1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:04,740 --> 00:00:07,560 right we will call meaning to order . 3 00:00:08,040 --> 00:00:10,096 I'll put my glasses on so I can read 4 00:00:10,096 --> 00:00:12,318 what we need to read here . This is the 5 00:00:12,318 --> 00:00:14,262 full committee hearing on national 6 00:00:14,262 --> 00:00:16,262 security challenges and US military 7 00:00:16,262 --> 00:00:18,373 activities in the Greater Middle East 8 00:00:18,373 --> 00:00:20,262 and Africa we have with us miss a 9 00:00:20,262 --> 00:00:22,151 mandatory who is the acting under 10 00:00:22,151 --> 00:00:24,373 Secretary of Defense for policy General 11 00:00:24,373 --> 00:00:26,096 Kenneth Mackenzie , who is the 12 00:00:26,096 --> 00:00:28,096 Commander of US Central Command and 13 00:00:28,096 --> 00:00:30,262 General Stephen Townsend , who was the 14 00:00:30,262 --> 00:00:32,429 Commander of U . S . African Command . 15 00:00:32,429 --> 00:00:34,651 Um As always this is a hybrid hearing . 16 00:00:34,651 --> 00:00:36,960 Uh So I will read the instructions for 17 00:00:36,960 --> 00:00:39,016 how to conduct a hybrid hearing . So 18 00:00:39,016 --> 00:00:41,071 we're all on the same page . Members 19 00:00:41,071 --> 00:00:42,904 who are joining remotely must be 20 00:00:42,904 --> 00:00:44,960 visible on screen for the purpose of 21 00:00:44,960 --> 00:00:47,016 identity verification , establishing 22 00:00:47,016 --> 00:00:49,182 and maintaining a quorum participating 23 00:00:49,182 --> 00:00:51,238 in the proceeding and voting . Those 24 00:00:51,238 --> 00:00:53,071 members must continue to use the 25 00:00:53,071 --> 00:00:52,970 software platforms , function while in 26 00:00:52,970 --> 00:00:54,859 attendance unless they experience 27 00:00:54,859 --> 00:00:57,026 connectivity issues or other technical 28 00:00:57,026 --> 00:00:59,026 problems that render them unable to 29 00:00:59,026 --> 00:01:01,026 participate on camera . If a member 30 00:01:01,026 --> 00:01:03,081 experiences technical difficulties , 31 00:01:03,081 --> 00:01:05,303 they should contact the committee staff 32 00:01:05,303 --> 00:01:04,980 for assistance . Video of members 33 00:01:04,980 --> 00:01:07,147 participation will be broadcast in the 34 00:01:07,147 --> 00:01:09,313 room and via the television . Internet 35 00:01:09,313 --> 00:01:11,424 feeds . Members participated remotely 36 00:01:11,424 --> 00:01:13,647 must seek recognition verbally and they 37 00:01:13,647 --> 00:01:13,640 are asked to mute their microphones 38 00:01:13,640 --> 00:01:15,696 when they are not speaking . Members 39 00:01:15,696 --> 00:01:17,640 who are participating remotely are 40 00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:19,807 reminded to keep the software platform 41 00:01:19,807 --> 00:01:21,973 video function on the entire time they 42 00:01:21,973 --> 00:01:23,973 attend the proceeding , members may 43 00:01:23,973 --> 00:01:26,084 leave and rejoin the proceeding , but 44 00:01:26,084 --> 00:01:25,950 if members depart for a short while , 45 00:01:25,950 --> 00:01:27,783 for reasons other than joining a 46 00:01:27,783 --> 00:01:29,728 different proceeding , they should 47 00:01:29,728 --> 00:01:31,561 leave the video function on . If 48 00:01:31,561 --> 00:01:33,172 members will be absent for a 49 00:01:33,172 --> 00:01:35,339 significant period or depart to join a 50 00:01:35,339 --> 00:01:35,130 different proceeding , they should exit 51 00:01:35,130 --> 00:01:37,420 the software platform entirely and we 52 00:01:37,420 --> 00:01:39,587 join it . If they return , members may 53 00:01:39,587 --> 00:01:41,809 use the software platforms chat feature 54 00:01:41,809 --> 00:01:43,809 to communicate with staff regarding 55 00:01:43,809 --> 00:01:45,976 technical or logistical support issues 56 00:01:45,976 --> 00:01:48,142 only . Finally , I have designated the 57 00:01:48,142 --> 00:01:49,864 committee staff member to , if 58 00:01:49,864 --> 00:01:52,087 necessary , mute , unrecognized members 59 00:01:52,087 --> 00:01:52,040 microphones to cancel any inadvertent 60 00:01:52,040 --> 00:01:54,300 background noise that may disrupt the 61 00:01:54,300 --> 00:01:57,730 proceeding . Thank you . As mentioned , 62 00:01:57,730 --> 00:01:59,674 we are here today to hear from our 63 00:01:59,680 --> 00:02:01,680 Central Command and African Command 64 00:02:01,680 --> 00:02:03,569 commanders and there is to put it 65 00:02:03,569 --> 00:02:05,710 mildly a lot going on in both of your 66 00:02:05,710 --> 00:02:07,710 areas of responsibility and we look 67 00:02:07,710 --> 00:02:09,821 forward to getting an update on those 68 00:02:09,821 --> 00:02:11,932 challenges . You know , certainly the 69 00:02:11,932 --> 00:02:13,932 counterterrorism challenge has been 70 00:02:13,932 --> 00:02:15,932 central for a very long time in the 71 00:02:15,932 --> 00:02:18,099 region as we've dealt with ISIS in the 72 00:02:18,099 --> 00:02:20,154 Middle East , between Iraq and Syria 73 00:02:20,154 --> 00:02:21,988 and elsewhere . And then various 74 00:02:21,990 --> 00:02:24,101 affiliates of many different groups , 75 00:02:24,101 --> 00:02:26,268 including ISIS and Al Qaeda throughout 76 00:02:26,268 --> 00:02:28,490 Africa . Um , I think educating members 77 00:02:28,490 --> 00:02:30,490 on exactly what's going on with the 78 00:02:30,490 --> 00:02:32,601 fights , there will be very important 79 00:02:32,601 --> 00:02:34,768 because you know , some of that is not 80 00:02:34,768 --> 00:02:36,768 on the front pages , but I know for 81 00:02:36,768 --> 00:02:38,657 instance what's going on in South 82 00:02:38,657 --> 00:02:40,323 Holland , West Africa is very 83 00:02:40,323 --> 00:02:42,379 concerning . We are working with our 84 00:02:42,379 --> 00:02:44,323 partners in the european command , 85 00:02:44,323 --> 00:02:46,434 sorry , with our with our partners in 86 00:02:46,434 --> 00:02:48,657 europe who have interests there as well 87 00:02:48,657 --> 00:02:50,879 and very interested to hear how that is 88 00:02:50,879 --> 00:02:50,340 going and what we can do to be 89 00:02:50,340 --> 00:02:53,370 supportive of that . But also as is 90 00:02:53,370 --> 00:02:55,440 previewed by the slides that General 91 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:58,040 Townsend has passed out for us , both 92 00:02:58,040 --> 00:03:00,096 of these areas of responsibility are 93 00:03:00,096 --> 00:03:02,096 also part of the larger great power 94 00:03:02,096 --> 00:03:04,040 competition . I think that is very 95 00:03:04,040 --> 00:03:05,929 important to understand that both 96 00:03:05,929 --> 00:03:07,818 Russia and china are particularly 97 00:03:07,818 --> 00:03:09,818 active in Africa , also , obviously 98 00:03:09,818 --> 00:03:11,873 active in the Middle East . How does 99 00:03:11,873 --> 00:03:13,929 how does our military play a role in 100 00:03:13,929 --> 00:03:16,040 those parts of the world with dealing 101 00:03:16,040 --> 00:03:18,151 with the great power competition that 102 00:03:18,151 --> 00:03:20,373 we're facing from both china and Russia 103 00:03:20,373 --> 00:03:22,540 will be very interested to hear that . 104 00:03:22,540 --> 00:03:24,651 And then of course , there is the big 105 00:03:24,651 --> 00:03:26,651 issue of the moment and that is the 106 00:03:26,651 --> 00:03:28,707 president's decision to withdraw our 107 00:03:28,707 --> 00:03:30,762 troops from Afghanistan . And NATO's 108 00:03:30,762 --> 00:03:32,984 corresponding decision to also withdraw 109 00:03:32,984 --> 00:03:35,151 their troops by the by september I , I 110 00:03:35,151 --> 00:03:37,096 think this is the right decision . 111 00:03:37,096 --> 00:03:39,373 There was no easy , good decision here . 112 00:03:39,373 --> 00:03:41,850 There was no win win win where 113 00:03:41,850 --> 00:03:43,906 everything was going to be fine , no 114 00:03:43,906 --> 00:03:46,017 matter what we did . Afghanistan is a 115 00:03:46,017 --> 00:03:48,183 very difficult part of the world . But 116 00:03:48,183 --> 00:03:50,310 when you look at the maps in front of 117 00:03:50,310 --> 00:03:52,366 us , when you look at just these two 118 00:03:52,366 --> 00:03:54,588 areas of responsibility , much less the 119 00:03:54,588 --> 00:03:56,754 concerns that we have elsewhere in the 120 00:03:56,754 --> 00:03:58,730 world , certainly in ASia , but 121 00:03:58,730 --> 00:04:00,890 increasingly in latin America , as we 122 00:04:00,890 --> 00:04:02,668 see the difficulties down there 123 00:04:02,668 --> 00:04:05,140 spilling across our border , we come to 124 00:04:05,140 --> 00:04:07,362 understand that the level of investment 125 00:04:07,362 --> 00:04:10,160 in Afghanistan does not meet where it 126 00:04:10,160 --> 00:04:11,938 currently falls in our national 127 00:04:11,938 --> 00:04:14,030 security objectives . We have 128 00:04:14,030 --> 00:04:16,252 accomplished much of what we set out to 129 00:04:16,252 --> 00:04:18,252 accomplish in terms of degrading Al 130 00:04:18,252 --> 00:04:20,830 Qaeda , Um certainly killed Osama bin 131 00:04:20,830 --> 00:04:23,350 Laden and we have significantly reduced 132 00:04:23,350 --> 00:04:25,294 the ability of terrorist groups to 133 00:04:25,294 --> 00:04:27,200 operate out of that region and at 134 00:04:27,210 --> 00:04:30,230 between 14 and $20 billion dollars a 135 00:04:30,230 --> 00:04:32,190 year . Um I I don't think that 136 00:04:32,190 --> 00:04:34,412 investment is justified at this point . 137 00:04:34,412 --> 00:04:36,468 I think the president made the right 138 00:04:36,468 --> 00:04:38,579 decision in terms of what our current 139 00:04:38,579 --> 00:04:40,801 defence priorities are . That is not to 140 00:04:40,801 --> 00:04:42,912 say that we're going to cease to have 141 00:04:42,912 --> 00:04:45,023 interests in the Afghanistan region . 142 00:04:45,023 --> 00:04:47,246 We will uh but there are other , better 143 00:04:47,246 --> 00:04:46,970 ways to meet those interests that are 144 00:04:46,970 --> 00:04:49,080 more cost effective . And the final 145 00:04:49,080 --> 00:04:51,080 point I would make on this is , you 146 00:04:51,080 --> 00:04:53,136 know , we've been a bit of a wall in 147 00:04:53,136 --> 00:04:55,191 terms of U . S . Casualties over the 148 00:04:55,191 --> 00:04:57,191 course of the last year , since the 149 00:04:57,191 --> 00:04:59,080 preliminary peace agreement is an 150 00:04:59,080 --> 00:05:01,080 overstatement . But the preliminary 151 00:05:01,080 --> 00:05:03,247 understanding was was reached with the 152 00:05:03,247 --> 00:05:05,191 Taliban whereby they have not been 153 00:05:05,191 --> 00:05:07,580 attacking us as we know that expires on 154 00:05:07,580 --> 00:05:10,480 May 1st . Uh and and at some point 155 00:05:10,490 --> 00:05:13,030 after that we would be back into a hot 156 00:05:13,030 --> 00:05:15,710 war and we would once again be losing U . 157 00:05:15,710 --> 00:05:17,340 S . Service members lives in 158 00:05:17,340 --> 00:05:19,970 Afghanistan given the commitment and 159 00:05:19,970 --> 00:05:22,026 given where we're at in our national 160 00:05:22,026 --> 00:05:24,192 security needs . I think the president 161 00:05:24,192 --> 00:05:26,248 made the right call . Um the risk of 162 00:05:26,248 --> 00:05:28,359 staying outweighs the benefit at this 163 00:05:28,359 --> 00:05:30,414 point . But we will want to hear the 164 00:05:30,414 --> 00:05:32,581 details from General Mackenzie and the 165 00:05:32,581 --> 00:05:34,840 story on how we plan to execute that , 166 00:05:34,850 --> 00:05:37,017 what the risks are and how we're going 167 00:05:37,017 --> 00:05:39,128 to mitigate those risks with that . I 168 00:05:39,128 --> 00:05:41,294 just want to thank our witnesses again 169 00:05:41,294 --> 00:05:43,461 for being here for their service and I 170 00:05:43,461 --> 00:05:45,628 will turn it over to Mr Rogers for his 171 00:05:45,628 --> 00:05:47,794 opening statement . Yes , thank you Mr 172 00:05:47,794 --> 00:05:49,628 Chairman . I want to welcome our 173 00:05:49,628 --> 00:05:51,739 witnesses and express my appreciation 174 00:05:51,739 --> 00:05:51,510 for their service and their time to 175 00:05:51,510 --> 00:05:53,510 prepare for this hearing . In both 176 00:05:53,510 --> 00:05:55,621 Africa comments , sitcom , we've made 177 00:05:55,621 --> 00:05:57,677 progress in combating terrorists but 178 00:05:57,677 --> 00:05:59,788 they're not completely gone adding to 179 00:05:59,788 --> 00:06:01,899 the problem . Many groups have spread 180 00:06:01,899 --> 00:06:03,899 out , making them more difficult to 181 00:06:03,899 --> 00:06:06,121 locate General Townsend as we discussed 182 00:06:06,121 --> 00:06:08,121 last week , maintaining pressure on 183 00:06:08,121 --> 00:06:10,343 these terrorist networks remain vitally 184 00:06:10,343 --> 00:06:12,177 important , But spending africom 185 00:06:12,177 --> 00:06:14,399 comprises only 3/10 of a percent of our 186 00:06:14,399 --> 00:06:16,232 defense budget , spreading those 187 00:06:16,232 --> 00:06:18,343 resources even further is increased . 188 00:06:18,740 --> 00:06:20,962 Is the increased presence of Russia and 189 00:06:20,962 --> 00:06:22,907 china on the continent . Russia is 190 00:06:22,907 --> 00:06:25,250 entering uh into a disturbing number of 191 00:06:25,250 --> 00:06:27,450 arms sales and strategic agreements 192 00:06:27,450 --> 00:06:29,770 with African nations . China is using 193 00:06:29,770 --> 00:06:32,190 its belt and road initiative to extract 194 00:06:32,200 --> 00:06:34,710 African national resources . The 195 00:06:34,710 --> 00:06:36,488 chinese Communist Party is also 196 00:06:36,488 --> 00:06:38,543 building its first overseas military 197 00:06:38,543 --> 00:06:40,543 base on the strategically important 198 00:06:40,543 --> 00:06:42,990 horn of Africa , alarmingly , it's only 199 00:06:42,990 --> 00:06:45,046 a few miles away from our own base . 200 00:06:45,340 --> 00:06:47,451 Given the increased role of china and 201 00:06:47,451 --> 00:06:49,673 Russia are playing in in Africa and its 202 00:06:49,673 --> 00:06:51,451 geo strategic importance . It's 203 00:06:51,451 --> 00:06:53,451 imperative that we continue to make 204 00:06:53,451 --> 00:06:55,562 investments there . I look forward to 205 00:06:55,562 --> 00:06:57,784 hearing from General Townsend about how 206 00:06:57,784 --> 00:07:00,007 we can maximize diplomatic and military 207 00:07:00,007 --> 00:07:01,729 efforts to eliminate terrorist 208 00:07:01,729 --> 00:07:03,562 footholds and counter Russia and 209 00:07:03,562 --> 00:07:07,090 china's global ambitions in Africa In 210 00:07:07,090 --> 00:07:09,201 Centcom , General Mackenzie is facing 211 00:07:09,201 --> 00:07:11,201 tremendous challenges from hardened 212 00:07:11,201 --> 00:07:13,146 terrorists and nations bent on our 213 00:07:13,146 --> 00:07:14,923 destruction . President Biden's 214 00:07:14,923 --> 00:07:16,979 decision to unconditionally withdraw 215 00:07:16,979 --> 00:07:19,110 all forces by September 11 2021 will 216 00:07:19,110 --> 00:07:21,310 only complicate matters . I'm very 217 00:07:21,310 --> 00:07:23,477 concerned the Taliban will overrun the 218 00:07:23,477 --> 00:07:25,643 democratically elected government soon 219 00:07:25,643 --> 00:07:27,990 after we withdraw . When that happens , 220 00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:29,722 what assurance do we have that 221 00:07:29,722 --> 00:07:31,722 Afghanistan will not become another 222 00:07:31,722 --> 00:07:33,833 breeding ground for terrorists ? I've 223 00:07:33,833 --> 00:07:36,000 yet to hear how the president tends to 224 00:07:36,000 --> 00:07:38,000 conduct counterterrorism operations 225 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:39,889 without any U . S . Troops in the 226 00:07:39,889 --> 00:07:42,111 region , there had better be a plan for 227 00:07:42,111 --> 00:07:44,333 that and I expect the administration to 228 00:07:44,333 --> 00:07:46,500 explain it to us as soon as possible . 229 00:07:46,500 --> 00:07:48,333 I'm also very concerned with the 230 00:07:48,333 --> 00:07:50,556 ongoing destabilizing actions of Iran . 231 00:07:50,556 --> 00:07:52,556 The Ayatollah continues to fund and 232 00:07:52,556 --> 00:07:54,550 equip terrorist targeting american 233 00:07:54,550 --> 00:07:56,840 troops . His cronies are prolonging a 234 00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:59,040 civil war and humanitarian crisis in 235 00:07:59,040 --> 00:08:02,520 Syria and his regime is aggressively 236 00:08:02,520 --> 00:08:04,340 pursuing nuclear weapons . We 237 00:08:04,350 --> 00:08:06,517 absolutely cannot allow that to happen 238 00:08:06,740 --> 00:08:08,860 and I'm not convinced that reentering 239 00:08:08,860 --> 00:08:11,138 the J . C . P . O . A . Will stop them . 240 00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:13,296 I look forward to hearing more about 241 00:08:13,296 --> 00:08:15,351 the administration's plan for ending 242 00:08:15,351 --> 00:08:17,184 the ayatollahs quest for nuclear 243 00:08:17,184 --> 00:08:19,184 weapons and how they intend to deal 244 00:08:19,184 --> 00:08:20,851 with the rest of the regime's 245 00:08:20,851 --> 00:08:22,851 destabilizing actions . Finally , I 246 00:08:22,851 --> 00:08:24,851 want to express my deep frustration 247 00:08:24,851 --> 00:08:26,851 with the defense budget proposed by 248 00:08:26,851 --> 00:08:28,740 President biden , cutting defense 249 00:08:28,740 --> 00:08:30,796 spending below the rate of inflation 250 00:08:30,796 --> 00:08:32,796 will mean combatant commanders like 251 00:08:32,796 --> 00:08:34,962 General Townsend and General Mackenzie 252 00:08:34,962 --> 00:08:34,550 will not have the resources and 253 00:08:34,550 --> 00:08:36,883 capabilities they need to do their jobs . 254 00:08:36,883 --> 00:08:38,883 I look forward to working with both 255 00:08:38,883 --> 00:08:40,772 republicans and democrats on this 256 00:08:40,772 --> 00:08:42,828 committee to pass the defense budget 257 00:08:42,828 --> 00:08:45,050 that adequately supports our servicemen 258 00:08:45,050 --> 00:08:47,161 and women . Thank you . Mr . Chairman 259 00:08:47,161 --> 00:08:49,272 of your back . Thank you Miss story . 260 00:08:49,272 --> 00:08:51,050 You recognized for your opening 261 00:08:51,050 --> 00:08:54,710 statement . Mhm . Thank you . 262 00:08:54,710 --> 00:08:57,140 Chairman smith Ranking member Rogers . 263 00:08:57,150 --> 00:09:00,070 Can you hear me ? Okay ? I believe so . 264 00:09:00,070 --> 00:09:02,440 Yes . Okay very good . Thank you . And 265 00:09:02,440 --> 00:09:04,718 distinguished members of the committee . 266 00:09:04,718 --> 00:09:06,940 I appreciate the opportunity to testify 267 00:09:06,940 --> 00:09:08,996 on our defense policy in the U . S . 268 00:09:08,996 --> 00:09:10,940 Africa Command and U . S . Central 269 00:09:10,940 --> 00:09:12,730 Command areas of responsibility 270 00:09:12,770 --> 00:09:14,910 alongside their commanders . General 271 00:09:14,910 --> 00:09:16,966 Mackenzie and General Townsend today 272 00:09:17,540 --> 00:09:19,096 I'd also like to express my 273 00:09:19,096 --> 00:09:21,207 appreciation for the strong support . 274 00:09:21,207 --> 00:09:23,318 Congress provides . The Department of 275 00:09:23,318 --> 00:09:25,500 Defense as a career civilian and the 276 00:09:25,500 --> 00:09:27,556 Office of the Secretary of Defense . 277 00:09:27,556 --> 00:09:29,667 I've seen firsthand how the executive 278 00:09:29,667 --> 00:09:31,833 and legislative branches work together 279 00:09:31,833 --> 00:09:33,910 to ensure our armed forces have the 280 00:09:33,910 --> 00:09:36,130 resources and authorities required to 281 00:09:36,130 --> 00:09:39,250 deter and , if necessary , defeat any 282 00:09:39,250 --> 00:09:42,850 foe . Secretary Austin has emphasized 283 00:09:42,850 --> 00:09:45,680 the need to match resources to strategy , 284 00:09:45,690 --> 00:09:48,640 strategy to policy and policy to the 285 00:09:48,640 --> 00:09:50,940 will of the american people . The 286 00:09:50,940 --> 00:09:54,200 President's interim national Security 287 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:56,089 strategic guidance speaks to that 288 00:09:56,089 --> 00:09:58,200 approach by prioritizing the security 289 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:00,480 of the american people , expansion of 290 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:02,790 economic prosperity and opportunity and 291 00:10:02,790 --> 00:10:04,957 the defense of our democratic values . 292 00:10:05,440 --> 00:10:07,607 This requires Department of Defense to 293 00:10:07,607 --> 00:10:10,010 defend our people and economy deter and 294 00:10:10,010 --> 00:10:12,066 prevent adversaries from threatening 295 00:10:12,066 --> 00:10:14,010 the United States , our allies and 296 00:10:14,010 --> 00:10:15,880 partners and support whole of 297 00:10:15,880 --> 00:10:18,130 government efforts to lead a stable and 298 00:10:18,140 --> 00:10:21,120 open international system . An early 299 00:10:21,120 --> 00:10:23,287 priority for the secretary is to match 300 00:10:23,287 --> 00:10:25,580 our resources to strategy by right 301 00:10:25,580 --> 00:10:28,730 sizing our posture investments to that 302 00:10:28,730 --> 00:10:30,841 end , the president's direction , the 303 00:10:30,841 --> 00:10:32,786 department is undertaking a global 304 00:10:32,786 --> 00:10:34,897 posture review to balance operational 305 00:10:34,897 --> 00:10:37,500 requirements , risk readiness and 306 00:10:37,500 --> 00:10:40,240 international commitments in Africa and 307 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:42,351 the Middle East . D . O . D . Plays a 308 00:10:42,351 --> 00:10:44,296 supporting role to broader U . S . 309 00:10:44,296 --> 00:10:45,684 Government efforts in an 310 00:10:45,684 --> 00:10:47,980 acknowledgement that military force is 311 00:10:47,980 --> 00:10:49,980 not the answer to the challenges in 312 00:10:49,980 --> 00:10:52,790 these regions . Our policy objective is 313 00:10:52,790 --> 00:10:55,740 to increase stability and secure our 314 00:10:55,740 --> 00:10:57,770 interests by working by with and 315 00:10:57,770 --> 00:11:01,640 through our reinvigorated networks of 316 00:11:01,640 --> 00:11:04,200 allies and partners . Africa is a 317 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:06,890 continent ripe with opportunities and 318 00:11:06,890 --> 00:11:09,150 challenges in Africa , the interim 319 00:11:09,150 --> 00:11:11,317 national strategic guidance directs us 320 00:11:11,317 --> 00:11:13,428 to continue building our partnerships 321 00:11:13,428 --> 00:11:15,594 and to work towards bringing an end to 322 00:11:15,594 --> 00:11:17,261 the deadliest conflicts while 323 00:11:17,261 --> 00:11:19,590 preventing the onset of new ones . It 324 00:11:19,590 --> 00:11:21,479 also directs us to assist African 325 00:11:21,479 --> 00:11:23,660 nations to combat the threats posed by 326 00:11:23,670 --> 00:11:26,250 climate change and violent extremism . 327 00:11:27,340 --> 00:11:29,396 Under guarded by the investments and 328 00:11:29,396 --> 00:11:31,562 tools you have afforded the Department 329 00:11:31,562 --> 00:11:34,130 for building partnership capacity and 330 00:11:34,130 --> 00:11:35,797 in close cooperation with our 331 00:11:35,797 --> 00:11:38,019 diplomatic and development colleagues . 332 00:11:38,019 --> 00:11:40,241 The resulting partnerships enable us to 333 00:11:40,241 --> 00:11:42,250 support conflict resolution efforts 334 00:11:42,940 --> 00:11:44,940 combat the threats posed by violent 335 00:11:44,940 --> 00:11:46,960 extremism , improved defense 336 00:11:46,960 --> 00:11:49,450 institutions and strengthen democratic 337 00:11:49,450 --> 00:11:51,870 norms and the rule of law . These 338 00:11:51,870 --> 00:11:54,100 modest investments play an outsized 339 00:11:54,100 --> 00:11:56,100 role in Africa and the department's 340 00:11:56,100 --> 00:11:58,370 objectives across the continent in the 341 00:11:58,370 --> 00:12:00,550 Middle East , Diode works to deter 342 00:12:00,550 --> 00:12:03,070 Iranian aggression , disrupt al Qaeda 343 00:12:03,070 --> 00:12:06,030 networks , prevent an ISIS resurgence 344 00:12:06,040 --> 00:12:08,040 and protect vital interests such as 345 00:12:08,040 --> 00:12:10,560 freedom of navigation . We've made 346 00:12:10,560 --> 00:12:12,727 progress toward achieving the enduring 347 00:12:12,727 --> 00:12:14,880 defeat of ISIS and transition . The 348 00:12:14,880 --> 00:12:17,540 focus of operation inherent resolve to 349 00:12:17,540 --> 00:12:19,880 advising equipping and assisting 350 00:12:19,880 --> 00:12:22,680 partner forces to enable them to manage 351 00:12:22,680 --> 00:12:25,330 the ISIS threat independently . The 352 00:12:25,330 --> 00:12:27,497 State Department is leading diplomatic 353 00:12:27,497 --> 00:12:29,750 efforts to bring Iran's nuclear program 354 00:12:29,750 --> 00:12:32,170 back into compliance with the joint 355 00:12:32,170 --> 00:12:34,800 comprehensive plan of action while D . 356 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:37,190 O . D . Focuses on deterring and 357 00:12:37,190 --> 00:12:40,040 defending against Iranian threats in 358 00:12:40,040 --> 00:12:42,740 Yemen , we ended support to Saudi led 359 00:12:42,750 --> 00:12:45,170 offensive operations but continue to 360 00:12:45,170 --> 00:12:47,059 demonstrate our commitment to the 361 00:12:47,059 --> 00:12:49,490 defense of Saudi Arabia by providing 362 00:12:49,490 --> 00:12:52,130 limited non combat support to help our 363 00:12:52,130 --> 00:12:54,186 partners defend their territory from 364 00:12:54,186 --> 00:12:57,080 who the attacks in Afghanistan . Our 365 00:12:57,080 --> 00:12:59,191 mission has been preventing terrorist 366 00:12:59,191 --> 00:13:01,024 groups from using the country to 367 00:13:01,024 --> 00:13:03,191 threaten the interests and security of 368 00:13:03,191 --> 00:13:05,136 the United States , our allies and 369 00:13:05,136 --> 00:13:07,870 partners . After two decades of us and 370 00:13:07,870 --> 00:13:09,481 NATO military involvement in 371 00:13:09,481 --> 00:13:11,703 Afghanistan , we have accomplished that 372 00:13:11,703 --> 00:13:13,926 mission and President Biden has decided 373 00:13:13,926 --> 00:13:15,870 to draw down the remaining U . S . 374 00:13:15,870 --> 00:13:18,150 Troops from Afghanistan . In closing , 375 00:13:18,150 --> 00:13:20,039 I'm confident in the department's 376 00:13:20,039 --> 00:13:22,150 capacity to contend with the range of 377 00:13:22,150 --> 00:13:24,206 dynamic challenges facing the United 378 00:13:24,206 --> 00:13:26,317 States in Africa in the Middle East , 379 00:13:26,317 --> 00:13:28,820 we retain many advantages , including 380 00:13:28,820 --> 00:13:31,210 our economic power dynamism , 381 00:13:31,220 --> 00:13:33,320 democratic values , military 382 00:13:33,320 --> 00:13:35,560 capabilities and global alliances . 383 00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:38,018 Thank you to the members of the 384 00:13:38,018 --> 00:13:40,073 committee for your continued support 385 00:13:40,073 --> 00:13:42,018 and look forward to discussing the 386 00:13:42,018 --> 00:13:41,960 topics further in the rest of the 387 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:44,060 hearing . Thank you . Thank you . 388 00:13:44,070 --> 00:13:45,181 General Mackenzie , 389 00:13:47,840 --> 00:13:49,729 Chairman smith , Ranking member , 390 00:13:49,729 --> 00:13:51,840 Rogers , distinguished members of the 391 00:13:51,840 --> 00:13:53,784 House Armed Services Committee . I 392 00:13:53,784 --> 00:13:55,951 appear before you proudly representing 393 00:13:55,951 --> 00:13:58,118 the 70,000 men and women of the United 394 00:13:58,118 --> 00:14:00,229 States Central Command . It's a great 395 00:14:00,229 --> 00:13:59,590 pleasure to be with you here today . 396 00:13:59,600 --> 00:14:01,790 It's my duty to testify . Of course I 397 00:14:01,790 --> 00:14:03,957 have to say . It's also a privilege to 398 00:14:03,957 --> 00:14:06,068 address this body and all the greater 399 00:14:06,068 --> 00:14:08,068 honor to do so . Sitting beside the 400 00:14:08,068 --> 00:14:10,123 acting Secretary Defense mystery and 401 00:14:10,123 --> 00:14:12,457 the Commander of U . S . Africa Command , 402 00:14:12,457 --> 00:14:14,623 General steve Townsend . Since my last 403 00:14:14,623 --> 00:14:14,170 testimony , the region has continued to 404 00:14:14,170 --> 00:14:16,210 evolve and it remains as dynamic as 405 00:14:16,210 --> 00:14:17,766 ever . With the President's 406 00:14:17,766 --> 00:14:19,988 announcement last week , we are focused 407 00:14:19,988 --> 00:14:21,932 on working closely with the Afghan 408 00:14:21,932 --> 00:14:23,821 government and our NATO allies to 409 00:14:23,821 --> 00:14:26,250 responsibly conclude Operation resolute 410 00:14:26,250 --> 00:14:28,730 support in Afghanistan . This is my 411 00:14:28,730 --> 00:14:30,841 main effort at present , but it's not 412 00:14:30,841 --> 00:14:32,897 my only responsibility . My prepared 413 00:14:32,897 --> 00:14:35,063 statement addresses are other missions 414 00:14:35,063 --> 00:14:37,174 in detail . The United States and our 415 00:14:37,174 --> 00:14:39,341 NATO allies sent forces to Afghanistan 416 00:14:39,341 --> 00:14:41,452 nearly 20 years ago and the president 417 00:14:41,452 --> 00:14:43,619 has judged that now is the appropriate 418 00:14:43,619 --> 00:14:45,730 time to redeploy and reposition these 419 00:14:45,730 --> 00:14:47,897 forces so that they are better arrayed 420 00:14:47,897 --> 00:14:49,897 to deter adversaries and respond to 421 00:14:49,897 --> 00:14:52,008 threats globally , including those in 422 00:14:52,008 --> 00:14:54,230 the central command region are singular 423 00:14:54,230 --> 00:14:56,174 purpose in Afghanistan has been to 424 00:14:56,174 --> 00:14:56,030 assure that al Qaeda and other violent 425 00:14:56,030 --> 00:14:58,030 extremist organizations could never 426 00:14:58,030 --> 00:15:00,200 again plot , prepare and perpetrate 427 00:15:00,210 --> 00:15:02,321 attacks against the United States and 428 00:15:02,321 --> 00:15:04,266 our allies from the refuge of that 429 00:15:04,266 --> 00:15:06,210 country . The campaign has evolved 430 00:15:06,210 --> 00:15:08,432 considerably over the years from active 431 00:15:08,432 --> 00:15:10,377 combat operations with us and NATO 432 00:15:10,377 --> 00:15:12,543 forces in the lead to advisory efforts 433 00:15:12,543 --> 00:15:14,766 designed to enhance the Afghan national 434 00:15:14,766 --> 00:15:16,932 defence and security forces ability to 435 00:15:16,932 --> 00:15:18,932 conduct their own campaigns against 436 00:15:18,932 --> 00:15:21,099 violent extremist organizations . That 437 00:15:21,099 --> 00:15:20,810 there has not been another 9 , 11 is 438 00:15:20,810 --> 00:15:22,866 not an accident . It is accumulative 439 00:15:22,866 --> 00:15:25,032 product of these efforts . We will now 440 00:15:25,032 --> 00:15:27,143 conclude our Afghanistan based advice 441 00:15:27,143 --> 00:15:29,199 and support mission . We are further 442 00:15:29,199 --> 00:15:30,699 planning now for continued 443 00:15:30,699 --> 00:15:32,921 counterterrorism operations from within 444 00:15:32,921 --> 00:15:35,088 the region , ensuring that the violent 445 00:15:35,088 --> 00:15:37,143 extremist organizations fighting for 446 00:15:37,143 --> 00:15:39,254 their existence in the hinterlands of 447 00:15:39,254 --> 00:15:41,254 Afghanistan remain under persistent 448 00:15:41,254 --> 00:15:43,477 surveillance and pressure Ever since 12 449 00:15:43,477 --> 00:15:45,310 September 2001 , when our allies 450 00:15:45,310 --> 00:15:47,199 invoked Article five of the North 451 00:15:47,199 --> 00:15:48,921 Atlantic Treaty , we have done 452 00:15:48,921 --> 00:15:48,850 everything in Afghanistan within a 453 00:15:48,850 --> 00:15:51,072 partnership framework and that will not 454 00:15:51,072 --> 00:15:53,072 change in the months ahead . We are 455 00:15:53,072 --> 00:15:54,961 planning collaboratively with our 456 00:15:54,961 --> 00:15:57,128 interagency and international partners 457 00:15:57,128 --> 00:15:59,183 and will take all measures to ensure 458 00:15:59,183 --> 00:16:01,350 the safe and orderly withdrawal of all 459 00:16:01,350 --> 00:16:03,572 of our forces and those of our partners 460 00:16:03,572 --> 00:16:03,440 from Afghanistan . This includes 461 00:16:03,440 --> 00:16:05,662 positioning significant combat power to 462 00:16:05,662 --> 00:16:07,829 guard against the possibility that the 463 00:16:07,829 --> 00:16:09,996 Taliban decide to interfere in any way 464 00:16:09,996 --> 00:16:12,218 with our orderly redeployment . I'd now 465 00:16:12,218 --> 00:16:14,273 like to briefly summarize some other 466 00:16:14,273 --> 00:16:16,384 challenges in the region . While Iran 467 00:16:16,384 --> 00:16:18,273 has itself avoided state on state 468 00:16:18,273 --> 00:16:20,162 attacks on US forces . Since last 469 00:16:20,162 --> 00:16:22,162 january strikes on the al assad and 470 00:16:22,162 --> 00:16:24,107 mobile air bases , it continues to 471 00:16:24,107 --> 00:16:26,218 menace regional partners and the free 472 00:16:26,218 --> 00:16:28,218 flow of commerce through the use of 473 00:16:28,218 --> 00:16:30,384 proxies and the proliferation of armed 474 00:16:30,384 --> 00:16:30,170 unmanned aerial systems and other 475 00:16:30,170 --> 00:16:32,230 munitions . Its pursuit of regional 476 00:16:32,230 --> 00:16:34,452 hegemony remains the greatest source of 477 00:16:34,452 --> 00:16:36,820 instability across the Middle East in 478 00:16:36,820 --> 00:16:38,653 Iraq and Syria . The campaign to 479 00:16:38,653 --> 00:16:40,820 eliminate the threat posed by ISIS has 480 00:16:40,820 --> 00:16:42,670 entered a new phase in Iraq were 481 00:16:42,670 --> 00:16:44,726 engaged in a strategic dialogue with 482 00:16:44,726 --> 00:16:46,837 the Iraqi government to determine the 483 00:16:46,837 --> 00:16:48,948 nature of our security relationship . 484 00:16:48,948 --> 00:16:51,114 IsIS , so called physical caliphate is 485 00:16:51,114 --> 00:16:53,337 no more , but it's toxic ideology lives 486 00:16:53,337 --> 00:16:55,559 on . The problem is especially acute in 487 00:16:55,559 --> 00:16:57,781 communities ravaged by conflict and its 488 00:16:57,781 --> 00:16:59,892 sprawling camps for displaced persons 489 00:16:59,892 --> 00:17:01,781 where ISIS praise upon vulnerable 490 00:17:01,781 --> 00:17:03,837 populations . What is accelerated in 491 00:17:03,837 --> 00:17:06,059 the last year is the influence of china 492 00:17:06,059 --> 00:17:08,114 and Russia , which each in their own 493 00:17:08,114 --> 00:17:10,114 way , are attempting to subvert the 494 00:17:10,114 --> 00:17:12,281 rules based international order and to 495 00:17:12,281 --> 00:17:14,448 gain strategic influence in the Middle 496 00:17:14,448 --> 00:17:14,230 East . China's activity in the region 497 00:17:14,230 --> 00:17:16,452 takes the form of economic investment , 498 00:17:16,452 --> 00:17:18,810 arms sales and other overtures . Russia 499 00:17:18,810 --> 00:17:20,977 has made an 18th century power play in 500 00:17:20,977 --> 00:17:23,199 Syria , propping up the murderous assad 501 00:17:23,199 --> 00:17:25,254 regime . The Middle East remains key 502 00:17:25,254 --> 00:17:27,421 terrain and I believe China and Russia 503 00:17:27,421 --> 00:17:29,532 will continue to expand their efforts 504 00:17:29,532 --> 00:17:31,754 to improve their position in the region 505 00:17:31,754 --> 00:17:33,643 and diminish us standing wherever 506 00:17:33,643 --> 00:17:35,366 possible . The centcom area of 507 00:17:35,366 --> 00:17:37,199 responsibility is the most cyber 508 00:17:37,199 --> 00:17:39,366 contested theater in the world . It is 509 00:17:39,366 --> 00:17:41,143 also the proving ground for the 510 00:17:41,143 --> 00:17:42,921 proliferation and employment of 511 00:17:42,921 --> 00:17:44,866 unmanned weaponized systems , many 512 00:17:44,866 --> 00:17:46,921 emanating from Iran . This difficult 513 00:17:46,921 --> 00:17:48,921 and complex operational environment 514 00:17:48,921 --> 00:17:50,588 provides units inside centcom 515 00:17:50,588 --> 00:17:52,810 opportunities to operate and to conduct 516 00:17:52,810 --> 00:17:54,977 realistic training with an environment 517 00:17:54,977 --> 00:17:54,600 that exists nowhere else in the world . 518 00:17:54,610 --> 00:17:56,666 I can state as a matter of fact that 519 00:17:56,666 --> 00:17:58,999 the units and ships assigned to centcom , 520 00:17:58,999 --> 00:18:00,943 we're as ready as any in the joint 521 00:18:00,943 --> 00:18:03,166 force . The weeks and months ahead will 522 00:18:03,166 --> 00:18:05,277 see us execute a very complicated and 523 00:18:05,277 --> 00:18:07,054 demanding military operation to 524 00:18:07,054 --> 00:18:08,888 withdraw us and NATO forces from 525 00:18:08,888 --> 00:18:10,888 Afghanistan . This is presently the 526 00:18:10,888 --> 00:18:12,999 main effort of my command and we have 527 00:18:12,999 --> 00:18:15,110 the tools necessary to accomplish the 528 00:18:15,110 --> 00:18:17,054 task with that . I look forward to 529 00:18:17,054 --> 00:18:16,910 answering your questions . Thank you 530 00:18:16,910 --> 00:18:19,520 sir . Thank you very much . General 531 00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:20,520 Townsend , 532 00:18:23,540 --> 00:18:25,540 Chairman , smith , ranking member , 533 00:18:25,540 --> 00:18:27,651 Rogers and members of the committee . 534 00:18:27,651 --> 00:18:29,596 Good morning and thank you for the 535 00:18:29,596 --> 00:18:31,818 opportunity to appear here today . It's 536 00:18:31,818 --> 00:18:33,762 a privilege to represent America's 537 00:18:33,762 --> 00:18:35,818 exceptional men and women at U . S . 538 00:18:35,818 --> 00:18:37,818 Africa Command who are dedicated to 539 00:18:37,818 --> 00:18:39,873 securing us interests and preserving 540 00:18:39,873 --> 00:18:41,929 our strategic options on the African 541 00:18:41,929 --> 00:18:43,651 continent . This morning , I'm 542 00:18:43,651 --> 00:18:43,570 accompanied by one of my key staff 543 00:18:43,570 --> 00:18:45,792 advisors , Air Force Colonel Jacqueline 544 00:18:45,792 --> 00:18:47,848 Breeden . I'm also here this morning 545 00:18:47,848 --> 00:18:49,959 with my colleagues and friends . Miss 546 00:18:49,959 --> 00:18:52,181 Amanda Dorrie are acting undersecretary 547 00:18:52,181 --> 00:18:54,403 of defense for policy and general frank 548 00:18:54,403 --> 00:18:56,514 McKenzie , the centcom commander , to 549 00:18:56,514 --> 00:18:58,403 discuss our shared challenges and 550 00:18:58,403 --> 00:19:00,070 opportunities in our areas of 551 00:19:00,070 --> 00:19:02,237 responsibility and the high return the 552 00:19:02,237 --> 00:19:04,348 american people get for their defense 553 00:19:04,348 --> 00:19:06,070 investments around the globe . 554 00:19:06,070 --> 00:19:08,070 Historically , America has not been 555 00:19:08,070 --> 00:19:09,959 penalized for underestimating the 556 00:19:09,959 --> 00:19:12,210 importance of Africa . Today we can no 557 00:19:12,210 --> 00:19:14,154 longer afford to underestimate the 558 00:19:14,154 --> 00:19:16,740 economic opportunity and strategic 559 00:19:16,740 --> 00:19:19,720 consequence Africa embodies in which 560 00:19:19,720 --> 00:19:21,650 competitors like china and Russia 561 00:19:21,660 --> 00:19:25,300 recognized . Africa is the crossroads 562 00:19:25,300 --> 00:19:27,490 of the globe . The recent blockage of 563 00:19:27,490 --> 00:19:29,546 the Suez Canal not only demonstrated 564 00:19:29,546 --> 00:19:32,010 the importance of critical sea lines of 565 00:19:32,010 --> 00:19:33,899 communication flowing through the 566 00:19:33,899 --> 00:19:36,450 mediterranean and red seas , but also 567 00:19:36,450 --> 00:19:39,950 around the Cape of good hope , violent 568 00:19:39,960 --> 00:19:42,016 extremist organizations , competitor 569 00:19:42,016 --> 00:19:44,300 activities and fragile states are among 570 00:19:44,300 --> 00:19:46,390 some of the threats to us interests 571 00:19:47,940 --> 00:19:50,110 beyond geography . Global population 572 00:19:50,110 --> 00:19:54,000 growth is largely African . By 2051 573 00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:56,167 in four people on the planet will live 574 00:19:56,167 --> 00:19:59,460 in Africa . Rapidly growing markets , 575 00:19:59,630 --> 00:20:03,530 60% of the earth's arable land and 576 00:20:03,530 --> 00:20:05,830 vast untapped resources , including 577 00:20:05,830 --> 00:20:08,740 strategic rare earth minerals , provide 578 00:20:08,740 --> 00:20:12,000 tremendous economic potential . 13 of 579 00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:14,140 the world's 25 fastest growing 580 00:20:14,140 --> 00:20:17,630 economies are in Africa . Africa's 581 00:20:17,630 --> 00:20:19,910 tremendous opportunities are offset by 582 00:20:19,910 --> 00:20:21,854 significant challenges , including 583 00:20:21,854 --> 00:20:23,743 climate change , food shortages , 584 00:20:23,743 --> 00:20:26,360 poverty , Ungoverned spaces , historic 585 00:20:26,360 --> 00:20:29,080 grievances and other factors that make 586 00:20:29,080 --> 00:20:31,500 the continent also home to 14 of the 587 00:20:31,500 --> 00:20:33,560 world's 20 most fragile countries . 588 00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:38,440 Our strategic competitors are very 589 00:20:38,440 --> 00:20:41,480 active in Africa . China has invested 590 00:20:41,480 --> 00:20:43,700 heavily in their second continent or 591 00:20:43,700 --> 00:20:46,120 some think tanks call it china's fourth 592 00:20:46,130 --> 00:20:49,800 or fifth island chain . Russia seeks to 593 00:20:49,800 --> 00:20:52,030 exploit instability and fragility for 594 00:20:52,030 --> 00:20:54,510 their own gain and at US expense . 595 00:20:55,940 --> 00:20:58,890 Iran is also increasingly active on the 596 00:20:58,890 --> 00:21:02,510 continent . African based videos like 597 00:21:02,520 --> 00:21:05,980 Al Qaeda , their affiliate , Al Shabaab 598 00:21:05,980 --> 00:21:08,520 and ISIS thrive in the continent's 599 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:10,576 ungoverned spaces . They provide the 600 00:21:10,576 --> 00:21:12,742 greatest threat to many of our African 601 00:21:12,742 --> 00:21:14,909 partners and aspired to kill americans 602 00:21:14,909 --> 00:21:17,460 in Africa as well as here at home . 603 00:21:18,940 --> 00:21:21,010 Across this diverse continent , us 604 00:21:21,010 --> 00:21:24,730 africom operates with .3 of the diodes 605 00:21:24,730 --> 00:21:28,660 budget And .3 of Diodes Manpower . 606 00:21:29,320 --> 00:21:31,310 This tiny investment pays enormous 607 00:21:31,310 --> 00:21:34,420 dividends as just under 6000 service 608 00:21:34,420 --> 00:21:36,850 members , civilians and contractors 609 00:21:36,850 --> 00:21:39,050 work with our partners , both inter 610 00:21:39,050 --> 00:21:41,310 agency and foreign to counter malign 611 00:21:41,310 --> 00:21:43,270 actors and transnational threats , 612 00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:45,910 respond to crises and strengthen 613 00:21:45,910 --> 00:21:48,200 security forces to advance U . S . 614 00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:50,533 Interests and promote regional security , 615 00:21:50,840 --> 00:21:53,910 stability and prosperity . African 616 00:21:53,910 --> 00:21:55,966 works every day to protect America's 617 00:21:55,966 --> 00:21:57,966 security and advance our access and 618 00:21:57,966 --> 00:22:00,132 influence . We do this arm in arm with 619 00:22:00,132 --> 00:22:02,132 the U . S . Interagency and through 620 00:22:02,132 --> 00:22:04,077 coordinated action with allies and 621 00:22:04,077 --> 00:22:06,980 partners . What African accomplishes 622 00:22:06,980 --> 00:22:09,330 with a few people and a few dollars on 623 00:22:09,330 --> 00:22:11,441 a continent 3.5 times the size of the 624 00:22:11,441 --> 00:22:13,990 continental United States is a bargain 625 00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:16,670 for the american taxpayer , A low cost 626 00:22:16,670 --> 00:22:20,060 insurance policy for America . Mr . 627 00:22:20,060 --> 00:22:22,282 Chairman and members of the committee . 628 00:22:22,282 --> 00:22:24,338 Thanks for your continued support to 629 00:22:24,338 --> 00:22:26,393 our armed forces . I look forward to 630 00:22:26,393 --> 00:22:29,300 your questions . Mhm . Thank you all 631 00:22:29,300 --> 00:22:31,411 very much . I think something is very 632 00:22:31,411 --> 00:22:33,244 interesting about Africa and our 633 00:22:33,244 --> 00:22:35,300 investment there and D . O . D . S . 634 00:22:35,300 --> 00:22:37,522 Investment , there is a lot of bang for 635 00:22:37,522 --> 00:22:39,856 the buck and as I look around the world , 636 00:22:39,856 --> 00:22:41,911 I think with the multiple challenges 637 00:22:41,911 --> 00:22:44,078 that we have that's sort of key to how 638 00:22:44,078 --> 00:22:46,300 we approach them is how can we make 639 00:22:46,300 --> 00:22:48,300 make a difference and cover all the 640 00:22:48,300 --> 00:22:50,522 areas we cover ? And that kind of Socom 641 00:22:50,522 --> 00:22:52,578 has been very involved in that being 642 00:22:52,578 --> 00:22:54,744 president , countries building partner 643 00:22:54,744 --> 00:22:56,911 capacity , working with other allies . 644 00:22:56,911 --> 00:22:59,022 Can you expand upon that a little bit 645 00:22:59,022 --> 00:23:01,244 and how that plays out in Africa as you 646 00:23:01,244 --> 00:23:03,300 deal with all the various challenges 647 00:23:03,300 --> 00:23:05,022 that are spread out across the 648 00:23:05,022 --> 00:23:08,660 continent . Thanks Chairman . So 649 00:23:08,670 --> 00:23:12,320 first of all uh we everything we do 650 00:23:12,330 --> 00:23:15,320 is through partners . America . 651 00:23:15,330 --> 00:23:18,150 America's military is not really in the 652 00:23:18,150 --> 00:23:20,300 lead for anything in Africa . We work 653 00:23:20,300 --> 00:23:24,030 first with our African Partners . We 654 00:23:24,030 --> 00:23:26,640 work secondarily through other partners 655 00:23:26,640 --> 00:23:30,350 like Europeans , uh notably in the in 656 00:23:30,350 --> 00:23:32,517 West Africa , the french for example . 657 00:23:32,517 --> 00:23:34,350 But many countries actually . So 658 00:23:34,350 --> 00:23:36,406 everything we do and our interagency 659 00:23:36,406 --> 00:23:38,517 partners of course . So everything we 660 00:23:38,517 --> 00:23:40,683 do is through partners . You mentioned 661 00:23:40,683 --> 00:23:42,683 Chairman U . S . Special Operations 662 00:23:42,683 --> 00:23:45,760 Command . A lot of the troops who have 663 00:23:45,770 --> 00:23:49,660 boots on the ground in Africa are us 664 00:23:49,670 --> 00:23:52,020 Special operating Forces ? Not all of 665 00:23:52,020 --> 00:23:54,590 them . There are plenty of general 666 00:23:54,590 --> 00:23:58,490 purpose forces there as well . So 667 00:23:58,500 --> 00:24:00,556 we don't try to be all things to all 668 00:24:00,556 --> 00:24:02,780 people . We try to focus our efforts in 669 00:24:02,780 --> 00:24:05,110 priority areas . There are 53 countries 670 00:24:05,110 --> 00:24:08,440 in my area of operation . We don't have 671 00:24:08,440 --> 00:24:10,940 we don't try to win in all 53 countries 672 00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:14,330 but we do try to focus our efforts 673 00:24:14,340 --> 00:24:16,820 where it matters the most for America's 674 00:24:16,820 --> 00:24:18,990 security . And now I'll ask you a 675 00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:20,944 question is probably impossible to 676 00:24:20,944 --> 00:24:23,111 answer at this point . But I'm curious 677 00:24:23,111 --> 00:24:24,944 what you think as we pull out of 678 00:24:24,944 --> 00:24:26,889 Afghanistan ? I mean the budget in 679 00:24:26,889 --> 00:24:29,340 Afghanistan last year was $14 billion 680 00:24:29,340 --> 00:24:31,507 3500 troops . A lot of what we've been 681 00:24:31,507 --> 00:24:33,729 doing has been about the rotations that 682 00:24:33,729 --> 00:24:35,840 are involved in sending our forces in 683 00:24:35,840 --> 00:24:38,007 Afghanistan . With that extra money in 684 00:24:38,007 --> 00:24:40,130 those extra forces . Have you guys , 685 00:24:40,140 --> 00:24:41,973 you know , within the pentagon , 686 00:24:41,973 --> 00:24:44,200 started to think about , how do we then 687 00:24:44,200 --> 00:24:46,367 distribute them ? Do we bring them all 688 00:24:46,367 --> 00:24:48,740 home ? Are there places in in Africa 689 00:24:48,740 --> 00:24:50,962 elsewhere where you could shore up your 690 00:24:50,962 --> 00:24:52,907 efforts ? How do you see a benefit 691 00:24:52,907 --> 00:24:55,073 coming from , you know , reducing that 692 00:24:55,073 --> 00:24:56,980 expenditure by that amount ? And 693 00:24:56,980 --> 00:24:59,091 General Mackenzie , it's you're a our 694 00:24:59,091 --> 00:25:01,340 starting point . So I'd be curious what 695 00:25:01,340 --> 00:25:03,396 your thoughts are and I know this is 696 00:25:03,396 --> 00:25:05,507 probably early on , but curious where 697 00:25:05,507 --> 00:25:08,890 you see that going . So I think there 698 00:25:08,900 --> 00:25:11,300 uh , for our forces come out and were 699 00:25:11,300 --> 00:25:13,411 able to re posture . I think first of 700 00:25:13,411 --> 00:25:15,633 all , we have to look at what we define 701 00:25:15,633 --> 00:25:15,630 as the pacing threats for the 702 00:25:15,630 --> 00:25:17,741 department . And I think we looked we 703 00:25:17,741 --> 00:25:19,963 looked at china , we look to Russia and 704 00:25:19,963 --> 00:25:21,908 we have to look at those areas . I 705 00:25:21,908 --> 00:25:21,470 think some of the forces are gonna 706 00:25:21,470 --> 00:25:23,526 remain in central command because we 707 00:25:23,526 --> 00:25:25,692 are going to look at offshore over the 708 00:25:25,692 --> 00:25:27,637 horizon options . And that's gonna 709 00:25:27,637 --> 00:25:29,803 require us to do some things . Nothing 710 00:25:29,803 --> 00:25:29,480 on the scale of expenditures that 711 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:31,480 you're seeing now in Afghanistan of 712 00:25:31,480 --> 00:25:33,702 course , but we will send still need to 713 00:25:33,702 --> 00:25:35,758 do some things there as well . But I 714 00:25:35,758 --> 00:25:35,560 think broadly , it's going to be a 715 00:25:35,560 --> 00:25:38,150 significant uh lever for the department 716 00:25:38,150 --> 00:25:40,317 to apply against what I agree with the 717 00:25:40,317 --> 00:25:42,483 most , the most significant challenges 718 00:25:42,483 --> 00:25:44,428 that we face today . Thank you . I 719 00:25:44,428 --> 00:25:46,650 appreciate that . Um with that , I will 720 00:25:46,650 --> 00:25:48,706 recognize Mr Wilson who I believe is 721 00:25:48,706 --> 00:25:52,470 with us , virtually . Thank you Mr 722 00:25:52,470 --> 00:25:54,970 Chairman and thank our witnesses for 723 00:25:54,970 --> 00:25:57,460 being here today and I'm really 724 00:25:57,460 --> 00:26:00,630 grateful . Uh Phil Mackenzie , question , 725 00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:03,350 I believe the US Israel relationship is 726 00:26:03,350 --> 00:26:05,461 of paramount importance to US foreign 727 00:26:05,461 --> 00:26:07,820 policy . Given that Israel has now been 728 00:26:07,820 --> 00:26:10,350 moved under the purview of sin calm , I 729 00:26:10,350 --> 00:26:13,310 want to ensure that our cooperation 730 00:26:13,310 --> 00:26:15,550 with Israel continues to be a priority 731 00:26:15,650 --> 00:26:17,880 in moving Israel to centcom . It's 732 00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:19,991 important that we don't undermine the 733 00:26:19,991 --> 00:26:22,230 cooperation Israel has in europe , 734 00:26:22,230 --> 00:26:24,341 particularly with NATO . The question 735 00:26:24,341 --> 00:26:26,341 would be , how are we ensuring this 736 00:26:26,341 --> 00:26:28,508 move does not undermine agreements and 737 00:26:28,508 --> 00:26:30,619 understandings that currently exist . 738 00:26:32,440 --> 00:26:34,440 So that's a that's a great question 739 00:26:34,440 --> 00:26:36,440 about Israel . So today Israel does 740 00:26:36,440 --> 00:26:38,551 most of its operational business with 741 00:26:38,551 --> 00:26:40,496 US Central Command . Their threats 742 00:26:40,496 --> 00:26:42,384 typically emanate from the east . 743 00:26:42,384 --> 00:26:44,162 Nonetheless , they have brought 744 00:26:44,162 --> 00:26:46,500 enduring cultural and other ties to to 745 00:26:46,510 --> 00:26:49,040 to the Europeans and to NATO . So as 746 00:26:49,040 --> 00:26:51,096 part of direction I've been received 747 00:26:51,096 --> 00:26:53,318 from from the Secretary of Defense over 748 00:26:53,318 --> 00:26:55,484 the next several months , we will work 749 00:26:55,484 --> 00:26:57,707 a careful plan to integrate Israel into 750 00:26:57,707 --> 00:26:59,373 the Central Command Hor while 751 00:26:59,373 --> 00:27:01,318 preserving their unique nature and 752 00:27:01,318 --> 00:27:03,429 their unique ties back into back into 753 00:27:03,429 --> 00:27:05,596 Western europe . So we think we have a 754 00:27:05,596 --> 00:27:07,818 good plan to do that . But in many ways 755 00:27:07,818 --> 00:27:07,700 the movement into the Central Command 756 00:27:07,700 --> 00:27:09,644 hor simply reflects an operational 757 00:27:09,644 --> 00:27:11,644 effect that's been in existence for 758 00:27:11,644 --> 00:27:13,756 some time . We work closely with them 759 00:27:13,756 --> 00:27:16,530 every day . Now the we'll have a not a 760 00:27:16,530 --> 00:27:18,419 divided responsibility for it but 761 00:27:18,419 --> 00:27:20,641 rather a single responsibility for it . 762 00:27:20,641 --> 00:27:22,808 But I would tell you that I will still 763 00:27:22,808 --> 00:27:22,700 be in very close touch with General 764 00:27:22,700 --> 00:27:24,700 Todd , Walters and U . S . European 765 00:27:24,700 --> 00:27:26,867 command as we go forward . And I think 766 00:27:26,867 --> 00:27:28,922 that is an important relationship as 767 00:27:28,922 --> 00:27:30,978 you note , but also it's going to be 768 00:27:30,978 --> 00:27:30,710 important to for Israel to have the 769 00:27:30,710 --> 00:27:32,710 opportunity to develop normalized 770 00:27:32,710 --> 00:27:34,940 relationships with Arab nations . And 771 00:27:34,940 --> 00:27:37,107 that's one of the key things that will 772 00:27:37,107 --> 00:27:39,273 accrue from having them in the Central 773 00:27:39,273 --> 00:27:41,329 command . A . O . R . Well thank you 774 00:27:41,329 --> 00:27:43,107 very much and I appreciate that 775 00:27:43,107 --> 00:27:45,610 assurance to our friends of Israel uh 776 00:27:45,620 --> 00:27:48,100 Secretary Dori , The US defensive 777 00:27:48,100 --> 00:27:51,020 expeditionary operations are enabled by 778 00:27:51,020 --> 00:27:52,687 network of american bases and 779 00:27:52,687 --> 00:27:55,170 facilities hosted an allied and partner 780 00:27:55,170 --> 00:27:58,270 countries , particularly in Afghanistan . 781 00:27:58,940 --> 00:28:00,996 Presuming that the withdrawal of all 782 00:28:00,996 --> 00:28:03,780 forces results in the loss of control 783 00:28:03,780 --> 00:28:06,230 of Bagram and Kandahar airbase is how 784 00:28:06,230 --> 00:28:09,070 does that complicate our ability to re 785 00:28:09,070 --> 00:28:11,300 enter Afghanistan to combat research 786 00:28:11,300 --> 00:28:13,467 and terrorist groups ? As we had to do 787 00:28:13,467 --> 00:28:15,880 in Iraq ? What number of U . S . Forces 788 00:28:15,880 --> 00:28:17,491 will be required to re enter 789 00:28:17,491 --> 00:28:20,020 Afghanistan without control of existing 790 00:28:20,020 --> 00:28:22,960 infrastructure . The attacks of 9 11 by 791 00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:24,960 Osama bin Laden were from a cave in 792 00:28:24,960 --> 00:28:28,740 Afghanistan In 2001 . What assurance 793 00:28:28,750 --> 00:28:30,750 does the president have that future 794 00:28:30,750 --> 00:28:33,660 attacks will not come from caves of 795 00:28:33,670 --> 00:28:36,260 Afghanistan against the American public 796 00:28:39,140 --> 00:28:40,918 congressman . Thank you for the 797 00:28:40,918 --> 00:28:43,200 question about what our future posture 798 00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:44,922 will look like with respect to 799 00:28:44,922 --> 00:28:47,230 Afghanistan . Following the force . 800 00:28:47,230 --> 00:28:49,180 Draw down . What I can say at this 801 00:28:49,180 --> 00:28:53,050 point is that work is underway to adapt 802 00:28:53,050 --> 00:28:55,460 to the adjusting security environment 803 00:28:55,460 --> 00:28:58,170 and consider how to continue to apply 804 00:28:58,170 --> 00:29:01,240 pressure with respect to potential cT 805 00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:03,810 threats emanating from Afghanistan . So 806 00:29:03,810 --> 00:29:06,480 looking throughout the in terms of over 807 00:29:06,480 --> 00:29:09,090 the horizon opportunities , of course , 808 00:29:09,090 --> 00:29:11,600 the uh surveillance intelligence 809 00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:13,940 component of that is fundamental to 810 00:29:13,940 --> 00:29:16,180 ensuring the type of scenario that you 811 00:29:16,180 --> 00:29:18,970 just laid out would not persist in the 812 00:29:18,970 --> 00:29:21,280 future with respect to individuals in 813 00:29:21,290 --> 00:29:23,346 caves who had threatened the U . S . 814 00:29:23,346 --> 00:29:25,640 Homeland . What I can say from the 815 00:29:25,650 --> 00:29:28,790 decision process that the president 816 00:29:28,790 --> 00:29:31,130 lead with his national security team is 817 00:29:31,130 --> 00:29:33,352 that there was consideration of a range 818 00:29:33,352 --> 00:29:36,360 of scenarios for the future of 819 00:29:36,370 --> 00:29:38,592 Afghanistan and our ability to continue 820 00:29:38,592 --> 00:29:40,870 to apply pressure . But the commitment 821 00:29:40,870 --> 00:29:43,220 is that there will not be threats 822 00:29:43,220 --> 00:29:45,387 emanating from Afghanistan against the 823 00:29:45,387 --> 00:29:47,410 US homeland looking ahead into the 824 00:29:47,410 --> 00:29:50,720 future . And additionally , 825 00:29:50,730 --> 00:29:52,880 secretary over the last several years 826 00:29:52,880 --> 00:29:55,100 in the conflict in Syria , Iran has 827 00:29:55,100 --> 00:29:57,267 entrenched itself deeply within Syrian 828 00:29:57,267 --> 00:29:59,540 territory . It has basis factories , 829 00:29:59,550 --> 00:30:01,870 weapons storage facilities . These pose 830 00:30:01,870 --> 00:30:04,148 a threat to US interests in the region , 831 00:30:04,148 --> 00:30:06,259 including our alliance with Israel as 832 00:30:06,259 --> 00:30:08,660 well as safety of the Syrian people who 833 00:30:08,660 --> 00:30:11,100 often are being used as human shields . 834 00:30:11,340 --> 00:30:13,410 Does the U . S . Continue to support 835 00:30:13,420 --> 00:30:15,460 the freedom of action for Israel to 836 00:30:15,460 --> 00:30:18,860 address Iranian threats from Syria 837 00:30:21,640 --> 00:30:24,450 congressman ? Our commitment to Israel 838 00:30:24,450 --> 00:30:27,420 remains ironclad . I think we have seen 839 00:30:27,420 --> 00:30:29,950 through the Secretary's initial visit 840 00:30:29,950 --> 00:30:33,870 to Israel last week and in the 841 00:30:33,870 --> 00:30:36,092 dialogues that have been conducted with 842 00:30:36,092 --> 00:30:38,910 Israel already in this administration , 843 00:30:38,910 --> 00:30:42,140 including a rejuvenated effort led by 844 00:30:42,140 --> 00:30:44,840 the national security adviser uh that 845 00:30:44,840 --> 00:30:48,170 the relationship remains robust and 846 00:30:48,170 --> 00:30:50,810 close , that there is a strong level of 847 00:30:50,820 --> 00:30:53,098 dialogue and commitment to one another . 848 00:30:54,040 --> 00:30:56,207 Thank you very much . And I yield back 849 00:30:56,207 --> 00:30:58,450 Mr Chairman . Thank you . Mr Landerman 850 00:30:58,450 --> 00:31:00,283 is recognized for five minutes . 851 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:07,607 Very good . Do you hear me okay ? This 852 00:31:07,607 --> 00:31:09,773 chairman ? Yes , we got your will turn 853 00:31:09,773 --> 00:31:11,940 your volume up a little bit here , but 854 00:31:11,940 --> 00:31:13,996 you're good . Go ahead . Very good . 855 00:31:13,996 --> 00:31:16,162 Thank you . Uh , Good morning . I want 856 00:31:16,162 --> 00:31:17,940 to thank our witnesses for your 857 00:31:17,940 --> 00:31:20,520 testimony today . So we've heard uh 858 00:31:20,530 --> 00:31:22,363 entities like Special Operations 859 00:31:22,363 --> 00:31:25,470 Command say that counter V . E O . Is a 860 00:31:25,470 --> 00:31:28,170 form of a great power competition . 861 00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:30,807 General Townsend . Do you believe that 862 00:31:30,807 --> 00:31:33,084 that statement is true and it's so lie . 863 00:31:36,140 --> 00:31:38,307 Thank you , congressman . I absolutely 864 00:31:38,307 --> 00:31:40,307 believe that statement is true . In 865 00:31:40,307 --> 00:31:42,362 fact , we say that often in Africa , 866 00:31:42,362 --> 00:31:45,570 here's why . So what is uh we don't use 867 00:31:45,570 --> 00:31:47,737 a term great power competition . There 868 00:31:47,737 --> 00:31:49,848 are our partners don't really like to 869 00:31:49,848 --> 00:31:51,848 hear that term . So we use a global 870 00:31:51,848 --> 00:31:54,010 power competition in Africa . What's 871 00:31:54,010 --> 00:31:56,343 the purpose of global power competition ? 872 00:31:56,343 --> 00:31:59,600 But to expand America's access and 873 00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:02,480 influence . So how do you get that ? 874 00:32:02,490 --> 00:32:05,310 You get that by helping a partner with 875 00:32:05,320 --> 00:32:08,560 a problem that they have . And one of 876 00:32:08,560 --> 00:32:10,671 the significant problems that many of 877 00:32:10,671 --> 00:32:13,430 our African partners have is the 878 00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:16,370 scourge of terrorism . Uh , so by doing 879 00:32:16,370 --> 00:32:18,730 counter V E . O or counterterrorist 880 00:32:18,730 --> 00:32:20,930 operations supporting our African 881 00:32:20,930 --> 00:32:23,890 partners , we are gaining access and 882 00:32:23,890 --> 00:32:26,810 influence by doing that . Absolutely . 883 00:32:26,820 --> 00:32:29,780 In Africa , Counterterrorism operations 884 00:32:29,790 --> 00:32:32,460 are a way of global power competition . 885 00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:37,260 Thank you . I personally also agree 886 00:32:37,260 --> 00:32:39,850 with that statement . I think it's 887 00:32:39,860 --> 00:32:41,582 important that we look at this 888 00:32:41,582 --> 00:32:43,749 holistically because uh , terrorism is 889 00:32:43,749 --> 00:32:46,680 not going away anytime soon is in my 890 00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,230 view . But what other forms of great 891 00:32:49,230 --> 00:32:52,410 power competition happen in Africa or 892 00:32:52,420 --> 00:32:54,753 global competition as you talk about it . 893 00:32:54,753 --> 00:32:56,976 And what role does the military players 894 00:32:56,976 --> 00:32:59,170 china uh particular makes diplomatic 895 00:32:59,340 --> 00:33:00,951 and economic inroads there ? 896 00:33:03,940 --> 00:33:07,820 So china and Russia are very active in 897 00:33:07,820 --> 00:33:11,640 Africa . Um Russia is very active 898 00:33:11,650 --> 00:33:14,540 with arms sales , but most of their 899 00:33:14,540 --> 00:33:16,762 activity on the continent . I judged to 900 00:33:16,762 --> 00:33:19,380 be a self interested and exploitative 901 00:33:19,380 --> 00:33:22,280 in nature . And I think uh though they 902 00:33:22,280 --> 00:33:25,870 may be a threat today , I think they 903 00:33:25,870 --> 00:33:28,270 are less of a threat . Uh tomorrow 904 00:33:28,540 --> 00:33:31,070 china however is of great concern . 905 00:33:31,070 --> 00:33:33,150 They are literally everywhere on the 906 00:33:33,150 --> 00:33:35,372 continent . Their placing a lot of bets 907 00:33:35,372 --> 00:33:37,650 down . They're spending a lot of money . 908 00:33:37,650 --> 00:33:39,372 We know they use debt , trap , 909 00:33:39,372 --> 00:33:41,990 diplomacy , coercion with corrupt 910 00:33:41,990 --> 00:33:44,490 politicians . They build a lot of 911 00:33:44,490 --> 00:33:46,960 critical infrastructure And so most of 912 00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:49,340 their competition is through economic 913 00:33:49,340 --> 00:33:52,450 means building infrastructure and 914 00:33:52,460 --> 00:33:56,050 trapping African countries and 915 00:33:56,060 --> 00:33:59,390 bad loans that give the chinese access 916 00:33:59,390 --> 00:34:03,140 to that infrastructure after they build 917 00:34:03,140 --> 00:34:05,640 it . They're also , you know , their 918 00:34:05,640 --> 00:34:08,570 first overseas military base that 919 00:34:08,570 --> 00:34:11,300 they're only one is in Africa . And 920 00:34:11,300 --> 00:34:15,050 they have just expanded that by adding 921 00:34:15,050 --> 00:34:19,050 a significant peer that can support 922 00:34:19,440 --> 00:34:21,460 even their aircraft carriers in the 923 00:34:21,460 --> 00:34:23,960 future around the continent . They're 924 00:34:23,960 --> 00:34:26,238 looking for other basing opportunities . 925 00:34:26,238 --> 00:34:28,560 They're also doing cooperation in the 926 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:31,220 intelligence realm That concerns me , 927 00:34:31,230 --> 00:34:34,360 uh , significantly I would say that 928 00:34:34,360 --> 00:34:36,460 they have offered training and arms 929 00:34:36,460 --> 00:34:39,980 sales uh , frequently that winds 930 00:34:39,980 --> 00:34:43,460 up working out okay for us because 931 00:34:43,740 --> 00:34:46,080 their quality of their equipment that 932 00:34:46,080 --> 00:34:49,430 they sell uh , frequently is inferior . 933 00:34:49,430 --> 00:34:51,430 And uh , the Africans wind up being 934 00:34:51,430 --> 00:34:53,486 disappointed with both the equipment 935 00:34:53,486 --> 00:34:55,541 they get from china and the training 936 00:34:55,541 --> 00:34:57,763 they get with from china . But china is 937 00:34:57,763 --> 00:34:59,986 a learning organization and they're the 938 00:34:59,986 --> 00:35:02,041 concern for the future . Thank you . 939 00:35:02,041 --> 00:35:03,763 Gerald . Let me try to General 940 00:35:03,763 --> 00:35:06,440 Mackenzie if I could uh , general 941 00:35:06,450 --> 00:35:08,506 because in your testimony , you list 942 00:35:08,840 --> 00:35:10,951 great power competition as your third 943 00:35:10,951 --> 00:35:14,680 priority behind containing Iran's uh , 944 00:35:14,690 --> 00:35:18,240 reading influence and C . V . E . O . 945 00:35:18,250 --> 00:35:20,980 Operation . What does power competition 946 00:35:20,980 --> 00:35:24,360 looks like your uh , what is your 947 00:35:24,370 --> 00:35:26,420 timeframe of the shift in your 948 00:35:26,420 --> 00:35:28,642 priorities to great power competition ? 949 00:35:29,740 --> 00:35:31,920 So , we see with Russia disruptive 950 00:35:31,920 --> 00:35:33,809 activities , uh , you know , they 951 00:35:33,809 --> 00:35:36,210 seized a foothold in Syria that allows 952 00:35:36,210 --> 00:35:38,266 them to pursue an age old dream of a 953 00:35:38,266 --> 00:35:39,988 warm war report in the Eastern 954 00:35:39,988 --> 00:35:42,099 Mediterranean , basing in the Eastern 955 00:35:42,099 --> 00:35:44,266 Mediterranean , which also allows them 956 00:35:44,266 --> 00:35:44,250 a little pad to go into africa . So 957 00:35:44,250 --> 00:35:46,139 Russia is generally opportunistic 958 00:35:46,139 --> 00:35:48,139 weapons sales . As general Townsend 959 00:35:48,139 --> 00:35:50,361 noted , china is , as in Africa playing 960 00:35:50,361 --> 00:35:52,472 a much deeper and a longer game . And 961 00:35:52,472 --> 00:35:54,639 it is principally an economic effort , 962 00:35:54,639 --> 00:35:56,750 although we believe they do , they do 963 00:35:56,750 --> 00:35:58,917 aspire at some point to have basing in 964 00:35:58,917 --> 00:36:01,139 the theater , but that's still ahead of 965 00:36:01,139 --> 00:36:00,710 them . But right now we see china is 966 00:36:00,710 --> 00:36:03,290 principally economic Gentleman's time 967 00:36:03,290 --> 00:36:05,850 has expired . Mr Turner is recognized 968 00:36:05,850 --> 00:36:09,250 for five minutes . Thank you . 969 00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:14,600 Mystery as Mr Landerman just mentioned 970 00:36:14,610 --> 00:36:16,721 General Mackenzie has in his comments 971 00:36:17,230 --> 00:36:19,450 the importance of deterring Iran 972 00:36:19,830 --> 00:36:21,830 looking to how do we strengthen our 973 00:36:21,830 --> 00:36:24,850 allies and um the importance of 974 00:36:24,850 --> 00:36:26,961 intelligence to be able to respond to 975 00:36:26,961 --> 00:36:28,850 their malign activities . In your 976 00:36:28,850 --> 00:36:32,150 statement uh throughout you reference 977 00:36:32,150 --> 00:36:34,150 the malign activities that Iran has 978 00:36:34,150 --> 00:36:37,390 done um and has performed . That is 979 00:36:37,390 --> 00:36:40,170 obviously of great concern other than 980 00:36:40,180 --> 00:36:42,347 the entering back into the J . C . P . 981 00:36:42,347 --> 00:36:44,402 O . A which is a flawed agreement of 982 00:36:44,402 --> 00:36:46,624 which they have currently breached . Um 983 00:36:46,624 --> 00:36:48,624 what else do we need to be doing to 984 00:36:48,624 --> 00:36:52,620 deter Iran ? Thank 985 00:36:52,620 --> 00:36:54,287 you . Excuse me . Thank you , 986 00:36:54,287 --> 00:36:57,210 congressman . I I would start off by 987 00:36:57,210 --> 00:37:00,870 saying the president has chosen to lead 988 00:37:00,880 --> 00:37:03,330 with respect to diplomacy when it comes 989 00:37:03,330 --> 00:37:06,150 to J . C . P . O . And the nuclear file . 990 00:37:06,530 --> 00:37:08,863 That leaves an important role for D . O . 991 00:37:08,863 --> 00:37:11,430 D . With respect to deterring malign 992 00:37:11,430 --> 00:37:14,770 activity in the other range of 993 00:37:14,770 --> 00:37:17,270 activities Iran engages in . So there's 994 00:37:17,270 --> 00:37:19,260 a very important role for the 995 00:37:19,260 --> 00:37:21,690 department to continue with respect to 996 00:37:21,690 --> 00:37:23,912 the range of allies and partners in the 997 00:37:23,912 --> 00:37:27,080 region to backstop them to have forces 998 00:37:27,080 --> 00:37:29,490 on the ground , working to advise , 999 00:37:29,490 --> 00:37:31,490 train and assist with the different 1000 00:37:31,490 --> 00:37:34,590 partners . Each partnership has its own 1001 00:37:34,590 --> 00:37:36,680 character and quality . But the 1002 00:37:36,690 --> 00:37:38,912 combination of the force presence , the 1003 00:37:38,912 --> 00:37:41,023 ability to provide the president with 1004 00:37:41,023 --> 00:37:42,960 options in the event , those are 1005 00:37:42,960 --> 00:37:44,810 required . Those those are the 1006 00:37:44,820 --> 00:37:46,987 fundamental roles of the department at 1007 00:37:46,987 --> 00:37:49,270 this point , john McKenzie you 1008 00:37:49,270 --> 00:37:52,520 mentioned is are in the tools that are 1009 00:37:52,520 --> 00:37:55,790 necessary to be able to deter Iran . Uh 1010 00:37:55,800 --> 00:37:57,820 specifically citing the MQ nine . I 1011 00:37:57,820 --> 00:37:59,900 know that you know that there is 1012 00:37:59,910 --> 00:38:02,140 pressure on the committee for the 1013 00:38:02,140 --> 00:38:05,540 purposes of diminishing the role of of 1014 00:38:05,550 --> 00:38:07,940 MQ nine and and other deployable I . S . 1015 00:38:07,940 --> 00:38:10,720 R . Um , I thought you might want to 1016 00:38:10,720 --> 00:38:12,387 take an opportunity to give a 1017 00:38:12,387 --> 00:38:14,498 commercial for the importance of that 1018 00:38:14,498 --> 00:38:16,664 tool . As you look to deterring Iran . 1019 00:38:17,320 --> 00:38:19,542 Well , sir , let me begin by saying , I 1020 00:38:19,542 --> 00:38:22,080 recognize that there is a global global 1021 00:38:22,080 --> 00:38:24,500 demand for for I . S . R . And also we 1022 00:38:24,500 --> 00:38:26,820 need to move beyond the MQ nine system , 1023 00:38:26,820 --> 00:38:28,931 which is the backbone system for us . 1024 00:38:28,931 --> 00:38:31,042 Central command . The future is going 1025 00:38:31,042 --> 00:38:33,042 to demand bigger , better different 1026 00:38:33,042 --> 00:38:35,042 kinds of I . S . Are more more more 1027 00:38:35,042 --> 00:38:34,790 sophisticated than what we've got now . 1028 00:38:34,790 --> 00:38:36,790 However , right now for me , the MQ 1029 00:38:36,790 --> 00:38:38,901 nine is a very good platform and what 1030 00:38:38,901 --> 00:38:41,123 we have found that particularly against 1031 00:38:41,123 --> 00:38:42,790 Iran , They do not like their 1032 00:38:42,790 --> 00:38:44,957 activities to be exposed in the summer 1033 00:38:44,957 --> 00:38:47,390 of 2019 . We believe we stopped several 1034 00:38:47,400 --> 00:38:49,622 imminent attacks . Dreams from ships at 1035 00:38:49,622 --> 00:38:51,820 sea simply by positioning MQ nine 1036 00:38:51,830 --> 00:38:53,608 overhead so they could hear him 1037 00:38:53,608 --> 00:38:55,552 operating . I'm confident that the 1038 00:38:55,552 --> 00:38:57,774 intelligence is very clear on that . So 1039 00:38:57,774 --> 00:38:59,830 in the intelligence , first of all , 1040 00:38:59,830 --> 00:39:01,997 the the platform , first of all allows 1041 00:39:01,997 --> 00:39:04,108 us together intelligence . But second 1042 00:39:04,108 --> 00:39:06,330 we have been observed and reported upon 1043 00:39:06,330 --> 00:39:08,274 deterring effect on Iran by simply 1044 00:39:08,274 --> 00:39:10,386 manipulating those platforms so I use 1045 00:39:10,386 --> 00:39:11,997 them . But I am not I am not 1046 00:39:11,997 --> 00:39:13,886 insensitive to the future of this 1047 00:39:13,886 --> 00:39:15,941 platform . And the fact we've got to 1048 00:39:15,941 --> 00:39:18,108 make some adjustments globally great . 1049 00:39:18,108 --> 00:39:20,219 And your comments , you emphasize our 1050 00:39:20,219 --> 00:39:21,941 need to work with our allies . 1051 00:39:21,941 --> 00:39:24,052 Certainly working with those allies , 1052 00:39:24,052 --> 00:39:23,670 we need to be strengthening their 1053 00:39:23,670 --> 00:39:26,100 capabilities . The trump administration 1054 00:39:26,100 --> 00:39:29,860 had entered into Um a transaction to 1055 00:39:29,870 --> 00:39:32,240 provide the F 35 to you either . By 1056 00:39:32,240 --> 00:39:34,630 administration has confirmed its 1057 00:39:34,630 --> 00:39:37,400 interest in continuing to do so . Um 1058 00:39:37,410 --> 00:39:39,577 two could you speak for a moment about 1059 00:39:39,577 --> 00:39:41,521 how important it is for us to have 1060 00:39:41,521 --> 00:39:43,743 advanced tools and equipment like the F 1061 00:39:43,743 --> 00:39:47,720 35 certainly um weapons systems in the 1062 00:39:47,720 --> 00:39:49,831 hands of our allies that join with us 1063 00:39:49,831 --> 00:39:52,390 in trying to deter Iran . So one of the 1064 00:39:52,390 --> 00:39:54,790 key aspects of deterring Iran is an 1065 00:39:54,790 --> 00:39:56,957 international community that has voted 1066 00:39:56,957 --> 00:39:59,012 that is devoted to that deterrence . 1067 00:39:59,012 --> 00:40:01,190 Iran has no friends . So so what we 1068 00:40:01,190 --> 00:40:03,180 have is lots of friends , friends 1069 00:40:03,180 --> 00:40:05,236 across the region and friends across 1070 00:40:05,236 --> 00:40:07,180 the globe as well . But one of the 1071 00:40:07,180 --> 00:40:09,236 things for supporting our friends in 1072 00:40:09,236 --> 00:40:11,236 the region is to give them the best 1073 00:40:11,236 --> 00:40:10,820 capability that we can afford to give 1074 00:40:10,820 --> 00:40:12,542 them consistent with the other 1075 00:40:12,542 --> 00:40:14,542 requirements such as reassurance of 1076 00:40:14,542 --> 00:40:16,542 Israel , which is always in my mind 1077 00:40:16,542 --> 00:40:18,764 when I give advice on these deals , but 1078 00:40:18,764 --> 00:40:20,987 it's not a centcom decision but I think 1079 00:40:20,987 --> 00:40:20,400 that is a good capability and it will 1080 00:40:20,400 --> 00:40:22,622 stand us in good stead with our friends 1081 00:40:22,622 --> 00:40:24,678 and you a thank you general , you're 1082 00:40:24,678 --> 00:40:26,900 back . Mr Larson is recognized for five 1083 00:40:26,900 --> 00:40:29,067 minutes . Thank you . Mr Chair General 1084 00:40:29,067 --> 00:40:31,530 Townsend . I don't know if I need an 1085 00:40:31,530 --> 00:40:34,370 answer won't be it won't be a comment 1086 00:40:34,370 --> 00:40:36,592 really on this issue that Mr Landon and 1087 00:40:36,592 --> 00:40:39,010 brought up about C . T . And global 1088 00:40:39,010 --> 00:40:41,010 power competition . My concern with 1089 00:40:41,010 --> 00:40:43,121 your answer is a concern of expresses 1090 00:40:43,121 --> 00:40:45,343 so calm . It's just that sometimes it's 1091 00:40:45,343 --> 00:40:48,370 it should only be a ct mission and not 1092 00:40:48,380 --> 00:40:50,158 creep into something else . And 1093 00:40:50,158 --> 00:40:52,102 sometimes it should start out as a 1094 00:40:52,102 --> 00:40:54,500 global power competition mission and 1095 00:40:54,500 --> 00:40:56,611 not being necessarily based on the ct 1096 00:40:56,611 --> 00:40:58,778 mission . That may not be the case for 1097 00:40:58,778 --> 00:41:00,889 everywhere on the continent of Africa 1098 00:41:00,889 --> 00:41:03,270 for you . But I guess I do a question . 1099 00:41:03,270 --> 00:41:06,830 Do you have an example where a Socom 1100 00:41:06,830 --> 00:41:09,130 mission uh , that's operating under 1101 00:41:09,140 --> 00:41:12,720 africom is just a global power 1102 00:41:12,720 --> 00:41:13,942 competition mission ? 1103 00:41:16,510 --> 00:41:18,440 Yes , congressman . I'd prefer to 1104 00:41:18,440 --> 00:41:20,980 discuss that . Yes or no . It's fine 1105 00:41:20,980 --> 00:41:22,869 with me . And they said yes and I 1106 00:41:22,869 --> 00:41:24,980 appreciate that . I just want to make 1107 00:41:24,980 --> 00:41:26,813 the point that sometimes they're 1108 00:41:26,813 --> 00:41:29,036 related and sometimes they're not and I 1109 00:41:29,036 --> 00:41:31,091 don't need to , I don't want to keep 1110 00:41:31,091 --> 00:41:33,770 hearing CT is GPC because it sounds 1111 00:41:33,770 --> 00:41:37,410 like an excuse to keep cT all the 1112 00:41:37,410 --> 00:41:39,890 time and sometimes it's not appropriate 1113 00:41:39,900 --> 00:41:41,844 and sometimes it is and we're just 1114 00:41:41,844 --> 00:41:43,900 trying to , trying to get so calm to 1115 00:41:43,900 --> 00:41:46,240 think through this a little bit more 1116 00:41:46,250 --> 00:41:48,472 than I think I'm getting the impression 1117 00:41:48,472 --> 00:41:50,639 that they are so , but I've been clear 1118 00:41:50,639 --> 00:41:52,861 to the Socom folks about that as well , 1119 00:41:52,861 --> 00:41:54,972 awesome Staying on the continent . Um 1120 00:41:54,972 --> 00:41:56,750 actually specific countries and 1121 00:41:56,760 --> 00:41:58,910 secretary dori 20 years ago is all 1122 00:41:58,910 --> 00:42:00,910 Afghanistan all the time when I got 1123 00:42:00,910 --> 00:42:03,450 here Just in the last three weeks . I 1124 00:42:03,450 --> 00:42:05,672 wouldn't have heard this 20 years ago . 1125 00:42:05,672 --> 00:42:07,839 I've heard from Ugandan constituents . 1126 00:42:07,839 --> 00:42:09,728 You got there from the country of 1127 00:42:09,728 --> 00:42:12,160 origin is Uganda . Every constituents 1128 00:42:12,160 --> 00:42:15,580 from to Gary . I think I got to 1129 00:42:15,580 --> 00:42:17,636 pronounce correctly and I want to be 1130 00:42:17,636 --> 00:42:20,170 disrespectful About the respective 1131 00:42:20,170 --> 00:42:22,337 problems in those countries . Wouldn't 1132 00:42:22,337 --> 00:42:24,503 heard that 20 years ago , My districts 1133 00:42:24,503 --> 00:42:26,910 changing the country's changing . We're 1134 00:42:26,910 --> 00:42:28,632 a nation of immigrants and new 1135 00:42:28,632 --> 00:42:31,250 immigrants . So can you um on those two 1136 00:42:31,260 --> 00:42:34,310 areas , Can you give us give this uh 1137 00:42:34,320 --> 00:42:36,042 committee or give me an update 1138 00:42:36,042 --> 00:42:38,209 something ? I can tell my constituents 1139 00:42:38,209 --> 00:42:40,042 who are both concerned about the 1140 00:42:40,042 --> 00:42:42,098 elections in Uganda and and my other 1141 00:42:42,098 --> 00:42:44,153 constituents who are concerned about 1142 00:42:44,153 --> 00:42:46,376 how their families are being treated in 1143 00:42:46,376 --> 00:42:47,487 Northern Ethiopia . 1144 00:42:50,100 --> 00:42:52,900 Thank thank you congressman uh in that 1145 00:42:52,910 --> 00:42:55,340 period of time , I previously served as 1146 00:42:55,340 --> 00:42:57,284 the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 1147 00:42:57,284 --> 00:43:00,350 africa . So for some of us that those 1148 00:43:00,350 --> 00:43:02,830 were areas we were working even before 1149 00:43:02,830 --> 00:43:05,340 the recent our renaissance , if you 1150 00:43:05,340 --> 00:43:08,400 will , in terms of Uganda , what I 1151 00:43:08,400 --> 00:43:10,430 would say there is . The U . S . 1152 00:43:10,430 --> 00:43:12,486 Government is very concerned at this 1153 00:43:12,486 --> 00:43:15,750 point in terms of the quality or lack 1154 00:43:15,750 --> 00:43:17,940 thereof of the election , the 1155 00:43:17,950 --> 00:43:21,410 repression against the other candidates 1156 00:43:21,410 --> 00:43:24,850 who contested the election uh and the 1157 00:43:24,860 --> 00:43:28,000 the actions of the security services in 1158 00:43:28,010 --> 00:43:31,270 Uganda in terms of repressing uh 1159 00:43:31,280 --> 00:43:34,070 participation by citizens and their 1160 00:43:34,070 --> 00:43:37,700 concerns and governance . So , messages 1161 00:43:37,700 --> 00:43:39,867 in particular via the State Department 1162 00:43:39,867 --> 00:43:42,580 are robust with respect to our concerns . 1163 00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:45,590 We do recognize the positive role that 1164 00:43:45,590 --> 00:43:47,740 Uganda has played with respect to the 1165 00:43:47,740 --> 00:43:50,030 amazon mission in Somalia over many , 1166 00:43:50,030 --> 00:43:52,570 many years on the one hand , but that 1167 00:43:52,580 --> 00:43:55,710 does not counterbalance the concerns in 1168 00:43:55,710 --> 00:43:58,590 terms of the repression that's underway 1169 00:43:58,610 --> 00:44:01,480 in Uganda proper . Similarly , with 1170 00:44:01,480 --> 00:44:04,980 respect to Ethiopia and tigre 1171 00:44:04,990 --> 00:44:08,750 intense concerns on the part of the U . 1172 00:44:08,750 --> 00:44:11,110 S . Government with respect to the 1173 00:44:11,120 --> 00:44:13,770 conflict under way there uh and 1174 00:44:13,770 --> 00:44:17,220 concerns that it's fundamental to have 1175 00:44:17,220 --> 00:44:19,442 a negotiated settlement to the conflict 1176 00:44:19,442 --> 00:44:21,609 at this point . You have participation 1177 00:44:21,609 --> 00:44:24,090 by regional players in addition to the 1178 00:44:24,100 --> 00:44:26,360 different groups within Ethiopia and 1179 00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:28,582 the way forward is through dialogue and 1180 00:44:28,582 --> 00:44:31,080 that's something that our our embassy 1181 00:44:31,080 --> 00:44:33,247 on the ground and the State Department 1182 00:44:33,247 --> 00:44:35,469 are leaning into robustly . Thank you . 1183 00:44:35,469 --> 00:44:37,636 General Townsend back to you . Can you 1184 00:44:37,636 --> 00:44:41,090 comment on Mozambique and uh huh 1185 00:44:41,490 --> 00:44:44,570 In the last 45 seconds , if we're how 1186 00:44:44,570 --> 00:44:46,403 do you assess what's happened in 1187 00:44:46,403 --> 00:44:48,570 northern Mozambique and what does that 1188 00:44:48,570 --> 00:44:50,570 mean for decision and decisions and 1189 00:44:50,570 --> 00:44:52,348 advisor providing to the to the 1190 00:44:52,348 --> 00:44:56,250 department ? Um The over the last two 1191 00:44:56,250 --> 00:44:59,490 years ISis Mozambique has been an 1192 00:44:59,490 --> 00:45:01,157 increasing threat in northern 1193 00:45:01,157 --> 00:45:02,970 Mozambique and the Cabo Delgado 1194 00:45:02,980 --> 00:45:05,700 province . As you saw a couple of weeks 1195 00:45:05,700 --> 00:45:09,070 ago , they launched a 7-10 day siege on 1196 00:45:09,070 --> 00:45:11,470 the town of Palma . It's not clear to 1197 00:45:11,470 --> 00:45:14,110 me if they're actually more than just 1198 00:45:14,110 --> 00:45:16,300 local groups flying an ISIS flag of 1199 00:45:16,300 --> 00:45:18,890 convenience , but ISIS Core has claimed 1200 00:45:18,900 --> 00:45:22,190 them as their own . My view is that the 1201 00:45:22,190 --> 00:45:24,630 african partners need to do more , and 1202 00:45:24,630 --> 00:45:26,850 european partners need to do more 1203 00:45:26,860 --> 00:45:28,916 before the United States . Does more 1204 00:45:28,916 --> 00:45:31,180 there . Thank you . Thank you . Ranking 1205 00:45:31,180 --> 00:45:33,620 member is recognized . Thank you . Mr 1206 00:45:33,620 --> 00:45:35,880 Chairman Gentle Mackenzie . In your 1207 00:45:35,880 --> 00:45:38,960 2020 posture statement , you noted that 1208 00:45:38,960 --> 00:45:40,849 without sustained pressure living 1209 00:45:40,849 --> 00:45:43,016 against it , ISIS had the potential to 1210 00:45:43,016 --> 00:45:46,010 reconstitute in uh in Iraq and Syria . 1211 00:45:46,390 --> 00:45:48,660 I'm interested in your thoughts in your 1212 00:45:48,660 --> 00:45:51,220 2021st posture statement about that as 1213 00:45:51,220 --> 00:45:53,310 well as ISIS , the 1214 00:45:54,590 --> 00:45:57,730 blossoming under a taliban controlled 1215 00:45:57,740 --> 00:45:59,907 Afghanistan . After we leave that , we 1216 00:45:59,907 --> 00:46:03,510 leave serving in Iraq and 1217 00:46:03,510 --> 00:46:05,677 Syria , we have completed the physical 1218 00:46:05,677 --> 00:46:07,788 destruction of what was the so called 1219 00:46:07,788 --> 00:46:10,250 ISIS caliphate . IsIS remnants still 1220 00:46:10,250 --> 00:46:12,760 remain in Syria and some in Iraq as 1221 00:46:12,760 --> 00:46:15,230 well . They find it difficult if not 1222 00:46:15,230 --> 00:46:17,397 impossible , to hold ground . They can 1223 00:46:17,397 --> 00:46:19,690 still conduct small scale terror 1224 00:46:19,690 --> 00:46:21,930 attacks and they do that . But largely 1225 00:46:21,930 --> 00:46:24,097 in Iraq and Syria and Iraq , the Iraqi 1226 00:46:24,097 --> 00:46:26,208 security forces are generally able to 1227 00:46:26,208 --> 00:46:28,041 handle that problem . We are not 1228 00:46:28,041 --> 00:46:29,930 patrolling with the Iraqis on the 1229 00:46:29,930 --> 00:46:32,097 ground . The Iraqis are doing it now . 1230 00:46:32,097 --> 00:46:34,208 We provide them enabling support , We 1231 00:46:34,208 --> 00:46:36,152 provide them high level advice and 1232 00:46:36,152 --> 00:46:38,374 assist . But generally , the Iraqis are 1233 00:46:38,374 --> 00:46:40,486 doing that themselves in Syria , sort 1234 00:46:40,486 --> 00:46:40,260 of the same thing . Our Sdf partners 1235 00:46:40,260 --> 00:46:42,371 there are conducting those operations 1236 00:46:42,371 --> 00:46:44,427 with our back in the rear advice and 1237 00:46:44,427 --> 00:46:46,093 support for them . So , those 1238 00:46:46,093 --> 00:46:48,093 operations are continuing now . The 1239 00:46:48,093 --> 00:46:50,204 future in Iraq and Syria is not going 1240 00:46:50,204 --> 00:46:52,316 to be bloodless . They're ISIS is not 1241 00:46:52,316 --> 00:46:54,649 going to go away , it's going to remain . 1242 00:46:54,649 --> 00:46:56,704 But our objective there is to enable 1243 00:46:56,704 --> 00:46:58,649 local security forces that we have 1244 00:46:58,649 --> 00:47:00,538 trained and enabled to be able to 1245 00:47:00,538 --> 00:47:02,538 handle the problem at a local level 1246 00:47:02,538 --> 00:47:04,760 without significant external assistance 1247 00:47:04,760 --> 00:47:06,982 from either us or our european allies . 1248 00:47:06,982 --> 00:47:09,204 The other component of that is you want 1249 00:47:09,204 --> 00:47:09,030 to prevent those elements from being 1250 00:47:09,030 --> 00:47:10,920 able to develop global connective 1251 00:47:10,920 --> 00:47:13,330 tissue to reach out to other entities 1252 00:47:13,330 --> 00:47:15,441 and that is not only a physical fight 1253 00:47:15,441 --> 00:47:17,608 on the ground there , but also a fight 1254 00:47:17,608 --> 00:47:19,830 and cyber and we conducted in all those 1255 00:47:19,830 --> 00:47:21,997 domains . So that's the way I read the 1256 00:47:21,997 --> 00:47:24,163 picture right now , continued pressure 1257 00:47:24,163 --> 00:47:26,163 is still necessary . The trends are 1258 00:47:26,163 --> 00:47:25,260 moving the right way . And the 1259 00:47:25,260 --> 00:47:27,149 strategic dialogue with our Iraqi 1260 00:47:27,149 --> 00:47:29,204 partners is just one example of that 1261 00:47:29,204 --> 00:47:31,204 moving forward . As we go forward , 1262 00:47:31,204 --> 00:47:33,427 we'll be able to look to re examine the 1263 00:47:33,427 --> 00:47:35,538 posture we have in Iraq and that will 1264 00:47:35,538 --> 00:47:34,930 be , it will be something we'll take a 1265 00:47:34,930 --> 00:47:36,986 look look at here in the future with 1266 00:47:36,986 --> 00:47:39,170 our Iraqi partners in Afghanistan . As 1267 00:47:39,170 --> 00:47:41,114 you , as you noted , the principal 1268 00:47:41,114 --> 00:47:43,170 reason that , you know , we see that 1269 00:47:43,170 --> 00:47:44,892 IsIS and al Qaeda have been so 1270 00:47:44,892 --> 00:47:46,892 significantly degraded , has been a 1271 00:47:46,892 --> 00:47:48,948 significant ct pressure that we have 1272 00:47:48,948 --> 00:47:51,114 been able to put on them over the past 1273 00:47:51,114 --> 00:47:53,226 several years . IsIS is very small in 1274 00:47:53,226 --> 00:47:55,170 Afghanistan , probably several 100 1275 00:47:55,170 --> 00:47:57,059 several 100 fighters , ISIS K , a 1276 00:47:57,059 --> 00:47:59,281 little bigger but still disaggregated . 1277 00:47:59,281 --> 00:48:01,448 They have not been able to hold ground 1278 00:48:01,448 --> 00:48:03,781 successfully in the east . They look to , 1279 00:48:03,781 --> 00:48:03,050 you know , they look they look to 1280 00:48:03,050 --> 00:48:05,161 reassert themselves if they can , but 1281 00:48:05,161 --> 00:48:07,217 it's a but pressure is the important 1282 00:48:07,217 --> 00:48:09,272 component of that and I see that I'm 1283 00:48:09,272 --> 00:48:11,272 out of time there . Well , so if if 1284 00:48:11,272 --> 00:48:13,494 we're gone and the coalition forces are 1285 00:48:13,494 --> 00:48:15,940 gone , and and Taliban does take a more 1286 00:48:15,940 --> 00:48:18,290 prominent role in Afghanistan , is it a 1287 00:48:18,290 --> 00:48:20,560 concern of yours that they may uh 1288 00:48:20,570 --> 00:48:22,650 increase their presence ? So that is 1289 00:48:22,650 --> 00:48:24,594 there to push back The taliban has 1290 00:48:24,594 --> 00:48:26,706 undertaken to agree to not allow that 1291 00:48:26,706 --> 00:48:28,761 to happen uh with the taliban . I've 1292 00:48:28,761 --> 00:48:31,039 learned to not listen to what they say , 1293 00:48:31,039 --> 00:48:33,150 but rather to watch what they do . So 1294 00:48:33,150 --> 00:48:32,790 we will watch closely what they do . 1295 00:48:32,800 --> 00:48:35,320 Great General Townsend , given the 1296 00:48:35,320 --> 00:48:38,420 massive size of your A . O . R . I'd 1297 00:48:38,420 --> 00:48:40,642 like to hear more about your additional 1298 00:48:40,642 --> 00:48:42,198 any additional resources or 1299 00:48:42,198 --> 00:48:44,309 capabilities unique , particularly in 1300 00:48:44,309 --> 00:48:46,420 the southern part of the continent uh 1301 00:48:46,420 --> 00:48:48,309 in western part to carry out your 1302 00:48:48,309 --> 00:48:50,400 mission . Are you adequately uh 1303 00:48:50,870 --> 00:48:53,148 resource in that part of the continent ? 1304 00:48:55,870 --> 00:48:58,540 Um Remember as you noted , you know , 1305 00:48:58,550 --> 00:49:01,290 Africa is 3.5 times the size of the 1306 00:49:01,290 --> 00:49:03,512 continental United States . And we have 1307 00:49:03,512 --> 00:49:05,512 about 6000 total troops spread over 1308 00:49:05,512 --> 00:49:07,734 that area . We don't have a significant 1309 00:49:07,734 --> 00:49:10,580 footprint from about the Equator 1310 00:49:10,590 --> 00:49:13,580 South . I'm not sure that we need that . 1311 00:49:14,070 --> 00:49:17,520 Um , I would say that , you know , our 1312 00:49:17,520 --> 00:49:19,631 force posture is under review as part 1313 00:49:19,631 --> 00:49:21,687 of this global posture review . So I 1314 00:49:21,687 --> 00:49:23,742 don't really want to get ahead of my 1315 00:49:23,742 --> 00:49:25,909 civilian leaders on describing what we 1316 00:49:25,909 --> 00:49:28,187 might need or might not need . However , 1317 00:49:28,187 --> 00:49:30,242 there are some perennial things that 1318 00:49:30,242 --> 00:49:32,860 are always on the razor's edge of , 1319 00:49:32,870 --> 00:49:34,981 We're going to get that or are we not 1320 00:49:34,981 --> 00:49:38,020 going to get that ? Um , One of them is 1321 00:49:38,020 --> 00:49:40,470 the I . S . R . That general Mackenzie 1322 00:49:40,470 --> 00:49:43,350 has already mentioned . Uh , we the 1323 00:49:43,350 --> 00:49:45,517 simple fact of the matter is we do not 1324 00:49:45,517 --> 00:49:47,550 have enough to do what we assess we 1325 00:49:47,550 --> 00:49:51,460 need to do in Africa , realize there's 1326 00:49:51,460 --> 00:49:53,293 pressure on it across the entire 1327 00:49:53,293 --> 00:49:55,500 department . Um , and then our 1328 00:49:55,500 --> 00:49:57,990 Warfighter Recovery network , which is 1329 00:49:58,000 --> 00:50:01,240 providing timely casualty evacuation 1330 00:50:01,240 --> 00:50:04,260 and medical care to our troops . Um 1331 00:50:04,270 --> 00:50:06,214 that's fairly , we do most of that 1332 00:50:06,214 --> 00:50:08,381 through contracted . We don't actually 1333 00:50:08,381 --> 00:50:10,650 need to put pressure on low density , 1334 00:50:10,650 --> 00:50:13,380 high demand units like military medevac 1335 00:50:13,380 --> 00:50:16,470 and personal recovery assets . We can 1336 00:50:16,470 --> 00:50:18,700 do most of our work through contracted 1337 00:50:18,700 --> 00:50:21,220 sources that takes money and uh , we're 1338 00:50:21,220 --> 00:50:23,220 always waiting to get that money to 1339 00:50:23,220 --> 00:50:25,220 make sure our troops have what they 1340 00:50:25,220 --> 00:50:27,276 need . Those are probably two things 1341 00:50:27,276 --> 00:50:29,220 right off the top of my head . All 1342 00:50:29,220 --> 00:50:31,387 right , thank you . You bet , Monsieur 1343 00:50:31,387 --> 00:50:33,331 Mr Courtney is recognized for five 1344 00:50:33,331 --> 00:50:35,387 months . Thank you Mr Chairman . And 1345 00:50:35,387 --> 00:50:37,498 again , General Mackenzie , thank you 1346 00:50:37,498 --> 00:50:40,370 for reminding us just a moment ago that 1347 00:50:40,380 --> 00:50:42,324 there actually was an agreement in 1348 00:50:42,324 --> 00:50:45,230 place that uh , the sitting government 1349 00:50:45,240 --> 00:50:47,240 of this country entered into in the 1350 00:50:47,240 --> 00:50:49,129 last administration . And in many 1351 00:50:49,129 --> 00:50:50,962 respects , the announcement that 1352 00:50:50,962 --> 00:50:53,129 President biden made was really to try 1353 00:50:53,129 --> 00:50:54,850 and make that agreement More 1354 00:50:54,860 --> 00:50:57,240 logistically execute herbal um , so 1355 00:50:57,240 --> 00:50:59,184 that we're not in a situation like 1356 00:50:59,184 --> 00:51:01,890 Saigon 1975 . So 1357 00:51:02,660 --> 00:51:05,080 mystery sort of alluded a moment ago to 1358 00:51:05,080 --> 00:51:07,080 the fact that we are still going to 1359 00:51:07,080 --> 00:51:09,730 retain over the horizon capability to 1360 00:51:09,740 --> 00:51:11,910 to make sure that a counterterrorism 1361 00:51:11,920 --> 00:51:14,900 effort can continue and and protect the 1362 00:51:14,900 --> 00:51:16,844 homeland . Can you describe just a 1363 00:51:16,844 --> 00:51:19,020 little bit more detail what that looks 1364 00:51:19,020 --> 00:51:20,798 like that is ? I think the real 1365 00:51:20,798 --> 00:51:23,020 heartburn that I certainly pick up from 1366 00:51:23,020 --> 00:51:25,242 my constituents about the decision , is 1367 00:51:25,242 --> 00:51:27,409 it gonna be at sea ? Is it going to be 1368 00:51:27,409 --> 00:51:30,370 um in neighboring um countries where we 1369 00:51:30,380 --> 00:51:33,390 again have the ability to to deploy 1370 00:51:33,390 --> 00:51:36,330 assets to again respond to a terrorist 1371 00:51:36,330 --> 00:51:39,790 threat ? Mm So I'm actually 1372 00:51:39,790 --> 00:51:41,790 conducting detailed planning by the 1373 00:51:41,790 --> 00:51:43,901 direction of the secretary to look at 1374 00:51:43,901 --> 00:51:45,846 those options right now and I will 1375 00:51:45,846 --> 00:51:47,901 report back to him by the end of the 1376 00:51:47,901 --> 00:51:49,957 month with some alternatives . But I 1377 00:51:49,957 --> 00:51:52,068 can broadly state if you if you leave 1378 00:51:52,068 --> 00:51:54,234 Afghanistan and you want to go back in 1379 00:51:54,234 --> 00:51:56,401 to conduct these kinds of operations , 1380 00:51:56,401 --> 00:51:55,670 there's three things you need to do . 1381 00:51:55,670 --> 00:51:57,948 You need , you need to find the target , 1382 00:51:57,948 --> 00:52:00,170 you need to fix the target and you need 1383 00:52:00,170 --> 00:52:02,226 to be able to finish the target . So 1384 00:52:02,226 --> 00:52:04,448 three things , all the first to require 1385 00:52:04,448 --> 00:52:06,559 heavy intelligence support . Um , and 1386 00:52:06,559 --> 00:52:08,614 if you're out of the country and you 1387 00:52:08,614 --> 00:52:08,320 don't have the ecosystem that we have 1388 00:52:08,320 --> 00:52:10,320 there now , it will be harder to do 1389 00:52:10,320 --> 00:52:12,598 that . It is not impossible to do that . 1390 00:52:12,598 --> 00:52:14,764 It would just be harder to do it . You 1391 00:52:14,764 --> 00:52:16,987 will have to base your overhead . I . S 1392 00:52:16,987 --> 00:52:19,209 are from no longer within Afghanistan , 1393 00:52:19,209 --> 00:52:21,376 where , and I think you and I can take 1394 00:52:21,376 --> 00:52:21,010 off and be over its target in a matter 1395 00:52:21,010 --> 00:52:23,470 of minutes , uh , perhaps much further 1396 00:52:23,470 --> 00:52:25,680 away . We will look at all the all the 1397 00:52:25,680 --> 00:52:27,791 countries in the region are diplomats 1398 00:52:27,791 --> 00:52:29,791 will reach out and we'll talk about 1399 00:52:29,791 --> 00:52:31,624 places where we could base those 1400 00:52:31,624 --> 00:52:33,680 resources . Some of them may be very 1401 00:52:33,680 --> 00:52:32,760 far away . And then there would be a 1402 00:52:32,760 --> 00:52:35,320 significant bill for those types of 1403 00:52:35,320 --> 00:52:37,431 resources because you have to cycle a 1404 00:52:37,431 --> 00:52:39,487 lot of them in and out . That is all 1405 00:52:39,487 --> 00:52:41,709 doable . However , so there are ways to 1406 00:52:41,709 --> 00:52:44,210 get to the the find in the fixed part . 1407 00:52:44,220 --> 00:52:46,553 The fixed part is very important though , 1408 00:52:46,553 --> 00:52:48,498 because if we were going to strike 1409 00:52:48,498 --> 00:52:50,553 something , we're gonna strike it in 1410 00:52:50,553 --> 00:52:52,720 concert with the law of armed conflict 1411 00:52:52,720 --> 00:52:52,410 and the american way of war , we're 1412 00:52:52,410 --> 00:52:54,521 going to minimize collateral damage . 1413 00:52:54,521 --> 00:52:56,743 We're gonna make sure we have a precise 1414 00:52:56,743 --> 00:52:58,910 target and that we're gonna be able to 1415 00:52:58,910 --> 00:53:00,799 control what happens there . It's 1416 00:53:00,799 --> 00:53:02,910 difficult to do that at range . It is 1417 00:53:02,910 --> 00:53:04,966 not impossible to do that at range . 1418 00:53:04,966 --> 00:53:04,560 And so you have a variety of ways that 1419 00:53:04,560 --> 00:53:06,782 you could actually strike the target if 1420 00:53:06,782 --> 00:53:08,949 you chose to do that , you could do it 1421 00:53:08,949 --> 00:53:11,060 with long range precision fires . You 1422 00:53:11,060 --> 00:53:10,770 could do it with you can do it with 1423 00:53:10,770 --> 00:53:12,548 manned raids . All of those are 1424 00:53:12,548 --> 00:53:14,492 inherently dangerous . But you can 1425 00:53:14,492 --> 00:53:16,714 still do it . You can do it with manned 1426 00:53:16,714 --> 00:53:18,826 aircraft . Uh There are problems with 1427 00:53:18,826 --> 00:53:20,992 all three of those options but there's 1428 00:53:20,992 --> 00:53:20,710 also opportunities with all three of 1429 00:53:20,710 --> 00:53:22,766 those options . So I don't want to I 1430 00:53:22,766 --> 00:53:24,710 don't want to make light of it . I 1431 00:53:24,710 --> 00:53:24,380 don't want to put on rose clever 1432 00:53:24,380 --> 00:53:26,491 glasses and say it's gonna be easy to 1433 00:53:26,491 --> 00:53:28,547 do . I can tell you that the U . S . 1434 00:53:28,547 --> 00:53:30,658 Military can do just about anything . 1435 00:53:30,658 --> 00:53:32,769 And we're examining this problem with 1436 00:53:32,769 --> 00:53:32,330 all of our resources right now to find 1437 00:53:32,330 --> 00:53:34,730 a way to do it and you know , in the 1438 00:53:34,740 --> 00:53:36,740 most intelligent , risk free manner 1439 00:53:36,740 --> 00:53:38,962 that we can . Well , thank you for that 1440 00:53:38,962 --> 00:53:40,907 answer . And again , I think it is 1441 00:53:40,907 --> 00:53:43,129 important to , you know , remember that 1442 00:53:43,129 --> 00:53:45,351 we're not in the same mindset . We were 1443 00:53:45,351 --> 00:53:47,573 in uh 19 at the time of 9 11 . I mean , 1444 00:53:47,573 --> 00:53:49,570 I think , you know , certainly it 1445 00:53:49,570 --> 00:53:51,792 sounds like again , you're very focused 1446 00:53:51,792 --> 00:53:53,903 in terms of making sure that a threat 1447 00:53:53,903 --> 00:53:56,030 like what occurred back then is going 1448 00:53:56,030 --> 00:53:59,740 to be uh planned for and and and 1449 00:53:59,750 --> 00:54:02,490 again , addressed as needed as the case 1450 00:54:02,490 --> 00:54:06,180 may be . Um general uh towns in the 1451 00:54:06,180 --> 00:54:08,550 last NBA , there probably were at least 1452 00:54:08,550 --> 00:54:11,080 two or three provisions regarding 1453 00:54:11,090 --> 00:54:13,180 critical minerals and rare earth 1454 00:54:13,180 --> 00:54:15,124 minerals , which I've been on this 1455 00:54:15,124 --> 00:54:17,124 committee a while , that was pretty 1456 00:54:17,124 --> 00:54:19,124 unique . But again , I think from a 1457 00:54:19,124 --> 00:54:21,291 security standpoint , I think there is 1458 00:54:21,291 --> 00:54:23,291 now a pretty widespread recognition 1459 00:54:23,291 --> 00:54:26,470 that china has been very methodical and 1460 00:54:26,480 --> 00:54:28,702 um successful in terms of cornering the 1461 00:54:28,702 --> 00:54:30,924 market in terms of critical minerals in 1462 00:54:30,924 --> 00:54:33,700 Africa I think is clearly a part of the 1463 00:54:33,700 --> 00:54:37,270 world that they've succeeded at that . 1464 00:54:37,280 --> 00:54:39,502 Again , your map on economic activity I 1465 00:54:39,502 --> 00:54:41,558 realized was kind of a global view . 1466 00:54:41,558 --> 00:54:43,790 But is that something that um uh 1467 00:54:43,800 --> 00:54:46,800 africom is watching and at least being 1468 00:54:46,800 --> 00:54:49,590 able to help at least if nothing else 1469 00:54:49,600 --> 00:54:52,050 educate us back here about the fact 1470 00:54:52,050 --> 00:54:53,883 that you know , we've got to pay 1471 00:54:53,883 --> 00:54:56,160 attention to this because they have a 1472 00:54:56,170 --> 00:54:58,281 stranglehold . Let's face it in terms 1473 00:54:58,281 --> 00:55:00,290 of things like antimony and cobalt 1474 00:55:00,300 --> 00:55:02,930 lithium , all of these um minerals that 1475 00:55:02,930 --> 00:55:05,152 go into everything from our cell phones 1476 00:55:05,152 --> 00:55:07,310 to platforms that we need for our 1477 00:55:07,320 --> 00:55:08,280 national defense 1478 00:55:10,540 --> 00:55:13,550 congressman , you said it great . Uh so 1479 00:55:13,550 --> 00:55:16,970 the Russians are are looking to me , to 1480 00:55:16,970 --> 00:55:19,137 me , they're looking at exploiting and 1481 00:55:19,137 --> 00:55:21,192 short term gain . The chinese have a 1482 00:55:21,192 --> 00:55:23,081 much longer term view that's more 1483 00:55:23,081 --> 00:55:25,248 concerning to me . And so they are not 1484 00:55:25,248 --> 00:55:28,810 only mining rare minerals in Africa for 1485 00:55:28,810 --> 00:55:32,040 their own use . They are cornering the 1486 00:55:32,050 --> 00:55:35,610 market on these concerns in Africa 1487 00:55:35,620 --> 00:55:38,570 to have them under control for a rainy 1488 00:55:38,570 --> 00:55:40,681 day in the future . Uh that should be 1489 00:55:40,681 --> 00:55:42,792 of concern to us . If you look at the 1490 00:55:42,792 --> 00:55:44,792 list of rare earth minerals and you 1491 00:55:44,792 --> 00:55:46,903 named a few of them , a couple others 1492 00:55:46,903 --> 00:55:49,126 tantalum and I was just looking at them 1493 00:55:49,126 --> 00:55:51,181 yesterday . General , I do apologize 1494 00:55:51,181 --> 00:55:53,403 generally time has expired . Try to get 1495 00:55:53,403 --> 00:55:55,626 the other folks here . Uh Mr Lamborn is 1496 00:55:55,626 --> 00:55:57,959 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 1497 00:55:57,959 --> 00:56:01,110 Mr Chairman . I'm concerned because as 1498 00:56:01,110 --> 00:56:05,030 robert Gates said famously um regarding 1499 00:56:05,030 --> 00:56:07,141 when joe biden was a senator and then 1500 00:56:07,141 --> 00:56:09,363 vice president , he seemed to be on the 1501 00:56:09,363 --> 00:56:11,960 wrong side of foreign policy decisions 1502 00:56:11,970 --> 00:56:14,460 at almost every turn . You could go 1503 00:56:14,460 --> 00:56:16,890 back to the 80s when the nuclear freeze 1504 00:56:16,890 --> 00:56:19,180 was being discussed and that would have 1505 00:56:19,180 --> 00:56:21,220 frozen a permanent advantage into 1506 00:56:21,230 --> 00:56:23,230 Russia's favor . The Soviet Union's 1507 00:56:23,230 --> 00:56:27,150 favor to as Vice president uh 1508 00:56:27,160 --> 00:56:29,730 promoting the withdrawal of troops out 1509 00:56:29,730 --> 00:56:31,730 of Iraq . That let ISIS come to the 1510 00:56:31,730 --> 00:56:34,660 fore or counseling against 1511 00:56:35,130 --> 00:56:38,700 um the strike against Osama bin laden 1512 00:56:38,710 --> 00:56:40,710 and on and on and on . And I'm just 1513 00:56:40,710 --> 00:56:42,766 concerned that we're seeing this bad 1514 00:56:42,766 --> 00:56:45,130 decision making today with Afghanistan 1515 00:56:45,140 --> 00:56:48,360 and Iran So on . Afghanistan . General 1516 00:56:48,360 --> 00:56:50,730 Mackenzie . Are you able to tell us 1517 00:56:50,740 --> 00:56:53,340 whether whether or not you advised the 1518 00:56:53,340 --> 00:56:57,140 president to uh unilaterally withdraw 1519 00:56:57,150 --> 00:57:00,400 by September 11 ? All us forces ? Or 1520 00:57:00,410 --> 00:57:02,577 are you able to not ? Are you not able 1521 00:57:02,577 --> 00:57:04,577 to discuss that ? So I can tell you 1522 00:57:04,577 --> 00:57:06,632 that I had multiple opportunities to 1523 00:57:06,632 --> 00:57:08,743 have a detailed conversation with the 1524 00:57:08,743 --> 00:57:10,966 president and give my advice . He heard 1525 00:57:10,966 --> 00:57:13,188 my advice . I'm not going to be able to 1526 00:57:13,188 --> 00:57:13,180 share it with you here this morning , 1527 00:57:13,180 --> 00:57:16,740 sir . Okay . Um okay . 1528 00:57:17,430 --> 00:57:19,597 Regarding the taliban , We've talked a 1529 00:57:19,597 --> 00:57:21,597 little bit about that . The ranking 1530 00:57:21,597 --> 00:57:23,763 member had some questions . Are they a 1531 00:57:23,763 --> 00:57:26,120 reliable partner in negotiations ? I 1532 00:57:26,120 --> 00:57:28,231 have grave doubts about the taliban's 1533 00:57:28,231 --> 00:57:30,176 reliability . I've expressed those 1534 00:57:30,176 --> 00:57:32,287 publicly going back for a long period 1535 00:57:32,287 --> 00:57:34,176 of time , but we need to see what 1536 00:57:34,176 --> 00:57:36,287 they're gonna do here . Uh , The fact 1537 00:57:36,287 --> 00:57:38,453 of the matter is if if if let's say we 1538 00:57:38,453 --> 00:57:38,220 leave , if they want any form of future 1539 00:57:38,220 --> 00:57:39,887 international recognition for 1540 00:57:39,887 --> 00:57:42,053 Afghanistan , if they want any form of 1541 00:57:42,053 --> 00:57:44,164 international support , they're gonna 1542 00:57:44,164 --> 00:57:46,220 have to keep , they're gonna have to 1543 00:57:46,220 --> 00:57:45,750 keep the agreements that they've made , 1544 00:57:45,830 --> 00:57:48,052 we will be able to observe that and see 1545 00:57:48,052 --> 00:57:50,274 it very clearly and directly whether or 1546 00:57:50,274 --> 00:57:52,497 not they're able to do it . Well , I am 1547 00:57:52,497 --> 00:57:54,552 happy to hear that we're going to be 1548 00:57:54,552 --> 00:57:56,719 watching them closely . But my concern 1549 00:57:56,719 --> 00:57:56,530 is that we've been watching them 1550 00:57:56,530 --> 00:57:58,740 closely and they've been pretty much 1551 00:57:58,740 --> 00:58:02,740 uniformly unreliable . Um , 1552 00:58:03,220 --> 00:58:05,220 mystery . I'd like to ask you about 1553 00:58:05,220 --> 00:58:07,140 Iran . Um , 1554 00:58:08,420 --> 00:58:10,420 Recently they made the announcement 1555 00:58:10,420 --> 00:58:12,531 that they were going to upgrade their 1556 00:58:12,531 --> 00:58:15,340 highly enriched uranium to 60 and that 1557 00:58:15,340 --> 00:58:17,340 pretty much goes against everything 1558 00:58:17,340 --> 00:58:21,130 that we want them to be doing or peace 1559 00:58:21,130 --> 00:58:23,352 loving people in the world want them to 1560 00:58:23,352 --> 00:58:25,241 be doing . So . What is the biden 1561 00:58:25,241 --> 00:58:27,352 administration going to do about that 1562 00:58:29,720 --> 00:58:31,887 congressman ? I think what we see with 1563 00:58:31,887 --> 00:58:34,640 that announcement is uh playing now in 1564 00:58:34,640 --> 00:58:36,529 terms of the public nature of the 1565 00:58:36,529 --> 00:58:38,440 announcement is the jockeying for 1566 00:58:38,440 --> 00:58:40,051 leverage with respect to the 1567 00:58:40,051 --> 00:58:42,420 negotiations that are underway in 1568 00:58:42,420 --> 00:58:45,160 Vienna right now . So it's important 1569 00:58:45,160 --> 00:58:47,382 what is happening in public . It's also 1570 00:58:47,382 --> 00:58:49,271 important what's happening behind 1571 00:58:49,271 --> 00:58:51,438 closed doors and whether we're getting 1572 00:58:51,438 --> 00:58:53,327 closer through the talks that are 1573 00:58:53,327 --> 00:58:55,810 underway to a resumption of compliance 1574 00:58:55,810 --> 00:58:58,088 on the part of Iran with the agreement , 1575 00:58:58,520 --> 00:59:01,650 Would you agree that upgrading their HQ 1576 00:59:01,660 --> 00:59:03,530 to 60 is unacceptable ? 1577 00:59:04,920 --> 00:59:07,870 Absolutely . And how close does that 1578 00:59:07,870 --> 00:59:11,650 get them to weapons grade capable ? A 1579 00:59:11,650 --> 00:59:13,880 G you highly enriched uranium 1580 00:59:15,420 --> 00:59:17,364 Congressman ? It puts them farther 1581 00:59:17,364 --> 00:59:20,840 along that path . The 90 level and 1582 00:59:20,840 --> 00:59:23,007 above is where you would need to be in 1583 00:59:23,007 --> 00:59:26,530 terms of weapons grade uranium . Mhm . 1584 00:59:27,120 --> 00:59:28,040 Um , 1585 00:59:32,120 --> 00:59:34,287 well , I've just got a lot of concerns 1586 00:59:34,287 --> 00:59:36,231 like you , General Mackenzie , I'm 1587 00:59:36,231 --> 00:59:38,453 gonna be watching closely . Um , oh , I 1588 00:59:38,453 --> 00:59:40,453 do have one last question for you , 1589 00:59:40,453 --> 00:59:40,450 General Mackenzie , my last minute , 1590 00:59:41,020 --> 00:59:44,030 and this is a concern . I have that 1591 00:59:44,040 --> 00:59:46,151 where we're not taking advantage of a 1592 00:59:46,151 --> 00:59:48,040 capability that we have . We have 1593 00:59:48,040 --> 00:59:50,262 purchased some iron dome batteries from 1594 00:59:50,262 --> 00:59:52,350 Israel and we know that these are 1595 00:59:52,360 --> 00:59:55,600 highly capable units shooting down 1596 00:59:55,610 --> 00:59:58,730 incoming rockets and missiles . Are 1597 00:59:58,730 --> 01:00:00,910 there places in centcom where we could 1598 01:00:00,910 --> 01:00:03,940 be using these iron dome batteries ? 1599 01:00:04,310 --> 01:00:06,750 And my understanding is we're not using 1600 01:00:06,750 --> 01:00:09,028 them at all . I hope I'm wrong on that . 1601 01:00:09,028 --> 01:00:11,083 But if we're not using them at all , 1602 01:00:11,083 --> 01:00:13,306 aren't there places where they could be 1603 01:00:13,306 --> 01:00:15,417 put to good use ? So I prefer to talk 1604 01:00:15,417 --> 01:00:17,417 to that a little more directly into 1605 01:00:17,417 --> 01:00:17,220 closed session a little bit later this 1606 01:00:17,220 --> 01:00:19,331 afternoon . But but I would just tell 1607 01:00:19,331 --> 01:00:21,498 you this , we look we look globally at 1608 01:00:21,498 --> 01:00:23,387 the management of our air defense 1609 01:00:23,387 --> 01:00:25,387 assets . Centcom has requirements . 1610 01:00:25,387 --> 01:00:27,387 There are other places in the world 1611 01:00:27,387 --> 01:00:27,080 that have requirements as well and we 1612 01:00:27,080 --> 01:00:29,247 just need to bear that in mind . And I 1613 01:00:29,247 --> 01:00:31,358 go in and fight for the resources for 1614 01:00:31,358 --> 01:00:33,469 CENTcom . But there are in fact other 1615 01:00:33,469 --> 01:00:32,920 places in the world they need air 1616 01:00:32,920 --> 01:00:35,087 defense assets as well . And so I need 1617 01:00:35,087 --> 01:00:37,087 I just I do recognize that . Okay , 1618 01:00:37,087 --> 01:00:39,087 well let's continue that discussion 1619 01:00:39,087 --> 01:00:41,198 later today . Thank you all for being 1620 01:00:41,198 --> 01:00:43,309 here . And I yield back Mr Chairman . 1621 01:00:43,309 --> 01:00:45,031 Uh thank you . Mr Garamendi is 1622 01:00:45,031 --> 01:00:47,364 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 1623 01:00:47,364 --> 01:00:50,750 Mr Chairman uh Mr General Mackenzie . 1624 01:00:50,760 --> 01:00:54,190 Is it true that president trump reduced 1625 01:00:54,200 --> 01:00:56,390 the number of troops from 10,000 to 1626 01:00:56,390 --> 01:01:00,250 2500 B . A . Tweet last year and then 1627 01:01:00,250 --> 01:01:02,472 via another treat decided that we would 1628 01:01:02,472 --> 01:01:04,970 leave by May early May all troops out 1629 01:01:04,970 --> 01:01:08,080 of Afghanistan . So he 1630 01:01:08,090 --> 01:01:10,790 I believe he tweeted it . But my orders 1631 01:01:10,790 --> 01:01:12,679 came through the chain of command 1632 01:01:12,679 --> 01:01:14,679 resulting from the President to the 1633 01:01:14,679 --> 01:01:16,457 Secretary written orders in the 1634 01:01:16,457 --> 01:01:18,679 Department of Defense . We moved troops 1635 01:01:18,679 --> 01:01:20,901 based on exercise , execute orders . So 1636 01:01:20,901 --> 01:01:20,290 he may have tweeted that at the 1637 01:01:20,290 --> 01:01:22,346 beginning . I'm not exactly aware of 1638 01:01:22,346 --> 01:01:24,512 the time when he did or didn't do it . 1639 01:01:24,512 --> 01:01:26,679 But the the chain of command which the 1640 01:01:26,679 --> 01:01:26,620 president sits at the top of is what 1641 01:01:26,620 --> 01:01:29,650 directs us to move forces . So it was 1642 01:01:29,660 --> 01:01:31,716 president trump that said all troops 1643 01:01:31,716 --> 01:01:33,940 would be out by May of this year , 1644 01:01:35,510 --> 01:01:37,980 conditions based conditions based , 1645 01:01:38,160 --> 01:01:41,380 okay , just a slight clarification 1646 01:01:41,380 --> 01:01:43,602 there . Of the way in which we now find 1647 01:01:43,602 --> 01:01:46,660 ourselves with troops leaving in 1648 01:01:46,760 --> 01:01:50,460 september . Um My question is to the 1649 01:01:50,460 --> 01:01:53,830 countries surrounding Afghanistan . 1650 01:01:55,210 --> 01:01:57,280 What is your assessment miss story 1651 01:01:57,280 --> 01:01:59,610 first and then Mr General Mackenzie 1652 01:01:59,610 --> 01:02:01,680 about the role of the surrounding 1653 01:02:01,680 --> 01:02:04,440 countries , Pakistan , India china 1654 01:02:04,440 --> 01:02:07,860 Russia , others , how are they going to 1655 01:02:07,870 --> 01:02:11,630 respond to the departure of 1656 01:02:11,630 --> 01:02:13,020 NATO and US troops , 1657 01:02:15,600 --> 01:02:17,800 congressman ? I think you'll see an 1658 01:02:17,800 --> 01:02:21,640 array of hedging behaviors as the U . S . 1659 01:02:21,640 --> 01:02:24,390 And coalition forces began to depart . 1660 01:02:24,400 --> 01:02:27,990 And as we focus in on a diplomatic 1661 01:02:28,000 --> 01:02:31,570 first presence in the country , you'll 1662 01:02:31,570 --> 01:02:35,340 see behaviors in terms of already we 1663 01:02:35,340 --> 01:02:37,670 see it with Pakistan , where Pakistan 1664 01:02:37,670 --> 01:02:41,380 is I applying pressure to an extent 1665 01:02:41,390 --> 01:02:43,970 with respect to the Taliban , out of 1666 01:02:43,970 --> 01:02:47,550 concern for the impact on Pakistan . 1667 01:02:47,560 --> 01:02:51,030 Should civil war break out again and 1668 01:02:51,040 --> 01:02:53,690 refugee flows affect their country ? I 1669 01:02:53,690 --> 01:02:56,090 think that same dynamic is true with 1670 01:02:56,090 --> 01:02:58,090 the other neighbors as well . Where 1671 01:02:58,090 --> 01:03:00,600 each is looking at the situation now to 1672 01:03:00,600 --> 01:03:02,740 assess for themselves , what are what 1673 01:03:02,740 --> 01:03:05,420 are the risks ? What are the threats 1674 01:03:05,430 --> 01:03:07,652 and how will we posture ourselves going 1675 01:03:07,652 --> 01:03:11,630 forward general ? Sorry ? So 1676 01:03:11,630 --> 01:03:13,963 I think Mr recaptured it pretty clearly . 1677 01:03:13,963 --> 01:03:16,130 I think the country that's going to be 1678 01:03:16,130 --> 01:03:18,297 the most affected , frankly , is going 1679 01:03:18,297 --> 01:03:18,030 to be Pakistan because of the 1680 01:03:18,030 --> 01:03:20,086 possibility of unconstrained refugee 1681 01:03:20,086 --> 01:03:22,141 flow , because of the possibility of 1682 01:03:22,141 --> 01:03:24,252 renewed terrorist attacks in Pakistan 1683 01:03:24,252 --> 01:03:26,530 that could ramp up as a result of this . 1684 01:03:26,530 --> 01:03:28,697 All of those things are certainly very 1685 01:03:28,697 --> 01:03:30,919 possible . I think we should also , the 1686 01:03:30,919 --> 01:03:33,030 countries to the north of Afghanistan 1687 01:03:33,030 --> 01:03:35,141 will also be concerned . Tajikistan , 1688 01:03:35,141 --> 01:03:37,252 the Courage Republic , turkmenistan , 1689 01:03:37,252 --> 01:03:39,363 Uzbekistan , those countries up there 1690 01:03:39,363 --> 01:03:38,730 because they're gonna be worried about 1691 01:03:38,730 --> 01:03:40,841 refugee flow and the flow of fighters 1692 01:03:40,841 --> 01:03:42,952 perhaps to the north as well . So , I 1693 01:03:42,952 --> 01:03:45,063 think all of them are gonna we'll see 1694 01:03:45,063 --> 01:03:47,230 what happens when we leave . They look 1695 01:03:47,230 --> 01:03:49,397 at how we posture after we go and then 1696 01:03:49,397 --> 01:03:48,970 they'll they'll have to decide , you 1697 01:03:48,970 --> 01:03:50,914 know , the way they're going to go 1698 01:03:50,914 --> 01:03:52,970 forward with that . It's going to be 1699 01:03:52,970 --> 01:03:52,160 they're going to face some very tough 1700 01:03:52,160 --> 01:03:55,050 choices though . So they may or may not 1701 01:03:55,060 --> 01:03:58,590 be encouraging or engaging in what 1702 01:03:58,590 --> 01:04:00,830 could be a civil war . I just don't 1703 01:04:00,830 --> 01:04:02,941 know . I think that I think they will 1704 01:04:02,941 --> 01:04:05,108 all be keenly aware of the probable it 1705 01:04:05,108 --> 01:04:07,108 should've civil worker , they'll be 1706 01:04:07,108 --> 01:04:09,330 very aware of the population flow , the 1707 01:04:09,330 --> 01:04:11,497 violence that will certainly spillover 1708 01:04:11,497 --> 01:04:13,719 from Afghanistan . If that's the case . 1709 01:04:13,719 --> 01:04:15,663 Thank you . Let's turn to africa . 1710 01:04:15,663 --> 01:04:17,830 General Townsend . Uh Climate change , 1711 01:04:17,830 --> 01:04:20,420 That's a hill . How is climate change 1712 01:04:20,420 --> 01:04:22,476 likely to affect ? At least ? That's 1713 01:04:22,476 --> 01:04:24,698 the hill area and we have time beyond ? 1714 01:04:28,290 --> 01:04:30,880 Well , um first of all , I think 1715 01:04:30,880 --> 01:04:34,240 Afrikaans role is to support the State 1716 01:04:34,240 --> 01:04:36,640 Department and U . S . A . I . D . Uh 1717 01:04:36,650 --> 01:04:39,060 in this area of climate change , but we 1718 01:04:39,060 --> 01:04:42,400 see clear evidence of that on the 1719 01:04:42,410 --> 01:04:44,466 African continent . And probably you 1720 01:04:44,466 --> 01:04:46,770 mentioned this a hell . The biggest 1721 01:04:46,770 --> 01:04:48,937 issue we see , there's water shortages 1722 01:04:48,937 --> 01:04:51,970 and desertification of the farmland 1723 01:04:51,980 --> 01:04:55,670 there and that spreading southward of 1724 01:04:55,670 --> 01:04:58,090 the Sahara desert is probably one of 1725 01:04:58,090 --> 01:05:00,146 our biggest concerns and that sparks 1726 01:05:00,146 --> 01:05:02,257 all kinds of conflict between herders 1727 01:05:02,257 --> 01:05:06,090 and farmers , for example . Um I think 1728 01:05:06,100 --> 01:05:08,320 the ways the Department of Defense is 1729 01:05:08,320 --> 01:05:10,320 looking at a lot of ways we've been 1730 01:05:10,320 --> 01:05:12,153 charged by the President and the 1731 01:05:12,153 --> 01:05:14,376 Secretary of Defense to look at ways we 1732 01:05:14,376 --> 01:05:18,060 can contribute to helping uh mitigate 1733 01:05:18,060 --> 01:05:20,282 the climate change problem . Uh some of 1734 01:05:20,282 --> 01:05:22,380 those ways are with unique energy 1735 01:05:22,380 --> 01:05:25,780 solutions and those kind of projects 1736 01:05:25,780 --> 01:05:28,610 are are starting to unfold in africa . 1737 01:05:29,390 --> 01:05:31,446 Thank you very much . I yield back . 1738 01:05:31,690 --> 01:05:33,746 Thank you . Mr Whitman is recognized 1739 01:05:33,746 --> 01:05:35,523 for five minutes . Thank you Mr 1740 01:05:35,523 --> 01:05:37,579 Chairman Like to thank our witnesses 1741 01:05:37,579 --> 01:05:37,090 for joining us today . General kinsey 1742 01:05:37,090 --> 01:05:39,090 like to begin with you . You know , 1743 01:05:39,090 --> 01:05:41,201 there's there's a concern that I have 1744 01:05:41,201 --> 01:05:44,110 about the tension between are 1745 01:05:45,190 --> 01:05:47,079 our service branch chiefs and our 1746 01:05:47,079 --> 01:05:49,079 combatant commanders as your demand 1747 01:05:49,079 --> 01:05:51,023 signal is before you with a global 1748 01:05:51,023 --> 01:05:53,079 force management allocation plan and 1749 01:05:53,079 --> 01:05:55,220 generating readiness today . And the 1750 01:05:55,220 --> 01:05:57,331 service Branch Chiefs focus on making 1751 01:05:57,331 --> 01:05:59,387 sure that there's not only readiness 1752 01:05:59,387 --> 01:06:01,510 today , but there's modernization and 1753 01:06:01,880 --> 01:06:05,000 and we'll call it revitalization for 1754 01:06:05,000 --> 01:06:07,990 meeting the future demand signal . 1755 01:06:08,480 --> 01:06:11,560 Um let me ask to begin here when when 1756 01:06:11,560 --> 01:06:14,480 we look at the gift map today , we see 1757 01:06:14,480 --> 01:06:17,450 in many circumstances the increased 1758 01:06:17,450 --> 01:06:20,710 number of our FFS request for forces . 1759 01:06:21,580 --> 01:06:25,050 Does that reflect that the continuity 1760 01:06:25,050 --> 01:06:27,430 of what's happening is changing or is 1761 01:06:27,440 --> 01:06:29,218 the gift map maybe a little bit 1762 01:06:29,218 --> 01:06:31,496 outdated ? And we need to look at that ? 1763 01:06:31,496 --> 01:06:33,662 Give me your perspective on where that 1764 01:06:33,662 --> 01:06:35,829 dynamic is today . From your from your 1765 01:06:35,829 --> 01:06:38,107 thoughts . Certainly , sir . Thank you . 1766 01:06:38,107 --> 01:06:39,996 So , my last job before I was the 1767 01:06:39,996 --> 01:06:42,218 Commander of US Central Command , I was 1768 01:06:42,218 --> 01:06:41,580 the director of the Joint Staff . 1769 01:06:41,590 --> 01:06:43,701 Before that , I was the J five of the 1770 01:06:43,701 --> 01:06:45,812 US Joint Staff . So I was at the very 1771 01:06:45,812 --> 01:06:47,979 core of the Gift Map process . I would 1772 01:06:47,979 --> 01:06:50,090 consider myself an expert on the Gift 1773 01:06:50,090 --> 01:06:52,146 Map process . And so there is always 1774 01:06:52,146 --> 01:06:54,257 going to be a natural tension between 1775 01:06:54,257 --> 01:06:56,479 those who raise and maintain forces and 1776 01:06:56,479 --> 01:06:55,980 those who employ forces . That is 1777 01:06:55,980 --> 01:06:58,202 natural . It goes back as long as we've 1778 01:06:58,202 --> 01:06:59,924 had Joint Chiefs and combatant 1779 01:06:59,924 --> 01:07:02,147 commanders . Uh so that's just , that's 1780 01:07:02,147 --> 01:07:04,258 just a natural byproduct of that . It 1781 01:07:04,258 --> 01:07:06,420 is not new . And those tensions are 1782 01:07:06,420 --> 01:07:08,531 adjudicated by really only one person 1783 01:07:08,531 --> 01:07:10,642 that is the secretary defense and the 1784 01:07:10,642 --> 01:07:12,698 process to do that . Adjudication is 1785 01:07:12,698 --> 01:07:14,753 actually quite good . Now , the gift 1786 01:07:14,753 --> 01:07:17,087 Map is actually a design for the future . 1787 01:07:17,087 --> 01:07:19,198 And like any design for the future is 1788 01:07:19,198 --> 01:07:21,364 based on a set of assumptions that the 1789 01:07:21,364 --> 01:07:21,340 Gift Map is as good as the assumptions 1790 01:07:21,340 --> 01:07:23,562 that were made . I would argue over the 1791 01:07:23,562 --> 01:07:25,562 over the last couple of years , the 1792 01:07:25,562 --> 01:07:27,118 Gift Map has not completely 1793 01:07:27,118 --> 01:07:29,229 incorporated the rise of Iran and the 1794 01:07:29,229 --> 01:07:31,451 White House is thinking and important . 1795 01:07:31,451 --> 01:07:33,507 So there were a lot of tensions as a 1796 01:07:33,507 --> 01:07:35,729 result of that . Should should tensions 1797 01:07:35,729 --> 01:07:37,896 with Iran go down or should we adopt a 1798 01:07:37,896 --> 01:07:37,890 new policy , then you could have a gift 1799 01:07:37,890 --> 01:07:40,168 Map that would be more aligned to that . 1800 01:07:40,168 --> 01:07:42,279 But again , the key thing is the gift 1801 01:07:42,279 --> 01:07:44,223 map is simply a plan . Any plan is 1802 01:07:44,223 --> 01:07:45,890 based on assumptions . If the 1803 01:07:45,890 --> 01:07:48,112 assumptions change , you have to change 1804 01:07:48,112 --> 01:07:49,900 the plan . Um , So I am not 1805 01:07:49,900 --> 01:07:52,067 particularly when I was the director , 1806 01:07:52,067 --> 01:07:54,178 I wasn't particularly concerned by it 1807 01:07:54,178 --> 01:07:56,011 now that I'm a coke on . I'm not 1808 01:07:56,011 --> 01:07:58,067 particularly concerned by it . I ask 1809 01:07:58,067 --> 01:08:00,233 for forces I need based on the tasks I 1810 01:08:00,233 --> 01:08:02,289 am given is the secretary advised by 1811 01:08:02,289 --> 01:08:04,289 the joint staff and by his civilian 1812 01:08:04,289 --> 01:08:06,067 leadership in the department to 1813 01:08:06,067 --> 01:08:07,956 determine if they can fix that by 1814 01:08:07,956 --> 01:08:09,900 either changing the task . They've 1815 01:08:09,900 --> 01:08:11,890 given me giving me more forces or 1816 01:08:11,890 --> 01:08:14,210 accepting the risk . And then that's a 1817 01:08:14,210 --> 01:08:16,377 risk that we all know and understand . 1818 01:08:16,377 --> 01:08:18,543 So I I would argue frankly the process 1819 01:08:18,543 --> 01:08:20,654 works pretty good . We might not like 1820 01:08:20,654 --> 01:08:22,877 the answers from the process , but it's 1821 01:08:22,877 --> 01:08:25,099 a pretty good process . Yeah , that's a 1822 01:08:25,099 --> 01:08:27,210 constant dynamic . Is mitigating risk 1823 01:08:27,210 --> 01:08:29,321 today versus risk in the future . How 1824 01:08:29,321 --> 01:08:31,543 much risk do we take today to make sure 1825 01:08:31,543 --> 01:08:31,310 we mitigate in the future ? 1826 01:08:31,320 --> 01:08:33,570 Unfortunately , it seems like history 1827 01:08:33,580 --> 01:08:37,410 looks at us in in a uh in a not so 1828 01:08:37,410 --> 01:08:39,577 kind way and that many times we've not 1829 01:08:39,577 --> 01:08:41,760 estimated well what the future risk is 1830 01:08:41,770 --> 01:08:43,870 and we focus too much on what's in 1831 01:08:43,870 --> 01:08:46,037 front of us today . So hopefully as we 1832 01:08:46,037 --> 01:08:48,148 look at what's out there and I'm glad 1833 01:08:48,148 --> 01:08:50,203 you mentioned the dynamic element of 1834 01:08:50,203 --> 01:08:52,314 the environment and how we're looking 1835 01:08:52,314 --> 01:08:54,426 at that that that future versus today 1836 01:08:54,426 --> 01:08:56,592 in generation of force and readiness . 1837 01:08:56,592 --> 01:08:58,592 Thanks Sean johnson . Let me let me 1838 01:08:58,592 --> 01:09:00,814 point to you , I know that . And you're 1839 01:09:00,814 --> 01:09:03,110 a are you see that Russia is looking to 1840 01:09:03,110 --> 01:09:05,060 increase influence there ? You see 1841 01:09:05,060 --> 01:09:07,004 their effort in the agreement with 1842 01:09:07,004 --> 01:09:10,660 Sudan for Essentially putting a naval 1843 01:09:10,660 --> 01:09:13,330 base there for the next 25 years . My 1844 01:09:13,330 --> 01:09:15,990 concern is , is again , you see the 1845 01:09:15,990 --> 01:09:18,046 chinese presence in Djibouti . Now , 1846 01:09:18,046 --> 01:09:20,268 you see Russian presence in Sudan , you 1847 01:09:20,268 --> 01:09:22,046 see them trying to expand their 1848 01:09:22,046 --> 01:09:24,101 influence in those areas . Are there 1849 01:09:24,101 --> 01:09:27,420 concerned that this development or this 1850 01:09:27,420 --> 01:09:30,170 placement of hardware there could go to 1851 01:09:30,170 --> 01:09:32,392 other areas , Could it go to areas like 1852 01:09:32,392 --> 01:09:36,190 South Sudan ? Uh and areas um in 1853 01:09:36,200 --> 01:09:39,790 uh the Tigray region of Ethiopia , are 1854 01:09:39,790 --> 01:09:42,012 we going to see an expansion of Russian 1855 01:09:42,012 --> 01:09:44,179 influence in that area ? What are your 1856 01:09:44,179 --> 01:09:46,068 perspectives and what we see with 1857 01:09:46,068 --> 01:09:48,540 Russian activity ? Thanks congressman , 1858 01:09:48,550 --> 01:09:50,550 I am concerned about what Russia is 1859 01:09:50,550 --> 01:09:53,550 doing on the continent first . Uh 1860 01:09:53,560 --> 01:09:57,540 they're uh influence in Libya that 1861 01:09:57,540 --> 01:09:59,430 seems to be maybe trending in a 1862 01:09:59,430 --> 01:10:02,700 positive direction . Next concern I 1863 01:10:02,700 --> 01:10:04,811 have is you just pointed out is Sudan 1864 01:10:04,811 --> 01:10:08,160 and their efforts to uh in place a 1865 01:10:08,170 --> 01:10:11,990 naval base there . That project has has 1866 01:10:11,990 --> 01:10:13,768 been a little fraught with some 1867 01:10:13,768 --> 01:10:15,990 friction for them , but they seem to be 1868 01:10:15,990 --> 01:10:18,400 trying to push that forward . Um First 1869 01:10:18,400 --> 01:10:21,010 of all , I would say that there are two 1870 01:10:21,010 --> 01:10:23,177 types of naval bases . So here I am an 1871 01:10:23,177 --> 01:10:25,288 army instrument , talking about naval 1872 01:10:25,288 --> 01:10:27,177 bases . But my my naval component 1873 01:10:27,177 --> 01:10:29,454 commander has educated me a little bit . 1874 01:10:29,454 --> 01:10:31,621 There's two types , the one type where 1875 01:10:31,621 --> 01:10:33,566 you can stop the gas and groceries 1876 01:10:33,566 --> 01:10:35,640 that's useful for port calls and and 1877 01:10:35,650 --> 01:10:38,430 steaming around the world . But for war 1878 01:10:38,440 --> 01:10:41,360 you need a militarily useful naval base 1879 01:10:41,360 --> 01:10:44,240 and the ability to rearm and repair 1880 01:10:44,250 --> 01:10:46,900 ships . So it's not clear to me that 1881 01:10:46,910 --> 01:10:49,300 there they're just on the ground stages 1882 01:10:49,300 --> 01:10:50,967 of trying to get an agreement 1883 01:10:50,967 --> 01:10:53,189 solidified to get . So we got some time 1884 01:10:53,320 --> 01:10:56,110 to work this . I am concerned about 1885 01:10:56,110 --> 01:10:58,277 what they're doing . And you mentioned 1886 01:10:58,277 --> 01:11:00,340 that they connect all the way uh 1887 01:11:00,350 --> 01:11:02,517 Russian activity that connects all the 1888 01:11:02,517 --> 01:11:04,517 way to the apologize uh the sun has 1889 01:11:04,517 --> 01:11:07,780 expired my bed . Mr Brown is recognized . 1890 01:11:09,560 --> 01:11:11,504 Thank you very much very much . Mr 1891 01:11:11,504 --> 01:11:15,080 Chairman , is that my echo ? 1892 01:11:16,260 --> 01:11:18,482 You're good Miss Sherman , Can you come 1893 01:11:18,482 --> 01:11:20,593 back to me and maybe tech can help me 1894 01:11:20,593 --> 01:11:23,190 with this ? I know right now . We're 1895 01:11:23,190 --> 01:11:25,412 hearing you just fine . Are you hearing 1896 01:11:25,412 --> 01:11:27,579 an echo ? Yeah , I'm hearing an echo . 1897 01:11:27,579 --> 01:11:29,670 Are you know , we got you loud and 1898 01:11:29,670 --> 01:11:33,100 clear . We're okay . Okay . Can I just 1899 01:11:33,100 --> 01:11:35,322 ask them that my clock be reset to five 1900 01:11:35,322 --> 01:11:38,150 minutes ? Thank you . Mr Chairman . Now 1901 01:11:38,160 --> 01:11:40,750 go ahead . Thank you . I appreciate it . 1902 01:11:40,750 --> 01:11:42,750 And thank you to our panelists . Um 1903 01:11:42,750 --> 01:11:44,940 general towns and a question for you . 1904 01:11:44,950 --> 01:11:47,370 Um Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 1905 01:11:47,370 --> 01:11:50,600 Defense for Africa Affairs . Um Mr 1906 01:11:50,600 --> 01:11:52,433 Myers recently said that U . S . 1907 01:11:52,433 --> 01:11:55,380 Engagement with the nations of the 1908 01:11:55,380 --> 01:11:57,213 continent is crucial for peace , 1909 01:11:57,213 --> 01:11:59,390 democracy and development . Could you 1910 01:11:59,390 --> 01:12:01,930 describe what additional security 1911 01:12:01,930 --> 01:12:05,110 resources , military assistance and 1912 01:12:05,110 --> 01:12:07,970 capabilities that you need to mitigate 1913 01:12:07,970 --> 01:12:10,490 the risk and support the various 1914 01:12:10,490 --> 01:12:13,320 diplomatic disaster assistance and 1915 01:12:13,320 --> 01:12:15,530 humanitarian efforts across the 1916 01:12:15,530 --> 01:12:16,530 continent . 1917 01:12:19,150 --> 01:12:22,010 Thanks Thanks congressman . I would uh 1918 01:12:22,020 --> 01:12:24,480 like to defer my conversation about my 1919 01:12:24,480 --> 01:12:28,350 answer about forces as we are engaging 1920 01:12:28,350 --> 01:12:30,980 in this global posture review and I 1921 01:12:30,980 --> 01:12:33,650 haven't presented our plans yet or 1922 01:12:33,650 --> 01:12:35,910 recommendations yet to the Secretary of 1923 01:12:35,910 --> 01:12:38,190 Defense about forces but other 1924 01:12:38,190 --> 01:12:41,040 capabilities I'd like to address . Uh 1925 01:12:41,050 --> 01:12:43,690 those are foreign military sales , 1926 01:12:43,690 --> 01:12:46,440 foreign military financing 33 section 1927 01:12:46,440 --> 01:12:49,890 333 Support I met . Those 1928 01:12:49,890 --> 01:12:53,180 types of security assistance are 1929 01:12:53,190 --> 01:12:55,860 absolutely vital to our ability to get 1930 01:12:55,870 --> 01:12:59,750 our uh mission accomplished in Africa . 1931 01:12:59,760 --> 01:13:03,270 And uh Africom has seen significant 1932 01:13:03,450 --> 01:13:05,980 reductions in those types of security 1933 01:13:05,980 --> 01:13:07,980 assistance over the last couple of 1934 01:13:07,980 --> 01:13:11,750 years . Uh and one of them I met is a 1935 01:13:11,760 --> 01:13:15,380 great concern but also 333 uh 1936 01:13:15,390 --> 01:13:17,930 funding . So it's those types of things 1937 01:13:17,930 --> 01:13:20,600 that I am willing to talk about now 1938 01:13:20,610 --> 01:13:23,430 short of actually talking about forces 1939 01:13:23,440 --> 01:13:27,300 over Thank you . Can you describe 1940 01:13:27,300 --> 01:13:30,590 how terrorists and extremist activity 1941 01:13:30,600 --> 01:13:33,570 uh interferes with the humanitarian 1942 01:13:33,570 --> 01:13:36,070 missions and how it stalls economic 1943 01:13:36,070 --> 01:13:38,126 development across the continent ? I 1944 01:13:38,126 --> 01:13:40,860 witnessed that on a codel I spoke with 1945 01:13:40,870 --> 01:13:43,150 uh representatives from U . S . A . I . 1946 01:13:43,150 --> 01:13:45,206 D . And the embassy , they said they 1947 01:13:45,206 --> 01:13:47,600 just can't do their work uh in a secure 1948 01:13:47,600 --> 01:13:49,822 enough environment because of terrorist 1949 01:13:49,822 --> 01:13:51,767 and extremist activities . Can you 1950 01:13:51,767 --> 01:13:53,933 share a little bit put a little bit of 1951 01:13:53,933 --> 01:13:56,220 meat on that bone ? Sure , congressman , 1952 01:13:56,230 --> 01:13:58,780 Thank you . Uh So there's a symbiotic 1953 01:13:58,780 --> 01:14:00,920 relationship between those three Ds . 1954 01:14:00,930 --> 01:14:04,830 Diplomacy uh development 1955 01:14:04,840 --> 01:14:07,630 and defense . And uh one of the ways we 1956 01:14:07,640 --> 01:14:09,751 assist those two other Ds and getting 1957 01:14:09,751 --> 01:14:12,240 their work done is providing a secure 1958 01:14:12,250 --> 01:14:15,020 environment . So our work with the 1959 01:14:15,020 --> 01:14:18,100 security forces of an african country 1960 01:14:18,110 --> 01:14:21,570 uh is critical to allowing U . S . A . 1961 01:14:21,570 --> 01:14:23,650 I . D . Do development work and the 1962 01:14:23,650 --> 01:14:25,872 Department of State do their diplomatic 1963 01:14:25,872 --> 01:14:28,270 work and that symbiotic relationship . 1964 01:14:28,640 --> 01:14:32,050 It's very evident in Africa and because 1965 01:14:32,050 --> 01:14:35,190 of the generally uh you know and 1966 01:14:35,190 --> 01:14:37,412 security and the status of the security 1967 01:14:37,412 --> 01:14:39,740 environment there , uh the Department 1968 01:14:39,740 --> 01:14:41,851 of Defense is assistance is regularly 1969 01:14:41,851 --> 01:14:45,370 needed over . Thank you . And just in 1970 01:14:45,370 --> 01:14:47,259 what little time we have left for 1971 01:14:47,259 --> 01:14:49,370 General Mackenzie and General Towns . 1972 01:14:49,370 --> 01:14:51,537 And if you could take 30 seconds or so 1973 01:14:51,537 --> 01:14:53,590 each , can you please describe the 1974 01:14:53,590 --> 01:14:56,040 programs and initiatives within your 1975 01:14:56,040 --> 01:14:59,870 command that you use uh to foster a 1976 01:14:59,870 --> 01:15:02,590 culture of inclusion , diversity and 1977 01:15:02,600 --> 01:15:06,050 equity within our ranks in your command . 1978 01:15:08,240 --> 01:15:11,040 General Mackenzie . Yeah , go ahead 1979 01:15:11,050 --> 01:15:13,430 frank sir . So uh there are there are a 1980 01:15:13,430 --> 01:15:15,830 variety of programs but I would say 1981 01:15:15,840 --> 01:15:18,160 what absolutely most important is what 1982 01:15:18,160 --> 01:15:21,330 leaders do by if you go into the front 1983 01:15:21,330 --> 01:15:23,441 office of a leader who's who's in the 1984 01:15:23,441 --> 01:15:25,608 outer office , who the leaders pick as 1985 01:15:25,608 --> 01:15:27,790 principal staff officers , who uh 1986 01:15:27,800 --> 01:15:30,080 people see , see those things . And 1987 01:15:30,080 --> 01:15:32,302 while the programs are very important , 1988 01:15:32,302 --> 01:15:34,469 we have variety of those programs that 1989 01:15:34,469 --> 01:15:36,691 are underway . I think for a high level 1990 01:15:36,691 --> 01:15:36,420 leader , the most important thing you 1991 01:15:36,420 --> 01:15:38,309 have to do is act because I think 1992 01:15:38,309 --> 01:15:40,309 that's what actually people see and 1993 01:15:40,309 --> 01:15:44,240 I'll pause there , sir . And uh I think 1994 01:15:44,250 --> 01:15:46,361 General Mackenzie said it very well . 1995 01:15:46,361 --> 01:15:49,000 Uh the only thing I might add is at 1996 01:15:49,000 --> 01:15:52,270 africom , we have a gender adviser on 1997 01:15:52,270 --> 01:15:54,326 our staff to help us with that . But 1998 01:15:54,326 --> 01:15:56,048 that gets back to what General 1999 01:15:56,048 --> 01:15:57,881 Mackenzie said . It's about what 2000 01:15:57,881 --> 01:16:01,570 leaders do . And I agree with you that 2001 01:16:01,580 --> 01:16:03,691 people that you have in place and the 2002 01:16:03,691 --> 01:16:05,636 commitment of leaders to diversity 2003 01:16:05,636 --> 01:16:08,720 equity inclusion are extremely 2004 01:16:08,720 --> 01:16:11,940 important . I will point out that in 2005 01:16:11,940 --> 01:16:15,740 the fy 21 nd a uh this committee along 2006 01:16:15,740 --> 01:16:17,740 with our colleagues in the senate , 2007 01:16:17,740 --> 01:16:19,796 collectively , Congress directed the 2008 01:16:19,796 --> 01:16:22,410 secretary of defense to establish a 2009 01:16:22,410 --> 01:16:25,250 mentor program among many other things 2010 01:16:25,250 --> 01:16:27,070 we've asked him to do regarding 2011 01:16:27,070 --> 01:16:29,310 diversity equity inclusion but a mentor 2012 01:16:29,310 --> 01:16:32,170 program to ensure greater diversity 2013 01:16:32,180 --> 01:16:35,090 among more career fields and throughout 2014 01:16:35,090 --> 01:16:37,630 the rank structure . So I know you're 2015 01:16:37,630 --> 01:16:39,574 doing a lot of good things . We're 2016 01:16:39,574 --> 01:16:41,686 probably gonna want you to do step it 2017 01:16:41,686 --> 01:16:43,908 up even a little bit more . Thank you . 2018 01:16:43,908 --> 01:16:46,019 Mr Chairman . I'll yield back . Thank 2019 01:16:46,019 --> 01:16:48,186 you . Mr scott is very honest . Yeah . 2020 01:16:48,186 --> 01:16:49,963 Thank you . Mr Chairman General 2021 01:16:49,963 --> 01:16:51,797 Townsend . Uh thank you for your 2022 01:16:51,797 --> 01:16:53,686 support and could help Panetta in 2023 01:16:53,686 --> 01:16:55,908 august of 19 Mr Brown . Mr Panetta . Mr 2024 01:16:55,908 --> 01:16:57,797 Hudson . And I had a great trip , 2025 01:16:57,797 --> 01:16:59,630 learned a lot and could not have 2026 01:16:59,630 --> 01:17:01,741 learned what we did . Had it not been 2027 01:17:01,741 --> 01:17:05,630 for your support at that time , we 2028 01:17:05,640 --> 01:17:08,700 visited the U . N . Mission in mali and 2029 01:17:08,710 --> 01:17:11,450 uh many of the people in the meeting 2030 01:17:11,450 --> 01:17:13,690 that we had discussed china's activity 2031 01:17:13,690 --> 01:17:15,690 and expressed concerns that china's 2032 01:17:15,690 --> 01:17:17,912 activity was going to lead to civil war 2033 01:17:17,912 --> 01:17:19,857 uh in many of the countries on the 2034 01:17:19,857 --> 01:17:22,680 continent of Africa . Yesterday , I'm 2035 01:17:22,680 --> 01:17:25,600 sorry . Last week , Admiral Fowler had 2036 01:17:25,600 --> 01:17:28,020 a south com testified and I'll quote 2037 01:17:28,020 --> 01:17:30,131 him . Our interagency partners in the 2038 01:17:30,131 --> 01:17:32,187 United States have pointed out to us 2039 01:17:32,187 --> 01:17:34,353 the FBI and others . The chinese money 2040 01:17:34,353 --> 01:17:36,409 laundering Is the # one underwriting 2041 01:17:36,409 --> 01:17:38,298 source for transnational criminal 2042 01:17:38,298 --> 01:17:40,520 organizations . In your testimony , you 2043 01:17:40,520 --> 01:17:42,540 mentioned on page 12 that illegal , 2044 01:17:42,540 --> 01:17:44,650 unreported and unregulated fishing , 2045 01:17:45,130 --> 01:17:47,186 the communist chinese is the primary 2046 01:17:47,186 --> 01:17:49,241 contributor to a growing food crisis 2047 01:17:49,241 --> 01:17:51,408 that will further drive instability in 2048 01:17:51,408 --> 01:17:53,770 West Africa . And obviously food crisis 2049 01:17:53,770 --> 01:17:57,280 and instability have um historically 2050 01:17:57,280 --> 01:18:00,890 led to civil wars . My question , 2051 01:18:00,900 --> 01:18:04,250 uh , for you is 2052 01:18:05,620 --> 01:18:09,490 how do we stop this activity 2053 01:18:09,500 --> 01:18:12,540 from china short of 2054 01:18:13,720 --> 01:18:14,850 absolute war ? 2055 01:18:18,020 --> 01:18:20,820 Thanks congressman . I think the , the 2056 01:18:20,820 --> 01:18:23,530 solution there is competition , right ? 2057 01:18:23,920 --> 01:18:27,770 We want to compete before war comes 2058 01:18:27,770 --> 01:18:31,410 and competition is , is forever task 2059 01:18:31,420 --> 01:18:33,720 because you're always trying to stay 2060 01:18:33,730 --> 01:18:37,230 short Of war . So 2061 01:18:37,240 --> 01:18:39,407 with China , we have to compete and we 2062 01:18:39,407 --> 01:18:41,462 don't have to compete with them . In 2063 01:18:41,462 --> 01:18:43,629 all , 53 countries of the African mayo 2064 01:18:43,629 --> 01:18:45,740 are equally , but we have to pick and 2065 01:18:45,740 --> 01:18:47,573 choose uh , where we're going to 2066 01:18:47,573 --> 01:18:49,573 compete . And one of the ways we do 2067 01:18:49,573 --> 01:18:52,820 that is just simply by calling out , uh , 2068 01:18:52,830 --> 01:18:55,220 their activity on the continent . You 2069 01:18:55,220 --> 01:18:57,450 mentioned illegal fishing and they are 2070 01:18:57,450 --> 01:19:00,540 probably , uh , my assessment is , are 2071 01:19:00,540 --> 01:19:02,720 probably the number one offender . An 2072 01:19:02,720 --> 01:19:04,498 eagle , illegal fishing and its 2073 01:19:04,498 --> 01:19:07,110 commercial . But we all know that china 2074 01:19:07,110 --> 01:19:10,570 has a command economy . Uh , so uh 2075 01:19:10,580 --> 01:19:13,360 calling that out has helped us a lot . 2076 01:19:13,370 --> 01:19:16,460 Another example is helping countries 2077 01:19:16,460 --> 01:19:20,120 avoid getting the bad deals uh 2078 01:19:20,130 --> 01:19:23,260 with china . And this is an example 2079 01:19:23,260 --> 01:19:25,204 where our Department of State does 2080 01:19:25,204 --> 01:19:27,149 something I'm aware of it . But we 2081 01:19:27,149 --> 01:19:29,340 offer a free service to evaluate the 2082 01:19:29,340 --> 01:19:31,340 contracts of any of our African 2083 01:19:31,340 --> 01:19:33,340 partners . Before they enter sign a 2084 01:19:33,340 --> 01:19:37,170 contract with china or chinese 2085 01:19:37,170 --> 01:19:39,059 entity , the U . S . Embassy will 2086 01:19:39,059 --> 01:19:41,226 review that contract and point out the 2087 01:19:41,226 --> 01:19:43,114 inconsistencies and the potential 2088 01:19:43,114 --> 01:19:45,170 pitfalls in that contract and advise 2089 01:19:45,170 --> 01:19:47,281 the african partners so they can make 2090 01:19:47,281 --> 01:19:50,970 smart decisions general . I'm uh I 2091 01:19:50,970 --> 01:19:53,137 appreciate your question . I will tell 2092 01:19:53,137 --> 01:19:55,303 you . I also think we need the support 2093 01:19:55,303 --> 01:19:54,940 of corporate America and the american 2094 01:19:54,940 --> 01:19:58,220 consumer and that while I recognize 2095 01:19:58,220 --> 01:20:02,190 that our manufacturing faces 2096 01:20:02,190 --> 01:20:05,370 become contingent upon our um asia , 2097 01:20:05,380 --> 01:20:07,602 there are a lot of other countries that 2098 01:20:07,602 --> 01:20:09,491 share our interests and share our 2099 01:20:09,491 --> 01:20:11,324 values outside of china . And it 2100 01:20:11,324 --> 01:20:13,670 bothers me when I walk into a uh store 2101 01:20:13,670 --> 01:20:15,614 to buy a power tool that virtually 2102 01:20:15,614 --> 01:20:17,670 every power tool that's available on 2103 01:20:17,670 --> 01:20:19,837 the shelves in America is manufactured 2104 01:20:19,837 --> 01:20:21,837 in china . And so we've got to have 2105 01:20:21,837 --> 01:20:24,003 some help from corporate America uh to 2106 01:20:24,003 --> 01:20:26,920 to source our products from countries 2107 01:20:26,920 --> 01:20:29,060 outside of china . one of the other 2108 01:20:29,060 --> 01:20:32,210 things I want to mention . And is that 2109 01:20:32,220 --> 01:20:35,040 on that code L we got to witness the 2110 01:20:35,510 --> 01:20:37,566 the O . D . A . Missions and the and 2111 01:20:37,566 --> 01:20:39,566 the training missions . And this is 2112 01:20:39,566 --> 01:20:41,840 something that uh mystery maybe more 2113 01:20:41,840 --> 01:20:43,951 for you . But we we bring these young 2114 01:20:43,951 --> 01:20:47,790 men in from Africa there uh 18 or 2115 01:20:47,790 --> 01:20:51,780 so . They have a uh at best a 2116 01:20:51,780 --> 01:20:53,520 med school , 6th 7th 8th grade 2117 01:20:53,520 --> 01:20:56,480 education . We have them on site for 24 2118 01:20:56,480 --> 01:20:59,580 months uh seven days a week . And they 2119 01:20:59,580 --> 01:21:02,070 leave with that 7th or 8th grade 2120 01:21:02,070 --> 01:21:04,181 education after we've trained them to 2121 01:21:04,181 --> 01:21:07,130 fight . And my concern is that ah 2122 01:21:07,510 --> 01:21:09,670 without an education that they become 2123 01:21:09,670 --> 01:21:13,000 the people that uh in the , you know , 2124 01:21:13,000 --> 01:21:15,290 leave and their ability to fight as 2125 01:21:15,290 --> 01:21:17,179 their greatest asset . So I would 2126 01:21:17,179 --> 01:21:18,957 encourage you to work with your 2127 01:21:18,957 --> 01:21:21,123 counterparts . This is more of a State 2128 01:21:21,123 --> 01:21:23,234 Department mission and and maybe more 2129 01:21:23,234 --> 01:21:25,568 of a mission for the french in the area . 2130 01:21:25,568 --> 01:21:27,690 But while we have those young men on 2131 01:21:27,690 --> 01:21:30,930 our bases or bases where we're training 2132 01:21:30,930 --> 01:21:32,597 them , I do think it would be 2133 01:21:32,597 --> 01:21:34,597 worthwhile to look at what it would 2134 01:21:34,597 --> 01:21:36,652 take to educate those men and try to 2135 01:21:36,652 --> 01:21:38,374 move them from that med school 2136 01:21:38,374 --> 01:21:40,263 education closer to a high school 2137 01:21:40,263 --> 01:21:42,541 graduate education . Uh With that said , 2138 01:21:42,541 --> 01:21:44,374 I look forward to the classified 2139 01:21:44,374 --> 01:21:46,880 hearing . My uh time is up . Thank you . 2140 01:21:46,890 --> 01:21:49,112 Thank you all for everything you do for 2141 01:21:49,112 --> 01:21:52,050 our country . Thank you . Thank you . 2142 01:21:52,050 --> 01:21:56,040 Mr Karr . Was recognized . Mhm . 2143 01:21:56,410 --> 01:21:58,632 Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank you all 2144 01:21:58,632 --> 01:22:01,020 for coming in here today . My first 2145 01:22:01,020 --> 01:22:04,490 question is to a mystery . MS 2146 01:22:04,490 --> 01:22:08,340 toria . Last Alaskan nd a 2147 01:22:08,340 --> 01:22:10,720 process this Congress passed a 2148 01:22:10,720 --> 01:22:13,800 provision section 12 15 that would 2149 01:22:13,800 --> 01:22:16,720 ensure that any administration at that 2150 01:22:16,720 --> 01:22:18,720 time the trump administration would 2151 01:22:18,720 --> 01:22:20,776 actually engage with Congress on the 2152 01:22:20,776 --> 01:22:24,060 issue of Afghanistan . Specifically , 2153 01:22:24,180 --> 01:22:28,150 12 15 requires that 2154 01:22:28,160 --> 01:22:30,160 the administration make assessments 2155 01:22:30,160 --> 01:22:31,930 regarding the impeding of 2156 01:22:31,930 --> 01:22:34,097 counterterrorism missions . Because we 2157 01:22:34,097 --> 01:22:36,208 saw what happened with the insurgents 2158 01:22:36,208 --> 01:22:38,830 of ISIS after our withdrawal in Iraq . 2159 01:22:39,300 --> 01:22:41,633 It talks about the risk posed the U . S . 2160 01:22:41,633 --> 01:22:43,744 Personnel because these are obviously 2161 01:22:43,744 --> 01:22:45,911 the men and women that we represent in 2162 01:22:45,911 --> 01:22:47,967 our communities . It talks about the 2163 01:22:47,967 --> 01:22:49,744 issue of Afghanistan becoming a 2164 01:22:49,744 --> 01:22:51,411 terrorist safe haven . Uh the 2165 01:22:51,411 --> 01:22:53,633 assessments that are required there and 2166 01:22:53,633 --> 01:22:56,020 of course the impact on our partners 2167 01:22:56,020 --> 01:22:58,131 allies and humanitarian conditions on 2168 01:22:58,131 --> 01:23:00,020 the ground . Because we have made 2169 01:23:00,020 --> 01:23:02,110 substantial investments and capacity 2170 01:23:02,110 --> 01:23:04,840 building investments in humanitarian 2171 01:23:04,850 --> 01:23:07,610 aid and the men and women and Children 2172 01:23:07,610 --> 01:23:09,277 and vulnerable populations in 2173 01:23:09,277 --> 01:23:11,790 Afghanistan . So with that said , and 2174 01:23:11,790 --> 01:23:14,012 the fact that this is America's war and 2175 01:23:14,012 --> 01:23:16,179 not anyone administration's war and it 2176 01:23:16,179 --> 01:23:18,346 is federal law that the administration 2177 01:23:18,346 --> 01:23:20,930 provide that assessment to Congress in 2178 01:23:20,930 --> 01:23:23,880 advance of withdrawal from Afghanistan . 2179 01:23:23,890 --> 01:23:26,220 Is it The administration's intend to 2180 01:23:26,220 --> 01:23:28,387 comply with that law and provide those 2181 01:23:28,387 --> 01:23:30,331 assessments to the United States . 2182 01:23:30,331 --> 01:23:33,650 Congress congressman is my 2183 01:23:33,650 --> 01:23:35,761 understanding that the administration 2184 01:23:35,761 --> 01:23:38,840 will comply with the law . My 2185 01:23:38,840 --> 01:23:40,840 understanding further the briefings 2186 01:23:40,840 --> 01:23:43,007 that will be provided later today or a 2187 01:23:43,007 --> 01:23:45,062 down payment in some respects , with 2188 01:23:45,062 --> 01:23:47,570 respect to section 1215 . Well , just 2189 01:23:47,570 --> 01:23:49,970 as you know , I don't expect a briefing 2190 01:23:50,000 --> 01:23:52,730 would satisfy those requirements . And 2191 01:23:53,630 --> 01:23:55,686 and when I say comply with the law , 2192 01:23:55,686 --> 01:23:57,686 the Last administration , the trump 2193 01:23:57,686 --> 01:23:59,686 administration basically provided a 2194 01:23:59,686 --> 01:24:01,852 certification invoking an emergency to 2195 01:24:01,852 --> 01:24:03,908 bypass the intent of the law and not 2196 01:24:03,908 --> 01:24:05,963 actually provide those assessments . 2197 01:24:05,963 --> 01:24:08,186 And we would expect this administration 2198 01:24:08,186 --> 01:24:10,408 to comply in good faith with the intent 2199 01:24:10,408 --> 01:24:12,519 of that law and that have written and 2200 01:24:12,519 --> 01:24:14,519 comprehensive assessments . Can you 2201 01:24:14,519 --> 01:24:16,890 provide any insight into which approach 2202 01:24:16,900 --> 01:24:18,900 the administration is going to take 2203 01:24:18,900 --> 01:24:22,150 care , congressman ? All I can say 2204 01:24:22,160 --> 01:24:25,170 right now , based on just the evolving 2205 01:24:25,170 --> 01:24:27,650 nature of the decision making process 2206 01:24:27,650 --> 01:24:29,872 of the decision just happened and we're 2207 01:24:29,872 --> 01:24:32,800 now moving into implementation , but I 2208 01:24:33,690 --> 01:24:36,560 fully expect compliance with the law in 2209 01:24:36,560 --> 01:24:38,338 a manner that's intended by the 2210 01:24:38,338 --> 01:24:41,030 Congress . Okay , thanks my story . 2211 01:24:41,150 --> 01:24:43,710 General Mackenzie over to you . One of 2212 01:24:43,710 --> 01:24:46,043 my biggest concerns is force protection . 2213 01:24:46,043 --> 01:24:48,043 Obviously retrograde operations are 2214 01:24:48,043 --> 01:24:50,266 some of the riskiest things we do . You 2215 01:24:50,266 --> 01:24:52,488 have testified earlier as to a surge of 2216 01:24:52,488 --> 01:24:54,543 combat power into Afghanistan to set 2217 01:24:54,543 --> 01:24:56,766 the conditions for the withdrawal . But 2218 01:24:56,766 --> 01:24:58,821 I'm gravely gravely concerned as our 2219 01:24:58,821 --> 01:25:00,821 footprint is smaller , what the QRF 2220 01:25:00,990 --> 01:25:03,520 capacity looks like in the event the 2221 01:25:03,530 --> 01:25:05,419 security situation dissolves much 2222 01:25:05,419 --> 01:25:07,308 faster than our assessments might 2223 01:25:07,308 --> 01:25:09,530 indicate . Can you speak to what forces 2224 01:25:09,530 --> 01:25:11,760 regional forces would be available and 2225 01:25:11,760 --> 01:25:14,710 how we're going to ensure that the last 2226 01:25:14,710 --> 01:25:17,040 remaining units in Afghanistan have 2227 01:25:17,040 --> 01:25:19,490 assistance available to them . So I 2228 01:25:19,490 --> 01:25:21,490 prefer to talk to specific tactical 2229 01:25:21,490 --> 01:25:23,434 details in the closed session this 2230 01:25:23,434 --> 01:25:25,434 afternoon , but I'll be happy to do 2231 01:25:25,434 --> 01:25:27,601 that in that session . I would I would 2232 01:25:27,601 --> 01:25:29,712 tell you that I I spent a lot of time 2233 01:25:29,712 --> 01:25:28,900 looking at force protection in 2234 01:25:28,900 --> 01:25:31,200 Afghanistan withdrawal . Such as we are 2235 01:25:31,200 --> 01:25:33,033 doing is based on three of three 2236 01:25:33,033 --> 01:25:35,520 components . One is uh the equipment 2237 01:25:35,530 --> 01:25:37,697 extraction , what you're gonna do with 2238 01:25:37,697 --> 01:25:39,641 it . The other is turning over the 2239 01:25:39,641 --> 01:25:41,697 basis and the infrastructure and the 2240 01:25:41,697 --> 01:25:41,070 third . And the most important is the 2241 01:25:41,070 --> 01:25:43,348 force protection itself for our forces . 2242 01:25:43,348 --> 01:25:45,348 General Miller and I talk every day 2243 01:25:45,348 --> 01:25:47,459 about force protection in Afghanistan 2244 01:25:47,459 --> 01:25:49,681 and I'm confident that we will have the 2245 01:25:49,681 --> 01:25:51,848 forces necessary to protect our forces 2246 01:25:51,848 --> 01:25:53,737 should the taliban aside to begin 2247 01:25:53,737 --> 01:25:55,959 attacking us on one May or at any other 2248 01:25:55,959 --> 01:25:55,500 date . And I'll be happy to provide the 2249 01:25:55,500 --> 01:25:57,444 details to you in a classified for 2250 01:25:57,444 --> 01:25:59,667 Thank you . Look forward to having that 2251 01:25:59,667 --> 01:26:01,889 discussion this afternoon . And General 2252 01:26:01,889 --> 01:26:04,000 Townsend . Very briefly , I represent 2253 01:26:04,000 --> 01:26:06,222 one of the nation's largest communities 2254 01:26:06,222 --> 01:26:08,444 of Ethiopians in Ethiopian diaspora and 2255 01:26:08,444 --> 01:26:10,450 I'm extremely concerned for the 2256 01:26:10,450 --> 01:26:13,410 security situation , particularly the 2257 01:26:13,420 --> 01:26:16,340 great uh Ethiopian renaissance Dam 2258 01:26:16,340 --> 01:26:18,890 project . Could you provide in some 2259 01:26:18,890 --> 01:26:21,640 insight as to our efforts to ensure 2260 01:26:21,640 --> 01:26:23,960 that that project does not result in 2261 01:26:23,960 --> 01:26:25,404 regional armed conflict . 2262 01:26:28,280 --> 01:26:30,660 Thanks Congressman with the remaining 2263 01:26:30,660 --> 01:26:32,827 30 seconds , I might want to give some 2264 01:26:32,827 --> 01:26:35,400 mystery on this . Uh we're watching the 2265 01:26:35,400 --> 01:26:37,011 situation with the Ethiopian 2266 01:26:37,011 --> 01:26:40,360 Renaissance Dam uh and we're trying to 2267 01:26:40,360 --> 01:26:42,527 keep people informed . I think this is 2268 01:26:42,527 --> 01:26:44,749 mostly a diplomatic led effort and I'll 2269 01:26:44,749 --> 01:26:48,020 turn over to mystery there . I agree 2270 01:26:48,020 --> 01:26:50,187 fully with General Townsend that there 2271 01:26:50,187 --> 01:26:52,464 is a big diplomatic push at this point . 2272 01:26:52,464 --> 01:26:54,464 With respect to the GERD concerns . 2273 01:26:54,680 --> 01:26:56,402 Okay , thank you to all of you 2274 01:26:56,402 --> 01:26:58,580 appreciate the testimony very much . 2275 01:26:58,590 --> 01:27:00,812 Chairman of Quebec . Thank you . I want 2276 01:27:00,812 --> 01:27:02,923 to make sure members . No , I did not 2277 01:27:02,923 --> 01:27:05,090 announce this upfront . We're going we 2278 01:27:05,090 --> 01:27:06,979 have a hard stop at 1 30 for this 2279 01:27:06,979 --> 01:27:09,090 portion and then we'll be reconvening 2280 01:27:09,090 --> 01:27:12,220 at three uh in this room actually for 2281 01:27:12,220 --> 01:27:14,331 the classified hearing . So I want to 2282 01:27:14,331 --> 01:27:16,442 emphasize that point because normally 2283 01:27:16,442 --> 01:27:18,276 we do at the CBC with the CBC is 2284 01:27:18,276 --> 01:27:21,580 occupied today by extended discussions 2285 01:27:21,580 --> 01:27:24,770 about Afghanistan . So 1 30 hard stop 2286 01:27:24,780 --> 01:27:26,947 and three o'clock back here for that . 2287 01:27:26,947 --> 01:27:29,169 I will be departing shortly and turning 2288 01:27:29,169 --> 01:27:31,391 the committee over to the capable hands 2289 01:27:31,391 --> 01:27:33,447 of Mr laura to go over and do one of 2290 01:27:33,447 --> 01:27:35,669 the CBC briefings but just want to make 2291 01:27:35,669 --> 01:27:37,724 sure everyone had that uh scheduling 2292 01:27:37,724 --> 01:27:39,836 update and with that Mr Desjarlais is 2293 01:27:39,836 --> 01:27:42,080 recognized . Thank you Jeremy smith , 2294 01:27:42,090 --> 01:27:44,490 General Mackenzie with state actor in 2295 01:27:44,490 --> 01:27:46,546 your area of responsibility . Do you 2296 01:27:46,546 --> 01:27:48,323 believe to be the United States 2297 01:27:48,323 --> 01:27:51,200 greatest geostrategic foe ? I consider 2298 01:27:51,200 --> 01:27:53,089 Iran to be the greatest threat to 2299 01:27:53,089 --> 01:27:55,200 regional stability in the Middle East 2300 01:27:56,280 --> 01:27:58,447 and with Israel moving from um descent 2301 01:27:58,447 --> 01:28:00,613 comedy this year , do you believe that 2302 01:28:00,613 --> 01:28:02,669 they will be your closest partner in 2303 01:28:02,669 --> 01:28:04,836 the er we have a lot of close partners 2304 01:28:04,836 --> 01:28:06,947 in the Hor Israel will certainly join 2305 01:28:06,947 --> 01:28:09,113 the line of dependable friendships and 2306 01:28:09,113 --> 01:28:08,930 partnerships that we have in the region . 2307 01:28:08,950 --> 01:28:11,220 We have a unique an old relationship 2308 01:28:11,220 --> 01:28:13,442 with with Israel but I wouldn't further 2309 01:28:13,442 --> 01:28:16,850 characterize it . Okay , uh when you 2310 01:28:16,850 --> 01:28:18,906 have the political leadership of our 2311 01:28:18,906 --> 01:28:20,794 greatest foe in the region , Iran 2312 01:28:20,794 --> 01:28:22,906 threatening our closest ally , Israel 2313 01:28:22,906 --> 01:28:24,906 and stating that its mission of the 2314 01:28:24,906 --> 01:28:26,961 Islamic Republic of Iran is to erase 2315 01:28:26,961 --> 01:28:29,600 Israel from the map of the region . You 2316 01:28:29,600 --> 01:28:31,656 believe that one of our top priority 2317 01:28:31,656 --> 01:28:33,822 should be keeping a nuclear weapon out 2318 01:28:33,822 --> 01:28:35,600 of Iran's hands . I believe the 2319 01:28:35,600 --> 01:28:37,600 president has stated that is a high 2320 01:28:37,600 --> 01:28:39,711 priority . I also believe that one of 2321 01:28:39,711 --> 01:28:41,767 the things central Command does on a 2322 01:28:41,767 --> 01:28:43,878 daily basis is deter Iran from acting 2323 01:28:43,878 --> 01:28:45,822 against against us and against our 2324 01:28:45,822 --> 01:28:47,878 partners and friends in the region . 2325 01:28:48,270 --> 01:28:50,780 That's if Iran were to develop nuclear 2326 01:28:50,780 --> 01:28:53,002 weapons , what you believe would be the 2327 01:28:53,002 --> 01:28:55,224 response from some of our allies in the 2328 01:28:55,224 --> 01:28:57,447 region . And do you believe such a move 2329 01:28:57,447 --> 01:28:59,447 could have the potential set off an 2330 01:28:59,447 --> 01:29:01,336 arms race ? I would prefer not to 2331 01:29:01,336 --> 01:29:03,502 speculate about future contingencies . 2332 01:29:03,502 --> 01:29:05,724 I can tell you that uh it would be very 2333 01:29:05,724 --> 01:29:07,780 concerning to us if Iran possessed a 2334 01:29:07,780 --> 01:29:09,669 nuclear weapon and it was able to 2335 01:29:09,669 --> 01:29:11,724 possess a nuclear weapon . And it is 2336 01:29:11,724 --> 01:29:13,891 the aim of the United States policy to 2337 01:29:13,891 --> 01:29:13,400 prevent that condition from occurring . 2338 01:29:14,870 --> 01:29:17,092 You mentioned in your opening statement 2339 01:29:17,092 --> 01:29:19,037 that as a result of the challenges 2340 01:29:19,037 --> 01:29:20,592 faced with US detection and 2341 01:29:20,592 --> 01:29:22,814 interdiction , the United States is for 2342 01:29:22,814 --> 01:29:24,814 the first time since the korean war 2343 01:29:24,814 --> 01:29:26,537 operating without complete air 2344 01:29:26,537 --> 01:29:29,220 superiority . What would we what should 2345 01:29:29,220 --> 01:29:31,387 we be doing to address this gap in our 2346 01:29:31,387 --> 01:29:33,498 capabilities and retain the advantage 2347 01:29:33,498 --> 01:29:35,720 against Iranian forces ? So I think the 2348 01:29:35,720 --> 01:29:37,831 I think first of all , the Department 2349 01:29:37,831 --> 01:29:37,680 of Defense has moved out very 2350 01:29:37,680 --> 01:29:39,847 aggressively to address this problem . 2351 01:29:39,847 --> 01:29:41,847 The army is the executive agent for 2352 01:29:41,847 --> 01:29:44,069 close in protection against these small 2353 01:29:44,069 --> 01:29:46,236 US US systems that are most concerning 2354 01:29:46,236 --> 01:29:48,402 to me . Uh but I think we still have a 2355 01:29:48,402 --> 01:29:50,569 ways to go to get on the right side of 2356 01:29:50,569 --> 01:29:52,680 the curve with this because right now 2357 01:29:52,680 --> 01:29:54,791 you can go out and buy one at walmart 2358 01:29:54,791 --> 01:29:56,624 or some other location , you can 2359 01:29:56,624 --> 01:29:58,736 weaponize it very readily . Sometimes 2360 01:29:58,736 --> 01:30:00,847 it is very difficult for us to detect 2361 01:30:00,847 --> 01:30:00,600 them until it's too late . We have a 2362 01:30:00,600 --> 01:30:02,711 variety of systems that we're testing 2363 01:30:02,711 --> 01:30:04,933 now in a free market , a competition to 2364 01:30:04,933 --> 01:30:06,822 find the best and most integrated 2365 01:30:06,822 --> 01:30:08,933 capabilities . We are not there yet . 2366 01:30:08,933 --> 01:30:10,767 And it remains a very concerning 2367 01:30:10,767 --> 01:30:13,490 priority of mine . Okay , can you spell 2368 01:30:13,490 --> 01:30:16,230 out the implications of China's 25-year 2369 01:30:16,230 --> 01:30:18,286 agreement with Iran , which includes 2370 01:30:18,286 --> 01:30:20,700 expanding military cooperation ? Sure . 2371 01:30:20,700 --> 01:30:22,980 So , you know , that China has had an 2372 01:30:22,980 --> 01:30:25,091 existing military agreement with Iran 2373 01:30:25,091 --> 01:30:27,258 for a period of time . I'm not certain 2374 01:30:27,258 --> 01:30:29,424 that this is going to produce anything 2375 01:30:29,424 --> 01:30:31,536 new or different . Uh , again , we'll 2376 01:30:31,536 --> 01:30:33,480 watch to see what it does with oil 2377 01:30:33,480 --> 01:30:33,220 exports and I'm probably not the best 2378 01:30:33,220 --> 01:30:35,331 person to talk about that right now . 2379 01:30:35,331 --> 01:30:37,442 But a number of sanctions could still 2380 01:30:37,442 --> 01:30:39,664 come in place against chinese companies 2381 01:30:39,664 --> 01:30:41,776 should they elect to do business with 2382 01:30:41,776 --> 01:30:43,831 Iran ? So , again , I'm probably not 2383 01:30:43,831 --> 01:30:43,450 the best guy to give you an answer an 2384 01:30:43,450 --> 01:30:46,320 answer . Okay . But the annual threat 2385 01:30:46,320 --> 01:30:48,930 assessment issued earlier this month By 2386 01:30:48,930 --> 01:30:51,097 the Office of the Director of National 2387 01:30:51,097 --> 01:30:53,319 Intelligence that they highlighted Iraq 2388 01:30:53,319 --> 01:30:55,263 as the key battleground for Iran's 2389 01:30:55,263 --> 01:30:57,319 influence this year . And during the 2390 01:30:57,319 --> 01:30:59,319 next several years , you agree with 2391 01:30:59,319 --> 01:31:01,374 this assessment . I completely agree 2392 01:31:01,374 --> 01:31:00,910 with that . And I would go further to 2393 01:31:00,910 --> 01:31:03,760 say that the year 2020 , Iran's plan 2394 01:31:03,760 --> 01:31:05,830 was again through political action , 2395 01:31:05,830 --> 01:31:07,997 the ejection of the United States from 2396 01:31:07,997 --> 01:31:10,163 the region and principally from Iraq . 2397 01:31:10,163 --> 01:31:12,219 They failed in doing that . And as a 2398 01:31:12,219 --> 01:31:14,330 result , we're beginning to see a tax 2399 01:31:14,330 --> 01:31:16,497 ramp up from there . She uh from their 2400 01:31:16,497 --> 01:31:16,360 Shia groups in the region and I think 2401 01:31:16,360 --> 01:31:19,870 that's going to continue . Okay , so 2402 01:31:19,870 --> 01:31:22,037 you kind of partly answered that , But 2403 01:31:22,037 --> 01:31:24,259 what would be the net effect of the U . 2404 01:31:24,259 --> 01:31:26,259 S . Were to draw down or completely 2405 01:31:26,259 --> 01:31:28,481 withdraw troops from Iraq ? Well , that 2406 01:31:28,481 --> 01:31:30,703 move is not contemplated if if there is 2407 01:31:30,703 --> 01:31:30,570 one of the one of the good news stories 2408 01:31:30,570 --> 01:31:32,626 in the region is I believe we have a 2409 01:31:32,626 --> 01:31:34,737 good relationship with the government 2410 01:31:34,737 --> 01:31:36,903 of Iraq . Recently completed strategic 2411 01:31:36,903 --> 01:31:38,626 dialogue is going to provide a 2412 01:31:38,626 --> 01:31:40,626 framework for us to decide what our 2413 01:31:40,626 --> 01:31:40,250 forces are gonna look like going 2414 01:31:40,250 --> 01:31:42,417 forward . So I don't think there's a I 2415 01:31:42,417 --> 01:31:44,528 I don't see us withdrawing completely 2416 01:31:44,528 --> 01:31:47,280 from Iraq in the future . Okay , well 2417 01:31:47,280 --> 01:31:49,391 thank you general , both generals for 2418 01:31:49,391 --> 01:31:51,336 your service and the story . Uh Mr 2419 01:31:51,336 --> 01:31:53,336 Chairman , I go back thank you . Mr 2420 01:31:53,336 --> 01:31:55,502 Carver Hall . Thank you . Mr Chair and 2421 01:31:55,502 --> 01:31:57,502 thank you to all the witnesses here 2422 01:31:57,502 --> 01:32:00,170 today , Miss Dori . Uh I welcome this 2423 01:32:00,170 --> 01:32:01,781 administration's decision to 2424 01:32:01,781 --> 01:32:04,140 strategically withdraw US forces from 2425 01:32:04,140 --> 01:32:07,770 Afghanistan By September 11 2021 . 2426 01:32:08,650 --> 01:32:10,872 I must say though , that the difference 2427 01:32:10,872 --> 01:32:12,872 between this administration and the 2428 01:32:12,872 --> 01:32:15,680 previous administration is that it 2429 01:32:15,680 --> 01:32:18,640 seems that we're doing it with our 2430 01:32:18,640 --> 01:32:20,584 allies and we're doing it in close 2431 01:32:20,584 --> 01:32:22,751 coordination and collaboration instead 2432 01:32:22,751 --> 01:32:25,920 of hearing about a tweet uh and 2433 01:32:25,930 --> 01:32:28,680 our commanders not really being in the 2434 01:32:28,680 --> 01:32:31,710 loop . So I appreciate that . But still , 2435 01:32:31,710 --> 01:32:34,250 the question that stays as a 2436 01:32:34,250 --> 01:32:36,361 significant issue is , well , what is 2437 01:32:36,361 --> 01:32:39,710 our plan ? That was my criticism before 2438 01:32:39,720 --> 01:32:41,887 with the previous administration ? And 2439 01:32:41,887 --> 01:32:43,998 that's I think what we're all looking 2440 01:32:43,998 --> 01:32:46,290 to better understand what is the plan 2441 01:32:46,300 --> 01:32:50,140 as we leave Afghanistan . Um So if you 2442 01:32:50,140 --> 01:32:52,690 could answer that and then help me 2443 01:32:52,690 --> 01:32:56,610 understand what President biden 2444 01:32:56,610 --> 01:32:58,777 meant when he said will reorganize our 2445 01:32:58,777 --> 01:33:00,888 counterterrorism capabilities and the 2446 01:33:00,888 --> 01:33:03,690 substantial assets in the region to 2447 01:33:03,690 --> 01:33:06,170 prevent re emergence of terrorism ? 2448 01:33:06,750 --> 01:33:08,583 Well , can you elaborate on that 2449 01:33:08,850 --> 01:33:12,570 statement ? Mhm . Thank you , 2450 01:33:12,570 --> 01:33:15,910 congressman . This administration has 2451 01:33:15,910 --> 01:33:18,400 reinvigorated a focus on alliances and 2452 01:33:18,400 --> 01:33:20,640 partnerships and I think you see it in 2453 01:33:20,640 --> 01:33:23,190 the work that has been underway to 2454 01:33:23,190 --> 01:33:25,730 support taking a decision with respect 2455 01:33:25,730 --> 01:33:28,670 to the future of the U . S . Uh force 2456 01:33:28,670 --> 01:33:30,990 posture in Afghanistan . So the 2457 01:33:30,990 --> 01:33:33,101 intensive engagement that we saw most 2458 01:33:33,101 --> 01:33:36,170 recently with NATO and coalition 2459 01:33:36,170 --> 01:33:38,650 partners with respect to the decision 2460 01:33:38,650 --> 01:33:42,280 to draw down in Afghanistan in the in 2461 01:33:42,280 --> 01:33:44,920 the very near term , there is detailed 2462 01:33:44,920 --> 01:33:46,753 planning underway , as you heard 2463 01:33:46,753 --> 01:33:48,753 General Mackenzie referred to a few 2464 01:33:48,753 --> 01:33:50,864 moments ago , with respect to how the 2465 01:33:50,864 --> 01:33:53,110 force drawdown will proceed in 2466 01:33:53,110 --> 01:33:56,040 conjunction with Allies and partners , 2467 01:33:56,050 --> 01:33:58,272 separate planning underway with respect 2468 01:33:58,272 --> 01:34:00,850 to what the counterterrorism footprint 2469 01:34:00,850 --> 01:34:03,017 will look like going forward given the 2470 01:34:03,017 --> 01:34:06,260 focus i in Afghanistan the primary 2471 01:34:06,260 --> 01:34:08,560 vital interest that has sustained us 2472 01:34:08,560 --> 01:34:10,760 over time being . To ensure that there 2473 01:34:10,760 --> 01:34:12,660 are no attacks emanating from 2474 01:34:12,670 --> 01:34:14,892 Afghanistan with respect to the U . S . 2475 01:34:14,892 --> 01:34:18,060 Homeland . And we will have in the 2476 01:34:18,070 --> 01:34:20,237 classified briefings later today we'll 2477 01:34:20,237 --> 01:34:22,237 be able to get into that into a lot 2478 01:34:22,237 --> 01:34:24,510 more detail . Okay does that include 2479 01:34:24,520 --> 01:34:26,450 what our footprint will look like 2480 01:34:26,460 --> 01:34:30,110 moving forward ? Well I think what we 2481 01:34:30,110 --> 01:34:33,540 understand is from here into september 2482 01:34:33,540 --> 01:34:35,707 that will have we will not have combat 2483 01:34:35,707 --> 01:34:37,880 forces , us or coalition combat forces 2484 01:34:37,880 --> 01:34:40,240 there and we will transition to a 2485 01:34:40,240 --> 01:34:43,070 diplomatically oriented footprint with 2486 01:34:43,070 --> 01:34:46,240 the U . S . Embassy . Thank you . Can 2487 01:34:46,240 --> 01:34:48,407 you provide us with an update on where 2488 01:34:48,407 --> 01:34:50,650 the intra afghan peace talks are at at 2489 01:34:50,650 --> 01:34:53,940 this point ? I think 2490 01:34:53,950 --> 01:34:56,970 uh Ambassador Khalilzad will be one of 2491 01:34:56,970 --> 01:34:59,026 the panelists in the briefings later 2492 01:34:59,026 --> 01:35:00,803 this afternoon and will be well 2493 01:35:00,803 --> 01:35:03,290 postured to give just just a fresh 2494 01:35:03,300 --> 01:35:05,940 update on those talks . Great , thank 2495 01:35:05,940 --> 01:35:08,550 you General Mackenzie in your testimony , 2496 01:35:08,550 --> 01:35:10,661 you comment that centcom is committed 2497 01:35:10,661 --> 01:35:12,772 to working with inter agency partners 2498 01:35:12,940 --> 01:35:14,829 to develop mechanisms that ensure 2499 01:35:14,829 --> 01:35:16,850 continued oversight of an 2500 01:35:16,850 --> 01:35:18,739 accountability of the Afghanistan 2501 01:35:18,739 --> 01:35:21,150 security forces fund . What oversight 2502 01:35:21,150 --> 01:35:23,430 tools do we currently use that will be 2503 01:35:23,430 --> 01:35:25,720 important to continue after the 2504 01:35:25,720 --> 01:35:29,140 withdrawal . How will our our oversight 2505 01:35:29,140 --> 01:35:31,251 adapt to having a limited presence on 2506 01:35:31,251 --> 01:35:34,140 the ground ? The principal tool that we 2507 01:35:34,140 --> 01:35:36,084 use to manage the oversight of the 2508 01:35:36,084 --> 01:35:38,084 disbursement of those funds and the 2509 01:35:38,084 --> 01:35:40,196 proper use of it or the people on the 2510 01:35:40,196 --> 01:35:42,362 ground that see what happens to it and 2511 01:35:42,362 --> 01:35:44,307 and monitor that as we draw down . 2512 01:35:44,307 --> 01:35:44,070 That's gonna become our principal 2513 01:35:44,070 --> 01:35:46,126 challenge . How do we do that from a 2514 01:35:46,126 --> 01:35:48,292 remote location ? A lot will depend on 2515 01:35:48,292 --> 01:35:50,348 the size of the U . S . Embassy that 2516 01:35:50,348 --> 01:35:52,348 remains and we have not yet finally 2517 01:35:52,348 --> 01:35:54,514 determined that . And that's something 2518 01:35:54,514 --> 01:35:56,570 that we're in talking about planning 2519 01:35:56,570 --> 01:35:58,848 right now , the smaller the embassy is , 2520 01:35:58,848 --> 01:35:58,750 the more difficult it will be become to 2521 01:35:58,750 --> 01:36:00,750 manage the A . S . F . F . As we go 2522 01:36:00,750 --> 01:36:02,917 forward . We're keenly aware of that . 2523 01:36:02,917 --> 01:36:05,139 That is right at the centerpiece of our 2524 01:36:05,139 --> 01:36:07,361 planning and we're working very closely 2525 01:36:07,361 --> 01:36:06,710 with the Department of State to make 2526 01:36:06,710 --> 01:36:08,821 those determinations . Thank you very 2527 01:36:08,821 --> 01:36:12,430 much . Mr . On your back . Thank 2528 01:36:12,430 --> 01:36:14,730 you represent Carvajal . The chair now 2529 01:36:14,730 --> 01:36:16,786 recognizes wraps up gates in Florida 2530 01:36:16,786 --> 01:36:20,050 for five minutes . Thank you . Mr 2531 01:36:20,050 --> 01:36:23,010 Chairman . All right . I want to talk 2532 01:36:23,010 --> 01:36:24,843 about chad . General Town Senate 2533 01:36:24,843 --> 01:36:26,954 appears in the last several hours the 2534 01:36:26,954 --> 01:36:29,770 president of chad was killed on engaged 2535 01:36:29,770 --> 01:36:32,600 in front line fighting against rebels 2536 01:36:32,600 --> 01:36:35,050 who had based in Libya and had crossed 2537 01:36:35,050 --> 01:36:37,480 the border . What do you know currently 2538 01:36:37,490 --> 01:36:40,180 about the situation in chad and 2539 01:36:40,180 --> 01:36:43,770 particularly any change to the counter 2540 01:36:43,770 --> 01:36:46,070 terrorism cooperation that we've been 2541 01:36:46,070 --> 01:36:48,237 able to rely on from that government . 2542 01:36:53,430 --> 01:36:55,652 Thanks congressman . As you know , it's 2543 01:36:55,652 --> 01:36:57,597 sort of breaking news story . As I 2544 01:36:57,597 --> 01:36:59,950 walked in here this morning , we 2545 01:36:59,950 --> 01:37:02,260 learned about the reported and 2546 01:37:02,260 --> 01:37:04,860 confirmed death . President Deby , he's 2547 01:37:04,860 --> 01:37:08,780 a retired general and he has 2548 01:37:08,780 --> 01:37:12,240 in the past , uh , gone to the front 2549 01:37:12,250 --> 01:37:14,770 where there was action and we don't 2550 01:37:14,770 --> 01:37:16,826 know exactly how he got killed . But 2551 01:37:16,826 --> 01:37:19,048 the report is , he was killed in action 2552 01:37:19,048 --> 01:37:20,937 up there , uh , facing off with a 2553 01:37:20,937 --> 01:37:23,550 column of rebels that are not 2554 01:37:23,560 --> 01:37:25,782 terrorists . They're not ISIS , they're 2555 01:37:25,782 --> 01:37:28,930 not Al Qaeda . Um , they are anti , 2556 01:37:28,940 --> 01:37:32,140 they were actually anti regime in chad . 2557 01:37:32,530 --> 01:37:36,340 They were based in southern Libya . Uh , 2558 01:37:36,350 --> 01:37:38,572 they mounted up in several 100 vehicles 2559 01:37:38,572 --> 01:37:40,970 and they transited a long way across 2560 01:37:40,970 --> 01:37:43,450 the chadian desert , uh , towards the 2561 01:37:43,450 --> 01:37:45,561 south . The chadian government forces 2562 01:37:45,561 --> 01:37:47,450 started engaging them . They were 2563 01:37:47,450 --> 01:37:50,530 supported by the french . We observe 2564 01:37:50,530 --> 01:37:54,340 this . Um , and then President , it 2565 01:37:54,340 --> 01:37:56,810 looked like that the column had made 2566 01:37:56,810 --> 01:37:58,810 the decision to withdraw . This has 2567 01:37:58,810 --> 01:38:00,900 happened before . They were about to 2568 01:38:00,900 --> 01:38:03,122 withdraw , we think , and then the news 2569 01:38:03,122 --> 01:38:05,289 of the President Debbie's death became 2570 01:38:05,289 --> 01:38:07,680 known . It's unclear what this means 2571 01:38:07,680 --> 01:38:10,570 for our relationship there . 2572 01:38:10,580 --> 01:38:13,920 His son , President Deby son , 2573 01:38:13,930 --> 01:38:16,650 former intel intel chief has been 2574 01:38:16,650 --> 01:38:19,560 appointed as the interim president . Um 2575 01:38:19,570 --> 01:38:23,150 We expect that he , he is inclined 2576 01:38:23,150 --> 01:38:25,317 towards good relationships with France 2577 01:38:25,317 --> 01:38:27,428 and the United States . Uh , we think 2578 01:38:27,428 --> 01:38:29,428 that will continue . There could be 2579 01:38:29,428 --> 01:38:31,594 some potential for violence and we are 2580 01:38:31,594 --> 01:38:33,817 working closely with our country team . 2581 01:38:33,817 --> 01:38:35,928 There are embassy did a precautionary 2582 01:38:35,928 --> 01:38:38,150 drawdown of personnel uh , to a minimum 2583 01:38:38,150 --> 01:38:40,317 staff . And we also have some military 2584 01:38:40,317 --> 01:38:42,539 folks . They're working with the french 2585 01:38:42,539 --> 01:38:44,539 and the embassy . So we're watching 2586 01:38:44,539 --> 01:38:46,539 this very closely to keep americans 2587 01:38:46,539 --> 01:38:46,310 safe . While this becomes a little more 2588 01:38:46,310 --> 01:38:49,940 clear , it seems tactically significant 2589 01:38:49,940 --> 01:38:52,107 that these rebels were able to base in 2590 01:38:52,107 --> 01:38:54,218 Southern Libya that they were able to 2591 01:38:54,218 --> 01:38:56,320 traverse such a distance and then 2592 01:38:56,330 --> 01:38:58,970 execute this mission . It might suggest 2593 01:38:58,970 --> 01:39:01,350 that the situation in Libya is getting 2594 01:39:01,350 --> 01:39:04,370 worse as well with a failed state 2595 01:39:04,380 --> 01:39:07,210 following the Gaddafi regime . With 2596 01:39:07,210 --> 01:39:09,980 this transition council that has 2597 01:39:10,170 --> 01:39:13,540 President Deby Son now in some position 2598 01:39:13,540 --> 01:39:15,762 of leadership , I guess the position of 2599 01:39:15,762 --> 01:39:17,929 leadership in the country . Um what do 2600 01:39:17,929 --> 01:39:20,151 we expect from the french ? I know that 2601 01:39:20,151 --> 01:39:22,484 they were very supportive of the regime . 2602 01:39:22,484 --> 01:39:24,651 Is there anything that we would expect 2603 01:39:24,651 --> 01:39:26,484 as a change from regarding their 2604 01:39:26,484 --> 01:39:28,651 involvement with the country ? On your 2605 01:39:28,651 --> 01:39:30,873 point about the situation in Libya , we 2606 01:39:30,873 --> 01:39:32,929 know that the chadian government had 2607 01:39:32,929 --> 01:39:34,929 been supportive and there were also 2608 01:39:34,929 --> 01:39:37,620 factions uh in chad that supported 2609 01:39:37,620 --> 01:39:41,180 various factions in Libya um regarding 2610 01:39:41,180 --> 01:39:43,490 the future with this uh interim 2611 01:39:43,490 --> 01:39:45,712 President , the son of President Deby , 2612 01:39:45,712 --> 01:39:48,030 uh the interim President Deby . Um 2613 01:39:48,040 --> 01:39:51,980 right now I anticipate that it 2614 01:39:51,980 --> 01:39:53,970 will he will be favorable to good 2615 01:39:53,970 --> 01:39:55,914 relations with France and France I 2616 01:39:55,914 --> 01:39:58,330 anticipate will continue to do what 2617 01:39:58,330 --> 01:40:00,330 they've been doing up to this point 2618 01:40:00,330 --> 01:40:02,552 supporting the government of chad . But 2619 01:40:02,552 --> 01:40:04,719 I have to be honest with you , this is 2620 01:40:04,719 --> 01:40:06,830 breaking news and it's not clear , it 2621 01:40:06,830 --> 01:40:09,052 sort of seems when a president who took 2622 01:40:09,052 --> 01:40:11,640 power through a military coup then dies 2623 01:40:11,640 --> 01:40:14,360 in a battle against political rebels , 2624 01:40:14,370 --> 01:40:18,130 not religious extremists and then 2625 01:40:18,130 --> 01:40:21,930 gives rise to his son being selected by 2626 01:40:21,930 --> 01:40:23,986 the National council . That it's not 2627 01:40:23,986 --> 01:40:26,000 the strongest case for emerging 2628 01:40:26,000 --> 01:40:28,320 democracy in africa . It seems to 2629 01:40:28,320 --> 01:40:30,540 suggest more of a move toward 2630 01:40:30,550 --> 01:40:33,270 authoritarianism and I think that's 2631 01:40:33,270 --> 01:40:35,603 something we should all watch carefully . 2632 01:40:35,603 --> 01:40:37,826 I think the Chairman and I yield back . 2633 01:40:37,826 --> 01:40:41,700 Yeah , mm . Thank 2634 01:40:41,700 --> 01:40:44,110 you . Uh Chair recognizes represents 2635 01:40:44,110 --> 01:40:46,320 lock in michigan . Thank you . Mr 2636 01:40:46,320 --> 01:40:48,487 Chairman . Um , happy to see all three 2637 01:40:48,487 --> 01:40:50,598 of you here . Um , some of our really 2638 01:40:50,598 --> 01:40:52,820 foremost experts on the Middle East and 2639 01:40:52,820 --> 01:40:55,042 africa that we have in our government . 2640 01:40:55,042 --> 01:40:56,931 Um , my questions are going to be 2641 01:40:56,931 --> 01:40:58,876 primarily for General Mackenzie on 2642 01:40:58,876 --> 01:41:00,987 Afghanistan . Um , you know , I think 2643 01:41:00,987 --> 01:41:04,000 for the most part , most of us feel at 2644 01:41:04,000 --> 01:41:06,167 least I feel from my constituents that 2645 01:41:06,167 --> 01:41:08,389 they want to be out of Afghanistan . We 2646 01:41:08,389 --> 01:41:10,556 have fathers who are sending off their 2647 01:41:10,556 --> 01:41:12,500 sons to fight in the same war they 2648 01:41:12,500 --> 01:41:14,667 fought in . But what holds people back 2649 01:41:14,667 --> 01:41:16,778 is this fear that the exact reason we 2650 01:41:16,778 --> 01:41:18,611 went in , you know , a threat of 2651 01:41:18,611 --> 01:41:20,778 terrorist attacks against our homeland 2652 01:41:20,778 --> 01:41:22,722 and our allies could creep back up 2653 01:41:22,722 --> 01:41:25,770 again . Um , so help us understand , I 2654 01:41:25,770 --> 01:41:27,659 understand we'll talk more of the 2655 01:41:27,659 --> 01:41:30,100 classified stuff in a separate session , 2656 01:41:30,110 --> 01:41:32,850 but general kensi help reassure my 2657 01:41:32,850 --> 01:41:35,300 constituents that by pulling out , we 2658 01:41:35,300 --> 01:41:38,490 won't be doing right going right back 2659 01:41:38,490 --> 01:41:41,090 in because we have a threat that 2660 01:41:41,090 --> 01:41:42,979 impacts us here in the homeland . 2661 01:41:43,510 --> 01:41:46,080 Thanks . Thanks mom for that . And I 2662 01:41:46,080 --> 01:41:47,802 appreciate the concern of your 2663 01:41:47,802 --> 01:41:49,913 constituents like them . I've sent my 2664 01:41:49,913 --> 01:41:52,080 son twice to Afghanistan , so I'm very 2665 01:41:52,080 --> 01:41:54,630 much aware of those concerns . Uh , uh , 2666 01:41:55,310 --> 01:41:57,421 as we've talked a little bit before , 2667 01:41:57,421 --> 01:41:59,032 we're going to go to zero in 2668 01:41:59,032 --> 01:42:01,254 Afghanistan . That means there'll be no 2669 01:42:01,254 --> 01:42:03,477 U . S . Forces on the ground there . We 2670 01:42:03,477 --> 01:42:03,410 will use a variety of means to monitor 2671 01:42:03,410 --> 01:42:05,720 Al Qaeda and ISIS in Afghanistan . 2672 01:42:05,760 --> 01:42:09,030 It'll intelligence will decline A 2673 01:42:09,040 --> 01:42:11,210 Director of National CIA Director has 2674 01:42:11,210 --> 01:42:13,321 said that , but we will still be able 2675 01:42:13,321 --> 01:42:15,432 to see into Afghanistan . There still 2676 01:42:15,432 --> 01:42:17,599 will be ways to do that . Much of that 2677 01:42:17,599 --> 01:42:17,480 will depend on the embassy platform 2678 01:42:17,480 --> 01:42:19,091 that remains and that is yet 2679 01:42:19,091 --> 01:42:21,313 undetermined . But that will be helpful 2680 01:42:21,313 --> 01:42:23,591 if we maintain an embassy there . Well , 2681 01:42:23,591 --> 01:42:23,050 we're gonna be able to continue to look 2682 01:42:23,050 --> 01:42:24,883 into Afghanistan and I think the 2683 01:42:24,883 --> 01:42:27,106 president's been very clear , we're not 2684 01:42:27,106 --> 01:42:28,772 going to re enter to reoccupy 2685 01:42:28,772 --> 01:42:30,717 Afghanistan and or any conceivable 2686 01:42:30,717 --> 01:42:32,939 circumstances . What we will retain the 2687 01:42:32,939 --> 01:42:35,106 ability to do is to find and fix those 2688 01:42:35,106 --> 01:42:37,328 people who plan attacks against us that 2689 01:42:37,328 --> 01:42:39,550 we can detect and then when appropriate 2690 01:42:39,550 --> 01:42:41,494 we will be able to strike them . I 2691 01:42:41,494 --> 01:42:43,439 don't want to make that sound easy 2692 01:42:43,439 --> 01:42:43,100 because it's not easy . It's going to 2693 01:42:43,100 --> 01:42:45,211 be extremely difficult to do it , but 2694 01:42:45,211 --> 01:42:47,378 it is not impossible to do it . So I'm 2695 01:42:47,378 --> 01:42:49,433 deeply impacted by our experience in 2696 01:42:49,433 --> 01:42:51,600 Iraq as someone who grew up as an Iraq 2697 01:42:51,600 --> 01:42:53,822 specialist um and who didn't agree with 2698 01:42:53,822 --> 01:42:56,340 the decision to go to zero in Iraq . Um 2699 01:42:56,340 --> 01:42:58,507 And then watched in the years after we 2700 01:42:58,507 --> 01:43:00,673 had pulled out how difficult it was to 2701 01:43:00,673 --> 01:43:02,896 get Washington to pay attention to what 2702 01:43:02,896 --> 01:43:05,310 was then a growing threat of ISIS . We 2703 01:43:05,310 --> 01:43:07,532 couldn't get the intelligence support , 2704 01:43:07,532 --> 01:43:09,588 we couldn't get the overhead imagery 2705 01:43:09,588 --> 01:43:11,810 support . We couldn't get the attention 2706 01:43:11,810 --> 01:43:14,032 of folks um when we saw things creeping 2707 01:43:14,032 --> 01:43:16,088 back in the wrong direction , please 2708 01:43:16,088 --> 01:43:16,010 help me understand how this will be 2709 01:43:16,010 --> 01:43:18,460 different . Well , speaking of the 2710 01:43:18,460 --> 01:43:20,404 future , I don't know , but I will 2711 01:43:20,404 --> 01:43:22,516 certainly be a relentless advocate to 2712 01:43:22,516 --> 01:43:24,682 keep the focus on Afghanistan . We are 2713 01:43:24,682 --> 01:43:26,738 going to shift assets out of central 2714 01:43:26,738 --> 01:43:26,010 command . That's a given that's going 2715 01:43:26,010 --> 01:43:28,232 to happen at the same time . We need to 2716 01:43:28,232 --> 01:43:30,399 balance against what we know the known 2717 01:43:30,399 --> 01:43:32,454 aspiration of these groups to launch 2718 01:43:32,454 --> 01:43:34,621 attacks against the United States that 2719 01:43:34,621 --> 01:43:36,732 hasn't gone away and it's there right 2720 01:43:36,732 --> 01:43:38,899 now , they're they're depressed . They 2721 01:43:38,899 --> 01:43:41,010 have very little ability to do that . 2722 01:43:41,010 --> 01:43:40,370 Certainly , it's possible they could , 2723 01:43:40,370 --> 01:43:42,481 they could re establish themselves in 2724 01:43:42,481 --> 01:43:44,481 the future . It's also possible the 2725 01:43:44,481 --> 01:43:46,703 Taliban will do some of the things that 2726 01:43:46,703 --> 01:43:46,500 they've said they're going to do . I'll 2727 01:43:46,500 --> 01:43:48,500 just watch that very closely to see 2728 01:43:48,500 --> 01:43:50,500 that it happens . I think that is a 2729 01:43:50,500 --> 01:43:52,500 reasonable concern and I share that 2730 01:43:52,500 --> 01:43:54,611 concern frankly . And I know that you 2731 01:43:54,611 --> 01:43:54,210 know , we've learned in the past 20 2732 01:43:54,210 --> 01:43:56,760 years that are best attempts in these 2733 01:43:56,760 --> 01:43:58,816 wars is through coalitions , through 2734 01:43:58,816 --> 01:44:00,982 alliances , doing things with partners 2735 01:44:00,982 --> 01:44:02,927 and allies . So I'm heartened that 2736 01:44:02,927 --> 01:44:05,260 we're having the conversation with them . 2737 01:44:05,260 --> 01:44:07,316 But is there anything planned on the 2738 01:44:07,316 --> 01:44:09,538 regional security architecture a formal 2739 01:44:09,538 --> 01:44:11,593 plan with our allies and partners to 2740 01:44:11,593 --> 01:44:13,760 have a conversation not just about how 2741 01:44:13,760 --> 01:44:15,871 to end the war but how to contain the 2742 01:44:15,871 --> 01:44:18,038 situation after the war has ended . So 2743 01:44:18,038 --> 01:44:20,260 I defer to Mr Dorian for some of that . 2744 01:44:20,260 --> 01:44:22,093 But I would say what's been very 2745 01:44:22,093 --> 01:44:24,149 impressive to me has been a complete 2746 01:44:24,149 --> 01:44:25,704 and comprehensive degree of 2747 01:44:25,704 --> 01:44:27,538 consultation that went into this 2748 01:44:27,538 --> 01:44:29,482 decision and the execution of this 2749 01:44:29,482 --> 01:44:31,649 decision , both with our NATO partners 2750 01:44:31,649 --> 01:44:31,620 or other coalition partners on the 2751 01:44:31,620 --> 01:44:33,787 ground and in fact regional partners . 2752 01:44:33,787 --> 01:44:36,009 So I think that sets the stage for some 2753 01:44:36,009 --> 01:44:38,064 former regional architecture , but I 2754 01:44:38,064 --> 01:44:39,842 did for the mystery for further 2755 01:44:39,842 --> 01:44:42,009 comments on that . I'll go to Missouri 2756 01:44:42,009 --> 01:44:44,120 in just a second . But just to finish 2757 01:44:44,120 --> 01:44:46,120 out your , one of our most seasoned 2758 01:44:46,120 --> 01:44:48,120 experienced four star generals with 2759 01:44:48,120 --> 01:44:50,287 experience on the ground in the Middle 2760 01:44:50,287 --> 01:44:52,231 East tour after tour , do you feel 2761 01:44:52,231 --> 01:44:54,453 confident that the american people will 2762 01:44:54,453 --> 01:44:56,453 stay safe and not be attacked again 2763 01:44:56,453 --> 01:44:58,620 Emanating out of Afghanistan ? The key 2764 01:44:58,620 --> 01:45:00,620 thing that's different in 2021 from 2765 01:45:00,620 --> 01:45:02,842 2001 is not only what's going on in the 2766 01:45:02,842 --> 01:45:05,064 theater , but our ability to harden the 2767 01:45:05,064 --> 01:45:07,120 country here . The steps we've taken 2768 01:45:07,120 --> 01:45:09,342 here to protect ourselves . It's a very 2769 01:45:09,342 --> 01:45:11,453 different country in terms of ability 2770 01:45:11,453 --> 01:45:13,398 to enter and operate in the United 2771 01:45:13,398 --> 01:45:15,676 States than it was in the fall of 2001 . 2772 01:45:15,676 --> 01:45:17,787 So we worked very hard to ensure that 2773 01:45:17,787 --> 01:45:16,930 attacks are going to come from 2774 01:45:16,930 --> 01:45:19,170 Afghanistan or from africa Or from any 2775 01:45:19,170 --> 01:45:21,281 other place . It begins on the ground 2776 01:45:21,281 --> 01:45:23,281 there , but there's also a broad in 2777 01:45:23,281 --> 01:45:25,503 depth defense that is in place that was 2778 01:45:25,503 --> 01:45:27,448 not in place before and in my last 2779 01:45:27,448 --> 01:45:29,559 remaining 20 seconds . Do you know of 2780 01:45:29,559 --> 01:45:31,820 any discussions with the Afghanis about 2781 01:45:31,830 --> 01:45:33,960 the Afghans ? Excuse me . On a status 2782 01:45:33,960 --> 01:45:35,849 of forces agreement or diplomatic 2783 01:45:35,849 --> 01:45:38,600 security agreement for our embassy . I 2784 01:45:38,610 --> 01:45:40,777 know that I know that's actively being 2785 01:45:40,777 --> 01:45:42,999 work now , but I don't have any details 2786 01:45:42,999 --> 01:45:42,940 beyond that . Thank you . General , 2787 01:45:42,940 --> 01:45:46,050 appreciate it . You're back . Thank you . 2788 01:45:46,050 --> 01:45:47,828 Representative Chair recognizes 2789 01:45:47,828 --> 01:45:49,939 representative waltz florida for five 2790 01:45:49,939 --> 01:45:51,560 minutes represented waltz . 2791 01:45:53,690 --> 01:45:55,690 Thank you . Mr Chairman . I want to 2792 01:45:55,690 --> 01:45:58,710 make . Okay . You're good . Yeah . 2793 01:45:59,090 --> 01:46:02,110 All right . Thank you . Uh , General . 2794 01:46:02,110 --> 01:46:05,030 I just want to pick up all the slackens 2795 01:46:05,030 --> 01:46:08,180 questions . I certainly share her 2796 01:46:08,180 --> 01:46:10,180 concerns . And it was good to spend 2797 01:46:10,180 --> 01:46:12,500 some time with you a few weeks ago . 2798 01:46:13,080 --> 01:46:16,420 Can you talk to me ? What about or or 2799 01:46:16,430 --> 01:46:19,910 mystery ? What basing agreements do we 2800 01:46:19,910 --> 01:46:22,660 have from any of the stands ? Uh 2801 01:46:22,670 --> 01:46:25,800 Tajikistan were obviously we no longer 2802 01:46:26,180 --> 01:46:28,630 where we have no basing Kyrgyzstan . 2803 01:46:28,630 --> 01:46:30,320 Where we no longer have Manas 2804 01:46:30,530 --> 01:46:32,586 Uzbekistan where we no longer have K 2805 01:46:32,586 --> 01:46:34,840 two . What agreements we have with any 2806 01:46:34,840 --> 01:46:37,062 of the neighboring countries to be able 2807 01:46:37,062 --> 01:46:39,173 to base our forces and conduct lethal 2808 01:46:39,173 --> 01:46:41,340 strikes or even surveillance back into 2809 01:46:41,340 --> 01:46:43,062 Afghanistan . Do we have any ? 2810 01:46:43,062 --> 01:46:45,173 Currently at this time ? We have no . 2811 01:46:45,173 --> 01:46:47,173 We have none of those agreements in 2812 01:46:47,173 --> 01:46:49,396 place . General . Do you think it would 2813 01:46:49,396 --> 01:46:51,173 have been optimal to have those 2814 01:46:51,173 --> 01:46:53,284 agreements before we announced to the 2815 01:46:53,284 --> 01:46:55,507 world that we're going to zero in a few 2816 01:46:55,507 --> 01:46:57,451 months ? I can't speak to that . I 2817 01:46:57,451 --> 01:46:56,710 would tell you that right now we're 2818 01:46:56,710 --> 01:46:58,654 engaged in a significant effort to 2819 01:46:58,654 --> 01:47:00,877 evaluate where we want to put potential 2820 01:47:00,877 --> 01:47:02,932 CT forces where they would be best . 2821 01:47:02,932 --> 01:47:04,988 Optimize some geography and also the 2822 01:47:04,988 --> 01:47:07,321 diplomatic angle of it as we go forward . 2823 01:47:08,380 --> 01:47:10,710 I I think we need to be clear with the 2824 01:47:10,710 --> 01:47:12,877 american people that when the military 2825 01:47:12,877 --> 01:47:16,140 goes , our intelligence assets go . Uh 2826 01:47:16,150 --> 01:47:18,980 the agency , the Central Intelligence 2827 01:47:18,980 --> 01:47:21,202 Agency and other agencies are dependent 2828 01:47:21,202 --> 01:47:24,050 on that military backbone and basing 2829 01:47:24,060 --> 01:47:27,560 also our contracts on our contractors 2830 01:47:27,560 --> 01:47:30,200 go with estimates of 15 to 20,000 2831 01:47:30,200 --> 01:47:32,630 currently there providing logistics 2832 01:47:32,630 --> 01:47:34,797 maintenance and other critical support 2833 01:47:34,797 --> 01:47:36,963 of the Afghan security forces . What's 2834 01:47:36,963 --> 01:47:39,230 the plan for the continuing presence of 2835 01:47:39,230 --> 01:47:41,250 those critical contract support 2836 01:47:41,250 --> 01:47:43,680 services ? So right now most of the 2837 01:47:43,680 --> 01:47:45,513 contractors are going to leave , 2838 01:47:45,513 --> 01:47:47,624 certainly the U . S . Contractors are 2839 01:47:47,624 --> 01:47:49,736 going to leave . We'll try to develop 2840 01:47:49,736 --> 01:47:51,902 ways to do distant distant contracting 2841 01:47:51,902 --> 01:47:54,013 where we can clearly there's gonna be 2842 01:47:54,013 --> 01:47:53,850 some things that we're not going to be 2843 01:47:53,850 --> 01:47:56,017 able to do any more as the contractors 2844 01:47:56,017 --> 01:47:58,350 leave and I don't want to minimize that . 2845 01:47:58,780 --> 01:48:01,002 And and and it's important for everyone 2846 01:48:01,002 --> 01:48:03,350 to understand that those contractors 2847 01:48:03,350 --> 01:48:05,183 were providing maintenance , for 2848 01:48:05,183 --> 01:48:07,239 example , for the Blackhawks that we 2849 01:48:07,239 --> 01:48:09,720 provided to the Afghan security forces 2850 01:48:09,720 --> 01:48:11,670 to the limited close air support 2851 01:48:11,670 --> 01:48:14,340 capabilities that they have and again 2852 01:48:14,340 --> 01:48:16,062 critical logistic and advisory 2853 01:48:16,062 --> 01:48:18,229 functions . All of that is going to be 2854 01:48:18,229 --> 01:48:20,290 gone in the next few months . Uh And 2855 01:48:20,290 --> 01:48:23,440 both a number of reports , both think 2856 01:48:23,440 --> 01:48:25,496 tank intelligence community and even 2857 01:48:25,496 --> 01:48:27,960 afghans themselves have cast real doubt 2858 01:48:27,970 --> 01:48:30,081 on the ability of the afghan security 2859 01:48:30,081 --> 01:48:33,070 forces to continue to hold without that 2860 01:48:33,070 --> 01:48:35,930 support . So , I fear to to add on to 2861 01:48:35,940 --> 01:48:38,530 Miss Larkins questions if the Taliban 2862 01:48:38,530 --> 01:48:40,641 does take over , or we do even have a 2863 01:48:40,641 --> 01:48:42,474 power sharing agreement with the 2864 01:48:42,474 --> 01:48:44,697 Taliban will now be reliant on them for 2865 01:48:44,697 --> 01:48:48,500 any basing overflight or or any type of 2866 01:48:48,500 --> 01:48:50,722 authorities that we need to go after Al 2867 01:48:50,722 --> 01:48:53,056 Qaeda , assuming that they'll give them . 2868 01:48:53,056 --> 01:48:55,850 Is that , do I have that wrong ? So , 2869 01:48:55,850 --> 01:48:58,140 that's a lot of future hypotheticals 2870 01:48:58,140 --> 01:49:00,251 that I'm probably not the best person 2871 01:49:00,251 --> 01:49:02,418 to talk about . I would tell you right 2872 01:49:02,418 --> 01:49:04,251 now , though , there's still the 2873 01:49:04,251 --> 01:49:06,307 possibility of inter Afghan dialogue 2874 01:49:06,307 --> 01:49:08,473 that could still continue . We can all 2875 01:49:08,473 --> 01:49:08,000 have our own assessment about the 2876 01:49:08,000 --> 01:49:10,167 probability of that reaching success , 2877 01:49:10,167 --> 01:49:12,700 but that still continues well . But 2878 01:49:12,700 --> 01:49:15,310 general that I want to be clear with uh 2879 01:49:15,320 --> 01:49:17,640 with with everyone that it is not a 2880 01:49:17,640 --> 01:49:19,807 hypothetical that the State Department 2881 01:49:19,807 --> 01:49:21,862 has introduced a draft power sharing 2882 01:49:21,862 --> 01:49:24,500 agreement into the dialogue where the 2883 01:49:24,510 --> 01:49:26,677 Afghan government would dissolve as it 2884 01:49:26,677 --> 01:49:28,788 currently stands and share power with 2885 01:49:28,788 --> 01:49:30,788 the Taliban . So it's I don't think 2886 01:49:30,788 --> 01:49:32,954 it's it's elite to say , we would then 2887 01:49:32,954 --> 01:49:34,899 have to negotiate them for any any 2888 01:49:34,899 --> 01:49:37,530 ability to return and go after Al Qaeda . 2889 01:49:37,540 --> 01:49:39,940 My question is what military , so 2890 01:49:39,940 --> 01:49:43,720 assume they have the will uh to uh 2891 01:49:43,730 --> 01:49:46,560 to turn on and and and conduct 2892 01:49:46,560 --> 01:49:48,860 operations against al Qaeda ? What 2893 01:49:48,860 --> 01:49:51,100 military capability does the Taliban 2894 01:49:51,100 --> 01:49:54,110 have ? That 300,000 men , Afghan army 2895 01:49:54,120 --> 01:49:57,350 and 42 coalition nations have struggled 2896 01:49:57,590 --> 01:50:00,380 in terms of containing Al Qaeda . What 2897 01:50:00,380 --> 01:50:02,658 military capabilities the afghans have ? 2898 01:50:02,960 --> 01:50:05,071 So the afghans would have significant 2899 01:50:05,071 --> 01:50:07,182 residual capability . It would depend 2900 01:50:07,182 --> 01:50:09,127 on if the nation is whole , if the 2901 01:50:09,127 --> 01:50:11,071 nation is fractured , if there's a 2902 01:50:11,071 --> 01:50:13,071 civil war , their variety of future 2903 01:50:13,071 --> 01:50:15,127 contingents that would uh that would 2904 01:50:15,127 --> 01:50:14,840 directly affect the ability of the 2905 01:50:14,840 --> 01:50:16,896 afghan , whatever whoever is leading 2906 01:50:16,896 --> 01:50:18,729 the afghan afghan government and 2907 01:50:18,729 --> 01:50:20,951 whatever state it is , their ability to 2908 01:50:20,951 --> 01:50:22,951 actually concentrate combat power . 2909 01:50:22,951 --> 01:50:25,284 Some of those scenarios you've outlined , 2910 01:50:25,284 --> 01:50:27,340 it would be a fractured state . They 2911 01:50:27,340 --> 01:50:29,284 would not be able to do it . Other 2912 01:50:29,284 --> 01:50:28,980 scenarios , they might be able to do it . 2913 01:50:30,760 --> 01:50:32,927 No , thank you . General . Just at the 2914 01:50:32,927 --> 01:50:34,871 time I have remaining would bagram 2915 01:50:34,871 --> 01:50:38,190 airbase be valuable to you being where 2916 01:50:38,190 --> 01:50:41,030 it's located geographically west of 2917 01:50:41,030 --> 01:50:43,308 China , south of Russia , east of Iran . 2918 01:50:44,260 --> 01:50:46,580 Bagram is keeping in great power 2919 01:50:46,580 --> 01:50:48,860 contingencies . Bagram is key terrain 2920 01:50:48,860 --> 01:50:50,416 tactically in Afghanistan . 2921 01:50:50,416 --> 01:50:52,582 Operationally and strategically is the 2922 01:50:52,582 --> 01:50:56,170 definition of key terrain and and it's 2923 01:50:56,170 --> 01:50:58,281 notable that we're about to just give 2924 01:50:58,281 --> 01:51:00,226 that away with nothing in return . 2925 01:51:00,226 --> 01:51:02,190 Thank you . Mr . Chairman . I you 2926 01:51:03,160 --> 01:51:05,327 Gentlemen . Time's expired . The chair 2927 01:51:05,327 --> 01:51:07,160 recognizes represent Hoolahan of 2928 01:51:07,160 --> 01:51:09,640 Pennsylvania for five minutes . Thank 2929 01:51:09,640 --> 01:51:12,080 you . Mr . Chair . My questions first 2930 01:51:12,080 --> 01:51:14,136 to the General Mackenzie and General 2931 01:51:14,136 --> 01:51:16,136 Towns and I have to do with china , 2932 01:51:16,136 --> 01:51:17,969 which is obviously significantly 2933 01:51:17,969 --> 01:51:19,858 invested in Pakistan and parts of 2934 01:51:19,858 --> 01:51:21,969 Africa as part of their belt and road 2935 01:51:21,969 --> 01:51:24,191 initiative . And I was wondering if you 2936 01:51:24,191 --> 01:51:26,358 could tell me a little bit if you have 2937 01:51:26,358 --> 01:51:28,358 any concerns about them in terms of 2938 01:51:28,358 --> 01:51:30,524 national security in the region . Uh , 2939 01:51:30,524 --> 01:51:32,747 and also , if you might be able to tell 2940 01:51:32,747 --> 01:51:34,969 us if you have heard any whisperings of 2941 01:51:34,969 --> 01:51:36,747 the fact that they are , may be 2942 01:51:36,747 --> 01:51:38,691 interested in sending peacekeeping 2943 01:51:38,691 --> 01:51:40,858 troops to Afghanistan . If we indeed , 2944 01:51:40,858 --> 01:51:43,390 you leave the region . I'll begin 2945 01:51:43,390 --> 01:51:45,501 briefly , just talk about the Central 2946 01:51:45,501 --> 01:51:47,446 command before handing over to the 2947 01:51:47,446 --> 01:51:49,446 general towns . And so we see china 2948 01:51:49,446 --> 01:51:51,057 operating in central command 2949 01:51:51,057 --> 01:51:52,668 principally from an economic 2950 01:51:52,668 --> 01:51:54,723 perspective , they offer a number of 2951 01:51:54,723 --> 01:51:57,001 apparently seductive and attractive uh , 2952 01:51:57,001 --> 01:51:59,057 infrastructure and other development 2953 01:51:59,057 --> 01:52:01,223 loans and projects to countries in the 2954 01:52:01,223 --> 01:52:03,390 region which then have on the back end 2955 01:52:03,390 --> 01:52:02,900 of that or not , don't appear to be 2956 01:52:02,900 --> 01:52:04,900 such a good deal . After all , they 2957 01:52:04,900 --> 01:52:07,178 want access to the region . They would , 2958 01:52:07,178 --> 01:52:09,289 I think eventually want to seek naval 2959 01:52:09,289 --> 01:52:11,344 basing in the region because they do 2960 01:52:11,344 --> 01:52:11,190 import a significant amount of their 2961 01:52:11,190 --> 01:52:13,190 hydro carbons through the strait of 2962 01:52:13,190 --> 01:52:15,246 hormones and out of the region . But 2963 01:52:15,246 --> 01:52:17,246 for now , for the short term to the 2964 01:52:17,246 --> 01:52:19,246 medium term , it is printed , it is 2965 01:52:19,246 --> 01:52:21,357 principally economic engagement going 2966 01:52:21,357 --> 01:52:23,523 forward . And you're right , we see it 2967 01:52:23,523 --> 01:52:23,180 in Pakistan , but also in some of the 2968 01:52:23,180 --> 01:52:25,100 gulf states , it is significantly 2969 01:52:25,100 --> 01:52:27,211 concerning to me . They are playing a 2970 01:52:27,211 --> 01:52:29,322 very long game and they're playing it 2971 01:52:29,322 --> 01:52:31,544 with vast amounts of resources . And so 2972 01:52:31,544 --> 01:52:34,290 do you see any concerns or significant 2973 01:52:34,290 --> 01:52:36,720 concerns as a result of that ? I am 2974 01:52:36,720 --> 01:52:38,887 very concerned about where we're going 2975 01:52:38,887 --> 01:52:41,053 to be in a few years with china in the 2976 01:52:41,053 --> 01:52:43,053 region . I believe that some of the 2977 01:52:43,053 --> 01:52:45,109 nation states in the region are also 2978 01:52:45,109 --> 01:52:47,331 waking up to this and becoming aware of 2979 01:52:47,331 --> 01:52:47,080 it because they see what's happening in 2980 01:52:47,080 --> 01:52:49,191 africa . They see what's happening in 2981 01:52:49,191 --> 01:52:51,247 South America and other parts of the 2982 01:52:51,247 --> 01:52:51,120 globe . And as you know , there are 2983 01:52:51,120 --> 01:52:53,287 nations in the region that actually do 2984 01:52:53,287 --> 01:52:55,509 have significant resources themselves . 2985 01:52:55,509 --> 01:52:57,509 So they don't need to fall into the 2986 01:52:57,509 --> 01:52:59,398 debt trap with china . Others are 2987 01:52:59,398 --> 01:53:01,620 susceptible to that . Uh , that to that 2988 01:53:01,620 --> 01:53:03,520 predatory diplomacy and General 2989 01:53:03,520 --> 01:53:05,853 Townsend , do you have anything as well ? 2990 01:53:06,450 --> 01:53:09,440 I'd say our concerns are very similar 2991 01:53:09,450 --> 01:53:11,840 to those expressed by General Mackenzie . 2992 01:53:11,840 --> 01:53:13,618 I don't know if you receive the 2993 01:53:13,618 --> 01:53:15,618 placemats , we handed out placemats 2994 01:53:15,618 --> 01:53:17,340 here in the room and I told we 2995 01:53:17,340 --> 01:53:19,618 distribute them electronically as well . 2996 01:53:19,618 --> 01:53:21,784 One of them is on general . We do have 2997 01:53:21,784 --> 01:53:24,007 those placements . Thank you . Uh , the 2998 01:53:24,007 --> 01:53:26,180 uh , what , what china is doing in 2999 01:53:26,180 --> 01:53:28,236 Africa and that kind of gives you an 3000 01:53:28,236 --> 01:53:30,347 idea . I think the only thing I'd add 3001 01:53:30,347 --> 01:53:32,347 to what General Mackenzie said is , 3002 01:53:32,347 --> 01:53:35,050 they very much have intent to establish 3003 01:53:35,050 --> 01:53:37,580 additional overseas bases in Africa , 3004 01:53:37,950 --> 01:53:41,110 whether that beyond the atlantic coast 3005 01:53:41,110 --> 01:53:43,277 of Africa or the indian ocean coast of 3006 01:53:43,277 --> 01:53:45,110 Africa , they're working hard to 3007 01:53:45,110 --> 01:53:48,470 establish a naval bases and or air 3008 01:53:48,470 --> 01:53:50,581 bases and that is of great concern to 3009 01:53:50,581 --> 01:53:54,290 Africa . And so with 3010 01:53:54,290 --> 01:53:56,234 regard to , you know , a potential 3011 01:53:56,234 --> 01:53:58,346 build up of china , do you anticipate 3012 01:53:58,346 --> 01:54:00,568 General Townsend um with the withdrawal 3013 01:54:00,568 --> 01:54:02,623 of troops from Afghanistan , that we 3014 01:54:02,623 --> 01:54:04,734 might increase our troops in Africa ? 3015 01:54:04,734 --> 01:54:06,957 Uh given that there , as we know , is a 3016 01:54:06,957 --> 01:54:09,179 constant threat of extremism , how will 3017 01:54:09,179 --> 01:54:11,457 we possibly do that ? I think , indeed , 3018 01:54:11,457 --> 01:54:14,960 that is our plan . Do you think , um 3019 01:54:14,970 --> 01:54:17,410 Congresswoman , I don't , as an economy 3020 01:54:17,410 --> 01:54:19,750 of force effort for the Department of 3021 01:54:19,750 --> 01:54:21,530 Defense , I don't anticipate 3022 01:54:21,540 --> 01:54:24,300 significant uplift of resources to 3023 01:54:24,300 --> 01:54:26,320 africom despite the drawdown in 3024 01:54:26,320 --> 01:54:28,540 Afghanistan . Uh so I'm not 3025 01:54:28,550 --> 01:54:30,717 anticipating that , but we're going to 3026 01:54:30,717 --> 01:54:33,620 undergo this global posture review and 3027 01:54:33,620 --> 01:54:35,730 we're gonna work through all those 3028 01:54:35,730 --> 01:54:39,720 questions . Uh huh . I look 3029 01:54:39,720 --> 01:54:41,887 forward to that . I do have concerns . 3030 01:54:41,887 --> 01:54:43,720 I know I don't I'm not alone and 3031 01:54:43,720 --> 01:54:45,942 sharing those concerns with that , that 3032 01:54:45,942 --> 01:54:48,053 particular part of the world , Africa 3033 01:54:48,053 --> 01:54:50,109 seems to be a rising opportunity for 3034 01:54:50,109 --> 01:54:52,500 terrorists to land there in the absence 3035 01:54:52,500 --> 01:54:54,611 of other places around the world that 3036 01:54:54,611 --> 01:54:56,667 they could land . And I just want to 3037 01:54:56,667 --> 01:54:58,889 make sure that we're keeping our eye on 3038 01:54:58,889 --> 01:55:01,000 the region . I appreciate your time , 3039 01:55:01,000 --> 01:55:03,056 gentlemen . And I'll yell back thank 3040 01:55:03,056 --> 01:55:04,778 you . Representative Chair now 3041 01:55:04,778 --> 01:55:06,611 recognizes Representative Ice of 3042 01:55:06,611 --> 01:55:09,020 Oklahoma for five minutes , thank you . 3043 01:55:09,020 --> 01:55:11,430 Mr Chairman , thank you , General . I'm 3044 01:55:11,430 --> 01:55:13,541 sorry , thank you for being here this 3045 01:55:13,541 --> 01:55:15,374 afternoon . Um My first question 3046 01:55:15,374 --> 01:55:17,990 revolves around china and Russia and 3047 01:55:17,990 --> 01:55:19,823 there continue to reach into the 3048 01:55:19,823 --> 01:55:22,550 African region . One of the things that 3049 01:55:22,560 --> 01:55:24,620 I have learned in my very short time 3050 01:55:24,620 --> 01:55:27,090 here is that rare earth minerals are 3051 01:55:27,090 --> 01:55:30,630 becoming a very big concern 3052 01:55:30,630 --> 01:55:33,030 and the chinese and Russians are 3053 01:55:33,030 --> 01:55:36,440 tapping into uh the African region to 3054 01:55:36,440 --> 01:55:39,490 try to mind those . What are the is the 3055 01:55:39,490 --> 01:55:42,370 drd taking any steps to facilitate um 3056 01:55:42,740 --> 01:55:45,320 access ? Uh She goes rare earth 3057 01:55:45,320 --> 01:55:48,670 minerals for domestic ease . Okay , 3058 01:55:49,140 --> 01:55:51,473 thanks to your question , congresswoman , 3059 01:55:51,473 --> 01:55:53,807 the on the topic of rare earth minerals . 3060 01:55:53,810 --> 01:55:55,921 Both countries , as you pointed out , 3061 01:55:55,921 --> 01:55:57,950 are seeking to exploit those on the 3062 01:55:57,950 --> 01:56:01,550 African continent . The Russians are 3063 01:56:01,560 --> 01:56:04,690 sort of near term exploiters uh and the 3064 01:56:04,690 --> 01:56:06,801 chinese are more strategic exploiters 3065 01:56:06,801 --> 01:56:09,680 in my view there very carefully seeking 3066 01:56:09,680 --> 01:56:12,990 out mineral deposits that they want to 3067 01:56:13,000 --> 01:56:15,690 um lockdown for the future . Uh The 3068 01:56:15,700 --> 01:56:17,922 Department of Defense is supporting the 3069 01:56:17,922 --> 01:56:20,320 U . S . A . I . D . And the Department 3070 01:56:20,320 --> 01:56:22,542 of State in this effort . We don't have 3071 01:56:22,542 --> 01:56:25,030 a particular effort directed at 3072 01:56:25,040 --> 01:56:27,970 securing rare earth minerals on the 3073 01:56:27,980 --> 01:56:30,320 video decide . But we are supporting 3074 01:56:30,320 --> 01:56:32,653 our interagency partners in that regard . 3075 01:56:33,330 --> 01:56:36,060 Do you feel like that's being effective ? 3076 01:56:37,630 --> 01:56:40,240 I know that it has the energy of this 3077 01:56:40,240 --> 01:56:42,640 administration . It's a great concern 3078 01:56:42,640 --> 01:56:44,862 to this administration . I think it's a 3079 01:56:44,862 --> 01:56:48,500 legitimate concern um 3080 01:56:48,510 --> 01:56:52,360 pivoting just debate here . We've also 3081 01:56:52,360 --> 01:56:54,416 heard a lot about technology and the 3082 01:56:54,416 --> 01:56:56,527 use of technology across the region . 3083 01:56:56,527 --> 01:56:58,980 How are centcom in africa addressing 3084 01:56:58,990 --> 01:57:02,030 the emerging threat of drones and 3085 01:57:02,030 --> 01:57:05,860 transform tactics ? I'll 3086 01:57:05,870 --> 01:57:08,092 uh and that can really sort of apply to 3087 01:57:08,092 --> 01:57:10,710 yeah centcom or African ? Sure I'll 3088 01:57:10,710 --> 01:57:12,599 answer and hand it off to General 3089 01:57:12,599 --> 01:57:16,360 Mackenzie in my first encounter 3090 01:57:16,360 --> 01:57:19,240 with drone delivered munitions was in 3091 01:57:19,240 --> 01:57:22,030 the Battle of Mosul in Iraq two or 3092 01:57:22,030 --> 01:57:25,270 three years ago . Uh So this is an area 3093 01:57:25,270 --> 01:57:27,270 of great concern to us . We haven't 3094 01:57:27,270 --> 01:57:29,080 seen significant employment of 3095 01:57:29,080 --> 01:57:31,660 weaponized drones in Africa yet , but 3096 01:57:31,660 --> 01:57:33,716 we are working very hard to be ready 3097 01:57:33,716 --> 01:57:35,470 for that and head that off the 3098 01:57:35,470 --> 01:57:37,414 Department of Defense . As General 3099 01:57:37,414 --> 01:57:39,303 Mackenzie explained earlier , the 3100 01:57:39,303 --> 01:57:41,192 Department of Defense has a great 3101 01:57:41,192 --> 01:57:43,350 program focused on that threat . I'm 3102 01:57:43,350 --> 01:57:45,890 concerned about the small armed you 3103 01:57:45,900 --> 01:57:49,590 drones as well as the larger one way 3104 01:57:49,600 --> 01:57:52,160 attack drones that we've seen employed 3105 01:57:52,160 --> 01:57:54,960 in the region . Uh , so , uh , I think 3106 01:57:54,960 --> 01:57:57,182 we're focused on it and we're employing 3107 01:57:57,182 --> 01:57:59,490 as much technology as we can uh , to 3108 01:57:59,490 --> 01:58:01,546 prepare for that . General Mackenzie 3109 01:58:02,520 --> 01:58:04,242 thanks so small , commercially 3110 01:58:04,242 --> 01:58:06,187 available drones , one of the most 3111 01:58:06,187 --> 01:58:08,298 persistent and dangerous threats that 3112 01:58:08,298 --> 01:58:10,353 we see in the central Command . They 3113 01:58:10,353 --> 01:58:12,576 are , I am very concerned about it . We 3114 01:58:12,576 --> 01:58:14,631 have ways to deal with a larger land 3115 01:58:14,631 --> 01:58:14,080 attack cruise missiles , they're 3116 01:58:14,080 --> 01:58:16,191 equally there concerning , but we can 3117 01:58:16,191 --> 01:58:18,024 deal with them as an air defense 3118 01:58:18,024 --> 01:58:20,024 problem . It's a lot harder to deal 3119 01:58:20,024 --> 01:58:22,024 with something that small , perhaps 3120 01:58:22,024 --> 01:58:21,750 commercially off the shelf bought 3121 01:58:21,820 --> 01:58:24,260 modified and uh , we're on the wrong 3122 01:58:24,260 --> 01:58:26,482 side of the cost in position curve when 3123 01:58:26,482 --> 01:58:28,710 it comes to these systems . So were a 3124 01:58:28,710 --> 01:58:30,710 lot of a lot of great work is being 3125 01:58:30,710 --> 01:58:32,710 done in the department . We are not 3126 01:58:32,710 --> 01:58:36,630 there yet . Um , and that 3127 01:58:36,630 --> 01:58:38,630 sort of leads to my next question , 3128 01:58:38,630 --> 01:58:40,852 which was the factors that are limiting 3129 01:58:40,852 --> 01:58:42,741 your ability to deploy counter us 3130 01:58:42,741 --> 01:58:44,852 systems within centcom in africa . So 3131 01:58:44,852 --> 01:58:47,074 within Sym com , there are a variety of 3132 01:58:47,074 --> 01:58:49,186 systems out there . I'll tell you , I 3133 01:58:49,186 --> 01:58:50,852 take any system and employ it 3134 01:58:50,852 --> 01:58:53,200 immediately . What we would , what we 3135 01:58:53,200 --> 01:58:55,256 where we need to go is an integrated 3136 01:58:55,256 --> 01:58:57,144 system . Because the system in an 3137 01:58:57,144 --> 01:58:59,311 integrated system would give you early 3138 01:58:59,311 --> 01:59:01,311 warning of launch perhaps through a 3139 01:59:01,311 --> 01:59:03,533 variety of means . It would give you an 3140 01:59:03,533 --> 01:59:05,367 idea of where they're coming and 3141 01:59:05,367 --> 01:59:05,160 they're altitude , then it would give 3142 01:59:05,160 --> 01:59:06,827 you an ability to engage them 3143 01:59:06,827 --> 01:59:09,049 kinetically and non kinetically . We do 3144 01:59:09,049 --> 01:59:11,160 not yet have a single system that can 3145 01:59:11,160 --> 01:59:12,993 do all that . What we have are a 3146 01:59:12,993 --> 01:59:15,160 variety of systems that all do part of 3147 01:59:15,160 --> 01:59:17,271 this and that's part of the problem . 3148 01:59:17,271 --> 01:59:19,271 We were not integrated so we pushed 3149 01:59:19,271 --> 01:59:21,382 very hard to get an integrated system 3150 01:59:21,382 --> 01:59:23,327 but one that is not delivered late 3151 01:59:23,327 --> 01:59:25,382 behind them behind need . That's the 3152 01:59:25,382 --> 01:59:24,930 problem . When you push for an 3153 01:59:24,930 --> 01:59:27,670 integrated system this story , do you 3154 01:59:27,670 --> 01:59:29,226 have any comments on that ? 3155 01:59:31,920 --> 01:59:34,087 I would just add to that congresswoman 3156 01:59:34,087 --> 01:59:36,550 that the issue of counter us is 3157 01:59:36,560 --> 01:59:38,700 something not just within the 3158 01:59:38,710 --> 01:59:40,766 department at this point , but has a 3159 01:59:40,766 --> 01:59:43,820 profile in terms of the inter agency 3160 01:59:43,820 --> 01:59:47,170 discussions on how to deter and defeat 3161 01:59:47,170 --> 01:59:50,400 that threat . So within the Department 3162 01:59:50,400 --> 01:59:52,510 of Defense there is the joint effort 3163 01:59:52,510 --> 01:59:54,288 underway that the generals have 3164 01:59:54,288 --> 01:59:56,200 referred to . But there's also a 3165 01:59:56,210 --> 01:59:58,410 broader whole government approach that 3166 01:59:58,410 --> 02:00:01,720 is recently initiated . Thank you . 3167 02:00:01,730 --> 02:00:04,300 Well thank you miss story General 3168 02:00:04,300 --> 02:00:06,522 Mackenzie and General Townsend for your 3169 02:00:06,522 --> 02:00:08,578 time and your back . Mr . Chairman . 3170 02:00:08,578 --> 02:00:11,180 Thank you . Before I go to the next uh 3171 02:00:11,190 --> 02:00:13,650 questioner , I do want to just stop as 3172 02:00:13,650 --> 02:00:15,650 well . Thank General kinsey for his 3173 02:00:15,650 --> 02:00:17,872 hospitality a few weeks ago . That said 3174 02:00:17,872 --> 02:00:19,872 comma appreciate that and I did not 3175 02:00:19,872 --> 02:00:21,761 take that opportunity earlier . I 3176 02:00:21,761 --> 02:00:23,817 wanted to thank you for that chair . 3177 02:00:23,817 --> 02:00:25,706 Now recognizes drops in Lauria of 3178 02:00:25,706 --> 02:00:27,261 Virginia for five minutes . 3179 02:00:31,210 --> 02:00:33,590 Well , thank you gentlemen for uh 3180 02:00:33,600 --> 02:00:36,010 historic for your testimony today , I'd 3181 02:00:36,010 --> 02:00:38,200 like to first address the issue with 3182 02:00:38,200 --> 02:00:40,256 General Mackenzie of mine warfare in 3183 02:00:40,260 --> 02:00:43,540 the centcom you are . Um Iranian mining 3184 02:00:43,550 --> 02:00:45,772 capability is obviously a vulnerability 3185 02:00:45,772 --> 02:00:47,661 for US and allied military forces 3186 02:00:47,661 --> 02:00:49,494 within the region as well as for 3187 02:00:49,494 --> 02:00:52,050 commercial shipping and free trade . Um 3188 02:00:52,060 --> 02:00:54,440 And the navy plans to soon decommission 3189 02:00:54,450 --> 02:00:56,940 um It's remaining for NCM platform 3190 02:00:56,940 --> 02:01:00,070 station in the gulf um and bahrain . 3191 02:01:00,080 --> 02:01:02,191 And as we know the material condition 3192 02:01:02,191 --> 02:01:04,500 and capabilities of these aging M . Cm 3193 02:01:04,510 --> 02:01:06,677 has been severely degraded over time . 3194 02:01:06,677 --> 02:01:08,850 However the Navy's planned replacement 3195 02:01:08,850 --> 02:01:10,906 of a mind for capability through the 3196 02:01:10,906 --> 02:01:12,850 mission modules on the L . C . S . 3197 02:01:12,850 --> 02:01:14,628 Class of ships is neither fully 3198 02:01:14,628 --> 02:01:16,794 developed nor has it been successfully 3199 02:01:16,794 --> 02:01:19,017 deployed from the L . C . S . However , 3200 02:01:19,017 --> 02:01:20,850 testing the N . C . M . Suite of 3201 02:01:20,850 --> 02:01:22,870 platforms on on platforms of 3202 02:01:22,870 --> 02:01:25,350 opportunity um such as provided by 3203 02:01:25,350 --> 02:01:28,710 allied navies um in 2019 Royal Fleet 3204 02:01:28,710 --> 02:01:31,300 auxiliary mounts bay um successfully 3205 02:01:31,300 --> 02:01:33,578 tested this and then the T . S . B . E . 3206 02:01:33,578 --> 02:01:36,230 S . Before herschel woody Williams Also 3207 02:01:36,230 --> 02:01:39,990 in 2019 proved successful and these ad 3208 02:01:39,990 --> 02:01:42,220 hoc capabilities are not resident in 3209 02:01:42,220 --> 02:01:44,387 the centcom kor which is gonna leave a 3210 02:01:44,387 --> 02:01:47,070 significant gap and mm cm um capability 3211 02:01:47,080 --> 02:01:49,690 once these ships are decommissioned um 3212 02:01:49,700 --> 02:01:51,756 as the combatant commander , are you 3213 02:01:51,756 --> 02:01:53,756 confident in the current and future 3214 02:01:53,756 --> 02:01:55,867 mind warfare capabilities provided by 3215 02:01:55,867 --> 02:01:58,840 the navy and your A . O . R . Thank you 3216 02:01:58,840 --> 02:02:01,007 for the question . I am very concerned 3217 02:02:01,007 --> 02:02:03,340 about Iranian mine warfare capabilities . 3218 02:02:03,400 --> 02:02:05,178 I think it's one of their great 3219 02:02:05,178 --> 02:02:07,400 asymmetric weapons and they employed in 3220 02:02:07,400 --> 02:02:09,511 two areas up in the strait McKenzie . 3221 02:02:09,511 --> 02:02:09,480 I'm sorry , could you just get that 3222 02:02:09,480 --> 02:02:11,702 microphone pointed right at your chin . 3223 02:02:11,702 --> 02:02:14,700 How's that better ? Better ? Uh I'm 3224 02:02:14,700 --> 02:02:16,760 very concerned about , about Iranian 3225 02:02:16,760 --> 02:02:18,704 mine warfare capabilities . It's a 3226 02:02:18,704 --> 02:02:20,927 significant asymmetric threat that they 3227 02:02:20,927 --> 02:02:23,149 possess and they possess it not only up 3228 02:02:23,149 --> 02:02:25,093 in the strait of Hormuz , which is 3229 02:02:25,093 --> 02:02:24,900 where we always think about it , but 3230 02:02:24,900 --> 02:02:27,011 also down in the bab el Mandeb at the 3231 02:02:27,011 --> 02:02:29,233 in the Red Sea . Their ability to to to 3232 02:02:29,233 --> 02:02:31,480 deploy a wide variety of thousands of 3233 02:02:31,480 --> 02:02:33,590 minds is very concerning to me right 3234 02:02:33,590 --> 02:02:35,479 now . We have a very limited mine 3235 02:02:35,479 --> 02:02:37,701 warfare capability in the theater . Our 3236 02:02:37,701 --> 02:02:39,757 ships , as you have noted and are in 3237 02:02:39,757 --> 02:02:41,534 the in the ships of our british 3238 02:02:41,534 --> 02:02:43,701 partners uh are also about all we have 3239 02:02:43,701 --> 02:02:45,868 if we had to sweep and open the strait 3240 02:02:45,868 --> 02:02:47,368 of Hormuz which is a vital 3241 02:02:47,368 --> 02:02:49,590 international international passage and 3242 02:02:49,590 --> 02:02:49,420 it would take us an extended amount of 3243 02:02:49,420 --> 02:02:51,531 time to do it with the resources that 3244 02:02:51,531 --> 02:02:53,820 we have now I to have noted the L . C . 3245 02:02:53,820 --> 02:02:55,987 S . And and and the problems that have 3246 02:02:55,987 --> 02:02:58,520 that have attended it as a possible 3247 02:02:58,520 --> 02:03:00,742 mind sweeping variant . Regardless it's 3248 02:03:00,742 --> 02:03:02,909 not gonna be available in a reasonable 3249 02:03:02,909 --> 02:03:04,520 amount of time from me in my 3250 02:03:04,520 --> 02:03:06,353 requirements and U . S . Central 3251 02:03:06,353 --> 02:03:06,200 Command . So I would share your 3252 02:03:06,200 --> 02:03:08,660 concerns . I uh we talk about this all 3253 02:03:08,660 --> 02:03:10,950 the time . This is an area of Iranian 3254 02:03:10,950 --> 02:03:12,980 capability that remains vexing and 3255 02:03:12,980 --> 02:03:16,450 concerning to me so 3256 02:03:16,460 --> 02:03:18,600 general . Um since there was a 3257 02:03:18,600 --> 02:03:20,990 successful test of these new advanced 3258 02:03:20,990 --> 02:03:23,740 my warfare capabilities using the TSB 3259 02:03:23,740 --> 02:03:25,740 platform which is something that is 3260 02:03:25,740 --> 02:03:27,684 already deployed in your theater . 3261 02:03:27,684 --> 02:03:29,740 Would that be a valuable addition in 3262 02:03:29,740 --> 02:03:31,684 the sitcom ? A are we were able to 3263 02:03:31,684 --> 02:03:33,684 leverage that capability on the TsB 3264 02:03:33,684 --> 02:03:35,796 centcom will be happy to leverage any 3265 02:03:35,796 --> 02:03:37,907 any capability that's out there right 3266 02:03:37,907 --> 02:03:40,018 now given the significant gap between 3267 02:03:40,018 --> 02:03:42,129 our available resources and the scope 3268 02:03:42,129 --> 02:03:44,240 and scale of the problem . Okay thank 3269 02:03:44,240 --> 02:03:46,129 you . And then the time remaining 3270 02:03:46,129 --> 02:03:48,240 general Townsend I wanted to focus on 3271 02:03:48,240 --> 02:03:48,140 as some of my colleagues already have 3272 02:03:48,140 --> 02:03:49,980 in the rapidly expanding chinese 3273 02:03:49,980 --> 02:03:52,202 influence on the African continent . Um 3274 02:03:52,202 --> 02:03:54,369 We've already referenced the strategic 3275 02:03:54,369 --> 02:03:56,480 location of the Chinese overseas base 3276 02:03:56,480 --> 02:03:58,536 in Djibouti , adjacent to the bab el 3277 02:03:58,536 --> 02:04:00,813 Mandeb and the entrance to the Red Sea . 3278 02:04:00,813 --> 02:04:02,536 Uh , but more than a strategic 3279 02:04:02,536 --> 02:04:04,470 positioning from their maritime 3280 02:04:04,470 --> 02:04:06,414 perspective , I wanted to focus on 3281 02:04:06,414 --> 02:04:08,637 focus on some of the infrastructure and 3282 02:04:08,637 --> 02:04:10,581 transportation um investments that 3283 02:04:10,581 --> 02:04:12,803 they're making reaching into Ethiopia . 3284 02:04:12,803 --> 02:04:14,748 Um it appears that the chinese who 3285 02:04:14,748 --> 02:04:16,970 arguably want to grow their position on 3286 02:04:16,970 --> 02:04:18,859 the world stage and in Africa are 3287 02:04:18,859 --> 02:04:21,360 engaging in their own version of a 3288 02:04:21,370 --> 02:04:23,481 modern day colonialism on the African 3289 02:04:23,481 --> 02:04:25,648 continent . As they venture , you have 3290 02:04:25,648 --> 02:04:27,759 to find cheaper labor markets and use 3291 02:04:27,759 --> 02:04:30,030 infrastructure debt to leverage as the 3292 02:04:30,030 --> 02:04:33,150 leverage tool . Can you comment on the 3293 02:04:33,160 --> 02:04:35,160 domestic and regional impact of the 3294 02:04:35,160 --> 02:04:37,260 chinese economic expansion into 3295 02:04:37,270 --> 02:04:39,492 Ethiopia and then maybe a little bit at 3296 02:04:39,492 --> 02:04:41,800 a time remaining on how the recent 3297 02:04:41,810 --> 02:04:44,700 unrest in the Tigre region has changed 3298 02:04:44,700 --> 02:04:47,120 any chinese activity in the area . 3299 02:04:49,490 --> 02:04:51,740 Thanks congresswoman . So that you 3300 02:04:51,740 --> 02:04:55,190 mentioned chinese an example of their 3301 02:04:55,190 --> 02:04:57,357 investments on the african continent . 3302 02:04:57,357 --> 02:04:59,190 Transportation infrastructure is 3303 02:04:59,190 --> 02:05:01,770 certainly one of those seaports , 3304 02:05:01,840 --> 02:05:04,470 airports and rail lines in particular . 3305 02:05:04,890 --> 02:05:07,001 Uh , and you see that with Ethiopia , 3306 02:05:07,001 --> 02:05:09,600 with rail lines , uh , running to the 3307 02:05:09,600 --> 02:05:11,822 Red Sea from the country . You see that 3308 02:05:11,822 --> 02:05:15,140 in kenya as well . Uh , in some places , 3309 02:05:15,150 --> 02:05:18,900 these investments have worked out okay . 3310 02:05:18,910 --> 02:05:21,200 I don't , I haven't seen any of them 3311 02:05:21,200 --> 02:05:23,422 that have worked out really well as the 3312 02:05:23,422 --> 02:05:25,830 chinese had hoped they would um , 3313 02:05:25,840 --> 02:05:28,620 regarding your question about Tigre . 3314 02:05:28,990 --> 02:05:30,934 Um , we haven't , I haven't seen a 3315 02:05:30,934 --> 02:05:33,210 connection to Tigre in china , 3316 02:05:34,390 --> 02:05:38,070 represents time's expired . Thank 3317 02:05:38,070 --> 02:05:40,520 you . Chair . Now recognizes , 3318 02:05:40,530 --> 02:05:42,530 represent Franklin from Florida for 3319 02:05:42,530 --> 02:05:45,950 five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman . 3320 02:05:45,960 --> 02:05:48,182 And in the interest of time , I do have 3321 02:05:48,182 --> 02:05:49,904 a couple questions for General 3322 02:05:49,904 --> 02:05:51,940 Mackenzie first following up on 3323 02:05:51,950 --> 02:05:54,350 Representative Waltz's dialogue earlier 3324 02:05:54,350 --> 02:05:56,680 regarding basing in the region And the 3325 02:05:56,680 --> 02:05:58,736 changes we're now going to face with 3326 02:05:58,736 --> 02:06:00,569 Afghanistan not being there with 3327 02:06:00,569 --> 02:06:02,569 physical presence on the ground . I 3328 02:06:02,569 --> 02:06:04,680 think back to just after 9-11 , I was 3329 02:06:04,680 --> 02:06:06,847 in Bahrain were planning some of those 3330 02:06:06,847 --> 02:06:09,013 initial strikes into Afghanistan . The 3331 02:06:09,013 --> 02:06:11,236 challenge we had with long distances to 3332 02:06:11,236 --> 02:06:13,402 make those happen . And we had carrier 3333 02:06:13,402 --> 02:06:15,291 Pilots that were flying 8-10 hour 3334 02:06:15,291 --> 02:06:17,347 missions with multiple refuelings to 3335 02:06:17,347 --> 02:06:19,458 get there . Um that's obviously going 3336 02:06:19,458 --> 02:06:21,624 to be a challenge if we find ourselves 3337 02:06:21,624 --> 02:06:23,736 having to go back in and that kind of 3338 02:06:23,736 --> 02:06:23,090 scale in the future . But in your 3339 02:06:23,090 --> 02:06:25,034 testimony , you mentioned pursuing 3340 02:06:25,034 --> 02:06:27,201 opportunities to enhance expeditionary 3341 02:06:27,201 --> 02:06:29,423 basing and less vulnerable areas of the 3342 02:06:29,423 --> 02:06:31,590 Hor . Could you expand a little bit on 3343 02:06:31,590 --> 02:06:33,423 those and where they may stand ? 3344 02:06:33,423 --> 02:06:35,534 Certainly when we talk about that , I 3345 02:06:35,534 --> 02:06:37,534 am primarily talking about the Iran 3346 02:06:37,534 --> 02:06:39,868 problem and the fact that our bases now , 3347 02:06:39,868 --> 02:06:41,812 such as how you did it . Al Dhafra 3348 02:06:41,812 --> 02:06:43,868 Manama bahrain , as you noted , have 3349 02:06:43,868 --> 02:06:45,979 the virtue of being close to the area 3350 02:06:45,979 --> 02:06:47,979 you might want to fight . They also 3351 02:06:47,979 --> 02:06:50,034 have the problem being very close to 3352 02:06:50,034 --> 02:06:52,146 the Iranians . So we would seek to do 3353 02:06:52,146 --> 02:06:51,950 is examine alternatives further to the 3354 02:06:51,950 --> 02:06:54,061 west and the Arabian peninsula . That 3355 02:06:54,061 --> 02:06:56,117 would make it more difficult for the 3356 02:06:56,117 --> 02:06:58,339 Iranians to target our bases there , it 3357 02:06:58,339 --> 02:06:58,330 would increase the range . Many of 3358 02:06:58,330 --> 02:07:00,441 their weapons would not actually have 3359 02:07:00,441 --> 02:07:02,663 the range to reach out there and get to 3360 02:07:02,663 --> 02:07:04,886 those bases . The problem will be , the 3361 02:07:04,886 --> 02:07:06,997 tanker bill is associated with that . 3362 02:07:06,997 --> 02:07:06,480 On the other hand , if the tanker can 3363 02:07:06,480 --> 02:07:08,480 survive out to the west is probably 3364 02:07:08,480 --> 02:07:10,702 better than it being close where it can 3365 02:07:10,702 --> 02:07:12,924 be struck . So there's a trade off that 3366 02:07:12,924 --> 02:07:15,091 we make and we look to our partners to 3367 02:07:15,091 --> 02:07:17,258 help us on this with these bases . And 3368 02:07:17,258 --> 02:07:19,480 we've never looked at based permanently 3369 02:07:19,480 --> 02:07:18,650 there . Whether you'd like to have the 3370 02:07:18,650 --> 02:07:20,761 ability to go in there , as you noted 3371 02:07:20,761 --> 02:07:22,983 in an expeditionary manner in a time of 3372 02:07:22,983 --> 02:07:25,150 crisis , around the time of war , just 3373 02:07:25,150 --> 02:07:27,206 to make it harder for an opponent to 3374 02:07:27,206 --> 02:07:29,483 threaten the force . Right . Thank you . 3375 02:07:29,483 --> 02:07:32,210 Um , switching gears to the displaced 3376 02:07:32,210 --> 02:07:35,640 persons camps in Northeast Syria , 3377 02:07:35,640 --> 02:07:37,820 particularly . Alan all I guess from 3378 02:07:37,820 --> 02:07:39,764 your testimony general , we talked 3379 02:07:39,764 --> 02:07:42,240 about 61,000 people there , 94% women 3380 02:07:42,240 --> 02:07:44,550 and Children , two thirds under 18 . In 3381 02:07:44,550 --> 02:07:47,410 addition to obvious humanitarian crisis , 3382 02:07:47,410 --> 02:07:49,688 I know there's a big problem with , uh , 3383 02:07:49,688 --> 02:07:51,521 radicalization of a lot of these 3384 02:07:51,521 --> 02:07:53,688 Children . So this I guess it would be 3385 02:07:53,688 --> 02:07:55,854 a question for you , General Mackenzie 3386 02:07:55,854 --> 02:07:57,966 and also mystery what's the way ahead 3387 02:07:57,966 --> 02:08:00,188 and that How do we fix this problem ? I 3388 02:08:00,188 --> 02:07:59,670 know a lot of the countries that these 3389 02:07:59,670 --> 02:08:01,726 people are coming from don't want to 3390 02:08:01,726 --> 02:08:03,781 back . What's the endgame for this ? 3391 02:08:03,781 --> 02:08:05,948 Sure . So I'll defer to this door here 3392 02:08:05,948 --> 02:08:08,170 in just a minute . But I will say it is 3393 02:08:08,170 --> 02:08:10,226 not a military problem , but it will 3394 02:08:10,226 --> 02:08:12,337 manifest itself in 5 to 10 years as a 3395 02:08:12,337 --> 02:08:14,559 military problem unless we solve it now 3396 02:08:14,559 --> 02:08:14,290 because the Children are gonna grow up 3397 02:08:14,300 --> 02:08:16,467 radicalized and we're going to see him 3398 02:08:16,467 --> 02:08:18,689 on the battlefields fighting us . So it 3399 02:08:18,689 --> 02:08:20,522 is an international problem . It 3400 02:08:20,522 --> 02:08:22,522 requires repatriation , It requires 3401 02:08:22,522 --> 02:08:24,744 nations to step up to the plate , claim 3402 02:08:24,744 --> 02:08:26,689 their citizens , bring them home , 3403 02:08:26,689 --> 02:08:28,522 reintegrate them back into their 3404 02:08:28,522 --> 02:08:30,189 communities and it demands de 3405 02:08:30,189 --> 02:08:32,078 radicalization which is extremely 3406 02:08:32,078 --> 02:08:34,189 difficult to do . It is best done and 3407 02:08:34,189 --> 02:08:36,356 practiced by nations in the region who 3408 02:08:36,356 --> 02:08:38,578 have a cultural affinity for the people 3409 02:08:38,578 --> 02:08:40,744 that are largely in this camps . It is 3410 02:08:40,744 --> 02:08:42,911 it's a tough problem . Our diplomats , 3411 02:08:42,911 --> 02:08:42,700 Department of State U . S . A . I . D . 3412 02:08:42,710 --> 02:08:44,821 And a lot of ngos are working at this 3413 02:08:44,821 --> 02:08:46,710 very hard . It is one of the most 3414 02:08:46,710 --> 02:08:48,543 pressing problems we have in the 3415 02:08:48,543 --> 02:08:50,766 centcom region right now . Without I'll 3416 02:08:50,766 --> 02:08:52,766 defer to history for anything she'd 3417 02:08:52,766 --> 02:08:54,988 like to add . I think General Mackenzie 3418 02:08:54,988 --> 02:08:56,766 put it beautifully . It's not a 3419 02:08:56,766 --> 02:08:58,988 military problem . It is an interagency 3420 02:08:58,988 --> 02:09:00,710 issue . And it's a question of 3421 02:09:00,710 --> 02:09:03,270 political will in terms of uh host 3422 02:09:03,270 --> 02:09:05,437 nations for the individuals who are in 3423 02:09:05,437 --> 02:09:07,990 the camps . So what pressure do we have 3424 02:09:07,990 --> 02:09:10,212 that we can apply to get these folks to 3425 02:09:10,212 --> 02:09:12,379 step up and accept these people and we 3426 02:09:12,379 --> 02:09:14,434 can't leave them there in the in the 3427 02:09:14,434 --> 02:09:17,720 desert forever . I think it depends on 3428 02:09:17,720 --> 02:09:19,942 which countries you're talking about in 3429 02:09:19,942 --> 02:09:22,053 the state of the dialogue with them . 3430 02:09:22,053 --> 02:09:24,770 What what forms of dialogue and 3431 02:09:24,770 --> 02:09:26,890 leverage we have at our disposal to 3432 02:09:26,900 --> 02:09:28,567 encourage stepping up to that 3433 02:09:28,567 --> 02:09:31,010 responsibility . Okay , thank you . Mr 3434 02:09:31,010 --> 02:09:33,700 Chairman and go back . Thank you 3435 02:09:33,700 --> 02:09:35,890 represent Franklin . Chair recognizes 3436 02:09:35,900 --> 02:09:38,380 representative Strickland before he 3437 02:09:38,380 --> 02:09:40,900 goes Strickland . Just uh , the next 3438 02:09:41,470 --> 02:09:44,050 Questioner will be represented VZ . So 3439 02:09:44,060 --> 02:09:46,227 represent Strickland . You recognize a 3440 02:09:46,227 --> 02:09:48,282 Washington state recognized for five 3441 02:09:48,282 --> 02:09:50,449 minutes . Thank you . Mr Chair General 3442 02:09:50,449 --> 02:09:52,227 Townsend . You notice that your 3443 02:09:52,227 --> 02:09:54,780 testimony that africom supported us 3444 02:09:54,790 --> 02:09:57,250 efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance 3445 02:09:57,250 --> 02:09:59,370 in 43 countries , including the 3446 02:09:59,370 --> 02:10:01,259 delivery of nearly 500 million in 3447 02:10:01,259 --> 02:10:03,481 medical supplies . The United States is 3448 02:10:03,481 --> 02:10:05,426 often at its best when it leads in 3449 02:10:05,426 --> 02:10:07,426 crises , as it did during the Ebola 3450 02:10:07,426 --> 02:10:09,426 crisis . Can you tell me please how 3451 02:10:09,426 --> 02:10:11,592 africom is working alongside the whole 3452 02:10:11,592 --> 02:10:13,592 of government efforts to respond to 3453 02:10:13,592 --> 02:10:16,070 COVID-19 and specifically have we , 3454 02:10:16,070 --> 02:10:18,350 along with USG started to develop a 3455 02:10:18,350 --> 02:10:21,020 plan to distribute vaccines for covid 3456 02:10:21,030 --> 02:10:24,900 partners on the continent . Thanks 3457 02:10:24,900 --> 02:10:27,540 congresswoman . So as you saw in the 3458 02:10:27,540 --> 02:10:29,429 testimony there , there have been 3459 02:10:29,429 --> 02:10:31,318 significant Department of Defense 3460 02:10:31,318 --> 02:10:33,290 efforts , but those are small in 3461 02:10:33,290 --> 02:10:36,850 comparison to the US government's Covid 3462 02:10:36,850 --> 02:10:38,900 assistance on the African continent 3463 02:10:38,910 --> 02:10:41,188 that's been led primarily by the U . S . 3464 02:10:41,188 --> 02:10:43,390 A . I . D . Uh and the Department of 3465 02:10:43,390 --> 02:10:46,060 State . So there are some military or V . 3466 02:10:46,060 --> 02:10:47,949 O . D . Capabilities that we have 3467 02:10:47,949 --> 02:10:50,370 employed to the maximum extent possible 3468 02:10:50,760 --> 02:10:53,940 um things like medical supplies and 3469 02:10:53,950 --> 02:10:56,680 mobile field hospitals that are being 3470 02:10:56,680 --> 02:11:00,180 fielded two military partners that are 3471 02:11:00,180 --> 02:11:02,900 being used by those partner countries 3472 02:11:02,910 --> 02:11:06,600 to treat covid . Uh so that's all 3473 02:11:06,600 --> 02:11:09,600 been part of uh the larger U . S . 3474 02:11:09,600 --> 02:11:11,767 Government response . And it's a small 3475 02:11:11,767 --> 02:11:13,790 part compared to what the State 3476 02:11:13,790 --> 02:11:16,012 Department and U . S . A . I . D . Have 3477 02:11:16,012 --> 02:11:18,730 done on your question about vaccines . 3478 02:11:18,740 --> 02:11:22,130 I'll defer to mystery . But uh the U . 3479 02:11:22,130 --> 02:11:24,530 S . Government is going to provide 3480 02:11:24,540 --> 02:11:28,450 eventually vaccines internationally and 3481 02:11:28,460 --> 02:11:30,890 and in Africa . But we're making sure 3482 02:11:30,890 --> 02:11:33,057 we're we've taken care of the american 3483 02:11:33,057 --> 02:11:35,260 population . First we have been asked 3484 02:11:35,270 --> 02:11:38,550 for input to provide that input to the 3485 02:11:38,550 --> 02:11:40,217 Department of Defense and the 3486 02:11:40,217 --> 02:11:42,272 government for decisions about where 3487 02:11:42,272 --> 02:11:44,272 vaccines might go first . Mystery . 3488 02:11:45,860 --> 02:11:48,027 Thank you . General Townsend . Just to 3489 02:11:48,027 --> 02:11:50,790 to add on that that with the state of 3490 02:11:50,800 --> 02:11:54,100 vaccination at home in in a much better 3491 02:11:54,100 --> 02:11:55,933 place than it has been plans are 3492 02:11:55,933 --> 02:11:58,100 underway . With respect to how the U . 3493 02:11:58,100 --> 02:12:00,100 S . Government will be able to help 3494 02:12:00,100 --> 02:12:02,270 overseas . R . A . I . D . Colleagues 3495 02:12:02,270 --> 02:12:04,437 and State Department colleagues are at 3496 02:12:04,437 --> 02:12:06,492 the forefront of those efforts and I 3497 02:12:06,492 --> 02:12:08,714 think we'll see the results of those in 3498 02:12:08,714 --> 02:12:11,460 coming months . All right . Thank you . 3499 02:12:11,460 --> 02:12:13,571 Then one more question . Mystery will 3500 02:12:13,571 --> 02:12:15,016 stay with you . The Prior 3501 02:12:15,016 --> 02:12:16,849 administration chose to close us 3502 02:12:16,849 --> 02:12:19,130 defence attache offices in several West 3503 02:12:19,130 --> 02:12:21,310 African countries . Defense attache 3504 02:12:21,310 --> 02:12:23,670 perform a vital role in representing 3505 02:12:23,670 --> 02:12:25,837 the U . S . Military and removing them 3506 02:12:25,837 --> 02:12:27,781 can send the wrong message to host 3507 02:12:27,781 --> 02:12:29,892 governments about the importance that 3508 02:12:29,892 --> 02:12:32,114 we put on the relationship and how much 3509 02:12:32,114 --> 02:12:33,892 we value it . As you review the 3510 02:12:33,892 --> 02:12:36,114 decisions of the prior administration . 3511 02:12:36,114 --> 02:12:35,990 Can you tell me about the status of 3512 02:12:35,990 --> 02:12:37,770 these defense attache offices ? 3513 02:12:39,750 --> 02:12:41,806 Congresswoman ? I'd be glad to and I 3514 02:12:41,806 --> 02:12:44,028 can imagine General Townsend might like 3515 02:12:44,028 --> 02:12:46,028 to add on to this as well . Defense 3516 02:12:46,028 --> 02:12:48,250 attaches are fundamental to the way the 3517 02:12:48,250 --> 02:12:50,417 Department of Defense does business in 3518 02:12:50,417 --> 02:12:52,560 the inter agency context . On the 3519 02:12:52,560 --> 02:12:54,710 ground . In our missions across the 3520 02:12:54,720 --> 02:12:57,370 world . We have the continued 3521 02:12:57,380 --> 02:13:00,100 challenges as we see in every other 3522 02:13:00,100 --> 02:13:02,630 type of personnel category of supply 3523 02:13:02,630 --> 02:13:04,940 and demand and insufficient supply 3524 02:13:04,940 --> 02:13:07,530 relative to demand has led to some 3525 02:13:07,530 --> 02:13:09,850 difficult decisions with respect to how 3526 02:13:09,850 --> 02:13:11,572 we're represented in different 3527 02:13:11,572 --> 02:13:13,406 countries and whether individual 3528 02:13:13,406 --> 02:13:15,572 attaches are responsible for more than 3529 02:13:15,572 --> 02:13:17,628 one country at a time , Abbott would 3530 02:13:17,628 --> 02:13:19,461 very much like to see sufficient 3531 02:13:19,461 --> 02:13:21,970 attaches to go around General Townsend . 3532 02:13:22,750 --> 02:13:24,990 Thanks congresswoman . So uh as you 3533 02:13:24,990 --> 02:13:26,990 heard , uh congresswoman in the the 3534 02:13:26,990 --> 02:13:29,212 last administration did make a decision 3535 02:13:29,212 --> 02:13:32,450 to close uh six defense attache offices 3536 02:13:32,450 --> 02:13:34,394 on the African continent . Some of 3537 02:13:34,394 --> 02:13:36,960 those were hub that did several , 3538 02:13:36,970 --> 02:13:38,970 several smaller countries as well . 3539 02:13:39,050 --> 02:13:41,510 That decision was overturned actually 3540 02:13:41,520 --> 02:13:44,550 before the end of the by the acting 3541 02:13:44,550 --> 02:13:47,110 secretary of Defense Miller before the 3542 02:13:47,110 --> 02:13:49,930 administration ended . I suspect it may 3543 02:13:49,940 --> 02:13:52,430 get reviewed during this global posture 3544 02:13:52,430 --> 02:13:55,180 review . Uh The problem is between the 3545 02:13:55,180 --> 02:13:57,810 initial decision to close those offices , 3546 02:13:57,820 --> 02:14:00,500 we had a personnel assignments cycle go 3547 02:14:00,500 --> 02:14:02,920 by , so no backfields were identified . 3548 02:14:02,920 --> 02:14:05,450 So now that the decision was overturned , 3549 02:14:05,640 --> 02:14:08,160 we have we're gonna probably have a gap 3550 02:14:08,170 --> 02:14:10,990 potentially of a year or two in some of 3551 02:14:10,990 --> 02:14:13,660 those defense attache offices . Uh 3552 02:14:13,670 --> 02:14:15,726 Anyway , that's the current state of 3553 02:14:15,726 --> 02:14:18,630 that and mystery covered very well the 3554 02:14:18,630 --> 02:14:20,970 importance of defense attache offices 3555 02:14:20,980 --> 02:14:24,790 in africa . Right , thank you . Thank 3556 02:14:24,790 --> 02:14:27,123 you , both of you . I yelled at my time . 3557 02:14:27,123 --> 02:14:29,290 Mr . Chair . Mhm . Thank you represent 3558 02:14:29,290 --> 02:14:30,957 Strickland turnout recognizes 3559 02:14:30,957 --> 02:14:33,068 representative easy of Texas for five 3560 02:14:33,068 --> 02:14:35,179 minutes . Mr . Chair . Thank you very 3561 02:14:35,179 --> 02:14:37,401 much . General Townsend . You testified 3562 02:14:37,401 --> 02:14:39,234 before the Senate Armed Services 3563 02:14:39,234 --> 02:14:41,610 Committee in January 2020 and warned 3564 02:14:41,610 --> 02:14:43,960 that videos were expanding at a very 3565 02:14:43,960 --> 02:14:47,560 rapid rate across West Africa , 3566 02:14:47,740 --> 02:14:49,720 noting that substantive external 3567 02:14:49,720 --> 02:14:51,776 assistance from Western partners was 3568 02:14:51,776 --> 02:14:53,887 critical to help our African partners 3569 02:14:53,887 --> 02:14:56,109 make progress To contain these videos . 3570 02:14:56,320 --> 02:14:58,570 At the end of September 2020 , African 3571 02:14:58,570 --> 02:15:00,830 reported that videos in the saddle were 3572 02:15:00,830 --> 02:15:04,830 either degraded uh and nor contained 3573 02:15:04,840 --> 02:15:07,580 uh were neither degraded nor contain . 3574 02:15:07,580 --> 02:15:09,802 And the videos in West Africa continued 3575 02:15:09,802 --> 02:15:11,920 to expand geographically , uh conduct 3576 02:15:11,920 --> 02:15:15,170 attacks and threaten uh people and that 3577 02:15:15,170 --> 02:15:17,392 our partners in the region , uh what do 3578 02:15:17,392 --> 02:15:19,448 you believe were the driving factors 3579 02:15:19,448 --> 02:15:21,503 behind the lack of progress over the 3580 02:15:21,503 --> 02:15:23,281 past year and how can we better 3581 02:15:23,281 --> 02:15:25,940 leverage USG resources specifically uh 3582 02:15:25,950 --> 02:15:28,061 in Nigeria , where violence threatens 3583 02:15:28,061 --> 02:15:30,006 the prosperity of Africa's largest 3584 02:15:30,006 --> 02:15:33,550 democracy , uh and making sure that we 3585 02:15:33,550 --> 02:15:37,360 keep Nigeria as stable as as 3586 02:15:37,360 --> 02:15:39,471 possible because they're so important 3587 02:15:39,471 --> 02:15:41,304 for the entire continent . Quite 3588 02:15:41,304 --> 02:15:45,060 frankly . Thanks congressman , you're 3589 02:15:45,060 --> 02:15:47,260 right . And my last testimony , I said 3590 02:15:47,260 --> 02:15:51,050 that the video threat in West Africa 3591 02:15:51,050 --> 02:15:53,161 was expanding . I don't know if I use 3592 02:15:53,161 --> 02:15:55,383 the analogy then , but it's appropriate 3593 02:15:55,383 --> 02:15:58,900 like a wildfire uh coming south from 3594 02:15:58,910 --> 02:16:01,860 mali and towards Burkina Faso and the 3595 02:16:01,860 --> 02:16:05,020 littoral states . Um and I believe the 3596 02:16:05,020 --> 02:16:07,080 reason for that is that the 3597 02:16:07,080 --> 02:16:09,140 international efforts there by the 3598 02:16:09,140 --> 02:16:11,270 African partners and and foreign 3599 02:16:11,270 --> 02:16:14,310 partners were both insufficient and 3600 02:16:14,310 --> 02:16:16,890 uncoordinated . Uh they might actually 3601 02:16:16,890 --> 02:16:18,779 be sufficient if they were better 3602 02:16:18,779 --> 02:16:20,946 coordinated , but it was impossible to 3603 02:16:20,946 --> 02:16:23,112 tell because they were uncoordinated . 3604 02:16:23,112 --> 02:16:26,410 Um Now that advance has not progressed 3605 02:16:26,420 --> 02:16:29,250 at the speed that I feared it would a 3606 02:16:29,250 --> 02:16:32,510 year ago , that advances still 3607 02:16:32,520 --> 02:16:35,240 north along the northern borders of the 3608 02:16:35,240 --> 02:16:37,462 littoral states , which we have a great 3609 02:16:37,462 --> 02:16:39,500 deal of concern about . Um I think 3610 02:16:39,500 --> 02:16:42,100 that's partly because of a number of 3611 02:16:42,100 --> 02:16:44,100 factors . One of them though is the 3612 02:16:44,100 --> 02:16:46,360 european partners led by the french 3613 02:16:46,730 --> 02:16:48,786 have initiated a couple of things to 3614 02:16:48,786 --> 02:16:51,170 try to improve the coordination between 3615 02:16:51,170 --> 02:16:53,337 all the international efforts that are 3616 02:16:53,337 --> 02:16:55,448 going in there . They're also doing a 3617 02:16:55,448 --> 02:16:57,559 much more effective advise and assist 3618 02:16:57,559 --> 02:16:59,726 operations Partnership for West Africa 3619 02:16:59,726 --> 02:17:01,670 is one of these things to increase 3620 02:17:01,670 --> 02:17:04,750 coordination . Uh Task Force to CUBA is 3621 02:17:04,750 --> 02:17:07,160 a advise and assist organization . The 3622 02:17:07,160 --> 02:17:09,420 french have stood up . They they have 3623 02:17:09,430 --> 02:17:12,380 asked for european partners to join in 3624 02:17:12,380 --> 02:17:14,547 that effort . They have joined in that 3625 02:17:14,547 --> 02:17:16,713 effort and it's uh starting to be more 3626 02:17:16,713 --> 02:17:18,840 effective . So I think they've done 3627 02:17:18,840 --> 02:17:21,090 some work to improve the coordination 3628 02:17:21,090 --> 02:17:23,160 of the international effort that has 3629 02:17:23,160 --> 02:17:26,650 slowed that spread . Some that said 3630 02:17:27,130 --> 02:17:30,370 that that forest fire is dancing along 3631 02:17:30,370 --> 02:17:32,370 the northern borders of all those 3632 02:17:32,370 --> 02:17:35,210 littoral states and I'm of the view 3633 02:17:35,210 --> 02:17:37,266 that we need to do . I would like to 3634 02:17:37,266 --> 02:17:39,321 for once I'd like to do something to 3635 02:17:39,321 --> 02:17:41,760 prevent a fire , prevent those littoral 3636 02:17:41,760 --> 02:17:44,380 states from gaining , getting fully 3637 02:17:44,380 --> 02:17:47,060 engulfed like Amalia's for example . 3638 02:17:47,060 --> 02:17:49,140 And I think there's some fairly low 3639 02:17:49,140 --> 02:17:51,307 impact things that could be done there 3640 02:17:51,307 --> 02:17:53,740 in the littoral states that might do 3641 02:17:53,740 --> 02:17:55,796 fire prevention there . So I think a 3642 02:17:55,796 --> 02:17:59,170 firebreak across the saddle which 3643 02:17:59,180 --> 02:18:01,291 largely is with the resources we have 3644 02:18:01,291 --> 02:18:04,620 there now , uh mostly African and 3645 02:18:04,620 --> 02:18:06,787 european and then some fire prevention 3646 02:18:06,787 --> 02:18:09,120 efforts in the littoral states . Let me 3647 02:18:09,120 --> 02:18:12,290 also ask you several years ago myself 3648 02:18:12,290 --> 02:18:16,260 and Representative Panetta and mr 3649 02:18:16,260 --> 02:18:18,720 scott from Georgia , we visited Camp 3650 02:18:18,720 --> 02:18:21,020 Lemonier and several other countries 3651 02:18:21,020 --> 02:18:23,400 there in africa and one of the areas of 3652 02:18:23,400 --> 02:18:26,130 concern was exactly where the chinese 3653 02:18:26,130 --> 02:18:28,800 base was being built . I know that they 3654 02:18:28,810 --> 02:18:31,032 there was strategically where it was at 3655 02:18:31,220 --> 02:18:33,442 seem to be a very good location for the 3656 02:18:33,442 --> 02:18:35,553 chinese and what they're trying to do 3657 02:18:35,553 --> 02:18:37,498 to expand , you know , their naval 3658 02:18:37,498 --> 02:18:39,553 operations and their presence in the 3659 02:18:39,553 --> 02:18:41,664 continent with uh the chinese and the 3660 02:18:41,664 --> 02:18:43,831 fact that , you know , they don't care 3661 02:18:43,831 --> 02:18:45,609 about , you know , human rights 3662 02:18:45,609 --> 02:18:47,664 violations , corruption . You know , 3663 02:18:47,664 --> 02:18:49,387 they'll fly , you know , prime 3664 02:18:49,387 --> 02:18:51,276 ministers and presidents from the 3665 02:18:51,276 --> 02:18:53,498 continent over to china and put them up 3666 02:18:53,498 --> 02:18:55,442 in nice houses . What can we do to 3667 02:18:55,442 --> 02:18:58,070 counter that ? As , you know , as more 3668 02:18:58,070 --> 02:19:00,292 and more countries in Africa seek to be 3669 02:19:00,292 --> 02:19:03,550 able to um , you know , uh , come into 3670 02:19:03,550 --> 02:19:06,760 the uh continue to grow economically 3671 02:19:06,760 --> 02:19:09,100 and and prosperous as they want to like 3672 02:19:09,110 --> 02:19:12,570 any other nation does congressman . The 3673 02:19:12,580 --> 02:19:15,610 African nations are not blind to what 3674 02:19:15,610 --> 02:19:17,790 the chinese are up to . Uh They have 3675 02:19:17,800 --> 02:19:20,620 fallen prey to some of these debt trap 3676 02:19:20,630 --> 02:19:23,400 diplomacy traps but they're not blind 3677 02:19:23,400 --> 02:19:25,930 to it . They can see it . They believe 3678 02:19:25,930 --> 02:19:27,986 they can , many of them believe they 3679 02:19:27,986 --> 02:19:29,819 can manage it and I think that's 3680 02:19:29,819 --> 02:19:32,041 probably the biggest thing we can do is 3681 02:19:32,041 --> 02:19:33,708 help them try to manage their 3682 02:19:33,708 --> 02:19:35,763 interactions with the chinese on the 3683 02:19:35,763 --> 02:19:39,700 content . Gentlemen . Uh Next 3684 02:19:39,710 --> 02:19:41,821 up will be represent Panetta followed 3685 02:19:41,821 --> 02:19:44,890 by a representative spear and so 3686 02:19:44,890 --> 02:19:46,890 represent Panetta from California's 3687 02:19:46,890 --> 02:19:49,330 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 3688 02:19:49,330 --> 02:19:51,330 Mr Chairman and gentlemen and ma'am 3689 02:19:51,330 --> 02:19:53,810 thank you for uh obviously your service , 3690 02:19:53,810 --> 02:19:55,866 your time , your preparation and for 3691 02:19:55,866 --> 02:19:57,810 being here today and your and your 3692 02:19:57,810 --> 02:19:59,870 answers to our questions . Um As my 3693 02:19:59,870 --> 02:20:03,250 colleague just mentioned uh we get a 3694 02:20:03,260 --> 02:20:05,482 code L did I forget what that was maybe 3695 02:20:05,482 --> 02:20:08,270 2018 summer 2018 where we had uh we 3696 02:20:08,280 --> 02:20:11,620 definitely had a One of the top models 3697 02:20:11,620 --> 02:20:13,787 I've been on and that we were based in 3698 02:20:13,787 --> 02:20:15,898 Djibouti and obviously flew C130s all 3699 02:20:15,898 --> 02:20:17,898 around one of the places we went to 3700 02:20:17,898 --> 02:20:21,060 with Manda Bay . And obviously uh 3701 02:20:21,070 --> 02:20:23,292 subsequent to that you're very familiar 3702 02:20:23,292 --> 02:20:25,459 with the attack that occurred in Manda 3703 02:20:25,459 --> 02:20:28,120 Bay . Unfortunately uh not just because 3704 02:20:28,120 --> 02:20:30,231 of the attack but unfortunately we're 3705 02:20:30,231 --> 02:20:32,870 trying to get uh the review of what 3706 02:20:32,870 --> 02:20:34,759 happened in regard to the initial 3707 02:20:34,759 --> 02:20:37,470 investigation because obviously I've 3708 02:20:37,470 --> 02:20:39,530 been there and obviously the tragedy 3709 02:20:39,530 --> 02:20:41,720 that happened as well . But what's 3710 02:20:41,720 --> 02:20:43,887 going on with the report ? I know it's 3711 02:20:43,887 --> 02:20:45,942 been 15 months since the attack took 3712 02:20:45,942 --> 02:20:48,109 place and I know that Secretary Austin 3713 02:20:48,109 --> 02:20:51,430 has ordered a now another review of it . 3714 02:20:51,440 --> 02:20:53,930 Can you give us some insight as to 3715 02:20:53,930 --> 02:20:55,986 what's going on with that report and 3716 02:20:55,986 --> 02:20:55,980 what do you think ? We're gonna get 3717 02:20:55,980 --> 02:20:57,758 this report as to what the heck 3718 02:20:57,758 --> 02:21:00,170 happened there ? Thanks Congressman . 3719 02:21:00,170 --> 02:21:03,350 Your visit was in uh the summer of 2019 3720 02:21:03,350 --> 02:21:05,860 2018 . It was my first coddle . After I 3721 02:21:05,860 --> 02:21:09,460 took command at Africa . Um now that 3722 02:21:09,460 --> 02:21:11,627 was a different one . This was command 3723 02:21:11,627 --> 02:21:13,682 Obey Manda Bay was before we went to 3724 02:21:13,682 --> 02:21:16,200 West Africa . Another excellent code . 3725 02:21:16,200 --> 02:21:18,367 All facilitated by you general . And I 3726 02:21:18,367 --> 02:21:20,422 appreciate that . But before that we 3727 02:21:20,422 --> 02:21:22,589 were in , we went to the the east side 3728 02:21:22,589 --> 02:21:24,700 of Africa . That was the West side of 3729 02:21:24,700 --> 02:21:26,922 Africa . Thanks congressman , correct ? 3730 02:21:26,922 --> 02:21:29,420 So Amanda Bay report . So uh first of 3731 02:21:29,420 --> 02:21:32,170 all , let me reassure you and the other 3732 02:21:32,170 --> 02:21:36,150 members that all the steps that have 3733 02:21:36,150 --> 02:21:38,510 been needed to take corrective action , 3734 02:21:38,510 --> 02:21:40,566 immediate corrective action had been 3735 02:21:40,566 --> 02:21:43,030 taken long long ago . Not only did we 3736 02:21:43,030 --> 02:21:45,780 take those steps at Manda Bay , we took 3737 02:21:45,780 --> 02:21:47,780 that report and apply those lessons 3738 02:21:47,780 --> 02:21:50,780 learned at every base across uh , 3739 02:21:50,790 --> 02:21:53,310 africa . Now , uh to answer your 3740 02:21:53,310 --> 02:21:55,480 specific question about the status of 3741 02:21:55,480 --> 02:21:58,310 the report , Africom concluded its 3742 02:21:58,310 --> 02:22:01,410 investigation in december 3743 02:22:01,600 --> 02:22:05,040 of last year . Of course . The timing 3744 02:22:05,040 --> 02:22:07,530 of that , trying to get that through 3745 02:22:07,530 --> 02:22:09,697 the Department of Defense and released 3746 02:22:09,697 --> 02:22:11,863 became problematic because it was over 3747 02:22:11,863 --> 02:22:13,610 laid on top of the change of 3748 02:22:13,610 --> 02:22:16,180 administration . Uh The new Secretary 3749 02:22:16,180 --> 02:22:18,330 of Defense came in . He received this 3750 02:22:18,330 --> 02:22:20,441 report , he didn't have all the depth 3751 02:22:20,441 --> 02:22:22,441 of background on it . So I think he 3752 02:22:22,441 --> 02:22:24,580 very rightfully said okay thanks 3753 02:22:24,590 --> 02:22:26,760 Africom . I think I'd like to have a 3754 02:22:26,760 --> 02:22:30,540 separate look at this . Um And Africom 3755 02:22:30,540 --> 02:22:34,520 supports that separate look . So uh the 3756 02:22:34,530 --> 02:22:36,920 Secretary of Defense has appointed a 3757 02:22:36,930 --> 02:22:39,730 disinterested uh four star from the 3758 02:22:39,730 --> 02:22:42,940 army to look at uh the report of the 3759 02:22:42,940 --> 02:22:45,820 investigation and give him advice on it . 3760 02:22:45,900 --> 02:22:48,630 Uh This is also necessary because many 3761 02:22:48,630 --> 02:22:52,180 of the fixes are uh pertain to other 3762 02:22:52,180 --> 02:22:54,680 services and other co coms . So they 3763 02:22:54,680 --> 02:22:56,540 weren't with all within all the 3764 02:22:56,540 --> 02:22:58,596 recommendations and findings weren't 3765 02:22:58,596 --> 02:23:01,420 within Africans purview to see through . 3766 02:23:01,430 --> 02:23:03,541 Uh So the Secretary of Defense has to 3767 02:23:03,541 --> 02:23:05,708 do that . So that's the current status 3768 02:23:05,708 --> 02:23:08,210 of it . I think he gave the army a 3769 02:23:08,220 --> 02:23:12,070 target of 90 days to report out . 3770 02:23:12,080 --> 02:23:15,320 Uh and I think this current situation 3771 02:23:15,800 --> 02:23:17,800 outstanding . Great , thank you for 3772 02:23:17,800 --> 02:23:19,800 that very thorough answer . General 3773 02:23:19,800 --> 02:23:21,689 appreciate that . Now go into the 3774 02:23:21,689 --> 02:23:23,856 summer 2019 when I did when we did the 3775 02:23:23,856 --> 02:23:26,078 Code Delta West Africa which once again 3776 02:23:26,078 --> 02:23:28,244 completely appreciate you facilitating 3777 02:23:28,244 --> 02:23:30,078 that . Um Let me let me read you 3778 02:23:30,078 --> 02:23:32,022 something that that really kind of 3779 02:23:32,022 --> 02:23:34,300 summarizes what I came . Came away with 3780 02:23:34,300 --> 02:23:36,578 an article in the economist last month , 3781 02:23:36,578 --> 02:23:38,633 two months ago . So basically talked 3782 02:23:38,633 --> 02:23:40,467 about french is France excuse me 3783 02:23:40,467 --> 02:23:42,880 Frances challenge uh there in that area 3784 02:23:42,880 --> 02:23:45,450 and it said basically uh France is 3785 02:23:45,450 --> 02:23:47,630 challenges faced by others who have 3786 02:23:47,630 --> 02:23:49,820 recently fought insurgencies in places 3787 02:23:49,820 --> 02:23:52,140 such as Afghanistan and Iraq . It is 3788 02:23:52,140 --> 02:23:54,660 that of trying to improve security 3789 02:23:54,670 --> 02:23:56,503 which is almost impossible to do 3790 02:23:56,503 --> 02:23:58,448 without development and also drive 3791 02:23:58,448 --> 02:24:00,337 development , which cannot happen 3792 02:24:00,337 --> 02:24:02,560 without better security . Um I think 3793 02:24:02,570 --> 02:24:04,626 you know , that was the impression I 3794 02:24:04,626 --> 02:24:06,792 had coming away from that trip to West 3795 02:24:06,792 --> 02:24:08,903 Africa . My question to you is is how 3796 02:24:08,903 --> 02:24:11,014 do we get out of that catch 22 ? What 3797 02:24:11,014 --> 02:24:13,126 what can we do ? Obviously , you gave 3798 02:24:13,126 --> 02:24:15,237 an excellent answer to my colleague , 3799 02:24:15,237 --> 02:24:15,190 MArc Veasey about coordination and 3800 02:24:15,190 --> 02:24:17,360 cooperation . Is there anything else 3801 02:24:17,360 --> 02:24:20,400 that we can do in order to provide 3802 02:24:20,400 --> 02:24:22,289 security and development as we go 3803 02:24:22,289 --> 02:24:24,233 forward ? Especially in the health 3804 02:24:25,790 --> 02:24:28,910 congressman ? I'd say that the thing 3805 02:24:28,910 --> 02:24:31,300 that's probably the easiest to solve is 3806 02:24:31,300 --> 02:24:33,244 the security challenges , but they 3807 02:24:33,244 --> 02:24:34,967 can't be solved without better 3808 02:24:34,967 --> 02:24:37,133 development . As you pointed out , and 3809 02:24:37,133 --> 02:24:39,450 better governance . That is the root of 3810 02:24:39,460 --> 02:24:41,516 all of this . And as we've seen that 3811 02:24:41,516 --> 02:24:45,410 from from Afghanistan uh to Africa 3812 02:24:45,790 --> 02:24:49,350 the root causes of poor governance , 3813 02:24:49,360 --> 02:24:52,200 insufficient development which needs a 3814 02:24:52,200 --> 02:24:55,120 secure environment to proceed and I 3815 02:24:55,120 --> 02:24:58,490 think probably expired . The you have 3816 02:24:58,490 --> 02:25:00,657 to finish up for the record . Thanks . 3817 02:25:00,657 --> 02:25:02,712 The international efforts are really 3818 02:25:02,712 --> 02:25:04,823 focused on security , unfortunately . 3819 02:25:04,823 --> 02:25:07,046 Thank you . Thank you . General . Thank 3820 02:25:07,046 --> 02:25:08,990 you . Mr Chairman Chair recognizes 3821 02:25:08,990 --> 02:25:10,990 represents fear from California for 3822 02:25:10,990 --> 02:25:13,780 five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman , 3823 02:25:13,790 --> 02:25:17,160 Thank you for your great service . 3824 02:25:17,170 --> 02:25:19,281 General Mackenzie . Let me start with 3825 02:25:19,281 --> 02:25:22,760 you . I'm very concerned 3826 02:25:22,760 --> 02:25:26,640 that the May deadline is upon us 3827 02:25:26,650 --> 02:25:28,539 and I don't know that we have any 3828 02:25:28,539 --> 02:25:31,850 assurances that the taliban will not 3829 02:25:31,850 --> 02:25:35,070 start attacking us forces in 3830 02:25:35,070 --> 02:25:37,126 Afghanistan . Can you provide us any 3831 02:25:37,126 --> 02:25:40,510 consolation regarding that ? I can tell 3832 02:25:40,510 --> 02:25:42,399 you that we're prepared for those 3833 02:25:42,399 --> 02:25:44,566 attacks should they occur and we'll be 3834 02:25:44,566 --> 02:25:48,540 able to defend ourselves . But we don't 3835 02:25:48,540 --> 02:25:50,651 have any subsequent agreement then it 3836 02:25:50,651 --> 02:25:52,818 appears I have no we have no agreement 3837 02:25:52,818 --> 02:25:55,020 on that past one May and I'm not 3838 02:25:55,020 --> 02:25:57,131 certain what decision making is going 3839 02:25:57,131 --> 02:25:59,298 on inside the taliban pursuant to what 3840 02:25:59,298 --> 02:26:01,464 actions they might or might not take . 3841 02:26:01,464 --> 02:26:03,687 We're ready for whatever they choose to 3842 02:26:03,687 --> 02:26:07,120 do and do we have any intention to 3843 02:26:07,130 --> 02:26:10,260 maintain defense contractors in 3844 02:26:10,260 --> 02:26:13,950 Afghanistan After we depart , everyone 3845 02:26:13,950 --> 02:26:16,172 will leave . All us defense contractors 3846 02:26:16,172 --> 02:26:18,339 will leave as part of the withdrawal . 3847 02:26:20,880 --> 02:26:24,720 All right . Um I think that answers my 3848 02:26:24,720 --> 02:26:26,720 questions . Mr Chairman I go back . 3849 02:26:27,480 --> 02:26:31,100 Yeah . Mhm . Represented yields back 3850 02:26:32,280 --> 02:26:34,391 just a moment for everyone . I'm just 3851 02:26:34,391 --> 02:26:38,100 checking with staff on other um members . 3852 02:26:40,580 --> 02:26:42,691 Okay . It looks like we're all good . 3853 02:26:42,691 --> 02:26:45,000 Uh So I want to thank the panel for 3854 02:26:45,010 --> 02:26:48,740 coming today . Well , I think Adjourn 3855 02:26:48,740 --> 02:26:52,080 or a recess till three pm And meet back 3856 02:26:52,080 --> 02:26:54,200 here at three p.m. for classified 3857 02:26:54,200 --> 02:26:57,290 portion of the hearing . I'll give you 3858 02:26:57,290 --> 02:27:00,230 all some time to uh , have some lunch . 3859 02:27:00,240 --> 02:27:02,570 So I appreciate your patience with us 3860 02:27:02,980 --> 02:27:04,980 And uh , answers to our questions . 3861 02:27:04,980 --> 02:27:07,270 Very much appreciate that . With that , 3862 02:27:07,280 --> 02:27:10,930 uh , we will stand in recess till three . 3863 02:27:12,280 --> 02:27:14,830 We will adjourn until three pm . I 3864 02:27:14,830 --> 02:27:15,610 apologize .