1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:08,840 --> 00:00:10,951 Good morning , ladies and gentlemen , 3 00:00:10,951 --> 00:00:13,007 thanks for being here . I want to go 4 00:00:13,007 --> 00:00:15,130 ahead and uh welcome you to today's 5 00:00:15,140 --> 00:00:17,230 morning morning press conference and 6 00:00:17,250 --> 00:00:20,230 introduce to you the commander of the U . 7 00:00:20,230 --> 00:00:22,286 S . Strategic Command . Admiral Chaz 8 00:00:22,286 --> 00:00:24,420 Richard . Uh , and sir , we'll just 9 00:00:24,420 --> 00:00:26,587 turn this right over to you . We'll do 10 00:00:26,587 --> 00:00:28,698 Q . And A after his opening remarks . 11 00:00:28,698 --> 00:00:30,976 All right , good morning everyone . Uh , 12 00:00:30,976 --> 00:00:32,976 and as Brooke just said , I'm Meryl 13 00:00:32,976 --> 00:00:32,910 Chaz Richard , Commander of U . S . 14 00:00:32,910 --> 00:00:35,210 Strategic Command have the Privilege of 15 00:00:35,210 --> 00:00:37,500 leading 150,000 soldiers , sailors , 16 00:00:37,500 --> 00:00:39,333 airmen , Marines , Guardians and 17 00:00:39,333 --> 00:00:41,940 civilians . I appreciate y'all taken 18 00:00:41,940 --> 00:00:44,250 sometime have a conversation to answer 19 00:00:44,250 --> 00:00:47,170 a few questions . I I do understand 20 00:00:47,180 --> 00:00:49,880 that this afternoon . General Mackenzie 21 00:00:49,890 --> 00:00:52,540 from Central Command will also be doing 22 00:00:52,540 --> 00:00:54,530 one of these and uh , perhaps it's 23 00:00:54,530 --> 00:00:56,752 they'll probably see him . And uh , and 24 00:00:56,752 --> 00:00:58,530 I don't think I'm gonna get the 25 00:00:58,530 --> 00:00:58,530 opportunity if they could pass him a 26 00:00:58,530 --> 00:01:01,060 roll tide on my behalf . Right . I uh 27 00:01:01,070 --> 00:01:04,160 I'd appreciate that the uh I do want to 28 00:01:04,160 --> 00:01:07,990 report that stratcom remains ready to 29 00:01:07,990 --> 00:01:10,450 accomplish all of our assigned missions . 30 00:01:10,460 --> 00:01:13,750 That has not been uh easy given the 31 00:01:13,750 --> 00:01:15,806 covid environment and other things , 32 00:01:15,806 --> 00:01:18,510 but we're fully mission capable . So as 33 00:01:18,510 --> 00:01:21,060 you know , I just spent a couple of 34 00:01:21,060 --> 00:01:23,270 days along with another command 35 00:01:23,270 --> 00:01:25,640 commander testifying to the House and 36 00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:28,260 Senate about my responsibilities , my 37 00:01:28,270 --> 00:01:30,437 commands , responsibilities , how well 38 00:01:30,437 --> 00:01:32,740 we're doing those and I feel very 39 00:01:32,740 --> 00:01:35,960 privileged to have had that opportunity . 40 00:01:36,540 --> 00:01:38,970 The as you know , we're responsible for 41 00:01:38,970 --> 00:01:42,250 maintaining strategic deterrence and in 42 00:01:42,250 --> 00:01:45,440 doing so , enabling the rest of the 43 00:01:45,440 --> 00:01:47,560 joint force to accomplish their 44 00:01:47,560 --> 00:01:50,730 emissions . I testified in some detail 45 00:01:51,130 --> 00:01:53,980 to the threats that we currently face 46 00:01:54,540 --> 00:01:56,484 once , you know , that we're fully 47 00:01:56,484 --> 00:01:58,540 ready for that challenge , including 48 00:01:58,540 --> 00:02:00,484 the challenge of deterring to peer 49 00:02:00,484 --> 00:02:03,110 competitors at the same time . And I 50 00:02:03,110 --> 00:02:05,277 didn't want to start off by saying , I 51 00:02:05,277 --> 00:02:07,690 applaud the secretary's leadership uh , 52 00:02:07,700 --> 00:02:11,680 in all areas , but in particular in our 53 00:02:11,690 --> 00:02:15,010 um efforts to do a series of 54 00:02:15,010 --> 00:02:18,170 reviews to include uh a strategic 55 00:02:18,170 --> 00:02:21,860 deterrence review . Um and the 56 00:02:21,860 --> 00:02:24,027 way we're approaching that , because I 57 00:02:24,027 --> 00:02:26,138 think it's important to remember that 58 00:02:26,138 --> 00:02:28,650 nuclear deterrence is not separate from 59 00:02:28,650 --> 00:02:31,250 strategic deterrence is not separate 60 00:02:31,250 --> 00:02:33,380 from conventional deterrence or space 61 00:02:33,380 --> 00:02:36,370 or cyber . Those must be all looked at 62 00:02:36,380 --> 00:02:39,280 together in order to accomplish a 63 00:02:39,290 --> 00:02:41,500 strategic deterrence mission . So I 64 00:02:41,500 --> 00:02:43,611 applaud where we're going and the way 65 00:02:43,611 --> 00:02:45,778 we are approaching that . So with that 66 00:02:45,778 --> 00:02:47,833 I'll stop and I'm happy to take your 67 00:02:47,833 --> 00:02:49,500 questions . Thank you , sir . 68 00:02:52,430 --> 00:02:54,810 Richard . I want to ask you about a 69 00:02:54,820 --> 00:02:56,931 couple of comments you made yesterday 70 00:02:56,931 --> 00:02:59,098 during your testimony uh when you were 71 00:02:59,098 --> 00:03:01,150 talking about the issues with the 72 00:03:01,160 --> 00:03:03,460 minuteman three and the question about 73 00:03:03,470 --> 00:03:06,250 possibly life extending it , you said 74 00:03:06,250 --> 00:03:08,417 that there's a long list of parts that 75 00:03:08,417 --> 00:03:10,639 are in very short supply . And you gave 76 00:03:10,639 --> 00:03:12,694 an example of lock switches that you 77 00:03:12,694 --> 00:03:14,806 said there's only two at the moment . 78 00:03:14,806 --> 00:03:16,750 Uh and then you went on to say I'm 79 00:03:16,750 --> 00:03:18,972 afraid there's a point where they won't 80 00:03:18,972 --> 00:03:21,194 they won't be able to pull a rabbit out 81 00:03:21,194 --> 00:03:23,361 of the hat and the system won't work . 82 00:03:23,361 --> 00:03:25,361 So I wonder if you can elaborate on 83 00:03:25,361 --> 00:03:27,417 what sounds to me like an unreliable 84 00:03:27,417 --> 00:03:29,472 aspect of the system . Okay , so the 85 00:03:29,472 --> 00:03:31,306 minimum three system is is fully 86 00:03:31,306 --> 00:03:33,550 reliable today . Right ? The question 87 00:03:33,550 --> 00:03:36,910 is both in terms of the future uh in 88 00:03:36,910 --> 00:03:39,620 terms of the system performance as well 89 00:03:39,620 --> 00:03:41,842 as its ability to pace the threat . You 90 00:03:41,842 --> 00:03:44,064 know , in the end I I defer the U . S . 91 00:03:44,064 --> 00:03:46,330 Air Force um in terms of their ability 92 00:03:46,330 --> 00:03:48,497 to do that , they have assured me they 93 00:03:48,497 --> 00:03:50,710 can do that . Um But it is getting 94 00:03:50,710 --> 00:03:53,330 increasingly harder and I do want to 95 00:03:53,330 --> 00:03:57,280 have uh an understanding of just what 96 00:03:57,280 --> 00:03:59,770 it's taking to keep that weapons system 97 00:03:59,770 --> 00:04:01,881 up to the standards that we expect of 98 00:04:01,881 --> 00:04:04,103 it . You say the system , you're afraid 99 00:04:04,103 --> 00:04:06,381 the system won't work on any given day . 100 00:04:06,381 --> 00:04:08,548 It doesn't sound like that sounds like 101 00:04:08,548 --> 00:04:10,714 a definition of unreliable to me . The 102 00:04:10,714 --> 00:04:13,280 again , today , it works fine Air Force 103 00:04:13,290 --> 00:04:16,300 uh confident in their ability to get it 104 00:04:16,300 --> 00:04:18,560 to the points where G BSD is expected 105 00:04:18,560 --> 00:04:20,620 to come in . But this is another 106 00:04:20,620 --> 00:04:24,290 example of no more margin . Right ? So 107 00:04:24,290 --> 00:04:26,401 can you keep going with that ? I want 108 00:04:26,401 --> 00:04:28,210 us to recognize that you can't 109 00:04:28,220 --> 00:04:31,260 indefinitely life extend anything . 110 00:04:31,480 --> 00:04:33,536 That's the point , right ? You can't 111 00:04:33,536 --> 00:04:36,520 take stuff that you got back at the end 112 00:04:36,520 --> 00:04:38,740 of the Cold War and to think somehow 113 00:04:38,740 --> 00:04:41,440 forever , you can continue to make it 114 00:04:41,440 --> 00:04:43,662 work , right ? There's a point where it 115 00:04:43,662 --> 00:04:45,884 becomes not cost effective to do that . 116 00:04:45,884 --> 00:04:47,884 And there's another point out there 117 00:04:47,884 --> 00:04:49,996 where it's not possible at all . Uh , 118 00:04:49,996 --> 00:04:51,940 and I want to make sure that as we 119 00:04:51,940 --> 00:04:53,884 think through these decisions , we 120 00:04:53,884 --> 00:04:55,996 recognize that those points exist and 121 00:04:55,996 --> 00:04:58,218 look for them . Uh , I wanted to give a 122 00:04:58,218 --> 00:05:00,870 specific example of the detail that is 123 00:05:00,870 --> 00:05:02,926 necessary to make sure we know where 124 00:05:02,926 --> 00:05:06,700 those points are . Okay . Also , 125 00:05:06,710 --> 00:05:08,932 still here in the room will go to Megan 126 00:05:08,932 --> 00:05:11,190 Meier's . So the other day in front of 127 00:05:11,190 --> 00:05:13,510 Congress , you testified that you are 128 00:05:13,520 --> 00:05:15,187 confident that there are zero 129 00:05:15,187 --> 00:05:17,298 extremists within strategic command . 130 00:05:17,298 --> 00:05:19,520 And one of the reasons you offered that 131 00:05:19,520 --> 00:05:21,464 is because security clearances are 132 00:05:21,464 --> 00:05:23,631 required for the entire organization . 133 00:05:23,631 --> 00:05:25,742 Do you want to clarify or expand upon 134 00:05:25,742 --> 00:05:27,798 those comments ? I do . Actually , I 135 00:05:27,798 --> 00:05:29,853 welcome the opportunity to do that . 136 00:05:29,853 --> 00:05:31,964 Look , the standard is really clear . 137 00:05:31,964 --> 00:05:35,050 We don't tolerate extremism , right ? 138 00:05:35,060 --> 00:05:37,760 My forces live up to an even higher 139 00:05:37,760 --> 00:05:40,038 standard based on their responsibility . 140 00:05:40,038 --> 00:05:42,270 This is not new , right ? The 141 00:05:42,270 --> 00:05:44,800 Department of Defense has never 142 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:47,820 tolerated extremism . Um , I think the 143 00:05:47,820 --> 00:05:50,860 Secretary's leadership is on point for 144 00:05:50,860 --> 00:05:53,360 us to remember this is a continuing 145 00:05:53,360 --> 00:05:55,582 effort , right ? The stand down , which 146 00:05:55,582 --> 00:05:57,670 my command is completed was a great 147 00:05:57,670 --> 00:05:59,892 opportunity to remind ourselves what is 148 00:05:59,892 --> 00:06:02,170 the standard uh and to make sure that 149 00:06:02,170 --> 00:06:04,114 we're upholding that standard . So 150 00:06:04,114 --> 00:06:06,400 we're not done right ? And I'm not 151 00:06:06,400 --> 00:06:08,990 naive . Uh and I don't think I'm immune 152 00:06:08,990 --> 00:06:12,530 to this . Uh So this is just a 153 00:06:12,540 --> 00:06:15,020 step in a longer process , right ? We 154 00:06:15,020 --> 00:06:17,580 are making sure that those procedures , 155 00:06:17,580 --> 00:06:19,636 security clearance being one of them 156 00:06:19,636 --> 00:06:21,730 are being rigorously executed , 157 00:06:21,740 --> 00:06:23,930 rigorous execution of the personnel 158 00:06:23,930 --> 00:06:26,290 reliability program . And I'll go back 159 00:06:26,290 --> 00:06:29,490 to what I said also said . Which is if 160 00:06:29,490 --> 00:06:32,440 you're there then you're hiding it very 161 00:06:32,440 --> 00:06:34,820 well . And it is just a matter of time 162 00:06:34,820 --> 00:06:36,931 before I get to you , right ? You are 163 00:06:36,931 --> 00:06:39,098 either on team constitution or you are 164 00:06:39,098 --> 00:06:41,153 not . And if you are not you have no 165 00:06:41,153 --> 00:06:44,700 place in my forces . So just to clarify , 166 00:06:44,710 --> 00:06:46,821 you're confident that it's zero . But 167 00:06:46,821 --> 00:06:48,988 that's not based on any data serving I 168 00:06:48,988 --> 00:06:51,220 know of none . Right . And I'm looking 169 00:06:51,220 --> 00:06:54,330 really hard . So what was one of the 170 00:06:54,330 --> 00:06:56,441 output cuts of the stand down ? Right 171 00:06:56,441 --> 00:06:59,660 is we didn't find anything . Right ? So 172 00:06:59,670 --> 00:07:02,890 yes , I know of none . And I'm doing my 173 00:07:02,890 --> 00:07:05,112 best to make sure that I haven't missed 174 00:07:05,112 --> 00:07:07,390 anybody . Okay , let's go to the phone . 175 00:07:07,390 --> 00:07:09,700 We're going to go to SAN commonly Radio 176 00:07:09,700 --> 00:07:12,400 Free Asia . Yeah , I have a two 177 00:07:12,400 --> 00:07:14,720 questions . Uh , it is known that 178 00:07:14,730 --> 00:07:17,230 deterrence and escalation came and we 179 00:07:17,240 --> 00:07:19,660 exercise hadn't been made last week . 180 00:07:20,140 --> 00:07:22,029 So , can you tell me North korean 181 00:07:22,029 --> 00:07:24,196 nuclear threat is also included as our 182 00:07:24,196 --> 00:07:26,260 target to detail for this exercise . 183 00:07:26,840 --> 00:07:29,410 The second question is North Korea 184 00:07:29,410 --> 00:07:31,466 continues to develop and deploy more 185 00:07:31,466 --> 00:07:34,010 capable I . C . B . M . And C . Based 186 00:07:34,010 --> 00:07:36,410 launch ballistic missile . So how do 187 00:07:36,410 --> 00:07:38,688 you assess north Korea this capability ? 188 00:07:38,688 --> 00:07:40,799 And do you think that current U . S . 189 00:07:40,799 --> 00:07:43,021 Strategy capability is capable to deter 190 00:07:43,021 --> 00:07:46,350 north Korea nuclear threat ? Miss the 191 00:07:46,360 --> 00:07:48,471 second half of the first question , I 192 00:07:48,471 --> 00:07:50,471 think you were referring to what we 193 00:07:50,471 --> 00:07:53,050 call the degree war game that was 194 00:07:53,060 --> 00:07:55,227 recently conducted . But what was your 195 00:07:55,227 --> 00:07:58,360 question about that this four exercises 196 00:07:58,360 --> 00:08:00,304 the North korean nuclear threat is 197 00:08:00,304 --> 00:08:03,290 targeted for this exercise . Uh , so 198 00:08:03,290 --> 00:08:06,420 the actual um work specifics inside of 199 00:08:06,420 --> 00:08:09,650 a degree are are classified . Uh and so 200 00:08:09,650 --> 00:08:11,594 I'm not really able to answer that 201 00:08:11,594 --> 00:08:14,130 question . I will tell you that I am 202 00:08:14,140 --> 00:08:17,590 very confident in my ability to deter 203 00:08:17,590 --> 00:08:19,670 what we're very familiar with North 204 00:08:19,670 --> 00:08:21,559 Korea's capabilities and I'm very 205 00:08:21,559 --> 00:08:24,750 confident in our ability to deter that . 206 00:08:26,540 --> 00:08:29,400 Okay and back in the room jenny , thank 207 00:08:29,400 --> 00:08:33,050 you . I ask about the North Korea again . 208 00:08:33,060 --> 00:08:35,250 Uh , you know that the north Korea 209 00:08:35,260 --> 00:08:38,370 continues to develop a nuclear weapon 210 00:08:38,370 --> 00:08:42,350 and wmD weapons of mass destructions . 211 00:08:42,840 --> 00:08:46,380 And recently North Korea has joined 212 00:08:46,390 --> 00:08:50,100 forces with china and Russia , 213 00:08:50,110 --> 00:08:53,430 it kind of a very dangerous to korean 214 00:08:53,440 --> 00:08:56,430 Peninsula state . Reading again , and 215 00:08:56,430 --> 00:09:00,320 uh what are the strategic goals 216 00:09:00,330 --> 00:09:04,200 of the United States to protect 217 00:09:04,210 --> 00:09:07,550 the alliance , you know , put 218 00:09:08,440 --> 00:09:11,760 from North Korea's threat for anything ? 219 00:09:11,820 --> 00:09:15,460 Biological weapons ? You know ? 220 00:09:16,640 --> 00:09:20,090 So , so the short answer is , 221 00:09:20,090 --> 00:09:23,970 first , I think uh that situation is 222 00:09:23,970 --> 00:09:26,560 right for a diplomatic resolution , 223 00:09:26,570 --> 00:09:30,000 right ? That uh that is the best path 224 00:09:30,010 --> 00:09:33,050 to resolve issues with North Korea is 225 00:09:33,050 --> 00:09:35,760 using diplomacy first , right , I will 226 00:09:35,760 --> 00:09:38,350 say that the United States and 227 00:09:38,350 --> 00:09:40,890 certainly my command are fully ready to 228 00:09:40,890 --> 00:09:43,780 honor our security commitments and 229 00:09:43,780 --> 00:09:46,540 alliance uh promises that we have made 230 00:09:46,540 --> 00:09:49,720 to South Korea as your strategic 231 00:09:49,720 --> 00:09:53,560 commander . So do you have any a 232 00:09:53,570 --> 00:09:57,350 space speaker and a strategic goals for 233 00:09:57,360 --> 00:10:00,640 this ? Uh , My goal is to 234 00:10:00,640 --> 00:10:03,080 fundamentally uphold my piece of 235 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:05,340 responsibility in the assurances and 236 00:10:05,340 --> 00:10:07,520 commitments that we have made to South 237 00:10:07,520 --> 00:10:09,687 Korea and I'm fully ready to do that . 238 00:10:10,940 --> 00:10:13,510 Okay . And I'll go to uh let's go here 239 00:10:13,510 --> 00:10:15,566 in the room mike Flynn sir , can you 240 00:10:15,566 --> 00:10:18,080 tell me how well do you think Congress 241 00:10:18,080 --> 00:10:20,420 appreciated your concerns during your 242 00:10:20,420 --> 00:10:23,870 testimony ? Are you are you optimistic 243 00:10:23,870 --> 00:10:26,760 about it or pessimistic after spending 244 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:28,982 the last couple of days up there on the 245 00:10:28,982 --> 00:10:31,093 hill ? Look , uh , to be honest , I I 246 00:10:31,093 --> 00:10:33,149 think you would have to ask them how 247 00:10:33,149 --> 00:10:35,316 well I did . What I appreciate was the 248 00:10:35,316 --> 00:10:37,427 fact that I had the opportunity to do 249 00:10:37,427 --> 00:10:39,649 it uh , and to lay out the mission both 250 00:10:39,649 --> 00:10:42,200 in a open and closed hearing . Uh , the 251 00:10:42,200 --> 00:10:44,422 way I see it in a very frank manner . I 252 00:10:44,422 --> 00:10:46,256 think I upheld my obligations to 253 00:10:46,256 --> 00:10:49,140 Congress to do that . Very good . Also 254 00:10:49,140 --> 00:10:51,370 here in the room bar General , it's a 255 00:10:51,370 --> 00:10:53,537 follow up on some of bob's questions . 256 00:10:53,840 --> 00:10:56,173 Can you starting with a minuteman three . 257 00:10:56,173 --> 00:10:58,340 Can you put some framework around it ? 258 00:10:58,340 --> 00:11:01,970 Are we talking months , years before it 259 00:11:01,970 --> 00:11:04,070 becomes unreliable and unable to 260 00:11:04,070 --> 00:11:05,959 sustain ? Can you put any kind of 261 00:11:05,959 --> 00:11:07,681 framework on that ? Well , the 262 00:11:07,681 --> 00:11:09,681 framework is , is the Air Force has 263 00:11:09,681 --> 00:11:11,681 made a commitment that they will be 264 00:11:11,681 --> 00:11:14,440 able to um present me a Minuteman three 265 00:11:14,440 --> 00:11:17,310 operating system to the IOC and F . O . 266 00:11:17,310 --> 00:11:19,810 C . Dates on G . BSD . And I am fully 267 00:11:19,810 --> 00:11:22,330 confident that they are able to go do 268 00:11:22,330 --> 00:11:24,860 that . What I'm trying to point out is 269 00:11:24,860 --> 00:11:26,693 is that if you want to push that 270 00:11:26,693 --> 00:11:29,880 further right , you are going into 271 00:11:29,890 --> 00:11:32,670 uncharted territory , we may be able to 272 00:11:32,670 --> 00:11:35,370 chart that territory , but there is an 273 00:11:35,370 --> 00:11:38,210 enormous amount of detail that has to 274 00:11:38,210 --> 00:11:40,110 go into that . And the only 275 00:11:40,110 --> 00:11:42,510 organization that I know who is capable 276 00:11:42,510 --> 00:11:44,621 of working through all of that detail 277 00:11:44,621 --> 00:11:46,843 is the United States Air Force . That's 278 00:11:46,843 --> 00:11:49,066 my point . I'm trying to point out , it 279 00:11:49,066 --> 00:11:51,399 is not simply a matter of saying , well , 280 00:11:51,399 --> 00:11:53,510 the rock , it'll work and a couple of 281 00:11:53,510 --> 00:11:55,710 other things , it's a weapons system 282 00:11:56,240 --> 00:11:59,510 Here is in your mind . The IOC of GBSD 283 00:11:59,510 --> 00:12:03,480 is uh 2029 and Senator Warren 284 00:12:03,480 --> 00:12:05,647 yesterday obviously expressed a lot of 285 00:12:05,647 --> 00:12:07,869 concern that while you were giving your 286 00:12:07,869 --> 00:12:10,070 milk best military advice , she raised 287 00:12:10,070 --> 00:12:13,180 the prospect that you were ahead 288 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:16,440 of the reviews that are being done 289 00:12:16,450 --> 00:12:20,350 about a strategic policy , Strategic 290 00:12:20,360 --> 00:12:23,260 reviews , nuclear reviews . Do you 291 00:12:23,270 --> 00:12:26,410 worry that this candid advice you're 292 00:12:26,420 --> 00:12:29,440 giving is boxing in the President 293 00:12:29,450 --> 00:12:32,150 before the reviews are done or even the 294 00:12:32,150 --> 00:12:34,700 budget has done . Barbara ? I I tell 295 00:12:34,700 --> 00:12:36,730 you , I tried very I felt like 296 00:12:36,730 --> 00:12:39,270 yesterday putting a sign beside my name 297 00:12:39,270 --> 00:12:42,130 that said this is best military advice . 298 00:12:42,160 --> 00:12:45,190 I am a military officer , military 299 00:12:45,190 --> 00:12:48,170 commander . I will do exactly what the 300 00:12:48,170 --> 00:12:51,510 president tells me to do or not do . Um 301 00:12:51,570 --> 00:12:55,030 The advice I was giving was not new . 302 00:12:55,040 --> 00:12:58,060 Right ? I have said that many times in 303 00:12:58,060 --> 00:13:00,171 the past . In fact , you can probably 304 00:13:00,171 --> 00:13:01,949 trace the lineage back to other 305 00:13:01,949 --> 00:13:04,116 strategic command commanders . Um so I 306 00:13:04,116 --> 00:13:06,600 absolutely understand my place inside 307 00:13:06,600 --> 00:13:10,320 the uh chain of command . Uh and so I'm 308 00:13:10,330 --> 00:13:12,390 absolutely ready to do whatever the 309 00:13:12,390 --> 00:13:15,630 nation asked me to do . Okay , let's go 310 00:13:15,630 --> 00:13:17,960 to the phones were gonna go to BRian 311 00:13:17,960 --> 00:13:20,071 Epstein from the Air Force magazine . 312 00:13:21,260 --> 00:13:23,427 Well , thank you for taking the time . 313 00:13:23,427 --> 00:13:25,204 I was hoping to go back to your 314 00:13:25,204 --> 00:13:27,371 statement from a couple of days ago on 315 00:13:27,371 --> 00:13:29,538 the if somehow the I . C . B . M . Leg 316 00:13:29,538 --> 00:13:31,649 of the triangle cut , you'd recommend 317 00:13:31,649 --> 00:13:33,760 returning bombers to alert if looking 318 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:35,982 at the current state of the Air Force's 319 00:13:35,982 --> 00:13:38,093 bomber fleet and the bomber roadmap . 320 00:13:38,093 --> 00:13:39,871 Is this something that could be 321 00:13:39,871 --> 00:13:41,927 Possible beyond just a few days that 322 00:13:41,927 --> 00:13:44,149 have been exercised ? And would that in 323 00:13:44,149 --> 00:13:45,927 turn caused a recommendation to 324 00:13:45,927 --> 00:13:48,470 increase the B-21 by , Hey , so one , 325 00:13:48,470 --> 00:13:50,637 thank you for the question and two , I 326 00:13:50,637 --> 00:13:53,210 was using that as a specific example of 327 00:13:53,210 --> 00:13:55,377 the challenges the nation would face . 328 00:13:55,377 --> 00:13:58,540 Right Remember , um I am unique among 329 00:13:58,540 --> 00:14:01,380 the combatant commands that I don't get 330 00:14:01,380 --> 00:14:04,120 to decide or offer to the secretary 331 00:14:04,120 --> 00:14:07,470 what my objectives are right . Most 332 00:14:07,470 --> 00:14:09,810 other combatant commands execute their 333 00:14:09,810 --> 00:14:12,940 missions that way mine are directed by 334 00:14:12,940 --> 00:14:14,940 the President as interpreted by the 335 00:14:14,940 --> 00:14:17,051 Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 336 00:14:17,051 --> 00:14:19,273 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . And so I 337 00:14:19,273 --> 00:14:22,410 take those and then look at the threat 338 00:14:22,420 --> 00:14:24,870 and then ask for the forces to a 339 00:14:24,870 --> 00:14:27,250 complication . It's a very analytic 340 00:14:27,260 --> 00:14:30,820 process . Um and that results 341 00:14:30,830 --> 00:14:34,050 and the nation has repeatedly 342 00:14:34,340 --> 00:14:38,290 um validated that given us and 343 00:14:38,290 --> 00:14:40,512 those objectives that I'm talking about 344 00:14:40,512 --> 00:14:42,790 are very consistent . I can trace their 345 00:14:42,790 --> 00:14:44,370 lineage back to the Kennedy 346 00:14:44,370 --> 00:14:47,710 administration . We have repeatedly um 347 00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:50,160 decided the triad is the best way to do . 348 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:52,049 That doesn't mean that that's the 349 00:14:52,049 --> 00:14:53,938 decision that will come to in the 350 00:14:53,938 --> 00:14:55,882 future . Right ? That's what these 351 00:14:55,882 --> 00:14:57,827 reviews are gonna go show . Um and 352 00:14:57,827 --> 00:15:00,470 we'll be ready to execute whatever 353 00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:03,480 decisions that the nation makes . My 354 00:15:03,480 --> 00:15:05,640 point was given what I'm responsible 355 00:15:05,640 --> 00:15:09,080 for now , given the standards that we 356 00:15:09,080 --> 00:15:11,302 have historically held this mission set 357 00:15:11,302 --> 00:15:14,380 to , which is specifically um if any 358 00:15:14,380 --> 00:15:17,080 piece of it fails right ? We assume we 359 00:15:17,080 --> 00:15:19,230 can fail an entire piece for whatever 360 00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:23,060 reason . Um We can still do what we 361 00:15:23,060 --> 00:15:25,780 were assigned to do with what remains 362 00:15:25,790 --> 00:15:29,240 uh that I gave you the day today 363 00:15:29,250 --> 00:15:33,000 example of what I would ask for . Um , 364 00:15:33,010 --> 00:15:35,580 that's only a subset . I'd still have 365 00:15:35,580 --> 00:15:39,060 to figure out some other pieces . Um , 366 00:15:39,200 --> 00:15:42,880 and so , uh , that was only 367 00:15:42,880 --> 00:15:46,560 one subset of a larger class of stuff 368 00:15:46,570 --> 00:15:48,737 that I'd be responsible , figuring out 369 00:15:48,737 --> 00:15:52,670 an answer to . Okay . And also on the 370 00:15:52,670 --> 00:15:54,503 phone will go to frank Wolf with 371 00:15:54,503 --> 00:15:57,110 defense daily . Uh , yeah . Good 372 00:15:57,110 --> 00:15:59,277 morning , Admiral . Uh , we just had a 373 00:15:59,277 --> 00:16:01,332 question . I wondered if I could get 374 00:16:01,332 --> 00:16:05,280 your insights on 2018 nuclear posture 375 00:16:05,280 --> 00:16:08,330 review , which stated that the SSB 376 00:16:08,330 --> 00:16:11,640 enforce , uh , presumably the existing 377 00:16:11,640 --> 00:16:13,862 Ohio class . S . S . B . N . S . In the 378 00:16:13,862 --> 00:16:16,170 future . Columbia class will are 379 00:16:16,170 --> 00:16:18,281 virtually undetectable and there's no 380 00:16:18,281 --> 00:16:20,614 near term threat to their survivability . 381 00:16:20,614 --> 00:16:22,900 So when we talk about the ground based 382 00:16:22,900 --> 00:16:25,660 leg of the triad being necessary um 383 00:16:25,670 --> 00:16:27,726 could you just explain that if if in 384 00:16:27,726 --> 00:16:30,270 fact you modernize the N . C . Three 385 00:16:30,270 --> 00:16:32,990 command and control system so that um 386 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:35,056 command authority could still get in 387 00:16:35,056 --> 00:16:37,840 touch with the S . S . B . N . Um What 388 00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:40,290 what why is that ? Why is the ground 389 00:16:40,290 --> 00:16:43,080 leg necessary ? Why why is G . BSD or 390 00:16:43,090 --> 00:16:45,690 or the service life extension of the 391 00:16:45,690 --> 00:16:48,610 minuteman three necessary . Okay so 392 00:16:48,610 --> 00:16:51,830 first um there is a total 393 00:16:51,830 --> 00:16:54,570 amount of capability and capacity 394 00:16:54,570 --> 00:16:56,720 that's required to execute the 395 00:16:56,730 --> 00:16:59,063 responsibilities that I have been given . 396 00:16:59,063 --> 00:17:01,730 I need the forces that we have to 397 00:17:01,730 --> 00:17:03,600 include uh the intercontinental 398 00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:05,433 ballistic missiles to be able to 399 00:17:05,433 --> 00:17:07,770 accomplish all of that . Um We don't 400 00:17:07,770 --> 00:17:11,580 have capacity um uh in any to to start 401 00:17:11,580 --> 00:17:13,580 to change that unless we change the 402 00:17:13,580 --> 00:17:15,802 guidance . Right ? And we can always do 403 00:17:15,802 --> 00:17:18,090 that . Um Then the second piece is 404 00:17:18,100 --> 00:17:21,160 there there are things that um 405 00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:25,810 we all take as givens nowadays . 406 00:17:26,240 --> 00:17:28,660 One of them is bolt out of the blue , 407 00:17:28,670 --> 00:17:30,810 right ? I'm referring to an unworn 408 00:17:30,820 --> 00:17:33,042 large attack , right ? I think we would 409 00:17:33,042 --> 00:17:35,700 all agree that that is highly unlikely . 410 00:17:35,710 --> 00:17:37,932 Um , we'd be the first to tell you that 411 00:17:37,932 --> 00:17:40,154 it's highly unlikely because we look at 412 00:17:40,154 --> 00:17:43,540 it every day , but we forget how we got 413 00:17:43,540 --> 00:17:46,580 here . In some cases we made bolt out 414 00:17:46,580 --> 00:17:50,010 of the blue unlikely um , ballistic 415 00:17:50,010 --> 00:17:51,810 missile , submarines , the 416 00:17:51,820 --> 00:17:53,987 responsiveness of the intercontinental 417 00:17:53,987 --> 00:17:56,340 leg . Our postures are policies , the 418 00:17:56,340 --> 00:17:58,451 way we execute the reason bolt out of 419 00:17:58,451 --> 00:18:01,270 the blue is unlikely . It's cause it's 420 00:18:01,270 --> 00:18:03,410 probably not gonna work . Right ? And 421 00:18:03,410 --> 00:18:05,830 so we have to be careful when we uh 422 00:18:05,840 --> 00:18:07,840 make future decisions that we don't 423 00:18:07,840 --> 00:18:10,920 forget how we got here . Uh , unless we 424 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:13,070 return ourselves to a world we don't 425 00:18:13,070 --> 00:18:16,740 want to be in . Uh , and do we 426 00:18:16,740 --> 00:18:18,796 have any other questions here in the 427 00:18:18,796 --> 00:18:21,750 room chris Anderson ? Thank you for 428 00:18:21,750 --> 00:18:25,160 taking my question . I'm wondering if 429 00:18:25,170 --> 00:18:27,392 uh if you could talk a little bit about 430 00:18:27,392 --> 00:18:29,614 the capabilities that Space Command has 431 00:18:29,614 --> 00:18:31,837 brought having the guardians under your 432 00:18:31,837 --> 00:18:35,580 command . Um One I I applaud the 433 00:18:35,580 --> 00:18:38,630 decision to establish a space command . 434 00:18:38,740 --> 00:18:42,430 I think it has been a great benefit to 435 00:18:42,430 --> 00:18:44,440 my mission sets . As you know , we 436 00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:46,551 still think of ourselves as the proud 437 00:18:46,551 --> 00:18:48,607 parents of Space Command because the 438 00:18:48,607 --> 00:18:50,718 responsibilities were transferred out 439 00:18:50,718 --> 00:18:52,940 of stratcom to Space command and the of 440 00:18:52,940 --> 00:18:55,610 many things that I could point to uh in 441 00:18:55,610 --> 00:18:59,470 terms of how General Dickinson helps 442 00:18:59,470 --> 00:19:02,020 me accomplish my mission better . The 443 00:19:02,020 --> 00:19:05,830 one I'd point to is uh his role and 444 00:19:05,830 --> 00:19:08,500 responsibility as the sensor manager . 445 00:19:08,510 --> 00:19:11,020 Right ? So now we are looking across 446 00:19:11,020 --> 00:19:13,131 three different missions set . So I'm 447 00:19:13,131 --> 00:19:15,298 specifically referring to mr warning , 448 00:19:15,298 --> 00:19:17,409 missile defense and space situational 449 00:19:17,409 --> 00:19:19,631 awareness . And we are able to take the 450 00:19:19,631 --> 00:19:22,330 nation's total collection of capability 451 00:19:22,330 --> 00:19:24,950 and sensors in this case and use them 452 00:19:24,950 --> 00:19:27,620 much more effectively so that all three 453 00:19:27,620 --> 00:19:30,200 missions actually benefited from that . 454 00:19:30,210 --> 00:19:33,160 Um This is a good specific example . 455 00:19:33,240 --> 00:19:35,462 Some of the ways we need to think about 456 00:19:35,462 --> 00:19:37,462 command and control moving into the 457 00:19:37,462 --> 00:19:40,670 future . Very good . And one final . Do 458 00:19:40,670 --> 00:19:43,120 you have any information about the 459 00:19:43,120 --> 00:19:46,990 north Korea prepared for the SlbM 460 00:19:46,990 --> 00:19:49,960 lunch or CBM very soon ? 461 00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:54,320 Um so ma'am look uh we are ready for 462 00:19:54,320 --> 00:19:57,180 just about anything North Korea can do . 463 00:19:57,190 --> 00:19:59,850 Right . Um so I am fully confident that 464 00:19:59,860 --> 00:20:02,810 uh we're prepared for whatever they 465 00:20:02,810 --> 00:20:05,550 might decide to do . All right , 466 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,030 very good , very good . Okay , and with 467 00:20:09,030 --> 00:20:12,030 that oh actually one final question for 468 00:20:12,030 --> 00:20:14,920 Lucas , Admiral Lucas tomlinson Fox 469 00:20:14,920 --> 00:20:17,060 news , can you talk about the growing 470 00:20:17,070 --> 00:20:20,580 chinese uh ballistic missile threat and 471 00:20:20,580 --> 00:20:23,100 why is china putting I . C . B . M . S 472 00:20:23,100 --> 00:20:26,280 into the ground ? So one as I testified 473 00:20:26,290 --> 00:20:28,500 um they have hit some kind of 474 00:20:28,500 --> 00:20:30,444 inflection point . They're rapidly 475 00:20:30,444 --> 00:20:32,556 expanding . I think I covered that in 476 00:20:32,556 --> 00:20:36,160 some detail uh uh in testimony 477 00:20:36,170 --> 00:20:38,760 right as to why they're doing that . 478 00:20:38,760 --> 00:20:41,230 Remember they're very opaque . Um in 479 00:20:41,230 --> 00:20:45,030 fact uh Lucas , I'd almost ask you to 480 00:20:45,030 --> 00:20:47,240 ask them right ? And as I was getting 481 00:20:47,240 --> 00:20:49,351 ready for this , I was like trying to 482 00:20:49,351 --> 00:20:51,850 think of other countries , admirals and 483 00:20:51,850 --> 00:20:53,961 generals who are willing to get up in 484 00:20:53,961 --> 00:20:56,128 front of their press or are willing to 485 00:20:56,128 --> 00:20:58,410 go testify in front of their Congress 486 00:20:58,410 --> 00:21:01,990 or other legislative body . Um and and 487 00:21:01,990 --> 00:21:04,101 I think it's something as americans , 488 00:21:04,101 --> 00:21:06,268 we should be proud of that , that your 489 00:21:06,268 --> 00:21:08,434 military is willing to come and answer 490 00:21:08,434 --> 00:21:10,657 your questions and I can't ask him that 491 00:21:10,657 --> 00:21:12,768 question , right ? But you can't . Uh 492 00:21:12,768 --> 00:21:14,990 and I would love for uh , some of these 493 00:21:14,990 --> 00:21:17,157 questions I'll ask me if you would ask 494 00:21:17,157 --> 00:21:19,323 them the same things . I would like to 495 00:21:19,323 --> 00:21:21,546 know the answer myself . You talk about 496 00:21:21,546 --> 00:21:24,610 their growing stockpile . Um , look 497 00:21:24,620 --> 00:21:26,610 again , I covered that in a lot of 498 00:21:26,610 --> 00:21:30,180 detail and I would offer uh , just the 499 00:21:30,180 --> 00:21:32,300 one point maybe the to reemphasize 500 00:21:32,310 --> 00:21:35,530 measuring a stockpile is a very crude 501 00:21:35,530 --> 00:21:37,960 way to describe what a nation can and 502 00:21:37,960 --> 00:21:40,016 can't do . There's much more to it . 503 00:21:40,016 --> 00:21:42,349 It's delivery systems , command control , 504 00:21:42,349 --> 00:21:44,920 readiness training . Um , and I don't 505 00:21:44,920 --> 00:21:46,753 have the luxury of deterring one 506 00:21:46,753 --> 00:21:48,864 country at a time , Right ? I have to 507 00:21:48,864 --> 00:21:50,864 deter all countries all the time in 508 00:21:50,864 --> 00:21:52,976 order to accomplish my mission sets . 509 00:21:52,976 --> 00:21:55,290 Um , and so I asked us to to consider 510 00:21:55,290 --> 00:21:57,457 that , right ? As we think through the 511 00:21:57,457 --> 00:21:59,990 security challenges that we have . Okay , 512 00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:02,222 sir , Thank you very much . All right . 513 00:22:02,222 --> 00:22:04,500 Do you have any any any final comments ? 514 00:22:04,500 --> 00:22:06,667 No . It's just a privileged to talk to 515 00:22:06,667 --> 00:22:08,389 you all . And again , remember 516 00:22:08,389 --> 00:22:10,556 Mackenzie Roll Tide . Right . Thanks . 517 00:22:10,556 --> 00:22:11,260 Thank you very much .