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mhm . Go ahead and call the meeting to 

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order if we have members take their 

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seats 

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once again , we are doing a hybrid 

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hearing . So I will read a fun filled 

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little statement here that explains how 

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that hybrid hearing is going to work 

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and what the rules are . Members who 

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are joining remotely must be visible on 

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screen for the purposes of identity 

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verification , establishing and 

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maintaining a quorum . Participating in 

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the proceeding and voting , those 

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members must continue to use the 

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software platforms video function while 

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in attendance unless they experience 

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connectivity issues or other technical 

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problems that render them unable to 

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participate on camera . If a member 

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experiences technical difficulties , 

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they should contact the committee staff 

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for assistance . Video of members 

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Participation will be broadcast in the 

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room and via the television Internet 

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Slash Internet feeds . Members 

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participating remotely must seek 

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recognition verbally , and they're 

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asked to meet their microphones when 

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they are not speaking . Members who are 

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participating remotely are reminded to 

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keep the software platforms video 

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function on the entire time they attend 

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the proceeding . Members may leave and 

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rejoin the proceeding if members depart 

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for a short while for reasons other 

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than joining a different proceeding . 

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They should leave the video function on . 

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If members will be absent for a 

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significant period or depart to during 

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different seeding , they should exit 

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the software platform entirely . And 

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then we join . If they return . Members 

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may use the software platforms chat 

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feature to communicate with staff 

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regarding technical or logistical 

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support issues only . Finally , I have 

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designated a committee staff member to , 

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if necessary , mute unrecognized 

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members microphones to cancel any 

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inadvertent background noise that may 

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disrupt the proceedings . Thank you and 

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again , I want to thank Our staff are 

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pulling all of this together now , 

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Members , you know , it's It's been a 

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complicated and difficult year , but we 

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we've made it work . So I appreciate 

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the cooperation in a bipartisan way on 

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the staff to make sure that we continue 

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to do our job within the limitations 

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that the pandemic has placed us . Uh , 

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and today we have our first posture 

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hearing of 2021 . So our first hybrid 

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posture hearing , um and we are focused 

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on the Indo Pacific region , uh , this 

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morning and we have three witnesses . 

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Mr . David Hell V , who is the acting 

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assistant secretary of defense for Indo 

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Pacific affairs with D o D . Admiral 

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Phillip Davidson , United States Navy 

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who was the commander of the US Indo 

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Pacific Command and General Robert 

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Abrams , who is joining us at What is 

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it , like one o'clock in the morning 

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there ? General ? Mhm . Yeah . 

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Yes , Mr Chairman . It is there 103 to 

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be precise . You look like it's like 

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the middle of the afternoon . Just all 

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ready to go . So we thank you for 

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joining us and for your flexibility . 

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Understand ? You're engaged in 

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exercises on the Korean Peninsula right 

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now that are important for you to be 

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there . So thank you for making the 

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time . I do also want to note that in 

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all likelihood , this is the last time 

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the General Abrams and Admiral Davidson 

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will appear before our committee . Uh , 

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I want a very , very sincerely thank 

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both of you for your leadership . 

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Certainly for your service to our 

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country , the outstanding jobs you've 

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done , But but also for your 

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relationship with this committee . Both 

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of you have really gone out of your way . 

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Um , to be accessible , um , to make 

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sure that we are kept informed of what 

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you're doing to answer our questions 

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and work with us . You are to a great 

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examples for this country and the 

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United States military . So I thank you 

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very much for your service and look 

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forward to , uh , our opportunity to 

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talk with you today . Um , as mentioned , 

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we are here to do our posture hearing 

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for the Indo Pacific Command and the 

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Indo Pacific region . Uh , this is an 

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incredibly important part of the world , 

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as China is without question the 

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largest national security challenge and 

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competitive that we have in the world 

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today . And I think it's not an 

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overstatement to say that you know how 

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the next 50 years goes for , for this 

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globe is going to be significantly 

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impacted by about how we manage that 

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relationship with China . Um , how we 

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meet the challenges that they present 

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on in many areas , but certainly in the 

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Indo Pacific region . Um , and I really 

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welcome the opportunity to have a 

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conversation with with our witnesses 

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today who are so expert on that subject . 

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There is no doubt that the problem with 

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China has grown in the last decade . Uh , 

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they are looking to export an ideology , 

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uh , an authoritarian ideology . Um , 

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and they are also looking to diminish 

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our influence in the world . There are 

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a number of different challenges here , 

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but overwhelmingly , I just want to 

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make it clear . I think it is 

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incredibly important that the United 

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States stay present in the Indo Pacific 

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region so that we can be there to work 

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with our partners and allies , to make 

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sure that a rules based system holds 

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sway in that region and that China is 

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not able to crush it , Um , and take a 

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hegemonic approach instead . Central to 

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this , in my view , are the 

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partnerships that we have in the region . 

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Certainly we can have influence , but 

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the stronger nations like like India 

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and Japan and South Korea and Thailand 

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and the Philippines and others are the 

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stronger our partnership is , the more 

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we can continue to enforce that rule of 

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law and make sure that there is a fair 

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balance of power in the region and is 

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enormously important that we do that as 

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we move forward . Um , I also want to 

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make sure that we don't stumble into a 

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Cold War with China , and you know , 

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I'll be interested to hear more from 

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our witnesses and how to do this but I 

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want us to be strong enough to deter 

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China . Uh , the idea that we can build 

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a military large enough and strong 

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enough to dominate China in the modern 

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world is not realistic and is fraught 

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with danger . So I hope we can better 

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understand how to make the proper 

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investments . And that's one big point . 

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I was very pleased to work in a 

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bipartisan way and last , um session to 

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create the Indo Pacific Defense 

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Initiative . Um , that's incredibly 

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important to build partnerships going 

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forward , and I know that it is going 

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to have to be funded . Um , but I want 

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to make sure that we are making wise 

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investments in that we have far more 

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demands for D o . D money than we have 

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money . So we're gonna have to make 

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some tough choices to figure out what's 

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the best way to spend it . What's the 

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wisest way to live and to to to live 

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with that ? As some of you might have 

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heard , I drew an analogy to the NFL 

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salary cap recently , Uh , you know , 

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basically , I put together a team , you 

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got to meet all these different 

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responsibilities , but you got one cap 

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on how much money you can spend . And 

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if you spend it all in one area , then 

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the other area will be too weak to 

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accomplish your overall objective . So 

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I'm trying to strike that balance . Um , 

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and obviously the other big challenge 

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in the region is North Korea . Um , 

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definitely look forward to hearing from 

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General Abrams about that challenge . 

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What ? He thinks our best approach is 

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going forward . Uh , I just want to 

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close again by emphasizing I think the 

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most important thing we can do in the 

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region is build partnerships and build 

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partner capacities . There are a lot of 

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countries in that part of the world 

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that are sympathetic to where we're 

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coming from that want to work with work 

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with us . We need to take advantage of 

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that . Build those those partnerships 

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as strong as they possibly can be , and 

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and build the capacity of those 

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partners . With that , I will yield to 

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Mr Rogers for his opening statement . 

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Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh , last 

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week , the Chinese Communist Party 

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rolled out a new set of defense 

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policies that included a 7% increase in 

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defense spending and a plan to become 

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an Arctic and Antarctic power . The CCP 

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also reiterated their expectation that 

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the world will soon be doing business 

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on its terms . Our allies in the in the 

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Indo Pacific share America's commitment 

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to freedom and democratic government . 

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Like us , they are at risk of being 

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overrun by China's push for global 

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supremacy . Effective American military 

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strength in the Indo Pacific is 

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essential to the security of our allies , 

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global trade and democracy . That means 

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we need to build a modern , credible , 

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conventional deterrent to ongoing 

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Chinese territorial expansion . And it 

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means that we need to modernize nuclear 

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triad to deter a broader conflict . 

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This is not about domination , it's 

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about deterrent . We must make any 

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attack on Americans or or our allies 

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too costly for the Chinese Communist 

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Party to consider . Section 12 51 of 

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this year's India required Admiral 

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Davidson to complete an independent 

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assessment of what Indo Pak Com needs 

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to build a meaningful deterrent in the 

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region . He reported back that we need 

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to make investments and integrated air 

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and missile defenses , long range 

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precision fires and logistical 

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capabilities that can survive in a 

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contested battlefield capabilities like 

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the Guam Defense system using Aegis 

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ashore intact , more in Palau will 

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provide our forces with critical 

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information about coming targets . Long 

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range precision fires , backed by more 

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robust I . R s capabilities , will 

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create openings for our forces to move 

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in a contested environment . I don't 

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think these capabilities are nice to 

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have . I believe they are bare minimum 

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of what we need to protect our forces 

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and deter China's territorial ambitions . 

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This committee created the Pacific 

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Defense Initiative in a bipartisan 

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fashion . To get honest military advice 

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from experts like Admiral Davidson , we 

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would be foolish to seek out his advice 

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and then toss it aside . I look forward 

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to hearing from Admiral Davidson today 

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about these important priorities . 

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General Abrams faces similar challenges . 

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Allied forces under his command have 

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been the backbone of deterrence on the 

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Korean Peninsula for decades . But we 

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need to continue to improve our 

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capabilities in the region to maintain 

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that deterrent . Even under extreme 

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sanctions , North Korea continues to 

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modernize its military , developing 

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larger and more advanced missiles to 

275
00:09:30,190 --> 00:09:32,340
threaten South Korea , Japan and even 

276
00:09:32,340 --> 00:09:34,760
the U . S mainland . We cannot afford 

277
00:09:34,760 --> 00:09:36,810
to let that go unchecked . I'm 

278
00:09:36,810 --> 00:09:38,977
interested to hear from General Abrams 

279
00:09:38,977 --> 00:09:41,199
talks on North Korea's newly publicized 

280
00:09:41,199 --> 00:09:43,310
capabilities as well as South Korea's 

281
00:09:43,310 --> 00:09:46,170
ongoing defense modernization . I also 

282
00:09:46,170 --> 00:09:48,226
want to know whether the new Special 

283
00:09:48,226 --> 00:09:50,114
Measures agreement announced this 

284
00:09:50,114 --> 00:09:52,310
weekend will improve our ability to 

285
00:09:52,310 --> 00:09:54,460
turn North Korea's aggression . To 

286
00:09:54,460 --> 00:09:56,571
effectively deter the threat posed by 

287
00:09:56,571 --> 00:09:58,238
China , North Korea and other 

288
00:09:58,238 --> 00:10:00,238
adversaries , we must feel existing 

289
00:10:00,238 --> 00:10:02,349
readiness caps while at the same time 

290
00:10:02,349 --> 00:10:04,690
modernizing our forces . But that comes 

291
00:10:04,690 --> 00:10:06,801
at a price , and it's not going to be 

292
00:10:06,801 --> 00:10:09,023
cheap . The bipartisan National Defense 

293
00:10:09,023 --> 00:10:11,190
Strategy Commission recommended annual 

294
00:10:11,190 --> 00:10:13,560
growth of 3 to 5% above inflation in 

295
00:10:13,680 --> 00:10:15,830
defense . Top line . Our defense 

296
00:10:15,830 --> 00:10:17,997
leaders and experts inside and outside 

297
00:10:17,997 --> 00:10:20,108
the Pentagon have affirmed that level 

298
00:10:20,108 --> 00:10:22,274
of investment . I understand that some 

299
00:10:22,274 --> 00:10:24,497
are opposed to spending what's needed . 

300
00:10:24,497 --> 00:10:26,608
They'd like to see the money invested 

301
00:10:26,608 --> 00:10:28,719
elsewhere , but I believe that now is 

302
00:10:28,719 --> 00:10:30,663
not the time to cut or even freeze 

303
00:10:30,663 --> 00:10:32,830
defense spending . Doing so delays the 

304
00:10:32,830 --> 00:10:34,886
development and delivery of critical 

305
00:10:34,886 --> 00:10:34,740
new capabilities . Our military leaders 

306
00:10:34,740 --> 00:10:36,851
need to maintain deterrence , protect 

307
00:10:36,851 --> 00:10:39,340
our allies and defend our nation after 

308
00:10:39,340 --> 00:10:41,507
we hear about the threats we face from 

309
00:10:41,507 --> 00:10:43,729
our witnesses today and other combatant 

310
00:10:43,729 --> 00:10:45,729
commanders that will come before us 

311
00:10:45,729 --> 00:10:47,951
soon . I hope that we can agree that we 

312
00:10:47,951 --> 00:10:50,007
must keep investing in defense Thank 

313
00:10:50,007 --> 00:10:52,118
you , Mr Chairman . Now you're back . 

314
00:10:52,118 --> 00:10:54,284
Thank you . Before turning in order to 

315
00:10:54,284 --> 00:10:56,451
our witnesses . I do want to recognize 

316
00:10:56,451 --> 00:10:58,673
Matt Rhodes , who is our staff lead for 

317
00:10:58,673 --> 00:11:00,896
this hearing . Today is his last day on 

318
00:11:00,896 --> 00:11:03,062
our committee . And Matt Matt has done 

319
00:11:03,062 --> 00:11:05,229
incredible service . Mentioned all the 

320
00:11:05,229 --> 00:11:07,451
time with a terrific staff we have Matt 

321
00:11:07,451 --> 00:11:07,390
is one of those examples . So thank you 

322
00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:09,400
very much for your your service and 

323
00:11:09,400 --> 00:11:11,567
sorry to see you go . But you're going 

324
00:11:11,567 --> 00:11:13,733
to a better place , as they say . So , 

325
00:11:13,733 --> 00:11:15,900
um , we're sure you'll do what ? Thank 

326
00:11:15,900 --> 00:11:19,810
you very much . Mhm , Mhm . And 

327
00:11:19,810 --> 00:11:21,977
that I will turn it over to Mr Healthy 

328
00:11:21,977 --> 00:11:23,532
for his opening statement . 

329
00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:29,440
Well , Chairman Smith , ranking Member 

330
00:11:29,440 --> 00:11:31,440
Rogers and distinguished members of 

331
00:11:31,440 --> 00:11:33,400
this committee Thank you for the 

332
00:11:33,400 --> 00:11:35,567
opportunity to appear before you today 

333
00:11:35,567 --> 00:11:37,733
to testify on the department's efforts 

334
00:11:37,733 --> 00:11:39,956
in the end of Pacific region . I'd like 

335
00:11:39,956 --> 00:11:41,900
to express my appreciation for the 

336
00:11:41,900 --> 00:11:44,122
continued support from Congress in this 

337
00:11:44,122 --> 00:11:46,178
committee , in particular in shaping 

338
00:11:46,178 --> 00:11:48,233
and re sourcing our strategy in this 

339
00:11:48,233 --> 00:11:50,344
critical region . I'm also pleased to 

340
00:11:50,344 --> 00:11:52,550
be here . Joined by Admiral Davidson , 

341
00:11:52,550 --> 00:11:54,772
commander of United States Indo Pacific 

342
00:11:54,772 --> 00:11:56,717
Command , and virtually by General 

343
00:11:56,717 --> 00:11:58,939
Abrams , commander of the United States 

344
00:11:58,939 --> 00:12:00,883
Forces Korea , the Combined Forces 

345
00:12:00,883 --> 00:12:02,994
Command in the United Nations Command 

346
00:12:03,340 --> 00:12:05,562
As a Pacific nation , the future of the 

347
00:12:05,562 --> 00:12:07,784
United States is inextricably linked to 

348
00:12:07,784 --> 00:12:09,784
that of the end of Pacific region . 

349
00:12:09,840 --> 00:12:12,007
From the earliest days of our nation , 

350
00:12:12,007 --> 00:12:14,007
our leaders and diplomats have been 

351
00:12:14,007 --> 00:12:16,229
committed to preserving a free and Indo 

352
00:12:16,229 --> 00:12:18,340
Pacific uh , an Indo Pacific region . 

353
00:12:18,340 --> 00:12:20,673
Now it may remain free and open for all . 

354
00:12:20,840 --> 00:12:23,007
As our department's priority theater , 

355
00:12:23,007 --> 00:12:25,229
we're committed to upholding a free and 

356
00:12:25,229 --> 00:12:27,173
open Indo Pacific region where all 

357
00:12:27,173 --> 00:12:29,340
nations , large and small , are secure 

358
00:12:29,340 --> 00:12:31,229
in their sovereignty , can pursue 

359
00:12:31,229 --> 00:12:33,062
economic opportunity and resolve 

360
00:12:33,062 --> 00:12:35,062
disputes without coercion , and can 

361
00:12:35,062 --> 00:12:37,062
exercise the freedoms of navigation 

362
00:12:37,062 --> 00:12:39,229
overflight consistent with an open and 

363
00:12:39,229 --> 00:12:41,350
stable international order . It's an 

364
00:12:41,350 --> 00:12:43,294
order that places all nations on a 

365
00:12:43,294 --> 00:12:45,239
level playing field and holds them 

366
00:12:45,239 --> 00:12:46,961
responsible for preserving the 

367
00:12:46,961 --> 00:12:49,072
principles that have benefited all of 

368
00:12:49,072 --> 00:12:51,128
us . Today , this framework is being 

369
00:12:51,128 --> 00:12:53,239
challenged . The People's Republic of 

370
00:12:53,239 --> 00:12:55,406
China seeks to use all elements of its 

371
00:12:55,406 --> 00:12:57,406
national power to reshape the world 

372
00:12:57,406 --> 00:12:59,517
order into one that's consistent with 

373
00:12:59,517 --> 00:13:01,294
its authoritarian model and its 

374
00:13:01,294 --> 00:13:03,183
national goals . Likewise , North 

375
00:13:03,183 --> 00:13:05,406
Korea's continued pursuit of weapons of 

376
00:13:05,406 --> 00:13:07,572
mass destruction and ballistic missile 

377
00:13:07,572 --> 00:13:09,794
programmes constitutes an extraordinary 

378
00:13:09,794 --> 00:13:11,961
threat to United States and our allies 

379
00:13:11,961 --> 00:13:13,572
and partners in the region . 

380
00:13:13,640 --> 00:13:16,220
Pyongyang's proliferation of weapons in 

381
00:13:16,220 --> 00:13:18,164
advanced technology is a threat to 

382
00:13:18,164 --> 00:13:20,331
international peace and security , and 

383
00:13:20,331 --> 00:13:21,720
it undermines the global 

384
00:13:21,720 --> 00:13:23,730
nonproliferation regime . And we 

385
00:13:23,730 --> 00:13:26,330
continue to see , uh , you know , 

386
00:13:26,330 --> 00:13:28,163
within the Indo Pacific region a 

387
00:13:28,163 --> 00:13:30,108
variety of transnational threats , 

388
00:13:30,108 --> 00:13:32,380
including terrorism , illicit arms , 

389
00:13:32,390 --> 00:13:34,612
drug and human trafficking , piracy and 

390
00:13:34,612 --> 00:13:36,470
natural disasters , including 

391
00:13:36,480 --> 00:13:39,170
infectious disease . The department 

392
00:13:39,170 --> 00:13:41,003
regularly works to address these 

393
00:13:41,003 --> 00:13:42,837
threats alongside our allies and 

394
00:13:42,837 --> 00:13:44,726
partners throughout the region to 

395
00:13:44,726 --> 00:13:46,837
prepare for and when the time comes , 

396
00:13:46,837 --> 00:13:48,781
which it certainly will respond to 

397
00:13:48,781 --> 00:13:51,740
quickly and effectively To advance our 

398
00:13:51,740 --> 00:13:53,573
vision , the department has been 

399
00:13:53,573 --> 00:13:55,796
implementing an Indo Pacific strategy , 

400
00:13:55,796 --> 00:13:57,907
which comprises three principal lines 

401
00:13:57,907 --> 00:14:00,129
of effort . The first is preparedness , 

402
00:14:00,129 --> 00:14:02,018
bolstering our ability to compete 

403
00:14:02,018 --> 00:14:04,240
across all domains and , if necessary , 

404
00:14:04,240 --> 00:14:06,296
to fight and win a conflict with the 

405
00:14:06,296 --> 00:14:07,962
near peer competitor . Second 

406
00:14:07,962 --> 00:14:10,150
partnerships , reinvigorating our 

407
00:14:10,150 --> 00:14:11,817
alliances and partnerships by 

408
00:14:11,817 --> 00:14:13,817
increasing our interoperability and 

409
00:14:13,817 --> 00:14:16,039
leveraging our combined resources for a 

410
00:14:16,039 --> 00:14:18,370
common goal and third , promoting a 

411
00:14:18,370 --> 00:14:20,520
networked region promoting an 

412
00:14:20,530 --> 00:14:22,586
interconnected network of allies and 

413
00:14:22,586 --> 00:14:24,530
partners that can serve as a force 

414
00:14:24,530 --> 00:14:26,363
multiplier to advance our shared 

415
00:14:26,363 --> 00:14:28,700
interests . These lines of effort are 

416
00:14:28,700 --> 00:14:30,756
the baseline for efforts in the Indo 

417
00:14:30,756 --> 00:14:32,978
Pacific and guide our relationships and 

418
00:14:32,978 --> 00:14:34,978
defense cooperation with allies and 

419
00:14:34,978 --> 00:14:36,811
partners , translating them into 

420
00:14:36,811 --> 00:14:38,922
concrete actions that are advancing a 

421
00:14:38,922 --> 00:14:40,867
shared vision for the region . The 

422
00:14:40,867 --> 00:14:42,922
department is strongly committed two 

423
00:14:42,922 --> 00:14:45,033
fielding robust military capabilities 

424
00:14:45,033 --> 00:14:46,922
that leave no doubt two allies to 

425
00:14:46,922 --> 00:14:49,089
partners or adversaries of our ability 

426
00:14:49,089 --> 00:14:51,144
to deter and respond to aggression . 

427
00:14:51,340 --> 00:14:53,562
Secretary Austin is stated clearly that 

428
00:14:53,562 --> 00:14:55,860
China is our highest priority and the 

429
00:14:55,860 --> 00:14:58,120
pacing challenge for the department and 

430
00:14:58,120 --> 00:14:59,787
has directed us to review our 

431
00:14:59,787 --> 00:15:01,898
activities and ensure their alignment 

432
00:15:01,898 --> 00:15:03,953
with our strategic priorities . Mr . 

433
00:15:03,953 --> 00:15:05,787
Chairman , I thank you again for 

434
00:15:05,787 --> 00:15:07,953
inviting me to appear today and I look 

435
00:15:07,953 --> 00:15:07,680
forward to taking your questions . 

436
00:15:08,240 --> 00:15:11,350
Thank you , Admiral Davidson . Okay , 

437
00:15:13,340 --> 00:15:15,560
Chairman Smith , Ranking Member Rogers 

438
00:15:15,560 --> 00:15:17,393
and distinguished members of the 

439
00:15:17,393 --> 00:15:19,616
Committee Thank you for the opportunity 

440
00:15:19,616 --> 00:15:21,616
to appear before you to discuss the 

441
00:15:21,616 --> 00:15:23,616
Indo Pacific region and thank you , 

442
00:15:23,616 --> 00:15:25,616
Chairman Smith , for your very kind 

443
00:15:25,616 --> 00:15:27,504
remarks today I am joined by Indo 

444
00:15:27,504 --> 00:15:29,727
Pacific Command Senior Enlisted Advisor 

445
00:15:29,727 --> 00:15:31,893
Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter , 

446
00:15:31,893 --> 00:15:34,004
a Special Forces warrior with decades 

447
00:15:34,004 --> 00:15:36,004
of experience in the Indo Pacific , 

448
00:15:36,004 --> 00:15:38,060
operating and training alongside our 

449
00:15:38,060 --> 00:15:40,171
most critical allies and partners . I 

450
00:15:40,171 --> 00:15:42,393
can report that Indo Pacific command is 

451
00:15:42,393 --> 00:15:44,290
laser focused on the secretary of 

452
00:15:44,300 --> 00:15:46,550
defense is immediate five priorities , 

453
00:15:46,940 --> 00:15:49,107
beginning with the initiative centered 

454
00:15:49,107 --> 00:15:51,107
on the health and well being of our 

455
00:15:51,107 --> 00:15:53,329
people . Indeed , investing in our most 

456
00:15:53,329 --> 00:15:55,329
critical and resilient resource our 

457
00:15:55,329 --> 00:15:57,200
people , is a national security 

458
00:15:57,200 --> 00:15:59,970
imperative . For the past 12 months , 

459
00:15:59,980 --> 00:16:01,647
we have worked to support the 

460
00:16:01,647 --> 00:16:03,869
protection and sustainment of our joint 

461
00:16:03,869 --> 00:16:05,924
force readiness while mitigating the 

462
00:16:05,924 --> 00:16:07,869
effects of the covid 19 pandemic . 

463
00:16:07,940 --> 00:16:09,940
Additionally , our team has worked 

464
00:16:09,940 --> 00:16:12,160
extensively with local , state and 

465
00:16:12,160 --> 00:16:14,380
national leadership to help defeat the 

466
00:16:14,380 --> 00:16:16,970
disease and minimize the impact on our 

467
00:16:16,970 --> 00:16:19,920
ability to perform our missions . We 

468
00:16:19,920 --> 00:16:21,620
also remain deeply focused on 

469
00:16:21,620 --> 00:16:23,787
cultivating a safe environment for our 

470
00:16:23,787 --> 00:16:26,380
d . O D professionals to learn , thrive , 

471
00:16:26,390 --> 00:16:28,612
execute their mission and fulfill their 

472
00:16:28,612 --> 00:16:31,960
oath to the Constitution . In doing so , 

473
00:16:31,970 --> 00:16:34,680
we must work and continue to work to 

474
00:16:34,680 --> 00:16:36,620
eliminate sexual assault , sexual 

475
00:16:36,620 --> 00:16:39,810
harassment , racism and extremism , all 

476
00:16:39,810 --> 00:16:42,143
of which have no place within our ranks . 

477
00:16:42,180 --> 00:16:43,770
Such a boring behaviors are 

478
00:16:43,780 --> 00:16:46,070
inconsistent with our values and the 

479
00:16:46,070 --> 00:16:49,040
principles we are sworn to defend . Our 

480
00:16:49,040 --> 00:16:51,040
greatest military strength is our 

481
00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:53,500
people . Therefore , operating in an 

482
00:16:53,500 --> 00:16:55,556
environment free of discrimination , 

483
00:16:55,556 --> 00:16:57,111
hate and harassment , while 

484
00:16:57,111 --> 00:16:59,278
accomplishing our mission is paramount 

485
00:16:59,278 --> 00:17:01,570
to our success . Indeed , it is 

486
00:17:01,570 --> 00:17:03,792
paramount to ensuring we can accomplish 

487
00:17:03,792 --> 00:17:05,626
our mission to meet the greatest 

488
00:17:05,626 --> 00:17:09,610
challenges of the 21st century . The 

489
00:17:09,610 --> 00:17:12,000
Indo Pacific is the most consequential 

490
00:17:12,000 --> 00:17:14,222
region for America's future and remains 

491
00:17:14,222 --> 00:17:16,278
the United States Priority Theater . 

492
00:17:16,640 --> 00:17:18,807
The region itself contains four of the 

493
00:17:18,807 --> 00:17:20,696
five priority security challenges 

494
00:17:20,696 --> 00:17:23,029
identified by the Department of Defense , 

495
00:17:23,240 --> 00:17:26,730
China , Russia , North Korea as well as 

496
00:17:26,740 --> 00:17:29,760
violent extremist organizations . The 

497
00:17:29,760 --> 00:17:31,816
Indo Pacific region also experiences 

498
00:17:31,816 --> 00:17:34,560
frequent natural and man made disasters , 

499
00:17:34,940 --> 00:17:37,218
the negative impacts of climate change , 

500
00:17:37,218 --> 00:17:39,162
rapid population growth , drug and 

501
00:17:39,162 --> 00:17:41,162
human trafficking and , of course , 

502
00:17:41,162 --> 00:17:44,030
disease and pandemics . The region 

503
00:17:44,030 --> 00:17:46,440
accounts for 60% of the world's current 

504
00:17:46,440 --> 00:17:49,360
gross domestic product and contributes 

505
00:17:49,360 --> 00:17:51,580
more than two thirds to the present 

506
00:17:51,580 --> 00:17:54,800
global economic growth . And in 10 

507
00:17:54,800 --> 00:17:57,190
years , the region will host two thirds 

508
00:17:57,190 --> 00:17:59,180
of the world's population and two 

509
00:17:59,180 --> 00:18:02,420
thirds of the global economy . Our 

510
00:18:02,420 --> 00:18:04,420
nation's vision for a free and open 

511
00:18:04,420 --> 00:18:06,420
Indo Pacific serves as an important 

512
00:18:06,420 --> 00:18:08,420
reminder to all nations that the US 

513
00:18:08,420 --> 00:18:10,476
remains committed to free , fair and 

514
00:18:10,476 --> 00:18:12,600
reciprocal trade , shared access to 

515
00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:14,880
global markets , good governance and 

516
00:18:14,880 --> 00:18:17,660
human rights and civil liberties . Now 

517
00:18:17,660 --> 00:18:19,960
let me focus my remaining remarks and 

518
00:18:19,960 --> 00:18:22,182
the greatest long term strategic threat 

519
00:18:22,182 --> 00:18:24,182
in the 21st century and that is the 

520
00:18:24,182 --> 00:18:26,680
People's Republic of China . In stark 

521
00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:28,847
contrast to our free and open vision , 

522
00:18:29,070 --> 00:18:31,400
the Communist Party of China promotes a 

523
00:18:31,400 --> 00:18:35,250
closed and authoritarian system through 

524
00:18:35,250 --> 00:18:38,180
internal oppression as well as external 

525
00:18:38,190 --> 00:18:40,600
aggression . China's very pernicious 

526
00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:42,822
approach to the region includes a whole 

527
00:18:42,822 --> 00:18:44,767
party effort to coerce corrupt and 

528
00:18:44,767 --> 00:18:46,820
corrupt governments , businesses , 

529
00:18:46,820 --> 00:18:49,030
organizations and the people of the 

530
00:18:49,030 --> 00:18:51,940
Indo Pacific . As China continues to 

531
00:18:51,940 --> 00:18:54,390
increase the size of the LA and advance 

532
00:18:54,390 --> 00:18:56,740
their joint capabilities , the military 

533
00:18:56,740 --> 00:18:58,962
balance in the Indo Pacific is becoming 

534
00:18:58,962 --> 00:19:01,129
more unfavorable for the United States 

535
00:19:01,129 --> 00:19:03,170
and our allies . And with this 

536
00:19:03,170 --> 00:19:05,600
imbalance , we are accumulating risk 

537
00:19:05,610 --> 00:19:09,010
that may embolden China to unilaterally 

538
00:19:09,010 --> 00:19:11,650
change the status quo before our forces 

539
00:19:11,660 --> 00:19:13,910
may be able to deliver an effective 

540
00:19:13,910 --> 00:19:16,540
response . The greatest danger of the 

541
00:19:16,540 --> 00:19:18,596
United States and our allies face in 

542
00:19:18,596 --> 00:19:20,207
the region is the erosion of 

543
00:19:20,207 --> 00:19:22,318
conventional deterrence vis a vis the 

544
00:19:22,318 --> 00:19:24,950
People's Republic of China . Absent a 

545
00:19:24,960 --> 00:19:27,260
convincing deterrent , China will be 

546
00:19:27,260 --> 00:19:29,371
emboldened to continue to take action 

547
00:19:29,371 --> 00:19:31,593
to supplant the established rules based 

548
00:19:31,593 --> 00:19:33,538
international order and the values 

549
00:19:33,538 --> 00:19:35,704
represented in our vision . For a free 

550
00:19:35,704 --> 00:19:37,871
and open Indo Pacific , our deterrence 

551
00:19:37,871 --> 00:19:40,100
posture in the Indo Pacific must 

552
00:19:40,100 --> 00:19:41,933
demonstrate the capability , the 

553
00:19:41,933 --> 00:19:44,360
capacity and the will to convince 

554
00:19:44,360 --> 00:19:47,030
Beijing unequivocally that the cost of 

555
00:19:47,030 --> 00:19:49,141
achieving their objectives by the use 

556
00:19:49,141 --> 00:19:51,363
of military force are simply too high . 

557
00:19:51,740 --> 00:19:53,796
Indeed , we must be doing everything 

558
00:19:53,796 --> 00:19:56,260
possible to deter conflict are number 

559
00:19:56,260 --> 00:19:59,550
one job is to keep the peace , but we 

560
00:19:59,550 --> 00:20:01,606
absolutely must be prepared to fight 

561
00:20:01,606 --> 00:20:03,710
and win . Should competition turn to 

562
00:20:03,710 --> 00:20:05,920
conflict . I want to thank this 

563
00:20:05,920 --> 00:20:08,031
committee for your deep commitment to 

564
00:20:08,031 --> 00:20:10,087
defending US values and interests in 

565
00:20:10,087 --> 00:20:12,198
the Indo Pacific through your efforts 

566
00:20:12,198 --> 00:20:13,920
to establish the ground baking 

567
00:20:13,920 --> 00:20:15,809
groundbreaking Pacific Deterrence 

568
00:20:15,809 --> 00:20:17,809
Initiative or the P d . P . D . I . 

569
00:20:17,809 --> 00:20:19,364
Provides the foundation for 

570
00:20:19,364 --> 00:20:21,420
establishing afford deployed defense 

571
00:20:21,420 --> 00:20:23,800
and depth posture that defends US 

572
00:20:23,810 --> 00:20:25,810
homeland and our interests abroad , 

573
00:20:25,810 --> 00:20:28,230
deters aggression , assures allies and 

574
00:20:28,230 --> 00:20:30,830
partners and provides flexible response 

575
00:20:30,830 --> 00:20:33,630
options should deterrence fail . It is 

576
00:20:33,630 --> 00:20:35,930
the joint integration you seek in the 

577
00:20:35,930 --> 00:20:38,230
theater . On behalf of the men and 

578
00:20:38,230 --> 00:20:40,119
women of the United States in the 

579
00:20:40,119 --> 00:20:42,286
Pacific Command . I thank you for your 

580
00:20:42,286 --> 00:20:44,397
time today for your continued support 

581
00:20:44,397 --> 00:20:46,341
and for your desire to improve the 

582
00:20:46,341 --> 00:20:48,341
prosperity and security of the Indo 

583
00:20:48,341 --> 00:20:50,286
Pacific . Indeed the most critical 

584
00:20:50,286 --> 00:20:52,397
region on the planet . Thank you , Mr 

585
00:20:52,397 --> 00:20:54,619
Chairman . Thank you , General Abrams , 

586
00:20:55,340 --> 00:20:57,507
Chairman Smith , ranking member Rogers 

587
00:20:57,507 --> 00:20:59,673
and distinguished members of the House 

588
00:20:59,673 --> 00:21:01,896
Armed Services Committee . I am honored 

589
00:21:01,896 --> 00:21:03,896
to appear before you today , as the 

590
00:21:03,896 --> 00:21:06,007
chairman mentioned . We are currently 

591
00:21:06,007 --> 00:21:08,118
conducting our biannual theatre level 

592
00:21:08,118 --> 00:21:10,284
combined command post training our men 

593
00:21:10,284 --> 00:21:12,118
and women in uniform alongside a 

594
00:21:12,118 --> 00:21:14,340
Republic of Korea . Forces are immersed 

595
00:21:14,340 --> 00:21:16,340
in a very realistic and challenging 

596
00:21:16,340 --> 00:21:18,118
training environment . And I am 

597
00:21:18,118 --> 00:21:20,490
appearing this morning our time from an 

598
00:21:20,490 --> 00:21:22,546
undisclosed wartime command bunker . 

599
00:21:22,940 --> 00:21:24,996
Chairman Smith Thank you , sir , for 

600
00:21:24,996 --> 00:21:26,884
approving my request to testify . 

601
00:21:26,884 --> 00:21:28,996
Virtually your support has allowed me 

602
00:21:28,996 --> 00:21:31,051
to remain on the Korean Peninsula in 

603
00:21:31,051 --> 00:21:33,273
order to execute my responsibilities as 

604
00:21:33,273 --> 00:21:35,496
the commander of United Nations Command 

605
00:21:35,496 --> 00:21:37,384
Combined Forces Command and U . S 

606
00:21:37,384 --> 00:21:39,273
Forces Korea to lead our combined 

607
00:21:39,273 --> 00:21:41,470
forces to ensure that we are indeed 

608
00:21:41,470 --> 00:21:43,692
ready to fight tonight . I also want to 

609
00:21:43,692 --> 00:21:45,692
recognize the commitment of all the 

610
00:21:45,692 --> 00:21:47,748
members of Congress to fulfill their 

611
00:21:47,748 --> 00:21:49,914
constitutional duty . On January 6th , 

612
00:21:50,440 --> 00:21:52,607
the events of that day deeply affected 

613
00:21:52,607 --> 00:21:55,300
USFK personnel stationed 8000 miles 

614
00:21:55,300 --> 00:21:57,411
away from the nation's capital and as 

615
00:21:57,411 --> 00:21:59,467
an American citizen , I was proud to 

616
00:21:59,467 --> 00:22:01,022
see the Congress completely 

617
00:22:01,022 --> 00:22:03,022
constitutional duty under some very 

618
00:22:03,022 --> 00:22:05,078
stressful and dangerous conditions . 

619
00:22:05,340 --> 00:22:07,400
I'm honored today to represent the 

620
00:22:07,400 --> 00:22:09,622
soldiers , sailors , airmen , Marines , 

621
00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:11,640
Department of Defense , civilians , 

622
00:22:11,640 --> 00:22:13,862
contractors and families who all served 

623
00:22:13,870 --> 00:22:16,720
here in the Republic of Korea . When I 

624
00:22:16,720 --> 00:22:19,053
briefed the committee last year , Covid . 

625
00:22:19,053 --> 00:22:21,276
19 was attempting to test our readiness 

626
00:22:21,276 --> 00:22:23,498
and the subsequent impact of the global 

627
00:22:23,498 --> 00:22:25,442
pandemic exacerbated the challenge 

628
00:22:25,442 --> 00:22:27,498
across our operational environment . 

629
00:22:27,498 --> 00:22:29,553
Our alliance , however , rose to the 

630
00:22:29,553 --> 00:22:32,070
occasion to adapt , innovate and , in 

631
00:22:32,070 --> 00:22:34,181
the end , strengthen the bond between 

632
00:22:34,181 --> 00:22:36,180
our two nations . We have greatly 

633
00:22:36,180 --> 00:22:38,360
benefited from our robust partnership 

634
00:22:38,370 --> 00:22:40,481
with the Republican Korean government 

635
00:22:40,481 --> 00:22:42,426
and the Korean Disease Control and 

636
00:22:42,426 --> 00:22:44,410
Prevention Agency , ktc a who have 

637
00:22:44,410 --> 00:22:46,840
supported our efforts and as a result , 

638
00:22:46,850 --> 00:22:48,683
a rate of infection has remained 

639
00:22:48,683 --> 00:22:51,080
extremely low . Of the 58,000 people 

640
00:22:51,080 --> 00:22:53,980
who touch USFK basis daily , we've seen 

641
00:22:53,980 --> 00:22:57,540
a total of 110 local affiliated 

642
00:22:57,540 --> 00:23:01,400
cases . And of that 110 only 28 

643
00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:03,567
service members have tested positive , 

644
00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:05,860
a remarkable record . Our biggest 

645
00:23:05,860 --> 00:23:08,210
challenge has been from in bombs for 

646
00:23:08,210 --> 00:23:10,321
returnees coming from the continental 

647
00:23:10,321 --> 00:23:12,099
United States , where we've had 

648
00:23:12,099 --> 00:23:14,760
approximately 700 positive cases . We 

649
00:23:14,760 --> 00:23:16,982
strictly follow what government control 

650
00:23:16,982 --> 00:23:19,149
measures for reception of every flight 

651
00:23:19,149 --> 00:23:21,390
and we follow the rock quarantine 

652
00:23:21,390 --> 00:23:23,770
guidance very closely and as a result , 

653
00:23:23,770 --> 00:23:25,992
there's been no threat to our personnel 

654
00:23:25,992 --> 00:23:28,214
or the Korean people . Now I'll provide 

655
00:23:28,214 --> 00:23:30,437
a quick update on the current situation 

656
00:23:30,437 --> 00:23:32,492
here on the Korean Peninsula . There 

657
00:23:32,492 --> 00:23:34,659
remains a palpable reduction intention 

658
00:23:34,659 --> 00:23:37,240
that emerged in 2018 after a very 

659
00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:39,550
dangerous and provocative 2017 . 

660
00:23:40,440 --> 00:23:42,690
Despite the reduction intention , rest 

661
00:23:42,690 --> 00:23:44,468
assured that we have not become 

662
00:23:44,468 --> 00:23:46,801
complacent when it comes to North Korea . 

663
00:23:46,801 --> 00:23:48,523
We remain clear eyed about the 

664
00:23:48,523 --> 00:23:50,746
persistent challenges we face today and 

665
00:23:50,746 --> 00:23:52,857
in the future , North Korea continues 

666
00:23:52,857 --> 00:23:54,690
their development of nuclear and 

667
00:23:54,690 --> 00:23:56,523
advanced missile systems , cyber 

668
00:23:56,523 --> 00:23:58,079
capability as well as other 

669
00:23:58,079 --> 00:24:00,134
conventional and emerging asymmetric 

670
00:24:00,134 --> 00:24:01,950
military technologies . We will 

671
00:24:01,950 --> 00:24:03,728
continue to ensure a strong and 

672
00:24:03,728 --> 00:24:05,783
effective deterrence posture so that 

673
00:24:05,783 --> 00:24:08,460
Pyongyang never misjudges our role , 

674
00:24:08,840 --> 00:24:11,007
never misjudges our commitment and our 

675
00:24:11,007 --> 00:24:13,240
capability to respond as an alliance 

676
00:24:13,940 --> 00:24:15,940
above all , a proud report that are 

677
00:24:15,940 --> 00:24:18,162
combined . Joint force here in Korea is 

678
00:24:18,162 --> 00:24:20,051
credible and ready to execute our 

679
00:24:20,051 --> 00:24:21,996
assigned returns from war fighting 

680
00:24:21,996 --> 00:24:24,107
missions . We stand together to deter 

681
00:24:24,107 --> 00:24:26,107
aggression , maintain the armistice 

682
00:24:26,107 --> 00:24:28,218
conditions and ensure the security of 

683
00:24:28,218 --> 00:24:30,384
the Republic of Korea . Your continued 

684
00:24:30,384 --> 00:24:32,662
support of our capability enhancements , 

685
00:24:32,662 --> 00:24:34,718
joint and combined training programs 

686
00:24:34,718 --> 00:24:36,960
and theater exercises is critical to 

687
00:24:36,960 --> 00:24:39,182
our fight tonight . Readiness Posture . 

688
00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:41,551
Iraq US alliance remains the linchpin 

689
00:24:41,551 --> 00:24:43,718
of security and stability in Northeast 

690
00:24:43,718 --> 00:24:45,940
Asia , and our partnership continues to 

691
00:24:45,940 --> 00:24:48,218
grow by promoting economic cooperation , 

692
00:24:48,218 --> 00:24:49,940
mitigating threats to regional 

693
00:24:49,940 --> 00:24:51,551
stability and fulfilling our 

694
00:24:51,551 --> 00:24:53,662
commitments to allies and partners in 

695
00:24:53,662 --> 00:24:55,662
the region . Every alliance has its 

696
00:24:55,662 --> 00:24:57,662
challenges , however , and are iron 

697
00:24:57,662 --> 00:24:59,662
clad Alliance is no exception . One 

698
00:24:59,662 --> 00:25:01,662
such challenge that confronts us is 

699
00:25:01,662 --> 00:25:03,718
limited access to training ranges in 

700
00:25:03,718 --> 00:25:05,884
airspace here in South Korea . If left 

701
00:25:05,884 --> 00:25:08,107
unsolved , this limitation could affect 

702
00:25:08,107 --> 00:25:10,273
our force readiness . We are currently 

703
00:25:10,273 --> 00:25:12,329
working hard with our rock allies to 

704
00:25:12,329 --> 00:25:14,162
identify bilaterally supportable 

705
00:25:14,162 --> 00:25:16,329
solution so there are forces can train 

706
00:25:16,329 --> 00:25:18,790
on the peninsula and maintain a 

707
00:25:18,790 --> 00:25:21,450
credible combat deterrent . The 

708
00:25:21,450 --> 00:25:23,728
alliance between the Republic of Korea , 

709
00:25:23,728 --> 00:25:25,728
the United States was forged in the 

710
00:25:25,728 --> 00:25:27,672
crucible of war and shaped over 71 

711
00:25:27,672 --> 00:25:29,783
years of combined military operations 

712
00:25:29,783 --> 00:25:32,010
and training . The shared sacrifice 

713
00:25:32,010 --> 00:25:35,020
built on trust , respect , commitment 

714
00:25:35,050 --> 00:25:36,820
and mutually agreed principles 

715
00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:39,060
underpins everything that we do here . 

716
00:25:39,540 --> 00:25:41,707
Thank you again for the opportunity to 

717
00:25:41,707 --> 00:25:43,818
testify today . And I look forward to 

718
00:25:43,818 --> 00:25:45,984
answer your questions . Thank you very 

719
00:25:45,984 --> 00:25:48,040
much , General Admiral Davidson . We 

720
00:25:48,040 --> 00:25:50,207
talked a lot about both ranking member 

721
00:25:50,207 --> 00:25:52,318
Rogers and I spoke about deterrence , 

722
00:25:52,318 --> 00:25:54,484
you know , How do we deter China ? And 

723
00:25:54,484 --> 00:25:54,420
what are we deterring them from doing ? 

724
00:25:54,420 --> 00:25:56,364
I think the most obvious example , 

725
00:25:56,364 --> 00:25:58,780
obviously , is Taiwan . Um , nothing 

726
00:25:58,780 --> 00:26:01,220
would blow the situation up there more 

727
00:26:01,220 --> 00:26:03,580
than if China took an aggressive move 

728
00:26:03,580 --> 00:26:06,080
against Taiwan . What do you think is 

729
00:26:06,080 --> 00:26:08,880
most important for us to do to deter 

730
00:26:08,880 --> 00:26:10,950
China from taking a step like that ? 

731
00:26:12,940 --> 00:26:15,850
Mhm . Well , sir , we've 

732
00:26:16,740 --> 00:26:20,260
described in our 12 51 assessment 

733
00:26:20,260 --> 00:26:22,770
which was mandated by law for me to 

734
00:26:22,770 --> 00:26:25,060
submit to you directly . Um , it 

735
00:26:25,060 --> 00:26:27,960
articulates the needs principally in in 

736
00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:30,800
five categories . You know , first , an 

737
00:26:30,800 --> 00:26:32,744
effort to increase our joint force 

738
00:26:32,744 --> 00:26:36,730
lethality . Um , that includes , uh , 

739
00:26:36,740 --> 00:26:38,962
long range precision fires , integrated 

740
00:26:38,962 --> 00:26:41,120
air and missile defense . Uh , my 

741
00:26:41,130 --> 00:26:44,080
number one priority , which is , uh , 

742
00:26:44,090 --> 00:26:47,230
defensive system at Guam , um , which 

743
00:26:47,230 --> 00:26:49,750
is centered on the aegis ashore system , 

744
00:26:49,760 --> 00:26:51,649
but certainly , and importantly , 

745
00:26:51,649 --> 00:26:55,120
delivers the network the command and 

746
00:26:55,120 --> 00:26:57,342
control for the network that enables it 

747
00:26:57,342 --> 00:27:00,770
to link to other joint assets , Um , on 

748
00:27:00,770 --> 00:27:02,881
the defensive side and potentially on 

749
00:27:02,881 --> 00:27:04,770
the offensive side as well . That 

750
00:27:04,770 --> 00:27:06,714
includes air , maritime and , uh , 

751
00:27:06,714 --> 00:27:08,780
other ground forces as well . We're 

752
00:27:08,780 --> 00:27:10,836
also focused on enhancing our design 

753
00:27:10,836 --> 00:27:12,780
and posture on the region . You've 

754
00:27:12,780 --> 00:27:15,002
heard a lot of talk about dispersal and 

755
00:27:15,002 --> 00:27:18,360
hardening of , um , bases , um , and 

756
00:27:18,360 --> 00:27:20,260
dispersal to places that might be 

757
00:27:20,260 --> 00:27:22,204
possible in the 1st and 2nd island 

758
00:27:22,204 --> 00:27:24,640
chain . There are several proposals 

759
00:27:24,640 --> 00:27:27,400
along those lines we're advocating for 

760
00:27:27,400 --> 00:27:29,622
strengthening our allies and partners . 

761
00:27:29,740 --> 00:27:31,962
That's principally done through foreign 

762
00:27:31,962 --> 00:27:33,962
military sales . But it's also done 

763
00:27:33,962 --> 00:27:35,962
through our exercise program , um , 

764
00:27:35,962 --> 00:27:37,851
which , uh , as as our allies and 

765
00:27:37,851 --> 00:27:39,907
partners in the network are bringing 

766
00:27:39,907 --> 00:27:42,220
aboard important assets with us , like 

767
00:27:42,230 --> 00:27:44,452
fifth Gen fighters , integrated air and 

768
00:27:44,452 --> 00:27:47,210
missile defense and advanced fires 

769
00:27:47,210 --> 00:27:50,030
themselves . We need to advance our 

770
00:27:50,030 --> 00:27:52,141
exercise program to make sure that we 

771
00:27:52,141 --> 00:27:55,960
have the the capabilities to exercise , 

772
00:27:56,340 --> 00:27:58,340
preserve the things that we want to 

773
00:27:58,340 --> 00:28:01,070
preserve , you know , not not reveal to 

774
00:28:01,080 --> 00:28:03,550
potential adversaries and move forward . 

775
00:28:03,940 --> 00:28:05,718
Um , we're also very focused on 

776
00:28:05,718 --> 00:28:07,540
exercises , experimentation and 

777
00:28:07,540 --> 00:28:09,318
innovation . We think that's an 

778
00:28:09,318 --> 00:28:11,373
important element , um , to bring to 

779
00:28:11,373 --> 00:28:13,318
our training ranges as well as our 

780
00:28:13,318 --> 00:28:15,207
joint exercise program . And then 

781
00:28:15,207 --> 00:28:17,429
lastly , um , we have several proposals 

782
00:28:17,429 --> 00:28:19,900
in joint logistics . Uh , that we think 

783
00:28:19,900 --> 00:28:22,090
are critical to the sustainment , the 

784
00:28:22,090 --> 00:28:23,980
provision of munitions , fuel 

785
00:28:23,980 --> 00:28:25,758
distribution in the theater and 

786
00:28:25,758 --> 00:28:28,430
recapitalization of lift assets and our 

787
00:28:28,430 --> 00:28:30,486
means to command and control them as 

788
00:28:30,486 --> 00:28:32,597
well . Thank you , general . Everyone 

789
00:28:32,597 --> 00:28:34,763
just just quickly . You mentioned your 

790
00:28:34,763 --> 00:28:37,730
response to covid 19 pandemic and and 

791
00:28:37,740 --> 00:28:39,907
thank you . You did an outstanding job 

792
00:28:39,907 --> 00:28:42,129
of responding that protecting our force 

793
00:28:42,129 --> 00:28:44,351
and making sure you can continue in the 

794
00:28:44,351 --> 00:28:44,100
readiness . What ? What would you say 

795
00:28:44,100 --> 00:28:46,156
is the sort of the top level lessons 

796
00:28:46,156 --> 00:28:48,156
learned about why your response was 

797
00:28:48,156 --> 00:28:50,280
successful and what we can learn from 

798
00:28:50,280 --> 00:28:51,891
that now and going forward , 

799
00:28:54,040 --> 00:28:56,840
Chairman first and foremost , um , we 

800
00:28:56,840 --> 00:28:58,951
needed to operationalize our response 

801
00:28:58,951 --> 00:29:02,400
immediately . Um , there was early on , 

802
00:29:02,410 --> 00:29:04,410
you know , it was sort of in health 

803
00:29:04,410 --> 00:29:06,466
channels , and , uh , and I have the 

804
00:29:06,466 --> 00:29:08,577
utmost respect for infectious disease 

805
00:29:08,577 --> 00:29:10,577
doctors and so forth and our health 

806
00:29:10,577 --> 00:29:12,799
force protection people . But we had to 

807
00:29:12,799 --> 00:29:14,966
operationalize this , um , so that was 

808
00:29:14,966 --> 00:29:18,690
step number one . Step number two was 

809
00:29:18,690 --> 00:29:22,000
effective communications to inform our 

810
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:25,710
force to inform our entire community on 

811
00:29:25,720 --> 00:29:28,950
the nature of the threat . Um , And 

812
00:29:28,950 --> 00:29:31,228
then what ? What should we do about it ? 

813
00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:34,720
And it was constant , clear , concise , 

814
00:29:34,720 --> 00:29:37,860
transparent communications throughout 

815
00:29:37,860 --> 00:29:39,940
the entire peninsula . Led by 

816
00:29:39,940 --> 00:29:41,773
commanders are base commanders , 

817
00:29:41,773 --> 00:29:43,950
garrison commanders being very 

818
00:29:43,950 --> 00:29:46,510
aggressive , um , and reducing the 

819
00:29:46,510 --> 00:29:49,340
anxiety with our people . And then the 

820
00:29:49,340 --> 00:29:52,250
third thing chairman is 

821
00:29:52,260 --> 00:29:55,620
adoption of court tenants . We call it 

822
00:29:55,620 --> 00:29:57,787
the new normal , um , that everyone is 

823
00:29:57,787 --> 00:29:59,953
very familiar with . But this was very 

824
00:29:59,953 --> 00:30:02,120
strange for everyone over a year ago . 

825
00:30:02,120 --> 00:30:03,842
You know , the simple things . 

826
00:30:03,842 --> 00:30:05,787
Practicing good personal hygiene , 

827
00:30:05,787 --> 00:30:07,900
washing your hand , wearing a mask , 

828
00:30:07,900 --> 00:30:09,789
maintaining physical distancing , 

829
00:30:10,140 --> 00:30:13,290
avoiding large groups . Um , this is in 

830
00:30:13,300 --> 00:30:16,350
disinfecting our areas . Um , use 

831
00:30:16,350 --> 00:30:18,406
maximizing tele work . These are our 

832
00:30:18,406 --> 00:30:20,461
core tenants , and I'd say those are 

833
00:30:20,461 --> 00:30:22,683
the three top line messages . Thank you 

834
00:30:22,683 --> 00:30:25,890
very much , Mr Rogers . Thank Miss 

835
00:30:25,890 --> 00:30:28,112
Chairman Admiral Davidson . In response 

836
00:30:28,112 --> 00:30:30,223
to the chairman's question , you made 

837
00:30:30,223 --> 00:30:32,390
reference to your 12 51 report in your 

838
00:30:32,390 --> 00:30:34,334
recommendation for an Aegis ashore 

839
00:30:34,334 --> 00:30:37,890
system on Guam . Can you explain in an 

840
00:30:37,890 --> 00:30:39,612
unclassified manner why that's 

841
00:30:39,612 --> 00:30:42,300
important ? Um , and why it needs to be 

842
00:30:42,300 --> 00:30:45,410
integrated with other systems ? Um , 

843
00:30:45,420 --> 00:30:49,140
the threat as it's developed , um , in 

844
00:30:49,140 --> 00:30:52,300
the Western Pacific , um , has moved in 

845
00:30:52,300 --> 00:30:55,550
a way in which we need to have better 

846
00:30:55,610 --> 00:30:57,554
integrated air and missile defense 

847
00:30:57,554 --> 00:30:59,666
capability on Guam in order to defend 

848
00:30:59,666 --> 00:31:02,330
it . What you have in place right now 

849
00:31:02,340 --> 00:31:05,520
is a fad radar , um , which only has 

850
00:31:05,620 --> 00:31:09,380
100 and 20 degree wide look at threats 

851
00:31:09,380 --> 00:31:11,324
in the region , and in fact , it's 

852
00:31:11,324 --> 00:31:13,269
oriented on North Korea , and it's 

853
00:31:13,269 --> 00:31:16,510
meant to defend against robe shot of 

854
00:31:16,520 --> 00:31:18,631
intermediate range from North Korea . 

855
00:31:18,631 --> 00:31:20,510
We supplement that with an Aegis 

856
00:31:20,510 --> 00:31:23,260
destroyer as we look at the 

857
00:31:24,030 --> 00:31:27,610
expanse of Chinese 

858
00:31:27,660 --> 00:31:31,040
weapons systems and their employment of 

859
00:31:31,050 --> 00:31:33,272
air and maritime forces in the region . 

860
00:31:33,410 --> 00:31:36,450
We need a 360 degree defense now of 

861
00:31:36,460 --> 00:31:39,170
Guam , and it must be able to meet the 

862
00:31:39,170 --> 00:31:41,337
ballistic missile threat that can come 

863
00:31:41,337 --> 00:31:44,450
from PRC land as well as PRC ships . 

864
00:31:45,040 --> 00:31:48,250
But it also should meet the 360 degree 

865
00:31:48,260 --> 00:31:51,120
threat around Guam that comes from 

866
00:31:51,160 --> 00:31:54,420
circum navigations of Guam by PRC Naval 

867
00:31:54,420 --> 00:31:56,810
assets , including submarines that 

868
00:31:56,810 --> 00:31:59,143
could shoot land attack cruise missiles , 

869
00:31:59,143 --> 00:32:01,560
for example , um , as well as bomber 

870
00:32:01,560 --> 00:32:03,700
approaches and its ability to shoot 

871
00:32:03,710 --> 00:32:05,821
land attack cruise missiles as well . 

872
00:32:06,530 --> 00:32:08,586
We have to be able to defend against 

873
00:32:08,586 --> 00:32:10,870
all those threats . Aegis Ashore is a 

874
00:32:10,870 --> 00:32:12,981
proven technology that you have today 

875
00:32:12,981 --> 00:32:14,930
at sea , and you have it ashore in 

876
00:32:14,930 --> 00:32:16,920
Romania and Poland to help in the 

877
00:32:16,920 --> 00:32:19,820
defense of Europe . Um , that system 

878
00:32:19,830 --> 00:32:22,250
would enable all the capabilities that 

879
00:32:22,250 --> 00:32:24,306
you have today and begin to meet the 

880
00:32:24,306 --> 00:32:27,490
threats in the future as China develops 

881
00:32:27,500 --> 00:32:30,490
hypersonic weapons during the course of 

882
00:32:30,490 --> 00:32:32,930
this decade . Clearly , there's going 

883
00:32:32,930 --> 00:32:35,080
to be a need to have space sensing 

884
00:32:35,080 --> 00:32:37,080
associated with that . You're still 

885
00:32:37,080 --> 00:32:39,302
going to have to have an interceptor to 

886
00:32:39,302 --> 00:32:41,413
meet the threat . In my view , that's 

887
00:32:41,413 --> 00:32:43,358
gonna you rectify that by bridging 

888
00:32:43,358 --> 00:32:45,636
Aegis ashore with our space capability , 

889
00:32:45,636 --> 00:32:47,747
that is to come . How does building a 

890
00:32:47,747 --> 00:32:49,580
long range precision fire enable 

891
00:32:49,580 --> 00:32:51,802
mobility in a with the state like china 

892
00:32:51,802 --> 00:32:54,710
and conflict ? Mhm . You know , much of 

893
00:32:54,710 --> 00:32:56,870
our long range precision fires come 

894
00:32:56,870 --> 00:32:59,148
from our air and maritime assets today . 

895
00:32:59,148 --> 00:33:02,490
That's it that enables any adversary to 

896
00:33:02,490 --> 00:33:05,840
focus . Um , there , um 

897
00:33:05,850 --> 00:33:09,780
uh , means of sensing and ability to 

898
00:33:09,790 --> 00:33:12,980
target our assets on only a portion of 

899
00:33:12,980 --> 00:33:15,520
the joint force . If we had a wider 

900
00:33:15,610 --> 00:33:19,180
base of long range precision fires , it 

901
00:33:19,180 --> 00:33:21,630
forces the Chinese intelligence , 

902
00:33:21,630 --> 00:33:23,408
surveillance and reconnaissance 

903
00:33:23,408 --> 00:33:25,560
apparatus to work much , much harder 

904
00:33:25,570 --> 00:33:29,290
locating all those nodes and 

905
00:33:29,300 --> 00:33:31,790
then in all the ways that ground air 

906
00:33:31,790 --> 00:33:33,600
and maritime forces can hide 

907
00:33:33,610 --> 00:33:35,610
manipulation of the electromagnetic 

908
00:33:35,610 --> 00:33:38,770
spectrum , um , Speed , 

909
00:33:39,240 --> 00:33:41,570
concealment , all those things we can 

910
00:33:41,570 --> 00:33:43,737
then use those to enhance the maneuver 

911
00:33:43,737 --> 00:33:45,737
of the force . And , you know , for 

912
00:33:45,737 --> 00:33:47,792
those with military experience , you 

913
00:33:47,792 --> 00:33:49,959
know that maneuver and fires work hand 

914
00:33:49,959 --> 00:33:51,959
in hand and the They are key to the 

915
00:33:51,959 --> 00:33:53,959
overall , uh , set of needs that we 

916
00:33:53,959 --> 00:33:56,181
have to employ at the operational level 

917
00:33:56,181 --> 00:33:58,181
to be successful , right ? And your 

918
00:33:58,181 --> 00:34:00,348
professional military judgment . If we 

919
00:34:00,348 --> 00:34:02,514
build out the capability you described 

920
00:34:02,514 --> 00:34:02,240
in your report , along with the other 

921
00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:04,351
investments we've got in the region , 

922
00:34:04,351 --> 00:34:06,351
would that in fact have a deterrent 

923
00:34:06,351 --> 00:34:08,870
effect on Chinese aggression ? Um , we 

924
00:34:08,870 --> 00:34:11,037
call the brief in large , regained the 

925
00:34:11,037 --> 00:34:13,259
advantage . Um , we think those are the 

926
00:34:13,259 --> 00:34:15,426
key elements of joint integration that 

927
00:34:15,426 --> 00:34:17,560
are required to bring by what ? I'm 

928
00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:19,671
very encouraged by all the individual 

929
00:34:19,671 --> 00:34:21,671
service doctrines , but it's got to 

930
00:34:21,671 --> 00:34:23,893
come together in a joint approach . And 

931
00:34:23,893 --> 00:34:25,949
this is the methodology to do that . 

932
00:34:25,949 --> 00:34:27,880
And it's meant to deter . Okay , 

933
00:34:27,890 --> 00:34:30,090
General Abrams , the South Korean 

934
00:34:30,090 --> 00:34:32,700
government has committed to increasing 

935
00:34:32,700 --> 00:34:34,770
their defense spending , uh , and 

936
00:34:34,770 --> 00:34:37,170
buying a lot of their own hardware . Uh , 

937
00:34:37,180 --> 00:34:38,847
is that hard ? We're gonna be 

938
00:34:38,847 --> 00:34:40,680
interoperable with our systems . 

939
00:34:45,340 --> 00:34:48,320
Congressman , uh , interoperability is 

940
00:34:48,320 --> 00:34:51,840
at the very core of , uh , Iraq U S 

941
00:34:51,840 --> 00:34:54,430
military alliance , and it's been that 

942
00:34:54,430 --> 00:34:57,880
way for decades . Um , so it's it's 

943
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:00,830
part of our d n a . And to answer 

944
00:35:00,830 --> 00:35:04,000
questions specifically , yes , these 

945
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:06,167
key capabilities as they come online , 

946
00:35:06,167 --> 00:35:08,290
even the indigenously produced . We 

947
00:35:08,290 --> 00:35:10,234
have a shared commitment from both 

948
00:35:10,234 --> 00:35:12,179
nations to ensure that we maintain 

949
00:35:12,179 --> 00:35:14,234
interoperability . Excellent . Thank 

950
00:35:14,234 --> 00:35:16,290
you , Mr Chairman . Thank you . Mr . 

951
00:35:16,290 --> 00:35:18,623
Landerman is recognized for five months . 

952
00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:21,007
Mhm . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I want 

953
00:35:21,007 --> 00:35:23,118
to thank our witnesses for being here 

954
00:35:23,118 --> 00:35:25,210
this morning , Uh , particularly 

955
00:35:25,210 --> 00:35:27,266
general , going above and beyond the 

956
00:35:27,266 --> 00:35:30,070
call being being available at such a 

957
00:35:30,080 --> 00:35:32,560
late hour . But thank you . 

958
00:35:33,640 --> 00:35:36,730
Uh , let me start on a technology 

959
00:35:36,730 --> 00:35:40,410
question . Uh uh . The USS Portland 

960
00:35:40,410 --> 00:35:43,700
will deploy your area of 

961
00:35:43,700 --> 00:35:47,500
operations with a 150 kilowatt laser 

962
00:35:47,500 --> 00:35:49,990
next year , and the Navy is in the 

963
00:35:49,990 --> 00:35:52,790
process of integrating . Uh , it's new 

964
00:35:52,790 --> 00:35:56,670
Helios major system with Egypt's , uh , 

965
00:35:56,680 --> 00:35:59,060
Admiral Davidson . How do you envision 

966
00:35:59,060 --> 00:36:01,171
incorporating these weapons systems ? 

967
00:36:01,171 --> 00:36:03,630
Uh , into your operational concepts ? 

968
00:36:03,640 --> 00:36:06,240
Uh , rules of engagement and , uh , in 

969
00:36:06,240 --> 00:36:08,650
tactical employment considerations , 

970
00:36:10,530 --> 00:36:13,030
Um , directed energy weapons . Uh , 

971
00:36:13,040 --> 00:36:15,151
Congressman , I , I think are the way 

972
00:36:15,151 --> 00:36:18,890
of the future . Um , in in 

973
00:36:18,890 --> 00:36:21,057
my view , the capability that Portland 

974
00:36:21,057 --> 00:36:23,223
is bringing , and then in the future , 

975
00:36:23,223 --> 00:36:25,510
our ability to marry that directed 

976
00:36:25,510 --> 00:36:27,621
energy with the ages . Weapons system 

977
00:36:27,621 --> 00:36:29,510
is really going to help us in our 

978
00:36:29,510 --> 00:36:31,460
terminal defenses , which are so 

979
00:36:31,460 --> 00:36:33,404
critically important because we're 

980
00:36:33,404 --> 00:36:35,460
gonna find over time , um , that are 

981
00:36:35,460 --> 00:36:39,250
need to defend . While , um , 

982
00:36:39,630 --> 00:36:43,350
a network of sensors is going to be 

983
00:36:43,360 --> 00:36:46,620
extremely important going forward to 

984
00:36:46,840 --> 00:36:48,840
project long range fires , whether 

985
00:36:48,840 --> 00:36:51,118
those are offensive or defensive fires , 

986
00:36:51,330 --> 00:36:53,441
um , we are going to have to layer in 

987
00:36:53,441 --> 00:36:55,497
some defensive weapon capabilities . 

988
00:36:55,497 --> 00:36:57,441
And this is where I think Directed 

989
00:36:57,441 --> 00:36:59,663
energy is going to make its entree into 

990
00:36:59,663 --> 00:37:01,997
the joint force . Very encouraged by it . 

991
00:37:01,997 --> 00:37:05,040
Thank you , Adam . Yes , 

992
00:37:07,530 --> 00:37:09,770
the way I am . Technologies , 

993
00:37:11,330 --> 00:37:14,040
as we as we , uh , develop new 

994
00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:16,560
technologies like direct energy . Can 

995
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:19,680
you still get You're kind of breaking 

996
00:37:19,680 --> 00:37:22,080
up a little bit . Take another shot at 

997
00:37:22,080 --> 00:37:25,580
it . Okay , So I was saying that I'm 

998
00:37:25,580 --> 00:37:27,247
concerned . As we develop new 

999
00:37:27,247 --> 00:37:29,247
technologies like directed energy , 

1000
00:37:29,247 --> 00:37:31,302
high level planners won't understand 

1001
00:37:31,302 --> 00:37:33,302
their capabilities and will fail to 

1002
00:37:33,302 --> 00:37:35,580
take advantage of their true potential . 

1003
00:37:35,580 --> 00:37:37,580
So , Admiral Davidson , how are you 

1004
00:37:37,580 --> 00:37:39,469
working to improve your staff and 

1005
00:37:39,469 --> 00:37:41,691
subordinate commanders understanding of 

1006
00:37:41,691 --> 00:37:43,691
these new technologies and how they 

1007
00:37:43,691 --> 00:37:45,802
will be utilized ? Yes , sir . One of 

1008
00:37:45,802 --> 00:37:47,636
the things we did in the Pacific 

1009
00:37:47,636 --> 00:37:49,580
command , uh , was to , you know , 

1010
00:37:49,580 --> 00:37:52,210
create a process for planning and 

1011
00:37:52,210 --> 00:37:55,340
operations collaboration . Um , that 

1012
00:37:55,350 --> 00:37:58,310
pulled on the very narrow set of people 

1013
00:37:58,310 --> 00:38:00,780
that , um , have the highest 

1014
00:38:00,780 --> 00:38:02,670
classifications that address the 

1015
00:38:02,670 --> 00:38:04,448
highest technologies that we're 

1016
00:38:04,448 --> 00:38:06,559
bringing into force to make sure that 

1017
00:38:06,559 --> 00:38:09,650
our future plans are developed In a way , 

1018
00:38:10,020 --> 00:38:13,820
um , that understand those 

1019
00:38:13,830 --> 00:38:16,180
high classification , high technology 

1020
00:38:16,190 --> 00:38:18,980
priorities ? Um , I think that process 

1021
00:38:18,980 --> 00:38:20,800
address mint , um , has been 

1022
00:38:20,800 --> 00:38:22,522
extraordinarily helpful in the 

1023
00:38:22,522 --> 00:38:24,689
headquarters . Um , as we've worked to 

1024
00:38:24,689 --> 00:38:26,800
to work on our , you know , the 

1025
00:38:26,800 --> 00:38:28,930
assignments I get to do contingency 

1026
00:38:28,930 --> 00:38:31,152
planning itself . Um , and I think it's 

1027
00:38:31,152 --> 00:38:33,208
gonna be the wave of the future . At 

1028
00:38:33,208 --> 00:38:35,208
the end of the day , we're going to 

1029
00:38:35,208 --> 00:38:37,319
have to have We're gonna have to have 

1030
00:38:37,319 --> 00:38:38,930
more people understand these 

1031
00:38:38,930 --> 00:38:40,780
technologies at the appropriate 

1032
00:38:40,780 --> 00:38:43,500
classification level . Um , in order to 

1033
00:38:43,510 --> 00:38:45,399
introduce these properly into our 

1034
00:38:45,399 --> 00:38:49,010
planning and ops , I agree with that . 

1035
00:38:49,010 --> 00:38:51,177
I I'm glad you're you're planning well 

1036
00:38:51,177 --> 00:38:53,510
for the future . Um , let me ask one 

1037
00:38:53,510 --> 00:38:55,732
other question . You Admiral Davidson . 

1038
00:38:55,732 --> 00:38:57,788
You know , we're looking at emerging 

1039
00:38:57,788 --> 00:39:00,040
technologies that are peer adversaries 

1040
00:39:00,040 --> 00:39:02,330
are developing . Uh , and what do you 

1041
00:39:02,330 --> 00:39:04,020
believe is the most dangerous 

1042
00:39:04,020 --> 00:39:06,380
technology or capability that's been 

1043
00:39:06,380 --> 00:39:09,020
deployed in your O . R . And what do 

1044
00:39:09,020 --> 00:39:11,131
you think would be the most dangerous 

1045
00:39:11,131 --> 00:39:15,000
in the future ? Well , sir , uh , you 

1046
00:39:15,000 --> 00:39:17,111
know my obligations , you know , have 

1047
00:39:17,111 --> 00:39:18,910
to span a number of potential 

1048
00:39:18,910 --> 00:39:20,966
adversaries as well as the number of 

1049
00:39:20,966 --> 00:39:22,910
threats systems . Uh , I'd be hard 

1050
00:39:22,910 --> 00:39:25,400
pressed to identify , um , one that I 

1051
00:39:25,400 --> 00:39:28,920
can't . You know , I must account for 

1052
00:39:28,920 --> 00:39:30,920
them all somewhat in the current 

1053
00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:33,580
environment , Uh , as we think about 

1054
00:39:33,580 --> 00:39:37,230
the future . Um , uh , the creation 

1055
00:39:37,240 --> 00:39:41,240
and the fielding of hypersonic weapons , 

1056
00:39:41,820 --> 00:39:44,200
the potential ranges that those might 

1057
00:39:44,210 --> 00:39:47,970
affect and influence much wider and 

1058
00:39:47,970 --> 00:39:51,810
wider areas of the globe . Um , I think 

1059
00:39:51,820 --> 00:39:54,000
are really going to challenge , um , 

1060
00:39:54,010 --> 00:39:56,590
our needs to develop , like , offensive 

1061
00:39:56,590 --> 00:39:59,320
capability as well as defensive systems 

1062
00:39:59,320 --> 00:40:03,300
against those . Very good . Thank you , 

1063
00:40:03,300 --> 00:40:05,578
Admiral . As in my time's winding down . 

1064
00:40:05,578 --> 00:40:07,411
So I just thank you all for your 

1065
00:40:07,411 --> 00:40:09,522
service . Uh , and for your testimony 

1066
00:40:09,522 --> 00:40:11,633
here today , forward to our continued 

1067
00:40:11,633 --> 00:40:13,967
work together . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1068
00:40:13,967 --> 00:40:13,580
I'll yield back . Thank you . Mr . 

1069
00:40:13,580 --> 00:40:15,691
Wilson is recognized . Thank you , Mr 

1070
00:40:15,691 --> 00:40:17,858
Chairman . Thank each of you for being 

1071
00:40:17,858 --> 00:40:20,024
here today and in particular . Admiral 

1072
00:40:20,024 --> 00:40:22,247
Davidson , I want to thank you for your 

1073
00:40:22,247 --> 00:40:24,469
recognition of Guam , how strategically 

1074
00:40:24,469 --> 00:40:26,970
located that is and how the citizens 

1075
00:40:26,970 --> 00:40:29,630
there are such patriotic Americans and 

1076
00:40:29,710 --> 00:40:31,599
so proud to serve . They have the 

1077
00:40:31,599 --> 00:40:33,821
highest percentage of membership of the 

1078
00:40:33,821 --> 00:40:35,932
military of any state or territory of 

1079
00:40:35,932 --> 00:40:38,043
the United States . So we have a real 

1080
00:40:38,043 --> 00:40:40,266
asset there that we want to work with , 

1081
00:40:40,266 --> 00:40:42,488
so thank you for your identification of 

1082
00:40:42,488 --> 00:40:44,766
that . Additionally , Secretary Hill V . 

1083
00:40:44,766 --> 00:40:46,988
Recently , I introduced the Foreign and 

1084
00:40:46,988 --> 00:40:48,988
Influence Transparency Act to limit 

1085
00:40:48,988 --> 00:40:50,766
foreign interference within our 

1086
00:40:50,766 --> 00:40:52,599
universities . Many that conduct 

1087
00:40:52,599 --> 00:40:54,488
defense research We know that the 

1088
00:40:54,488 --> 00:40:56,599
People's Republic of China integrates 

1089
00:40:56,599 --> 00:40:59,290
information operations into its its 

1090
00:40:59,290 --> 00:41:01,640
defense posture by way of Confucius 

1091
00:41:01,640 --> 00:41:03,790
institutes . These are extensions of 

1092
00:41:03,790 --> 00:41:05,730
the Chinese government that Human 

1093
00:41:05,730 --> 00:41:07,897
Rights Watch says sensors on political 

1094
00:41:07,897 --> 00:41:09,952
grounds and expects loyalty from its 

1095
00:41:09,952 --> 00:41:12,750
employees . Has d o d . Assessed the 

1096
00:41:12,750 --> 00:41:15,750
risk posed by China's information 

1097
00:41:15,750 --> 00:41:17,917
operations efforts at our universities 

1098
00:41:17,917 --> 00:41:19,750
and the implications for defense 

1099
00:41:19,750 --> 00:41:21,806
research . How can we further assist 

1100
00:41:21,806 --> 00:41:24,710
the OD to confront China's influence in 

1101
00:41:24,710 --> 00:41:28,630
U . S . Academia ? Well , 

1102
00:41:28,640 --> 00:41:30,807
uh , Mr Wilson , thank you . Thank you 

1103
00:41:30,807 --> 00:41:32,973
for that question . And you're right . 

1104
00:41:32,973 --> 00:41:34,751
We are very concerned about the 

1105
00:41:34,751 --> 00:41:36,740
potential for , um , what could be 

1106
00:41:36,740 --> 00:41:39,140
called young , non traditional types of 

1107
00:41:39,150 --> 00:41:41,290
intelligence operations in the United 

1108
00:41:41,290 --> 00:41:43,623
States , and one of which would be , uh , 

1109
00:41:43,623 --> 00:41:45,700
the use of of students sometimes 

1110
00:41:45,700 --> 00:41:48,750
witting or not at our universities and 

1111
00:41:48,750 --> 00:41:51,060
research centers . Uh , So part of what 

1112
00:41:51,060 --> 00:41:53,116
we've tried to do as a department is 

1113
00:41:53,116 --> 00:41:55,171
one to understand the nature of that 

1114
00:41:55,171 --> 00:41:57,449
challenge and threat and to , you know , 

1115
00:41:57,449 --> 00:41:59,671
work with our partners across the inter 

1116
00:41:59,671 --> 00:42:01,670
agency , including domestic law 

1117
00:42:01,670 --> 00:42:03,980
enforcement and , uh , and , uh , to 

1118
00:42:03,980 --> 00:42:07,250
help educate over the nature of of that 

1119
00:42:07,260 --> 00:42:09,560
of that challenge to help educate folks 

1120
00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:12,970
that how China uses some of these tools 

1121
00:42:12,970 --> 00:42:15,192
and instruments to , you know , conduct 

1122
00:42:15,192 --> 00:42:16,914
its influence , operations are 

1123
00:42:16,914 --> 00:42:19,137
conducted intelligence operations . And 

1124
00:42:19,137 --> 00:42:20,859
so part of it has been kind of 

1125
00:42:20,859 --> 00:42:22,914
documenting this and working to make 

1126
00:42:22,914 --> 00:42:25,081
sure that that information is provided 

1127
00:42:25,081 --> 00:42:26,914
so that folks can make their own 

1128
00:42:26,914 --> 00:42:29,026
decisions on whether or not they want 

1129
00:42:29,026 --> 00:42:28,550
to participate in how they want to 

1130
00:42:28,550 --> 00:42:30,550
interact . I think the second thing 

1131
00:42:30,550 --> 00:42:32,730
that we've been able to do is working 

1132
00:42:32,730 --> 00:42:34,940
again with our partners across the 

1133
00:42:34,940 --> 00:42:37,590
inter agency , uh , to work to tighten , 

1134
00:42:37,600 --> 00:42:39,767
tighten the controls . Uh , you know , 

1135
00:42:39,767 --> 00:42:41,544
whether it's export controls or 

1136
00:42:41,544 --> 00:42:44,690
licensing , so that as we identify , uh , 

1137
00:42:44,700 --> 00:42:47,020
entities that could be concerned the 

1138
00:42:47,020 --> 00:42:49,187
entities of concern entities that have 

1139
00:42:49,187 --> 00:42:50,964
an affiliation with the Chinese 

1140
00:42:50,964 --> 00:42:52,687
Communist Party , the People's 

1141
00:42:52,687 --> 00:42:54,798
Liberation Army , that we can provide 

1142
00:42:54,798 --> 00:42:56,909
that information to allow folks to be 

1143
00:42:56,909 --> 00:42:59,131
able to make due diligence decisions on 

1144
00:42:59,131 --> 00:42:58,960
how they engage with them . So , for 

1145
00:42:58,960 --> 00:43:00,960
example , we started to publish the 

1146
00:43:00,960 --> 00:43:04,310
list of entities associated with the so 

1147
00:43:04,310 --> 00:43:06,366
called the 12 37 report , which goes 

1148
00:43:06,366 --> 00:43:08,520
back to a piece of legislation that 

1149
00:43:08,520 --> 00:43:10,990
Congress passed to identify Chinese 

1150
00:43:11,000 --> 00:43:13,330
military companies and affiliated 

1151
00:43:13,330 --> 00:43:15,441
companies . You know , the Department 

1152
00:43:15,441 --> 00:43:17,386
of Defense has a responsibility to 

1153
00:43:17,386 --> 00:43:19,552
produce that we are producing that and 

1154
00:43:19,552 --> 00:43:21,274
that serves , we think , as an 

1155
00:43:21,274 --> 00:43:23,441
important tool to help our partners in 

1156
00:43:23,441 --> 00:43:25,719
the inter agency , but also , you know , 

1157
00:43:25,719 --> 00:43:27,830
private private citizens and entities 

1158
00:43:27,830 --> 00:43:29,830
to be able to make decisions on how 

1159
00:43:29,830 --> 00:43:31,830
they want to engage with these with 

1160
00:43:31,830 --> 00:43:34,108
these organizations and outfits . Well , 

1161
00:43:34,108 --> 00:43:34,090
thank you for being proactive . And I'm 

1162
00:43:34,090 --> 00:43:36,257
really grateful that the University of 

1163
00:43:36,257 --> 00:43:38,201
South Carolina led by General uh , 

1164
00:43:38,201 --> 00:43:39,923
President Bob Castle in former 

1165
00:43:39,923 --> 00:43:41,923
superintendent of West Point , uh , 

1166
00:43:41,923 --> 00:43:44,270
they've taken the effort to remove the 

1167
00:43:44,270 --> 00:43:46,780
Confucius Institutes . Uh , and , uh , 

1168
00:43:46,790 --> 00:43:48,880
this and so we need other college 

1169
00:43:48,880 --> 00:43:51,400
university to show equal courage . 

1170
00:43:51,410 --> 00:43:53,750
Additionally , General Abrams , I'm 

1171
00:43:53,750 --> 00:43:55,472
encouraged by the agreement in 

1172
00:43:55,472 --> 00:43:57,694
principle between the United States and 

1173
00:43:57,694 --> 00:43:59,861
Korea , South Korea , and that is with 

1174
00:43:59,861 --> 00:44:02,083
the agreement as a meaningful deterrent 

1175
00:44:02,083 --> 00:44:04,530
to malign actors as well as a symbol of 

1176
00:44:04,530 --> 00:44:06,586
our continued peace through strength 

1177
00:44:06,586 --> 00:44:08,586
with our courageous Korean allies , 

1178
00:44:08,586 --> 00:44:10,808
given the changing security environment 

1179
00:44:10,808 --> 00:44:12,919
presented by emboldened China , where 

1180
00:44:12,919 --> 00:44:14,808
the steps being taken for a joint 

1181
00:44:14,808 --> 00:44:16,610
strategy against the DPRK . 

1182
00:44:22,990 --> 00:44:26,320
Uh , congressman , um , as you're well 

1183
00:44:26,320 --> 00:44:28,264
aware , uh , so it's really on two 

1184
00:44:28,264 --> 00:44:30,710
levels . The first level , um , on the 

1185
00:44:30,710 --> 00:44:34,470
military side , all of our planning 

1186
00:44:34,680 --> 00:44:36,736
to deal with any sort of contingency 

1187
00:44:36,736 --> 00:44:38,736
here on the Korean Peninsula . Um , 

1188
00:44:38,736 --> 00:44:40,513
that is governed by an alliance 

1189
00:44:40,890 --> 00:44:43,840
decision making process alliance to 

1190
00:44:43,850 --> 00:44:45,961
produce strategic planning , guidance 

1191
00:44:45,961 --> 00:44:48,072
and strategic planning directive that 

1192
00:44:48,072 --> 00:44:50,350
drives all of our operational planning . 

1193
00:44:50,350 --> 00:44:52,920
And , uh , and that is at the center of 

1194
00:44:52,920 --> 00:44:55,950
our military alliance operations . Um , 

1195
00:44:55,960 --> 00:44:58,410
on a broader scale in terms of the 

1196
00:44:58,410 --> 00:45:01,120
strategy , Um , I would defer to Mr 

1197
00:45:01,120 --> 00:45:03,064
Healthy , but this is all part and 

1198
00:45:03,064 --> 00:45:05,500
parcel of the North Korea policy Review 

1199
00:45:05,510 --> 00:45:07,800
that was directed by President Biden . 

1200
00:45:07,810 --> 00:45:10,910
That review is ongoing , and as you 

1201
00:45:10,920 --> 00:45:12,809
probably are aware , um , they're 

1202
00:45:12,809 --> 00:45:15,031
firmly committed to ensuring that there 

1203
00:45:15,031 --> 00:45:17,253
is proper and adequate consultation and 

1204
00:45:17,253 --> 00:45:19,420
close coordination with the government 

1205
00:45:19,420 --> 00:45:21,642
interrupting . General Gentleman's time 

1206
00:45:21,642 --> 00:45:23,864
has expired . We got a lot of people to 

1207
00:45:23,864 --> 00:45:25,976
get to , so I gotta I gotta get on to 

1208
00:45:25,976 --> 00:45:28,142
the next member is recognized for five 

1209
00:45:28,142 --> 00:45:30,420
minutes . Thank you , Admiral Davidson . 

1210
00:45:30,420 --> 00:45:33,720
Welcome . And , uh , up here . Ah , can 

1211
00:45:33,720 --> 00:45:37,500
you discuss in brief how us and open 

1212
00:45:37,500 --> 00:45:41,310
com will utilize and reposition so calm 

1213
00:45:41,690 --> 00:45:45,410
forces as part of the PD ? 

1214
00:45:45,890 --> 00:45:49,570
It's an issue of the use of socom in 

1215
00:45:49,570 --> 00:45:51,760
the great power competition spear and 

1216
00:45:51,760 --> 00:45:53,927
wonder If you had some comments on how 

1217
00:45:53,927 --> 00:45:56,760
you envision that , I'll leave some of 

1218
00:45:56,760 --> 00:45:59,093
the specifics to the classified hearing , 

1219
00:45:59,093 --> 00:46:01,540
sir . But , you know , broadly , um , 

1220
00:46:01,550 --> 00:46:04,180
special operations forces , um , 

1221
00:46:04,190 --> 00:46:06,301
special operation command and support 

1222
00:46:06,301 --> 00:46:08,190
of our efforts . You know , their 

1223
00:46:08,190 --> 00:46:10,300
traditional missions are in , um , 

1224
00:46:11,480 --> 00:46:14,180
building partner capacity building 

1225
00:46:14,180 --> 00:46:16,640
relationships with other nations in 

1226
00:46:16,640 --> 00:46:18,950
peacetime , Uh , in a non kinetic 

1227
00:46:18,950 --> 00:46:21,090
environment . Um , there is a lot of 

1228
00:46:21,090 --> 00:46:23,380
opportunity to do that across the whole 

1229
00:46:23,390 --> 00:46:25,557
of the Indo Pacific region . I've been 

1230
00:46:25,557 --> 00:46:27,612
quite pleased with the way sock pack 

1231
00:46:27,612 --> 00:46:31,350
has adapted . Um uh , in the 

1232
00:46:31,350 --> 00:46:33,406
region , um , providing , you know , 

1233
00:46:33,406 --> 00:46:36,170
small elements of teams to help build 

1234
00:46:36,170 --> 00:46:38,790
those partnerships with other nations . 

1235
00:46:39,180 --> 00:46:41,347
But I'll talk to some of the specifics 

1236
00:46:41,347 --> 00:46:43,680
and classified here . Great . Thank you , 

1237
00:46:43,680 --> 00:46:45,847
Mr Healthy . Welcome . Welcome back as 

1238
00:46:45,847 --> 00:46:49,390
well . Um , many of the 

1239
00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:51,970
nations that both listed in your we'll 

1240
00:46:51,980 --> 00:46:54,147
talk about in your testimony listed in 

1241
00:46:54,147 --> 00:46:56,430
Admiral Davidson's testimony , Um , are 

1242
00:46:56,430 --> 00:46:58,652
great supporters of the United States . 

1243
00:46:58,652 --> 00:47:00,708
However , there is a feeling in that 

1244
00:47:00,708 --> 00:47:02,930
region . And I think Prime Minister Lee 

1245
00:47:02,930 --> 00:47:05,263
of Singapore mentioned this is the last , 

1246
00:47:05,263 --> 00:47:07,319
the last Shangri La dialogue that we 

1247
00:47:07,319 --> 00:47:10,090
could go to . Uh , you didn't say this 

1248
00:47:10,090 --> 00:47:12,312
way , but the theme was , Don't make us 

1249
00:47:12,312 --> 00:47:15,240
choose . And so I'm wondering how the 

1250
00:47:15,250 --> 00:47:18,800
department defense is managing that 

1251
00:47:19,480 --> 00:47:21,647
that feeling in the region about don't 

1252
00:47:21,647 --> 00:47:23,980
make us choose between the US and China , 

1253
00:47:23,980 --> 00:47:26,036
although from testimony , looks like 

1254
00:47:26,036 --> 00:47:28,260
they've chosen . Um , But how do you 

1255
00:47:28,270 --> 00:47:30,880
How do you manage that ? Um , attitude 

1256
00:47:30,880 --> 00:47:33,047
among some of the countries that would 

1257
00:47:33,047 --> 00:47:36,300
like to see more support out of , uh , 

1258
00:47:36,310 --> 00:47:38,366
Well , thank you , Mr Larson . And , 

1259
00:47:38,366 --> 00:47:40,366
you know , first and foremost , you 

1260
00:47:40,366 --> 00:47:42,588
know , you're you're right to point out 

1261
00:47:42,588 --> 00:47:44,754
our ally , our allies and our partners 

1262
00:47:44,754 --> 00:47:47,088
are critical asset to the United States , 

1263
00:47:47,088 --> 00:47:49,088
and it creates an advantage that we 

1264
00:47:49,088 --> 00:47:51,370
have that our adversaries can cannot 

1265
00:47:51,370 --> 00:47:53,710
hope to manage , cannot hope to match . 

1266
00:47:54,080 --> 00:47:57,030
Um uh , and we have taken on board and 

1267
00:47:57,030 --> 00:47:59,280
understand concerns from the region . 

1268
00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:01,447
We've heard it very clearly . Uh , you 

1269
00:48:01,447 --> 00:48:03,502
know , don't make us choose . That's 

1270
00:48:03,502 --> 00:48:05,690
been a consistent refrain , and the 

1271
00:48:05,690 --> 00:48:07,740
reality is that we're not asking 

1272
00:48:07,750 --> 00:48:09,806
nations to choose between the United 

1273
00:48:09,806 --> 00:48:12,210
States or China . In fact , we we 

1274
00:48:12,210 --> 00:48:14,100
welcome and encourage all nations 

1275
00:48:14,100 --> 00:48:16,840
across the end of Pacific to maintain 

1276
00:48:16,850 --> 00:48:20,170
peaceful , uh , productive relations 

1277
00:48:20,170 --> 00:48:22,170
with all of their neighbors . China 

1278
00:48:22,170 --> 00:48:24,840
included , uh , framing the strategic 

1279
00:48:24,850 --> 00:48:26,970
competition that we find ourselves in 

1280
00:48:26,970 --> 00:48:30,730
with China as a as a choice between 

1281
00:48:30,740 --> 00:48:32,950
us or China or as a choice between 

1282
00:48:32,950 --> 00:48:35,117
nations . Yeah , it was really a false 

1283
00:48:35,117 --> 00:48:38,380
choice . The choice that our allies and 

1284
00:48:38,390 --> 00:48:40,390
partners and everyone in the region 

1285
00:48:40,390 --> 00:48:42,168
faces is between supporting the 

1286
00:48:42,168 --> 00:48:44,870
existing international order , the 

1287
00:48:44,870 --> 00:48:47,080
existing system that's free and open . 

1288
00:48:47,470 --> 00:48:49,359
It's the system that we helped to 

1289
00:48:49,359 --> 00:48:51,581
create that we've supported and that we 

1290
00:48:51,581 --> 00:48:53,748
believe has benefited everybody in the 

1291
00:48:53,748 --> 00:48:55,692
region , including in particular , 

1292
00:48:55,692 --> 00:48:58,360
including China , uh , and the 

1293
00:48:58,360 --> 00:49:00,027
alternative now that China is 

1294
00:49:00,027 --> 00:49:02,760
presenting , which is a closed system 

1295
00:49:02,760 --> 00:49:04,704
in a more authoritarian governance 

1296
00:49:04,704 --> 00:49:07,410
model . So it's a it's a competition 

1297
00:49:07,410 --> 00:49:09,410
between systems , and it's a choice 

1298
00:49:09,410 --> 00:49:11,820
between systems . Do you want to choose 

1299
00:49:12,030 --> 00:49:14,252
a free and open system , or do you want 

1300
00:49:14,252 --> 00:49:16,363
to choose a closed , an authoritarian 

1301
00:49:16,363 --> 00:49:18,130
one ? And so we're only asking 

1302
00:49:18,140 --> 00:49:20,800
countries to do their part , uh , to 

1303
00:49:20,800 --> 00:49:23,570
uphold , uh , the international laws , 

1304
00:49:23,570 --> 00:49:26,420
rules and norms which support their 

1305
00:49:26,420 --> 00:49:28,642
interests , which they benefited from , 

1306
00:49:28,642 --> 00:49:30,531
Uh , and it helped to provide for 

1307
00:49:30,531 --> 00:49:32,753
security and prosperity for all of us . 

1308
00:49:32,753 --> 00:49:34,698
Uh , so that's that's the ask that 

1309
00:49:34,698 --> 00:49:36,809
we've got our allies , our partners , 

1310
00:49:36,809 --> 00:49:38,864
thanks . Probably more . And I would 

1311
00:49:38,864 --> 00:49:40,809
know I would also know China . The 

1312
00:49:40,809 --> 00:49:43,031
Chinese government makes it really easy 

1313
00:49:43,031 --> 00:49:45,530
for some countries as well to to choose 

1314
00:49:45,540 --> 00:49:49,430
free and open world order . Uh , 

1315
00:49:49,440 --> 00:49:52,100
General Abrams , the last time I was in 

1316
00:49:52,100 --> 00:49:54,156
Korea , which , which is about seems 

1317
00:49:54,156 --> 00:49:57,390
like four million years ago , um , we 

1318
00:49:57,390 --> 00:50:00,110
talked about training exercises , and I 

1319
00:50:00,120 --> 00:50:02,370
think my question to you was if things 

1320
00:50:02,370 --> 00:50:04,426
didn't go well with the negotiations 

1321
00:50:04,426 --> 00:50:06,426
between the United States and North 

1322
00:50:06,426 --> 00:50:09,830
Korea , would we re up the reinvigorate ? 

1323
00:50:09,830 --> 00:50:11,941
The training exercises ? Can you tell 

1324
00:50:11,941 --> 00:50:13,997
us where things sit with that ? With 

1325
00:50:13,997 --> 00:50:16,052
between the U . S . F . K and rock ? 

1326
00:50:16,052 --> 00:50:17,997
And sadly , you have 12 seconds to 

1327
00:50:17,997 --> 00:50:20,390
answer that question . That's what 

1328
00:50:20,390 --> 00:50:22,279
members . That's what members are 

1329
00:50:22,279 --> 00:50:24,057
interfering with my time . Mr . 

1330
00:50:24,057 --> 00:50:27,840
Chairman . Go ahead , Sir . Congressman , 

1331
00:50:27,840 --> 00:50:31,420
I'll tell I'll provide your office . Uh , 

1332
00:50:31,430 --> 00:50:33,610
an appropriate response . That , uh , 

1333
00:50:33,620 --> 00:50:36,350
that is necessary . Um but I'll go back 

1334
00:50:36,350 --> 00:50:38,572
to my opening comments . Uh , we have a 

1335
00:50:38,572 --> 00:50:40,683
trained and ready forces are Training 

1336
00:50:40,683 --> 00:50:43,430
has continued . Thank you . Thank you . 

1337
00:50:43,440 --> 00:50:45,640
Mr . Turner is recognized for five 

1338
00:50:45,640 --> 00:50:48,770
minutes . Mr . Chairman , General 

1339
00:50:48,770 --> 00:50:50,881
Abrams appreciated the opportunity to 

1340
00:50:50,881 --> 00:50:53,840
talk to you last week . Um , I 

1341
00:50:53,840 --> 00:50:57,390
understand , um , that when we were 

1342
00:50:57,390 --> 00:51:00,000
talking about the issue of the impact 

1343
00:51:00,010 --> 00:51:02,360
of covid There's a great deal of 

1344
00:51:02,360 --> 00:51:05,320
concern as to how our foreign based 

1345
00:51:05,320 --> 00:51:07,153
personnel and their families are 

1346
00:51:07,153 --> 00:51:09,209
receiving the vaccination . This was 

1347
00:51:09,209 --> 00:51:11,264
undertaken as a federal program warp 

1348
00:51:11,264 --> 00:51:13,431
speed and certainly are protecting our 

1349
00:51:13,431 --> 00:51:15,153
service members should be of a 

1350
00:51:15,153 --> 00:51:17,376
incredible high priority . I understand 

1351
00:51:17,376 --> 00:51:19,598
you have about 65,000 service members , 

1352
00:51:19,598 --> 00:51:21,542
family civilians , contractors and 

1353
00:51:21,542 --> 00:51:23,709
retirees . They don't have the ability 

1354
00:51:23,709 --> 00:51:25,764
to go off base , as you do in United 

1355
00:51:25,764 --> 00:51:27,764
States . If you're in another state 

1356
00:51:27,764 --> 00:51:29,876
that has a program , you could go and 

1357
00:51:29,876 --> 00:51:29,400
participate in that program . So 

1358
00:51:29,400 --> 00:51:31,540
they're reliant on your ability to 

1359
00:51:31,540 --> 00:51:34,990
deliver the vaccine . There's a 75% 

1360
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:38,640
take rate in vaccination and 

1361
00:51:38,790 --> 00:51:42,210
the Could you please tell us about the 

1362
00:51:42,210 --> 00:51:44,321
availability of vaccine , what you're 

1363
00:51:44,321 --> 00:51:46,377
receiving . Excuse me , guys . Hey , 

1364
00:51:46,377 --> 00:51:49,690
guys . Um , could you please tell us 

1365
00:51:49,700 --> 00:51:51,533
about the number of vaccines are 

1366
00:51:51,533 --> 00:51:54,230
receiving how few they are and how your 

1367
00:51:54,230 --> 00:51:55,280
increased need . 

1368
00:52:00,450 --> 00:52:02,617
And they have muted you . I think it's 

1369
00:52:02,617 --> 00:52:06,170
that I think it's the deep state . OK , 

1370
00:52:06,180 --> 00:52:08,180
Congressman , can you hear me now ? 

1371
00:52:08,180 --> 00:52:10,560
Thank you . Um , uh , thanks for the 

1372
00:52:10,560 --> 00:52:13,290
question . And , uh um , since you and 

1373
00:52:13,290 --> 00:52:16,930
I last spoke , uh , I'm happy to 

1374
00:52:16,930 --> 00:52:19,780
report , uh , that we recently received 

1375
00:52:19,790 --> 00:52:22,700
un forecasted 9700 doses of the Johnson 

1376
00:52:22,700 --> 00:52:24,840
and Johnson vaccine , which will go a 

1377
00:52:24,840 --> 00:52:28,420
long way towards being able to give 

1378
00:52:28,420 --> 00:52:31,770
the immunizations , um , to our 

1379
00:52:31,770 --> 00:52:34,760
beneficiaries . Uh , but but your your 

1380
00:52:34,760 --> 00:52:37,260
broader point , Um , we're following 

1381
00:52:37,260 --> 00:52:40,600
the Department of Defense schema . And 

1382
00:52:40,600 --> 00:52:43,970
as you stated , my concern is is that , 

1383
00:52:43,980 --> 00:52:46,147
you know , for our large course of our 

1384
00:52:46,147 --> 00:52:48,200
healthy military force , but it's 

1385
00:52:48,200 --> 00:52:50,780
really are non military beneficiaries . 

1386
00:52:50,790 --> 00:52:53,000
So we have retirees . We have family 

1387
00:52:53,000 --> 00:52:55,260
members , uh , et cetera , who are 

1388
00:52:55,260 --> 00:52:58,430
affiliated as part of that 65,000 . Um , 

1389
00:52:58,440 --> 00:53:01,070
I am concerned about the continued 

1390
00:53:01,070 --> 00:53:03,181
availability . We've got a great push 

1391
00:53:03,181 --> 00:53:05,348
right now . Um , but we have We've got 

1392
00:53:05,348 --> 00:53:07,500
some concerns going forward to ensure 

1393
00:53:07,510 --> 00:53:10,010
that our family members and others , um , 

1394
00:53:10,020 --> 00:53:12,750
have the access to the vaccine 

1395
00:53:12,760 --> 00:53:14,649
commensurate with their stateside 

1396
00:53:14,649 --> 00:53:16,760
counterparts . Certainly . And Also , 

1397
00:53:16,760 --> 00:53:18,649
as we all know , that Johnson and 

1398
00:53:18,649 --> 00:53:20,816
Johnson vaccine is not as effective as 

1399
00:53:20,816 --> 00:53:22,871
the as the others . So we're sort of 

1400
00:53:22,871 --> 00:53:22,690
downgrading . As chairman , I'd love to 

1401
00:53:22,690 --> 00:53:24,634
join with you on an inquiry on the 

1402
00:53:24,634 --> 00:53:27,220
issue of how What is our plans for our 

1403
00:53:27,230 --> 00:53:29,286
foreign based personnel ? Because it 

1404
00:53:29,286 --> 00:53:31,230
does sound that we're like , we're 

1405
00:53:31,230 --> 00:53:33,341
shorting them . Uh , General Abrams , 

1406
00:53:33,341 --> 00:53:35,286
um , as you're aware , we had land 

1407
00:53:35,286 --> 00:53:37,640
based tactical nuclear weapons on the 

1408
00:53:37,640 --> 00:53:40,040
southern on the nuclear Excuse me , 

1409
00:53:40,040 --> 00:53:42,096
North Korea Peninsula in South Korea 

1410
00:53:42,096 --> 00:53:44,940
for over decades . Uh , George Herbert 

1411
00:53:44,940 --> 00:53:47,250
Walker . Bush pulled them out in 1991 . 

1412
00:53:47,260 --> 00:53:49,149
Uh , I think you know , certainly 

1413
00:53:49,149 --> 00:53:50,940
That's a great illustration of 

1414
00:53:50,940 --> 00:53:53,030
rebutting the philosophy of if we 

1415
00:53:53,030 --> 00:53:54,974
denuclearize , others won't pursue 

1416
00:53:54,974 --> 00:53:57,030
nuclear weapons . Because now you're 

1417
00:53:57,030 --> 00:53:58,863
facing and nuclear North Korea , 

1418
00:53:58,863 --> 00:54:00,974
they're moving to solid propellants , 

1419
00:54:00,974 --> 00:54:02,460
greater accuracy , uh , 

1420
00:54:02,470 --> 00:54:03,970
intercontinental ballistic 

1421
00:54:03,970 --> 00:54:05,970
intercontinental ballistic missiles 

1422
00:54:05,970 --> 00:54:08,081
that affect the United States , and , 

1423
00:54:08,081 --> 00:54:10,081
of course , sub based . What do you 

1424
00:54:10,081 --> 00:54:12,192
need ? And what is your assessment of 

1425
00:54:12,192 --> 00:54:14,414
the missile defence Priorities . As you 

1426
00:54:14,414 --> 00:54:16,526
look to what you're facing from North 

1427
00:54:16,526 --> 00:54:20,070
Korea . Uh , congressman , we have We 

1428
00:54:20,070 --> 00:54:22,710
have a very robust combined capability 

1429
00:54:22,710 --> 00:54:24,766
between the rock and the U . S . Air 

1430
00:54:24,766 --> 00:54:27,170
and missile defense forces . Um , and 

1431
00:54:27,170 --> 00:54:28,837
we've been the beneficiary of 

1432
00:54:28,837 --> 00:54:30,670
congressional support of a joint 

1433
00:54:30,670 --> 00:54:32,670
urgency operational needs statement 

1434
00:54:32,670 --> 00:54:34,892
from a couple of years ago . M B A . Is 

1435
00:54:34,892 --> 00:54:36,726
in the process of fielding three 

1436
00:54:36,726 --> 00:54:38,781
specific capabilities . Ones already 

1437
00:54:38,781 --> 00:54:41,003
here . The other two will come on board 

1438
00:54:41,003 --> 00:54:42,940
this year that will significantly 

1439
00:54:42,950 --> 00:54:45,660
enhance our ballistic missile defense . 

1440
00:54:47,940 --> 00:54:50,540
Admiral Davidson , the F 35 . Tell us 

1441
00:54:50,540 --> 00:54:52,590
how critical it is to your overall 

1442
00:54:52,590 --> 00:54:55,560
planning and , uh , defense . And as 

1443
00:54:55,560 --> 00:54:57,616
you look at what the capabilities of 

1444
00:54:57,616 --> 00:54:59,838
our adversaries in the area , and maybe 

1445
00:54:59,838 --> 00:55:02,004
or that they're developing , um , what 

1446
00:55:02,004 --> 00:55:05,950
the F 30 five's role would be Thank 

1447
00:55:05,950 --> 00:55:07,950
you very much , Congressman , uh , 

1448
00:55:07,960 --> 00:55:10,960
fifth gen fighters the F 35 in the F 22 

1449
00:55:10,960 --> 00:55:14,840
r critical to any future war fight . We 

1450
00:55:14,850 --> 00:55:17,660
we might have , uh , in the theater . 

1451
00:55:18,040 --> 00:55:21,690
Um , our adversaries are developing 

1452
00:55:21,700 --> 00:55:23,940
our fielding already fifth , gen 

1453
00:55:23,940 --> 00:55:27,440
fighters themselves and and we know 

1454
00:55:27,450 --> 00:55:30,370
from our own gaming and emulations that 

1455
00:55:30,370 --> 00:55:33,040
fifth gen fighters are actually a game 

1456
00:55:33,040 --> 00:55:36,740
changer . Um , in the war fight , um , 

1457
00:55:36,750 --> 00:55:39,030
to go backwards , uh , into fourth 

1458
00:55:39,030 --> 00:55:41,252
generation capability as a substitute . 

1459
00:55:41,252 --> 00:55:43,860
Broadly , um , would be a mistake in my 

1460
00:55:43,860 --> 00:55:46,420
view , uh , and would actually put us 

1461
00:55:46,430 --> 00:55:48,990
at a severe disadvantage over the over 

1462
00:55:48,990 --> 00:55:51,360
the course of this decade . And again , 

1463
00:55:51,360 --> 00:55:53,638
I must have when it comes to apologize , 

1464
00:55:53,638 --> 00:55:55,971
Admiral for interactive . The gentlemen . 

1465
00:55:55,971 --> 00:55:58,082
Thank you . Admiral has expired . And 

1466
00:55:58,082 --> 00:55:59,916
Mr Cooper is recognized for five 

1467
00:55:59,916 --> 00:56:01,916
minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman , 

1468
00:56:01,916 --> 00:56:04,027
because I'm going to ask my questions 

1469
00:56:04,027 --> 00:56:06,027
in the classified session . I would 

1470
00:56:06,027 --> 00:56:05,870
like to yield my time now to Mr 

1471
00:56:05,870 --> 00:56:09,830
Courtney . Thank you , Mr Cooper . 

1472
00:56:09,840 --> 00:56:11,784
Thank you . To the witnesses . And 

1473
00:56:11,784 --> 00:56:13,673
again , General Abrams and , uh , 

1474
00:56:13,673 --> 00:56:15,784
Admiral Davidson . Thank you for your 

1475
00:56:15,784 --> 00:56:18,062
great tours of duty at a critical time . 

1476
00:56:18,062 --> 00:56:21,290
Um , Admiral Davidson on page 35 of 

1477
00:56:21,290 --> 00:56:24,020
your testimony , you set forth China's , 

1478
00:56:24,030 --> 00:56:26,720
um , sort of brazen , repeated 

1479
00:56:26,720 --> 00:56:28,942
violations of the Law of the Sea Treaty 

1480
00:56:29,030 --> 00:56:31,920
and mentioned the fact that 80 South 

1481
00:56:31,920 --> 00:56:33,864
China Sea Geographic features were 

1482
00:56:33,864 --> 00:56:37,040
renamed with , I guess Chinese names . 

1483
00:56:37,430 --> 00:56:39,541
Can you flush that out a little bit ? 

1484
00:56:39,541 --> 00:56:41,541
What ? That means in terms of , you 

1485
00:56:41,541 --> 00:56:45,140
know , maritime territorial claims and 

1486
00:56:45,150 --> 00:56:47,039
the impact in terms of freedom of 

1487
00:56:47,039 --> 00:56:50,110
navigation . Well , the Chinese are 

1488
00:56:50,110 --> 00:56:53,620
trying to , um , basically impose 

1489
00:56:53,620 --> 00:56:55,176
Chinese national law on the 

1490
00:56:55,176 --> 00:56:57,580
international regime . Um , that 

1491
00:56:57,590 --> 00:56:59,900
provides for the freedom of navigation 

1492
00:56:59,900 --> 00:57:02,720
and freedom of the seas . Um , we've 

1493
00:57:02,730 --> 00:57:05,320
spoken quite a bit about the Chinese 

1494
00:57:05,320 --> 00:57:08,660
use of law . Fair . Um , this is , uh , 

1495
00:57:08,670 --> 00:57:10,837
you know , one of the methodologies in 

1496
00:57:10,837 --> 00:57:13,330
which they do it ? Um , it's not just 

1497
00:57:13,340 --> 00:57:17,180
the naming or renaming of features 

1498
00:57:17,190 --> 00:57:19,520
that have had longstanding names in the 

1499
00:57:19,520 --> 00:57:21,920
region . It's the redefinition of what 

1500
00:57:21,920 --> 00:57:24,230
they might be because , you know , 

1501
00:57:24,240 --> 00:57:26,790
rocks is slits . Islands All have very 

1502
00:57:26,790 --> 00:57:30,400
specific , uh , navigational rights 

1503
00:57:30,410 --> 00:57:32,810
associated with them , as well as their 

1504
00:57:32,810 --> 00:57:35,120
continued militarization of the 

1505
00:57:35,120 --> 00:57:37,250
features that they built out early in 

1506
00:57:37,250 --> 00:57:39,510
the last decade . Um , there , 

1507
00:57:39,510 --> 00:57:42,460
continued militarization is to is to 

1508
00:57:43,030 --> 00:57:45,190
frankly deterred not only the United 

1509
00:57:45,190 --> 00:57:48,900
States , but truly cow all 

1510
00:57:48,910 --> 00:57:51,340
of our allies and partners in the 

1511
00:57:51,340 --> 00:57:53,396
region and certainly the South China 

1512
00:57:53,396 --> 00:57:55,396
Sea claimants from their from their 

1513
00:57:55,396 --> 00:57:58,370
absolute rights to operate and , uh , 

1514
00:57:58,380 --> 00:58:00,550
those rights that they enjoy for for 

1515
00:58:00,550 --> 00:58:03,200
economic resource , extraction , of 

1516
00:58:03,210 --> 00:58:05,266
freedom of the seas , freedom of the 

1517
00:58:05,266 --> 00:58:07,432
airways , et cetera . Well , thank you 

1518
00:58:07,432 --> 00:58:09,488
for that answer . Because again , as 

1519
00:58:09,488 --> 00:58:11,599
you point out , this isn't just about 

1520
00:58:11,599 --> 00:58:13,821
sort of names . It's also about sort of 

1521
00:58:13,821 --> 00:58:15,988
territorial claims and what that means 

1522
00:58:15,988 --> 00:58:18,210
to the rules based system that has been 

1523
00:58:18,210 --> 00:58:20,377
so successful over the last 75 years . 

1524
00:58:20,377 --> 00:58:22,599
Your predecessor Admiral Harris back in 

1525
00:58:22,599 --> 00:58:24,821
2015 when he was asked about whether or 

1526
00:58:24,821 --> 00:58:27,350
not the U . S should participate as a 

1527
00:58:27,350 --> 00:58:30,680
full ratified country in terms of , um , 

1528
00:58:30,680 --> 00:58:33,550
class was pretty forthright in terms of 

1529
00:58:33,550 --> 00:58:35,772
saying that . And I'm quoting , I think 

1530
00:58:35,772 --> 00:58:37,828
that in the 21st century , our moral 

1531
00:58:37,828 --> 00:58:39,939
standing is affected by the fact that 

1532
00:58:39,939 --> 00:58:41,883
we're not a signatory to to , um , 

1533
00:58:41,883 --> 00:58:44,050
class . Can you state in your military 

1534
00:58:44,050 --> 00:58:45,939
opinion is in terms of whether we 

1535
00:58:45,939 --> 00:58:47,940
should become a full signatory and 

1536
00:58:47,940 --> 00:58:50,051
whether you agree with Admiral Harris 

1537
00:58:50,051 --> 00:58:52,480
Uh , statement . Yes , sir . I agree . 

1538
00:58:52,480 --> 00:58:54,036
I'm I'm on the record at my 

1539
00:58:54,036 --> 00:58:56,258
confirmation hearing that I think being 

1540
00:58:56,258 --> 00:58:58,424
a signatory is important and I haven't 

1541
00:58:58,424 --> 00:59:00,536
changed my mind at all . Well , thank 

1542
00:59:00,536 --> 00:59:02,647
you for that answer . Because again , 

1543
00:59:02,647 --> 00:59:04,702
the Seapower subcommittee is working 

1544
00:59:04,702 --> 00:59:04,520
with the Foreign Affairs Committee to 

1545
00:59:04,520 --> 00:59:06,742
try and do a joint hearing to to really 

1546
00:59:06,742 --> 00:59:09,920
elevate this issue . Back when Admiral 

1547
00:59:09,920 --> 00:59:12,031
Harris was testifying . That was when 

1548
00:59:12,031 --> 00:59:14,142
the Philippines had the claim against 

1549
00:59:14,142 --> 00:59:16,364
China , which , as you know , The Hague 

1550
00:59:16,364 --> 00:59:19,550
ruled unanimously in favor of the 

1551
00:59:19,550 --> 00:59:22,440
Philippines . The US tried to even get 

1552
00:59:22,440 --> 00:59:24,496
observer status in that proceeding . 

1553
00:59:24,496 --> 00:59:26,384
They obviously couldn't get party 

1554
00:59:26,384 --> 00:59:28,607
status as not a signatory . But again , 

1555
00:59:28,607 --> 00:59:30,773
we were denied observer status and had 

1556
00:59:30,773 --> 00:59:32,940
to rely on Australia to kind of be our 

1557
00:59:32,940 --> 00:59:34,884
legal aid lawyer , uh , to sort of 

1558
00:59:34,884 --> 00:59:37,107
represent our interests . So , um , you 

1559
00:59:37,107 --> 00:59:39,107
know , it's really , you know , way 

1560
00:59:39,107 --> 00:59:41,860
past time for us to become a full 

1561
00:59:41,860 --> 00:59:45,470
participant . Um , also on page 

1562
00:59:45,470 --> 00:59:48,390
35 . Excuse me , 32 of your testimony . 

1563
00:59:48,390 --> 00:59:51,330
You noted the fact that in 2020 China 

1564
00:59:51,720 --> 00:59:54,990
Commission 25 major warships , 

1565
00:59:55,520 --> 00:59:59,320
which is kind of a stunning factoid in 

1566
00:59:59,320 --> 01:00:02,390
terms of the middle of a pandemic , 

1567
01:00:02,400 --> 01:00:04,460
that they would be able to turn out 

1568
01:00:04,470 --> 01:00:07,250
those I would just remind my colleagues , 

1569
01:00:07,260 --> 01:00:09,593
you know , you're just about a year ago , 

1570
01:00:09,593 --> 01:00:11,316
we got a budget from the prior 

1571
01:00:11,316 --> 01:00:13,538
administration , which cut shipbuilding 

1572
01:00:13,538 --> 01:00:17,210
by 18% . It was seven ships 

1573
01:00:17,220 --> 01:00:19,053
in the budget , according to the 

1574
01:00:19,053 --> 01:00:21,276
Congressional Research Service , two of 

1575
01:00:21,276 --> 01:00:23,164
which are tugboats again , we did 

1576
01:00:23,164 --> 01:00:25,109
Yeoman's work in this committee to 

1577
01:00:25,109 --> 01:00:27,109
backfill those cuts , and I want to 

1578
01:00:27,109 --> 01:00:29,331
publicly thank you , Admiral Davidson , 

1579
01:00:29,331 --> 01:00:31,553
for speaking out about the fact that we 

1580
01:00:31,553 --> 01:00:33,776
could not lose a submarine if we wanted 

1581
01:00:33,776 --> 01:00:35,498
to really , um , again have an 

1582
01:00:35,498 --> 01:00:37,609
effective deterrence in that region . 

1583
01:00:37,609 --> 01:00:39,831
And , you know , again , it's that type 

1584
01:00:39,831 --> 01:00:41,887
of leadership , which I think really 

1585
01:00:41,887 --> 01:00:43,720
helps the Congress , who has the 

1586
01:00:43,720 --> 01:00:45,664
constitutional duty to provide and 

1587
01:00:45,664 --> 01:00:48,230
maintain a Navy to at least try and , 

1588
01:00:48,710 --> 01:00:51,640
you know , have some semblance of 

1589
01:00:51,640 --> 01:00:53,810
deterrence , uh , in in that region of 

1590
01:00:53,810 --> 01:00:55,866
the world and without a yield back . 

1591
01:00:55,866 --> 01:00:58,088
Thank you , Mr Lambert . Recognized for 

1592
01:00:58,088 --> 01:01:00,366
five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1593
01:01:00,366 --> 01:01:02,588
Mr . Hill V . I have a couple questions 

1594
01:01:02,588 --> 01:01:04,754
for you . China wants to be considered 

1595
01:01:04,754 --> 01:01:06,754
a major player on the international 

1596
01:01:06,754 --> 01:01:08,588
stage , but it keeps engaging in 

1597
01:01:08,588 --> 01:01:10,754
irresponsible behavior . Some of these 

1598
01:01:10,754 --> 01:01:12,699
examples are violating territorial 

1599
01:01:12,699 --> 01:01:14,754
waters of other nations in the South 

1600
01:01:14,754 --> 01:01:16,700
China Sea . Theft of intellectual 

1601
01:01:16,700 --> 01:01:18,890
property , genocide of the weaker 

1602
01:01:18,890 --> 01:01:22,360
people , their social credit system , 

1603
01:01:22,360 --> 01:01:24,470
environmental pollution , lack of 

1604
01:01:24,470 --> 01:01:26,360
donations to international relief 

1605
01:01:26,360 --> 01:01:29,390
efforts and on and on and on . And one 

1606
01:01:29,400 --> 01:01:32,390
other area of irresponsibility is that 

1607
01:01:32,390 --> 01:01:34,390
they have not entered into any arms 

1608
01:01:34,390 --> 01:01:37,940
control agreements . And , uh , this is 

1609
01:01:37,940 --> 01:01:39,773
while they are modernizing their 

1610
01:01:39,773 --> 01:01:42,450
nuclear weapons and their increasing 

1611
01:01:42,450 --> 01:01:44,561
the number of their nuclear weapons . 

1612
01:01:44,561 --> 01:01:48,070
But there's no transparency , and I 

1613
01:01:48,070 --> 01:01:51,110
know many people have said they need to 

1614
01:01:51,110 --> 01:01:54,430
be part of an international arms , uh , 

1615
01:01:54,810 --> 01:01:57,480
control protocol . What is the Biden 

1616
01:01:57,480 --> 01:01:59,990
administration doing to bring them into 

1617
01:01:59,990 --> 01:02:01,730
arms control negotiations . 

1618
01:02:03,600 --> 01:02:06,240
Uh , thank you , sir , for that . For 

1619
01:02:06,240 --> 01:02:08,184
that question . And you're right . 

1620
01:02:08,184 --> 01:02:12,100
China has been pursuing a robust , uh , 

1621
01:02:12,110 --> 01:02:14,340
young strategic forces modernization , 

1622
01:02:14,340 --> 01:02:16,980
and the and the transparency into it is 

1623
01:02:16,980 --> 01:02:19,300
truly lacking . Yeah . There has been 

1624
01:02:19,310 --> 01:02:21,143
efforts over the years to try to 

1625
01:02:21,143 --> 01:02:23,460
encourage china to participate in , uh , 

1626
01:02:23,470 --> 01:02:25,803
in some type of arms control discussion . 

1627
01:02:25,803 --> 01:02:27,637
Uh , this was something that was 

1628
01:02:27,637 --> 01:02:29,303
undertaken under the previous 

1629
01:02:29,303 --> 01:02:30,914
administration under martial 

1630
01:02:30,914 --> 01:02:33,192
Billingsley , uh , to try to to try to , 

1631
01:02:33,192 --> 01:02:35,192
you know , work with China to to to 

1632
01:02:35,192 --> 01:02:37,359
bring them into the discussion that we 

1633
01:02:37,359 --> 01:02:39,581
have with the Russians . The Chinese to 

1634
01:02:39,581 --> 01:02:41,637
date have refused , um , in terms of 

1635
01:02:41,637 --> 01:02:43,859
how the current administration is going 

1636
01:02:43,859 --> 01:02:43,800
to approach it , That's something 

1637
01:02:43,800 --> 01:02:45,800
that's being looked at as part of a 

1638
01:02:45,800 --> 01:02:48,440
broader based China strategy and policy 

1639
01:02:48,440 --> 01:02:51,000
review . Uh , that that's going to have 

1640
01:02:51,000 --> 01:02:53,050
to kind of play out before the 

1641
01:02:53,060 --> 01:02:54,504
president is able to make 

1642
01:02:54,504 --> 01:02:56,616
determinations on how it wants to how 

1643
01:02:56,616 --> 01:02:58,504
it wants to address China in this 

1644
01:02:58,504 --> 01:03:00,504
particular aspect . Okay , well , I 

1645
01:03:00,504 --> 01:03:02,671
want to hear , and I think we all want 

1646
01:03:02,671 --> 01:03:04,782
to hear how that comes along . I wish 

1647
01:03:04,782 --> 01:03:06,838
you were farther along , but I guess 

1648
01:03:06,838 --> 01:03:08,838
we'll have to just wait and see how 

1649
01:03:08,838 --> 01:03:10,949
this evolves . But there's gotta be a 

1650
01:03:10,949 --> 01:03:13,740
plan to it may not work , but they're 

1651
01:03:13,740 --> 01:03:15,907
at least should be a plan to push them 

1652
01:03:15,907 --> 01:03:18,030
in that direction . And then I'd like 

1653
01:03:18,030 --> 01:03:20,230
to ask you about India . Um , I think 

1654
01:03:20,230 --> 01:03:22,174
we all agree that it needs to be a 

1655
01:03:22,174 --> 01:03:24,286
better partner and a counterweight to 

1656
01:03:24,286 --> 01:03:26,390
China . So what is the Biden 

1657
01:03:26,390 --> 01:03:29,660
administration plan to build a stronger 

1658
01:03:29,790 --> 01:03:31,346
partnership with India both 

1659
01:03:31,346 --> 01:03:34,890
economically and militarily ? Well , uh , 

1660
01:03:34,900 --> 01:03:36,956
sir , we'll try to do is stay within 

1661
01:03:36,956 --> 01:03:39,122
the stay within the defense lane . And 

1662
01:03:39,122 --> 01:03:41,344
you're right to point out India is a is 

1663
01:03:41,344 --> 01:03:43,560
a a real partner , a rising partner of 

1664
01:03:43,560 --> 01:03:45,616
the United States . We have a unique 

1665
01:03:45,616 --> 01:03:47,782
designation with India . It's called a 

1666
01:03:47,782 --> 01:03:49,727
major defense partner . One of the 

1667
01:03:49,727 --> 01:03:51,616
things that we're prioritizing is 

1668
01:03:51,616 --> 01:03:53,782
looking at ways to operationalize this 

1669
01:03:53,782 --> 01:03:55,949
defense partnership with India , to be 

1670
01:03:55,949 --> 01:03:58,171
able to look at ways where we can , you 

1671
01:03:58,171 --> 01:03:57,850
know , work together in the defense 

1672
01:03:57,850 --> 01:04:00,540
space in pursuit of common interests 

1673
01:04:00,540 --> 01:04:02,430
based on are converging , are 

1674
01:04:02,430 --> 01:04:04,652
converging strategic interests . So one 

1675
01:04:04,652 --> 01:04:06,763
of the things we'd like to be able to 

1676
01:04:06,763 --> 01:04:08,986
do is build on some of the foundational 

1677
01:04:08,986 --> 01:04:08,460
agreements that we've been able to 

1678
01:04:08,460 --> 01:04:10,571
conclude with India in recent years , 

1679
01:04:10,571 --> 01:04:12,738
say , for example , with information , 

1680
01:04:12,738 --> 01:04:15,980
security or logistics arrangements to 

1681
01:04:15,980 --> 01:04:18,091
where we could share more information 

1682
01:04:18,091 --> 01:04:20,202
with India . So we can build a common 

1683
01:04:20,202 --> 01:04:22,424
strategic understanding of the types of 

1684
01:04:22,424 --> 01:04:24,647
threats that we face together . Look at 

1685
01:04:24,647 --> 01:04:24,580
how we can use our forces in Indian 

1686
01:04:24,580 --> 01:04:26,691
forces in the Indian Ocean region and 

1687
01:04:26,691 --> 01:04:29,370
beyond , uh , to be able to work 

1688
01:04:29,370 --> 01:04:31,370
together , whether it's in maritime 

1689
01:04:31,370 --> 01:04:33,481
domain awareness or maritime security 

1690
01:04:33,590 --> 01:04:35,820
or humanitarian assistance and disaster 

1691
01:04:35,820 --> 01:04:38,880
response . As you know , the quad that 

1692
01:04:38,890 --> 01:04:41,010
people talk about has its origins in 

1693
01:04:41,010 --> 01:04:43,343
responding to the 2000 and four tsunami . 

1694
01:04:43,343 --> 01:04:45,399
So we're looking at ways to where we 

1695
01:04:45,399 --> 01:04:47,621
can work with India and with other like 

1696
01:04:47,621 --> 01:04:49,732
minded partners to be able to operate 

1697
01:04:49,732 --> 01:04:51,621
operationalize our cooperation in 

1698
01:04:51,621 --> 01:04:53,621
pursuit of common task . So I think 

1699
01:04:53,621 --> 01:04:55,677
that's one area next to another area 

1700
01:04:55,677 --> 01:04:57,843
that we're looking to do is deepen our 

1701
01:04:57,843 --> 01:04:59,843
military technical cooperation with 

1702
01:04:59,843 --> 01:05:01,899
India that's based on providing them 

1703
01:05:01,899 --> 01:05:04,010
arms and equipment so we can build an 

1704
01:05:04,010 --> 01:05:06,121
interoperable forces and capabilities 

1705
01:05:06,121 --> 01:05:08,232
and work with India is developing its 

1706
01:05:08,232 --> 01:05:10,232
own defense industrial base so that 

1707
01:05:10,232 --> 01:05:12,343
India is able to produce equipment to 

1708
01:05:12,343 --> 01:05:14,454
service their needs and to be able to 

1709
01:05:14,454 --> 01:05:16,677
work more with us and others around the 

1710
01:05:16,677 --> 01:05:16,620
region . Admiral , do you have anything 

1711
01:05:16,620 --> 01:05:20,470
to add to that ? Uh , no , 

1712
01:05:20,470 --> 01:05:23,920
sir , I I agree with Mr Healthy . 

1713
01:05:24,390 --> 01:05:28,040
Uh , over the course of my tenure at 

1714
01:05:28,050 --> 01:05:30,106
window pick , Um uh , there has been 

1715
01:05:30,106 --> 01:05:31,994
some opportunity to cooperate the 

1716
01:05:31,994 --> 01:05:35,360
maritime and to assist a little bit in 

1717
01:05:35,360 --> 01:05:37,960
the information sharing some cold 

1718
01:05:37,960 --> 01:05:39,960
weather gear and things like that . 

1719
01:05:39,960 --> 01:05:42,127
With India's challenges along the line 

1720
01:05:42,127 --> 01:05:44,349
of actual control , I think it's gone a 

1721
01:05:44,349 --> 01:05:46,620
long way to deepening our relationship 

1722
01:05:46,630 --> 01:05:48,810
and really presents a key strategic 

1723
01:05:48,810 --> 01:05:50,866
opportunity , I think for the United 

1724
01:05:50,866 --> 01:05:53,032
States . Okay . Well , thank you . And 

1725
01:05:53,032 --> 01:05:52,090
I look forward to hearing more 

1726
01:05:52,090 --> 01:05:54,146
specifics . I know it's early in the 

1727
01:05:54,146 --> 01:05:56,257
administration , but I really want to 

1728
01:05:56,257 --> 01:05:56,250
hear some more specifics as we get 

1729
01:05:56,250 --> 01:05:58,417
farther along . Thank you . You Beck . 

1730
01:05:58,590 --> 01:06:01,410
Thank you , Mr Garamendi . Yeah . Thank 

1731
01:06:01,410 --> 01:06:03,466
you . Mr Chairman . General Emmons . 

1732
01:06:03,466 --> 01:06:05,743
Thank you for the discussion last week . 

1733
01:06:05,743 --> 01:06:07,743
I'll forego additional questions at 

1734
01:06:07,743 --> 01:06:10,120
this time . Mr . Shelby , your response 

1735
01:06:10,120 --> 01:06:12,970
to Mr Lamborn was most useful and 

1736
01:06:12,970 --> 01:06:15,137
interesting with regard to India . And 

1737
01:06:15,137 --> 01:06:17,180
I would want to pursue that . My 

1738
01:06:17,180 --> 01:06:20,030
question really goes to Admiral 

1739
01:06:20,030 --> 01:06:22,880
Davidson . You have recently in 

1740
01:06:22,880 --> 01:06:25,102
response to last year's for the current 

1741
01:06:25,102 --> 01:06:28,240
N . D . A . Issued a Pacific deterrence 

1742
01:06:28,240 --> 01:06:30,462
initiative . I thank you for that piece 

1743
01:06:30,462 --> 01:06:33,420
of work . In previous discussions , 

1744
01:06:33,420 --> 01:06:35,660
we've talked about the tyranny of 

1745
01:06:35,660 --> 01:06:38,500
distance . And I'm 

1746
01:06:39,580 --> 01:06:42,980
concerned that this document does not 

1747
01:06:42,980 --> 01:06:45,990
talk about maritime logistics from the 

1748
01:06:45,990 --> 01:06:49,120
West Coast or anywhere in the 

1749
01:06:49,120 --> 01:06:51,710
continental United States to support 

1750
01:06:52,080 --> 01:06:54,180
the Pacific Enterprise . This is 

1751
01:06:54,180 --> 01:06:56,800
something that I would want to take up 

1752
01:06:56,800 --> 01:06:58,689
in a classified hearing . Perhaps 

1753
01:06:58,689 --> 01:07:00,710
that's where it is . I know that Mr 

1754
01:07:00,710 --> 01:07:04,060
Whitman and Mr Kourtney have 

1755
01:07:04,070 --> 01:07:06,480
expressed concerns about this whole 

1756
01:07:06,480 --> 01:07:08,410
issue of maritime logistics 

1757
01:07:09,560 --> 01:07:12,090
specifically on the demand and supply 

1758
01:07:12,090 --> 01:07:15,100
side the demand for 

1759
01:07:15,980 --> 01:07:19,910
of supplies fuel . I don't see address 

1760
01:07:19,910 --> 01:07:22,860
to your document . Could you speak to 

1761
01:07:22,860 --> 01:07:25,010
that ? Uh , and then , uh , in a 

1762
01:07:25,010 --> 01:07:26,899
broader sense about how you would 

1763
01:07:26,899 --> 01:07:29,190
propose at this point to deal with the 

1764
01:07:29,200 --> 01:07:31,367
maritime logistics issue , the tyranny 

1765
01:07:31,367 --> 01:07:33,422
of distance ? Uh , yes , sir . Thank 

1766
01:07:33,422 --> 01:07:36,350
you . Um , the 12 51 assessment 

1767
01:07:36,360 --> 01:07:38,330
provided to inform the Pacific 

1768
01:07:38,330 --> 01:07:41,120
Deterrence Initiative does have as one 

1769
01:07:41,120 --> 01:07:43,650
of its five main pillars , uh , joint 

1770
01:07:43,650 --> 01:07:46,110
logistics in it . Our approach to that 

1771
01:07:46,110 --> 01:07:48,060
document is to address the joint 

1772
01:07:48,060 --> 01:07:50,060
integration . That must happen . So 

1773
01:07:50,060 --> 01:07:52,282
there's a very heavy logistics focus in 

1774
01:07:52,282 --> 01:07:54,338
it . Um , the services all represent 

1775
01:07:54,338 --> 01:07:56,616
the platforms of of their capabilities . 

1776
01:07:56,616 --> 01:07:58,116
And without a doubt , Um , 

1777
01:07:58,116 --> 01:08:00,910
recapitalization of military sealift is 

1778
01:08:00,910 --> 01:08:03,100
very , very important to our 

1779
01:08:03,100 --> 01:08:05,330
warfighting concept in the Indo Pacific 

1780
01:08:05,340 --> 01:08:08,090
as well as the 12 51 report . Because 

1781
01:08:08,090 --> 01:08:09,979
the 12 . 51 you know specifically 

1782
01:08:09,979 --> 01:08:11,812
addresses the need to be able to 

1783
01:08:11,812 --> 01:08:14,860
distribute fuel munitions . Um , the 

1784
01:08:14,870 --> 01:08:17,230
other , um , you know , costs of 

1785
01:08:17,230 --> 01:08:19,990
sustainment . So to speak , through a 

1786
01:08:20,000 --> 01:08:23,180
wider , more dispersed , um , set of , 

1787
01:08:23,190 --> 01:08:26,830
um places , bases as well as Seaborn s . 

1788
01:08:26,830 --> 01:08:30,320
It's so , um , it does address what our 

1789
01:08:30,320 --> 01:08:32,542
needs are in the sea lift . And it does 

1790
01:08:32,542 --> 01:08:34,764
it from all the way from the west coast 

1791
01:08:34,764 --> 01:08:36,987
of the United States and all the way to 

1792
01:08:36,987 --> 01:08:39,153
the point of delivery . What our total 

1793
01:08:39,153 --> 01:08:41,260
joint logistics needs are I'll be 

1794
01:08:41,260 --> 01:08:43,970
looking forward to the detail behind 

1795
01:08:43,980 --> 01:08:47,850
that statement . Ah , and also 

1796
01:08:47,850 --> 01:08:51,480
how we would provide that see , 

1797
01:08:51,480 --> 01:08:54,020
left . Where is the money for it ? 

1798
01:08:54,020 --> 01:08:56,187
Where the ships for what kind of ships 

1799
01:08:56,187 --> 01:08:58,187
and so on and so forth . We've been 

1800
01:08:58,187 --> 01:09:00,076
talking about a national maritime 

1801
01:09:00,076 --> 01:09:02,410
strategy using the Jones Act fleet to 

1802
01:09:02,410 --> 01:09:04,690
support the military in a way that has 

1803
01:09:04,690 --> 01:09:08,680
not been done for 70 years for 75 years . 

1804
01:09:08,690 --> 01:09:10,968
So we'll be looking at at those things . 

1805
01:09:10,968 --> 01:09:13,210
Look forward to working with you and 

1806
01:09:13,210 --> 01:09:15,800
your people on this entire maritime 

1807
01:09:15,800 --> 01:09:18,100
strategy . The logistics piece of it . 

1808
01:09:18,470 --> 01:09:20,470
Thank you so very much with that at 

1809
01:09:20,470 --> 01:09:23,180
your back . Mhm . Mhm . 

1810
01:09:24,270 --> 01:09:26,510
Thank you , Mr Whitman . Thank you , Mr 

1811
01:09:26,510 --> 01:09:28,621
Chairman . Gentlemen , thanks so much 

1812
01:09:28,621 --> 01:09:30,732
for coming to join us today . Admiral 

1813
01:09:30,732 --> 01:09:32,954
Davidson wanted to ask you a question . 

1814
01:09:32,954 --> 01:09:35,121
It's really a dynamic about generating 

1815
01:09:35,121 --> 01:09:37,288
current readiness and the need to make 

1816
01:09:37,288 --> 01:09:39,399
sure we have long term readiness . As 

1817
01:09:39,399 --> 01:09:41,621
you know , we have the the global force 

1818
01:09:41,621 --> 01:09:41,390
management allocation plan , which 

1819
01:09:41,390 --> 01:09:43,168
essentially says , What are the 

1820
01:09:43,168 --> 01:09:45,260
combatant commands need in the long 

1821
01:09:45,260 --> 01:09:47,371
term ? And then there's a request for 

1822
01:09:47,371 --> 01:09:48,982
forces . So if things change 

1823
01:09:48,982 --> 01:09:51,204
operational , you can request and say , 

1824
01:09:51,204 --> 01:09:53,316
Listen , based on a threat we need we 

1825
01:09:53,316 --> 01:09:55,371
need more assets in these particular 

1826
01:09:55,371 --> 01:09:57,260
areas . The one thing that does , 

1827
01:09:57,260 --> 01:09:59,482
though , is that it creates a challenge 

1828
01:09:59,482 --> 01:10:01,649
for us because we need to understand . 

1829
01:10:01,649 --> 01:10:03,816
Where is that request for forces ? And 

1830
01:10:03,816 --> 01:10:03,700
the process , to be honest with is a 

1831
01:10:03,710 --> 01:10:05,932
little opaque . It's hard to understand 

1832
01:10:05,932 --> 01:10:08,010
exactly where that where that demand 

1833
01:10:08,010 --> 01:10:11,200
comes from . I wanted to ask this when 

1834
01:10:11,200 --> 01:10:14,280
the COCOM submits a very high volume of 

1835
01:10:14,280 --> 01:10:17,540
requests for forces , uh , without us 

1836
01:10:17,540 --> 01:10:19,429
understanding what's changing the 

1837
01:10:19,429 --> 01:10:21,596
operational environment . That kind of 

1838
01:10:21,596 --> 01:10:23,762
runs counter to the gift map , as it's 

1839
01:10:23,762 --> 01:10:25,707
called , and that does create some 

1840
01:10:25,707 --> 01:10:27,929
questions . So I wanted to know Is that 

1841
01:10:27,929 --> 01:10:27,800
essentially saying the gift map is 

1842
01:10:27,800 --> 01:10:30,480
incorrect ? And secondly , do you think 

1843
01:10:30,480 --> 01:10:32,910
that Indo Pak com has been judicious in 

1844
01:10:32,910 --> 01:10:36,270
its , uh , request for forces ? And 

1845
01:10:36,270 --> 01:10:38,270
thirdly , if there's this imbalance 

1846
01:10:38,270 --> 01:10:40,437
between the request for forces and the 

1847
01:10:40,437 --> 01:10:42,548
gift map , do you think we need to re 

1848
01:10:42,548 --> 01:10:44,710
look at the process in what goes into 

1849
01:10:44,710 --> 01:10:46,877
generating the information in the gift 

1850
01:10:46,877 --> 01:10:49,190
map ? Especially since we're generating 

1851
01:10:49,190 --> 01:10:51,530
readiness today , which consumes 

1852
01:10:51,530 --> 01:10:54,350
resources that do also need to be 

1853
01:10:54,350 --> 01:10:56,406
allocated to generating readiness in 

1854
01:10:56,406 --> 01:10:58,628
the future ? So I just want to get your 

1855
01:10:58,628 --> 01:11:00,850
perspective on that . Thank you for the 

1856
01:11:00,850 --> 01:11:04,550
question , Congressman . Um , a very 

1857
01:11:04,550 --> 01:11:07,040
complex process . Uh , I understand 

1858
01:11:07,040 --> 01:11:09,790
that , uh , exactly basically , a 

1859
01:11:09,790 --> 01:11:12,030
request for forces is to address an 

1860
01:11:12,040 --> 01:11:14,780
urgent or current need . The gift map , 

1861
01:11:14,780 --> 01:11:16,558
as it's developed , actually is 

1862
01:11:16,558 --> 01:11:18,724
developed beginning about two years in 

1863
01:11:18,724 --> 01:11:20,558
advance of the fiscal year going 

1864
01:11:20,558 --> 01:11:23,170
forward . Um , whenever an R f . F is 

1865
01:11:23,170 --> 01:11:25,059
submitted from whatever Combatant 

1866
01:11:25,059 --> 01:11:27,114
Commander might submitted around the 

1867
01:11:27,114 --> 01:11:29,120
world . The process actually brings 

1868
01:11:29,120 --> 01:11:31,231
together all the people that might be 

1869
01:11:31,231 --> 01:11:33,453
affected that it certainly includes the 

1870
01:11:33,453 --> 01:11:35,564
service chiefs whose focus is on both 

1871
01:11:35,564 --> 01:11:37,342
current readiness and long term 

1872
01:11:37,342 --> 01:11:39,509
readiness . And it certainly brings in 

1873
01:11:39,509 --> 01:11:41,564
the affected combatant commanders as 

1874
01:11:41,564 --> 01:11:43,176
well . So we at least get an 

1875
01:11:43,176 --> 01:11:45,064
opportunity to comment on what we 

1876
01:11:45,064 --> 01:11:47,231
believe the risks are . I can tell you 

1877
01:11:47,231 --> 01:11:49,342
my own addressing of these issues has 

1878
01:11:49,342 --> 01:11:51,176
an eye on both the long term and 

1879
01:11:51,176 --> 01:11:53,231
current risk . You know , actually , 

1880
01:11:53,231 --> 01:11:55,287
formally being a fleet commander , I 

1881
01:11:55,287 --> 01:11:54,680
know what some of these effects are 

1882
01:11:54,680 --> 01:11:57,230
going forward . And I would say that , 

1883
01:11:57,240 --> 01:11:59,470
uh , hope occam's approach throughout 

1884
01:11:59,470 --> 01:12:01,637
this process has been very judicious . 

1885
01:12:01,637 --> 01:12:03,910
Very good . Thanks , Admiral wanted to 

1886
01:12:03,910 --> 01:12:06,132
again go back to the idea of short term 

1887
01:12:06,132 --> 01:12:08,466
readiness is versus long term readiness . 

1888
01:12:08,466 --> 01:12:10,410
And as you know , last year , uh , 

1889
01:12:10,410 --> 01:12:13,370
Lincoln returned after 283 days at sea . 

1890
01:12:13,380 --> 01:12:15,770
We just saw the U . S s Nimitz return 

1891
01:12:15,780 --> 01:12:18,230
after 321 days at sea . That's the 

1892
01:12:18,230 --> 01:12:20,980
longest deployment since since Vietnam . 

1893
01:12:21,250 --> 01:12:23,083
We see we're sending out the USS 

1894
01:12:23,083 --> 01:12:25,540
Eisenhower . She's gonna be double pump , 

1895
01:12:25,540 --> 01:12:27,790
so we're continuing to really stress 

1896
01:12:27,790 --> 01:12:29,623
the assets that we have today to 

1897
01:12:29,623 --> 01:12:31,790
generate readiness , uh , that we have 

1898
01:12:31,790 --> 01:12:34,180
before us . And again , it looks at the 

1899
01:12:34,180 --> 01:12:36,069
dichotomy between the request for 

1900
01:12:36,069 --> 01:12:38,291
forces and the gift map and determining 

1901
01:12:38,291 --> 01:12:40,624
if we have a lot of requests for forces . 

1902
01:12:40,624 --> 01:12:42,624
Where does that really leave us and 

1903
01:12:42,624 --> 01:12:44,624
what we're trying to do in the long 

1904
01:12:44,624 --> 01:12:46,680
term ? And that is how do we balance 

1905
01:12:46,680 --> 01:12:48,736
those risks ? Long term versus short 

1906
01:12:48,736 --> 01:12:50,791
term . Um , first of all , I want to 

1907
01:12:50,791 --> 01:12:52,958
ask , Do you believe it's important to 

1908
01:12:52,958 --> 01:12:54,847
have a , uh , an aircraft carrier 

1909
01:12:54,847 --> 01:12:57,069
presence in Indo pay ? Com . And do you 

1910
01:12:57,069 --> 01:12:59,180
believe that they have the ability to 

1911
01:12:59,180 --> 01:13:01,236
deter conflict within the region and 

1912
01:13:01,236 --> 01:13:03,990
and and what that perspective is from 

1913
01:13:04,000 --> 01:13:06,940
from your standpoint and then your best 

1914
01:13:06,950 --> 01:13:09,670
professional military judgment ? Do you 

1915
01:13:09,670 --> 01:13:12,150
believe that considering the current 

1916
01:13:12,150 --> 01:13:14,317
stress on the aircraft carrier force , 

1917
01:13:14,450 --> 01:13:17,000
that taking out an aircraft carrier 

1918
01:13:17,000 --> 01:13:19,560
from service just before its mid life 

1919
01:13:19,560 --> 01:13:21,980
refueling would be a smart thing to do ? 

1920
01:13:23,650 --> 01:13:25,261
Thank you for the question , 

1921
01:13:25,261 --> 01:13:27,390
Congressman . Yes , carrier presence 

1922
01:13:27,400 --> 01:13:30,170
for deployed is one of our main 

1923
01:13:30,170 --> 01:13:32,337
mechanisms of deterrence and certainly 

1924
01:13:32,650 --> 01:13:34,860
provides a high level of assurance to 

1925
01:13:34,860 --> 01:13:36,971
our allies and partners in the region 

1926
01:13:36,971 --> 01:13:40,840
that , uh , the United States 

1927
01:13:40,840 --> 01:13:43,350
considers the Indo Pacific . Um , not 

1928
01:13:43,350 --> 01:13:46,300
only a priority , but its number one 

1929
01:13:46,300 --> 01:13:49,980
priority going forward . Um , I don't 

1930
01:13:50,550 --> 01:13:52,640
There is no capability that we have 

1931
01:13:52,650 --> 01:13:55,030
that can substitute for an aircraft 

1932
01:13:55,030 --> 01:13:57,680
carrier . In my view , um , you can see 

1933
01:13:57,680 --> 01:14:01,610
by the strain of of , um , deployments 

1934
01:14:01,620 --> 01:14:03,731
over the course of the last year that 

1935
01:14:03,731 --> 01:14:06,780
they are in high demand by all the 

1936
01:14:06,780 --> 01:14:09,230
combatant commanders . Um , and 

1937
01:14:09,230 --> 01:14:11,080
sustaining that capability going 

1938
01:14:11,080 --> 01:14:12,802
forward , uh , in my view , is 

1939
01:14:12,802 --> 01:14:14,747
critically important . I'm in full 

1940
01:14:14,747 --> 01:14:16,802
support of the law , which calls for 

1941
01:14:16,802 --> 01:14:18,858
the number of carriers in the United 

1942
01:14:18,858 --> 01:14:20,913
States . Thanks for . Thank you , Mr 

1943
01:14:20,913 --> 01:14:23,960
Chairman of You back , Ms Spear . 

1944
01:14:24,940 --> 01:14:27,162
Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you all 

1945
01:14:27,162 --> 01:14:28,940
for your service . Um , Admiral 

1946
01:14:28,940 --> 01:14:31,162
Davidson , where does cybersecurity fit 

1947
01:14:31,162 --> 01:14:33,218
into your proposal for expanding the 

1948
01:14:33,218 --> 01:14:35,384
Pacific Deterrence Initiative ? If you 

1949
01:14:35,384 --> 01:14:37,450
receive your additional 90 billets , 

1950
01:14:37,460 --> 01:14:39,516
will any of them be devoted to cyber 

1951
01:14:39,516 --> 01:14:42,730
issues ? Yeah , a little less than a 

1952
01:14:42,740 --> 01:14:44,851
little more than a quarter . A little 

1953
01:14:44,851 --> 01:14:46,573
less than a third are actually 

1954
01:14:46,573 --> 01:14:48,851
committed to cybersecurity issues . Um , 

1955
01:14:48,851 --> 01:14:50,962
of course cybersecurity . Support for 

1956
01:14:50,962 --> 01:14:53,184
the combatant commanders . Uh , there's 

1957
01:14:53,184 --> 01:14:55,320
a support supported supporting 

1958
01:14:55,320 --> 01:14:57,940
relationship with cyber com Uh , and , 

1959
01:14:57,940 --> 01:15:00,107
of course , all the services as well , 

1960
01:15:00,140 --> 01:15:02,251
you know , have some responsibilities 

1961
01:15:02,251 --> 01:15:04,510
to help provide for cybersecurity . So 

1962
01:15:04,510 --> 01:15:06,510
a portion of that nineties actually 

1963
01:15:06,510 --> 01:15:08,770
committed to that ? Thank you . Um , 

1964
01:15:10,340 --> 01:15:12,507
I understand that in your report , you 

1965
01:15:12,507 --> 01:15:14,562
asked for a number of investments to 

1966
01:15:14,562 --> 01:15:16,784
strengthen military capabilities in the 

1967
01:15:16,784 --> 01:15:18,729
Indo Pacific . I noticed that your 

1968
01:15:18,729 --> 01:15:20,896
request did not include mention of the 

1969
01:15:20,896 --> 01:15:22,590
littoral combat ship or the 

1970
01:15:22,590 --> 01:15:25,260
Constellation class frigate . Do these 

1971
01:15:25,260 --> 01:15:27,316
ships have any use in our efforts to 

1972
01:15:27,316 --> 01:15:29,820
confront China and in the Indo Pacific , 

1973
01:15:29,830 --> 01:15:31,870
or are they draining resources away 

1974
01:15:31,870 --> 01:15:33,592
from more useful and effective 

1975
01:15:33,592 --> 01:15:36,110
equipment ? No . They have absolute 

1976
01:15:36,120 --> 01:15:39,030
utility . Bam . Um , the focus of the 

1977
01:15:39,030 --> 01:15:41,970
12 . 51 report was really on the joint , 

1978
01:15:41,980 --> 01:15:44,036
You know , the capabilities that are 

1979
01:15:44,036 --> 01:15:45,813
needed to bring the joint force 

1980
01:15:45,813 --> 01:15:48,147
together , they're effectively to deter . 

1981
01:15:48,147 --> 01:15:50,369
Um , as well . As you know , if we were 

1982
01:15:50,369 --> 01:15:52,147
called upon to fight and win in 

1983
01:15:52,147 --> 01:15:54,147
conflict , I can't possibly write a 

1984
01:15:54,147 --> 01:15:56,369
report that would accommodate for every 

1985
01:15:56,369 --> 01:15:58,424
platform and every capability desire 

1986
01:15:58,424 --> 01:16:00,424
across all the services . Um , that 

1987
01:16:00,424 --> 01:16:02,536
said I am in full support of what the 

1988
01:16:02,536 --> 01:16:04,536
services have advocated for both in 

1989
01:16:04,536 --> 01:16:07,020
their vision , um , for , uh , 

1990
01:16:07,030 --> 01:16:09,086
doctrinal evolution . You know their 

1991
01:16:09,086 --> 01:16:12,220
individual service visions . Um , and 

1992
01:16:12,220 --> 01:16:14,276
I'm in close coordination with those 

1993
01:16:14,276 --> 01:16:16,331
service chiefs to make sure that our 

1994
01:16:16,331 --> 01:16:18,553
warfighting concepts out there adapt to 

1995
01:16:18,553 --> 01:16:21,720
those visions . So you're endorsing the 

1996
01:16:21,730 --> 01:16:23,900
littoral combat ship We're now calling 

1997
01:16:23,900 --> 01:16:26,280
a frigate because it isn't really a 

1998
01:16:26,280 --> 01:16:30,080
combat ship . The we had great success 

1999
01:16:30,080 --> 01:16:32,247
with the Gabrielle Giffords deployment 

2000
01:16:32,247 --> 01:16:35,070
during the course of 2019 and 2020 . Um , 

2001
01:16:35,080 --> 01:16:37,400
there will be more . LCS is deploying 

2002
01:16:37,400 --> 01:16:39,511
to the Indo Pacific during the course 

2003
01:16:39,511 --> 01:16:41,622
of this calendar year . Um , and it's 

2004
01:16:41,622 --> 01:16:43,678
been very , very important to us for 

2005
01:16:43,678 --> 01:16:45,400
engagement , especially across 

2006
01:16:45,400 --> 01:16:47,622
Southeast Asia . And it does have a war 

2007
01:16:47,622 --> 01:16:51,530
phone . All right . Um , I am aware of 

2008
01:16:51,530 --> 01:16:53,290
serious maintenance problems , 

2009
01:16:53,300 --> 01:16:55,522
especially , I believe with the freedom 

2010
01:16:55,522 --> 01:16:58,550
class . So , um , I will leave that 

2011
01:16:58,930 --> 01:17:01,920
there . Um , let me ask you one final 

2012
01:17:01,920 --> 01:17:04,031
question . Uh , I saw in your written 

2013
01:17:04,031 --> 01:17:06,253
testimony that you've conducted surveys 

2014
01:17:06,253 --> 01:17:08,476
on sexual harassment and sexual assault 

2015
01:17:08,476 --> 01:17:10,531
and have used the results to improve 

2016
01:17:10,531 --> 01:17:12,476
prevention and response programs . 

2017
01:17:12,476 --> 01:17:14,587
Would you tell us more about what you 

2018
01:17:14,587 --> 01:17:17,150
learned from those climate surveys ? 

2019
01:17:18,730 --> 01:17:20,619
Yeah . One of the things that was 

2020
01:17:20,619 --> 01:17:22,674
important and this is specific to my 

2021
01:17:22,674 --> 01:17:24,840
headquarters alone was because of the 

2022
01:17:24,850 --> 01:17:28,040
joint nature of Indo Pacific Command in 

2023
01:17:28,040 --> 01:17:30,690
the large service presence . Um , we 

2024
01:17:30,690 --> 01:17:33,290
didn't have , um , direct 

2025
01:17:33,290 --> 01:17:36,780
representatives on the staff , um , to 

2026
01:17:36,790 --> 01:17:38,960
to manage the program for sexual 

2027
01:17:38,960 --> 01:17:42,150
assault as well as to do e o equal 

2028
01:17:42,150 --> 01:17:44,260
opportunity and equal opportunity 

2029
01:17:44,260 --> 01:17:47,400
employment functions . Um , if anybody 

2030
01:17:47,400 --> 01:17:49,511
had an issue on the staff , they were 

2031
01:17:49,511 --> 01:17:51,678
required to actually go to the service 

2032
01:17:51,678 --> 01:17:53,844
component headquarters where there was 

2033
01:17:53,844 --> 01:17:56,011
representation , um , to address those 

2034
01:17:56,011 --> 01:17:58,160
issues . Um , certainly the smooth 

2035
01:17:58,160 --> 01:18:00,530
communications get more accountability 

2036
01:18:00,530 --> 01:18:02,752
in it at the leadership level . And the 

2037
01:18:02,752 --> 01:18:04,641
headquarters , I took out to hide 

2038
01:18:04,641 --> 01:18:06,586
people that had the training to do 

2039
01:18:06,586 --> 01:18:08,808
those functions established them in the 

2040
01:18:08,808 --> 01:18:10,808
headquarters . And it's improved my 

2041
01:18:10,808 --> 01:18:12,974
ability to share best practices , um , 

2042
01:18:12,974 --> 01:18:15,086
and receive best practices across the 

2043
01:18:15,086 --> 01:18:17,220
island of Allahu , Um , as well as 

2044
01:18:17,230 --> 01:18:19,230
assure my force that were properly 

2045
01:18:19,230 --> 01:18:21,397
paying attention to this . I don't I'm 

2046
01:18:21,397 --> 01:18:23,452
not quite sure whether all combatant 

2047
01:18:23,452 --> 01:18:25,619
commands have that issue , but I would 

2048
01:18:25,619 --> 01:18:27,286
say that the I guess I'm more 

2049
01:18:27,286 --> 01:18:29,508
interested . Excuse me for interrupting 

2050
01:18:29,508 --> 01:18:31,841
and what the climate surveys showed you . 

2051
01:18:31,920 --> 01:18:35,850
Mm . We had a rating of 

2052
01:18:35,860 --> 01:18:38,690
excellent . Um , 93% of the people on 

2053
01:18:38,690 --> 01:18:42,580
the staff said , uh that , um our our 

2054
01:18:42,580 --> 01:18:44,580
approach to program management with 

2055
01:18:44,580 --> 01:18:46,802
sexual assault was positive and gave it 

2056
01:18:46,802 --> 01:18:49,040
an excellent rating . All right , um , 

2057
01:18:49,420 --> 01:18:53,100
finally , uh , in 34 seconds , 

2058
01:18:53,110 --> 01:18:56,700
um , there is in hawaii a 

2059
01:18:56,710 --> 01:18:59,570
serious problem with childcare . Um , 

2060
01:18:59,580 --> 01:19:02,870
and you are anticipating new positions . 

2061
01:19:02,880 --> 01:19:05,440
Um , have you contemplated how the 

2062
01:19:05,440 --> 01:19:07,630
child care component of that is going 

2063
01:19:07,630 --> 01:19:09,540
to be considered ? 

2064
01:19:11,820 --> 01:19:14,180
Uh , yes , ma'am . I appreciate you 

2065
01:19:14,190 --> 01:19:17,240
saying that . Um , there is high demand 

2066
01:19:17,240 --> 01:19:20,340
for childcare in Hawaii . Broadly . 

2067
01:19:20,920 --> 01:19:23,610
Um , what's going on right now is 

2068
01:19:23,610 --> 01:19:25,499
they're conducting virtual . Um , 

2069
01:19:25,499 --> 01:19:27,666
they're having a virtual hiring fair . 

2070
01:19:27,820 --> 01:19:30,750
The D o . D has also addressed this by , 

2071
01:19:31,120 --> 01:19:33,250
um , and again , use of life must 

2072
01:19:33,250 --> 01:19:35,660
apologize . And and other things I'd be 

2073
01:19:35,660 --> 01:19:38,190
happy to talk to you . General eighties 

2074
01:19:38,190 --> 01:19:40,030
time has expired . Mr . Phonic , 

2075
01:19:44,420 --> 01:19:46,710
I beg your pardon ? I don't think I'm 

2076
01:19:46,710 --> 01:19:48,821
next in line . I think I came late to 

2077
01:19:48,821 --> 01:19:52,770
the hearing . Mhm . Okay , um 

2078
01:19:53,060 --> 01:19:55,171
I'll ask a question . According to my 

2079
01:19:55,171 --> 01:19:57,338
handy dandy sheet here , right next in 

2080
01:19:57,338 --> 01:19:59,560
line . I will not yield others . Then , 

2081
01:19:59,560 --> 01:20:01,671
um , I want to talk about some of our 

2082
01:20:01,671 --> 01:20:03,893
cyber capabilities as you're looking at 

2083
01:20:03,893 --> 01:20:06,116
China continuing to make investments in 

2084
01:20:06,116 --> 01:20:08,330
their cyber capabilities . And ai , 

2085
01:20:08,810 --> 01:20:10,643
This has been a priority for the 

2086
01:20:10,643 --> 01:20:13,040
subcommittee that I'm the rancor on the 

2087
01:20:13,050 --> 01:20:15,710
previous EITC . Now it's strictly 

2088
01:20:15,710 --> 01:20:17,432
focused on cyber and technical 

2089
01:20:17,432 --> 01:20:19,640
capabilities . Can you talk about what 

2090
01:20:19,640 --> 01:20:22,230
steps you think we need to take to make 

2091
01:20:22,230 --> 01:20:25,220
sure that we maintain , um , 

2092
01:20:25,710 --> 01:20:27,760
leadership in those technology 

2093
01:20:27,760 --> 01:20:29,900
capabilities and how we can partner 

2094
01:20:29,900 --> 01:20:32,160
more effectively with our allies within 

2095
01:20:32,160 --> 01:20:35,230
pay calm on both the cyber side and ai 

2096
01:20:35,230 --> 01:20:39,120
side ? Um , specific to my theater 

2097
01:20:39,120 --> 01:20:41,398
alone and in my own priorities , ma'am , 

2098
01:20:41,398 --> 01:20:44,770
Um , I've advocated for in the 12 51 

2099
01:20:44,770 --> 01:20:46,940
report a mission partner environment . 

2100
01:20:47,310 --> 01:20:49,580
Um , this is I t technology that's 

2101
01:20:49,580 --> 01:20:51,469
available to us now , which would 

2102
01:20:51,469 --> 01:20:53,302
deepen our collaboration and our 

2103
01:20:53,302 --> 01:20:55,440
ability to share information . Do 

2104
01:20:55,440 --> 01:20:57,496
planning that kind of stuff with the 

2105
01:20:57,496 --> 01:20:59,440
Allied and Partner Network broadly 

2106
01:20:59,440 --> 01:21:01,830
across the region . Um , so I I think 

2107
01:21:01,830 --> 01:21:03,941
that's a key way ahead . We do have a 

2108
01:21:03,941 --> 01:21:06,052
system called Biases X right now that 

2109
01:21:06,052 --> 01:21:08,163
we share with a number of partners in 

2110
01:21:08,163 --> 01:21:10,274
the region that needs to be sustained 

2111
01:21:10,274 --> 01:21:12,970
in my view , um , in order to provide 

2112
01:21:12,980 --> 01:21:15,490
this resiliency and security that you 

2113
01:21:15,490 --> 01:21:17,546
talk about going forward , Of course 

2114
01:21:17,546 --> 01:21:19,823
there's broader needs across the globe , 

2115
01:21:19,823 --> 01:21:21,879
but I'd I'd have to leave that to to 

2116
01:21:21,879 --> 01:21:25,860
policy and d o d to address . Well , 

2117
01:21:25,860 --> 01:21:27,804
ma'am , I I understand you will be 

2118
01:21:27,804 --> 01:21:30,020
getting briefings , uh , and testimony 

2119
01:21:30,020 --> 01:21:33,540
later from folks from us cyber com , uh , 

2120
01:21:33,550 --> 01:21:35,161
and others that are directly 

2121
01:21:35,161 --> 01:21:37,328
responsible for cyber policy . I would 

2122
01:21:37,328 --> 01:21:39,550
just add that we understand , given the 

2123
01:21:39,550 --> 01:21:41,772
increased investments from other threat 

2124
01:21:41,772 --> 01:21:43,772
actors like China and North Korea . 

2125
01:21:43,772 --> 01:21:45,994
That cyber is an area that we've got to 

2126
01:21:45,994 --> 01:21:47,994
maintain focus not only in terms of 

2127
01:21:47,994 --> 01:21:50,060
ensuring that we've got hardened and 

2128
01:21:50,070 --> 01:21:52,260
defended networks , but also that we 

2129
01:21:52,260 --> 01:21:54,371
can share information with our allies 

2130
01:21:54,371 --> 01:21:56,593
and partners to help them address their 

2131
01:21:56,593 --> 01:21:58,704
own vulnerabilities . Uh , one of the 

2132
01:21:58,704 --> 01:22:00,927
things that's been a consistent theme , 

2133
01:22:00,927 --> 01:22:03,149
both in terms of what I've talked about 

2134
01:22:03,149 --> 01:22:02,330
today and what Admiral Davidson has 

2135
01:22:02,330 --> 01:22:04,608
talked about as well as General Abrams , 

2136
01:22:04,608 --> 01:22:06,920
is how important being able to share 

2137
01:22:07,000 --> 01:22:09,056
and work closely with our allies and 

2138
01:22:09,056 --> 01:22:11,278
partners around the region are . And to 

2139
01:22:11,278 --> 01:22:13,389
the extent to which that , you know , 

2140
01:22:13,389 --> 01:22:15,444
cyber threats affect not only us and 

2141
01:22:15,444 --> 01:22:17,556
our allies and partners , we've got a 

2142
01:22:17,556 --> 01:22:19,667
responsibility to help make sure that 

2143
01:22:19,667 --> 01:22:21,722
we're clean as well , as well as the 

2144
01:22:21,722 --> 01:22:21,570
folks that are to the left and right of 

2145
01:22:21,570 --> 01:22:23,570
us and General Abrams . 

2146
01:22:29,300 --> 01:22:33,300
Um , Congresswoman , I agree with Mr 

2147
01:22:33,300 --> 01:22:36,100
Healthy and Amil Davidson , and we are 

2148
01:22:36,100 --> 01:22:38,610
the beneficiary , uh , great support on 

2149
01:22:38,610 --> 01:22:41,340
the cyber side from Army Cyber , which 

2150
01:22:41,340 --> 01:22:43,396
is the combat command support agency 

2151
01:22:43,396 --> 01:22:46,710
for us here . But I strongly endorse Mr 

2152
01:22:46,710 --> 01:22:48,821
Welby's comments about the importance 

2153
01:22:48,821 --> 01:22:50,680
when it comes to dealing and 

2154
01:22:50,680 --> 01:22:52,791
interacting and interoperability with 

2155
01:22:52,791 --> 01:22:54,870
our rock counterparts . Thank you . 

2156
01:22:54,870 --> 01:22:58,240
You're back . Thank you . I should have 

2157
01:22:58,240 --> 01:23:00,073
said this at the outset , but as 

2158
01:23:00,073 --> 01:23:02,296
members know , at two o'clock and we're 

2159
01:23:02,296 --> 01:23:04,460
going to move over to the CBC for a 

2160
01:23:04,460 --> 01:23:06,627
classified brief , we want to give the 

2161
01:23:06,627 --> 01:23:08,571
witnesses sometime in between . So 

2162
01:23:08,571 --> 01:23:10,738
we're gonna have a hard stop at 1 15 . 

2163
01:23:10,800 --> 01:23:12,950
1 15 . We will pause . People want to 

2164
01:23:12,950 --> 01:23:14,950
grab a quick lunch , and then we'll 

2165
01:23:14,950 --> 01:23:17,117
reconvene in the CBC auditorium at two 

2166
01:23:17,117 --> 01:23:19,228
o'clock for a classified discussion . 

2167
01:23:19,228 --> 01:23:21,394
Mr . Carver Hall is recognized . Thank 

2168
01:23:21,394 --> 01:23:23,617
you , Mr Chair . Um , first , I want to 

2169
01:23:23,617 --> 01:23:26,640
thank both Admiral Davidson and General 

2170
01:23:26,640 --> 01:23:28,918
Abrams for including in your testimony . 

2171
01:23:28,918 --> 01:23:30,807
Is your commitment to address and 

2172
01:23:30,807 --> 01:23:32,918
prevent sexual assault and harassment 

2173
01:23:32,918 --> 01:23:34,930
within your commands in order to 

2174
01:23:34,930 --> 01:23:37,100
effectively address this , Obviously , 

2175
01:23:37,110 --> 01:23:39,350
there must be buying at all levels of 

2176
01:23:39,360 --> 01:23:42,000
the leadership . So I appreciate your 

2177
01:23:42,000 --> 01:23:44,340
and the Biden administrations pledge on 

2178
01:23:44,340 --> 01:23:46,284
this very , very important issue . 

2179
01:23:48,100 --> 01:23:50,580
Admiral Davidson . China is exceedingly 

2180
01:23:50,580 --> 01:23:52,800
operating in the gray zone between 

2181
01:23:52,800 --> 01:23:55,060
peaceful relations and overt 

2182
01:23:55,060 --> 01:23:57,360
hostilities . How does your assessment 

2183
01:23:57,370 --> 01:23:59,500
of resourcing requirements for the 

2184
01:23:59,500 --> 01:24:02,280
Pacific Deterrence Initiative meet the 

2185
01:24:02,280 --> 01:24:04,730
challenge that is gray zone warfare in 

2186
01:24:04,730 --> 01:24:08,440
the region ? The fundamental 

2187
01:24:08,440 --> 01:24:10,662
100 paintings of the documents are , is 

2188
01:24:10,662 --> 01:24:13,530
to , um , is to approach the region 

2189
01:24:13,540 --> 01:24:16,420
with a deterrence strategy . Um , 

2190
01:24:16,430 --> 01:24:18,710
deterrence large . While we have some 

2191
01:24:18,720 --> 01:24:20,942
some new names and things like that for 

2192
01:24:20,942 --> 01:24:23,053
Gray Zone , it's about our ability to 

2193
01:24:23,053 --> 01:24:26,200
do it day to day in peacetime , Um , so 

2194
01:24:26,200 --> 01:24:28,311
that the approach that we've taken is 

2195
01:24:28,311 --> 01:24:30,010
to bring together uh , set of 

2196
01:24:30,010 --> 01:24:32,177
capabilities and the five pillars that 

2197
01:24:32,177 --> 01:24:35,190
I described earlier in a way that helps 

2198
01:24:35,200 --> 01:24:38,220
deter our potential adversaries . And 

2199
01:24:38,220 --> 01:24:40,220
that would include North Korea , as 

2200
01:24:40,220 --> 01:24:42,530
well as assure our allies and partners 

2201
01:24:42,540 --> 01:24:46,170
all while preparing , um , the strength 

2202
01:24:46,180 --> 01:24:48,930
of what I believe is the U . S . Um , 

2203
01:24:48,940 --> 01:24:51,140
influence in the region , which is our 

2204
01:24:51,140 --> 01:24:53,310
Allied and partner network . Get them 

2205
01:24:53,310 --> 01:24:55,640
to assistance in in many of these 

2206
01:24:55,640 --> 01:24:58,270
things , share in the information that 

2207
01:24:58,280 --> 01:25:00,620
we they develop , and that we develop 

2208
01:25:01,200 --> 01:25:04,470
and basically pursue the 

2209
01:25:04,470 --> 01:25:07,060
idea with the assurance to others that 

2210
01:25:07,060 --> 01:25:09,250
we are there to stay for a free and 

2211
01:25:09,250 --> 01:25:12,670
open Indo Pacific . Thank you . In both 

2212
01:25:12,670 --> 01:25:15,070
your testimonies and road Davidson and 

2213
01:25:15,080 --> 01:25:17,470
Secretary healthy , you discuss how a 

2214
01:25:17,470 --> 01:25:19,760
changing climate is an increasing 

2215
01:25:19,760 --> 01:25:22,770
security challenge for the region . Can 

2216
01:25:22,770 --> 01:25:24,603
both of you elaborate on how the 

2217
01:25:24,603 --> 01:25:26,770
department and Indo Pak com is working 

2218
01:25:26,770 --> 01:25:28,980
with partner nations on addressing 

2219
01:25:28,980 --> 01:25:30,980
climate change , especially when it 

2220
01:25:30,980 --> 01:25:33,290
comes to small island nations who are 

2221
01:25:33,290 --> 01:25:37,110
more at risk ? Um 

2222
01:25:37,120 --> 01:25:40,160
uh , that principally falls into my 

2223
01:25:40,160 --> 01:25:42,493
responsibility out there in the theater . 

2224
01:25:42,493 --> 01:25:44,716
Sure . Uh , one of the , uh , and to be 

2225
01:25:44,716 --> 01:25:46,938
briefed , one of the organizations that 

2226
01:25:46,938 --> 01:25:48,993
reports to Indo Pak um is called the 

2227
01:25:48,993 --> 01:25:50,938
Center for Excellence for Disaster 

2228
01:25:50,938 --> 01:25:53,104
Management . And it trains not only my 

2229
01:25:53,104 --> 01:25:55,160
military people in the Pacific , but 

2230
01:25:55,160 --> 01:25:57,104
government officials in the United 

2231
01:25:57,104 --> 01:25:59,327
States , local , state , national , non 

2232
01:25:59,327 --> 01:26:02,220
government organizations as and we've 

2233
01:26:02,230 --> 01:26:05,040
offered this course to partner nations 

2234
01:26:05,040 --> 01:26:07,290
in the region , principally in Oceania 

2235
01:26:07,300 --> 01:26:09,890
to train both their civilian defense 

2236
01:26:09,890 --> 01:26:12,140
force officials , law enforcement and 

2237
01:26:12,140 --> 01:26:14,140
how to mitigate the effects of a 

2238
01:26:14,140 --> 01:26:16,880
natural disaster , some of which may be , 

2239
01:26:16,890 --> 01:26:19,090
you know , 500 year storm A couple of 

2240
01:26:19,090 --> 01:26:21,423
years ago in the wake of climate change . 

2241
01:26:21,780 --> 01:26:24,600
Um , that's a very important engagement 

2242
01:26:24,610 --> 01:26:27,790
organization for me , and it has great 

2243
01:26:27,800 --> 01:26:30,700
influence and weight far beyond , you 

2244
01:26:30,700 --> 01:26:32,811
know , the resources that we actually 

2245
01:26:32,811 --> 01:26:35,144
put into it . I think that's , you know , 

2246
01:26:35,144 --> 01:26:37,367
the prime way in which I addressed this 

2247
01:26:37,367 --> 01:26:39,478
in the region right now . Thank you , 

2248
01:26:39,478 --> 01:26:41,870
Secretary . Healthy in your testimony , 

2249
01:26:41,870 --> 01:26:44,037
you state that one of the department's 

2250
01:26:44,037 --> 01:26:46,203
most far reaching objectives is to set 

2251
01:26:46,203 --> 01:26:48,314
the military relationship between the 

2252
01:26:48,314 --> 01:26:50,481
United States and China on a long term 

2253
01:26:50,481 --> 01:26:52,814
path of transparency and non aggression . 

2254
01:26:53,680 --> 01:26:56,350
That is a worthy goal . So how are we 

2255
01:26:56,350 --> 01:26:58,600
balancing the desire for non aggression 

2256
01:26:59,180 --> 01:27:01,250
with long term strategic competition 

2257
01:27:01,250 --> 01:27:04,450
with China ? Thank you for that 

2258
01:27:04,450 --> 01:27:06,506
question , sir . And you're right to 

2259
01:27:06,506 --> 01:27:08,672
point out in the 2018 National Defense 

2260
01:27:08,672 --> 01:27:10,660
strategy was identified as our our 

2261
01:27:10,660 --> 01:27:12,900
farthest reaching goal . The way we 

2262
01:27:12,900 --> 01:27:15,770
accomplished that is basically in three 

2263
01:27:15,770 --> 01:27:17,992
pillars . One , obviously . And this is 

2264
01:27:17,992 --> 01:27:19,881
the stuff that Admiral Davidson's 

2265
01:27:19,881 --> 01:27:21,992
talked a lot about this morning . You 

2266
01:27:21,992 --> 01:27:24,159
know , we got to be able to maintain , 

2267
01:27:24,159 --> 01:27:26,326
you know , a credible forward presence 

2268
01:27:26,326 --> 01:27:28,548
and a credible deterrence . Pardon me . 

2269
01:27:28,548 --> 01:27:30,960
A second aspect of it is working very 

2270
01:27:30,960 --> 01:27:33,560
carefully with our allies and partners 

2271
01:27:33,560 --> 01:27:35,393
around the region to ensure that 

2272
01:27:35,393 --> 01:27:37,504
they're able to work with us and with 

2273
01:27:37,504 --> 01:27:39,504
each other in order to preserve and 

2274
01:27:39,504 --> 01:27:41,560
protect their own sovereignty . That 

2275
01:27:41,560 --> 01:27:43,782
helps to augment deterrence and help to 

2276
01:27:43,782 --> 01:27:45,616
maintain a regional and security 

2277
01:27:45,616 --> 01:27:47,893
environment that's peaceful and stable . 

2278
01:27:47,893 --> 01:27:49,838
And then the third part of it , it 

2279
01:27:49,838 --> 01:27:52,060
would be how we engage with the Chinese 

2280
01:27:52,060 --> 01:27:54,171
themselves , where we're very careful 

2281
01:27:54,171 --> 01:27:56,227
and deliberate , consistent with the 

2282
01:27:56,227 --> 01:27:58,338
statutory limitations in the National 

2283
01:27:58,338 --> 01:28:00,338
Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal 

2284
01:28:00,338 --> 01:28:02,393
Year 2000 . We're looking at ways to 

2285
01:28:02,393 --> 01:28:02,030
ensure that we're maintaining open 

2286
01:28:02,030 --> 01:28:04,252
channels of communication at all levels 

2287
01:28:04,252 --> 01:28:06,419
of the People's Liberation Army and in 

2288
01:28:06,419 --> 01:28:08,530
prioritizing within those dialogues , 

2289
01:28:08,530 --> 01:28:10,530
tools and mechanisms to ensure risk 

2290
01:28:10,530 --> 01:28:12,419
reduction and confidence building 

2291
01:28:12,419 --> 01:28:14,960
measures so that as we operate close to 

2292
01:28:14,960 --> 01:28:17,071
each other , if there's an incident , 

2293
01:28:17,071 --> 01:28:19,127
if there's an accident , we have the 

2294
01:28:19,127 --> 01:28:21,349
tools in place that we can manage it in 

2295
01:28:21,349 --> 01:28:23,293
a way that doesn't escalate into a 

2296
01:28:23,293 --> 01:28:25,293
confrontation or conflict . And the 

2297
01:28:25,293 --> 01:28:27,460
last part of it is we want to look for 

2298
01:28:27,460 --> 01:28:27,120
areas where we can cooperate where we 

2299
01:28:27,120 --> 01:28:29,287
have mutual interest . Journalist Time 

2300
01:28:29,287 --> 01:28:31,480
has expired . Thank you . Charlie is 

2301
01:28:31,480 --> 01:28:33,702
recognized . Thank you , Chairman Smith 

2302
01:28:33,702 --> 01:28:35,702
and I'd like to thank our witnesses 

2303
01:28:35,702 --> 01:28:37,869
today for their service . Uh , Admiral 

2304
01:28:37,869 --> 01:28:40,110
Davidson , Um , what do you consider 

2305
01:28:40,110 --> 01:28:42,270
the most likely potential target of 

2306
01:28:42,270 --> 01:28:44,460
Chinese aggression or military action 

2307
01:28:44,470 --> 01:28:46,400
in the next 5 to 10 years ? 

2308
01:28:48,470 --> 01:28:50,780
Um , given what they've said both 

2309
01:28:50,790 --> 01:28:53,900
publicly and , um , over time 

2310
01:28:54,640 --> 01:28:57,520
and certainly during the during the 

2311
01:28:57,520 --> 01:29:01,020
tenure of Chairman Xi Jinping , I would 

2312
01:29:01,020 --> 01:29:04,270
say Taiwan is the first . Yeah , I 

2313
01:29:04,270 --> 01:29:06,103
noted . On Monday at top Chinese 

2314
01:29:06,103 --> 01:29:08,170
diplomat , State Councilor Wang , he 

2315
01:29:08,170 --> 01:29:10,180
warned that there is no room for 

2316
01:29:10,180 --> 01:29:12,402
compromise on Taiwan and that the U . S 

2317
01:29:12,402 --> 01:29:14,236
government should drop the prior 

2318
01:29:14,236 --> 01:29:16,236
administration is dangerous acts of 

2319
01:29:16,236 --> 01:29:18,291
playing with fire . Also on Monday , 

2320
01:29:18,291 --> 01:29:20,402
White House press secretary Jen Psaki 

2321
01:29:20,402 --> 01:29:22,513
said American commitment to Taiwan is 

2322
01:29:22,513 --> 01:29:25,670
rock solid . What have you seen in your 

2323
01:29:25,670 --> 01:29:27,837
three year tenure ? As far as how that 

2324
01:29:27,837 --> 01:29:30,030
relationship is involved ? And , uh , 

2325
01:29:30,040 --> 01:29:32,373
where do you think they currently stand ? 

2326
01:29:32,373 --> 01:29:34,484
I'm sorry . Who's relationships ? The 

2327
01:29:34,484 --> 01:29:36,707
relationship between China and Taiwan ? 

2328
01:29:36,770 --> 01:29:40,750
Um hmm . I would say that 

2329
01:29:40,770 --> 01:29:44,260
China's , um passage 

2330
01:29:44,270 --> 01:29:47,470
basic revocation of a one country , two 

2331
01:29:47,470 --> 01:29:50,740
systems approach in Hong Kong alarmed 

2332
01:29:50,810 --> 01:29:54,750
Taiwan To the extent that , um during 

2333
01:29:54,750 --> 01:29:57,680
the course of the late 20 

2334
01:29:58,070 --> 01:30:01,810
19 election in Taiwan that 

2335
01:30:01,810 --> 01:30:05,120
both parties , um , that we're running 

2336
01:30:05,120 --> 01:30:07,690
for election were required to say , um , 

2337
01:30:07,700 --> 01:30:09,922
they didn't support a one country , two 

2338
01:30:09,922 --> 01:30:13,280
systems approach with China . Um , so 

2339
01:30:13,290 --> 01:30:17,190
it has steeled . I think Taiwan's , 

2340
01:30:17,660 --> 01:30:21,200
um uh , status in the region . And I 

2341
01:30:21,200 --> 01:30:23,560
think all other nations in the region 

2342
01:30:23,570 --> 01:30:27,300
as well have have noticed a very 

2343
01:30:27,300 --> 01:30:29,467
pernicious approach that China took to 

2344
01:30:29,467 --> 01:30:32,390
Hong Kong . And that's put a chill on 

2345
01:30:32,400 --> 01:30:35,620
many relationships as well . Okay , uh , 

2346
01:30:35,630 --> 01:30:37,408
one of the more notable items , 

2347
01:30:37,408 --> 01:30:39,810
including your proposal for P . D . I 

2348
01:30:39,810 --> 01:30:42,032
was a request for ground based , highly 

2349
01:30:42,032 --> 01:30:44,199
survivable precision strike fires from 

2350
01:30:44,199 --> 01:30:46,310
greater than 500 kilometers . I don't 

2351
01:30:46,310 --> 01:30:48,340
know , uh , whether you think that 

2352
01:30:48,340 --> 01:30:50,562
would have a deterrent impact with what 

2353
01:30:50,562 --> 01:30:52,729
is our best strategic option to uphold 

2354
01:30:52,729 --> 01:30:54,618
US defence and possibly offensive 

2355
01:30:54,618 --> 01:30:58,440
capabilities in this region . Well , 

2356
01:30:58,450 --> 01:31:00,680
I think broadening our base of long 

2357
01:31:00,680 --> 01:31:04,190
range fires , uh , across all domains 

2358
01:31:04,190 --> 01:31:06,500
is incredibly important , as is the 

2359
01:31:06,500 --> 01:31:09,420
defense of Guam going forward . And the 

2360
01:31:09,420 --> 01:31:11,642
advantage of the defense of Guam brings 

2361
01:31:11,642 --> 01:31:13,930
us is its capability . That's , um , 

2362
01:31:13,940 --> 01:31:16,600
already online . Um , it's not in 

2363
01:31:16,600 --> 01:31:18,489
development . It's actually stuff 

2364
01:31:18,489 --> 01:31:20,656
you've purchased already . It's highly 

2365
01:31:20,656 --> 01:31:22,900
integral with the joint force on both 

2366
01:31:22,910 --> 01:31:25,132
offensive and defensive fires , which I 

2367
01:31:25,132 --> 01:31:27,299
think is critically important . And it 

2368
01:31:27,299 --> 01:31:29,521
will be very , very important . Command 

2369
01:31:29,521 --> 01:31:31,632
controlled note for us in Guam . Um , 

2370
01:31:31,632 --> 01:31:35,250
Guam is key to our approach . Um , to 

2371
01:31:35,250 --> 01:31:37,472
the Western Pacific . Not only is it us 

2372
01:31:37,472 --> 01:31:39,806
territory , it's a critical sustainment . 

2373
01:31:39,806 --> 01:31:42,620
Munitions power projection platform and 

2374
01:31:42,620 --> 01:31:45,290
repair facility for our ships . Forward . 

2375
01:31:46,160 --> 01:31:47,993
Okay . Thank you . You're back . 

2376
01:31:50,660 --> 01:31:54,080
Thank you . Um , sorry . Up here , Mr 

2377
01:31:54,080 --> 01:31:56,136
Chairman . Mr . Brown , I saw you in 

2378
01:31:56,136 --> 01:31:58,302
the back room . Thank your on screen . 

2379
01:31:58,302 --> 01:32:00,980
It was confusing , Mr Brown . Thank you . 

2380
01:32:00,990 --> 01:32:02,990
Thank you very much , Mr Chairman . 

2381
01:32:02,990 --> 01:32:04,879
Thanks for convening this posture 

2382
01:32:04,879 --> 01:32:06,657
hearing . And thanks to our our 

2383
01:32:06,657 --> 01:32:08,823
Panelists for being here today and for 

2384
01:32:08,823 --> 01:32:11,250
your leadership , Admiral Davidson , I 

2385
01:32:11,250 --> 01:32:13,260
wanted to talk to you about our 

2386
01:32:13,260 --> 01:32:15,530
alliances and partnerships in the 

2387
01:32:15,530 --> 01:32:18,180
region and beyond , sort of 

2388
01:32:18,190 --> 01:32:21,790
coordinating presence . Um , I'd like 

2389
01:32:21,790 --> 01:32:25,570
to know what coordination 

2390
01:32:26,250 --> 01:32:29,800
there is with our allies and partners 

2391
01:32:29,810 --> 01:32:33,490
around four structure investments in 

2392
01:32:33,490 --> 01:32:35,970
capabilities and capacity . And I asked 

2393
01:32:35,970 --> 01:32:37,970
this because , as was stated by the 

2394
01:32:37,970 --> 01:32:40,320
chairman at the outset of the hearing , 

2395
01:32:40,320 --> 01:32:42,487
and as we all know , the United States 

2396
01:32:42,487 --> 01:32:44,440
simply can't do this alone . And 

2397
01:32:44,440 --> 01:32:46,980
certainly not in isolation given , you 

2398
01:32:46,980 --> 01:32:49,380
know , China's increasing enhanced 

2399
01:32:49,380 --> 01:32:51,920
capabilities and capacity . So I know 

2400
01:32:51,920 --> 01:32:54,031
in Europe , we've got a pretty mature 

2401
01:32:54,031 --> 01:32:56,760
process of coordinating investments and 

2402
01:32:56,760 --> 01:32:59,070
force structure . Can you describe the 

2403
01:32:59,070 --> 01:33:01,181
processes and the commitment to doing 

2404
01:33:01,181 --> 01:33:03,380
that in the Indo Pacific ? 

2405
01:33:05,150 --> 01:33:07,380
Um , thanks for that , Congressman . 

2406
01:33:07,390 --> 01:33:09,112
You know , we have a series of 

2407
01:33:09,112 --> 01:33:11,410
bilateral alliances , uh , in the Indo 

2408
01:33:11,410 --> 01:33:13,970
Pacific , Japan , Korea , Australia , 

2409
01:33:13,970 --> 01:33:16,137
Philippines and Thailand . And we have 

2410
01:33:16,137 --> 01:33:18,220
key partnerships , some of which Mr 

2411
01:33:18,220 --> 01:33:20,442
Healthy addressed , of course , India , 

2412
01:33:20,442 --> 01:33:22,776
Singapore , New Zealand . And of course , 

2413
01:33:22,776 --> 01:33:25,260
we have other alliances . Um , where we 

2414
01:33:25,260 --> 01:33:27,740
have influencing nations in the Indo 

2415
01:33:27,740 --> 01:33:29,796
Pacific like the United Kingdom , of 

2416
01:33:29,796 --> 01:33:32,760
course , in Canada as well as others . 

2417
01:33:33,150 --> 01:33:35,930
Um , many of these , I can tell you 

2418
01:33:35,930 --> 01:33:38,500
that many of our bilateral allies in 

2419
01:33:38,500 --> 01:33:41,060
the region by us equipments , um , even , 

2420
01:33:41,070 --> 01:33:43,570
uh , you know , as their status as 

2421
01:33:43,580 --> 01:33:46,490
defence partners Or , you know , even 

2422
01:33:46,490 --> 01:33:48,490
as lesser partners out there , they 

2423
01:33:48,490 --> 01:33:50,400
seek us equipments . I think it's 

2424
01:33:50,400 --> 01:33:52,178
incredibly important because it 

2425
01:33:52,178 --> 01:33:54,344
generates a level of compatibility and 

2426
01:33:54,344 --> 01:33:56,122
interoperability when we're all 

2427
01:33:56,122 --> 01:33:59,310
operating like equipments . Um , we 

2428
01:33:59,310 --> 01:34:01,570
have a series of dialogues with these 

2429
01:34:01,570 --> 01:34:03,737
individual nations , some of which are 

2430
01:34:03,737 --> 01:34:06,240
are run , um , at the policy making 

2431
01:34:06,240 --> 01:34:08,510
level at O . S . D . I have bilateral 

2432
01:34:08,510 --> 01:34:10,850
defence dialogues as well , um , 

2433
01:34:10,860 --> 01:34:13,210
investments in that regard . What 

2434
01:34:13,220 --> 01:34:16,450
people want and what we collectively , 

2435
01:34:16,460 --> 01:34:19,390
collectively , bilaterally think our 

2436
01:34:19,390 --> 01:34:21,610
improvements are are always discussed 

2437
01:34:21,700 --> 01:34:25,630
in the process . Thank you . And 

2438
01:34:25,640 --> 01:34:28,680
another question for you , Admiral , Um , 

2439
01:34:28,690 --> 01:34:32,070
there has been some criticism that the 

2440
01:34:32,080 --> 01:34:35,400
training exercise in the Indo 

2441
01:34:35,400 --> 01:34:39,010
Pacific , uh , command are a little 

2442
01:34:39,020 --> 01:34:41,450
outdated , and they rely a lot on sort 

2443
01:34:41,450 --> 01:34:44,280
of , like big fleet , big ship , uh , 

2444
01:34:44,290 --> 01:34:46,870
exercises . They don't They're not 

2445
01:34:46,870 --> 01:34:49,070
necessarily joint . They're not 

2446
01:34:49,070 --> 01:34:50,848
reflecting the doctoring or the 

2447
01:34:50,848 --> 01:34:53,000
concepts that you're moving towards . 

2448
01:34:53,000 --> 01:34:55,160
The more you know , distributed 

2449
01:34:55,160 --> 01:34:58,990
maritime operations . Um , and 

2450
01:34:59,000 --> 01:35:00,889
they don't necessarily adequately 

2451
01:35:00,889 --> 01:35:04,470
involve our allies and partners , 

2452
01:35:04,480 --> 01:35:07,610
Uh , in sort of like a multi force way , 

2453
01:35:07,610 --> 01:35:09,610
A real combined force way . Can you 

2454
01:35:09,610 --> 01:35:12,080
speak to that criticism and and if it's 

2455
01:35:12,090 --> 01:35:15,310
accurate , what are we doing to , um , 

2456
01:35:15,310 --> 01:35:17,477
sort ? Of course correct . Yes , sir . 

2457
01:35:17,477 --> 01:35:19,699
It was one of the things I addressed in 

2458
01:35:19,699 --> 01:35:21,866
the 12 51 assessment . It's one of our 

2459
01:35:21,866 --> 01:35:24,032
pillars there to advance our exercises 

2460
01:35:24,032 --> 01:35:26,199
are experimentation and our innovation 

2461
01:35:26,340 --> 01:35:29,010
and actually calls for some monies . Um , 

2462
01:35:29,010 --> 01:35:31,350
that would stress , uh , to higher end 

2463
01:35:31,350 --> 01:35:33,890
threats . Uh , not only the u S force . 

2464
01:35:33,900 --> 01:35:35,790
Um , but those of our allies and 

2465
01:35:35,790 --> 01:35:38,670
potentially are our partners as well . 

2466
01:35:38,940 --> 01:35:40,996
Um , what are the key investments is 

2467
01:35:40,996 --> 01:35:43,230
not only , you know , improvements in 

2468
01:35:43,230 --> 01:35:45,397
the joint exercise program that you're 

2469
01:35:45,397 --> 01:35:47,674
talking about the exercises themselves , 

2470
01:35:47,674 --> 01:35:50,330
but advocacy for a Pacific multi domain 

2471
01:35:50,330 --> 01:35:52,530
training center . Uh , which is really 

2472
01:35:52,540 --> 01:35:55,310
a mobile concept designed to knit 

2473
01:35:55,310 --> 01:35:57,199
together the really extraordinary 

2474
01:35:57,199 --> 01:35:59,310
training ranges we have in the end of 

2475
01:35:59,310 --> 01:36:01,870
Pacific in Alaska , in Hawaii and Guam , 

2476
01:36:01,880 --> 01:36:04,760
and , uh , potentially with our allies 

2477
01:36:04,760 --> 01:36:07,710
in Australia and Japan . Um , we think 

2478
01:36:07,710 --> 01:36:10,440
it's a very cost effective way to bring 

2479
01:36:10,440 --> 01:36:12,551
multi domain , which we have to bring 

2480
01:36:12,551 --> 01:36:15,610
cyber space capability all these long 

2481
01:36:15,610 --> 01:36:17,520
range fires , integrated air and 

2482
01:36:17,520 --> 01:36:19,820
missile defense into our exercises in 

2483
01:36:19,820 --> 01:36:23,260
order to present the kind of adversary 

2484
01:36:23,270 --> 01:36:25,300
in a virtual and constructive 

2485
01:36:25,310 --> 01:36:28,010
computerized construct in order to more 

2486
01:36:28,010 --> 01:36:30,010
highly stressed the force . I think 

2487
01:36:30,010 --> 01:36:32,080
it's critically important . Just 

2488
01:36:32,080 --> 01:36:34,302
finally , you may not be able to answer 

2489
01:36:34,302 --> 01:36:36,524
it fully . Each of the services seem to 

2490
01:36:36,524 --> 01:36:38,691
be developing new operating concepts . 

2491
01:36:38,691 --> 01:36:40,770
Multi domain for the army , uh , 

2492
01:36:40,780 --> 01:36:43,060
littoral operations in a contested 

2493
01:36:43,060 --> 01:36:45,282
environment for Marines . Um , what are 

2494
01:36:45,282 --> 01:36:47,338
you doing to sort of like synthesize 

2495
01:36:47,338 --> 01:36:49,150
and aggregate and , uh , those 

2496
01:36:49,150 --> 01:36:51,094
different concepts in a more joint 

2497
01:36:51,130 --> 01:36:54,700
concept ? Um , very briefly , we've 

2498
01:36:54,700 --> 01:36:57,440
certainly used that to inform as I 

2499
01:36:57,450 --> 01:36:59,617
mentioned the joint integration . That 

2500
01:36:59,617 --> 01:37:02,040
is the approach in our 12 51 assessment . 

2501
01:37:02,050 --> 01:37:04,430
And it's also informed what we're 

2502
01:37:04,430 --> 01:37:06,652
required to do for contingency planning 

2503
01:37:06,652 --> 01:37:08,486
as well as what we call the Indo 

2504
01:37:08,486 --> 01:37:10,708
Pacific war fighting concept , which is 

2505
01:37:10,708 --> 01:37:12,930
informing the joint warfighting concept 

2506
01:37:12,930 --> 01:37:15,263
in the Pentagon . Thank you . Thank you , 

2507
01:37:15,263 --> 01:37:17,263
Admiral . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

2508
01:37:17,263 --> 01:37:19,097
Your , uh , Mr Gallagher is next 

2509
01:37:20,030 --> 01:37:21,863
chairman . There we go . Admiral 

2510
01:37:21,863 --> 01:37:23,808
Davidson . In your statement , you 

2511
01:37:23,808 --> 01:37:25,863
highlight that Indo Pak com requires 

2512
01:37:25,863 --> 01:37:28,480
highly survivable precision strike 

2513
01:37:28,480 --> 01:37:30,740
fires featuring increased quantities of 

2514
01:37:30,740 --> 01:37:33,600
ground basements and improved air and 

2515
01:37:33,600 --> 01:37:35,610
long range naval fires capable of 

2516
01:37:35,610 --> 01:37:38,650
ranges over 500 kilometers . I agree . 

2517
01:37:38,650 --> 01:37:40,780
Emphatically . Unfortunately , last 

2518
01:37:40,780 --> 01:37:42,950
year the appropriators zeroed out 

2519
01:37:42,950 --> 01:37:44,894
funding for Marine Corps anti ship 

2520
01:37:44,894 --> 01:37:46,783
missiles that would have provided 

2521
01:37:46,783 --> 01:37:49,230
exactly this kind of capability . Just 

2522
01:37:49,230 --> 01:37:51,880
so everyone is crystal clear . Why 

2523
01:37:51,880 --> 01:37:53,810
operationally do you need this 

2524
01:37:53,810 --> 01:37:57,700
capability so badly ? The required to 

2525
01:37:57,700 --> 01:37:59,644
deter in the near term , given the 

2526
01:37:59,644 --> 01:38:02,170
advances in Chinese capability , um , I 

2527
01:38:02,170 --> 01:38:05,890
think requires the use of 

2528
01:38:05,900 --> 01:38:08,040
existing capabilities that we have . 

2529
01:38:08,420 --> 01:38:11,140
What the Marine Corps has asked for 

2530
01:38:11,150 --> 01:38:13,094
have already been developed in the 

2531
01:38:13,094 --> 01:38:15,570
navels in the navy , um , and is 

2532
01:38:15,570 --> 01:38:17,626
employed on navy ships , things like 

2533
01:38:17,626 --> 01:38:19,900
maritime strike Tomahawk , sm six . 

2534
01:38:19,900 --> 01:38:22,122
These are immediate capabilities that I 

2535
01:38:22,122 --> 01:38:24,233
think should be made available to the 

2536
01:38:24,233 --> 01:38:26,289
Marine Court . Yes . Can you speak ? 

2537
01:38:26,289 --> 01:38:28,720
How ? Specifically , the cut for Marine 

2538
01:38:28,720 --> 01:38:30,831
Corps Long range precision fires last 

2539
01:38:30,831 --> 01:38:32,998
year impacted your command . How would 

2540
01:38:32,998 --> 01:38:34,820
a similar cut this year impact 

2541
01:38:34,820 --> 01:38:37,590
readiness in your command ? Well , 

2542
01:38:37,590 --> 01:38:41,060
we've spoken a lot a little bit today 

2543
01:38:41,060 --> 01:38:44,340
about our our ability to enhance the 

2544
01:38:44,340 --> 01:38:46,750
maneuver of our air and maritime forces . 

2545
01:38:46,760 --> 01:38:49,370
This what ? This is what a broad base 

2546
01:38:49,380 --> 01:38:52,640
of fires actually brings to us ? Um , 

2547
01:38:53,120 --> 01:38:56,150
I would say continuing to cut that in 

2548
01:38:56,150 --> 01:38:59,010
hopes for some future capability . Um , 

2549
01:38:59,020 --> 01:39:01,450
is not meeting the time needs that we 

2550
01:39:01,450 --> 01:39:03,880
have to address the Chinese threats 

2551
01:39:03,880 --> 01:39:06,800
that are manifest in theater right now , 

2552
01:39:06,800 --> 01:39:09,470
and it undermines our deterrent . Um , 

2553
01:39:09,480 --> 01:39:11,424
and we've talked a lot related Lee 

2554
01:39:11,424 --> 01:39:13,480
about dispersal . Today , the Marine 

2555
01:39:13,480 --> 01:39:15,424
Corps expeditionary advanced based 

2556
01:39:15,424 --> 01:39:17,480
operations concept is one innovative 

2557
01:39:17,480 --> 01:39:19,147
solution that I believe would 

2558
01:39:19,147 --> 01:39:20,647
supplement are fixed based 

2559
01:39:20,647 --> 01:39:22,536
infrastructure in the region with 

2560
01:39:22,536 --> 01:39:24,647
dispersed teams of Marines contesting 

2561
01:39:24,647 --> 01:39:26,869
strategically important maritime spaces 

2562
01:39:26,869 --> 01:39:29,091
in your professional judgment , is this 

2563
01:39:29,091 --> 01:39:30,980
kind of dispersed the HBO concept 

2564
01:39:30,980 --> 01:39:33,091
feasible without long range precision 

2565
01:39:33,091 --> 01:39:36,430
fires ? I'm certainly not as effective . 

2566
01:39:37,520 --> 01:39:39,520
And to put a point on that . If you 

2567
01:39:39,520 --> 01:39:42,640
want dispersed mobile and survivable 

2568
01:39:42,640 --> 01:39:45,110
firepower in the Indo Pacific , do you 

2569
01:39:45,110 --> 01:39:47,332
need to ensure the Marine Corps and the 

2570
01:39:47,332 --> 01:39:49,240
Army have ground based anti ship 

2571
01:39:49,240 --> 01:39:52,740
missiles with ranges over $500 ? 

2572
01:39:53,420 --> 01:39:55,253
Um , Admiral . Finally , in your 

2573
01:39:55,253 --> 01:39:57,309
statement , you wrote , the greatest 

2574
01:39:57,309 --> 01:39:59,309
danger for the United States is the 

2575
01:39:59,309 --> 01:40:01,364
erosion of conventional deterrence . 

2576
01:40:01,510 --> 01:40:03,621
What role would ground base anti ship 

2577
01:40:03,621 --> 01:40:06,060
missiles play in , in in supplementing 

2578
01:40:06,070 --> 01:40:07,760
or strengthening conventional 

2579
01:40:07,760 --> 01:40:09,427
deterrence ? And what are the 

2580
01:40:09,427 --> 01:40:11,427
consequences if we unilaterally see 

2581
01:40:11,427 --> 01:40:13,593
this capability to Beijing again ? I I 

2582
01:40:13,593 --> 01:40:15,900
think , um , the expansion of , uh , 

2583
01:40:15,910 --> 01:40:18,430
ground ground based fires , um , 

2584
01:40:18,440 --> 01:40:21,920
enables the maneuver of our maritime 

2585
01:40:21,920 --> 01:40:24,640
and air forces because what you get is 

2586
01:40:24,650 --> 01:40:27,710
the require for much more intense 

2587
01:40:27,720 --> 01:40:31,250
search . Um , for offensive capability , 

2588
01:40:31,250 --> 01:40:33,560
out of any adversaries . Intelligence , 

2589
01:40:33,570 --> 01:40:35,740
uh , surveillance and reconnaissance 

2590
01:40:35,740 --> 01:40:37,670
Network . We want to make our 

2591
01:40:37,670 --> 01:40:41,030
adversaries work harder , um , to find 

2592
01:40:41,030 --> 01:40:43,400
our stuff and to defend against it . 

2593
01:40:43,410 --> 01:40:45,410
That's what deterrence is about its 

2594
01:40:45,410 --> 01:40:48,070
imposing costs . Thank you , Admiral . 

2595
01:40:48,080 --> 01:40:50,600
Mr . Harvey , I think you mentioned 

2596
01:40:50,600 --> 01:40:54,330
earlier the FY 99 nd a report . The 

2597
01:40:54,340 --> 01:40:56,562
12 37 reporter . Someone mentioned it . 

2598
01:40:56,562 --> 01:40:59,370
Forgive me . Um , you know , it's 

2599
01:40:59,380 --> 01:41:01,324
Admiral . Thanks . In part to your 

2600
01:41:01,324 --> 01:41:03,547
predecessors help a strong support . We 

2601
01:41:03,547 --> 01:41:05,491
passed the Foreign Investment Risk 

2602
01:41:05,491 --> 01:41:07,547
review Modernization act in the last 

2603
01:41:07,547 --> 01:41:09,547
Congress , you know , strengthening 

2604
01:41:09,547 --> 01:41:11,602
Citius . We haven't really addressed 

2605
01:41:11,602 --> 01:41:13,602
the sort of outbound investment Two 

2606
01:41:13,602 --> 01:41:15,824
Chinese companies . So , Mr Healthy , I 

2607
01:41:15,824 --> 01:41:17,936
just be curious in what little time I 

2608
01:41:17,936 --> 01:41:19,824
have left . You do investments in 

2609
01:41:19,824 --> 01:41:22,680
companies on that list , uh , 

2610
01:41:22,690 --> 01:41:25,980
complicate your job and make all of our 

2611
01:41:25,980 --> 01:41:28,036
jobs more difficult when it comes to 

2612
01:41:28,036 --> 01:41:30,369
our force posture in the end of Pacific . 

2613
01:41:30,369 --> 01:41:32,591
Uh , well , certainly I think the , you 

2614
01:41:32,591 --> 01:41:34,869
know , one of the principal , you know , 

2615
01:41:34,869 --> 01:41:36,980
benefits of of , you know , the 12 37 

2616
01:41:36,980 --> 01:41:39,202
or 12 60 h young reports is to increase 

2617
01:41:39,202 --> 01:41:41,369
the transparency . Uh , and that's why 

2618
01:41:41,369 --> 01:41:43,424
we we we try to make sure that we've 

2619
01:41:43,424 --> 01:41:45,591
got a rigorous methodology to identify 

2620
01:41:45,591 --> 01:41:47,758
these entities and companies and their 

2621
01:41:47,758 --> 01:41:49,924
connections , and we try to base it on 

2622
01:41:49,924 --> 01:41:52,147
open information to the greatest extent 

2623
01:41:52,147 --> 01:41:54,258
possible so that it allows , uh , you 

2624
01:41:54,258 --> 01:41:56,313
know , you know , private citizens , 

2625
01:41:56,313 --> 01:41:58,202
you know , companies , commercial 

2626
01:41:58,202 --> 01:42:00,424
entities to be able to do due diligence 

2627
01:42:00,424 --> 01:42:02,147
so they understand where their 

2628
01:42:02,147 --> 01:42:04,313
resources could be going and what that 

2629
01:42:04,313 --> 01:42:04,190
could be contributing to and quite 

2630
01:42:04,190 --> 01:42:06,700
frankly , given China's strategy of , 

2631
01:42:06,710 --> 01:42:08,932
uh , you know , military civil fusion . 

2632
01:42:08,932 --> 01:42:10,988
Having that type of transparency and 

2633
01:42:10,988 --> 01:42:13,210
due diligence helps folks to understand 

2634
01:42:13,210 --> 01:42:14,821
because , yes , you could be 

2635
01:42:14,821 --> 01:42:17,250
contributing to commercial enterprises 

2636
01:42:17,250 --> 01:42:19,306
in China that are building equipment 

2637
01:42:19,400 --> 01:42:21,511
that could ultimately pose threats to 

2638
01:42:21,511 --> 01:42:23,622
the United States or are ours . Thank 

2639
01:42:23,622 --> 01:42:25,622
you . I'm out of time . Thank you . 

2640
01:42:25,622 --> 01:42:27,567
General Time expired . Mr . Kim is 

2641
01:42:27,567 --> 01:42:29,900
recognized for five minutes . Thank you , 

2642
01:42:29,900 --> 01:42:31,900
Chairman , for bringing us together 

2643
01:42:31,900 --> 01:42:34,122
with this and thank you all for joining 

2644
01:42:34,122 --> 01:42:36,289
us here today . I wanted to just start 

2645
01:42:36,289 --> 01:42:38,400
with a big picture question here . In 

2646
01:42:38,400 --> 01:42:40,233
terms of next steps , some of my 

2647
01:42:40,233 --> 01:42:42,233
colleagues have raised issues about 

2648
01:42:42,233 --> 01:42:44,344
what next ? When it comes to actually 

2649
01:42:44,344 --> 01:42:46,511
coalition building in the region . And 

2650
01:42:46,511 --> 01:42:48,511
Admiral Davidson , I wanted to just 

2651
01:42:48,511 --> 01:42:50,567
kind of get from from you a sense of 

2652
01:42:50,567 --> 01:42:52,567
what comes next with regards to the 

2653
01:42:52,567 --> 01:42:54,733
quad . You know , when we've seen this 

2654
01:42:54,733 --> 01:42:56,678
these initial discussions that are 

2655
01:42:56,678 --> 01:42:58,844
happening so building out for over the 

2656
01:42:58,844 --> 01:43:01,178
last couple of years , what do you What ? 

2657
01:43:01,178 --> 01:43:01,080
What is the end goal here ? You know , 

2658
01:43:01,080 --> 01:43:03,191
what is it that we're actually trying 

2659
01:43:03,191 --> 01:43:05,136
to achieve strategically here that 

2660
01:43:05,136 --> 01:43:07,340
we're trying to get towards ? Yes , 

2661
01:43:07,340 --> 01:43:09,562
there is something I I think Mr Healthy 

2662
01:43:09,562 --> 01:43:12,830
should address as well . Um , I I think 

2663
01:43:12,840 --> 01:43:16,680
clod the potential for clod , um , is 

2664
01:43:16,680 --> 01:43:18,440
far more than just a security 

2665
01:43:18,440 --> 01:43:21,690
relationship . I think the whole of the 

2666
01:43:21,690 --> 01:43:25,230
region is looking for assurances from a 

2667
01:43:25,230 --> 01:43:28,150
network of like minded partners . Um , 

2668
01:43:28,160 --> 01:43:31,900
for a free and open Indo Pacific . I 

2669
01:43:31,910 --> 01:43:33,743
think the visions that have been 

2670
01:43:33,743 --> 01:43:35,854
articulated not only by the cloud but 

2671
01:43:35,854 --> 01:43:38,077
by others in in the nation , you know , 

2672
01:43:38,077 --> 01:43:40,354
support that vision going forward . Um , 

2673
01:43:40,354 --> 01:43:42,466
so you know , as we think about it in 

2674
01:43:42,466 --> 01:43:44,188
the military and diplomacy and 

2675
01:43:44,188 --> 01:43:47,970
economics , Um uh , information in the 

2676
01:43:47,970 --> 01:43:49,970
military sphere . I think there's a 

2677
01:43:49,970 --> 01:43:52,081
great opportunity across the whole of 

2678
01:43:52,081 --> 01:43:54,248
that apparatus . Yes , Mr Helveg , I'd 

2679
01:43:54,248 --> 01:43:56,526
be interested in hearing your thoughts . 

2680
01:43:56,526 --> 01:43:58,692
And if you don't mind , also just draw 

2681
01:43:58,692 --> 01:44:00,914
on top of that . Just the dynamics that 

2682
01:44:00,914 --> 01:44:00,880
we're seeing between South Korea and 

2683
01:44:00,880 --> 01:44:02,991
Japan . Right now , I know that there 

2684
01:44:02,991 --> 01:44:05,102
is some news that perhaps we're going 

2685
01:44:05,102 --> 01:44:07,324
to have some diplomatic discussions and 

2686
01:44:07,324 --> 01:44:09,547
how it is that we can try to strengthen 

2687
01:44:09,547 --> 01:44:11,713
that relationship because I think many 

2688
01:44:11,713 --> 01:44:13,880
of us would agree that that dynamic is 

2689
01:44:13,880 --> 01:44:15,936
not where we'd like it to be between 

2690
01:44:15,936 --> 01:44:17,936
South Korea and Japan . So how does 

2691
01:44:17,936 --> 01:44:19,769
that lay ? On top of some of the 

2692
01:44:19,769 --> 01:44:21,880
visions moving forward for the quad , 

2693
01:44:21,880 --> 01:44:21,680
especially given that South Korea is 

2694
01:44:21,680 --> 01:44:23,736
not part of that type of structure . 

2695
01:44:23,736 --> 01:44:25,680
How do we see this kind of fitting 

2696
01:44:25,680 --> 01:44:27,736
together ? Uh , well , thank you for 

2697
01:44:27,736 --> 01:44:29,958
that question is , as I mentioned early 

2698
01:44:29,958 --> 01:44:32,013
on in this hearing , the the origins 

2699
01:44:32,013 --> 01:44:34,124
the quad actually go back to the quad 

2700
01:44:34,124 --> 01:44:36,013
being the United States , Japan , 

2701
01:44:36,013 --> 01:44:38,013
Australia and India , you know , go 

2702
01:44:38,013 --> 01:44:40,069
back to the multilateral response to 

2703
01:44:40,069 --> 01:44:42,180
the 2004 , uh , tsunami in the Indian 

2704
01:44:42,180 --> 01:44:44,890
Ocean region . But beyond that initial 

2705
01:44:44,890 --> 01:44:47,270
kind of response , yeah , we saw that 

2706
01:44:47,270 --> 01:44:49,437
we've got shared values and converging 

2707
01:44:49,437 --> 01:44:51,548
strategic interests . And between the 

2708
01:44:51,548 --> 01:44:53,548
four countries , we've got a pretty 

2709
01:44:53,548 --> 01:44:55,714
strong commitment to upholding a rules 

2710
01:44:55,714 --> 01:44:57,937
based international order in a free and 

2711
01:44:57,937 --> 01:45:00,048
open the Indo Pacific . Yeah , we see 

2712
01:45:00,048 --> 01:45:02,103
the quad as a venue for coordination 

2713
01:45:02,103 --> 01:45:04,326
and collaboration across our respective 

2714
01:45:04,326 --> 01:45:06,326
governments . This is not something 

2715
01:45:06,326 --> 01:45:08,492
that's uniquely defense and security . 

2716
01:45:08,492 --> 01:45:10,714
In fact , most of the discussion within 

2717
01:45:10,714 --> 01:45:12,826
the quad has been about diplomacy and 

2718
01:45:12,826 --> 01:45:14,548
economics . And I know this is 

2719
01:45:14,548 --> 01:45:16,714
something that will be discussed on on 

2720
01:45:16,714 --> 01:45:18,700
Friday at the leader level , which 

2721
01:45:18,710 --> 01:45:20,877
President Biden is going to be holding 

2722
01:45:20,877 --> 01:45:23,110
a virtual Kwan . So what we'd like to 

2723
01:45:23,110 --> 01:45:25,860
be able to see over time is the 

2724
01:45:25,860 --> 01:45:27,820
introduction of operational and 

2725
01:45:27,820 --> 01:45:30,870
practical types of cooperation not only 

2726
01:45:30,870 --> 01:45:33,150
among the Quad nations but the quad 

2727
01:45:33,150 --> 01:45:35,206
nations and other like minded allies 

2728
01:45:35,206 --> 01:45:37,372
and partners . I think we saw evidence 

2729
01:45:37,372 --> 01:45:39,261
of this last year when we had the 

2730
01:45:39,261 --> 01:45:41,428
Malabar exercise , which was the first 

2731
01:45:41,428 --> 01:45:43,428
time since 2000 and seven which the 

2732
01:45:43,428 --> 01:45:45,594
four parties were able to get together 

2733
01:45:45,594 --> 01:45:48,310
and work at a very practical tasks 

2734
01:45:48,590 --> 01:45:50,868
through it through a maritime exercise . 

2735
01:45:50,868 --> 01:45:52,923
Beyond that , we could see areas for 

2736
01:45:52,923 --> 01:45:54,479
cooperation and things like 

2737
01:45:54,479 --> 01:45:56,534
humanitarian assistance and disaster 

2738
01:45:56,534 --> 01:45:58,590
relief cooperation some of these new 

2739
01:45:58,590 --> 01:46:00,812
domains like space and cyber . A lot of 

2740
01:46:00,812 --> 01:46:03,034
this is stuff that creates the types of 

2741
01:46:03,034 --> 01:46:05,090
challenges that we all face , but we 

2742
01:46:05,090 --> 01:46:07,312
can't necessarily tackle it alone . And 

2743
01:46:07,312 --> 01:46:09,590
so when you look at it in that context , 

2744
01:46:09,590 --> 01:46:11,812
you see that the quad becomes part of a 

2745
01:46:11,812 --> 01:46:14,090
broader regional security architecture , 

2746
01:46:14,090 --> 01:46:16,730
which is overlapping , yes , layered 

2747
01:46:16,730 --> 01:46:20,080
sets of capabilities and groupings that 

2748
01:46:20,080 --> 01:46:22,136
have its its foundation and core , a 

2749
01:46:22,136 --> 01:46:24,136
series of bilateral relationships . 

2750
01:46:24,136 --> 01:46:26,024
Admiral Davidson talked about our 

2751
01:46:26,024 --> 01:46:28,247
treaty relationships , and we also have 

2752
01:46:28,247 --> 01:46:30,302
strategic partnerships or in India's 

2753
01:46:30,302 --> 01:46:32,358
case , a major defense partnership . 

2754
01:46:32,358 --> 01:46:34,302
We've got a number of multilateral 

2755
01:46:34,302 --> 01:46:36,413
venues that we can operate on , which 

2756
01:46:36,413 --> 01:46:38,636
is the quad inclusive things related to 

2757
01:46:38,636 --> 01:46:40,580
the Association of Southeast Asian 

2758
01:46:40,580 --> 01:46:42,524
Nations . Trilateral relationships 

2759
01:46:42,524 --> 01:46:44,636
between the United States , Japan and 

2760
01:46:44,636 --> 01:46:46,691
South Korea . Why don't I just pause 

2761
01:46:46,691 --> 01:46:48,858
there for a second ? So one last thing 

2762
01:46:48,858 --> 01:46:50,913
I wanted to ask General Abrams about 

2763
01:46:50,913 --> 01:46:53,024
just in the final seconds here , uh , 

2764
01:46:53,024 --> 01:46:54,913
there have been discussions about 

2765
01:46:54,913 --> 01:46:57,024
whether or not we should move forward 

2766
01:46:57,024 --> 01:46:56,740
as the United States with the formal 

2767
01:46:56,750 --> 01:46:59,630
end to the Korean War . I know there 

2768
01:46:59,630 --> 01:47:01,852
are political discussions about that in 

2769
01:47:01,852 --> 01:47:04,019
terms of what ? What ? How that should 

2770
01:47:04,019 --> 01:47:06,400
figure into negotiations on a 

2771
01:47:06,400 --> 01:47:08,567
diplomatic angle . But from a military 

2772
01:47:08,567 --> 01:47:10,960
standpoint , is there any problem or 

2773
01:47:10,960 --> 01:47:13,300
any Any challenges that you want to 

2774
01:47:13,300 --> 01:47:16,030
cite for us in terms of a declaration 

2775
01:47:16,030 --> 01:47:17,030
of that sort ? 

2776
01:47:19,190 --> 01:47:21,270
Congressman , the short answer is I 

2777
01:47:21,270 --> 01:47:23,400
have no immediate military concerns . 

2778
01:47:23,880 --> 01:47:26,100
Um , in terms of our mission here in 

2779
01:47:26,100 --> 01:47:28,378
Korea , uh , the bigger point , though , 

2780
01:47:28,378 --> 01:47:30,090
is that , uh , that should be 

2781
01:47:30,090 --> 01:47:32,540
considered , uh , as part of a broader 

2782
01:47:32,540 --> 01:47:34,540
strategy with a clearly defined end 

2783
01:47:34,540 --> 01:47:36,651
state . Thank you , sir . Thank you . 

2784
01:47:36,651 --> 01:47:38,920
Mr . Bacon is recognized . Thanks . to 

2785
01:47:38,920 --> 01:47:41,087
all three of our panels today . Thanks 

2786
01:47:41,087 --> 01:47:43,620
for your leadership over here . So it's 

2787
01:47:43,620 --> 01:47:45,620
hard to find who's talking with the 

2788
01:47:45,620 --> 01:47:47,842
masks on . Uh , I really appreciate the 

2789
01:47:47,842 --> 01:47:49,898
three of you and what you do for our 

2790
01:47:49,898 --> 01:47:51,953
the defense of our country . Federal 

2791
01:47:51,953 --> 01:47:53,842
Davidson . We've already talked a 

2792
01:47:53,842 --> 01:47:55,898
little about the need for services , 

2793
01:47:55,898 --> 01:47:58,120
surface missiles , uh , Navy projection 

2794
01:47:58,120 --> 01:48:00,120
capabilities . And a lot of this is 

2795
01:48:00,120 --> 01:48:02,287
result because we were part of the i n 

2796
01:48:02,287 --> 01:48:02,230
f treaty . So we couldn't build these 

2797
01:48:02,240 --> 01:48:04,580
capabilities while China could . Now 

2798
01:48:04,580 --> 01:48:06,802
they can target all of our bases in the 

2799
01:48:06,802 --> 01:48:08,950
Pacific . Uh , one thing I haven't 

2800
01:48:08,950 --> 01:48:11,006
heard you talk about is the need for 

2801
01:48:11,006 --> 01:48:13,240
long range strike aviation stealth 

2802
01:48:13,240 --> 01:48:15,620
capabilities like the B 21 . Could you 

2803
01:48:15,620 --> 01:48:17,440
talk about how important that 

2804
01:48:17,440 --> 01:48:19,496
capability is to you for your combat 

2805
01:48:19,496 --> 01:48:22,520
plans ? You know , as I think about the 

2806
01:48:22,520 --> 01:48:25,280
future in the region and proliferation 

2807
01:48:25,280 --> 01:48:27,720
of offensive fires in the region as 

2808
01:48:27,720 --> 01:48:29,720
well as you know , ever increasing 

2809
01:48:29,720 --> 01:48:32,550
improvements in range . Um , you know , 

2810
01:48:32,550 --> 01:48:34,717
a long range stealth bomber like the B 

2811
01:48:34,717 --> 01:48:36,883
21 is going to be incredibly important 

2812
01:48:36,883 --> 01:48:38,828
going forward . Um , I speak quite 

2813
01:48:38,828 --> 01:48:41,050
frequently about what it takes to deter 

2814
01:48:41,050 --> 01:48:43,320
in the region , and our ability to do 

2815
01:48:43,320 --> 01:48:45,487
so means we've got to be able to fight 

2816
01:48:45,487 --> 01:48:47,653
in the clinch as well as to be able to 

2817
01:48:47,653 --> 01:48:50,020
fight from outside the ring , too . And 

2818
01:48:50,020 --> 01:48:52,830
it's the power of those capabilities 

2819
01:48:52,840 --> 01:48:55,570
that has been core , um , to 

2820
01:48:55,570 --> 01:48:57,570
warfighting concepts for the United 

2821
01:48:57,570 --> 01:48:59,792
States going back 100 years now , and I 

2822
01:48:59,792 --> 01:49:02,014
suspect they'll be needed going forward 

2823
01:49:02,014 --> 01:49:04,070
as well . Now , I point out to be 21 

2824
01:49:04,070 --> 01:49:06,181
gives you rapid response capability . 

2825
01:49:06,181 --> 01:49:08,403
Uh , your perhaps your fastest response 

2826
01:49:08,403 --> 01:49:10,590
capability and one of the concerns if 

2827
01:49:10,590 --> 01:49:12,534
you if we're looking at surface to 

2828
01:49:12,534 --> 01:49:14,590
surface missiles , which I think are 

2829
01:49:14,590 --> 01:49:16,812
important , what countries do you think 

2830
01:49:16,812 --> 01:49:18,979
would be willing to host these knowing 

2831
01:49:18,979 --> 01:49:20,868
they're targeting China ? Because 

2832
01:49:20,868 --> 01:49:20,780
that's a big , big part of the question . 

2833
01:49:21,970 --> 01:49:24,210
Well , certainly I made mention earlier 

2834
01:49:24,210 --> 01:49:26,377
that I think all nations in the region 

2835
01:49:26,377 --> 01:49:28,154
are somewhat alarmed by China's 

2836
01:49:28,154 --> 01:49:30,321
activities and very profound changes , 

2837
01:49:30,321 --> 01:49:33,400
uh , in there the numbers of 

2838
01:49:33,870 --> 01:49:35,926
ballistic missiles that they have in 

2839
01:49:35,926 --> 01:49:38,260
the region . And I would say that many 

2840
01:49:38,260 --> 01:49:40,660
nations out there are considering , um , 

2841
01:49:40,670 --> 01:49:43,360
what their needs are here , but they're 

2842
01:49:43,360 --> 01:49:45,527
certainly going to have to be a policy 

2843
01:49:45,527 --> 01:49:47,749
approach to a number of nations there . 

2844
01:49:47,749 --> 01:49:50,040
And I'd let , uh Mr Harvey here talking 

2845
01:49:50,040 --> 01:49:52,040
about that sure seems to me we need 

2846
01:49:52,040 --> 01:49:54,096
multiple capabilities to to get this 

2847
01:49:54,096 --> 01:49:56,318
done . A lot of pivot , a little bit to 

2848
01:49:56,318 --> 01:49:58,540
nuclear deterrence . You know , there's 

2849
01:49:58,540 --> 01:50:00,762
been a debate in this body for the last 

2850
01:50:00,762 --> 01:50:02,984
three or four years And do we modernize 

2851
01:50:02,984 --> 01:50:05,151
the i C B . M s ? Do we go to a diet ? 

2852
01:50:05,151 --> 01:50:07,207
I think the debate has swung towards 

2853
01:50:07,207 --> 01:50:09,540
the triad and modernizing the I c B M s . 

2854
01:50:09,540 --> 01:50:11,762
But for I think the important have your 

2855
01:50:11,762 --> 01:50:14,360
perspective , uh , in regards to China , 

2856
01:50:14,370 --> 01:50:16,700
if we do not modernize our 400 I c B . 

2857
01:50:16,700 --> 01:50:19,570
M s and focus on bombers and submarines , 

2858
01:50:19,580 --> 01:50:21,920
what do you think is the impact to 

2859
01:50:21,930 --> 01:50:23,819
strategic deterrence with China ? 

2860
01:50:25,380 --> 01:50:27,324
Certainly the lessons I've learned 

2861
01:50:27,324 --> 01:50:29,491
during the course of my career is that 

2862
01:50:29,491 --> 01:50:31,713
the Triad has been critically important 

2863
01:50:31,713 --> 01:50:34,850
to , um uh the security of the United 

2864
01:50:34,850 --> 01:50:36,961
States , you know , as we think about 

2865
01:50:37,260 --> 01:50:40,200
the Cold War with the Soviets . Um , as 

2866
01:50:40,200 --> 01:50:43,670
I look towards the great expansion of 

2867
01:50:43,680 --> 01:50:46,560
Chinese capability , I made comment 

2868
01:50:46,570 --> 01:50:49,970
yesterday that they have quadrupled the 

2869
01:50:49,970 --> 01:50:52,137
size of their force over the course of 

2870
01:50:52,137 --> 01:50:54,359
the last 20 years till today , and it's 

2871
01:50:54,359 --> 01:50:56,526
estimated that it will at least double 

2872
01:50:56,526 --> 01:50:58,581
over the next 10 years . Um , that's 

2873
01:50:58,581 --> 01:51:01,300
that's going to require , um , you know , 

2874
01:51:01,310 --> 01:51:05,140
um , be the going to have to be 

2875
01:51:05,150 --> 01:51:08,280
the basis of our assessment as we think 

2876
01:51:08,280 --> 01:51:10,391
about what our strategic deterrent is 

2877
01:51:10,391 --> 01:51:12,690
going forward . Strategic deterrence is 

2878
01:51:12,700 --> 01:51:15,070
job number one , I believe . And I 

2879
01:51:15,070 --> 01:51:17,014
think it's so important that we do 

2880
01:51:17,014 --> 01:51:19,237
modernize my final question . I used to 

2881
01:51:19,237 --> 01:51:21,780
be electronic warfare officer for most 

2882
01:51:21,780 --> 01:51:24,060
of my career in the Air Force . We had 

2883
01:51:24,060 --> 01:51:26,227
superiority in the electronic magnetic 

2884
01:51:26,227 --> 01:51:28,393
spectrum up through the nineties , and 

2885
01:51:28,393 --> 01:51:30,338
we sort of disinvested and put our 

2886
01:51:30,338 --> 01:51:32,227
money in other places while China 

2887
01:51:32,227 --> 01:51:34,393
really invested in this area . I think 

2888
01:51:34,393 --> 01:51:36,116
many folks would say they have 

2889
01:51:36,116 --> 01:51:37,727
superiority in this area and 

2890
01:51:37,727 --> 01:51:39,504
controlling electronic magnetic 

2891
01:51:39,504 --> 01:51:41,800
spectrum . But we tried to do some good 

2892
01:51:41,800 --> 01:51:43,911
work on this in the last four or five 

2893
01:51:43,911 --> 01:51:45,911
years to turn this around . Are you 

2894
01:51:45,911 --> 01:51:47,911
satisfied with the direction of the 

2895
01:51:47,911 --> 01:51:50,022
department when it comes to regaining 

2896
01:51:50,022 --> 01:51:52,022
superiority and electronic magnetic 

2897
01:51:52,022 --> 01:51:54,078
spectrum ? And do you feel satisfied 

2898
01:51:54,078 --> 01:51:56,300
where we're going when it comes to your 

2899
01:51:56,300 --> 01:51:59,020
theater ? Thank you . Yeah . The effort 

2900
01:51:59,020 --> 01:52:00,909
over the last five years has been 

2901
01:52:00,909 --> 01:52:03,430
critically important to restore on this . 

2902
01:52:03,440 --> 01:52:06,020
Um , we went through a a relatively 

2903
01:52:06,020 --> 01:52:08,076
finite period here over the previous 

2904
01:52:08,076 --> 01:52:10,340
two decades in which we didn't have to 

2905
01:52:10,340 --> 01:52:13,060
worry about challenges to that 

2906
01:52:13,060 --> 01:52:15,650
dominance out there . But as I think 

2907
01:52:15,650 --> 01:52:17,706
about investments going forward writ 

2908
01:52:17,706 --> 01:52:19,428
large and this goes beyond the 

2909
01:52:19,428 --> 01:52:21,590
electromagnetic spectrum alone , um , 

2910
01:52:21,590 --> 01:52:23,540
we have to think about contested 

2911
01:52:23,540 --> 01:52:26,040
environments . Um , and one of those 

2912
01:52:26,040 --> 01:52:28,240
things that can contest multiple 

2913
01:52:28,240 --> 01:52:30,351
environments the maritime , the air , 

2914
01:52:30,351 --> 01:52:32,540
the ground space and cyberspace is the 

2915
01:52:32,540 --> 01:52:34,920
exploitation of electromagnetic kind of 

2916
01:52:34,920 --> 01:52:37,087
fires . Um , so we need to continue to 

2917
01:52:37,087 --> 01:52:40,040
stay after that to preserve , um , and 

2918
01:52:40,040 --> 01:52:42,262
regain , in some cases , the advantages 

2919
01:52:42,262 --> 01:52:44,373
that we enjoy in those other domain . 

2920
01:52:44,373 --> 01:52:47,360
Thank you Has expired , Ms Loria . And 

2921
01:52:47,360 --> 01:52:49,850
I'm sorry . I do want to 1 15 . We've 

2922
01:52:49,850 --> 01:52:51,906
got to be done . I apologize . We'll 

2923
01:52:51,906 --> 01:52:53,961
get to as many as we can between now 

2924
01:52:53,961 --> 01:52:55,294
and then . Ms . Loria . 

2925
01:52:58,150 --> 01:53:01,630
Oh , I apologize . It seems this micro 

2926
01:53:01,640 --> 01:53:03,918
is this microphone working . Oh , well , 

2927
01:53:03,918 --> 01:53:06,140
thank you . I will . Davidson . Nice to 

2928
01:53:06,140 --> 01:53:08,251
to see you and have you here again to 

2929
01:53:08,251 --> 01:53:10,307
talk about this very critical , um , 

2930
01:53:10,307 --> 01:53:12,251
area of the world for our national 

2931
01:53:12,251 --> 01:53:12,100
defense . And in your testimony you 

2932
01:53:12,100 --> 01:53:14,500
talk about providing a convincing 

2933
01:53:14,500 --> 01:53:16,800
deterrent ? Um so convincing deterrent 

2934
01:53:16,800 --> 01:53:19,590
requires presence within the A O . R . 

2935
01:53:19,590 --> 01:53:21,757
So I wanted to talk a little bit about 

2936
01:53:21,757 --> 01:53:23,923
that . Obviously , there's the tyranny 

2937
01:53:23,923 --> 01:53:26,034
of distance . We have our forward for 

2938
01:53:26,034 --> 01:53:28,312
forward deployed naval forces in Japan . 

2939
01:53:28,312 --> 01:53:30,646
But the other forces coming from Kaunas , 

2940
01:53:30,646 --> 01:53:32,868
um , take much longer to transit . Um , 

2941
01:53:32,868 --> 01:53:34,868
can you talk a little bit about the 

2942
01:53:34,868 --> 01:53:36,979
potential growth of , um , you know , 

2943
01:53:36,979 --> 01:53:39,090
other places that are forces could be 

2944
01:53:39,090 --> 01:53:41,034
stationed overseas to provide more 

2945
01:53:41,034 --> 01:53:43,670
continuous presence within the hor . Um , 

2946
01:53:43,680 --> 01:53:45,791
if there are any particular locations 

2947
01:53:45,791 --> 01:53:47,902
that you are optimistic that we could 

2948
01:53:47,902 --> 01:53:49,902
create basing arrangements with our 

2949
01:53:49,902 --> 01:53:52,013
allies , um , in order to have a more 

2950
01:53:52,013 --> 01:53:54,124
sustained operational presence within 

2951
01:53:54,124 --> 01:53:57,930
the region , three of the areas 

2952
01:53:57,930 --> 01:54:00,830
that have been being developed over the 

2953
01:54:00,830 --> 01:54:02,941
course of the last several years have 

2954
01:54:02,941 --> 01:54:05,250
been , uh , Northwest Australia , 

2955
01:54:05,260 --> 01:54:07,730
Singapore and , of course , Guam . And 

2956
01:54:07,730 --> 01:54:10,080
associated with Guam is the D . P . R . 

2957
01:54:10,080 --> 01:54:13,400
I . Um , the re stationing of Marines 

2958
01:54:13,400 --> 01:54:15,622
from Okinawa and partnership with Japan 

2959
01:54:15,622 --> 01:54:17,678
and Guam is one of the beneficiaries 

2960
01:54:17,678 --> 01:54:19,789
there . Um , those are three areas in 

2961
01:54:19,789 --> 01:54:22,510
which I think , um , bases , uh , need 

2962
01:54:22,510 --> 01:54:25,550
to be continued to flesh out . Um It 

2963
01:54:25,550 --> 01:54:28,470
may not mean necessarily more people or 

2964
01:54:28,470 --> 01:54:30,970
more capabilities in in all places , 

2965
01:54:30,980 --> 01:54:33,790
but certainly the access and some of 

2966
01:54:33,790 --> 01:54:36,000
what we envision in the Indo Pacific 

2967
01:54:36,000 --> 01:54:38,111
Warfighting concepts and in the p d I 

2968
01:54:38,111 --> 01:54:40,278
to facilitate , you know , things like 

2969
01:54:40,278 --> 01:54:42,167
sustainment and logistics will be 

2970
01:54:42,167 --> 01:54:44,222
critically important . I can't leave 

2971
01:54:44,222 --> 01:54:46,460
out the Garcia as well . Now we do have 

2972
01:54:46,460 --> 01:54:48,349
ambition in there for what I call 

2973
01:54:48,349 --> 01:54:50,293
places . Not basis , not permanent 

2974
01:54:50,293 --> 01:54:52,349
bases that look like housing and the 

2975
01:54:52,349 --> 01:54:54,404
permanent assignment of troops . But 

2976
01:54:54,404 --> 01:54:56,650
places that we might assess , um , 

2977
01:54:56,660 --> 01:54:58,438
there Well , articulated in the 

2978
01:54:58,438 --> 01:55:00,760
classified 12 51 report . And perhaps 

2979
01:55:00,760 --> 01:55:02,649
we could talk about some of those 

2980
01:55:02,649 --> 01:55:05,680
countries . Um , later . Yeah . I also 

2981
01:55:05,680 --> 01:55:08,050
wanted to touch on the recent 

2982
01:55:08,050 --> 01:55:09,994
announcement by the Navy that they 

2983
01:55:09,994 --> 01:55:11,939
would be re establishing the first 

2984
01:55:11,939 --> 01:55:13,772
fleet . Um , so as the combatant 

2985
01:55:13,772 --> 01:55:15,828
Commander and kind of looking at the 

2986
01:55:15,828 --> 01:55:18,050
naval forces in the O . R . Um , do you 

2987
01:55:18,050 --> 01:55:20,106
find that the advantageous from your 

2988
01:55:20,106 --> 01:55:22,328
position to have that split between the 

2989
01:55:22,328 --> 01:55:24,439
first and the seventh Fleet or do you 

2990
01:55:24,439 --> 01:55:26,494
find the current operations with the 

2991
01:55:26,494 --> 01:55:28,661
seventh Fleet covering essentially the 

2992
01:55:28,661 --> 01:55:30,606
whole maritime area of your A R is 

2993
01:55:30,606 --> 01:55:33,310
sufficient . Um , Abdal Aquilino at 

2994
01:55:33,310 --> 01:55:35,532
Pacific Fleet has been asked by Navy to 

2995
01:55:35,532 --> 01:55:37,532
look at some options for what ? The 

2996
01:55:37,532 --> 01:55:39,699
fourth the first Fleet might do . Um , 

2997
01:55:39,699 --> 01:55:42,032
he's still in the process of developing , 

2998
01:55:42,032 --> 01:55:44,710
Um , what the concepts might be , what 

2999
01:55:44,710 --> 01:55:47,580
the impacts , pros and cons are and how 

3000
01:55:47,580 --> 01:55:49,636
it affects seven fleet . Some of our 

3001
01:55:49,636 --> 01:55:51,802
relationships out there as well I look 

3002
01:55:51,802 --> 01:55:53,802
forward to having that conversation 

3003
01:55:53,802 --> 01:55:55,858
with certainly can follow up on that 

3004
01:55:55,858 --> 01:55:58,080
and also talking about presence and the 

3005
01:55:58,080 --> 01:56:00,191
type of ships and aircraft we have in 

3006
01:56:00,191 --> 01:56:02,247
the theater recently , the U S Coast 

3007
01:56:02,247 --> 01:56:04,413
guard deployed , um , to the peak . Um 

3008
01:56:04,413 --> 01:56:06,413
er , um , and I wonder if you could 

3009
01:56:06,413 --> 01:56:08,450
talk about your perspective on the 

3010
01:56:08,460 --> 01:56:10,330
utility of that type of platform 

3011
01:56:10,330 --> 01:56:12,163
operating , you know , under the 

3012
01:56:12,163 --> 01:56:13,997
control of the Coast Guard , and 

3013
01:56:13,997 --> 01:56:15,886
potentially , um , under tactical 

3014
01:56:15,886 --> 01:56:18,710
control of the Navy or yourself at , um , 

3015
01:56:18,720 --> 01:56:21,053
future times . Do you find more utility ? 

3016
01:56:21,053 --> 01:56:23,220
Should we have more Coast Guard , um , 

3017
01:56:23,220 --> 01:56:24,887
assets in the region and that 

3018
01:56:24,887 --> 01:56:26,998
particular platform something that is 

3019
01:56:26,998 --> 01:56:28,887
very useful under the Coast Guard 

3020
01:56:28,887 --> 01:56:31,120
within your er , um , we work in close 

3021
01:56:31,120 --> 01:56:33,342
collaboration collaboration . Excuse me 

3022
01:56:33,342 --> 01:56:35,453
with the pack . Area Commander , Vice 

3023
01:56:35,453 --> 01:56:37,610
Admiral Linda Fagan , um , the Coast 

3024
01:56:37,610 --> 01:56:41,350
Guard has a has , um , relationships in 

3025
01:56:41,350 --> 01:56:43,517
the region and all the same country to 

3026
01:56:43,517 --> 01:56:45,461
country relationships that that we 

3027
01:56:45,461 --> 01:56:47,239
would have . Um , but in unique 

3028
01:56:47,239 --> 01:56:49,760
portfolios , like , uh , illegal , 

3029
01:56:49,760 --> 01:56:51,890
unregulated , unreported fishing , 

3030
01:56:51,900 --> 01:56:54,240
narco trafficking , human trafficking , 

3031
01:56:54,240 --> 01:56:56,420
maritime domain awareness . Uh , and 

3032
01:56:56,420 --> 01:56:58,400
they have key relationships with 

3033
01:56:58,410 --> 01:57:00,521
countries , particularly in Oceania , 

3034
01:57:00,521 --> 01:57:02,466
that may only have law enforcement 

3035
01:57:02,466 --> 01:57:04,940
organizations . So there , 

3036
01:57:04,950 --> 01:57:08,200
uh , Coast Guard presence in the region 

3037
01:57:08,210 --> 01:57:11,130
is very , very important , As when we 

3038
01:57:11,130 --> 01:57:13,241
talked about earlier building partner 

3039
01:57:13,241 --> 01:57:15,730
capacity and our engagements . Um , I'm 

3040
01:57:15,740 --> 01:57:19,050
very grateful for , um , their approach 

3041
01:57:19,050 --> 01:57:20,883
to the region , and they seek to 

3042
01:57:20,883 --> 01:57:22,939
collaborate with us . Uh , the Coast 

3043
01:57:22,939 --> 01:57:25,920
Guard does . I'm also very appreciative 

3044
01:57:25,930 --> 01:57:28,041
of the very unique relationships they 

3045
01:57:28,041 --> 01:57:29,790
have . Um , uh , fisheries 

3046
01:57:29,790 --> 01:57:31,846
relationships with Taiwan , even the 

3047
01:57:31,846 --> 01:57:34,012
People's Republic of China , Um , that 

3048
01:57:34,012 --> 01:57:37,540
are important venues to engage in 

3049
01:57:37,540 --> 01:57:40,480
advance interests of mutual interests 

3050
01:57:40,480 --> 01:57:43,230
that we're both concerned with . Uh huh . 

3051
01:57:43,730 --> 01:57:45,990
Thank you . And your back . Thank you . 

3052
01:57:46,000 --> 01:57:49,010
So we got 15 minutes left , and that 

3053
01:57:49,020 --> 01:57:51,740
means we've got Miss Cini , Miska , 

3054
01:57:51,740 --> 01:57:54,220
Healy and Mr Waltz . So we'll get to 

3055
01:57:54,220 --> 01:57:56,480
those three and then we'll be done and 

3056
01:57:56,480 --> 01:57:58,430
reconvene over at the CVC for the 

3057
01:57:58,430 --> 01:58:00,319
classified brief . Ms . Cheney is 

3058
01:58:00,319 --> 01:58:03,430
recognized for five minutes Thank you 

3059
01:58:03,430 --> 01:58:05,590
very much , Sharon Smith , And thank 

3060
01:58:05,590 --> 01:58:07,710
you to all of our witnesses for being 

3061
01:58:07,710 --> 01:58:10,810
here today . I want to start . I want 

3062
01:58:10,810 --> 01:58:13,510
to thank in particular General Abrams 

3063
01:58:13,510 --> 01:58:16,630
for your comments about January 6th . 

3064
01:58:16,630 --> 01:58:20,570
And I think all of us recognize we 

3065
01:58:20,570 --> 01:58:22,960
were reminded that day , uh , how 

3066
01:58:22,960 --> 01:58:26,100
fragile our systems could be , but also 

3067
01:58:26,100 --> 01:58:28,740
how resilient they are . And , uh , and 

3068
01:58:28,750 --> 01:58:31,610
the system is held . Uh , and I know 

3069
01:58:31,610 --> 01:58:34,750
that in a bipartisan fashion , we all 

3070
01:58:34,750 --> 01:58:38,070
strive every day to make sure that we 

3071
01:58:38,070 --> 01:58:40,181
remember and recognize the sacrifices 

3072
01:58:40,181 --> 01:58:42,370
that have been made to defend our 

3073
01:58:42,370 --> 01:58:44,810
freedom and the sacrifices that those 

3074
01:58:44,810 --> 01:58:47,640
of you in uniform continue to make and 

3075
01:58:47,820 --> 01:58:50,480
to conduct ourselves in in in ways that 

3076
01:58:50,480 --> 01:58:52,480
are worthy of your service and your 

3077
01:58:52,480 --> 01:58:55,640
sacrifice . So thank you for your 

3078
01:58:55,640 --> 01:58:57,418
service and thank you for those 

3079
01:58:57,418 --> 01:58:59,584
comments . And and thank you for being 

3080
01:58:59,584 --> 01:59:01,473
here with us today . Um , Admiral 

3081
01:59:01,473 --> 01:59:04,670
Davidson , I wanted to ask you about 

3082
01:59:04,680 --> 01:59:07,680
deterrence . And , um , Shannon Smith 

3083
01:59:07,680 --> 01:59:11,020
has mentioned a couple of times the a 

3084
01:59:11,020 --> 01:59:14,580
concern about ensuring that , 

3085
01:59:14,590 --> 01:59:18,340
uh , we aren't creating a new cold war , 

3086
01:59:18,350 --> 01:59:22,050
uh , vis a vis china . Um , and so I 

3087
01:59:22,050 --> 01:59:25,050
wondered if you could You could uh , 

3088
01:59:25,060 --> 01:59:27,227
dispel that notion . Talk a little bit 

3089
01:59:27,227 --> 01:59:29,449
about exactly what this strategy is . I 

3090
01:59:29,449 --> 01:59:31,504
know you talked about this yesterday 

3091
01:59:31,504 --> 01:59:33,690
over in the Senate in terms of what 

3092
01:59:33,690 --> 01:59:36,580
really is required , um , to ensure 

3093
01:59:36,580 --> 01:59:40,280
that that the , uh , Chinese military 

3094
01:59:40,280 --> 01:59:42,450
recognizes and understands how painful 

3095
01:59:42,450 --> 01:59:45,790
the 1st 24 48 72 hours would be for 

3096
01:59:45,790 --> 01:59:48,370
them ensuring that we have sufficient 

3097
01:59:48,380 --> 01:59:51,370
resources and capabilities , Um , so 

3098
01:59:51,370 --> 01:59:54,490
that they aren't , uh , provoked by our 

3099
01:59:54,490 --> 01:59:56,601
weakness . Frankly , but if you could 

3100
01:59:56,601 --> 01:59:58,601
give us a little bit more detail in 

3101
01:59:58,601 --> 02:00:00,268
terms of how you look at that 

3102
02:00:00,268 --> 02:00:02,379
deterrence , I know some of that will 

3103
02:00:02,379 --> 02:00:04,657
come in the classified portion as well . 

3104
02:00:04,657 --> 02:00:06,712
Um , thank you , congresswoman . And 

3105
02:00:06,712 --> 02:00:09,750
very well articulated . Um , uh , at 

3106
02:00:09,750 --> 02:00:11,861
the heart of our approach in the Indo 

3107
02:00:11,861 --> 02:00:14,130
Pacific is a deterrence by denial 

3108
02:00:14,510 --> 02:00:18,450
approach . Um , in my mind that 

3109
02:00:18,460 --> 02:00:21,440
that takes a requirement to have the 

3110
02:00:21,440 --> 02:00:24,740
capability forward . Um , that involves 

3111
02:00:24,740 --> 02:00:27,190
both are forward based forces today , 

3112
02:00:27,200 --> 02:00:29,280
as well as the forces that we rotate 

3113
02:00:29,290 --> 02:00:31,346
routinely in the region . You know , 

3114
02:00:31,346 --> 02:00:35,240
sufficient warning is our presence of 

3115
02:00:35,240 --> 02:00:38,440
conventional assets , and you know , 

3116
02:00:38,450 --> 02:00:41,540
the the ability to project offense to 

3117
02:00:41,540 --> 02:00:44,330
defend our forces , to defend our our 

3118
02:00:44,340 --> 02:00:46,562
obligations in the theater , not only U 

3119
02:00:46,562 --> 02:00:49,480
s territory about our bilateral allies 

3120
02:00:49,480 --> 02:00:52,720
as well . Uh , you know , in order for 

3121
02:00:53,210 --> 02:00:55,377
any adversary to peel back the curtain 

3122
02:00:55,377 --> 02:00:58,240
every day and say I see they have the 

3123
02:00:58,240 --> 02:01:02,050
presence because the capability 

3124
02:01:02,060 --> 02:01:05,340
in the numbers , the capacity and you 

3125
02:01:05,340 --> 02:01:07,720
know , the desired training and 

3126
02:01:07,730 --> 02:01:10,410
authorities to actually prevent me from 

3127
02:01:10,420 --> 02:01:12,960
pursuing my objectives and then close 

3128
02:01:12,960 --> 02:01:15,016
the curtain and say today is not the 

3129
02:01:15,016 --> 02:01:17,071
day . Um , that's the very nature of 

3130
02:01:17,071 --> 02:01:19,127
what we're trying to accomplish . We 

3131
02:01:19,127 --> 02:01:20,830
seek to maintain the peace . 

3132
02:01:22,510 --> 02:01:25,630
Thank you . And I'll important to talk 

3133
02:01:25,630 --> 02:01:27,720
in more detail about that in the 

3134
02:01:27,730 --> 02:01:29,730
classified setting . Um , could you 

3135
02:01:29,730 --> 02:01:31,952
just say a few words ? Admiral Davidson 

3136
02:01:31,952 --> 02:01:33,952
about operational concepts ? I know 

3137
02:01:33,952 --> 02:01:35,952
this is something that the national 

3138
02:01:35,952 --> 02:01:38,174
defense strategy focused on a few years 

3139
02:01:38,174 --> 02:01:40,930
ago . Um , but in your view , where are 

3140
02:01:40,930 --> 02:01:43,230
we in terms of having updated and 

3141
02:01:43,230 --> 02:01:46,070
adequate operational concepts with 

3142
02:01:46,070 --> 02:01:48,320
respect to China in particular ? 

3143
02:01:49,710 --> 02:01:52,080
Yes , ma'am . The joint staff , the 

3144
02:01:52,080 --> 02:01:54,136
chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his 

3145
02:01:54,136 --> 02:01:56,247
staff are are working very diligently 

3146
02:01:56,247 --> 02:01:58,940
on a joint warfighting concepts and or 

3147
02:01:58,940 --> 02:02:01,350
subordinate , um , warfighting concepts 

3148
02:02:01,350 --> 02:02:04,480
of logistics and networking and others , 

3149
02:02:04,490 --> 02:02:06,490
um , that we believe are critically 

3150
02:02:06,490 --> 02:02:08,712
important . We've been running a series 

3151
02:02:08,712 --> 02:02:11,900
of war games to help inform development 

3152
02:02:11,900 --> 02:02:13,960
of those concepts . Uh , and as I 

3153
02:02:13,960 --> 02:02:15,960
mentioned earlier , um , you know , 

3154
02:02:15,960 --> 02:02:19,220
given , uh , my requirement to focus on 

3155
02:02:19,230 --> 02:02:21,230
the immediate needs , uh , that are 

3156
02:02:21,230 --> 02:02:23,341
present out there in the theater . We 

3157
02:02:23,341 --> 02:02:25,341
are working with the services quite 

3158
02:02:25,341 --> 02:02:27,508
closely as new capabilities come in to 

3159
02:02:27,508 --> 02:02:29,619
be able to pull them into our what we 

3160
02:02:29,619 --> 02:02:31,452
call in the Pacific war fighting 

3161
02:02:31,452 --> 02:02:33,786
concept . Uh , that would be , you know , 

3162
02:02:33,786 --> 02:02:35,786
our approach to the region over the 

3163
02:02:35,786 --> 02:02:38,300
next few years . Three times . Okay . 

3164
02:02:38,310 --> 02:02:40,588
Thank you . I yield back , Mr Chairman . 

3165
02:02:40,700 --> 02:02:42,922
Thank you . And I apologize . I made an 

3166
02:02:42,922 --> 02:02:45,089
error . Um , one of the things about , 

3167
02:02:45,089 --> 02:02:48,020
um , people come and go , and when they 

3168
02:02:48,020 --> 02:02:50,187
come back , if they were here ahead of 

3169
02:02:50,187 --> 02:02:52,464
the list . So I apologize to Mr Keeley , 

3170
02:02:52,464 --> 02:02:54,687
we're not gonna be able to get to you . 

3171
02:02:54,687 --> 02:02:56,853
Mr . Keating has returned , and he was 

3172
02:02:56,853 --> 02:02:59,020
here at the start . Um , so Mr Keating 

3173
02:02:59,020 --> 02:03:01,076
is recognized for five minutes , and 

3174
02:03:01,076 --> 02:03:03,131
then Mr Waltz will wrap us up . Mr . 

3175
02:03:03,131 --> 02:03:05,270
Keating . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

3176
02:03:05,270 --> 02:03:07,820
I'll try and be brief and narrow . 

3177
02:03:07,830 --> 02:03:11,520
Thank the witnesses . Yeah . You know , 

3178
02:03:11,530 --> 02:03:15,040
really continues to , uh , be a concern 

3179
02:03:15,040 --> 02:03:17,207
is you know , the reports where we had 

3180
02:03:17,207 --> 02:03:19,450
started out with joint . We're not we 

3181
02:03:19,460 --> 02:03:22,340
but that the Chinese and Russians , uh , 

3182
02:03:22,350 --> 02:03:24,650
and that's quite a change in their 

3183
02:03:24,650 --> 02:03:26,950
posturing before actually engaged in 

3184
02:03:26,950 --> 02:03:29,960
joint training exercises . Could you 

3185
02:03:29,960 --> 02:03:32,130
comment on what the outlook is for 

3186
02:03:32,130 --> 02:03:34,241
continuation of that ? What your take 

3187
02:03:34,241 --> 02:03:37,250
is on , uh , you know , uh , threat 

3188
02:03:37,250 --> 02:03:39,472
that could impose . And what changes in 

3189
02:03:39,472 --> 02:03:41,528
their relationship could impact us . 

3190
02:03:44,300 --> 02:03:47,120
Uh , thank you , Congressman . Um , 

3191
02:03:48,000 --> 02:03:50,000
during the course of the last three 

3192
02:03:50,000 --> 02:03:52,320
years , we've seen , um , the Chinese 

3193
02:03:52,320 --> 02:03:54,920
participate with the Russians in in 

3194
02:03:54,930 --> 02:03:57,760
Russia's Capstone Eastern Military 

3195
02:03:57,760 --> 02:04:00,810
district exercises on an annual basis . 

3196
02:04:01,390 --> 02:04:03,980
We've seen some cold bomber flights , 

3197
02:04:03,980 --> 02:04:05,924
you know , side by side flights of 

3198
02:04:05,924 --> 02:04:08,190
bombers from People's Liberation Army 

3199
02:04:08,190 --> 02:04:10,790
in China as well as , um , Russian 

3200
02:04:10,790 --> 02:04:14,110
forces . And we've also seen some naval 

3201
02:04:14,110 --> 02:04:16,540
exercises during the course of my three 

3202
02:04:16,540 --> 02:04:19,310
years in command in the Indo Pacific . 

3203
02:04:19,790 --> 02:04:23,330
Um , I think we'll continue to see , uh , 

3204
02:04:23,340 --> 02:04:25,451
exercises and cooperation like that . 

3205
02:04:25,690 --> 02:04:27,900
There are many that say that those 

3206
02:04:27,910 --> 02:04:30,680
exercises are pretty nascent and and 

3207
02:04:30,680 --> 02:04:33,160
don't demonstrate the kind of coalition 

3208
02:04:33,160 --> 02:04:35,271
approach that the United States might 

3209
02:04:35,271 --> 02:04:37,160
have with others . Nevertheless , 

3210
02:04:37,160 --> 02:04:39,610
they're learning along the way and we 

3211
02:04:39,610 --> 02:04:42,020
should be concerned about it . Uh huh . 

3212
02:04:42,390 --> 02:04:45,160
Thank you . And , uh , that just speaks 

3213
02:04:45,160 --> 02:04:48,360
to our necessity , uh , moving forward 

3214
02:04:48,360 --> 02:04:50,527
on our own partnerships . Like the one 

3215
02:04:50,527 --> 02:04:52,749
you referenced the new Senate testimony 

3216
02:04:52,749 --> 02:04:54,527
with the quad . India , Japan , 

3217
02:04:54,527 --> 02:04:56,582
Australia and the US Mr . Chairman , 

3218
02:04:56,582 --> 02:04:58,471
I'll yield back some time so that 

3219
02:04:58,471 --> 02:05:00,471
everyone gets a chance at the end . 

3220
02:05:00,471 --> 02:05:00,390
Thank you . Thank you . I appreciate 

3221
02:05:00,390 --> 02:05:02,446
that . And that will give us time to 

3222
02:05:02,446 --> 02:05:04,668
get to Mr Keeley . So yeah . Coming and 

3223
02:05:04,668 --> 02:05:06,723
going . Mr . Waltz is recognized for 

3224
02:05:06,723 --> 02:05:10,460
five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

3225
02:05:10,470 --> 02:05:12,470
I want to be sure you can hear me . 

3226
02:05:12,470 --> 02:05:16,100
Okay . Yes , We got you . Yeah . Thank 

3227
02:05:16,100 --> 02:05:19,760
you . Uh , thank you , Admiral . 

3228
02:05:19,770 --> 02:05:23,030
Uh , Mr Hell , v General Abrams , Thank 

3229
02:05:23,030 --> 02:05:25,220
you so much . For for for your service 

3230
02:05:25,220 --> 02:05:27,630
over the last few years and for your 

3231
02:05:27,640 --> 02:05:30,130
candor and commitment to the oversight 

3232
02:05:30,130 --> 02:05:32,074
of this committee . I just want to 

3233
02:05:32,074 --> 02:05:34,130
throw out there where I'm starting . 

3234
02:05:34,130 --> 02:05:35,908
Kind of . From at least from my 

3235
02:05:35,908 --> 02:05:38,019
perspective , I do believe we're in a 

3236
02:05:38,019 --> 02:05:40,019
Cold war with the Chinese Communist 

3237
02:05:40,019 --> 02:05:42,130
Party . Or at least they believe that 

3238
02:05:42,130 --> 02:05:45,150
they are in one with us . Uh , we need 

3239
02:05:45,160 --> 02:05:49,070
a bit of a wake up call across our 

3240
02:05:49,070 --> 02:05:51,820
populist to that fact . And , you know , 

3241
02:05:51,820 --> 02:05:55,130
just by definition , if we have a 

3242
02:05:55,140 --> 02:05:59,000
competitor , uh , that has a by many 

3243
02:05:59,000 --> 02:06:01,111
measures larger economy than ours and 

3244
02:06:01,111 --> 02:06:03,760
is on track to have a larger military 

3245
02:06:03,770 --> 02:06:05,590
and is seeking to displace us 

3246
02:06:05,590 --> 02:06:07,479
diplomatically , economically and 

3247
02:06:07,479 --> 02:06:09,900
through the information space that that 

3248
02:06:09,900 --> 02:06:12,200
is , um , that is a Cold War 

3249
02:06:12,580 --> 02:06:14,660
environment , at least by by my 

3250
02:06:14,660 --> 02:06:17,520
definition , Admiral , I want would 

3251
02:06:17,520 --> 02:06:20,240
like your opinion on some analysis that 

3252
02:06:20,250 --> 02:06:23,410
I've been absorbing that that points to 

3253
02:06:23,410 --> 02:06:26,360
what ? That CCP and the P . L . A . 

3254
02:06:26,370 --> 02:06:28,580
Define a success . And one of the 

3255
02:06:28,580 --> 02:06:31,640
things that they plan on , at least in 

3256
02:06:31,640 --> 02:06:34,540
their long range campaign planning , Is 

3257
02:06:34,540 --> 02:06:37,780
the United States financially , uh , 

3258
02:06:37,790 --> 02:06:40,020
fiscally , not no longer being able to 

3259
02:06:40,020 --> 02:06:42,750
compete essentially the United States 

3260
02:06:42,750 --> 02:06:45,710
in many ways , uh , declining 

3261
02:06:45,710 --> 02:06:47,870
economically to the point where we 

3262
02:06:47,870 --> 02:06:51,820
can't afford to be a 

3263
02:06:51,830 --> 02:06:54,052
competitor with China and certainly not 

3264
02:06:54,052 --> 02:06:56,710
in the Pacific and in the Indo Pacific . 

3265
02:06:56,720 --> 02:06:58,609
Do you agree with that analysis ? 

3266
02:07:01,080 --> 02:07:03,330
Um , sir , I think , uh , you know , 

3267
02:07:03,330 --> 02:07:05,552
one of the key advantages of the United 

3268
02:07:05,552 --> 02:07:08,230
States over the course of the last over 

3269
02:07:08,230 --> 02:07:10,286
the course of the post World War Two 

3270
02:07:10,286 --> 02:07:12,250
history is our ability to lead the 

3271
02:07:12,250 --> 02:07:15,770
world in innovation . Um , that's led 

3272
02:07:15,780 --> 02:07:18,100
not only to prosperity in this nation , 

3273
02:07:18,100 --> 02:07:20,120
but I would say across the globe as 

3274
02:07:20,120 --> 02:07:23,670
well , um , investments that focus on 

3275
02:07:23,680 --> 02:07:25,624
innovation . And there's plenty of 

3276
02:07:25,624 --> 02:07:27,569
opportunities there and artificial 

3277
02:07:27,569 --> 02:07:29,790
intelligence and five g technologies 

3278
02:07:29,790 --> 02:07:33,040
and , you know , on and on their , you 

3279
02:07:33,040 --> 02:07:35,220
know , advanced energy production and 

3280
02:07:35,220 --> 02:07:37,570
things like that . There's plenty of 

3281
02:07:37,570 --> 02:07:39,626
opportunity for the United States to 

3282
02:07:39,626 --> 02:07:41,890
continue to lead the globe there . I 

3283
02:07:41,900 --> 02:07:44,750
will say that that one of the Chinese 

3284
02:07:44,750 --> 02:07:46,972
talking points and one of their efforts 

3285
02:07:46,972 --> 02:07:50,500
to deter the world and to deter 

3286
02:07:50,510 --> 02:07:53,870
us , um , from our bilateral alliances 

3287
02:07:53,870 --> 02:07:57,170
and and multilateral associations is to 

3288
02:07:57,170 --> 02:07:58,892
convince the rest of the world 

3289
02:07:58,892 --> 02:08:01,226
precisely that that were on the decline . 

3290
02:08:01,226 --> 02:08:03,337
And they're on the rise . Um , I have 

3291
02:08:03,337 --> 02:08:05,337
to tell you , I'm an optimist about 

3292
02:08:05,337 --> 02:08:08,060
America . Um , uh , if we focus on our 

3293
02:08:08,060 --> 02:08:11,120
strengths Uh huh . Now , Yeah , 

3294
02:08:11,130 --> 02:08:13,297
Absolutely . Thank you . I'm wrong . I 

3295
02:08:13,297 --> 02:08:15,352
would I would just commit that if we 

3296
02:08:15,352 --> 02:08:17,297
don't have our own health in order 

3297
02:08:17,297 --> 02:08:19,408
financially . If we continue to build 

3298
02:08:19,408 --> 02:08:21,580
on a $30 trillion debt , that may 

3299
02:08:21,580 --> 02:08:23,469
imperil our ability to make those 

3300
02:08:23,469 --> 02:08:26,030
investments that you find so critical 

3301
02:08:26,030 --> 02:08:28,252
and then . Secondly , if we continue to 

3302
02:08:28,252 --> 02:08:30,308
allow the Chinese Communist Party to 

3303
02:08:30,308 --> 02:08:32,880
steal their way to the top , uh , 

3304
02:08:32,890 --> 02:08:34,890
through cyber , through mergers and 

3305
02:08:34,890 --> 02:08:37,290
acquisitions , uh , and through frankly , 

3306
02:08:37,290 --> 02:08:39,512
just outright theft in our research and 

3307
02:08:39,512 --> 02:08:41,440
academic universities , the 

3308
02:08:41,440 --> 02:08:43,384
conversations that we have in this 

3309
02:08:43,384 --> 02:08:45,570
committee may not matter because we 

3310
02:08:45,570 --> 02:08:48,320
just cannot keep pace . So one of the 

3311
02:08:48,320 --> 02:08:50,540
things that I'd like to get out from , 

3312
02:08:50,550 --> 02:08:52,383
at least in a few minutes I have 

3313
02:08:52,383 --> 02:08:56,310
remaining is Do you agree 

3314
02:08:56,310 --> 02:08:59,630
that what gets what is Beijing fear the 

3315
02:08:59,630 --> 02:09:03,550
most ? They fear internal unrest . Uh , 

3316
02:09:03,560 --> 02:09:07,290
rearmed Japan Unified Korean Peninsula 

3317
02:09:07,300 --> 02:09:10,870
Uh , western U . S . Allies on their 

3318
02:09:10,870 --> 02:09:13,092
periphery . I mean , we've talked a lot 

3319
02:09:13,092 --> 02:09:15,092
today today about how to defend our 

3320
02:09:15,092 --> 02:09:17,480
basing and to maintain our capabilities . 

3321
02:09:17,490 --> 02:09:19,712
But how do we get inside their decision 

3322
02:09:19,712 --> 02:09:22,430
making as a as we seek to maintain 

3323
02:09:22,430 --> 02:09:26,170
deterrence . Thank you , 

3324
02:09:26,180 --> 02:09:28,402
sir , for that . You know , I would say 

3325
02:09:28,402 --> 02:09:30,569
that they're setting aside fears for a 

3326
02:09:30,569 --> 02:09:32,680
minute . Their number one priority is 

3327
02:09:32,680 --> 02:09:34,902
to keep the Communist Party of China in 

3328
02:09:34,902 --> 02:09:37,069
power . They have concerns about their 

3329
02:09:37,069 --> 02:09:38,902
own internal security . What the 

3330
02:09:38,902 --> 02:09:41,450
influences are there and they have 

3331
02:09:41,460 --> 02:09:43,404
external security concerns which I 

3332
02:09:43,404 --> 02:09:45,630
think are totally unwarranted . given 

3333
02:09:45,630 --> 02:09:47,840
the West , you know , support to China 

3334
02:09:47,850 --> 02:09:50,190
over the last nearly 40 years . Now 

3335
02:09:50,190 --> 02:09:53,400
specifically , um uh , as well . 

3336
02:09:54,570 --> 02:09:58,040
Right . Thank you , Mr Chairman . I'll 

3337
02:09:58,040 --> 02:10:00,180
yield my 10 seconds . Thank you . 

3338
02:10:00,190 --> 02:10:02,301
Appreciate that . Hey , that's that's 

3339
02:10:02,301 --> 02:10:04,412
that's better than average . Um , and 

3340
02:10:04,412 --> 02:10:06,680
hospital , at least . Mr . Cahill . 

3341
02:10:08,960 --> 02:10:10,960
Hello . Thank you so much . Chair . 

3342
02:10:10,960 --> 02:10:12,960
Hello , Albert Davidson . It's It's 

3343
02:10:12,960 --> 02:10:15,071
great to see you . Thanks so much for 

3344
02:10:15,071 --> 02:10:17,238
taking the time , uh , to meet with me 

3345
02:10:17,238 --> 02:10:19,460
just before coming here to Washington . 

3346
02:10:19,460 --> 02:10:21,430
D c uh , I'll be I'll be quick . I 

3347
02:10:21,440 --> 02:10:24,660
appreciate , uh , the testimony , and I 

3348
02:10:24,660 --> 02:10:27,560
couldn't agree more about your analysis 

3349
02:10:27,570 --> 02:10:31,350
of 360 degree , Um uh , missile 

3350
02:10:31,350 --> 02:10:33,350
defense capability , protection for 

3351
02:10:33,350 --> 02:10:36,270
Guam . And I hope that whatever system 

3352
02:10:36,280 --> 02:10:39,350
we put in place there to protect our 

3353
02:10:39,350 --> 02:10:41,940
1st and 2nd island chains , uh , we one 

3354
02:10:41,940 --> 02:10:44,590
day look at protecting have a as well 

3355
02:10:44,600 --> 02:10:46,822
as you well know , I represent Hawaii . 

3356
02:10:46,822 --> 02:10:49,400
I commend the Navy for the successful , 

3357
02:10:49,410 --> 02:10:52,330
uh um and , uh , end up becoming 

3358
02:10:52,330 --> 02:10:55,320
successful . FTM 44 test , uh , last 

3359
02:10:55,320 --> 02:10:57,450
December of the coast of Hawaii and 

3360
02:10:57,450 --> 02:10:59,750
showing the value of the Pacific , uh , 

3361
02:10:59,760 --> 02:11:02,180
missile range facility at Parkinson's . 

3362
02:11:02,560 --> 02:11:06,370
And and so my question is in regards to 

3363
02:11:06,380 --> 02:11:08,770
China's increasing threat and their 

3364
02:11:08,770 --> 02:11:11,590
development of their threats . Uh , 

3365
02:11:11,600 --> 02:11:14,800
specifically , um , potential ballistic 

3366
02:11:14,800 --> 02:11:16,911
missile threats for Hawaii . Is there 

3367
02:11:16,911 --> 02:11:19,200
any thoughts of discussion put into , 

3368
02:11:19,210 --> 02:11:22,200
um , one day , looking at sm three 

3369
02:11:22,200 --> 02:11:24,300
blocked away interceptors either 

3370
02:11:24,300 --> 02:11:26,560
deployed on ages , ships off of Hawaii 

3371
02:11:26,570 --> 02:11:30,280
or utilizing the VLS ages ashore site 

3372
02:11:30,520 --> 02:11:34,130
at P . M . R . F uh , once we 

3373
02:11:34,140 --> 02:11:36,251
direct our attention towards Guam and 

3374
02:11:36,251 --> 02:11:38,590
then start to look at things like uh 

3375
02:11:38,590 --> 02:11:42,540
huh . Thanks for your question , 

3376
02:11:42,540 --> 02:11:45,380
Congressman . I you know , my my 

3377
02:11:45,860 --> 02:11:47,749
nearest priority there is for the 

3378
02:11:47,749 --> 02:11:49,860
homeland defense radar , Hawaii . And 

3379
02:11:49,860 --> 02:11:51,693
it's unfortunate that that falls 

3380
02:11:51,693 --> 02:11:53,416
outside the Pacific Deterrence 

3381
02:11:53,416 --> 02:11:55,360
Initiative . But as we think about 

3382
02:11:55,360 --> 02:11:57,360
developing threats , uh , what , it 

3383
02:11:57,360 --> 02:11:59,300
might come to that sensing and 

3384
02:11:59,300 --> 02:12:01,880
awareness , um , you know , helps 

3385
02:12:02,700 --> 02:12:05,320
improve capability gaps when it comes 

3386
02:12:05,320 --> 02:12:08,880
to maneuvering . Excuse me ? Decoys . 

3387
02:12:09,250 --> 02:12:11,194
Ballistic missiles that might have 

3388
02:12:11,194 --> 02:12:13,650
decoys associated with their , uh , 

3389
02:12:13,660 --> 02:12:16,460
their reentry vehicles . Um , and then 

3390
02:12:16,470 --> 02:12:18,770
potentially , um , for maneuvering 

3391
02:12:18,770 --> 02:12:20,992
vehicles when they enter the atmosphere 

3392
02:12:20,992 --> 02:12:24,760
as well . Um , uh , I I 

3393
02:12:24,760 --> 02:12:27,430
hope everyone in the Congress has noted 

3394
02:12:27,440 --> 02:12:30,760
that the sm 32 

3395
02:12:31,150 --> 02:12:33,360
they had a very successful engagement 

3396
02:12:33,370 --> 02:12:35,780
here , Uh , several months ago from the 

3397
02:12:35,780 --> 02:12:39,410
USS John Finn . Uh , presents certainly 

3398
02:12:39,420 --> 02:12:41,531
capability , option to the nation and 

3399
02:12:41,531 --> 02:12:43,753
should something . It is something that 

3400
02:12:43,753 --> 02:12:45,698
I think should be considered going 

3401
02:12:45,698 --> 02:12:47,920
forward as we think that as we see that 

3402
02:12:47,920 --> 02:12:50,430
the threats developed right . Great . 

3403
02:12:50,430 --> 02:12:52,541
And my last question then , Admiral , 

3404
02:12:52,541 --> 02:12:55,090
uh , if that's the case as a National 

3405
02:12:55,090 --> 02:12:57,257
Guardsmen , it's my understanding that 

3406
02:12:57,257 --> 02:12:59,146
north , um , ground based missile 

3407
02:12:59,146 --> 02:13:02,110
defense system is man , uh , in 

3408
02:13:02,110 --> 02:13:04,054
combination with the Army National 

3409
02:13:04,054 --> 02:13:06,221
Guard and active component soldiers in 

3410
02:13:06,221 --> 02:13:08,277
Colorado and Alaska and California . 

3411
02:13:08,277 --> 02:13:11,620
The chief naval officer , uh , Admiral 

3412
02:13:11,630 --> 02:13:15,500
Gildea 2021 navigation plan . In it , 

3413
02:13:15,500 --> 02:13:17,490
he states that remain ahead of our 

3414
02:13:17,490 --> 02:13:20,300
competitors . We will divest ourselves 

3415
02:13:20,300 --> 02:13:22,411
of legacy capabilities that no longer 

3416
02:13:22,411 --> 02:13:24,744
bring sufficient lethality to the fight . 

3417
02:13:25,050 --> 02:13:27,850
This includes divesting non core Navy 

3418
02:13:27,850 --> 02:13:29,970
missions like ages ashore and 

3419
02:13:29,970 --> 02:13:32,137
transferring the shore based ballistic 

3420
02:13:32,137 --> 02:13:34,414
missile defense sites to ground forces , 

3421
02:13:34,414 --> 02:13:36,581
enables sailors to focus on their core 

3422
02:13:36,581 --> 02:13:39,040
missions at sea and frees up resources 

3423
02:13:39,040 --> 02:13:42,290
to increase our lethality . Uh , 

3424
02:13:42,300 --> 02:13:44,356
Admiral Davidson , do you ever think 

3425
02:13:44,356 --> 02:13:46,300
that the ages ashore system , um , 

3426
02:13:46,300 --> 02:13:48,522
could be possibly manned in India ? Pay 

3427
02:13:48,522 --> 02:13:51,980
calm by the National Guard ? Mhm . 

3428
02:13:52,350 --> 02:13:54,600
Um , I think certainly there's the 

3429
02:13:54,600 --> 02:13:57,330
potential for that . The Navy has built 

3430
02:13:57,340 --> 02:13:59,007
training infrastructure . The 

3431
02:13:59,007 --> 02:14:01,229
maintenance pipelines . Uh , you know , 

3432
02:14:01,229 --> 02:14:03,340
the supply parts needs all that other 

3433
02:14:03,340 --> 02:14:05,284
kind of stuff , um , to be able to 

3434
02:14:05,284 --> 02:14:07,284
bridge off of . And I know that the 

3435
02:14:07,284 --> 02:14:09,062
chief of Naval operations is in 

3436
02:14:09,062 --> 02:14:10,951
discussion with his service chief 

3437
02:14:10,951 --> 02:14:13,173
counterparts in the Pentagon about what 

3438
02:14:13,173 --> 02:14:15,340
the way ahead might be . All right . 

3439
02:14:15,340 --> 02:14:17,618
Thank you . Thank you . Chair . Mahalo . 

3440
02:14:17,618 --> 02:14:19,507
Thank you all very much that will 

3441
02:14:19,507 --> 02:14:21,673
conclude our hearing . I want to thank 

3442
02:14:21,673 --> 02:14:23,840
General Abrams , uh , for joining us . 

3443
02:14:23,840 --> 02:14:26,118
You will not be joining us , obviously , 

3444
02:14:26,118 --> 02:14:28,229
um , in the classified session in the 

3445
02:14:28,229 --> 02:14:30,229
CBC . But again , really appreciate 

3446
02:14:30,229 --> 02:14:32,173
your service and your leadership . 

3447
02:14:32,173 --> 02:14:34,396
You've done a fantastic job . Good luck 

3448
02:14:34,396 --> 02:14:36,451
with the rest of the exercise . Um , 

3449
02:14:36,451 --> 02:14:38,410
and thank you again . Two other 

3450
02:14:38,410 --> 02:14:40,577
witnesses as well . We will see you in 

3451
02:14:40,577 --> 02:14:42,920
45 minutes over in the CVC . And with 

3452
02:14:42,920 --> 02:14:45,480
that , we are jerk . Mr . Rogers did 

3453
02:14:45,480 --> 02:14:48,910
everything generated . You'll get some 

3454
02:14:48,910 --> 02:14:51,960
sleep , he's probably gonna go back to 

3455
02:14:51,960 --> 02:14:54,016
work . I don't think your microphone 

3456
02:14:54,016 --> 02:14:56,238
was on , so I don't think I heard you . 

3457
02:14:56,238 --> 02:14:58,404
But anyway , uh , Mr Rogers was urging 

3458
02:14:58,404 --> 02:14:57,980
you to get some sleep if you have the 

3459
02:14:57,980 --> 02:15:00,147
opportunity . But , uh , we'll see how 

3460
02:15:00,147 --> 02:15:02,313
that goes . Thank you very much . Were 

3461
02:15:02,313 --> 02:15:03,870
jerk where you all clean