1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:02,390 right . Hope everybody had a good 2 00:00:02,390 --> 00:00:05,580 weekend . Just a couple of things off 3 00:00:05,580 --> 00:00:09,530 the top . I think , um , you know that 4 00:00:09,540 --> 00:00:13,300 today's Gold Star Spouses Day And I 5 00:00:13,300 --> 00:00:16,710 know many of you know , some gold star 6 00:00:16,710 --> 00:00:18,932 spouses and the sacrifice that they and 7 00:00:18,932 --> 00:00:21,154 their family have , uh , have undergone 8 00:00:21,154 --> 00:00:22,821 in the last 20 years of war . 9 00:00:22,821 --> 00:00:25,130 Particularly , uh , and , uh , on 10 00:00:25,130 --> 00:00:26,852 behalf of the department , the 11 00:00:26,852 --> 00:00:28,830 secretary just wants to , uh , 12 00:00:28,840 --> 00:00:32,530 recognize the sacrifice that Gold Star 13 00:00:32,530 --> 00:00:34,790 spouses have endured continue to endure 14 00:00:34,790 --> 00:00:37,210 the grief that they still suffer , Um , 15 00:00:37,210 --> 00:00:40,250 and , uh , and the resilience that so 16 00:00:40,250 --> 00:00:43,530 many of them have shown in the face of 17 00:00:43,540 --> 00:00:46,060 tragedy . So it's a it's a good 18 00:00:47,740 --> 00:00:51,130 It's a good day to stop and think 19 00:00:51,140 --> 00:00:53,362 about what these families have done for 20 00:00:53,362 --> 00:00:55,473 our country and what they continue to 21 00:00:55,473 --> 00:00:58,090 do for the country . Speaking of what 22 00:00:58,100 --> 00:01:00,267 families do for the country , April is 23 00:01:00,267 --> 00:01:02,489 also the designated as the month of the 24 00:01:02,489 --> 00:01:04,378 military child , underscoring the 25 00:01:04,378 --> 00:01:06,489 important role that military Children 26 00:01:06,489 --> 00:01:09,240 play in our armed forces community . Uh , 27 00:01:09,250 --> 00:01:12,550 so we're grateful as well for all that 28 00:01:12,560 --> 00:01:15,000 our military Children , uh , do every 29 00:01:15,000 --> 00:01:18,270 day to , uh , to make our families 30 00:01:18,270 --> 00:01:20,492 whole , uh , and to contribute in their 31 00:01:20,492 --> 00:01:22,690 own way to stability and security and 32 00:01:22,690 --> 00:01:24,910 happiness in the military home . And 33 00:01:24,920 --> 00:01:27,260 we're grateful for all the moves and 34 00:01:27,270 --> 00:01:30,810 all the time away from mom and or Dad 35 00:01:30,810 --> 00:01:33,200 that they that they have to endure . Uh , 36 00:01:33,200 --> 00:01:35,311 and we're grateful as well for them . 37 00:01:35,311 --> 00:01:37,533 So with that taking questions , I don't 38 00:01:37,533 --> 00:01:39,867 think I've got Bob or lead on the phone . 39 00:01:39,867 --> 00:01:42,033 So , Jen , we'll go with you first . I 40 00:01:42,033 --> 00:01:44,256 have two questions . John , I'd like to 41 00:01:44,256 --> 00:01:46,144 follow up on the Fort Sill sexual 42 00:01:46,144 --> 00:01:48,311 assault investigation that the Army is 43 00:01:48,311 --> 00:01:50,478 carrying out . There were reports that 44 00:01:50,478 --> 00:01:52,700 up to 22 soldiers have been suspended . 45 00:01:52,700 --> 00:01:54,922 Is that accurate ? And some are calling 46 00:01:54,922 --> 00:01:57,080 this Fort Hood 2.0 . Is that an 47 00:01:57,080 --> 00:01:58,802 accurate description ? Are you 48 00:01:58,802 --> 00:02:01,230 concerned that there's a kind of , uh , 49 00:02:01,240 --> 00:02:03,680 sexual assault environment down at Fort 50 00:02:03,680 --> 00:02:07,500 Sill that could have led to such a 51 00:02:07,510 --> 00:02:09,600 serious case ? I can tell you , the 52 00:02:09,600 --> 00:02:12,820 secretary has been kept informed about , 53 00:02:12,830 --> 00:02:16,820 uh , the investigative efforts at Fort , 54 00:02:16,820 --> 00:02:19,042 so we obviously won't say anything from 55 00:02:19,042 --> 00:02:21,150 this podium that we'll get ahead of 56 00:02:21,150 --> 00:02:23,206 that investigation . So I'm not in a 57 00:02:23,206 --> 00:02:25,370 position to confirm uh , specific 58 00:02:25,370 --> 00:02:29,280 actions that the Army has taken . Uh , 59 00:02:29,290 --> 00:02:31,457 secretary knows that the Army and Army 60 00:02:31,457 --> 00:02:33,401 leadership is taking this incident 61 00:02:33,401 --> 00:02:36,320 seriously . Um , and as I said , he's 62 00:02:36,320 --> 00:02:38,790 being kept apprised . But it would be 63 00:02:38,800 --> 00:02:41,570 really imprudent for us to talk to any 64 00:02:41,570 --> 00:02:45,160 specifics about , uh , the 65 00:02:45,540 --> 00:02:49,290 case being evaluated as well as , 66 00:02:49,300 --> 00:02:51,940 uh , jumping ahead and speculating as 67 00:02:51,940 --> 00:02:54,680 to where this investigation is going to 68 00:02:54,680 --> 00:02:56,902 go and what it might portend or what it 69 00:02:56,902 --> 00:03:00,090 might say . Uh , you know more broadly 70 00:03:00,090 --> 00:03:02,340 about Fort Sill . The only other thing 71 00:03:02,340 --> 00:03:05,100 that I would add is that , uh , that he 72 00:03:05,100 --> 00:03:07,100 knows The secretary knows that Army 73 00:03:07,100 --> 00:03:09,600 leadership is providing the necessary 74 00:03:09,600 --> 00:03:13,330 support , uh , to the victim and to the 75 00:03:13,330 --> 00:03:16,650 victim's family . And separately , um , 76 00:03:16,660 --> 00:03:18,890 there have been new reports about 77 00:03:18,890 --> 00:03:20,834 Russian activities in the Arctic , 78 00:03:20,834 --> 00:03:23,340 including some satellite imagery , uh , 79 00:03:23,350 --> 00:03:26,500 that show new bases , uh , testing of 80 00:03:26,500 --> 00:03:30,270 weapons . How seriously concerned at 81 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:33,280 the Pentagon about , um , have you seen 82 00:03:33,290 --> 00:03:36,790 any tests of hypersonic weapons or what 83 00:03:36,790 --> 00:03:38,512 are the dangers of the kind of 84 00:03:38,520 --> 00:03:41,090 unregulated , uh , testing that's 85 00:03:41,090 --> 00:03:43,146 taking place ? How concerned are you 86 00:03:43,146 --> 00:03:45,479 about Russia's activities in the Arctic ? 87 00:03:45,479 --> 00:03:47,312 Uh , well , without getting into 88 00:03:47,312 --> 00:03:49,312 specific intelligence assessments , 89 00:03:49,312 --> 00:03:51,646 obviously we're monitoring very closely . 90 00:03:51,646 --> 00:03:55,170 Um uh uh . Nobody wants to 91 00:03:55,170 --> 00:03:57,490 see the Arctic as a region become 92 00:03:57,490 --> 00:04:00,950 militarized . Um , we obviously 93 00:04:00,950 --> 00:04:02,900 recognize that the region is key 94 00:04:02,900 --> 00:04:05,030 terrain that's vital to our own 95 00:04:05,030 --> 00:04:07,940 homeland defense . Uh , and as a 96 00:04:07,940 --> 00:04:09,996 potential strategic corridor between 97 00:04:09,996 --> 00:04:12,107 the Indo Pacific , Europe and the and 98 00:04:12,107 --> 00:04:14,051 the homeland , which would make it 99 00:04:15,040 --> 00:04:18,680 vulnerable to expanded competition , if 100 00:04:18,680 --> 00:04:21,080 you will , um , uh , we're committed to 101 00:04:21,080 --> 00:04:23,540 protecting our US national security 102 00:04:23,540 --> 00:04:25,707 interests in the Arctic by upholding a 103 00:04:25,707 --> 00:04:27,990 rules based order , uh , in the region , 104 00:04:27,990 --> 00:04:29,990 particularly through our network of 105 00:04:29,990 --> 00:04:32,250 Arctic allies and partners who share 106 00:04:32,250 --> 00:04:35,120 the same mutual interest that we do in 107 00:04:35,130 --> 00:04:37,880 exactly that order . But I won't talk 108 00:04:37,880 --> 00:04:41,820 to specifics in terms of yeah , how 109 00:04:41,820 --> 00:04:43,876 we assess what's going on there . So 110 00:04:43,876 --> 00:04:46,153 you can't say whether Russia is broken . 111 00:04:46,153 --> 00:04:48,320 Any treaties there ? I think I've gone 112 00:04:48,320 --> 00:04:50,542 about as far as I'm gonna be able to go 113 00:04:50,542 --> 00:04:52,876 today . Obviously , we're watching this . 114 00:04:52,876 --> 00:04:54,876 Uh , and as I said before , uh , we 115 00:04:54,876 --> 00:04:57,042 have national security interests there 116 00:04:57,042 --> 00:04:59,153 that we know we're gonna that we need 117 00:04:59,153 --> 00:05:01,690 to protect and defend . And , um , as I 118 00:05:01,690 --> 00:05:03,746 said , nobody's interested in seeing 119 00:05:03,746 --> 00:05:06,360 the Arctic become militarized . Um , on 120 00:05:06,360 --> 00:05:09,340 the phone , Idris . Thanks , John . Um , 121 00:05:09,350 --> 00:05:11,770 if I could ask about the National Guard 122 00:05:11,770 --> 00:05:15,030 troops on the Capitol hill , um , it 123 00:05:15,030 --> 00:05:17,260 does appear that the incident on Friday 124 00:05:17,260 --> 00:05:19,520 with sort of a lone wolf rather than , 125 00:05:19,530 --> 00:05:21,530 you know , some sort of coordinated 126 00:05:21,530 --> 00:05:24,320 right wing attack . Given what happened 127 00:05:24,330 --> 00:05:26,441 on Friday , do you anticipated change 128 00:05:26,441 --> 00:05:28,608 in the garden mission on the capital ? 129 00:05:28,608 --> 00:05:30,830 Or you still expect all troops to , you 130 00:05:30,830 --> 00:05:32,886 know , essentially be removed around 131 00:05:32,886 --> 00:05:34,770 mid may ? Uh , well , there's an 132 00:05:34,770 --> 00:05:36,881 investigation ongoing , and certainly 133 00:05:36,881 --> 00:05:39,048 we're not going to get ahead of that . 134 00:05:39,048 --> 00:05:41,480 I don't , um , have any changes to the 135 00:05:41,480 --> 00:05:43,536 mission of the National Guard troops 136 00:05:43,536 --> 00:05:45,800 that are on Capitol Hill to announce to 137 00:05:45,810 --> 00:05:48,630 announce her to speak to today . Um , 138 00:05:48,640 --> 00:05:52,250 and again , we , as a secretary said on 139 00:05:52,250 --> 00:05:53,917 Friday , certainly extend our 140 00:05:53,917 --> 00:05:55,750 condolences to the family of the 141 00:05:55,750 --> 00:05:58,580 officer who was killed . And again , 142 00:05:58,590 --> 00:06:02,110 it's a reminder of , um , how important 143 00:06:02,120 --> 00:06:04,310 our law enforcement people are . Our 144 00:06:04,310 --> 00:06:06,630 personnel are , um , and we're grateful 145 00:06:06,630 --> 00:06:08,852 for the support that the National Guard 146 00:06:08,852 --> 00:06:10,963 is still able to provide and was able 147 00:06:10,963 --> 00:06:12,797 to provide that day . But as for 148 00:06:12,797 --> 00:06:14,880 specific outcomes that might come of 149 00:06:14,880 --> 00:06:16,880 this in terms of the National Guard 150 00:06:16,880 --> 00:06:18,936 mission , we're just not there yet . 151 00:06:18,936 --> 00:06:21,102 Tom . John , you said the secretary of 152 00:06:21,102 --> 00:06:23,324 meeting with the Chiefs this week . Now 153 00:06:23,324 --> 00:06:25,269 that the stand down is over to get 154 00:06:25,269 --> 00:06:27,491 their sense of what they heard . What's 155 00:06:27,491 --> 00:06:29,491 coming up from the services . Do we 156 00:06:29,491 --> 00:06:31,491 expect any readout from his meeting 157 00:06:31,491 --> 00:06:33,602 with the Chiefs ? And also , what are 158 00:06:33,602 --> 00:06:35,713 the next steps here , if any . So the 159 00:06:35,713 --> 00:06:35,180 meeting hasn't happened . You're right . 160 00:06:35,180 --> 00:06:37,347 The secretary does expect this week to 161 00:06:37,347 --> 00:06:39,458 meet with the service secretaries and 162 00:06:39,458 --> 00:06:41,710 service chiefs , uh , as he does 163 00:06:41,710 --> 00:06:44,810 normally . But what we expect at least 164 00:06:44,820 --> 00:06:47,042 a topic of conversation in this meeting 165 00:06:47,042 --> 00:06:49,700 will be to get their feedback on how 166 00:06:49,700 --> 00:06:51,811 they conducted the stand on what they 167 00:06:51,811 --> 00:06:53,811 learned . Um , the experiences that 168 00:06:53,811 --> 00:06:55,922 they that they can pass on to him and 169 00:06:55,922 --> 00:06:58,033 whatever lessons uh , they might want 170 00:06:58,033 --> 00:07:00,033 to offer , I won't get ahead of the 171 00:07:00,033 --> 00:07:02,144 Secretary's decision space here . I'm 172 00:07:02,144 --> 00:07:03,978 sure that what he hears from the 173 00:07:03,978 --> 00:07:06,150 services will help inform whatever 174 00:07:06,150 --> 00:07:08,317 decisions he makes going forward . You 175 00:07:08,317 --> 00:07:10,483 also asked , will there be a readout ? 176 00:07:10,483 --> 00:07:12,594 I fully expect that I'll be providing 177 00:07:12,594 --> 00:07:14,817 some sense of how that meeting went and 178 00:07:14,817 --> 00:07:16,539 just in broad terms , what the 179 00:07:16,539 --> 00:07:20,290 secretary learned . Yeah . Therese . 180 00:07:23,540 --> 00:07:25,640 Yes , sir . Um , they just asked the 181 00:07:25,640 --> 00:07:27,862 question about the national Guard there 182 00:07:27,862 --> 00:07:30,280 being any changes . But my question is , 183 00:07:30,290 --> 00:07:32,600 um , not as far as the guard goes . But 184 00:07:32,600 --> 00:07:34,630 as far as the fencing around the 185 00:07:34,630 --> 00:07:36,686 capital , has there been any word on 186 00:07:36,686 --> 00:07:38,908 any changes ? Are they gonna , um , put 187 00:07:38,908 --> 00:07:40,963 more fencing up after the incident ? 188 00:07:40,963 --> 00:07:43,130 That happened , or is there no changes 189 00:07:43,130 --> 00:07:45,297 to that as well ? I'd refer you to the 190 00:07:45,297 --> 00:07:47,241 Capitol police for that question . 191 00:07:47,241 --> 00:07:49,463 Therese , That's not a question for the 192 00:07:49,463 --> 00:07:51,574 National Guard for the Pentagon , but 193 00:07:51,574 --> 00:07:53,852 for Capitol Police Barb on Afghanistan . 194 00:07:53,852 --> 00:07:56,730 So we now know , a few days ago , there 195 00:07:56,730 --> 00:07:58,786 was another Taliban attack that they 196 00:07:58,786 --> 00:08:01,860 claimed credit for uh , F O B Chapman , 197 00:08:02,240 --> 00:08:04,330 which is a well known location since 198 00:08:04,330 --> 00:08:07,010 the CIA lost so many people there . And 199 00:08:07,010 --> 00:08:09,710 there were , in fact , U S personnel at 200 00:08:09,720 --> 00:08:12,650 Chapman when the indirect fire attack 201 00:08:12,660 --> 00:08:16,590 occurred . Um , where 202 00:08:16,590 --> 00:08:20,450 does this leave the thoughts about 203 00:08:20,450 --> 00:08:23,310 whether it's even possible to trust the 204 00:08:23,310 --> 00:08:25,720 Taliban , since this is only the latest 205 00:08:26,020 --> 00:08:27,853 in an apparent series of attacks 206 00:08:27,853 --> 00:08:30,076 against bases where US troops are . But 207 00:08:30,076 --> 00:08:32,076 in terms of this one alone , you're 208 00:08:32,076 --> 00:08:34,187 trying to negotiate your less than 30 209 00:08:34,187 --> 00:08:36,076 days out and they conduct another 210 00:08:36,076 --> 00:08:37,964 attack against the base where U S 211 00:08:37,964 --> 00:08:40,076 personnel are . Where does this leave 212 00:08:40,540 --> 00:08:44,020 the interest level ? In trying to 213 00:08:44,030 --> 00:08:47,000 negotiate with them and trying to even 214 00:08:47,000 --> 00:08:49,900 think about getting out by May 1st . I 215 00:08:49,900 --> 00:08:51,980 certainly won't speak for our 216 00:08:51,980 --> 00:08:53,702 negotiators . Uh , and for the 217 00:08:53,702 --> 00:08:55,980 diplomats at the State Department , um , 218 00:08:56,840 --> 00:09:00,550 they that process still continues . We 219 00:09:00,550 --> 00:09:02,272 still want to see a negotiated 220 00:09:02,272 --> 00:09:04,328 settlement , uh , to the end of this 221 00:09:04,328 --> 00:09:06,960 war . And it's clear to us here at the 222 00:09:06,960 --> 00:09:08,682 Department of Defense that our 223 00:09:08,682 --> 00:09:10,849 colleagues at the State Department and 224 00:09:10,849 --> 00:09:12,627 our negotiators are taking this 225 00:09:12,627 --> 00:09:14,849 seriously , and they continue to try to 226 00:09:14,849 --> 00:09:16,860 press for a diplomatic solution . I 227 00:09:16,860 --> 00:09:19,780 think clearly , uh , as the president 228 00:09:19,780 --> 00:09:22,820 himself has indicated , um , it's gonna 229 00:09:22,820 --> 00:09:26,300 be tough to meet May 1st , uh , as 230 00:09:26,310 --> 00:09:29,680 a deadline for the complete withdrawal . 231 00:09:29,690 --> 00:09:33,500 Logistically , just tough to make that 232 00:09:33,500 --> 00:09:37,150 said their review is ongoing . The 233 00:09:37,150 --> 00:09:39,206 president hasn't made a decision one 234 00:09:39,206 --> 00:09:41,430 way or the other about force levels in 235 00:09:41,430 --> 00:09:43,708 Afghanistan or missions in Afghanistan . 236 00:09:43,708 --> 00:09:45,708 And , as the secretary himself said 237 00:09:45,708 --> 00:09:47,874 when we were in Kabul just a couple of 238 00:09:47,874 --> 00:09:49,930 weeks ago , that he's confident that 239 00:09:49,930 --> 00:09:51,874 whatever the decision is , if that 240 00:09:51,874 --> 00:09:54,580 decision involves a withdrawal that 241 00:09:54,590 --> 00:09:56,646 General Miller and General Mackenzie 242 00:09:56,646 --> 00:09:58,534 will be able to do so in a safe , 243 00:09:58,534 --> 00:10:00,479 orderly and effective way , let me 244 00:10:00,479 --> 00:10:02,590 follow up on two points . Still , the 245 00:10:02,590 --> 00:10:04,757 Taliban are now openly attacking bases 246 00:10:04,757 --> 00:10:06,757 where U . S personnel are located . 247 00:10:07,240 --> 00:10:10,480 Does that concern you ? And you also 248 00:10:10,480 --> 00:10:12,870 just said there hasn't been a decision 249 00:10:12,880 --> 00:10:16,440 on missions . Is the actual follow on 250 00:10:16,440 --> 00:10:18,607 our future missions ? I mean , they're 251 00:10:18,607 --> 00:10:20,496 still conducting the mission that 252 00:10:20,496 --> 00:10:22,829 they've been assigned now . Well , well , 253 00:10:22,829 --> 00:10:25,980 are you ? Is that mission opened to 254 00:10:25,990 --> 00:10:29,860 being rethought in this process of some 255 00:10:29,870 --> 00:10:31,981 other mission in Afghanistan and what 256 00:10:31,981 --> 00:10:34,037 you're doing that won't get ahead of 257 00:10:34,037 --> 00:10:36,148 the secretary's decision making . And 258 00:10:36,148 --> 00:10:38,314 how concerned are you now , given what 259 00:10:38,314 --> 00:10:40,537 happened in Chapman just a few days ago 260 00:10:40,537 --> 00:10:42,648 While these negotiations are going on 261 00:10:42,648 --> 00:10:44,870 that they're continuing to attack basis 262 00:10:44,870 --> 00:10:46,870 where U . S personnel are located ? 263 00:10:46,870 --> 00:10:46,420 Obviously , we all think the violence 264 00:10:46,420 --> 00:10:48,480 is too high . Uh , the secretary has 265 00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:52,090 said that himself . Um uh , and clearly 266 00:10:52,090 --> 00:10:55,330 this , uh , the the attack on , 267 00:10:55,340 --> 00:10:58,900 uh , on the forward operating base . 268 00:10:58,910 --> 00:11:01,120 Chapman is of concern , and I want to 269 00:11:01,120 --> 00:11:03,342 correct my last entry . I said I wasn't 270 00:11:03,342 --> 00:11:05,287 gonna get the secretary's decision 271 00:11:05,287 --> 00:11:07,509 making . I meant to say the president's 272 00:11:07,509 --> 00:11:06,970 decision making . The president gets to 273 00:11:06,970 --> 00:11:09,460 make this decision . That was my bad . 274 00:11:10,140 --> 00:11:12,480 Yes , ma'am . In the back question . 275 00:11:12,480 --> 00:11:16,120 First do you have concerns regarding 276 00:11:16,120 --> 00:11:19,320 the situation in Jordan , the stability 277 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:21,580 of the kingdom and also did you reach 278 00:11:21,590 --> 00:11:24,760 out to any of the Jordanian officials ? 279 00:11:25,140 --> 00:11:27,580 The second question . I understand that 280 00:11:27,590 --> 00:11:29,646 there is no decision about the troop 281 00:11:29,646 --> 00:11:32,520 level in Iraq , but can you please 282 00:11:32,530 --> 00:11:36,110 update us on when or where we are in 283 00:11:36,110 --> 00:11:39,750 the process ? Did the secretary present 284 00:11:39,750 --> 00:11:41,472 his recommendations yet to the 285 00:11:41,472 --> 00:11:45,000 president ? Is the president now like 286 00:11:45,010 --> 00:11:47,320 that he needs to do to make the 287 00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:50,340 decision ? Where are we in this process ? 288 00:11:50,350 --> 00:11:52,730 As for the president's decision making 289 00:11:52,730 --> 00:11:54,619 process , I would refer you to my 290 00:11:54,619 --> 00:11:56,786 colleagues at the White House to speak 291 00:11:56,786 --> 00:11:58,897 to that . Um , and I certainly am not 292 00:11:58,897 --> 00:12:00,952 going to make it a habit of speaking 293 00:12:00,952 --> 00:12:03,250 here publicly about the secretary's 294 00:12:03,260 --> 00:12:06,250 council or advice to the commander in 295 00:12:06,250 --> 00:12:08,410 chief that that's just not something 296 00:12:08,410 --> 00:12:10,354 we're going to publicly speak to . 297 00:12:10,354 --> 00:12:12,410 There's still a review ongoing . The 298 00:12:12,410 --> 00:12:15,620 president hasn't made a final decision 299 00:12:15,620 --> 00:12:18,140 about troop posture in Afghanistan were 300 00:12:18,140 --> 00:12:21,200 still very much , uh , executing to the 301 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:23,311 mission that we had been assigned and 302 00:12:23,311 --> 00:12:25,422 what our troops are . Still , they're 303 00:12:25,422 --> 00:12:28,170 executing , Um , and , uh , if and when 304 00:12:28,170 --> 00:12:30,630 that changes than than we'll adjust , I 305 00:12:30,630 --> 00:12:32,650 won't get ahead of that process on 306 00:12:32,650 --> 00:12:34,872 Jordan . Obviously , we're watching the 307 00:12:34,872 --> 00:12:36,761 situation closely . It's really a 308 00:12:36,761 --> 00:12:38,594 question better put to the State 309 00:12:38,594 --> 00:12:40,317 Department . Um , uh , the U S 310 00:12:40,317 --> 00:12:42,206 government has been in touch with 311 00:12:42,206 --> 00:12:44,261 Jordanian officials . We have a very 312 00:12:44,261 --> 00:12:45,817 strong military to military 313 00:12:45,817 --> 00:12:47,761 relationship with the kingdom . We 314 00:12:47,761 --> 00:12:49,983 Obviously , our focus is on making sure 315 00:12:49,983 --> 00:12:52,094 that that relationship and our shared 316 00:12:52,094 --> 00:12:53,928 security interests in the region 317 00:12:53,928 --> 00:12:56,730 remained foremost in our minds . Okay , 318 00:12:56,740 --> 00:13:00,260 Abraham , uh , two questions . One , um , 319 00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:02,942 Southern Command announced the movement 320 00:13:02,942 --> 00:13:04,609 of some detainees at Gitmo to 321 00:13:04,609 --> 00:13:06,860 consolidate , So I wanted to ask if the 322 00:13:07,240 --> 00:13:09,480 Okay , the secretary has any update 323 00:13:09,490 --> 00:13:12,800 regarding the NSC process evaluating 324 00:13:12,810 --> 00:13:15,730 how that how Guantanamo Bay detention 325 00:13:15,730 --> 00:13:17,560 facility might be closed D o d 326 00:13:17,560 --> 00:13:19,782 presumably has a role in that . Can you 327 00:13:19,782 --> 00:13:21,970 describe what the idea has been doing 328 00:13:21,970 --> 00:13:24,137 for the past two months regarding that 329 00:13:24,137 --> 00:13:26,359 process ? And then separately , can you 330 00:13:26,359 --> 00:13:28,359 talk at all about the Russian troop 331 00:13:28,359 --> 00:13:30,414 build up on the Ukraine border ? Has 332 00:13:30,414 --> 00:13:32,637 there been any determination made as if 333 00:13:32,637 --> 00:13:34,970 that is training , If that is offensive , 334 00:13:34,970 --> 00:13:37,303 anything new to report about that Gitmo ? 335 00:13:37,303 --> 00:13:39,470 The secretary fully supports President 336 00:13:39,470 --> 00:13:41,692 Biden's desire to close the facility to 337 00:13:41,692 --> 00:13:44,440 close the detention facility there ? Um , 338 00:13:44,450 --> 00:13:47,680 the the the thinking behind that . The 339 00:13:47,680 --> 00:13:51,520 process of reviewing , uh , how to do 340 00:13:51,520 --> 00:13:54,020 that is one being led by the National 341 00:13:54,020 --> 00:13:56,353 Security Council and by the White House . 342 00:13:56,353 --> 00:13:59,060 And so the secretary is , uh , provides 343 00:13:59,060 --> 00:14:01,720 his views , Um , and , uh , in his 344 00:14:01,720 --> 00:14:04,000 counsel , and I won't get ahead of that 345 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:06,167 process over there . But clearly , the 346 00:14:06,167 --> 00:14:08,910 secretary agrees that , uh , it's long 347 00:14:08,910 --> 00:14:10,743 past time to close the detention 348 00:14:10,743 --> 00:14:13,120 facility . Your second question . I 349 00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:15,064 knew I forgot to forget . Russia . 350 00:14:15,064 --> 00:14:17,231 Ukraine , Right , Russia , Ukraine . I 351 00:14:17,231 --> 00:14:19,342 don't have any additional assessments 352 00:14:19,342 --> 00:14:21,509 to talk to today . As you know , we're 353 00:14:21,509 --> 00:14:23,620 not going to speak about intelligence 354 00:14:23,620 --> 00:14:25,787 matters . Um , uh , secretary , as you 355 00:14:25,787 --> 00:14:27,898 know , was in touch with the minister 356 00:14:27,898 --> 00:14:29,990 of Defense of Ukraine . Um , and he 357 00:14:29,990 --> 00:14:32,480 pledged in that call , and we pledged 358 00:14:32,480 --> 00:14:35,150 publicly to standing up and supporting 359 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:37,690 the territorial integrity of Ukraine . 360 00:14:37,700 --> 00:14:41,010 Um , and calling on Russia to respect 361 00:14:41,010 --> 00:14:43,280 that territorial integrity . A couple 362 00:14:43,280 --> 00:14:45,930 quick follows Secretary is the 363 00:14:45,940 --> 00:14:47,607 Department of Defense sharing 364 00:14:47,607 --> 00:14:49,607 intelligence with Ukraine to assist 365 00:14:49,607 --> 00:14:51,607 them in that process . I won't talk 366 00:14:51,607 --> 00:14:53,551 about intelligence issues from the 367 00:14:53,551 --> 00:14:55,773 podium from Gitmo . Uh , presumably D o 368 00:14:55,773 --> 00:14:58,070 d . Is doing something on that review . 369 00:14:58,080 --> 00:15:00,530 Or is this fully handled by MSC . No , 370 00:15:00,530 --> 00:15:02,752 no , no . Of course , we have a role to 371 00:15:02,752 --> 00:15:04,363 play , as I said , and we're 372 00:15:04,363 --> 00:15:06,197 participant in that discussion . 373 00:15:06,197 --> 00:15:08,419 There's no question about it . Um , but 374 00:15:08,419 --> 00:15:10,641 I I simply won't get ahead of , uh , of 375 00:15:10,641 --> 00:15:12,697 our colleagues at the White House in 376 00:15:12,697 --> 00:15:15,160 terms of how that process is ongoing . 377 00:15:15,440 --> 00:15:18,260 Thank you . Okay . Peter Lowy . 378 00:15:23,140 --> 00:15:25,290 Hi , John . Thanks very much . Um , 379 00:15:25,300 --> 00:15:27,710 there was a question about an hour ago 380 00:15:27,710 --> 00:15:30,540 in the State Department briefing about 381 00:15:30,550 --> 00:15:33,080 rejoining the Ottawa Treaty and a 382 00:15:33,090 --> 00:15:35,530 landmine ban , and and , well , that 383 00:15:35,530 --> 00:15:37,086 would be a question for the 384 00:15:37,086 --> 00:15:39,197 administration . The State Department 385 00:15:39,197 --> 00:15:41,419 did say specifically on the use of land 386 00:15:41,419 --> 00:15:41,050 mines , we would refer you to the 387 00:15:41,050 --> 00:15:42,772 Department of Defense . So I'm 388 00:15:43,140 --> 00:15:45,362 following up on that and wondering what 389 00:15:45,362 --> 00:15:47,362 is the current , uh , Department of 390 00:15:47,362 --> 00:15:50,350 Defense landmine use policy . And why 391 00:15:50,360 --> 00:15:53,640 does the department still need slashes 392 00:15:53,640 --> 00:15:55,980 the next ? Let me get back to you , 393 00:15:55,980 --> 00:15:58,147 Peter . I'm gonna take that question . 394 00:15:58,147 --> 00:16:00,258 I wasn't aware that that question has 395 00:16:00,258 --> 00:16:02,424 been raised earlier today at the State 396 00:16:02,424 --> 00:16:04,424 Department . And rather than try to 397 00:16:04,424 --> 00:16:04,000 wing it here , I'm going to take that 398 00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:06,111 question we'll get . We'll get you an 399 00:16:06,111 --> 00:16:08,167 answer back . Thanks very much . You 400 00:16:08,167 --> 00:16:11,840 Jared . Hi , John . Thanks for joining 401 00:16:11,840 --> 00:16:14,650 us . Um , we've seen reports in the 402 00:16:14,660 --> 00:16:16,438 White House , has said that the 403 00:16:16,438 --> 00:16:18,493 strategic dialogue with Iraq will is 404 00:16:18,493 --> 00:16:20,604 supposed to be commencing this week . 405 00:16:20,604 --> 00:16:22,549 Um , have any department officials 406 00:16:22,549 --> 00:16:24,604 spoken with Iraqi officials ahead of 407 00:16:24,604 --> 00:16:26,827 the talks ? Uh , and is the presence of 408 00:16:26,827 --> 00:16:28,993 2500 U . S troops in Iraq on the table 409 00:16:28,993 --> 00:16:28,940 for these discussions ? We routinely 410 00:16:28,940 --> 00:16:31,800 talk to our counterparts in Iraq , as 411 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:34,070 you know , because we do have 2500 or 412 00:16:34,070 --> 00:16:36,260 so troops there that are in a counter 413 00:16:36,260 --> 00:16:39,650 isis mission in , uh , which requires a 414 00:16:39,650 --> 00:16:42,370 deep partnership with Iraqi security 415 00:16:42,370 --> 00:16:44,481 force partners . I'm not aware of any 416 00:16:44,481 --> 00:16:46,314 specific conversations that have 417 00:16:46,314 --> 00:16:48,481 occurred here from the department with 418 00:16:48,481 --> 00:16:50,648 respect to the strategic dialogue . It 419 00:16:50,648 --> 00:16:52,870 is really a process is being handled by 420 00:16:52,870 --> 00:16:54,981 our State Department colleagues . But 421 00:16:54,981 --> 00:16:58,100 again , um , we share the Iraqi goal of 422 00:16:58,100 --> 00:17:00,267 halving its security forces capable of 423 00:17:00,267 --> 00:17:02,489 defending Iraq's own sovereignty and of 424 00:17:02,489 --> 00:17:04,489 denying terrorist groups the use of 425 00:17:04,489 --> 00:17:06,489 Iraq as a base for operations . The 426 00:17:06,489 --> 00:17:08,656 coalition continues to support partner 427 00:17:08,656 --> 00:17:10,489 forces in Iraq and in Syria with 428 00:17:10,489 --> 00:17:12,489 advising air support , provision of 429 00:17:12,489 --> 00:17:14,156 intelligence surveillance and 430 00:17:14,156 --> 00:17:16,156 reconnaissance and conditions based 431 00:17:16,156 --> 00:17:18,433 equipment divestments . Though Isis is , 432 00:17:18,433 --> 00:17:22,280 uh , by orders of magnitude . Not the 433 00:17:22,290 --> 00:17:24,401 organization with the capability they 434 00:17:24,401 --> 00:17:26,734 once were . They're still a threat . Um , 435 00:17:26,734 --> 00:17:28,679 and , uh , and we are still on the 436 00:17:28,679 --> 00:17:30,901 ground in Iraq , assisting and advising 437 00:17:30,901 --> 00:17:33,068 our Iraqi partners at their invitation 438 00:17:33,068 --> 00:17:36,650 to be there . Yeah , Pierre , the 439 00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:38,706 movement of the carrier Eisenhower . 440 00:17:38,706 --> 00:17:40,817 We're going to the CENTCOM area , and 441 00:17:40,817 --> 00:17:42,817 part of it , it seems that they are 442 00:17:42,817 --> 00:17:44,872 joining or keeping joining the fight 443 00:17:44,872 --> 00:17:46,928 against Isis . You saw that over the 444 00:17:46,928 --> 00:17:48,761 weekend . USS Eisenhower and her 445 00:17:48,761 --> 00:17:52,250 Associated strike group . Ships and 446 00:17:52,260 --> 00:17:55,780 aircraft , um , formally entered 447 00:17:55,790 --> 00:17:59,290 into the fifth Fleet , the Central 448 00:17:59,290 --> 00:18:01,401 Command , Navy Central Command , area 449 00:18:01,401 --> 00:18:04,070 of operations . Um , uh , and they're 450 00:18:04,070 --> 00:18:06,310 there to support a myriad of tasking 451 00:18:06,310 --> 00:18:09,100 that General Mackenzie , uh , might 452 00:18:09,100 --> 00:18:12,050 have for them there . Um uh , and I 453 00:18:12,050 --> 00:18:14,106 won't get into the specifics of what 454 00:18:14,106 --> 00:18:16,272 that task you might be over time , but 455 00:18:16,272 --> 00:18:18,180 but it's a multi mission set of 456 00:18:18,180 --> 00:18:20,124 capabilities that a carrier strike 457 00:18:20,124 --> 00:18:22,124 group brings . It also brings great 458 00:18:22,124 --> 00:18:26,000 flexibility . Yes , thank you . I would 459 00:18:26,010 --> 00:18:28,480 ask you about North Korea policy review , 460 00:18:28,490 --> 00:18:31,650 the last North Korea policy review . Uh , 461 00:18:31,660 --> 00:18:33,660 last week , the national security 462 00:18:33,660 --> 00:18:36,490 advisers , uh , of the United States , 463 00:18:36,500 --> 00:18:40,160 Japan , South Korea , head 464 00:18:40,540 --> 00:18:43,250 trilateral talks to complete the review . 465 00:18:43,480 --> 00:18:46,470 Then the joint statement mentioned , uh , 466 00:18:46,480 --> 00:18:49,340 they agreed to work together to enhance 467 00:18:49,350 --> 00:18:52,260 the deterrence on the Korean Peninsula . 468 00:18:52,640 --> 00:18:55,510 Do you expect a change of both poster 469 00:18:55,520 --> 00:18:59,080 military exercises capabilities after 470 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:01,800 actually finishing this review ? Well , 471 00:19:01,800 --> 00:19:04,022 the reviews ongoing , um , and so would 472 00:19:04,022 --> 00:19:05,911 be premature to speak to specific 473 00:19:05,911 --> 00:19:07,967 outcomes of that . Obviously , we're 474 00:19:07,967 --> 00:19:10,078 all committed to the denuclearization 475 00:19:10,078 --> 00:19:12,189 of North Korea . Uh , and to security 476 00:19:12,189 --> 00:19:14,189 and stability on the peninsula , we 477 00:19:14,189 --> 00:19:16,411 always take a look , um , in any normal 478 00:19:16,411 --> 00:19:20,330 year about the the degree 479 00:19:20,330 --> 00:19:22,830 to which the frequency with which , uh , 480 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:25,620 in the scope of military training 481 00:19:25,630 --> 00:19:27,950 across around the world , but certainly 482 00:19:27,950 --> 00:19:30,117 there on the peninsula as well to make 483 00:19:30,117 --> 00:19:32,283 sure that we're as ready as possible , 484 00:19:32,283 --> 00:19:35,020 uh , to deter . And , uh , if 485 00:19:35,020 --> 00:19:37,390 deterrence fails to defeat any threat , 486 00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:41,200 we take our commitments to the 487 00:19:41,210 --> 00:19:43,321 alliance that we have in the Republic 488 00:19:43,321 --> 00:19:45,488 of Korea very , very seriously . And I 489 00:19:45,488 --> 00:19:47,599 just won't get ahead of a review that 490 00:19:47,599 --> 00:19:49,543 isn't complete yet , but we're all 491 00:19:49,543 --> 00:19:51,710 committed . And I think you saw coming 492 00:19:51,710 --> 00:19:53,543 out of Annapolis , uh , that our 493 00:19:53,543 --> 00:19:55,710 counterparts , uh , in Japan and South 494 00:19:55,710 --> 00:19:58,043 Korea share that same commitment . Okay , 495 00:19:58,043 --> 00:19:58,850 Jared . 496 00:20:02,940 --> 00:20:04,829 Hi , John . I don't have a second 497 00:20:04,829 --> 00:20:07,460 question . I'm sorry to ask you , Tom . 498 00:20:11,540 --> 00:20:13,596 Hey , John . Thank you very much . I 499 00:20:13,596 --> 00:20:15,651 have two questions today . The first 500 00:20:15,651 --> 00:20:17,818 one comes from one of my superiors and 501 00:20:17,818 --> 00:20:20,040 one of my , uh , one of my hosts at the 502 00:20:20,040 --> 00:20:22,096 station in Wisconsin . In regards to 503 00:20:22,096 --> 00:20:24,350 stand out , he he asked me to ask you 504 00:20:24,940 --> 00:20:27,107 if you have to remind people to follow 505 00:20:27,107 --> 00:20:29,273 their oath . Doesn't that tell you the 506 00:20:29,273 --> 00:20:32,350 scope of the problem ? Okay . And your 507 00:20:32,350 --> 00:20:34,461 second question , the second question 508 00:20:34,461 --> 00:20:36,461 is more broad . One not regard to a 509 00:20:36,461 --> 00:20:38,628 specific incident at the moment . As a 510 00:20:38,628 --> 00:20:40,683 former officer , I'm speaking to you 511 00:20:40,683 --> 00:20:42,906 and thinking of your conversations with 512 00:20:42,906 --> 00:20:45,239 your colleagues . What is your reaction ? 513 00:20:45,239 --> 00:20:47,461 Two When an order or a directive issued 514 00:20:47,461 --> 00:20:49,461 and it is ignored , flaunted or not 515 00:20:49,461 --> 00:20:52,910 Obey . Well , those are two very 516 00:20:52,910 --> 00:20:55,860 interesting questions , Tom . Um , mhm . 517 00:20:57,640 --> 00:20:59,950 I think as we've said this before , 518 00:21:01,540 --> 00:21:05,540 extremism in the ranks is sadly not 519 00:21:05,540 --> 00:21:08,660 a new problem . Um , and to some degree , 520 00:21:09,340 --> 00:21:12,060 you know , there's been elements in the 521 00:21:12,060 --> 00:21:16,010 ranks since the civil War , And what 522 00:21:16,010 --> 00:21:18,600 happened in early January , as I've 523 00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:20,711 said before , was something of a wake 524 00:21:20,711 --> 00:21:22,600 up call for all of us here in the 525 00:21:22,600 --> 00:21:26,540 Pentagon . uh , given that there 526 00:21:26,540 --> 00:21:29,460 was a population of veterans 527 00:21:30,640 --> 00:21:32,751 and at least one reserve officer that 528 00:21:32,751 --> 00:21:35,490 we know of that participated in in an 529 00:21:35,490 --> 00:21:38,270 attack on the capital while 530 00:21:39,940 --> 00:21:42,107 Congress was in session conducting the 531 00:21:42,107 --> 00:21:44,420 people's business . Um , and so it 532 00:21:44,420 --> 00:21:46,476 would be irresponsible for us not to 533 00:21:46,476 --> 00:21:50,120 take that seriously . Um , and as for 534 00:21:50,120 --> 00:21:52,450 the oath , well , first of all to your 535 00:21:52,450 --> 00:21:54,617 other question about what to say about 536 00:21:54,617 --> 00:21:56,617 this , we don't understand the full 537 00:21:56,617 --> 00:21:56,420 scope of the problem . That's one of 538 00:21:56,420 --> 00:21:58,642 the things we're trying to get our arms 539 00:21:58,642 --> 00:22:01,160 around . Is , um , is how deep 540 00:22:01,840 --> 00:22:05,800 abroad , um , and and 541 00:22:05,800 --> 00:22:07,689 how menacing the problem might be 542 00:22:07,689 --> 00:22:09,522 inside the ranks . We think it's 543 00:22:09,522 --> 00:22:11,633 probably less than what the headlines 544 00:22:11,633 --> 00:22:11,500 might suggest in more than what we're 545 00:22:11,500 --> 00:22:13,722 comfortable with . But as the secretary 546 00:22:13,722 --> 00:22:15,889 said , even a small number can have an 547 00:22:15,889 --> 00:22:18,167 outsized effect on morale and cohesion . 548 00:22:18,167 --> 00:22:20,222 And certainly the behavior that this 549 00:22:20,222 --> 00:22:22,278 kind of ideology could espouse could 550 00:22:22,278 --> 00:22:24,444 have a direct impact on good order and 551 00:22:24,444 --> 00:22:26,667 discipline as well as the safety of our 552 00:22:26,667 --> 00:22:29,610 teammates . Um , we make no apologies 553 00:22:29,620 --> 00:22:32,480 for taking time over the last couple of 554 00:22:32,480 --> 00:22:36,170 months . Two . Pause and 555 00:22:36,740 --> 00:22:39,750 consider the oath that we take and and 556 00:22:39,760 --> 00:22:41,982 asking during the stand down for people 557 00:22:41,982 --> 00:22:44,870 to reconsider that oath isn't an 558 00:22:44,880 --> 00:22:47,240 indication that the vast majority 559 00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:49,351 aren't quite the contrary . In fact , 560 00:22:49,351 --> 00:22:51,629 the secretary has made that very clear . 561 00:22:51,629 --> 00:22:53,740 99.9% he says , served with honor and 562 00:22:53,740 --> 00:22:55,907 dignity and character and respect that 563 00:22:55,907 --> 00:22:58,240 oath . But that doesn't mean it's wrong . 564 00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:00,296 It doesn't mean it's wrong to take a 565 00:23:00,296 --> 00:23:02,240 moment out and and read it again . 566 00:23:02,240 --> 00:23:04,407 Revisit it . There's some great active 567 00:23:04,407 --> 00:23:06,407 verbs in that oath . And maybe just 568 00:23:06,407 --> 00:23:08,810 focusing on some of those verbs , um , 569 00:23:08,820 --> 00:23:11,098 is a good thing . It's a healthy thing . 570 00:23:11,098 --> 00:23:14,380 Many of us I'm no longer in uniform , 571 00:23:14,390 --> 00:23:16,390 but certainly over the course of my 572 00:23:16,390 --> 00:23:18,446 military career , I had to take that 573 00:23:18,446 --> 00:23:20,668 oath many , many times . Um , and every 574 00:23:20,668 --> 00:23:22,890 time , even when I attended a promotion 575 00:23:22,890 --> 00:23:22,640 ceremony where I wasn't the guy being 576 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:26,050 promoted when it was being given to the 577 00:23:26,050 --> 00:23:28,272 individual being honored , I still took 578 00:23:28,272 --> 00:23:30,217 a moment to just think about those 579 00:23:30,217 --> 00:23:32,106 words and what they mean . It's a 580 00:23:32,106 --> 00:23:34,217 promise to the American people , Uh , 581 00:23:34,217 --> 00:23:36,106 and it's a promise to support and 582 00:23:36,106 --> 00:23:37,939 defend a founding document . And 583 00:23:37,939 --> 00:23:40,670 there's absolutely nothing wrong . Uh , 584 00:23:40,680 --> 00:23:42,890 fact there's everything right about 585 00:23:42,890 --> 00:23:44,501 taking a few moments out and 586 00:23:44,501 --> 00:23:46,723 reconsidering it . And the fact that we 587 00:23:46,723 --> 00:23:48,834 did this during the stand down and we 588 00:23:48,834 --> 00:23:51,001 asked people to reconsider it isn't an 589 00:23:51,001 --> 00:23:53,168 indication of a lack of faith or trust 590 00:23:53,168 --> 00:23:55,446 in them . Uh , it's quite the contrary . 591 00:23:55,446 --> 00:23:57,501 It was a chance to , um to restore , 592 00:23:57,510 --> 00:24:00,610 not restore to revisit that that faith 593 00:24:00,610 --> 00:24:02,554 and confidence . Um , and then I'm 594 00:24:02,554 --> 00:24:04,666 sorry . Your second question was more 595 00:24:04,666 --> 00:24:06,777 personal about me . What was it about 596 00:24:06,777 --> 00:24:08,999 you you and other officers ? You know , 597 00:24:08,999 --> 00:24:11,221 when you when you give an order or give 598 00:24:11,221 --> 00:24:13,332 a directive and that order is ignored 599 00:24:13,332 --> 00:24:15,443 or flaunted by the troops , Are those 600 00:24:15,443 --> 00:24:17,610 in the ranks ? It what is the reaction 601 00:24:17,610 --> 00:24:19,777 of the officer corps or an officer ? I 602 00:24:19,777 --> 00:24:23,200 mean , uh , that's a question that I 603 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:25,660 don't think , you know , I have 604 00:24:25,670 --> 00:24:27,781 anywhere near the requisite time here 605 00:24:27,781 --> 00:24:29,892 today to to talk about Tom . I mean , 606 00:24:29,892 --> 00:24:33,410 um , the one of the 607 00:24:33,410 --> 00:24:35,577 foundations of military service is the 608 00:24:35,577 --> 00:24:37,910 importance of the chain of command . Um , 609 00:24:37,910 --> 00:24:40,210 and the duty that all of us have , uh , 610 00:24:40,220 --> 00:24:43,170 when I was in uniform , too . Obey 611 00:24:43,540 --> 00:24:45,960 lawful orders given by your chain of 612 00:24:45,960 --> 00:24:48,270 command . And when those orders are 613 00:24:48,280 --> 00:24:50,336 obeyed , there are repercussions for 614 00:24:50,336 --> 00:24:52,391 that some more serious than others , 615 00:24:52,391 --> 00:24:54,724 given the order given the circumstances . 616 00:24:54,724 --> 00:24:56,947 But there's certainly repercussions for 617 00:24:56,947 --> 00:25:00,000 that . Um , uh , It's again , 618 00:25:00,010 --> 00:25:03,500 lawful orders being obeyed , uh , 619 00:25:03,510 --> 00:25:06,030 promptly and effectively , uh , is one 620 00:25:06,030 --> 00:25:08,252 of the hallmarks of military service Is 621 00:25:08,252 --> 00:25:10,197 one of the things that makes us so 622 00:25:10,197 --> 00:25:12,450 effective on the battlefield and 623 00:25:12,460 --> 00:25:14,460 effective off the battlefield is 624 00:25:14,460 --> 00:25:16,738 something that we all take . Seriously . 625 00:25:16,740 --> 00:25:19,340 Thanks a lot , Dan . You mentioned 626 00:25:19,350 --> 00:25:22,650 veterans being involved in the January 627 00:25:22,650 --> 00:25:24,870 6 events . Has the department been in 628 00:25:24,870 --> 00:25:27,120 discussion with either veterans groups 629 00:25:27,120 --> 00:25:29,231 or the Department of Veterans Affairs 630 00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:32,210 to try to get at that aspect of the 631 00:25:32,210 --> 00:25:34,377 problem since obviously you don't have 632 00:25:34,377 --> 00:25:36,321 authority over over former service 633 00:25:36,321 --> 00:25:38,488 members , we don't . You're right . We 634 00:25:38,488 --> 00:25:40,821 don't have authority over over veterans . 635 00:25:40,821 --> 00:25:43,660 I know that Secretary Austin and 636 00:25:43,660 --> 00:25:45,382 Secretary McDonough have had a 637 00:25:45,382 --> 00:25:47,549 conversation about this . This general 638 00:25:47,549 --> 00:25:49,900 problem I would refer you to the the V 639 00:25:49,900 --> 00:25:53,190 A for for their thoughts on this . But 640 00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:55,650 we do have purview while individuals 641 00:25:55,650 --> 00:25:57,872 are still in the ranks . And one of the 642 00:25:57,872 --> 00:25:59,928 things that we're looking at is what 643 00:25:59,928 --> 00:26:02,039 are we doing to help prepare them for 644 00:26:02,039 --> 00:26:04,206 the transition to civilian life ? Uh , 645 00:26:04,206 --> 00:26:06,317 and we know that some of these groups 646 00:26:06,317 --> 00:26:08,150 are actively recruiting veterans 647 00:26:08,150 --> 00:26:10,317 because they know they have leadership 648 00:26:10,317 --> 00:26:12,428 skills . They have weapons training . 649 00:26:12,428 --> 00:26:14,594 They are good organizers . Uh , and so 650 00:26:14,594 --> 00:26:16,650 we're asking ourselves , what are we 651 00:26:16,650 --> 00:26:18,872 doing to better make sure that as as we 652 00:26:18,872 --> 00:26:20,706 prepare for future veterans that 653 00:26:20,706 --> 00:26:22,928 they're able to make that transition in 654 00:26:22,928 --> 00:26:24,983 an informed , educated way about who 655 00:26:24,983 --> 00:26:26,983 and what is waiting for them on the 656 00:26:26,983 --> 00:26:29,560 other side . That is a question about 657 00:26:29,570 --> 00:26:32,640 hypersonic . Uh , well known the Air 658 00:26:32,640 --> 00:26:34,550 Force is about to test its first 659 00:26:34,560 --> 00:26:37,870 hypersonic , uh , air launch missile . 660 00:26:37,880 --> 00:26:39,936 And you've seen the Russians and the 661 00:26:39,936 --> 00:26:43,010 Chinese devote a lot of their , uh , 662 00:26:43,020 --> 00:26:45,630 funding to developing hypersonic . How 663 00:26:45,630 --> 00:26:47,900 important are hyper sonics that go five 664 00:26:47,900 --> 00:26:50,320 times the speed of south for the U . S . 665 00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:52,542 Military ? It's an important capability 666 00:26:52,542 --> 00:26:54,960 that , as you rightly pointed out , 667 00:26:54,970 --> 00:26:58,810 Barbara , we are involved in 668 00:26:58,810 --> 00:27:02,700 exploring um , and then resourcing and , 669 00:27:02,710 --> 00:27:05,420 uh , and better understanding the 670 00:27:05,430 --> 00:27:07,652 research and development side of this . 671 00:27:07,840 --> 00:27:10,700 So again , I won't get into specifics 672 00:27:10,700 --> 00:27:14,130 here other than to say we're mindful of 673 00:27:14,140 --> 00:27:16,362 the importance of this capability , and 674 00:27:16,362 --> 00:27:18,418 we're also mindful of the pursuit of 675 00:27:18,418 --> 00:27:20,362 this capability by by other nation 676 00:27:20,362 --> 00:27:23,200 states that that would , uh , that 677 00:27:23,200 --> 00:27:24,978 would potentially challenge our 678 00:27:24,978 --> 00:27:27,033 national security interests . Okay , 679 00:27:27,033 --> 00:27:27,270 Thanks , everybody