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the subcommittee will come to order . 

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Yeah . Before I begin my opening 

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statement , when I welcome our 

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witnesses , I'm just gonna read some 

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but some technical uh information since 

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this is a hybrid hearing and some 

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members will be joining us remotely 

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welcome to today's hearing operations 

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in cyberspace and building cyber cyber 

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capabilities across the Department of 

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Defense . We have convened , this is a 

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hybrid hearing and we are joined by 

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members who are participating remotely . 

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Members who are joining remotely uh 

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must be visible on screen for the 

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purposes of identity verification 

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established in maintaining a quorum 

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participating in the proceeding and 

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voting . Those members must continue to 

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use the software platforms video 

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function while in attendance unless 

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they experience connectivity issues or 

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other technical problems that render 

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them unable to participate on camera . 

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If a member experiences difficulties , 

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they should contact the committee 

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staffer assistance . Um video of 

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members participation will be broadcast 

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in the room and via the television , 

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internet feeds Members participating 

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remotely must seek recognition verbally , 

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uh and they are asked to mute their 

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microphones when they are not speaking . 

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Members who are participating remotely 

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are reminded to keep the software 

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platforms video function on the entire 

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time they attend the proceeding , 

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members may leave and rejoin the 

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proceeding . Uh If members depart for a 

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short while for reasons other than 

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joining a different proceeding , they 

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should leave the video function on . If 

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members will be absent for a 

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significant period or depart to join a 

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different proceeding , they should exit 

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the software platform entirely and then 

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rejoin . Uh it If the uh if they return , 

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members may use the software platforms , 

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chat feature to communicate with staff 

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regarding technical or logistical 

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support issues only . I've designated 

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the committee staff member to have 

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necessary mute , unrecognized members 

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microphones to cancel any inadvertent 

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background noise that may disrupt the 

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proceeding . So I'd like to welcome our 

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witnesses . Uh General paul Nokia Sony , 

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the commander of U . S . Cyber command 

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and the director of national Security 

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Agency and make a oh yang , the deputy 

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

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cyber policy . Welcome to you both . In 

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past hearings , General Nicholson has 

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been joined by Assistant Secretary of 

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Defense for homeland Defense and global 

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Security . However , with the 

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challenges faced uh that role , we are 

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thankful that MS Go Yang is able to 

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step in and the committee appreciates 

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your cooperation and collaboration . So 

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it's truly incredible how much has 

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changed since our last cyber posture 

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hearing on March 4 2020 . The world has 

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been upended by a pandemic , changing 

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the lives of literally every person on 

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the planet . Uh in the realm of cyber 

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matters , the men and women of the 

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Department of Defense , including our 

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soldiers , sailors , airmen , marines 

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and and guardians have had no respect 

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continuing to operate and defend 

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american's interest . Americans 

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interested in cyberspace . Despite the 

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pandemic , our adversaries and 

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competitors have not let up their cyber 

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campaigns in the last six months alone , 

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the media has reported almost nonstop 

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on in arguably some of the most 

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significant cyber incidents ever to 

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affect our nation from solar winds to 

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half the um , uh , to just in the last 

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week , the attack against colonial 

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pipeline by the dark side criminal 

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collective . So if there were any uh 

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doubters that cyberspace is inactive 

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and contested warfighting domain , uh , 

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I would hope that uh , that the last 

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year has changed those perspectives . 

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Yet incredibly , it still appears that 

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uh , to this committee that cyber does 

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not always have the focus for much of 

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the department's senior uniformed and 

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civilian leadership that it requires 

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despite our forces engaging adversaries 

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in this domain every single day , I 

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point this out recently , the Air Force 

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removed cyber from its mission 

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statement , even though report from the 

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Office of Secretary Defense concluded 

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uh that the inclusion of cyber in the 

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Air Force mission statement is the 

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single reason why Air Force personnel 

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have had vastly outpaced other services 

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in pursuing cyber related 

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certifications candidate . It's 

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frustrating that uh the people in this 

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room , both members and witnesses seem 

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to be fighting an uphill battle to put 

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cyber front and center in the 

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department out of five officially 

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recognized warfighting domains . Uh 

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Senior civilian official uh for air , 

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sea , land and space domains are 

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military service secretaries . Yet with 

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all due respect to Miss O . Yang and 

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her spectacularly overworked team , the 

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civilian , the senior civilian for 

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cyber is four rungs lower than our 

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counterparts overseeing other domains . 

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So we also have to account uh for the 

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ways in which cyberspace operations 

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occur within and affect the information 

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environment . One of the most 

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illustrative examples of how the 

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department's structure can hinder 

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rather than able operations . Uh is its 

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own organization chart the D O D s 

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joint publication 3 13 notes that 

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cyberspace is one of many information 

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related capabilities designed to 

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affect the information domain alongside 

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psychological operations and 

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electromagnetic spectrum operations . 

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Yet each of the information related 

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capabilities is handled by a separate 

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entity and siloed within the department , 

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ensuring that we cannot leverage 

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capabilities to the maximum extent 

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possible . This needs to change in our 

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current age of great power competition 

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conflict in the gray zone below the 

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level of armed conflict has never been 

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more relevant to our strategic thought . 

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For numerous reasons , challenges with 

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attribution , easily altered payloads 

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and ease of proliferation . Cyber is 

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the ideal tool for grades own conflict . 

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The information domain including 

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cyberspace is where our forces are 

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engaged against our adversaries daily 

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as the nation comes to realize that 

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this domain is as important as any 

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other . We need the Defense Department 

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to adapt to ensure that any conflict 

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with adversaries remains in the 

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information space as much as possible 

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and never moves into the kinetic realm 

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as we push the department to adapt 

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toward the information environment . 

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Congressional oversight has never been 

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more necessary . It is the mechanism by 

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which we monitor the activities of the 

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executive branch and ensure compliance 

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with relevant statute . While I 

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understand that that transitions can 

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result in disconnect uh , or 

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misunderstandings , I anticipate 

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hearing from the committee staff that 

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any issues that may have arisen uh will 

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quickly will be quickly resolved to our 

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satisfaction . So I'm happy to add 

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detail in private , but we'll leave it 

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at that for now so that I now want to 

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thank our witnesses again for appearing 

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before us today as a reminder after 

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this open session will move to the CVC 

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of auditorium uh for a closed member 

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only session . With that , I want to 

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turn now to ranking member Gallagher 

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for his remarks . Uh thank you mr 

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chairman and thank you to general knock 

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Sony and mrs yu yang for being here 

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today . Uh Cyberspace is the ultimate 

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grey zone in which operations often do 

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not fit neatly into either traditional 

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kinetic war fighting or non traditional 

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activities . So adversaries like china 

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and Russia as well as non state actors , 

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are continuously exploiting the gray 

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zone and probing our networks and 

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exploiting our vulnerabilities in 

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cyberspace . I mean just in recent 

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months we've had solar winds , we've 

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had Microsoft exchange , we had Russian 

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cyber actors last week shut down a 

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major U . S . Pipeline , highlighting 

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the cyber threat posed to our critical 

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infrastructure from actors anywhere in 

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the world and how actors all over the 

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world can reach out and touch all of 

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our constituents no matter where our 

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districts are . Um I just would say 

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though our our cyber adversaries are 

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diffused and evolving and they proved 

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time and again that our our cyber 

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networks are only as strong as the 

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weakest link . Our operations and 

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capabilities have also evolved in large 

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part due to the work of this 

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subcommittee and the leadership of 

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general maxime at U . S . Cyber command 

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and in particular general the input 

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that you provided to the cyberspace 

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selenium Commission over the last two 

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years , which took up a lot of uh 

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representative launch event in my work 

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over the last couple of years . Um but 

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as we continue to harden our networks 

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and improve our capabilities , the 

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President's budget must focus on 

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modernizing duties platforms . We must 

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consider cutting legacy platforms out 

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of date for modern conflict and 

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investing in emerging technologies and 

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cyber . And I believe I speak for 

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everyone here when I say , I hope to 

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see a budget that recognizes the 

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importance of our cyber mission force , 

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invests in necessary cyber 

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infrastructure , including technology 

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and human capital , highlights 

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necessary cyber authorities and really 

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pushes the department out of it silos 

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and into a streamlined structure that 

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prioritizes cyber agility and 

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responsiveness . Are cyber . Mission 

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force has also matured but we must 

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continue to identify cyber talent and 

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train equip and support our cyber force 

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to improve our capabilities across the 

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cyber continuum and maintain 

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superiority over hostile cyber actors . 

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So we took a lot of pivotal steps in 

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this direction last year's N . D . A . 

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And I know we will continue to make 

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progress towards our cyber goals again 

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this year . But the fundamental shift 

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in thinking about cyber will take more 

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than just directives in the N . D . A . 

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It will require leaders at D . O . D . 

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And throughout the government and in 

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Congress to think strategically and 

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acknowledge that cyber is now the 

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critical domain to every facet of our 

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national security . With that Mr 

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Chairman , I look forward to hearing 

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from our witnesses today and I yield 

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back thank you . Ranking member 

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Gallagher for your remarks . With that . 

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Uh I'll now turn it over to Mr Yang and 

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general Marcus only for five minutes 

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remarks . Each missile yank you are 

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recognized . You may proceed . Thank 

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you . Chairman Lanvin , representative 

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Gallagher and members of the committee . 

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I'm pleased to be here with General 

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Nakatani , the commander of U . S . 

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Cyber command to report the progress of 

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the Department of Defense has made in 

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00:10:44,753 --> 00:10:44,380
achieving the department's objectives 

281
00:10:44,380 --> 00:10:46,340
in cyberspace . This afternoon I'm 

282
00:10:46,340 --> 00:10:48,890
testifying in my role as the deputy 

283
00:10:48,890 --> 00:10:50,834
assistant secretary of defense for 

284
00:10:50,834 --> 00:10:52,668
cyber policy . In that role I am 

285
00:10:52,668 --> 00:10:54,834
responsible for advising the secretary 

286
00:10:54,834 --> 00:10:56,779
and Deputy Secretary on cyberspace 

287
00:10:56,779 --> 00:10:58,668
policy and the development of the 

288
00:10:58,668 --> 00:11:00,668
department cyber strategy and other 

289
00:11:00,668 --> 00:11:02,690
cyberspace policy . Um Congress has 

290
00:11:02,700 --> 00:11:04,890
demonstrated that it views cyber 

291
00:11:04,890 --> 00:11:07,057
defense as a priority through not only 

292
00:11:07,057 --> 00:11:09,279
its legislative work but through member 

293
00:11:09,279 --> 00:11:11,334
service on the Solarium Commission . 

294
00:11:11,334 --> 00:11:13,446
And for that we are grateful for your 

295
00:11:13,446 --> 00:11:15,612
ongoing support for this crucial issue 

296
00:11:15,612 --> 00:11:17,779
um in a broad and bipartisan manner To 

297
00:11:17,779 --> 00:11:19,668
start , I would like to offer our 

298
00:11:19,668 --> 00:11:21,557
perspective on the current global 

299
00:11:21,557 --> 00:11:23,723
strategic context . As you know , 2020 

300
00:11:23,723 --> 00:11:25,723
was a year of turmoil with a global 

301
00:11:25,723 --> 00:11:27,834
pandemic drastically altering our day 

302
00:11:27,834 --> 00:11:29,723
to day reality and increasing our 

303
00:11:29,723 --> 00:11:31,557
dependence on the Internet . Our 

304
00:11:31,557 --> 00:11:33,557
adversaries took notice for growing 

305
00:11:33,557 --> 00:11:35,668
reliance on technology cybercriminals 

306
00:11:35,668 --> 00:11:37,612
and nation state actors alike took 

307
00:11:37,612 --> 00:11:39,612
advantage of COVID-19 by unleashing 

308
00:11:39,612 --> 00:11:41,779
ransomware on health care facilities , 

309
00:11:41,779 --> 00:11:44,001
targeting vaccine production and supply 

310
00:11:44,001 --> 00:11:46,001
chains , exploiting fears to spread 

311
00:11:46,001 --> 00:11:47,946
disinformation and even disrupting 

312
00:11:47,946 --> 00:11:50,112
pipeline companies . As a result , the 

313
00:11:50,112 --> 00:11:50,010
cyberspace domain is both more 

314
00:11:50,010 --> 00:11:52,066
important and more contested than it 

315
00:11:52,066 --> 00:11:54,280
has been in recent memory , enhancing 

316
00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:56,447
the security of cyberspace both in the 

317
00:11:56,447 --> 00:11:58,669
United States and around the world as a 

318
00:11:58,669 --> 00:12:00,891
top priority as the president's interim 

319
00:12:00,891 --> 00:12:02,724
National security . Uh strategic 

320
00:12:02,724 --> 00:12:04,891
guidance prioritizes cybersecurity and 

321
00:12:04,891 --> 00:12:07,290
pledges to expand investments needed to 

322
00:12:07,290 --> 00:12:09,290
defend the nation against malicious 

323
00:12:09,290 --> 00:12:12,300
cyber activity and cyber attack . Our 

324
00:12:12,300 --> 00:12:14,189
competitors are using their cyber 

325
00:12:14,189 --> 00:12:16,022
capabilities to seek political , 

326
00:12:16,022 --> 00:12:17,911
economic information and military 

327
00:12:17,911 --> 00:12:19,689
advantages and to undermine our 

328
00:12:19,689 --> 00:12:21,911
security by engaging in malicious cyber 

329
00:12:21,911 --> 00:12:24,022
activity . The detainee assesses that 

330
00:12:24,022 --> 00:12:25,967
cyber threats from nation states , 

331
00:12:25,967 --> 00:12:28,133
particularly china , Russia , Iran and 

332
00:12:28,133 --> 00:12:30,244
north Korea and their surrogates will 

333
00:12:30,244 --> 00:12:32,022
remain acute both in day to day 

334
00:12:32,022 --> 00:12:34,078
competition and to seek advantage in 

335
00:12:34,078 --> 00:12:36,133
armed conflict . As Secretary Austin 

336
00:12:36,133 --> 00:12:36,040
said at his confirmation hearing in 

337
00:12:36,040 --> 00:12:38,410
january china is the pacing threat for 

338
00:12:38,410 --> 00:12:40,410
the department , including in cyber 

339
00:12:40,410 --> 00:12:42,300
operations , china uses cyber 

340
00:12:42,300 --> 00:12:44,430
operations to erode US military 

341
00:12:44,430 --> 00:12:46,330
overmatch and economic vitality , 

342
00:12:46,340 --> 00:12:48,507
stealing U . S . Intellectual property 

343
00:12:48,507 --> 00:12:50,673
and research . Chinese malicious cyber 

344
00:12:50,673 --> 00:12:52,910
activity continues to this day . Russia 

345
00:12:52,920 --> 00:12:54,587
also continues to be a highly 

346
00:12:54,587 --> 00:12:56,587
sophisticated and capable adversary 

347
00:12:56,587 --> 00:12:58,753
integrating malicious cyber activities 

348
00:12:58,753 --> 00:13:00,420
including espionage influence 

349
00:13:00,420 --> 00:13:02,642
operations in mutually reinforcing ways 

350
00:13:02,642 --> 00:13:04,864
to achieve its objectives . They engage 

351
00:13:04,864 --> 00:13:06,760
in a wide range of malign cyber 

352
00:13:06,760 --> 00:13:08,704
activities , including attempts to 

353
00:13:08,704 --> 00:13:10,927
interfere with US elections , spreading 

354
00:13:10,927 --> 00:13:13,093
ransomware such as not peta efforts to 

355
00:13:13,093 --> 00:13:15,149
disrupt the postponed Tokyo olympics 

356
00:13:15,149 --> 00:13:17,204
and most the most recent solar winds 

357
00:13:17,204 --> 00:13:19,390
attack . In addition to using 

358
00:13:19,390 --> 00:13:21,810
cyberspace as an offensive tool , china 

359
00:13:21,810 --> 00:13:23,699
and Russia view the internet as a 

360
00:13:23,699 --> 00:13:25,699
mechanism to control and intimidate 

361
00:13:25,699 --> 00:13:27,588
their own populations . While the 

362
00:13:27,588 --> 00:13:29,699
United States advocates for an open , 

363
00:13:29,699 --> 00:13:31,699
interoperable , secure and reliable 

364
00:13:31,699 --> 00:13:33,866
internet china and Russia have created 

365
00:13:33,866 --> 00:13:35,921
and employed a digital authoritarian 

366
00:13:35,921 --> 00:13:38,032
model , using their technological and 

367
00:13:38,032 --> 00:13:40,143
cyberspace capabilities to manipulate 

368
00:13:40,143 --> 00:13:42,088
narratives , repress free speech , 

369
00:13:42,088 --> 00:13:44,310
surveil their citizens and quashed sent 

370
00:13:44,310 --> 00:13:46,254
domestically china seeks to export 

371
00:13:46,254 --> 00:13:48,143
digital authoritarianism to other 

372
00:13:48,143 --> 00:13:50,032
repressive regimes , remaking the 

373
00:13:50,032 --> 00:13:52,360
internet in its image beyond china and 

374
00:13:52,360 --> 00:13:54,527
Russia . We remain concerned about the 

375
00:13:54,527 --> 00:13:56,582
cyber threat posed by Iran and north 

376
00:13:56,582 --> 00:13:58,693
Korea and further nation state actors 

377
00:13:58,693 --> 00:14:00,638
such as criminals , terrorists and 

378
00:14:00,638 --> 00:14:02,860
violent extremists continue to leverage 

379
00:14:02,860 --> 00:14:05,082
the Internet to advance their agendas . 

380
00:14:05,082 --> 00:14:06,971
The line between nation state and 

381
00:14:06,971 --> 00:14:09,249
criminal actors is increasingly blurry . 

382
00:14:09,249 --> 00:14:11,138
As nation states turn to criminal 

383
00:14:11,138 --> 00:14:13,249
proxies as a tool of state power then 

384
00:14:13,249 --> 00:14:15,249
turn a blind eye to the cyber crime 

385
00:14:15,249 --> 00:14:17,138
perpetrated by the same malicious 

386
00:14:17,138 --> 00:14:19,304
actors . This is a common practice for 

387
00:14:19,304 --> 00:14:21,527
Russia whose security services leverage 

388
00:14:21,527 --> 00:14:23,527
cybercriminals while shielding them 

389
00:14:23,527 --> 00:14:25,749
from prosecution for crimes they commit 

390
00:14:25,749 --> 00:14:28,220
for personal benefit . We have also 

391
00:14:28,220 --> 00:14:30,387
seen some states allow the governor of 

392
00:14:30,387 --> 00:14:32,498
their government hackers to moonlight 

393
00:14:32,498 --> 00:14:34,790
as cybercriminals . This is not how 

394
00:14:34,790 --> 00:14:37,140
responsible states behave in cyberspace , 

395
00:14:37,380 --> 00:14:39,830
nor can responsible states Condoned 

396
00:14:39,930 --> 00:14:42,660
shielding of this criminal behavior . 

397
00:14:44,140 --> 00:14:46,251
The president has made clear also the 

398
00:14:46,251 --> 00:14:48,029
nest the need to strengthen our 

399
00:14:48,029 --> 00:14:50,140
alliances . The department is driving 

400
00:14:50,140 --> 00:14:51,973
new approaches to do that and we 

401
00:14:51,973 --> 00:14:54,084
continue hunt forward operations with 

402
00:14:54,084 --> 00:14:56,307
partners even during pandemic and cyber 

403
00:14:56,307 --> 00:14:58,362
exercises such as cyber flag to help 

404
00:14:58,362 --> 00:15:00,196
our allies prepare for adversary 

405
00:15:00,196 --> 00:15:02,540
actions . Um President biden is 

406
00:15:02,540 --> 00:15:04,373
currently conducting a review of 

407
00:15:04,373 --> 00:15:06,096
national strategy , which will 

408
00:15:06,096 --> 00:15:08,151
culminate in the issuance of two key 

409
00:15:08,151 --> 00:15:10,040
documents , the National Security 

410
00:15:10,040 --> 00:15:09,680
Strategy and the National cyber 

411
00:15:09,680 --> 00:15:11,680
strategy . The president's guidance 

412
00:15:11,680 --> 00:15:13,736
will inform our own upcoming defense 

413
00:15:13,736 --> 00:15:15,791
level review of the National Defense 

414
00:15:15,791 --> 00:15:18,260
Strategy and follow on 

415
00:15:19,540 --> 00:15:21,970
National Department second ever cyber 

416
00:15:21,970 --> 00:15:24,137
posture review which will evaluate our 

417
00:15:24,137 --> 00:15:25,914
ability to execute national and 

418
00:15:25,914 --> 00:15:27,748
departmental level strategies to 

419
00:15:27,748 --> 00:15:29,803
achieve our goals in cyberspace . We 

420
00:15:29,803 --> 00:15:32,026
look forward to delivering the strategy 

421
00:15:32,026 --> 00:15:34,026
and posture review to Congress once 

422
00:15:34,026 --> 00:15:36,192
they are completed . Thank you for the 

423
00:15:36,192 --> 00:15:38,470
opportunity to appear before you today . 

424
00:15:38,470 --> 00:15:37,940
And I look forward to the member's 

425
00:15:37,940 --> 00:15:40,610
questions . Thank you , Miss Yang and 

426
00:15:40,620 --> 00:15:42,731
john Knox only you are now recognized 

427
00:15:42,731 --> 00:15:44,842
five minutes . Chairman , nine german 

428
00:15:44,842 --> 00:15:46,564
ranking member , Gallagher and 

429
00:15:46,564 --> 00:15:46,440
distinguished members of the 

430
00:15:46,440 --> 00:15:48,670
subcommittee . I'm honored to be here 

431
00:15:48,670 --> 00:15:51,440
and testify beside Secretary Yang and 

432
00:15:51,440 --> 00:15:53,607
represent the men and women of U . S . 

433
00:15:53,607 --> 00:15:55,860
Cyber command . Three major incidents 

434
00:15:55,870 --> 00:15:57,940
over the past six months demonstrate 

435
00:15:57,940 --> 00:16:00,162
the importance of cyber security to our 

436
00:16:00,162 --> 00:16:02,760
nation . Well resourced and 

437
00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:04,427
sophisticated adversaries are 

438
00:16:04,427 --> 00:16:06,649
exploiting gaps in the nation's ability 

439
00:16:06,649 --> 00:16:08,871
to monitor us cyberspace infrastructure 

440
00:16:08,871 --> 00:16:11,093
while conducting operations from within 

441
00:16:11,093 --> 00:16:13,204
the boundaries of the United States . 

442
00:16:13,204 --> 00:16:15,093
The solar winds incident occurred 

443
00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:17,607
through the highly skilled means of an 

444
00:16:17,607 --> 00:16:19,718
adversary against a U . S . Companies 

445
00:16:19,718 --> 00:16:22,150
supply chain . At nearly the same time , 

446
00:16:22,540 --> 00:16:24,318
the server hack associated with 

447
00:16:24,318 --> 00:16:26,750
Microsoft exchange showcase the ability 

448
00:16:26,760 --> 00:16:28,538
of another adversary to exploit 

449
00:16:28,538 --> 00:16:30,560
vulnerabilities and attacks systems 

450
00:16:30,570 --> 00:16:33,390
around the world . The colonial 

451
00:16:33,390 --> 00:16:35,340
pipeline ransomware attack also 

452
00:16:35,340 --> 00:16:37,700
demonstrate a growing trend of 

453
00:16:37,700 --> 00:16:39,867
companies and even government agencies 

454
00:16:39,867 --> 00:16:41,978
being held hostage by malicious cyber 

455
00:16:41,978 --> 00:16:45,210
actors . These cases demonstrate the 

456
00:16:45,210 --> 00:16:46,821
broadening scope , scale and 

457
00:16:46,821 --> 00:16:49,030
sophistication employed by some 

458
00:16:49,030 --> 00:16:51,120
adversaries . The United States 

459
00:16:51,120 --> 00:16:53,176
government , in tandem with industry 

460
00:16:53,176 --> 00:16:55,287
partners , must improve its defensive 

461
00:16:55,287 --> 00:16:57,453
posture to prevent and or minimize the 

462
00:16:57,453 --> 00:16:59,620
impacts while contesting and defeating 

463
00:16:59,620 --> 00:17:01,231
those who would exploit such 

464
00:17:01,231 --> 00:17:03,231
vulnerabilities and target american 

465
00:17:03,231 --> 00:17:06,670
companies and citizens cybersecurity 

466
00:17:07,140 --> 00:17:11,050
is national security . Over the past 

467
00:17:11,050 --> 00:17:13,161
year , I emphasized the importance of 

468
00:17:13,161 --> 00:17:15,328
defending the election against foreign 

469
00:17:15,328 --> 00:17:17,494
interference . We did this through the 

470
00:17:17,494 --> 00:17:19,550
Election Security Group , a combined 

471
00:17:19,550 --> 00:17:21,772
team from U . S . Cyber Command and the 

472
00:17:21,772 --> 00:17:23,939
National Security Agency . We built on 

473
00:17:23,939 --> 00:17:25,939
lessons from earlier operations and 

474
00:17:25,939 --> 00:17:27,883
home partnerships with the Federal 

475
00:17:27,883 --> 00:17:29,661
Bureau of Investigation and the 

476
00:17:29,661 --> 00:17:31,550
Department of Homeland Security , 

477
00:17:31,550 --> 00:17:33,383
cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

478
00:17:33,383 --> 00:17:35,383
Security Agency sharing information 

479
00:17:35,383 --> 00:17:37,383
with those who needed it as fast as 

480
00:17:37,383 --> 00:17:39,328
possible . We also worked with the 

481
00:17:39,328 --> 00:17:41,217
National Guard Bureau to create a 

482
00:17:41,217 --> 00:17:43,328
mechanism that enabled guard units to 

483
00:17:43,328 --> 00:17:45,217
share information about incidents 

484
00:17:45,217 --> 00:17:48,510
quickly , easily and uniformly . US . 

485
00:17:48,510 --> 00:17:50,621
Cyber Command conducted more than two 

486
00:17:50,621 --> 00:17:52,454
dozen operations to get ahead of 

487
00:17:52,454 --> 00:17:54,621
foreign threats before they interfered 

488
00:17:54,621 --> 00:17:56,621
with or influenced our elections in 

489
00:17:56,621 --> 00:17:58,510
2020 . I am proud of the work the 

490
00:17:58,510 --> 00:18:00,732
command and the election security group 

491
00:18:00,732 --> 00:18:02,454
performed as part of a broader 

492
00:18:02,454 --> 00:18:04,870
government effort to deliver a safe , 

493
00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:08,590
secure 2020 election cyber 

494
00:18:08,590 --> 00:18:10,812
commas building on recent guidance from 

495
00:18:10,812 --> 00:18:12,701
the department seeking to promote 

496
00:18:12,701 --> 00:18:14,600
readiness , improved training and 

497
00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:18,520
attract high end talent . The 

498
00:18:18,520 --> 00:18:20,464
cyberspace environment has changed 

499
00:18:20,464 --> 00:18:23,140
significantly over the past years . To 

500
00:18:23,140 --> 00:18:25,140
your point chairman . Even over the 

501
00:18:25,140 --> 00:18:26,807
past 14 months , we've seen a 

502
00:18:26,807 --> 00:18:28,418
tremendous difference in the 

503
00:18:28,418 --> 00:18:30,290
environment . Adversaries are 

504
00:18:30,290 --> 00:18:32,512
demonstrating a changed risk calculus . 

505
00:18:32,540 --> 00:18:34,707
They are undertaking malign activities 

506
00:18:34,707 --> 00:18:36,873
in cyberspace at greater scope , scale 

507
00:18:36,873 --> 00:18:38,873
and sophistication . They desire to 

508
00:18:38,873 --> 00:18:41,096
take on the US and cyberspace below the 

509
00:18:41,096 --> 00:18:43,330
level of armed conflict to defend our 

510
00:18:43,330 --> 00:18:45,219
security and our interest in this 

511
00:18:45,219 --> 00:18:47,219
environment . U . S . Cyber command 

512
00:18:47,219 --> 00:18:49,108
must continue to adapt , innovate 

513
00:18:49,440 --> 00:18:52,290
partner and succeed against such 

514
00:18:52,290 --> 00:18:54,720
adversaries . The men and women at U . 

515
00:18:54,720 --> 00:18:56,609
S . Cyber Command look forward to 

516
00:18:56,609 --> 00:18:58,609
working with this committee and are 

517
00:18:58,609 --> 00:19:00,831
truly grateful for the support Congress 

518
00:19:00,831 --> 00:19:02,998
has given to our command again . Thank 

519
00:19:02,998 --> 00:19:05,220
you for your support and I look forward 

520
00:19:05,220 --> 00:19:07,442
to your questions . Thank you . General 

521
00:19:07,442 --> 00:19:10,000
Next Sony . I'm so young for your your 

522
00:19:10,000 --> 00:19:13,360
testimony here today . Um before we 

523
00:19:13,360 --> 00:19:15,600
begin uh procedure questions , I want 

524
00:19:15,600 --> 00:19:17,767
to thank you again for your commitment 

525
00:19:17,767 --> 00:19:19,933
to the national security of the United 

526
00:19:19,933 --> 00:19:22,044
States . And I want to just point out 

527
00:19:22,044 --> 00:19:24,156
as a a matter of personal privilege . 

528
00:19:24,156 --> 00:19:26,790
We all recognize that our nation is one 

529
00:19:26,790 --> 00:19:29,750
giant melting pot and I think diversity 

530
00:19:29,750 --> 00:19:31,861
is something to be celebrated . And I 

531
00:19:31,861 --> 00:19:34,028
think this may be a historic first for 

532
00:19:34,028 --> 00:19:36,250
for this committee and that we have two 

533
00:19:36,250 --> 00:19:38,306
members of the A . P . I . Community 

534
00:19:38,306 --> 00:19:40,528
testifying before us at the same time . 

535
00:19:40,528 --> 00:19:42,750
So pretty cool to note . And uh , thank 

536
00:19:42,750 --> 00:19:46,680
you again . Very good . 

537
00:19:48,040 --> 00:19:50,262
All right , well thank you both for for 

538
00:19:50,262 --> 00:19:52,484
being here again for your testimony and 

539
00:19:52,484 --> 00:19:54,262
your commitment to the National 

540
00:19:54,262 --> 00:19:56,760
Security . United States . Uh uh thank 

541
00:19:56,760 --> 00:19:58,871
you for your remarks . Were gonna now 

542
00:19:58,871 --> 00:20:00,927
proceed with questions . Each member 

543
00:20:00,927 --> 00:20:03,038
will be recognized for five minutes , 

544
00:20:03,038 --> 00:20:05,220
beginning with myself and so young . I 

545
00:20:05,220 --> 00:20:08,140
want to start with you if I could . So 

546
00:20:08,140 --> 00:20:10,990
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

547
00:20:11,000 --> 00:20:13,056
Special operations and low intensity 

548
00:20:13,056 --> 00:20:15,830
conflict is responsible for information 

549
00:20:15,830 --> 00:20:18,010
operations , but the Assistant 

550
00:20:18,010 --> 00:20:21,480
Secretary uh of Defense for Homeland 

551
00:20:21,490 --> 00:20:23,590
Defense and Global Security is 

552
00:20:23,590 --> 00:20:25,960
responsible for cyberspace operations . 

553
00:20:26,340 --> 00:20:29,200
Can you explain the logic as to why uh 

554
00:20:29,210 --> 00:20:32,310
two separate chains are established for 

555
00:20:32,310 --> 00:20:34,520
operations within the same information 

556
00:20:34,520 --> 00:20:35,520
environments ? 

557
00:20:39,240 --> 00:20:41,750
Mr Chairman . Um I appreciate the 

558
00:20:41,760 --> 00:20:43,816
question here . I think I'm not sure 

559
00:20:43,816 --> 00:20:46,690
that I um um can give the full history 

560
00:20:46,690 --> 00:20:49,950
on how that evolved from uh the 

561
00:20:49,950 --> 00:20:52,006
department's perspective in terms of 

562
00:20:52,006 --> 00:20:54,061
why those two things are in separate 

563
00:20:54,061 --> 00:20:56,172
silos , um agree that there is a fair 

564
00:20:56,172 --> 00:20:58,560
amount of overlap there . Um But as you 

565
00:20:58,560 --> 00:21:01,350
may know , the psyops Information Ops 

566
00:21:01,350 --> 00:21:04,260
had traditionally been held in the the 

567
00:21:04,260 --> 00:21:06,450
Special operations community . Um and 

568
00:21:06,450 --> 00:21:08,770
as cyberspace grew up , it went through 

569
00:21:08,770 --> 00:21:10,826
a number of evolutions and has found 

570
00:21:10,826 --> 00:21:12,992
itself within the homeland defense and 

571
00:21:12,992 --> 00:21:15,214
global security arena , in part because 

572
00:21:15,214 --> 00:21:17,381
of the focus I think , on the homeland 

573
00:21:17,381 --> 00:21:20,220
security aspects of cybersecurity , But 

574
00:21:20,220 --> 00:21:22,331
certainly there are some coordination 

575
00:21:22,331 --> 00:21:24,498
challenges in the division between the 

576
00:21:24,498 --> 00:21:28,130
two . So to that point , you know , how 

577
00:21:28,140 --> 00:21:29,918
do you and the Deputy Assistant 

578
00:21:29,918 --> 00:21:31,751
Secretary of Defense for Special 

579
00:21:31,751 --> 00:21:33,529
Operations and Counterterrorism 

580
00:21:33,529 --> 00:21:35,640
position that owns the information 

581
00:21:35,640 --> 00:21:38,600
operations portfolio for osd policy , 

582
00:21:38,600 --> 00:21:40,211
coordinate and collaborate . 

583
00:21:42,540 --> 00:21:44,596
I'm in regular communication with my 

584
00:21:44,596 --> 00:21:47,150
colleagues and we are we are 

585
00:21:47,150 --> 00:21:49,372
collaborating at all levels between our 

586
00:21:49,372 --> 00:21:51,720
two offices . Mr Chairman . Okay . 

587
00:21:51,730 --> 00:21:53,786
That's something that we're going to 

588
00:21:53,786 --> 00:21:55,952
have to continue to work on I think to 

589
00:21:55,952 --> 00:21:59,710
the um um joe Nacchio Sony um one of 

590
00:21:59,710 --> 00:22:01,800
the solarium uh cyberspace sodium 

591
00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:05,180
commissions , uh key uh outstanding 

592
00:22:05,180 --> 00:22:08,860
questions uh uh as to whether was was 

593
00:22:08,860 --> 00:22:12,020
whether the cyber mission force uh 

594
00:22:12,030 --> 00:22:14,370
designed uh now nine years ago was 

595
00:22:14,370 --> 00:22:16,940
properly sized . Um You may remember 

596
00:22:16,940 --> 00:22:19,450
that I asked you about this uh last 

597
00:22:19,450 --> 00:22:21,672
year's hearing . Uh We spoke about this 

598
00:22:21,672 --> 00:22:24,270
yesterday when you and I met uh also my 

599
00:22:24,270 --> 00:22:26,360
office . Um but last year you had 

600
00:22:26,360 --> 00:22:29,360
replied uh that you needed more 

601
00:22:29,360 --> 00:22:32,340
relevant data uh and without discussing 

602
00:22:32,340 --> 00:22:34,507
the contents of the President's budget 

603
00:22:34,507 --> 00:22:37,260
before it's released , can you tell us 

604
00:22:37,270 --> 00:22:40,100
about whether you acquired the 

605
00:22:40,100 --> 00:22:41,878
information necessary to make a 

606
00:22:41,878 --> 00:22:43,989
decision on the size of the force and 

607
00:22:43,989 --> 00:22:45,878
what insights you glean from this 

608
00:22:45,878 --> 00:22:46,878
information ? 

609
00:22:49,640 --> 00:22:51,970
Chairman , Thank you . Uh We do have 

610
00:22:51,970 --> 00:22:54,360
the data uh and again to your point , 

611
00:22:54,360 --> 00:22:56,160
not to get ahead of the budget 

612
00:22:56,160 --> 00:22:58,550
submission , but in general terms , uh 

613
00:22:59,140 --> 00:23:01,980
Uh I would anticipate that as we as we 

614
00:23:01,980 --> 00:23:04,091
lay out the case , we have to look at 

615
00:23:04,091 --> 00:23:06,130
some critical elements that will 

616
00:23:06,140 --> 00:23:08,540
influence the future size of the cyber 

617
00:23:08,540 --> 00:23:12,100
mission force . Now , 133 teams uh in 

618
00:23:12,100 --> 00:23:14,211
the future we have to account for the 

619
00:23:14,211 --> 00:23:16,690
growing importance of space . I think 

620
00:23:16,690 --> 00:23:18,880
we have to account for the importance 

621
00:23:18,890 --> 00:23:21,110
of what we're seeing with malign cyber 

622
00:23:21,110 --> 00:23:23,660
actors . Whether or not it's Russian 

623
00:23:23,660 --> 00:23:25,771
cyber actors , chinese cyber actors , 

624
00:23:25,771 --> 00:23:28,170
Iranian cyber actors and their intent . 

625
00:23:28,190 --> 00:23:31,170
And I think the last pieces is that we 

626
00:23:31,170 --> 00:23:32,781
are in a period of strategic 

627
00:23:32,781 --> 00:23:35,260
competition and I think the word is 

628
00:23:35,260 --> 00:23:37,371
competition . So we have to have that 

629
00:23:37,371 --> 00:23:39,482
balance of not only what we are going 

630
00:23:39,482 --> 00:23:41,260
to support our fellow combatant 

631
00:23:41,260 --> 00:23:44,010
commands if conflict was to break out , 

632
00:23:44,010 --> 00:23:46,250
but also if our adversaries are 

633
00:23:46,250 --> 00:23:48,139
operating below the love of armed 

634
00:23:48,139 --> 00:23:50,250
conflict every single day , what type 

635
00:23:50,250 --> 00:23:52,139
of force do we need to be able to 

636
00:23:52,139 --> 00:23:54,361
ensure that we can counteract that much 

637
00:23:54,361 --> 00:23:56,417
in the same way that we have done in 

638
00:23:56,417 --> 00:23:58,639
our support to the national elections . 

639
00:23:58,639 --> 00:24:01,130
Thank you . General . Um and uh 

640
00:24:01,140 --> 00:24:03,730
recently one of your uh subordinate 

641
00:24:03,730 --> 00:24:05,397
commands , Army cyber command 

642
00:24:05,397 --> 00:24:07,508
established uh in Information Warfare 

643
00:24:07,508 --> 00:24:09,870
Operations Center at uh at nearly the 

644
00:24:09,870 --> 00:24:12,110
exact same time US Army Special 

645
00:24:12,110 --> 00:24:13,943
Operations Command at Fort Bragg 

646
00:24:13,943 --> 00:24:16,054
separately established in Information 

647
00:24:16,054 --> 00:24:18,410
Warfare Center . So acknowledging that 

648
00:24:18,410 --> 00:24:21,730
this uh is army specific . It points to 

649
00:24:21,730 --> 00:24:24,230
a wider issue about lack of clarity on 

650
00:24:24,230 --> 00:24:27,460
mission sets and an absence of 

651
00:24:27,460 --> 00:24:30,290
direction inside the department . How 

652
00:24:30,290 --> 00:24:33,940
do you distinguish what cyber command 

653
00:24:34,200 --> 00:24:36,010
and its cyber focus subordinate 

654
00:24:36,010 --> 00:24:38,840
commands do versus what special 

655
00:24:38,840 --> 00:24:41,040
operations command and it's soft 

656
00:24:41,050 --> 00:24:43,170
centric subordinate elements . Do 

657
00:24:45,140 --> 00:24:47,160
chairman have a very very close and 

658
00:24:47,170 --> 00:24:49,226
enduring partnership with US Special 

659
00:24:49,226 --> 00:24:51,480
Operations Command under the leadership 

660
00:24:51,480 --> 00:24:53,480
of General Rich Clark ? We talked 

661
00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:55,647
frequently on this to provide a bit of 

662
00:24:55,647 --> 00:24:59,310
perspective on this . I I see it as uh 

663
00:24:59,320 --> 00:25:01,376
only natural that Special operations 

664
00:25:01,376 --> 00:25:03,542
command as they operate across all the 

665
00:25:03,542 --> 00:25:05,376
different domains , also has the 

666
00:25:05,376 --> 00:25:07,542
capability within cyberspace . I think 

667
00:25:07,542 --> 00:25:09,653
the delineation is you know , what is 

668
00:25:09,653 --> 00:25:11,876
the focus of U . S . Special operations 

669
00:25:11,876 --> 00:25:14,042
command ? What is the focus of U . S . 

670
00:25:14,042 --> 00:25:15,876
Army cyber command ? What is the 

671
00:25:15,876 --> 00:25:18,153
overall focus of U . S . Cyber command ? 

672
00:25:18,153 --> 00:25:20,376
I think we have worked through that . I 

673
00:25:20,376 --> 00:25:22,542
think to your point there's still work 

674
00:25:22,542 --> 00:25:21,780
to do in our doctrine . We will 

675
00:25:21,780 --> 00:25:24,830
continue to advocate for that work but 

676
00:25:24,830 --> 00:25:27,980
we all realize that it's more than um 

677
00:25:27,990 --> 00:25:30,212
you know just conducting one cyberspace 

678
00:25:30,212 --> 00:25:32,030
operations . It's the entire 

679
00:25:32,030 --> 00:25:34,080
information domain that we have to 

680
00:25:34,080 --> 00:25:35,969
understand and be able to operate 

681
00:25:35,969 --> 00:25:39,900
within . Thank you general um hole 

682
00:25:39,900 --> 00:25:42,122
there and uh turn to the ranking member 

683
00:25:42,122 --> 00:25:44,420
of his questions now . Thank you . Uh 

684
00:25:44,430 --> 00:25:46,620
General . You mentioned the challenge 

685
00:25:46,630 --> 00:25:49,190
in the colonial pipeline context of of 

686
00:25:49,190 --> 00:25:51,357
ransomware and and criminal groups and 

687
00:25:51,357 --> 00:25:53,579
I think it's safe to say that challenge 

688
00:25:53,579 --> 00:25:55,912
is only going to grow in the short term . 

689
00:25:55,912 --> 00:25:58,079
Part of the problem , it strikes me as 

690
00:25:58,079 --> 00:26:00,301
an authorities problem . I'd be curious 

691
00:26:00,301 --> 00:26:02,357
to the same . You can answer an open 

692
00:26:02,357 --> 00:26:04,579
session what tools you believe you have 

693
00:26:04,579 --> 00:26:06,746
in your kit to get at that challenge ? 

694
00:26:06,746 --> 00:26:08,801
Because I believe you also mentioned 

695
00:26:08,801 --> 00:26:10,912
that NSA director , you're limited in 

696
00:26:10,912 --> 00:26:13,246
obviously monitoring domestic U . S . I . 

697
00:26:13,246 --> 00:26:15,301
T infrastructure . Do you think your 

698
00:26:15,301 --> 00:26:17,246
cyber com forces could be provided 

699
00:26:17,246 --> 00:26:19,357
under DSC A the DHS for example , and 

700
00:26:19,357 --> 00:26:21,579
used to conduct this sort of monitoring 

701
00:26:21,579 --> 00:26:23,801
analysis under DHS authorities at least 

702
00:26:23,801 --> 00:26:26,023
until DHS builds its own capabilities . 

703
00:26:26,023 --> 00:26:28,079
How do we get this , get this in the 

704
00:26:28,079 --> 00:26:30,301
short term , while we sort of build out 

705
00:26:30,301 --> 00:26:33,500
a longer term answer . Ranking member . 

706
00:26:33,500 --> 00:26:35,620
I think to your initial point , it's 

707
00:26:35,620 --> 00:26:37,950
really important to look at this as a 

708
00:26:37,950 --> 00:26:40,440
broader uh , element . And how do we 

709
00:26:40,440 --> 00:26:44,090
get after uh this criminal activity ? I 

710
00:26:44,100 --> 00:26:46,100
think this is a whole of government 

711
00:26:46,100 --> 00:26:48,100
effort in the United States . It is 

712
00:26:48,100 --> 00:26:50,044
most appropriate that lead federal 

713
00:26:50,044 --> 00:26:52,100
agencies . Obviously , Department of 

714
00:26:52,100 --> 00:26:54,211
Homeland Security , Federal Bureau of 

715
00:26:54,211 --> 00:26:53,570
Investigation . I don't think there's 

716
00:26:53,580 --> 00:26:56,690
any a problem with the authorities in 

717
00:26:56,690 --> 00:26:59,250
terms of what it's , what it's stated 

718
00:26:59,250 --> 00:27:01,610
out to do . But as we look at ransom , 

719
00:27:01,610 --> 00:27:03,721
where and as we continue to peel this 

720
00:27:03,721 --> 00:27:05,832
back , as we see criminal actors that 

721
00:27:05,832 --> 00:27:08,166
are operating outside the United States , 

722
00:27:08,240 --> 00:27:10,018
I think what the administration 

723
00:27:10,018 --> 00:27:12,240
obviously is moving towards us , how do 

724
00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:14,407
we have a whole of government approach 

725
00:27:14,407 --> 00:27:16,351
that brings together our levels of 

726
00:27:16,351 --> 00:27:18,240
power that includes diplomacy and 

727
00:27:18,240 --> 00:27:20,730
certainly our economic and if necessary , 

728
00:27:20,740 --> 00:27:23,130
and if authorized outside the United 

729
00:27:23,130 --> 00:27:25,352
States , What the Department of Defense 

730
00:27:25,352 --> 00:27:27,560
might do to your last point ranking 

731
00:27:27,560 --> 00:27:30,560
member with regards to support for an 

732
00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:32,671
incident like this ? Well established 

733
00:27:32,671 --> 00:27:34,893
processes as you know , defense support 

734
00:27:34,893 --> 00:27:37,004
to civil authorities . Uh and I think 

735
00:27:37,004 --> 00:27:39,060
that those would be executed if lead 

736
00:27:39,060 --> 00:27:41,116
federal agencies needed to have that 

737
00:27:41,116 --> 00:27:43,282
support as we attempt to step back and 

738
00:27:43,282 --> 00:27:45,449
look at it holistically . I think it's 

739
00:27:45,449 --> 00:27:44,840
fair , at least with one lens to look 

740
00:27:44,840 --> 00:27:48,170
at it as um not just as this attack 

741
00:27:48,180 --> 00:27:50,350
isolated but as a Russia problem . 

742
00:27:50,360 --> 00:27:52,304
Right . And part of the problem at 

743
00:27:52,304 --> 00:27:54,471
times opaque relationships between the 

744
00:27:54,471 --> 00:27:56,471
Russian government and and criminal 

745
00:27:56,471 --> 00:27:58,416
groups , Do we have the sufficient 

746
00:27:58,416 --> 00:28:00,582
analytical capacity to tease out those 

747
00:28:00,582 --> 00:28:02,804
relationships make those distinctions ? 

748
00:28:02,804 --> 00:28:05,750
Is there more regional expertise that 

749
00:28:05,750 --> 00:28:08,000
we need to apply to this problem ? I'd 

750
00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:10,167
be curious to the extent . Again , the 

751
00:28:10,167 --> 00:28:12,389
extent you can answer in this session , 

752
00:28:12,389 --> 00:28:12,010
how you think about those opaque 

753
00:28:12,010 --> 00:28:14,232
relationships and our ability to better 

754
00:28:14,232 --> 00:28:16,770
understand them ? Uh quite simply , I 

755
00:28:16,770 --> 00:28:18,900
think about it in terms of how do I 

756
00:28:18,900 --> 00:28:21,500
provide the most intelligence I can as 

757
00:28:21,510 --> 00:28:23,621
the director of the National Security 

758
00:28:23,621 --> 00:28:25,621
Agency or Commander ? U . S . Cyber 

759
00:28:25,621 --> 00:28:27,843
command that provides both uh viewpoint 

760
00:28:27,843 --> 00:28:29,621
on intent and capability of our 

761
00:28:29,621 --> 00:28:31,732
adversaries . Uh I think , you know , 

762
00:28:31,732 --> 00:28:34,410
as as any director of uh a combat 

763
00:28:34,410 --> 00:28:36,577
support agency would share with you is 

764
00:28:36,577 --> 00:28:38,870
we need to do more and we can talk a 

765
00:28:38,870 --> 00:28:41,203
little bit more in closed session today . 

766
00:28:41,203 --> 00:28:43,450
But again , I think that overall we 

767
00:28:43,450 --> 00:28:45,506
have work to do across U . S . Cyber 

768
00:28:45,506 --> 00:28:47,394
Command and the National Security 

769
00:28:47,394 --> 00:28:49,506
Agency . And then finally , uh one of 

770
00:28:49,506 --> 00:28:51,910
the uh cyberspace Solarium Commission 

771
00:28:51,910 --> 00:28:54,640
recommendations that we are working on 

772
00:28:54,640 --> 00:28:57,150
right now is this concept of 

773
00:28:57,160 --> 00:28:58,938
systemically important critical 

774
00:28:58,938 --> 00:29:01,160
infrastructure with just case obviously 

775
00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:03,490
brings up . Do you support the idea of 

776
00:29:03,490 --> 00:29:05,323
creating a codified relationship 

777
00:29:05,323 --> 00:29:07,379
between the United States government 

778
00:29:07,379 --> 00:29:08,657
and critical functions 

779
00:29:11,240 --> 00:29:13,240
Congressman ? I would say I support 

780
00:29:13,240 --> 00:29:15,296
anything that is going to ensure the 

781
00:29:15,296 --> 00:29:17,518
security of our critical infrastructure 

782
00:29:17,518 --> 00:29:19,629
and key resources . My experience has 

783
00:29:19,629 --> 00:29:21,796
been with elections , but there are 16 

784
00:29:21,796 --> 00:29:23,962
other sectors uh and I think that what 

785
00:29:23,962 --> 00:29:26,073
the administration is laid out in the 

786
00:29:26,073 --> 00:29:28,240
100 day plan initially with regards to 

787
00:29:28,240 --> 00:29:27,940
energy is is a great start where we 

788
00:29:27,940 --> 00:29:30,107
need to figure out how do we bring the 

789
00:29:30,107 --> 00:29:32,218
the whole parts of the government and 

790
00:29:32,218 --> 00:29:34,162
particularly important , how do we 

791
00:29:34,162 --> 00:29:36,384
bring the private sector into a greater 

792
00:29:36,384 --> 00:29:38,329
partnership to ensure that we have 

793
00:29:38,329 --> 00:29:38,310
outcomes that will lead to a greater 

794
00:29:38,310 --> 00:29:40,580
resiliency . And obviously security , 

795
00:29:40,590 --> 00:29:42,701
thank you . I guess the clock doesn't 

796
00:29:42,701 --> 00:29:44,868
count down when you're up this high in 

797
00:29:44,868 --> 00:29:47,034
the diets , which is interesting . But 

798
00:29:47,034 --> 00:29:49,146
in the interest of time I'll still go 

799
00:29:49,146 --> 00:29:51,090
back . We follow the leader of the 

800
00:29:51,090 --> 00:29:50,860
chair rank . Remember the full 

801
00:29:50,860 --> 00:29:52,693
committee that the the chair and 

802
00:29:52,693 --> 00:29:54,749
ranking member of the subcommittee ? 

803
00:29:54,749 --> 00:29:58,260
Not on the clock , but with that . Um I 

804
00:29:58,260 --> 00:30:00,427
want to know . Thank you for your kind 

805
00:30:00,427 --> 00:30:02,649
of questions and I also want to commend 

806
00:30:02,649 --> 00:30:04,760
the ranking member for his leadership 

807
00:30:04,760 --> 00:30:06,593
as uh co chair of the cyberspace 

808
00:30:06,593 --> 00:30:08,649
Election Commission . I was proud to 

809
00:30:08,649 --> 00:30:10,871
serve in the commission with you and uh 

810
00:30:10,871 --> 00:30:13,093
really appreciate uh your commitment to 

811
00:30:13,093 --> 00:30:15,316
our national security . That report was 

812
00:30:15,316 --> 00:30:17,538
a long way I think toward getting to us 

813
00:30:17,538 --> 00:30:19,538
to a stronger place in cyberspace . 

814
00:30:19,538 --> 00:30:21,704
With that I want to recognize now . Mr 

815
00:30:21,704 --> 00:30:25,460
Larson for five minutes . Yeah , 

816
00:30:26,340 --> 00:30:29,700
thank you . Mr Chair ranking member 

817
00:30:29,700 --> 00:30:31,870
Gallagher will see the clock ticking 

818
00:30:31,880 --> 00:30:34,770
now that we're on to others . 

819
00:30:35,440 --> 00:30:37,170
General Marks , Sony 

820
00:30:38,140 --> 00:30:41,950
thanks . General Marks , Tony Section 

821
00:30:41,950 --> 00:30:44,880
17 29 of the N . B . A . Required 

822
00:30:44,880 --> 00:30:47,170
conference evaluation by the sec def 

823
00:30:47,940 --> 00:30:49,829
basically on how to use the cyber 

824
00:30:49,829 --> 00:30:52,051
capabilities of the National Guard . Do 

825
00:30:52,051 --> 00:30:55,350
you have an update on the status of of 

826
00:30:55,840 --> 00:30:59,530
all that evaluation congressman ? I 

827
00:30:59,530 --> 00:31:01,752
would have to defer to uh the secretary 

828
00:31:01,752 --> 00:31:03,752
if she has one . I personally don't 

829
00:31:03,752 --> 00:31:05,974
have one . Um But certainly we can take 

830
00:31:05,974 --> 00:31:07,919
that for the record if necessary . 

831
00:31:07,919 --> 00:31:09,900
Congressman . That's great . Thank 

832
00:31:09,910 --> 00:31:11,460
perhaps secretary um 

833
00:31:13,740 --> 00:31:17,440
um uh Mr Larson just wanted to 

834
00:31:17,440 --> 00:31:19,840
clarify uh since we've had a number of 

835
00:31:19,840 --> 00:31:21,896
Congressional interest provisions on 

836
00:31:21,896 --> 00:31:24,100
National Guard , exactly which of the 

837
00:31:24,110 --> 00:31:26,210
provisions are we refer referring to 

838
00:31:26,320 --> 00:31:28,420
cyber cyber capabilities and 

839
00:31:28,420 --> 00:31:30,587
interoperability of the National Guard 

840
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:33,407
requires a comprehensive evaluation by 

841
00:31:33,407 --> 00:31:35,462
sec death on the mechanisms by which 

842
00:31:35,462 --> 00:31:37,573
the department is able to improve the 

843
00:31:37,573 --> 00:31:39,573
utilization of cyber capabilities . 

844
00:31:39,573 --> 00:31:42,170
Resident in the National Guard . Um Our 

845
00:31:42,170 --> 00:31:44,392
understanding is that we should have an 

846
00:31:44,392 --> 00:31:46,392
answer for you later this summer on 

847
00:31:46,392 --> 00:31:50,060
that on that topic . All right . Um I 

848
00:31:50,060 --> 00:31:52,100
have a list of questions are really 

849
00:31:52,100 --> 00:31:54,320
more appropriate for a different 

850
00:31:54,320 --> 00:31:57,910
setting , but I did want to ask 

851
00:31:57,920 --> 00:32:01,350
uh where my question down here . Oh uh 

852
00:32:01,740 --> 00:32:03,851
perhaps for general Marcus Sony , can 

853
00:32:03,851 --> 00:32:05,690
you highlight perhaps how your 

854
00:32:05,700 --> 00:32:07,311
leveraging commercial threat 

855
00:32:07,311 --> 00:32:10,090
information providers um and and how do 

856
00:32:10,090 --> 00:32:11,701
you share that information , 

857
00:32:12,940 --> 00:32:15,040
congressman ? We have a number of 

858
00:32:15,040 --> 00:32:17,151
different relationships with with the 

859
00:32:17,151 --> 00:32:20,430
private sector , uh sincerely in terms 

860
00:32:20,430 --> 00:32:22,597
of being able to understand better the 

861
00:32:22,597 --> 00:32:24,730
vulnerabilities that exist in our 

862
00:32:24,730 --> 00:32:27,950
private uh invest in private companies 

863
00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:30,570
is critical for us . This is obviously 

864
00:32:30,570 --> 00:32:33,150
sometimes uh a means upon which we have 

865
00:32:33,160 --> 00:32:36,030
early alerts to uh problems that might 

866
00:32:36,040 --> 00:32:39,080
exist in the private sector uh at the 

867
00:32:39,080 --> 00:32:41,260
command I assure you that any type of 

868
00:32:41,260 --> 00:32:44,490
data is looked at screen uh and 

869
00:32:44,490 --> 00:32:47,570
carefully um uh evaluated for us 

870
00:32:47,570 --> 00:32:50,450
persons data . And if by rare occasion 

871
00:32:50,450 --> 00:32:52,617
that we do have that we will certainly 

872
00:32:52,617 --> 00:32:54,490
minimize and uh and uh we have 

873
00:32:54,490 --> 00:32:56,657
processes and procedures upon which to 

874
00:32:56,657 --> 00:33:00,250
deal with . And then the last year's N . 

875
00:33:00,250 --> 00:33:03,560
D . A . Um uh we authorize some 

876
00:33:03,560 --> 00:33:05,870
language that has cyber com participate 

877
00:33:05,870 --> 00:33:07,926
in and contribute to the joint cyber 

878
00:33:07,926 --> 00:33:10,670
planning office at Cisa . Um how will 

879
00:33:10,670 --> 00:33:13,160
you plan to implement that provision , 

880
00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:16,384
Congressman ? We've we've had some 

881
00:33:16,384 --> 00:33:18,607
experience in working very closely with 

882
00:33:18,607 --> 00:33:20,773
cysts and it began with the election . 

883
00:33:20,773 --> 00:33:22,829
Um one of the things that I directed 

884
00:33:22,829 --> 00:33:24,884
were a series of planners to go over 

885
00:33:24,884 --> 00:33:26,996
and to work closely with system as we 

886
00:33:26,996 --> 00:33:29,162
put together our strategy for securing 

887
00:33:29,162 --> 00:33:31,218
the 2020 election . What we found is 

888
00:33:31,218 --> 00:33:33,384
that this truly is value added the way 

889
00:33:33,384 --> 00:33:35,510
that we do planning operations uh is 

890
00:33:35,510 --> 00:33:37,677
something that I think is very helpful 

891
00:33:37,677 --> 00:33:39,677
is as we take a look at broad based 

892
00:33:39,677 --> 00:33:41,899
problems like election security , we're 

893
00:33:41,899 --> 00:33:43,899
going to continue to support that . 

894
00:33:43,899 --> 00:33:46,121
That's been uh been an element that the 

895
00:33:46,121 --> 00:33:48,232
secretary has emphasized to us and in 

896
00:33:48,232 --> 00:33:48,120
very close partnership obviously with 

897
00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:50,700
Sista . So this will be uh just the 

898
00:33:50,700 --> 00:33:52,880
first of many steps as we , uh , as we 

899
00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:56,060
go to to work this closely . 

900
00:33:56,540 --> 00:33:59,000
And uh , one final question and this is 

901
00:33:59,010 --> 00:34:01,570
um , kind of related , operates the N . 

902
00:34:01,570 --> 00:34:03,560
S . A . But congress has just been 

903
00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:06,230
notified general that there's a 

904
00:34:06,240 --> 00:34:08,570
decision made to close the NSA's on 

905
00:34:08,570 --> 00:34:11,550
site childcare center trade , a tough 

906
00:34:11,550 --> 00:34:14,760
situation for employees or parents . 

907
00:34:15,140 --> 00:34:17,251
Can you speak a little bit about that 

908
00:34:17,251 --> 00:34:19,084
decision , Congressman ? We were 

909
00:34:19,084 --> 00:34:21,370
alerted several weeks ago by the 

910
00:34:21,380 --> 00:34:23,324
private company that that runs the 

911
00:34:23,324 --> 00:34:25,158
child care center that they were 

912
00:34:25,158 --> 00:34:27,269
intending to uh , to close at the end 

913
00:34:27,269 --> 00:34:30,300
of june . We have spent the past 

914
00:34:30,300 --> 00:34:32,078
several weeks doing a series of 

915
00:34:32,078 --> 00:34:34,189
different activities , first of all , 

916
00:34:34,189 --> 00:34:36,189
working closely with those families 

917
00:34:36,189 --> 00:34:38,300
that are affected to ensure that they 

918
00:34:38,300 --> 00:34:40,950
have information and , and uh , and uh , 

919
00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:43,290
and and leads to other childcare 

920
00:34:43,290 --> 00:34:46,010
facilities within the area . Secondly , 

921
00:34:46,020 --> 00:34:47,980
taking a look at mid and long term 

922
00:34:47,980 --> 00:34:50,430
plans , as you know , we are in the 

923
00:34:50,440 --> 00:34:54,140
midst of a fairly large construction um 

924
00:34:54,150 --> 00:34:56,970
work at Fort Meade . And so this was , 

925
00:34:57,140 --> 00:34:59,630
I think part of the impetus where where 

926
00:34:59,630 --> 00:35:01,852
the private company decided to close at 

927
00:35:01,852 --> 00:35:03,908
the end of the june , but clearly it 

928
00:35:03,908 --> 00:35:05,908
begins with our engagement with the 

929
00:35:05,908 --> 00:35:08,019
families that are affected and it has 

930
00:35:08,019 --> 00:35:11,480
my personal interest sir . I'm glad to 

931
00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:13,720
hear that pre pandemic . We have a 

932
00:35:13,720 --> 00:35:15,760
child care crisis in the country . 

933
00:35:16,140 --> 00:35:18,270
Pandemic has exacerbated that we've 

934
00:35:18,270 --> 00:35:20,270
taken action to the american rescue 

935
00:35:20,270 --> 00:35:22,492
plan to try to alleviate some of that , 

936
00:35:22,492 --> 00:35:24,603
but we don't need to don't really add 

937
00:35:24,603 --> 00:35:26,770
to the problems of folks . So , thanks 

938
00:35:26,770 --> 00:35:29,930
for updating . Go back right on time . 

939
00:35:29,930 --> 00:35:32,370
Larson . Very good . I thank the 

940
00:35:32,370 --> 00:35:34,481
gentleman for his final question . Uh 

941
00:35:34,481 --> 00:35:36,370
Mr Rogers now recognized for five 

942
00:35:36,370 --> 00:35:38,270
minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman 

943
00:35:38,280 --> 00:35:41,110
General Nagasaki . The threats that 

944
00:35:41,110 --> 00:35:43,350
you've described that we face , uh , 

945
00:35:43,360 --> 00:35:45,471
from adversaries in the cyber world . 

946
00:35:45,471 --> 00:35:49,450
How imminent are they ? Well , I think 

947
00:35:49,460 --> 00:35:51,770
congressman to your , to your point . I 

948
00:35:51,770 --> 00:35:54,048
think that what we're seeing right now , 

949
00:35:54,048 --> 00:35:56,090
our adversaries that are increasing 

950
00:35:56,090 --> 00:35:58,368
their scope , scale and sophistication , 

951
00:35:58,368 --> 00:36:00,590
What do I mean by that ? I mean that it 

952
00:36:00,590 --> 00:36:02,757
no longer is just a simple guessing of 

953
00:36:02,757 --> 00:36:05,170
passwords or perhaps a phishing email 

954
00:36:05,410 --> 00:36:07,632
that our adversaries are , are starting 

955
00:36:07,632 --> 00:36:09,870
to use their using things like supply 

956
00:36:09,870 --> 00:36:11,870
chain operations as we saw in solar 

957
00:36:11,870 --> 00:36:14,210
winds . Or they're utilizing zero day 

958
00:36:14,210 --> 00:36:16,460
vulnerabilities , those vulnerabilities 

959
00:36:16,460 --> 00:36:18,627
that the provider doesn't know about , 

960
00:36:18,627 --> 00:36:20,849
but that an adversary can utilize as we 

961
00:36:20,849 --> 00:36:24,160
saw with Microsoft . Um , and so this 

962
00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:26,382
is the , this is the world in which are 

963
00:36:26,382 --> 00:36:28,604
our adversaries are operating below the 

964
00:36:28,604 --> 00:36:30,771
level of armed conflict , trying to do 

965
00:36:30,771 --> 00:36:32,993
three primary things . They are looking 

966
00:36:32,993 --> 00:36:35,049
to steal our intellectual property . 

967
00:36:35,049 --> 00:36:37,680
They are looking to um you know , steal 

968
00:36:37,680 --> 00:36:39,847
our personal identification whether or 

969
00:36:39,847 --> 00:36:41,791
not that's you know , passwords or 

970
00:36:41,791 --> 00:36:43,902
that's Social Social Security numbers 

971
00:36:43,902 --> 00:36:46,100
or that email addresses . And they're 

972
00:36:46,100 --> 00:36:48,560
looking to conduct interference and 

973
00:36:48,560 --> 00:36:51,070
influence operations either against our 

974
00:36:51,070 --> 00:36:53,014
electoral processes are within our 

975
00:36:53,014 --> 00:36:55,126
economy . Are they looking to do that 

976
00:36:55,126 --> 00:36:57,292
in the future ? Are they looking to do 

977
00:36:57,292 --> 00:36:59,292
that now ? They're doing that now , 

978
00:36:59,292 --> 00:37:01,348
congressman . So you would urge this 

979
00:37:01,348 --> 00:37:03,570
committee to act with haste on whatever 

980
00:37:03,570 --> 00:37:05,681
you're gonna recommend for us to do . 

981
00:37:05,681 --> 00:37:07,681
And this year is the N . D . A . Uh 

982
00:37:07,681 --> 00:37:09,970
Congressman . Uh I would certainly 

983
00:37:09,980 --> 00:37:12,090
focus internally and I'm gonna be uh 

984
00:37:12,100 --> 00:37:14,156
ensuring that whatever we're doing , 

985
00:37:14,156 --> 00:37:16,100
we're doing at a at a pace that is 

986
00:37:16,100 --> 00:37:18,100
accelerated . Well , my point is if 

987
00:37:18,100 --> 00:37:19,933
you're gonna need any additional 

988
00:37:19,933 --> 00:37:22,044
statutory authority , you need to let 

989
00:37:22,044 --> 00:37:24,211
us know because we're ready to act . I 

990
00:37:24,211 --> 00:37:26,100
talked to you yesterday about the 

991
00:37:26,100 --> 00:37:28,840
committee's uh uh welcoming of the 

992
00:37:28,840 --> 00:37:31,020
recommendation from the National 

993
00:37:31,020 --> 00:37:32,909
Defense Strategy Commission . The 

994
00:37:32,909 --> 00:37:35,590
suggestion of uh Digital Service 

995
00:37:35,590 --> 00:37:38,210
Academy help train up personnel to take 

996
00:37:38,210 --> 00:37:41,410
on this challenge . And you mentioned 

997
00:37:41,410 --> 00:37:43,790
that you also had a retention issue . 

998
00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:45,744
Can you talk more to the committee 

999
00:37:45,744 --> 00:37:47,689
about the challenges you face with 

1000
00:37:47,689 --> 00:37:49,856
retention of quality personnel in this 

1001
00:37:49,856 --> 00:37:52,110
in this area . Um , so Congressman , 

1002
00:37:52,110 --> 00:37:54,166
you asked me yesterday about how the 

1003
00:37:54,166 --> 00:37:55,943
services were doing in terms of 

1004
00:37:55,943 --> 00:37:57,888
providing us military and civilian 

1005
00:37:57,888 --> 00:37:59,943
members to to outfit 133 teams . And 

1006
00:37:59,943 --> 00:38:01,554
and my response is they do a 

1007
00:38:01,554 --> 00:38:03,610
spectacular job at doing that . It's 

1008
00:38:03,610 --> 00:38:06,500
not the fact that our services uh , 

1009
00:38:06,510 --> 00:38:08,677
don't do a great job in recruiting and 

1010
00:38:08,677 --> 00:38:10,732
the fact that they do a great job in 

1011
00:38:10,732 --> 00:38:12,899
training and then we developed them at 

1012
00:38:12,899 --> 00:38:15,121
U . S . Cyber command at the end of the 

1013
00:38:15,121 --> 00:38:17,177
day . What I think the most about is 

1014
00:38:17,177 --> 00:38:19,510
how do we retain this uh superior force , 

1015
00:38:19,510 --> 00:38:21,732
particularly those individuals that are 

1016
00:38:21,732 --> 00:38:23,954
so much more capable than their peers ? 

1017
00:38:24,020 --> 00:38:27,210
And so retention is something that that 

1018
00:38:27,210 --> 00:38:30,490
means a lot to us . And you know , one 

1019
00:38:30,490 --> 00:38:32,712
of the things that I I continue to work 

1020
00:38:32,712 --> 00:38:34,879
closely with the services is how do we 

1021
00:38:34,879 --> 00:38:36,712
ensure that the best of the best 

1022
00:38:36,712 --> 00:38:38,879
decided to stay with us or if they are 

1023
00:38:38,879 --> 00:38:41,046
going to leave us , how do they become 

1024
00:38:41,046 --> 00:38:43,046
part of our reserve component , our 

1025
00:38:43,046 --> 00:38:45,212
National Guard or Reserve Force or how 

1026
00:38:45,212 --> 00:38:47,323
do they continue to contribute within 

1027
00:38:47,323 --> 00:38:49,546
the broader U . S . Government ? Do you 

1028
00:38:49,546 --> 00:38:51,712
think you're gonna need some statutory 

1029
00:38:52,420 --> 00:38:54,750
uh leeway to be able to accommodate 

1030
00:38:54,750 --> 00:38:57,720
that challenge ? Well , so this is this 

1031
00:38:57,720 --> 00:38:59,776
is a point where that that will work 

1032
00:38:59,776 --> 00:39:01,942
closely obviously with the joint staff 

1033
00:39:01,942 --> 00:39:04,109
and the Office of Secretary Defense to 

1034
00:39:04,109 --> 00:39:05,664
come back at with some some 

1035
00:39:05,664 --> 00:39:07,887
recommendations because I think that we 

1036
00:39:07,887 --> 00:39:09,998
have a growing amount of data that uh 

1037
00:39:09,998 --> 00:39:11,831
that can be helpful here for the 

1038
00:39:11,831 --> 00:39:14,053
department to make an overall request . 

1039
00:39:14,053 --> 00:39:16,220
Great well I look forward to receiving 

1040
00:39:16,220 --> 00:39:16,110
that and thank you for your service 

1041
00:39:16,120 --> 00:39:20,040
your back . Thank you . Mr Rogers . Um 

1042
00:39:20,520 --> 00:39:22,880
Well next go to Mr moulton , welcome 

1043
00:39:22,880 --> 00:39:24,547
back from paternity leave and 

1044
00:39:24,547 --> 00:39:27,970
congratulations . Seth and you are now 

1045
00:39:27,970 --> 00:39:29,637
recognized for five minutes . 

1046
00:39:32,920 --> 00:39:33,920
You're on mute . 

1047
00:39:45,920 --> 00:39:48,198
How's that ? We got you go right ahead . 

1048
00:39:48,320 --> 00:39:50,750
You're recognized . Sorry I was a muted 

1049
00:39:50,750 --> 00:39:52,750
but I was on the wrong microphone . 

1050
00:39:52,750 --> 00:39:54,972
Apparently . My apologies . Mr Chairman 

1051
00:39:54,972 --> 00:39:57,139
thank you for your remarks . It's good 

1052
00:39:57,139 --> 00:39:59,139
to be back and to build off some of 

1053
00:39:59,139 --> 00:39:58,730
your comments on the need for 

1054
00:39:58,730 --> 00:40:01,810
coordination between info operations 

1055
00:40:01,820 --> 00:40:04,190
and cyber operations . General Marcus 

1056
00:40:04,190 --> 00:40:06,134
only a few weeks ago , the D . C . 

1057
00:40:06,134 --> 00:40:08,079
Police was attacked by the hacking 

1058
00:40:08,079 --> 00:40:10,023
group Book , which is reportedly a 

1059
00:40:10,023 --> 00:40:12,079
Russian speaking group they accessed 

1060
00:40:12,079 --> 00:40:14,246
and published hundreds of confidential 

1061
00:40:14,246 --> 00:40:16,079
documents , clearly damaging the 

1062
00:40:16,079 --> 00:40:18,134
public's confidence in the police in 

1063
00:40:18,134 --> 00:40:20,190
the process in the past year . We've 

1064
00:40:20,190 --> 00:40:22,079
also seen influence operations by 

1065
00:40:22,079 --> 00:40:21,910
Russian entities to undermine 

1066
00:40:21,910 --> 00:40:24,132
confidence in the police and exacerbate 

1067
00:40:24,132 --> 00:40:26,466
societal tensions related to the police . 

1068
00:40:26,466 --> 00:40:28,730
So it's not a stretch to an adversary 

1069
00:40:28,730 --> 00:40:30,563
could use a combination of cyber 

1070
00:40:30,563 --> 00:40:32,730
attacks like the one connect conducted 

1071
00:40:32,730 --> 00:40:35,490
by book and influence operations to 

1072
00:40:35,490 --> 00:40:37,768
undermine faith in public institutions . 

1073
00:40:37,768 --> 00:40:39,934
Further , in fact , Russia has clearly 

1074
00:40:39,934 --> 00:40:42,101
tried to do just that in our elections 

1075
00:40:42,101 --> 00:40:44,268
by hacking our electoral organizations 

1076
00:40:44,268 --> 00:40:46,157
while also running disinformation 

1077
00:40:46,157 --> 00:40:48,157
campaigns to undermine the public's 

1078
00:40:48,157 --> 00:40:50,101
faith in the process . How is your 

1079
00:40:50,101 --> 00:40:52,500
organization posturing itself to defend 

1080
00:40:52,510 --> 00:40:55,030
against that kind of layered attack , 

1081
00:40:57,610 --> 00:41:00,960
congressman ? Um We're well postured uh 

1082
00:41:00,970 --> 00:41:03,120
to to ensure that we provide the 

1083
00:41:03,120 --> 00:41:05,530
appropriate support to uh the lead 

1084
00:41:05,530 --> 00:41:08,020
federal agencies involved . Let me give 

1085
00:41:08,020 --> 00:41:10,300
you several examples . Uh so first of 

1086
00:41:10,300 --> 00:41:12,356
all , begin with , the elections are 

1087
00:41:12,356 --> 00:41:14,467
focused at U . S . Cyber command , at 

1088
00:41:14,467 --> 00:41:16,689
the National Security Agency is outside 

1089
00:41:16,689 --> 00:41:18,522
the United States to provide the 

1090
00:41:18,522 --> 00:41:20,522
insights on our adversaries Uh into 

1091
00:41:20,522 --> 00:41:22,744
what they are doing were well practiced 

1092
00:41:22,744 --> 00:41:22,690
at this . And I think we've 

1093
00:41:22,690 --> 00:41:24,746
demonstrated our proficiency in both 

1094
00:41:24,746 --> 00:41:26,968
the 18 and 20 elections in doing this . 

1095
00:41:27,210 --> 00:41:30,710
In terms of the recent uh concerns 

1096
00:41:30,710 --> 00:41:33,040
about domestic violence . Again , our 

1097
00:41:33,040 --> 00:41:35,550
focus is outside the United States for 

1098
00:41:35,550 --> 00:41:37,606
foreign actors . That might be doing 

1099
00:41:37,606 --> 00:41:39,670
one of three things . First of all , 

1100
00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:41,790
generating content that might be 

1101
00:41:41,790 --> 00:41:43,790
utilized within the United States . 

1102
00:41:44,110 --> 00:41:47,000
Secondly , any type of violent 

1103
00:41:47,010 --> 00:41:50,140
activities that that are being uh 

1104
00:41:50,150 --> 00:41:52,420
called for by a foreign actor . And 

1105
00:41:52,420 --> 00:41:54,840
then , thirdly , any type of uh 

1106
00:41:54,850 --> 00:41:56,628
information that's being passed 

1107
00:41:56,628 --> 00:42:00,010
internally uh with regards to um 

1108
00:42:00,400 --> 00:42:03,400
gathering against uh against 

1109
00:42:03,410 --> 00:42:06,860
uh the United States in any 

1110
00:42:06,860 --> 00:42:09,260
location . We work closely with the FBI 

1111
00:42:09,260 --> 00:42:11,204
on that . We work closely with the 

1112
00:42:11,204 --> 00:42:13,427
Department of Homeland Security . Uh We 

1113
00:42:13,427 --> 00:42:15,538
will continue to do that now and well 

1114
00:42:15,538 --> 00:42:17,760
into the future General . How would you 

1115
00:42:17,760 --> 00:42:20,720
characterize um the interagency process 

1116
00:42:20,720 --> 00:42:22,720
and how effectively you are able to 

1117
00:42:22,720 --> 00:42:25,530
work um with these different agencies ? 

1118
00:42:25,540 --> 00:42:28,810
It strikes me as an observer that the 

1119
00:42:28,820 --> 00:42:31,410
lines of authority are not particularly 

1120
00:42:31,410 --> 00:42:33,940
clear and it's hard to delineate who's 

1121
00:42:33,940 --> 00:42:35,884
responsible for which operations , 

1122
00:42:35,884 --> 00:42:37,940
especially when even just giving the 

1123
00:42:37,940 --> 00:42:40,107
example you just described . It's very 

1124
00:42:40,107 --> 00:42:43,920
easy to see how a Russia can 

1125
00:42:43,930 --> 00:42:46,600
easily have a single operation that 

1126
00:42:46,610 --> 00:42:49,790
goes into the territory of multiple U . 

1127
00:42:49,790 --> 00:42:53,430
S . Organizations congressman , I think 

1128
00:42:53,430 --> 00:42:55,374
the authorities , at least from my 

1129
00:42:55,374 --> 00:42:57,486
perspective as both commander and the 

1130
00:42:57,486 --> 00:42:59,810
Director are clearly state and I know 

1131
00:42:59,810 --> 00:43:01,754
them very well and I know that our 

1132
00:43:01,754 --> 00:43:03,921
focus is outside the United States . I 

1133
00:43:03,921 --> 00:43:06,280
know that our focus is enabling our 

1134
00:43:06,280 --> 00:43:09,250
partners within the United States . Um 

1135
00:43:09,260 --> 00:43:12,080
And I think I I come back to the 

1136
00:43:12,080 --> 00:43:14,540
elections . There could not have been a 

1137
00:43:14,550 --> 00:43:16,780
closer partnership between U . S . 

1138
00:43:16,780 --> 00:43:18,891
Cyber Command , the National Security 

1139
00:43:18,891 --> 00:43:20,447
Agency , the Federal Bureau 

1140
00:43:20,447 --> 00:43:22,613
investigation uh and the Department of 

1141
00:43:22,613 --> 00:43:24,447
Homeland Security to give you an 

1142
00:43:24,447 --> 00:43:27,360
example . Uh the elections are general 

1143
00:43:27,360 --> 00:43:29,527
just short on time . It's just to give 

1144
00:43:29,527 --> 00:43:31,638
you an example of the problem here is 

1145
00:43:31,638 --> 00:43:33,638
that if if the rest of us don't see 

1146
00:43:33,638 --> 00:43:35,749
that partnership or understand how it 

1147
00:43:35,749 --> 00:43:37,860
works , then you can have a situation 

1148
00:43:37,860 --> 00:43:39,916
where , you know , you've briefed us 

1149
00:43:39,916 --> 00:43:41,916
that the last election was the most 

1150
00:43:41,916 --> 00:43:44,138
secure in american history . Uh And yet 

1151
00:43:44,138 --> 00:43:46,249
half the people in Washington today , 

1152
00:43:46,249 --> 00:43:48,471
all of one party are trying to make the 

1153
00:43:48,471 --> 00:43:50,416
case that it wasn't . So how do we 

1154
00:43:50,416 --> 00:43:53,710
improve that , that understanding , 

1155
00:43:53,710 --> 00:43:55,210
even if it's just a public 

1156
00:43:55,210 --> 00:43:57,210
understanding of how these lines of 

1157
00:43:57,210 --> 00:44:00,330
authority work ? So , congressman in 

1158
00:44:00,330 --> 00:44:02,650
terms of of the election , you know , I 

1159
00:44:02,650 --> 00:44:05,170
speak to attempts by foreign 

1160
00:44:05,170 --> 00:44:07,590
adversaries trying to interfere in the 

1161
00:44:07,590 --> 00:44:09,701
and influence our electoral process . 

1162
00:44:09,701 --> 00:44:11,923
Uh and I am very proud of the work that 

1163
00:44:11,923 --> 00:44:14,034
has been done and in partnership with 

1164
00:44:14,034 --> 00:44:17,340
FBI and DHS on this . Yes . But you're 

1165
00:44:17,340 --> 00:44:19,340
not answering my question general , 

1166
00:44:19,340 --> 00:44:21,284
which is that if public perception 

1167
00:44:21,284 --> 00:44:23,396
don't understand how this interagency 

1168
00:44:23,396 --> 00:44:23,270
coordination works , and it's easy to 

1169
00:44:23,270 --> 00:44:25,270
think that these operations are not 

1170
00:44:25,270 --> 00:44:28,700
successful . Mr moulton , if I 

1171
00:44:28,700 --> 00:44:32,040
may , uh Mr martin , if I may say 

1172
00:44:32,070 --> 00:44:34,760
it is something that the department 

1173
00:44:34,770 --> 00:44:37,660
works with whole of government to 

1174
00:44:37,670 --> 00:44:39,837
protect our elections . And I think we 

1175
00:44:39,837 --> 00:44:42,370
are very clear with the public about um 

1176
00:44:42,370 --> 00:44:44,481
the work that we do in this space but 

1177
00:44:44,490 --> 00:44:46,910
we do not operate domestically and so 

1178
00:44:46,910 --> 00:44:48,854
we have to engage with the rest of 

1179
00:44:48,854 --> 00:44:50,688
government to make sure that the 

1180
00:44:50,688 --> 00:44:52,521
american people are resilient to 

1181
00:44:52,521 --> 00:44:54,632
misinformation and disinformation and 

1182
00:44:54,632 --> 00:44:56,521
we will continue to work with our 

1183
00:44:56,521 --> 00:44:59,040
interagency partners on that . Yeah I 

1184
00:44:59,040 --> 00:45:01,207
mean that's that's my point and I know 

1185
00:45:01,207 --> 00:45:03,096
my time I'm Sharon but I think we 

1186
00:45:03,096 --> 00:45:05,207
clearly need to do work on that . And 

1187
00:45:05,207 --> 00:45:07,318
um you know if I had time I was going 

1188
00:45:07,318 --> 00:45:09,429
to ask you know when I visit a marine 

1189
00:45:09,429 --> 00:45:11,484
unit on the ground are they going to 

1190
00:45:11,484 --> 00:45:13,707
say that they are integrated with cyber 

1191
00:45:13,707 --> 00:45:15,651
command ? My questions all revolve 

1192
00:45:15,651 --> 00:45:15,580
revolve around this coordination . It's 

1193
00:45:15,580 --> 00:45:18,340
very difficult to do and I'm not trying 

1194
00:45:18,340 --> 00:45:20,562
to suggest that I don't have confidence 

1195
00:45:20,562 --> 00:45:22,784
in your ability to follow your lines of 

1196
00:45:22,784 --> 00:45:24,896
authority . But let's let's make sure 

1197
00:45:24,896 --> 00:45:26,784
that that they work well not only 

1198
00:45:26,784 --> 00:45:28,951
internally but that we can communicate 

1199
00:45:28,951 --> 00:45:31,118
them effectively to the american . The 

1200
00:45:31,118 --> 00:45:32,951
american public . Thank you . Mr 

1201
00:45:32,951 --> 00:45:35,062
Chairman . Thank you . Mr bolton . MR 

1202
00:45:35,062 --> 00:45:37,173
Gates and I recognized five minutes . 

1203
00:45:37,173 --> 00:45:39,396
Thank you MR Chairman and thank you for 

1204
00:45:39,396 --> 00:45:41,562
holding this very important and timely 

1205
00:45:41,562 --> 00:45:43,284
hearing millions of our fellow 

1206
00:45:43,284 --> 00:45:46,140
americans are suffering right now in 

1207
00:45:46,150 --> 00:45:48,372
their quality of life and their ability 

1208
00:45:48,372 --> 00:45:50,483
to interact with their jobs and their 

1209
00:45:50,483 --> 00:45:52,539
families as a consequence of lack of 

1210
00:45:52,539 --> 00:45:54,980
resilience uh , to these foreign cyber 

1211
00:45:54,980 --> 00:45:57,091
threats And general , I wanted to ask 

1212
00:45:57,091 --> 00:45:59,800
you in circumstances where this 

1213
00:45:59,810 --> 00:46:02,040
opaqueness exists , that ranking member 

1214
00:46:02,040 --> 00:46:04,530
Gallagher referenced regarding the 

1215
00:46:04,530 --> 00:46:06,570
connections between malicious cyber 

1216
00:46:06,570 --> 00:46:10,090
actors and state actors . How should we 

1217
00:46:10,090 --> 00:46:12,530
think about the concept of deterrence 

1218
00:46:12,540 --> 00:46:15,390
and our capability to deter against 

1219
00:46:15,390 --> 00:46:18,400
some of these more asymmetric threats ? 

1220
00:46:20,680 --> 00:46:23,670
Congressman ? I think that uh in terms 

1221
00:46:23,670 --> 00:46:25,559
of thinking about deterrence , it 

1222
00:46:25,559 --> 00:46:27,670
really isn't thinking about how do we 

1223
00:46:27,670 --> 00:46:30,140
impose costs and that's the way that we 

1224
00:46:30,140 --> 00:46:32,140
have approached it at U . S . Cyber 

1225
00:46:32,140 --> 00:46:34,307
command within the department in terms 

1226
00:46:34,307 --> 00:46:36,584
of operating outside the United States , 

1227
00:46:36,584 --> 00:46:38,751
when we see elements that are that are 

1228
00:46:38,751 --> 00:46:40,973
operating , how do we try to impose the 

1229
00:46:40,973 --> 00:46:40,790
largest cost possible ? Whether or not 

1230
00:46:40,790 --> 00:46:43,620
that's true , being able to expose them 

1231
00:46:43,620 --> 00:46:45,620
whether or not that's being able to 

1232
00:46:45,620 --> 00:46:47,787
share the information with a series of 

1233
00:46:47,787 --> 00:46:50,009
partners that we have or whether or not 

1234
00:46:50,009 --> 00:46:52,120
when authorized to conduct operations 

1235
00:46:52,120 --> 00:46:54,342
against them . Can our fellow americans 

1236
00:46:54,342 --> 00:46:56,564
who are dealing with the impact of this 

1237
00:46:56,564 --> 00:46:59,010
last cyberattack assume that the 

1238
00:46:59,020 --> 00:47:01,470
imposition of some cost is what's being 

1239
00:47:01,470 --> 00:47:03,359
contemplated by the Department of 

1240
00:47:03,359 --> 00:47:06,590
Defense now . So while I won't get into 

1241
00:47:06,590 --> 00:47:09,030
obviously any of the operations that 

1242
00:47:09,040 --> 00:47:11,262
are being considered , what I would say 

1243
00:47:11,262 --> 00:47:13,262
is that , you know , my role as the 

1244
00:47:13,262 --> 00:47:13,230
commander of U . S . Cyber command is 

1245
00:47:13,230 --> 00:47:15,970
to provide a series of operational uh 

1246
00:47:15,980 --> 00:47:18,600
opportunities or uh courses of action 

1247
00:47:18,600 --> 00:47:20,711
for the secretary of the president to 

1248
00:47:20,711 --> 00:47:23,310
consider . And I want to again 

1249
00:47:23,320 --> 00:47:25,800
delineate the types of options that 

1250
00:47:26,180 --> 00:47:29,050
we'd like to task you to develop as 

1251
00:47:29,050 --> 00:47:31,217
they relate to state actors versus non 

1252
00:47:31,217 --> 00:47:33,328
state actors . I understand that with 

1253
00:47:33,328 --> 00:47:36,230
governments exposure and embarrassment 

1254
00:47:36,240 --> 00:47:39,340
can be a high cost . Do you agree that 

1255
00:47:39,350 --> 00:47:41,530
with more asymmetric threats ? The 

1256
00:47:41,530 --> 00:47:44,450
costs have to be more direct and 

1257
00:47:44,460 --> 00:47:46,410
economic and kinetic 

1258
00:47:47,980 --> 00:47:50,036
congressman ? What I would say is my 

1259
00:47:50,036 --> 00:47:53,400
experience is that the type of threats 

1260
00:47:53,400 --> 00:47:55,511
that you described that are non state 

1261
00:47:55,511 --> 00:47:58,280
uh in nature . Our response has to be 

1262
00:47:58,280 --> 00:48:01,750
persistent that it can't be a one time 

1263
00:48:01,760 --> 00:48:04,430
effort . It has to be persistently that 

1264
00:48:04,430 --> 00:48:06,652
we are going to enable our partners and 

1265
00:48:06,652 --> 00:48:08,874
to act when authorized . I also want to 

1266
00:48:08,874 --> 00:48:10,986
associate myself with the comments of 

1267
00:48:10,986 --> 00:48:12,708
the ranking member of the full 

1268
00:48:12,708 --> 00:48:14,819
committee regarding the workforce and 

1269
00:48:14,819 --> 00:48:17,160
recruitment . We all know why you have 

1270
00:48:17,160 --> 00:48:19,327
retention problems . It is because the 

1271
00:48:19,327 --> 00:48:21,790
private sector pays multiples what we 

1272
00:48:21,790 --> 00:48:24,012
would be able to pay people . And while 

1273
00:48:24,012 --> 00:48:26,234
pay certainly isn't the only thing that 

1274
00:48:26,234 --> 00:48:28,179
motivates folks , it certainly can 

1275
00:48:28,179 --> 00:48:30,234
contribute to a lack of retention of 

1276
00:48:30,234 --> 00:48:32,401
some of this high end talent . It used 

1277
00:48:32,401 --> 00:48:35,330
to be the case not too long ago that 

1278
00:48:35,330 --> 00:48:37,660
the brightest minds in Silicon Valley 

1279
00:48:37,670 --> 00:48:40,680
were working on cyber and munitions and 

1280
00:48:40,680 --> 00:48:43,510
labor and lasers and the Department of 

1281
00:48:43,510 --> 00:48:45,732
Defense was the most important customer 

1282
00:48:45,732 --> 00:48:47,954
and often the most important investor . 

1283
00:48:47,954 --> 00:48:49,710
And now I'm concerned that the 

1284
00:48:49,710 --> 00:48:51,877
brightest minds in America are working 

1285
00:48:51,877 --> 00:48:54,910
on likes and shares and memes and other 

1286
00:48:54,910 --> 00:48:57,077
activities that don't directly connect 

1287
00:48:57,077 --> 00:48:59,243
to the mission of the department . And 

1288
00:48:59,243 --> 00:49:01,299
so I think it's essentially critical 

1289
00:49:01,299 --> 00:49:03,132
for us to follow the thread that 

1290
00:49:03,132 --> 00:49:05,021
ranking member Rogers laid out to 

1291
00:49:05,021 --> 00:49:07,188
actually develop more of that pipeline 

1292
00:49:07,188 --> 00:49:09,570
earlier understanding that there will 

1293
00:49:09,570 --> 00:49:12,590
be some attrition , but a digital 

1294
00:49:12,590 --> 00:49:14,730
service academy seems to be an 

1295
00:49:14,730 --> 00:49:17,260
inspirational , patriotic nationalist 

1296
00:49:17,270 --> 00:49:19,492
thing for us to be able to do . I think 

1297
00:49:19,492 --> 00:49:21,326
it would inspire a great deal of 

1298
00:49:21,326 --> 00:49:23,437
confidence both in the public and the 

1299
00:49:23,437 --> 00:49:25,492
private sector . Is there any advice 

1300
00:49:25,492 --> 00:49:27,437
you would give us going forward to 

1301
00:49:27,437 --> 00:49:29,270
perhaps flush out that idea from 

1302
00:49:29,270 --> 00:49:32,950
ranking member Rogers ? So I think I 

1303
00:49:32,960 --> 00:49:35,016
couldn't agree more in terms of just 

1304
00:49:35,016 --> 00:49:38,790
the spirit of what both you and and 

1305
00:49:38,800 --> 00:49:40,911
congressman Rogers has described with 

1306
00:49:40,911 --> 00:49:43,133
regards to opportunities future for for 

1307
00:49:43,133 --> 00:49:45,300
talent , I would only add what we have 

1308
00:49:45,300 --> 00:49:48,840
to do collectively as uh as obviously 

1309
00:49:48,980 --> 00:49:51,202
the department and the government is to 

1310
00:49:51,202 --> 00:49:53,369
make it as easy as possible for people 

1311
00:49:53,369 --> 00:49:55,536
to go from the private sector into the 

1312
00:49:55,536 --> 00:49:57,591
public sector . And I think we still 

1313
00:49:57,591 --> 00:49:59,813
have work to do there . Yeah , I mean , 

1314
00:49:59,813 --> 00:50:01,536
I I recall even from our first 

1315
00:50:01,536 --> 00:50:04,450
orientation , uh the challenges 

1316
00:50:04,460 --> 00:50:06,840
presented by some of the limitations 

1317
00:50:06,840 --> 00:50:09,062
and exclusions that the department puts 

1318
00:50:09,062 --> 00:50:12,460
on people for decisions or recreation 

1319
00:50:12,460 --> 00:50:14,516
that they engaged in that then could 

1320
00:50:14,516 --> 00:50:16,627
disqualify them . And I would hope we 

1321
00:50:16,627 --> 00:50:19,080
would want to cast a wide net for high 

1322
00:50:19,080 --> 00:50:20,969
quality talent that can make that 

1323
00:50:20,969 --> 00:50:22,969
contribution . And again , that the 

1324
00:50:22,969 --> 00:50:25,080
earlier you get started with people , 

1325
00:50:25,080 --> 00:50:27,247
you know , we we get to nominate these 

1326
00:50:27,247 --> 00:50:29,469
great patriots to service academies now 

1327
00:50:29,469 --> 00:50:29,120
and we see how in the ninth and 10th 

1328
00:50:29,120 --> 00:50:31,342
grade they're already making choices to 

1329
00:50:31,342 --> 00:50:33,564
try to earn those nominations and those 

1330
00:50:33,564 --> 00:50:35,787
appointments . And so I think that that 

1331
00:50:35,787 --> 00:50:37,731
that building that pipeline sooner 

1332
00:50:37,731 --> 00:50:39,731
would certainly be very helpful . I 

1333
00:50:39,731 --> 00:50:39,690
think the chairman , I yield back . 

1334
00:50:41,460 --> 00:50:44,180
Yeah , thank you . Mr Gates . Uh , this 

1335
00:50:44,180 --> 00:50:46,180
Hoolahan is now recognized for five 

1336
00:50:46,180 --> 00:50:46,140
minutes . 

1337
00:50:51,960 --> 00:50:53,670
Thank you Chairman , I really 

1338
00:50:53,670 --> 00:50:55,948
appreciate the chance to ask questions . 

1339
00:50:55,948 --> 00:50:58,114
This one is for General Nokia Sony and 

1340
00:50:58,114 --> 00:51:00,337
it's nice to see you again . I'm really 

1341
00:51:00,337 --> 00:51:02,448
interested in digital citizenship and 

1342
00:51:02,448 --> 00:51:04,226
digital literacy . I think it's 

1343
00:51:04,226 --> 00:51:06,281
incredibly important , especially in 

1344
00:51:06,281 --> 00:51:08,281
this time when we're frankly , as a 

1345
00:51:08,281 --> 00:51:10,448
nation and as a world unclear on where 

1346
00:51:10,448 --> 00:51:12,559
the truth lies , I'm wondering if you 

1347
00:51:12,559 --> 00:51:14,726
could tell us how you , frankly , both 

1348
00:51:14,726 --> 00:51:16,726
of you are ensuring that your cyber 

1349
00:51:16,726 --> 00:51:18,726
professionals are trained on how to 

1350
00:51:18,726 --> 00:51:20,781
identify and root out disinformation 

1351
00:51:20,860 --> 00:51:22,971
and if there is any specific training 

1352
00:51:22,971 --> 00:51:25,490
that you are using for your own team , 

1353
00:51:25,500 --> 00:51:27,278
is there anything that we could 

1354
00:51:27,278 --> 00:51:29,500
leverage or take advantage of to expand 

1355
00:51:29,500 --> 00:51:31,667
to all of the D . O . D . Employees to 

1356
00:51:31,667 --> 00:51:33,833
be able to educate them in sussing out 

1357
00:51:33,833 --> 00:51:37,390
the truth as well . So , 

1358
00:51:37,390 --> 00:51:39,390
congressman , I'll begin and if the 

1359
00:51:39,390 --> 00:51:41,680
secretary wants to jump in , so I begin 

1360
00:51:41,690 --> 00:51:44,350
in terms of our work , we have a very 

1361
00:51:44,350 --> 00:51:46,670
very structured analytic development 

1362
00:51:46,670 --> 00:51:48,780
program at U . S . Cyber Command uh 

1363
00:51:48,790 --> 00:51:51,350
that walks our analysts through being 

1364
00:51:51,350 --> 00:51:53,294
able to understand the information 

1365
00:51:53,294 --> 00:51:55,461
that's presented I think to your point 

1366
00:51:55,461 --> 00:51:57,517
this is a dynamic environment and so 

1367
00:51:57,517 --> 00:51:59,680
our training continues to evolve . Uh 

1368
00:51:59,690 --> 00:52:01,634
We continue to see our adversaries 

1369
00:52:01,634 --> 00:52:03,857
utilize uh new means upon which they're 

1370
00:52:03,857 --> 00:52:06,023
trying to uh to influence . And that's 

1371
00:52:06,023 --> 00:52:08,134
one of the areas that we have focused 

1372
00:52:08,134 --> 00:52:10,246
on is being able to have that ability 

1373
00:52:10,246 --> 00:52:12,357
to uh to meet our our training fairly 

1374
00:52:12,357 --> 00:52:14,412
rapidly . And is there anything that 

1375
00:52:14,412 --> 00:52:16,134
you can think of that would be 

1376
00:52:16,134 --> 00:52:18,246
applicable to the broader D . O . D . 

1377
00:52:18,246 --> 00:52:21,490
Uh at large if I'm a congresswoman um I 

1378
00:52:21,490 --> 00:52:23,546
know that this is a priority for the 

1379
00:52:23,546 --> 00:52:25,712
secretary increasing the resilience of 

1380
00:52:25,712 --> 00:52:27,657
the D . O . D . Workforce and it's 

1381
00:52:27,657 --> 00:52:27,640
something that he has been working on 

1382
00:52:27,650 --> 00:52:29,800
um as we have gone through and 

1383
00:52:29,810 --> 00:52:32,260
responded to the events of january 6th . 

1384
00:52:32,270 --> 00:52:34,200
Um and I think to echo general 

1385
00:52:34,200 --> 00:52:36,311
moccasins comments about the analytic 

1386
00:52:36,311 --> 00:52:38,478
workforce , not just at NSA but at all 

1387
00:52:38,478 --> 00:52:40,644
of diodes , intelligence elements . We 

1388
00:52:40,644 --> 00:52:42,589
do teach a fair amount of critical 

1389
00:52:42,589 --> 00:52:44,311
thinking to large parts of our 

1390
00:52:44,311 --> 00:52:46,311
workforce . Thank you . I'd love to 

1391
00:52:46,311 --> 00:52:48,256
follow up with you both on whether 

1392
00:52:48,256 --> 00:52:50,478
there's any applicability to the larger 

1393
00:52:50,478 --> 00:52:52,478
reports and not just the analytical 

1394
00:52:52,478 --> 00:52:54,533
aspects of our D . O . D . Workforce 

1395
00:52:54,533 --> 00:52:56,478
but the body as a whole . The next 

1396
00:52:56,478 --> 00:52:58,200
question I'd like to very much 

1397
00:52:58,200 --> 00:53:00,422
associate myself with the remarks of Mr 

1398
00:53:00,422 --> 00:53:02,589
Gates and I know Mr Rogers as well are 

1399
00:53:02,589 --> 00:53:04,478
interested in this concept of the 

1400
00:53:04,478 --> 00:53:06,700
digital service academy . I as well I'm 

1401
00:53:06,700 --> 00:53:08,478
very keen on exploring that and 

1402
00:53:08,478 --> 00:53:10,478
advancing that as well . But in the 

1403
00:53:10,478 --> 00:53:12,200
meantime , highly skilled stem 

1404
00:53:12,200 --> 00:53:14,367
professionals are definitely something 

1405
00:53:14,367 --> 00:53:16,311
that we're competing with with the 

1406
00:53:16,311 --> 00:53:18,478
civilian economy . And I was wondering 

1407
00:53:18,478 --> 00:53:20,589
if you could speak a little bit about 

1408
00:53:20,589 --> 00:53:22,700
the cyber accepted service and how it 

1409
00:53:22,700 --> 00:53:24,700
has either positively or negatively 

1410
00:53:24,700 --> 00:53:26,756
impacted diodes , cyber missions and 

1411
00:53:26,756 --> 00:53:28,811
what we can do in this space more to 

1412
00:53:28,811 --> 00:53:30,867
enhance our workforce capabilities . 

1413
00:53:30,867 --> 00:53:33,089
Maybe general in august on any of these 

1414
00:53:33,089 --> 00:53:35,410
first . Thank you congresswoman . I'm a 

1415
00:53:35,410 --> 00:53:37,243
huge supporter of cyber accepted 

1416
00:53:37,243 --> 00:53:39,410
service . What are we seeing with it ? 

1417
00:53:39,410 --> 00:53:42,130
We're seeing that it is an avenue for 

1418
00:53:42,130 --> 00:53:45,600
us to be able to go to recruiting fairs 

1419
00:53:45,600 --> 00:53:48,280
and offer final job opportunities and 

1420
00:53:48,290 --> 00:53:51,400
uh , opportunities for young people to 

1421
00:53:51,400 --> 00:53:54,050
come and consider a career with that U . 

1422
00:53:54,050 --> 00:53:56,161
S . Cyber command . The other element 

1423
00:53:56,161 --> 00:53:57,994
is is that I think it takes into 

1424
00:53:57,994 --> 00:53:59,606
account that we have to hire 

1425
00:53:59,606 --> 00:54:01,606
differently . And so we're seeing a 

1426
00:54:01,606 --> 00:54:03,328
dramatic drop in the number of 

1427
00:54:03,328 --> 00:54:06,300
processing days for those that Are 

1428
00:54:06,310 --> 00:54:08,366
hired under cyber accepted service . 

1429
00:54:08,366 --> 00:54:09,977
Let me give you an example . 

1430
00:54:09,977 --> 00:54:12,199
Traditionally it's taken about 110 days 

1431
00:54:12,199 --> 00:54:14,460
uh to bring someone into our civilian 

1432
00:54:14,460 --> 00:54:16,738
workforce under cyber accepted service . 

1433
00:54:16,738 --> 00:54:18,571
We're seeing that dropped to two 

1434
00:54:18,571 --> 00:54:20,516
somewhere in the 60 day range . So 

1435
00:54:20,516 --> 00:54:22,793
that's that's a tremendous drop for us . 

1436
00:54:22,793 --> 00:54:24,960
That means that we get people into our 

1437
00:54:24,960 --> 00:54:27,310
workforce much quicker . It it's a much 

1438
00:54:27,310 --> 00:54:29,421
better sign for those that are coming 

1439
00:54:29,421 --> 00:54:31,532
into U . S . Cyber command that we're 

1440
00:54:31,532 --> 00:54:33,699
serious about talent is our number one 

1441
00:54:33,699 --> 00:54:35,754
priority . MS So young , do you have 

1442
00:54:35,754 --> 00:54:38,032
anything further to contribute to that ? 

1443
00:54:38,032 --> 00:54:40,410
I think that general Nakatani is right 

1444
00:54:40,410 --> 00:54:43,150
and building a strong and vibrant cyber 

1445
00:54:43,150 --> 00:54:45,372
workforce is certainly a priority . And 

1446
00:54:45,372 --> 00:54:47,539
we've been working with our colleagues 

1447
00:54:47,539 --> 00:54:49,650
in personnel and readiness to try and 

1448
00:54:49,650 --> 00:54:52,500
improve them . Thank you . And with the 

1449
00:54:52,500 --> 00:54:54,722
last couple minutes of a couple seconds 

1450
00:54:54,722 --> 00:54:56,889
of my time , is there anything further 

1451
00:54:56,889 --> 00:54:59,000
that we could be doing in addition to 

1452
00:54:59,000 --> 00:55:01,222
things like the Digital Service academy 

1453
00:55:01,222 --> 00:55:03,389
and programs such as these that we can 

1454
00:55:03,389 --> 00:55:03,000
make sure that we're including in this 

1455
00:55:03,010 --> 00:55:06,850
round of the India . So 

1456
00:55:06,850 --> 00:55:08,628
congressman , if I might let me 

1457
00:55:08,628 --> 00:55:10,739
highlight Dream Port , which is uh an 

1458
00:55:10,739 --> 00:55:12,683
initiative that this committee has 

1459
00:55:12,683 --> 00:55:14,850
supported , I think you'll recall that 

1460
00:55:14,850 --> 00:55:17,072
Dream Port in 2018 was stood up . Uh It 

1461
00:55:17,072 --> 00:55:18,906
is an unclassified facility just 

1462
00:55:18,906 --> 00:55:21,180
outside of uh for me that we utilize 

1463
00:55:21,180 --> 00:55:23,402
for a number of different initiatives , 

1464
00:55:23,402 --> 00:55:25,347
initiatives such as bringing young 

1465
00:55:25,347 --> 00:55:27,710
people in a series of of high school 

1466
00:55:27,720 --> 00:55:29,930
interns for the summer . Uh an ability 

1467
00:55:29,930 --> 00:55:32,210
to bring together uh commercial 

1468
00:55:32,220 --> 00:55:34,387
industry with U . S . Cyber Command to 

1469
00:55:34,387 --> 00:55:37,700
talk about key topics like uh you know , 

1470
00:55:37,710 --> 00:55:40,060
uh new architectures for our networks . 

1471
00:55:40,110 --> 00:55:42,277
But what I've seen when I've gone over 

1472
00:55:42,277 --> 00:55:44,277
to a place like Dream Port , a very 

1473
00:55:44,277 --> 00:55:46,560
small investment can have tremendous 

1474
00:55:46,570 --> 00:55:48,560
impact on young people in terms of 

1475
00:55:48,640 --> 00:55:50,640
exciting them about coming into and 

1476
00:55:50,640 --> 00:55:53,580
thinking about cyber as a career . The 

1477
00:55:53,580 --> 00:55:55,636
only other thing that I would add to 

1478
00:55:55,636 --> 00:55:57,969
that , and I appreciate that . Go ahead . 

1479
00:55:57,969 --> 00:56:00,191
I'm sorry . The only other thing that I 

1480
00:56:00,191 --> 00:56:02,191
would add to what General Nicholson 

1481
00:56:02,191 --> 00:56:01,990
says is that many of the people in our 

1482
00:56:01,990 --> 00:56:04,500
workforce , um they come to us because 

1483
00:56:04,500 --> 00:56:06,667
they are motivated by the mission that 

1484
00:56:06,667 --> 00:56:08,444
that money is not their primary 

1485
00:56:08,444 --> 00:56:10,480
motivator . And so the Congress has 

1486
00:56:10,480 --> 00:56:13,290
continued support for our the ways in 

1487
00:56:13,290 --> 00:56:15,750
which we can uh bolster the training 

1488
00:56:15,750 --> 00:56:17,920
and education of our workforce to help 

1489
00:56:17,930 --> 00:56:19,763
them deepen their support to the 

1490
00:56:19,763 --> 00:56:21,930
mission . Um We appreciate the support 

1491
00:56:21,930 --> 00:56:24,152
that you've given us so far and we hope 

1492
00:56:24,152 --> 00:56:26,430
that that would continue in the future . 

1493
00:56:26,430 --> 00:56:28,374
Thank you . Thank you . I am and I 

1494
00:56:28,374 --> 00:56:30,263
yield back . Thank you again . Mr 

1495
00:56:30,263 --> 00:56:32,208
franco has not recognized for five 

1496
00:56:32,208 --> 00:56:34,430
minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman . And 

1497
00:56:34,430 --> 00:56:36,541
my first question to be for Miso Yang 

1498
00:56:36,541 --> 00:56:39,210
and follow up really to what Mr Gates 

1499
00:56:39,210 --> 00:56:41,266
was referring to before asking about 

1500
00:56:41,266 --> 00:56:43,660
regarding uh , the attacks were seeing 

1501
00:56:43,660 --> 00:56:45,882
that are coming from both nation states 

1502
00:56:45,882 --> 00:56:48,270
and non state actors . Um specifically 

1503
00:56:48,270 --> 00:56:50,530
with the non state actors that are 

1504
00:56:50,530 --> 00:56:52,419
being financially backed by these 

1505
00:56:52,419 --> 00:56:54,530
states are tactics differ on how we , 

1506
00:56:54,530 --> 00:56:56,530
how we attack or how we deter those 

1507
00:56:56,530 --> 00:56:58,586
attacks depending on whether they're 

1508
00:56:58,586 --> 00:57:00,641
coming from the nation states or non 

1509
00:57:00,641 --> 00:57:02,586
state actors . Certainly non state 

1510
00:57:02,586 --> 00:57:04,752
actors who are engaging in financially 

1511
00:57:04,752 --> 00:57:06,530
motivated crimes . The lead for 

1512
00:57:06,530 --> 00:57:09,090
responding to those actors are the FBI 

1513
00:57:09,090 --> 00:57:11,312
and Doj . The challenge I think that we 

1514
00:57:11,312 --> 00:57:13,423
have is that when those attacks first 

1515
00:57:13,423 --> 00:57:15,710
come across the networks and and impact 

1516
00:57:15,710 --> 00:57:17,599
us when those um when we see that 

1517
00:57:17,599 --> 00:57:19,543
malicious activity , it's always a 

1518
00:57:19,543 --> 00:57:21,710
challenge of attribution to be able to 

1519
00:57:21,710 --> 00:57:23,766
pull it apart and figure out who are 

1520
00:57:23,766 --> 00:57:25,821
the state actors and who are the non 

1521
00:57:25,821 --> 00:57:27,988
state actors . Which which elements of 

1522
00:57:27,988 --> 00:57:30,210
government would then be um tasked with 

1523
00:57:30,210 --> 00:57:33,730
the lead to um disrupt that activity 

1524
00:57:33,730 --> 00:57:36,270
varies based on location and whether or 

1525
00:57:36,270 --> 00:57:38,070
not their criminal or not . But 

1526
00:57:38,070 --> 00:57:40,181
certainly it is clear that for nation 

1527
00:57:40,181 --> 00:57:42,710
states who are playing in this hybrid 

1528
00:57:42,710 --> 00:57:44,850
space , we consider that um 

1529
00:57:44,860 --> 00:57:47,640
irresponsible state behavior um and 

1530
00:57:47,640 --> 00:57:49,807
would continue to call it out where we 

1531
00:57:49,807 --> 00:57:52,800
see it . All right , thank you . And 

1532
00:57:52,800 --> 00:57:54,967
both of your testimonies , you made it 

1533
00:57:54,967 --> 00:57:56,911
clear that the U . S . Can't go it 

1534
00:57:56,911 --> 00:57:59,078
alone here . And uh we have this great 

1535
00:57:59,078 --> 00:58:01,133
need to work with our allies when it 

1536
00:58:01,133 --> 00:58:03,133
comes to cyber specifically . Uh in 

1537
00:58:03,133 --> 00:58:05,133
what ways can you see that ? We can 

1538
00:58:05,133 --> 00:58:07,300
strengthen our current relationships ? 

1539
00:58:07,300 --> 00:58:09,356
And then how do we go about building 

1540
00:58:09,356 --> 00:58:11,330
out new ones and with some of our 

1541
00:58:11,520 --> 00:58:14,590
tactics like Hunt Forward that has that 

1542
00:58:14,590 --> 00:58:16,870
position changed over time , depending 

1543
00:58:16,870 --> 00:58:18,759
on which part of the country were 

1544
00:58:18,759 --> 00:58:21,780
referring to ? Um Congressman , I would 

1545
00:58:21,780 --> 00:58:23,891
just say that um as the president has 

1546
00:58:23,891 --> 00:58:26,500
indicated strengthening and reinforcing 

1547
00:58:26,500 --> 00:58:28,556
our relationships with our alliances 

1548
00:58:28,556 --> 00:58:30,611
and partners is a very high priority 

1549
00:58:30,611 --> 00:58:33,150
for him . Uh We have demonstrated our 

1550
00:58:33,150 --> 00:58:35,261
commitment to working with allies and 

1551
00:58:35,261 --> 00:58:37,483
partners in the face of the threat . We 

1552
00:58:37,483 --> 00:58:39,428
have expanded our participation in 

1553
00:58:39,428 --> 00:58:41,594
cyber flag and the president continues 

1554
00:58:41,594 --> 00:58:43,990
to maintain a high interest and support 

1555
00:58:43,990 --> 00:58:45,879
for hunt forward operations . Let 

1556
00:58:45,879 --> 00:58:47,712
General Marcus only speak to the 

1557
00:58:47,712 --> 00:58:49,879
specifics of that , but we continue to 

1558
00:58:49,879 --> 00:58:51,990
build relationships with partners and 

1559
00:58:51,990 --> 00:58:54,212
Allies . Congressman . I would just add 

1560
00:58:54,212 --> 00:58:56,379
um Hunt forward operations where we're 

1561
00:58:56,379 --> 00:58:58,434
obviously coming at the request of a 

1562
00:58:58,434 --> 00:59:00,546
foreign government worked through the 

1563
00:59:00,546 --> 00:59:00,160
Department of Defense and the 

1564
00:59:00,160 --> 00:59:02,670
Department of State has been a I think 

1565
00:59:02,670 --> 00:59:05,290
a tremendous ability for us to to show 

1566
00:59:05,290 --> 00:59:07,430
our commitment to partnerships and uh 

1567
00:59:07,440 --> 00:59:09,607
you know , just during the the defense 

1568
00:59:09,607 --> 00:59:11,890
of the 2020 elections , 11 different 

1569
00:59:11,890 --> 00:59:14,057
missions in nine different countries . 

1570
00:59:14,057 --> 00:59:16,112
You can see the importance that that 

1571
00:59:16,112 --> 00:59:19,430
the department places on this . All 

1572
00:59:19,430 --> 00:59:21,652
right , thank you . That's all I have . 

1573
00:59:21,652 --> 00:59:23,763
Mr . Chairman , Go back . Thank you . 

1574
00:59:23,763 --> 00:59:25,597
Mr Franklin . Miss Hopkins , now 

1575
00:59:25,597 --> 00:59:27,740
recognized for five minutes . Great , 

1576
00:59:27,740 --> 00:59:29,907
thank you Mr Chairman and thank you to 

1577
00:59:29,907 --> 00:59:32,129
our witnesses for showing up here . You 

1578
00:59:32,129 --> 00:59:34,240
guys have such an important mission . 

1579
00:59:34,240 --> 00:59:36,407
Um I want to associate myself with the 

1580
00:59:36,407 --> 00:59:38,573
comments that Representative Gallagher 

1581
00:59:38,573 --> 00:59:40,700
said at the top of the session here . 

1582
00:59:40,710 --> 00:59:43,640
Um I think it would be so important to 

1583
00:59:43,640 --> 00:59:46,400
really present truly transformational 

1584
00:59:46,400 --> 00:59:49,900
budget on cyber . Uh you know , 

1585
00:59:49,900 --> 00:59:52,210
whenever you guys submit it , I think 

1586
00:59:52,220 --> 00:59:55,110
that this committee is crying out for 

1587
00:59:55,110 --> 00:59:57,332
it , I think that the country is crying 

1588
00:59:57,332 --> 00:59:59,443
out for it and we know that that will 

1589
00:59:59,443 --> 01:00:01,610
come at the expense of older systems , 

1590
01:00:01,610 --> 01:00:04,050
legacy systems , pork . Um and that 

1591
01:00:04,050 --> 01:00:06,700
Congress has a responsibility to help 

1592
01:00:06,700 --> 01:00:08,811
you with that , which we don't always 

1593
01:00:08,811 --> 01:00:10,589
live up to , but I just want to 

1594
01:00:10,589 --> 01:00:12,422
encourage you to be bold and and 

1595
01:00:12,422 --> 01:00:14,610
provide something that really helps 

1596
01:00:14,610 --> 01:00:18,100
move us into the 24th century so we can 

1597
01:00:18,100 --> 01:00:20,730
maintain our military edge . I guess 

1598
01:00:20,730 --> 01:00:23,390
the question I have for both of you is 

1599
01:00:23,390 --> 01:00:25,557
I'm running this task force along with 

1600
01:00:25,557 --> 01:00:27,723
Mr Gallagher on the Defense Department 

1601
01:00:27,723 --> 01:00:29,834
supply chains and our vulnerabilities 

1602
01:00:29,834 --> 01:00:32,900
and cyber has come up at every single 

1603
01:00:32,900 --> 01:00:35,122
session that we've had eight weeks in a 

1604
01:00:35,122 --> 01:00:37,233
row . So can you tell me particularly 

1605
01:00:37,233 --> 01:00:39,289
in the wake of solar winds , kind of 

1606
01:00:39,289 --> 01:00:41,650
what cyber commas doing to look at 

1607
01:00:41,650 --> 01:00:43,960
supply chain vulnerabilities either 

1608
01:00:43,960 --> 01:00:47,630
access by foreigners or um , or 

1609
01:00:47,630 --> 01:00:49,352
just , you know , whether it's 

1610
01:00:49,352 --> 01:00:51,574
intentional or benign . Can you talk to 

1611
01:00:51,574 --> 01:00:53,297
me about supply chain issues , 

1612
01:00:53,310 --> 01:00:55,643
congressman , congresswoman ? I'm sorry . 

1613
01:00:55,643 --> 01:00:57,699
Uh , what we have done in the in the 

1614
01:00:57,699 --> 01:01:00,320
wake of solar winds is again taken 

1615
01:01:00,320 --> 01:01:03,080
apart and better understand exactly 

1616
01:01:03,080 --> 01:01:05,640
what the adversary was was able to do 

1617
01:01:06,010 --> 01:01:07,843
and from that . Working with the 

1618
01:01:07,843 --> 01:01:09,980
National Security Agency and the 

1619
01:01:09,990 --> 01:01:12,810
Department of Defense have looked at 

1620
01:01:12,810 --> 01:01:14,977
the Defense Industrial Base to be able 

1621
01:01:14,977 --> 01:01:17,199
to share that information I would offer 

1622
01:01:17,199 --> 01:01:19,360
to you , however , that we are also 

1623
01:01:19,360 --> 01:01:21,527
getting a tremendous amount of support 

1624
01:01:21,527 --> 01:01:24,260
and information from defense industrial 

1625
01:01:24,260 --> 01:01:26,482
based companies that provide is kind of 

1626
01:01:26,482 --> 01:01:28,649
an indicator and be more than happy to 

1627
01:01:28,649 --> 01:01:30,593
to follow up with that in a future 

1628
01:01:30,593 --> 01:01:34,220
session . Okay . Um , the other thing I 

1629
01:01:34,220 --> 01:01:37,290
guess I would ask is um you know in 

1630
01:01:37,290 --> 01:01:39,350
michigan we host a multi domain 

1631
01:01:39,350 --> 01:01:42,480
exercise that is Army , Air Force and 

1632
01:01:42,480 --> 01:01:45,830
has now been integrating cyber into you 

1633
01:01:45,830 --> 01:01:48,052
know the giant exercise . Tell me about 

1634
01:01:48,052 --> 01:01:50,163
what you've done to try encourage the 

1635
01:01:50,163 --> 01:01:51,941
cyber component of multi domain 

1636
01:01:51,941 --> 01:01:53,552
exercises all over the world 

1637
01:01:55,010 --> 01:01:57,360
congressman . What what we have done is 

1638
01:01:57,370 --> 01:02:01,360
twofold one is to try to encourage 

1639
01:02:01,360 --> 01:02:03,750
and support the guard not only in 

1640
01:02:03,750 --> 01:02:06,240
exercises but in real world . And so we 

1641
01:02:06,240 --> 01:02:08,351
created a capability called the cyber 

1642
01:02:08,351 --> 01:02:11,240
nine line which allows any element 

1643
01:02:11,240 --> 01:02:14,670
within the guard , air or army to be 

1644
01:02:14,670 --> 01:02:17,360
able to access our big data platform to 

1645
01:02:17,360 --> 01:02:19,530
share information at an unclassified 

1646
01:02:19,530 --> 01:02:21,641
level with the simple use of a Common 

1647
01:02:21,641 --> 01:02:23,919
access card which is your I . D . card . 

1648
01:02:23,919 --> 01:02:26,086
Every single element within the United 

1649
01:02:26,086 --> 01:02:28,840
States . The 54 elements of the guard 

1650
01:02:28,840 --> 01:02:30,890
in our states and territories has 

1651
01:02:30,890 --> 01:02:33,040
utilized that . The second pieces is 

1652
01:02:33,050 --> 01:02:35,350
continuing to support . Not only within 

1653
01:02:35,350 --> 01:02:37,600
our exercises , cyber flag as as a 

1654
01:02:37,600 --> 01:02:39,600
secretary mentioned but also within 

1655
01:02:39,600 --> 01:02:41,656
guard exercises to have robust cyber 

1656
01:02:41,656 --> 01:02:45,390
play . Okay . Um I 

1657
01:02:45,400 --> 01:02:47,410
guess um you know this is more of a 

1658
01:02:47,410 --> 01:02:50,160
comment that it is a question but along 

1659
01:02:50,160 --> 01:02:51,993
the lines of what representative 

1660
01:02:51,993 --> 01:02:54,880
moulton was saying um it is so hard to 

1661
01:02:54,880 --> 01:02:57,670
explain to the american public what 

1662
01:02:57,670 --> 01:02:59,800
we're doing to respond when they see 

1663
01:02:59,800 --> 01:03:01,856
these very visible attacks , whether 

1664
01:03:01,856 --> 01:03:03,633
they're from a foreign entity , 

1665
01:03:03,633 --> 01:03:05,610
ransomware or whatnot . Our 

1666
01:03:05,610 --> 01:03:07,890
constituents , they are on the front 

1667
01:03:07,890 --> 01:03:09,890
lines of these attacks and yet they 

1668
01:03:09,890 --> 01:03:12,001
can't feel they don't know what their 

1669
01:03:12,001 --> 01:03:14,001
country is doing to respond . And I 

1670
01:03:14,001 --> 01:03:16,112
know that that's a difficult position 

1671
01:03:16,112 --> 01:03:18,279
for you . All what you do is Um should 

1672
01:03:18,279 --> 01:03:20,279
be under the radar but I would just 

1673
01:03:20,279 --> 01:03:22,334
note that there is a real sense that 

1674
01:03:22,334 --> 01:03:24,446
there's just no deterrence on a cyber 

1675
01:03:24,446 --> 01:03:26,334
attack . That a Russian group , a 

1676
01:03:26,334 --> 01:03:28,446
Chinese group can just attack us with 

1677
01:03:28,446 --> 01:03:30,446
impunity . They can steal a million 

1678
01:03:30,446 --> 01:03:32,668
records . You know the SF 86 forms of a 

1679
01:03:32,668 --> 01:03:34,940
million federal workers . And we put 

1680
01:03:34,940 --> 01:03:37,550
out a strongly worded press relief . So 

1681
01:03:37,560 --> 01:03:40,780
we are going to need to figure out how 

1682
01:03:40,780 --> 01:03:42,836
to not just do it in the shadows but 

1683
01:03:42,836 --> 01:03:45,058
communicate to the american people that 

1684
01:03:45,058 --> 01:03:47,169
we're not leaving ourselves open . Um 

1685
01:03:47,169 --> 01:03:49,169
As this becomes kind of the primary 

1686
01:03:49,169 --> 01:03:51,336
form of attack on the average american 

1687
01:03:51,336 --> 01:03:53,391
citizen . So I'll leave it at that . 

1688
01:03:53,391 --> 01:03:55,391
Thanks very much . And I yield back 

1689
01:03:55,391 --> 01:03:57,613
Thank you . Mr Watkin . Mr Fallon's not 

1690
01:03:57,613 --> 01:03:59,280
recognized for five minutes . 

1691
01:04:07,990 --> 01:04:11,840
Mr value with us . Yes sorry 

1692
01:04:11,840 --> 01:04:13,896
Mr Chairman can you hear me ? We can 

1693
01:04:13,896 --> 01:04:16,173
hear you now yep . You're recommending . 

1694
01:04:16,173 --> 01:04:18,284
Oh wonderful thank you so much . Well 

1695
01:04:18,284 --> 01:04:20,396
uh my colleagues have asked very good 

1696
01:04:20,396 --> 01:04:22,507
questions , excellent questions and I 

1697
01:04:22,507 --> 01:04:25,300
wanted to ask Secretary oh yeah , uh 

1698
01:04:25,310 --> 01:04:27,970
the cyber mission force , There's only 

1699
01:04:27,970 --> 01:04:30,330
reached full operational capacity in 

1700
01:04:30,330 --> 01:04:32,980
two by 2018 . And given that personal 

1701
01:04:32,980 --> 01:04:35,147
computers and the Internet have been a 

1702
01:04:35,147 --> 01:04:37,160
part of our daily lives for 30 plus 

1703
01:04:37,160 --> 01:04:39,160
years , why do you think it took so 

1704
01:04:39,160 --> 01:04:41,810
long to gain this capability capacity 

1705
01:04:45,490 --> 01:04:47,540
congressman ? I think ? Um , well I 

1706
01:04:47,540 --> 01:04:51,170
wasn't here in the , in the department 

1707
01:04:51,180 --> 01:04:54,160
in 2018 , I think that it is a growing 

1708
01:04:54,160 --> 01:04:56,240
recognition of the importance that 

1709
01:04:56,240 --> 01:04:58,710
cyber plays . Um , prior to this , many 

1710
01:04:58,710 --> 01:05:00,877
of the cyber response capabilities for 

1711
01:05:00,877 --> 01:05:02,877
the department were resident in the 

1712
01:05:02,877 --> 01:05:04,988
services . But as we realize the um , 

1713
01:05:04,988 --> 01:05:07,210
need to integrate and think about those 

1714
01:05:07,210 --> 01:05:08,988
things more broadly , the cyber 

1715
01:05:08,988 --> 01:05:11,099
national emission forces stood up and 

1716
01:05:11,099 --> 01:05:13,154
I'm happy to let General Marcus only 

1717
01:05:13,154 --> 01:05:15,377
speak to what the evolution of that has 

1718
01:05:15,377 --> 01:05:17,543
been and the capability that they have 

1719
01:05:17,543 --> 01:05:19,710
developed . Um , I think we are in the 

1720
01:05:19,710 --> 01:05:22,520
uh , at the beginning of being able to 

1721
01:05:22,530 --> 01:05:26,080
see the , the role of the cyber mission 

1722
01:05:26,080 --> 01:05:28,400
force and its integration into the rest 

1723
01:05:28,400 --> 01:05:30,630
of diodes responses . Um , but I think 

1724
01:05:30,630 --> 01:05:32,686
that it's role will continue to grow 

1725
01:05:32,686 --> 01:05:36,340
for us in the department Congressman , 

1726
01:05:36,340 --> 01:05:38,680
I would say . Um , we began building 

1727
01:05:38,680 --> 01:05:41,640
the force in 2014 based upon a decision 

1728
01:05:41,640 --> 01:05:43,751
at the Department . The command stuff 

1729
01:05:43,751 --> 01:05:47,000
stood up in in 2010 , 2018 was a 

1730
01:05:47,000 --> 01:05:49,222
pivotal year for us . It's not just the 

1731
01:05:49,222 --> 01:05:51,000
fact that we were achieved full 

1732
01:05:51,000 --> 01:05:53,222
operational capability uh with the help 

1733
01:05:53,222 --> 01:05:55,278
of this committee , with the help of 

1734
01:05:55,278 --> 01:05:57,389
Congress , we received the right uh , 

1735
01:05:57,389 --> 01:05:59,167
authorities within the NBA that 

1736
01:05:59,167 --> 01:06:01,056
identified cyber is a traditional 

1737
01:06:01,056 --> 01:06:03,100
military activity uh , and that was 

1738
01:06:03,180 --> 01:06:05,291
Instrumental for the work that we did 

1739
01:06:05,291 --> 01:06:08,560
in the 2018 midterm elections . Um the 

1740
01:06:08,570 --> 01:06:10,737
forces maturity , it's moving on , its 

1741
01:06:10,737 --> 01:06:12,959
it's getting better , it's innovating , 

1742
01:06:12,959 --> 01:06:15,070
it's it's improving . Um You know , I 

1743
01:06:15,070 --> 01:06:17,540
can't speak to the length of time to uh 

1744
01:06:17,550 --> 01:06:20,090
to why it took us until 2018 to finish 

1745
01:06:20,090 --> 01:06:22,312
it . But what I can speak to is is that 

1746
01:06:22,312 --> 01:06:24,740
um very proud of the work that is done 

1747
01:06:24,740 --> 01:06:27,170
and where we're headed . Well , general , 

1748
01:06:27,170 --> 01:06:29,114
I would say thank you for the your 

1749
01:06:29,114 --> 01:06:31,170
answer , but I would little bit more 

1750
01:06:31,170 --> 01:06:32,948
concerned , not so much that we 

1751
01:06:32,948 --> 01:06:35,003
finished , uh , the beginning really 

1752
01:06:35,003 --> 01:06:37,003
well at the end of the beginning of 

1753
01:06:37,003 --> 01:06:39,170
2018 , but we didn't start to 2014 . I 

1754
01:06:39,170 --> 01:06:41,281
think this is something that probably 

1755
01:06:41,281 --> 01:06:43,448
should have been done uh back when you 

1756
01:06:43,448 --> 01:06:43,290
were a company great officer in the 90s . 

1757
01:06:43,580 --> 01:06:45,524
Uh it's unfortunate that it hasn't 

1758
01:06:45,524 --> 01:06:47,691
happened . It seems like we're playing 

1759
01:06:47,691 --> 01:06:49,469
catch up since 2018 . General . 

1760
01:06:49,469 --> 01:06:52,640
Whatever what do you see as the notable 

1761
01:06:52,640 --> 01:06:54,862
accomplishments that have been achieved 

1762
01:06:54,862 --> 01:06:58,290
by youth man Congressman ? 

1763
01:06:58,290 --> 01:07:00,490
Uh I would I would begin with the 

1764
01:07:00,500 --> 01:07:02,750
security of the elections in 2018 and 

1765
01:07:02,750 --> 01:07:06,070
2020 , a much different result that 

1766
01:07:06,070 --> 01:07:07,970
came about based upon again , the 

1767
01:07:07,970 --> 01:07:10,970
authorities that that were uh that came 

1768
01:07:10,970 --> 01:07:13,410
to us from both uh the legislative and 

1769
01:07:13,410 --> 01:07:15,577
the executive branch . There are other 

1770
01:07:15,577 --> 01:07:17,577
series of operations that have been 

1771
01:07:17,577 --> 01:07:19,577
conducted since then , that I would 

1772
01:07:19,577 --> 01:07:21,521
welcome to be able to comment this 

1773
01:07:21,521 --> 01:07:23,632
afternoon in a different form , but I 

1774
01:07:23,632 --> 01:07:25,760
think I would close with uh just the 

1775
01:07:25,760 --> 01:07:27,890
ability for the services and the 

1776
01:07:27,890 --> 01:07:30,057
department to evolve pretty quickly in 

1777
01:07:30,057 --> 01:07:32,001
terms of not only the fact that we 

1778
01:07:32,001 --> 01:07:34,057
stood up a force , but the fact that 

1779
01:07:34,057 --> 01:07:36,279
the services now have established cyber 

1780
01:07:36,279 --> 01:07:38,334
services and cyber branches and then 

1781
01:07:38,334 --> 01:07:40,840
being able to to move quickly to react 

1782
01:07:40,840 --> 01:07:43,490
to how we need to outfit those forces 

1783
01:07:44,880 --> 01:07:47,250
general . What kind of collaboration 

1784
01:07:47,250 --> 01:07:50,700
exists between cyber . Com and 

1785
01:07:51,180 --> 01:07:54,960
DHS is Cisa Daily collaboration 

1786
01:07:54,960 --> 01:07:57,127
congressman . As I mentioned , we have 

1787
01:07:57,127 --> 01:07:59,238
a series of planners that are there . 

1788
01:07:59,238 --> 01:08:02,930
We have worked such initiatives as um 

1789
01:08:02,940 --> 01:08:04,773
you know , the protection of the 

1790
01:08:04,773 --> 01:08:07,770
vaccines within the this uh this 

1791
01:08:07,770 --> 01:08:10,200
country . We have also looked at a 

1792
01:08:10,200 --> 01:08:12,640
series of exercises to posture 

1793
01:08:12,640 --> 01:08:15,370
ourselves for support to DHS in the 

1794
01:08:15,370 --> 01:08:18,440
event of of a crisis . So that's it's 

1795
01:08:18,440 --> 01:08:20,750
an ongoing robust relationship with 

1796
01:08:20,760 --> 01:08:24,450
Susan . Uh Thank thank you General 

1797
01:08:24,450 --> 01:08:26,672
Secretary and thank you . Mr Chairman , 

1798
01:08:26,672 --> 01:08:29,040
I yield back . Thank you . Mr Fallon . 

1799
01:08:29,050 --> 01:08:30,994
Miss EScobar's recognized for five 

1800
01:08:30,994 --> 01:08:33,730
minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman . 

1801
01:08:33,740 --> 01:08:36,150
Really appreciate the opportunity . Um 

1802
01:08:36,160 --> 01:08:39,800
many thanks also to our witnesses for 

1803
01:08:39,810 --> 01:08:42,032
their service to our country as well as 

1804
01:08:42,032 --> 01:08:44,143
uh for they're giving their expertise 

1805
01:08:44,143 --> 01:08:46,660
of this subcommittee , you know , as 

1806
01:08:46,660 --> 01:08:49,580
our daily lives and as more of our 

1807
01:08:49,590 --> 01:08:51,534
security and the utilities that we 

1808
01:08:51,534 --> 01:08:55,500
depend on uh migrate toward the 

1809
01:08:55,500 --> 01:08:59,180
web . And as we see recent attacks like 

1810
01:08:59,180 --> 01:09:01,236
what we saw with colonial pipeline , 

1811
01:09:01,236 --> 01:09:04,040
the urgency of this issue could not be 

1812
01:09:04,040 --> 01:09:06,340
more pressing for our committee . I'm 

1813
01:09:06,340 --> 01:09:08,760
I'm very interested in exploring 

1814
01:09:08,770 --> 01:09:11,280
innovation in general . You mentioned 

1815
01:09:11,370 --> 01:09:14,880
innovation and and secretary so young 

1816
01:09:14,880 --> 01:09:17,280
you did as well . Um But Secretary Oh 

1817
01:09:17,280 --> 01:09:19,502
Yang , I'd like to explore a little bit 

1818
01:09:19,502 --> 01:09:21,740
more um the department's initiatives to 

1819
01:09:21,740 --> 01:09:24,140
engage institutions of higher learning , 

1820
01:09:24,150 --> 01:09:27,090
not just for recruitment when it comes 

1821
01:09:27,090 --> 01:09:29,270
to cyberspace , but also as partners 

1822
01:09:29,270 --> 01:09:31,950
for this badly needed innovation . The 

1823
01:09:31,950 --> 01:09:34,006
University of texas at El paso in my 

1824
01:09:34,006 --> 01:09:36,340
home district is a national center of 

1825
01:09:36,340 --> 01:09:38,007
Academic excellence and cyber 

1826
01:09:38,007 --> 01:09:40,730
operations . And so I'm curious about 

1827
01:09:40,740 --> 01:09:43,150
just how much the department 

1828
01:09:43,150 --> 01:09:45,880
prioritizes collaboration with 

1829
01:09:45,880 --> 01:09:48,340
universities . Um you know , as you 

1830
01:09:48,340 --> 01:09:50,451
describe D . O . D . S . Key partners 

1831
01:09:50,451 --> 01:09:52,507
outside the U . S . Government and I 

1832
01:09:52,507 --> 01:09:54,673
want to give you a chance to elaborate 

1833
01:09:54,673 --> 01:09:57,530
on this and again not just in terms of 

1834
01:09:57,530 --> 01:10:00,050
recruitment but also as a as a key 

1835
01:10:00,050 --> 01:10:03,160
partner . Yes , absolutely . 

1836
01:10:03,160 --> 01:10:05,330
Congresswoman , um research 

1837
01:10:05,330 --> 01:10:08,370
universities like UTEP and others who 

1838
01:10:08,370 --> 01:10:10,890
have a focus on cyber do provide 

1839
01:10:10,890 --> 01:10:13,150
tremendous benefit to the nation . Um 

1840
01:10:13,150 --> 01:10:15,450
Universities as part of our research 

1841
01:10:15,460 --> 01:10:17,182
and engineering efforts in the 

1842
01:10:17,182 --> 01:10:20,180
department are a key source of ideas 

1843
01:10:20,180 --> 01:10:22,290
and innovation for us and we have 

1844
01:10:22,460 --> 01:10:24,370
prioritized funding to those 

1845
01:10:24,370 --> 01:10:26,990
institutions . Um We'll have to we can 

1846
01:10:26,990 --> 01:10:29,330
re engage with you uh when the 

1847
01:10:29,330 --> 01:10:31,441
president's budget is submitted about 

1848
01:10:31,441 --> 01:10:33,052
um specifics related to that 

1849
01:10:33,660 --> 01:10:35,716
congressman . If I might just add to 

1850
01:10:35,716 --> 01:10:37,771
the secretary's comments . Uh as you 

1851
01:10:37,771 --> 01:10:39,660
well know , the National Security 

1852
01:10:39,660 --> 01:10:41,660
Agency sponsors over 300 Centers of 

1853
01:10:41,660 --> 01:10:44,060
Academic Excellence uh in the United 

1854
01:10:44,060 --> 01:10:46,282
States , of which I believe Utep as you 

1855
01:10:46,282 --> 01:10:48,227
indicated as one of them , we will 

1856
01:10:48,227 --> 01:10:50,449
continue to do that as an agency . It's 

1857
01:10:50,449 --> 01:10:52,671
critical not only in the sense , as you 

1858
01:10:52,671 --> 01:10:54,782
noted with regards to the development 

1859
01:10:54,782 --> 01:10:56,893
of our our young people , but also in 

1860
01:10:56,893 --> 01:10:56,580
the development of curriculum . That 

1861
01:10:56,580 --> 01:10:58,680
changes in matters too . What are 

1862
01:10:58,680 --> 01:11:01,310
universities are are working on ? So I 

1863
01:11:01,310 --> 01:11:03,421
think this is a rich partnership that 

1864
01:11:03,421 --> 01:11:05,477
we will certainly continue well into 

1865
01:11:05,477 --> 01:11:07,254
the future . General . I really 

1866
01:11:07,254 --> 01:11:09,477
appreciate that . And you know , one of 

1867
01:11:09,477 --> 01:11:11,760
the things that I would add in in 

1868
01:11:11,760 --> 01:11:14,650
addition to bringing that that 

1869
01:11:14,660 --> 01:11:17,200
innovation that universities and 

1870
01:11:17,210 --> 01:11:19,432
institutions of higher learning can can 

1871
01:11:19,432 --> 01:11:21,654
bring an institution as you know , like 

1872
01:11:21,654 --> 01:11:23,599
Utep , which is a hispanic serving 

1873
01:11:23,599 --> 01:11:25,750
institution brings badly needed 

1874
01:11:25,750 --> 01:11:28,820
diversity too , the way that we operate 

1875
01:11:28,820 --> 01:11:31,570
as a country , as a government . Um and 

1876
01:11:31,570 --> 01:11:33,570
so I I appreciate that . And I look 

1877
01:11:33,570 --> 01:11:35,737
forward to continuing to work with you 

1878
01:11:35,737 --> 01:11:37,959
all on ways to expand opportunities for 

1879
01:11:37,959 --> 01:11:40,181
institutions like you tip , but also to 

1880
01:11:40,181 --> 01:11:43,490
to really rely on that innovation 

1881
01:11:43,490 --> 01:11:47,070
that I think will help get us from 

1882
01:11:47,360 --> 01:11:50,180
out from being behind the curb and to 

1883
01:11:50,190 --> 01:11:52,110
being more in front of it . Um 

1884
01:11:52,110 --> 01:11:55,040
Secretario Young , one last thing I 

1885
01:11:55,050 --> 01:11:58,210
want to explore the Pathfinder program . 

1886
01:11:58,220 --> 01:12:01,410
You said you partner with DHS on this 

1887
01:12:01,420 --> 01:12:03,587
in which U . S . S . Private companies 

1888
01:12:03,587 --> 01:12:05,698
by enhancing their ability to protect 

1889
01:12:05,698 --> 01:12:08,100
their own networks . Can you describe 

1890
01:12:08,100 --> 01:12:09,767
the results of the Pathfinder 

1891
01:12:09,767 --> 01:12:13,010
initiatives ? So I believe we owe 

1892
01:12:13,010 --> 01:12:16,340
Congress a more fulsome answer on our 

1893
01:12:16,350 --> 01:12:18,670
analysis of the Pathfinder program , 

1894
01:12:18,680 --> 01:12:22,080
but as we see today with the 

1895
01:12:22,650 --> 01:12:25,380
interruption of colonial pipeline , the 

1896
01:12:25,380 --> 01:12:27,436
department's ability to partner with 

1897
01:12:27,436 --> 01:12:29,547
private sector in order to be able to 

1898
01:12:29,547 --> 01:12:31,547
help them identify threats on their 

1899
01:12:31,547 --> 01:12:33,769
networks is an important defensive step 

1900
01:12:33,769 --> 01:12:35,769
that we can take to help secure the 

1901
01:12:35,769 --> 01:12:37,713
whole of nation . Um , and I think 

1902
01:12:37,713 --> 01:12:39,658
perhaps General Nicholson has some 

1903
01:12:39,658 --> 01:12:41,769
thoughts on additional public private 

1904
01:12:41,769 --> 01:12:44,410
partnerships in that area . So 

1905
01:12:44,410 --> 01:12:46,670
congresswoman , I think my experience 

1906
01:12:46,670 --> 01:12:48,837
has been , we have worked closely with 

1907
01:12:48,837 --> 01:12:50,726
both the financial and the energy 

1908
01:12:50,726 --> 01:12:52,892
sector's on that . If we might if if I 

1909
01:12:52,892 --> 01:12:55,003
can take that for the record though , 

1910
01:12:55,003 --> 01:12:54,880
to provide you a more fulsome answer , 

1911
01:12:56,250 --> 01:12:58,250
that'd be great . I appreciate it . 

1912
01:12:58,250 --> 01:13:00,083
Thank you both . Mr Chairman I . 

1913
01:13:00,083 --> 01:13:03,100
Dilbeck . Thank you . Mr escobar . Miss 

1914
01:13:03,100 --> 01:13:05,433
bice is now recognized for five minutes . 

1915
01:13:05,433 --> 01:13:07,600
Thank you Mr Chairman for holding this 

1916
01:13:07,600 --> 01:13:09,767
very important hearing . And thank you 

1917
01:13:09,767 --> 01:13:11,822
to both the witnesses for joining us 

1918
01:13:11,822 --> 01:13:14,044
today to share your perspectives . Ah , 

1919
01:13:14,044 --> 01:13:16,156
I appreciated your comment general in 

1920
01:13:16,156 --> 01:13:18,156
the beginning that cybersecurity is 

1921
01:13:18,156 --> 01:13:20,322
national security and I think that the 

1922
01:13:20,322 --> 01:13:22,378
things that we've seen over the last 

1923
01:13:22,378 --> 01:13:24,600
week or two especially have highlighted 

1924
01:13:24,600 --> 01:13:26,767
the importance um and the swiftness at 

1925
01:13:26,767 --> 01:13:28,933
which this issue needs to be addressed 

1926
01:13:28,950 --> 01:13:31,061
as both of you know , the D . O . D . 

1927
01:13:31,061 --> 01:13:33,172
Currently relies on thousands of data 

1928
01:13:33,172 --> 01:13:35,061
centers that are often stovepiped 

1929
01:13:35,061 --> 01:13:37,061
disconnected and in many cases have 

1930
01:13:37,061 --> 01:13:39,117
reached their limits of service life 

1931
01:13:39,117 --> 01:13:40,894
service , they can no longer be 

1932
01:13:40,894 --> 01:13:43,061
upgraded to meet current cyber threats 

1933
01:13:43,061 --> 01:13:45,061
our nation is facing . I understand 

1934
01:13:45,061 --> 01:13:47,061
there's a directive for D . O . D . 

1935
01:13:47,061 --> 01:13:49,283
Agencies to migrate to McLeod to Dato . 

1936
01:13:49,283 --> 01:13:51,394
But the adoption has been slow uh for 

1937
01:13:51,394 --> 01:13:52,950
both of the witnesses , but 

1938
01:13:52,950 --> 01:13:55,117
specifically to Secretary Yang , could 

1939
01:13:55,117 --> 01:13:57,339
you provide me with your perspective on 

1940
01:13:57,339 --> 01:13:59,561
the migration to McLeod to Dato and the 

1941
01:13:59,561 --> 01:14:01,728
degree to which the migration can help 

1942
01:14:01,728 --> 01:14:03,728
address D . O . D . S current cyber 

1943
01:14:03,728 --> 01:14:06,670
vernal vulnerabilities . Uh So as you 

1944
01:14:06,670 --> 01:14:08,892
know , the department takes a number of 

1945
01:14:08,892 --> 01:14:10,948
steps to defend its networks and its 

1946
01:14:10,948 --> 01:14:13,330
data . Um and but as to the specifics 

1947
01:14:13,330 --> 01:14:15,441
of the great migration , I'll have to 

1948
01:14:15,441 --> 01:14:17,497
take that for the record . I want to 

1949
01:14:17,497 --> 01:14:17,030
make sure that I've coordinated that 

1950
01:14:17,030 --> 01:14:19,550
with my C . I . O . Colleagues . Thank 

1951
01:14:19,550 --> 01:14:21,272
you . What I would add to that 

1952
01:14:21,272 --> 01:14:23,383
congresswoman is what we have learned 

1953
01:14:23,383 --> 01:14:26,300
over the past uh 6 to 12 months is that 

1954
01:14:26,310 --> 01:14:28,032
we have to think about defense 

1955
01:14:28,032 --> 01:14:30,500
differently in terms of as we move to , 

1956
01:14:30,510 --> 01:14:33,050
you know , cloud based capabilities to 

1957
01:14:33,050 --> 01:14:35,520
secure our data . Uh many people think 

1958
01:14:35,520 --> 01:14:37,742
that we'll just put it into the cloud . 

1959
01:14:37,742 --> 01:14:39,964
Uh it doesn't work quite that way . And 

1960
01:14:39,964 --> 01:14:42,187
so ensuring we have the right contracts 

1961
01:14:42,187 --> 01:14:44,187
written , ensuring that we have our 

1962
01:14:44,187 --> 01:14:46,242
defensive forces trained to a higher 

1963
01:14:46,242 --> 01:14:48,298
degree in terms of their abilities , 

1964
01:14:48,298 --> 01:14:48,180
ensuring we have the big data 

1965
01:14:48,180 --> 01:14:50,069
capabilities that are necessary . 

1966
01:14:50,069 --> 01:14:52,390
That's what I would add to it . Follow 

1967
01:14:52,390 --> 01:14:54,550
up question um specific to that topic 

1968
01:14:54,550 --> 01:14:56,606
and that is , do you believe that we 

1969
01:14:56,606 --> 01:14:59,170
are investing enough in cybersecurity 

1970
01:15:02,340 --> 01:15:04,880
and I'll elaborate on that . I feel 

1971
01:15:04,880 --> 01:15:08,170
like um we we tend to focus when we're 

1972
01:15:08,170 --> 01:15:10,870
looking at budgets on people and um , 

1973
01:15:10,880 --> 01:15:12,936
you know , equipment , but we're not 

1974
01:15:12,936 --> 01:15:15,158
looking at that cyberspace as much as I 

1975
01:15:15,158 --> 01:15:17,324
believe maybe we should be , and maybe 

1976
01:15:17,324 --> 01:15:19,380
some of the things that we're seeing 

1977
01:15:19,380 --> 01:15:22,950
now are highlighting some of that . Um 

1978
01:15:22,960 --> 01:15:25,370
certainly we have tremendous risk in 

1979
01:15:25,370 --> 01:15:28,570
cyberspace and we are facing persistent 

1980
01:15:28,570 --> 01:15:31,240
adversaries in this space . Uh I think 

1981
01:15:31,240 --> 01:15:33,630
that the questions of the resourcing 

1982
01:15:33,630 --> 01:15:35,686
are things that we have to take into 

1983
01:15:35,686 --> 01:15:37,686
consideration in light of the other 

1984
01:15:37,686 --> 01:15:39,519
demands that are placed upon the 

1985
01:15:39,519 --> 01:15:41,741
department and the nation . Um while we 

1986
01:15:41,741 --> 01:15:43,908
certainly could make use of additional 

1987
01:15:43,908 --> 01:15:47,120
funds , whether or not um whether how 

1988
01:15:47,120 --> 01:15:49,120
that all works out , we're happy to 

1989
01:15:49,120 --> 01:15:50,787
engage the committee when the 

1990
01:15:50,787 --> 01:15:52,620
president's budget is released , 

1991
01:15:52,940 --> 01:15:54,607
congressman . I'm at a bit of 

1992
01:15:54,607 --> 01:15:56,773
disadvantage because you're asking the 

1993
01:15:56,773 --> 01:15:58,940
combatant commander in charge of cyber 

1994
01:15:58,940 --> 01:16:01,273
to comment on a question like that . Um , 

1995
01:16:01,273 --> 01:16:03,440
here's what I would say . Uh , we have 

1996
01:16:03,440 --> 01:16:05,384
to use every single dollar that is 

1997
01:16:05,384 --> 01:16:07,670
provided to us by Congress in probably 

1998
01:16:07,670 --> 01:16:10,130
a much more efficient way . And the way 

1999
01:16:10,130 --> 01:16:12,297
I would characterize that is , is that 

2000
01:16:12,297 --> 01:16:14,574
working very , very closely with the D . 

2001
01:16:14,574 --> 01:16:16,574
O . D . Chief information officer ? 

2002
01:16:16,574 --> 01:16:18,741
Where do we prioritize our last dollar 

2003
01:16:18,741 --> 01:16:20,852
of defense ? He has done a tremendous 

2004
01:16:20,852 --> 01:16:22,963
job john Sherman in laying that out . 

2005
01:16:22,980 --> 01:16:25,200
We have clear guidance from the 

2006
01:16:25,200 --> 01:16:27,311
secretary . That accountability means 

2007
01:16:27,311 --> 01:16:29,589
something with regard to cybersecurity . 

2008
01:16:29,589 --> 01:16:31,756
So it's not just the fact that we need 

2009
01:16:31,756 --> 01:16:33,922
more money . We need to be able to use 

2010
01:16:33,922 --> 01:16:35,978
the money that we have to , the most 

2011
01:16:35,978 --> 01:16:38,089
efficient benefit of our department . 

2012
01:16:38,089 --> 01:16:37,940
Do you believe on that ? Do you believe 

2013
01:16:37,940 --> 01:16:40,660
that flexibility in making those 

2014
01:16:40,660 --> 01:16:42,827
acquisitions in a timely fashion would 

2015
01:16:42,827 --> 01:16:45,049
be of benefit to you because one of the 

2016
01:16:45,049 --> 01:16:47,216
concerns I have is that we spend a lot 

2017
01:16:47,216 --> 01:16:49,350
of time planning , developing , uh , 

2018
01:16:49,350 --> 01:16:51,572
and then procuring . But , but it could 

2019
01:16:51,572 --> 01:16:53,739
be two years by the time that actually 

2020
01:16:53,739 --> 01:16:55,850
takes place . And at that point , the 

2021
01:16:55,850 --> 01:16:58,017
technology that we are acquiring is no 

2022
01:16:58,017 --> 01:17:00,920
longer , um , you know , of use in many 

2023
01:17:00,920 --> 01:17:02,587
cases . How do we address the 

2024
01:17:02,587 --> 01:17:04,642
timeliness of making sure that we're 

2025
01:17:04,642 --> 01:17:06,698
keeping up with these cyber security 

2026
01:17:06,698 --> 01:17:09,250
challenges ? I do think this is one of 

2027
01:17:09,250 --> 01:17:11,194
those areas where we have to think 

2028
01:17:11,194 --> 01:17:13,139
differently given the speed of the 

2029
01:17:13,139 --> 01:17:14,806
threat . Um , the traditional 

2030
01:17:14,806 --> 01:17:16,972
acquisition models that the department 

2031
01:17:16,972 --> 01:17:19,028
has used for , uh , concrete weapons 

2032
01:17:19,028 --> 01:17:21,250
systems are not applicable . May not be 

2033
01:17:21,250 --> 01:17:23,361
applicable to cyber , given the speed 

2034
01:17:23,361 --> 01:17:23,090
of things , but that is something that 

2035
01:17:23,090 --> 01:17:25,312
we need to work out with our colleagues 

2036
01:17:25,312 --> 01:17:27,257
in acquisition and sustainment and 

2037
01:17:27,257 --> 01:17:29,257
happy to come back to you guys with 

2038
01:17:29,257 --> 01:17:31,312
some additional thoughts on that . I 

2039
01:17:31,312 --> 01:17:33,479
appreciate the committee's elimination 

2040
01:17:33,479 --> 01:17:35,590
of the $75 million cap on acquisition 

2041
01:17:35,590 --> 01:17:37,479
and the last N . D . A . That was 

2042
01:17:37,479 --> 01:17:39,646
incredibly important for us because we 

2043
01:17:39,646 --> 01:17:41,757
are starting to now grow this ability 

2044
01:17:41,757 --> 01:17:43,868
to do acquisition at the command . Uh 

2045
01:17:43,868 --> 01:17:46,090
we need to go faster on that . But that 

2046
01:17:46,090 --> 01:17:48,257
is an example of something that helped 

2047
01:17:48,257 --> 01:17:50,312
us tremendously . Thank you for your 

2048
01:17:50,312 --> 01:17:52,980
time today . Mr . Terry Dilbeck . Thank 

2049
01:17:52,980 --> 01:17:54,980
you . Miss Base . Mr Morelli is now 

2050
01:17:54,980 --> 01:17:58,860
recognized for five minutes . Thanks 

2051
01:17:58,860 --> 01:18:02,640
very much . Mr Chair for this important 

2052
01:18:02,650 --> 01:18:06,330
hearing . And I want to not only thank 

2053
01:18:06,330 --> 01:18:08,441
you but thank the witnesses for their 

2054
01:18:08,620 --> 01:18:10,453
considerable contribution to the 

2055
01:18:10,453 --> 01:18:12,564
country and uh general , it's nice to 

2056
01:18:12,564 --> 01:18:14,787
see you . I had an opportunity with the 

2057
01:18:14,787 --> 01:18:16,842
freshman class in 2019 to visit with 

2058
01:18:16,842 --> 01:18:18,564
you at Fort Meade and was very 

2059
01:18:18,564 --> 01:18:20,787
impressed with the operation and I know 

2060
01:18:20,787 --> 01:18:22,898
how critical this is . I want to just 

2061
01:18:22,898 --> 01:18:25,320
and he may have been . The question is 

2062
01:18:25,320 --> 01:18:27,320
I'm thinking about it may have been 

2063
01:18:27,320 --> 01:18:29,542
asked in one form , but maybe you could 

2064
01:18:29,542 --> 01:18:31,860
just drill down a little . I have some 

2065
01:18:31,860 --> 01:18:35,080
questions about how private industry 

2066
01:18:35,170 --> 01:18:37,540
the private sector innovation can help 

2067
01:18:37,920 --> 01:18:41,090
say a gun address increased cyber 

2068
01:18:41,090 --> 01:18:43,201
attacks , whether they can whether in 

2069
01:18:43,201 --> 01:18:45,423
your opinion , some of those images can 

2070
01:18:45,423 --> 01:18:47,646
I know the private sector is working on 

2071
01:18:47,646 --> 01:18:49,646
it secondly , is whether or not the 

2072
01:18:49,646 --> 01:18:51,868
command is well positioned to implement 

2073
01:18:51,868 --> 01:18:53,701
cutting edge technology from the 

2074
01:18:53,701 --> 01:18:55,534
private sector . So , um , is it 

2075
01:18:55,534 --> 01:18:57,534
available ? Is there help out there 

2076
01:18:57,534 --> 01:18:59,701
that you think you could use ? Are you 

2077
01:18:59,701 --> 01:19:01,923
position to be able to implement , help 

2078
01:19:01,923 --> 01:19:03,923
and resources and innovation in the 

2079
01:19:03,923 --> 01:19:05,979
private sector ? And finally , other 

2080
01:19:05,979 --> 01:19:08,201
obstacles preventing you from acquiring 

2081
01:19:08,201 --> 01:19:10,201
and implementing technology that we 

2082
01:19:10,201 --> 01:19:12,368
need to address , that We need to help 

2083
01:19:12,368 --> 01:19:14,590
you , you go through the N . B . A . Or 

2084
01:19:14,590 --> 01:19:16,757
other means to help you with a greater 

2085
01:19:16,757 --> 01:19:18,868
collaboration . And I asked them both 

2086
01:19:18,868 --> 01:19:22,620
witnesses congressman 

2087
01:19:22,630 --> 01:19:26,430
just to start , I would say that is 

2088
01:19:26,430 --> 01:19:28,652
there initiatives in the private sector 

2089
01:19:28,652 --> 01:19:30,708
that could certainly help us ? Yes , 

2090
01:19:30,708 --> 01:19:32,819
most definitely . And and we see that 

2091
01:19:32,819 --> 01:19:35,760
we're working with uh defense uh 

2092
01:19:35,770 --> 01:19:38,260
Defense innovation unit were working uh 

2093
01:19:38,270 --> 01:19:40,381
through a series of partnerships that 

2094
01:19:40,381 --> 01:19:42,603
have been established uh and then we're 

2095
01:19:42,603 --> 01:19:44,714
bringing it to uh you know , a common 

2096
01:19:44,714 --> 01:19:46,770
location like our dream for facility 

2097
01:19:46,770 --> 01:19:48,992
where it's unclassified . We can have a 

2098
01:19:48,992 --> 01:19:51,214
discussion . We can they can understand 

2099
01:19:51,214 --> 01:19:50,330
in the private sector what our 

2100
01:19:50,330 --> 01:19:52,497
priorities are . That's among the most 

2101
01:19:52,497 --> 01:19:54,608
important things that that we have to 

2102
01:19:54,608 --> 01:19:56,830
do with the command is list . These are 

2103
01:19:56,830 --> 01:19:56,740
the challenges that we need assistance 

2104
01:19:56,740 --> 01:19:59,290
on private sector is seeing that they 

2105
01:19:59,300 --> 01:20:02,000
understand that the other piece is is 

2106
01:20:02,000 --> 01:20:05,590
that I think that um perhaps what we 

2107
01:20:05,590 --> 01:20:07,930
have to do even more prevalent lee is 

2108
01:20:07,940 --> 01:20:09,773
be able to have the culture that 

2109
01:20:09,773 --> 01:20:11,884
sometimes we don't have to develop it 

2110
01:20:11,884 --> 01:20:13,773
uh that has been developed in the 

2111
01:20:13,773 --> 01:20:15,940
private sector . So when we talk about 

2112
01:20:15,940 --> 01:20:17,940
new architectures for our network , 

2113
01:20:17,940 --> 01:20:20,162
there's a lot of networks in the United 

2114
01:20:20,162 --> 01:20:22,051
States , a lot of really well run 

2115
01:20:22,051 --> 01:20:21,860
networks in the United States . We 

2116
01:20:21,860 --> 01:20:23,830
should be able to to be able to to 

2117
01:20:23,830 --> 01:20:25,719
leverage that quite rapidly . And 

2118
01:20:25,719 --> 01:20:27,886
that's what we're doing the last piece 

2119
01:20:27,886 --> 01:20:29,830
in terms of obstacles . If I might 

2120
01:20:29,830 --> 01:20:32,052
again just working through uh our folks 

2121
01:20:32,052 --> 01:20:34,219
and then back to the department . If I 

2122
01:20:34,219 --> 01:20:34,050
can provide some thoughts on that as 

2123
01:20:34,050 --> 01:20:37,620
well . Thank you . General Madam . 

2124
01:20:37,620 --> 01:20:39,620
Secretary , You have any additional 

2125
01:20:39,620 --> 01:20:42,130
thoughts that private sector ? 

2126
01:20:43,540 --> 01:20:47,080
All right here , sorry . Um the private 

2127
01:20:47,080 --> 01:20:48,969
sector has a tremendous amount of 

2128
01:20:48,969 --> 01:20:51,191
capability and innovation . I think the 

2129
01:20:51,191 --> 01:20:53,247
department is looking for innovative 

2130
01:20:53,247 --> 01:20:54,913
ways to be able to bring that 

2131
01:20:54,913 --> 01:20:57,220
innovation uh , into benefit our 

2132
01:20:57,220 --> 01:20:59,350
mission . Um The challenge I think is 

2133
01:20:59,350 --> 01:21:01,517
while the private sector may move fast 

2134
01:21:01,517 --> 01:21:03,739
and break things , we in the department 

2135
01:21:03,739 --> 01:21:05,906
can't afford to have things break . We 

2136
01:21:05,906 --> 01:21:08,017
need to move fast and fix things . So 

2137
01:21:08,017 --> 01:21:09,628
um we welcome private sector 

2138
01:21:09,628 --> 01:21:11,961
partnership to work on that . Thank you . 

2139
01:21:13,310 --> 01:21:15,477
Very good . Mr Chair . I think this is 

2140
01:21:15,477 --> 01:21:18,440
an important the subject to continue to 

2141
01:21:18,440 --> 01:21:20,440
be a part of the conversation to be 

2142
01:21:20,440 --> 01:21:22,440
helpful to the secretary general as 

2143
01:21:22,440 --> 01:21:24,890
they meet what are emerging and 

2144
01:21:24,900 --> 01:21:28,620
obviously very serious threats that 

2145
01:21:29,490 --> 01:21:33,210
Mr thank you . Mr Morelli . uh mr Moore 

2146
01:21:33,210 --> 01:21:35,266
is now recognized for five minutes . 

2147
01:21:35,910 --> 01:21:39,500
Thank you Chairman . Uh obviously a 

2148
01:21:39,500 --> 01:21:41,111
very pertinent and important 

2149
01:21:41,410 --> 01:21:43,466
conversation today . So I'm glad and 

2150
01:21:43,466 --> 01:21:45,188
appreciate having the time and 

2151
01:21:45,188 --> 01:21:47,410
witnesses for being here . Um , I think 

2152
01:21:47,410 --> 01:21:49,466
the american public would be able to 

2153
01:21:49,466 --> 01:21:52,230
categorize this as uh these things , 

2154
01:21:52,240 --> 01:21:54,462
this keep these issues keep happening . 

2155
01:21:54,462 --> 01:21:56,407
We have colonial , we've got solar 

2156
01:21:56,407 --> 01:21:59,340
winds . Um my two questions are for 

2157
01:21:59,340 --> 01:22:02,050
general naka Sony , they're about 

2158
01:22:02,050 --> 01:22:04,700
deterrence and talent . So let me jump 

2159
01:22:04,700 --> 01:22:08,090
into the first one . Uh we've now set a 

2160
01:22:08,090 --> 01:22:10,257
precedent . We're naming Russia is the 

2161
01:22:10,257 --> 01:22:11,923
culprit and a couple of these 

2162
01:22:12,400 --> 01:22:16,040
situations . And these attacks . Is 

2163
01:22:16,040 --> 01:22:18,207
that is that a plan going forward ? Is 

2164
01:22:18,207 --> 01:22:20,570
it is it meant to be a deterrent for 

2165
01:22:20,570 --> 01:22:23,300
future hacks will be a deterrent ? 

2166
01:22:23,300 --> 01:22:25,356
Could you provide some context on on 

2167
01:22:25,356 --> 01:22:27,411
our approach to that ? And even more 

2168
01:22:27,411 --> 01:22:29,633
broadly to with respect to deterrence ? 

2169
01:22:30,800 --> 01:22:32,633
Uh If I might start and then I'm 

2170
01:22:32,633 --> 01:22:34,633
certain that the secretary may have 

2171
01:22:34,633 --> 01:22:37,090
some comments on that as well . Um So 

2172
01:22:37,100 --> 01:22:39,156
with regards to what we're seeing by 

2173
01:22:39,156 --> 01:22:41,550
adversaries operating against us in 

2174
01:22:41,550 --> 01:22:43,820
cyberspace , uh this is going to 

2175
01:22:43,820 --> 01:22:45,764
continue , and so the department's 

2176
01:22:45,764 --> 01:22:47,764
position in terms of defend forward 

2177
01:22:47,764 --> 01:22:49,987
operating outside the United States and 

2178
01:22:49,987 --> 01:22:51,987
U . S . Cyber command ability to do 

2179
01:22:51,987 --> 01:22:54,209
persistent engagement is is what we are 

2180
01:22:54,209 --> 01:22:56,431
doing and we need to do more of it . We 

2181
01:22:56,431 --> 01:22:58,598
need to be able to enable our partners 

2182
01:22:58,598 --> 01:22:58,240
better and we need to act when 

2183
01:22:58,240 --> 01:23:01,060
authorized uh more effectively . And I 

2184
01:23:01,060 --> 01:23:03,230
think that uh that this will be 

2185
01:23:03,240 --> 01:23:05,470
certainly where we are headed in terms 

2186
01:23:05,470 --> 01:23:07,930
of specific options regarding any of 

2187
01:23:07,930 --> 01:23:10,097
the adversaries that differ that until 

2188
01:23:10,097 --> 01:23:12,860
this afternoon , but there are , from 

2189
01:23:12,860 --> 01:23:15,490
my , from my vantage point , a series 

2190
01:23:15,490 --> 01:23:18,570
of options that uh that we continue to 

2191
01:23:18,580 --> 01:23:21,180
develop and provide when necessary for 

2192
01:23:21,180 --> 01:23:23,320
a number and a range of opportunities 

2193
01:23:23,320 --> 01:23:25,376
for the Secretary of the President's 

2194
01:23:25,376 --> 01:23:28,560
determination . Uh Congressman , thank 

2195
01:23:28,560 --> 01:23:30,838
you for that . Very important question . 

2196
01:23:30,838 --> 01:23:32,838
I think deterrence is certainly the 

2197
01:23:32,838 --> 01:23:34,782
department's goal when it comes to 

2198
01:23:34,782 --> 01:23:36,949
cyberspace , but I think we need to be 

2199
01:23:36,949 --> 01:23:39,116
specific about what kind of deterrence 

2200
01:23:39,116 --> 01:23:41,393
and against which types of adversaries . 

2201
01:23:41,393 --> 01:23:43,282
Um since there are um some of the 

2202
01:23:43,282 --> 01:23:45,970
activity that you referenced is um what 

2203
01:23:45,970 --> 01:23:48,700
we would consider cyberespionage , and 

2204
01:23:48,700 --> 01:23:51,150
while we uh we would expect that there 

2205
01:23:51,150 --> 01:23:53,261
is nothing that an adversary could do 

2206
01:23:53,261 --> 01:23:55,610
to deter us intelligence gathering in 

2207
01:23:55,610 --> 01:23:58,510
from um efforts . There's likewise , um 

2208
01:23:58,510 --> 01:24:00,660
we may not be able to deter adversary 

2209
01:24:00,660 --> 01:24:03,180
activity in that space to zero . That's 

2210
01:24:03,180 --> 01:24:05,680
not to say we can't impose costs both 

2211
01:24:05,680 --> 01:24:07,624
by calling it out and making their 

2212
01:24:07,624 --> 01:24:11,030
lives harder , um and um engaging 

2213
01:24:11,030 --> 01:24:13,480
through other means to try and limit 

2214
01:24:13,490 --> 01:24:17,040
the scope of that activity . Um and I 

2215
01:24:17,040 --> 01:24:19,262
think that there are other ways that we 

2216
01:24:19,262 --> 01:24:21,429
can think about deterrence by denial . 

2217
01:24:21,429 --> 01:24:23,540
I would just note that um in terms of 

2218
01:24:23,540 --> 01:24:25,596
cyber attacks that would rise to the 

2219
01:24:25,596 --> 01:24:27,707
level of an armed attack , um We have 

2220
01:24:27,707 --> 01:24:29,929
uh we have not seen that type of attack 

2221
01:24:29,929 --> 01:24:33,010
from the adversary on the U . S . From 

2222
01:24:33,010 --> 01:24:35,066
a nation state adversary on the US . 

2223
01:24:35,066 --> 01:24:37,800
And we would , I think continue to 

2224
01:24:37,990 --> 01:24:40,046
maintain a strong deterrence posture 

2225
01:24:40,046 --> 01:24:42,580
against any type of attack of that 

2226
01:24:42,580 --> 01:24:46,410
nature . Okay , excellent . Thank you . 

2227
01:24:46,420 --> 01:24:49,860
Uh look forward to discussing more for 

2228
01:24:49,860 --> 01:24:52,600
our closed briefing quickly just with 

2229
01:24:52,600 --> 01:24:55,980
respect to the pool of cyber talent in 

2230
01:24:55,980 --> 01:24:58,810
the D . O . D . How ultimately are we 

2231
01:24:58,810 --> 01:25:00,990
going to be competitive with with the 

2232
01:25:00,990 --> 01:25:04,500
commercial industry ? Um how can we how 

2233
01:25:04,500 --> 01:25:07,240
can we better avoid the attrition that 

2234
01:25:07,240 --> 01:25:09,462
we oftentimes see within the within the 

2235
01:25:09,462 --> 01:25:13,210
D . O . D . That it's both expense and 

2236
01:25:13,590 --> 01:25:16,890
um you know , a dearth of a dearth of 

2237
01:25:16,890 --> 01:25:20,510
talent that exists . Yeah . 

2238
01:25:21,090 --> 01:25:23,880
So congressman , I begin , um , our 

2239
01:25:23,880 --> 01:25:25,880
number one competitive advantage in 

2240
01:25:25,880 --> 01:25:27,991
this space is , is our mission . Uh , 

2241
01:25:27,991 --> 01:25:30,158
there's nowhere you can do some of the 

2242
01:25:30,158 --> 01:25:32,380
things that you can do at U . S . Cyber 

2243
01:25:32,380 --> 01:25:34,436
command legally , uh , in the United 

2244
01:25:34,436 --> 01:25:36,602
States . And so that is something that 

2245
01:25:36,602 --> 01:25:39,440
we continue to , to obviously reinforce 

2246
01:25:39,440 --> 01:25:41,440
with our members . The second is is 

2247
01:25:41,440 --> 01:25:43,551
that we have world class facilities . 

2248
01:25:43,551 --> 01:25:45,718
Whether or not you're in Fort meade or 

2249
01:25:45,718 --> 01:25:47,607
Georgia , texas hawaii colorado , 

2250
01:25:47,607 --> 01:25:49,773
anyplace that we're operating ? One of 

2251
01:25:49,773 --> 01:25:49,680
the things that we have been , the 

2252
01:25:49,680 --> 01:25:52,800
beneficiaries of , uh , is a very , 

2253
01:25:52,800 --> 01:25:54,800
very high standard of facility that 

2254
01:25:54,800 --> 01:25:56,856
would operate . And thirdly , one of 

2255
01:25:56,856 --> 01:25:58,578
the things that we continue to 

2256
01:25:58,578 --> 01:26:01,210
obviously leverage are a series of 

2257
01:26:01,380 --> 01:26:03,547
financial incentives that the services 

2258
01:26:03,547 --> 01:26:05,713
cyber accepted service has provided to 

2259
01:26:05,713 --> 01:26:07,936
us . But it will never be about money . 

2260
01:26:07,936 --> 01:26:10,047
It needs to be about what we're doing 

2261
01:26:10,047 --> 01:26:12,047
in the mission . And the folks that 

2262
01:26:12,047 --> 01:26:14,220
they're working with . Excellent . 

2263
01:26:14,220 --> 01:26:16,498
Welcome Any other thoughts , secretary . 

2264
01:26:17,480 --> 01:26:19,647
Um , thank you congressman . We really 

2265
01:26:19,647 --> 01:26:21,790
appreciate the committee's focus on 

2266
01:26:21,790 --> 01:26:25,130
this . Um , and while we seek to retain 

2267
01:26:25,130 --> 01:26:27,297
the best possible cyber talent for the 

2268
01:26:27,297 --> 01:26:30,020
department , um we do have the benefit 

2269
01:26:30,020 --> 01:26:33,160
of as we train , um , cyber personnel's 

2270
01:26:33,160 --> 01:26:35,104
general moccasins , um personnel , 

2271
01:26:35,104 --> 01:26:37,104
complete their military service and 

2272
01:26:37,104 --> 01:26:39,216
return to the private sector . We are 

2273
01:26:39,216 --> 01:26:41,160
also helping to fill a shortage of 

2274
01:26:41,160 --> 01:26:43,160
cyber talent across the nation . So 

2275
01:26:43,160 --> 01:26:45,327
while we need to make sure that we can 

2276
01:26:45,327 --> 01:26:47,450
meet our retention requirements and 

2277
01:26:47,450 --> 01:26:49,750
readiness requirements , um , it is not 

2278
01:26:49,750 --> 01:26:51,917
a complete loss for the nation because 

2279
01:26:51,917 --> 01:26:54,139
we send more people out there to defend 

2280
01:26:54,139 --> 01:26:56,417
um in the private sector space as well . 

2281
01:26:57,880 --> 01:26:59,602
Excellent . Looking forward to 

2282
01:26:59,602 --> 01:27:01,713
discussing more . You'll back . Thank 

2283
01:27:01,713 --> 01:27:04,690
you . Very good . Uh thank you Mr more . 

2284
01:27:04,700 --> 01:27:07,260
Uh and with that uh when I thank our 

2285
01:27:07,260 --> 01:27:10,330
witnesses for uh their testimony , the 

2286
01:27:10,340 --> 01:27:12,640
members for their questions uh to our 

2287
01:27:12,640 --> 01:27:14,640
witnesses , I know that members had 

2288
01:27:14,640 --> 01:27:16,918
some questions that required follow up , 

2289
01:27:16,918 --> 01:27:18,696
and members may have additional 

2290
01:27:18,696 --> 01:27:20,807
questions that I asked that uh you uh 

2291
01:27:20,807 --> 01:27:22,751
respond in writing at the earliest 

2292
01:27:22,751 --> 01:27:25,590
opportunity . And with that we're going 

2293
01:27:25,590 --> 01:27:28,770
to close out the uh the open session of 

2294
01:27:28,770 --> 01:27:30,826
this hearing , and we'll move now to 

2295
01:27:30,826 --> 01:27:34,030
spc uh 200 cbc for 200 for the 

2296
01:27:34,040 --> 01:27:36,770
classified portion uh without the uh 

2297
01:27:36,780 --> 01:27:38,300
hearing stands adjourned . Thank you .