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Mhm . 

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Yeah . Okay . A couple things at the 

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top , as you all remember back in 

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february , the Secretary of Defense 

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directed to stand down across the force 

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to occur within the following 60 days , 

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the ensuing 60 days to address 

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extremism across the duty workforce . 

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While we are still reviewing of course 

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what we learned there . Now , there are 

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some immediate actions that are subject 

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matter experts here in the department 

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have identified as critical initial 

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steps and the secretary has approved 

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and I believe you'll be seeing the 

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specific memo here posted immediately . 

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But to give you a summary today , the 

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secretary is directing uh several 

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immediate accents as well as and 

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including the establishment of a 

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countering extremism working group as 

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we continue to address this issue in an 

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active manner . The immediate actions 

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and again , all this is in the memo 

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that you'll be getting if you don't 

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have it already consistently review and 

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update Of the department's instruction 

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1 3 - 506 . Uh the 

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definition of extremist activities in 

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that instruction , we're gonna update , 

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provide an update to service member 

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transition checklists , review and 

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standardized screening questionnaires 

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for a sessions for new personnel . Um 

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And we're going to commission a study . 

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The secretary has commissioned a study 

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on extremist behavior within our total 

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force uh to include greater fidelity on 

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the scope of the problem . The working 

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group will be led by Mr Bishop Garrison , 

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senior advisor on human capital and 

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diversity equity and inclusion and will 

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oversee the implementation of the 

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immediate actions that I just described 

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above as well as the development of mid 

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term and long term recommendations for 

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continued engagement on this issue . In 

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the memo which you will see there are 

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lines of effort for the working group . 

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I'll point you to that to go through 

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that and so you can see exactly what 

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the lines of effort are for the working 

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group going forward . A report of 

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additional mid term and long-term 

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recommendations and the status of 

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implementation of those aforementioned 

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immediate actions will be provided by 

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the working group no later than 90 days 

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from its first meeting , which will 

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occur on or about on or about 14 April . 

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Now shifting to uh the indo pacific 

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region , we remain concerned by the 

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massing of chinese maritime militia 

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vessels in the Union Bank area of the 

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south China sea and china's efforts to 

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impede the lawful rights of our treaty 

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ally , the Philippines . The United 

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States stands by our ally and we remain 

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firmly committed to preserving a free 

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and open indo pacific that is rooted in 

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international law , as reflected in the 

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law of the Sea Convention . In support 

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of our longstanding commitment to 

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freedom of the seas and to regional 

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security as well . The Theodore 

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Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group and the 

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U . S . S . Makin Island amphibious 

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readiness group are undertaking high 

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end training and operations in the 

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south China sea this week . As we've 

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said many times before , the United 

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States will continue to fly sail and 

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operate wherever international law 

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allows . And we will support the rights 

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of all nations to do the same . This is 

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not going to change . And with that , 

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we'll start taking questions . I think 

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we have leader on the phone . 

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Uh , john just a couple of things on 

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this , the memo today , can you give us 

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a better um description or I don't know 

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if it's it's your sending it out with 

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uh , with the memo , but I hadn't 

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gotten the memo yet . A better 

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description of this screening 

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questionnaire . Is this going to be 

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required for all recruiting for all the 

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services and services get to tweak it 

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or not . Just I guess a few more 

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details on that and sort of what what 

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you're looking for . And secondarily , 

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um did any of the 

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sessions or did anything come up 

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regarding the renaming of bases or 

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other service um buildings et 

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cetera . Is that an issue that was 

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discussed at all or that came up in 

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these sessions ? Thanks . So . Thanks 

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on . On your question about the 

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screening questionnaires , what we're 

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specifically doing in the immediate 

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actions is uh requiring the secretaries 

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of of of each of the military 

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departments to update and standardized 

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session . That's recruits their 

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screening questionnaires to solicit 

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specific information about current or 

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previous extremist behavior . Such such 

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questions should be designed for two 

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purposes . One to gather actionable 

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information in the short term to ensure 

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that only the best qualified recruits 

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are selected for services and to to 

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clarify that any demonstrably false 

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answers provided in response to that 

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questionnaire could form the basis for 

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punitive action for fraudulent 

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enlistment . So I hope that answers 

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your question On the 2nd question . 

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Leader , I did have the opportunity to 

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sit in with the secretary when he met 

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with the service secretaries today to 

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get their feedback about the stand down . 

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Uh and that was not an item that they 

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highlighted for the secretary . That's 

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not to say that in every case at every 

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unit . I mean , uh some of the uh the 

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stand down training was done all the 

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way down at the platoon level , so it 

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would be difficult to know what was 

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discussed in each and every session 

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conducted across the force , but that 

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the idea of the of the basis or 

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installations being named for uh 

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Confederate leaders was not something 

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that bubbled up to the feedback that 

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the secretary got today . Tom . I'm 

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sorry lee did you have another one ? 

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Yeah . Yeah . To follow up on the 

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screening question , um you said um , 

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gather potentially gather action 

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behavior . So so is this a 

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questionnaire that's going to be kept 

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that future behaviour would be checked 

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against ? And is there any way to , I 

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guess , do some sort of a screening of 

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already uh enlisted personnel . 

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Uh this screening questionnaires that 

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the immediate action that we're taking 

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today is really about having the 

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services standardize that we want them 

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to work together to standardize what 

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that screening questionnaire looks like , 

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the kinds of questions that are on 

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there . It wasn't about . And I 

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apologize if I was reading right from 

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the memo , I don't think , I don't know . 

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I didn't mean for it to be confusing . 

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It's not about uh anticipating future 

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behavior , it's it's allowing for 

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accountability by the department . 

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Should it be determined that in 

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answering the questionnaire an 

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applicant answered falsely giving us 

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the flexibility to be able to hold 

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somebody accountable for false answers 

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on that questionnaire . So this is 

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really about getting the services 

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aligned and getting the questionnaires 

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to deal with this issue and to deal 

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with it in an equitable way , a way 

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that is consistent across the services 

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and their recruiting platforms . Does 

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that answer your question leader ? Yeah . 

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Thanks tom . Give us a sense of what 

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the secretary heard from the service 

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shows anything jump out at him , that 

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he heard . Anything trouble him . And 

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just your general sense of anecdotes . 

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And also , when you say , review and 

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update the definition , extremist 

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activity , will he look at maybe 

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borrowing simple membership in 

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extremist groups , which right now is 

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allowed ? That is something that um , 

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the secretary has indicated that he 

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wants the working group to look at . Um 

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that's not something tom that's in the 

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immediate actions , which is an 

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updating of the actual instruction that 

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exists right now , but he certainly is 

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willing to have the working group take 

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a look at this and see if that makes 

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sense . And as for the feedback , I 

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mean , um , uh first of all , each of 

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the services reported uh completion of 

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the stand down . Obviously there were 

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some minor exceptions to that , um , in 

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particular , with reserves and guard 

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units that have asked for and have 

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received extensions , very different 

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time frame extensions based on the 

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services and the services can speak to 

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that . But by and large , the service 

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secretaries reported , You know , 100 

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completion of the stand down again . 

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With some exceptions , um , I don't 

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want to speak for them , but it was 

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clear to the secretary that they took 

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it seriously . The standout , that they 

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believed their people took it seriously 

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across the force , that the listening 

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sessions that the secretary asked for 

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was particularly fruitful and valuable . 

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And I myself found that the same when 

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we did our stand down here in public 

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affairs , that those listening sessions 

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were really critical . That seems to 

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have been the same feedback that the 

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secretary got from the services . Um , 

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I think it was one consistent thing 

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that he did here was that the force 

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wants better guidance . The men and 

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women want better guidance about what 

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extremist activity really is , which is 

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again , totally in keeping with what 

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we're going to try to do here with this 

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instruction and through the working 

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group . Um , and once that , you know , 

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guidance to be as clear as possible . 

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Um , so it was really , um , a 

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consistent theme that he heard was this 

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hunger for more information and context 

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about what we're talking about here any 

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more detail about problems they see . 

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Do they see problems of extremism in 

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the military or racism ? Anything that 

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he heard that kind of jumped out at him ? 

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I mean , he did get , I mean , 

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anecdotally the service secretary 

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shared with him what they , what , you 

252
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know , bubbled up from the ranks and in 

253
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terms of what they heard . And um well , 

254
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I don't have specific stories . It 

255
00:10:14,596 --> 00:10:16,651
wasn't like they gave him a specific 

256
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story or anecdote . They just 

257
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reinforced for him that um , that in in 

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many , not all , but in many cases 

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people did express that uh that they 

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understand this is that this is a 

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problem that some of them have 

262
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experienced personally . I found that 

263
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in my own stand down that we did here 

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at the pentagon , um I heard uh quite a 

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few uh , personal anecdotes about 

266
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experiencing it and I think that was 

267
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reflected across the force . Jim . Was 

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there any any indication of the extent 

269
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of the program ? Did the service 

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secretaries talk to the Secretary about 

271
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how deep they think this might be in 

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the ranks ? I think , again , um , one 

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thing that was reinforced by the 

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00:11:02,740 --> 00:11:04,907
services to the Secretary of something 

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you've heard him say before , and 

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00:11:06,796 --> 00:11:10,070
that's that the vast majority are 

277
00:11:10,070 --> 00:11:12,360
serving with honor and dignity and 

278
00:11:12,370 --> 00:11:14,690
upholding the oath and living by the 

279
00:11:14,690 --> 00:11:16,870
core values of the military . I think 

280
00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:19,047
that was that that certainly came back 

281
00:11:19,047 --> 00:11:22,750
to the Secretary , uh , that , uh , 

282
00:11:22,760 --> 00:11:24,871
that the men and women of the force , 

283
00:11:24,871 --> 00:11:26,871
military and civilian , um , by and 

284
00:11:26,871 --> 00:11:29,480
large by vast majorities , are not 

285
00:11:29,480 --> 00:11:31,702
espousing this ideology and they're not 

286
00:11:31,702 --> 00:11:33,702
conducting themselves in accordance 

287
00:11:33,702 --> 00:11:36,560
with this uh , ideology . Um , but that , 

288
00:11:36,570 --> 00:11:39,850
uh , that there is a corrosive effect . 

289
00:11:40,550 --> 00:11:43,260
Though , the numbers are probably small . 

290
00:11:43,640 --> 00:11:45,790
That is , that is a , there's a 

291
00:11:45,790 --> 00:11:47,957
corrosive effect . And that's why when 

292
00:11:47,957 --> 00:11:50,570
you , well , one reason why when you 

293
00:11:50,570 --> 00:11:52,850
look at the memo , one of the things 

294
00:11:52,850 --> 00:11:55,072
the working group is going to do is try 

295
00:11:55,072 --> 00:11:57,239
to get a better handle on the data and 

296
00:11:57,239 --> 00:11:59,239
try to improve our partnerships and 

297
00:11:59,239 --> 00:12:01,350
relationships with , particularly law 

298
00:12:01,350 --> 00:12:03,517
enforcement , to try to make sure that 

299
00:12:03,517 --> 00:12:05,683
we have a better sense of of what that 

300
00:12:05,683 --> 00:12:08,980
scope is . Again in the memo , you'll 

301
00:12:08,980 --> 00:12:11,091
see he's commissioned . I think I put 

302
00:12:11,091 --> 00:12:13,147
this actually , one of the immediate 

303
00:12:13,147 --> 00:12:15,202
action is to commission an extremism 

304
00:12:15,202 --> 00:12:17,490
study again to try to see what we , 

305
00:12:17,500 --> 00:12:19,870
what we can do to get better , get a 

306
00:12:19,870 --> 00:12:22,420
better grasp of the situation . Let me 

307
00:12:22,420 --> 00:12:24,476
go back to the phones here . I got a 

308
00:12:24,476 --> 00:12:26,642
lot of folks to get through , so we'll 

309
00:12:26,642 --> 00:12:30,190
just , we'll keep at it . Um , nick 

310
00:12:30,190 --> 00:12:33,490
from PBS . Thanks john , um , 

311
00:12:33,500 --> 00:12:36,940
there's the third bit of immediate 

312
00:12:36,940 --> 00:12:40,120
actions we haven't asked about is the 

313
00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:42,350
transition checklist . This is a 

314
00:12:42,350 --> 00:12:46,060
description of something of training 

315
00:12:46,070 --> 00:12:49,530
uh , for service members as they retire 

316
00:12:49,530 --> 00:12:52,840
or separate on how they might be 

317
00:12:52,840 --> 00:12:55,007
targeted by extremist groups . Can you 

318
00:12:55,007 --> 00:12:57,173
give us a little bit more about that ? 

319
00:12:57,173 --> 00:13:00,370
What has been found about the level of 

320
00:13:00,370 --> 00:13:02,770
recruiting by extremist groups on 

321
00:13:02,770 --> 00:13:05,350
recently separated or recently retired ? 

322
00:13:05,360 --> 00:13:07,830
Uh , and is there a sense that those 

323
00:13:07,830 --> 00:13:09,941
recently retired or separated are not 

324
00:13:09,941 --> 00:13:12,140
getting enough either support or 

325
00:13:12,140 --> 00:13:14,470
information upon separation retirement 

326
00:13:14,480 --> 00:13:16,647
about possible extremist recruitment ? 

327
00:13:16,647 --> 00:13:18,702
There's definitely a sense nick that 

328
00:13:18,702 --> 00:13:20,758
more needs to be done to educate and 

329
00:13:20,758 --> 00:13:24,490
inform transitioning members about 

330
00:13:24,500 --> 00:13:27,590
who and what waiting for them on the 

331
00:13:27,590 --> 00:13:29,900
other side . Um , in the last 

332
00:13:29,900 --> 00:13:32,500
administration , they did , uh , 

333
00:13:32,510 --> 00:13:36,270
extremism study uh ended , I think in 

334
00:13:36,270 --> 00:13:39,350
the fall . And in that report , it said 

335
00:13:39,350 --> 00:13:41,970
very clearly that we have evidence that 

336
00:13:41,970 --> 00:13:44,780
some extremist groups are actively 

337
00:13:44,780 --> 00:13:47,450
recruiting active duty members as they 

338
00:13:47,450 --> 00:13:49,506
get ready to transition because they 

339
00:13:49,506 --> 00:13:51,506
value their leadership capability , 

340
00:13:51,506 --> 00:13:51,420
their organizational skills , their 

341
00:13:51,420 --> 00:13:53,476
weapons training . So we know what's 

342
00:13:53,476 --> 00:13:56,400
happening . Um , and , um , I don't 

343
00:13:56,400 --> 00:13:58,780
think that's really in dispute what 

344
00:13:58,790 --> 00:14:01,012
what we need to do and focus on more is 

345
00:14:01,012 --> 00:14:04,080
how do we prepare transitioning members , 

346
00:14:04,090 --> 00:14:07,830
um , to be aware of that interest in 

347
00:14:07,830 --> 00:14:10,500
them , um , and to to know what it 

348
00:14:10,500 --> 00:14:12,500
looks like and what it feels like , 

349
00:14:12,500 --> 00:14:14,611
what it sounds like when these groups 

350
00:14:14,611 --> 00:14:16,833
are trying to recruit them . So we have 

351
00:14:16,833 --> 00:14:18,889
asked again in the immediate actions 

352
00:14:18,889 --> 00:14:21,160
for all the services to add provisions 

353
00:14:21,890 --> 00:14:24,057
into their transition checklists , all 

354
00:14:24,057 --> 00:14:26,168
the things that , you know , when you 

355
00:14:26,168 --> 00:14:28,446
get ready to leave the service that we , 

356
00:14:28,446 --> 00:14:30,668
that we make sure you're ready for when 

357
00:14:30,668 --> 00:14:30,390
you go to civilian life , What your 

358
00:14:30,390 --> 00:14:32,223
medical benefits are , what your 

359
00:14:32,223 --> 00:14:34,446
educational benefits are , how to buy a 

360
00:14:34,446 --> 00:14:36,501
new house . There's a whole list . I 

361
00:14:36,501 --> 00:14:38,668
mean , in some cases when you retire , 

362
00:14:38,668 --> 00:14:40,779
they even tell you how to pick a suit 

363
00:14:40,779 --> 00:14:42,723
and a tie , but there's nothing in 

364
00:14:42,723 --> 00:14:44,834
there . Not consistently anyway about 

365
00:14:44,834 --> 00:14:46,946
uh , this particular problem and what 

366
00:14:46,946 --> 00:14:49,057
the secretary wants to be included in 

367
00:14:49,057 --> 00:14:51,168
that transition checklist for all the 

368
00:14:51,168 --> 00:14:53,279
services is an acknowledgement that , 

369
00:14:53,279 --> 00:14:55,112
uh , that this is that this is a 

370
00:14:55,112 --> 00:14:57,446
possibility and , and that these groups , 

371
00:14:57,446 --> 00:14:59,668
uh , many of them are seeking the kinds 

372
00:14:59,668 --> 00:15:01,690
of skills , the kinds of leadership 

373
00:15:01,690 --> 00:15:05,020
that that our men and women exude when 

374
00:15:05,020 --> 00:15:06,964
they're in the service and getting 

375
00:15:06,964 --> 00:15:09,131
ready to transition into civilian life 

376
00:15:09,131 --> 00:15:11,020
on that item . What can you do to 

377
00:15:11,020 --> 00:15:13,020
guarantee that it's not literally a 

378
00:15:13,020 --> 00:15:15,020
check the box that this is a robust 

379
00:15:15,020 --> 00:15:17,520
effort of of education and facilitation 

380
00:15:17,520 --> 00:15:20,930
for recently retired or separated . 

381
00:15:20,930 --> 00:15:23,097
That goes just beyond checking a box . 

382
00:15:23,097 --> 00:15:24,874
That's actually a real level of 

383
00:15:24,874 --> 00:15:27,650
education , uh , giving them what they 

384
00:15:27,650 --> 00:15:30,980
need , that the military departments 

385
00:15:30,980 --> 00:15:33,530
will uh come back to him and keep him 

386
00:15:33,530 --> 00:15:36,110
informed about what this training is 

387
00:15:36,110 --> 00:15:38,166
gonna look like . I mean , he's very 

388
00:15:38,166 --> 00:15:40,110
interested in knowing um , that it 

389
00:15:40,110 --> 00:15:42,940
isn't , as you rightly pointed out and 

390
00:15:42,940 --> 00:15:45,051
I can see if you , you know , when we 

391
00:15:45,051 --> 00:15:47,162
talk about a transition checklist , I 

392
00:15:47,162 --> 00:15:49,273
could understand your question coming 

393
00:15:49,273 --> 00:15:51,273
from wall , was that just means you 

394
00:15:51,273 --> 00:15:53,440
check the box and , and no , of course 

395
00:15:53,440 --> 00:15:55,384
not . And um , he expects that the 

396
00:15:55,384 --> 00:15:57,273
service secretaries will keep him 

397
00:15:57,273 --> 00:15:59,440
informed about what the training looks 

398
00:15:59,440 --> 00:16:01,384
like . Um , and he , you know , he 

399
00:16:01,384 --> 00:16:03,273
doesn't want to micro manage that 

400
00:16:03,273 --> 00:16:05,329
process . He just wants to make sure 

401
00:16:05,329 --> 00:16:05,290
that all the services are taking a 

402
00:16:05,290 --> 00:16:07,234
serious look at this as people get 

403
00:16:07,234 --> 00:16:09,346
ready to transition . And as I said , 

404
00:16:09,346 --> 00:16:11,457
he expects them to report back to him 

405
00:16:11,457 --> 00:16:13,568
and keep him informed about what that 

406
00:16:13,568 --> 00:16:16,320
training is gonna look like . Uh okay , 

407
00:16:16,320 --> 00:16:18,376
I went on the phone , So , Abraham , 

408
00:16:18,376 --> 00:16:20,598
thank you . Uh as far as the study , do 

409
00:16:20,598 --> 00:16:22,653
you have any details about how , for 

410
00:16:22,653 --> 00:16:24,820
example , they would be gathering data 

411
00:16:24,820 --> 00:16:27,760
and then also uh for the study that's 

412
00:16:27,770 --> 00:16:29,603
that's commissioned the study on 

413
00:16:29,603 --> 00:16:31,714
extremism this commission . How would 

414
00:16:31,714 --> 00:16:33,770
you , is there any ideas of how they 

415
00:16:33,770 --> 00:16:35,881
would go about gathering data , about 

416
00:16:35,881 --> 00:16:38,103
how many how many extremists are people 

417
00:16:38,103 --> 00:16:39,770
who hold extremist ideology , 

418
00:16:39,770 --> 00:16:42,030
ideologies exist in the in the force ? 

419
00:16:42,040 --> 00:16:43,984
And then also , uh there have been 

420
00:16:43,984 --> 00:16:46,410
concerns from Congress that catholic 

421
00:16:46,420 --> 00:16:48,840
and evangelical service members would 

422
00:16:48,840 --> 00:16:50,840
be targeted . Was there any concern 

423
00:16:50,840 --> 00:16:53,380
brought up today about how to assure 

424
00:16:53,380 --> 00:16:55,360
that those folks would not be 

425
00:16:55,540 --> 00:16:57,373
specifically targeted by any new 

426
00:16:57,373 --> 00:16:59,262
actions ? I did not hear concerns 

427
00:16:59,262 --> 00:17:01,429
expressed by the service secretaries , 

428
00:17:01,429 --> 00:17:04,670
with respect to uh religious beliefs , 

429
00:17:05,440 --> 00:17:09,360
um , uh , at all , and as we said , 

430
00:17:09,370 --> 00:17:12,260
this has absolutely nothing to do with 

431
00:17:12,640 --> 00:17:14,640
what God you worship or whether you 

432
00:17:14,640 --> 00:17:17,210
worship at all . This is about the kind 

433
00:17:17,210 --> 00:17:21,090
of extremist ideology uh , that is 

434
00:17:21,090 --> 00:17:24,710
based on uh extreme 

435
00:17:24,710 --> 00:17:26,910
hatred or discrimination 

436
00:17:26,920 --> 00:17:30,570
on based on ethnicity 

437
00:17:30,570 --> 00:17:34,230
and and discrimination based on 

438
00:17:34,240 --> 00:17:36,720
someone's personal background and um , 

439
00:17:36,730 --> 00:17:39,360
uh , not about not about 

440
00:17:40,340 --> 00:17:42,173
religion . So that that wasn't a 

441
00:17:42,173 --> 00:17:44,396
concern that that that that we that the 

442
00:17:44,396 --> 00:17:46,980
secretary heard today at all . And then 

443
00:17:46,980 --> 00:17:49,550
on your question about data , this is 

444
00:17:49,560 --> 00:17:53,430
largely about helping us lash 

445
00:17:53,430 --> 00:17:55,860
up better with civilian law enforcement 

446
00:17:56,810 --> 00:17:59,010
and what what they're seeing , because 

447
00:17:59,010 --> 00:18:02,390
not all , um , not all 

448
00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:06,210
offenses which could be related to the 

449
00:18:06,220 --> 00:18:08,540
behavior of that is inspired by 

450
00:18:08,540 --> 00:18:10,707
extremist ideology , occurs on base or 

451
00:18:10,707 --> 00:18:12,707
on poster , on duty . So it's about 

452
00:18:12,707 --> 00:18:14,873
getting a better sense of the universe 

453
00:18:14,873 --> 00:18:16,984
of the kinds of cases that are , that 

454
00:18:16,984 --> 00:18:19,340
are out there . This is not about , uh , 

455
00:18:19,350 --> 00:18:21,350
you know , being the thought police 

456
00:18:21,350 --> 00:18:23,900
abraham , it's not about identifying , 

457
00:18:23,910 --> 00:18:26,410
uh , you know , you as an individual 

458
00:18:26,410 --> 00:18:29,550
and what's in between your ears , It's 

459
00:18:29,550 --> 00:18:32,060
about what you do with what's between 

460
00:18:32,060 --> 00:18:34,000
your ears . Uh , it's about the 

461
00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,170
behavior and the conduct that is 

462
00:18:36,170 --> 00:18:38,910
inspired by or influenced by this kind 

463
00:18:38,910 --> 00:18:41,280
of ideology . Obviously , without 

464
00:18:41,280 --> 00:18:44,200
question , we would want and expect 

465
00:18:44,200 --> 00:18:46,200
that anybody who raises their right 

466
00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:48,367
hand and takes that oath and joins the 

467
00:18:48,367 --> 00:18:50,890
military , civilian or military , That 

468
00:18:50,890 --> 00:18:53,280
they're going to live by that oath . 

469
00:18:53,290 --> 00:18:56,560
And , as the secretary said , 99.9 do . 

470
00:18:57,140 --> 00:19:00,320
Um , but there's no way of knowing . Uh , 

471
00:19:00,330 --> 00:19:02,497
you know , when you're just looking at 

472
00:19:02,497 --> 00:19:04,497
somebody , what what they believe , 

473
00:19:04,497 --> 00:19:06,608
what we're talking about is , uh , is 

474
00:19:06,608 --> 00:19:08,774
about what they , what they do that is 

475
00:19:08,774 --> 00:19:10,941
that runs contrary to that oath or the 

476
00:19:10,941 --> 00:19:12,774
values that they act on that are 

477
00:19:12,774 --> 00:19:15,760
contrary or inimical to what we believe . 

478
00:19:15,760 --> 00:19:18,790
Our core values are . I might , uh , 

479
00:19:18,800 --> 00:19:20,522
when you say latch up with law 

480
00:19:20,522 --> 00:19:22,522
enforcement , like what's not being 

481
00:19:22,522 --> 00:19:24,467
done now , that could be , there's 

482
00:19:24,467 --> 00:19:26,356
already there's already been uh , 

483
00:19:26,356 --> 00:19:29,820
coordination between um , between 

484
00:19:29,820 --> 00:19:31,598
federal law enforcement and the 

485
00:19:31,598 --> 00:19:33,480
military in terms of uh , better 

486
00:19:33,480 --> 00:19:36,770
sharing of information of , of um , 

487
00:19:38,240 --> 00:19:41,880
of individuals , um , being a 

488
00:19:41,890 --> 00:19:44,180
military affiliated individuals being 

489
00:19:44,180 --> 00:19:47,430
investigated for crimes , uh , that are 

490
00:19:47,430 --> 00:19:49,486
believed to be inspired by extremist 

491
00:19:49,486 --> 00:19:51,541
ideology . So , some of this work is 

492
00:19:51,541 --> 00:19:53,541
already going on . I think what the 

493
00:19:53,541 --> 00:19:53,480
secretary wants to do is 

494
00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:55,591
institutionalize that cooperation and 

495
00:19:55,591 --> 00:19:58,000
deepen it broaden , just very quickly 

496
00:19:58,010 --> 00:19:59,954
follow up on that . You talk about 

497
00:19:59,954 --> 00:20:01,954
working with law enforcement . What 

498
00:20:01,954 --> 00:20:04,066
about the Pentagon's own statistics ? 

499
00:20:04,066 --> 00:20:06,177
Like someone kicked out for a variety 

500
00:20:06,177 --> 00:20:08,066
of reasons . One of them could be 

501
00:20:08,066 --> 00:20:10,121
extremist behavior , but it that box 

502
00:20:10,121 --> 00:20:12,232
isn't checked . Extremist behavior is 

503
00:20:12,232 --> 00:20:14,740
the way you guys can , can work that on 

504
00:20:14,740 --> 00:20:16,962
your own side . Your own data . Again , 

505
00:20:16,962 --> 00:20:18,962
I think , I think that's one of the 

506
00:20:18,962 --> 00:20:21,184
things that he's gonna want the working 

507
00:20:21,184 --> 00:20:23,296
group to look and see if it's even if 

508
00:20:23,296 --> 00:20:25,462
it's even possible , but that's one of 

509
00:20:25,462 --> 00:20:25,110
the lines of effort of the working 

510
00:20:25,110 --> 00:20:28,300
group . Yeah , joe on a different topic 

511
00:20:28,310 --> 00:20:30,980
on Ukraine . As you may know , Turkey 

512
00:20:30,990 --> 00:20:33,660
has said today that the United States , 

513
00:20:34,140 --> 00:20:36,430
The trick that sent two warships into 

514
00:20:36,430 --> 00:20:38,840
the Black Sea . If you could give us 

515
00:20:38,910 --> 00:20:40,820
more details about that . And you 

516
00:20:40,820 --> 00:20:43,610
consider the move as a message to the 

517
00:20:43,620 --> 00:20:46,070
Kremlin . As you know , joe , we 

518
00:20:46,070 --> 00:20:48,480
routinely operate uh and conduct 

519
00:20:48,480 --> 00:20:50,510
operations in the Black Sea uh and 

520
00:20:50,510 --> 00:20:53,080
throughout the european command A . R 

521
00:20:53,090 --> 00:20:55,312
and as you also know , I'm not going to 

522
00:20:55,312 --> 00:20:58,640
forecaster or speak about hypotheticals 

523
00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:00,807
or about future operations . This this 

524
00:21:00,807 --> 00:21:03,550
is a normal evolution for the United 

525
00:21:03,550 --> 00:21:05,560
States military and we obviously 

526
00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:08,100
coordinate um the entry into the Black 

527
00:21:08,100 --> 00:21:10,100
Sea through the Montreux convention 

528
00:21:10,100 --> 00:21:12,800
with Turkey . But I won't speak to the 

529
00:21:12,810 --> 00:21:14,921
press report that you're referring to 

530
00:21:14,921 --> 00:21:18,620
specifically sending two warships into 

531
00:21:18,620 --> 00:21:21,910
the Black Sea to the tensions on the 

532
00:21:21,910 --> 00:21:25,120
eastern side of this is first of all , 

533
00:21:25,130 --> 00:21:27,130
I'm not going to confirm the Turkey 

534
00:21:27,130 --> 00:21:29,408
press reports that you're referring to , 

535
00:21:29,408 --> 00:21:31,630
We routinely operate in the Black Sea . 

536
00:21:31,630 --> 00:21:33,686
We just had some ships in there just 

537
00:21:33,686 --> 00:21:37,090
recently , um that's not anything new . 

538
00:21:37,100 --> 00:21:39,570
Um Again , this goes right in keeping 

539
00:21:39,570 --> 00:21:41,681
with what I said at the topper . With 

540
00:21:41,681 --> 00:21:43,681
respect to the south china sea , we 

541
00:21:43,681 --> 00:21:45,626
will fly sail and operate wherever 

542
00:21:45,626 --> 00:21:47,848
international law permits us to do . So 

543
00:21:47,848 --> 00:21:49,890
that's what this is about . Um And 

544
00:21:49,900 --> 00:21:53,750
clearly we take our obligations uh 

545
00:21:53,760 --> 00:21:56,000
throughout the european command area of 

546
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:58,360
uh area of operations . Very very 

547
00:21:58,360 --> 00:22:01,710
seriously grateful . Uh huh . What's 

548
00:22:01,710 --> 00:22:03,870
the latest assessment of the pentagon 

549
00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:07,770
in regards to the I'm missing a Russian 

550
00:22:07,770 --> 00:22:10,360
forces on the eastern side of Ukraine . 

551
00:22:11,540 --> 00:22:13,830
It's the same as it's been since we've 

552
00:22:13,830 --> 00:22:15,886
been talking about it , joe we would 

553
00:22:15,886 --> 00:22:18,108
like better clarity . We would like the 

554
00:22:18,108 --> 00:22:20,219
Russians to be more transparent about 

555
00:22:20,219 --> 00:22:22,163
what it is they're doing with this 

556
00:22:22,163 --> 00:22:25,670
force build up uh in Crimea and 

557
00:22:25,670 --> 00:22:29,030
also along the eastern border 

558
00:22:29,040 --> 00:22:32,040
of Ukraine . Uh It's not exactly clear , 

559
00:22:32,040 --> 00:22:34,130
we don't believe it's conducive to 

560
00:22:34,130 --> 00:22:37,800
stability and security there and we we 

561
00:22:37,800 --> 00:22:39,856
call on Russia , as I've said in the 

562
00:22:39,856 --> 00:22:42,270
past , to be more transparent about 

563
00:22:42,280 --> 00:22:44,058
what they're up to , what their 

564
00:22:44,058 --> 00:22:46,810
intentions are . Uh huh . Um yeah , go 

565
00:22:46,810 --> 00:22:50,240
ahead . Uh Secretary Austin , in his 

566
00:22:50,250 --> 00:22:52,790
visit next week to europe , will be 

567
00:22:52,790 --> 00:22:56,740
seeking maybe a united action from the 

568
00:22:56,740 --> 00:23:00,670
NATO toward Russia . I'm not 

569
00:23:00,670 --> 00:23:02,670
going to get ahead of the secretary 

570
00:23:02,670 --> 00:23:04,837
schedule . Um I think you saw the trip 

571
00:23:04,837 --> 00:23:06,726
announcement last night . It will 

572
00:23:06,726 --> 00:23:08,948
include a stop in brussels and a chance 

573
00:23:08,948 --> 00:23:08,940
to meet with NATO leaders particularly 

574
00:23:08,950 --> 00:23:11,228
and specifically the Secretary General . 

575
00:23:11,228 --> 00:23:13,394
He's looking forward to . That . There 

576
00:23:13,394 --> 00:23:15,470
are a number of regional and global 

577
00:23:15,480 --> 00:23:18,960
security issues uh that I have full 

578
00:23:18,960 --> 00:23:21,182
expectation he'll address , but I'm not 

579
00:23:21,182 --> 00:23:23,071
going to get ahead of the of that 

580
00:23:23,071 --> 00:23:25,293
meeting or those meetings until they've 

581
00:23:25,293 --> 00:23:27,850
happened . Okay , let me go back here . 

582
00:23:30,440 --> 00:23:32,670
Uh let's see . Yeah , 

583
00:23:33,240 --> 00:23:35,360
Travis from Bloomberg . 

584
00:23:38,540 --> 00:23:41,990
Hi john thanks . Um India is a Foreign 

585
00:23:41,990 --> 00:23:44,280
Ministry issued a statement today 

586
00:23:44,280 --> 00:23:46,560
saying that the U . S . S . John paul 

587
00:23:46,560 --> 00:23:48,504
jones passed through the country's 

588
00:23:48,504 --> 00:23:50,400
exclusive economic zone without 

589
00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:52,990
permission . Um and it said that it 

590
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:56,170
registered concerns with us 

591
00:23:56,170 --> 00:23:59,420
diplomats . I'm just wondering does the 

592
00:23:59,430 --> 00:24:02,190
pentagon believe that the destroyer was 

593
00:24:02,190 --> 00:24:04,246
within its rights when it was in the 

594
00:24:04,246 --> 00:24:07,410
easy ? And um do you have any message 

595
00:24:07,410 --> 00:24:10,490
for India ? Thanks . Uh what I can tell 

596
00:24:10,490 --> 00:24:12,601
you is that the U . S . S . John paul 

597
00:24:12,601 --> 00:24:14,490
jones , a navy destroyer asserted 

598
00:24:14,490 --> 00:24:16,712
navigational rights and freedoms in the 

599
00:24:16,712 --> 00:24:18,490
vicinity of the Republic of the 

600
00:24:18,490 --> 00:24:20,712
Maldives by conducting innocent passage 

601
00:24:20,712 --> 00:24:22,934
through the through its territorial sea 

602
00:24:22,934 --> 00:24:24,768
and normal operations within its 

603
00:24:24,768 --> 00:24:26,546
exclusive economic zone without 

604
00:24:26,546 --> 00:24:28,434
requesting prior permission . And 

605
00:24:28,434 --> 00:24:30,490
that's consistent with international 

606
00:24:30,490 --> 00:24:32,379
law . Again , we will continue to 

607
00:24:32,379 --> 00:24:35,230
maintain the right indeed the 

608
00:24:35,230 --> 00:24:37,063
responsibility to fly , sail and 

609
00:24:37,063 --> 00:24:38,563
operate in accordance with 

610
00:24:38,563 --> 00:24:41,250
international law . Yes , ma'am . So 

611
00:24:41,260 --> 00:24:43,427
the question on the President's budget 

612
00:24:43,427 --> 00:24:45,093
request included a section on 

613
00:24:45,093 --> 00:24:47,220
shipbuilding and it said to reassure 

614
00:24:47,230 --> 00:24:49,570
allies and signal us resolve potential 

615
00:24:49,580 --> 00:24:51,636
adversaries . So I wonder if you can 

616
00:24:51,636 --> 00:24:53,524
talk more about the importance of 

617
00:24:53,524 --> 00:24:55,580
investing in shipbuilding to counter 

618
00:24:55,580 --> 00:24:58,020
china . I would just let's back up a 

619
00:24:58,020 --> 00:25:00,600
little bit from that . And and uh and 

620
00:25:00,600 --> 00:25:04,050
not necessarily make shipbuilding all 

621
00:25:04,050 --> 00:25:06,272
about one nation or one nation state or 

622
00:25:06,272 --> 00:25:09,870
one threat . The Secretary believes uh 

623
00:25:09,880 --> 00:25:12,102
that our navy remains the most powerful 

624
00:25:12,102 --> 00:25:13,880
navy in the world and under his 

625
00:25:13,880 --> 00:25:15,991
leadership , he wants it to stay that 

626
00:25:15,991 --> 00:25:18,047
way . And that means , uh and you've 

627
00:25:18,047 --> 00:25:20,158
heard the Secretary talk about this , 

628
00:25:20,158 --> 00:25:22,380
that that means making sure that in the 

629
00:25:22,380 --> 00:25:24,602
maritime domain , our Navy has a proper 

630
00:25:24,602 --> 00:25:26,824
mix of capabilities across the spectrum 

631
00:25:26,824 --> 00:25:29,710
uh to defend this country at sea on the 

632
00:25:29,710 --> 00:25:32,070
sea and under the sea . Uh And I'm not 

633
00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:34,410
going to get ahead , as you might 

634
00:25:34,410 --> 00:25:37,720
imagine of the budget lay down or 

635
00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:39,720
specific programs . That's just not 

636
00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:41,887
gonna happen today . But I can , I can 

637
00:25:41,887 --> 00:25:44,550
assure you as you saw , uh in our 

638
00:25:44,550 --> 00:25:46,661
statement that certainly shipbuilding 

639
00:25:46,661 --> 00:25:48,828
is something the secretary is going to 

640
00:25:48,828 --> 00:25:50,939
be focused on again , with the mind , 

641
00:25:50,939 --> 00:25:52,994
with the mind towards making sure we 

642
00:25:52,994 --> 00:25:55,161
have the right mix of capabilities now 

643
00:25:55,161 --> 00:25:57,161
in the future , um , to defend this 

644
00:25:57,161 --> 00:25:59,860
country on and under the sea . Okay . 

645
00:26:00,540 --> 00:26:03,480
Megan Secretary Austin's assertion that 

646
00:26:03,480 --> 00:26:07,330
99.9 of the force does not engage in 

647
00:26:07,330 --> 00:26:09,530
any sort of extremist behavior beliefs 

648
00:26:09,530 --> 00:26:12,150
is extremely unscientific , given that 

649
00:26:12,160 --> 00:26:14,271
the pentagon , the services know that 

650
00:26:14,271 --> 00:26:16,327
they don't really have any data that 

651
00:26:16,327 --> 00:26:18,549
really covers the spectrum of this . Is 

652
00:26:18,549 --> 00:26:20,716
there another way that you would couch 

653
00:26:20,716 --> 00:26:20,700
that our character , It's a 

654
00:26:20,700 --> 00:26:22,850
colloquialism , million ? He's 

655
00:26:22,860 --> 00:26:25,193
basically trying to make the point that , 

656
00:26:25,193 --> 00:26:27,138
um , that we still believe , and I 

657
00:26:27,138 --> 00:26:29,471
think the feedback today reinforce that , 

658
00:26:29,471 --> 00:26:32,960
that the numbers of people in the force 

659
00:26:33,540 --> 00:26:36,530
that espouse this ideology are very 

660
00:26:36,530 --> 00:26:39,440
small . But he's also said right after 

661
00:26:39,440 --> 00:26:43,160
making that colloquialism that even a 

662
00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:46,040
small number , first of all , the , you 

663
00:26:46,040 --> 00:26:48,850
know , the number ought to be zero , 

664
00:26:48,860 --> 00:26:51,082
given the fact that you take an oath to 

665
00:26:51,082 --> 00:26:52,971
defend the constitution of United 

666
00:26:52,971 --> 00:26:55,193
States , that you make a promise to the 

667
00:26:55,193 --> 00:26:57,249
american people about what you stand 

668
00:26:57,249 --> 00:26:59,582
for . But even though the numbers small , 

669
00:26:59,582 --> 00:27:01,916
it can have a corrosive outsized effect . 

670
00:27:01,916 --> 00:27:03,860
And that's the larger point . He's 

671
00:27:03,860 --> 00:27:05,693
trying to make the Guard and the 

672
00:27:05,693 --> 00:27:07,693
Reserve have until june to complete 

673
00:27:07,693 --> 00:27:09,860
their stand down . So I assume General 

674
00:27:09,860 --> 00:27:09,310
Wilkinson has been part of this 

675
00:27:09,310 --> 00:27:11,950
discussion , but what sort of feedback 

676
00:27:11,950 --> 00:27:14,150
did he have given ? That his troops 

677
00:27:14,150 --> 00:27:16,261
have not necessarily all been able to 

678
00:27:16,261 --> 00:27:18,372
weigh in at their own standards . The 

679
00:27:18,372 --> 00:27:20,317
meeting today was with the service 

680
00:27:20,317 --> 00:27:22,428
secretaries , uh , and they did brief 

681
00:27:22,428 --> 00:27:24,539
the secretary on sort of the progress 

682
00:27:24,539 --> 00:27:26,706
of reserving guards , that that you're 

683
00:27:26,706 --> 00:27:28,872
right . They have they have extensions 

684
00:27:28,872 --> 00:27:30,983
in place . Um And each service with a 

685
00:27:30,983 --> 00:27:32,872
reserve and guard component had a 

686
00:27:32,872 --> 00:27:35,039
different set of expectations for when 

687
00:27:35,039 --> 00:27:37,094
those were going to be complete . Um 

688
00:27:37,094 --> 00:27:39,110
But the service and again , I don't 

689
00:27:39,110 --> 00:27:40,777
want to speak for the service 

690
00:27:40,777 --> 00:27:42,999
secretaries , but they did roll up what 

691
00:27:42,999 --> 00:27:44,832
they've been learning from their 

692
00:27:44,832 --> 00:27:47,054
reserve and guard components into their 

693
00:27:47,054 --> 00:27:49,166
larger reports to the secretary . And 

694
00:27:49,166 --> 00:27:51,110
again , I I gave sort of uh an out 

695
00:27:51,110 --> 00:27:53,054
brief here at the top that that it 

696
00:27:53,054 --> 00:27:54,721
isn't that it , you know , uh 

697
00:27:54,721 --> 00:27:56,943
recognition that it is a problem . It's 

698
00:27:56,943 --> 00:27:59,110
not a problem that is pervasive across 

699
00:27:59,110 --> 00:28:01,750
all ranks and all of force . Um and 

700
00:28:01,750 --> 00:28:04,710
that um they too appreciated the small 

701
00:28:04,710 --> 00:28:06,766
listening sessions and the chance to 

702
00:28:06,766 --> 00:28:10,230
talk back . And also the recognition 

703
00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:13,120
that that the forces I mentioned tom 

704
00:28:13,130 --> 00:28:17,130
clearly wants more clarity about what 

705
00:28:17,130 --> 00:28:20,300
extremist activity actually means . Um 

706
00:28:20,300 --> 00:28:22,522
and you know what they can do or should 

707
00:28:22,522 --> 00:28:24,800
do in terms of how to report that , how 

708
00:28:24,800 --> 00:28:27,360
to act in in that space . Okay . 

709
00:28:28,340 --> 00:28:31,270
Um see SAM from us and I 

710
00:28:32,940 --> 00:28:35,430
hi john uh two things on the south 

711
00:28:35,430 --> 00:28:37,860
china sea situation , um the 

712
00:28:37,870 --> 00:28:39,870
representatives from the Philippine 

713
00:28:39,870 --> 00:28:42,740
Defence Ministry said that um they 

714
00:28:42,740 --> 00:28:46,470
were pursuing active communication with 

715
00:28:46,470 --> 00:28:49,040
the U . S . To uh as part of the mutual 

716
00:28:49,040 --> 00:28:51,060
defense treaty . How those 

717
00:28:51,060 --> 00:28:53,650
conversations have been going ? Can you 

718
00:28:53,650 --> 00:28:55,872
just give a flavor if you all have been 

719
00:28:55,872 --> 00:28:58,094
in communication or not with Manila and 

720
00:28:58,094 --> 00:29:01,130
the number two , the ships that the tr 

721
00:29:01,130 --> 00:29:03,186
in the making island encountering um 

722
00:29:03,186 --> 00:29:06,150
from the Chinese Navy or the maritime 

723
00:29:06,150 --> 00:29:08,317
militia or the China Coast Guard . Any 

724
00:29:08,317 --> 00:29:10,094
one of those three , have those 

725
00:29:10,094 --> 00:29:12,206
interactions been professional or are 

726
00:29:12,206 --> 00:29:14,580
they moving towards ? Uh Not . Thank 

727
00:29:14,580 --> 00:29:17,660
you . Reports that indicate that any 

728
00:29:17,660 --> 00:29:19,771
interactions have been unprofessional 

729
00:29:19,771 --> 00:29:21,938
aren't safe . But I'd point you to the 

730
00:29:21,938 --> 00:29:24,104
service in this case , the Navy or the 

731
00:29:24,104 --> 00:29:25,993
indo pacific command for for more 

732
00:29:25,993 --> 00:29:28,049
information . Um , I also don't have 

733
00:29:28,049 --> 00:29:30,570
any specific communications with our 

734
00:29:30,570 --> 00:29:32,681
treaty ally , the Philippines to , to 

735
00:29:32,681 --> 00:29:34,792
read out to you today . But as I said 

736
00:29:34,792 --> 00:29:36,959
at the top where we take our treaty uh 

737
00:29:36,959 --> 00:29:39,400
commitments uh seriously and and 

738
00:29:39,400 --> 00:29:42,320
certainly any attack on the Philippines 

739
00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:45,740
who would certainly warrant us acting 

740
00:29:45,740 --> 00:29:47,851
on those commitments , but we're just 

741
00:29:47,851 --> 00:29:50,018
not there yet . And of course , nobody 

742
00:29:50,018 --> 00:29:52,129
wants to see this uh come to blows or 

743
00:29:52,129 --> 00:29:53,684
to result in any conflict . 

744
00:29:55,140 --> 00:29:58,800
Uh , Jeff task and purpose . 

745
00:29:59,740 --> 00:30:02,410
Uh , thank you . Um , if I heard you 

746
00:30:02,410 --> 00:30:04,299
right , there are no plans in the 

747
00:30:04,299 --> 00:30:06,580
immediate future to address the issue 

748
00:30:06,580 --> 00:30:09,210
that active participation in extremist 

749
00:30:09,210 --> 00:30:11,730
group doesn't just mean that if you're 

750
00:30:11,740 --> 00:30:13,462
a member , you can be invented 

751
00:30:13,470 --> 00:30:15,960
involuntarily separated . I'm wondering , 

752
00:30:15,960 --> 00:30:17,960
this seems to be an easy fix . Just 

753
00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:20,016
change a couple of words from active 

754
00:30:20,016 --> 00:30:22,740
participation to membership . Why 

755
00:30:22,740 --> 00:30:26,100
hasn't diode fixed this already ? I 

756
00:30:26,110 --> 00:30:27,721
guess I take issue with your 

757
00:30:27,721 --> 00:30:29,777
characterization of this as being an 

758
00:30:29,777 --> 00:30:31,832
easy fix . I mean , it may seem like 

759
00:30:31,832 --> 00:30:33,888
something with a stroke open and you 

760
00:30:33,888 --> 00:30:37,850
could do , um but uh , but uh , the 

761
00:30:37,860 --> 00:30:39,971
nature of these groups change all the 

762
00:30:39,971 --> 00:30:43,870
time . Um and new groups pop up and old 

763
00:30:43,870 --> 00:30:45,960
groups die off , they morph into 

764
00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:48,016
something else . And the other thing 

765
00:30:48,016 --> 00:30:50,182
Jeff is that it's not just about group 

766
00:30:50,182 --> 00:30:52,430
membership , it's about , and I keep 

767
00:30:52,430 --> 00:30:54,486
coming back to this and my answer to 

768
00:30:54,486 --> 00:30:56,597
Abraham , it's about the ideology and 

769
00:30:56,597 --> 00:30:58,374
they conduct that that ideology 

770
00:30:58,374 --> 00:31:00,870
inspires and when and you know , this 

771
00:31:00,870 --> 00:31:02,703
Jeff , you've been covering this 

772
00:31:02,703 --> 00:31:04,703
building a long time . Some of this 

773
00:31:04,703 --> 00:31:06,870
radicalization occurs on an individual 

774
00:31:06,870 --> 00:31:09,092
level , and some of it happens based on 

775
00:31:09,092 --> 00:31:11,203
interaction in social media circles , 

776
00:31:11,203 --> 00:31:13,426
and some of it happens with interaction 

777
00:31:13,426 --> 00:31:13,410
with peers and colleagues and not all 

778
00:31:13,410 --> 00:31:15,521
those peers and colleagues are in the 

779
00:31:15,521 --> 00:31:17,577
ranks . I mean , we we uh you know , 

780
00:31:17,577 --> 00:31:19,688
sometimes we talk about troops , like 

781
00:31:19,688 --> 00:31:21,854
there's some insular body and they did 

782
00:31:21,854 --> 00:31:23,688
they don't interact with anybody 

783
00:31:23,688 --> 00:31:23,600
outside the military , and that's just 

784
00:31:23,600 --> 00:31:25,670
not the case . So it's not quite so 

785
00:31:25,670 --> 00:31:27,726
simple as that Jeff , and and as and 

786
00:31:27,726 --> 00:31:29,948
just to follow up on that . And I think 

787
00:31:29,948 --> 00:31:32,550
in my answer to tom um certainly , I 

788
00:31:32,550 --> 00:31:34,530
think this idea is going to be 

789
00:31:34,530 --> 00:31:36,697
something the working group's going to 

790
00:31:36,697 --> 00:31:39,610
look at , but I wouldn't predict or try 

791
00:31:39,610 --> 00:31:42,410
to uh anticipate any specific finding 

792
00:31:42,410 --> 00:31:44,132
that they might have . But the 

793
00:31:44,132 --> 00:31:46,188
secretary wants the working group to 

794
00:31:46,188 --> 00:31:48,500
take a look at , you know , uh these 

795
00:31:48,500 --> 00:31:51,060
groups themselves , um , and whether 

796
00:31:51,060 --> 00:31:53,116
that's something that's that's worth 

797
00:31:53,116 --> 00:31:55,227
thinking about . But but it's because 

798
00:31:55,227 --> 00:31:57,970
it's not easy if it was easy if we 

799
00:31:57,970 --> 00:31:59,803
would have put it in the list of 

800
00:31:59,803 --> 00:32:01,859
immediate actions . But it's because 

801
00:32:01,859 --> 00:32:03,914
it's not and it does get complicated 

802
00:32:03,914 --> 00:32:05,692
and it does tend to ignore this 

803
00:32:05,692 --> 00:32:07,803
individual radicalization that can go 

804
00:32:07,803 --> 00:32:09,859
on that that is not in the immediate 

805
00:32:09,859 --> 00:32:11,914
actions . What data does D . O . D . 

806
00:32:11,914 --> 00:32:14,026
Have on the number of service members 

807
00:32:14,026 --> 00:32:16,137
who have been involuntarily separated 

808
00:32:16,137 --> 00:32:18,248
for extremist activity ? I don't have 

809
00:32:18,248 --> 00:32:20,414
that data handy here Jeff . And as you 

810
00:32:20,414 --> 00:32:22,581
as you well know , not all separations 

811
00:32:22,581 --> 00:32:24,526
from the military are handled at a 

812
00:32:24,526 --> 00:32:26,637
central level uh , largely and mostly 

813
00:32:26,637 --> 00:32:28,748
they are handled uh , you know , at a 

814
00:32:28,748 --> 00:32:30,581
lower level administratively and 

815
00:32:30,581 --> 00:32:32,748
sometimes it's not always indicated um 

816
00:32:32,748 --> 00:32:35,820
with great specificity why a member 

817
00:32:35,830 --> 00:32:37,886
might be separated there . Obviously 

818
00:32:37,886 --> 00:32:40,108
there's many reasons to do . It usually 

819
00:32:40,108 --> 00:32:42,386
is in terms of violations of the U . C . 

820
00:32:42,386 --> 00:32:44,719
M . J . Or repeated violations of the U . 

821
00:32:44,719 --> 00:32:47,680
C . M . J . But it doesn't always have 

822
00:32:47,680 --> 00:32:49,790
to indicate extremist ideology or 

823
00:32:49,790 --> 00:32:52,068
extremist behavior . Sometimes it does . 

824
00:32:52,068 --> 00:32:54,179
Sometimes it doesn't , as I said many 

825
00:32:54,179 --> 00:32:56,401
of these people they like living in the 

826
00:32:56,401 --> 00:32:56,120
shadows and you're not always gonna 

827
00:32:56,120 --> 00:32:58,510
know what inspired them to act or what 

828
00:32:58,510 --> 00:33:00,770
inspired them to commit a crime or 

829
00:33:00,770 --> 00:33:03,570
violation of the UcMj a Tony a couple 

830
00:33:03,570 --> 00:33:05,650
of questions . The Israeli trip that 

831
00:33:05,660 --> 00:33:07,938
the stuff that the secretary is making , 

832
00:33:07,938 --> 00:33:09,827
is he going to be discussing with 

833
00:33:09,827 --> 00:33:11,938
Israeli ministers there , the new lay 

834
00:33:11,938 --> 00:33:14,550
down where centcom has now , Israel and 

835
00:33:14,560 --> 00:33:16,671
the rest of the Middle East under its 

836
00:33:16,671 --> 00:33:18,782
purview . That's not a goal for going 

837
00:33:18,782 --> 00:33:21,410
Tony , I mean I think it's about uh 

838
00:33:21,420 --> 00:33:23,587
making sure we reaffirm our commitment 

839
00:33:23,587 --> 00:33:25,587
to our strategic partnership and to 

840
00:33:25,587 --> 00:33:28,030
Israel's qualitative Military edge . Um 

841
00:33:28,030 --> 00:33:30,250
and to talk about a range of regional 

842
00:33:30,250 --> 00:33:32,361
security issues , to consult with our 

843
00:33:32,361 --> 00:33:34,472
Israeli counterparts about their view 

844
00:33:34,472 --> 00:33:36,583
of regional security . Um and I think 

845
00:33:36,583 --> 00:33:38,806
he's going ahead of Remembrance Day and 

846
00:33:38,806 --> 00:33:40,972
he looks forward to honoring uh fallen 

847
00:33:40,972 --> 00:33:43,450
Israeli soldiers who have fought so 

848
00:33:43,450 --> 00:33:45,394
bravely and and and defended their 

849
00:33:45,394 --> 00:33:47,283
country . Um He's not going there 

850
00:33:47,283 --> 00:33:50,180
specifically to address uh unified Camp 

851
00:33:50,190 --> 00:33:53,120
campaign plan in terms of like where 

852
00:33:53,120 --> 00:33:56,510
they sit in uh in what uh what 

853
00:33:56,510 --> 00:33:58,732
combatant command that they belong to . 

854
00:33:58,732 --> 00:34:00,954
I don't expect just uh put a fine point 

855
00:34:00,954 --> 00:34:03,240
in a period on this . Um I don't expect 

856
00:34:03,240 --> 00:34:06,160
the secretary to challenge or to change 

857
00:34:06,170 --> 00:34:08,640
the decision that was made prior to him 

858
00:34:08,640 --> 00:34:12,470
coming into office uh to uh to move 

859
00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:15,470
Israel into the central command region 

860
00:34:15,480 --> 00:34:18,020
in terms of the UCP guidelines , I 

861
00:34:18,020 --> 00:34:20,353
don't I don't expect any change in that . 

862
00:34:20,353 --> 00:34:22,480
The global force structure review of 

863
00:34:22,480 --> 00:34:24,702
global posture review . Where does that 

864
00:34:24,702 --> 00:34:26,758
stand by way of completion and might 

865
00:34:26,758 --> 00:34:28,990
then inform the FY 22 budgets since 

866
00:34:28,990 --> 00:34:31,820
that's still in flux ? Or is it more 

867
00:34:31,820 --> 00:34:35,370
likely that 23 through 27 plan , I kind 

868
00:34:35,370 --> 00:34:37,370
of , you know , want to say all the 

869
00:34:37,370 --> 00:34:39,592
above Tony so the global posture review 

870
00:34:39,592 --> 00:34:42,350
is ongoing um and we expected to be 

871
00:34:42,350 --> 00:34:46,220
complete midsummer ish um uh 

872
00:34:46,230 --> 00:34:49,530
that work is ongoing and um I don't I 

873
00:34:49,530 --> 00:34:51,860
don't want to overstate uh the effect 

874
00:34:51,860 --> 00:34:53,730
it's having on the 22 budget 

875
00:34:53,730 --> 00:34:55,990
discussions , but clearly anything we 

876
00:34:55,990 --> 00:34:57,934
learn is that that process that we 

877
00:34:57,934 --> 00:35:00,170
might think could inform uh this first 

878
00:35:00,170 --> 00:35:02,340
budget cycle . I think the secretary 

879
00:35:02,340 --> 00:35:04,507
and the Deputy secretary would be open 

880
00:35:04,507 --> 00:35:06,673
to that . That's not the goal though , 

881
00:35:06,673 --> 00:35:08,896
in the global posture review is again , 

882
00:35:08,896 --> 00:35:10,896
it's a work in progress that said , 

883
00:35:10,896 --> 00:35:12,951
when it's complete in the summer and 

884
00:35:12,951 --> 00:35:12,370
when the secretary has had a chance to 

885
00:35:12,370 --> 00:35:14,592
review and approve it and send it up to 

886
00:35:14,592 --> 00:35:16,814
the White House for their approval , uh 

887
00:35:16,814 --> 00:35:18,981
you know , I would fully expect that . 

888
00:35:18,981 --> 00:35:21,092
That would also help inform follow on 

889
00:35:21,092 --> 00:35:23,148
budget and programme decisions going 

890
00:35:23,148 --> 00:35:26,920
forward because it is very much about 

891
00:35:26,930 --> 00:35:30,130
resourcing , resourcing the strategy uh 

892
00:35:30,140 --> 00:35:32,140
and resourcing , as you well know , 

893
00:35:32,140 --> 00:35:34,084
does get right down to the program 

894
00:35:34,084 --> 00:35:36,340
level structure to if you've got 

895
00:35:36,350 --> 00:35:38,461
absolutely in the Middle East , yes , 

896
00:35:38,461 --> 00:35:40,800
focused on china to the great degree 

897
00:35:40,800 --> 00:35:42,967
that you want . So that's why it's the 

898
00:35:42,967 --> 00:35:45,022
question . It will it will certainly 

899
00:35:45,022 --> 00:35:47,360
inform subsequent budgets . Yeah . Um 

900
00:35:48,540 --> 00:35:51,360
let's see , Faisal from Al Jazeera , 

901
00:35:57,740 --> 00:35:59,060
give it another sick . 

902
00:36:01,630 --> 00:36:05,460
Okay , steven from I can't read this 

903
00:36:05,460 --> 00:36:08,160
book . Am I com 

904
00:36:09,630 --> 00:36:11,960
I think that's the military dot com . 

905
00:36:12,330 --> 00:36:16,160
Uh Yeah , thanks . Um 

906
00:36:16,630 --> 00:36:18,780
I'm curious about the line of effort 

907
00:36:18,780 --> 00:36:20,947
regarding the Insider threat program . 

908
00:36:20,947 --> 00:36:23,130
He talked to me a little bit about how 

909
00:36:23,130 --> 00:36:27,050
much these programs right now are um 

910
00:36:27,730 --> 00:36:29,563
are are dealing with things like 

911
00:36:29,563 --> 00:36:31,410
insider threats ? Like is this 

912
00:36:31,420 --> 00:36:33,587
something that insider threat programs 

913
00:36:33,587 --> 00:36:35,860
do already and you're trying to improve 

914
00:36:35,860 --> 00:36:38,700
them or have these kinds of programs 

915
00:36:38,710 --> 00:36:41,480
not covered issues such as the type of 

916
00:36:41,480 --> 00:36:45,030
extremism in question . So the specific 

917
00:36:45,030 --> 00:36:47,340
line of effort uh that the working 

918
00:36:47,340 --> 00:36:49,507
group will look at is to determine how 

919
00:36:49,507 --> 00:36:51,729
the department should facilitate better 

920
00:36:51,729 --> 00:36:53,840
information collection . This gets to 

921
00:36:53,840 --> 00:36:55,840
the issue about data uh and sharing 

922
00:36:55,840 --> 00:36:57,673
among the service insider threat 

923
00:36:57,673 --> 00:36:59,729
program . So the services have these 

924
00:36:59,729 --> 00:37:01,896
programs . Um so one of things I think 

925
00:37:01,896 --> 00:37:04,007
the working group wants to look at is 

926
00:37:04,007 --> 00:37:06,118
how well are they interconnected ? Uh 

927
00:37:06,118 --> 00:37:08,330
and how how robustly are they sharing 

928
00:37:08,330 --> 00:37:10,590
information and best practices to 

929
00:37:10,590 --> 00:37:12,479
include , again , data collection 

930
00:37:12,479 --> 00:37:15,120
through partnership with law 

931
00:37:15,120 --> 00:37:17,176
enforcement organizations , security 

932
00:37:17,176 --> 00:37:19,830
organizations as well as commanders and 

933
00:37:19,830 --> 00:37:22,950
supervisors . Is that just a it's kind 

934
00:37:22,950 --> 00:37:26,720
of unclear right now , the 

935
00:37:26,720 --> 00:37:28,942
extent to which these types of programs 

936
00:37:28,942 --> 00:37:30,998
are addressing the violent extremism 

937
00:37:30,998 --> 00:37:33,540
issue . I think he wants them , he 

938
00:37:33,540 --> 00:37:35,610
wants to uh take a look at the 

939
00:37:35,610 --> 00:37:38,060
consistency among them , to see the 

940
00:37:38,060 --> 00:37:39,893
degree to which they are in fact 

941
00:37:39,893 --> 00:37:42,350
addressing this particular challenge , 

942
00:37:42,980 --> 00:37:45,600
and again , to improve the sharing of 

943
00:37:45,600 --> 00:37:47,656
information between the services and 

944
00:37:47,656 --> 00:37:50,160
also between us as a department and law 

945
00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:52,049
enforcement . But that's why this 

946
00:37:52,049 --> 00:37:54,104
particular line of effort was nested 

947
00:37:54,104 --> 00:37:56,216
inside the working group . Because it 

948
00:37:56,216 --> 00:37:58,470
is an issue that uh to the point of 

949
00:37:58,470 --> 00:38:00,526
your question that that that I think 

950
00:38:00,526 --> 00:38:02,748
the secretary believes we need a little 

951
00:38:02,748 --> 00:38:04,803
bit more clarity on and that's gonna 

952
00:38:04,803 --> 00:38:06,414
take some time . Thank you . 

953
00:38:08,620 --> 00:38:11,800
Thank you . Um given the satellite 

954
00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:14,520
images in the North Sea in the arctic 

955
00:38:14,520 --> 00:38:16,687
that have recently come to light . And 

956
00:38:16,687 --> 00:38:19,310
then uh pressures in Ukraine with 

957
00:38:19,310 --> 00:38:23,020
soviet troop buildups down into Crimea 

958
00:38:23,030 --> 00:38:25,810
Ukraine and then down into Georgia 

959
00:38:25,810 --> 00:38:27,977
where there is continued pressure from 

960
00:38:27,977 --> 00:38:30,490
the soviet union . Sorry from Russia . 

961
00:38:31,160 --> 00:38:34,510
I'm an old style from Russia down there . 

962
00:38:34,520 --> 00:38:37,150
Has any of this congealed into thinking 

963
00:38:37,720 --> 00:38:40,150
uh that there needs to be any sort of 

964
00:38:40,520 --> 00:38:43,470
build up a response or posture change ? 

965
00:38:43,470 --> 00:38:47,280
Or has NATO expressed any uh 

966
00:38:47,290 --> 00:38:49,457
requirement , any desire for support , 

967
00:38:49,457 --> 00:38:51,600
additional support from the U . S . 

968
00:38:51,600 --> 00:38:53,570
Military . I'm not aware of any 

969
00:38:53,580 --> 00:38:55,802
requests from the alliance about this . 

970
00:38:55,802 --> 00:38:57,969
I mean obviously and I've been talking 

971
00:38:57,969 --> 00:39:00,024
about this all week , we're watching 

972
00:39:00,024 --> 00:39:03,750
particularly um this force build up 

973
00:39:04,420 --> 00:39:06,660
along the eastern border with Ukraine 

974
00:39:06,660 --> 00:39:08,110
and in Crimea 

975
00:39:08,120 --> 00:39:12,060
uh as 

976
00:39:12,060 --> 00:39:14,850
concerning and certainly not conducive 

977
00:39:14,850 --> 00:39:18,590
to um a sense of security and stability 

978
00:39:18,590 --> 00:39:21,030
in that part of the world . Uh And we 

979
00:39:21,030 --> 00:39:23,030
want better clarity on that . We're 

980
00:39:23,030 --> 00:39:25,252
also mindful and you know , I've talked 

981
00:39:25,252 --> 00:39:27,474
about this in the last for several days 

982
00:39:27,474 --> 00:39:29,641
of other Russian aggressive activities 

983
00:39:29,641 --> 00:39:32,010
uh in terms of air intercepts , uh 

984
00:39:32,020 --> 00:39:34,600
admissions of that sort that again are 

985
00:39:34,600 --> 00:39:37,970
not conducive to security and stability 

986
00:39:37,970 --> 00:39:40,370
there or elsewhere around the world 

987
00:39:40,370 --> 00:39:43,300
where they occur . Um And I'm not 

988
00:39:43,310 --> 00:39:47,030
certainly not going to get ahead of of 

989
00:39:47,030 --> 00:39:50,060
specific policy options or operations . 

990
00:39:50,070 --> 00:39:53,280
Um But as the secretary testified and 

991
00:39:53,280 --> 00:39:55,280
has talked to many times , I mean , 

992
00:39:55,280 --> 00:39:57,391
we're mindful of the continued threat 

993
00:39:57,391 --> 00:40:00,430
that the Russian military poses uh to 

994
00:40:00,440 --> 00:40:02,860
specifically to its neighbors . Um And 

995
00:40:02,870 --> 00:40:05,870
one of the things that um I mean the 

996
00:40:05,870 --> 00:40:07,981
first call the secretary made when he 

997
00:40:07,981 --> 00:40:10,840
took office was the first call was to 

998
00:40:10,840 --> 00:40:13,510
the Secretary general of NATO . Uh And 

999
00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:15,576
um and he very much looks forward to 

1000
00:40:15,576 --> 00:40:18,130
going to brussels , uh , to talk about 

1001
00:40:18,140 --> 00:40:20,251
the importance of the of the alliance 

1002
00:40:20,251 --> 00:40:22,196
and the future capabilities of the 

1003
00:40:22,196 --> 00:40:25,090
alliance as a as a defense , 

1004
00:40:25,510 --> 00:40:28,330
defense , uh , 

1005
00:40:28,810 --> 00:40:32,140
against aggression there in europe . 

1006
00:40:33,110 --> 00:40:36,020
Yeah , we I'm going back to the screen 

1007
00:40:36,610 --> 00:40:39,960
for what the screening of the line of 

1008
00:40:39,960 --> 00:40:42,760
effort for screening . Yeah . So masked 

1009
00:40:42,760 --> 00:40:46,330
up here , uh , there is a reference to 

1010
00:40:46,330 --> 00:40:48,670
social media . Um , right , and 

1011
00:40:48,670 --> 00:40:50,670
monitoring algorithms , things like 

1012
00:40:50,670 --> 00:40:52,837
that . This sounds like it's something 

1013
00:40:52,837 --> 00:40:54,670
new . I mean , this is something 

1014
00:40:54,670 --> 00:40:56,670
proactive that's going to be taking 

1015
00:40:56,670 --> 00:40:58,837
place where they're gonna be betting . 

1016
00:40:58,837 --> 00:41:01,059
Is that the proper term of social media 

1017
00:41:01,059 --> 00:41:03,059
of applicants of new recruits ? And 

1018
00:41:03,059 --> 00:41:05,281
what are some of the things that you're 

1019
00:41:05,281 --> 00:41:07,226
gonna be looking for and what will 

1020
00:41:07,226 --> 00:41:09,281
immediately disqualify somebody from 

1021
00:41:09,281 --> 00:41:11,310
service ? Well , we don't have the 

1022
00:41:11,310 --> 00:41:13,532
exact answers for that right now . Some 

1023
00:41:13,532 --> 00:41:15,588
of the services and their recruiting 

1024
00:41:15,588 --> 00:41:18,530
already , uh , take a look at , um , 

1025
00:41:19,110 --> 00:41:21,360
what's out there in , in the public 

1026
00:41:21,360 --> 00:41:24,120
realm because that's not violating 

1027
00:41:24,130 --> 00:41:27,780
anybody's First Amendment rights if you 

1028
00:41:27,780 --> 00:41:29,836
post something on facebook or social 

1029
00:41:29,836 --> 00:41:32,113
media and it's out in the public . But , 

1030
00:41:32,113 --> 00:41:34,058
um , so there's some of that and I 

1031
00:41:34,058 --> 00:41:36,002
think the secretary wants to get a 

1032
00:41:36,002 --> 00:41:38,002
better sense of its utility and the 

1033
00:41:38,002 --> 00:41:40,830
consistency across the services again , 

1034
00:41:41,310 --> 00:41:44,470
doing this in a legal lawful way . But , 

1035
00:41:44,480 --> 00:41:47,030
um , is there more that we could be , 

1036
00:41:47,030 --> 00:41:49,380
or should be thinking about , um , in 

1037
00:41:49,380 --> 00:41:51,300
terms of , uh , looking at that 

1038
00:41:51,300 --> 00:41:54,480
activity before we bring somebody in as 

1039
00:41:54,480 --> 00:41:58,290
an indicator , um , of , of 

1040
00:41:58,300 --> 00:42:00,244
their behavior and their conduct . 

1041
00:42:01,110 --> 00:42:03,380
That's the way to standardize what's 

1042
00:42:03,390 --> 00:42:05,920
out there and see up to what point you 

1043
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:08,142
can leave this problem . Yeah . There's 

1044
00:42:08,142 --> 00:42:10,309
best practices , uh , by , uh , by the 

1045
00:42:10,309 --> 00:42:12,309
services that I think the secretary 

1046
00:42:12,309 --> 00:42:14,531
wants them to share amongst one another 

1047
00:42:14,531 --> 00:42:16,698
about how to do this , another part of 

1048
00:42:16,698 --> 00:42:18,642
the world too . The situation with 

1049
00:42:18,642 --> 00:42:21,110
Ukraine . Um , I think Jen Psaki said 

1050
00:42:21,110 --> 00:42:23,110
yesterday that the number of troops 

1051
00:42:23,110 --> 00:42:25,221
that are , are around the border area 

1052
00:42:25,221 --> 00:42:27,710
with Ukraine are the largest number 

1053
00:42:27,710 --> 00:42:31,290
that has been seen since 2014 . Can you 

1054
00:42:31,290 --> 00:42:33,570
quantify that for us and tell us what 

1055
00:42:33,570 --> 00:42:36,490
kinds of personnel and equipment were 

1056
00:42:36,490 --> 00:42:38,379
seeing there ? I know you've been 

1057
00:42:38,379 --> 00:42:40,101
saying that you can't get into 

1058
00:42:40,101 --> 00:42:42,710
intelligence , but she did publicly say 

1059
00:42:42,720 --> 00:42:44,720
that . So therefore I'm looking for 

1060
00:42:44,720 --> 00:42:46,831
something that didn't quantify that . 

1061
00:42:46,831 --> 00:42:48,831
I'm not able to quantify it for you 

1062
00:42:48,831 --> 00:42:50,942
specifically right now , louis , I'll 

1063
00:42:50,942 --> 00:42:53,109
take a look and see if we can give you 

1064
00:42:53,109 --> 00:42:55,164
a more specific sense of that . I am 

1065
00:42:55,164 --> 00:42:57,370
loath to talk about intelligence 

1066
00:42:57,370 --> 00:42:59,870
assessments . What I think we'd like , 

1067
00:43:00,160 --> 00:43:03,430
louis is for the Russians to answer 

1068
00:43:03,430 --> 00:43:07,330
your question no . Okay . They haven't 

1069
00:43:07,330 --> 00:43:09,820
responded to me . I'm shocked to hear . 

1070
00:43:10,400 --> 00:43:12,730
I'm shocked to hear that . 

1071
00:43:13,200 --> 00:43:17,010
Okay , Phil from Reuters . 

1072
00:43:18,100 --> 00:43:20,378
Hey , there just to follow up . I mean , 

1073
00:43:20,378 --> 00:43:23,270
uh , you know , on the , on your 

1074
00:43:23,270 --> 00:43:25,214
counterparts at the White House is 

1075
00:43:25,214 --> 00:43:27,326
remarks about How the build up is the 

1076
00:43:27,326 --> 00:43:30,160
biggest since any time since 2014 . Um , 

1077
00:43:30,170 --> 00:43:32,170
you know , the Pentagon Press Corps 

1078
00:43:32,170 --> 00:43:34,226
Loves details . Could you provide us 

1079
00:43:34,226 --> 00:43:36,448
any more insight on the kinds of forces 

1080
00:43:36,448 --> 00:43:38,570
that that that she mentioned and uh , 

1081
00:43:38,580 --> 00:43:40,910
and also military hardware that you're 

1082
00:43:40,910 --> 00:43:43,132
seeing . And then I have a follow up on 

1083
00:43:43,132 --> 00:43:45,650
that . I'm going to stay consistent 

1084
00:43:45,650 --> 00:43:47,594
here . I'm not going to talk about 

1085
00:43:47,594 --> 00:43:49,761
intelligence assessments or what we're 

1086
00:43:49,761 --> 00:43:51,761
seeing . What we call on is for the 

1087
00:43:51,761 --> 00:43:53,983
Russians , uh , to do exactly that , to 

1088
00:43:53,983 --> 00:43:56,094
tell the world what they're doing and 

1089
00:43:56,094 --> 00:43:58,317
with what force and what capability and 

1090
00:43:58,317 --> 00:44:00,372
uh , and what their intentions are . 

1091
00:44:00,372 --> 00:44:02,483
I'm not going to get into assessments 

1092
00:44:02,483 --> 00:44:05,550
here from the pentagon podium . Okay . 

1093
00:44:05,560 --> 00:44:07,630
Um , and the Secretary believe this 

1094
00:44:07,630 --> 00:44:10,320
kind of open show , forced by Moscow 

1095
00:44:10,330 --> 00:44:13,630
more likely suggests posturing or , or , 

1096
00:44:13,640 --> 00:44:15,862
or preparations given his experience as 

1097
00:44:15,862 --> 00:44:19,270
a military man . Again , I won't talk 

1098
00:44:19,270 --> 00:44:20,992
about the Secretary's personal 

1099
00:44:20,992 --> 00:44:23,560
assessments here . Uh , the , what we 

1100
00:44:23,560 --> 00:44:25,782
continue to call on is for the Russians 

1101
00:44:25,782 --> 00:44:28,770
to be , uh , more transparent about 

1102
00:44:28,780 --> 00:44:30,669
what they're doing and what their 

1103
00:44:30,669 --> 00:44:32,669
intentions are . Uh , the fact that 

1104
00:44:32,669 --> 00:44:36,600
they haven't been transparent again is , 

1105
00:44:36,610 --> 00:44:39,420
uh , only causing , 

1106
00:44:39,890 --> 00:44:41,850
uh , more instability and more 

1107
00:44:41,850 --> 00:44:44,170
insecurity and a part of the world 

1108
00:44:44,170 --> 00:44:46,337
where there's , there's already been , 

1109
00:44:46,337 --> 00:44:49,460
uh , too much strife in too much 

1110
00:44:49,470 --> 00:44:51,570
violence . I mean , just late last 

1111
00:44:51,570 --> 00:44:53,570
month , the Ukrainian soldiers were 

1112
00:44:53,570 --> 00:44:56,130
killed in skirmishes . So we call on 

1113
00:44:56,130 --> 00:44:58,186
the Russians to be transparent about 

1114
00:44:58,186 --> 00:45:00,519
what their intentions are . And I again , 

1115
00:45:00,519 --> 00:45:02,352
I won't speak to the Secretary's 

1116
00:45:02,352 --> 00:45:04,352
personal assessment of this . We're 

1117
00:45:04,352 --> 00:45:06,463
watching this very , very closely for 

1118
00:45:06,463 --> 00:45:09,140
sure , Tony did you have a point was 

1119
00:45:09,140 --> 00:45:11,480
for figures like roughly how many 

1120
00:45:11,480 --> 00:45:13,591
Russians ? I'm not sure how does that 

1121
00:45:13,591 --> 00:45:15,591
an intelligence assessment with the 

1122
00:45:15,591 --> 00:45:19,150
assessment be the intent of ? Uh , just 

1123
00:45:19,320 --> 00:45:23,140
I understand the thirst for data . Uh , 

1124
00:45:23,150 --> 00:45:25,317
but that's wrapped up in that , that's 

1125
00:45:25,317 --> 00:45:28,260
part of what uh , an intelligence 

1126
00:45:28,260 --> 00:45:30,482
assessment is and I'm just not going to 

1127
00:45:30,482 --> 00:45:32,760
be able to go into that with you today . 

1128
00:45:32,760 --> 00:45:34,816
Um , it is a big build up and jen is 

1129
00:45:34,816 --> 00:45:36,816
right at the biggest one that we've 

1130
00:45:36,816 --> 00:45:39,310
seen since 2014 . And that offers all 

1131
00:45:39,310 --> 00:45:41,088
the more for the Russians to be 

1132
00:45:41,088 --> 00:45:43,421
transparent about what they're doing to , 

1133
00:45:43,421 --> 00:45:45,421
to explain themselves in the public 

1134
00:45:45,421 --> 00:45:47,477
interest and get a sense of the size 

1135
00:45:47,477 --> 00:45:49,699
and scope of the , of the estate . As I 

1136
00:45:49,699 --> 00:45:51,866
said to louis , I will take a look and 

1137
00:45:51,866 --> 00:45:54,088
see if there's a way to quantify this . 

1138
00:45:54,088 --> 00:45:56,421
I'm not guaranteeing that I can do that . 

1139
00:45:56,421 --> 00:45:58,532
I'm not promising anything , but I'll 

1140
00:45:58,532 --> 00:46:00,754
take a look and see that . But thus far 

1141
00:46:00,754 --> 00:46:02,921
we have been very reticent to speak to 

1142
00:46:02,921 --> 00:46:05,032
specifics here about their build up , 

1143
00:46:05,032 --> 00:46:07,199
it's their build up . Um and these are 

1144
00:46:07,199 --> 00:46:09,199
questions that should be put to the 

1145
00:46:09,199 --> 00:46:11,366
Ministry of Defense in Moscow and they 

1146
00:46:11,366 --> 00:46:11,130
should feel compelled to answer to the 

1147
00:46:11,130 --> 00:46:13,074
international community about what 

1148
00:46:13,074 --> 00:46:15,352
they're doing and why they're doing it , 

1149
00:46:15,352 --> 00:46:17,408
ma'am . Well , I wanted to ask about 

1150
00:46:17,408 --> 00:46:19,800
Belarus where there are reports that 

1151
00:46:20,280 --> 00:46:22,430
that the Russian military is sort of 

1152
00:46:22,430 --> 00:46:24,740
taking over the country slowly but just 

1153
00:46:24,740 --> 00:46:27,340
quietly in terms of their calling it 

1154
00:46:27,340 --> 00:46:30,340
training . But is there any comment on 

1155
00:46:30,340 --> 00:46:32,280
that ? I don't have a comment on 

1156
00:46:32,280 --> 00:46:35,190
Belarus today mike , I'm gonna go back 

1157
00:46:35,190 --> 00:46:37,079
to the budget . There have been a 

1158
00:46:37,079 --> 00:46:39,246
number of republican leaders up in the 

1159
00:46:39,246 --> 00:46:41,246
hill have been very critical of the 

1160
00:46:41,246 --> 00:46:43,246
flat budget is saying it enters our 

1161
00:46:43,246 --> 00:46:45,520
ability to execute missions and sends a 

1162
00:46:45,530 --> 00:46:49,230
dangerous message of weakness . What 

1163
00:46:49,240 --> 00:46:52,650
is secretary comfortable with you with 

1164
00:46:52,650 --> 00:46:55,100
these numbers and what's the thought of 

1165
00:46:55,880 --> 00:46:58,560
of , you know from here about what the 

1166
00:46:58,570 --> 00:47:02,350
republicans are saying of an L uhh the 

1167
00:47:02,360 --> 00:47:05,300
Secretary think you saw his statement 

1168
00:47:05,680 --> 00:47:08,630
um he believes that uh this top line 

1169
00:47:08,630 --> 00:47:11,290
figure will help us invest in the core 

1170
00:47:11,290 --> 00:47:13,401
foundations of our country's strength 

1171
00:47:13,401 --> 00:47:15,401
uh and it will advance departmental 

1172
00:47:15,401 --> 00:47:17,457
priorities to defend the nation , to 

1173
00:47:17,457 --> 00:47:19,679
innovate and modernize the department , 

1174
00:47:19,679 --> 00:47:21,734
to build resilience and readiness to 

1175
00:47:21,734 --> 00:47:23,457
take care of our people and to 

1176
00:47:23,457 --> 00:47:25,234
contribute to our alliances and 

1177
00:47:25,234 --> 00:47:27,401
partnerships to be able to continue to 

1178
00:47:27,401 --> 00:47:30,330
revitalize um uh those alliances and 

1179
00:47:30,330 --> 00:47:32,330
partnerships . And as he said , the 

1180
00:47:32,330 --> 00:47:34,163
pursuit of our national security 

1181
00:47:34,163 --> 00:47:36,108
interest requires investments that 

1182
00:47:36,108 --> 00:47:38,108
target and align our priorities and 

1183
00:47:38,108 --> 00:47:40,274
capabilities to address the constantly 

1184
00:47:40,274 --> 00:47:42,497
evolving and dynamic threat landscape . 

1185
00:47:42,497 --> 00:47:44,330
The president's uh discretionary 

1186
00:47:44,330 --> 00:47:46,552
funding request represents an important 

1187
00:47:46,552 --> 00:47:48,330
investment that will ensure the 

1188
00:47:48,330 --> 00:47:50,552
department's resources are matched with 

1189
00:47:50,552 --> 00:47:52,497
our strategy and policy again , to 

1190
00:47:52,497 --> 00:47:52,430
defend the nation and take care of our 

1191
00:47:52,430 --> 00:47:54,486
people were while revitalizing those 

1192
00:47:54,486 --> 00:47:56,597
key alliances and partnerships around 

1193
00:47:56,597 --> 00:47:58,708
the world . So is there anything he's 

1194
00:47:58,708 --> 00:48:00,819
pretty all prepared to lose if if the 

1195
00:48:00,819 --> 00:48:03,580
budget doesn't I like , you know , the 

1196
00:48:04,070 --> 00:48:07,060
uh , the ranking members wants a 33 to 

1197
00:48:07,060 --> 00:48:09,116
5% increase . Is there anything that 

1198
00:48:09,116 --> 00:48:12,350
that you are were wary of ? Uh not 

1199
00:48:12,360 --> 00:48:14,693
being able to have if the budget is not , 

1200
00:48:14,693 --> 00:48:16,638
does not get that 3 to 5% . Well , 

1201
00:48:16,638 --> 00:48:19,020
that's getting into speculating about 

1202
00:48:19,030 --> 00:48:22,440
uh , about what legislative action 

1203
00:48:22,440 --> 00:48:24,496
might occur here as the budget moves 

1204
00:48:24,496 --> 00:48:27,700
forward . The secretary um , uh , is 

1205
00:48:27,700 --> 00:48:29,644
grateful for this level of funding 

1206
00:48:29,644 --> 00:48:31,867
because he believes it will allow us to 

1207
00:48:31,867 --> 00:48:33,978
innovate modernize and again continue 

1208
00:48:33,978 --> 00:48:36,033
to defend the nation and I won't get 

1209
00:48:36,033 --> 00:48:38,780
into specific programs or or sub parts 

1210
00:48:38,780 --> 00:48:40,724
of the budget going forward . That 

1211
00:48:40,724 --> 00:48:42,780
process is still , is still tracking 

1212
00:48:42,780 --> 00:48:44,947
along and it's just premature to to be 

1213
00:48:44,947 --> 00:48:47,224
able to answer your question right now . 

1214
00:48:47,224 --> 00:48:49,430
Barbara back to Russia Ukraine for a 

1215
00:48:49,430 --> 00:48:52,450
minute . Your terminology today is 

1216
00:48:52,450 --> 00:48:54,660
quite different . You just repeatedly 

1217
00:48:54,660 --> 00:48:57,730
called it a build up . When the 

1218
00:48:57,730 --> 00:49:00,920
Russians have publicly said it's 

1219
00:49:00,920 --> 00:49:03,620
training , it's exercises , whether you 

1220
00:49:03,620 --> 00:49:05,842
believe them or not , you're calling it 

1221
00:49:05,842 --> 00:49:08,700
a built up , you're much more uhh 

1222
00:49:09,470 --> 00:49:12,810
your word selection is much more 

1223
00:49:12,810 --> 00:49:15,088
concerned than it has been in the past , 

1224
00:49:15,870 --> 00:49:18,860
Jen Psaki is sounding alarms that it's 

1225
00:49:18,860 --> 00:49:21,590
the biggest one since 2014 . 

1226
00:49:22,370 --> 00:49:26,070
Um Mhm . What has led to 

1227
00:49:26,070 --> 00:49:28,650
this change in tone by the 

1228
00:49:28,650 --> 00:49:31,020
administration as the last couple of 

1229
00:49:31,030 --> 00:49:33,960
weeks have gone on ? I think I have 

1230
00:49:33,960 --> 00:49:35,904
consistently referred to this as a 

1231
00:49:35,904 --> 00:49:38,610
build up . I've never referred to it as 

1232
00:49:38,620 --> 00:49:41,880
training or exercises . I have talked 

1233
00:49:41,880 --> 00:49:44,280
about it consistently as a build up . 

1234
00:49:45,540 --> 00:49:48,600
And it's precisely because we don't I 

1235
00:49:48,610 --> 00:49:50,499
think that the Russians have been 

1236
00:49:50,499 --> 00:49:52,554
totally transparent about their what 

1237
00:49:52,554 --> 00:49:54,666
they're doing , that I have used that 

1238
00:49:54,666 --> 00:49:56,554
phrase and consistently used that 

1239
00:49:56,554 --> 00:49:58,666
phrase . Uh and again , this is , you 

1240
00:49:58,666 --> 00:50:00,777
know , these are great questions that 

1241
00:50:00,777 --> 00:50:03,290
should be put uh Minister Shoigu in 

1242
00:50:03,290 --> 00:50:05,630
Moscow about what he's doing with his 

1243
00:50:05,630 --> 00:50:07,686
military . You don't believe they're 

1244
00:50:07,686 --> 00:50:09,797
transparent . Their public statements 

1245
00:50:09,797 --> 00:50:11,741
have been training and exercises , 

1246
00:50:11,741 --> 00:50:13,963
you're saying you don't believe they're 

1247
00:50:13,963 --> 00:50:15,463
transparent . So the biden 

1248
00:50:15,463 --> 00:50:17,660
administration right now simply does 

1249
00:50:17,660 --> 00:50:21,140
not believe the Russians . The question 

1250
00:50:21,140 --> 00:50:24,850
is a how concerned are you , is this 

1251
00:50:25,260 --> 00:50:27,570
is that they're engaged in rhetoric , 

1252
00:50:28,460 --> 00:50:30,627
divided ? Administration is engaged in 

1253
00:50:30,627 --> 00:50:33,770
rhetoric , but is it is it serious ? Or 

1254
00:50:33,770 --> 00:50:37,150
is this just a war work , man ? This 

1255
00:50:37,150 --> 00:50:39,372
isn't about being engaged in rhetoric ? 

1256
00:50:39,372 --> 00:50:41,539
The Russians are engaged in conducting 

1257
00:50:41,539 --> 00:50:43,650
a military build up among the eastern 

1258
00:50:43,650 --> 00:50:46,490
border of Ukraine and in Crimea , which 

1259
00:50:46,490 --> 00:50:49,400
still belongs to Ukraine . And that is 

1260
00:50:49,400 --> 00:50:53,140
of concern . And we want to know 

1261
00:50:53,150 --> 00:50:55,600
more about what it is they're doing and 

1262
00:50:55,600 --> 00:50:57,767
what their intentions are , because we 

1263
00:50:57,767 --> 00:50:59,544
don't believe it's conducive to 

1264
00:50:59,544 --> 00:51:01,544
security and stability there . This 

1265
00:51:01,544 --> 00:51:03,656
isn't about rhetoric , Barbara , this 

1266
00:51:03,656 --> 00:51:05,656
is about the physical build up of a 

1267
00:51:05,656 --> 00:51:08,650
considerable amount of force . And we 

1268
00:51:08,650 --> 00:51:11,370
believe that the Russians should should 

1269
00:51:11,370 --> 00:51:14,740
be made to speak to that . And what do 

1270
00:51:14,740 --> 00:51:18,510
you think , What do you assess their 

1271
00:51:18,510 --> 00:51:22,490
intention to be ? Well , again , we we 

1272
00:51:22,490 --> 00:51:24,712
want them to speak to that . Um , and I 

1273
00:51:24,712 --> 00:51:26,712
won't get into , you know , I'm not 

1274
00:51:26,712 --> 00:51:30,050
gonna get into the speculation here on 

1275
00:51:30,050 --> 00:51:33,590
our part because right now , uh , it 

1276
00:51:33,590 --> 00:51:35,646
would be largely speculation because 

1277
00:51:35,646 --> 00:51:37,868
they haven't been very clear about what 

1278
00:51:37,868 --> 00:51:40,034
they're doing . So you really , I just 

1279
00:51:40,034 --> 00:51:42,368
want to pursue this for one more minute . 

1280
00:51:42,368 --> 00:51:44,479
You're you're not speculating because 

1281
00:51:44,479 --> 00:51:46,590
you really don't know at this point , 

1282
00:51:46,590 --> 00:51:48,757
I'm not going to speak to intelligence 

1283
00:51:48,757 --> 00:51:51,260
assessments . Those assessments would 

1284
00:51:51,260 --> 00:51:53,650
be aided by greater transparency by the 

1285
00:51:53,650 --> 00:51:55,817
Russians about what they're doing . My 

1286
00:51:55,817 --> 00:51:57,817
last question then , given what did 

1287
00:51:57,817 --> 00:52:00,039
happen in Crimea and the fact that they 

1288
00:52:00,039 --> 00:52:02,039
were able to execute essentially an 

1289
00:52:02,039 --> 00:52:05,100
invasion of Crimea without the world 

1290
00:52:05,110 --> 00:52:08,320
somewhat noticing in time and without 

1291
00:52:08,320 --> 00:52:11,430
anybody doing anything about it , the 

1292
00:52:11,440 --> 00:52:13,770
history of what happened in Crimea , 

1293
00:52:13,890 --> 00:52:17,310
how much is that concerning the biden 

1294
00:52:17,310 --> 00:52:19,550
administration right now , as you see 

1295
00:52:19,550 --> 00:52:21,494
this play out , it's not just what 

1296
00:52:21,494 --> 00:52:23,717
happened in Crimea , it's what happened 

1297
00:52:23,717 --> 00:52:25,120
along . 

1298
00:52:27,350 --> 00:52:30,730
It's a history , it's a history that 

1299
00:52:30,740 --> 00:52:34,260
a way of operating , that we've seen 

1300
00:52:34,260 --> 00:52:36,850
from the Russians in many places . Um , 

1301
00:52:36,850 --> 00:52:39,100
and we are , we are certainly aware of 

1302
00:52:39,100 --> 00:52:41,550
that history and uh and and that's one 

1303
00:52:41,550 --> 00:52:43,717
of the reasons why we're watching this 

1304
00:52:43,717 --> 00:52:45,939
very , very closely . I really can't go 

1305
00:52:45,939 --> 00:52:49,880
further than that right now . Um , see , 

1306
00:52:49,880 --> 00:52:53,460
I'm almost through everybody I think uh , 

1307
00:52:53,470 --> 00:52:56,170
Jared from Al Monitor . 

1308
00:52:57,850 --> 00:52:59,628
Hi , john , I apologize If this 

1309
00:52:59,628 --> 00:53:01,739
question was already asked , I had to 

1310
00:53:01,739 --> 00:53:03,517
step in a bit late . I was just 

1311
00:53:03,517 --> 00:53:05,739
wondering if I could circle back to the 

1312
00:53:05,739 --> 00:53:07,794
Iraq strategic dialogue earlier this 

1313
00:53:07,794 --> 00:53:09,961
week . I was wondering if you have any 

1314
00:53:09,961 --> 00:53:09,730
clarity for us on what exactly combat 

1315
00:53:09,730 --> 00:53:12,470
forces coalition combat forces means . 

1316
00:53:12,480 --> 00:53:15,570
Um , we had seen in the joint statement 

1317
00:53:15,840 --> 00:53:17,940
that the transition to the MAG last 

1318
00:53:17,940 --> 00:53:21,370
year in Iraq has enabled , uh quote , 

1319
00:53:21,370 --> 00:53:23,480
the redeployment of coalition combat 

1320
00:53:23,480 --> 00:53:27,170
forces . Um can you give us any clarity 

1321
00:53:27,170 --> 00:53:29,170
on that , what that what that means 

1322
00:53:29,650 --> 00:53:31,830
specific . When we talk about combat 

1323
00:53:31,830 --> 00:53:33,997
forces were specifically talking about 

1324
00:53:33,997 --> 00:53:37,750
uh you know , uh forces or troops that 

1325
00:53:37,750 --> 00:53:40,500
are as a part of their core mission 

1326
00:53:40,500 --> 00:53:44,070
engaged in direct conflict , armed 

1327
00:53:44,070 --> 00:53:46,460
conflict with the enemy and the enemy 

1328
00:53:46,460 --> 00:53:48,516
in Iraq . Obviously that we're still 

1329
00:53:48,516 --> 00:53:51,670
helping the Iraqis fight is ISIS . But 

1330
00:53:51,670 --> 00:53:53,837
what that strategic dialogue statement 

1331
00:53:53,837 --> 00:53:55,837
did was reaffirmed what had already 

1332
00:53:55,837 --> 00:53:57,559
been taking place , which is a 

1333
00:53:57,559 --> 00:54:01,220
transition uh really almost solely 

1334
00:54:01,220 --> 00:54:03,680
to advise and assist . And that's 

1335
00:54:03,680 --> 00:54:05,791
basically the mission that our troops 

1336
00:54:05,791 --> 00:54:07,902
are they're doing now , which is this 

1337
00:54:07,902 --> 00:54:09,958
advise and assist ? I'm not going to 

1338
00:54:09,958 --> 00:54:12,330
get uh in the , you know , specific 

1339
00:54:12,330 --> 00:54:16,130
operational um details here . Uh but 

1340
00:54:16,130 --> 00:54:19,010
that that statement reflected what has 

1341
00:54:19,010 --> 00:54:22,650
been an ongoing uh move now to make the 

1342
00:54:22,650 --> 00:54:24,761
mission all about advise and assist , 

1343
00:54:25,040 --> 00:54:27,270
making sure that the Iraqi security 

1344
00:54:27,270 --> 00:54:29,270
forces have the competency , the 

1345
00:54:29,270 --> 00:54:31,492
capability , the confidence to continue 

1346
00:54:31,492 --> 00:54:33,890
to prosecute operations against ISIS . 

1347
00:54:33,900 --> 00:54:37,610
Uh And again , nobody ever uh went 

1348
00:54:37,620 --> 00:54:39,860
into Iraq at the invitation of the 

1349
00:54:39,860 --> 00:54:41,971
government there with the expectation 

1350
00:54:41,971 --> 00:54:44,193
that we would be there forever . It's a 

1351
00:54:44,193 --> 00:54:46,082
very specifically defined mission 

1352
00:54:46,082 --> 00:54:48,660
against ISIS . Uh And we are now the 

1353
00:54:48,660 --> 00:54:50,549
other thing that came out of that 

1354
00:54:50,549 --> 00:54:53,530
dialogue was a plan to conduct talks 

1355
00:54:53,540 --> 00:54:56,050
going forward in the future um to 

1356
00:54:56,050 --> 00:54:58,320
eventually draw down that footprint in 

1357
00:54:58,320 --> 00:55:01,200
Iraq uh as as suits 

1358
00:55:01,210 --> 00:55:04,200
uh the Iraqi people , the Iraqi 

1359
00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:06,330
government um an Iraqi national 

1360
00:55:06,330 --> 00:55:10,070
security interests understood . I mean , 

1361
00:55:10,080 --> 00:55:12,191
as I understand from the , you know , 

1362
00:55:12,191 --> 00:55:14,080
the transition to the MAG and the 

1363
00:55:14,080 --> 00:55:15,969
advising last year , there really 

1364
00:55:15,969 --> 00:55:18,080
aren't uh any significant number of , 

1365
00:55:18,080 --> 00:55:20,302
as you defined it combat forces in Iraq 

1366
00:55:20,302 --> 00:55:22,469
right now . Um I mean , are we talking 

1367
00:55:22,469 --> 00:55:24,580
about S . O . F . Forces or what what 

1368
00:55:24,580 --> 00:55:26,747
are we talking about ? It doesn't seem 

1369
00:55:26,747 --> 00:55:28,969
like a significant number to pull out . 

1370
00:55:28,969 --> 00:55:30,858
The mission has become advise and 

1371
00:55:30,858 --> 00:55:32,969
assist and I won't speak to specifics 

1372
00:55:32,969 --> 00:55:36,060
beyond that . Peter Lowy . 

1373
00:55:37,240 --> 00:55:38,240
Yeah . 

1374
00:55:41,440 --> 00:55:43,390
Hi john thanks very much . Um The 

1375
00:55:43,390 --> 00:55:45,223
government accountability office 

1376
00:55:45,223 --> 00:55:47,390
released the military readiness report 

1377
00:55:47,390 --> 00:55:49,390
on Wednesday that appears to show a 

1378
00:55:49,390 --> 00:55:51,168
decline in readiness despite an 

1379
00:55:51,168 --> 00:55:52,946
increase in funding . The annex 

1380
00:55:52,946 --> 00:55:54,834
includes a letter saying that the 

1381
00:55:54,834 --> 00:55:56,834
Department of Defense quote unquote 

1382
00:55:56,834 --> 00:55:59,270
concurs with that . Can you expand on 

1383
00:55:59,270 --> 00:56:01,450
that ? And what makes today's budget 

1384
00:56:01,450 --> 00:56:03,460
requests emphasis on readiness 

1385
00:56:03,830 --> 00:56:05,774
different from past requests which 

1386
00:56:05,774 --> 00:56:07,830
apparently did not boost readiness . 

1387
00:56:07,830 --> 00:56:09,941
Thanks , I have to take your question 

1388
00:56:09,941 --> 00:56:11,886
in the letter . I've not seen that 

1389
00:56:11,886 --> 00:56:13,886
letter . Um Again , I would just go 

1390
00:56:13,886 --> 00:56:17,180
back uh to the top line figure and the 

1391
00:56:17,180 --> 00:56:19,130
secretary's comments about his 

1392
00:56:19,130 --> 00:56:22,080
confidence um that that top line figure 

1393
00:56:22,080 --> 00:56:24,590
will allow us to put forward a specific 

1394
00:56:24,590 --> 00:56:28,400
budget uh with 

1395
00:56:28,400 --> 00:56:30,620
program lines um that allow us to 

1396
00:56:30,620 --> 00:56:32,787
properly defend the nation and part of 

1397
00:56:32,787 --> 00:56:34,676
defending the nation is of course 

1398
00:56:34,676 --> 00:56:36,842
making sure that uh that our forces of 

1399
00:56:36,842 --> 00:56:38,676
field and afloat are fully ready 

1400
00:56:38,676 --> 00:56:40,731
trained and enable for the mission . 

1401
00:56:40,731 --> 00:56:42,953
But again , on that specific letter , I 

1402
00:56:42,953 --> 00:56:45,064
think we're just gonna have to take a 

1403
00:56:45,064 --> 00:56:44,750
look at that . I've not I've not seen 

1404
00:56:44,750 --> 00:56:47,350
that . Um anything more in the room . 

1405
00:56:47,930 --> 00:56:50,041
One more and then we'll call it a day 

1406
00:56:50,041 --> 00:56:52,208
to gender . I don't think I've taken a 

1407
00:56:52,208 --> 00:56:56,040
question from you yet . Yeah , Can you 

1408
00:56:56,040 --> 00:56:59,780
hit me ? I got you , buddy . I , first 

1409
00:56:59,780 --> 00:57:03,730
of all , congratulations on coming back . 

1410
00:57:03,740 --> 00:57:06,960
Okay . You answered the question partly , 

1411
00:57:07,330 --> 00:57:11,180
but I'm not sure that I can , you know , 

1412
00:57:11,190 --> 00:57:14,760
get a clear answer on that . The 

1413
00:57:14,760 --> 00:57:18,250
passage of uss john paul because in the 

1414
00:57:18,250 --> 00:57:21,950
Indian Ministry statement says that we 

1415
00:57:21,950 --> 00:57:25,150
have conveyed our concerns regarding 

1416
00:57:25,150 --> 00:57:27,428
this passage and they called the U . N . 

1417
00:57:27,610 --> 00:57:30,820
Convention on the law of the sea . So 

1418
00:57:30,820 --> 00:57:33,550
what is the U . S . Reaction to that 

1419
00:57:34,030 --> 00:57:37,590
concerns of India ginger ? I won't 

1420
00:57:37,590 --> 00:57:40,990
speak to specific communication um uh 

1421
00:57:41,000 --> 00:57:44,870
with uh with India on this , as I said , 

1422
00:57:44,880 --> 00:57:47,820
uh this innocent passage through 

1423
00:57:47,830 --> 00:57:50,550
the territorial sea in the vicinity of 

1424
00:57:50,550 --> 00:57:52,930
the Republic of the maltese was within 

1425
00:57:52,940 --> 00:57:56,400
our within its exclusive economic zone 

1426
00:57:56,400 --> 00:57:59,440
was conducted uh with norm against 

1427
00:57:59,440 --> 00:58:02,820
normal operations uh and all consistent 

1428
00:58:02,820 --> 00:58:05,790
with international law . This is this 

1429
00:58:05,790 --> 00:58:09,630
is again um uh part of our 

1430
00:58:09,640 --> 00:58:13,040
um our responsibility really to uphold 

1431
00:58:13,050 --> 00:58:16,280
the freedom of navigation uh and the 

1432
00:58:16,280 --> 00:58:18,391
rights and freedoms of lawful uses of 

1433
00:58:18,391 --> 00:58:20,724
the sea recognized in international law . 

1434
00:58:20,724 --> 00:58:23,058
Um And as I think we've said , you know , 

1435
00:58:23,058 --> 00:58:25,700
when we unveiled the freedom of 

1436
00:58:25,700 --> 00:58:28,550
Navigation report um a few weeks back , 

1437
00:58:28,560 --> 00:58:31,210
um uh everybody , when we when we talk 

1438
00:58:31,210 --> 00:58:33,488
about freedom of navigation operations , 

1439
00:58:33,488 --> 00:58:35,432
you tend to get we all tend to get 

1440
00:58:35,432 --> 00:58:37,377
focused on , well , it's against a 

1441
00:58:37,377 --> 00:58:39,377
nation state . It's not against the 

1442
00:58:39,377 --> 00:58:41,488
nation state , it's for a principle . 

1443
00:58:41,488 --> 00:58:43,654
Um and we do it all around the world . 

1444
00:58:43,654 --> 00:58:45,654
It's not just something that uh you 

1445
00:58:45,654 --> 00:58:47,766
know , we tend to talk about it in in 

1446
00:58:47,766 --> 00:58:49,821
regards to china and their excessive 

1447
00:58:49,821 --> 00:58:49,800
maritime claims . But it isn't all just 

1448
00:58:49,800 --> 00:58:51,967
about china . It's something we do not 

1449
00:58:51,967 --> 00:58:54,189
against something but for something and 

1450
00:58:54,189 --> 00:58:57,510
we do it all around the world . Thank 

1451
00:58:57,510 --> 00:58:59,732
you . Everybody was saying today at the 

1452
00:58:59,732 --> 00:59:01,732
White House with General Milley and 

1453
00:59:01,732 --> 00:59:03,843
Secretary Blinken . Any sense of what 

1454
00:59:03,843 --> 00:59:03,170
was discussed , whether Russia or 

1455
00:59:03,170 --> 00:59:04,980
Afghanistan of course and on 

1456
00:59:04,980 --> 00:59:07,050
Afghanistan three weeks ago . Isen't 

1457
00:59:07,050 --> 00:59:09,272
there some obligation or responsibility 

1458
00:59:09,272 --> 00:59:11,383
to let NATO allies an afghan partners 

1459
00:59:11,383 --> 00:59:13,439
know what the intention is . I'm not 

1460
00:59:13,439 --> 00:59:15,661
going to speak to the specific schedule 

1461
00:59:15,661 --> 00:59:17,883
uh at the at the White House . Yes , he 

1462
00:59:17,883 --> 00:59:20,380
was there . But we don't talk about the 

1463
00:59:20,380 --> 00:59:22,547
details of meetings that he has at the 

1464
00:59:22,547 --> 00:59:25,600
White House . Uh let the my White House 

1465
00:59:25,610 --> 00:59:28,570
colleagues uh refer to them to speak to 

1466
00:59:28,570 --> 00:59:31,020
that . And or and we're all mindful of 

1467
00:59:31,020 --> 00:59:33,131
the clock here . And as the President 

1468
00:59:33,131 --> 00:59:35,242
said himself , um it's gonna be tough 

1469
00:59:35,242 --> 00:59:38,530
to me . Uh May one deadline for the 

1470
00:59:38,540 --> 00:59:42,120
complete withdrawal of US forces as was 

1471
00:59:42,130 --> 00:59:44,760
uh agreed to by the previous 

1472
00:59:44,760 --> 00:59:48,120
administration . Uh and I'm not going 

1473
00:59:48,120 --> 00:59:50,120
to get ahead of the decision making 

1474
00:59:50,120 --> 00:59:52,287
process . There hasn't been a decision 

1475
00:59:52,287 --> 00:59:54,453
made by the President . The mission of 

1476
00:59:54,453 --> 00:59:56,564
our troops in Afghanistan remains the 

1477
00:59:56,564 --> 00:59:58,564
same right now and the secretary is 

1478
00:59:58,564 --> 00:59:58,370
focused on making sure that they have 

1479
00:59:58,370 --> 01:00:00,620
the resources they need to continue to 

1480
01:00:00,620 --> 01:00:02,990
get the job done . He is and will 

1481
01:00:02,990 --> 01:00:05,210
continue to provide his advice and 

1482
01:00:05,210 --> 01:00:06,988
counsel to the President as the 

1483
01:00:06,988 --> 01:00:09,043
president works through the decision 

1484
01:00:09,043 --> 01:00:11,266
making process about what he's gonna do 

1485
01:00:11,266 --> 01:00:13,043
going forward . Okay . Thanks . 

1486
01:00:13,043 --> 01:00:14,988
Everybody . Have a great weekend . 

1487
01:00:14,988 --> 01:00:18,300
Bishop Garrison is uh leading it . And 

1488
01:00:18,310 --> 01:00:20,310
if you look in the memo , there's a 

1489
01:00:20,310 --> 01:00:21,921
complete list of who will be 

1490
01:00:21,921 --> 01:00:24,088
represented on that . It's on the memo 

1491
01:00:24,088 --> 01:00:26,650
that we released . Thank you . Mhm .