,500 three enterprise lead and as such , I'm 269 00:10:05,500 --> 00:10:08,070 committed to investing in modernizing 270 00:10:08,070 --> 00:10:10,880 RNC three systems to be more robust and 271 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:12,640 survivable against physical , 272 00:10:12,650 --> 00:10:15,030 electromagnetic and cyber attacks . 273 00:10:15,740 --> 00:10:17,796 Over the last 18 months , we've been 274 00:10:17,796 --> 00:10:20,018 busy . We started by establishing the N 275 00:10:20,018 --> 00:10:22,018 C three Enterprise Center portfolio 276 00:10:22,018 --> 00:10:24,260 manager to act as the coordinating 277 00:10:24,260 --> 00:10:26,320 agency for personnel Resource Is and 278 00:10:26,320 --> 00:10:28,350 requirements we've aligned our 279 00:10:28,360 --> 00:10:30,527 acquisition and sustainment capability 280 00:10:30,527 --> 00:10:32,527 inputs with our service partners to 281 00:10:32,527 --> 00:10:34,960 ensure full funding for N . C three 282 00:10:34,960 --> 00:10:37,490 next generation efforts . We've also 283 00:10:37,490 --> 00:10:39,546 engaged with the S and T and systems 284 00:10:39,546 --> 00:10:41,379 engineers to establish technical 285 00:10:41,379 --> 00:10:43,660 standards for configuration control and 286 00:10:43,660 --> 00:10:45,827 ensure interoperability and continuity 287 00:10:45,827 --> 00:10:48,350 is maintained last and certainly not 288 00:10:48,350 --> 00:10:50,572 inclusive of all of our efforts . We've 289 00:10:50,572 --> 00:10:52,350 established in N . C three next 290 00:10:52,350 --> 00:10:54,690 generation division to integrate near 291 00:10:54,690 --> 00:10:56,412 and future concepts with other 292 00:10:56,412 --> 00:10:58,634 developmental efforts like join all the 293 00:10:58,634 --> 00:11:00,880 main C two . I'm convinced we must go 294 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:03,410 fast by iterating our development and 295 00:11:03,410 --> 00:11:05,577 taking advantage of efficiencies among 296 00:11:05,577 --> 00:11:09,260 similar programs . So how do we shape 297 00:11:09,260 --> 00:11:11,093 the strategic environment to our 298 00:11:11,093 --> 00:11:13,590 advantage ? We need to start by facing 299 00:11:13,590 --> 00:11:15,646 the reality that I have . The Siri's 300 00:11:15,646 --> 00:11:17,368 have blurred the lines between 301 00:11:17,368 --> 00:11:19,479 conventional and nuclear conflict and 302 00:11:19,479 --> 00:11:21,701 have developed capabilities to directly 303 00:11:21,701 --> 00:11:24,100 challenge The strategy , doctrine and 304 00:11:24,100 --> 00:11:26,211 advantages we've held is a nation and 305 00:11:26,211 --> 00:11:28,580 alliance . We can no longer expect our 306 00:11:28,580 --> 00:11:30,636 potential adversaries toe act within 307 00:11:30,636 --> 00:11:33,120 our longstanding self imposed 308 00:11:33,120 --> 00:11:35,430 constraints based on our rule sets of 309 00:11:35,430 --> 00:11:37,150 values , particularly between 310 00:11:37,150 --> 00:11:40,550 conventional and nuclear . To that end , 311 00:11:40,560 --> 00:11:42,616 I've challenged my command to revise 312 00:11:42,616 --> 00:11:44,727 our 21st century strategic deterrence 313 00:11:44,727 --> 00:11:46,930 theory that considers our adversaries 314 00:11:46,930 --> 00:11:49,810 decision calculus and behaviors and 315 00:11:49,810 --> 00:11:52,220 identifies threat indicators or 316 00:11:52,220 --> 00:11:54,820 conditions that could indicate 317 00:11:54,820 --> 00:11:57,360 potential actions . Crafting this 318 00:11:57,360 --> 00:12:00,010 revised theory informs our action and 319 00:12:00,010 --> 00:12:02,380 minimizes risk inherent in competing 320 00:12:02,380 --> 00:12:04,491 against another nuclear armed state . 321 00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:07,007 It's an exhaustive assessment to fully 322 00:12:07,007 --> 00:12:08,840 account for current conditions , 323 00:12:08,840 --> 00:12:11,030 emerging capabilities , changing norms 324 00:12:11,030 --> 00:12:13,210 and rules sets and potentially 325 00:12:13,220 --> 00:12:15,331 unintended outcomes within a spectrum 326 00:12:15,331 --> 00:12:18,650 of conflict . Now the basic equation 327 00:12:18,650 --> 00:12:21,700 hasn't changed . We still drive to be 328 00:12:21,700 --> 00:12:25,150 able to deny our adversary their aim or 329 00:12:25,150 --> 00:12:27,372 impose a cost that is greater than what 330 00:12:27,372 --> 00:12:29,450 they seek , such that the benefit of 331 00:12:29,450 --> 00:12:31,670 their restraint outweighs the benefit 332 00:12:31,670 --> 00:12:34,300 of their possible action Within the 333 00:12:34,300 --> 00:12:36,570 spectrum of violence from gray zone 334 00:12:36,570 --> 00:12:38,630 that level below conventional 335 00:12:38,640 --> 00:12:41,260 conventional conflict to strategic 336 00:12:41,260 --> 00:12:43,500 nuclear exchange , However , we need to 337 00:12:43,500 --> 00:12:46,840 recognize that all that is coupled and 338 00:12:46,850 --> 00:12:48,990 in that spectrum they have nonlinear 339 00:12:48,990 --> 00:12:51,212 charities and discontinuities we didn't 340 00:12:51,212 --> 00:12:53,800 have during the Cold War . Today we 341 00:12:53,800 --> 00:12:55,967 have to account for the possibility of 342 00:12:55,967 --> 00:12:58,080 conflict . Leading conditions that 343 00:12:58,080 --> 00:13:00,620 could seemingly very rapidly drive an 344 00:13:00,620 --> 00:13:02,770 adversary to consider nuclear uses 345 00:13:02,770 --> 00:13:05,810 their least bad option . We must also 346 00:13:05,810 --> 00:13:07,660 consider how to employ different 347 00:13:07,810 --> 00:13:11,050 tailored strategies against multiple 348 00:13:11,050 --> 00:13:15,040 nuclear adversaries simultaneously . By 349 00:13:15,040 --> 00:13:17,262 the end of the decade , if not sooner , 350 00:13:17,262 --> 00:13:19,880 we will face to nuclear capable peer 351 00:13:19,890 --> 00:13:22,620 adversaries who have to be deterred 352 00:13:22,620 --> 00:13:24,970 differently . We've never had to face 353 00:13:24,970 --> 00:13:27,740 that situation in our history . We also 354 00:13:27,740 --> 00:13:29,962 need to engage in the environment early 355 00:13:30,140 --> 00:13:32,084 to shape our potential adversaries 356 00:13:32,084 --> 00:13:35,150 actions , using a synchronized whole of 357 00:13:35,150 --> 00:13:36,983 government and integrated global 358 00:13:36,983 --> 00:13:39,290 mindset . This is a consequence of the 359 00:13:39,290 --> 00:13:41,880 coupling I described earlier our 360 00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:44,310 ability for global integrated planning , 361 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:46,850 communications and execution and a 362 00:13:46,850 --> 00:13:49,820 defined shared under understanding of 363 00:13:49,820 --> 00:13:51,876 the threat and what we do about it . 364 00:13:51,876 --> 00:13:54,240 Maybe our last remaining advantage over 365 00:13:54,240 --> 00:13:56,610 the adversary . We've always had 366 00:13:56,610 --> 00:13:58,870 something . During the World wars , we 367 00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:01,050 out produced our adversary . For a 368 00:14:01,050 --> 00:14:02,828 short period , we had a nuclear 369 00:14:02,828 --> 00:14:04,910 advantage and then held a technology 370 00:14:04,910 --> 00:14:06,688 advantage with precision guided 371 00:14:06,688 --> 00:14:08,688 munitions . Stealth and many others 372 00:14:08,690 --> 00:14:10,579 were one of the first toe haven't 373 00:14:10,579 --> 00:14:12,900 integrated joint force . But all the 374 00:14:12,900 --> 00:14:15,190 things I just described our potential 375 00:14:15,190 --> 00:14:17,412 adversaries could do pretty much all of 376 00:14:17,412 --> 00:14:20,650 that now , just like we can . Therefore , 377 00:14:20,650 --> 00:14:22,483 we must advance our abilities to 378 00:14:22,483 --> 00:14:24,539 integrate our coordination processes 379 00:14:24,539 --> 00:14:27,160 across the globe and across all domains . 380 00:14:27,640 --> 00:14:29,640 This will include rethinking how we 381 00:14:29,640 --> 00:14:32,860 execute RNC three As advanced kinetic 382 00:14:32,860 --> 00:14:35,270 capabilities were developed . We must 383 00:14:35,270 --> 00:14:37,510 have the ability to detect , identify , 384 00:14:37,540 --> 00:14:39,570 track and integrate our command and 385 00:14:39,570 --> 00:14:42,120 control architectures , or C three . 386 00:14:42,120 --> 00:14:43,842 Architecture is a patchwork of 387 00:14:43,842 --> 00:14:45,676 delivered systems that have been 388 00:14:45,676 --> 00:14:47,898 piecemeal over decades . It works quite 389 00:14:47,898 --> 00:14:50,680 well , but it needs to be updated . We 390 00:14:50,680 --> 00:14:53,000 can no longer afford single mission 391 00:14:53,000 --> 00:14:55,860 focus systems . We recently hosted our 392 00:14:55,860 --> 00:14:57,582 space command in Cyber Command 393 00:14:57,582 --> 00:14:59,527 teammates to discuss the synergies 394 00:14:59,527 --> 00:15:01,830 among our capabilities . I'm convinced 395 00:15:01,830 --> 00:15:03,997 that we can better integrate our space 396 00:15:03,997 --> 00:15:06,163 center layer with our land based radar 397 00:15:06,163 --> 00:15:08,274 and do it with better protection with 398 00:15:08,274 --> 00:15:10,552 RNC three Next Generation architecture . 399 00:15:10,640 --> 00:15:12,862 As I close , I know I gave you a lot to 400 00:15:12,862 --> 00:15:15,084 unpack and painted a sobering picture , 401 00:15:15,340 --> 00:15:17,396 but I really wanted to highlight the 402 00:15:17,396 --> 00:15:19,507 reality facing all of us and give you 403 00:15:19,507 --> 00:15:21,618 some perspective . As you go into the 404 00:15:21,618 --> 00:15:23,618 next couple of days . I'm confident 405 00:15:23,618 --> 00:15:25,396 your discussions will be highly 406 00:15:25,396 --> 00:15:27,618 beneficial of the nuclear and strategic 407 00:15:27,618 --> 00:15:29,729 defense community . I'm sorry to have 408 00:15:29,729 --> 00:15:31,673 missed you . And I look forward to 409 00:15:31,673 --> 00:15:33,896 hosting you here in Omaha next spring . 410 00:15:33,896 --> 00:15:33,910 Have a great conference .