1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:04,940 --> 00:00:06,996 Good afternoon , everybody . Sorry , 3 00:00:06,996 --> 00:00:09,107 we're a few minutes late here today . 4 00:00:10,540 --> 00:00:12,820 As you're aware , President Biden 5 00:00:12,820 --> 00:00:14,950 ordered a 90 day commission to pursue 6 00:00:14,950 --> 00:00:16,900 solutions to sexual assault in the 7 00:00:16,900 --> 00:00:19,450 military . To carry out the president's 8 00:00:19,450 --> 00:00:21,750 direction , Secretary Austin ordered 9 00:00:21,750 --> 00:00:23,520 the establishment of a 90 day 10 00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:26,010 independent Review Commission on sexual 11 00:00:26,010 --> 00:00:28,940 assault in the military . We refer to 12 00:00:28,940 --> 00:00:31,800 it as the IRC to review department 13 00:00:31,800 --> 00:00:35,120 policies and processes as directed by 14 00:00:35,120 --> 00:00:37,500 the president . Secretary has 15 00:00:37,500 --> 00:00:39,980 designated Lynn Rosenthal , formerly 16 00:00:39,980 --> 00:00:42,091 the first ever White House adviser on 17 00:00:42,091 --> 00:00:44,202 violence against women and a longtime 18 00:00:44,202 --> 00:00:46,036 advocate for survivors of gender 19 00:00:46,036 --> 00:00:48,258 violence , to lead this commission . In 20 00:00:48,258 --> 00:00:50,480 a moment , I'm going to turn the podium 21 00:00:50,480 --> 00:00:52,536 over to Lynn to walk through some of 22 00:00:52,536 --> 00:00:54,702 the specifics of the IRC structure and 23 00:00:54,702 --> 00:00:56,924 goals and then to take some questions . 24 00:00:56,924 --> 00:00:59,160 In addition to the Independent Review 25 00:00:59,160 --> 00:01:01,160 Commission , the secretary directed 26 00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:02,882 immediate absence to bring the 27 00:01:02,882 --> 00:01:05,049 department in compliance with evidence 28 00:01:05,049 --> 00:01:06,493 based practices to ensure 29 00:01:06,493 --> 00:01:08,549 accountability of sexual assault and 30 00:01:08,549 --> 00:01:10,604 harassment efforts at every level of 31 00:01:10,604 --> 00:01:13,110 the total force . The secretary also 32 00:01:13,110 --> 00:01:14,999 pledged on Day one the countering 33 00:01:14,999 --> 00:01:17,054 sexual assault and harassment in the 34 00:01:17,054 --> 00:01:19,221 military is the top priority . Keeping 35 00:01:19,221 --> 00:01:21,443 with that pledge Secretary participated 36 00:01:21,443 --> 00:01:23,610 in a virtual roundtable just this last 37 00:01:23,610 --> 00:01:25,940 Tuesday with veterans Veterans Affairs 38 00:01:25,940 --> 00:01:28,070 Secretary Denis McDonough and sexual 39 00:01:28,070 --> 00:01:30,750 assault survivors and advocates . This 40 00:01:30,750 --> 00:01:32,750 engagement informed ongoing work to 41 00:01:32,750 --> 00:01:34,806 review and improve our approaches to 42 00:01:34,806 --> 00:01:36,861 countering sexual assault and sexual 43 00:01:36,861 --> 00:01:38,750 harassment in the military and to 44 00:01:38,750 --> 00:01:40,917 caring for survivors during transition 45 00:01:40,917 --> 00:01:43,450 and beyond . The meeting reaffirmed 46 00:01:43,460 --> 00:01:45,682 their these leaders commitment to these 47 00:01:45,682 --> 00:01:47,849 shared priorities , and they solicited 48 00:01:47,849 --> 00:01:49,904 participants perspectives on the way 49 00:01:49,904 --> 00:01:52,127 ahead . Every member of the total force 50 00:01:52,127 --> 00:01:54,180 deserves a workplace free of sexual 51 00:01:54,180 --> 00:01:56,640 assault and harassment and personal 52 00:01:56,640 --> 00:01:59,080 fear . We must commit ourselves to 53 00:01:59,080 --> 00:02:01,450 eliminating this illegal and corrosive 54 00:02:01,450 --> 00:02:03,617 behavior . Now , with that , I'm gonna 55 00:02:03,617 --> 00:02:05,850 turn it over to Ms Rosenthal to address 56 00:02:05,860 --> 00:02:08,050 the Independent Review Committee 57 00:02:08,050 --> 00:02:10,590 activities specifically . And then , uh , 58 00:02:10,600 --> 00:02:12,656 she'll stay up here . Uh , and we'll 59 00:02:12,656 --> 00:02:14,822 take some questions on that , and then 60 00:02:14,822 --> 00:02:16,822 we'll get into the regular briefing 61 00:02:16,822 --> 00:02:18,878 later . So with that , then thanks . 62 00:02:18,878 --> 00:02:21,760 Okay , good afternoon . 63 00:02:22,740 --> 00:02:25,600 This effort . This commission is 64 00:02:25,600 --> 00:02:28,090 dedicated to those service members who 65 00:02:28,090 --> 00:02:30,150 have suffered from sexual assault , 66 00:02:30,740 --> 00:02:33,660 both those who have come forward and 67 00:02:33,660 --> 00:02:36,410 shared their stories at great personal 68 00:02:36,410 --> 00:02:39,150 cost and those who have suffered in 69 00:02:39,150 --> 00:02:41,810 silence and who continue to suffer in 70 00:02:41,810 --> 00:02:45,650 silence alone and also at great cost 71 00:02:46,040 --> 00:02:49,550 the trauma and life altering effects of 72 00:02:49,550 --> 00:02:51,950 sexual assault are devastating in any 73 00:02:51,950 --> 00:02:55,360 context . What I'm struck by here as I 74 00:02:55,360 --> 00:02:58,360 listen to stories of military survivors 75 00:02:58,370 --> 00:03:01,340 is what , how much their service meant 76 00:03:01,350 --> 00:03:03,900 to them , how their life was about this 77 00:03:03,900 --> 00:03:07,090 dream of serving in the military , and 78 00:03:07,090 --> 00:03:09,510 the stream was a part of their identity . 79 00:03:09,520 --> 00:03:11,353 And for many , their dreams were 80 00:03:11,353 --> 00:03:13,850 shattered by the trauma of sexual 81 00:03:13,850 --> 00:03:16,320 violence and sometimes retaliation for 82 00:03:16,320 --> 00:03:19,880 coming forward . This must end . I'm 83 00:03:19,880 --> 00:03:21,780 grateful for the leadership of 84 00:03:21,780 --> 00:03:25,000 President Biden and Secretary Austin in 85 00:03:25,000 --> 00:03:27,860 establishing this Independent Review 86 00:03:27,870 --> 00:03:30,460 Commission . As both the president and 87 00:03:30,460 --> 00:03:33,880 the secretary have said , all options 88 00:03:33,890 --> 00:03:36,880 must be on the table . The most 89 00:03:36,880 --> 00:03:39,970 pressing task facing this commission is 90 00:03:39,970 --> 00:03:42,510 accountability for those who have 91 00:03:42,510 --> 00:03:44,920 committed sexual assault . But I want 92 00:03:44,920 --> 00:03:47,050 to be clear that that is not the only 93 00:03:47,050 --> 00:03:49,600 task . We will also look at climate , 94 00:03:49,610 --> 00:03:53,430 culture and prevention . One of the 95 00:03:53,430 --> 00:03:55,640 hardest things to hear when you listen 96 00:03:55,640 --> 00:03:59,600 to survivors talk is how hostility 97 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:02,040 was conveyed by their Attackers , this 98 00:04:02,050 --> 00:04:04,380 hostile approach to them as a part of 99 00:04:04,380 --> 00:04:07,060 the sexual assault , and that approach 100 00:04:07,060 --> 00:04:09,820 was to the victim . You don't belong 101 00:04:09,820 --> 00:04:12,070 here . You don't belong in this 102 00:04:12,070 --> 00:04:14,580 military . No one will believe you . If 103 00:04:14,580 --> 00:04:16,636 you talk about what happened and you 104 00:04:16,636 --> 00:04:19,550 will be blamed , this commission 105 00:04:19,560 --> 00:04:23,470 says to that service member , You 106 00:04:23,470 --> 00:04:27,460 do belong in this military . You belong , 107 00:04:27,470 --> 00:04:30,360 and it's our job to make this climate 108 00:04:30,370 --> 00:04:33,560 safe for you to be here . I know 109 00:04:33,560 --> 00:04:36,120 firsthand for my work that there is 110 00:04:36,120 --> 00:04:38,420 tremendous capacity in this building 111 00:04:38,420 --> 00:04:40,700 and in the forces that there's capacity 112 00:04:40,700 --> 00:04:43,360 that there are best practices that are 113 00:04:43,360 --> 00:04:46,580 in place . Uh , and this commission 114 00:04:46,580 --> 00:04:48,691 will build on that knowledge . But we 115 00:04:48,691 --> 00:04:52,050 will also consult outside experts and 116 00:04:52,050 --> 00:04:53,883 stakeholders . We want to hear a 117 00:04:53,883 --> 00:04:56,170 diversity of views from every level of 118 00:04:56,170 --> 00:04:58,760 the services and in civilian society . 119 00:04:58,940 --> 00:05:00,940 And we will take all of those views 120 00:05:00,940 --> 00:05:03,370 into account in our deliberations and 121 00:05:03,370 --> 00:05:05,760 our recommendations so more to come on 122 00:05:05,760 --> 00:05:07,870 our process and our membership . But 123 00:05:07,870 --> 00:05:10,037 that's where we're starting today . So 124 00:05:10,037 --> 00:05:11,148 thank you so much . 125 00:05:13,740 --> 00:05:17,220 Thank you . And we're gonna go to the 126 00:05:17,220 --> 00:05:19,390 normal policy practice here . We'll go 127 00:05:19,400 --> 00:05:21,530 to the phones first and then into the 128 00:05:21,540 --> 00:05:23,707 room , and we'll go one for one . Uh , 129 00:05:23,707 --> 00:05:25,540 so I would ask you to limit your 130 00:05:25,540 --> 00:05:27,762 questions for this part of the briefing 131 00:05:27,762 --> 00:05:29,707 to Ms Rosenthal in the work of the 132 00:05:29,707 --> 00:05:31,707 Independent Review commission . And 133 00:05:31,707 --> 00:05:33,873 with that , uh , leader , did you have 134 00:05:33,873 --> 00:05:36,550 a question ? Um , I'll pass . Thanks . 135 00:05:37,340 --> 00:05:40,130 In the room . Tara . Thanks for doing 136 00:05:40,130 --> 00:05:42,260 this . Talk up with McClatchy . Um , 137 00:05:42,270 --> 00:05:44,437 what we've seen in past sexual assault 138 00:05:44,437 --> 00:05:46,620 reporting incidents is that sometimes 139 00:05:46,620 --> 00:05:48,760 the very people on base that these 140 00:05:48,760 --> 00:05:50,760 victims are having to report to our 141 00:05:50,760 --> 00:05:52,871 sometimes the ones perpetrating these 142 00:05:52,871 --> 00:05:54,927 attacks . And there's been a call of 143 00:05:54,927 --> 00:05:57,038 time and time again for there to be a 144 00:05:57,038 --> 00:05:59,260 counselor on base or a civilian on bass 145 00:05:59,260 --> 00:06:01,482 and independent civilian , for military 146 00:06:01,482 --> 00:06:03,260 personnel to report to and just 147 00:06:03,260 --> 00:06:05,316 wondering if that will be one of the 148 00:06:05,316 --> 00:06:05,130 things you take into account . I think 149 00:06:05,130 --> 00:06:07,241 we'll look closely at that . And I've 150 00:06:07,241 --> 00:06:09,074 seen that recommendations in the 151 00:06:09,074 --> 00:06:11,074 previous report . So I think that's 152 00:06:11,074 --> 00:06:11,050 what we mean by all options are on the 153 00:06:11,050 --> 00:06:13,050 table . We want to think creatively 154 00:06:13,050 --> 00:06:15,161 about that , and we want to hear from 155 00:06:15,161 --> 00:06:17,272 service members about what it is that 156 00:06:17,272 --> 00:06:19,494 they think would make the climate safer 157 00:06:19,494 --> 00:06:21,272 for them . You hear that ? Work 158 00:06:21,272 --> 00:06:22,994 actionable recommendations for 159 00:06:22,994 --> 00:06:25,560 absolutely . So we have a 90 day 160 00:06:25,560 --> 00:06:27,560 commission and we're working on the 161 00:06:27,560 --> 00:06:29,504 charter now . I'm working with the 162 00:06:29,504 --> 00:06:31,616 Deputy Secretary's office on what our 163 00:06:31,616 --> 00:06:33,727 charter will look like within 60 days 164 00:06:33,727 --> 00:06:36,060 we'll have some initial recommendations , 165 00:06:36,060 --> 00:06:35,650 particularly on the accountability 166 00:06:35,650 --> 00:06:37,570 issue , and within 90 days will 167 00:06:37,570 --> 00:06:39,681 complete the work of the commission . 168 00:06:39,681 --> 00:06:41,737 But I also know that that's just the 169 00:06:41,737 --> 00:06:43,903 first step for the secretary . I think 170 00:06:43,903 --> 00:06:46,070 the secretary is our greatest asset in 171 00:06:46,070 --> 00:06:48,181 fighting this problem . He gets it so 172 00:06:48,181 --> 00:06:50,380 deeply he cares about it so much he 173 00:06:50,380 --> 00:06:52,491 cares about his service members . And 174 00:06:52,491 --> 00:06:54,713 so the commission ends in 90 days . But 175 00:06:54,713 --> 00:06:56,158 the implementation of the 176 00:06:56,158 --> 00:06:58,491 recommendations will certainly continue . 177 00:06:58,640 --> 00:07:01,580 Rebecca there , Nick Schifrin from PBS 178 00:07:01,580 --> 00:07:03,747 News are key to talk a little bit more 179 00:07:03,747 --> 00:07:05,802 about the commission itself . I know 180 00:07:05,802 --> 00:07:07,802 it's early , but are your member is 181 00:07:07,802 --> 00:07:09,691 going to be from this building or 182 00:07:09,691 --> 00:07:11,802 they're all gonna be from outside and 183 00:07:11,802 --> 00:07:13,913 the Terrorist point ? One of the main 184 00:07:13,913 --> 00:07:15,913 things , as you know that advocates 185 00:07:15,913 --> 00:07:18,136 called for is the removal of commanders 186 00:07:18,136 --> 00:07:20,358 from the adjudication process . Is that 187 00:07:20,358 --> 00:07:22,469 idea just an option , or is that idea 188 00:07:22,469 --> 00:07:24,691 part of the charter itself ? Well , the 189 00:07:24,691 --> 00:07:26,802 president and the secretary have said 190 00:07:26,802 --> 00:07:29,136 that all options should be on the table . 191 00:07:29,136 --> 00:07:31,247 I don't think we have a predetermined 192 00:07:31,247 --> 00:07:33,247 outcome of this question , which we 193 00:07:33,247 --> 00:07:35,247 must very carefully examine and the 194 00:07:35,247 --> 00:07:37,302 membership of the commission will be 195 00:07:37,302 --> 00:07:39,358 made up of military leaders , former 196 00:07:39,358 --> 00:07:41,524 leaders , sexual assault advocates and 197 00:07:41,524 --> 00:07:43,691 sexual assault experts . So it will be 198 00:07:43,691 --> 00:07:45,691 both internal and external . And we 199 00:07:45,691 --> 00:07:47,802 hope to have a very dynamic process . 200 00:07:47,802 --> 00:07:49,969 And I don't think we need to be afraid 201 00:07:49,969 --> 00:07:52,330 of a diversity of views that is part of 202 00:07:52,330 --> 00:07:54,330 this conversation , and we need not 203 00:07:54,330 --> 00:07:56,386 fear it . And especially because the 204 00:07:56,386 --> 00:07:58,330 secretary has invited that kind of 205 00:07:58,330 --> 00:08:01,880 inquiry on the phones . Aaron made a 206 00:08:01,890 --> 00:08:05,660 defense news . I got 207 00:08:05,660 --> 00:08:07,604 nothing for this one , but one for 208 00:08:07,604 --> 00:08:09,716 later . Thanks . Okay . In the room . 209 00:08:09,870 --> 00:08:12,037 Yes , ma'am . Killing Kenny with Stars 210 00:08:12,037 --> 00:08:14,370 and Stripes . I know this is very early , 211 00:08:14,370 --> 00:08:16,790 but I have a question to follow up . Um , 212 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:19,370 for the secretary . Do you believe that 213 00:08:19,380 --> 00:08:20,991 he may be taking some of the 214 00:08:20,991 --> 00:08:23,213 recommendations that you may have along 215 00:08:23,213 --> 00:08:25,380 the way , like immediately ? Or do you 216 00:08:25,380 --> 00:08:27,436 think he's going to be waiting until 217 00:08:27,436 --> 00:08:29,658 the recommendations are all out there ? 218 00:08:29,658 --> 00:08:29,430 Or do you think that he'll actually 219 00:08:29,430 --> 00:08:31,430 take what you guys come up with and 220 00:08:31,430 --> 00:08:33,430 immediately act on it ? Well , he's 221 00:08:33,430 --> 00:08:35,597 already taking immediate action , so I 222 00:08:35,597 --> 00:08:37,708 know that's the case , and I think if 223 00:08:37,708 --> 00:08:39,874 we identify something that needs to be 224 00:08:39,874 --> 00:08:39,850 fixed right away , and those may be out 225 00:08:39,850 --> 00:08:41,683 there where we feel that service 226 00:08:41,683 --> 00:08:43,739 members are in jeopardy . I think he 227 00:08:43,739 --> 00:08:45,906 would take immediate action . I mean , 228 00:08:45,906 --> 00:08:48,017 I can't speak for him at this point , 229 00:08:48,017 --> 00:08:50,017 but I think that he's so devoted to 230 00:08:50,017 --> 00:08:51,906 making sure that we're protecting 231 00:08:51,906 --> 00:08:53,906 service members , that if something 232 00:08:53,906 --> 00:08:56,128 needed to be done right away , he would 233 00:08:56,128 --> 00:08:58,072 make sure that it happened . And I 234 00:08:58,072 --> 00:09:00,128 guess after this commission , I know 235 00:09:00,128 --> 00:08:59,800 you talked about . This is the first 236 00:08:59,800 --> 00:09:01,856 step . How do you make some of these 237 00:09:01,856 --> 00:09:03,911 recommendations part of the military 238 00:09:03,911 --> 00:09:06,740 culture ? A movement for everyone from , 239 00:09:06,750 --> 00:09:09,400 you know , the basic training all the 240 00:09:09,400 --> 00:09:11,310 way up to the secretary ? I guess 241 00:09:11,320 --> 00:09:13,487 that's the core question . That's what 242 00:09:13,487 --> 00:09:15,598 the commission will be charged with . 243 00:09:15,598 --> 00:09:19,100 That's a great way to put it . Laura 244 00:09:19,100 --> 00:09:22,550 Seligman Politico Mhm 245 00:09:22,940 --> 00:09:25,162 Hey , John , no questions on this , but 246 00:09:25,162 --> 00:09:27,550 I have a question later . Thanks . Yeah , 247 00:09:27,550 --> 00:09:30,160 Megan in the back . So as part of the 248 00:09:30,160 --> 00:09:32,382 commission , is there going ? Are there 249 00:09:32,382 --> 00:09:34,549 going to be teams traveling around and 250 00:09:34,549 --> 00:09:36,327 doing sensing sessions or doing 251 00:09:36,327 --> 00:09:38,438 interviews with service members where 252 00:09:38,438 --> 00:09:40,271 there'll be a place online where 253 00:09:40,271 --> 00:09:42,493 someone can put in their suggestions or 254 00:09:42,493 --> 00:09:44,604 share their stories . How can service 255 00:09:44,604 --> 00:09:46,827 members get to you guys and tell them , 256 00:09:46,827 --> 00:09:46,500 Tell you what they want ? That's 257 00:09:46,500 --> 00:09:48,444 absolutely what we want to do . So 258 00:09:48,444 --> 00:09:50,389 we're working on what that process 259 00:09:50,389 --> 00:09:52,389 would be now . So I envisioned that 260 00:09:52,389 --> 00:09:54,556 part of it will be online . We want to 261 00:09:54,556 --> 00:09:56,500 hear from as many people as we can 262 00:09:56,500 --> 00:09:58,444 about their experiences . So we're 263 00:09:58,444 --> 00:10:00,556 working on that process now . And I'm 264 00:10:00,556 --> 00:10:00,400 not sure . I think that there will be 265 00:10:00,400 --> 00:10:02,456 some travel because there are places 266 00:10:02,456 --> 00:10:04,511 we're gonna want to go and visit and 267 00:10:04,511 --> 00:10:06,400 see , particularly if we identify 268 00:10:06,400 --> 00:10:08,511 something that's really working where 269 00:10:08,511 --> 00:10:10,567 the metrics show that they're moving 270 00:10:10,567 --> 00:10:12,678 the needle . I think we're gonna want 271 00:10:12,678 --> 00:10:12,660 to go see that . So I think we'll do 272 00:10:12,660 --> 00:10:15,890 all of what you just described . Okay . 273 00:10:15,900 --> 00:10:19,420 Any other will be . Are you going to be 274 00:10:19,430 --> 00:10:21,670 talking to Kirsten ? Senator Kirsten 275 00:10:21,670 --> 00:10:23,892 Gillibrand's office is you know , she's 276 00:10:23,892 --> 00:10:26,114 pushed very hard to have this taken out 277 00:10:26,114 --> 00:10:28,170 of the military chain of command and 278 00:10:28,170 --> 00:10:30,337 press . The Pentagon has pushed in the 279 00:10:30,337 --> 00:10:32,448 other direction . But there are a lot 280 00:10:32,448 --> 00:10:34,559 of critics who think you can't really 281 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:36,559 do anything about this until you at 282 00:10:36,559 --> 00:10:38,726 least do that . Where do you Hey , are 283 00:10:38,726 --> 00:10:38,050 you going to be talking to her , 284 00:10:38,060 --> 00:10:40,282 including her office in this commission 285 00:10:40,282 --> 00:10:42,282 and be Where do you stand on that ? 286 00:10:42,282 --> 00:10:44,227 Well , we're absolutely engaged in 287 00:10:44,227 --> 00:10:46,227 outreach to members of Congress and 288 00:10:46,227 --> 00:10:48,393 particularly centered Gillibrand , who 289 00:10:48,393 --> 00:10:50,616 has so much capacity and thinking about 290 00:10:50,616 --> 00:10:50,400 this . And I've spoken with her about 291 00:10:50,400 --> 00:10:52,733 it over the year , so I'm very familiar . 292 00:10:52,733 --> 00:10:54,900 And as I described and we don't have a 293 00:10:54,900 --> 00:10:56,956 predetermined outcome , I think that 294 00:10:56,956 --> 00:10:58,678 accountability is critical . I 295 00:10:58,678 --> 00:11:00,511 absolutely believe that . I also 296 00:11:00,511 --> 00:11:02,567 believe that these pillars intersect 297 00:11:02,567 --> 00:11:04,622 with each other . So without a clear 298 00:11:04,622 --> 00:11:06,733 pathway for accountability , the work 299 00:11:06,733 --> 00:11:08,810 we want to do on prevention will be 300 00:11:08,820 --> 00:11:11,042 completely undermined . And by the same 301 00:11:11,042 --> 00:11:13,264 token , we could address that one issue 302 00:11:13,264 --> 00:11:15,264 of the chain of command . And if we 303 00:11:15,264 --> 00:11:17,431 don't do all the other things , that's 304 00:11:17,431 --> 00:11:19,487 not gonna work either . So I believe 305 00:11:19,487 --> 00:11:21,487 this . And I've expressed this view 306 00:11:21,487 --> 00:11:23,264 before that all of this travels 307 00:11:23,264 --> 00:11:25,487 together . So I think we're gonna We're 308 00:11:25,487 --> 00:11:27,320 gonna look with an open mind and 309 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:29,431 diverse views on this question of the 310 00:11:29,431 --> 00:11:31,598 chain of command without a doubt . And 311 00:11:31,598 --> 00:11:33,709 the secretary has said that himself . 312 00:11:33,709 --> 00:11:35,987 Okay . Any other questions in the room ? 313 00:11:35,987 --> 00:11:38,580 Okay , ma'am . Thank you . Thank you . 314 00:11:38,580 --> 00:11:39,160 so much . 315 00:11:45,140 --> 00:11:45,650 Thanks . 316 00:11:51,740 --> 00:11:55,560 Mhm . Mhm . Mhm , 317 00:11:57,340 --> 00:12:00,450 Mhm . Okay . 318 00:12:02,340 --> 00:12:04,340 As we announced yesterday evening , 319 00:12:05,140 --> 00:12:07,380 military forces conducted an airstrike 320 00:12:07,390 --> 00:12:09,420 against infrastructure utilized by 321 00:12:09,420 --> 00:12:11,590 Iranian backed militant groups in 322 00:12:11,590 --> 00:12:13,870 eastern Syria . The strike was 323 00:12:13,870 --> 00:12:16,380 authorized in response to recent 324 00:12:16,380 --> 00:12:18,547 attacks against American and coalition 325 00:12:18,547 --> 00:12:20,380 personnel in Iraq and to ongoing 326 00:12:20,380 --> 00:12:23,880 threats to those personnel . We 327 00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:26,190 recognize the significance of this 328 00:12:26,190 --> 00:12:28,134 operation as the first of its kind 329 00:12:28,134 --> 00:12:30,640 under the new administration . Uh and 330 00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:32,860 so while I typically , 331 00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:36,520 uh , I'm loath to get into operational 332 00:12:36,520 --> 00:12:39,470 details given that this has the 333 00:12:39,470 --> 00:12:41,470 interest that it does and it is the 334 00:12:41,470 --> 00:12:43,750 first one that President Biden has 335 00:12:43,750 --> 00:12:47,010 authorized , I can offer a little bit 336 00:12:47,020 --> 00:12:49,240 more detail . Uh , then I would 337 00:12:49,240 --> 00:12:51,750 typically be comfortable sharing at the 338 00:12:51,750 --> 00:12:55,590 podium . Two F 15 e strike 339 00:12:55,590 --> 00:12:58,820 eagles dropped seven precision guided 340 00:12:58,820 --> 00:13:01,600 munitions , totally destroying nine 341 00:13:01,600 --> 00:13:04,840 facilities and partially destroying two 342 00:13:04,850 --> 00:13:07,450 facilities , making them functionally 343 00:13:07,530 --> 00:13:10,610 destroyed . The structures were located 344 00:13:10,610 --> 00:13:12,840 at the Abu Kamal Terrorist Entry 345 00:13:12,840 --> 00:13:16,000 Control Point , located near the Syria 346 00:13:16,010 --> 00:13:19,330 Iraq border . On the Syrian side , this 347 00:13:19,330 --> 00:13:22,530 location is known to facilitate Iranian 348 00:13:22,530 --> 00:13:25,750 aligned militia group activity . We 349 00:13:25,750 --> 00:13:28,230 have preliminary details about 350 00:13:28,230 --> 00:13:31,940 casualties on site , but I won't be 351 00:13:31,940 --> 00:13:34,051 able to discuss additional details at 352 00:13:34,051 --> 00:13:36,051 this time because our battle damage 353 00:13:36,051 --> 00:13:39,610 assessment is ongoing . This response 354 00:13:39,620 --> 00:13:41,787 was conducted together with diplomatic 355 00:13:41,787 --> 00:13:43,953 measures , including consultation with 356 00:13:43,953 --> 00:13:45,953 coalition partners . The department 357 00:13:45,953 --> 00:13:47,842 notified congressional leadership 358 00:13:47,842 --> 00:13:49,842 before the strikes . Administration 359 00:13:49,842 --> 00:13:51,842 officials have been briefing at the 360 00:13:51,842 --> 00:13:53,953 member and staff level today and they 361 00:13:53,953 --> 00:13:56,410 will and there will be a full 362 00:13:56,420 --> 00:13:58,660 classified briefing early next week . 363 00:13:59,340 --> 00:14:02,940 No , as we made clear last night and I 364 00:14:02,940 --> 00:14:05,107 think the president Biden's order , he 365 00:14:05,107 --> 00:14:07,273 made clear that the United States will 366 00:14:07,273 --> 00:14:09,560 act to protect American and coalition 367 00:14:09,560 --> 00:14:11,782 personnel and our security interests in 368 00:14:11,782 --> 00:14:15,020 the region . Moving on today , 369 00:14:15,030 --> 00:14:17,030 Secretary Austin spoke with Kuwaiti 370 00:14:17,030 --> 00:14:19,141 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 371 00:14:19,141 --> 00:14:21,820 Defence H . E . Sheikh Hamad Jabber al 372 00:14:21,820 --> 00:14:24,510 Sabah to commemorate the 30th 373 00:14:24,520 --> 00:14:27,160 anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait . 374 00:14:27,740 --> 00:14:29,962 The secretary acknowledged the Kuwaitis 375 00:14:29,962 --> 00:14:32,073 and Americans who have bravely fought 376 00:14:32,073 --> 00:14:34,000 side by side to restore Kuwait's 377 00:14:34,000 --> 00:14:36,111 territorial integrity and respect for 378 00:14:36,111 --> 00:14:38,222 its sovereignty alongside the largest 379 00:14:38,222 --> 00:14:40,167 coalition the world had seen since 380 00:14:40,167 --> 00:14:42,780 World War Two . He also underscored 381 00:14:42,780 --> 00:14:44,836 that 30 years later , now the United 382 00:14:44,836 --> 00:14:46,947 States and Kuwait maintained a strong 383 00:14:46,947 --> 00:14:48,891 bilateral partnership . The United 384 00:14:48,891 --> 00:14:51,113 States and Kuwait remained committed to 385 00:14:51,113 --> 00:14:53,336 a close defence partnership that brings 386 00:14:53,336 --> 00:14:55,669 peace and prosperity to the gulf region . 387 00:14:55,840 --> 00:14:57,618 Another news . We're excited to 388 00:14:57,618 --> 00:14:59,840 announce the 2021 Department of Defense 389 00:14:59,840 --> 00:15:02,007 Warrior Games will be held at the ESPN 390 00:15:02,007 --> 00:15:04,062 Wide World of Sports Complex at Walt 391 00:15:04,062 --> 00:15:06,240 Disney World in Orlando from September 392 00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:09,350 12th to the 22nd . This annual event 393 00:15:09,350 --> 00:15:11,572 brings together hundreds of wounded ill 394 00:15:11,572 --> 00:15:13,739 injured service members from the U . S 395 00:15:13,739 --> 00:15:15,906 military and our ally nations as a way 396 00:15:15,906 --> 00:15:17,461 to enhance the recovery and 397 00:15:17,461 --> 00:15:19,572 rehabilitation of wounded warriors by 398 00:15:19,572 --> 00:15:21,572 providing them exposure to adaptive 399 00:15:21,572 --> 00:15:23,572 sports . This is the first time the 400 00:15:23,572 --> 00:15:25,628 Warrior games have been held at this 401 00:15:25,628 --> 00:15:25,140 location and in coordination with 402 00:15:25,140 --> 00:15:27,196 Disney , and we're grateful for that 403 00:15:27,196 --> 00:15:29,251 coordination and opportunity . As we 404 00:15:29,251 --> 00:15:31,362 prepare for this event , we will work 405 00:15:31,362 --> 00:15:33,529 closely to obviously ensure the health 406 00:15:33,529 --> 00:15:35,307 and welfare of all athletes and 407 00:15:35,307 --> 00:15:37,473 Spectators involved . More information 408 00:15:37,473 --> 00:15:39,196 and all the covid measures are 409 00:15:39,196 --> 00:15:41,307 available on the Department of Armies 410 00:15:41,307 --> 00:15:44,370 website . Uh , now I also know that 411 00:15:44,370 --> 00:15:46,259 many of you are interested in the 412 00:15:46,259 --> 00:15:48,370 training materials we provided to the 413 00:15:48,370 --> 00:15:50,592 services and the divorce for use during 414 00:15:50,592 --> 00:15:52,814 their stand downs . The extremism stand 415 00:15:52,814 --> 00:15:55,037 down that secretary ordered a couple of 416 00:15:55,037 --> 00:15:57,037 weeks ago . I'm happy to inform you 417 00:15:57,037 --> 00:15:59,092 that we posted all this material and 418 00:15:59,092 --> 00:16:01,203 it's available on our website defense 419 00:16:01,203 --> 00:16:02,814 dot gov slash newsroom slash 420 00:16:02,930 --> 00:16:05,041 publications . If you want to look at 421 00:16:05,041 --> 00:16:07,240 it , the materials are consistent with 422 00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:09,018 the secretaries approach to his 423 00:16:09,018 --> 00:16:11,184 priorities and provide enough guidance 424 00:16:11,184 --> 00:16:13,184 to facilitate these important stand 425 00:16:13,184 --> 00:16:15,407 down conversations . It is not meant to 426 00:16:15,407 --> 00:16:17,629 be prescriptive . It is not meant to be 427 00:16:17,629 --> 00:16:19,851 all inclusive . We want the services we 428 00:16:19,851 --> 00:16:22,018 want commands . We want leaders , uh , 429 00:16:22,018 --> 00:16:24,240 to conduct these stand downs in the way 430 00:16:24,240 --> 00:16:26,407 they see best fit for their schedule , 431 00:16:26,407 --> 00:16:28,351 their operations , their culture . 432 00:16:28,351 --> 00:16:30,200 They're people , services and 433 00:16:30,200 --> 00:16:32,510 components are and will continue to 434 00:16:32,510 --> 00:16:34,510 provide additional information that 435 00:16:34,510 --> 00:16:36,732 enable commanders to address this issue 436 00:16:36,732 --> 00:16:39,066 in greater detail with their units . Um , 437 00:16:39,066 --> 00:16:41,320 I can also announce that our new deputy 438 00:16:41,320 --> 00:16:43,542 secretary of defense , Kathleen Hicks , 439 00:16:43,542 --> 00:16:45,950 will join the Twittersphere today , and 440 00:16:45,950 --> 00:16:49,730 her handle is at DEP sec def . D E 441 00:16:49,730 --> 00:16:53,590 p S E C D E f . So please feel free to 442 00:16:53,590 --> 00:16:56,660 follow her on Twitter . And finally , 443 00:16:57,240 --> 00:16:59,462 I need to correct something that I said 444 00:16:59,462 --> 00:17:02,710 during the Tuesday press gaggle . There 445 00:17:02,720 --> 00:17:04,990 is no change to US policy regarding the 446 00:17:04,990 --> 00:17:07,520 sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands . As 447 00:17:07,520 --> 00:17:09,631 president , Biden understood , scored 448 00:17:09,631 --> 00:17:12,260 in his call with Prime Minister Saga 449 00:17:12,740 --> 00:17:14,780 secretary Blinken reaffirmed in his 450 00:17:14,780 --> 00:17:18,200 call would Foreign Minister Mottaki 451 00:17:18,940 --> 00:17:21,162 and Secretary Austin further reaffirmed 452 00:17:21,162 --> 00:17:24,670 in his call with Defense Minister Kishi . 453 00:17:25,040 --> 00:17:27,207 The United States is unwavering in its 454 00:17:27,207 --> 00:17:29,151 commitment to the defense of Japan 455 00:17:29,151 --> 00:17:31,096 under Article five of Our Security 456 00:17:31,096 --> 00:17:33,096 Treaty , which includes the Senkaku 457 00:17:33,096 --> 00:17:35,207 Isles . The United States opposes any 458 00:17:35,207 --> 00:17:37,373 unilateral action that seeks to change 459 00:17:37,373 --> 00:17:40,140 the status quo for further discussion 460 00:17:40,140 --> 00:17:41,862 on US policy and , of course , 461 00:17:41,862 --> 00:17:43,807 referring to our colleagues at the 462 00:17:43,807 --> 00:17:45,918 State Department . But I do regret my 463 00:17:45,918 --> 00:17:48,930 error the other day that was E and 464 00:17:48,940 --> 00:17:51,120 apologize for any confusion that that 465 00:17:51,120 --> 00:17:54,060 caused . Okay , let's get the questions 466 00:17:54,600 --> 00:17:55,550 leader . 467 00:17:58,840 --> 00:18:01,960 Hi . Thanks . Um , John , A couple , um , 468 00:18:01,970 --> 00:18:05,450 questions on the strike . Um , 469 00:18:06,740 --> 00:18:10,060 can you say whether or not 470 00:18:10,440 --> 00:18:14,370 there was any imminent threat 471 00:18:14,380 --> 00:18:18,130 coming from those facilities 472 00:18:18,140 --> 00:18:21,670 that were hit versus just a sort of a 473 00:18:22,540 --> 00:18:24,950 retaliatory strike against something 474 00:18:24,950 --> 00:18:27,130 they had ? There's been some reporting 475 00:18:27,130 --> 00:18:29,260 that there were trucks hit , was just 476 00:18:29,260 --> 00:18:33,130 buildings and was like a weapon . Were 477 00:18:33,130 --> 00:18:35,760 there weapons or something there that 478 00:18:36,140 --> 00:18:39,020 so to prevent future attacks ? Um , and 479 00:18:39,020 --> 00:18:41,510 then just one quick thing on Congress , 480 00:18:41,520 --> 00:18:43,409 you mentioned that there was some 481 00:18:43,409 --> 00:18:45,630 congressional notification . Um , 482 00:18:45,640 --> 00:18:47,862 there's been some complaints that there 483 00:18:47,862 --> 00:18:50,029 was no congressional authorization and 484 00:18:50,029 --> 00:18:52,196 questions about the legality of the US 485 00:18:52,196 --> 00:18:54,140 taking a strike in Syria . Can you 486 00:18:54,140 --> 00:18:56,362 address that ? Thank you . So there's a 487 00:18:56,362 --> 00:19:00,170 lot there lead to , um uh 488 00:19:01,140 --> 00:19:03,740 I won't get into as I think you can 489 00:19:03,740 --> 00:19:05,573 imagine . I'm not gonna get into 490 00:19:05,573 --> 00:19:08,860 specific intelligence assessments . Uh , 491 00:19:09,440 --> 00:19:12,560 the purpose for striking these targets 492 00:19:13,340 --> 00:19:17,010 was , uh , two fold one . 493 00:19:17,010 --> 00:19:20,260 Clearly , to , 494 00:19:20,740 --> 00:19:23,670 uh , to try to , 495 00:19:24,140 --> 00:19:26,570 uh , make an impact on these groups and 496 00:19:26,570 --> 00:19:29,480 their ability to conduct , uh , future 497 00:19:29,480 --> 00:19:33,060 attacks . Um , uh , and 498 00:19:33,640 --> 00:19:37,110 and two to send a very clear signal 499 00:19:38,240 --> 00:19:40,184 that the United States is going to 500 00:19:40,184 --> 00:19:42,420 protect its people and its going to 501 00:19:42,420 --> 00:19:44,364 protect our interests . It's gonna 502 00:19:44,364 --> 00:19:46,309 protect those of our , uh , of our 503 00:19:46,309 --> 00:19:48,880 partners in the region . Uh , so this 504 00:19:48,880 --> 00:19:51,330 was these targets were chosen carefully , 505 00:19:51,330 --> 00:19:53,497 very deliberately , uh , and struck in 506 00:19:53,497 --> 00:19:56,980 exactly the same manner . Um , and I'm 507 00:19:56,980 --> 00:19:59,036 sorry , Alina . Your second question 508 00:19:59,036 --> 00:20:01,147 was I think it was on notifications . 509 00:20:02,740 --> 00:20:05,320 Right . Um , notifications to Congress . 510 00:20:05,330 --> 00:20:08,690 Um , there's been some complaints that 511 00:20:08,700 --> 00:20:10,756 Congress was not able to provide any 512 00:20:10,756 --> 00:20:12,644 authorization for the strikes and 513 00:20:12,644 --> 00:20:14,422 questions about the legality of 514 00:20:14,422 --> 00:20:17,730 striking , um , structures in Syria . 515 00:20:17,740 --> 00:20:20,560 Can you address that ? And I guess just 516 00:20:20,570 --> 00:20:23,060 circling back to your previous comment . 517 00:20:23,240 --> 00:20:26,400 Um , can you say if there were weapons 518 00:20:26,410 --> 00:20:29,500 at all in any of the structures that 519 00:20:29,500 --> 00:20:33,310 were hit . On the second question , try 520 00:20:33,320 --> 00:20:35,431 not to forget now the other one , but 521 00:20:35,431 --> 00:20:38,460 on the issue of weapons again , our 522 00:20:38,460 --> 00:20:40,571 battle damage assessment is ongoing . 523 00:20:40,571 --> 00:20:42,682 And I don't have any more information 524 00:20:42,682 --> 00:20:44,904 than what I've been able to provide you 525 00:20:44,904 --> 00:20:47,490 today . I've gone as far as I actually 526 00:20:47,490 --> 00:20:50,680 can , based on what we know . Um , and 527 00:20:50,690 --> 00:20:52,634 to the degree we are able to share 528 00:20:52,634 --> 00:20:54,912 additional information . Um , you know , 529 00:20:54,912 --> 00:20:57,240 we will . But I also cautioned you to 530 00:20:57,250 --> 00:20:59,417 to understand that there's going to be 531 00:20:59,417 --> 00:21:01,639 a limit to how much more information we 532 00:21:01,639 --> 00:21:04,670 may be able to provide on the legality . 533 00:21:04,680 --> 00:21:07,270 There are two , 534 00:21:07,740 --> 00:21:11,550 uh , frameworks here which clearly 535 00:21:11,550 --> 00:21:14,570 defined the legality of this strike . 536 00:21:14,570 --> 00:21:16,514 One is article to the Commander in 537 00:21:16,514 --> 00:21:20,360 Chief under article two has , uh , not 538 00:21:20,360 --> 00:21:22,940 only the authority , but the obligation , 539 00:21:22,950 --> 00:21:26,410 uh , to protect American 540 00:21:26,420 --> 00:21:29,610 forces , uh , in combat theaters and in 541 00:21:29,620 --> 00:21:32,190 operations , military operations . So 542 00:21:32,190 --> 00:21:35,540 clearly under his constitutional under 543 00:21:35,540 --> 00:21:38,260 the U . S . Constitutional authorities . 544 00:21:38,270 --> 00:21:41,030 This was this was right right there . 545 00:21:41,040 --> 00:21:43,390 Uh , and then second , under article 51 546 00:21:43,390 --> 00:21:46,060 of the United Nations , uh , 547 00:21:46,070 --> 00:21:49,220 international law , it gives nations 548 00:21:49,220 --> 00:21:51,220 involved in operations the right of 549 00:21:51,220 --> 00:21:53,220 self defense . And as I said at the 550 00:21:53,220 --> 00:21:55,276 very outset , uh , this really was a 551 00:21:55,276 --> 00:21:58,950 defensive strike , uh , meant to help 552 00:21:58,950 --> 00:22:02,900 protect in the future . Uh , American 553 00:22:02,900 --> 00:22:05,130 forces and coalition partners , Given 554 00:22:05,130 --> 00:22:07,241 what we knew , those those structures 555 00:22:07,241 --> 00:22:09,870 were used for , um , right there on the 556 00:22:09,870 --> 00:22:13,250 other side of that border to to provide , 557 00:22:13,260 --> 00:22:16,810 um , throughput for these groups and 558 00:22:16,810 --> 00:22:20,460 their activities inside Iraq so very 559 00:22:20,460 --> 00:22:24,270 much was a defensive operation 560 00:22:24,390 --> 00:22:27,280 to protect our troops and our coalition 561 00:22:27,290 --> 00:22:29,457 partners as well . As as I said at the 562 00:22:29,457 --> 00:22:31,623 outset , to send a strong signal about 563 00:22:31,623 --> 00:22:33,568 our resolve . Did that answer your 564 00:22:33,568 --> 00:22:37,160 question leader ? Uhh , 565 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:40,710 Sure . I guess that you're sort of 566 00:22:40,710 --> 00:22:44,050 saying that it was to protect troops 567 00:22:44,050 --> 00:22:46,217 and throughput , But you're not saying 568 00:22:46,217 --> 00:22:48,890 what was in any of these multitude of 569 00:22:48,890 --> 00:22:52,880 structures . Not I think so much of the 570 00:22:52,890 --> 00:22:54,890 detail . We're confident that these 571 00:22:54,890 --> 00:22:58,320 were legitimate targets , uh , that 572 00:22:58,330 --> 00:23:01,250 were utilized by groups associated with 573 00:23:01,250 --> 00:23:04,360 these recent attacks . Um , okay , 574 00:23:05,340 --> 00:23:08,830 but structures housing capabilities 575 00:23:08,830 --> 00:23:12,720 that they that they utilized , uh , 576 00:23:12,730 --> 00:23:15,550 to help perpetrate attacks on our 577 00:23:15,550 --> 00:23:17,772 troops and on our coalition partners in 578 00:23:17,772 --> 00:23:19,939 Iraq . We're confident in that I'm not 579 00:23:19,939 --> 00:23:22,161 going to get into the specific intel of 580 00:23:22,161 --> 00:23:24,328 that . And as for the again , you know 581 00:23:24,328 --> 00:23:26,550 your question about where their weapons 582 00:23:26,550 --> 00:23:28,217 hit again , our battle damage 583 00:23:28,217 --> 00:23:30,161 assessments ongoing . I'm just not 584 00:23:30,161 --> 00:23:32,383 going to get ahead of that . And to the 585 00:23:32,383 --> 00:23:32,360 degree we are able to provide more 586 00:23:32,360 --> 00:23:35,490 context in time when we know more . I 587 00:23:35,490 --> 00:23:38,950 certainly will . Tom John , the Syrian 588 00:23:38,950 --> 00:23:41,590 Observatory for Human Rights says 17 589 00:23:41,590 --> 00:23:44,290 were killed in this operation . I know 590 00:23:44,290 --> 00:23:46,401 you're still doing the BDA , but does 591 00:23:46,401 --> 00:23:48,670 that sound way off the mark from what 592 00:23:48,670 --> 00:23:52,110 you know right now ? And also , did you 593 00:23:52,120 --> 00:23:54,287 communicate at all with the Russians ? 594 00:23:54,287 --> 00:23:56,287 Did you deconflict with them before 595 00:23:56,287 --> 00:23:59,060 this operation ? On the on the 596 00:23:59,640 --> 00:24:01,584 casualties ? I've seen those press 597 00:24:01,584 --> 00:24:03,990 reports , Tom , Um , as I said in my 598 00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:05,778 opening statement , we received 599 00:24:05,778 --> 00:24:07,889 preliminary indications of casualties 600 00:24:07,889 --> 00:24:10,056 on site , but I don't have more detail 601 00:24:10,056 --> 00:24:12,960 right now in terms of , uh , numbers . 602 00:24:12,970 --> 00:24:16,520 Uh , we have preliminary indications of 603 00:24:16,520 --> 00:24:18,631 casualties on site . I'm not going to 604 00:24:18,631 --> 00:24:20,700 go any further than that . Um , the 605 00:24:20,710 --> 00:24:22,860 Russians were contacted just prior to 606 00:24:22,860 --> 00:24:24,804 the strike using the deconfliction 607 00:24:24,804 --> 00:24:27,260 mechanism that is in place . Yeah . . 608 00:24:29,240 --> 00:24:32,070 At one point did it become clear who 609 00:24:32,070 --> 00:24:34,520 was behind the rocket attack in Air 610 00:24:34,520 --> 00:24:38,430 Bill and And how 611 00:24:38,430 --> 00:24:40,890 long did it take you to sort of decide 612 00:24:40,890 --> 00:24:42,668 on the target and carry out the 613 00:24:42,668 --> 00:24:44,820 operation and also with the other 614 00:24:44,820 --> 00:24:47,590 rocket attacks at the Balad air base 615 00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:49,940 and the Green Zone afterward , with 616 00:24:49,940 --> 00:24:52,300 those also linked to those same groups ? 617 00:24:53,140 --> 00:24:55,450 Well , when we referred to 618 00:24:56,940 --> 00:24:59,107 when we refer to the justification for 619 00:24:59,107 --> 00:25:01,051 the strikes we talked about recent 620 00:25:01,051 --> 00:25:03,051 attacks . So I'd leave it at that , 621 00:25:03,051 --> 00:25:05,162 that certainly you can take away from 622 00:25:05,162 --> 00:25:07,080 that that this structure was hit 623 00:25:07,090 --> 00:25:09,034 because we know it was utilized by 624 00:25:09,034 --> 00:25:11,670 groups that were responsible for for , 625 00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:14,950 uh , these recent attacks not just , 626 00:25:15,640 --> 00:25:19,630 uh , reveal . Um , And as for the 627 00:25:19,640 --> 00:25:21,751 ticktock that you're asking , I don't 628 00:25:21,751 --> 00:25:23,862 have that level of specificity except 629 00:25:23,862 --> 00:25:25,640 to say that . And you heard the 630 00:25:25,640 --> 00:25:27,751 secretary talked about this last week 631 00:25:27,751 --> 00:25:29,973 that the Iraqi partners were conducting 632 00:25:29,973 --> 00:25:32,196 an investigation and he said last night 633 00:25:32,196 --> 00:25:34,180 that some of the information they 634 00:25:34,180 --> 00:25:36,700 gleaned what they learned from that 635 00:25:36,710 --> 00:25:39,630 certainly , uh , was of significant 636 00:25:39,630 --> 00:25:41,519 assistance and and our ability to 637 00:25:41,519 --> 00:25:45,500 develop this target set . Um , So that 638 00:25:45,500 --> 00:25:48,690 process evolved over the last couple of 639 00:25:48,690 --> 00:25:51,360 weeks since the attack , uh , in Erbil 640 00:25:51,360 --> 00:25:53,100 when their investigative and 641 00:25:53,100 --> 00:25:55,322 intelligence efforts began , so it sort 642 00:25:55,322 --> 00:25:57,544 of was evolving over the last couple of 643 00:25:57,544 --> 00:25:59,767 weeks . I don't know . I can't give you 644 00:25:59,767 --> 00:26:01,822 a date certain , Dan , When you know 645 00:26:01,822 --> 00:26:04,044 when all of a sudden the You know , the 646 00:26:04,044 --> 00:26:06,100 light bulb went on and we knew , You 647 00:26:06,100 --> 00:26:08,267 know , this is this was the These were 648 00:26:08,267 --> 00:26:07,520 the groups , and this is what we were 649 00:26:07,520 --> 00:26:09,780 gonna , uh , what we were gonna do . 650 00:26:09,780 --> 00:26:12,390 But I I can tell you that the president 651 00:26:12,390 --> 00:26:14,760 himself authorized this , uh , 652 00:26:14,770 --> 00:26:18,200 yesterday morning . Let me go to the 653 00:26:18,210 --> 00:26:22,180 phones . Uh , Louis 654 00:26:22,180 --> 00:26:25,620 Martinez , ABC . Hey , John . 655 00:26:25,630 --> 00:26:27,920 Um , last night on the plane , 656 00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:29,809 Secretary Austin talked about the 657 00:26:29,809 --> 00:26:32,031 importance of having the Iraqis conduct 658 00:26:32,031 --> 00:26:34,031 the investigation . He talked about 659 00:26:34,031 --> 00:26:35,864 encouraging them to conduct this 660 00:26:35,864 --> 00:26:38,570 investigation . Um , can you talk ? Can 661 00:26:38,570 --> 00:26:40,870 you address that ? And also , the level 662 00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:44,550 of involvement of the US had , 663 00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:47,320 uh , in nailing down the linkage 664 00:26:47,330 --> 00:26:50,020 between these , uh , militia groups and 665 00:26:50,020 --> 00:26:52,470 these attacks . Um , and how much was 666 00:26:52,470 --> 00:26:54,637 relying on the Iraqis and how much was 667 00:26:54,637 --> 00:26:56,914 relying on us intelligence . Thank you . 668 00:26:56,914 --> 00:26:59,026 Uh , it was very much a team effort , 669 00:26:59,026 --> 00:27:02,020 Louis . Uh , the secretary was very 670 00:27:02,020 --> 00:27:04,210 sincere when he praised our Iraqi 671 00:27:04,220 --> 00:27:06,530 partners for their investigative and 672 00:27:06,530 --> 00:27:09,490 intelligence work That they did , um I 673 00:27:09,500 --> 00:27:11,360 won't speak for them . Uh , that 674 00:27:11,360 --> 00:27:13,980 wouldn't be appropriate , but , uh , 675 00:27:13,990 --> 00:27:16,157 but there was some very good work done 676 00:27:16,157 --> 00:27:18,323 on the on the intelligence side , Um , 677 00:27:18,323 --> 00:27:20,910 that helped lead to this , uh , these 678 00:27:20,910 --> 00:27:24,360 successful strikes . And 679 00:27:24,840 --> 00:27:27,670 as as I think he said , we offered , uh , 680 00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:30,010 support and assistance . We were able 681 00:27:30,010 --> 00:27:32,066 to provide some information to their 682 00:27:32,066 --> 00:27:34,343 investigative process that that helped , 683 00:27:34,343 --> 00:27:36,399 Um , I won't get into the details of 684 00:27:36,399 --> 00:27:38,566 that , but it was I think it's safe to 685 00:27:38,566 --> 00:27:40,677 assume that , um that while it was an 686 00:27:40,677 --> 00:27:42,954 Iraqi investigation , clearly , I mean , 687 00:27:42,954 --> 00:27:45,066 there was some assistance provided by 688 00:27:45,066 --> 00:27:47,066 the United States to help , um , to 689 00:27:47,066 --> 00:27:49,288 help with the information gathering and 690 00:27:49,288 --> 00:27:51,510 the intelligence assessments . But that 691 00:27:51,510 --> 00:27:51,230 is not unusual , Louis , you know that , 692 00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:53,540 uh , throughout our mission there in 693 00:27:53,540 --> 00:27:55,700 Iraq at the invitation of our Iraqi 694 00:27:55,700 --> 00:27:58,410 partners and this counter isis , uh , 695 00:27:58,420 --> 00:28:00,950 effort . That sort of information 696 00:28:00,950 --> 00:28:03,500 sharing is a fairly routine process 697 00:28:03,500 --> 00:28:06,880 between us and our Iraqi partners . Uh , 698 00:28:06,890 --> 00:28:10,100 Lucas , there's something up , John . 699 00:28:10,110 --> 00:28:12,332 The Iraqi military is saying today that 700 00:28:12,332 --> 00:28:14,277 they did not help in these U . S . 701 00:28:14,277 --> 00:28:16,499 Strikes in eastern Syria that they only 702 00:28:16,499 --> 00:28:18,610 helped us military . When it comes to 703 00:28:18,610 --> 00:28:20,721 striking Isis , who's right here uh , 704 00:28:20,721 --> 00:28:22,610 there's not There's I don't think 705 00:28:22,610 --> 00:28:24,830 there's a split here . Lucas is true 706 00:28:24,830 --> 00:28:27,420 that the mission inside Iraq as a 707 00:28:27,420 --> 00:28:31,290 counter isis effort . Um , 708 00:28:31,300 --> 00:28:34,060 this mission didn't take place in Iraq . 709 00:28:34,070 --> 00:28:36,510 It took place in Syria . And as the 710 00:28:36,510 --> 00:28:39,380 secretary said last night , uh , the 711 00:28:39,380 --> 00:28:41,450 Iraqis were critical . Iraqi and 712 00:28:41,450 --> 00:28:43,617 Kurdish partners were critical , and , 713 00:28:43,617 --> 00:28:46,070 uh , their investigative process and 714 00:28:46,070 --> 00:28:47,792 the things they learned in the 715 00:28:47,792 --> 00:28:50,014 intelligence assessments that they were 716 00:28:50,014 --> 00:28:52,126 able to provide to the to the process 717 00:28:52,126 --> 00:28:54,403 to in terms of assisting are targeting . 718 00:28:54,403 --> 00:28:56,514 So when the secretary says the Iraqis 719 00:28:56,514 --> 00:28:58,681 were quote very helpful to us . That's 720 00:28:58,681 --> 00:29:00,959 the investigation into the rock attack , 721 00:29:00,959 --> 00:29:03,181 not in the targeting . That's correct . 722 00:29:03,181 --> 00:29:02,170 In eastern Syria . That's correct . 723 00:29:02,540 --> 00:29:04,707 That is correct . Yeah . Thank you for 724 00:29:04,707 --> 00:29:07,610 clearing it up . Um , can I go back to 725 00:29:07,610 --> 00:29:09,777 attribution ? I've been told that it's 726 00:29:09,777 --> 00:29:11,999 been made more difficult since Sulamani 727 00:29:11,999 --> 00:29:13,999 Mohandas Death . These groups are a 728 00:29:13,999 --> 00:29:16,221 little , uh , more gray in terms of who 729 00:29:16,221 --> 00:29:18,443 they are and their control . So can you 730 00:29:18,443 --> 00:29:20,666 just go into a little bit more detail ? 731 00:29:20,666 --> 00:29:22,888 Why are so complex group or groups what 732 00:29:22,888 --> 00:29:24,999 was behind it and that Iran is behind 733 00:29:24,999 --> 00:29:26,999 those groups and then follow that . 734 00:29:26,999 --> 00:29:29,221 What is the message the strike sends to 735 00:29:29,221 --> 00:29:31,388 Iraq . So , Nick , uh , this will be a 736 00:29:31,388 --> 00:29:33,554 fairly unsatisfactory answer . I'm not 737 00:29:33,554 --> 00:29:35,666 going to get into the specifics of of 738 00:29:35,666 --> 00:29:37,888 the intelligence anymore than I already 739 00:29:37,888 --> 00:29:40,530 have . And again , I wanna credit Iraqi 740 00:29:40,530 --> 00:29:42,697 and Kurdish partners for some terrific 741 00:29:42,697 --> 00:29:44,863 intelligence work that they did , Um , 742 00:29:44,863 --> 00:29:48,410 uh , to lead us to the degree of 743 00:29:48,410 --> 00:29:50,521 confidence that we had that these two 744 00:29:50,521 --> 00:29:54,430 groups were responsible , um , and and 745 00:29:54,430 --> 00:29:57,450 have actually been responsible even 746 00:29:57,450 --> 00:30:00,720 prior to , uh , these three most recent 747 00:30:00,730 --> 00:30:04,540 attacks . Um , and it's been no secret 748 00:30:04,540 --> 00:30:07,510 that that , uh , that they do have ties 749 00:30:07,520 --> 00:30:11,420 to to Iran . Um , that's that . 750 00:30:11,430 --> 00:30:13,170 That's a think longstanding 751 00:30:13,180 --> 00:30:16,170 understanding that we , um that we have . 752 00:30:16,170 --> 00:30:18,170 And I'm sorry you had another one . 753 00:30:18,170 --> 00:30:20,281 That was the message the strike sends 754 00:30:20,281 --> 00:30:22,337 to Iran . I think the strike sends a 755 00:30:22,337 --> 00:30:24,970 message to anyone in the region to all 756 00:30:24,970 --> 00:30:27,303 adversaries in the region . People that , 757 00:30:27,303 --> 00:30:31,000 uh , organizations , uh , 758 00:30:31,010 --> 00:30:33,710 people leaders , um , that are 759 00:30:33,710 --> 00:30:36,690 operating , um , in ways that are 760 00:30:36,690 --> 00:30:38,820 inimical to security and stability of 761 00:30:38,820 --> 00:30:40,820 the region and to our interest into 762 00:30:40,820 --> 00:30:43,250 those of our partners that we will 763 00:30:43,250 --> 00:30:45,930 defend ourselves , that we will protect 764 00:30:45,930 --> 00:30:48,041 our interests . We're certainly going 765 00:30:48,041 --> 00:30:50,208 to act to protect our people and our , 766 00:30:50,208 --> 00:30:52,130 uh , the forces of our allies and 767 00:30:52,130 --> 00:30:54,340 partners . That is an unambiguous , 768 00:30:54,340 --> 00:30:56,990 clear message to anyone in the region 769 00:30:57,000 --> 00:31:00,920 about what the stakes are . If you're 770 00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:04,290 going to continue to conduct attacks on 771 00:31:04,290 --> 00:31:06,401 our people and and the Iraqi people , 772 00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:09,190 let me go to the phones again . 773 00:31:09,560 --> 00:31:13,420 Injuries . Hey , John , 774 00:31:13,430 --> 00:31:15,240 um , just just wanted some 775 00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:17,550 clarification on the Iraqis and what 776 00:31:17,560 --> 00:31:20,480 role they played . So , uh , I might 777 00:31:20,480 --> 00:31:22,647 have missed her , but I think you said 778 00:31:22,647 --> 00:31:25,410 they helped , uh , sort of , um some 779 00:31:25,410 --> 00:31:28,470 targeting data . Um , but the Iraqis 780 00:31:28,470 --> 00:31:30,081 say they didn't exchange any 781 00:31:30,081 --> 00:31:32,081 information about the target within 782 00:31:32,081 --> 00:31:34,248 Syria's . Could you just again help me 783 00:31:34,248 --> 00:31:36,248 explain what the Iraqis exactly did 784 00:31:36,248 --> 00:31:38,960 with regard to the strike that they 785 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:41,170 helped with targeting data ? In fact , 786 00:31:41,180 --> 00:31:43,480 my answer to Lucas was quite quite to 787 00:31:43,480 --> 00:31:46,660 the opposite point . I did not say that 788 00:31:46,660 --> 00:31:48,771 they helped with targeting what I did 789 00:31:48,771 --> 00:31:50,716 say . What the secretary said last 790 00:31:50,716 --> 00:31:52,271 night is that through their 791 00:31:52,271 --> 00:31:54,493 investigative process and through their 792 00:31:54,493 --> 00:31:56,493 own good , intelligent intelligence 793 00:31:56,493 --> 00:31:59,060 work , it was able to help us better 794 00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:03,330 determine , um , who was responsible 795 00:32:03,340 --> 00:32:05,510 for these attacks ? What groups were 796 00:32:05,510 --> 00:32:08,980 responsible for these attacks ? Um and 797 00:32:08,980 --> 00:32:12,360 then that helped us that gave us , 798 00:32:12,740 --> 00:32:15,030 uh , you know , the ability to , uh , 799 00:32:15,040 --> 00:32:16,984 to do the targeting process and to 800 00:32:16,984 --> 00:32:19,880 determine , uh , what would be 801 00:32:19,890 --> 00:32:22,600 the best set of targets for this 802 00:32:22,600 --> 00:32:24,489 particular circumstance for these 803 00:32:24,489 --> 00:32:26,960 strikes . But they you know , I there 804 00:32:26,960 --> 00:32:29,640 was They were correct when they say 805 00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:32,050 they did not assist in the targeting 806 00:32:32,050 --> 00:32:35,480 process . Cristina , good to see you . 807 00:32:35,490 --> 00:32:38,360 Good to see you too . Um , so two 808 00:32:38,360 --> 00:32:40,640 questions . One Iraq related one non 809 00:32:40,640 --> 00:32:43,440 Iraq related . Um , first , can you 810 00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:45,662 explain the thinking behind striking in 811 00:32:45,662 --> 00:32:48,310 Syria versus Iraq , where the rocket 812 00:32:48,310 --> 00:32:51,170 attacks were believed to have come from , 813 00:32:51,170 --> 00:32:55,150 and and I'll address the 814 00:32:55,150 --> 00:32:57,680 second one later . So I think I'd worry 815 00:32:57,680 --> 00:32:59,902 less about the geography and more about 816 00:32:59,902 --> 00:33:02,013 the function . Right . Uh , and these 817 00:33:02,013 --> 00:33:04,124 these these structures again , we had 818 00:33:04,124 --> 00:33:07,880 information that we believe gave us 819 00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:10,102 confidence that these structures , this 820 00:33:10,102 --> 00:33:11,824 site , this compound , all the 821 00:33:11,824 --> 00:33:13,824 buildings were on a single compound 822 00:33:13,900 --> 00:33:16,220 were being used by these groups to 823 00:33:16,220 --> 00:33:19,200 facilitate the movement of , uh , 824 00:33:19,210 --> 00:33:22,930 resources material , Um , uh , and 825 00:33:22,940 --> 00:33:25,660 weaponry , uh , into Iraq to conduct 826 00:33:25,660 --> 00:33:28,210 the attacks . So , um , it was really 827 00:33:28,210 --> 00:33:31,760 more that than , um , you know , then 828 00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:34,250 the then the map , You have another 829 00:33:34,250 --> 00:33:37,650 question . The second one has Secretary 830 00:33:37,650 --> 00:33:40,150 Austin had a chance to consider the 831 00:33:40,150 --> 00:33:43,280 Medal of Honor nomination for Sergeant 832 00:33:43,280 --> 00:33:45,800 First Class Alwin Cash ? Or has it not 833 00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,140 risen to his level yet ? I'm gonna take 834 00:33:48,140 --> 00:33:50,970 that question . I don't believe it is , 835 00:33:50,980 --> 00:33:53,270 uh , that that package has , uh , 836 00:33:53,740 --> 00:33:56,400 gotten that far in the process , but I 837 00:33:56,400 --> 00:33:58,456 don't know that for sure . So let me 838 00:33:58,456 --> 00:34:00,830 take that question . Uh , dance gallon 839 00:34:00,830 --> 00:34:04,750 on the phone . No , I'm good . 840 00:34:04,750 --> 00:34:06,861 Nick . Nick . Nick asked the question 841 00:34:06,861 --> 00:34:09,010 for us . Okay ? I guess I should have 842 00:34:09,010 --> 00:34:11,690 thought of that . Sorry , Nick . Missy 843 00:34:11,690 --> 00:34:13,079 Ryan , Washington Post . 844 00:34:18,640 --> 00:34:21,080 Sorry . I want you to myself . Um 845 00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:23,247 Thanks , John . I just want to go back 846 00:34:23,247 --> 00:34:25,024 to the role of these particular 847 00:34:25,024 --> 00:34:27,191 facilities and I will come out , and I 848 00:34:27,191 --> 00:34:29,860 just I just want to make sure that I'm 849 00:34:29,860 --> 00:34:31,804 understanding what you're saying . 850 00:34:31,804 --> 00:34:34,070 You're describing these as , um , way 851 00:34:34,070 --> 00:34:36,292 stations kind of that are used by these 852 00:34:36,292 --> 00:34:38,510 specific militias Khatab , Hezbollah 853 00:34:38,510 --> 00:34:41,650 and Khatab . The kss as 854 00:34:41,660 --> 00:34:44,340 moving militants . From where to where 855 00:34:44,340 --> 00:34:46,730 and and also are you saying are you 856 00:34:46,730 --> 00:34:48,952 saying that the Iraqi government didn't 857 00:34:48,952 --> 00:34:52,070 help the targeting ? But they i deed kh 858 00:34:52,070 --> 00:34:54,890 and KF s as behind the RBL attack so I 859 00:34:54,890 --> 00:34:56,668 just want to make sure that I'm 860 00:34:56,668 --> 00:34:58,612 understanding what you're saying . 861 00:34:58,612 --> 00:35:00,834 Again . I'm loathe to get into too much 862 00:35:00,834 --> 00:35:03,001 more detail than what I've said thus , 863 00:35:03,001 --> 00:35:06,250 pharmacy . Um uh , 864 00:35:06,940 --> 00:35:09,290 And as you get back to my answer to 865 00:35:09,290 --> 00:35:13,160 Lucas , uh , Iraqi and Kurdish partners 866 00:35:13,160 --> 00:35:17,080 were helpful in helping gather 867 00:35:17,080 --> 00:35:19,620 the information and the intelligence , 868 00:35:19,620 --> 00:35:21,787 which gave us the degree of confidence 869 00:35:22,340 --> 00:35:25,470 that these two groups were responsible 870 00:35:25,470 --> 00:35:28,290 for recent attacks . Um , And as I said 871 00:35:28,300 --> 00:35:32,200 at the outset on this , uh , on 872 00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:35,450 this structure , this compound Abu 873 00:35:35,450 --> 00:35:38,430 Kamal entry control point is the way I 874 00:35:38,430 --> 00:35:40,990 described it located near the Syria 875 00:35:41,000 --> 00:35:43,320 Iraq border . And I think I tried to 876 00:35:43,320 --> 00:35:45,542 describe that as best I could as a sort 877 00:35:45,542 --> 00:35:48,470 of a way for them to throughput 878 00:35:48,910 --> 00:35:51,580 into Iraq . You called it a way station ? 879 00:35:51,580 --> 00:35:53,191 I don't I don't think that's 880 00:35:53,191 --> 00:35:55,990 necessarily a a bad way of putting it . 881 00:35:56,000 --> 00:35:58,110 But , I mean , we know that this 882 00:35:58,110 --> 00:36:01,730 compound was used by these groups , um , 883 00:36:01,740 --> 00:36:03,790 to help resource , uh , and help 884 00:36:03,790 --> 00:36:06,390 facilitate , uh , their ability to 885 00:36:06,390 --> 00:36:08,920 conduct these kinds of attacks inside 886 00:36:08,920 --> 00:36:11,750 Iraq . And again , this is not 887 00:36:11,750 --> 00:36:13,917 something that I think is all that new 888 00:36:13,917 --> 00:36:16,510 to many of you who have covered this 889 00:36:16,510 --> 00:36:18,732 region for a long time . That that area 890 00:36:18,732 --> 00:36:21,930 of Syria , Um , it's not uncommon for , 891 00:36:21,940 --> 00:36:25,600 uh , since it is , um uh , largely 892 00:36:25,600 --> 00:36:29,380 unpopulated , very austere 893 00:36:29,380 --> 00:36:31,630 environment . Um , that that groups 894 00:36:31,630 --> 00:36:34,890 like these , uh , in fact . And Isis 895 00:36:34,900 --> 00:36:38,560 used to , uh , significantly use 896 00:36:38,570 --> 00:36:42,470 that area of Syria , um , as , uh , as 897 00:36:42,470 --> 00:36:45,050 way stations , training facilities , 898 00:36:45,230 --> 00:36:49,040 weapons caches , places to 899 00:36:49,050 --> 00:36:51,370 to , uh , to make possible the attacks 900 00:36:51,370 --> 00:36:53,314 that they were doing in Iraq . And 901 00:36:53,314 --> 00:36:55,148 again , I think that's that's in 902 00:36:55,148 --> 00:36:57,259 keeping with what we understood about 903 00:36:57,259 --> 00:37:00,500 about this compound . Yeah . Joe , I 904 00:37:00,510 --> 00:37:02,940 would like to ask you if the Pentagon 905 00:37:02,940 --> 00:37:05,590 is concerned about the momentum in 906 00:37:05,590 --> 00:37:08,050 relationship with Riyadh in the 907 00:37:08,050 --> 00:37:11,380 aftermath of the release of the report 908 00:37:11,390 --> 00:37:15,100 by the DNA . I think the secretary we 909 00:37:15,100 --> 00:37:17,550 address this , Uh uh , 910 00:37:18,530 --> 00:37:20,752 when the secretary , when we offered to 911 00:37:20,752 --> 00:37:23,240 read out of the secretaries , call with 912 00:37:23,250 --> 00:37:27,150 the crown prince . I mean , um , and 913 00:37:27,150 --> 00:37:29,261 I'm not I'm not going to speak to the 914 00:37:29,261 --> 00:37:32,070 specifics of this report That's outside 915 00:37:32,070 --> 00:37:34,181 the lanes of the Defense Department . 916 00:37:34,330 --> 00:37:38,040 Uh , but Saudi Arabia 917 00:37:38,040 --> 00:37:40,340 remains a strategic partner in the 918 00:37:40,340 --> 00:37:44,040 region . We have to be courageous 919 00:37:44,040 --> 00:37:47,750 enough as friends to speak candidly 920 00:37:47,750 --> 00:37:51,160 and , um , and to make 921 00:37:51,170 --> 00:37:55,100 clear our concerns about the 922 00:37:55,100 --> 00:37:57,730 rule of law and about civil and human 923 00:37:57,730 --> 00:38:00,010 rights . Uh , even with friends and 924 00:38:00,010 --> 00:38:03,630 partners , um , and , uh , to my State 925 00:38:03,630 --> 00:38:05,797 Department colleagues to speak to that 926 00:38:05,797 --> 00:38:07,463 from from a military military 927 00:38:07,463 --> 00:38:09,990 perspective . Uh , as I've said many 928 00:38:09,990 --> 00:38:13,290 times , we take seriously our security 929 00:38:13,290 --> 00:38:15,370 commitments to Saudi Arabia with 930 00:38:15,370 --> 00:38:17,314 respect to their ability to defend 931 00:38:17,314 --> 00:38:19,537 themselves . And they do need to defend 932 00:38:19,537 --> 00:38:21,592 themselves , particularly along that 933 00:38:21,592 --> 00:38:24,570 southern border . Um and , um and it's 934 00:38:24,570 --> 00:38:26,681 important that we continue to be able 935 00:38:26,681 --> 00:38:28,848 to have frank and candid conversations 936 00:38:28,848 --> 00:38:30,959 about how that relationship should go 937 00:38:30,959 --> 00:38:33,014 forward . Uh , again , I won't speak 938 00:38:33,014 --> 00:38:35,070 for the broader government on this , 939 00:38:35,070 --> 00:38:36,848 but from a military to military 940 00:38:36,848 --> 00:38:38,737 perspective , we we recognize our 941 00:38:38,737 --> 00:38:40,792 commitments and and , uh , and those 942 00:38:40,792 --> 00:38:42,681 requirements . And we also , uh , 943 00:38:42,681 --> 00:38:46,360 respect our governments , uh , right 944 00:38:46,360 --> 00:38:49,760 and responsibility , uh , to make clear 945 00:38:49,770 --> 00:38:51,940 the broader context of the bilateral 946 00:38:51,940 --> 00:38:54,218 relationship between the United States , 947 00:38:54,218 --> 00:38:56,670 uh , and Saudi Arabia , Iran , Uh , how 948 00:38:56,680 --> 00:38:59,180 do you describe the serious strikes as 949 00:38:59,380 --> 00:39:02,930 defensive and known ? So then why wait 950 00:39:02,940 --> 00:39:05,000 until American Service members and 951 00:39:05,000 --> 00:39:08,660 diplomats are endangered by rockets to 952 00:39:08,670 --> 00:39:11,280 strike these facilities ? And is the 953 00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:14,410 Defense Department ready to finally lay 954 00:39:14,410 --> 00:39:16,410 blame on Iran ? Is ultimately 955 00:39:16,410 --> 00:39:18,466 responsible for these strikes . Take 956 00:39:18,466 --> 00:39:20,743 issue with the premise of the question , 957 00:39:20,743 --> 00:39:22,743 Abraham , Why wait ? I mean , we've 958 00:39:22,743 --> 00:39:25,050 talked about this many times . I can't 959 00:39:25,050 --> 00:39:27,217 speak , and I won't speak for what the 960 00:39:27,217 --> 00:39:29,190 previous administration did or the 961 00:39:29,190 --> 00:39:32,520 speed with which they acted . What I 962 00:39:32,520 --> 00:39:34,770 can speak for is this administration 963 00:39:34,780 --> 00:39:36,770 and this administration took these 964 00:39:36,770 --> 00:39:39,290 attacks very seriously and wanted to 965 00:39:39,290 --> 00:39:42,380 make sure that if and when there was a 966 00:39:42,380 --> 00:39:44,430 response , it was the appropriate 967 00:39:44,430 --> 00:39:46,652 response and done at a time in a manner 968 00:39:46,652 --> 00:39:48,763 in a place of our choosing . Um , and 969 00:39:48,763 --> 00:39:51,340 that is exactly what we did , based on , 970 00:39:51,350 --> 00:39:53,730 uh , collaboration and information that 971 00:39:53,730 --> 00:39:56,250 we got from our Iraqi and Kurdish 972 00:39:56,250 --> 00:39:59,090 partners , which gave us the high 973 00:39:59,090 --> 00:40:01,540 degree of confidence that we were , uh , 974 00:40:01,550 --> 00:40:03,494 that we were going after the right 975 00:40:03,494 --> 00:40:07,370 groups here . Um and I know it may seem 976 00:40:07,380 --> 00:40:10,000 like this is a simple thing to do . You 977 00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:12,230 get hit , so you hit right back . Um , 978 00:40:12,240 --> 00:40:16,160 but we wanted to be absolutely certain 979 00:40:16,170 --> 00:40:18,960 about what we were doing when we were 980 00:40:18,960 --> 00:40:20,849 doing it and who we were doing it 981 00:40:20,849 --> 00:40:23,016 against . And we make no apologies for 982 00:40:23,016 --> 00:40:25,127 the fact that we took the time and we 983 00:40:25,127 --> 00:40:27,530 allowed Iraqi partners to take the time 984 00:40:27,910 --> 00:40:30,410 to get this right . Um , And then your 985 00:40:30,410 --> 00:40:32,354 second question was ready . Is the 986 00:40:32,354 --> 00:40:34,320 Department of Defense ready to lay 987 00:40:34,320 --> 00:40:36,850 blame on Iran as ultimately responsible ? 988 00:40:36,860 --> 00:40:39,290 I think we have been very clear since 989 00:40:39,290 --> 00:40:42,160 since the beginning about our concerns 990 00:40:42,160 --> 00:40:44,216 over what Iran has been doing in the 991 00:40:44,216 --> 00:40:46,640 region and their malign activities to 992 00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:48,862 include their support for these militia 993 00:40:48,862 --> 00:40:52,690 groups who continue to attack our 994 00:40:52,690 --> 00:40:55,030 interest in our people . Um , as well 995 00:40:55,030 --> 00:40:57,086 as the other things are doing in the 996 00:40:57,086 --> 00:40:59,197 region , there's been no walking back 997 00:40:59,197 --> 00:41:02,130 from that . Let me go to the phone here . 998 00:41:03,010 --> 00:41:04,954 Laura . You had a question . Laura 999 00:41:04,954 --> 00:41:08,140 Sullivan . Yes , I did . Thank you , 1000 00:41:08,140 --> 00:41:10,990 John . Um , so two related questions . 1001 00:41:10,990 --> 00:41:13,046 One . Can you talk a little bit more 1002 00:41:13,046 --> 00:41:15,340 about what other options were 1003 00:41:15,340 --> 00:41:18,080 considered ? Um , were was it discussed 1004 00:41:18,090 --> 00:41:20,740 targeting additional facilities ? And 1005 00:41:20,740 --> 00:41:24,040 what was the reason for not going with 1006 00:41:24,050 --> 00:41:26,106 sort of a more aggressive response ? 1007 00:41:26,106 --> 00:41:28,300 And then also , can you respond to the 1008 00:41:28,310 --> 00:41:30,532 criticism from lawmakers , particularly 1009 00:41:30,532 --> 00:41:33,440 from Senator Sanders about , um , the 1010 00:41:33,440 --> 00:41:36,070 administration interpreting war powers 1011 00:41:36,070 --> 00:41:38,790 authorities too broadly and putting us 1012 00:41:38,800 --> 00:41:41,460 on a path to continuing forever wars . 1013 00:41:41,470 --> 00:41:44,030 Thank you . Okay , 1014 00:41:47,310 --> 00:41:51,040 So your first question again I won't 1015 00:41:51,040 --> 00:41:54,140 get into , um , discussing here from 1016 00:41:54,140 --> 00:41:57,440 the podium the decision making process 1017 00:41:57,450 --> 00:42:01,330 and in the range of options , uh , that 1018 00:42:01,340 --> 00:42:03,640 the commander in chief had had before 1019 00:42:03,640 --> 00:42:06,170 him , uh , to choose . What I will say 1020 00:42:06,170 --> 00:42:08,940 is , as I said at the outset , we 1021 00:42:08,940 --> 00:42:11,110 believe that this was a deliberate and 1022 00:42:11,110 --> 00:42:15,010 proportionate attack a strike on , 1023 00:42:15,020 --> 00:42:18,520 um , on infrastructure that 1024 00:42:19,100 --> 00:42:22,190 we know was being utilized by the 1025 00:42:22,190 --> 00:42:24,190 groups responsible for these recent 1026 00:42:24,190 --> 00:42:26,370 attacks . There was a high degree of 1027 00:42:26,370 --> 00:42:29,120 confidence , um , that those were the 1028 00:42:29,120 --> 00:42:31,400 right groups and that this and that 1029 00:42:31,410 --> 00:42:35,020 that hitting this compound was was the 1030 00:42:35,020 --> 00:42:38,670 right approach . There's , uh uh , but 1031 00:42:38,670 --> 00:42:41,010 I won't get into speculating about 1032 00:42:41,020 --> 00:42:43,790 other options that might or might not 1033 00:42:43,800 --> 00:42:47,510 have been , uh , considered . Um , as 1034 00:42:47,510 --> 00:42:49,860 for the , uh , comments about the War 1035 00:42:49,860 --> 00:42:52,930 Powers act , um , and Forever wars , I 1036 00:42:52,930 --> 00:42:55,470 think President Biden has been nothing 1037 00:42:55,470 --> 00:42:58,030 but clear . As Secretary , Austin has 1038 00:42:58,030 --> 00:43:00,690 been nothing but clear that we that we 1039 00:43:00,690 --> 00:43:03,950 know we want , uh , to end these quote 1040 00:43:03,950 --> 00:43:06,110 unquote forever wars . Um , 1041 00:43:06,120 --> 00:43:09,280 specifically , that oftentimes refers 1042 00:43:09,280 --> 00:43:11,280 to Afghanistan , even though I know 1043 00:43:11,280 --> 00:43:13,280 we're not talking about Afghanistan 1044 00:43:13,280 --> 00:43:15,502 right now . I mean , the leadership has 1045 00:43:15,502 --> 00:43:17,669 been very clear . Um , that it is time 1046 00:43:17,669 --> 00:43:17,140 to do this , but it is also time to do 1047 00:43:17,140 --> 00:43:19,473 it in a responsible and sustainable way . 1048 00:43:19,473 --> 00:43:21,370 And it is also incumbent upon the 1049 00:43:21,370 --> 00:43:23,910 secretary and the president , uh , in 1050 00:43:23,910 --> 00:43:26,132 keeping with his duties as commander in 1051 00:43:26,132 --> 00:43:28,188 chief , to protect our people and to 1052 00:43:28,188 --> 00:43:30,188 protect our allies . And this was a 1053 00:43:30,188 --> 00:43:32,188 defensive strike that went at their 1054 00:43:32,188 --> 00:43:34,354 ability . These groups abilities to do 1055 00:43:34,354 --> 00:43:37,090 just that to attack our our people . Um , 1056 00:43:37,090 --> 00:43:40,340 and as for , um , the legal authorities 1057 00:43:40,340 --> 00:43:42,507 again , Laura , I'll go back to what I 1058 00:43:42,507 --> 00:43:44,451 said at the outset . There are two 1059 00:43:44,451 --> 00:43:46,340 primary justifications where the 1060 00:43:46,340 --> 00:43:48,340 president was well within his legal 1061 00:43:48,340 --> 00:43:50,580 right to order these accents . One is 1062 00:43:50,580 --> 00:43:52,636 Article two under the Constitution , 1063 00:43:52,636 --> 00:43:54,858 his duties as commander in chief and to 1064 00:43:54,858 --> 00:43:56,802 Article 51 of the United Nations , 1065 00:43:56,802 --> 00:43:58,969 which makes it clear and international 1066 00:43:58,969 --> 00:44:01,191 law that nations have the right of self 1067 00:44:01,191 --> 00:44:03,302 defense . And then the last thing I'd 1068 00:44:03,302 --> 00:44:05,413 say is , uh , there was congressional 1069 00:44:05,413 --> 00:44:08,410 notification prior to the strike . And 1070 00:44:08,890 --> 00:44:10,840 as I also said at the outset , 1071 00:44:10,850 --> 00:44:14,560 congressional uh , briefings and the 1072 00:44:14,570 --> 00:44:16,737 provision of information , including a 1073 00:44:16,737 --> 00:44:18,681 classified briefing , will be done 1074 00:44:18,681 --> 00:44:20,903 later this week . That's ongoing , uh , 1075 00:44:20,903 --> 00:44:22,681 so Congress will be kept , uh , 1076 00:44:22,681 --> 00:44:24,681 informed as much as possible here , 1077 00:44:24,681 --> 00:44:26,780 going going forward . But there was 1078 00:44:26,790 --> 00:44:29,012 congressional notification beforehand . 1079 00:44:29,390 --> 00:44:32,950 Um , let's see . Uh , Tony 1080 00:44:32,950 --> 00:44:36,860 Capezio . Hi , Jack . John . Hi . 1081 00:44:36,860 --> 00:44:39,530 Can you hear me ? Yes , sir . Okay , I 1082 00:44:39,540 --> 00:44:41,400 have a non strike question . You 1083 00:44:41,400 --> 00:44:43,400 mentioned that Hicks was gonna miss 1084 00:44:43,400 --> 00:44:45,622 Hicks was going to go on Twitter . Uh , 1085 00:44:45,622 --> 00:44:47,733 this week . Can you talk a little bit 1086 00:44:47,733 --> 00:44:49,733 about her February 17th memo to the 1087 00:44:49,733 --> 00:44:52,120 services on her reviews for the 22 1088 00:44:52,120 --> 00:44:54,287 budget process ? Does this essentially 1089 00:44:54,287 --> 00:44:56,980 kick off the process ? The 22 process 1090 00:44:56,980 --> 00:44:59,660 for the for the Austin Pentagon ? When 1091 00:44:59,660 --> 00:45:01,770 does she expect these reviews to be 1092 00:45:01,770 --> 00:45:04,620 completed ? And does the memo actually 1093 00:45:04,630 --> 00:45:07,740 constitute a hicks hit list of programs 1094 00:45:07,750 --> 00:45:10,510 likely to be reduced in the 22 plan 1095 00:45:10,520 --> 00:45:13,080 versus the current budget plan left by 1096 00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:15,460 the last administration ? Thanks , Tony . 1097 00:45:15,470 --> 00:45:17,526 I think you can understand . I'm not 1098 00:45:17,526 --> 00:45:21,380 gonna speak to two internal pre 1099 00:45:21,380 --> 00:45:24,750 decisional documents regardless of the 1100 00:45:24,750 --> 00:45:27,110 fact that some of them have found them 1101 00:45:27,120 --> 00:45:29,680 found themselves in the public domain , 1102 00:45:29,690 --> 00:45:33,110 uh , counter to what their purpose is . 1103 00:45:33,490 --> 00:45:36,540 All I would say , uh , Tony is , uh , 1104 00:45:36,550 --> 00:45:39,290 the deputy does remain and has since 1105 00:45:39,290 --> 00:45:41,570 literally her first day in the building 1106 00:45:41,580 --> 00:45:44,350 has remained , uh , focused on 1107 00:45:44,350 --> 00:45:47,500 preparing the department's uh , f Y 1108 00:45:47,500 --> 00:45:51,310 22 budget submission . Uh 1109 00:45:51,490 --> 00:45:53,601 oh . And be controls the timeline for 1110 00:45:53,601 --> 00:45:55,434 that . You know that better than 1111 00:45:55,434 --> 00:45:57,546 anybody . Tony , I'm not going to get 1112 00:45:57,546 --> 00:45:59,379 ahead of any specifics . And I'm 1113 00:45:59,379 --> 00:46:01,490 certainly not going to preview , uh , 1114 00:46:01,490 --> 00:46:03,712 any details inside that budget in terms 1115 00:46:03,712 --> 00:46:06,060 of programmatic decisions . Um uh , 1116 00:46:06,070 --> 00:46:08,330 just to say again that the Deputy 1117 00:46:08,330 --> 00:46:11,060 Secretary , uh , is focused on this , 1118 00:46:11,070 --> 00:46:13,126 uh , in a very concerted way . She's 1119 00:46:13,126 --> 00:46:16,820 already had several meetings with key 1120 00:46:16,820 --> 00:46:18,876 leaders here in the Pentagon , and I 1121 00:46:18,876 --> 00:46:20,820 think you're gonna see that energy 1122 00:46:20,820 --> 00:46:23,153 continue here and throughout the spring . 1123 00:46:23,153 --> 00:46:23,110 And when we have something that we can 1124 00:46:23,110 --> 00:46:25,210 speak to specifically , you know , 1125 00:46:25,220 --> 00:46:28,510 we'll do that . But right now , um uh , 1126 00:46:28,520 --> 00:46:30,631 for this administration , the process 1127 00:46:30,631 --> 00:46:33,320 is in its nation phase , and I want to 1128 00:46:33,320 --> 00:46:35,470 respect the secretary and the deputy 1129 00:46:35,480 --> 00:46:37,610 deputy secretaries ability to make 1130 00:46:37,610 --> 00:46:40,500 decisions in their own time . Jenny , 1131 00:46:42,280 --> 00:46:44,970 I have occasion about the North Korean 1132 00:46:44,970 --> 00:46:47,960 nuclear issues . Recently , 1133 00:46:47,970 --> 00:46:51,550 Secretary of State Blinken has 1134 00:46:51,550 --> 00:46:55,300 mentioned that the priority 1135 00:46:55,310 --> 00:46:59,100 is to resolve North Korea issues as 1136 00:46:59,100 --> 00:47:02,200 much as , uh , missile launches and 1137 00:47:02,210 --> 00:47:06,040 also , uh , WMD weapons of mass 1138 00:47:06,050 --> 00:47:09,890 destruction in North Korea with the 1139 00:47:09,900 --> 00:47:12,790 d o . D Department of Defense . 1140 00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:16,360 Implement a strong policy for the North 1141 00:47:16,360 --> 00:47:19,630 Korea or will be pursued 1142 00:47:19,640 --> 00:47:23,380 for diplomatic support . Which one ? 1143 00:47:23,380 --> 00:47:27,210 You won't get ahead of the 1144 00:47:27,210 --> 00:47:30,710 State Department and their approach , 1145 00:47:30,720 --> 00:47:33,590 as Secretary Austin has said literally 1146 00:47:33,590 --> 00:47:37,060 from Even before he , uh , was 1147 00:47:37,060 --> 00:47:40,120 confirmed that he believes our job here 1148 00:47:40,120 --> 00:47:42,342 at the Defense Department is to support 1149 00:47:42,342 --> 00:47:44,564 the work of diplomacy . The president's 1150 00:47:44,564 --> 00:47:46,787 been very clear that he wants diplomats 1151 00:47:46,787 --> 00:47:49,009 in the lead and were supportive of that 1152 00:47:49,009 --> 00:47:51,064 here at the Defense Department . But 1153 00:47:51,064 --> 00:47:53,231 North Korea's continued development of 1154 00:47:53,231 --> 00:47:55,398 ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 1155 00:47:55,398 --> 00:47:57,731 destruction represents a threat . Two U . 1156 00:47:57,731 --> 00:47:57,510 S . Interest and the security of our 1157 00:47:57,510 --> 00:47:59,621 allies and partners . We anticipate a 1158 00:47:59,621 --> 00:48:01,730 review , uh , the U . S government's 1159 00:48:01,730 --> 00:48:03,952 entire approach to North Korea . And of 1160 00:48:03,952 --> 00:48:06,120 course , the Department of Defense is 1161 00:48:06,120 --> 00:48:08,231 gonna support that review will have a 1162 00:48:08,231 --> 00:48:10,287 role in that . We'll have a voice in 1163 00:48:10,287 --> 00:48:12,509 that , and we'll take that seriously in 1164 00:48:12,509 --> 00:48:12,250 The New York Times . We're going to 1165 00:48:12,250 --> 00:48:14,250 work in close coordination with our 1166 00:48:14,250 --> 00:48:16,306 allies and partners to seek to deter 1167 00:48:16,970 --> 00:48:19,650 negative behavior from North Korea . 1168 00:48:19,720 --> 00:48:21,664 And , you know , as you and I have 1169 00:48:21,664 --> 00:48:23,776 talked about many times , I mean that 1170 00:48:23,776 --> 00:48:27,020 that includes , um , strengthening the 1171 00:48:27,020 --> 00:48:29,460 alliance with the Republic of Korea , 1172 00:48:29,470 --> 00:48:31,359 which we believe is a linchpin of 1173 00:48:31,359 --> 00:48:33,526 security in the region . And that also 1174 00:48:33,526 --> 00:48:35,526 means that working closely with our 1175 00:48:35,526 --> 00:48:37,748 South Korean allies on making sure that 1176 00:48:37,748 --> 00:48:39,303 our two militaries have the 1177 00:48:39,303 --> 00:48:41,526 capabilities in the readiness , uh , to 1178 00:48:41,526 --> 00:48:43,748 defend our interests on the peninsula . 1179 00:48:43,748 --> 00:48:45,803 Okay , it's time for a couple more . 1180 00:48:45,803 --> 00:48:48,900 Okay , Um , we're the strike . It was 1181 00:48:48,900 --> 00:48:52,230 like the goal of it in terms of taking 1182 00:48:52,230 --> 00:48:54,580 out this specific location . Was it 1183 00:48:54,580 --> 00:48:56,790 trying to stop that capability from 1184 00:48:56,790 --> 00:48:58,901 ever being used again ? Was it trying 1185 00:48:58,901 --> 00:49:01,320 to really set back those groups from 1186 00:49:01,330 --> 00:49:03,980 operating ? Or was it just when did you 1187 00:49:03,980 --> 00:49:07,070 accomplish that goal ? So the battle 1188 00:49:07,070 --> 00:49:09,790 damage assessment is ongoing . Um , but 1189 00:49:09,790 --> 00:49:13,040 as I said in my outset , uh , a nine 1190 00:49:13,050 --> 00:49:16,530 structures destroyed . Uh uh . We're 1191 00:49:16,530 --> 00:49:18,840 pretty confident that even the ones 1192 00:49:18,840 --> 00:49:20,784 that weren't totally destroyed are 1193 00:49:20,784 --> 00:49:23,230 going to be extremely difficult for 1194 00:49:23,230 --> 00:49:25,452 these groups to use again . And many of 1195 00:49:25,452 --> 00:49:27,619 them they won't be able to use again . 1196 00:49:27,619 --> 00:49:29,841 Um , so , uh , but again , I don't want 1197 00:49:29,841 --> 00:49:31,730 to get ahead of the battle damage 1198 00:49:31,730 --> 00:49:33,952 assessment . We'll learn more in coming 1199 00:49:33,952 --> 00:49:35,841 hours and days . Um , but to your 1200 00:49:35,841 --> 00:49:38,910 broader question , and I I apologize if 1201 00:49:38,910 --> 00:49:41,188 I didn't make this clear at the outset . 1202 00:49:41,188 --> 00:49:44,520 But this was very much about hitting a 1203 00:49:44,530 --> 00:49:48,370 compound Structures facilities that we 1204 00:49:48,370 --> 00:49:50,481 know belong to . These two groups are 1205 00:49:50,481 --> 00:49:52,648 that they use these . These two groups 1206 00:49:52,648 --> 00:49:56,420 used those facilities to , 1207 00:49:56,430 --> 00:49:59,800 uh to enhance and , um , and 1208 00:49:59,800 --> 00:50:02,310 enable their operations inside Iraq . 1209 00:50:02,310 --> 00:50:04,720 So very much was about taking away a 1210 00:50:04,720 --> 00:50:07,940 capability . Um uh , and now we're 1211 00:50:07,940 --> 00:50:09,996 gonna you know , obviously we'll see 1212 00:50:09,996 --> 00:50:12,920 how you know if we'll see to what 1213 00:50:12,920 --> 00:50:15,440 degree there's a reaction to that . But 1214 00:50:15,440 --> 00:50:17,607 this was a very deliberate strike on a 1215 00:50:17,607 --> 00:50:19,773 very deliberate set of targets that we 1216 00:50:19,773 --> 00:50:21,996 believe were valuable to these groups . 1217 00:50:21,996 --> 00:50:23,829 And then , I guess , is what I'm 1218 00:50:23,829 --> 00:50:26,051 getting at is like , Is this a Was this 1219 00:50:26,051 --> 00:50:28,107 trying to just stop these facilities 1220 00:50:28,107 --> 00:50:30,273 are being used ? Or was this trying to 1221 00:50:30,273 --> 00:50:32,329 be a bigger thing of really stopping 1222 00:50:32,329 --> 00:50:34,970 the future actions of this group ? Like 1223 00:50:34,980 --> 00:50:37,202 for for several months for years , like 1224 00:50:37,202 --> 00:50:39,490 what was ? I guess the overall goal is 1225 00:50:39,490 --> 00:50:41,657 that they will never , ever be able to 1226 00:50:41,657 --> 00:50:43,940 operate again or fair question . Uh , 1227 00:50:43,950 --> 00:50:46,720 look , look , I don't think anybody 1228 00:50:46,720 --> 00:50:49,790 would argue that this compound alone , 1229 00:50:49,800 --> 00:50:53,440 um , is the only facility that these 1230 00:50:53,440 --> 00:50:57,350 two groups have have access to . Our 1231 00:50:57,360 --> 00:51:00,550 desire was to remove it from their 1232 00:51:00,550 --> 00:51:03,130 inventory and to send a strong message 1233 00:51:03,130 --> 00:51:05,780 about future attacks . Clearly , we 1234 00:51:05,780 --> 00:51:07,836 want there to be a deterrent message 1235 00:51:07,836 --> 00:51:10,770 here , delivered straight to them 1236 00:51:11,160 --> 00:51:14,260 about the repercussions of going after 1237 00:51:14,260 --> 00:51:16,371 our people and our Iraqi partners and 1238 00:51:16,371 --> 00:51:18,550 our facilities inside Iraq . Now we'll 1239 00:51:18,550 --> 00:51:20,772 have to see . But that was the intent . 1240 00:51:21,560 --> 00:51:25,310 One more god , anything that 1241 00:51:25,320 --> 00:51:29,040 Israeli I do 1242 00:51:29,040 --> 00:51:32,600 not know . Paul 1243 00:51:32,600 --> 00:51:34,656 Shechtman , You on the phone still , 1244 00:51:36,360 --> 00:51:38,304 Uh , yeah . Hi , John . Thanks for 1245 00:51:38,304 --> 00:51:40,660 taking my call . So there's going back 1246 00:51:40,660 --> 00:51:42,640 to the question about geography . 1247 00:51:42,650 --> 00:51:44,950 There's been a lot of discussion about 1248 00:51:44,960 --> 00:51:47,580 the reason that the strikes were in 1249 00:51:47,580 --> 00:51:50,620 Syria and not in Iraq is that there was 1250 00:51:50,630 --> 00:51:53,840 an intention not to give Shia militia 1251 00:51:53,850 --> 00:51:57,020 in Iraq something to rally behind and 1252 00:51:57,030 --> 00:51:59,530 to cite further violence . So I suppose 1253 00:51:59,540 --> 00:52:03,000 my question is , is the US more willing 1254 00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:05,220 to strike these kinds of facilities in 1255 00:52:05,220 --> 00:52:08,480 Syria than it is in Iraq ? 1256 00:52:08,950 --> 00:52:11,450 Um , and then separately , going back 1257 00:52:11,450 --> 00:52:13,617 to , um , the question about informing 1258 00:52:13,617 --> 00:52:15,617 foreign countries , Russian Foreign 1259 00:52:15,617 --> 00:52:17,783 Minister Lavrov this morning said that 1260 00:52:17,783 --> 00:52:19,894 I think he said that Russia was given 1261 00:52:19,894 --> 00:52:22,061 four minutes notice before this attack 1262 00:52:22,061 --> 00:52:24,394 took place and that that was negligible . 1263 00:52:24,394 --> 00:52:26,394 Given that I think his phrasing was 1264 00:52:26,394 --> 00:52:28,672 that the strike was already in the air . 1265 00:52:28,672 --> 00:52:30,783 Uh , and that that was dangerous . Do 1266 00:52:30,783 --> 00:52:32,950 you have any response to that ? On the 1267 00:52:32,950 --> 00:52:35,550 first question again , I as I said 1268 00:52:35,550 --> 00:52:38,050 before , we believe this target set was 1269 00:52:38,050 --> 00:52:41,880 relevant , uh , to , um 1270 00:52:42,450 --> 00:52:46,310 two damaging these groups 1271 00:52:46,310 --> 00:52:50,140 abilities to operate inside Iraq . And 1272 00:52:50,140 --> 00:52:53,370 I won't speculate at all about future 1273 00:52:53,370 --> 00:52:56,750 operations or future decisions with 1274 00:52:56,750 --> 00:52:58,806 respect to protecting our troops and 1275 00:52:58,806 --> 00:53:00,861 our people in Iraq . I just won't go 1276 00:53:00,861 --> 00:53:03,740 there . We're confident that this was a 1277 00:53:03,750 --> 00:53:06,270 purposeful set of targets 1278 00:53:06,620 --> 00:53:10,520 that did , to Caitlin's question 1279 00:53:10,530 --> 00:53:13,500 accomplished . Two things remove those 1280 00:53:13,500 --> 00:53:15,556 facilities from their ability to use 1281 00:53:15,556 --> 00:53:18,850 them . Um uh , as a way station , uh , 1282 00:53:18,860 --> 00:53:21,800 as an entry point , if you will , uh , 1283 00:53:21,810 --> 00:53:24,820 into Iraq , Um , and and clearly , to 1284 00:53:24,830 --> 00:53:27,440 send a very strong message about how we 1285 00:53:27,450 --> 00:53:29,506 take the attacks on our people , how 1286 00:53:29,506 --> 00:53:31,561 seriously we take the attacks on our 1287 00:53:31,561 --> 00:53:33,617 people and our Iraqi partners , I'll 1288 00:53:33,617 --> 00:53:35,839 just leave it at that . And as for uh , 1289 00:53:35,839 --> 00:53:37,950 Foreign Minister Lavrov , I won't get 1290 00:53:37,950 --> 00:53:39,839 into the specifics of exactly the 1291 00:53:39,839 --> 00:53:42,790 timing that was involved here . But I'm 1292 00:53:42,790 --> 00:53:44,623 grateful to see that the foreign 1293 00:53:44,623 --> 00:53:46,512 minister confirmed what I've been 1294 00:53:46,512 --> 00:53:48,512 saying for the last couple of hours 1295 00:53:48,512 --> 00:53:50,401 that they were , in fact informed 1296 00:53:50,401 --> 00:53:52,568 through the Deconfliction Channel . So 1297 00:53:52,568 --> 00:53:54,568 I'm grateful that he was willing to 1298 00:53:54,568 --> 00:53:56,679 confirm that , um , and again , we we 1299 00:53:56,679 --> 00:53:58,846 did what ? We believe we're the proper 1300 00:53:58,846 --> 00:54:00,960 amount of notification before this , 1301 00:54:00,960 --> 00:54:03,127 and I think I can , you know , without 1302 00:54:03,127 --> 00:54:05,090 getting into the details . Um , it 1303 00:54:05,090 --> 00:54:07,146 shouldn't come as a shock to anybody 1304 00:54:07,146 --> 00:54:09,368 that we're gonna We're gonna do what we 1305 00:54:09,368 --> 00:54:11,479 have to do to notify , but we're also 1306 00:54:11,479 --> 00:54:11,110 going to do what we have to do to 1307 00:54:11,110 --> 00:54:14,480 protect our our forces in this 1308 00:54:14,480 --> 00:54:17,210 particular case , Um , the air forces 1309 00:54:17,210 --> 00:54:19,154 that were conducting this strike , 1310 00:54:19,154 --> 00:54:21,090 there's a There's a matter of 1311 00:54:21,100 --> 00:54:23,267 operational security that we take very 1312 00:54:23,267 --> 00:54:25,489 seriously . Okay , Thanks , everybody . 1313 00:54:25,489 --> 00:54:27,378 You always get the last one . You 1314 00:54:27,378 --> 00:54:29,711 always jump in right at the end of Iran . 1315 00:54:29,711 --> 00:54:31,933 Control the malicious that you hit last 1316 00:54:31,933 --> 00:54:34,050 night . We know that these groups 1317 00:54:34,630 --> 00:54:38,240 have been , uh , and continue to be 1318 00:54:38,240 --> 00:54:41,630 supported outside out of Iran . What is 1319 00:54:41,630 --> 00:54:44,520 the definition of extremism ? Oh , my 1320 00:54:44,520 --> 00:54:47,030 goodness . Lucas , Let's let's have 1321 00:54:47,030 --> 00:54:49,086 this . Let's come to my office later 1322 00:54:49,086 --> 00:54:51,086 today and we'll have a conversation 1323 00:54:51,086 --> 00:54:52,863 about that . Alright , Thanks , 1324 00:54:52,863 --> 00:54:53,260 everybody . Every weekend