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Mm . 

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The committee will come to 

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order . The committee meets today to 

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consider expected nomination of Dr 

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Kathleen Hicks to be deputy secretary 

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of defense . Thank you all for being 

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here today , Dr Hicks . Welcome . A 

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warm welcome to your husband , Thomas 

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Hicks . We're glad Thio have you both 

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with us today . And I'd like to 

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acknowledge your Children who I know to 

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be a source of great joy support you 

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both . Dr . Hicks , you'll be 

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introduced by former Secretary of 

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Defense Robert Gates , who joins us 

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virtually . Secretary Gates Air . You 

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on there ? 

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There . All right . 

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Secretary Yates . You hear me ? Yes , I 

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do . Mr . Chairman , you are recognized . 

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Oh , thank you . Chairman Inhofe , the 

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ranking member read distinguished 

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members of the Armed Services Committee . 

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It gives me great pleasure to introduce 

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my friend and former colleague Dr 

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Kathleen Hicks as the president's 

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nominee to be deputy secretary of 

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defense . When I was asked to remain a 

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secretary of defense by newly elected 

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President Obama in early 2000 and nine , 

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I welcome Dr Hicks into the Office of 

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the Secretary as deputy Undersecretary 

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for strategy plans and forces . At that 

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point , she'd already spent more than a 

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dozen years in OSD is a career civil 

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servant rising remarkably fast from 

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presidential management in turn to 

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senior executive service . As a result 

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of that experience , she hit the ground 

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running in 2000 and nine . Among other 

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monumental assignments , she led the 

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2010 Quadrennial Defense Review , a 

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huge and complex task involving 

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statutory requirements , service 

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equities , mountains of analysis and 

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innumerable organizational interests . 

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Preparing the QDR requires the 

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bureaucratic skill . Toe heard 

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countless defense officials , both 

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military and civilian , into one place , 

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getting them all to agree to a document 

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with significant future strategic and 

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budgetary implications . She did the 

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same with the national defense strategy 

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and other consequential intellectual 

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and bureaucratic achievement . In 

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addition , while I was secretary , Dr 

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Hicks spearheaded our work in thinking 

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through the long term challenge from 

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China , and she was in charge of 

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reviewing and preparing for my approval . 

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The military plans of the Combatant 

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Commander , one of Dr Hicks most 

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significant achievements is deputy 

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undersecretary began on my watch in 

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2011 . That spring , President Obama 

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asked me to reduce the defense budget 

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by $400 billion on top of the 400 

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billion we had already cut in 9 4010 . 

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I told the president I thought that was 

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a mistake , but of course we would do . 

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Is he directed ? I did persuading , 

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though , that prior to any such 

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reduction , we should have a strategic 

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review to determine just what the 

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implications of such a cut would be for 

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our military strength and what changes 

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in military strategy would be required . 

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I turned to the one person I thought 

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had the skill to leave such a high 

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stakes endeavor , and that was Dr Hicks . 

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Subsequent to my retirement is 

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secretary . In mid summer , 2011 

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Congress passed sequestration 

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legislation that cut another $600 

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billion from defense . That's the 

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strategic review I had signed to . Dr . 

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Hicks took on even greater importance . 

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The resulting defense strategic 

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guidance , issued in January 2012 , 

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preserve the sensible military strategy 

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while meeting congressional intent , an 

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extraordinary and rare feat at a time 

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of significant challenges 

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internationally and great uncertainty 

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surrounding defense budgets and 

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programs . Dr . Catholics is 

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exceptionally well qualified to assist 

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Secretary Austin in realistically 

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ensuring that budgetary decisions and 

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military strategy are integrated in 

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order to fully protect our country . 

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She also has the long experience within 

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and deep knowledge of the Department of 

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Defense , as well as the personal 

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leadership talent to bring together the 

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military and civilian leadership in 

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common purpose . And some . Dr Hicks is 

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a superb manager of complex processes 

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and large numbers of people and 

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organizations with competing interests 

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for her remarkable contributions to the 

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department . While I was secretary , I 

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presented Cath with Distinguished 

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Civilian Service Award , the highest 

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award for civilians in the Department 

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of Defense . In the citation I wrote , 

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Dr Hicks strengthened the civilian role 

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in the early phase of strategy and 

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force development , contingency 

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planning and the promulgation of key 

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department guidance . She skillfully 

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worked with the leadership and staff of 

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the combatant commands , the services , 

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the Joint Staff and the Office of the 

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Secretary of Defense to provide 

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superior and timely support to the 

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secretary on the full range of 

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strategic and programmatic challenges 

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confronting the department . It is with 

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pride and Dr Hicks and confidence in 

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her tough mindedness , her experience 

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and defense issues and strategy , and 

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her mastery of bureaucratic black arts 

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in the Pentagon that I introduced her 

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to you today . Hey , but well , thank 

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you very much , Secretary Gates . It's 

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an excellent introduction and who 

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further introduce and participation 

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introduction A Senator Shaheen . You 

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make remarks . Well , thank you very 

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much , Mr Chairman . And , um , Senator 

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Reid and members of the committee . I'm 

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really honored to be here alongside 

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Secretary Gates to introduce President 

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Biden's nominee to be the first woman 

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to serve as the deputy secretary of 

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defense , Dr Kathleen Hicks . This 

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nomination truly is historic , and if 

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approved , Dr Hicks would be the 

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highest ranking civilian woman to be 

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confirmed to serve at the Department of 

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Defense . Now , as we meet today , we 

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face complex and challenging national 

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security threats around the world . And 

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Dr Hicks , extensive career in national 

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security and at the Department of 

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Defense makes her well qualified not 

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only to confront these challenges but 

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also to handle the day to day 

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responsibilities of running the largest 

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federal bureaucracy . Uh , as I was 

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talking Thio folks about Dr Hicks , 

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she was described to me as someone who 

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grew up at the Pentagon and given that 

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she began , there is a civil servant in 

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1993 . I think that's a pretty accurate 

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description . From 2000 and 9 to 

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2012 , she served as the deputy 

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undersecretary of defense for strategy 

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plans and forces and his principal 

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deputy undersecretary of defense for 

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policy from 2012 to 2013 during the 

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Obama administration . And as we heard 

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from Secretary Gates , he gave , I 

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think about his glowing , uh , an 

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introduction , as I've heard on this 

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committee for anyone he has served with 

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before taking a lead role on the Biden 

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transition team , Dr Hicks served as 

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the senior vice president at the Center 

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for Strategic and International Studies . 

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I had an opportunity toe see her , 

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um , management experience and the 

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knowledge and her breath of national 

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security experience firsthand when we 

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participated in several panels together 

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at the Reagan National Defense Form , 

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and we discuss topics ranging from 

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everything about assessing our 

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footprint in the Middle East to nuclear 

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weapons . I also had a chance to see 

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very directly her leadership capacity 

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at CFCs when she played an instrumental 

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role in the signing into 

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law . The legislation that I worked on 

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the Serious Study Group which 

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ultimately produced recommendations and 

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a real comprehensive strategy to 

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address the conflict in Syria . Sadly , 

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um , our position on Syria changed 

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before many of those recommendations 

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could get implemented But not only is 

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Dr Hicks an expert on many of these 

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issues , she also understands the need 

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for more civilian engagement at the 

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Department of Defense . It's one of the 

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topics that we had the opportunity to 

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talk about several weeks ago , when we 

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were able to speak about some of the 

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challenges she will face at D . O D . 

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If she's confirmed , I'm confident that 

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Dr Hicks will be able to work alongside 

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Secretary Austin to address this 

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challenge and to improve civilian 

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military relations within the Pentagon . 

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Mr . Chairman and members of the 

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committee . I believe that Dr Hicks is 

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the right person for this job right now . 

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Her extensive Pentagon experience , her 

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command of the most challenging 

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national security threats make her a 

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fantastic choice for this role . And I 

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am so pleased to be able to be here to 

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introduce her this morning . And I 

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urged the committee to swiftly confirm 

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her . And let's get her back to the 

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Pentagon , where she could do the work 

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that needs to be done . Thank you very 

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much . Thank you . Thank you . Senator 

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Shaheen . Excellent introduction . I 

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agree with it all . Dr . Hicks , it's 

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ah standard for this committee . 

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There's some required questions that we 

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must ask you . And we ask that you 

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reply inaudible yes or no to each of 

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these questions . Okay . Have you 

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adhere to the ethical laws and 

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regulations governing conflicts of 

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interest ? Yes . Will you ensure that 

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your staff complies with deadlines 

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established for requesting 

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communications , including questions ? 

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For the record in hearings , Yes . Will 

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you cooperate in providing witnesses 

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and briefers in response to 

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congressional request ? Yes . Well , 

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you will those witnesses be protected 

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from Reprisal for their testimony or 

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briefings ? Yes . Do you agree , if 

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confirmed , to appear and testify upon 

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request before this committee ? Yes . 

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You agree to provide documents 

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including copies of electron Elektronik 

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forms of communication in a timely 

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matter when requested by a duly 

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constituted committee , or to consult 

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with the Committee regarding the basis 

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of any good faith , delay or denial in 

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providing such documents . Lastly , 

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have you assumed any duties or 

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undertaken any actions which would 

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appear to presume to to presume the 

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outcome of the confirmation process ? 

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No . Well , Dr Hicks , I don't have 

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to tell you that I believe that we're 

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in the most dangerous time arguably in 

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our lifetime . It's a the greatest 

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threat to united National Security 

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comes from China and Russia . That 

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won't change just because we've got a 

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new administration , the the 2000 and 

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18 national event strategy . And I 

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think of all the things that qualify 

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you for this . I think the fact that 

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you are one of the 12 authors of this 

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is most significant because these 12 , 

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6 Democrats , six Republicans , all 

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experts in the field drafted this 

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document that we have used , uh , 

281
00:12:04,640 --> 00:12:07,760
since 2018 . 

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Uh , if we are serious about the 

283
00:12:11,460 --> 00:12:13,627
security of our nation , and I believe 

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that you are , we must ensure a strong 

285
00:12:15,793 --> 00:12:18,016
national defense that will heater China 

286
00:12:18,016 --> 00:12:21,360
and Russia . Our other top order of 

287
00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:23,750
business must be making sure our troops 

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have the resource is they need to 

289
00:12:25,639 --> 00:12:28,440
achieve this strategy . Over the past 

290
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decade , as a result of the Budget 

291
00:12:30,384 --> 00:12:32,900
Control Act sequestration , the U . S . 

292
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Military has lost $550 billion of 

293
00:12:35,670 --> 00:12:38,750
planned spending readiness , plummeted 

294
00:12:39,050 --> 00:12:41,450
shortsighted cuts across the Pentagon , 

295
00:12:42,140 --> 00:12:45,040
drove talented service members to leave 

296
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and rendered Pentagon civilians unable 

297
00:12:47,690 --> 00:12:49,760
to conduct critical oversight 

298
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activities . As you pointed out , when 

299
00:12:53,290 --> 00:12:57,160
you helped put together the 

300
00:12:57,160 --> 00:13:00,140
National Defense Committee report , and 

301
00:13:00,140 --> 00:13:02,810
I'm quoting from it . Now . Civilian 

302
00:13:02,810 --> 00:13:05,800
voices have been relatively muted on 

303
00:13:05,810 --> 00:13:08,020
issues at the center of the U . S . 

304
00:13:08,020 --> 00:13:10,370
Defense and the national security 

305
00:13:10,370 --> 00:13:13,590
policy , undermining the concept of 

306
00:13:13,600 --> 00:13:16,850
civilian control . Modernization has 

307
00:13:16,850 --> 00:13:20,740
put on hold while our adversaries 

308
00:13:20,740 --> 00:13:22,760
rapidly jumped out ahead of us in 

309
00:13:22,770 --> 00:13:25,050
developing technologies like hyper 

310
00:13:25,050 --> 00:13:28,060
sonics and artificial intelligence to 

311
00:13:28,060 --> 00:13:30,650
exploit our vulnerabilities . I think 

312
00:13:31,040 --> 00:13:33,150
maybe the only one old enough to 

313
00:13:33,150 --> 00:13:36,650
remember . But ever since World War two , 

314
00:13:36,660 --> 00:13:39,060
we've been in a position Thio say that 

315
00:13:39,060 --> 00:13:41,171
we really had essentially the best of 

316
00:13:41,171 --> 00:13:44,070
everything and that cease to be true . 

317
00:13:44,080 --> 00:13:46,560
And we know what happened during the 

318
00:13:46,560 --> 00:13:48,560
Obama administration because I know 

319
00:13:48,560 --> 00:13:50,671
you're active there . But we actually 

320
00:13:50,671 --> 00:13:53,360
dropped our military funding by 25% 

321
00:13:53,740 --> 00:13:56,280
during the last five years of that 

322
00:13:56,280 --> 00:13:58,450
administration , which would have been 

323
00:13:58,940 --> 00:14:02,010
from 2000 10 

324
00:14:02,010 --> 00:14:04,950
2015 , um , 

325
00:14:05,840 --> 00:14:08,560
so that modernization was on hold for 

326
00:14:08,560 --> 00:14:10,782
decades . We starved investments in our 

327
00:14:10,782 --> 00:14:13,020
nuclear weapons and infrastructure . In 

328
00:14:13,020 --> 00:14:15,660
stark contrast , China and Russia 

329
00:14:15,670 --> 00:14:17,726
expanded their stockpiles , building 

330
00:14:17,726 --> 00:14:19,890
thousands of additional missiles to 

331
00:14:19,890 --> 00:14:21,834
threaten the United States and our 

332
00:14:21,900 --> 00:14:24,120
allies . In fact , during that time , 

333
00:14:24,240 --> 00:14:26,650
the five year period that I referred to 

334
00:14:27,040 --> 00:14:29,860
China actually increased their activity 

335
00:14:29,860 --> 00:14:33,650
by some 83% . What ? We have dropped 

336
00:14:33,660 --> 00:14:36,660
25% . The 

337
00:14:36,670 --> 00:14:40,460
2018 NDS and several years of 

338
00:14:40,460 --> 00:14:43,870
stable funding were the course 

339
00:14:43,870 --> 00:14:46,260
correction we needed . Our military has 

340
00:14:46,260 --> 00:14:48,371
started to recover , but still a long 

341
00:14:48,371 --> 00:14:50,260
ways to go . President Biden must 

342
00:14:50,260 --> 00:14:53,490
replace the five 150 billion of defense 

343
00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:57,000
funding cut by sequestration in 

344
00:14:57,000 --> 00:14:59,400
Congress . We need to work with him to 

345
00:14:59,400 --> 00:15:02,940
do so . This investment is down payment 

346
00:15:02,940 --> 00:15:04,829
required to maintain our position 

347
00:15:04,940 --> 00:15:07,107
against China and Russia over the next 

348
00:15:07,107 --> 00:15:09,051
several decades . It will give our 

349
00:15:09,051 --> 00:15:10,718
military leaders that the the 

350
00:15:10,718 --> 00:15:13,450
predictability and certainly that 

351
00:15:13,460 --> 00:15:16,690
they've asked for time and time again 

352
00:15:16,690 --> 00:15:19,030
in this very room , working with the 

353
00:15:19,030 --> 00:15:22,710
soon to be chairman , I will continue 

354
00:15:22,710 --> 00:15:25,550
to fight for this . And look , Dr Hicks , 

355
00:15:25,550 --> 00:15:27,383
our nation needs strong civilian 

356
00:15:27,383 --> 00:15:29,439
leadership at the Pentagon . You and 

357
00:15:29,439 --> 00:15:31,383
Secretary Austin must tackle these 

358
00:15:31,383 --> 00:15:33,383
problems head on , and we hope Thio 

359
00:15:33,383 --> 00:15:35,494
preserve and defend our way of life . 

360
00:15:35,494 --> 00:15:38,480
We can't afford to backslide I . This 

361
00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:41,060
will be my last meeting to actually 

362
00:15:41,060 --> 00:15:43,282
chair . And the chairmanship will go to 

363
00:15:43,540 --> 00:15:46,260
Senator Reid after this Senator Reid . 

364
00:15:47,140 --> 00:15:48,918
Well , thank you very much , Mr 

365
00:15:48,918 --> 00:15:51,084
Chairman , and I join you in welcoming 

366
00:15:51,084 --> 00:15:53,140
Dr Hicks to this morning's hearing , 

367
00:15:53,640 --> 00:15:56,620
and I want to thank her for her 

368
00:15:56,620 --> 00:15:59,050
willingness to serve again . She served 

369
00:15:59,050 --> 00:16:01,700
her entire life , it seems , in the 

370
00:16:01,700 --> 00:16:03,922
defense in the nation . Thank you again 

371
00:16:03,922 --> 00:16:06,200
for that . Let me welcome your husband , 

372
00:16:06,200 --> 00:16:08,422
Tom . I know your Children are watching 

373
00:16:08,422 --> 00:16:12,000
this avidly from afar and very proud of 

374
00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:13,944
their mother . Finally , I want to 

375
00:16:13,944 --> 00:16:15,667
recognize the and thank former 

376
00:16:15,667 --> 00:16:18,180
secretary defense Bob Gates for his 

377
00:16:18,190 --> 00:16:20,301
introduction , but more than that for 

378
00:16:20,301 --> 00:16:22,560
his extraordinary work as secretary of 

379
00:16:22,560 --> 00:16:24,890
defense under two presidents . He's 

380
00:16:24,890 --> 00:16:27,001
certainly example of the very best in 

381
00:16:27,001 --> 00:16:29,110
public service . And let me also 

382
00:16:29,110 --> 00:16:30,943
recognize and thank my colleague 

383
00:16:30,943 --> 00:16:32,888
Senator Shaheen for that wonderful 

384
00:16:32,888 --> 00:16:34,832
introduction . Thank you , Senator 

385
00:16:34,832 --> 00:16:36,666
Shaheen . Dr . Hicks is a highly 

386
00:16:36,666 --> 00:16:38,832
regarded national security and defense 

387
00:16:38,832 --> 00:16:41,054
policy expert with extensive experience 

388
00:16:41,054 --> 00:16:43,221
in government and the private sector . 

389
00:16:43,221 --> 00:16:44,943
She has served in senior level 

390
00:16:44,943 --> 00:16:47,110
positions in the department defense as 

391
00:16:47,110 --> 00:16:49,110
well as with public policy research 

392
00:16:49,110 --> 00:16:51,221
organizations , including here recent 

393
00:16:51,221 --> 00:16:53,110
tenure as a senior adviser at the 

394
00:16:53,110 --> 00:16:55,277
Center for Strategic and International 

395
00:16:55,277 --> 00:16:57,166
Studies . This committee has also 

396
00:16:57,166 --> 00:16:59,388
relied on Dr Hicks's expertise to shape 

397
00:16:59,388 --> 00:17:01,554
defense policy and conduct oversight . 

398
00:17:01,940 --> 00:17:03,884
Her testimony before the committee 

399
00:17:03,884 --> 00:17:05,884
helped inform the Goldwater Nichols 

400
00:17:05,884 --> 00:17:09,000
reforms included in the F Y 2017 

401
00:17:09,010 --> 00:17:11,232
National Defense Act , and she has also 

402
00:17:11,232 --> 00:17:13,550
testified on civil military relations . 

403
00:17:13,940 --> 00:17:15,940
Most recently , Dr Hicks serves the 

404
00:17:15,940 --> 00:17:18,162
member of the National Defense Strategy 

405
00:17:18,162 --> 00:17:20,300
Commission , which provided valuable 

406
00:17:20,300 --> 00:17:21,967
analysis for this committee's 

407
00:17:21,967 --> 00:17:24,189
consideration as we conducted oversight 

408
00:17:24,189 --> 00:17:26,940
on N . D s implementation . If 

409
00:17:26,940 --> 00:17:29,162
confirmed , Dr Hicks would be the first 

410
00:17:29,162 --> 00:17:31,650
woman confirmed by the Senate to serve 

411
00:17:31,660 --> 00:17:33,716
as the deputy secretary of defense . 

412
00:17:34,040 --> 00:17:36,040
She was exceptionally qualified for 

413
00:17:36,040 --> 00:17:37,984
this position . Her background and 

414
00:17:37,984 --> 00:17:40,250
expertise should serve her well . The 

415
00:17:40,250 --> 00:17:42,306
deputy secretary defense position is 

416
00:17:42,306 --> 00:17:44,472
complementary to the secretary defense 

417
00:17:44,472 --> 00:17:46,528
and equally critical . The deputy is 

418
00:17:46,528 --> 00:17:48,639
focused on the internal management of 

419
00:17:48,639 --> 00:17:50,306
the department , and it takes 

420
00:17:50,306 --> 00:17:52,250
considerable skill to administer a 

421
00:17:52,250 --> 00:17:54,417
large and diverse bureaucracy like the 

422
00:17:54,417 --> 00:17:56,417
Department of Defense . You've done 

423
00:17:56,417 --> 00:17:58,194
effectively . It can enable the 

424
00:17:58,194 --> 00:17:59,972
secretary to focus primarily on 

425
00:17:59,972 --> 00:18:01,750
establishing defense policy and 

426
00:18:01,750 --> 00:18:04,360
maintaining alliances and partnerships 

427
00:18:04,370 --> 00:18:06,770
while developing strategy to counter 

428
00:18:06,770 --> 00:18:09,270
our competitors . And one of the most 

429
00:18:09,270 --> 00:18:11,437
consequential decisions for the deputy 

430
00:18:11,437 --> 00:18:13,750
secretary of defense is how to allocate 

431
00:18:13,750 --> 00:18:15,972
budget resource is that the development 

432
00:18:15,972 --> 00:18:18,083
of weapons platforms and cutting edge 

433
00:18:18,083 --> 00:18:20,240
technologies this year will be an 

434
00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:22,407
inflection point in how the department 

435
00:18:22,407 --> 00:18:25,040
prioritizes the resource is and needs 

436
00:18:25,090 --> 00:18:27,330
to accomplish its missions . Given that 

437
00:18:27,330 --> 00:18:30,410
the fiscal year 2022 budget will not be 

438
00:18:30,410 --> 00:18:32,632
constrained by the Budget Control Act . 

439
00:18:33,140 --> 00:18:35,362
Dr . Hicks , as we discussed during our 

440
00:18:35,362 --> 00:18:37,307
office , called one of the primary 

441
00:18:37,307 --> 00:18:39,140
challenges you'll face is how to 

442
00:18:39,140 --> 00:18:41,960
transform how the department operates . 

443
00:18:42,340 --> 00:18:44,670
Transformation includes ensuring the 

444
00:18:44,670 --> 00:18:46,840
department is partially to face future 

445
00:18:46,840 --> 00:18:49,060
threats , which means harnessing 

446
00:18:49,070 --> 00:18:50,870
cutting edge technologies like 

447
00:18:50,880 --> 00:18:52,870
artificial intelligence , quantum 

448
00:18:52,870 --> 00:18:54,980
computing , biotechnology and 

449
00:18:54,980 --> 00:18:57,700
cybersecurity , while also divesting of 

450
00:18:57,700 --> 00:19:00,500
legacy systems that are not optimized 

451
00:19:00,500 --> 00:19:03,040
for future combat . A transformation 

452
00:19:03,040 --> 00:19:05,230
also includes becoming mawr efficient 

453
00:19:05,240 --> 00:19:07,560
in managing the back office of 

454
00:19:07,560 --> 00:19:09,449
literally one of the largest Arab 

455
00:19:09,449 --> 00:19:11,060
bureaucracies in the world . 

456
00:19:11,440 --> 00:19:13,662
Transformation of defensive argument is 

457
00:19:13,662 --> 00:19:15,829
not new , and it's been tried before , 

458
00:19:16,140 --> 00:19:18,510
but it had never . Lee faces obstacles . 

459
00:19:18,640 --> 00:19:20,600
One complication could be serviced 

460
00:19:20,600 --> 00:19:23,370
parochialism , as each military service 

461
00:19:23,370 --> 00:19:25,700
is responsible for the platforms that 

462
00:19:25,700 --> 00:19:28,033
are needed to meet mission requirements , 

463
00:19:28,033 --> 00:19:30,200
and each service has their favorites . 

464
00:19:30,440 --> 00:19:32,670
Such parochialism could also extend to 

465
00:19:32,670 --> 00:19:34,760
the civilian components of the OSD 

466
00:19:34,760 --> 00:19:37,270
staff , making efficiency initiatives 

467
00:19:37,270 --> 00:19:40,380
difficult . Also , the interest of 

468
00:19:40,380 --> 00:19:42,602
individual members of Congress can also 

469
00:19:42,602 --> 00:19:44,602
hinder change , particularly in the 

470
00:19:44,602 --> 00:19:47,040
retirement of legacy systems . Dr . 

471
00:19:47,040 --> 00:19:49,262
Hicks , I hope you will share with this 

472
00:19:49,262 --> 00:19:51,373
committee , your thoughts and how you 

473
00:19:51,373 --> 00:19:53,540
intend to manage this process . If you 

474
00:19:53,540 --> 00:19:55,596
are confirmed , the other issue will 

475
00:19:55,596 --> 00:19:57,762
need to immediately address is filling 

476
00:19:57,762 --> 00:19:57,190
the civilian vacancies in the 

477
00:19:57,190 --> 00:19:59,620
department and revitalizing civil 

478
00:19:59,620 --> 00:20:02,020
military relations . There are always 

479
00:20:02,020 --> 00:20:03,964
multiple positions that need to be 

480
00:20:03,964 --> 00:20:05,687
filled at the start of any new 

481
00:20:05,687 --> 00:20:07,464
administration . However , I am 

482
00:20:07,464 --> 00:20:09,131
concerned about the morale in 

483
00:20:09,131 --> 00:20:11,187
department , given that the previous 

484
00:20:11,187 --> 00:20:13,353
administration made a concerted effort 

485
00:20:13,353 --> 00:20:15,576
to leave multiple senior level civilian 

486
00:20:15,576 --> 00:20:17,810
officers unfilled , necessitating the 

487
00:20:17,810 --> 00:20:20,090
installment of career or mid level 

488
00:20:20,090 --> 00:20:22,300
officials into senior positions in an 

489
00:20:22,310 --> 00:20:24,970
acting capacity . Furthermore , large 

490
00:20:24,970 --> 00:20:27,137
numbers of experience career civilians 

491
00:20:27,137 --> 00:20:29,137
left the department during the past 

492
00:20:29,137 --> 00:20:30,970
four years , leaving a dearth of 

493
00:20:30,970 --> 00:20:33,137
expertise that increasing the workload 

494
00:20:33,137 --> 00:20:35,026
on those who remained . Secretary 

495
00:20:35,026 --> 00:20:37,081
Austin has pledged his commitment to 

496
00:20:37,081 --> 00:20:39,248
repairing civil military relations and 

497
00:20:39,248 --> 00:20:41,470
empowering civilians at all echelons of 

498
00:20:41,470 --> 00:20:43,692
department . And if you are confirmed , 

499
00:20:43,692 --> 00:20:45,803
you will be integral to this effort . 

500
00:20:45,803 --> 00:20:47,526
Finally , every member of this 

501
00:20:47,526 --> 00:20:49,526
committee wants to ensure that high 

502
00:20:49,526 --> 00:20:51,359
caliber candidates servant , the 

503
00:20:51,359 --> 00:20:53,303
department and we will continue to 

504
00:20:53,303 --> 00:20:55,137
fully evaluate and expeditiously 

505
00:20:55,137 --> 00:20:57,359
consider nominees for these positions . 

506
00:20:57,359 --> 00:20:59,359
Filling these vacancies quickly and 

507
00:20:59,359 --> 00:21:01,470
with capable and talented individuals 

508
00:21:01,470 --> 00:21:03,692
will ensure the department is operating 

509
00:21:03,692 --> 00:21:05,859
effectively . I want to thank Chairman 

510
00:21:05,859 --> 00:21:08,250
Herman in Hall for working to schedule 

511
00:21:08,250 --> 00:21:10,306
a prompt confirmation hearing for Dr 

512
00:21:10,306 --> 00:21:12,083
Hicks and Dr Hicks . If you are 

513
00:21:12,083 --> 00:21:13,972
confirmed to help , you will work 

514
00:21:13,972 --> 00:21:16,028
closely with Secretary Orson to fill 

515
00:21:16,028 --> 00:21:17,972
these positions and provide steady 

516
00:21:17,972 --> 00:21:20,250
leadership for department . Dr . Hicks , 

517
00:21:20,250 --> 00:21:22,194
we faced many challenges that will 

518
00:21:22,194 --> 00:21:24,083
require strong leadership and the 

519
00:21:24,083 --> 00:21:26,306
ability to make tough decisions . Thank 

520
00:21:26,306 --> 00:21:28,528
you again for your willingness to serve 

521
00:21:28,528 --> 00:21:30,694
our country . Thank you . Well , thank 

522
00:21:30,694 --> 00:21:33,700
you , Senator Reid , with some senators 

523
00:21:33,700 --> 00:21:37,110
attending remotely of , I want to let 

524
00:21:37,120 --> 00:21:39,009
everyone know how we're gonna run 

525
00:21:39,009 --> 00:21:41,176
things since it's not possible to know 

526
00:21:41,176 --> 00:21:43,398
exactly when our colleagues who will be 

527
00:21:43,398 --> 00:21:45,750
joining us via computer when they 

528
00:21:45,750 --> 00:21:47,861
arrive . We will not be following our 

529
00:21:47,861 --> 00:21:50,250
standard early bird timing rule instead . 

530
00:21:50,250 --> 00:21:53,320
Well , handle the order of questions by 

531
00:21:53,320 --> 00:21:56,110
seniority , alternating side to side . 

532
00:21:56,110 --> 00:21:58,850
Until we've going through everyone , we 

533
00:21:58,850 --> 00:22:00,739
would do the standard five minute 

534
00:22:00,739 --> 00:22:02,906
rounds . Now , as my colleagues on the 

535
00:22:02,906 --> 00:22:05,072
computers to please keep in eye on the 

536
00:22:05,072 --> 00:22:07,072
clock . But you should have on your 

537
00:22:07,072 --> 00:22:08,850
screen and finally to allow for 

538
00:22:08,850 --> 00:22:10,961
everyone to be heard , whether in the 

539
00:22:10,961 --> 00:22:12,961
room or on the computer . I ask all 

540
00:22:12,961 --> 00:22:15,070
colleagues to please mute your 

541
00:22:15,070 --> 00:22:17,770
microphones when you're not speaking , 

542
00:22:18,140 --> 00:22:20,610
Dr . Hicks will begin with your opening 

543
00:22:20,610 --> 00:22:23,330
statement . You are recognized well , 

544
00:22:23,330 --> 00:22:25,163
Good morning , Chairman Inhofe , 

545
00:22:25,163 --> 00:22:27,052
ranking member read and committee 

546
00:22:27,052 --> 00:22:29,540
members . I am honored to come before 

547
00:22:29,540 --> 00:22:31,870
you today As President Biden's nominee 

548
00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:34,770
for deputy secretary of defense , I'm 

549
00:22:34,770 --> 00:22:36,714
grateful to the committee for your 

550
00:22:36,714 --> 00:22:38,714
stewardship of the National Defense 

551
00:22:38,714 --> 00:22:40,659
Authorization Act over the past 60 

552
00:22:40,659 --> 00:22:43,000
years . You're effective . Bipartisan 

553
00:22:43,000 --> 00:22:45,056
governance is a ballast for American 

554
00:22:45,056 --> 00:22:47,810
national security . I want to thank you , 

555
00:22:47,810 --> 00:22:49,810
Senator Shaheen , for your words of 

556
00:22:49,810 --> 00:22:52,250
support . As the first woman elected to 

557
00:22:52,250 --> 00:22:54,083
the Senate from the state of New 

558
00:22:54,083 --> 00:22:56,306
Hampshire and the first woman to become 

559
00:22:56,306 --> 00:22:58,528
that state's governor , you are a model 

560
00:22:58,528 --> 00:23:00,806
to all those who aim to break barriers . 

561
00:23:01,040 --> 00:23:03,210
Secretary Gates , Thank you for your 

562
00:23:03,210 --> 00:23:05,321
generosity and introducing me . Today 

563
00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:07,751
was an honor to work for you when you 

564
00:23:07,751 --> 00:23:09,973
served a secretary . And if confirmed , 

565
00:23:09,973 --> 00:23:11,807
I hope to follow your example of 

566
00:23:11,807 --> 00:23:14,390
principled leadership . My deepest 

567
00:23:14,390 --> 00:23:16,501
thanks go to my husband , Tom , whose 

568
00:23:16,501 --> 00:23:18,557
love and support have been my anchor 

569
00:23:18,557 --> 00:23:20,830
for 27 years . Our greatest joy is our 

570
00:23:20,830 --> 00:23:22,997
three Children , who teach me patience 

571
00:23:22,997 --> 00:23:26,460
and humility . Routinely , I'm also 

572
00:23:26,460 --> 00:23:28,516
grateful for my large and formidable 

573
00:23:28,516 --> 00:23:31,490
Irish American family . My parents , 

574
00:23:31,490 --> 00:23:33,379
Lifetime of service to the United 

575
00:23:33,379 --> 00:23:35,101
States Navy set a standard and 

576
00:23:35,101 --> 00:23:37,230
selflessness for all of us . I am 

577
00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:39,407
honored to sit before you today in the 

578
00:23:39,407 --> 00:23:41,629
hopes of carrying on that family legacy 

579
00:23:41,629 --> 00:23:44,580
of service . If confirmed , I would be 

580
00:23:44,580 --> 00:23:46,636
returning to a department where over 

581
00:23:46,636 --> 00:23:48,580
much of the past three decades , I 

582
00:23:48,580 --> 00:23:50,810
worked alongside dedicated women and 

583
00:23:50,810 --> 00:23:53,980
men , civilian and military . I could 

584
00:23:53,980 --> 00:23:55,930
not be prouder at the prospect of 

585
00:23:55,930 --> 00:23:58,530
serving with them once more . The 

586
00:23:58,530 --> 00:24:00,419
overriding mission of the Defense 

587
00:24:00,419 --> 00:24:02,586
Department is to deter adversaries and 

588
00:24:02,586 --> 00:24:04,474
defend the United States center . 

589
00:24:04,474 --> 00:24:06,308
Citizens challengers who seek to 

590
00:24:06,308 --> 00:24:08,474
undermine America's interests by force 

591
00:24:08,474 --> 00:24:10,363
should never doubt our resolve or 

592
00:24:10,363 --> 00:24:12,790
readiness to thwart their aims . The 

593
00:24:12,790 --> 00:24:15,012
department is most effective when it is 

594
00:24:15,012 --> 00:24:17,179
working in concert with other tools of 

595
00:24:17,179 --> 00:24:19,570
national power . Our military strength 

596
00:24:19,580 --> 00:24:21,636
bolsters the work of our diplomats , 

597
00:24:21,636 --> 00:24:23,247
reinforces our alliances and 

598
00:24:23,247 --> 00:24:25,080
partnerships and strengthens our 

599
00:24:25,080 --> 00:24:28,550
prosperity . If confirmed , foremost 

600
00:24:28,560 --> 00:24:30,449
among my charges would be to help 

601
00:24:30,449 --> 00:24:32,449
translate the rhetoric of strategic 

602
00:24:32,449 --> 00:24:34,227
competition into the reality of 

603
00:24:34,227 --> 00:24:36,890
execution . China is the pacing 

604
00:24:36,890 --> 00:24:39,650
challenge of our time . Armed conflict 

605
00:24:39,660 --> 00:24:41,827
between the United States and China is 

606
00:24:41,827 --> 00:24:43,600
not desirable , and it is not 

607
00:24:43,600 --> 00:24:46,460
inevitable . The U . S military plays a 

608
00:24:46,460 --> 00:24:48,293
critical role in preventing that 

609
00:24:48,293 --> 00:24:51,770
outcome . We must stand ready today , 

610
00:24:51,950 --> 00:24:54,310
and we must modernize if deterrence is 

611
00:24:54,310 --> 00:24:57,160
to endure . If confirmed , I would seek 

612
00:24:57,160 --> 00:24:59,130
to increase the speed and scale of 

613
00:24:59,140 --> 00:25:01,920
innovation in our force . The Defense 

614
00:25:01,920 --> 00:25:03,980
Department cannot do this alone . It 

615
00:25:03,980 --> 00:25:06,380
must engage Congress , expand public 

616
00:25:06,380 --> 00:25:08,324
private partnerships and work with 

617
00:25:08,324 --> 00:25:11,670
America's allies and partners . Our 

618
00:25:11,670 --> 00:25:13,892
greatest military strength is America's 

619
00:25:13,892 --> 00:25:16,140
total force , supported by its military 

620
00:25:16,140 --> 00:25:18,790
families . We must not forget that the 

621
00:25:18,790 --> 00:25:20,679
Defense Department's workforce is 

622
00:25:20,679 --> 00:25:23,170
America's workforce . The pandemic has 

623
00:25:23,170 --> 00:25:25,530
tested the U . S military just as it 

624
00:25:25,530 --> 00:25:28,080
has tested all Americans . The Defense 

625
00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:30,080
Department has a vested interest in 

626
00:25:30,080 --> 00:25:32,247
leaning into covert response efforts , 

627
00:25:32,247 --> 00:25:34,247
as President Biden has directed and 

628
00:25:34,247 --> 00:25:36,980
Secretary Austin has committed . But 

629
00:25:36,980 --> 00:25:39,036
most challenges facing the force and 

630
00:25:39,036 --> 00:25:41,091
military families did not begin with 

631
00:25:41,091 --> 00:25:43,202
Cove it and they will not disappear . 

632
00:25:43,202 --> 00:25:45,210
It its end . If confirmed , I will 

633
00:25:45,210 --> 00:25:47,210
assist Secretary Austin in bringing 

634
00:25:47,210 --> 00:25:49,850
enduring consistent focus to total 

635
00:25:49,850 --> 00:25:53,170
force , health and quality . We must 

636
00:25:53,170 --> 00:25:55,170
address suicide and mental health , 

637
00:25:55,170 --> 00:25:57,300
housing , child care and food 

638
00:25:57,300 --> 00:25:59,750
insecurity . We must root out violent 

639
00:25:59,750 --> 00:26:02,590
extremism , systemic racism , sexual 

640
00:26:02,590 --> 00:26:04,550
assault and harassment and other 

641
00:26:04,550 --> 00:26:07,420
inhibitors to readiness and this is a 

642
00:26:07,420 --> 00:26:09,680
matter of readiness . We will not be 

643
00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:11,847
able to attract and retain the world's 

644
00:26:11,847 --> 00:26:14,013
finest force , one that represents our 

645
00:26:14,013 --> 00:26:15,680
democracy . If we cannot hold 

646
00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:17,624
accountable those who threaten its 

647
00:26:17,624 --> 00:26:19,960
viability from within , the department 

648
00:26:19,960 --> 00:26:21,627
must also manage its business 

649
00:26:21,627 --> 00:26:23,870
operations efficiently and in line with 

650
00:26:23,870 --> 00:26:26,760
performance goals . If confirmed , I 

651
00:26:26,760 --> 00:26:28,982
would build on existing efforts to make 

652
00:26:28,982 --> 00:26:31,204
clear and accountable progress toward a 

653
00:26:31,204 --> 00:26:33,660
clean audit . I would also immediately 

654
00:26:33,660 --> 00:26:35,104
assess the disposition of 

655
00:26:35,104 --> 00:26:37,327
responsibilities previously assigned to 

656
00:26:37,327 --> 00:26:39,438
the chief management officer and make 

657
00:26:39,438 --> 00:26:42,210
any adjustments needed . Our success in 

658
00:26:42,210 --> 00:26:44,377
meeting these goals requires a regular 

659
00:26:44,377 --> 00:26:46,432
in constructive dialogue between the 

660
00:26:46,432 --> 00:26:49,010
Department of Congress . If confirmed , 

661
00:26:49,020 --> 00:26:51,280
I will help Secretary Austin facilitate 

662
00:26:51,280 --> 00:26:53,520
communication and exchange with you and 

663
00:26:53,520 --> 00:26:55,780
your staff . The nation needs us to 

664
00:26:55,780 --> 00:26:58,110
work together . Members of the 

665
00:26:58,110 --> 00:27:00,450
committee . If confirmed , I would 

666
00:27:00,450 --> 00:27:02,006
bring to these challenges a 

667
00:27:02,006 --> 00:27:04,061
professional life spent committed to 

668
00:27:04,061 --> 00:27:06,006
improving the nation's defense . I 

669
00:27:06,006 --> 00:27:08,117
would bring an insider's knowledge of 

670
00:27:08,117 --> 00:27:10,560
the levers for action and an outsider's 

671
00:27:10,560 --> 00:27:12,910
drive for reform . I would bring a 

672
00:27:12,910 --> 00:27:15,021
commitment to restoring healthy civil 

673
00:27:15,021 --> 00:27:17,000
military dynamics and establishing 

674
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:19,900
regular order , and I would be proud to 

675
00:27:19,900 --> 00:27:22,067
put another crack in the glass ceiling 

676
00:27:22,067 --> 00:27:24,289
of the department I've spent most of my 

677
00:27:24,289 --> 00:27:26,910
adult life serving senators . I look 

678
00:27:26,910 --> 00:27:28,910
forward to your questions , and I'm 

679
00:27:28,910 --> 00:27:31,132
grateful for this time with you today . 

680
00:27:31,740 --> 00:27:34,350
Well , thank you very much , Dr Hicks . 

681
00:27:35,240 --> 00:27:38,990
Um , I'm going to cover four questions 

682
00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:41,770
real quickly . Thio kind of set this 

683
00:27:41,770 --> 00:27:43,860
thing off . First of all , on the 

684
00:27:43,860 --> 00:27:45,693
document that we referred to the 

685
00:27:45,693 --> 00:27:47,860
National Defense Strategy Commission . 

686
00:27:48,340 --> 00:27:51,620
To me , that's tells the whole world 

687
00:27:51,630 --> 00:27:54,270
the significance of the 12 people who 

688
00:27:54,270 --> 00:27:56,492
put this document together that we have 

689
00:27:56,492 --> 00:27:58,492
adhered to . Some people are saying 

690
00:27:58,492 --> 00:28:00,714
that it's it's maybe already outdated . 

691
00:28:00,714 --> 00:28:02,714
Since that was put together back in 

692
00:28:02,714 --> 00:28:05,140
2018 , I would ask the question , Does 

693
00:28:05,140 --> 00:28:07,307
it ? Well , first of all , there are a 

694
00:28:07,307 --> 00:28:09,473
lot of things that people keep talking 

695
00:28:09,473 --> 00:28:11,807
about on the floor about climate change . 

696
00:28:11,807 --> 00:28:13,920
And yet in no nowhere in the 

697
00:28:13,920 --> 00:28:16,920
commission's analysis can I find that 

698
00:28:16,930 --> 00:28:20,820
that phrase so in your view and given 

699
00:28:20,820 --> 00:28:23,098
your experience , is a member of the N . 

700
00:28:23,098 --> 00:28:27,060
D S commission does the 2018 

701
00:28:27,060 --> 00:28:29,140
India's accurately , it says the 

702
00:28:29,140 --> 00:28:31,740
current strategic threat that we're 

703
00:28:31,740 --> 00:28:35,580
faced with Senator 

704
00:28:35,590 --> 00:28:39,190
the 2000 and 18 nds , I think was , ah , 

705
00:28:39,200 --> 00:28:41,230
remarkable reflection of strong 

706
00:28:41,230 --> 00:28:43,480
bipartisan consensus around the growing 

707
00:28:43,480 --> 00:28:45,313
challenges presented by China in 

708
00:28:45,313 --> 00:28:47,536
particular , and also the opportunistic 

709
00:28:47,536 --> 00:28:49,870
challenges presented by Russia . And I 

710
00:28:49,870 --> 00:28:52,550
think those factors continue to endure . 

711
00:28:52,840 --> 00:28:54,618
The job of the National Defense 

712
00:28:54,618 --> 00:28:56,896
Strategy Commission was to evaluate um , 

713
00:28:56,900 --> 00:29:00,280
that NDS 2018 in Congress 

714
00:29:00,290 --> 00:29:02,780
has established a requirement every 

715
00:29:02,780 --> 00:29:04,560
four years for a new national , 

716
00:29:04,560 --> 00:29:07,090
different strategy . I would imagine 

717
00:29:07,090 --> 00:29:09,312
the Biden administration will be moving 

718
00:29:09,312 --> 00:29:11,220
quickly to undertaking a full 

719
00:29:11,220 --> 00:29:13,840
assessment not only of the 2018 

720
00:29:13,840 --> 00:29:16,062
document and hopefully the commission's 

721
00:29:16,062 --> 00:29:18,229
recommendations , but also the current 

722
00:29:18,229 --> 00:29:20,451
threat environment and other challenges 

723
00:29:20,451 --> 00:29:22,840
we face . Um , example , in addition to 

724
00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:25,062
climate might be co vid , which did not 

725
00:29:25,062 --> 00:29:27,173
appear in the 2018 document the world 

726
00:29:27,173 --> 00:29:29,710
changes on , we need to always be 

727
00:29:29,710 --> 00:29:31,988
assessing our forces against you Think ? 

728
00:29:31,990 --> 00:29:33,768
Well , what are the documents ? 

729
00:29:33,768 --> 00:29:36,670
Statements in this thing ? Document is 

730
00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:39,800
we would need to establish a really 

731
00:29:39,800 --> 00:29:43,030
growth of 3 to 5% . You still think 

732
00:29:43,030 --> 00:29:46,960
that's ah , a good goal , Senator . I 

733
00:29:46,960 --> 00:29:49,071
think that was an accurate reflection 

734
00:29:49,071 --> 00:29:51,680
of what it would take in a ballpark way 

735
00:29:51,690 --> 00:29:54,060
to meet the requirements of the 2018 

736
00:29:54,070 --> 00:29:57,850
nds as it was laid out . S o I stand by 

737
00:29:57,850 --> 00:29:59,850
that as a general rule of thumb for 

738
00:29:59,850 --> 00:30:02,280
that document . Okay ? And I'm gonna 

739
00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:04,280
cover to other areas real quickly . 

740
00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:06,400
Here , one I'm gonna quote from this 

741
00:30:06,410 --> 00:30:10,230
NDS quote . Civilian voices have been 

742
00:30:10,230 --> 00:30:12,370
relatively muted on issues at the 

743
00:30:12,370 --> 00:30:14,370
center of the U . S . Defense and 

744
00:30:14,370 --> 00:30:16,580
national security policy undermining 

745
00:30:16,580 --> 00:30:19,810
the concept of civilian control . And 

746
00:30:19,810 --> 00:30:23,720
we talked thio , uh , to General 

747
00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:26,670
Austin about this also , would you , uh , 

748
00:30:26,680 --> 00:30:30,400
give kind of what concrete steps would 

749
00:30:30,400 --> 00:30:33,130
you recommend to correct this ? If you 

750
00:30:33,130 --> 00:30:35,700
agree with this statement , I do agree 

751
00:30:35,700 --> 00:30:37,700
with that statement . And Secretary 

752
00:30:37,700 --> 00:30:41,460
Austin , um , senator has has laid out 

753
00:30:41,470 --> 00:30:43,690
already in his confirmation hearing , 

754
00:30:43,690 --> 00:30:45,746
and my understanding is in the steps 

755
00:30:45,746 --> 00:30:47,746
he's implementing in the department 

756
00:30:47,746 --> 00:30:49,801
several concrete approaches . One is 

757
00:30:49,801 --> 00:30:51,857
about who is in the room , who has a 

758
00:30:51,857 --> 00:30:54,320
seat at the table and whose voices are 

759
00:30:54,330 --> 00:30:57,190
engaged in major issues of force , 

760
00:30:57,190 --> 00:30:59,412
deployment and force operations as well 

761
00:30:59,412 --> 00:31:02,320
as policy . Andi , He's been very clear 

762
00:31:02,320 --> 00:31:04,153
that , if confirmed , that would 

763
00:31:04,153 --> 00:31:06,264
include me as the deputy secretary of 

764
00:31:06,264 --> 00:31:08,487
defense . His undersecretary of defense 

765
00:31:08,487 --> 00:31:10,890
for policy , when confirmed , would 

766
00:31:10,890 --> 00:31:14,010
also be a new important figure in that 

767
00:31:14,020 --> 00:31:16,950
alongside other civilian officials . 

768
00:31:17,640 --> 00:31:19,880
Very good . And lastly , I want to 

769
00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:22,440
mention the nuclear triad This is 

770
00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:24,329
something that most people , many 

771
00:31:24,329 --> 00:31:27,350
people , agrees significant 

772
00:31:28,240 --> 00:31:30,573
problem that we're faced with Right now . 

773
00:31:30,573 --> 00:31:32,796
We have both Russia and China . They're 

774
00:31:32,796 --> 00:31:34,907
modernizing , expanding their nuclear 

775
00:31:34,907 --> 00:31:37,540
forces as well as North Korea and some 

776
00:31:37,540 --> 00:31:39,262
others that are moving in that 

777
00:31:39,262 --> 00:31:43,120
direction . Also , Senator Secretary 

778
00:31:43,120 --> 00:31:44,960
Austin has recused himself , 

779
00:31:44,970 --> 00:31:48,580
potentially for the entire entirety of 

780
00:31:48,580 --> 00:31:50,691
his term as secretary of defense from 

781
00:31:50,691 --> 00:31:53,030
any matter involving Raytheon 

782
00:31:53,030 --> 00:31:55,630
Technologies . So understand that you 

783
00:31:55,630 --> 00:31:57,797
will be making the decisions for D . O 

784
00:31:57,797 --> 00:32:00,340
d . About the long range standoff 

785
00:32:00,350 --> 00:32:02,790
weapons , the ground base support . I'd 

786
00:32:02,790 --> 00:32:05,123
like to get you on the record right now . 

787
00:32:05,123 --> 00:32:07,346
Do you agree with the assessment of the 

788
00:32:07,346 --> 00:32:09,346
past secretaries of defense ? And I 

789
00:32:09,346 --> 00:32:11,770
believe Secretary Austin Aziz well , 

790
00:32:11,780 --> 00:32:13,836
that the modernizing of the nation's 

791
00:32:13,836 --> 00:32:16,060
nuclear forces is the critic most 

792
00:32:16,060 --> 00:32:19,670
critical national security priority and 

793
00:32:19,680 --> 00:32:21,910
including we're talking about the triad 

794
00:32:22,110 --> 00:32:25,900
of land , air and sea . Critics 

795
00:32:25,910 --> 00:32:28,200
quite often talk about that as if 

796
00:32:28,210 --> 00:32:30,321
that's you can get by with two out of 

797
00:32:30,321 --> 00:32:32,321
three , and I don't think you can . 

798
00:32:32,321 --> 00:32:34,543
What's your thought , Senator ? I think 

799
00:32:34,543 --> 00:32:36,710
first , that nuclear deterrence is the 

800
00:32:36,710 --> 00:32:38,543
cornerstone of American national 

801
00:32:38,543 --> 00:32:40,766
security . As long as there are threats 

802
00:32:40,766 --> 00:32:42,988
out nuclear threats out there and there 

803
00:32:42,988 --> 00:32:45,154
certainly are those . I also think the 

804
00:32:45,154 --> 00:32:47,377
Triad has been a secretary . Austin has 

805
00:32:47,377 --> 00:32:49,266
put it the bedrock of our nuclear 

806
00:32:49,266 --> 00:32:51,210
deterrent . And I think it must be 

807
00:32:51,210 --> 00:32:53,950
modernized in order to be safe , secure , 

808
00:32:53,960 --> 00:32:57,750
credible . Andi , I would just add that 

809
00:32:57,750 --> 00:32:59,750
I am worried about the state of the 

810
00:32:59,750 --> 00:33:02,280
readiness of the nuclear triad . And if 

811
00:33:02,280 --> 00:33:04,336
confirmed , that's an area . I would 

812
00:33:04,336 --> 00:33:06,502
want to get my team in place and start 

813
00:33:06,502 --> 00:33:08,224
to look at right away . That's 

814
00:33:08,224 --> 00:33:10,558
excellent . Thank you . You read . Well , 

815
00:33:10,558 --> 00:33:12,780
thank you very much , Mr Chairman . And 

816
00:33:12,780 --> 00:33:15,002
thank you , Dr Hicks . As I mentioned , 

817
00:33:15,002 --> 00:33:17,113
transformation is gonna be the one of 

818
00:33:17,113 --> 00:33:19,113
the key challenges you face . And I 

819
00:33:19,113 --> 00:33:21,280
alluded to some of the obstacles . The 

820
00:33:21,280 --> 00:33:23,447
services have favorite programs . Uh , 

821
00:33:23,447 --> 00:33:25,558
there's an aversion , a risk aversion 

822
00:33:25,558 --> 00:33:27,502
to gaps in capabilities . And then 

823
00:33:27,502 --> 00:33:29,002
there's also congressional 

824
00:33:29,002 --> 00:33:31,080
unwillingness to sacrifice platforms 

825
00:33:31,080 --> 00:33:33,300
that might be beneficial to their 

826
00:33:33,310 --> 00:33:36,090
locality . So can you give us an idea 

827
00:33:36,090 --> 00:33:38,312
of what specific actions you might take 

828
00:33:38,312 --> 00:33:41,170
to accelerate this transformation and 

829
00:33:41,540 --> 00:33:43,980
the challenges you anticipate facing , 

830
00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:48,960
Senator , I think one of the major 

831
00:33:48,970 --> 00:33:50,859
areas to look at our what are the 

832
00:33:50,859 --> 00:33:53,330
incentives for the services ? Obviously , 

833
00:33:53,330 --> 00:33:55,800
members of Congress , um industry , 

834
00:33:55,800 --> 00:33:58,660
other stakeholders and how do we work 

835
00:33:58,670 --> 00:34:01,120
on improving the alignment of those 

836
00:34:01,120 --> 00:34:03,510
incentives to get the kinds of outcomes 

837
00:34:03,510 --> 00:34:06,000
we need for the joint warfighter ? One 

838
00:34:06,000 --> 00:34:08,580
major area that I would like to explore , 

839
00:34:08,580 --> 00:34:11,240
if confirmed , is on concepts and joint 

840
00:34:11,240 --> 00:34:13,240
concepts . The vice chairman of the 

841
00:34:13,240 --> 00:34:15,240
Joint Chiefs of Staff has an effort 

842
00:34:15,240 --> 00:34:17,462
underway already in that area . I think 

843
00:34:17,462 --> 00:34:19,518
we can create more incentives . Thio 

844
00:34:19,518 --> 00:34:21,750
ensure that what we are pursuing in 

845
00:34:21,750 --> 00:34:23,917
terms of capabilities actually line up 

846
00:34:23,917 --> 00:34:26,410
to theories of victory . For how we're 

847
00:34:26,410 --> 00:34:28,466
trying to pace challenges from China 

848
00:34:28,466 --> 00:34:31,590
and Russia and alluding to China and 

849
00:34:31,590 --> 00:34:33,368
Russia and the national Defense 

850
00:34:33,368 --> 00:34:35,534
strategy as you indicated , it will be 

851
00:34:35,534 --> 00:34:37,146
revised shortly by the Biden 

852
00:34:37,146 --> 00:34:39,380
administration . Are there any 

853
00:34:39,390 --> 00:34:42,040
assumptions that you feel might have 

854
00:34:42,040 --> 00:34:44,920
changed since the last version and also 

855
00:34:44,930 --> 00:34:47,220
operational concepts ? This is not a 

856
00:34:47,220 --> 00:34:50,070
static situation . Much has happened in 

857
00:34:50,070 --> 00:34:53,610
the last several years on both sides or 

858
00:34:53,620 --> 00:34:56,470
all sides . I should say . Are there 

859
00:34:56,470 --> 00:34:58,780
any again assumptions that you might 

860
00:34:58,790 --> 00:35:01,600
sort of question or operational 

861
00:35:01,600 --> 00:35:04,350
concepts that have changed so that , uh , 

862
00:35:04,360 --> 00:35:06,740
it has an impact on the next four 

863
00:35:06,740 --> 00:35:09,550
statement ? Senator , I think I would , 

864
00:35:09,560 --> 00:35:11,710
if confirmed the to get in and really 

865
00:35:11,710 --> 00:35:14,090
look at the threat assessments , Um , 

866
00:35:14,100 --> 00:35:16,090
in terms of what we're seeing from 

867
00:35:16,090 --> 00:35:18,610
China , Russia and others , as well as 

868
00:35:18,610 --> 00:35:20,777
how the advancement of US capabilities 

869
00:35:20,777 --> 00:35:23,190
is going , Um , they're obviously 

870
00:35:23,190 --> 00:35:25,490
programs that I am not privy to in my 

871
00:35:25,490 --> 00:35:27,712
current capacity , that I would want to 

872
00:35:27,712 --> 00:35:29,712
understand better how they're being 

873
00:35:29,712 --> 00:35:32,070
integrated into departments thinking 

874
00:35:32,070 --> 00:35:34,190
about operational concepts . I would 

875
00:35:34,190 --> 00:35:36,140
say in general terms , areas that 

876
00:35:36,140 --> 00:35:37,990
concern me or quantum computing 

877
00:35:37,990 --> 00:35:40,750
advances , hypersonic missile 

878
00:35:40,760 --> 00:35:43,660
capabilities and technology and 

879
00:35:43,660 --> 00:35:46,010
challenges , perhaps to the US 

880
00:35:46,020 --> 00:35:48,131
asymmetric advantages in the undersea 

881
00:35:48,131 --> 00:35:51,370
domain . Well , that's very sensible . 

882
00:35:51,370 --> 00:35:54,950
And I think focusing on threats as a 

883
00:35:54,950 --> 00:35:57,260
driver of policy is probably the best 

884
00:35:57,260 --> 00:35:59,430
way to begin or not only policy , but 

885
00:35:59,430 --> 00:36:02,750
operational dispositions and force 

886
00:36:02,750 --> 00:36:04,583
structure . All of those will be 

887
00:36:04,583 --> 00:36:06,870
affected by what the threat is . And I 

888
00:36:06,870 --> 00:36:10,330
think again any analysis has to begin 

889
00:36:10,330 --> 00:36:12,330
with the assumptions , make sure we 

890
00:36:12,330 --> 00:36:14,340
have them , right ? Uh , one of the 

891
00:36:14,340 --> 00:36:17,960
other aspects of our national 

892
00:36:17,960 --> 00:36:19,849
security response to the whole of 

893
00:36:19,849 --> 00:36:21,738
government response . I think the 

894
00:36:21,738 --> 00:36:23,738
National Defense Strategy Report is 

895
00:36:23,738 --> 00:36:26,500
very much focused on the Department of 

896
00:36:26,500 --> 00:36:29,450
Defense and the military response , but 

897
00:36:29,460 --> 00:36:31,830
we have to , I believe , have a much 

898
00:36:31,840 --> 00:36:34,540
stronger whole of government effort . 

899
00:36:34,540 --> 00:36:37,560
Can you comment on that ? Yes , Senator , 

900
00:36:37,560 --> 00:36:39,671
If if we look at the challenges being 

901
00:36:39,671 --> 00:36:42,740
presented today , the good news is that 

902
00:36:42,750 --> 00:36:45,390
our strategic deterrent in the case of 

903
00:36:45,390 --> 00:36:47,650
nuclear weapons appears to be holding . 

904
00:36:48,130 --> 00:36:50,352
Um , the conventional deterrent appears 

905
00:36:50,352 --> 00:36:53,370
toe largely beholding . The result of 

906
00:36:53,370 --> 00:36:55,550
that strength , which is good for the 

907
00:36:55,560 --> 00:36:58,050
American people , is that adversaries 

908
00:36:58,050 --> 00:37:00,510
have toe look below the threshold of 

909
00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:02,464
conventional conflict . And we are 

910
00:37:02,464 --> 00:37:05,020
seeing that different terms . People 

911
00:37:05,020 --> 00:37:07,240
use malign influence , gray zone 

912
00:37:07,250 --> 00:37:09,550
threats . But certainly China and 

913
00:37:09,550 --> 00:37:11,494
Russia , in their ways , have been 

914
00:37:11,494 --> 00:37:13,980
pursuing these many of the solutions , 

915
00:37:13,990 --> 00:37:16,260
uh , to those gray zone challenges 

916
00:37:16,260 --> 00:37:18,204
which come in the form of economic 

917
00:37:18,204 --> 00:37:20,480
coercion , cyber threats , as we've 

918
00:37:20,480 --> 00:37:23,020
seen very recently from Russia . Um , 

919
00:37:23,030 --> 00:37:25,910
threats , even in space . A lot of the 

920
00:37:25,910 --> 00:37:28,300
answers to those start in the civil 

921
00:37:28,300 --> 00:37:30,244
society side . They start with the 

922
00:37:30,244 --> 00:37:32,450
strength of American democracy . They 

923
00:37:32,450 --> 00:37:35,290
start with our tools of statecraft and 

924
00:37:35,290 --> 00:37:37,512
how we build alliances and partnerships 

925
00:37:37,512 --> 00:37:39,401
to counter them . And the Defense 

926
00:37:39,401 --> 00:37:41,790
Department's typically in support for 

927
00:37:41,800 --> 00:37:44,360
many of those challenges . Well , 

928
00:37:44,360 --> 00:37:46,471
Doctor , I'm glad you alluded to your 

929
00:37:46,471 --> 00:37:48,638
Irish roots . Since we're both Irish , 

930
00:37:48,638 --> 00:37:50,804
we understand that our favorite harbor 

931
00:37:50,804 --> 00:37:53,680
is worrying . And after you worry about 

932
00:37:53,680 --> 00:37:55,847
your Children , I'm sure going to vote 

933
00:37:55,847 --> 00:37:57,902
most of the day , the worrying about 

934
00:37:57,902 --> 00:38:00,124
the Department of Defense . So I'm very 

935
00:38:00,124 --> 00:38:02,291
confident you'll do a good job . Thank 

936
00:38:02,291 --> 00:38:04,660
you . Thank you . Senator Reed . 

937
00:38:04,670 --> 00:38:08,480
Senator Wicker . Senator Wicker . Thank 

938
00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:10,770
you very much , Mr Chairman . And I'm 

939
00:38:10,770 --> 00:38:13,880
glad there is more than one person 

940
00:38:13,890 --> 00:38:16,530
worried in this room today . 

941
00:38:17,620 --> 00:38:19,731
And thank you for your willingness to 

942
00:38:19,731 --> 00:38:21,287
serve and thank you for the 

943
00:38:21,287 --> 00:38:23,509
conversation that we had early are very 

944
00:38:23,509 --> 00:38:25,870
much appreciate that I enjoyed , uh 

945
00:38:25,880 --> 00:38:29,340
your testimony and let me quote 

946
00:38:29,820 --> 00:38:31,931
China's military modernization is the 

947
00:38:31,931 --> 00:38:34,230
pacing challenge of our time . Armed 

948
00:38:34,230 --> 00:38:36,397
conflict between the United States and 

949
00:38:36,397 --> 00:38:38,710
China is not desirable , and it is not 

950
00:38:38,720 --> 00:38:41,890
inevitable . Would would you also agree 

951
00:38:41,890 --> 00:38:44,640
that it's not inconceivable ? I would 

952
00:38:44,640 --> 00:38:46,918
agree with that , Senator . Yes . Well , 

953
00:38:46,918 --> 00:38:49,840
eso let's let's worry about China 

954
00:38:50,320 --> 00:38:54,210
and and particularly this the Pacific . 

955
00:38:54,220 --> 00:38:57,470
But also I wanna ask you to be mindful 

956
00:38:57,470 --> 00:39:00,990
of Russia and the Black Sea and in that 

957
00:39:00,990 --> 00:39:04,780
area of threat also , how do you 

958
00:39:04,780 --> 00:39:06,780
view the growing imbalance of naval 

959
00:39:06,780 --> 00:39:09,760
forces and missile systems between the 

960
00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:13,110
United States and China ? Senator , I 

961
00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:15,176
first believe the United States must 

962
00:39:15,176 --> 00:39:17,400
have capable seapower . It must have a 

963
00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:21,370
qualitative advantage over adversaries . 

964
00:39:21,380 --> 00:39:24,070
Um , in order to achieve , protect its 

965
00:39:24,070 --> 00:39:26,410
interest , advance its interest . Um , 

966
00:39:26,420 --> 00:39:29,240
I do want to just say as an aside that 

967
00:39:29,250 --> 00:39:31,280
I think this committee in the House 

968
00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:33,502
Armed Services Committee for supporting 

969
00:39:33,502 --> 00:39:35,502
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative I 

970
00:39:35,502 --> 00:39:37,724
think if confirmed , that's a tool that 

971
00:39:37,724 --> 00:39:39,780
will be very helpful in building out 

972
00:39:39,780 --> 00:39:41,336
some initiatives , um , and 

973
00:39:41,336 --> 00:39:44,200
capabilities in this area . Um , my 

974
00:39:44,200 --> 00:39:46,367
understanding from the outside I'm not 

975
00:39:46,367 --> 00:39:48,367
privy again to the information that 

976
00:39:48,367 --> 00:39:51,340
that's available were I to be confirmed 

977
00:39:51,820 --> 00:39:54,080
is that the Chinese have , of course , 

978
00:39:54,080 --> 00:39:57,340
grown out the capacity of their , uh , 

979
00:39:57,350 --> 00:40:01,230
navy and their missile capability 

980
00:40:01,240 --> 00:40:03,400
based in in different domains , land 

981
00:40:03,400 --> 00:40:06,230
based , sea based onda . That's a very 

982
00:40:06,230 --> 00:40:08,286
worrisome trend line . I'm concerned 

983
00:40:08,286 --> 00:40:10,740
about the survivability of our naval 

984
00:40:10,740 --> 00:40:12,962
forces , and I'm concerned about making 

985
00:40:12,962 --> 00:40:16,160
sure we have them positioned and have a 

986
00:40:16,160 --> 00:40:18,300
concept for operating them . That can 

987
00:40:18,300 --> 00:40:20,467
be a war winning strategy . Okay , The 

988
00:40:20,467 --> 00:40:23,020
chairman had a conversation with you 

989
00:40:23,030 --> 00:40:25,520
about the national defense strategy 

990
00:40:25,710 --> 00:40:29,390
that's now three years old and will be 

991
00:40:29,400 --> 00:40:31,880
reviewed next year , or perhaps earlier 

992
00:40:31,880 --> 00:40:34,230
by the new administration . We have a 

993
00:40:34,230 --> 00:40:37,440
nef y 20 to 30 year shipbuilding plan 

994
00:40:37,910 --> 00:40:40,132
that was just released in December . So 

995
00:40:40,132 --> 00:40:42,360
it's only it's only two months old , 

996
00:40:42,370 --> 00:40:46,130
and it , um , calls for 

997
00:40:46,130 --> 00:40:49,580
405 man ships . By the year 

998
00:40:49,580 --> 00:40:53,040
2051 . It would add 82 new 

999
00:40:53,040 --> 00:40:56,940
ships between 2022 2026 

1000
00:40:57,310 --> 00:41:00,660
at a cost of $147 billion . By 

1001
00:41:00,660 --> 00:41:04,300
comparison , the Navy's F Y 21 budget 

1002
00:41:04,300 --> 00:41:08,140
request , projected to at only 44 

1003
00:41:08,140 --> 00:41:11,390
ships as compared to 82 at a cost 

1004
00:41:11,390 --> 00:41:14,130
$102 billion in the same timeframe . In 

1005
00:41:14,130 --> 00:41:17,180
other words , the Navy's F Y 20 to 30 

1006
00:41:17,180 --> 00:41:20,780
years shipbuilding plan shows an 86% 

1007
00:41:20,790 --> 00:41:22,790
increase in the number of ships the 

1008
00:41:22,790 --> 00:41:25,060
service would buy in the next five 

1009
00:41:25,060 --> 00:41:27,980
years and a 44% increase in funding of 

1010
00:41:27,980 --> 00:41:31,690
the same timeframe . Now , um , I think 

1011
00:41:31,690 --> 00:41:33,746
you told me that you've seen the non 

1012
00:41:33,746 --> 00:41:37,260
classified part of this plan , but not 

1013
00:41:37,260 --> 00:41:39,420
the classified . You'll soon be 

1014
00:41:39,420 --> 00:41:41,587
confirmed and and see the classified , 

1015
00:41:42,110 --> 00:41:45,960
Um , how how controlling do 

1016
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:49,180
you view this 30 year shipbuilding 

1017
00:41:49,180 --> 00:41:52,040
planet , which came from the previous 

1018
00:41:52,050 --> 00:41:54,880
administration ? And what do you plan 

1019
00:41:54,880 --> 00:41:57,300
to prioritize with regard to 

1020
00:41:57,300 --> 00:41:59,640
shipbuilding in the Defense Department ? 

1021
00:42:01,000 --> 00:42:03,280
senator , let me first say from the 

1022
00:42:03,290 --> 00:42:05,401
plan that raise released by the Trump 

1023
00:42:05,401 --> 00:42:07,457
administration in December , there's 

1024
00:42:07,457 --> 00:42:09,457
some really interesting operational 

1025
00:42:09,457 --> 00:42:11,401
themes that I'm attracted . Thio . 

1026
00:42:11,401 --> 00:42:13,457
There's a focus on increasing use of 

1027
00:42:13,457 --> 00:42:15,679
autonomy . There's a focus on dispersal 

1028
00:42:15,800 --> 00:42:17,744
of forces , and there's a focus on 

1029
00:42:17,744 --> 00:42:20,020
growing the number of small surface 

1030
00:42:20,020 --> 00:42:23,210
combatants relative to today . Um , but 

1031
00:42:23,210 --> 00:42:24,877
there are some things in that 

1032
00:42:24,877 --> 00:42:26,988
unclassified report as I mentioned to 

1033
00:42:26,988 --> 00:42:29,154
you that I saw as flags . Um , there's 

1034
00:42:29,154 --> 00:42:31,660
an indication that the information and 

1035
00:42:31,660 --> 00:42:34,490
there would require further analysis to 

1036
00:42:34,490 --> 00:42:37,590
validate the numbers . So if confirmed , 

1037
00:42:37,590 --> 00:42:40,340
I would want Thio get in there , get my 

1038
00:42:40,340 --> 00:42:42,580
team together . Certainly start to get 

1039
00:42:42,590 --> 00:42:44,646
our leadership for the Navy , put in 

1040
00:42:44,646 --> 00:42:47,220
place on the civilian side and assess , 

1041
00:42:47,500 --> 00:42:49,056
um , in accordance with the 

1042
00:42:49,056 --> 00:42:50,778
requirements that Congress has 

1043
00:42:50,778 --> 00:42:52,944
established for an f Y 22 shipbuilding 

1044
00:42:52,944 --> 00:42:55,520
plan . Assess that last document from 

1045
00:42:55,520 --> 00:42:57,631
the Trump administration and make any 

1046
00:42:57,631 --> 00:42:59,798
adjustments necessary . Just wanted to 

1047
00:42:59,798 --> 00:43:01,964
add that I would absolutely welcome if 

1048
00:43:01,964 --> 00:43:04,131
confirmed the opportunity to work with 

1049
00:43:04,131 --> 00:43:06,020
members of this committee to talk 

1050
00:43:06,020 --> 00:43:08,020
through what we are seeing as we're 

1051
00:43:08,020 --> 00:43:09,576
thinking ahead to what that 

1052
00:43:09,576 --> 00:43:11,798
shipbuilding plan should be . Okay , we 

1053
00:43:11,798 --> 00:43:13,909
will have further conversations about 

1054
00:43:13,909 --> 00:43:15,576
that . I appreciate it . Also 

1055
00:43:15,576 --> 00:43:17,687
appreciate the fact that in a foreign 

1056
00:43:17,687 --> 00:43:19,631
affairs piece you wrote , um , you 

1057
00:43:19,631 --> 00:43:21,798
stressed that the US will need to keep 

1058
00:43:21,798 --> 00:43:23,909
forces deployed overseas , especially 

1059
00:43:23,910 --> 00:43:26,730
in Asia and Europe . I agree with that . 

1060
00:43:27,100 --> 00:43:31,040
Um , much as Aziz , we might like 

1061
00:43:31,040 --> 00:43:32,929
to have savings there . I think , 

1062
00:43:32,929 --> 00:43:35,040
really , the long term savings in the 

1063
00:43:35,040 --> 00:43:37,151
long term deterrence , Uh , calls for 

1064
00:43:37,151 --> 00:43:39,470
that to continue . I'm gonna ask you 

1065
00:43:39,470 --> 00:43:42,570
thio to briefly discuss , uh , if 

1066
00:43:42,570 --> 00:43:44,850
you've looked at the two additional 

1067
00:43:44,850 --> 00:43:48,110
destroyers that wrote a Spain that are , 

1068
00:43:48,400 --> 00:43:50,620
um , in the works at this point , 

1069
00:43:51,400 --> 00:43:53,567
Senator , I haven't looked at that The 

1070
00:43:53,567 --> 00:43:55,844
decision making around that deployment . 

1071
00:43:55,844 --> 00:43:59,660
I'm aware that both of the value of 

1072
00:43:59,660 --> 00:44:02,870
Rhoda um and it's something that I 

1073
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:04,936
would want to look into as part of a 

1074
00:44:04,936 --> 00:44:06,713
holistic look , not only at our 

1075
00:44:06,713 --> 00:44:08,713
maritime presence , but our overall 

1076
00:44:08,713 --> 00:44:10,936
global posture to make sure we have the 

1077
00:44:10,936 --> 00:44:12,991
right forces in the right places for 

1078
00:44:12,991 --> 00:44:14,658
the kinds of contingencies we 

1079
00:44:14,658 --> 00:44:16,824
anticipate . Thank you , ma'am . Thank 

1080
00:44:16,824 --> 00:44:19,102
you . Senator Wicker . Senator Shaheen . 

1081
00:44:19,490 --> 00:44:22,180
Thank you again . Welcome . We're 

1082
00:44:22,180 --> 00:44:24,800
delighted that you're here on . We had 

1083
00:44:24,800 --> 00:44:26,856
the opportunity several weeks ago to 

1084
00:44:26,856 --> 00:44:28,967
talk about some of the challenges you 

1085
00:44:28,967 --> 00:44:32,410
will face if confirmed at D . O D . 

1086
00:44:32,790 --> 00:44:36,330
And I was very parochial in that call 

1087
00:44:36,330 --> 00:44:40,240
because I talked about the critical , 

1088
00:44:40,250 --> 00:44:43,900
um , aspect of New Hampshire's 

1089
00:44:43,900 --> 00:44:46,370
economy and our contributions to our 

1090
00:44:46,370 --> 00:44:48,990
national security . One of those is the 

1091
00:44:48,990 --> 00:44:51,490
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard , which is 

1092
00:44:51,490 --> 00:44:53,610
between New Hampshire and Maine , and 

1093
00:44:54,290 --> 00:44:56,012
Senator Wicker talks about the 

1094
00:44:56,012 --> 00:44:58,123
importance of the shipbuilding plan . 

1095
00:44:58,123 --> 00:45:00,123
But that ship building plan is only 

1096
00:45:00,123 --> 00:45:02,012
gonna work as well as we have the 

1097
00:45:02,012 --> 00:45:04,068
capacity to make sure that our ships 

1098
00:45:04,068 --> 00:45:07,830
and subs are modernized and restored . 

1099
00:45:08,040 --> 00:45:10,207
Something happens and we can keep them 

1100
00:45:10,207 --> 00:45:12,890
sailing . And I wonder if you can 

1101
00:45:12,900 --> 00:45:14,880
discuss the importance of the Navy 

1102
00:45:14,880 --> 00:45:16,936
Shipyard infrastructure optimization 

1103
00:45:16,936 --> 00:45:19,102
plan , which is so important right now 

1104
00:45:19,102 --> 00:45:21,324
we're seeing a dramatic increase in dry 

1105
00:45:21,324 --> 00:45:23,680
dock capacity because of that plan at 

1106
00:45:23,680 --> 00:45:27,000
Portsmouth . Thank you , Senator . I do 

1107
00:45:27,000 --> 00:45:29,167
think the sustainability It's not just 

1108
00:45:29,167 --> 00:45:30,722
the shipbuilding , it's the 

1109
00:45:30,722 --> 00:45:33,360
sustainability of our fleet . And both 

1110
00:45:33,360 --> 00:45:35,138
of those aspects are incredibly 

1111
00:45:35,138 --> 00:45:37,304
important . We need to have modernized 

1112
00:45:37,304 --> 00:45:39,500
depot capacity and capability to 

1113
00:45:39,500 --> 00:45:41,611
include in our naval shipyards . So I 

1114
00:45:41,611 --> 00:45:44,560
agree that it zgray tely important . I 

1115
00:45:44,560 --> 00:45:46,800
would need to if confirmed , understand 

1116
00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:49,410
better how well the optimization plan 

1117
00:45:49,410 --> 00:45:52,170
is working but I do think it appears 

1118
00:45:52,170 --> 00:45:54,226
from the outside that it's a step in 

1119
00:45:54,226 --> 00:45:56,392
the right direction . Thio . Make sure 

1120
00:45:56,392 --> 00:45:58,392
we have that sustainable capacity . 

1121
00:45:58,490 --> 00:46:00,490
Well , good . We'd love to have you 

1122
00:46:00,490 --> 00:46:02,323
come up and see it first hand in 

1123
00:46:02,323 --> 00:46:04,157
Portsmouth , where we think it's 

1124
00:46:04,157 --> 00:46:06,101
working very well . We also talked 

1125
00:46:06,101 --> 00:46:08,630
about the 157th Air Refueling Wing . 

1126
00:46:08,630 --> 00:46:11,070
That's at Peace Air National Guard Base , 

1127
00:46:11,070 --> 00:46:13,237
which you pointed out your husband has 

1128
00:46:13,237 --> 00:46:15,680
spent some time in is at peace when it 

1129
00:46:15,680 --> 00:46:18,870
was the former SAC Command . Um , and 

1130
00:46:18,880 --> 00:46:21,900
we're very proud that we were the first 

1131
00:46:21,910 --> 00:46:24,050
guard based to get those Casey 46 

1132
00:46:24,050 --> 00:46:26,730
tankers . Now , as you know , because 

1133
00:46:26,730 --> 00:46:29,060
of ah variety of challenges , including 

1134
00:46:29,060 --> 00:46:31,060
the most recent related to the room 

1135
00:46:31,060 --> 00:46:33,004
remote vision system , we're still 

1136
00:46:33,004 --> 00:46:35,410
waiting on those tankers to be 

1137
00:46:35,410 --> 00:46:39,320
operational . So will you commit to 

1138
00:46:39,330 --> 00:46:42,160
continuing to do everything you can to 

1139
00:46:42,160 --> 00:46:44,250
ensure that Boeing gets us those 

1140
00:46:44,250 --> 00:46:46,710
tankers operational a soon as possible ? 

1141
00:46:46,880 --> 00:46:49,670
I will , Senator , thank you very much . 

1142
00:46:49,680 --> 00:46:52,710
Um , we also talked about the 

1143
00:46:53,180 --> 00:46:56,870
role of women in defense , and 

1144
00:46:56,880 --> 00:46:59,510
I pointed out , as you already knew , 

1145
00:46:59,510 --> 00:47:01,454
the passage of the Women Peace and 

1146
00:47:01,454 --> 00:47:03,677
Security Act , which is designed to try 

1147
00:47:03,677 --> 00:47:06,680
and take make better use of the role 

1148
00:47:06,680 --> 00:47:09,030
that women can play , and particularly 

1149
00:47:09,030 --> 00:47:11,700
in conflict zones around the world . 

1150
00:47:12,280 --> 00:47:14,502
Can you talk about why you think that's 

1151
00:47:14,502 --> 00:47:17,140
important ? Absolutely . Senator 

1152
00:47:17,140 --> 00:47:19,251
Shaheen . First , I want to thank you 

1153
00:47:19,251 --> 00:47:21,307
for your work on the women peace and 

1154
00:47:21,307 --> 00:47:24,770
security legislation . The evidence , 

1155
00:47:24,780 --> 00:47:27,380
uh , that exists to date indicates that 

1156
00:47:27,380 --> 00:47:29,690
when women are engaged in peace and 

1157
00:47:29,690 --> 00:47:31,760
security matters that negotiated 

1158
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:34,630
settlements and enduring viable and 

1159
00:47:34,630 --> 00:47:37,610
enduring negotiated settlements arm or 

1160
00:47:37,620 --> 00:47:40,480
likely to come out , Um , what I 

1161
00:47:40,480 --> 00:47:42,591
understand the Defense Department has 

1162
00:47:42,591 --> 00:47:45,960
done already Thio put into place the 

1163
00:47:45,970 --> 00:47:47,970
legislative requirements is to have 

1164
00:47:47,970 --> 00:47:49,692
senior advisers at each of the 

1165
00:47:49,692 --> 00:47:51,859
combatant commands and some additional 

1166
00:47:51,859 --> 00:47:53,748
staffing within the office of the 

1167
00:47:53,748 --> 00:47:55,859
Secretary defense . I think those air 

1168
00:47:55,859 --> 00:47:58,026
are important steps . If confirmed , I 

1169
00:47:58,026 --> 00:48:00,248
would want to be able to understand how 

1170
00:48:00,248 --> 00:48:02,303
well that's working and what kind of 

1171
00:48:02,303 --> 00:48:05,290
voice those advisers and the folks who 

1172
00:48:05,290 --> 00:48:07,512
are staffing the secretary defense have 

1173
00:48:07,512 --> 00:48:10,170
in major considerations of peace and 

1174
00:48:10,170 --> 00:48:12,226
security . Well , thank you . I look 

1175
00:48:12,226 --> 00:48:14,337
forward to working with you on that , 

1176
00:48:14,337 --> 00:48:16,420
um , in response to , I think it was 

1177
00:48:16,430 --> 00:48:19,720
Senator Reid's question about how do we 

1178
00:48:20,620 --> 00:48:23,320
reduce ? How do we look at some of the 

1179
00:48:23,320 --> 00:48:25,376
big investments that we've made that 

1180
00:48:25,376 --> 00:48:28,130
may no longer be , Um , what we need to 

1181
00:48:28,130 --> 00:48:31,000
address the current times you talked 

1182
00:48:31,000 --> 00:48:33,300
about changing the incentives that we 

1183
00:48:33,300 --> 00:48:36,600
have . Can you give a little shed a 

1184
00:48:36,600 --> 00:48:38,600
little more light on ? Give me some 

1185
00:48:38,600 --> 00:48:40,656
examples of how you think that would 

1186
00:48:40,656 --> 00:48:43,330
work . Sure , Inside the defense 

1187
00:48:43,330 --> 00:48:46,520
Department an example is that when a 

1188
00:48:46,520 --> 00:48:48,960
system , if you will , is reduced in 

1189
00:48:48,960 --> 00:48:52,260
number or money is shifted that the 

1190
00:48:52,270 --> 00:48:55,240
service that has , um , you know , 

1191
00:48:55,250 --> 00:48:58,900
given up the capacity or the capability 

1192
00:48:59,070 --> 00:49:01,237
often believes that they will lose out 

1193
00:49:01,237 --> 00:49:03,403
overall and the incentive structure is 

1194
00:49:03,403 --> 00:49:06,000
built around budget share , I think 

1195
00:49:06,010 --> 00:49:08,010
first of all , we should make clear 

1196
00:49:08,010 --> 00:49:10,066
always from a leadership perspective 

1197
00:49:10,066 --> 00:49:12,288
that the incentive is about serving the 

1198
00:49:12,288 --> 00:49:14,454
joint warfighter . And we need to make 

1199
00:49:14,454 --> 00:49:16,232
sure we're promoting hiring and 

1200
00:49:16,232 --> 00:49:18,510
promoting , particularly in the senior , 

1201
00:49:18,510 --> 00:49:20,621
uh , general officer and flag officer 

1202
00:49:20,621 --> 00:49:22,970
ranks and our career civilians . That 

1203
00:49:22,980 --> 00:49:25,036
perspective . So the incentive start 

1204
00:49:25,036 --> 00:49:26,869
around promotion , but they also 

1205
00:49:26,869 --> 00:49:29,040
include how we keep the money , if you 

1206
00:49:29,040 --> 00:49:32,760
will , um , oriented towards services 

1207
00:49:32,760 --> 00:49:34,930
who are putting forward good ideas , 

1208
00:49:34,930 --> 00:49:36,930
even if those good ideas seem to go 

1209
00:49:36,930 --> 00:49:40,050
against ah vested interest I think when 

1210
00:49:40,050 --> 00:49:41,939
you're talking beyond the Defense 

1211
00:49:41,939 --> 00:49:44,160
Department first , the incentive and 

1212
00:49:44,170 --> 00:49:46,281
engagement between the department and 

1213
00:49:46,281 --> 00:49:48,440
Congress have to do with having a 

1214
00:49:48,440 --> 00:49:51,830
dialogue and not the department 

1215
00:49:51,840 --> 00:49:55,190
presenting its own fate accompli 

1216
00:49:55,270 --> 00:49:58,040
upon Congress . I think instead it's 

1217
00:49:58,040 --> 00:50:01,230
about a dialogue of how we move these 

1218
00:50:01,230 --> 00:50:03,700
joint capabilities forward and what 

1219
00:50:03,710 --> 00:50:06,300
kinds of approaches can be taken to 

1220
00:50:06,300 --> 00:50:08,540
help communities to help different 

1221
00:50:08,540 --> 00:50:10,151
parts of the design based or 

1222
00:50:10,151 --> 00:50:12,500
manufacturing base . Um , sometimes 

1223
00:50:12,500 --> 00:50:14,667
those solutions might be internal to D 

1224
00:50:14,667 --> 00:50:16,889
o D . And sometimes they might be about 

1225
00:50:16,889 --> 00:50:19,310
other in initiatives across the U . S . 

1226
00:50:19,310 --> 00:50:21,532
Government . And that's where D o . D . 

1227
00:50:21,532 --> 00:50:23,477
Will need to work closely with its 

1228
00:50:23,477 --> 00:50:25,643
partners in Department of Commerce and 

1229
00:50:25,643 --> 00:50:27,810
other , uh , state local governments . 

1230
00:50:27,810 --> 00:50:31,040
Small business initiatives to make sure 

1231
00:50:31,040 --> 00:50:33,780
we are part of the secretary . Excuse 

1232
00:50:33,780 --> 00:50:35,780
me , is President Biden puts it the 

1233
00:50:35,780 --> 00:50:38,058
build back . Better set of initiatives . 

1234
00:50:38,560 --> 00:50:40,671
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1235
00:50:40,671 --> 00:50:42,890
Thank you , Senator Shaheen . Now via 

1236
00:50:42,890 --> 00:50:46,860
WebEx , Senator Fisher . Thank 

1237
00:50:46,860 --> 00:50:49,280
you , Mr Chairman . Dr . Hicks . I 

1238
00:50:49,280 --> 00:50:51,860
appreciated our discussion of the 

1239
00:50:51,860 --> 00:50:54,210
importance of nuclear modernization 

1240
00:50:54,210 --> 00:50:56,970
yesterday , and I'd like to revisit a 

1241
00:50:56,970 --> 00:50:58,803
few of the questions in order to 

1242
00:50:58,803 --> 00:51:01,510
confirm your support record first . I 

1243
00:51:01,510 --> 00:51:03,710
do . Thank you for that support for 

1244
00:51:03,710 --> 00:51:06,330
maintaining an effective nuclear triad 

1245
00:51:06,330 --> 00:51:09,690
of land , air and sea based platforms . 

1246
00:51:10,360 --> 00:51:12,300
Do you also support moderate 

1247
00:51:12,310 --> 00:51:15,030
modernizing this triad as well as the 

1248
00:51:15,030 --> 00:51:17,030
infrastructure at the Department of 

1249
00:51:17,030 --> 00:51:19,200
Energy and the commanding control 

1250
00:51:19,200 --> 00:51:21,980
networks on which our nuclear forces 

1251
00:51:21,980 --> 00:51:25,930
depend ? I dio do you 

1252
00:51:25,930 --> 00:51:28,410
believe the reemergence of great power 

1253
00:51:28,410 --> 00:51:30,900
competition makes nuclear deterrence 

1254
00:51:30,910 --> 00:51:33,790
and therefore nuclear modernization 

1255
00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:36,330
increasingly important compared to 

1256
00:51:36,340 --> 00:51:40,340
previous eras , I think it makes it too 

1257
00:51:40,350 --> 00:51:44,100
remains the cornerstone . Do you 

1258
00:51:44,100 --> 00:51:46,300
believe reductions in nuclear forces 

1259
00:51:46,300 --> 00:51:49,500
should be made pursuant to a negotiated 

1260
00:51:49,510 --> 00:51:52,020
verifiable agreement ? In other words , 

1261
00:51:52,020 --> 00:51:55,790
not unilaterally . I do , senator . And 

1262
00:51:55,790 --> 00:51:57,957
do you believe the cost of our nuclear 

1263
00:51:57,957 --> 00:52:00,970
forces which including modernization , 

1264
00:52:00,970 --> 00:52:03,670
sustainment and operations , would 

1265
00:52:03,670 --> 00:52:06,540
consume less than 6.5% of the 

1266
00:52:06,540 --> 00:52:09,830
department budget at their peak ? And 

1267
00:52:09,830 --> 00:52:12,650
that is manageable center . I think our 

1268
00:52:12,650 --> 00:52:14,817
decisions on nuclear weapons should be 

1269
00:52:14,817 --> 00:52:18,260
driven foremost by strategy . Thank you , 

1270
00:52:18,750 --> 00:52:20,639
Dr Hicks , With the trains in the 

1271
00:52:20,639 --> 00:52:22,750
administration , opponents of nuclear 

1272
00:52:22,750 --> 00:52:25,230
weapons are renewing their arguments 

1273
00:52:25,240 --> 00:52:27,380
against elements of the triad and 

1274
00:52:27,380 --> 00:52:30,210
modernization programs , in particular 

1275
00:52:30,210 --> 00:52:33,250
the ICBM leg and the associative 

1276
00:52:33,250 --> 00:52:35,960
modernization program known as the G 

1277
00:52:35,960 --> 00:52:39,150
BSD in 2012 when you were in the 

1278
00:52:39,150 --> 00:52:40,928
department . This committee was 

1279
00:52:40,928 --> 00:52:43,039
considering your nomination to be the 

1280
00:52:43,039 --> 00:52:45,530
principal deputy undersecretary of 

1281
00:52:45,540 --> 00:52:48,490
defense policy , you stated in a 

1282
00:52:48,490 --> 00:52:50,870
written response for the record quote . 

1283
00:52:50,880 --> 00:52:53,170
Single warhead , I see P adverse 

1284
00:52:53,550 --> 00:52:56,670
tribute to stability and quote . Is 

1285
00:52:56,670 --> 00:52:59,550
that still your view ? Senator Fisher , 

1286
00:52:59,550 --> 00:53:01,828
May I ask you to repeat this statement ? 

1287
00:53:01,828 --> 00:53:04,180
I couldn't hear the quote . The quote 

1288
00:53:04,180 --> 00:53:08,010
was single Warhead ICBM's contribute 

1289
00:53:08,010 --> 00:53:11,100
to stability . I do agree with that 

1290
00:53:11,100 --> 00:53:14,740
statement . Some advocates are 

1291
00:53:14,740 --> 00:53:16,430
calling on the president put 

1292
00:53:16,430 --> 00:53:18,810
modernization programs on pause why 

1293
00:53:18,810 --> 00:53:20,880
they are reviewed . I find this 

1294
00:53:20,880 --> 00:53:22,824
especially concerning because what 

1295
00:53:22,824 --> 00:53:25,520
sounds like an innocents concept as the 

1296
00:53:25,520 --> 00:53:28,350
potential to break recapitalization 

1297
00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:31,270
schedule . We've repeatedly heard from 

1298
00:53:31,270 --> 00:53:33,470
Stratcom commanders that there is no 

1299
00:53:33,470 --> 00:53:35,620
additional margin in the schedule for 

1300
00:53:35,620 --> 00:53:37,710
the delay . Admiral Richard , the 

1301
00:53:37,710 --> 00:53:40,120
current Stratcom commander in his 

1302
00:53:40,120 --> 00:53:42,650
posture statement last year , testified , 

1303
00:53:42,650 --> 00:53:45,650
quote many of the modernization and 

1304
00:53:45,660 --> 00:53:48,940
sustainment efforts necessary to ensure 

1305
00:53:48,940 --> 00:53:51,890
the deterrence viability , have zero 

1306
00:53:51,890 --> 00:53:54,370
schedule margin and are late to need 

1307
00:53:54,370 --> 00:53:56,700
and quote . And he went on to state 

1308
00:53:56,700 --> 00:53:59,420
quote , We cannot afford more delays 

1309
00:53:59,420 --> 00:54:01,350
and uncertainty in delivering 

1310
00:54:01,350 --> 00:54:03,790
capabilities , and we must maintain a 

1311
00:54:03,800 --> 00:54:06,700
focus on revitalizing our nuclear 

1312
00:54:06,700 --> 00:54:09,010
forces and associated infrastructure . 

1313
00:54:09,010 --> 00:54:12,290
End quote That's been the consistent 

1314
00:54:12,290 --> 00:54:15,170
message since the Obama administration . 

1315
00:54:15,540 --> 00:54:17,800
We have already delayed , and we have 

1316
00:54:17,800 --> 00:54:19,820
deferred these programs as much as 

1317
00:54:19,820 --> 00:54:22,740
possible . And if we don't perceive 

1318
00:54:22,740 --> 00:54:25,690
with urgency , thes capabilities will 

1319
00:54:25,700 --> 00:54:28,570
age out and their replacements , they 

1320
00:54:28,570 --> 00:54:30,820
won't be available . That's something 

1321
00:54:30,820 --> 00:54:33,000
the less two administrations found 

1322
00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:36,470
completely unacceptable . Do you agree 

1323
00:54:36,840 --> 00:54:39,600
that allowing these capabilities to age 

1324
00:54:39,610 --> 00:54:41,970
into obsolescence is unaccepted ? 

1325
00:54:43,740 --> 00:54:46,770
Senator , I I was having a little 

1326
00:54:46,770 --> 00:54:48,992
trouble hearing you . I think the way I 

1327
00:54:48,992 --> 00:54:50,937
would respond to that is that I am 

1328
00:54:50,937 --> 00:54:53,159
concerned again about the modernization 

1329
00:54:53,159 --> 00:54:55,159
of the forest . I very much respect 

1330
00:54:55,159 --> 00:54:57,381
Admiral Richards . I think Stratcom has 

1331
00:54:57,381 --> 00:54:59,410
an important voice that this table 

1332
00:54:59,410 --> 00:55:01,900
should be respected and listened . Thio 

1333
00:55:01,910 --> 00:55:04,800
I if confirmed , I would need to get in 

1334
00:55:04,800 --> 00:55:06,967
and understand exactly what the status 

1335
00:55:06,967 --> 00:55:09,600
is and the to your point , the margin 

1336
00:55:09,600 --> 00:55:12,060
of error . Um , I don't think we should 

1337
00:55:12,070 --> 00:55:14,510
be risking the modernization of our 

1338
00:55:14,510 --> 00:55:16,940
deterrent , where that modernization 

1339
00:55:16,940 --> 00:55:19,470
actually challenges the quality of our 

1340
00:55:19,470 --> 00:55:23,430
strategic deterrent and Dr 

1341
00:55:23,430 --> 00:55:26,220
Hicks , our nuclear weapons production 

1342
00:55:26,220 --> 00:55:28,570
infrastructure . Much of it dates back 

1343
00:55:28,580 --> 00:55:31,250
to World War Two era of Manhattan 

1344
00:55:31,250 --> 00:55:33,760
Project . It's atrophy to the point 

1345
00:55:33,760 --> 00:55:36,260
where the United States is the only 

1346
00:55:36,270 --> 00:55:38,460
nuclear armed country in the world 

1347
00:55:38,840 --> 00:55:41,290
without the ability to produce a new 

1348
00:55:41,290 --> 00:55:43,960
weapon . Do you believe that the United 

1349
00:55:43,960 --> 00:55:47,510
States must rebuild and maintain the 

1350
00:55:47,510 --> 00:55:50,290
basic capabilities to design , 

1351
00:55:50,290 --> 00:55:53,700
manufacture and sustain and effective 

1352
00:55:53,700 --> 00:55:56,750
nuclear weapons stockpile to support 

1353
00:55:56,760 --> 00:55:59,050
our nation's deterrent ? I do . 

1354
00:56:00,330 --> 00:56:02,920
Thank you . I see my time is almost up 

1355
00:56:02,930 --> 00:56:06,830
by Appreciate your thoughtfulness . 

1356
00:56:06,840 --> 00:56:09,900
I appreciate your knowledge , and I 

1357
00:56:09,900 --> 00:56:12,011
look forward to you serving in this . 

1358
00:56:12,011 --> 00:56:14,178
Thank assassin . Thank you very much . 

1359
00:56:14,230 --> 00:56:16,286
Thank you . Senator Fisher . Senator 

1360
00:56:16,286 --> 00:56:19,520
Blumenthal . Thanks , Mr Chairman . 

1361
00:56:19,530 --> 00:56:21,740
Thank you for your service to our 

1362
00:56:21,740 --> 00:56:24,190
nation , Dr Hicks . Uh , I want to join 

1363
00:56:24,190 --> 00:56:26,910
him , thanking former Secretary Gates 

1364
00:56:26,910 --> 00:56:28,850
as well as my colleague , Senator 

1365
00:56:28,850 --> 00:56:30,950
Shaheen for their excellent 

1366
00:56:30,950 --> 00:56:32,920
introductions . And welcome your 

1367
00:56:32,920 --> 00:56:35,690
husband , Thomas . Well , as possibly 

1368
00:56:35,700 --> 00:56:38,790
your two sisters in West Hartford and 

1369
00:56:38,800 --> 00:56:41,150
your brother in New Haven , if they are 

1370
00:56:41,530 --> 00:56:43,641
listening , if not , please convey my 

1371
00:56:43,641 --> 00:56:46,650
regards to them . And they must be very 

1372
00:56:46,650 --> 00:56:49,480
proud of you , Aziz . Your whole family 

1373
00:56:49,480 --> 00:56:51,600
for your very distinguished service . 

1374
00:56:51,610 --> 00:56:53,510
Uh , I want to just begin with a 

1375
00:56:53,510 --> 00:56:57,160
comment because I read your 

1376
00:56:57,160 --> 00:56:59,950
remarks on the issue of sexual assault , 

1377
00:56:59,960 --> 00:57:02,870
which are very general . I will just be 

1378
00:57:02,870 --> 00:57:04,648
very blunt . As you know , this 

1379
00:57:04,648 --> 00:57:06,870
committee is accustomed to hearing very 

1380
00:57:06,870 --> 00:57:09,600
general remarks on this issue . For as 

1381
00:57:09,610 --> 00:57:11,832
long as I've been in the Senate , which 

1382
00:57:11,832 --> 00:57:13,888
is now 10 years , we've been hearing 

1383
00:57:13,930 --> 00:57:17,470
the same kind of generalities , and I 

1384
00:57:17,480 --> 00:57:19,670
don't mean to be rude , but sometimes 

1385
00:57:19,670 --> 00:57:22,250
they sound like good intentions , but , 

1386
00:57:22,830 --> 00:57:26,250
uh , a lot less action than there 

1387
00:57:26,260 --> 00:57:29,830
should be . So I'm hoping that your 

1388
00:57:29,830 --> 00:57:32,700
commitment on that issue will be 

1389
00:57:32,700 --> 00:57:35,210
sincere , vigorous and aggressive , as 

1390
00:57:35,210 --> 00:57:37,510
I expect it will be likewise on the 

1391
00:57:37,510 --> 00:57:40,080
issue of white supremacist ease . I'm 

1392
00:57:40,090 --> 00:57:42,650
very heartened by the remarks made by 

1393
00:57:43,130 --> 00:57:45,380
Secretary Austin as well as yourself on 

1394
00:57:45,380 --> 00:57:47,450
this issue , because I think that 

1395
00:57:47,830 --> 00:57:50,550
extremist ideology in the military , as 

1396
00:57:50,560 --> 00:57:52,900
any other phase of life has to be 

1397
00:57:52,900 --> 00:57:56,140
fought and overcome . I wanna 

1398
00:57:56,150 --> 00:58:00,070
focus on the issue of the 

1399
00:58:00,160 --> 00:58:02,327
Defense industrial base , as you and I 

1400
00:58:02,327 --> 00:58:04,930
discussed yesterday . The number of 

1401
00:58:04,930 --> 00:58:06,763
suppliers , for example , in the 

1402
00:58:06,763 --> 00:58:08,597
submarine program has diminished 

1403
00:58:08,920 --> 00:58:12,900
substantially over recent 

1404
00:58:12,900 --> 00:58:16,450
years , from about 17,000 in the 

1405
00:58:17,120 --> 00:58:19,176
period of a couple of decades ago to 

1406
00:58:19,176 --> 00:58:22,160
now a 5070% increase . Those numbers 

1407
00:58:22,160 --> 00:58:24,410
come from a recent G a O report . I 

1408
00:58:24,410 --> 00:58:26,680
raised them yesterday in a call with 

1409
00:58:26,680 --> 00:58:29,160
electric boat . They are extremely 

1410
00:58:29,160 --> 00:58:32,080
alarming to me . Your remarks , uh , 

1411
00:58:32,090 --> 00:58:35,780
indicate your commitment to aiding the 

1412
00:58:35,780 --> 00:58:37,947
small suppliers who are now struggling 

1413
00:58:38,220 --> 00:58:40,220
as a result of the pandemic and the 

1414
00:58:40,220 --> 00:58:43,060
economic crisis , but also developing 

1415
00:58:43,260 --> 00:58:46,830
new suppliers , returning with numbers 

1416
00:58:47,320 --> 00:58:49,530
of small startups and medium sized 

1417
00:58:49,530 --> 00:58:53,230
companies . And you remark that efforts 

1418
00:58:53,230 --> 00:58:55,990
so far have quote not yet led to the 

1419
00:58:55,990 --> 00:58:58,580
level of dynamism in the industrial 

1420
00:58:58,580 --> 00:59:01,670
base that we need end quote . So I'm 

1421
00:59:01,670 --> 00:59:04,600
hoping that you will focus on the 

1422
00:59:04,600 --> 00:59:07,040
supply chain that is so vitally 

1423
00:59:07,040 --> 00:59:09,730
important to major contractors like 

1424
00:59:09,740 --> 00:59:12,610
Electric Boat or Raytheon or any of our 

1425
00:59:12,610 --> 00:59:15,250
major sources of supply . 

1426
00:59:17,020 --> 00:59:19,330
Yes , Senator , if I may step back to 

1427
00:59:19,330 --> 00:59:21,810
address the first part of your of your 

1428
00:59:21,810 --> 00:59:24,260
comments on sexual assault could assure 

1429
00:59:24,260 --> 00:59:26,440
you as , ah , woman in modern American 

1430
00:59:26,440 --> 00:59:28,384
workplace and certainly a national 

1431
00:59:28,384 --> 00:59:30,440
security I to get tired of hearing a 

1432
00:59:30,440 --> 00:59:33,110
lot of talk that doesn't convert into 

1433
00:59:33,110 --> 00:59:35,900
actual change . I am very heartened by 

1434
00:59:35,900 --> 00:59:38,122
the fact that President Biden moved out 

1435
00:59:38,122 --> 00:59:41,230
quickly on this issue with his 90 day 

1436
00:59:41,230 --> 00:59:43,800
effort , and then Secretary Austin 

1437
00:59:43,810 --> 00:59:46,032
moved out himself inside the department 

1438
00:59:46,032 --> 00:59:49,830
with his memo . I was absolutely 

1439
00:59:49,830 --> 00:59:52,660
appalled , and , um , I think anyone 

1440
00:59:52,660 --> 00:59:54,882
who reads that Fort Hood a report would 

1441
00:59:54,882 --> 00:59:57,530
feel the same as Ideo at the failures 

1442
00:59:57,530 --> 00:59:59,530
we've experienced to date on sexual 

1443
00:59:59,530 --> 01:00:01,780
assault , and I think all good ideas 

1444
01:00:01,780 --> 01:00:03,891
should be on the table . We shouldn't 

1445
01:00:03,891 --> 01:00:05,947
be taking things off the table while 

1446
01:00:05,947 --> 01:00:08,113
we're looking for the best solutions . 

1447
01:00:08,113 --> 01:00:11,410
Um , on your point about consolidation 

1448
01:00:11,410 --> 01:00:13,410
of the industrial base . Yes , I am 

1449
01:00:13,410 --> 01:00:15,380
concerned . Some consolidation is 

1450
01:00:15,380 --> 01:00:17,590
probably inevitable . The Defense 

1451
01:00:17,590 --> 01:00:19,950
Department isn't sized , if you will , 

1452
01:00:19,950 --> 01:00:22,040
in many , many areas to maintain a 

1453
01:00:22,040 --> 01:00:25,680
large base . Um , but extreme 

1454
01:00:25,680 --> 01:00:27,736
consolidation does create challenges 

1455
01:00:27,736 --> 01:00:29,958
for innovation . My point on dynamism . 

1456
01:00:29,958 --> 01:00:31,958
You need to have a lot of different 

1457
01:00:31,958 --> 01:00:33,847
good ideas out there . That's our 

1458
01:00:33,847 --> 01:00:35,458
comparative advantage over a 

1459
01:00:35,458 --> 01:00:37,458
authoritarian states like China and 

1460
01:00:37,458 --> 01:00:40,170
Russia on DSO if we move all 

1461
01:00:40,170 --> 01:00:42,226
competition out , obviously that's a 

1462
01:00:42,226 --> 01:00:44,226
challenge , both the taxpayer . But 

1463
01:00:44,226 --> 01:00:46,337
it's also a challenge in terms of the 

1464
01:00:46,337 --> 01:00:48,503
innovation piece . So I would be happy 

1465
01:00:48,503 --> 01:00:50,670
if confirmed Senator toe work with you 

1466
01:00:50,670 --> 01:00:52,726
and your team on ways we can look at 

1467
01:00:52,726 --> 01:00:54,781
key parts of the industrial base and 

1468
01:00:54,781 --> 01:00:56,948
how we ensure there's a healthy supply 

1469
01:00:56,948 --> 01:00:59,420
chain . Thank you very much . Just one 

1470
01:00:59,420 --> 01:01:02,820
last question . Uh , on the issue 

1471
01:01:02,820 --> 01:01:06,430
of climate change and energy efficiency , 

1472
01:01:06,440 --> 01:01:08,640
you and I discussed this issue of some 

1473
01:01:09,110 --> 01:01:11,400
length . We don't have time today to 

1474
01:01:11,400 --> 01:01:13,511
continue that conversation , but I do 

1475
01:01:13,511 --> 01:01:15,233
hope to continue it . And very 

1476
01:01:15,233 --> 01:01:17,400
excitingly . You mentioned the idea of 

1477
01:01:18,110 --> 01:01:21,480
our fleet going possibly to electric 

1478
01:01:21,600 --> 01:01:24,440
power . Not surprising , given that 

1479
01:01:25,610 --> 01:01:27,820
automobile manufacturers are moving 

1480
01:01:27,830 --> 01:01:29,552
inexorably and quickly in that 

1481
01:01:29,552 --> 01:01:31,552
direction . GM very shortly , we'll 

1482
01:01:31,552 --> 01:01:34,440
have an all electric fleet . And maybe 

1483
01:01:34,440 --> 01:01:37,500
the Department of Defense can pursue 

1484
01:01:37,500 --> 01:01:39,444
that initiative as well . I see no 

1485
01:01:39,444 --> 01:01:41,720
reason why the Department of Defense 

1486
01:01:41,720 --> 01:01:44,320
can't have a fleet of vehicles that is 

1487
01:01:44,320 --> 01:01:47,290
all electric within a very foreseeable 

1488
01:01:47,300 --> 01:01:49,980
future . Would you agree ? Yes . 

1489
01:01:49,980 --> 01:01:52,210
President Biden and his executive order 

1490
01:01:52,210 --> 01:01:54,670
last week included a requirement on 

1491
01:01:54,670 --> 01:01:56,910
electric vehicle fleets . And if 

1492
01:01:56,910 --> 01:01:59,021
confirmed , that would be something I 

1493
01:01:59,021 --> 01:02:00,910
would wanna work on right away to 

1494
01:02:00,910 --> 01:02:03,021
determine the viability of that . The 

1495
01:02:03,021 --> 01:02:05,243
timeline for that for D o d . Thank you 

1496
01:02:05,243 --> 01:02:07,243
so much . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1497
01:02:07,243 --> 01:02:09,299
Thank you , Senator Blumenthal . Now 

1498
01:02:09,299 --> 01:02:11,520
via WebEx , Senator Cotton . 

1499
01:02:14,100 --> 01:02:16,520
Thank you , Mr Chairman . And thank you , 

1500
01:02:16,530 --> 01:02:18,940
Mrs Hicks , For your doctor Hicks for 

1501
01:02:18,940 --> 01:02:20,496
your appearance today . And 

1502
01:02:20,496 --> 01:02:22,662
congratulations on your nomination . I 

1503
01:02:22,662 --> 01:02:24,884
guess I am heartened by what I've heard 

1504
01:02:24,884 --> 01:02:26,940
you say , uh , to Senator Inhofe and 

1505
01:02:26,940 --> 01:02:29,107
Senator Fisher about our nuclear triad 

1506
01:02:29,107 --> 01:02:31,218
and our nuclear strategic deterrent . 

1507
01:02:31,218 --> 01:02:32,884
Andi , with Senator Fisher in 

1508
01:02:32,884 --> 01:02:34,884
particular , about the ground based 

1509
01:02:34,884 --> 01:02:36,996
strategic deterrent , the replacement 

1510
01:02:36,996 --> 01:02:39,051
for the Minuteman three . I do wanna 

1511
01:02:39,051 --> 01:02:41,162
get a little more specific about that 

1512
01:02:41,162 --> 01:02:43,162
because it's 50 years old and we've 

1513
01:02:43,162 --> 01:02:43,010
seen problems with structural fatigue 

1514
01:02:43,010 --> 01:02:45,288
and water intrusion and decayed wiring . 

1515
01:02:45,288 --> 01:02:47,510
The G A O is warning that we could lose 

1516
01:02:47,510 --> 01:02:49,870
confidence in the fleet by 2026 there 

1517
01:02:49,870 --> 01:02:52,000
five years from now , Congress has 

1518
01:02:52,000 --> 01:02:53,980
fully funded the G BSD , its 

1519
01:02:53,980 --> 01:02:56,202
replacement system in both military and 

1520
01:02:56,202 --> 01:02:58,147
civilian leaders have consistently 

1521
01:02:58,147 --> 01:03:00,313
warned that the service life extension 

1522
01:03:00,313 --> 01:03:02,480
of the Minuteman three is no longer an 

1523
01:03:02,480 --> 01:03:04,369
option , given that we have until 

1524
01:03:04,369 --> 01:03:05,980
recent years put off nuclear 

1525
01:03:05,980 --> 01:03:08,147
modernization for so long , the threat 

1526
01:03:08,147 --> 01:03:10,147
rising with China's crash , nuclear 

1527
01:03:10,147 --> 01:03:12,091
buildup and Russia's unconstrained 

1528
01:03:12,091 --> 01:03:14,369
tactical weapon inventory . Dr . Hicks , 

1529
01:03:14,369 --> 01:03:16,591
I want to know if you will fully commit 

1530
01:03:16,591 --> 01:03:18,702
to deploy the deployment of the G BSD 

1531
01:03:18,702 --> 01:03:20,960
on its planned schedule . Senator , 

1532
01:03:20,960 --> 01:03:23,790
I'll say again that I believe the Triad 

1533
01:03:23,790 --> 01:03:25,568
has been a bedrock for American 

1534
01:03:25,568 --> 01:03:27,780
security , and I am a big believer in 

1535
01:03:27,780 --> 01:03:29,836
the value of the nuclear deterrent . 

1536
01:03:29,836 --> 01:03:33,630
What I can't say today and until I have 

1537
01:03:33,630 --> 01:03:35,686
an opportunity . If I'm confirmed to 

1538
01:03:35,686 --> 01:03:38,170
get in and understand the state . Just 

1539
01:03:38,170 --> 01:03:40,650
Aziz , you are describing the the state 

1540
01:03:40,660 --> 01:03:42,771
of the various legs of the Triad , in 

1541
01:03:42,771 --> 01:03:44,993
this case , the state of the land based 

1542
01:03:44,993 --> 01:03:46,993
component . It's difficult for me . 

1543
01:03:46,993 --> 01:03:50,330
Thio assess exactly what the timeline 

1544
01:03:50,340 --> 01:03:52,640
and the margin , if you will is and 

1545
01:03:52,640 --> 01:03:54,870
also the technical feasibility issues 

1546
01:03:54,870 --> 01:03:57,037
not just resource issues but technical 

1547
01:03:57,037 --> 01:03:59,470
feasibility issues . But what I can 

1548
01:03:59,470 --> 01:04:01,192
promise is I am committed to a 

1549
01:04:01,192 --> 01:04:04,340
modernized , um , qualitatively 

1550
01:04:04,350 --> 01:04:07,180
effective deterrent . And , if 

1551
01:04:07,180 --> 01:04:09,291
confirmed , I'd be happy to work with 

1552
01:04:09,291 --> 01:04:12,550
members here on a discussion around 

1553
01:04:12,550 --> 01:04:14,383
what we're seeing and what those 

1554
01:04:14,383 --> 01:04:16,494
timelines look like . And making sure 

1555
01:04:16,494 --> 01:04:19,460
that the F Y 22 budget , um , pushes 

1556
01:04:19,470 --> 01:04:22,470
for the president's commitment to that 

1557
01:04:22,470 --> 01:04:24,900
nuclear deterrent at the same time that 

1558
01:04:24,900 --> 01:04:26,510
it's promoting America's 

1559
01:04:26,520 --> 01:04:30,300
nonproliferation agenda . Uh , 

1560
01:04:32,390 --> 01:04:34,650
that commitment to the deterrent 

1561
01:04:34,650 --> 01:04:37,600
includes the ground based leg deterrent . 

1562
01:04:37,610 --> 01:04:40,420
Correct ? Yes , Senator , I believe 

1563
01:04:40,420 --> 01:04:42,580
that our deterrent is strongest as a 

1564
01:04:42,580 --> 01:04:44,810
triad . I I understand that there will 

1565
01:04:44,810 --> 01:04:46,643
be a relook as there is in every 

1566
01:04:46,643 --> 01:04:49,140
administration at the various aspects 

1567
01:04:49,140 --> 01:04:51,490
of nuclear policy and modernization . I 

1568
01:04:51,490 --> 01:04:53,546
think that's appropriate . The Trump 

1569
01:04:53,546 --> 01:04:55,601
administration did that as well . Um 

1570
01:04:55,601 --> 01:04:57,823
But if you're asking my personal view , 

1571
01:04:57,823 --> 01:05:00,010
my view is that the we are the triad 

1572
01:05:00,010 --> 01:05:01,843
has served us very well . It has 

1573
01:05:01,843 --> 01:05:04,510
created stability , and it has a value . 

1574
01:05:05,590 --> 01:05:08,020
And I can understand your hesitation to 

1575
01:05:08,020 --> 01:05:10,140
make the commitment of the deployment 

1576
01:05:10,140 --> 01:05:12,760
on time . Given the Pentagon's long 

1577
01:05:12,760 --> 01:05:14,900
history of many programs running over 

1578
01:05:14,900 --> 01:05:18,670
time and over budget eso let's divide 

1579
01:05:18,670 --> 01:05:21,030
the reasons , uh , in half why you 

1580
01:05:21,030 --> 01:05:23,197
wouldn't make that commitment . One is 

1581
01:05:23,197 --> 01:05:25,141
the policy reason that some in the 

1582
01:05:25,141 --> 01:05:27,252
administration some of the Democratic 

1583
01:05:27,252 --> 01:05:29,252
Party , don't want to modernize the 

1584
01:05:29,252 --> 01:05:31,474
missile leg of triad . And then there's 

1585
01:05:31,474 --> 01:05:33,586
all the concerns about , as you say , 

1586
01:05:33,586 --> 01:05:35,586
the technical feasibility where the 

1587
01:05:35,586 --> 01:05:37,808
program is its financing and so forth . 

1588
01:05:37,808 --> 01:05:39,974
Is it the second concern that you have 

1589
01:05:39,974 --> 01:05:41,808
that , uh , because you hesitate 

1590
01:05:41,808 --> 01:05:43,863
towards making commitment towards on 

1591
01:05:43,863 --> 01:05:43,640
time delivery as opposed to the first , 

1592
01:05:43,650 --> 01:05:45,800
the ideological or the policy ? One 

1593
01:05:46,490 --> 01:05:48,950
senator is , ah , nominee for deputy 

1594
01:05:48,950 --> 01:05:51,550
secretary of Defense . I probably think 

1595
01:05:51,550 --> 01:05:53,772
of myself mostly in the former category 

1596
01:05:53,772 --> 01:05:55,994
in general . Yes , I would be very much 

1597
01:05:55,994 --> 01:05:57,772
focused on the viability of the 

1598
01:05:57,772 --> 01:06:00,510
programming element of this , and I 

1599
01:06:00,510 --> 01:06:02,677
would be in support of the secretary , 

1600
01:06:02,677 --> 01:06:04,843
of course , on the major policy issues 

1601
01:06:04,843 --> 01:06:07,360
regarding nuclear posture , where he 

1602
01:06:07,360 --> 01:06:10,120
seeks my advice . But as I as I said in 

1603
01:06:10,120 --> 01:06:12,420
my opening statement , I think my job 

1604
01:06:12,420 --> 01:06:14,740
is to make sure we can execute on the 

1605
01:06:14,740 --> 01:06:17,460
president's direction and on Secretary 

1606
01:06:17,460 --> 01:06:21,000
Austin's direction . Okay , well , what 

1607
01:06:21,010 --> 01:06:23,066
if confirmed ? I certainly hope that 

1608
01:06:23,066 --> 01:06:25,066
will be a very top priority to make 

1609
01:06:25,066 --> 01:06:27,010
sure all those programmatic , uh , 

1610
01:06:27,010 --> 01:06:29,066
issues , um , permit for the on time 

1611
01:06:29,066 --> 01:06:31,288
deployment of something critical to our 

1612
01:06:31,288 --> 01:06:33,343
national security . Dr . Hicks , you 

1613
01:06:33,343 --> 01:06:32,730
suggested something . Your answer that 

1614
01:06:32,730 --> 01:06:34,674
I want to touch on is well about a 

1615
01:06:34,674 --> 01:06:36,563
posture review . Will that by the 

1616
01:06:36,563 --> 01:06:38,397
administration conduct a nuclear 

1617
01:06:38,397 --> 01:06:40,619
posture review , as has been the custom 

1618
01:06:40,619 --> 01:06:42,730
for the last several new presidential 

1619
01:06:42,730 --> 01:06:44,841
administrations ? Senator Continent . 

1620
01:06:44,841 --> 01:06:46,897
That is my understanding . I I don't 

1621
01:06:46,897 --> 01:06:48,397
because I'm not inside the 

1622
01:06:48,397 --> 01:06:50,286
administration . I don't know the 

1623
01:06:50,286 --> 01:06:51,952
status of that , but it is my 

1624
01:06:51,952 --> 01:06:51,900
understanding that there is an 

1625
01:06:51,900 --> 01:06:54,260
intention to review nuclear posture as 

1626
01:06:54,260 --> 01:06:56,371
well as , of course , overall defense 

1627
01:06:56,371 --> 01:06:58,580
strategy . The latter part is a 

1628
01:06:58,590 --> 01:07:00,646
congressional mandated requirement . 

1629
01:07:01,080 --> 01:07:03,191
Thank you . One final question , like 

1630
01:07:03,191 --> 01:07:05,358
all administrations in the nuclear age 

1631
01:07:05,358 --> 01:07:07,469
to include the Obama administration , 

1632
01:07:07,469 --> 01:07:08,969
will be about , uh , Biden 

1633
01:07:08,969 --> 01:07:11,080
Administration declined to adopt a no 

1634
01:07:11,080 --> 01:07:13,247
first use policy for nuclear weapons . 

1635
01:07:13,480 --> 01:07:16,010
Senator , I can't speak Thio . How the 

1636
01:07:16,010 --> 01:07:18,232
by administration might ultimately come 

1637
01:07:18,232 --> 01:07:20,840
through its policy assessments with 

1638
01:07:20,840 --> 01:07:22,896
regard to either nuclear declaratory 

1639
01:07:22,896 --> 01:07:25,790
policy or other issues I have been on 

1640
01:07:25,790 --> 01:07:29,040
the record in the past is not being I 

1641
01:07:29,050 --> 01:07:31,480
don't believe new No first use policy 

1642
01:07:31,480 --> 01:07:33,647
is is necessarily in the best interest 

1643
01:07:33,647 --> 01:07:35,758
of the United States . But those will 

1644
01:07:35,758 --> 01:07:37,647
be decisions ultimately made , of 

1645
01:07:37,647 --> 01:07:39,591
course , by the president . Well , 

1646
01:07:39,591 --> 01:07:41,647
thank you . I hope you'll be a vocal 

1647
01:07:41,647 --> 01:07:43,647
voice for that and that people will 

1648
01:07:43,647 --> 01:07:46,220
listen to you . Thank you , Senator 

1649
01:07:46,220 --> 01:07:49,710
Cotton Via WebEx , Senator Gillibrand . 

1650
01:07:51,480 --> 01:07:54,120
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Andi , Thank 

1651
01:07:54,120 --> 01:07:57,030
you so much , dr . For being here . Um , 

1652
01:07:57,040 --> 01:07:59,096
I want to continue along the line of 

1653
01:07:59,096 --> 01:08:00,929
argument that I listened to from 

1654
01:08:00,929 --> 01:08:04,510
Senator Blumenthal . Andi , you did say 

1655
01:08:04,510 --> 01:08:06,288
that you reviewed the Fort Hood 

1656
01:08:06,288 --> 01:08:08,720
investigative report . Um , in that 

1657
01:08:08,720 --> 01:08:10,553
report , there was a significant 

1658
01:08:10,553 --> 01:08:13,590
recommendation on git said that 

1659
01:08:13,970 --> 01:08:16,160
Commander negligence at Fort Hood 

1660
01:08:16,160 --> 01:08:18,390
fostered a culture of violent crime , 

1661
01:08:18,390 --> 01:08:20,390
sexual assault and harassment . The 

1662
01:08:20,390 --> 01:08:23,970
investigators provided a solution quote 

1663
01:08:23,980 --> 01:08:26,750
to ensure objectivity and fairness . 

1664
01:08:26,750 --> 01:08:28,528
The sexual harassment , assault 

1665
01:08:28,528 --> 01:08:30,890
response or sharp program should 

1666
01:08:30,890 --> 01:08:33,150
operate independent from local commands 

1667
01:08:33,160 --> 01:08:36,730
and their legal advisers Dr Rick , Uh , 

1668
01:08:36,740 --> 01:08:39,320
do you think that if local commanders 

1669
01:08:39,320 --> 01:08:41,790
are not trusted to oversee Sharp that 

1670
01:08:41,790 --> 01:08:43,901
they should still get to decide which 

1671
01:08:43,901 --> 01:08:45,957
sexual assaults and complex criminal 

1672
01:08:45,957 --> 01:08:47,623
cases should go forward to be 

1673
01:08:47,623 --> 01:08:50,440
prosecuted ? Senator Gillibrand , let 

1674
01:08:50,440 --> 01:08:52,384
me just first , thank you for your 

1675
01:08:52,384 --> 01:08:54,496
leadership in general on this issue , 

1676
01:08:54,496 --> 01:08:56,440
As the Fort Hood report makes very 

1677
01:08:56,440 --> 01:08:58,496
clear . Even just in the one excerpt 

1678
01:08:58,496 --> 01:09:00,510
you've given , this isn't a problem 

1679
01:09:00,510 --> 01:09:02,940
that doesn't appear to be getting any 

1680
01:09:02,940 --> 01:09:06,210
better . Um , and we need to be really 

1681
01:09:06,220 --> 01:09:08,331
open . I think on the solutions , the 

1682
01:09:08,331 --> 01:09:10,276
levers , that will actually make a 

1683
01:09:10,276 --> 01:09:13,280
difference . Um , I am not a legal 

1684
01:09:13,280 --> 01:09:16,240
expert . I can't speak to the specifics 

1685
01:09:16,250 --> 01:09:18,980
of how the department at this point , 

1686
01:09:18,990 --> 01:09:20,768
you know , without being in the 

1687
01:09:20,768 --> 01:09:22,934
department how the department ought to 

1688
01:09:22,934 --> 01:09:25,046
move forward on those recommendations 

1689
01:09:25,046 --> 01:09:27,268
and in particular on the accountability 

1690
01:09:27,268 --> 01:09:28,823
side , um , prosecution and 

1691
01:09:28,823 --> 01:09:30,930
accountability side . But what I can 

1692
01:09:30,930 --> 01:09:32,652
say is that to the extent that 

1693
01:09:32,652 --> 01:09:36,130
Secretary Austin , um , eyes involving 

1694
01:09:36,130 --> 01:09:38,240
me in decisions relating thio 

1695
01:09:38,250 --> 01:09:40,028
accounting , sexual assault and 

1696
01:09:40,028 --> 01:09:42,028
harassment in the military that I'm 

1697
01:09:42,028 --> 01:09:44,850
very open to ideas even if they include 

1698
01:09:44,860 --> 01:09:48,140
removing the commander from from that , 

1699
01:09:48,150 --> 01:09:52,050
uh , prosecution chain mhm on The 

1700
01:09:52,050 --> 01:09:54,390
purpose of that would be to give the 

1701
01:09:54,390 --> 01:09:56,800
prosecution to trained military 

1702
01:09:56,800 --> 01:09:59,330
prosecutors who have had time to 

1703
01:09:59,330 --> 01:10:01,920
develop expertise in criminal law 

1704
01:10:01,930 --> 01:10:03,930
because right now , fewer cases air 

1705
01:10:03,930 --> 01:10:06,110
proceeding to trial and fewer cases or 

1706
01:10:06,110 --> 01:10:08,320
ending in conviction . And so as a 

1707
01:10:08,320 --> 01:10:10,520
result , we've seen a lessening of 

1708
01:10:10,530 --> 01:10:12,697
people's faith in the system . And the 

1709
01:10:12,697 --> 01:10:15,470
one recommendation that survivors and 

1710
01:10:15,480 --> 01:10:17,530
legal expert and advocates have 

1711
01:10:17,530 --> 01:10:19,350
recommended is allowing the 

1712
01:10:19,350 --> 01:10:21,517
professionalization of the prosecution 

1713
01:10:21,517 --> 01:10:24,760
of major crimes that have , um , jail 

1714
01:10:24,760 --> 01:10:26,649
time of more than a year . And so 

1715
01:10:26,649 --> 01:10:28,760
that's why this is the recommendation 

1716
01:10:28,760 --> 01:10:30,880
and for your benefit . We've put 

1717
01:10:30,880 --> 01:10:32,750
forward pretty much every other 

1718
01:10:32,760 --> 01:10:34,871
recommendation that the D . O . D has 

1719
01:10:34,871 --> 01:10:37,140
supported and turned it into law , and 

1720
01:10:37,140 --> 01:10:39,380
they have not changed these outcomes . 

1721
01:10:39,760 --> 01:10:41,927
Um , and the second thing that doesn't 

1722
01:10:41,927 --> 01:10:44,038
seem to matter is whether a secretary 

1723
01:10:44,038 --> 01:10:46,316
of defense takes this seriously or not , 

1724
01:10:46,316 --> 01:10:48,371
because every single one of them has 

1725
01:10:48,371 --> 01:10:50,427
said they've taken it seriously from 

1726
01:10:50,427 --> 01:10:53,060
Dick Cheney on and so promises empty 

1727
01:10:53,060 --> 01:10:55,227
promises are something that I hope the 

1728
01:10:55,227 --> 01:10:57,338
by administration does not tolerate , 

1729
01:10:57,560 --> 01:10:59,671
and I would like your commitment that 

1730
01:10:59,671 --> 01:11:02,090
you will really focus on this issue to 

1731
01:11:02,090 --> 01:11:04,034
make sure that we get to the right 

1732
01:11:04,034 --> 01:11:06,560
result where we can have a military 

1733
01:11:06,560 --> 01:11:08,940
justice system that is worthy of the 

1734
01:11:08,940 --> 01:11:11,051
sacrifices that the men and the women 

1735
01:11:11,051 --> 01:11:13,273
in our services make every single day . 

1736
01:11:13,860 --> 01:11:15,916
Senator , you have that commitment . 

1737
01:11:16,260 --> 01:11:19,130
Okay , I'd like to address now issues 

1738
01:11:19,130 --> 01:11:21,540
of cybersecurity . Last month that came 

1739
01:11:21,540 --> 01:11:23,484
to light that Russia had created a 

1740
01:11:23,484 --> 01:11:27,430
backdoor into computers of at least 250 

1741
01:11:27,430 --> 01:11:30,240
agencies for nine months and possibly 

1742
01:11:30,240 --> 01:11:32,770
still , they've been able to monitor 

1743
01:11:32,780 --> 01:11:35,160
computer activity and steal data that 

1744
01:11:35,160 --> 01:11:38,480
has come , uh , to our attention . So , 

1745
01:11:39,760 --> 01:11:43,700
um , a private company fire . I brought 

1746
01:11:43,700 --> 01:11:45,970
that to our attention , not the d o d . 

1747
01:11:46,460 --> 01:11:49,500
This comes on Lee , after two years 

1748
01:11:49,500 --> 01:11:51,620
that our cyber posture review found 

1749
01:11:51,630 --> 01:11:54,250
that we've had difficulties with D o d 

1750
01:11:54,250 --> 01:11:56,740
cyberspace operations ability to 

1751
01:11:56,740 --> 01:11:58,870
prevent malign activity from our 

1752
01:11:58,880 --> 01:12:01,950
adversaries . Now , we've had several 

1753
01:12:01,960 --> 01:12:04,071
hearings on this , and we've had lots 

1754
01:12:04,071 --> 01:12:07,480
of proposed changes . One proposal is 

1755
01:12:07,480 --> 01:12:09,536
to increase the role of the National 

1756
01:12:09,536 --> 01:12:11,536
Guard so that cybersecurity experts 

1757
01:12:11,536 --> 01:12:13,536
could maintain their day jobs while 

1758
01:12:13,536 --> 01:12:15,758
also serving the country . Do you think 

1759
01:12:15,758 --> 01:12:17,980
this is a tool that could be useful for 

1760
01:12:17,980 --> 01:12:20,030
this problem center ? I think the 

1761
01:12:20,030 --> 01:12:23,120
National Guard can bring , um uh , 

1762
01:12:23,130 --> 01:12:25,130
specialized capabilities in exactly 

1763
01:12:25,130 --> 01:12:26,852
these types of areas where the 

1764
01:12:26,852 --> 01:12:28,963
commercial sector to your point about 

1765
01:12:28,963 --> 01:12:31,074
fireeye , where the commercial sector 

1766
01:12:31,074 --> 01:12:32,908
is sometimes out in front of the 

1767
01:12:32,908 --> 01:12:35,130
federal government . So it does seem to 

1768
01:12:35,130 --> 01:12:37,186
be at first glance that the National 

1769
01:12:37,186 --> 01:12:39,297
Guard could be helpful in this area . 

1770
01:12:39,950 --> 01:12:43,460
Last one Touch on Diversity 

1771
01:12:43,470 --> 01:12:45,470
Recently , the D . O . D released a 

1772
01:12:45,470 --> 01:12:49,130
2017 survey that showed 24.4% of 

1773
01:12:49,140 --> 01:12:51,196
active duty Minority Service members 

1774
01:12:51,196 --> 01:12:52,640
experienced harassment or 

1775
01:12:52,640 --> 01:12:55,690
discrimination , but only 26% reported 

1776
01:12:55,690 --> 01:12:57,357
their experience to the Equal 

1777
01:12:57,357 --> 01:12:59,870
Opportunity program . Only 16% of 

1778
01:12:59,870 --> 01:13:01,759
reports lead to punishment of the 

1779
01:13:01,759 --> 01:13:03,870
perpetrator , and 10% somehow lead to 

1780
01:13:03,870 --> 01:13:06,020
punishment of the reporter . While 

1781
01:13:06,020 --> 01:13:08,450
interviewing um , Anthony Brown last 

1782
01:13:08,450 --> 01:13:10,520
July , you stated the military is a 

1783
01:13:10,520 --> 01:13:13,190
quote engine to counter racism . With 

1784
01:13:13,190 --> 01:13:15,190
statistics like this , do you think 

1785
01:13:15,190 --> 01:13:17,301
that engine is actually working ? And 

1786
01:13:17,301 --> 01:13:19,357
would you agree that service members 

1787
01:13:19,357 --> 01:13:21,523
should have the same ability to report 

1788
01:13:21,523 --> 01:13:23,690
discrimination without Reprisal ? As a 

1789
01:13:23,690 --> 01:13:26,950
civilian , D O D . Employees Senator , 

1790
01:13:26,950 --> 01:13:28,728
I hesitate to get into specific 

1791
01:13:28,728 --> 01:13:30,894
recommendations related thio , U , C , 

1792
01:13:30,894 --> 01:13:33,670
M . J , or other legal matters . If 

1793
01:13:33,670 --> 01:13:35,837
confirmed , I would absolutely want to 

1794
01:13:35,837 --> 01:13:37,740
speak to the career lawyers toe , 

1795
01:13:37,740 --> 01:13:39,907
understand what the implications are . 

1796
01:13:39,907 --> 01:13:42,510
But to your general point , I think it 

1797
01:13:42,510 --> 01:13:45,160
is crystal clear that the military has 

1798
01:13:45,170 --> 01:13:48,170
not undertaken sufficient efforts on 

1799
01:13:48,180 --> 01:13:51,110
diversity equity and inclusion . Andi , 

1800
01:13:51,110 --> 01:13:52,888
that we have a major leadership 

1801
01:13:52,888 --> 01:13:54,999
challenge . Quite frankly , we have a 

1802
01:13:54,999 --> 01:13:57,221
problem on the prevention side , and we 

1803
01:13:57,221 --> 01:13:59,443
clearly have a problem on holding folks 

1804
01:13:59,443 --> 01:14:01,332
accountable , whether it's sexual 

1805
01:14:01,332 --> 01:14:03,443
harassment and assault or it's , um , 

1806
01:14:03,443 --> 01:14:05,666
de ei related issues more broadly . And 

1807
01:14:05,666 --> 01:14:07,777
I am committed to making sure we make 

1808
01:14:07,777 --> 01:14:10,250
genuine progress . I know it is 

1809
01:14:10,250 --> 01:14:13,200
difficult to hear nominee after nominee 

1810
01:14:13,200 --> 01:14:15,367
come up and say that , but you have my 

1811
01:14:15,367 --> 01:14:17,478
commitment . And I would look forward 

1812
01:14:17,478 --> 01:14:19,700
to working with you on both sets of the 

1813
01:14:19,700 --> 01:14:21,756
both of these sets of issues . Thank 

1814
01:14:21,756 --> 01:14:25,060
you , Senator Gillibrand . And via 

1815
01:14:25,540 --> 01:14:28,170
WebEx Senator rounds . 

1816
01:14:29,940 --> 01:14:33,570
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Um , Dr Hicks , 

1817
01:14:33,580 --> 01:14:35,840
thank you for your years of service . 

1818
01:14:35,850 --> 01:14:38,950
Um , and the work that you've done in 

1819
01:14:38,960 --> 01:14:42,710
in , uh , national security issues . I 

1820
01:14:42,720 --> 01:14:44,942
wanna thank you for your willingness to 

1821
01:14:44,942 --> 01:14:47,120
serve once again in such a n'importe 

1822
01:14:47,130 --> 01:14:49,570
position . I enjoyed our phone call 

1823
01:14:49,570 --> 01:14:51,860
last week , and I want you to know that 

1824
01:14:51,860 --> 01:14:55,210
I intend to support your nomination . I 

1825
01:14:55,210 --> 01:14:57,377
do have a couple of questions that I'd 

1826
01:14:57,377 --> 01:14:58,932
like to go through with you 

1827
01:14:58,932 --> 01:15:01,250
specifically with regard to our R D o D 

1828
01:15:01,250 --> 01:15:03,990
cyber strategy . Um , which have been 

1829
01:15:03,990 --> 01:15:06,250
published back in December of 2018 , 

1830
01:15:06,250 --> 01:15:09,320
which charges the D O D to defend 

1831
01:15:09,320 --> 01:15:11,340
forward , shaped the day to day 

1832
01:15:11,350 --> 01:15:13,960
competition and prepare for war . 

1833
01:15:14,540 --> 01:15:16,318
United States Cyber Command has 

1834
01:15:16,318 --> 01:15:18,373
demonstrated successful instances of 

1835
01:15:18,373 --> 01:15:21,540
defend forward and securing the 2018 

1836
01:15:21,550 --> 01:15:24,490
and 2020 elections . What are your 

1837
01:15:24,490 --> 01:15:26,930
views on the defend forward ? Shape the 

1838
01:15:26,930 --> 01:15:29,097
day to day competition and prepare for 

1839
01:15:29,097 --> 01:15:31,850
war concepts to deter and disrupt 

1840
01:15:31,860 --> 01:15:34,550
Russia and China in cyberspace ? 

1841
01:15:35,540 --> 01:15:37,762
Senator First , thank you very much for 

1842
01:15:37,762 --> 01:15:41,560
your your support of my nomination . 

1843
01:15:42,040 --> 01:15:45,500
I have had an opportunity at different 

1844
01:15:45,510 --> 01:15:47,510
periods in the last several years . 

1845
01:15:47,510 --> 01:15:50,490
Thio . Get a little more information on 

1846
01:15:50,490 --> 01:15:52,434
what's behind . Defend forward , I 

1847
01:15:52,434 --> 01:15:55,230
would say , Based on the briefings that 

1848
01:15:55,230 --> 01:15:57,450
I have had , I am supportive of the 

1849
01:15:57,450 --> 01:15:59,930
approach . Um , I think , if confirmed , 

1850
01:15:59,930 --> 01:16:02,097
what I would like to understand better 

1851
01:16:02,097 --> 01:16:04,190
is exactly how the authorities are 

1852
01:16:04,190 --> 01:16:06,970
being executed . What kind of oversight 

1853
01:16:06,980 --> 01:16:09,680
is involved , how we are consulting 

1854
01:16:09,680 --> 01:16:12,970
with allies and partners , um , whose 

1855
01:16:12,970 --> 01:16:15,590
systems we might operate on ? I think 

1856
01:16:15,590 --> 01:16:18,400
those are very important questions for 

1857
01:16:18,400 --> 01:16:21,500
civilian policymakers to be engaged on . 

1858
01:16:21,510 --> 01:16:24,270
But in general , I believe that we have 

1859
01:16:24,270 --> 01:16:27,490
had to become , um , much more forward 

1860
01:16:27,490 --> 01:16:29,920
leaning in our approach . And I also 

1861
01:16:29,920 --> 01:16:32,270
think Congress has a critical role to 

1862
01:16:32,270 --> 01:16:34,680
play here in terms of authorities . And 

1863
01:16:34,680 --> 01:16:36,902
I would want to understand better again 

1864
01:16:36,902 --> 01:16:39,124
how it's being executed today to engage 

1865
01:16:39,124 --> 01:16:40,902
in a dialogue about what is the 

1866
01:16:40,902 --> 01:16:43,100
appropriate role for Congress and for 

1867
01:16:43,100 --> 01:16:45,330
civilians . Policymakers in the 

1868
01:16:45,330 --> 01:16:48,740
executive branch . I'm also very 

1869
01:16:48,740 --> 01:16:50,962
pleased by the progress that we've made 

1870
01:16:50,962 --> 01:16:53,350
enabling cyber com to rapidly conduct 

1871
01:16:53,730 --> 01:16:56,140
cyber effects operations to include 

1872
01:16:56,150 --> 01:16:59,280
offensive cyber operations . Can you 

1873
01:16:59,280 --> 01:17:01,600
tell the American people why this is so 

1874
01:17:01,600 --> 01:17:03,711
important to our national defense ? I 

1875
01:17:03,711 --> 01:17:05,767
think it's important that the public 

1876
01:17:05,767 --> 01:17:07,950
understand that that we've got 

1877
01:17:07,950 --> 01:17:10,061
challenges with people attacking us . 

1878
01:17:10,061 --> 01:17:12,430
But we have to be in a position to 

1879
01:17:12,430 --> 01:17:15,590
offer offensive cyber operations even 

1880
01:17:15,590 --> 01:17:17,923
when we're not in unidentified conflict . 

1881
01:17:19,730 --> 01:17:21,674
Yes , Senator , I think one of the 

1882
01:17:21,674 --> 01:17:23,897
major challenges about thinking through 

1883
01:17:24,130 --> 01:17:26,950
competition or or confrontations in 

1884
01:17:26,950 --> 01:17:29,080
cyberspace is that the classic 

1885
01:17:29,090 --> 01:17:31,312
definitions of what is offense and what 

1886
01:17:31,312 --> 01:17:35,200
what is defense are very blurred on 

1887
01:17:35,200 --> 01:17:39,140
DSO . It is challenging to use the kind 

1888
01:17:39,140 --> 01:17:41,570
of constructs we've thought of in the 

1889
01:17:41,570 --> 01:17:44,550
terrestrial sense in cyberspace . What 

1890
01:17:44,550 --> 01:17:47,090
I would say to your point is the way in 

1891
01:17:47,090 --> 01:17:50,220
which adversaries can come at our 

1892
01:17:50,220 --> 01:17:53,240
systems and the recent Russian hacks to 

1893
01:17:53,240 --> 01:17:54,796
include through solar winds 

1894
01:17:54,796 --> 01:17:57,170
demonstrated this is they can live in 

1895
01:17:57,170 --> 01:17:59,850
our systems for some time . They can 

1896
01:17:59,860 --> 01:18:02,330
undertake espionage , extract 

1897
01:18:02,330 --> 01:18:05,470
information and then can , um , 

1898
01:18:05,480 --> 01:18:08,780
turn , um , in many cases , onto what 

1899
01:18:08,780 --> 01:18:10,558
we would think of his offensive 

1900
01:18:10,558 --> 01:18:13,540
approaches in order for the US to to 

1901
01:18:13,550 --> 01:18:16,620
prevent that and deter that , it also 

1902
01:18:16,620 --> 01:18:19,740
sometimes has to defend forward . That 

1903
01:18:19,740 --> 01:18:22,440
is to say , it has to be living in 

1904
01:18:22,440 --> 01:18:24,630
systems so that it has the warning , 

1905
01:18:24,630 --> 01:18:27,530
the Intel indicators and warning , um 

1906
01:18:27,540 --> 01:18:30,110
to know that an attack is imminent . 

1907
01:18:30,120 --> 01:18:33,360
And that's where this offensive piece 

1908
01:18:33,360 --> 01:18:37,260
becomes important exactly . And not 

1909
01:18:37,260 --> 01:18:39,720
only that , but it also provides us 

1910
01:18:39,720 --> 01:18:41,831
with advanced warning about the types 

1911
01:18:41,831 --> 01:18:44,240
of tactics that might very well be used 

1912
01:18:44,620 --> 01:18:46,787
because if they're using those tactics 

1913
01:18:46,787 --> 01:18:48,842
in other countries in advance , they 

1914
01:18:48,842 --> 01:18:51,064
may very well be using the same tactics 

1915
01:18:51,064 --> 01:18:53,287
when it comes to trying to get into our 

1916
01:18:53,287 --> 01:18:55,231
systems as well . A Z we discussed 

1917
01:18:55,231 --> 01:18:57,590
during our call . There was an effort 

1918
01:18:57,600 --> 01:18:59,711
in the last administration to end the 

1919
01:18:59,711 --> 01:19:03,070
Stieber com s a dual hat again . I've 

1920
01:19:03,070 --> 01:19:05,181
been watching this issue for a number 

1921
01:19:05,181 --> 01:19:07,403
of years now , and I'm really concerned 

1922
01:19:07,403 --> 01:19:09,348
by that . I had originally come in 

1923
01:19:09,348 --> 01:19:09,110
thinking that , and it would be 

1924
01:19:09,110 --> 01:19:11,110
appropriate to split them up rather 

1925
01:19:11,110 --> 01:19:13,960
quickly . I changed my mind . I think 

1926
01:19:13,960 --> 01:19:15,960
that the dual hat with the Unity of 

1927
01:19:15,960 --> 01:19:18,182
Commander provides is working very well 

1928
01:19:18,182 --> 01:19:21,710
for the current and likely for future 

1929
01:19:21,720 --> 01:19:24,610
cyber com commanders that's separating 

1930
01:19:24,620 --> 01:19:27,180
the two organizations could creates 

1931
01:19:27,180 --> 01:19:29,540
real problems with regard to the assets 

1932
01:19:30,010 --> 01:19:32,140
that would have to be acquired in 

1933
01:19:32,140 --> 01:19:34,307
addition to what we have today . Would 

1934
01:19:34,307 --> 01:19:36,473
you please share your thoughts on this 

1935
01:19:36,473 --> 01:19:38,660
with the committee ? The senator ? I 

1936
01:19:38,670 --> 01:19:40,781
don't have a position on the ultimate 

1937
01:19:40,781 --> 01:19:43,160
disposition of the dual hat arrangement 

1938
01:19:43,160 --> 01:19:46,070
for cyber common ESA . I do have an 

1939
01:19:46,070 --> 01:19:49,140
assessment based on my work on the 

1940
01:19:49,140 --> 01:19:51,290
transition team , looking at where we 

1941
01:19:51,290 --> 01:19:53,690
are today , and particularly in light 

1942
01:19:53,700 --> 01:19:55,950
of this recent hack that included 

1943
01:19:55,950 --> 01:19:58,750
exploitation of the solar winds , um , 

1944
01:19:58,760 --> 01:20:01,680
software . And that is that we're not 

1945
01:20:01,690 --> 01:20:04,610
at a maturation point now with cyber 

1946
01:20:04,610 --> 01:20:08,160
com that makes the dual hat arranged an 

1947
01:20:08,160 --> 01:20:10,590
end to the dual hat arrangement wise in 

1948
01:20:10,590 --> 01:20:13,620
the immediate . Andi , if confirmed , I 

1949
01:20:13,620 --> 01:20:15,898
would be happy to continue . Of course , 

1950
01:20:15,898 --> 01:20:17,953
looking at this issue and giving the 

1951
01:20:17,953 --> 01:20:21,890
Secretary Austin my best advice on , um 

1952
01:20:21,900 --> 01:20:24,122
you know , if there comes a point where 

1953
01:20:24,122 --> 01:20:26,233
that does seem to be , the split does 

1954
01:20:26,233 --> 01:20:29,370
seem to be wise . Thank you . Thank you , 

1955
01:20:29,370 --> 01:20:31,370
Mr Chairman . Thank you , Senator . 

1956
01:20:31,370 --> 01:20:35,300
Rounds via WebEx , Senator 

1957
01:20:35,310 --> 01:20:37,730
Hirono . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1958
01:20:38,810 --> 01:20:41,040
Welcome , Dr Hicks . Thank you for 

1959
01:20:41,050 --> 01:20:43,250
chatting with me the other day . I 

1960
01:20:43,250 --> 01:20:45,417
start with the following two questions 

1961
01:20:45,417 --> 01:20:47,528
of every nominee who comes before any 

1962
01:20:47,528 --> 01:20:49,472
of the committees on which I sit . 

1963
01:20:49,510 --> 01:20:51,750
First question . Since you became an 

1964
01:20:51,750 --> 01:20:53,930
adult , have you ever made unwanted 

1965
01:20:53,930 --> 01:20:56,410
request for sexual favors or committed 

1966
01:20:56,420 --> 01:20:59,930
any verbal or physical harassment or 

1967
01:21:00,310 --> 01:21:04,160
assault of a sexual nature ? No . Have 

1968
01:21:04,160 --> 01:21:06,216
you ever faced discipline or entered 

1969
01:21:06,216 --> 01:21:08,382
into a settlement related to this kind 

1970
01:21:08,382 --> 01:21:10,130
of conduct ? No . 

1971
01:21:12,210 --> 01:21:15,620
I note in your responses thio questions 

1972
01:21:15,620 --> 01:21:17,940
from my colleagues that you recognize 

1973
01:21:17,940 --> 01:21:19,607
the importance of the Pacific 

1974
01:21:19,607 --> 01:21:22,210
Deterrence Initiative that includes the 

1975
01:21:22,210 --> 01:21:24,450
importance of the compacts that we have 

1976
01:21:24,450 --> 01:21:26,720
with the freely associated states of 

1977
01:21:26,720 --> 01:21:29,040
Micronesia allow and Marshall Islands . 

1978
01:21:29,410 --> 01:21:31,910
I believe that we could doom or in our 

1979
01:21:31,910 --> 01:21:33,910
partnerships with them , and I hope 

1980
01:21:33,910 --> 01:21:35,854
that you will be open . Thio , for 

1981
01:21:35,854 --> 01:21:38,180
example , Palau has asked us to invest 

1982
01:21:38,190 --> 01:21:41,930
in joint use facilities such as , uh , 

1983
01:21:41,940 --> 01:21:44,530
airfields and , uh , 

1984
01:21:45,710 --> 01:21:47,877
well , your field . So I hope that you 

1985
01:21:47,877 --> 01:21:49,877
will be open to doing more with our 

1986
01:21:49,877 --> 01:21:52,040
important partners in the Pacific . A 

1987
01:21:52,040 --> 01:21:55,760
senator , I am open to that . I do 

1988
01:21:55,760 --> 01:21:58,130
applaud Secretary Austin's recent 

1989
01:21:58,140 --> 01:22:00,170
announcement that the Pentagon will 

1990
01:22:00,170 --> 01:22:02,070
prioritize climate change 

1991
01:22:02,080 --> 01:22:05,890
considerations in its activities , risk 

1992
01:22:05,890 --> 01:22:07,946
assessments and in the next national 

1993
01:22:07,946 --> 01:22:10,820
defense strategy . I believe that 

1994
01:22:10,820 --> 01:22:13,020
renewable energy is not simply an 

1995
01:22:13,020 --> 01:22:15,380
environmental calculation , but it is 

1996
01:22:15,380 --> 01:22:17,713
becoming a tactical necessity for the D . 

1997
01:22:17,713 --> 01:22:19,750
O D . Which is the biggest user of 

1998
01:22:19,750 --> 01:22:23,110
energy in our in our government . 

1999
01:22:23,700 --> 01:22:26,530
So we have included provisions in India 

2000
01:22:26,530 --> 01:22:28,830
to prioritize energy security and 

2001
01:22:28,830 --> 01:22:30,360
resilience . Have military 

2002
01:22:30,370 --> 01:22:33,640
installations ID like thio , know 

2003
01:22:33,640 --> 01:22:35,362
whether you will make energy , 

2004
01:22:35,362 --> 01:22:38,340
resilience and mission . Brazilians and 

2005
01:22:38,340 --> 01:22:40,507
mission assures a priority for the D . 

2006
01:22:40,507 --> 01:22:43,510
O G . Yes , Senator , I think the 

2007
01:22:43,520 --> 01:22:46,950
resiliency aspects on climate are 

2008
01:22:46,960 --> 01:22:49,127
critical as a business proposition for 

2009
01:22:49,127 --> 01:22:51,320
d o . D . Again focused , Really , If 

2010
01:22:51,320 --> 01:22:53,431
you just take a hard nosed resource , 

2011
01:22:53,431 --> 01:22:56,740
look at it . Andi . I want to commend 

2012
01:22:56,750 --> 01:22:58,583
Congress for re establishing the 

2013
01:22:58,583 --> 01:23:00,750
assistant secretary defense for energy 

2014
01:23:00,750 --> 01:23:02,700
installations and environment . If 

2015
01:23:02,700 --> 01:23:04,811
confirmed , I would work with Senator 

2016
01:23:04,811 --> 01:23:07,033
Austin . Excuse me , Secretary Austin , 

2017
01:23:07,033 --> 01:23:10,360
to ensure that we , uh , put forward a 

2018
01:23:10,360 --> 01:23:12,660
nominee who's very capable , 

2019
01:23:12,660 --> 01:23:14,660
incompetent in these in these exact 

2020
01:23:14,660 --> 01:23:18,050
spaces . I think the issue of energy , 

2021
01:23:18,060 --> 01:23:20,630
resilience and all of that is that we 

2022
01:23:20,630 --> 01:23:23,210
have to stay the course . Senator 

2023
01:23:23,210 --> 01:23:24,988
Shaheen had asked you about the 

2024
01:23:24,988 --> 01:23:27,099
importance of our shipyards , and she 

2025
01:23:27,099 --> 01:23:29,260
said , It's a parochial concern , but 

2026
01:23:29,260 --> 01:23:31,320
it is not is that I've viewed as a 

2027
01:23:31,320 --> 01:23:33,264
national concern . And of course I 

2028
01:23:33,264 --> 01:23:35,376
chatted with you about the importance 

2029
01:23:35,376 --> 01:23:37,598
of the four public shipyards , of which 

2030
01:23:37,598 --> 01:23:39,750
there is one in Hawaii . So the 

2031
01:23:39,750 --> 01:23:42,160
modernization of these shipyards eyes a 

2032
01:23:42,160 --> 01:23:45,080
very important concern for a number of 

2033
01:23:45,080 --> 01:23:47,060
us . And I hope that I have your 

2034
01:23:47,060 --> 01:23:49,116
commitment that you will continue to 

2035
01:23:49,116 --> 01:23:51,220
support the funding for the 

2036
01:23:51,220 --> 01:23:53,387
modernization of our shipyards because 

2037
01:23:53,387 --> 01:23:55,498
this as you enlarge , it's not enough 

2038
01:23:55,498 --> 01:23:57,664
to just build ships . We actually have 

2039
01:23:57,664 --> 01:24:00,620
thio repair and maintain them . Yes , I 

2040
01:24:00,620 --> 01:24:02,750
agree completely , Senator , the 

2041
01:24:02,750 --> 01:24:05,380
sustainability of all of our forces , 

2042
01:24:05,380 --> 01:24:07,380
frankly , especially if you look at 

2043
01:24:07,380 --> 01:24:09,602
where the cost curves are on operations 

2044
01:24:09,602 --> 01:24:11,769
and sustainment . Um , that's going to 

2045
01:24:11,769 --> 01:24:13,713
be vital if we're going to compete 

2046
01:24:13,713 --> 01:24:16,330
effectively in the future . Senator 

2047
01:24:16,330 --> 01:24:19,430
Blumenthal and Gillibrand out . I have 

2048
01:24:19,430 --> 01:24:21,097
asked you questions about the 

2049
01:24:21,097 --> 01:24:23,263
continuing scourge of sexual assault , 

2050
01:24:23,263 --> 01:24:25,097
harassment , and I would include 

2051
01:24:25,097 --> 01:24:27,970
retaliation on the basis of , uh , 

2052
01:24:27,980 --> 01:24:30,880
reporting somebody who reports thes 

2053
01:24:30,890 --> 01:24:33,680
kinds of actions and continues to be a 

2054
01:24:33,680 --> 01:24:35,736
scourge , as I mentioned . And every 

2055
01:24:35,736 --> 01:24:37,791
secretary , every deputy , everybody 

2056
01:24:37,791 --> 01:24:39,791
who comes before us from D o D says 

2057
01:24:39,791 --> 01:24:41,902
that you will . You will do something 

2058
01:24:41,902 --> 01:24:43,958
about it . So I'd like to know . You 

2059
01:24:43,958 --> 01:24:45,950
know , what would be measures of 

2060
01:24:45,960 --> 01:24:49,620
progress in this area ? How would you 

2061
01:24:49,620 --> 01:24:51,842
determine with a real progress is being 

2062
01:24:51,842 --> 01:24:55,520
made thio eliminate or or reduce the 

2063
01:24:55,520 --> 01:24:57,631
scourge of sexual self harassment and 

2064
01:24:57,631 --> 01:25:00,760
retaliation ? Senator , I think first 

2065
01:25:00,770 --> 01:25:03,740
one of the most important tools we 

2066
01:25:03,750 --> 01:25:06,510
could have is transparency and data . 

2067
01:25:06,520 --> 01:25:10,100
And Aziz , you're likely aware the 

2068
01:25:10,110 --> 01:25:12,770
department has not collected recent 

2069
01:25:12,780 --> 01:25:16,040
data with regard Thio reporting on 

2070
01:25:16,040 --> 01:25:19,880
sexual harassment . Um , or way 

2071
01:25:19,880 --> 01:25:23,110
have we know how many , um , claims , 

2072
01:25:23,110 --> 01:25:25,110
if you will have been made . But we 

2073
01:25:25,110 --> 01:25:26,832
don't know the totality of the 

2074
01:25:26,832 --> 01:25:28,888
reporting . If you look again at the 

2075
01:25:28,888 --> 01:25:31,054
Fort Hood report , if you look at that 

2076
01:25:31,054 --> 01:25:33,221
microcosm of the Fort Hood community , 

2077
01:25:33,221 --> 01:25:35,710
um , it was very clear it was 

2078
01:25:35,720 --> 01:25:39,600
significant under reporting under way . 

2079
01:25:39,600 --> 01:25:41,767
And so I think that's an area we wanna 

2080
01:25:41,767 --> 01:25:44,620
look at right away , in terms of making 

2081
01:25:44,620 --> 01:25:47,530
clear that reporting does not have 

2082
01:25:47,540 --> 01:25:50,270
negative consequences for the career of 

2083
01:25:50,280 --> 01:25:52,336
anyone in the total four civilians , 

2084
01:25:52,336 --> 01:25:55,150
contractors or military on . But there 

2085
01:25:55,150 --> 01:25:58,750
are our tools , easy tools , hotlines 

2086
01:25:58,750 --> 01:26:00,806
that are easy to use , that everyone 

2087
01:26:00,806 --> 01:26:02,750
knows about that . The training is 

2088
01:26:02,750 --> 01:26:05,130
there on Ben . I would just add sort of 

2089
01:26:05,130 --> 01:26:07,930
the training element . A lot of these 

2090
01:26:07,940 --> 01:26:10,630
harassment harassment is often the 

2091
01:26:10,630 --> 01:26:13,160
grooming process toward assault us . We 

2092
01:26:13,160 --> 01:26:15,327
have to look at both of those issues , 

2093
01:26:15,327 --> 01:26:17,438
and a lot of this is happening in the 

2094
01:26:17,438 --> 01:26:19,438
youngest of our service members and 

2095
01:26:19,438 --> 01:26:21,271
that that means there's training 

2096
01:26:21,271 --> 01:26:23,216
opportunities . That means there's 

2097
01:26:23,216 --> 01:26:25,549
leadership opportunities at every level , 

2098
01:26:25,549 --> 01:26:27,549
and we need to be making sure we're 

2099
01:26:27,549 --> 01:26:29,660
holding folks accountable at the same 

2100
01:26:29,660 --> 01:26:31,882
time we're putting the resource is into 

2101
01:26:31,882 --> 01:26:34,049
prevention . That's why it's important 

2102
01:26:34,049 --> 01:26:35,827
to have sexual enhancement as a 

2103
01:26:35,827 --> 01:26:37,993
separate charge in these matters , and 

2104
01:26:37,993 --> 01:26:40,049
maybe another way Thio determine the 

2105
01:26:40,049 --> 01:26:42,160
extent of the problem . It is to pull 

2106
01:26:42,160 --> 01:26:44,271
your service members themselves as to 

2107
01:26:44,271 --> 01:26:46,510
whether they have experienced sexual 

2108
01:26:46,510 --> 01:26:48,830
harassment , assault , etcetera , 

2109
01:26:48,840 --> 01:26:50,896
including , by the way , asking them 

2110
01:26:50,896 --> 01:26:53,890
about racial discrimination . I believe 

2111
01:26:53,890 --> 01:26:56,310
my time is up . Thank you , Mr Chairman ,