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good morning . Everybody 

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like to make several announcements 

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related to the Fort Hood Independent 

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reviews Fort Hood The independent view 

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of Fort Hood's command climate . So 

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this will be a longer statement . The 

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murder of specialists Vanessa Gin 

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shocked our conscience conscience and 

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brought attention to deeper problems . 

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Initial investigation into Vanessa's 

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death , coupled with high numbers of 

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crimes and deaths at Fort Hood , has 

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revealed a series of missteps and 

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multiple failures in our system and 

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within our leadership . For that reason , 

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on July 30th , I directed the 

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undersecretary of the Army , Mr James 

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MacPherson , to establish an 

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independent review committee to review 

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the culture at Fort Hood Secretary 

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McPherson , with the help of the League 

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of United Latin American Citizens , 

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that's the members of Congress . Select 

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a diverse and highly experienced panel 

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to determine whether the command , 

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climate and culture at Fort Hood and 

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the surrounding military community 

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reflected the Army's values , including 

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safety , respect , inclusiveness and a 

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commitment to diversity , diversity and 

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workplaces and communities free from 

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sexual harassment and sexual assault . 

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The panel , led by Chris Swecker , also 

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included Jonathan Harmon , Kerri 

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Ritchie , Cattle Rodriguez and Jack 

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White . You have an opportunity to 

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speak with them shortly and we will 

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make their report available to the 

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public . Over the course of 103 

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days , the panel surveyed 

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31,612 soldiers , interviewed 

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647 soldiers and met with civic and 

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elected leaders , local law enforcement 

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leaders and the local district 

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attorneys . On November 9 , the panel 

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briefed the Army senior leaders and 

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provided nine findings and 70 

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recommendations . The findings of the 

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committee identified major flaws with 

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sexual harassment , an assault response 

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prevention program from implementation , 

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reporting and adjudication , 

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fundamental issues with Fort Hood 

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Criminal Investigation Command field 

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office activities that led to 

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unaddressed problems on Fort Hood . And 

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finally , a command climate at Fort 

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Hood that was permissive of sexual 

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harassment and sexual assault . 

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Further , the committee made 70 

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recommendations to improve the 

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following areas overall Sharp Program 

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structured Fort Hood Criminal 

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Investigation , field Office command 

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activities , Army missing soldier 

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protocols , Fort Hood crime prevention 

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and response activities , Army y 

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command , climate issues and Fort Hood 

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public affairs activities . Oh , 

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the tragic death of Vanessa Gin and a 

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rash of other challenges at Fort Hood 

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forced us to take a critical look at 

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our systems , our policies and 

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ourselves . But without leadership , 

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systems don't matter . This is not 

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about metrics . What about possessing 

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the ability to have the human decency , 

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to show compassion for our teammates 

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and to look out for the best interest 

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of our soldiers ? This report , without 

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a doubt , will cause the army to change 

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our culture . I have decided to accept 

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all these findings in whole . In 

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response , we have created the People 

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First Task Force to map out a plan to 

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tackle them . We have formed a 

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mechanism to ensure we have the right 

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systems , and resource is while 

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focusing on commitment over compliance . 

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While the Independent Review focused on 

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the command , climate and culture at 

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Fort Hood , the findings contained the 

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committee's report impact the entire 

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army of more than one million soldiers , 

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247,000 civilians and their families . 

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The People First Task Force . We'll 

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analyze the findings and 70 

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recommendations in the report , develop 

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a plan to address the issues identified 

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by the committee and reevaluate current 

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policy and programs . The Army will 

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begin implementation by March 2021 . 

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The task force chairs are Miss Diane 

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Random , assistant deputy chief of 

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staff G two Lieutenant General Gary 

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Brito , the Army G one and Sergeant 

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Major Julie Guerra , Army G two . I 

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have also signed a new missing soldier 

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policy . The policy will assist in 

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tracking and finding missing soldiers . 

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It clarifies expectations and 

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responsibilities of unit commanders and 

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law enforcement authorities , focusing 

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on the 1st 48 hours a soldier is 

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missing . It creates new processes for 

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soldiers , reporting to duty , status 

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and casualty status for supporting 

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missing soldiers , families and AIDS , 

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and identifying whether the absence is 

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voluntary before calling it absent 

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without leave . And finally , 

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we need the right leadership . I have 

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determined the issues at Fort Hood are 

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directly related to leadership failures , 

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leaders Dr Culture and are responsible 

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for everything the unit does or does 

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not happen to do . I am 

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gravely disappointed that leaders 

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failed to effectively created climate 

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that treated all soldiers with dignity 

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and respect , and they failed to 

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reinforce everyone's obligation to 

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prevent and properly respond 

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delegations of sexual harassment and 

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sexual assault . Because of this , to 

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restore trust in conference and 

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accountability , I directed the relief 

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and or suspension of commanders and 

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other leaders from the core to the 

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squad level . I have directed the 

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relief of the three core deputy 

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commanding general for support , the 

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third Armored Cavalry Regiment command 

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team , and suspended the first Cavalry 

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Division command team , pending the 

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results of a new investigation into the 

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command climate of the division . In 

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total , 14 leaders have been relieved 

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or suspended from their positions . In 

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addition , we're directing 

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investigation regarding criminal 

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investigation , command , re sourcing 

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policies and procedures . 

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Accountability and transparency are 

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foundational . As we move forward . We 

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have a great deal of work ahead of us . 

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This is an initial step to addressing 

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and fixing these issues . Even though 

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we're part of one of the most respected 

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institutions in the world . Living up 

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to the American people's trust is 

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something we have to do every day . I 

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believe in this institution and its 

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officers , non commissioned officers , 

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soldiers , civilians and their families 

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with every fiber of my being because of 

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extraordinary things they do on a daily 

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basis . I'm confident in our leaders 

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ability to overcome this challenge and 

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to continue to win our nation's wars 

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while caring for our people . General 

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Campbell . 

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Oh , good . Good afternoon . We 

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appreciate the work of the Fort Hood 

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Independent Review Committee and the 

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feedback that this report has given us , 

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we own the results . And , you know , 

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we've asked a lot of the Army in the 

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Fort Hood over the last 19 years during 

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continuous deployments to combat , and 

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we know in the Army that we are not 

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perfect . But what makes us the 

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greatest army in the world is that we 

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recognize where we must change . We 

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acknowledge our issues and we fix 

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them . Prior to coming here , I talked 

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to Mrs G in Vanessa's mother , 

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and I told her that we're gonna fix 

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thes issues and change the culture that 

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allowed them toe happen . I told her 

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we must and will provide a safe and 

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secure environment for American sons 

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and daughters that serve in the army . 

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As the secretary said , We're holding 

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leaders accountable and we will fix us 

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tomorrow . We're briefing the army 

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senior leaders on this report and we 

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will ensure it is understood and I plan 

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to move forward , will be implemented 

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throughout the army . We have entrusted 

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toe lead , the world's greatest 

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soldiers . It is our sacred duty to 

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protect our soldiers so we can defend 

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our nation . That is what we do . Thank 

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you . Lita 

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Baldor . First question , 

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Um , first question is , um can you 

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address , uh , just more broadly ? Why , 

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uh , sounded so , uh , General White 

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does not included among those , um 

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touched by the administrative actions . 

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Why not ? And then also , how 

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widespread . You believe these problems 

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are beyond Or it could because you seem 

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to suggest that , um , 19 years of 

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war act on on . This may be one 

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of the causation of factors . Is that 

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what you are saying ? Um Lee , 

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that's Ryan McCarthy . With respect to 

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General White . He was deployed for 13 

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months on our standard practice . I 

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like General McConville to common as 

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well . But General White was deployed 

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for 13 months . Are standard practices 

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that way Delegate , a senior mission 

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commander to take the role of running 

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the garrison activities . Eso , in this 

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case had been a standard practice that 

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we've used for think over a decade in 

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the formation . With respect to the 

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comments that we both made related , 

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we're we don't we're concerned that 

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there could be other systemic 

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challenges across the formation . And 

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that's why to the Chiefs Point , we're 

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going to utilize this report as a means 

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to , uh , look at systems and programs 

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and also leadership approaches to how 

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we address these days . Difficult 

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issues , Chief . Anything you wanna end ? 

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Just just on General White . I think 

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it's really important . He did a 

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fabulous job , uh , in Iraq over the 

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last 13 days . And leadership is about 

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presence . And when you're you're in 

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Iraq for 13 months , uh , that's why we 

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appoint a general officer to be the 

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senior commander . And as faras other 

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issues , uh , were about excellence . 

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Uh , you know , I said we're not 

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perfect , but we strive for excellence . 

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We need to take a hard look at 

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ourselves . That's why we're the best 

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army in the world . And that's what 

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we're gonna do . We're gonna take these 

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results . We're gonna make sure that 

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every single leader , uh , seizes 

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results . You know , some will say we 

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reflect society . I don't want to 

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reflect society and these type of 

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issues . I wanna make sure that we have 

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a environment where everyone is treated 

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with dignity , respect , and everyone 

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takes care of each other . And we 

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expect our leaders to do that . And 

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that's what we're gonna do . We have 

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time for one final question in the room . 

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Louis Martinez , Secretary General , um , 

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you talked about how this is going to 

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change the Army . But why did it take a 

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review panel ? And why did it take 

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Vanessa Ian's disappearance and murder 

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for you to look inward at these 

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programs That obviously now in 

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retrospect , looked like they failed 

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massively . Yeah , the 

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e think the level the caliber of work 

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that was provided in this independent 

280
00:12:30,300 --> 00:12:33,150
review , uh , panel brought a lot about 

281
00:12:33,150 --> 00:12:35,260
a fresh look and helped us look at a 

282
00:12:35,260 --> 00:12:37,371
lot of challenges . Uh , that we have 

283
00:12:37,371 --> 00:12:39,593
had that are potentially systemic , But 

284
00:12:39,593 --> 00:12:41,700
some of them we're also then the 

285
00:12:41,700 --> 00:12:43,867
leadership . So I think the fresh eyes 

286
00:12:43,867 --> 00:12:45,756
and having some other support has 

287
00:12:45,756 --> 00:12:47,756
helped us in this process . Cheap . 

288
00:12:47,756 --> 00:12:51,300
Recently , we want I could follow up 

289
00:12:51,310 --> 00:12:54,740
here . Yeah . Yes , this is leadership 

290
00:12:54,750 --> 00:12:56,750
with regards to this issue . But it 

291
00:12:56,750 --> 00:12:58,917
sounds like the report says that Sharp 

292
00:12:58,917 --> 00:13:00,972
is structurally not working on day . 

293
00:13:00,972 --> 00:13:03,139
That is an army wide program . So then 

294
00:13:03,139 --> 00:13:05,360
why can't you say that the program 

295
00:13:05,360 --> 00:13:07,630
itself needed complete restructuring ? 

296
00:13:07,630 --> 00:13:10,060
Or why wasn't it updated regularly so 

297
00:13:10,060 --> 00:13:12,004
that you could see that there were 

298
00:13:12,004 --> 00:13:14,171
issues at hand ? Really , This body of 

299
00:13:14,171 --> 00:13:16,338
work has identified things that we had 

300
00:13:16,338 --> 00:13:18,338
not seen previously . That's why we 

301
00:13:18,338 --> 00:13:20,449
have accepted all of the findings and 

302
00:13:20,449 --> 00:13:23,180
whole , You know , I previously have 

303
00:13:23,180 --> 00:13:25,069
seen independent panels that have 

304
00:13:25,069 --> 00:13:26,902
looked at mishandling of nuclear 

305
00:13:26,902 --> 00:13:29,460
weapons at Walter Reed . Ah , lot of 

306
00:13:29,460 --> 00:13:31,627
great reporting , quite frankly , is . 

307
00:13:31,627 --> 00:13:33,738
Well , as outside fresh perspective . 

308
00:13:33,738 --> 00:13:35,627
Help us look at ourselves and see 

309
00:13:35,627 --> 00:13:37,738
challenges that we didn't see . And , 

310
00:13:37,738 --> 00:13:39,904
uh , you'll have them come out here in 

311
00:13:39,904 --> 00:13:41,960
a minute , but that they helped us . 

312
00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:43,849
And that's gonna help us with the 

313
00:13:43,849 --> 00:13:46,071
institution so we can get better across 

314
00:13:46,071 --> 00:13:48,404
the board . Okay , ladies and gentlemen , 

315
00:13:48,404 --> 00:13:50,627
thank you . The secretary does not have 

316
00:13:50,627 --> 00:13:53,020
much time . Um , they yes , that there 

317
00:13:53,020 --> 00:13:55,353
is a press release . That's that's , um , 

318
00:13:55,353 --> 00:13:57,750
should be in your inbox now . So the 

319
00:13:57,760 --> 00:13:59,927
forehead independent review panel will 

320
00:13:59,927 --> 00:14:02,149
be out . We're gonna switch , Bring out 

321
00:14:02,149 --> 00:14:04,371
the new panel and we'll be here to take 

322
00:14:04,371 --> 00:14:03,970
your questions . Thank you very much . 

323
00:14:06,640 --> 00:14:09,160
It hasn't so forgive me 

324
00:14:10,940 --> 00:14:12,996
how many's backs up , but that's not 

325
00:14:12,996 --> 00:14:16,560
all the same side . Thanks . 

326
00:14:35,940 --> 00:14:36,940
Oh , 

327
00:14:44,140 --> 00:14:45,140
Mhm . 

328
00:14:49,140 --> 00:14:51,307
Good afternoon . Thank you for joining 

329
00:14:51,307 --> 00:14:53,307
us . I'm Elizabeth Chamberlain from 

330
00:14:53,307 --> 00:14:55,362
Army Public Affairs . Today , you'll 

331
00:14:55,362 --> 00:14:57,529
hear from the members of the Fort Hood 

332
00:14:57,529 --> 00:14:59,584
Independent Review Committee . Chris 

333
00:14:59,584 --> 00:15:01,700
Swecker , Jonathan Harmon , Kerri 

334
00:15:01,700 --> 00:15:04,400
Ritchie , Cater Rodriguez and Jack 

335
00:15:04,400 --> 00:15:06,940
White . This briefing will last 45 

336
00:15:06,940 --> 00:15:08,996
minutes , ending no later than one . 

337
00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:11,473
Before I introduce the committee 

338
00:15:11,473 --> 00:15:13,640
members , I have several announcements 

339
00:15:13,740 --> 00:15:17,040
if you RSVP'd for this briefing . You 

340
00:15:17,040 --> 00:15:19,207
previously received an embargoed press 

341
00:15:19,207 --> 00:15:21,720
release along with an embargoed copy of 

342
00:15:21,720 --> 00:15:24,330
the executive summary off the report of 

343
00:15:24,330 --> 00:15:26,163
the Fort Hood Independent Review 

344
00:15:26,163 --> 00:15:28,570
Committee that embargoes now lifted . 

345
00:15:29,440 --> 00:15:31,970
Very soon you'll receive an updated 

346
00:15:31,970 --> 00:15:34,330
version of the press release with a 

347
00:15:34,330 --> 00:15:36,520
second release outlining the 

348
00:15:36,530 --> 00:15:38,980
accountability actions Secretary 

349
00:15:38,980 --> 00:15:42,950
McCarthy just announced the Army's 

350
00:15:42,950 --> 00:15:44,830
new Fort Hood Independent Review 

351
00:15:44,830 --> 00:15:47,990
website , army dot mil slash Fort Hood 

352
00:15:47,990 --> 00:15:51,630
Review will go live shortly on this 

353
00:15:51,630 --> 00:15:54,370
site . You'll find both press releases , 

354
00:15:54,380 --> 00:15:57,460
AH , link to download the 136 page 

355
00:15:57,460 --> 00:15:59,990
redacted report and additional 

356
00:15:59,990 --> 00:16:02,500
background materials . This briefing 

357
00:16:02,500 --> 00:16:04,556
will begin with an opening statement 

358
00:16:04,556 --> 00:16:06,389
from Mr Swecker on behalf of the 

359
00:16:06,389 --> 00:16:08,500
committee . Afterward , the committee 

360
00:16:08,500 --> 00:16:10,722
members will take questions relating to 

361
00:16:10,722 --> 00:16:12,611
the report and their findings and 

362
00:16:12,611 --> 00:16:14,944
recommendations for the Q and A segment . 

363
00:16:14,944 --> 00:16:16,889
Please allow me to acknowledge you 

364
00:16:16,889 --> 00:16:18,970
before asking your question . Please 

365
00:16:18,970 --> 00:16:21,410
provide your name and affiliation . 

366
00:16:21,760 --> 00:16:24,160
Limit yourself to one question and one 

367
00:16:24,160 --> 00:16:26,840
follow up . I'll call on reporters in 

368
00:16:26,840 --> 00:16:29,400
the room and on the phone line I'll 

369
00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:31,622
provide a warning when we have time for 

370
00:16:31,622 --> 00:16:33,810
one more question . And now Mr Swecker 

371
00:16:33,810 --> 00:16:35,699
will read an opening statement on 

372
00:16:35,699 --> 00:16:37,143
behalf of the committee . 

373
00:16:40,740 --> 00:16:42,573
Good afternoon and thank you for 

374
00:16:42,573 --> 00:16:44,518
attending today . My name is Chris 

375
00:16:44,518 --> 00:16:46,518
Swecker . I'm the chair of the Fort 

376
00:16:46,518 --> 00:16:48,740
Hood Independent Review Committee . I'm 

377
00:16:48,740 --> 00:16:50,796
a practicing attorney in Charlotte , 

378
00:16:50,796 --> 00:16:52,851
North Carolina . I'm also of council 

379
00:16:52,851 --> 00:16:54,962
with Miller Martin out of Tennessee . 

380
00:16:54,962 --> 00:16:57,184
Uh , and I'm retired from the FBI after 

381
00:16:57,184 --> 00:16:59,073
24 years . Retiring his assistant 

382
00:16:59,073 --> 00:17:01,610
director of the FBI to my far left is 

383
00:17:01,610 --> 00:17:03,554
Jonathan Harmon . He's chairman of 

384
00:17:03,554 --> 00:17:06,330
McGuire Woods Law Firm . He is not . He 

385
00:17:06,330 --> 00:17:08,163
is a nationally recognized trial 

386
00:17:08,163 --> 00:17:10,219
attorney who previously served as an 

387
00:17:10,219 --> 00:17:12,390
Army officer at Fort Hood in the first 

388
00:17:12,390 --> 00:17:15,100
Cavalry Division after graduating from 

389
00:17:15,100 --> 00:17:18,780
West Point to my immediate left 

390
00:17:19,140 --> 00:17:21,800
in the front is , uh , carry Richie . 

391
00:17:21,830 --> 00:17:24,820
She is a retired Army JAG officer who 

392
00:17:24,820 --> 00:17:26,709
served three years at Fort Hood , 

393
00:17:26,740 --> 00:17:29,010
including as trial counsel , and is now 

394
00:17:29,010 --> 00:17:31,950
a senior executive serving as associate 

395
00:17:31,950 --> 00:17:34,228
attorney general counsel for the U . S . 

396
00:17:34,228 --> 00:17:37,170
Department of Agriculture . Just behind 

397
00:17:37,170 --> 00:17:41,080
this Richie is Quetta Rodriguez . She 

398
00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:43,191
is a retired Marine Corps officer who 

399
00:17:43,191 --> 00:17:45,710
served 20 years on active duty . She 

400
00:17:45,710 --> 00:17:47,821
currently serves as regional director 

401
00:17:47,821 --> 00:17:50,060
for Four Block , which is a veteran 

402
00:17:50,070 --> 00:17:53,050
serving non profit organization . To my 

403
00:17:53,050 --> 00:17:55,830
right is Jack White . He's a partner at 

404
00:17:55,830 --> 00:17:57,840
F H and L , a law firm where his 

405
00:17:57,840 --> 00:17:59,562
practice focuses on government 

406
00:17:59,562 --> 00:18:01,920
investigations and civil rights claims . 

407
00:18:01,940 --> 00:18:04,560
He served as a law clerk at the U . S 

408
00:18:04,560 --> 00:18:06,560
Supreme Court after graduating from 

409
00:18:06,560 --> 00:18:08,504
West Point and serving as an armor 

410
00:18:08,504 --> 00:18:10,910
officer in the active Army and the US 

411
00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:14,500
Army Reserve . So after after that 

412
00:18:14,500 --> 00:18:16,556
introduction , I'm gonna read a very 

413
00:18:16,556 --> 00:18:19,020
brief statement and turn it back over 

414
00:18:19,020 --> 00:18:22,540
to Elizabeth . On July 30th 

415
00:18:22,540 --> 00:18:25,260
2020 the Fort Hood Independent Review 

416
00:18:25,260 --> 00:18:26,982
Committee was chartered by the 

417
00:18:26,982 --> 00:18:28,927
secretary of the Army to conduct a 

418
00:18:28,927 --> 00:18:31,290
comprehensive , independent review of 

419
00:18:31,290 --> 00:18:33,570
the Fort Hood command , climate and 

420
00:18:33,570 --> 00:18:35,737
culture , and assess its impact on the 

421
00:18:35,737 --> 00:18:37,870
health , safety and readiness of its 

422
00:18:37,870 --> 00:18:40,550
soldiers and units , particularly as it 

423
00:18:40,550 --> 00:18:42,717
related to preventing sexual assault , 

424
00:18:42,717 --> 00:18:45,470
harassment , crime issues affecting 

425
00:18:45,470 --> 00:18:48,460
soldiers and missing soldier protocols . 

426
00:18:49,340 --> 00:18:51,420
We began our work immediately . The 

427
00:18:51,420 --> 00:18:53,531
committee members , who had never met 

428
00:18:53,531 --> 00:18:55,642
each other prior to their appointment 

429
00:18:55,642 --> 00:18:57,642
were asked , were tasked , organize 

430
00:18:57,642 --> 00:18:59,809
themselves , devise a strategy for the 

431
00:18:59,809 --> 00:19:01,753
review , gather relevant facts and 

432
00:19:01,753 --> 00:19:03,587
complete the final report to the 

433
00:19:03,587 --> 00:19:06,370
secretary within 90 days . All of the 

434
00:19:06,370 --> 00:19:08,590
members have day jobs with significant 

435
00:19:08,590 --> 00:19:10,940
responsibilities . We couldn't cast 

436
00:19:10,940 --> 00:19:13,360
those aside . However , we accepted 

437
00:19:13,360 --> 00:19:15,416
this appointment based on our shared 

438
00:19:15,416 --> 00:19:17,527
belief that an independent body could 

439
00:19:17,527 --> 00:19:19,600
indeed assess the serious issues at 

440
00:19:19,600 --> 00:19:22,110
hand and , if necessary , provide a 

441
00:19:22,110 --> 00:19:24,370
roadmap towards constructive change . 

442
00:19:24,940 --> 00:19:27,070
Each member of the committee accepted 

443
00:19:27,070 --> 00:19:29,292
this appointment with the intention and 

444
00:19:29,292 --> 00:19:31,620
a hope of supporting the mission and 

445
00:19:31,620 --> 00:19:34,350
well being of our brave soldiers . The 

446
00:19:34,350 --> 00:19:36,239
final report was delivered to the 

447
00:19:36,239 --> 00:19:38,350
secretary of the Army on November 6 . 

448
00:19:38,350 --> 00:19:40,406
We briefed the secretary of the Army 

449
00:19:40,406 --> 00:19:42,517
and the Army Command on November 18th 

450
00:19:42,517 --> 00:19:45,920
of this year . Before we go any further , 

451
00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:47,920
let me emphasize that the Secretary 

452
00:19:47,920 --> 00:19:50,290
Secretary McCarthy , Undersecretary 

453
00:19:50,290 --> 00:19:53,360
McPherson and Chief of Staff McConville 

454
00:19:53,940 --> 00:19:56,730
provided us absolute independence to do 

455
00:19:56,730 --> 00:20:00,140
our job . We were authorized access to 

456
00:20:00,150 --> 00:20:02,450
every available source of information , 

457
00:20:02,460 --> 00:20:04,880
and we were provided a full army staff , 

458
00:20:04,880 --> 00:20:07,030
including a brigadier general , two 

459
00:20:07,030 --> 00:20:09,197
colonels , several lieutenant colonels 

460
00:20:09,197 --> 00:20:11,252
and a master sergeant , each of whom 

461
00:20:11,252 --> 00:20:13,308
stood ready to support our mission . 

462
00:20:13,640 --> 00:20:15,540
Although the establishment of an 

463
00:20:15,540 --> 00:20:17,651
independent committee of civilians to 

464
00:20:17,651 --> 00:20:19,762
review US Army command and actions is 

465
00:20:19,762 --> 00:20:21,762
not unprecedented , it is extremely 

466
00:20:21,762 --> 00:20:25,170
rare , and it reflects a sincere desire 

467
00:20:25,180 --> 00:20:27,850
to identify the issues and address them . 

468
00:20:28,580 --> 00:20:30,730
The secretary and undersecretary also 

469
00:20:30,730 --> 00:20:32,860
approved and facilitated the addition 

470
00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:36,130
of five former FBI special agents and 

471
00:20:36,130 --> 00:20:38,074
civilian administrative support to 

472
00:20:38,074 --> 00:20:40,186
provide much needed assistance to the 

473
00:20:40,186 --> 00:20:43,240
team . We visited Fort Hood for 19 days 

474
00:20:43,240 --> 00:20:45,407
in August and September . We conducted 

475
00:20:45,407 --> 00:20:48,780
647 individual interviews . 

476
00:20:49,240 --> 00:20:51,184
We did 80 group interviews , which 

477
00:20:51,184 --> 00:20:54,270
encompassed over 1800 soldiers , and we 

478
00:20:54,270 --> 00:20:57,150
conducted over 140 specialized 

479
00:20:57,150 --> 00:20:59,720
interviews of various stakeholders on 

480
00:20:59,720 --> 00:21:02,380
and off the post . We retrieve and 

481
00:21:02,380 --> 00:21:05,270
analyze thousands of pages of documents , 

482
00:21:05,280 --> 00:21:07,770
commissioned 49 formal research 

483
00:21:07,770 --> 00:21:10,370
projects and conducted a survey 

484
00:21:11,140 --> 00:21:13,251
tailored for this review , which drew 

485
00:21:13,251 --> 00:21:15,350
over 31,000 responses from the Fort 

486
00:21:15,350 --> 00:21:17,740
Hood community representing what we're 

487
00:21:17,740 --> 00:21:20,410
told is 100% of the targeted audience . 

488
00:21:21,310 --> 00:21:23,421
The review focused on the period 2018 

489
00:21:23,421 --> 00:21:25,880
through 2020 . However , if information 

490
00:21:25,880 --> 00:21:27,713
from the last five years was was 

491
00:21:27,713 --> 00:21:29,936
considered if it was deemed relevant to 

492
00:21:29,936 --> 00:21:31,880
the review . After three months of 

493
00:21:31,880 --> 00:21:33,770
diligent , diligent work , the 

494
00:21:33,780 --> 00:21:36,810
committee issued nine findings and 70 

495
00:21:36,810 --> 00:21:39,520
constructive recommendations . The 

496
00:21:39,520 --> 00:21:41,576
report leads off with finding number 

497
00:21:41,576 --> 00:21:43,742
one , which states that the command at 

498
00:21:43,742 --> 00:21:45,576
Fort Hood was ineffective in its 

499
00:21:45,576 --> 00:21:47,798
implementation of the Sexual Harassment 

500
00:21:47,798 --> 00:21:50,131
Assault Response and Prevention Program , 

501
00:21:50,131 --> 00:21:52,187
the sharp program . This was due TOA 

502
00:21:52,187 --> 00:21:54,298
under emphasis of the program outside 

503
00:21:54,298 --> 00:21:56,242
the three corps headquarters and a 

504
00:21:56,242 --> 00:21:58,242
failure to culturally integrate the 

505
00:21:58,242 --> 00:22:00,187
program through the enlisted ranks 

506
00:22:00,187 --> 00:22:03,360
where almost 90% of sexual assault 

507
00:22:03,360 --> 00:22:05,700
victims were found . The committee 

508
00:22:05,700 --> 00:22:07,422
noted that while the Fort Hood 

509
00:22:07,422 --> 00:22:09,200
leadership afforded the highest 

510
00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:11,200
priority to maintaining equipment , 

511
00:22:11,200 --> 00:22:13,367
conducting field training and ensuring 

512
00:22:13,367 --> 00:22:15,460
deployment capability , a Siris of 

513
00:22:15,460 --> 00:22:17,740
command elements executed these duties 

514
00:22:17,740 --> 00:22:19,907
in a manner that was at the expense of 

515
00:22:19,907 --> 00:22:22,280
the health and safety of all soldiers , 

516
00:22:22,290 --> 00:22:24,530
but particularly for women at the 

517
00:22:24,530 --> 00:22:28,350
brigade level and below this dearth of 

518
00:22:28,350 --> 00:22:30,800
command emphasis on the sharp program 

519
00:22:30,810 --> 00:22:33,032
adversely impacted mission readiness in 

520
00:22:33,032 --> 00:22:35,032
terms of morale , reenlistments and 

521
00:22:35,032 --> 00:22:37,760
recruitments . The committee also found 

522
00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:39,760
that soldier accountability was not 

523
00:22:39,760 --> 00:22:41,704
strictly enforced and there was no 

524
00:22:41,704 --> 00:22:43,704
missing soldier protocols for first 

525
00:22:43,704 --> 00:22:46,230
line supervisors . This resulted in ad 

526
00:22:46,230 --> 00:22:48,710
hoc responses to soldiers . You failed 

527
00:22:48,710 --> 00:22:51,280
to report and may have been in jeopardy 

528
00:22:51,940 --> 00:22:53,940
with respect to the crime issues at 

529
00:22:53,940 --> 00:22:55,996
Fort Hood , the committee determined 

530
00:22:55,996 --> 00:22:58,107
that the crime environment within the 

531
00:22:58,107 --> 00:23:00,051
surrounding cities and counties is 

532
00:23:00,051 --> 00:23:02,310
commensurate with with similar sized 

533
00:23:02,320 --> 00:23:04,790
areas in Texas and around the United 

534
00:23:04,790 --> 00:23:07,220
States . However , serious crime 

535
00:23:07,220 --> 00:23:09,070
problems on Fort Hood have gone 

536
00:23:09,070 --> 00:23:11,630
unaddressed because the installation is 

537
00:23:11,630 --> 00:23:15,270
in a fully reactive posture . Leaders 

538
00:23:15,270 --> 00:23:17,326
across a Siris of commands failed to 

539
00:23:17,326 --> 00:23:19,270
use best practices in the areas of 

540
00:23:19,270 --> 00:23:21,326
public safety to develop and execute 

541
00:23:21,640 --> 00:23:24,540
Crime Suppression Strategies Committee 

542
00:23:24,540 --> 00:23:26,651
found that the serious crime problems 

543
00:23:26,651 --> 00:23:28,484
on the installation at Fort Hood 

544
00:23:28,484 --> 00:23:30,484
require proactive command action to 

545
00:23:30,484 --> 00:23:33,010
mitigate Fort Hood . The committee also 

546
00:23:33,010 --> 00:23:34,950
found that the Fort Hood C . I de 

547
00:23:34,950 --> 00:23:37,730
detachment had various inefficiencies 

548
00:23:37,730 --> 00:23:39,952
that adversely impacted accomplishments 

549
00:23:39,952 --> 00:23:42,590
of his mission . The committee wishes 

550
00:23:42,590 --> 00:23:44,710
to thank the secretary of the Army , 

551
00:23:44,990 --> 00:23:47,157
the undersecretary of the Army and the 

552
00:23:47,157 --> 00:23:49,900
Army chief of staff and the Army staff 

553
00:23:49,900 --> 00:23:51,789
that they provided for the strong 

554
00:23:51,789 --> 00:23:54,122
support they provided to this committee . 

555
00:23:54,122 --> 00:23:56,289
So I just want to add that we were all 

556
00:23:56,289 --> 00:23:58,344
fully immersed in all aspects of the 

557
00:23:58,344 --> 00:24:00,344
review . But each of us had a focus 

558
00:24:00,344 --> 00:24:02,456
area . So when you ask a question and 

559
00:24:02,456 --> 00:24:04,622
we may have that person come up to the 

560
00:24:04,622 --> 00:24:06,733
podium and we'll switch position , so 

561
00:24:06,733 --> 00:24:08,678
bear with us as we do the switch . 

562
00:24:09,140 --> 00:24:11,196
Thank you . Thank you . Mr . Swecker 

563
00:24:11,196 --> 00:24:13,362
will now take our first question which 

564
00:24:13,362 --> 00:24:16,170
goes to Lita Baldor , AP on the phone . 

565
00:24:18,540 --> 00:24:20,762
Hi . Um , I had a question earlier , so 

566
00:24:20,762 --> 00:24:22,929
I'll let someone else out . Go ahead , 

567
00:24:22,929 --> 00:24:25,190
Kyle . Room for a military times also 

568
00:24:25,190 --> 00:24:29,160
on the phone . Hi . 

569
00:24:29,160 --> 00:24:31,382
Thanks for doing this . Um , so we just 

570
00:24:31,382 --> 00:24:33,271
heard that , you know , 14 senior 

571
00:24:33,271 --> 00:24:35,370
commanders are 14 commanders there . 

572
00:24:35,380 --> 00:24:38,090
Fort Hood were relieved or suspended . 

573
00:24:38,100 --> 00:24:40,850
Um , but how far back do the problems 

574
00:24:40,860 --> 00:24:43,380
that you guys identified ? Go eyes . 

575
00:24:43,380 --> 00:24:45,491
There's something that just developed 

576
00:24:45,491 --> 00:24:47,824
in the past 12 months or doesn't extend . 

577
00:24:47,824 --> 00:24:49,936
You know , years back here , how long 

578
00:24:49,936 --> 00:24:52,090
has this been in development ? Well , 

579
00:24:52,090 --> 00:24:54,390
I'm gonna refer to the report . We look 

580
00:24:54,390 --> 00:24:57,820
back a Sfar as early as 2014 . Um , 

581
00:24:57,830 --> 00:24:59,719
there there were issues that were 

582
00:24:59,719 --> 00:25:01,941
called out . If you look at it in terms 

583
00:25:01,941 --> 00:25:04,108
of risk management , it became a known 

584
00:25:04,108 --> 00:25:06,760
risk very early in the process . We did 

585
00:25:06,760 --> 00:25:09,560
not fix accountability on any specific 

586
00:25:09,570 --> 00:25:11,550
general officer or any particular 

587
00:25:11,550 --> 00:25:14,120
commander , because for that very 

588
00:25:14,120 --> 00:25:16,287
reason , particularly in the last five 

589
00:25:16,287 --> 00:25:18,176
years , which was really the more 

590
00:25:18,176 --> 00:25:20,398
relevant time period , we just didn't . 

591
00:25:20,398 --> 00:25:22,770
It was it was not an act of commission . 

592
00:25:22,780 --> 00:25:25,280
These were acts of omission , if you 

593
00:25:25,280 --> 00:25:27,280
will Thes were things that were not 

594
00:25:27,280 --> 00:25:29,447
done . These were not things that were 

595
00:25:29,447 --> 00:25:31,910
done that were , um , to the detriment 

596
00:25:31,920 --> 00:25:34,031
of the of the soldiers , particularly 

597
00:25:34,031 --> 00:25:36,700
the female soldiers . Anybody else 

598
00:25:36,700 --> 00:25:37,850
wanna add to that ? 

599
00:25:41,540 --> 00:25:44,450
Okay , next question . Hayley Brisky . 

600
00:25:44,460 --> 00:25:46,682
Thank you , Hayley . Receive a task and 

601
00:25:46,682 --> 00:25:48,990
purpose on your conversations with 

602
00:25:48,990 --> 00:25:51,212
soldiers in your interviews with them . 

603
00:25:51,212 --> 00:25:53,101
Can you tell us about some of the 

604
00:25:53,101 --> 00:25:55,323
points that you heard repeatedly ? Some 

605
00:25:55,323 --> 00:25:57,546
of the concerns or complaints that they 

606
00:25:57,546 --> 00:25:57,310
had regarding the sexual assault 

607
00:25:57,310 --> 00:26:00,460
harassment programs ? Yes . The 

608
00:26:00,470 --> 00:26:02,526
individual interviews , especially , 

609
00:26:02,526 --> 00:26:04,692
were pretty revealing . We interviewed 

610
00:26:04,692 --> 00:26:08,270
500 of the 647 503 were female 

611
00:26:08,270 --> 00:26:10,670
soldiers . What we found was that there 

612
00:26:10,670 --> 00:26:13,180
was a fear of retaliation . All forms 

613
00:26:13,180 --> 00:26:16,660
of retaliation . Stigmatism , ostracism , 

614
00:26:16,900 --> 00:26:20,680
career derailing a career , um , 

615
00:26:20,690 --> 00:26:22,912
assignments , work assignments and that 

616
00:26:22,912 --> 00:26:24,968
sort of thing . Um , there was there 

617
00:26:24,968 --> 00:26:27,750
was a fear and a founded fear that the 

618
00:26:27,750 --> 00:26:29,583
confidentiality of the reporting 

619
00:26:29,583 --> 00:26:31,960
process would be compromised . Um , 

620
00:26:31,970 --> 00:26:34,360
there was a fear , or there was a lack 

621
00:26:34,360 --> 00:26:37,170
of any appreciation for the results of 

622
00:26:37,170 --> 00:26:39,770
the response because it took so long to 

623
00:26:39,770 --> 00:26:43,480
get in adjudication that 

624
00:26:43,490 --> 00:26:45,768
people that never saw the adjudication . 

625
00:26:45,768 --> 00:26:48,046
So they lost . They lost faith in that . 

626
00:26:48,046 --> 00:26:49,990
So there was . And there there are 

627
00:26:49,990 --> 00:26:52,101
other many other things that came out 

628
00:26:52,101 --> 00:26:54,101
of the interviews . Aziz , you will 

629
00:26:54,101 --> 00:26:56,323
read in the report , but let me open it 

630
00:26:56,323 --> 00:26:58,268
up to the other panel members . Is 

631
00:26:58,268 --> 00:27:00,379
anybody else ? Uh , yeah , I will say 

632
00:27:00,379 --> 00:27:02,930
that Quetta and Kerry interviewed did 

633
00:27:02,930 --> 00:27:04,986
the individual interviews , and they 

634
00:27:04,986 --> 00:27:07,152
may have something to say about that , 

635
00:27:07,152 --> 00:27:06,860
but they were very revealing . 

636
00:27:11,440 --> 00:27:13,384
I just want to add that one of the 

637
00:27:13,384 --> 00:27:15,551
things that thes soldiers at Fort Hood 

638
00:27:15,551 --> 00:27:18,850
many of them needed was to be believed . 

639
00:27:18,860 --> 00:27:21,440
And that was what we did . We listened . 

640
00:27:21,450 --> 00:27:23,570
And so if any of them see this , I 

641
00:27:23,570 --> 00:27:25,970
wanted to know we believe you . And 

642
00:27:25,970 --> 00:27:27,859
that was a really that's a really 

643
00:27:27,859 --> 00:27:29,803
important take away was to believe 

644
00:27:30,540 --> 00:27:32,151
that's all I wanted to add . 

645
00:27:38,440 --> 00:27:42,380
Mr . Speaker just stated , um , I spent 

646
00:27:42,380 --> 00:27:44,491
the bulk of my time during the course 

647
00:27:44,491 --> 00:27:46,102
of the our time at Fort Hood 

648
00:27:46,102 --> 00:27:48,158
interviewing these individuals . Azi 

649
00:27:48,158 --> 00:27:51,470
mentioned 503 of the 647 where women we 

650
00:27:51,470 --> 00:27:53,670
made a very concerted effort . Thio 

651
00:27:53,680 --> 00:27:55,680
interview every single woman within 

652
00:27:55,680 --> 00:27:58,470
specific units , um , in particular the 

653
00:27:58,470 --> 00:28:00,526
unit that Venice again belonged to . 

654
00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:04,290
And what we did discover was which was 

655
00:28:04,290 --> 00:28:06,800
one of the really shocking elements or 

656
00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:09,860
parts of the interview period where the 

657
00:28:09,870 --> 00:28:13,100
number of unreported sexual harassment 

658
00:28:13,100 --> 00:28:16,300
and sexual assault incidents of the 

659
00:28:16,300 --> 00:28:18,500
503 women that we interviewed we 

660
00:28:18,500 --> 00:28:22,450
discovered 93 credible accounts of 

661
00:28:22,450 --> 00:28:25,240
sexual assault . Of those , only 59 

662
00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:28,080
were reported . Um , and we also found 

663
00:28:28,090 --> 00:28:30,750
ah , 135 . I'm sorry . 

664
00:28:30,750 --> 00:28:34,730
217 unreported accounts 

665
00:28:34,740 --> 00:28:36,790
of sexual harassment . Eso that's a 

666
00:28:36,790 --> 00:28:39,270
really significant number of those just 

667
00:28:39,270 --> 00:28:41,381
over half were reported . And so what 

668
00:28:41,381 --> 00:28:43,326
we discovered during the course of 

669
00:28:43,326 --> 00:28:45,326
those interviews is that due to the 

670
00:28:45,326 --> 00:28:48,030
lack of confidence in the system , that 

671
00:28:48,030 --> 00:28:50,620
lack of confidence absolutely affected 

672
00:28:50,630 --> 00:28:53,170
effects the reporting of those 

673
00:28:53,170 --> 00:28:55,226
incidents . And obviously , if we're 

674
00:28:55,226 --> 00:28:58,280
not able to capture the those incidents , 

675
00:28:58,280 --> 00:29:00,850
then it's almost impossible to address 

676
00:29:00,850 --> 00:29:03,240
that . But again , as Mr Alluded to , 

677
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:05,351
there were other indicators that this 

678
00:29:05,351 --> 00:29:07,573
was a problem on DSO . That's something 

679
00:29:07,573 --> 00:29:09,796
that the report really focused on . And 

680
00:29:09,796 --> 00:29:11,907
this interview , the interview period 

681
00:29:11,907 --> 00:29:13,851
of all of those individuals really 

682
00:29:13,851 --> 00:29:16,018
focused on just letting people speak . 

683
00:29:16,018 --> 00:29:18,240
Tow us . Um , they knew that we were an 

684
00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:20,351
independent panel . None of us are on 

685
00:29:20,351 --> 00:29:22,518
active duty , which I think was a very 

686
00:29:22,518 --> 00:29:24,740
significant , very significant in their 

687
00:29:24,740 --> 00:29:26,740
willingness to speak with us and to 

688
00:29:26,740 --> 00:29:26,620
just believe is Miss . Miss Ritchie 

689
00:29:26,620 --> 00:29:30,430
just said Okay . Thank you . 

690
00:29:30,440 --> 00:29:32,496
Next question will go to the phone . 

691
00:29:32,496 --> 00:29:36,080
Jasmine Caldwell , K C N six Texas . 

692
00:29:36,230 --> 00:29:38,341
It's difficult for those of us on the 

693
00:29:38,341 --> 00:29:42,280
found . We went used . 

694
00:29:42,640 --> 00:29:46,290
Excuse me . Yes , Um , Panelists , if 

695
00:29:46,290 --> 00:29:48,346
you could committee members . If you 

696
00:29:48,346 --> 00:29:50,401
could identify yourselves before you 

697
00:29:50,401 --> 00:29:52,512
speak , that would help the people on 

698
00:29:52,512 --> 00:29:54,734
the phone . Good reminder . Thank you . 

699
00:29:54,734 --> 00:29:56,623
Jasmine Caldwell . Did you have a 

700
00:29:56,623 --> 00:30:00,220
question ? Hi . 

701
00:30:00,220 --> 00:30:02,980
Yes , Um , of the , uh you were just 

702
00:30:02,980 --> 00:30:05,740
talking about the reported sexual 

703
00:30:05,740 --> 00:30:08,990
assault and harassment on Fort Hood out 

704
00:30:08,990 --> 00:30:11,101
of the ones that were reported . Were 

705
00:30:11,101 --> 00:30:12,570
they properly handled ? 

706
00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:18,940
Uh huh . We It was all over the place 

707
00:30:18,940 --> 00:30:21,330
in terms of adjudications . So when you 

708
00:30:21,330 --> 00:30:24,360
say , properly handled , the ones that 

709
00:30:24,360 --> 00:30:26,638
were reported went through the process . 

710
00:30:26,638 --> 00:30:28,638
If they were sexual assaults , they 

711
00:30:28,638 --> 00:30:30,860
went through the criminal investigative 

712
00:30:30,860 --> 00:30:30,380
division . That detachment there for 

713
00:30:30,380 --> 00:30:32,602
investigation . If they're harassment , 

714
00:30:32,602 --> 00:30:34,658
there was an appointed investigating 

715
00:30:34,658 --> 00:30:37,640
officer out of the brigade where the 

716
00:30:37,650 --> 00:30:40,300
complaint took place . What we what we 

717
00:30:40,300 --> 00:30:42,810
saw were on this . This may be an area 

718
00:30:42,810 --> 00:30:45,300
where Miss Richie can address as well 

719
00:30:45,300 --> 00:30:47,356
because she was a former JAG officer 

720
00:30:47,356 --> 00:30:49,689
and she concentrated in this part of it . 

721
00:30:49,689 --> 00:30:51,744
We saw a lot of delayed justice , if 

722
00:30:51,744 --> 00:30:53,744
you will . The old saying , Justice 

723
00:30:53,744 --> 00:30:55,911
delayed Justice denied the process was 

724
00:30:55,911 --> 00:30:58,078
so long and drawn out that most people 

725
00:30:58,078 --> 00:31:00,300
never saw the actual results . So there 

726
00:31:00,300 --> 00:31:02,356
was no deterrent . Or at least there 

727
00:31:02,356 --> 00:31:04,670
was no visible deterrent . Uh , we 

728
00:31:04,670 --> 00:31:06,892
found that there were delays were built 

729
00:31:06,892 --> 00:31:08,781
into the process , and nobody was 

730
00:31:08,781 --> 00:31:12,050
monitoring the life cycle of a sexual 

731
00:31:12,050 --> 00:31:14,328
assault or sexual harassment complaint . 

732
00:31:14,540 --> 00:31:16,818
So nobody really knew how long it took . 

733
00:31:16,818 --> 00:31:18,984
Nobody had the responsibility to track 

734
00:31:18,984 --> 00:31:21,151
how long it took or different parts of 

735
00:31:21,151 --> 00:31:24,070
the process on . But let me let me ask , 

736
00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:26,024
uh , this reach you to come up and 

737
00:31:26,024 --> 00:31:28,080
address that as well , if you will . 

738
00:31:30,140 --> 00:31:32,280
Sure , I don't have too much more to 

739
00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:35,020
add . I will say that at Fort Hood . Um , 

740
00:31:35,030 --> 00:31:37,141
they have really organized themselves 

741
00:31:37,141 --> 00:31:39,141
well to prosecute sexual assaults . 

742
00:31:39,141 --> 00:31:41,308
They're not the easiest cases to try , 

743
00:31:41,308 --> 00:31:43,920
and they have some expertise . Um , but 

744
00:31:43,920 --> 00:31:45,976
what we found , as Chris mentioned , 

745
00:31:45,976 --> 00:31:47,809
was that there are delays in the 

746
00:31:47,809 --> 00:31:50,320
process that become very troublesome 

747
00:31:50,330 --> 00:31:52,400
for a victim . Imagine that you're 

748
00:31:52,400 --> 00:31:54,950
still waiting for justice more than a 

749
00:31:54,950 --> 00:31:58,140
year later . Um , s o I can't really 

750
00:31:58,140 --> 00:32:00,140
add too much more . It's all in the 

751
00:32:00,140 --> 00:32:02,140
report , but we did find some areas 

752
00:32:02,140 --> 00:32:04,870
where improvement could be found . Okay ? 

753
00:32:05,640 --> 00:32:08,100
Yeah , go ahead . Scarred with new Z , 

754
00:32:08,100 --> 00:32:10,560
I followed this issue a lot assed faras 

755
00:32:10,570 --> 00:32:12,681
sexual assaults in the military . And 

756
00:32:12,681 --> 00:32:14,681
one of the things that I found when 

757
00:32:14,681 --> 00:32:16,737
I've interviewed different survivors 

758
00:32:16,737 --> 00:32:18,903
and also former CIA agents were one of 

759
00:32:18,903 --> 00:32:21,170
the issues was they keep changing those 

760
00:32:21,170 --> 00:32:23,337
who are investigating it . So you have 

761
00:32:23,337 --> 00:32:25,503
one person who investigates , and he's 

762
00:32:25,503 --> 00:32:27,614
like , Oh , snap , I have to deploy . 

763
00:32:27,614 --> 00:32:29,503
Let me pass this documentation to 

764
00:32:29,503 --> 00:32:31,726
someone else . Now they have to pick it 

765
00:32:31,726 --> 00:32:31,620
up . Their new to it . They don't know 

766
00:32:31,620 --> 00:32:33,787
the case . And a lot of times , that's 

767
00:32:33,787 --> 00:32:35,842
what's dragging it on . And also , a 

768
00:32:35,842 --> 00:32:37,953
lot of evidence is being lost because 

769
00:32:37,953 --> 00:32:40,009
of it . So what do you guys do ? You 

770
00:32:40,009 --> 00:32:43,070
recommend , uh , ways to fix that issue 

771
00:32:43,070 --> 00:32:45,292
where you're not having multiple people 

772
00:32:45,292 --> 00:32:47,403
investigating the same issue and just 

773
00:32:47,403 --> 00:32:49,570
kind of passing it off from one person 

774
00:32:49,570 --> 00:32:51,626
to the next . Yes . So the report is 

775
00:32:51,626 --> 00:32:53,459
very detailed about the criminal 

776
00:32:53,459 --> 00:32:53,360
investigation divisions and 

777
00:32:53,360 --> 00:32:55,527
recommendations . And on that , I will 

778
00:32:55,527 --> 00:32:58,160
have Mr Swecker continue to talk on 

779
00:32:58,160 --> 00:32:59,993
that topic because he did a very 

780
00:32:59,993 --> 00:33:01,493
detailed review . Thanks . 

781
00:33:04,740 --> 00:33:07,090
So we did indeed . Look , a the whole 

782
00:33:07,090 --> 00:33:08,980
process that everybody has their 

783
00:33:08,980 --> 00:33:11,202
different components that have a role . 

784
00:33:11,202 --> 00:33:13,258
The JAG officers have a role . C i d 

785
00:33:13,258 --> 00:33:15,480
has a role . What we found within C I . 

786
00:33:15,480 --> 00:33:17,647
D . And this this may not g b . Just a 

787
00:33:17,647 --> 00:33:19,813
Fort Hood is that they were using Fort 

788
00:33:19,813 --> 00:33:22,147
Hood as a training ground for C . I . D . 

789
00:33:22,147 --> 00:33:25,580
Agents High turnover , uh , fairly 

790
00:33:25,580 --> 00:33:27,770
chronic understaffing throughout the 

791
00:33:27,770 --> 00:33:30,370
time period that we looked at and in 

792
00:33:30,370 --> 00:33:34,080
experience . So very of the 3rd , 45 

793
00:33:34,090 --> 00:33:36,050
a special agents assigned there . 

794
00:33:36,440 --> 00:33:38,607
They're probably about 35 . I think we 

795
00:33:38,607 --> 00:33:40,718
determined they were actually working 

796
00:33:40,718 --> 00:33:42,718
cases . Out of those 35 there might 

797
00:33:42,718 --> 00:33:44,829
have been three or four that had more 

798
00:33:44,829 --> 00:33:46,996
than two years of experience . So they 

799
00:33:46,996 --> 00:33:48,884
were rotating through . They were 

800
00:33:48,884 --> 00:33:51,107
coming out of Fort Leonard Leonard Wood 

801
00:33:51,107 --> 00:33:53,218
going straight to Fort Hood , Uh , un 

802
00:33:53,218 --> 00:33:55,470
credentialed apprentice agents . And 

803
00:33:55,470 --> 00:33:57,359
then within two years , they were 

804
00:33:57,359 --> 00:33:59,526
rotating out very quickly . So to your 

805
00:33:59,526 --> 00:34:01,748
point , there was a lot of attrition of 

806
00:34:01,748 --> 00:34:03,914
the case agents and the agents working 

807
00:34:03,914 --> 00:34:05,914
these investigations , many of them 

808
00:34:05,914 --> 00:34:07,637
were over assigned some of the 

809
00:34:07,637 --> 00:34:09,526
investigative tools that most law 

810
00:34:09,526 --> 00:34:11,748
enforcement agencies have . They didn't 

811
00:34:11,748 --> 00:34:13,914
necessarily have at their fingertips . 

812
00:34:13,914 --> 00:34:16,210
Cell phone tracking Uh uh mirroring or 

813
00:34:16,220 --> 00:34:18,610
extracting information from cellphones 

814
00:34:18,610 --> 00:34:20,554
and mobile devices , which is very 

815
00:34:20,554 --> 00:34:23,010
critical investigative techniques in 

816
00:34:23,010 --> 00:34:25,740
today's investigations . Um , they 

817
00:34:25,740 --> 00:34:28,220
needed mawr and better equipment and 

818
00:34:28,230 --> 00:34:30,119
much faster turnover . There were 

819
00:34:30,119 --> 00:34:32,780
delays in area , other areas as well . 

820
00:34:32,780 --> 00:34:35,030
When when a pass off goes to the JAG 

821
00:34:35,030 --> 00:34:37,220
officers or to the to the command 

822
00:34:37,270 --> 00:34:40,150
military justice , justice adviser , 

823
00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:42,327
there were delays there and getting an 

824
00:34:42,327 --> 00:34:44,493
opinion of probable cause . There were 

825
00:34:44,493 --> 00:34:46,549
delays in getting on assignment of a 

826
00:34:46,549 --> 00:34:48,771
victim council assigned to the victim . 

827
00:34:49,140 --> 00:34:52,190
So all of that combined and conspired 

828
00:34:52,190 --> 00:34:54,246
to make it a very long and drawn out 

829
00:34:54,246 --> 00:34:56,270
process . Um , anyone else ? 

830
00:34:59,140 --> 00:35:01,770
Yes , Go ahead , Christine . I don't 

831
00:35:01,770 --> 00:35:04,000
know no with Telemundo . I was 

832
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:06,080
wondering how how instrumental with 

833
00:35:06,080 --> 00:35:08,320
Vanessa Gin's family in this 

834
00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:11,680
investigation and who talked to her , 

835
00:35:12,720 --> 00:35:14,887
I'm gonna hand the podium over to Jack 

836
00:35:14,887 --> 00:35:17,053
White , who did talk to the family and 

837
00:35:17,053 --> 00:35:19,276
has some perspectives for you on that . 

838
00:35:22,840 --> 00:35:26,500
So , uh , this'll 

839
00:35:26,500 --> 00:35:30,130
Whole committee was precipitated by the 

840
00:35:30,140 --> 00:35:32,770
unfortunate events with , uh , 

841
00:35:33,340 --> 00:35:36,470
specialist skin . And as we put 

842
00:35:36,470 --> 00:35:39,720
together our methodology talking with 

843
00:35:39,720 --> 00:35:42,180
the family to engage in a two way 

844
00:35:42,180 --> 00:35:45,850
communication was important to us at 

845
00:35:45,850 --> 00:35:48,840
the outset . At the outset , we wanted 

846
00:35:48,840 --> 00:35:51,360
to communicate to the family , uh , 

847
00:35:51,840 --> 00:35:54,260
that their perspective was important 

848
00:35:54,270 --> 00:35:56,910
and that something was being done about 

849
00:35:56,920 --> 00:36:00,730
what they had experienced . But in 

850
00:36:00,730 --> 00:36:03,330
looking at the culture , we wanted to 

851
00:36:03,330 --> 00:36:05,930
hear from them about what their 

852
00:36:05,930 --> 00:36:09,350
experience . Waas uh , when 

853
00:36:10,130 --> 00:36:13,150
their daughter was missing , Uh , when 

854
00:36:13,160 --> 00:36:16,150
the search was ongoing , Uh , what were 

855
00:36:16,150 --> 00:36:19,220
the interactions with the command ? All 

856
00:36:19,220 --> 00:36:21,460
of that is a component of the culture . 

857
00:36:21,930 --> 00:36:25,240
So Miss Ritchie and I sat down with the 

858
00:36:25,240 --> 00:36:28,740
family Mrs G N Mr Again 

859
00:36:29,130 --> 00:36:32,970
Their daughters , uh , and we talked 

860
00:36:32,980 --> 00:36:36,160
for hours to understand what their 

861
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:39,480
experience . Waas indeed , 

862
00:36:39,930 --> 00:36:43,390
Uh , I spoke with Mrs Gin as recently 

863
00:36:43,390 --> 00:36:46,910
as this morning to inform her of what 

864
00:36:46,910 --> 00:36:50,040
was happening today and to assure her 

865
00:36:50,370 --> 00:36:53,400
that the conversation that she had with 

866
00:36:53,400 --> 00:36:57,170
us was meaningful . We learned a lot 

867
00:36:57,180 --> 00:37:00,250
about their experience . Uh , and 

868
00:37:00,260 --> 00:37:03,360
whatever we learned is reflected in the 

869
00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:07,180
report and will not be lost . Were they 

870
00:37:07,190 --> 00:37:09,412
happy with the recommendations that are 

871
00:37:09,412 --> 00:37:11,700
coming through do they feel that it 

872
00:37:11,700 --> 00:37:13,756
made an impact ? Because that's what 

873
00:37:13,756 --> 00:37:16,033
they were fighting for this whole time . 

874
00:37:16,430 --> 00:37:20,240
I do not want to speak for them . Uh , 

875
00:37:20,630 --> 00:37:23,380
I walked away from my conversation with 

876
00:37:23,380 --> 00:37:26,120
Mrs G in this morning , believing that 

877
00:37:26,120 --> 00:37:28,510
she is pleased that there is progress 

878
00:37:28,510 --> 00:37:32,070
being made . I do not believe that she 

879
00:37:32,070 --> 00:37:34,710
has had the benefit that the family has 

880
00:37:34,710 --> 00:37:37,490
had the benefit of reviewing the report 

881
00:37:37,500 --> 00:37:40,320
and our findings and recommendations 

882
00:37:40,330 --> 00:37:43,550
yet . Okay . Next question will go to 

883
00:37:43,550 --> 00:37:46,060
the phone . Matt cox military dot com 

884
00:37:46,060 --> 00:37:48,770
Do you have a question ? Yeah . Hi . 

885
00:37:48,770 --> 00:37:50,992
Thank you for doing this . I did have a 

886
00:37:50,992 --> 00:37:53,350
question about you know , your findings 

887
00:37:53,350 --> 00:37:55,910
on the Fort Hood criminal investigation 

888
00:37:55,910 --> 00:37:58,132
attachment . Uh , you know , one of the 

889
00:37:58,132 --> 00:38:00,243
big things of this was that the G and 

890
00:38:00,243 --> 00:38:02,550
family , you know , said that , um , 

891
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:05,080
that's again , you know , she was told 

892
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:08,660
them you the victim of sexual 

893
00:38:08,660 --> 00:38:11,910
harassment on possibly assault , 

894
00:38:11,920 --> 00:38:15,350
and C i d was very adamant that what we 

895
00:38:15,350 --> 00:38:17,572
found no evidence of that . There was , 

896
00:38:17,572 --> 00:38:19,350
you know , we found no credible 

897
00:38:19,350 --> 00:38:21,406
evidence of anything like that . Are 

898
00:38:21,406 --> 00:38:24,640
you saying that that you know a flawed 

899
00:38:24,650 --> 00:38:26,928
findings and that , you know , did you . 

900
00:38:26,928 --> 00:38:29,490
Was there any evidence or you know that 

901
00:38:29,490 --> 00:38:32,170
you found or can you speak to that ? As 

902
00:38:32,180 --> 00:38:35,430
far as what that says , You know what 

903
00:38:35,440 --> 00:38:38,240
these findings about the CIA detachment 

904
00:38:38,250 --> 00:38:42,110
say to that ? You know that whether she 

905
00:38:42,110 --> 00:38:44,221
was , whether there was evidence that 

906
00:38:44,221 --> 00:38:46,443
maybe have been overlooked , that makes 

907
00:38:46,443 --> 00:38:50,330
sense , that is the 

908
00:38:50,340 --> 00:38:52,490
subject of a separate Army 

909
00:38:52,490 --> 00:38:54,910
investigation , which is going very 

910
00:38:54,910 --> 00:38:57,500
deep into that area . I don't want to 

911
00:38:57,500 --> 00:38:59,611
step on an investigation . I will say 

912
00:38:59,611 --> 00:39:03,020
this . There is a misunderstanding on 

913
00:39:03,020 --> 00:39:05,980
one part of that . C i . D . Did not 

914
00:39:05,980 --> 00:39:08,390
find any evidence that specialist 

915
00:39:08,390 --> 00:39:11,550
Robinson sexually harassed Vaness again , 

916
00:39:12,420 --> 00:39:15,050
and I'll leave it at that because it's 

917
00:39:15,060 --> 00:39:18,330
way looked at the G M case as a case 

918
00:39:18,330 --> 00:39:21,740
study in terms of the overall broader 

919
00:39:22,120 --> 00:39:24,231
topic that we were looking at and the 

920
00:39:24,231 --> 00:39:26,398
subjects that we were looking at . But 

921
00:39:26,398 --> 00:39:28,620
once the the separate investigation was 

922
00:39:28,620 --> 00:39:30,860
announced , we did not weigh . Are not 

923
00:39:30,860 --> 00:39:34,550
the investigating body for Theis use 

924
00:39:34,550 --> 00:39:37,030
involving potential sexual harassment 

925
00:39:37,030 --> 00:39:39,410
or any other issues involving Vanessa 

926
00:39:39,410 --> 00:39:42,160
again inside her unit ? I'm not dodging 

927
00:39:42,160 --> 00:39:44,049
this question . It's just it's an 

928
00:39:44,049 --> 00:39:46,049
ongoing thing on . We don't want to 

929
00:39:46,049 --> 00:39:48,160
taint that investigation in any way . 

930
00:39:49,520 --> 00:39:53,080
Okay . Courtney , to do with anything 

931
00:39:53,090 --> 00:39:57,040
that she just following ? Um , ma'am , 

932
00:39:57,040 --> 00:39:59,207
you mentioned a bunch of numbers about 

933
00:39:59,207 --> 00:40:02,240
503 accounts . And I'm wondering if you 

934
00:40:02,240 --> 00:40:04,370
could just clarify them because you 

935
00:40:04,370 --> 00:40:07,010
said there were 217 unreported accounts 

936
00:40:07,010 --> 00:40:09,430
of sexual harassment . Is that correct ? 

937
00:40:09,910 --> 00:40:11,910
So but then you also said that some 

938
00:40:11,910 --> 00:40:14,077
about half of them had been reported . 

939
00:40:14,077 --> 00:40:16,021
Can you come through those numbers 

940
00:40:16,021 --> 00:40:18,820
again ? Do you mind ? Yes . Um , during 

941
00:40:18,820 --> 00:40:20,931
the course of our interviews , it was 

942
00:40:20,931 --> 00:40:23,980
647 individual interviews that included 

943
00:40:23,980 --> 00:40:27,430
both men and women . But there were 503 

944
00:40:27,440 --> 00:40:30,190
women that were interviewed of those , 

945
00:40:30,200 --> 00:40:33,490
um , night . We discovered 

946
00:40:33,500 --> 00:40:36,840
93 credible accounts of sexual assault . 

947
00:40:36,850 --> 00:40:39,200
And again , those were just individuals 

948
00:40:39,200 --> 00:40:41,256
of soldiers who were telling us that 

949
00:40:41,256 --> 00:40:44,780
this had happened to them . Of those 59 

950
00:40:44,790 --> 00:40:46,846
when we asked the question which was 

951
00:40:46,846 --> 00:40:49,068
part of part of the interview , Did you 

952
00:40:49,068 --> 00:40:51,234
report this , or was it reported ? The 

953
00:40:51,234 --> 00:40:53,346
answer was No , I'm sorry . Was yes . 

954
00:40:53,346 --> 00:40:55,568
59 of those that that was the extent of 

955
00:40:55,568 --> 00:40:59,400
those for sexual harassment . We 

956
00:40:59,400 --> 00:41:02,720
discovered 217 credible 

957
00:41:02,720 --> 00:41:06,480
accounts off sexual harassment of those 

958
00:41:06,480 --> 00:41:08,647
and I'll give you that specific number 

959
00:41:08,647 --> 00:41:10,869
that were actually reported . You get , 

960
00:41:12,210 --> 00:41:14,590
um , for those of you on the phone , 

961
00:41:14,590 --> 00:41:16,950
this is Miss Rodriguez speaking on and 

962
00:41:16,950 --> 00:41:18,894
all of these . These these numbers 

963
00:41:18,894 --> 00:41:21,061
three specific numbers are included in 

964
00:41:21,061 --> 00:41:24,140
the report . Thank you . 35 . There 

965
00:41:24,140 --> 00:41:26,870
were No , it was e . I apologize . I 

966
00:41:26,870 --> 00:41:28,926
don't know the number . It is in the 

967
00:41:28,926 --> 00:41:31,037
report . Yes . Those specific numbers 

968
00:41:31,037 --> 00:41:32,981
are actually I'm called out in the 

969
00:41:32,981 --> 00:41:36,130
report . Then you said that people just 

970
00:41:36,130 --> 00:41:38,510
wanted to be believed where people were 

971
00:41:38,510 --> 00:41:40,288
women . Not coming forward with 

972
00:41:40,288 --> 00:41:42,890
reporting . Leave a lot of what you 

973
00:41:42,890 --> 00:41:45,570
heard . Um , it was two things . It was 

974
00:41:45,580 --> 00:41:48,980
cases where , uh , there was either no 

975
00:41:48,990 --> 00:41:50,920
resolution or an unsatisfactory 

976
00:41:50,920 --> 00:41:54,440
resolution . Which happens , Andi , 

977
00:41:54,450 --> 00:41:57,130
Once it happens with one soldier , 

978
00:41:57,810 --> 00:42:00,850
every soldier in the unit learns of 

979
00:42:00,850 --> 00:42:03,380
what's happening . And for the other 

980
00:42:03,380 --> 00:42:06,830
women in that unit , it became a sense 

981
00:42:06,830 --> 00:42:09,380
that they didn't believe us , even if 

982
00:42:09,380 --> 00:42:12,340
they served as a witness . Um , we 

983
00:42:12,340 --> 00:42:14,960
weren't believed . And then other women 

984
00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:17,530
would say , Because of what happened to 

985
00:42:17,540 --> 00:42:19,740
this soldier , I wouldn't feel 

986
00:42:19,740 --> 00:42:21,950
comfortable coming forward . So there 

987
00:42:21,950 --> 00:42:25,340
was an overall sense that there is that 

988
00:42:25,340 --> 00:42:28,400
reluctance to report because who is 

989
00:42:28,400 --> 00:42:30,680
gonna believe us , especially for a 

990
00:42:30,680 --> 00:42:33,180
junior enlisted woman and especially 

991
00:42:33,180 --> 00:42:35,850
one who maybe isn't there star soldier 

992
00:42:35,850 --> 00:42:38,150
at the moment , there's that reluctance 

993
00:42:38,150 --> 00:42:39,983
in that feeling that we won't be 

994
00:42:39,983 --> 00:42:42,150
believed . And there were soldiers who 

995
00:42:42,150 --> 00:42:44,390
just didn't report because they felt 

996
00:42:44,390 --> 00:42:46,670
that . So just being able to talk one 

997
00:42:46,670 --> 00:42:49,460
on one and to hear their very personal 

998
00:42:49,470 --> 00:42:52,680
and sometimes very difficult stories to 

999
00:42:52,680 --> 00:42:55,410
be able to tell them . And Thio it was 

1000
00:42:55,420 --> 00:42:57,642
a little bit cathartic for many of them 

1001
00:42:57,642 --> 00:43:00,670
because someone was listening and they 

1002
00:43:00,670 --> 00:43:03,180
felt that they were being heard . So it 

1003
00:43:03,180 --> 00:43:05,513
was important to me to say we heard you . 

1004
00:43:05,513 --> 00:43:06,680
And we believe you . 

1005
00:43:08,900 --> 00:43:11,410
Let's go to the phone . Carson frame 

1006
00:43:11,410 --> 00:43:13,410
Texas Public Radio . Are you on the 

1007
00:43:13,410 --> 00:43:17,150
line ? And do you have a question ? Yes . 

1008
00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:19,400
Thank you for taking my question . Um , 

1009
00:43:19,410 --> 00:43:21,870
essentially , it boils down to , um 

1010
00:43:21,880 --> 00:43:24,047
you've looked over the sharp program . 

1011
00:43:24,047 --> 00:43:26,047
Um , and the criminal investigative 

1012
00:43:26,047 --> 00:43:28,158
response of Fort Hood . Um , how much 

1013
00:43:28,158 --> 00:43:30,630
would you say of these issues ? Are 

1014
00:43:30,640 --> 00:43:33,070
Fort Hood specific versus enterprise 

1015
00:43:33,080 --> 00:43:35,530
Wide and Army Army problem . 

1016
00:43:38,000 --> 00:43:38,330
It 

1017
00:43:42,100 --> 00:43:44,710
uh , this is Jack White . I'll start 

1018
00:43:44,710 --> 00:43:48,120
here . I'm sure that Mr Swecker will 

1019
00:43:48,130 --> 00:43:51,190
follow me . Uh , I want to start with 

1020
00:43:51,190 --> 00:43:54,320
our charter . Uh , our charter was to 

1021
00:43:54,320 --> 00:43:57,190
look at Fort Hood , and that is what we 

1022
00:43:57,190 --> 00:44:00,380
did . But we're not oblivious to the 

1023
00:44:00,380 --> 00:44:02,800
fact that , you know , this is one army 

1024
00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:07,930
and Fort Hood is potentially emblematic 

1025
00:44:07,940 --> 00:44:11,210
of other things going on in the Army . 

1026
00:44:11,220 --> 00:44:15,110
Sharp is an Army wide program . So 

1027
00:44:15,110 --> 00:44:18,900
some of our observations while we saw 

1028
00:44:18,900 --> 00:44:22,810
them at Fort Hood may very well , 

1029
00:44:22,820 --> 00:44:25,950
uh , be similar at other 

1030
00:44:25,950 --> 00:44:29,310
installations . A great number of our 

1031
00:44:29,310 --> 00:44:32,510
recommendations are Fort Hood specific 

1032
00:44:32,890 --> 00:44:34,890
because that's where we were on the 

1033
00:44:34,890 --> 00:44:37,020
ground and at Fort Hood . Our 

1034
00:44:37,020 --> 00:44:40,910
methodology permitted us to kick the 

1035
00:44:40,910 --> 00:44:44,280
tires on just about everything , uh , 

1036
00:44:44,290 --> 00:44:47,450
at Fort Hood . But some of our 

1037
00:44:47,450 --> 00:44:50,870
recommendations look beyond just Fort 

1038
00:44:50,870 --> 00:44:54,400
Hood because a ZAY said the sharp 

1039
00:44:54,400 --> 00:44:57,660
program is an army wide program . Some 

1040
00:44:57,660 --> 00:45:00,230
of our recommendations in other areas 

1041
00:45:00,240 --> 00:45:03,020
uh , look beyond Fort Hood as well , 

1042
00:45:03,990 --> 00:45:05,810
Chris ? Uh huh . 

1043
00:45:09,110 --> 00:45:11,850
This is John Harmon . You know , I 

1044
00:45:11,860 --> 00:45:14,670
agree with what Jack has described , 

1045
00:45:14,670 --> 00:45:17,520
and it became very apparent . A Z we're 

1046
00:45:17,520 --> 00:45:20,890
going through the investigation andan 

1047
00:45:20,890 --> 00:45:24,210
afterwards that the army was going to 

1048
00:45:24,210 --> 00:45:27,010
take thes and apply them broader . And 

1049
00:45:27,010 --> 00:45:29,066
you heard from the secretary and you 

1050
00:45:29,066 --> 00:45:31,177
heard from the chief and , you know , 

1051
00:45:31,177 --> 00:45:33,177
as Jack indicated , our charter was 

1052
00:45:33,177 --> 00:45:35,399
just to Fort Hood . But , you know , we 

1053
00:45:35,399 --> 00:45:37,510
have four of the five members on this 

1054
00:45:37,510 --> 00:45:39,732
panel have served in the military , two 

1055
00:45:39,732 --> 00:45:41,732
of us at Fort Hood . And so we know 

1056
00:45:41,732 --> 00:45:43,790
what it's like . And so we were very 

1057
00:45:43,790 --> 00:45:46,530
pleased to hear from the secretary and 

1058
00:45:46,530 --> 00:45:50,080
the chief about , um , using this Army 

1059
00:45:50,080 --> 00:45:52,170
wide . So again , our charter was 

1060
00:45:52,170 --> 00:45:55,090
focused solely on Fort Hood . But is 

1061
00:45:55,090 --> 00:45:57,770
Jack articulated ? And again , the 

1062
00:45:57,770 --> 00:45:59,659
secretary and the chief have said 

1063
00:45:59,659 --> 00:46:01,826
they're going to use this to make Army 

1064
00:46:01,826 --> 00:46:04,090
wide changes , which we applaud . 

1065
00:46:07,920 --> 00:46:11,690
Just just to add to that those 49 

1066
00:46:11,690 --> 00:46:14,590
research projects that we commissioned 

1067
00:46:14,630 --> 00:46:17,160
went deep , and they made comparisons 

1068
00:46:17,160 --> 00:46:19,438
to other installations across the Army . 

1069
00:46:19,440 --> 00:46:21,790
So we weren't as was mentioned . We're 

1070
00:46:21,790 --> 00:46:23,957
not . We weren't oblivious to what was 

1071
00:46:23,957 --> 00:46:26,123
going on at other installations around 

1072
00:46:26,123 --> 00:46:28,346
the Army . We made a lot of comparisons 

1073
00:46:28,346 --> 00:46:30,570
to how how things were going at other 

1074
00:46:30,570 --> 00:46:32,459
installations , and we also heard 

1075
00:46:32,459 --> 00:46:34,790
stories from soldiers who had served at 

1076
00:46:34,790 --> 00:46:37,950
other installations . So we did note , 

1077
00:46:37,950 --> 00:46:40,780
however , that in many cases Fort Hood 

1078
00:46:40,780 --> 00:46:44,300
was an outlier and things like a wall 

1079
00:46:44,300 --> 00:46:47,720
suicides and other other issues in 

1080
00:46:47,720 --> 00:46:49,609
comparison to some of these other 

1081
00:46:49,609 --> 00:46:51,609
installations . So there were There 

1082
00:46:51,609 --> 00:46:53,887
were four who was enough of an outlier , 

1083
00:46:53,887 --> 00:46:55,831
uh , that we felt like we really , 

1084
00:46:55,831 --> 00:46:57,887
really had to concentrate on what we 

1085
00:46:57,887 --> 00:47:01,300
had in front of us , sir . Uh , with 

1086
00:47:01,310 --> 00:47:03,680
Univision , we're talking about 70 

1087
00:47:03,680 --> 00:47:05,458
recommendations , and Secretary 

1088
00:47:05,458 --> 00:47:07,624
McCarthy said that he's gonna take all 

1089
00:47:07,624 --> 00:47:09,624
of them . Um , I would like to know 

1090
00:47:09,624 --> 00:47:11,624
what the role of this panel will be 

1091
00:47:11,624 --> 00:47:13,513
moving forward for accountability 

1092
00:47:13,513 --> 00:47:15,980
purposes to make sure those changes are 

1093
00:47:15,980 --> 00:47:18,140
implemented . So the people's first 

1094
00:47:18,140 --> 00:47:20,730
task force has been established . Uh , 

1095
00:47:20,740 --> 00:47:22,950
one of the colonel's that we worked 

1096
00:47:22,950 --> 00:47:25,770
with very closely and supported us is 

1097
00:47:25,780 --> 00:47:27,724
the chief of staff for that task . 

1098
00:47:27,724 --> 00:47:29,836
Force will be in touch with him , and 

1099
00:47:29,836 --> 00:47:32,130
he'll be in touch with us . And we will 

1100
00:47:32,130 --> 00:47:34,780
be , in some sense , uh , not 

1101
00:47:34,780 --> 00:47:36,891
overseeing it directly . But we'll be 

1102
00:47:36,891 --> 00:47:39,870
watching Thean Plantation . Of the 70 

1103
00:47:39,870 --> 00:47:42,070
recommendations we didn't expect , nor 

1104
00:47:42,070 --> 00:47:44,960
do we ever I think that all 70 

1105
00:47:44,960 --> 00:47:47,127
recommendations would be accepted . So 

1106
00:47:47,127 --> 00:47:49,127
that's you know , that's a bit of a 

1107
00:47:49,127 --> 00:47:51,460
surprise , but I think it reflects , um , 

1108
00:47:51,460 --> 00:47:53,627
a willingness on the part of Secretary 

1109
00:47:53,627 --> 00:47:55,682
the Under Secretary and the chief of 

1110
00:47:55,682 --> 00:47:58,210
staff Thio to fix things . It was a 

1111
00:47:58,210 --> 00:48:00,099
risk Thio to bring an independent 

1112
00:48:00,099 --> 00:48:02,321
review committee in . We recognize that 

1113
00:48:02,321 --> 00:48:04,377
we could have gone anywhere and done 

1114
00:48:04,377 --> 00:48:06,377
anything , and we wanted to do this 

1115
00:48:06,377 --> 00:48:08,488
right . We wanted to do this fairly . 

1116
00:48:08,488 --> 00:48:11,330
And we're very We're very happy with 

1117
00:48:11,330 --> 00:48:13,330
the way the Army has accepted these 

1118
00:48:13,330 --> 00:48:17,100
recommendations is going forward . Next 

1119
00:48:17,100 --> 00:48:19,211
question on the phone . Alex Horton , 

1120
00:48:19,211 --> 00:48:21,044
Washington Post . Did you have a 

1121
00:48:21,044 --> 00:48:24,940
question ? Yes , I did . Thank you . Uh , 

1122
00:48:24,950 --> 00:48:26,950
you know , you guys have spent some 

1123
00:48:26,950 --> 00:48:29,061
time focused on sexual harassment and 

1124
00:48:29,061 --> 00:48:31,061
assault . Um , I was curious if you 

1125
00:48:31,061 --> 00:48:33,394
were looking at other kinds of violence , 

1126
00:48:33,394 --> 00:48:35,617
um , at Fort Hood to include , uh , you 

1127
00:48:35,617 --> 00:48:37,839
know , other murders . Other other high 

1128
00:48:37,839 --> 00:48:40,006
profile incidents is including those , 

1129
00:48:40,006 --> 00:48:42,117
um , you know who who disappeared and 

1130
00:48:42,117 --> 00:48:44,006
were later found dead . And I was 

1131
00:48:44,006 --> 00:48:46,172
curious . You know what you have found 

1132
00:48:46,172 --> 00:48:50,050
in terms of army culture ? Of how you 

1133
00:48:50,050 --> 00:48:52,340
know , the brand of a wall in the brand 

1134
00:48:52,340 --> 00:48:54,580
of , you know , going missing , um , 

1135
00:48:54,590 --> 00:48:57,720
contribute to a ah lack of interest in 

1136
00:48:57,720 --> 00:49:00,840
finding them ? Yes . I mean , that was 

1137
00:49:00,840 --> 00:49:03,780
a big focus of the review and the 

1138
00:49:03,780 --> 00:49:06,740
report . We looked at crime issues on 

1139
00:49:06,740 --> 00:49:08,796
the base . We looked at crime issues 

1140
00:49:08,796 --> 00:49:10,740
off the base . I think there was a 

1141
00:49:10,740 --> 00:49:12,684
perception really , based on media 

1142
00:49:12,684 --> 00:49:14,796
stories , that there was some sort of 

1143
00:49:14,796 --> 00:49:17,120
crime wave around the surrounding area 

1144
00:49:17,120 --> 00:49:19,730
of the base . What we found was that 

1145
00:49:19,740 --> 00:49:22,180
their their crime rates in the areas 

1146
00:49:22,180 --> 00:49:25,640
surrounding the base were relatively 

1147
00:49:25,640 --> 00:49:27,980
low in comparison to other cities 

1148
00:49:27,980 --> 00:49:30,960
outside both major Army installations 

1149
00:49:30,960 --> 00:49:33,480
but other comparable size cities . Um , 

1150
00:49:33,480 --> 00:49:35,536
that's not to say that there weren't 

1151
00:49:35,536 --> 00:49:37,369
soldier victims off the base and 

1152
00:49:37,369 --> 00:49:39,480
soldier subjects off the base because 

1153
00:49:39,480 --> 00:49:41,590
there's a large population of active 

1154
00:49:41,590 --> 00:49:44,580
duty soldiers living off base . Retired 

1155
00:49:44,580 --> 00:49:46,691
soldiers separated soldiers and their 

1156
00:49:46,691 --> 00:49:49,270
families . So you're gonna find victims 

1157
00:49:49,280 --> 00:49:51,540
off the base . But what we found really 

1158
00:49:51,540 --> 00:49:55,530
was that on the base , there were 

1159
00:49:55,530 --> 00:49:57,752
some hot primaries that relatively high 

1160
00:49:57,752 --> 00:49:59,808
violent felonies . Sexual assaults , 

1161
00:49:59,808 --> 00:50:03,370
sex crimes , drugs . Um , positive drug 

1162
00:50:03,370 --> 00:50:05,770
tests were the highest in the Army . So 

1163
00:50:05,770 --> 00:50:08,900
we found areas of crime on the 

1164
00:50:08,900 --> 00:50:12,090
installation that if you compare them 

1165
00:50:12,090 --> 00:50:14,770
thio , civilian crime rates might be 

1166
00:50:14,770 --> 00:50:16,381
low . But this is a military 

1167
00:50:16,381 --> 00:50:18,603
installation . It's a gated community . 

1168
00:50:18,603 --> 00:50:20,714
There are a lot of tools that you can 

1169
00:50:20,714 --> 00:50:22,826
use to suppress crime . What we found 

1170
00:50:22,826 --> 00:50:25,048
was that There was no proactive efforts 

1171
00:50:25,048 --> 00:50:27,048
to suppress crime , to address drug 

1172
00:50:27,048 --> 00:50:29,570
issues to address violent crimes . 

1173
00:50:29,820 --> 00:50:32,720
Suicides were extremely high . And what 

1174
00:50:32,720 --> 00:50:34,942
we found was that because see , I d was 

1175
00:50:34,942 --> 00:50:36,720
so inexperienced and so tax for 

1176
00:50:36,720 --> 00:50:38,920
resource is they really didn't dive 

1177
00:50:38,920 --> 00:50:42,270
deep on suicides to find out why and 

1178
00:50:42,270 --> 00:50:44,860
what was happening . That was the 

1179
00:50:44,860 --> 00:50:46,860
trigger for the suicide . The death 

1180
00:50:46,860 --> 00:50:49,850
cases there aren't and an anomalous 

1181
00:50:49,860 --> 00:50:52,500
number of death cases at Fort Hood 

1182
00:50:53,820 --> 00:50:56,290
in terms of homicides . But the 

1183
00:50:56,290 --> 00:50:59,470
homicides that did occur got intense 

1184
00:50:59,470 --> 00:51:01,840
media attention on We looked very hard 

1185
00:51:01,840 --> 00:51:04,170
at those homicides . And again , what 

1186
00:51:04,170 --> 00:51:07,200
we found was in the death cases . See , 

1187
00:51:07,200 --> 00:51:09,350
I'd just needed mawr experience and 

1188
00:51:09,350 --> 00:51:12,580
mawr continuity inside the detachment 

1189
00:51:12,580 --> 00:51:15,270
there . And it may be a systemic across 

1190
00:51:15,270 --> 00:51:18,180
the idea that they're just isn't enough 

1191
00:51:18,190 --> 00:51:21,070
longevity at the post on the part of 

1192
00:51:21,070 --> 00:51:23,070
the investigators . So we recommend 

1193
00:51:23,070 --> 00:51:25,181
some recommendations regarding making 

1194
00:51:25,181 --> 00:51:27,403
sure they're experienced agents . There 

1195
00:51:27,403 --> 00:51:29,070
may be going to more civilian 

1196
00:51:29,070 --> 00:51:31,292
investigators , and that's something we 

1197
00:51:31,292 --> 00:51:32,959
asked them to look at . Yes , 

1198
00:51:37,960 --> 00:51:40,800
and this is Jack White , and Chris is 

1199
00:51:40,810 --> 00:51:44,260
speaking thio some very valuable 

1200
00:51:44,260 --> 00:51:48,110
information on specific , uh , criminal , 

1201
00:51:48,760 --> 00:51:50,780
uh , the viewpoint from a criminal 

1202
00:51:50,780 --> 00:51:53,260
perspective . But something else that 

1203
00:51:53,260 --> 00:51:57,110
we did here is we looked at What is 

1204
00:51:57,110 --> 00:52:00,380
it that leads a soldier to behave in 

1205
00:52:00,390 --> 00:52:04,080
this type of man ? And in the process 

1206
00:52:04,080 --> 00:52:07,760
of looking at that , we looked one of 

1207
00:52:07,760 --> 00:52:09,871
the things that the report contains , 

1208
00:52:09,871 --> 00:52:13,340
uh , is looking at the other armed 

1209
00:52:13,340 --> 00:52:16,660
services . What they do well , that 

1210
00:52:16,660 --> 00:52:20,130
might be able to be incorporated within 

1211
00:52:20,130 --> 00:52:23,010
what we do in the Army or what the Army 

1212
00:52:23,010 --> 00:52:25,220
does . And one of the things that we 

1213
00:52:25,220 --> 00:52:28,180
found is that one of the other services 

1214
00:52:28,950 --> 00:52:32,340
looks at the qualities in service 

1215
00:52:32,340 --> 00:52:36,270
members that lead them to violence . Uh , 

1216
00:52:36,280 --> 00:52:38,960
the kind of violence that we don't want 

1217
00:52:38,970 --> 00:52:42,640
in uniformed personnel and that 

1218
00:52:42,650 --> 00:52:45,750
fits that type of structure would fit 

1219
00:52:45,750 --> 00:52:48,820
well into an Army structure that looks 

1220
00:52:48,820 --> 00:52:52,180
at the whole soldier concept , the 

1221
00:52:52,190 --> 00:52:55,940
21st century soldier . So we are 

1222
00:52:55,940 --> 00:52:58,162
looking at the criminal component , but 

1223
00:52:58,162 --> 00:53:00,620
we're also looking at , uh , making 

1224
00:53:00,620 --> 00:53:03,470
soldiers mawr respectful of the 

1225
00:53:03,470 --> 00:53:06,700
contributions of other soldiers within 

1226
00:53:06,700 --> 00:53:10,060
their formation . And some of the other 

1227
00:53:10,070 --> 00:53:13,420
services do that well , and there's 

1228
00:53:13,420 --> 00:53:16,130
some aspects of what they do that we 

1229
00:53:16,130 --> 00:53:18,890
can bring in tow . What we do in the 

1230
00:53:18,890 --> 00:53:22,650
army . Okay , question in the room , 

1231
00:53:22,650 --> 00:53:24,690
Mr Glenn Michael in with Washington 

1232
00:53:24,690 --> 00:53:27,330
Times . It's one thing about Thio 

1233
00:53:27,340 --> 00:53:29,700
relieve for a bunch of kernels in 

1234
00:53:29,700 --> 00:53:31,589
general to be relieved . Is there 

1235
00:53:31,589 --> 00:53:33,644
anything in the report about sort of 

1236
00:53:33,644 --> 00:53:35,756
emphasizing the responsibility of the 

1237
00:53:35,756 --> 00:53:37,867
first line supervisors ? The ones who 

1238
00:53:37,867 --> 00:53:39,978
actually know something's happening ? 

1239
00:53:39,978 --> 00:53:41,978
The squad leader , platoon sergeant 

1240
00:53:41,978 --> 00:53:45,000
platoon leaders ? Or are because , I 

1241
00:53:45,000 --> 00:53:47,278
mean , they're the ones who would know . 

1242
00:53:47,278 --> 00:53:49,500
Well , know something's going on before 

1243
00:53:49,500 --> 00:53:51,667
a division commander will ever learn . 

1244
00:53:51,667 --> 00:53:53,833
Okay , I'll start there . This is Jack 

1245
00:53:53,833 --> 00:53:57,380
White again . The answer is yes . Uh , 

1246
00:53:58,150 --> 00:54:00,317
but let me take your question a little 

1247
00:54:00,317 --> 00:54:03,460
bit broader . Our question . Our 

1248
00:54:03,470 --> 00:54:07,270
mandate was not focused on attribution . 

1249
00:54:07,840 --> 00:54:11,160
Uh and we're very clear that the 

1250
00:54:11,160 --> 00:54:14,400
problem , the problems that we saw , 

1251
00:54:14,410 --> 00:54:18,340
our cultural , uh , and everybody 

1252
00:54:18,340 --> 00:54:22,230
is involved in culture from the highest 

1253
00:54:22,230 --> 00:54:25,360
levels to the one on one interaction 

1254
00:54:25,370 --> 00:54:28,320
between the squad leader and his or her 

1255
00:54:28,330 --> 00:54:31,610
squad member . We address all of it 

1256
00:54:31,620 --> 00:54:33,740
without attribution because 

1257
00:54:33,740 --> 00:54:36,900
accountability in that way was not our 

1258
00:54:36,900 --> 00:54:40,290
mandate that said yes . We focus on the 

1259
00:54:40,290 --> 00:54:44,280
importance of first line leaders 

1260
00:54:44,290 --> 00:54:46,670
knowing their soldiers and knowing 

1261
00:54:46,670 --> 00:54:50,480
where they are indeed , uh , part of 

1262
00:54:50,480 --> 00:54:53,810
what the d . O . D is focused on 

1263
00:54:53,820 --> 00:54:57,200
in You know , this whole movement 

1264
00:54:57,200 --> 00:54:59,760
toward violence prevention and looking 

1265
00:54:59,760 --> 00:55:02,870
at the whole soldier is just that those 

1266
00:55:02,870 --> 00:55:05,690
person to person interactions . And we 

1267
00:55:05,690 --> 00:55:07,746
address that in our report as well . 

1268
00:55:09,040 --> 00:55:11,040
Thank you . Let's go to the phone . 

1269
00:55:11,040 --> 00:55:13,151
David Bryant Killeen , Daily Herald . 

1270
00:55:13,151 --> 00:55:15,207
Are you on the phone ? Do you have a 

1271
00:55:15,207 --> 00:55:17,207
question ? Yes , Yes , yes . Dave , 

1272
00:55:17,207 --> 00:55:19,373
Brian , clean Daily Herald . Thank you 

1273
00:55:19,373 --> 00:55:21,707
for taking my question . Uh , they what ? 

1274
00:55:21,707 --> 00:55:23,818
I'm wondering . Have you all made any 

1275
00:55:23,818 --> 00:55:25,762
recommendations to ensure that the 

1276
00:55:25,762 --> 00:55:28,096
lower level units , such as your squads , 

1277
00:55:28,096 --> 00:55:30,262
platoons and companies actually comply 

1278
00:55:30,262 --> 00:55:32,318
with the recommendations that Joe of 

1279
00:55:32,318 --> 00:55:34,480
Yellow have made ? And looking at a 

1280
00:55:34,490 --> 00:55:36,960
couple of soldiers is just that . 

1281
00:55:38,740 --> 00:55:42,050
Well , I'm looking action , John . You 

1282
00:55:42,050 --> 00:55:43,050
want addresses ? 

1283
00:55:46,740 --> 00:55:49,290
So this I've you This is kind of tying 

1284
00:55:49,290 --> 00:55:51,512
in with the question you asked a little 

1285
00:55:51,512 --> 00:55:53,760
bit about the first line leaders . And 

1286
00:55:53,760 --> 00:55:55,816
when you have a chance to review the 

1287
00:55:55,816 --> 00:55:58,570
report in detail , you'll see as Jack 

1288
00:55:58,570 --> 00:56:00,626
said . And as Chris has said , there 

1289
00:56:00,626 --> 00:56:04,170
are a lot of details in there that go 

1290
00:56:04,230 --> 00:56:06,630
to the squad lever and the platoon 

1291
00:56:06,630 --> 00:56:09,750
sergeant , um , in this sense , when we 

1292
00:56:09,750 --> 00:56:11,583
were doing our interviews , both 

1293
00:56:11,583 --> 00:56:13,620
interviewed individually and from a 

1294
00:56:13,620 --> 00:56:15,731
group perspective . One of the things 

1295
00:56:15,731 --> 00:56:18,750
we heard over and over and over again 

1296
00:56:18,760 --> 00:56:21,750
from platoon sergeants and squad 

1297
00:56:21,750 --> 00:56:24,490
leaders was that they did not have the 

1298
00:56:24,490 --> 00:56:28,450
time , um , to really get to know their 

1299
00:56:28,450 --> 00:56:30,790
soldiers . And for those of us who had 

1300
00:56:30,790 --> 00:56:32,957
served in the military before , it was 

1301
00:56:32,957 --> 00:56:36,290
very , very shocking because we were . 

1302
00:56:36,300 --> 00:56:38,467
We grew up in a time when this platoon 

1303
00:56:38,467 --> 00:56:40,244
sergeants and squad leaders had 

1304
00:56:40,244 --> 00:56:42,840
sergeant time and they knew where their 

1305
00:56:42,840 --> 00:56:44,618
soldiers were . They knew their 

1306
00:56:44,618 --> 00:56:46,507
strengths , They knew about their 

1307
00:56:46,507 --> 00:56:48,507
families , and we heard that very , 

1308
00:56:48,507 --> 00:56:50,618
very frequently . So you'll see woven 

1309
00:56:50,618 --> 00:56:52,729
into the report . I wouldn't say that 

1310
00:56:52,729 --> 00:56:54,951
there is a specific accountability line 

1311
00:56:54,951 --> 00:56:57,320
directed right at the squad leader , 

1312
00:56:57,330 --> 00:56:59,441
but as you read the report , you will 

1313
00:56:59,441 --> 00:57:02,740
see that , as Chris indicated with 

1314
00:57:02,740 --> 00:57:04,573
Sharp and with some of the other 

1315
00:57:04,573 --> 00:57:07,360
programs , they weren't being , um , 

1316
00:57:08,330 --> 00:57:10,930
mandated down to below the brigade 

1317
00:57:10,930 --> 00:57:12,930
level . And that was certainly true 

1318
00:57:12,930 --> 00:57:15,900
with respect to the platoon sergeants 

1319
00:57:15,900 --> 00:57:18,470
and the squad leaders who , because of 

1320
00:57:18,470 --> 00:57:20,414
the operation tempo because of the 

1321
00:57:20,414 --> 00:57:22,192
requirements of maintenance and 

1322
00:57:22,192 --> 00:57:24,640
everything else , really , um , were 

1323
00:57:24,640 --> 00:57:28,000
unable or did not take the time because 

1324
00:57:28,000 --> 00:57:29,889
of all the other requirements and 

1325
00:57:29,889 --> 00:57:32,056
because it wasn't emphasized to get to 

1326
00:57:32,056 --> 00:57:35,790
know their soldiers , e , I will say , 

1327
00:57:35,800 --> 00:57:38,290
Just add . I think that the secretary 

1328
00:57:38,290 --> 00:57:40,470
in General McConnell are very much on 

1329
00:57:40,480 --> 00:57:42,550
on this topic . Uh , they've they've 

1330
00:57:42,550 --> 00:57:44,606
taken some steps already . They took 

1331
00:57:44,606 --> 00:57:46,494
some steps even after the interim 

1332
00:57:46,494 --> 00:57:50,060
briefing toe re emphasize the role of 

1333
00:57:50,060 --> 00:57:52,340
the CEOs and non commissioned officers , 

1334
00:57:52,340 --> 00:57:55,050
the first line supervisors and getting 

1335
00:57:55,050 --> 00:57:57,050
to know their soldiers . So if they 

1336
00:57:57,050 --> 00:57:59,050
happen to not report one day , they 

1337
00:57:59,050 --> 00:58:01,106
know exactly where to go to look for 

1338
00:58:01,106 --> 00:58:02,994
him . Because they know them well 

1339
00:58:02,994 --> 00:58:05,217
enough to know what's going on in their 

1340
00:58:05,217 --> 00:58:07,439
lives . For those of you on the phone , 

1341
00:58:07,439 --> 00:58:09,383
that was Mr White , followed by Mr 

1342
00:58:09,383 --> 00:58:11,439
Harmon , followed by Mr Swecker . We 

1343
00:58:11,439 --> 00:58:13,606
have time for one more question . Sick 

1344
00:58:13,606 --> 00:58:15,717
Christians in San Antonio and express 

1345
00:58:15,717 --> 00:58:15,380
news . Are you on the line ? Do you 

1346
00:58:15,380 --> 00:58:16,380
have a question ? 

1347
00:58:22,320 --> 00:58:25,870
No . Steve Campion , ABC , 13 . 

1348
00:58:25,870 --> 00:58:28,037
Houston . Are you on the line ? Do you 

1349
00:58:28,037 --> 00:58:30,850
have a question ? Yes , Steve . Camping 

1350
00:58:30,850 --> 00:58:32,961
here with ABC , 13 in Houston . We've 

1351
00:58:32,961 --> 00:58:34,906
spoken to a lot of the families of 

1352
00:58:34,906 --> 00:58:36,961
missing soldiers there at the base , 

1353
00:58:37,220 --> 00:58:39,442
including Vanessa here in Houston . And 

1354
00:58:39,442 --> 00:58:41,664
I wanted to see if you might be able to 

1355
00:58:41,664 --> 00:58:43,831
address this So many of them have told 

1356
00:58:43,831 --> 00:58:46,053
us when a soldier goes missing their on 

1357
00:58:46,053 --> 00:58:49,620
base , Uh , there wasn't a sense of 

1358
00:58:49,630 --> 00:58:52,140
urgency in finding that soldier . It 

1359
00:58:52,140 --> 00:58:54,140
was often seen that this person has 

1360
00:58:54,140 --> 00:58:56,310
gone AWOL . Can you give us a sense of 

1361
00:58:56,310 --> 00:58:59,260
what your review found in terms of 

1362
00:59:00,120 --> 00:59:03,860
that part of this equation ? Was there 

1363
00:59:03,870 --> 00:59:06,520
this lack of urgency to find soldiers 

1364
00:59:06,530 --> 00:59:08,550
who went missing their base ? 

1365
00:59:10,220 --> 00:59:12,240
Two things that we think really 

1366
00:59:12,240 --> 00:59:14,660
impacted that missing soldier Failure 

1367
00:59:14,670 --> 00:59:18,280
to report dynamic one waas we from what 

1368
00:59:18,280 --> 00:59:20,820
we saw and actually the gang case is a 

1369
00:59:20,820 --> 00:59:24,130
case study is an example of it . The 

1370
00:59:24,140 --> 00:59:27,750
the accountability for soldiers at the 

1371
00:59:27,750 --> 00:59:30,680
first muster or are the various musters 

1372
00:59:30,680 --> 00:59:32,940
during the day had slipped , 

1373
00:59:32,950 --> 00:59:36,490
particularly during cove it so And part 

1374
00:59:36,490 --> 00:59:38,940
of that is a function of the CEOs . Um , 

1375
00:59:39,320 --> 00:59:41,530
not again . Not necessarily knowing 

1376
00:59:41,530 --> 00:59:43,474
enough about their charges , their 

1377
00:59:43,474 --> 00:59:45,474
soldiers under their supervision to 

1378
00:59:45,474 --> 00:59:47,680
know what was normal , what was not in 

1379
00:59:47,680 --> 00:59:50,380
terms of not reporting . The second 

1380
00:59:50,380 --> 00:59:52,602
part of it was with all the regulations 

1381
00:59:52,602 --> 00:59:54,713
and all the protocols in the army and 

1382
00:59:54,713 --> 00:59:56,936
all the procedures there was none for a 

1383
00:59:56,936 --> 00:59:59,310
failure to report . There are rules and 

1384
00:59:59,310 --> 01:00:01,730
procedures around a wall and when to 

1385
01:00:01,730 --> 01:00:03,841
carry that as a status as a personnel 

1386
01:00:03,841 --> 01:00:05,870
status , their rules and procedures 

1387
01:00:05,870 --> 01:00:08,420
around when to carry someone a deserter 

1388
01:00:08,420 --> 01:00:11,760
when , uh , to put enter their names 

1389
01:00:11,760 --> 01:00:13,760
into the National Crime Information 

1390
01:00:13,760 --> 01:00:15,927
Center , N C I . C . Be on the lookout 

1391
01:00:15,927 --> 01:00:18,149
and that sort of thing . But they're at 

1392
01:00:18,149 --> 01:00:20,540
the front first line level each N c O 

1393
01:00:20,550 --> 01:00:22,606
had to rely on their own devices and 

1394
01:00:22,606 --> 01:00:24,383
their own judgment on their own 

1395
01:00:24,383 --> 01:00:26,494
experience as to whether that failure 

1396
01:00:26,494 --> 01:00:28,490
to report was under suspicious 

1397
01:00:28,490 --> 01:00:30,720
circumstances or circumstances where 

1398
01:00:30,720 --> 01:00:33,170
the soldier might be in jeopardy . And 

1399
01:00:33,180 --> 01:00:35,458
so it was a slippage of accountability , 

1400
01:00:35,458 --> 01:00:37,660
routine accountability , combined with 

1401
01:00:37,660 --> 01:00:39,850
no riel protocols and procedures in 

1402
01:00:39,850 --> 01:00:41,906
place for the N . C . O . S . In the 

1403
01:00:41,906 --> 01:00:44,820
first instance . So we described as an 

1404
01:00:44,820 --> 01:00:47,390
ad hoc response . Each response was 

1405
01:00:47,390 --> 01:00:49,446
different . There were no consistent 

1406
01:00:49,446 --> 01:00:51,557
responses they now have , and we have 

1407
01:00:51,557 --> 01:00:53,723
looked at the missing soldier protocol 

1408
01:00:53,723 --> 01:00:55,990
that they the army has put out , and 

1409
01:00:55,990 --> 01:00:58,157
it's a very good when it starts on our 

1410
01:00:58,157 --> 01:01:00,620
one . In any missing person case , the 

1411
01:01:00,620 --> 01:01:03,170
1st 24 hours is extremely critical . 

1412
01:01:03,180 --> 01:01:05,500
You can't get started 24 hours into it . 

1413
01:01:05,510 --> 01:01:08,150
You have to start on our one . So an 

1414
01:01:08,150 --> 01:01:10,261
hour or two . So that's where they're 

1415
01:01:10,261 --> 01:01:12,372
missing soldier protocol that they're 

1416
01:01:12,372 --> 01:01:14,594
They're promulgating now we think it is 

1417
01:01:14,594 --> 01:01:17,720
hits the mark . Thank you . That 

1418
01:01:17,730 --> 01:01:20,370
concludes this briefing . Thank you . 

1419
01:01:20,370 --> 01:01:22,148
To the members of the Fort Hood 

1420
01:01:22,148 --> 01:01:24,314
Independent Review Committee for their 

1421
01:01:24,314 --> 01:01:26,426
service on behalf of the Army . Thank 

1422
01:01:26,426 --> 01:01:30,240
you . Female on male correct 

1423
01:01:31,110 --> 01:01:33,054
male on female harassment . Or was 

1424
01:01:33,054 --> 01:01:34,490
there another type of 

1425
01:01:39,390 --> 01:01:40,740
but okay . Thank you .