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You will come to order . The purpose of 

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today's hearing is to receive testimony 

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on the 2022 budget request for missile 

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defense programs . First , I'd like to 

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ask unanimous consent that non 

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subcommittee members be allowed to 

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participate in today's hearing . After 

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all , subcommittee members have had an 

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opportunity to ask questions . Is there 

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objection Then without objection , non 

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subcommittee members will be recognized 

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for the appropriate time of five 

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minutes . I would also like to ask my 

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colleagues this is not a unanimous 

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consent request that we try to keep our 

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public comments as brief as possible so 

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that we'll have a maximum amount of 

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opportunity for the closed session 

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which will follow this one Ideally we 

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will start that one at 4:00 if not 

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earlier because the more time we have 

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in that session the better . Today's 

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distinguished witnesses are Miss 

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Leonora . Tomorrow , well known to the 

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subcommittee who is now Deputy 

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assistant Secretary of Defense for 

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nuclear and missile Defense policy 

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General Van Herck , Commander of the 

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United States Northern Command and 

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North american Aerospace Defense 

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Command . Vice Admiral Hill , director 

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of the Missile Defense Agency . 

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Lieutenant General Car blur . Commander 

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of the United States Army Space and 

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Missile Defense Command and Lieutenant 

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General john shaw , deputy commander of 

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the United States Face Command . We 

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have a breadth of experience with this 

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panel and I thank you for participating 

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in fy 22 budget requests this 

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administration continued efforts across 

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the Missile Defense Enterprise to 

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improve our U . S . Missile defense 

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capabilities . The administration has 

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properly funded the hypersonic and 

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ballistic missile attract space sensor 

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a top priority for our indo pak . Um , 

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stratcom and North com commanders . I'm 

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concerned regarding the emission of the 

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homeland defense radar hawaii because 

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we must ensure that the entire United 

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States gets maximum advanced warning 

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against threats from rogue nations like 

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North Korea . I'm optimistic that the 

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pentagon and Missile Defense Agency are 

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addressing issues which had led to the 

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cancellation of the archive program as 

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they pursue the next generation 

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interceptor . Lastly , I look forward 

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to hearing from both Lieutenant General 

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car blur and Lieutenant General Sean 

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how space command is affecting our 

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missile defense requirements . I now 

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turn to my ranking member , Mr . Turner 

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for his remarks . Mhm . 

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Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank you for 

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all of our witnesses being here . Um , 

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there's certainly been especially 

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challenging year even with covid and 

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high deployment rates for our war 

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fighters , we appreciate everything 

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that you've done to support our men and 

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women in uniform . I'm going to begin 

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with just a brief comment on the bidens 

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fiscal year budget . Uh , I'm very 

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concerned and that's where it has 

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placed us and that it is so late . 

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Having received it in june , it 

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inevitably means that we're going to be 

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operating in a continuing resolution . 

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I would like you and your comments to 

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please address how that might affect 

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the importance of your operations . I 

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think missile defense research and 

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development and certainly our nuclear 

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modernization or areas that are most 

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particularly impacted by cutting 

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resolutions . I continue to point out 

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that the fiscal year is congressionally 

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mandated . We have the ability to move 

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the fiscal year . I would hope that 

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Congress might take this up and we 

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could look to move the fiscal year to 

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the calendar year . We would save the 

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Department of Defense three months 

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every year of um , uh waste end and 

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shut down in important programs . And 

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of course , um , as I expressed before , 

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I'm disappointed in the top line in the 

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president's budget number . The mental 

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defense budget is just one example of 

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where the biden defense budget comes up 

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short . The biden missile defense 

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request is 8.9 billion down from the 

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10.5 billion enacted last year and is 

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the lowest since 2016 . Key programs 

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are underfunded , such as missile 

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defense for Guam funding for the 

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homeland defense radar hawaii , the 

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elevated radar for cruise missile 

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defense of the homeland and the 

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proliferated low earth orbit arctic 

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communications program . There are key 

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budget priority priorities that should 

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have been included in the FY 22 

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presidential request . In my opinion , 

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we must protect the homeland with the 

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next generation of missile defense 

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technology . One of things that I am 

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struck by and reviewing the written , 

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written , written testimony of our 

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witnesses is the key partnerships that 

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we build with our allies through 

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missile defense . We have Aegis ashore 

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in Romania and the Polish site is 90% 

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complete . Um , We also have 

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partnerships with Japan and South Korea 

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to other great partners that live day 

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in day out with the threat posed by 

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north Korea turning to the Middle East 

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just this past month , we saw our 

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partnership with Israel pay dividends 

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with the iron dome program . It is now 

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clear that we must replenish the iron 

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dome system and help advance next 

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generation missile defense technology 

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developed by the United States and 

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Israel . And I always like to point out 

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that prior to the deployment of of iron 

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Dome , uh the critics of missile 

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defense used to say that it is too 

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expensive , it is escalatory um and 

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that it won't work . And what we've 

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seen from Israel is that not only is it 

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cost effective in the amount of damage 

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that is avoided . Uh it works and it's 

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actually de escalatory because it gave 

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Israel of the ability to to weigh what 

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its options and its responses are . I 

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hope that we look to our own missile 

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defense doctrine as we look to our 

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missile defense review to understand 

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how those proven concepts should affect 

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us policy . Um I want to thank the 

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chairman again for holding this hearing 

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and I look forward to your 

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presentations . I think the gentlemen 

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will now ask each of our witnesses to 

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make their statements , which hopefully 

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will be fewer than five minutes in 

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length . Your written testimony will of 

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course , without objection , be entered 

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into the record in its entirety . And 

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by the way , I think this hearing may 

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hold the record for the number of 

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acronyms used in the testimony . So I 

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congratulate all the witnesses for that . 

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It might be an olympic record . So the 

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first witness will be Mr Romero . Yeah , 

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thank you . Mr Chairman , Chairman 

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Cooper , ranking member Turner and 

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distinguished members of the 

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subcommittee . Thank you for the 

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opportunity to testify today before you 

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in my previous home uh to speak about 

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missile defense threat in the 

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department's missile . Could you pull 

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the microphone a little closer ? Thank 

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you . Sure . And the department's 

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missile defense policy and priorities . 

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It's an honor to um it's an honor to 

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testify today with General Van Herck , 

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Vice Admiral Hill , Lieutenant General 

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Shaw and Lieutenant General Cobbler 

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along with left of launch capabilities 

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and our nuclear and conventional forces . 

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Missile defense plays a key role in US 

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defense . As missile technology matures 

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and proliferates the threat to the US 

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homeland , our allies and partners and 

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our deployed forces is increasing the 

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democratic People's Republic of Korea . 

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Dprk continues development and 

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deployment of more capable 

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intercontinental ballistic missiles 

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that have destabilized and reshape the 

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security environment in East Asia , 

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Iran's short and medium range ballistic 

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missiles comprise the largest missile 

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force in the Middle East . Additionally , 

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Russia and china continued to develop 

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and field increasingly advanced and 

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diverse regional offensive missile 

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capabilities as part of their anti 

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access antonin I'il strategy intended 

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to deny the United States freedom of 

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action to protect military power and to 

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protect our allies and partners 

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to adjust these evolving challenges . 

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The department will review its missile 

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defense policies , strategies and 

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capabilities to ensure that we have 

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effective missile defenses . The review 

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will nest within the National Defense 

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Strategy and contribute to the 

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department's approach on integrated 

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deterrence . We expect to complete the 

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strategy in January of 2022 . The 

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department is committed to defending 

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the United States against rogue States 

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missile threats . The department 

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recently initiated development of the 

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next generation interceptor . The N . G . 

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I . Will increase the reliability and 

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capability of missile defense of the 

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United States as this program moves 

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forward . It will align with the 

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administration's defense goals and 

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priorities with regard to regional 

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missile defence defences . Will also 

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remain central to maintaining the U . S . 

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Enduring advantage to flow forces into 

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a militarily contested regional 

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environment and to safeguard those 

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forces should a conflict arise . 

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Additionally , the department will 

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continue to ensure that we bring a more 

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integrated approach to air and missile 

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defense to address various types of 

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ballistic missile threats and enable 

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defense against cruise missiles and 

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unmanned aerial systems . I am do you 

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will feel interoperable and integrated 

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missile defense sensors , interceptors 

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and commanding control to improve 

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capability against a range of threats 

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with regard to enabling capabilities . 

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In addition to improving today's 

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operational systems . Where in 

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examining new enabling technologies , 

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Secretary Austin has noted the 

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importance of enhancing our global 

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network of integrated sensors . Space 

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based and land based sensors enable 

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variety of capabilities such as 

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detection , tracking and targeting 

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through all phases of flight for 

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incoming missiles . U . S . Commercial 

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innovation is already transforming this 

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field In Fy 22 . We will continue to 

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develop the prototype hypersonic and 

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ballistic tracking space sensor that 

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will allow the tracking of hypersonic 

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threats and add resiliency to our 

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sensor architecture . The department's 

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approach for regional hypersonic 

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defense will first focus on defense in 

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the terminal phase . Information 

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superiority is critical to the future 

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battlefield and necessary to enable 

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rapid planning and employment in a 

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joint operating environment . To that 

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end , the department is developing 

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multi cyber harden advanced all domain 

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awareness for a commanding control 

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architectures that will enable timely 

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and accurate decision making to address 

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emerging threats . And we will continue 

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to develop capabilities for left of 

280
00:10:21,760 --> 00:10:23,982
launching missile defeat that will play 

281
00:10:23,982 --> 00:10:25,816
an important role in effectively 

282
00:10:25,816 --> 00:10:27,760
countering limited missile defense 

283
00:10:27,760 --> 00:10:30,470
missile attacks , sorry , engaging and 

284
00:10:30,470 --> 00:10:32,692
working with our allies and partners to 

285
00:10:32,692 --> 00:10:34,859
enhance our collective missile defense 

286
00:10:34,859 --> 00:10:36,859
efforts is a core focus area of the 

287
00:10:36,859 --> 00:10:38,692
department . Cooperative missile 

288
00:10:38,692 --> 00:10:40,770
defense with strong allies including 

289
00:10:40,770 --> 00:10:43,720
Japan , the Republic of Korea Australia 

290
00:10:43,730 --> 00:10:46,560
and our NATO allies uh will continue to 

291
00:10:46,560 --> 00:10:49,530
be a strong priority in the Middle East . 

292
00:10:49,530 --> 00:10:51,030
Us Israeli Missile defense 

293
00:10:51,030 --> 00:10:53,330
collaboration demonstrates the mutual 

294
00:10:53,330 --> 00:10:55,552
benefits of technology sharing with our 

295
00:10:55,552 --> 00:10:57,774
allies and partners and we continue our 

296
00:10:57,774 --> 00:10:59,886
efforts to strengthen missile defense 

297
00:10:59,886 --> 00:11:02,130
cooperation with key gulf cooperation 

298
00:11:02,130 --> 00:11:05,110
council countries . In this context , 

299
00:11:05,120 --> 00:11:07,231
my office leads a series of dialogues 

300
00:11:07,231 --> 00:11:09,287
to discuss modernization efforts and 

301
00:11:09,287 --> 00:11:11,120
seek new opportunities for joint 

302
00:11:11,120 --> 00:11:13,342
research , training , co production and 

303
00:11:13,342 --> 00:11:15,453
co development . In conclusion , as a 

304
00:11:15,453 --> 00:11:17,564
department prepares for its strategic 

305
00:11:17,564 --> 00:11:19,453
review , I assure members of this 

306
00:11:19,453 --> 00:11:19,250
committee that we are steadfastly 

307
00:11:19,250 --> 00:11:21,083
committed to key missile defense 

308
00:11:21,083 --> 00:11:23,740
missions , priorities uh and 

309
00:11:23,740 --> 00:11:25,962
capabilities including working with our 

310
00:11:25,962 --> 00:11:27,740
allies and partners to meet the 

311
00:11:27,740 --> 00:11:29,962
challenge of growing missile threats in 

312
00:11:29,962 --> 00:11:31,573
a cost effective manner that 

313
00:11:31,573 --> 00:11:33,518
strengthens regional and strategic 

314
00:11:33,518 --> 00:11:35,462
stability . I look forward to your 

315
00:11:35,462 --> 00:11:37,462
questions . Thank you . Thank you . 

316
00:11:37,462 --> 00:11:39,407
General Van Herck , the chairman , 

317
00:11:39,407 --> 00:11:41,351
cooper , ranking member Turner and 

318
00:11:41,351 --> 00:11:42,962
distinguished members of the 

319
00:11:42,962 --> 00:11:45,073
subcommittee . It's a privilege to be 

320
00:11:45,073 --> 00:11:44,760
here in front of you again to testify . 

321
00:11:45,140 --> 00:11:47,251
I'm honored to serve as the Commander 

322
00:11:47,251 --> 00:11:49,307
of United States Northern Command in 

323
00:11:49,307 --> 00:11:51,362
the North American Aerospace Defense 

324
00:11:51,362 --> 00:11:53,307
Command and I'm grateful to appear 

325
00:11:53,307 --> 00:11:55,140
alongside my colleagues is their 

326
00:11:55,140 --> 00:11:57,307
crucial partners in the defense of our 

327
00:11:57,307 --> 00:11:59,307
homeland . United States . Northern 

328
00:11:59,307 --> 00:12:01,529
Command NORAD are separate commands yet 

329
00:12:01,529 --> 00:12:01,030
we work seamlessly to accomplish the 

330
00:12:01,030 --> 00:12:03,030
critical mission of defending North 

331
00:12:03,030 --> 00:12:05,030
America against all threats whether 

332
00:12:05,030 --> 00:12:06,974
posed by our competitors , natural 

333
00:12:06,974 --> 00:12:09,730
disasters or a pandemic . We are in an 

334
00:12:09,730 --> 00:12:13,100
era of a renewed strategic competition 

335
00:12:13,110 --> 00:12:15,277
and this time we're facing two nuclear 

336
00:12:15,277 --> 00:12:17,440
armed near peer competitors . Both 

337
00:12:17,440 --> 00:12:19,551
focused on circumventing our homeland 

338
00:12:19,551 --> 00:12:22,000
defenses . Additionally , North Korea's 

339
00:12:22,010 --> 00:12:23,600
recent unveiling of a new 

340
00:12:23,610 --> 00:12:25,554
intercontinental ballistic missile 

341
00:12:25,554 --> 00:12:27,610
capable of threatening Alaska hawaii 

342
00:12:27,610 --> 00:12:29,610
and the contiguous United States is 

343
00:12:29,610 --> 00:12:31,610
meant to constrain our options in a 

344
00:12:31,610 --> 00:12:33,666
crisis . I remain concerned about my 

345
00:12:33,666 --> 00:12:35,777
ability to defend the homeland as our 

346
00:12:35,777 --> 00:12:37,554
competitors continue to develop 

347
00:12:37,554 --> 00:12:39,610
capabilities to hold our homeland at 

348
00:12:39,610 --> 00:12:41,443
risk from all vectors and in all 

349
00:12:41,443 --> 00:12:43,710
domains kinetically and non kinetically 

350
00:12:43,970 --> 00:12:46,280
and to exploit a perceived gap between 

351
00:12:46,280 --> 00:12:48,502
our nuclear deterrent , which I believe 

352
00:12:48,502 --> 00:12:50,613
is the foundation of homeland defense 

353
00:12:50,613 --> 00:12:52,724
and our conventional homeland defense 

354
00:12:52,724 --> 00:12:54,891
capabilities . To close this perceived 

355
00:12:54,891 --> 00:12:56,891
gap , we must accelerate efforts to 

356
00:12:56,891 --> 00:12:58,836
transform our culture to think and 

357
00:12:58,836 --> 00:13:01,058
operate globally and across all domains 

358
00:13:01,240 --> 00:13:03,450
and factor homeland defense into every 

359
00:13:03,450 --> 00:13:05,890
strategy plan , force management , 

360
00:13:05,900 --> 00:13:07,733
force , design , acquisition and 

361
00:13:07,733 --> 00:13:10,030
budgetary decision . United States 

362
00:13:10,030 --> 00:13:11,752
Northern Command and NORAD are 

363
00:13:11,752 --> 00:13:13,919
aggressively pursuing a left of launch 

364
00:13:13,919 --> 00:13:16,030
framework to provide the president of 

365
00:13:16,030 --> 00:13:18,252
the United States the Secretary Defense 

366
00:13:18,252 --> 00:13:20,141
less escalatory options that will 

367
00:13:20,141 --> 00:13:22,308
increase decision space and deterrence 

368
00:13:22,308 --> 00:13:24,197
in strategic competition . Vice , 

369
00:13:24,197 --> 00:13:26,760
focusing on in game defeat in conflict 

370
00:13:27,240 --> 00:13:29,129
with the missile defense agency . 

371
00:13:29,129 --> 00:13:31,184
Leading the effort , progress on the 

372
00:13:31,184 --> 00:13:33,296
next generation interceptor is on the 

373
00:13:33,296 --> 00:13:35,407
right trajectory . But further delays 

374
00:13:35,407 --> 00:13:37,573
will be detrimental to our defense and 

375
00:13:37,573 --> 00:13:39,629
deterrence by denial capability . We 

376
00:13:39,629 --> 00:13:41,462
must also capitalize on globally 

377
00:13:41,462 --> 00:13:43,629
layered multi threat detection systems 

378
00:13:43,629 --> 00:13:45,573
such as over the horizon radar and 

379
00:13:45,573 --> 00:13:47,407
hypersonic and ballistic missile 

380
00:13:47,407 --> 00:13:49,770
tracking space sensors to adequately 

381
00:13:49,780 --> 00:13:51,840
address both the capability and 

382
00:13:51,840 --> 00:13:54,270
capacity of emerging threats the 

383
00:13:54,270 --> 00:13:56,492
additional capabilities . United States 

384
00:13:56,492 --> 00:13:58,492
Northern Command is pioneering , as 

385
00:13:58,492 --> 00:14:00,381
demonstrated by our latest global 

386
00:14:00,381 --> 00:14:02,548
information dominance experiment . Are 

387
00:14:02,548 --> 00:14:04,890
focused on prying data from existing 

388
00:14:04,890 --> 00:14:07,480
stove pipe networks to enable global 

389
00:14:07,560 --> 00:14:10,090
and all domain awareness by ingesting 

390
00:14:10,090 --> 00:14:12,146
data into a cloud based architecture 

391
00:14:12,146 --> 00:14:13,812
where the power of artificial 

392
00:14:13,812 --> 00:14:15,868
intelligence and machine learning is 

393
00:14:15,868 --> 00:14:17,979
unleashed . we can drastically reduce 

394
00:14:17,979 --> 00:14:20,034
processing times across the globe to 

395
00:14:20,034 --> 00:14:22,090
rapidly enable information dominance 

396
00:14:22,090 --> 00:14:25,150
and decision decision superiority . All 

397
00:14:25,150 --> 00:14:27,700
11 combatant commanders induce endorse 

398
00:14:27,710 --> 00:14:29,877
fielding these capabilities as soon as 

399
00:14:29,877 --> 00:14:31,988
possible for United States . Northern 

400
00:14:31,988 --> 00:14:34,210
Commanding NORAD , if we do not possess 

401
00:14:34,210 --> 00:14:36,432
global all domain awareness sensors and 

402
00:14:36,432 --> 00:14:38,321
the networks , data standards and 

403
00:14:38,321 --> 00:14:40,321
infrastructure to share information 

404
00:14:40,321 --> 00:14:42,488
quickly and efficiently our ability to 

405
00:14:42,488 --> 00:14:42,240
defend the homeland against emerging 

406
00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:44,184
threats such as improved ballistic 

407
00:14:44,184 --> 00:14:46,300
missiles , hypersonic , long range , 

408
00:14:46,300 --> 00:14:48,580
low radar cross section cruise missiles 

409
00:14:48,590 --> 00:14:51,150
will slowly degrade the United States 

410
00:14:51,150 --> 00:14:53,280
Northern Command . NORAD take solemn 

411
00:14:53,280 --> 00:14:55,280
pride in executing the Secretary of 

412
00:14:55,280 --> 00:14:57,280
Defense is top priority by standing 

413
00:14:57,280 --> 00:14:59,113
watch to defend our nation . I'm 

414
00:14:59,113 --> 00:15:00,613
grateful for the trust and 

415
00:15:00,613 --> 00:15:02,780
responsibility you place in the United 

416
00:15:02,780 --> 00:15:04,780
States Northern Command and NORAD . 

417
00:15:04,780 --> 00:15:04,630
Thank you . And I look forward to 

418
00:15:04,630 --> 00:15:07,370
answering your questions . Thank you . 

419
00:15:07,370 --> 00:15:09,260
General Now . Vice Admiral Hill . 

420
00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:11,751
Chairman Cooper , a ranking member of 

421
00:15:11,751 --> 00:15:13,973
Turner and distinguished members of the 

422
00:15:13,973 --> 00:15:16,140
subcommittee . Thank you for your time 

423
00:15:16,140 --> 00:15:17,807
today . Uh for PB 22 . NBA is 

424
00:15:17,807 --> 00:15:19,918
requesting 8.9 billion to develop and 

425
00:15:19,918 --> 00:15:21,973
deploy homeland defenses against the 

426
00:15:21,973 --> 00:15:24,084
rogue state threat and to improve our 

427
00:15:24,084 --> 00:15:26,251
regional defenses against existing and 

428
00:15:26,251 --> 00:15:28,418
emerging threats . The evolving threat 

429
00:15:28,418 --> 00:15:30,640
can be summarized as a less predictable 

430
00:15:30,640 --> 00:15:32,473
ballistic threat with decoys and 

431
00:15:32,473 --> 00:15:32,170
multiple warheads potentially with 

432
00:15:32,170 --> 00:15:34,310
nuclear payloads . Hypersonic cruise 

433
00:15:34,310 --> 00:15:36,477
missile threats present high speed and 

434
00:15:36,477 --> 00:15:38,532
global maneuvering challenges to our 

435
00:15:38,532 --> 00:15:40,699
sensor command and control and weapons 

436
00:15:40,699 --> 00:15:42,532
architecture . Now , despite the 

437
00:15:42,532 --> 00:15:44,310
pandemic restrictions , we have 

438
00:15:44,310 --> 00:15:46,366
maintained momentum by advancing the 

439
00:15:46,366 --> 00:15:46,230
program on several fronts this year . 

440
00:15:46,230 --> 00:15:48,230
So I'll go through a few of those . 

441
00:15:48,230 --> 00:15:50,341
I'll start with C two BMC command and 

442
00:15:50,341 --> 00:15:51,786
Control Battle management 

443
00:15:51,786 --> 00:15:53,674
Communications . We continued our 

444
00:15:53,674 --> 00:15:55,730
spiral upgrades to integrate sensors 

445
00:15:55,730 --> 00:15:57,674
and weapons across the Joint Force 

446
00:15:57,674 --> 00:15:59,619
supporting our Quebec commands and 

447
00:15:59,619 --> 00:16:01,674
services with tracking , queuing and 

448
00:16:01,674 --> 00:16:03,841
discrimination data . The hard network 

449
00:16:03,841 --> 00:16:06,063
integrates with Nazi too . From a space 

450
00:16:06,063 --> 00:16:05,910
global capability perspective to 

451
00:16:05,910 --> 00:16:08,077
improve detection , tracking , queuing 

452
00:16:08,077 --> 00:16:09,854
and discrimination . Hypersonic 

453
00:16:09,854 --> 00:16:12,077
ballistic tracking space sensor or HP . 

454
00:16:12,077 --> 00:16:14,243
TSS . That development continues under 

455
00:16:14,243 --> 00:16:16,466
two competitive awards focused on an on 

456
00:16:16,466 --> 00:16:18,950
orbit demo in Fy 23 for tracking dim 

457
00:16:18,950 --> 00:16:21,061
boosting ballistic missiles and hyper 

458
00:16:21,061 --> 00:16:23,283
glides . And this is a critical part of 

459
00:16:23,283 --> 00:16:25,394
the hypersonic defense architecture . 

460
00:16:25,394 --> 00:16:27,450
Space-based kill assessment or Scott 

461
00:16:27,450 --> 00:16:29,450
that is deployed today . Uh full of 

462
00:16:29,450 --> 00:16:31,339
constellation has participated in 

463
00:16:31,339 --> 00:16:33,450
several uh flight tests were on track 

464
00:16:33,450 --> 00:16:35,561
to deliver operational hit assessment 

465
00:16:35,561 --> 00:16:37,783
for the Homeland in 2023 . Moving up to 

466
00:16:37,783 --> 00:16:40,006
Alaska to the long range discrimination 

467
00:16:40,006 --> 00:16:42,172
radar . Despite the pandemic , we have 

468
00:16:42,172 --> 00:16:44,283
delivered both arrays . The light off 

469
00:16:44,283 --> 00:16:46,228
is underway now which means we are 

470
00:16:46,228 --> 00:16:48,506
radiating in coordination with the FAA . 

471
00:16:48,506 --> 00:16:50,617
To make sure that we take care of the 

472
00:16:50,617 --> 00:16:52,506
local Bush pilots . We will go to 

473
00:16:52,506 --> 00:16:54,728
government acceptance this year , which 

474
00:16:54,728 --> 00:16:56,894
is initial fielding uh and uh F Y 22 . 

475
00:16:56,894 --> 00:16:59,061
Our focus will be integration into the 

476
00:16:59,061 --> 00:17:01,228
ground based mid course defense system 

477
00:17:01,228 --> 00:17:00,640
and then we'll transfer to the lead 

478
00:17:00,640 --> 00:17:02,584
service of the Air Force for Space 

479
00:17:02,584 --> 00:17:04,940
Force operations in Fy 23 . From the 

480
00:17:04,940 --> 00:17:07,490
homeland perspective , continuing the G . 

481
00:17:07,490 --> 00:17:09,712
B fleet reliability efforts through the 

482
00:17:09,712 --> 00:17:11,768
service life extension programme has 

483
00:17:11,768 --> 00:17:13,823
been going very well . And what that 

484
00:17:13,823 --> 00:17:15,768
means for us is we can harvest age 

485
00:17:15,768 --> 00:17:17,546
hardware from The silos for our 

486
00:17:17,546 --> 00:17:19,712
stockpile reliability program . We now 

487
00:17:19,712 --> 00:17:21,434
have hardware-based analytical 

488
00:17:21,434 --> 00:17:23,657
background to our reliability estimates 

489
00:17:23,657 --> 00:17:25,546
while expanding the missile field 

490
00:17:25,546 --> 00:17:27,768
capacity and missile field for I'm very 

491
00:17:27,768 --> 00:17:29,601
proud of the soldiers of the 100 

492
00:17:29,601 --> 00:17:31,601
missile defense brigade in the 49th 

493
00:17:31,601 --> 00:17:33,657
Missile Defense Battalion . The next 

494
00:17:33,657 --> 00:17:33,450
test for the GMD system is boost 

495
00:17:33,450 --> 00:17:36,900
vehicle 203 B B T 03 developing 

496
00:17:36,900 --> 00:17:38,900
capability to use our three and two 

497
00:17:38,900 --> 00:17:41,067
stage G . B I . What we'll do is we'll 

498
00:17:41,067 --> 00:17:43,067
fly instead of the full kit . Matic 

499
00:17:43,067 --> 00:17:45,289
burn will burn only to the second stage 

500
00:17:45,289 --> 00:17:47,233
so that we can increase our battle 

501
00:17:47,233 --> 00:17:49,456
space and enhance the timelines that is 

502
00:17:49,456 --> 00:17:51,622
on track for later this year , N . G . 

503
00:17:51,622 --> 00:17:51,340
I development was mentioned . We are 

504
00:17:51,340 --> 00:17:53,562
underway with two competitive contracts 

505
00:17:53,562 --> 00:17:55,690
focused on round emplacement earlier 

506
00:17:55,690 --> 00:17:58,160
than the 2028 government estimate . We 

507
00:17:58,160 --> 00:18:00,104
switch over to one of our regional 

508
00:18:00,104 --> 00:18:02,327
systems that we just integrated air and 

509
00:18:02,327 --> 00:18:04,216
missile defense . We continue our 

510
00:18:04,216 --> 00:18:06,382
deliveries of the SM three Black would 

511
00:18:06,382 --> 00:18:06,000
be missiles the workhorse of the fleet 

512
00:18:06,010 --> 00:18:08,121
through a multi year procurement . SM 

513
00:18:08,121 --> 00:18:10,288
three block to a missiles developed in 

514
00:18:10,288 --> 00:18:12,454
cooperation with Japan . We are now in 

515
00:18:12,454 --> 00:18:14,510
production And we continue our close 

516
00:18:14,510 --> 00:18:16,677
coordination with the Navy to leverage 

517
00:18:16,677 --> 00:18:16,600
the SM six missile for sea-based 

518
00:18:16,600 --> 00:18:18,600
terminal , which I'll talk about in 

519
00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:20,878
just a second . I want to say a little , 

520
00:18:20,878 --> 00:18:22,933
a little bit about FTM 40 for flight 

521
00:18:22,933 --> 00:18:25,156
test Maritime 44 that we conducted last 

522
00:18:25,156 --> 00:18:26,933
november based on congressional 

523
00:18:26,933 --> 00:18:26,900
direction . To complete that test in 

524
00:18:26,900 --> 00:18:30,180
2020 we successfully uh intercepted a 

525
00:18:30,180 --> 00:18:32,180
simple rogue state I C B M with the 

526
00:18:32,180 --> 00:18:34,140
mighty ship , USs John Finn a new 

527
00:18:34,140 --> 00:18:36,307
construction . I am the destroyer with 

528
00:18:36,307 --> 00:18:38,529
the S and three block to a missile . We 

529
00:18:38,529 --> 00:18:40,640
leverage the design robustness within 

530
00:18:40,640 --> 00:18:42,696
Egypt's and within SM three . What I 

531
00:18:42,696 --> 00:18:44,640
mean by that is we are outside the 

532
00:18:44,640 --> 00:18:46,307
requirement space and we were 

533
00:18:46,307 --> 00:18:48,084
successful in that mission in a 

534
00:18:48,084 --> 00:18:50,307
defensive hawaii scenario . Back to the 

535
00:18:50,307 --> 00:18:52,307
pandemic that affected nearly every 

536
00:18:52,307 --> 00:18:54,140
construction project . We had to 

537
00:18:54,140 --> 00:18:56,196
include the aegis ashore in Poland . 

538
00:18:56,196 --> 00:18:58,418
But the great news today that I did not 

539
00:18:58,418 --> 00:19:00,529
report last year is we have all force 

540
00:19:00,529 --> 00:19:02,640
fire raise now in place in the site . 

541
00:19:02,640 --> 00:19:02,540
We have the fire control system in 

542
00:19:02,540 --> 00:19:04,762
place and this is a forcing function to 

543
00:19:04,762 --> 00:19:06,929
get us to install and check out of the 

544
00:19:06,929 --> 00:19:08,984
Aegis weapon system which we removed 

545
00:19:08,984 --> 00:19:11,096
from storage . We did all the digital 

546
00:19:11,096 --> 00:19:12,984
signal checks on it . We're doing 

547
00:19:12,984 --> 00:19:15,096
hardware upgrades and that site is on 

548
00:19:15,096 --> 00:19:14,980
path to complete construction and 

549
00:19:14,980 --> 00:19:17,500
coordination with the Army Corps E . J . 

550
00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:19,667
S . C . Based terminal increment to is 

551
00:19:19,667 --> 00:19:21,722
deployed today and it represents the 

552
00:19:21,722 --> 00:19:23,611
first regional hypersonic missile 

553
00:19:23,611 --> 00:19:25,833
defense capability . Increment three is 

554
00:19:25,833 --> 00:19:27,778
underway and delivers in Fy 24 now 

555
00:19:27,778 --> 00:19:30,000
based on real world data collection and 

556
00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:32,222
leveraging the proven Egypt's engage on 

557
00:19:32,222 --> 00:19:34,444
remote capabilities . PB 22 accelerates 

558
00:19:34,444 --> 00:19:36,611
are hypersonic missile defense , glide 

559
00:19:36,611 --> 00:19:38,611
face interceptor which allows us to 

560
00:19:38,611 --> 00:19:40,611
intercept prior to terminal . We're 

561
00:19:40,611 --> 00:19:42,722
evaluating industry proposals now and 

562
00:19:42,722 --> 00:19:44,667
we're going to make sure that that 

563
00:19:44,667 --> 00:19:46,611
design is extensible to land based 

564
00:19:46,611 --> 00:19:48,833
batteries shifting over to the terminal 

565
00:19:48,833 --> 00:19:50,556
high altitude air defense . We 

566
00:19:50,556 --> 00:19:52,778
continued our interceptor procurement , 

567
00:19:52,778 --> 00:19:52,490
our production training , support , 

568
00:19:52,490 --> 00:19:54,657
developing capabilities to address the 

569
00:19:54,657 --> 00:19:56,323
evolving threat in very close 

570
00:19:56,323 --> 00:19:58,546
coordination with the army . Will go to 

571
00:19:58,546 --> 00:20:00,546
the last of the Patriot integration 

572
00:20:00,546 --> 00:20:02,268
testing this year . Now in for 

573
00:20:02,268 --> 00:20:04,323
defensive Guam and PB 22 it includes 

574
00:20:04,323 --> 00:20:06,490
funding for the initial development of 

575
00:20:06,490 --> 00:20:08,323
the survivable and operationally 

576
00:20:08,323 --> 00:20:10,546
effective I . M . D . Uh integrated air 

577
00:20:10,546 --> 00:20:10,130
and missile defense leveraging mature 

578
00:20:10,140 --> 00:20:12,362
regional systems . I had a conversation 

579
00:20:12,362 --> 00:20:15,270
with an alkaline a last night and his 

580
00:20:15,270 --> 00:20:17,159
requirements are clear defend the 

581
00:20:17,159 --> 00:20:19,381
people defend the forces and do it on a 

582
00:20:19,381 --> 00:20:21,326
near term timeline . He has system 

583
00:20:21,326 --> 00:20:23,214
agnostic but when you look at the 

584
00:20:23,214 --> 00:20:25,103
ballistic , the hypersonic cruise 

585
00:20:25,103 --> 00:20:27,048
missile threats , it drives you to 

586
00:20:27,048 --> 00:20:28,826
mature to mature proven systems 

587
00:20:28,826 --> 00:20:30,826
integrated with the joint force and 

588
00:20:30,826 --> 00:20:32,881
operational in the near term . So in 

589
00:20:32,881 --> 00:20:32,530
coordination with Indo pay , common 

590
00:20:32,530 --> 00:20:34,641
Cape , the technical merits of proven 

591
00:20:34,641 --> 00:20:36,586
regional systems will point to the 

592
00:20:36,586 --> 00:20:38,863
architecture for our PB 22 investments . 

593
00:20:38,863 --> 00:20:41,030
So I'll wrap up by saying space , land 

594
00:20:41,030 --> 00:20:43,086
and sea based sensors along with the 

595
00:20:43,086 --> 00:20:45,252
network weapons integrated through C T 

596
00:20:45,252 --> 00:20:47,308
B M . C . That will tie the jazzy to 

597
00:20:47,308 --> 00:20:49,308
set the stage for hypersonic cruise 

598
00:20:49,308 --> 00:20:51,363
missile defense capabilities . Thank 

599
00:20:51,363 --> 00:20:50,670
you . I appreciate your time today . 

600
00:20:52,040 --> 00:20:53,929
Thank you've said , well , you've 

601
00:20:53,929 --> 00:20:56,040
covered a lot of territory . There is 

602
00:20:56,040 --> 00:20:57,984
even more in your testimony . Uh , 

603
00:20:57,984 --> 00:21:00,151
Lieutenant General Car blur , Chairman 

604
00:21:00,151 --> 00:21:02,096
cooper , Ranking member Turner and 

605
00:21:02,096 --> 00:21:03,707
distinguished members of the 

606
00:21:03,707 --> 00:21:05,818
subcommittee . I'm honored to testify 

607
00:21:05,818 --> 00:21:07,720
before you today . Thank you . 

608
00:21:07,730 --> 00:21:09,730
Especially during the unprecedented 

609
00:21:09,730 --> 00:21:11,830
health crisis of this past year for 

610
00:21:11,830 --> 00:21:13,663
supporting our service members , 

611
00:21:13,663 --> 00:21:16,010
civilians , contractors , and their 

612
00:21:16,010 --> 00:21:18,177
families and your continued support to 

613
00:21:18,177 --> 00:21:20,610
space and air and missile defense . I'm 

614
00:21:20,610 --> 00:21:22,554
here today as the commander of the 

615
00:21:22,554 --> 00:21:24,610
joint functional component , Command 

616
00:21:24,610 --> 00:21:26,832
for Integrated Missile defense . And as 

617
00:21:26,832 --> 00:21:28,888
the Army's proponent for air missile 

618
00:21:28,888 --> 00:21:30,999
defense forces and capabilities , I'm 

619
00:21:30,999 --> 00:21:33,110
responsible for providing General Van 

620
00:21:33,110 --> 00:21:35,332
Herck , the soldiers who stand ready to 

621
00:21:35,332 --> 00:21:37,554
defend our nation from intercontinental 

622
00:21:37,554 --> 00:21:39,666
ballistic missile attack , as well as 

623
00:21:39,666 --> 00:21:41,554
the soldiers who provide critical 

624
00:21:41,554 --> 00:21:43,666
missile warning to army and joint war 

625
00:21:43,666 --> 00:21:45,777
fighters . As air and missile threats 

626
00:21:45,777 --> 00:21:47,888
become more diverse and numerous from 

627
00:21:47,888 --> 00:21:49,943
adversaries worldwide . The Army Air 

628
00:21:49,943 --> 00:21:51,666
and Missile Defense Enterprise 

629
00:21:51,666 --> 00:21:53,777
continues to work hard to ensure that 

630
00:21:53,777 --> 00:21:55,888
our war fighters and our homeland are 

631
00:21:55,888 --> 00:21:57,999
protected . I would like to take this 

632
00:21:57,999 --> 00:21:59,832
opportunity to briefly thank and 

633
00:21:59,832 --> 00:22:01,943
highlight the mission accomplishments 

634
00:22:01,943 --> 00:22:04,260
of our team of nearly 3000 soldiers , 

635
00:22:04,280 --> 00:22:08,040
sailors , airmen , marines , guardians 

636
00:22:08,050 --> 00:22:10,161
and civilians and is challenging code 

637
00:22:10,161 --> 00:22:12,328
environment that we continue to endure 

638
00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:14,751
during this past year . In support of 

639
00:22:14,751 --> 00:22:16,980
stratcom , space . Com and nowhere at 

640
00:22:16,980 --> 00:22:19,202
north . Com , these outstanding men and 

641
00:22:19,202 --> 00:22:21,424
women provided the Army and Joint force 

642
00:22:21,424 --> 00:22:23,647
with satellite communications , space , 

643
00:22:23,647 --> 00:22:25,536
situational awareness and missile 

644
00:22:25,536 --> 00:22:27,647
warning and defense and protected our 

645
00:22:27,647 --> 00:22:31,460
homeland 24 7365 from ballistic missile 

646
00:22:31,460 --> 00:22:33,770
attack . Even in the pandemic 

647
00:22:33,770 --> 00:22:36,160
environment , they did not miss a beat 

648
00:22:36,740 --> 00:22:38,907
to outline one of numerous examples of 

649
00:22:38,907 --> 00:22:40,851
putting mission first and how army 

650
00:22:40,851 --> 00:22:42,851
families have sacrificed during the 

651
00:22:42,851 --> 00:22:45,018
pandemic . Members of our ground based 

652
00:22:45,018 --> 00:22:46,907
missile defense Cruz adhere to 12 

653
00:22:46,907 --> 00:22:48,684
consecutive months of stringent 

654
00:22:48,684 --> 00:22:50,684
measures ensuring the uninterrupted 

655
00:22:50,684 --> 00:22:52,851
execution of their mission , including 

656
00:22:52,851 --> 00:22:54,907
sequestering crew members from their 

657
00:22:54,907 --> 00:22:57,073
homes and families . Essentially , our 

658
00:22:57,073 --> 00:22:59,296
missile defense crews lived in a bubble 

659
00:22:59,296 --> 00:23:01,462
throughout their operational rotations 

660
00:23:01,462 --> 00:23:03,462
on this essential no fail mission . 

661
00:23:03,462 --> 00:23:05,351
While they and their families who 

662
00:23:05,351 --> 00:23:07,462
reside in colorado springs , colorado 

663
00:23:07,462 --> 00:23:09,351
and Fort Greely Alaska , the crew 

664
00:23:09,351 --> 00:23:11,407
members were basically deployed away 

665
00:23:11,407 --> 00:23:11,340
from their families for extended 

666
00:23:11,340 --> 00:23:14,300
periods of time . A positive I've drawn 

667
00:23:14,300 --> 00:23:16,022
from this pandemic is my daily 

668
00:23:16,022 --> 00:23:18,133
realization that I've never been more 

669
00:23:18,133 --> 00:23:20,078
proud and thankful of our greatest 

670
00:23:20,078 --> 00:23:22,080
asset , our people . Every day I am 

671
00:23:22,080 --> 00:23:24,330
awed by their dedication and unwavering 

672
00:23:24,330 --> 00:23:26,900
sacrifices to our nation . I consider 

673
00:23:26,900 --> 00:23:29,122
it an honor and a privilege to lead and 

674
00:23:29,122 --> 00:23:31,290
serve alongside them . The continued 

675
00:23:31,290 --> 00:23:33,457
support of Congress is critical to our 

676
00:23:33,457 --> 00:23:37,240
ability to recruit , develop , retain 

677
00:23:37,250 --> 00:23:39,840
and resource . Such a highly qualified 

678
00:23:39,850 --> 00:23:42,090
and mission ready team . I look forward 

679
00:23:42,090 --> 00:23:44,146
to addressing your questions . Thank 

680
00:23:44,146 --> 00:23:47,540
you . Thank you . General Lieutenant 

681
00:23:47,540 --> 00:23:51,340
General Shaw . Yeah . Okay . Why ? 

682
00:23:51,340 --> 00:23:52,340
Mike ? 

683
00:24:03,240 --> 00:24:07,060
What ? True . 

684
00:24:13,340 --> 00:24:14,340
Mhm . 

685
00:24:18,640 --> 00:24:21,760
Point . Okay . Better . All right . 

686
00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:24,662
Good afternoon . Ladies and gentlemen . 

687
00:24:24,662 --> 00:24:26,773
Thank you . Chairman cooper , ranking 

688
00:24:26,773 --> 00:24:26,570
member turner and members of the House 

689
00:24:26,570 --> 00:24:28,681
Armed Services Committee subcommittee 

690
00:24:28,681 --> 00:24:30,848
on Strategic Forces for the invitation 

691
00:24:30,848 --> 00:24:32,959
for to join my fellow witnesses today 

692
00:24:32,959 --> 00:24:34,792
and discussing critical national 

693
00:24:34,792 --> 00:24:37,014
security issues . I am pleased to speak 

694
00:24:37,014 --> 00:24:36,850
today on behalf of our commander , 

695
00:24:36,850 --> 00:24:38,730
General Dickinson in the 18,000 

696
00:24:38,740 --> 00:24:40,684
military , civilian and contractor 

697
00:24:40,684 --> 00:24:42,462
members directly engaged in and 

698
00:24:42,462 --> 00:24:44,573
supporting the missions of the United 

699
00:24:44,573 --> 00:24:46,684
States Space Command . As directed in 

700
00:24:46,684 --> 00:24:48,907
the Unified Command Plan . One of those 

701
00:24:48,907 --> 00:24:51,073
missions as the nation's Global sensor 

702
00:24:51,073 --> 00:24:53,073
Manager requires us to quote plan , 

703
00:24:53,073 --> 00:24:55,240
manage and execute assigned Department 

704
00:24:55,240 --> 00:24:57,073
of Defense , Space , situational 

705
00:24:57,073 --> 00:24:59,296
awareness , missile defense and missile 

706
00:24:59,296 --> 00:25:01,407
warning sensors unquote . I'm pleased 

707
00:25:01,407 --> 00:25:03,462
to offer you the United States Space 

708
00:25:03,462 --> 00:25:05,518
Command perspective on that slice of 

709
00:25:05,518 --> 00:25:07,740
our mission set . And I look forward to 

710
00:25:07,740 --> 00:25:07,490
a discussion on how within the context 

711
00:25:07,490 --> 00:25:09,712
of duties overarching national Security 

712
00:25:09,712 --> 00:25:11,768
strategy , our Global sensor manager 

713
00:25:11,768 --> 00:25:14,640
activities complement those of NORAD 

714
00:25:14,650 --> 00:25:16,817
Northern Command , the Missile Defense 

715
00:25:16,817 --> 00:25:18,650
Agency and the Space and Missile 

716
00:25:18,650 --> 00:25:20,817
Defense Command . An accomplishment of 

717
00:25:20,817 --> 00:25:23,320
their respective missions . The Unified 

718
00:25:23,320 --> 00:25:25,542
Command plan outlines us based commands 

719
00:25:25,542 --> 00:25:28,320
tasks as a supported combatant command 

720
00:25:28,330 --> 00:25:30,552
in a newly declared war fighting domain 

721
00:25:30,552 --> 00:25:33,120
with a clearly defined if rather large 

722
00:25:33,280 --> 00:25:36,200
area of operations . It also outlines a 

723
00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:38,530
series of supporting tasks through 

724
00:25:38,530 --> 00:25:40,586
which U . S . Space command enhances 

725
00:25:40,586 --> 00:25:42,808
the mission effectiveness of our fellow 

726
00:25:42,808 --> 00:25:45,100
warfighting combatant commands . It is 

727
00:25:45,100 --> 00:25:47,267
in our global sensor manager role that 

728
00:25:47,267 --> 00:25:49,489
you see one of the best examples of the 

729
00:25:49,489 --> 00:25:51,267
confluence of are supported and 

730
00:25:51,267 --> 00:25:53,600
supporting roles Within the 3rd of 

731
00:25:53,600 --> 00:25:55,767
General Dickinson's key five tasks for 

732
00:25:55,767 --> 00:25:57,920
the command which is maintaining key 

733
00:25:57,920 --> 00:26:00,600
relationships exists . The subtask of 

734
00:26:00,600 --> 00:26:02,760
enhancing interoperability , our 

735
00:26:02,760 --> 00:26:04,704
success at the strategic level and 

736
00:26:04,704 --> 00:26:06,427
building the key relationships 

737
00:26:06,427 --> 00:26:08,204
necessary for protection of the 

738
00:26:08,204 --> 00:26:10,930
homeland depends on integrating weapons 

739
00:26:10,930 --> 00:26:13,263
system operations at the tactical level . 

740
00:26:13,810 --> 00:26:15,699
That is why US basic man works so 

741
00:26:15,699 --> 00:26:18,060
closely with north um stratcom , M . D . 

742
00:26:18,060 --> 00:26:20,004
A . And S . And D . C . Among many 

743
00:26:20,004 --> 00:26:22,116
others to provide missile warning and 

744
00:26:22,116 --> 00:26:24,060
missile defense capabilities while 

745
00:26:24,060 --> 00:26:25,850
simultaneously and seamlessly 

746
00:26:25,850 --> 00:26:27,600
accomplishing our space domain 

747
00:26:27,600 --> 00:26:29,822
awareness missions . It's an example of 

748
00:26:29,822 --> 00:26:31,989
the classic aphorism that the whole is 

749
00:26:31,989 --> 00:26:34,100
greater than the sum of its parts the 

750
00:26:34,100 --> 00:26:36,211
ability to find synergies among these 

751
00:26:36,211 --> 00:26:37,933
seemingly disparate missions . 

752
00:26:37,933 --> 00:26:39,822
Functions and systems employed by 

753
00:26:39,822 --> 00:26:41,600
distinct and separate combatant 

754
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:43,822
commands will significantly enhance our 

755
00:26:43,822 --> 00:26:45,600
effectiveness in protecting and 

756
00:26:45,600 --> 00:26:47,600
defending the United States and our 

757
00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:47,270
allies . I look forward to your 

758
00:26:47,270 --> 00:26:49,492
questions on this and other examples of 

759
00:26:49,492 --> 00:26:51,548
the coordination collaboration among 

760
00:26:51,548 --> 00:26:53,492
the agencies represented here this 

761
00:26:53,492 --> 00:26:55,603
afternoon . Thank you . Mr Chairman . 

762
00:26:55,603 --> 00:26:57,492
Thank you . General will now have 

763
00:26:57,492 --> 00:26:59,492
member questioning and I'm going to 

764
00:26:59,492 --> 00:27:01,381
defer my questions for the closed 

765
00:27:01,381 --> 00:27:03,603
session . Mr Turner is now recognized . 

766
00:27:03,940 --> 00:27:06,290
Great thank you , Admiral . Start with 

767
00:27:06,290 --> 00:27:09,330
you . Continuing resolutions . They 

768
00:27:09,330 --> 00:27:13,310
impact missile defense . Are any 

769
00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:16,100
program that's based on ingenuity um 

770
00:27:16,110 --> 00:27:18,220
and news starts and our nuclear 

771
00:27:18,220 --> 00:27:20,690
modernization programs I believe more 

772
00:27:20,700 --> 00:27:23,650
uh than than even just basic continuing 

773
00:27:23,650 --> 00:27:26,110
operations . Could you please 

774
00:27:26,120 --> 00:27:29,070
describe some of the situations that 

775
00:27:29,070 --> 00:27:30,959
you're placed end with continuing 

776
00:27:30,959 --> 00:27:33,230
resolutions and its effects on your 

777
00:27:33,230 --> 00:27:35,560
programmes ? Thanks for the question , 

778
00:27:37,340 --> 00:27:40,010
congressman Turner . Uh , it's got a 

779
00:27:40,010 --> 00:27:42,970
broad impact across the program . And 

780
00:27:42,970 --> 00:27:45,290
let me just kind of start where it 

781
00:27:45,290 --> 00:27:47,457
really matters when you get out to the 

782
00:27:47,457 --> 00:27:49,568
fleet . Um , and you look for support 

783
00:27:49,568 --> 00:27:51,734
to get the ship ships underway right ? 

784
00:27:51,734 --> 00:27:53,790
We'll have to work very closely with 

785
00:27:53,790 --> 00:27:55,957
the Navy . Um , If we try to execute a 

786
00:27:55,957 --> 00:27:58,012
flight test will often find that the 

787
00:27:58,012 --> 00:28:00,234
test ranges are suffering from the same 

788
00:28:00,234 --> 00:28:02,457
continuous resolution and everyone will 

789
00:28:02,457 --> 00:28:01,920
have different budget cycles . So 

790
00:28:01,920 --> 00:28:05,130
execution of tests is at risk when you 

791
00:28:05,130 --> 00:28:07,770
back up . Can you explain why a test 

792
00:28:08,140 --> 00:28:11,290
gets impacted more than just the 

793
00:28:11,300 --> 00:28:14,480
general operations of a facility ? So 

794
00:28:14,480 --> 00:28:16,650
if you look at the way we fund our 

795
00:28:16,650 --> 00:28:18,817
warfare centers , for example , on the 

796
00:28:18,817 --> 00:28:20,761
on the Navy side , and the way the 

797
00:28:20,761 --> 00:28:22,872
ranges are funded , they will come to 

798
00:28:22,872 --> 00:28:22,250
an all stop with the continuing 

799
00:28:22,250 --> 00:28:24,810
resolution . So we can get a ship out 

800
00:28:24,810 --> 00:28:27,032
on station and operational ship there . 

801
00:28:27,032 --> 00:28:29,143
But we will not have the test support 

802
00:28:29,143 --> 00:28:31,254
to do that . We can't get the sensors 

803
00:28:31,254 --> 00:28:31,030
underway , we can't deploy the aircraft 

804
00:28:31,030 --> 00:28:33,680
that are going to collect data . So , 

805
00:28:33,680 --> 00:28:36,520
so that's that's a clear impact . So 

806
00:28:36,530 --> 00:28:38,970
frequently you can be undertaking 

807
00:28:38,970 --> 00:28:41,390
resolution for a quarter of the year . 

808
00:28:41,430 --> 00:28:44,270
So for three months out of the year , 

809
00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:47,760
your your schedules are set back , Your 

810
00:28:47,770 --> 00:28:50,740
work product is set back well and and 

811
00:28:50,740 --> 00:28:52,907
we'll we'll do our best to catch up on 

812
00:28:52,907 --> 00:28:55,129
schedules and deconflict and reschedule 

813
00:28:55,129 --> 00:28:57,240
where we can , but it's a significant 

814
00:28:57,240 --> 00:28:59,296
impact when it comes there . Then if 

815
00:28:59,296 --> 00:29:01,073
you back up even further to say 

816
00:29:01,073 --> 00:29:03,296
production , uh normally will be okay . 

817
00:29:03,296 --> 00:29:05,518
We can we can carry production for some 

818
00:29:05,518 --> 00:29:07,684
period of time . but if we start , you 

819
00:29:07,684 --> 00:29:09,573
know , holding up payments to the 

820
00:29:09,573 --> 00:29:11,684
contractor , you won't see us proceed 

821
00:29:11,684 --> 00:29:11,230
in those areas . So it could be a 

822
00:29:11,240 --> 00:29:13,351
shortened gap there or something that 

823
00:29:13,351 --> 00:29:15,351
cascades to the right and that that 

824
00:29:15,351 --> 00:29:17,573
really translates the cost , right ? So 

825
00:29:17,573 --> 00:29:19,629
when you back up to development , um 

826
00:29:19,629 --> 00:29:19,610
now it comes to the stability of the 

827
00:29:19,610 --> 00:29:21,890
team , right ? So just looking at the 

828
00:29:21,890 --> 00:29:24,420
government team , um you know , it it 

829
00:29:24,420 --> 00:29:26,531
casts a shadow right on on the future 

830
00:29:26,531 --> 00:29:28,753
of their careers and often time we find 

831
00:29:28,753 --> 00:29:30,753
ourselves losing talent during that 

832
00:29:30,753 --> 00:29:32,864
sort of phase . Um and then if you go 

833
00:29:32,864 --> 00:29:35,087
again to warfare centers and government 

834
00:29:35,087 --> 00:29:37,309
labs that are reimbursed , reimbursable 

835
00:29:37,309 --> 00:29:36,440
funding and those sorts of things , we 

836
00:29:36,450 --> 00:29:38,561
we put them in an all stop and freeze 

837
00:29:38,561 --> 00:29:40,783
them . Um does it affect costs and time 

838
00:29:40,783 --> 00:29:42,839
delivery ? Absolutely . It'll always 

839
00:29:42,839 --> 00:29:44,617
have an effect on cost and time 

840
00:29:44,617 --> 00:29:47,180
delivery cobbler . Uh , examples ways 

841
00:29:47,180 --> 00:29:49,236
in which continue resolutions affect 

842
00:29:49,236 --> 00:29:53,070
your operations . So much like 

843
00:29:53,080 --> 00:29:55,191
what Admiral Hill just talked about . 

844
00:29:55,191 --> 00:29:57,191
Uh , we uh , we run the Reagan test 

845
00:29:57,191 --> 00:29:59,024
site . So again , it affects our 

846
00:29:59,024 --> 00:30:01,191
ability to support those tests that we 

847
00:30:01,191 --> 00:30:03,247
do for the D . O . D . Out of out of 

848
00:30:03,247 --> 00:30:05,580
the Reagan test site on Kwajalein Atoll . 

849
00:30:05,580 --> 00:30:07,802
Mhm Van Heart , don't show this is your 

850
00:30:07,802 --> 00:30:09,802
chance of a commercial anything You 

851
00:30:09,802 --> 00:30:11,858
need anecdotal stories . You want to 

852
00:30:11,858 --> 00:30:13,747
provide any information as to how 

853
00:30:13,747 --> 00:30:15,858
you've seen continuing resolutions be 

854
00:30:15,858 --> 00:30:18,840
detrimental . It's about predictability , 

855
00:30:18,840 --> 00:30:20,784
congressman and being able to move 

856
00:30:20,784 --> 00:30:22,896
forward based on a plan to execute it 

857
00:30:22,896 --> 00:30:24,784
strategically for me directly and 

858
00:30:24,784 --> 00:30:26,951
defending homeland defense . Uh , I'll 

859
00:30:26,951 --> 00:30:29,007
be able to continue that mission the 

860
00:30:29,007 --> 00:30:31,229
most direct impact . And as you heard , 

861
00:30:31,229 --> 00:30:30,780
my opening statement is keeping pace 

862
00:30:30,780 --> 00:30:33,840
with potential threats and adversaries 

863
00:30:33,850 --> 00:30:36,210
and the programs that Admiral Hill and 

864
00:30:36,210 --> 00:30:38,321
General Carballo talked about . If we 

865
00:30:38,321 --> 00:30:40,432
further continue to delay those , the 

866
00:30:40,432 --> 00:30:42,321
risk is we fall further behind in 

867
00:30:42,321 --> 00:30:44,266
defending the homeland . Thank you 

868
00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:49,240
congressman . I just , I would just 

869
00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:51,351
echo what General Van Herck said that 

870
00:30:51,351 --> 00:30:53,573
combatant commands or demand capability 

871
00:30:53,573 --> 00:30:55,629
as soon as they can possibly get and 

872
00:30:55,629 --> 00:30:57,740
any continuing resolution that delays 

873
00:30:57,740 --> 00:30:57,610
the capability , whether it's testing 

874
00:30:57,610 --> 00:31:00,160
or fielding or development is a delay 

875
00:31:00,170 --> 00:31:02,170
in our ability to sustain readiness 

876
00:31:02,170 --> 00:31:05,400
against an adversary . Mr Mero . 

877
00:31:05,410 --> 00:31:08,780
Um , In the um , 

878
00:31:08,790 --> 00:31:11,990
2017 India , a fiscal year 2017 , 

879
00:31:12,390 --> 00:31:16,200
a um . the secretary of 

880
00:31:16,200 --> 00:31:18,800
defense was required to designate a 

881
00:31:18,800 --> 00:31:21,210
single entity as a lead acquisition 

882
00:31:21,210 --> 00:31:23,543
organization for defending the homeland . 

883
00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:26,207
I'm gonna ask you this question in the 

884
00:31:26,207 --> 00:31:27,984
general , you are in the unique 

885
00:31:27,984 --> 00:31:30,318
position of playing catch with yourself . 

886
00:31:30,540 --> 00:31:32,540
Uh , there's a bunch of things that 

887
00:31:32,540 --> 00:31:34,651
happened while you were here that you 

888
00:31:34,651 --> 00:31:36,990
now have over at the pentagon , um , 

889
00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:39,700
things that need to be completed that 

890
00:31:39,700 --> 00:31:42,020
or not , um , that you even had a 

891
00:31:42,020 --> 00:31:44,242
significant interest in and occurring . 

892
00:31:44,242 --> 00:31:46,298
What are some of the priorities that 

893
00:31:46,298 --> 00:31:48,520
you have to make sure that the pentagon 

894
00:31:48,520 --> 00:31:50,576
finishes and gets over to Congress , 

895
00:31:50,576 --> 00:31:52,687
things that you worked to compel them 

896
00:31:52,687 --> 00:31:56,560
to do . Ranking member . Thank you . 

897
00:31:57,240 --> 00:32:00,750
Yes , it's it's an honor to , to get 

898
00:32:00,760 --> 00:32:04,600
sorry . It's an honor to catch those 

899
00:32:04,610 --> 00:32:06,850
congressional requirements . Now in my 

900
00:32:06,850 --> 00:32:09,490
new position , um , with regard to 

901
00:32:09,490 --> 00:32:12,530
designating the single authority for 

902
00:32:12,540 --> 00:32:14,818
cruise missile defense of the homeland . 

903
00:32:14,818 --> 00:32:16,596
Uh , that is something that the 

904
00:32:16,596 --> 00:32:18,818
administration is going to look at . My 

905
00:32:18,818 --> 00:32:20,762
understanding is that the previous 

906
00:32:20,762 --> 00:32:20,590
administration looked at it and decided 

907
00:32:20,590 --> 00:32:23,320
not to designate a single authority . 

908
00:32:23,330 --> 00:32:25,108
We do understand that there are 

909
00:32:25,108 --> 00:32:27,470
capability gaps . Um , we need to look 

910
00:32:27,470 --> 00:32:30,770
at where and how to prioritize cruise 

911
00:32:30,770 --> 00:32:32,992
missile defense of the homeland . There 

912
00:32:32,992 --> 00:32:35,620
are cost issues . I know the 

913
00:32:35,630 --> 00:32:37,797
Congressional Budget Office identified 

914
00:32:37,797 --> 00:32:40,800
um significant cost ranging from 75 

915
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:44,660
billion to 8100 and 80 billion over 20 

916
00:32:44,660 --> 00:32:46,327
years . So that would include 

917
00:32:46,327 --> 00:32:48,970
acquisition , also operates operation , 

918
00:32:48,980 --> 00:32:52,540
operate uh operationalization 

919
00:32:52,550 --> 00:32:56,530
of the system maintenance um over 

920
00:32:56,530 --> 00:32:59,070
the long term . But I think what what 

921
00:32:59,070 --> 00:33:00,959
we need to look at is what is the 

922
00:33:00,959 --> 00:33:04,130
viability of our capabilities ? What 

923
00:33:04,130 --> 00:33:06,297
are the costs and how do we prioritize 

924
00:33:06,297 --> 00:33:10,160
um uh that defense . Are you 

925
00:33:10,160 --> 00:33:13,060
back ? Thank you . Mr Langevin . 

926
00:33:14,940 --> 00:33:17,107
Thank you . Mr Chairman . Can you hear 

927
00:33:17,107 --> 00:33:20,170
me ? Okay ? Very good . Thank you . 

928
00:33:20,180 --> 00:33:22,180
Thank you . Mr Chairman . I want to 

929
00:33:22,180 --> 00:33:24,347
thank our witnesses for your testimony 

930
00:33:24,347 --> 00:33:26,430
today . In particular . I want to 

931
00:33:26,440 --> 00:33:28,670
welcome back uh welcome to the 

932
00:33:28,670 --> 00:33:32,560
committee . Uh Mr Miro . And uh 

933
00:33:32,610 --> 00:33:34,450
and I enjoyed your work on the 

934
00:33:34,450 --> 00:33:36,561
committee when we work together . And 

935
00:33:36,561 --> 00:33:38,394
uh it's really a big loss to the 

936
00:33:38,394 --> 00:33:40,117
committee when you left by the 

937
00:33:40,117 --> 00:33:42,283
departments gain and I wish you well . 

938
00:33:42,283 --> 00:33:44,394
I want everyone for your services are 

939
00:33:44,394 --> 00:33:47,230
joined nation . Um , I want to begin on 

940
00:33:47,230 --> 00:33:50,880
a directed energy question . Uh , I 

941
00:33:50,890 --> 00:33:53,168
have to say I'm really disappointed uh , 

942
00:33:53,170 --> 00:33:55,226
that the president's budget canceled 

943
00:33:55,226 --> 00:33:57,480
NBA's directed energy program . Uh , 

944
00:33:57,490 --> 00:33:59,690
This program provides promising 

945
00:33:59,690 --> 00:34:01,746
ballistic missile defense technology 

946
00:34:01,746 --> 00:34:03,468
and then really addresses cost 

947
00:34:03,468 --> 00:34:06,020
imbalances between offense and defense . 

948
00:34:06,030 --> 00:34:09,300
Admiral Hill , uh , who made the 

949
00:34:09,300 --> 00:34:11,460
decision to cut the program and why 

950
00:34:12,840 --> 00:34:15,062
constantly german . I thank thanks very 

951
00:34:15,062 --> 00:34:17,229
much . Great . Great question . Um , I 

952
00:34:17,229 --> 00:34:20,250
would say it was a department uh effort 

953
00:34:20,260 --> 00:34:22,630
to consolidate directed energy work 

954
00:34:22,630 --> 00:34:25,640
within the department . And so I will 

955
00:34:25,650 --> 00:34:27,761
uh , you know , work closely with the 

956
00:34:27,761 --> 00:34:29,594
under secretary for research and 

957
00:34:29,594 --> 00:34:31,817
Engineering and when these capabilities 

958
00:34:31,817 --> 00:34:34,020
reach the power levels and the sizing 

959
00:34:34,020 --> 00:34:36,410
and levels that that we need being 

960
00:34:36,410 --> 00:34:38,440
control stability , lethality 

961
00:34:38,450 --> 00:34:41,620
capability , then we will adopt those 

962
00:34:41,630 --> 00:34:43,686
technologies and bring them into the 

963
00:34:43,686 --> 00:34:45,852
missile defense system . Okay . I'm in 

964
00:34:45,852 --> 00:34:47,908
I'm unclear was the decision made or 

965
00:34:47,908 --> 00:34:50,019
recommended under this administration 

966
00:34:50,019 --> 00:34:52,241
or the previous administrations ? Prior 

967
00:34:52,241 --> 00:34:54,408
prior administration ? Yes sir . I say 

968
00:34:54,408 --> 00:34:56,850
thank you . Um how how much 

969
00:34:56,850 --> 00:34:59,540
transparency and input will you have 

970
00:34:59,550 --> 00:35:01,772
into this new arrangement to ensure the 

971
00:35:01,772 --> 00:35:03,900
technology fits uh missile defense 

972
00:35:03,900 --> 00:35:06,230
requirements ? Yes , sir . Thank you . 

973
00:35:06,240 --> 00:35:09,970
Uh I think it's on us to ensure that we 

974
00:35:09,970 --> 00:35:12,192
stay close to the undersecretaries lead 

975
00:35:12,192 --> 00:35:14,530
for directed energy uh so that we can 

976
00:35:14,530 --> 00:35:16,530
influence the requirements so they 

977
00:35:16,530 --> 00:35:18,697
understand what our power levels are , 

978
00:35:18,697 --> 00:35:20,752
what our concept of operations are , 

979
00:35:20,752 --> 00:35:22,974
how we would leverage that technology . 

980
00:35:22,974 --> 00:35:25,570
Um I don't see that that's an issue in 

981
00:35:25,570 --> 00:35:27,792
terms of having access and transparency 

982
00:35:27,792 --> 00:35:29,430
into the road maps and those 

983
00:35:29,430 --> 00:35:31,263
capabilities going to industry . 

984
00:35:33,640 --> 00:35:36,320
Okay . Um is my understanding that you 

985
00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:38,710
have very little transparency into the 

986
00:35:38,720 --> 00:35:41,890
into the funding though ? That that is 

987
00:35:41,890 --> 00:35:43,980
true . I I don't have a good looking 

988
00:35:43,990 --> 00:35:46,101
into the funding . All I know is that 

989
00:35:46,101 --> 00:35:48,110
the funding was removed from the 

990
00:35:48,120 --> 00:35:51,700
missile defense budget . Um 

991
00:35:51,710 --> 00:35:53,940
So I just want to say , I think that 

992
00:35:53,940 --> 00:35:55,773
that that decision from the last 

993
00:35:55,773 --> 00:35:57,940
administration should be reevaluated . 

994
00:35:57,940 --> 00:36:00,330
That's my assessment . Uh if you move 

995
00:36:00,330 --> 00:36:03,590
these programs out of your agency , uh 

996
00:36:03,600 --> 00:36:05,900
well , I believe that we're gonna keep 

997
00:36:05,900 --> 00:36:08,011
them in their labs , the technology , 

998
00:36:08,011 --> 00:36:10,610
the labs to test them to death and 

999
00:36:10,610 --> 00:36:12,777
they'll never get to the warfighter at 

1000
00:36:12,777 --> 00:36:16,390
best . It's wasted money at worst , our 

1001
00:36:16,390 --> 00:36:19,040
systems can't keep up with what 

1002
00:36:19,040 --> 00:36:22,920
adversaries are developing . So uh the 

1003
00:36:22,930 --> 00:36:25,890
decision also cut the dial pumped 

1004
00:36:25,900 --> 00:36:29,860
alkaline laser program . Um and I'm 

1005
00:36:29,870 --> 00:36:32,420
concerned about that , but um let me 

1006
00:36:32,420 --> 00:36:35,440
get to uh something else in another 

1007
00:36:35,440 --> 00:36:38,240
area . Um So our adversaries build 

1008
00:36:38,240 --> 00:36:40,240
electronic warfare systems that are 

1009
00:36:40,240 --> 00:36:42,407
specifically targeted to undermine our 

1010
00:36:42,407 --> 00:36:44,573
technological commanding control . And 

1011
00:36:44,573 --> 00:36:46,796
it is a special disease general cobbler 

1012
00:36:46,796 --> 00:36:49,890
in Admiral Hill . How effective is our 

1013
00:36:49,900 --> 00:36:52,610
missile defense network in a contested 

1014
00:36:52,620 --> 00:36:54,400
spectrum environment ? And what 

1015
00:36:54,410 --> 00:36:57,460
improvements do we need to make ? Okay . 

1016
00:36:59,430 --> 00:37:01,700
Thanks congressman . So every day , 

1017
00:37:01,710 --> 00:37:04,920
every day uh within our missile defense 

1018
00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:06,890
systems that we have , uh we gotta 

1019
00:37:06,890 --> 00:37:08,612
practice , we gotta have cyber 

1020
00:37:08,612 --> 00:37:10,880
protection . Uh we have resiliency of 

1021
00:37:10,880 --> 00:37:13,047
the ballistic missile defense system . 

1022
00:37:13,047 --> 00:37:15,730
We collect analyse , report digital 

1023
00:37:15,730 --> 00:37:19,030
data . We deploy and maintain our 

1024
00:37:19,030 --> 00:37:21,540
network defense tools . We're 

1025
00:37:21,540 --> 00:37:24,200
constantly um evaluating our network 

1026
00:37:24,210 --> 00:37:26,830
defense operations . And then and then 

1027
00:37:26,830 --> 00:37:28,830
we respond to incidents and we work 

1028
00:37:28,830 --> 00:37:30,941
very closely with the Missile Defense 

1029
00:37:30,941 --> 00:37:33,100
Agency as as any of those potential 

1030
00:37:33,100 --> 00:37:35,780
incidents come up . Yeah . Yes , sir . 

1031
00:37:35,780 --> 00:37:38,290
And then , uh from my perspective , you 

1032
00:37:38,290 --> 00:37:40,068
know , working closely with the 

1033
00:37:40,068 --> 00:37:41,846
combatant commands and with the 

1034
00:37:41,846 --> 00:37:44,068
operational forces and services because 

1035
00:37:44,068 --> 00:37:46,179
all of the , you know , when you look 

1036
00:37:46,179 --> 00:37:45,930
at the missile defense system writ 

1037
00:37:45,930 --> 00:37:48,890
large , it cuts across all of the above . 

1038
00:37:48,900 --> 00:37:50,567
And so we have to do a lot of 

1039
00:37:50,567 --> 00:37:52,678
coordination there , but we are doing 

1040
00:37:52,678 --> 00:37:55,510
the the overall uh you know , insider 

1041
00:37:55,520 --> 00:37:57,464
work , we're doing the adversarial 

1042
00:37:57,464 --> 00:37:59,680
assessments , we're just now starting 

1043
00:37:59,680 --> 00:38:01,569
to work with D . O . T . Me to do 

1044
00:38:01,569 --> 00:38:03,458
something called persistent cyber 

1045
00:38:03,458 --> 00:38:05,410
operations . Uh where will be 24 7 

1046
00:38:05,410 --> 00:38:07,590
monitoring and in healing the networks 

1047
00:38:07,590 --> 00:38:09,920
as we go . Uh For me , I want to know 

1048
00:38:09,920 --> 00:38:11,809
where vulnerabilities are . So it 

1049
00:38:11,809 --> 00:38:13,864
becomes a very sensitive topic right 

1050
00:38:13,864 --> 00:38:15,476
away , but we've got a great 

1051
00:38:15,476 --> 00:38:17,698
relationship with the U . S . Cyber com 

1052
00:38:17,698 --> 00:38:19,809
with strategic commands , cyber group 

1053
00:38:19,809 --> 00:38:21,976
and and of course uh D . O . T . Any . 

1054
00:38:21,976 --> 00:38:24,198
So I think we're in a much better place 

1055
00:38:24,198 --> 00:38:26,309
if you'd asked me this question about 

1056
00:38:26,309 --> 00:38:25,920
three years or so ago we're learning 

1057
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:28,142
how to crawl . We're definitely walking 

1058
00:38:28,142 --> 00:38:30,400
very fast right now and almost about 

1059
00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:32,622
ready to run as we go into a persistent 

1060
00:38:32,622 --> 00:38:34,678
cyber operations . Gentlemen , thank 

1061
00:38:34,678 --> 00:38:36,844
you . I know what I'm expired . I have 

1062
00:38:36,844 --> 00:38:38,733
some questions for the record . I 

1063
00:38:38,733 --> 00:38:40,956
appreciate you responding . Thank you . 

1064
00:38:40,956 --> 00:38:43,122
Are you back ? Thank you john Wilson , 

1065
00:38:43,122 --> 00:38:45,344
thank you Mr Chairman and thank each of 

1066
00:38:45,344 --> 00:38:47,233
you for being here today and your 

1067
00:38:47,233 --> 00:38:50,460
service for our country uh and Miss uh 

1068
00:38:50,470 --> 00:38:53,590
Secretary tomorrow um Israeli families 

1069
00:38:53,600 --> 00:38:55,433
face the threat of larger , most 

1070
00:38:55,433 --> 00:38:57,267
sophisticated rocket and missile 

1071
00:38:57,267 --> 00:39:00,950
arsenals every day provided by Iran to 

1072
00:39:00,950 --> 00:39:03,440
Hamas and Hezbollah to address this 

1073
00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:05,607
mounting threat . Israel United States 

1074
00:39:05,607 --> 00:39:07,607
are working together to develop and 

1075
00:39:07,607 --> 00:39:09,829
deploy and multi tiered missile defense 

1076
00:39:09,829 --> 00:39:11,980
system . The us Israel memorandum of 

1077
00:39:11,980 --> 00:39:14,036
understanding on security assistance 

1078
00:39:14,036 --> 00:39:16,430
provides for $500 million dollars in 

1079
00:39:16,430 --> 00:39:18,610
funding for annual missile defense 

1080
00:39:18,610 --> 00:39:21,030
cooperation with Israel . Do you 

1081
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:23,151
support the continued funding for the 

1082
00:39:23,151 --> 00:39:25,440
joint U . S . Israel missile defense 

1083
00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:27,890
programs including Iron Dome David's 

1084
00:39:27,890 --> 00:39:30,057
Sling and Arrow . And can you speak on 

1085
00:39:30,057 --> 00:39:32,200
the progress of the development of 

1086
00:39:32,200 --> 00:39:33,140
Arrow four 

1087
00:39:36,120 --> 00:39:38,231
Congressman , thank you very much for 

1088
00:39:38,231 --> 00:39:40,342
for that question . Yes . Uh there is 

1089
00:39:40,342 --> 00:39:43,410
strong support for continuing um those 

1090
00:39:43,420 --> 00:39:45,587
those programs um they've had a record 

1091
00:39:45,587 --> 00:39:48,670
of success over a long time and and we 

1092
00:39:48,670 --> 00:39:50,870
continue our very close collaboration 

1093
00:39:50,880 --> 00:39:53,610
and cooperation with Israel . Um I 

1094
00:39:53,610 --> 00:39:56,940
think on the details of the development 

1095
00:39:56,940 --> 00:39:59,250
of Arrow , I'd like to differ to Vice 

1096
00:39:59,250 --> 00:40:02,210
Admiral Hill . Uh Sir Aero Four is 

1097
00:40:02,210 --> 00:40:04,620
going very well in terms of laying down 

1098
00:40:04,620 --> 00:40:06,750
the requirements for that system . In 

1099
00:40:06,750 --> 00:40:08,980
fact , as soon as the covid 19 

1100
00:40:08,980 --> 00:40:11,280
restrictions lifted , we had a team on 

1101
00:40:11,280 --> 00:40:13,447
site working very closely with I . M . 

1102
00:40:13,447 --> 00:40:15,613
D . O . To lay out requirements and to 

1103
00:40:15,613 --> 00:40:17,669
lay down the development path . So I 

1104
00:40:17,669 --> 00:40:19,891
think we're on a good place therefore . 

1105
00:40:19,891 --> 00:40:21,891
Thank you very much . And secretary 

1106
00:40:21,891 --> 00:40:23,836
tomorrow , another country that is 

1107
00:40:23,836 --> 00:40:27,430
under threat and and an 

1108
00:40:27,430 --> 00:40:29,597
inventory of short range missiles will 

1109
00:40:29,597 --> 00:40:31,819
provide and improve Taiwan's ability to 

1110
00:40:31,819 --> 00:40:34,330
deter chinese aggression by incredibly 

1111
00:40:34,330 --> 00:40:36,460
disrupting degrading and interdicting 

1112
00:40:36,470 --> 00:40:38,910
chinese command and control nodes , 

1113
00:40:38,910 --> 00:40:41,630
military airfields , supply depots and 

1114
00:40:41,630 --> 00:40:44,140
reinforcements in response to an attack . 

1115
00:40:44,150 --> 00:40:45,928
Does the administration support 

1116
00:40:45,928 --> 00:40:47,890
Taiwan's ability to defend itself 

1117
00:40:47,900 --> 00:40:50,330
through layer deterrence by including 

1118
00:40:50,330 --> 00:40:52,140
enhanced missile capability ? 

1119
00:40:55,010 --> 00:40:58,250
Uh , Congressman ? We we strong 

1120
00:40:58,260 --> 00:41:01,180
strongly support uh , deterrence uh , 

1121
00:41:01,180 --> 00:41:03,830
and um , and are investing in 

1122
00:41:03,840 --> 00:41:06,950
capabilities um , to deter a chinese 

1123
00:41:06,950 --> 00:41:09,680
attack in the area . Okay , thank you 

1124
00:41:09,680 --> 00:41:12,790
very much . And additionally , general 

1125
00:41:12,790 --> 00:41:16,510
cobbler . Uh I'm grateful that the 

1126
00:41:16,510 --> 00:41:19,130
support uh which is provided for 

1127
00:41:19,130 --> 00:41:21,600
funding Israel's combat proven iron 

1128
00:41:21,600 --> 00:41:24,870
dome system and the Fy 22 

1129
00:41:24,880 --> 00:41:26,900
budget requests . The army has 

1130
00:41:26,900 --> 00:41:29,340
purchased two iron dome batteries and 

1131
00:41:29,340 --> 00:41:31,550
has been reported , the department is 

1132
00:41:31,550 --> 00:41:33,661
considering purchasing more . Has the 

1133
00:41:33,661 --> 00:41:35,550
army determine where and when the 

1134
00:41:35,550 --> 00:41:37,550
batteries will be deployed ? Is the 

1135
00:41:37,550 --> 00:41:39,606
army not considering purchasing more 

1136
00:41:39,606 --> 00:41:41,661
batteries ? Which parts ? The system 

1137
00:41:41,661 --> 00:41:43,550
can be incorporated as part of an 

1138
00:41:43,550 --> 00:41:45,494
indirect fires , forced protection 

1139
00:41:45,494 --> 00:41:48,600
capability ? Yes , I had a chance to go 

1140
00:41:48,600 --> 00:41:50,767
visit the iron dome . Uh , the U . S . 

1141
00:41:50,767 --> 00:41:52,720
Army soldiers who are on the two 

1142
00:41:52,730 --> 00:41:54,897
batteries worth of iron dome equipment 

1143
00:41:54,897 --> 00:41:57,063
up at White Sands missile range . So I 

1144
00:41:57,063 --> 00:41:59,119
visit them a couple of months ago as 

1145
00:41:59,119 --> 00:42:01,230
they go through their training . Uh , 

1146
00:42:01,230 --> 00:42:03,397
at the end of this month , we'll see a 

1147
00:42:03,397 --> 00:42:05,508
iron dome live fire executed by those 

1148
00:42:05,508 --> 00:42:07,563
soldiers . And they'll wrap up their 

1149
00:42:07,563 --> 00:42:07,100
field training exercises and 

1150
00:42:07,100 --> 00:42:09,420
certifications with the goal that the 

1151
00:42:09,420 --> 00:42:11,370
first battery will be ready for 

1152
00:42:11,380 --> 00:42:13,660
worldwide deployment by september of 

1153
00:42:13,660 --> 00:42:15,882
this year and then the second battery . 

1154
00:42:15,882 --> 00:42:17,938
Shortly thereafter discussions about 

1155
00:42:17,938 --> 00:42:19,938
the future employment . I'd like to 

1156
00:42:19,938 --> 00:42:22,104
take that into the closed session if I 

1157
00:42:22,104 --> 00:42:24,104
could Absolutely gosh , that's very 

1158
00:42:24,104 --> 00:42:26,216
encouraging . And uh , Admiral Hill , 

1159
00:42:26,216 --> 00:42:28,438
uh , the value of american territory of 

1160
00:42:28,438 --> 00:42:30,870
Guam is a key Western pacific theater 

1161
00:42:30,880 --> 00:42:33,800
operations , logistical hub for our 

1162
00:42:33,800 --> 00:42:36,740
navy , making a a priority target for 

1163
00:42:36,740 --> 00:42:38,710
the Chinese Communist Party . The 

1164
00:42:38,710 --> 00:42:40,880
missile defense agencies FY 20 to 

1165
00:42:40,880 --> 00:42:44,110
request includes 118.3 million to 

1166
00:42:44,110 --> 00:42:46,277
develop an architecture for defense of 

1167
00:42:46,277 --> 00:42:49,590
Guam . Your agency has not yet actually 

1168
00:42:49,590 --> 00:42:51,701
detail what type of system this would 

1169
00:42:51,701 --> 00:42:54,320
be given china's increasing hostel 

1170
00:42:54,700 --> 00:42:57,000
pressure and the largest peacetime 

1171
00:42:57,000 --> 00:42:59,222
military build up in the history of the 

1172
00:42:59,222 --> 00:43:01,278
world . When can we expect to have a 

1173
00:43:01,278 --> 00:43:03,500
detailed overview of the system and its 

1174
00:43:03,500 --> 00:43:05,720
deployment timeline ? Thanks 

1175
00:43:05,720 --> 00:43:08,770
congressman . Thanks Mr Wilson . We 

1176
00:43:08,770 --> 00:43:11,590
were working at uh very actively last 

1177
00:43:11,590 --> 00:43:13,479
night . I mentioned in my opening 

1178
00:43:13,479 --> 00:43:15,701
comments discussing this with an A . La 

1179
00:43:15,701 --> 00:43:17,757
Colina last night . You'll see those 

1180
00:43:17,757 --> 00:43:19,868
details when we deliver the report to 

1181
00:43:19,868 --> 00:43:19,810
Congress . We're on path to deliver 

1182
00:43:19,810 --> 00:43:21,921
that from M . B . A . To the Cape and 

1183
00:43:21,921 --> 00:43:23,921
and have a discussion with Indo pak 

1184
00:43:23,921 --> 00:43:26,088
calm within the next couple of weeks . 

1185
00:43:26,088 --> 00:43:28,088
I think we we had promised june but 

1186
00:43:28,088 --> 00:43:30,310
given the complexity of it , it's gonna 

1187
00:43:30,310 --> 00:43:32,254
take us a little bit longer to get 

1188
00:43:32,254 --> 00:43:34,421
there . But we will definitely outline 

1189
00:43:34,421 --> 00:43:36,754
with the detail based on the threat set , 

1190
00:43:36,754 --> 00:43:38,532
which is ballistic , cruise and 

1191
00:43:38,532 --> 00:43:40,699
hypersonic . We're going to leverage a 

1192
00:43:40,699 --> 00:43:40,580
mature systems and we're going to 

1193
00:43:40,580 --> 00:43:43,350
procure those areas that we that we 

1194
00:43:43,350 --> 00:43:45,517
need for long lead in order to hit the 

1195
00:43:45,517 --> 00:43:47,683
timeline . It's it's a very aggressive 

1196
00:43:47,683 --> 00:43:49,794
timeline given where we're at . Thank 

1197
00:43:49,794 --> 00:43:51,794
you very much . Yes , sir , are you 

1198
00:43:51,794 --> 00:43:54,017
back ? Thanks to gentlemen Mr moulton . 

1199
00:43:54,200 --> 00:43:57,110
Uh , Thank you Chairman . Uh , Mhm 

1200
00:43:57,500 --> 00:44:00,030
threat detection and reaction time are 

1201
00:44:00,030 --> 00:44:02,140
clearly key to effective missile 

1202
00:44:02,140 --> 00:44:04,251
defense . And both of those depend on 

1203
00:44:04,251 --> 00:44:06,084
software . But it seems that our 

1204
00:44:06,084 --> 00:44:07,918
current system of acquisition is 

1205
00:44:07,918 --> 00:44:09,807
designed to keep us a step behind 

1206
00:44:09,807 --> 00:44:11,918
because we lock into contracts with a 

1207
00:44:11,918 --> 00:44:14,140
single company or single consortium for 

1208
00:44:14,140 --> 00:44:16,200
years at a time , assuming that that 

1209
00:44:16,200 --> 00:44:18,500
company has ability or incentive to 

1210
00:44:18,510 --> 00:44:20,690
update the software on the system at 

1211
00:44:20,690 --> 00:44:22,830
the speed of relevance , which often 

1212
00:44:22,830 --> 00:44:25,700
they don't . The world has long since 

1213
00:44:25,700 --> 00:44:28,050
become software centric , but D O . D . 

1214
00:44:28,050 --> 00:44:30,560
Is still stuck on hardware determined 

1215
00:44:30,560 --> 00:44:32,780
development . So Vice Admiral Hill , 

1216
00:44:32,780 --> 00:44:35,002
what is your organization doing to make 

1217
00:44:35,002 --> 00:44:37,540
sure that your systems software can be 

1218
00:44:37,540 --> 00:44:39,651
upgraded regularly ? Will be upgraded 

1219
00:44:39,651 --> 00:44:41,540
regularly ? Because I struggle to 

1220
00:44:41,540 --> 00:44:43,707
imagine an area where it would be more 

1221
00:44:43,707 --> 00:44:45,873
important to have the fastest and most 

1222
00:44:45,873 --> 00:44:48,151
accurate software running our defenses . 

1223
00:44:48,151 --> 00:44:50,429
Uh Thanks sir . A great great question . 

1224
00:44:50,429 --> 00:44:52,651
And I'll just highlight 22 programs and 

1225
00:44:52,651 --> 00:44:54,762
and give you some handsome some other 

1226
00:44:54,762 --> 00:44:56,707
areas . Um , We have adopted agile 

1227
00:44:56,707 --> 00:44:58,873
software processes across nearly every 

1228
00:44:58,873 --> 00:45:00,818
program within the missile defense 

1229
00:45:00,818 --> 00:45:02,596
agency in coordination with the 

1230
00:45:02,596 --> 00:45:04,596
services . So we've got very strong 

1231
00:45:04,596 --> 00:45:06,707
linkages with the Navy on Egypt , for 

1232
00:45:06,707 --> 00:45:08,873
example , when you look at the command 

1233
00:45:08,873 --> 00:45:11,096
of control battle management , which is 

1234
00:45:11,096 --> 00:45:12,762
that hard network that brings 

1235
00:45:12,762 --> 00:45:12,720
everything together . That is our all 

1236
00:45:12,720 --> 00:45:14,887
domain uh networking that will be tied 

1237
00:45:14,887 --> 00:45:17,250
to jazzy to downstream . That is in a 

1238
00:45:17,250 --> 00:45:20,300
spiral upgrade that program early on , 

1239
00:45:20,300 --> 00:45:22,522
we recognized because of the numbers of 

1240
00:45:22,522 --> 00:45:24,790
sensors that change the weapons that 

1241
00:45:24,790 --> 00:45:26,957
change along the way that that one has 

1242
00:45:26,957 --> 00:45:28,679
to be a spiral and in constant 

1243
00:45:28,679 --> 00:45:30,512
evolution . That's another great 

1244
00:45:30,512 --> 00:45:32,740
example of very agile quick software 

1245
00:45:32,740 --> 00:45:34,910
turns and delivery to the command 

1246
00:45:34,910 --> 00:45:36,854
command because that happens to be 

1247
00:45:36,854 --> 00:45:39,077
where the warfighter touches the system 

1248
00:45:39,077 --> 00:45:41,188
through C two B M C . Uh And then the 

1249
00:45:41,188 --> 00:45:43,299
last thing I'll mention is on the new 

1250
00:45:43,299 --> 00:45:43,250
contracts for next generation 

1251
00:45:43,250 --> 00:45:45,250
interceptor . It's actually written 

1252
00:45:45,250 --> 00:45:47,139
into the contract and the program 

1253
00:45:47,139 --> 00:45:49,250
offices two of them because we have a 

1254
00:45:49,250 --> 00:45:51,306
competition here are definitely tied 

1255
00:45:51,306 --> 00:45:53,250
into deficit cops . Uh , the agile 

1256
00:45:53,250 --> 00:45:55,583
framework and using digital engineering , 

1257
00:45:55,583 --> 00:45:57,639
that's a whole new thing . We've got 

1258
00:45:57,639 --> 00:45:59,639
the latest and greatest tools to go 

1259
00:45:59,639 --> 00:46:01,528
execute that and that will become 

1260
00:46:01,528 --> 00:46:03,694
really the standard that we use across 

1261
00:46:03,694 --> 00:46:05,806
the agency That our model if 10 years 

1262
00:46:05,806 --> 00:46:08,083
from now within the missile's lifetime , 

1263
00:46:08,083 --> 00:46:10,139
a different company has a better has 

1264
00:46:10,139 --> 00:46:12,310
better software or you simply have a 

1265
00:46:12,310 --> 00:46:14,650
company outside the consortium who has 

1266
00:46:14,650 --> 00:46:16,706
a better discriminating radar ? Some 

1267
00:46:16,706 --> 00:46:18,817
component like that . Do you have the 

1268
00:46:18,817 --> 00:46:21,120
ability to go outside and pick this 

1269
00:46:21,120 --> 00:46:23,342
component to add to the medical missile 

1270
00:46:23,342 --> 00:46:26,290
system ? Absolutely . We do . Um , and 

1271
00:46:26,290 --> 00:46:28,020
so by having modularity as a 

1272
00:46:28,020 --> 00:46:30,353
requirement and N . G . I , for example , 

1273
00:46:30,353 --> 00:46:32,298
that gives us the ability to go to 

1274
00:46:32,298 --> 00:46:34,353
those third parties those innovation 

1275
00:46:34,353 --> 00:46:36,520
sites . In fact I'm going to visit the 

1276
00:46:36,520 --> 00:46:38,409
United States Navy's forge uh new 

1277
00:46:38,409 --> 00:46:40,464
establishment that they have now for 

1278
00:46:40,464 --> 00:46:42,687
the Aegis system . And we're gonna talk 

1279
00:46:42,687 --> 00:46:44,798
about modularity and the complexities 

1280
00:46:44,798 --> 00:46:47,020
of bringing in innovation and the third 

1281
00:46:47,020 --> 00:46:49,076
parties . I'm not quite sold that we 

1282
00:46:49,076 --> 00:46:50,964
can do that right yet . But we're 

1283
00:46:50,964 --> 00:46:53,187
having a very close conversations on on 

1284
00:46:53,187 --> 00:46:55,076
incorporating exactly what you're 

1285
00:46:55,076 --> 00:46:57,242
talking about . How do we bring in the 

1286
00:46:57,242 --> 00:46:59,464
small business ? How do we bring in you 

1287
00:46:59,464 --> 00:46:59,390
know different thinking ? Uh Now you 

1288
00:46:59,390 --> 00:47:01,446
have to have a structure to that but 

1289
00:47:01,446 --> 00:47:03,501
we're working our way through that . 

1290
00:47:03,501 --> 00:47:06,370
Okay . Until you've said we rely on 

1291
00:47:06,370 --> 00:47:08,314
nuclear deterrence to address more 

1292
00:47:08,314 --> 00:47:10,540
complex threats to include near pier 

1293
00:47:10,550 --> 00:47:13,230
hypersonic missiles . But I'm concerned 

1294
00:47:13,230 --> 00:47:15,286
we do not have a vision for managing 

1295
00:47:15,286 --> 00:47:17,508
this emerging threat , that there's not 

1296
00:47:17,508 --> 00:47:19,452
potentially increase the risk of a 

1297
00:47:19,452 --> 00:47:22,060
nuclear response so far . I've I've 

1298
00:47:22,060 --> 00:47:24,171
asked this question a couple of times 

1299
00:47:24,171 --> 00:47:26,338
and have yet to receive a satisfactory 

1300
00:47:26,338 --> 00:47:28,504
answer on what the department's vision 

1301
00:47:28,504 --> 00:47:30,504
is for how we approach the emerging 

1302
00:47:30,504 --> 00:47:32,449
threat from hypersonic missiles or 

1303
00:47:32,449 --> 00:47:34,616
pursue our own hypersonic capabilities 

1304
00:47:34,616 --> 00:47:36,449
in a way that deters rather than 

1305
00:47:36,450 --> 00:47:39,910
destabilizes . So by several Hill is 

1306
00:47:39,910 --> 00:47:42,132
deterrence still sufficient in the face 

1307
00:47:42,132 --> 00:47:44,077
of this evolving capabilities . Uh 

1308
00:47:44,077 --> 00:47:46,243
Congressman I think uh policy would be 

1309
00:47:46,243 --> 00:47:48,466
better to answer that . I will tell you 

1310
00:47:48,466 --> 00:47:50,688
for hypersonic missile defense . We are 

1311
00:47:50,688 --> 00:47:53,000
targeting the regional threat . Um and 

1312
00:47:53,010 --> 00:47:54,843
but I'll turn it over to to miss 

1313
00:47:54,843 --> 00:47:56,732
tomorrow to talk to you about the 

1314
00:47:56,732 --> 00:47:59,910
overall policy . Great , thank you . Mr . 

1315
00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:02,470
Thank you . Thank you congressman . Uh 

1316
00:48:02,480 --> 00:48:04,424
Yes , this is something that we're 

1317
00:48:04,424 --> 00:48:06,536
going to take a close look at as part 

1318
00:48:06,536 --> 00:48:08,890
of the missile defense review , the 

1319
00:48:08,890 --> 00:48:11,180
nuclear posture review . Um and as they 

1320
00:48:11,180 --> 00:48:14,350
feed into looking at a more integrated 

1321
00:48:14,360 --> 00:48:17,100
approach to deterrence , looking at the 

1322
00:48:17,100 --> 00:48:20,550
threats across um domains and looking 

1323
00:48:20,550 --> 00:48:23,320
at the risk of escalation . So uh so 

1324
00:48:23,320 --> 00:48:26,400
the challenge you um 

1325
00:48:26,970 --> 00:48:30,950
alluded to is is one of the Mr 

1326
00:48:30,950 --> 00:48:33,172
Merritt . Look , I understand that this 

1327
00:48:33,172 --> 00:48:34,728
did not originate with this 

1328
00:48:34,728 --> 00:48:36,506
administration that is the last 

1329
00:48:36,506 --> 00:48:39,200
administration that has failed to 

1330
00:48:39,200 --> 00:48:41,367
develop any strategy here . But let me 

1331
00:48:41,367 --> 00:48:43,600
just point out how insane it is to be 

1332
00:48:43,600 --> 00:48:45,750
pouring billions of dollars into an 

1333
00:48:45,750 --> 00:48:47,890
advanced weapons system that we don't 

1334
00:48:47,890 --> 00:48:50,112
know how we're going to use and worse , 

1335
00:48:50,112 --> 00:48:52,260
might actually make the turns worse . 

1336
00:48:52,270 --> 00:48:55,510
So this has got to be an absolute top 

1337
00:48:55,510 --> 00:48:57,670
priority . Mr Chairman , I go back , 

1338
00:48:57,680 --> 00:49:00,160
Yes it is . Thank you . Thanks 

1339
00:49:00,160 --> 00:49:03,090
gentlemen . Mr uh Lamborn , 

1340
00:49:03,770 --> 00:49:06,540
thank you . Mr Chairman Admiral Hill . 

1341
00:49:06,540 --> 00:49:10,440
I'm wanting to talk to you about the 44 

1342
00:49:10,440 --> 00:49:12,590
deployed ground based interceptors . 

1343
00:49:12,970 --> 00:49:16,690
And uh is there a point over the 

1344
00:49:16,690 --> 00:49:18,634
next few years in which we will be 

1345
00:49:18,634 --> 00:49:21,690
dipping below that number , Congressman 

1346
00:49:21,690 --> 00:49:23,579
Lamar , thank you . Great , great 

1347
00:49:23,579 --> 00:49:25,134
question . When we had this 

1348
00:49:25,134 --> 00:49:27,246
conversation about a year or so ago , 

1349
00:49:27,246 --> 00:49:29,301
we saw reliability , uh , you know , 

1350
00:49:29,301 --> 00:49:31,412
falling off a lot earlier than what I 

1351
00:49:31,412 --> 00:49:33,579
actually believe it will fall off to . 

1352
00:49:33,579 --> 00:49:35,579
Uh and that's mostly because of the 

1353
00:49:35,579 --> 00:49:35,060
support from Congress and the service 

1354
00:49:35,060 --> 00:49:37,282
life extension program . So our ability 

1355
00:49:37,282 --> 00:49:39,449
to take those oldest rounds out of the 

1356
00:49:39,449 --> 00:49:41,338
ground , you know , there's three 

1357
00:49:41,338 --> 00:49:43,560
classes of G . B . The oldest ones have 

1358
00:49:43,560 --> 00:49:45,782
never been DM placed . And so by taking 

1359
00:49:45,782 --> 00:49:47,671
them out replacing the boosters , 

1360
00:49:47,671 --> 00:49:49,893
fixing one shot devices , upgrading the 

1361
00:49:49,893 --> 00:49:51,727
process , is updating the threat 

1362
00:49:51,727 --> 00:49:54,060
libraries that raises the capability uh , 

1363
00:49:54,060 --> 00:49:55,949
from what we have today . So , in 

1364
00:49:55,949 --> 00:49:58,116
addition to keeping the number , we're 

1365
00:49:58,116 --> 00:50:00,060
now going to increase the capacity 

1366
00:50:00,060 --> 00:50:02,116
because the capability goes up . And 

1367
00:50:02,116 --> 00:50:04,282
that is something that North . Com can 

1368
00:50:04,282 --> 00:50:06,227
consider as they look at assessing 

1369
00:50:06,227 --> 00:50:08,449
their shot doctrine . So that the slept 

1370
00:50:08,449 --> 00:50:10,393
program very important if you were 

1371
00:50:10,393 --> 00:50:10,160
asking about that timeline to get the N . 

1372
00:50:10,160 --> 00:50:12,220
G . I . The criticality that 

1373
00:50:12,220 --> 00:50:15,130
reliability program uh can't be stated 

1374
00:50:15,130 --> 00:50:17,297
more strongly than the fact that we've 

1375
00:50:17,297 --> 00:50:19,186
got to do that work so that we're 

1376
00:50:19,186 --> 00:50:21,241
hardware based and we really know as 

1377
00:50:21,241 --> 00:50:23,408
opposed to the analysis that we showed 

1378
00:50:23,408 --> 00:50:25,574
you last year , which was based purely 

1379
00:50:25,574 --> 00:50:25,080
on analysis . Now we have hardware by 

1380
00:50:25,080 --> 00:50:27,030
which to do that and we have some 

1381
00:50:27,030 --> 00:50:29,197
number of those that we've removed all 

1382
00:50:29,197 --> 00:50:31,086
ready to do that replacement . So 

1383
00:50:31,086 --> 00:50:33,141
there's some period of time where we 

1384
00:50:33,141 --> 00:50:35,141
will have a little bit of a dip but 

1385
00:50:35,141 --> 00:50:37,252
we'll coordinate that with North come 

1386
00:50:37,252 --> 00:50:39,030
before we do that . But again , 

1387
00:50:39,030 --> 00:50:40,919
capability being increased is the 

1388
00:50:40,919 --> 00:50:43,086
offset . Okay . Thank you . And I want 

1389
00:50:43,086 --> 00:50:45,141
to follow up briefly on something my 

1390
00:50:45,141 --> 00:50:47,197
friend and colleague James land have 

1391
00:50:47,197 --> 00:50:49,419
been brought up and that is funding for 

1392
00:50:49,419 --> 00:50:51,690
directed energy . Uh Apparently the 

1393
00:50:51,700 --> 00:50:53,930
money there will still be money on this 

1394
00:50:53,930 --> 00:50:56,152
research and development in other parts 

1395
00:50:56,152 --> 00:50:58,430
of D . O . D . It's just the M . D . A . 

1396
00:50:58,660 --> 00:51:01,670
Segment that is being cut for this year . 

1397
00:51:01,670 --> 00:51:04,160
Is that correct ? That's correct . So 

1398
00:51:04,170 --> 00:51:06,850
because I'm so focused on this mission , 

1399
00:51:06,850 --> 00:51:08,830
which is very discreet and has a 

1400
00:51:08,840 --> 00:51:11,330
totally union requirement on how we 

1401
00:51:11,330 --> 00:51:13,330
would leverage directed energy . It 

1402
00:51:13,330 --> 00:51:15,441
just means I have to change the way I 

1403
00:51:15,441 --> 00:51:17,497
do business . Right ? So rather than 

1404
00:51:17,497 --> 00:51:19,497
direct funding and transitioning to 

1405
00:51:19,497 --> 00:51:21,386
industry , I'll rely on the under 

1406
00:51:21,386 --> 00:51:23,608
secretary's office to to do that for me 

1407
00:51:23,608 --> 00:51:23,450
and then I'm working very closely with 

1408
00:51:23,450 --> 00:51:25,561
the service . Is one example would be 

1409
00:51:25,561 --> 00:51:27,561
that when the Navy deploys its base 

1410
00:51:27,561 --> 00:51:29,561
defense of the lower power directed 

1411
00:51:29,561 --> 00:51:31,728
energy , we can take that and use that 

1412
00:51:31,728 --> 00:51:33,950
once it matures and and raise the power 

1413
00:51:33,950 --> 00:51:35,783
even more to go do the ballistic 

1414
00:51:35,783 --> 00:51:37,839
missile defense mission . So it just 

1415
00:51:37,839 --> 00:51:40,061
changes the way we do business . Okay . 

1416
00:51:40,061 --> 00:51:42,172
Thank you . That that is reassuring . 

1417
00:51:42,172 --> 00:51:44,200
And uh , compared to how it first 

1418
00:51:44,210 --> 00:51:47,160
appeared and then second along that 

1419
00:51:47,160 --> 00:51:49,630
line . Uh , just a comment , I'll make 

1420
00:51:49,640 --> 00:51:51,696
not a question . And that is , we'll 

1421
00:51:51,696 --> 00:51:53,473
continue to work on cooperative 

1422
00:51:53,473 --> 00:51:55,680
programs with the state of Israel on 

1423
00:51:55,680 --> 00:51:58,230
joint research and development of 

1424
00:51:58,240 --> 00:52:00,518
directed energy in the missile defense , 

1425
00:52:00,518 --> 00:52:02,920
especially short term short range 

1426
00:52:02,930 --> 00:52:06,690
missiles and rockets . Um , uh , 

1427
00:52:06,700 --> 00:52:08,478
Mr miro , I'd like to ask you a 

1428
00:52:08,478 --> 00:52:10,533
question . It's great to have you in 

1429
00:52:10,533 --> 00:52:12,644
the uh , I guess on that side instead 

1430
00:52:12,644 --> 00:52:14,820
of this side of the , of the chairs 

1431
00:52:14,820 --> 00:52:18,100
here , but now that the new 

1432
00:52:18,100 --> 00:52:20,267
administration is working on a nuclear 

1433
00:52:20,267 --> 00:52:22,433
posture review . Do you anticipate any 

1434
00:52:22,433 --> 00:52:25,130
changes of policy pursuant to the 

1435
00:52:25,130 --> 00:52:27,890
results of that review when that comes 

1436
00:52:27,890 --> 00:52:30,223
out compared to the last administration ? 

1437
00:52:30,750 --> 00:52:33,320
I mean I think they'll be continuing in 

1438
00:52:33,320 --> 00:52:35,600
certain areas change in other areas . 

1439
00:52:35,610 --> 00:52:38,830
Um and we're about to start the posture 

1440
00:52:38,830 --> 00:52:41,510
review in in a couple of weeks . And so 

1441
00:52:41,520 --> 00:52:43,687
that will be , you know , the analysis 

1442
00:52:43,687 --> 00:52:47,430
and reviews uh will uh be 

1443
00:52:47,430 --> 00:52:49,830
performed over the summer . Uh And so 

1444
00:52:49,840 --> 00:52:51,784
what I can tell you is that we are 

1445
00:52:51,784 --> 00:52:54,450
going to look at um where there might 

1446
00:52:54,460 --> 00:52:56,238
be some change but that will be 

1447
00:52:56,238 --> 00:52:58,460
underpinned by analysis uh and thorough 

1448
00:52:58,460 --> 00:53:01,120
reviews . Okay . I'll be watching it 

1449
00:53:01,130 --> 00:53:03,520
with keen interest , hopefully more 

1450
00:53:03,520 --> 00:53:05,950
continuity than than disruption and 

1451
00:53:05,950 --> 00:53:09,840
change . Um And lastly , General Van 

1452
00:53:09,840 --> 00:53:13,270
Herck , you have previously testified 

1453
00:53:13,280 --> 00:53:15,391
that with regard to the current North 

1454
00:53:15,391 --> 00:53:18,030
korean I C . B . M . Capabilities , you 

1455
00:53:18,030 --> 00:53:19,974
are comfortable with our present , 

1456
00:53:19,974 --> 00:53:22,030
comfortable with our present missile 

1457
00:53:22,030 --> 00:53:23,890
defense capability , defense , 

1458
00:53:25,650 --> 00:53:27,910
a little glitter . But please add time 

1459
00:53:27,920 --> 00:53:31,840
back to my clock . But in your best 

1460
00:53:31,850 --> 00:53:34,017
judgment , do you still agree with the 

1461
00:53:34,017 --> 00:53:36,300
assessment that the North Korean threat 

1462
00:53:36,300 --> 00:53:39,440
will begin pacing our homeland defenses 

1463
00:53:39,440 --> 00:53:43,080
starting in 2025 . And so we'll need to 

1464
00:53:43,080 --> 00:53:45,570
supplement or enhance the current GMD 

1465
00:53:45,570 --> 00:53:48,690
system to maintain parody or overmatch . 

1466
00:53:48,690 --> 00:53:51,720
Actually , congressman , I believe we 

1467
00:53:51,720 --> 00:53:54,060
should talk about a classified forum . 

1468
00:53:54,300 --> 00:53:56,467
I'll tell you I'm comfortable with the 

1469
00:53:56,467 --> 00:53:58,522
programs that we have in place right 

1470
00:53:58,522 --> 00:54:00,744
now for the next generation interceptor 

1471
00:54:00,744 --> 00:54:02,689
Fielding by 2028 with incentives , 

1472
00:54:02,689 --> 00:54:04,744
incentives to pull further left . If 

1473
00:54:04,744 --> 00:54:06,967
Abel between the two companies that are 

1474
00:54:06,967 --> 00:54:09,189
competing , happy to discuss further in 

1475
00:54:09,189 --> 00:54:11,411
a classified environment . Okay , thank 

1476
00:54:11,411 --> 00:54:13,633
you very much . Mr Chairman of Quebec . 

1477
00:54:13,633 --> 00:54:17,170
Thank you . Mr Morelli . Thank you . Mr . 

1478
00:54:17,170 --> 00:54:19,226
Chairman and thank you to uh all the 

1479
00:54:19,226 --> 00:54:22,160
witnesses for their uh expertise , 

1480
00:54:22,170 --> 00:54:24,114
their time and and certainly their 

1481
00:54:24,114 --> 00:54:26,337
service to the country . I had a couple 

1482
00:54:26,337 --> 00:54:28,880
of uh just brief questions if I can . 

1483
00:54:28,880 --> 00:54:31,040
For general Van Herrick . 

1484
00:54:31,050 --> 00:54:34,870
Uh by the way , thank you general for 

1485
00:54:34,880 --> 00:54:38,650
uh engaged in uh appreciate our offline 

1486
00:54:38,650 --> 00:54:41,400
conversation a great deal . Uh 

1487
00:54:41,410 --> 00:54:44,600
yesterday I was reflecting on it and I 

1488
00:54:44,600 --> 00:54:46,767
think you and I were talking about the 

1489
00:54:46,767 --> 00:54:48,711
nature of conflict having become a 

1490
00:54:48,711 --> 00:54:50,933
global engagement . And I was I think I 

1491
00:54:50,933 --> 00:54:52,822
was commenting as I'm new to this 

1492
00:54:52,822 --> 00:54:55,000
committee about the combatant commands 

1493
00:54:55,000 --> 00:54:57,420
being more regional in nature . And we 

1494
00:54:57,420 --> 00:54:59,587
were having this conversation as I was 

1495
00:54:59,587 --> 00:55:01,753
reflecting , I wondered if I could ask 

1496
00:55:01,753 --> 00:55:03,698
you to just talk a little bit more 

1497
00:55:03,698 --> 00:55:05,950
about the nature of it , how it is 

1498
00:55:05,950 --> 00:55:08,061
really become a global engagement and 

1499
00:55:08,061 --> 00:55:10,172
our combatant commands are structured 

1500
00:55:10,172 --> 00:55:12,080
regionally . But could you talk a 

1501
00:55:12,080 --> 00:55:14,136
little bit more about how you see it 

1502
00:55:14,136 --> 00:55:16,160
and specifically how having domain 

1503
00:55:16,160 --> 00:55:18,350
awareness is a critical element to the 

1504
00:55:18,350 --> 00:55:20,461
success of that global engagement and 

1505
00:55:20,461 --> 00:55:22,350
then a little bit maybe about the 

1506
00:55:22,350 --> 00:55:24,517
challenge is potentially that it poses 

1507
00:55:24,517 --> 00:55:27,970
for you , congressman . Absolutely . So 

1508
00:55:28,340 --> 00:55:31,580
in today's uh global environment , what 

1509
00:55:31,580 --> 00:55:33,810
you see is all problems for the most 

1510
00:55:33,810 --> 00:55:35,754
part especially with the Russia or 

1511
00:55:35,754 --> 00:55:37,921
china . But even with the invention of 

1512
00:55:37,921 --> 00:55:39,550
the internet and non kinetic 

1513
00:55:39,550 --> 00:55:42,490
capabilities , even uh rogue state 

1514
00:55:42,490 --> 00:55:44,546
actors or even non state actors have 

1515
00:55:44,546 --> 00:55:46,712
the potential to have global influence 

1516
00:55:46,712 --> 00:55:48,879
through their activities both in a day 

1517
00:55:48,879 --> 00:55:50,990
to day competition and in crisis . My 

1518
00:55:50,990 --> 00:55:53,101
homeland defense design doesn't start 

1519
00:55:53,101 --> 00:55:55,268
with defending the homeland inside the 

1520
00:55:55,268 --> 00:55:55,160
borders of the North America or the 

1521
00:55:55,160 --> 00:55:57,382
United States . It actually starts from 

1522
00:55:57,382 --> 00:55:59,940
a global perspective relying on my 

1523
00:55:59,940 --> 00:56:01,940
fellow combatant commanders , other 

1524
00:56:01,940 --> 00:56:04,760
nations such as NATO Nations and our 

1525
00:56:04,770 --> 00:56:06,992
allies and partners around the globe to 

1526
00:56:06,992 --> 00:56:08,881
have domain awareness . They have 

1527
00:56:08,881 --> 00:56:10,937
sensors and capabilities . And if we 

1528
00:56:10,937 --> 00:56:12,881
share information from under C2 on 

1529
00:56:12,881 --> 00:56:14,992
orbit to include human information to 

1530
00:56:14,992 --> 00:56:17,103
give us a global picture will be in a 

1531
00:56:17,103 --> 00:56:19,270
much better position . So our homeland 

1532
00:56:19,270 --> 00:56:21,270
defense design focuses that way . I 

1533
00:56:21,270 --> 00:56:24,170
hope that helps clarify . Yeah , I'm 

1534
00:56:24,170 --> 00:56:27,170
just um any challenges that poses Or do 

1535
00:56:27,170 --> 00:56:29,940
you feel as though the design is 

1536
00:56:29,940 --> 00:56:32,500
sufficient ? There's enough situational 

1537
00:56:32,500 --> 00:56:35,990
awareness that the regional Combatant 

1538
00:56:35,990 --> 00:56:39,210
command approach can sufficiently meet 

1539
00:56:39,210 --> 00:56:42,660
those global challenges . Congressman 

1540
00:56:42,670 --> 00:56:45,660
from a domain awareness perspective , I 

1541
00:56:45,670 --> 00:56:48,390
still I still see challenges . That's 

1542
00:56:48,390 --> 00:56:51,620
why you'll see in my unfunded priority 

1543
00:56:51,620 --> 00:56:54,410
list after we saw the FY22 budget is 

1544
00:56:54,410 --> 00:56:56,460
for uh the top of it is over the 

1545
00:56:56,460 --> 00:56:58,571
horizon radar capabilities to give us 

1546
00:56:58,571 --> 00:57:00,920
that global domain awareness . The the 

1547
00:57:00,920 --> 00:57:03,031
competitors have extended their range 

1548
00:57:03,031 --> 00:57:05,364
to be able to hold our homeland at risk . 

1549
00:57:05,364 --> 00:57:07,420
In addition to that , you see arctic 

1550
00:57:07,420 --> 00:57:09,587
communications on my unfunded priority 

1551
00:57:09,587 --> 00:57:11,642
list , which gives us the ability to 

1552
00:57:11,642 --> 00:57:13,753
share data globally uh and to operate 

1553
00:57:13,753 --> 00:57:15,809
in the arctic . The same thing is uh 

1554
00:57:15,809 --> 00:57:17,920
has represented our uh ranking member 

1555
00:57:17,920 --> 00:57:19,920
tournament . Shinde is the elevated 

1556
00:57:19,920 --> 00:57:21,920
radar as well . Here is an unfunded 

1557
00:57:21,920 --> 00:57:23,809
priority to give domain awareness 

1558
00:57:23,809 --> 00:57:25,920
against potential cruise missiles and 

1559
00:57:25,920 --> 00:57:28,540
finally over the horizon polar radar 

1560
00:57:28,540 --> 00:57:31,270
capabilities . So I think there's room 

1561
00:57:31,270 --> 00:57:34,230
to grow . Uh I'm encouraged by the 

1562
00:57:34,240 --> 00:57:36,407
budget for ballistic missile defense . 

1563
00:57:36,407 --> 00:57:38,407
I think we have room to grow cruise 

1564
00:57:38,407 --> 00:57:40,573
missile defense domain awareness . I'm 

1565
00:57:40,573 --> 00:57:42,740
also encouraged with what the navy did 

1566
00:57:42,740 --> 00:57:44,518
with regards to undersea domain 

1567
00:57:44,518 --> 00:57:46,407
awareness . With almost a billion 

1568
00:57:46,407 --> 00:57:48,240
dollars in their undersea domain 

1569
00:57:48,240 --> 00:57:51,680
awareness . Um In just a little more 

1570
00:57:51,680 --> 00:57:54,400
than a minute that I have general , we 

1571
00:57:54,400 --> 00:57:56,410
talked quite a bit about ballistic 

1572
00:57:56,410 --> 00:57:58,577
missile threats . Can you talk to me a 

1573
00:57:58,577 --> 00:58:00,632
little bit more about cruise missile 

1574
00:58:00,632 --> 00:58:04,090
threats ? Um , and has that changed 

1575
00:58:04,090 --> 00:58:06,860
over the last few decades ? And there's 

1576
00:58:06,860 --> 00:58:09,082
anything we should be concerned about , 

1577
00:58:09,082 --> 00:58:11,249
Anything that you're concerned about , 

1578
00:58:11,320 --> 00:58:14,310
congressman . Absolutely . Uh Russia 

1579
00:58:14,310 --> 00:58:16,366
has developed the capability through 

1580
00:58:16,366 --> 00:58:18,588
long range cruise missiles that provide 

1581
00:58:18,588 --> 00:58:20,810
a very low radar cross section that are 

1582
00:58:20,810 --> 00:58:23,032
incredibly challenging to detect to our 

1583
00:58:23,032 --> 00:58:25,254
legacy north warning system uh , and to 

1584
00:58:25,254 --> 00:58:27,477
our platforms that exist today . That's 

1585
00:58:27,477 --> 00:58:29,643
why , again , domain awareness is as a 

1586
00:58:29,643 --> 00:58:31,810
priority for me to give us that longer 

1587
00:58:31,810 --> 00:58:33,866
range ability uh , to detect that in 

1588
00:58:33,866 --> 00:58:35,921
the not too distant future . 5 to 10 

1589
00:58:35,921 --> 00:58:37,699
years china will be in the same 

1590
00:58:37,699 --> 00:58:39,477
position . Russia has developed 

1591
00:58:39,477 --> 00:58:41,960
capabilities from undersea with their 

1592
00:58:41,960 --> 00:58:45,190
advanced , very quiet nearly on par 

1593
00:58:45,190 --> 00:58:47,920
with our submarines , uh , to feel that 

1594
00:58:47,920 --> 00:58:50,660
capability and their bombers uh to 

1595
00:58:50,660 --> 00:58:52,590
include polar over the rising 

1596
00:58:52,590 --> 00:58:54,740
capabilities and and also surface 

1597
00:58:54,740 --> 00:58:57,690
vessels . So I'm very uh concerned 

1598
00:58:57,690 --> 00:58:59,912
about the cruise missile defense of the 

1599
00:58:59,912 --> 00:59:01,968
homeland and something we could talk 

1600
00:59:01,968 --> 00:59:04,134
more about in the classified session . 

1601
00:59:04,134 --> 00:59:06,134
Sure , Well , I look , I appreciate 

1602
00:59:06,134 --> 00:59:08,468
very much your insights and MR chairman . 

1603
00:59:08,468 --> 00:59:11,180
I appreciate the opportunity to uh 

1604
00:59:11,190 --> 00:59:13,980
offer those uh those questions and with 

1605
00:59:13,980 --> 00:59:16,890
that I yield back . Thank you . I thank 

1606
00:59:16,890 --> 00:59:19,168
the gentleman is down to the final 2nd . 

1607
00:59:19,168 --> 00:59:21,330
Congratulations . Mr brooks . 

1608
00:59:24,220 --> 00:59:26,387
Thank you . Mr . Chairman Vice Admiral 

1609
00:59:26,387 --> 00:59:28,553
Hill . The Missile Defense Agency will 

1610
00:59:28,553 --> 00:59:30,720
be undertaking a new major development 

1611
00:59:30,720 --> 00:59:32,498
effort with the next generation 

1612
00:59:32,498 --> 00:59:34,664
interceptor program while concurrently 

1613
00:59:34,664 --> 00:59:36,887
restructuring the existing ground based 

1614
00:59:36,887 --> 00:59:39,109
interceptor program going from a single 

1615
00:59:39,109 --> 00:59:41,550
contract to multiple contracts . What 

1616
00:59:41,550 --> 00:59:43,717
assurances can you give this committee 

1617
00:59:43,717 --> 00:59:46,220
that the M . D . A . S approaching this 

1618
00:59:46,220 --> 00:59:48,540
program transition away That reduces 

1619
00:59:48,540 --> 00:59:50,840
risk while continuing to meet or exceed 

1620
00:59:50,840 --> 00:59:53,180
the current schedule . Thank Thanks 

1621
00:59:53,180 --> 00:59:56,550
congressman brooks . The uh we we did a 

1622
00:59:56,560 --> 00:59:58,870
top down bottoms up restructuring of 

1623
00:59:58,880 --> 01:00:01,410
missile defense agency writ large at 

1624
01:00:01,410 --> 01:00:03,920
the beginning of 2020 . A lot of folks 

1625
01:00:03,920 --> 01:00:06,142
call it M . D A two point . Uh And what 

1626
01:00:06,142 --> 01:00:08,253
what we mean by that is when we stood 

1627
01:00:08,253 --> 01:00:10,420
up the two contracts as we prepared to 

1628
01:00:10,420 --> 01:00:12,364
make that award , we have to start 

1629
01:00:12,364 --> 01:00:14,309
early on constructing two separate 

1630
01:00:14,309 --> 01:00:16,031
program offices with the right 

1631
01:00:16,031 --> 01:00:17,976
certified board leaders that we're 

1632
01:00:17,976 --> 01:00:20,031
gonna be in charge of . That put all 

1633
01:00:20,031 --> 01:00:22,142
the uh conflict of interest issues on 

1634
01:00:22,142 --> 01:00:24,198
the table , make sure we had all the 

1635
01:00:24,198 --> 01:00:25,920
firewalls up . We brought in a 

1636
01:00:25,920 --> 01:00:28,087
technical direction agent , uh new for 

1637
01:00:28,087 --> 01:00:30,198
the GMD program , uh , so that we can 

1638
01:00:30,198 --> 01:00:32,420
leverage the yorks and FFR DCs bringing 

1639
01:00:32,420 --> 01:00:34,476
that additional talent coming in . I 

1640
01:00:34,476 --> 01:00:36,587
mentioned before that we're moving to 

1641
01:00:36,587 --> 01:00:38,698
Digital Engineering and def sec ops . 

1642
01:00:38,698 --> 01:00:40,698
We we are that program , to me is a 

1643
01:00:40,698 --> 01:00:42,864
model program within the Department of 

1644
01:00:42,864 --> 01:00:44,864
Defense in terms of how we're doing 

1645
01:00:44,864 --> 01:00:46,809
business . Two contracts competing 

1646
01:00:46,809 --> 01:00:49,240
pressure on industry reducing risks . 

1647
01:00:49,240 --> 01:00:51,240
We're seeing Iraq investments being 

1648
01:00:51,240 --> 01:00:53,462
made in the critical areas that we were 

1649
01:00:53,462 --> 01:00:55,684
concerned about when we're with dealing 

1650
01:00:55,684 --> 01:00:57,851
with the R . K . B . Program . Uh , so 

1651
01:00:57,851 --> 01:00:57,510
I think we've got it right . Plus we've 

1652
01:00:57,510 --> 01:00:59,566
got a great set of operational needs 

1653
01:00:59,566 --> 01:01:01,510
statements coming from the Command 

1654
01:01:01,510 --> 01:01:03,510
command . We've got a strong set of 

1655
01:01:03,510 --> 01:01:03,150
requirements that were endorsed by the 

1656
01:01:03,150 --> 01:01:05,950
J Rock . This is a new and different 

1657
01:01:05,960 --> 01:01:08,050
next generation interceptor and uh , 

1658
01:01:08,050 --> 01:01:10,328
and I think we're poised to take it on . 

1659
01:01:10,328 --> 01:01:12,439
We've got the right professional team 

1660
01:01:12,439 --> 01:01:14,550
in place . Another question unrelated 

1661
01:01:14,550 --> 01:01:16,717
to the previous one , china is rapidly 

1662
01:01:16,717 --> 01:01:18,883
developing multiple hypersonic weapons 

1663
01:01:18,883 --> 01:01:20,606
systems . America's developing 

1664
01:01:20,606 --> 01:01:22,980
hypersonic missile defense programs at 

1665
01:01:22,980 --> 01:01:25,420
the speed of relevance is necessary to 

1666
01:01:25,420 --> 01:01:27,650
deter chinese aggression and defend 

1667
01:01:27,650 --> 01:01:30,250
against future attacks . The missile 

1668
01:01:30,260 --> 01:01:32,750
defense agencies unfunded priority list 

1669
01:01:32,750 --> 01:01:35,140
for fiscal year 2022 includes a request 

1670
01:01:35,140 --> 01:01:37,251
for additional funding for hypersonic 

1671
01:01:37,251 --> 01:01:39,196
missile defense efforts . Will you 

1672
01:01:39,196 --> 01:01:41,251
please share with this committee how 

1673
01:01:41,251 --> 01:01:43,418
the requested funding would accelerate 

1674
01:01:43,418 --> 01:01:45,584
development of this capability ? Yes , 

1675
01:01:45,584 --> 01:01:47,696
sir . And if we were to rewind and go 

1676
01:01:47,696 --> 01:01:49,751
go to last year , we were focused on 

1677
01:01:49,751 --> 01:01:51,918
the science technology of operating in 

1678
01:01:51,918 --> 01:01:53,918
that very unique environment of the 

1679
01:01:53,918 --> 01:01:56,140
glide phase . But after viewing many of 

1680
01:01:56,140 --> 01:01:58,196
those uh real world flight events to 

1681
01:01:58,196 --> 01:02:00,940
include , you know , actually US test 

1682
01:02:00,940 --> 01:02:03,162
events . We were able to show that with 

1683
01:02:03,162 --> 01:02:05,384
our our models of the systems which are 

1684
01:02:05,384 --> 01:02:07,551
very high fidelity that we can in fact 

1685
01:02:07,551 --> 01:02:09,662
close the fire control loops . And so 

1686
01:02:09,662 --> 01:02:09,610
one of the reasons we're focused right 

1687
01:02:09,610 --> 01:02:12,750
now on the Aegis capability . With this 

1688
01:02:12,750 --> 01:02:14,861
proven engage on remote capability is 

1689
01:02:14,870 --> 01:02:16,870
the fact that we can track in glide 

1690
01:02:16,870 --> 01:02:18,870
phase . We can have a ship upstream 

1691
01:02:18,870 --> 01:02:18,790
before you ever get the space 

1692
01:02:18,790 --> 01:02:21,012
constellation in place , pass that data 

1693
01:02:21,012 --> 01:02:23,068
to a ship and close the fire control 

1694
01:02:23,068 --> 01:02:25,290
loop . So what's what's missing in that 

1695
01:02:25,290 --> 01:02:27,512
equation is the interceptor . Um and so 

1696
01:02:27,512 --> 01:02:29,568
we put out a broad area announcement 

1697
01:02:29,568 --> 01:02:31,679
earlier this year and then in P . B . 

1698
01:02:31,679 --> 01:02:33,623
22 you see an acceleration of that 

1699
01:02:33,623 --> 01:02:35,679
program . So moving away from an S . 

1700
01:02:35,679 --> 01:02:37,846
And T . Program that was focused in on 

1701
01:02:37,846 --> 01:02:40,068
the mid thirties to a program that's on 

1702
01:02:40,068 --> 01:02:42,012
the program that's focused on this 

1703
01:02:42,012 --> 01:02:44,560
decade . And and so that's that's what 

1704
01:02:44,560 --> 01:02:46,671
we're doing . So when you look at the 

1705
01:02:46,671 --> 01:02:49,460
plus up area that will continue some of 

1706
01:02:49,460 --> 01:02:52,300
the parallel work to reduce risk in 

1707
01:02:52,300 --> 01:02:55,060
that program . Can you update the 

1708
01:02:55,060 --> 01:02:56,782
committee on the status of the 

1709
01:02:56,782 --> 01:02:59,110
hypersonic and ballistic tracking space 

1710
01:02:59,110 --> 01:03:01,530
sensor capability which is absolutely 

1711
01:03:01,530 --> 01:03:03,419
necessary for tracking hypersonic 

1712
01:03:03,419 --> 01:03:05,141
missile threats from launching 

1713
01:03:05,141 --> 01:03:07,363
throughout the missile's flight . Yes , 

1714
01:03:07,363 --> 01:03:09,530
sir . Thank thank you for asking about 

1715
01:03:09,530 --> 01:03:11,586
hB TSS hypersonic ballistic tracking 

1716
01:03:11,586 --> 01:03:13,808
space sensor . So as you know , we took 

1717
01:03:13,808 --> 01:03:15,919
a very measured approach to this . We 

1718
01:03:15,919 --> 01:03:18,030
started with a number of companies in 

1719
01:03:18,030 --> 01:03:17,840
the concept of development . Then we 

1720
01:03:17,840 --> 01:03:20,062
neck down to four companies that we put 

1721
01:03:20,062 --> 01:03:21,784
through what we call a clutter 

1722
01:03:21,784 --> 01:03:25,010
management demo which meant were coming 

1723
01:03:25,010 --> 01:03:27,121
from space , looking down on the Warm 

1724
01:03:27,121 --> 01:03:29,288
Earth at warm targets . You know , and 

1725
01:03:29,288 --> 01:03:31,232
could we develop the algorithms to 

1726
01:03:31,232 --> 01:03:33,566
extract those targets out of that scene ? 

1727
01:03:33,566 --> 01:03:35,510
And we were very successful in the 

1728
01:03:35,510 --> 01:03:37,621
ground . So where we are now is we've 

1729
01:03:37,621 --> 01:03:39,843
down selected to to contractors . So we 

1730
01:03:39,843 --> 01:03:42,010
have a competitive approach again . So 

1731
01:03:42,010 --> 01:03:41,550
to to companies in N . G . I . We've 

1732
01:03:41,550 --> 01:03:43,606
got two companies on the glide phase 

1733
01:03:43,606 --> 01:03:45,606
interceptor program and we have two 

1734
01:03:45,606 --> 01:03:47,717
companies on H . B . T . S . S . That 

1735
01:03:47,717 --> 01:03:49,828
that competitive pressure . And we're 

1736
01:03:49,828 --> 01:03:51,939
gonna put two of those up in orbit In 

1737
01:03:51,939 --> 01:03:54,106
Fy 23 . 2 different companies with the 

1738
01:03:54,106 --> 01:03:56,106
requirement to be interoperable and 

1739
01:03:56,106 --> 01:03:55,890
we're going to connect them to our 

1740
01:03:55,890 --> 01:03:58,168
flight tests in the Indo pak um region . 

1741
01:03:58,168 --> 01:04:00,223
So uh H . P . T . S . S . On path to 

1742
01:04:00,223 --> 01:04:03,230
get to demo on orbit in Fy 23 . Thank 

1743
01:04:03,230 --> 01:04:05,452
you . Mr Chairman . I see . Only have a 

1744
01:04:05,452 --> 01:04:08,100
few seconds left . I'll yield back . We 

1745
01:04:08,100 --> 01:04:10,650
appreciate the extra 16 seconds there . 

1746
01:04:10,650 --> 01:04:14,350
Mr horse food . Yeah thank you . Mr 

1747
01:04:14,350 --> 01:04:16,572
Chairman and thank you to our witnesses 

1748
01:04:16,572 --> 01:04:18,930
for testifying today . It's really 

1749
01:04:18,940 --> 01:04:20,773
great to have your expertise and 

1750
01:04:20,773 --> 01:04:23,610
insight . It's been very informative . 

1751
01:04:24,090 --> 01:04:27,260
Vice Admiral Admiral Hill in March of 

1752
01:04:27,270 --> 01:04:30,180
2018 . General heightened testified to 

1753
01:04:30,180 --> 01:04:32,480
the Senate Armed Services Committee and 

1754
01:04:32,480 --> 01:04:34,480
when it when it comes to hypersonic 

1755
01:04:34,480 --> 01:04:37,940
weapons specifically china's DF 17 

1756
01:04:37,950 --> 01:04:40,920
hypersonic boost glide vehicle . Quote , 

1757
01:04:41,190 --> 01:04:43,246
we don't have any defense that would 

1758
01:04:43,246 --> 01:04:45,301
deny the employment of such a weapon 

1759
01:04:45,301 --> 01:04:48,640
against us . Last week , you testify to 

1760
01:04:48,640 --> 01:04:51,250
the same committee that the Aegis sea 

1761
01:04:51,250 --> 01:04:53,610
based terminal is quote the first 

1762
01:04:53,610 --> 01:04:56,510
regional help yourself . 

1763
01:04:57,190 --> 01:05:00,420
They can hear you right now . No , 

1764
01:05:02,590 --> 01:05:06,200
we can hear you . Okay . Last 

1765
01:05:06,200 --> 01:05:08,650
week you you testify to the same 

1766
01:05:08,650 --> 01:05:11,010
committee that the S . C . Based 

1767
01:05:11,010 --> 01:05:13,390
terminal is quote the first regional 

1768
01:05:13,390 --> 01:05:15,930
hypersonic missile defense capability 

1769
01:05:15,940 --> 01:05:17,884
that is deployed with the aircraft 

1770
01:05:17,884 --> 01:05:20,230
carrier strike groups today . And it's 

1771
01:05:20,230 --> 01:05:22,397
important that we have that capability 

1772
01:05:22,397 --> 01:05:24,960
now because the hypersonic threat is 

1773
01:05:24,960 --> 01:05:27,610
there now . So my understanding is that 

1774
01:05:27,620 --> 01:05:30,210
last operational test of the Aegis 

1775
01:05:30,210 --> 01:05:34,040
system and the E . S . Uh sm 

1776
01:05:34,040 --> 01:05:36,750
three blocks to a interceptor was 

1777
01:05:36,750 --> 01:05:39,190
conducted in november 2020 against a 

1778
01:05:39,190 --> 01:05:42,420
simple ballistic I . C . B . M 

1779
01:05:42,430 --> 01:05:46,000
threat during F . T . M . 44 . 

1780
01:05:46,290 --> 01:05:48,123
So I'm curious if any additional 

1781
01:05:48,123 --> 01:05:50,150
advancements have been made since 

1782
01:05:50,150 --> 01:05:52,960
General heightens 2018 testament 

1783
01:05:52,970 --> 01:05:55,780
testimony that have changed the D . O . 

1784
01:05:55,780 --> 01:05:58,002
D . S . Assessment of the effectiveness 

1785
01:05:58,002 --> 01:06:00,230
of Egypt's against the hypersonic 

1786
01:06:00,240 --> 01:06:02,407
threat . Okay , constant . Thank you . 

1787
01:06:02,407 --> 01:06:04,629
So I'm going to separate two things for 

1788
01:06:04,629 --> 01:06:06,573
you . F . T . M 44 with an S . And 

1789
01:06:06,573 --> 01:06:08,684
three is a mid course engagement of a 

1790
01:06:08,684 --> 01:06:10,740
ballistic missile so that's separate 

1791
01:06:10,740 --> 01:06:12,629
and distinct when I say Cee Biggs 

1792
01:06:12,629 --> 01:06:14,796
terminal that is leveraging the SM six 

1793
01:06:14,796 --> 01:06:17,018
missile down in the atmosphere where it 

1794
01:06:17,018 --> 01:06:19,129
was where it is maneuvering and going 

1795
01:06:19,129 --> 01:06:21,240
after a high value unit . And I think 

1796
01:06:21,240 --> 01:06:20,870
that's what your questions are really 

1797
01:06:20,870 --> 01:06:23,110
centered on . We're on what we call 

1798
01:06:23,120 --> 01:06:26,280
increments to today with a upgraded 

1799
01:06:26,280 --> 01:06:28,330
version of S . M . Six and we're 

1800
01:06:28,330 --> 01:06:30,330
testing that over the course of the 

1801
01:06:30,330 --> 01:06:32,710
next year . Uh increment three will 

1802
01:06:32,710 --> 01:06:35,043
bring in a broader set of those threats . 

1803
01:06:35,043 --> 01:06:37,099
So it was a true statement last year 

1804
01:06:37,099 --> 01:06:39,099
because what we're really designing 

1805
01:06:39,099 --> 01:06:41,154
against in the early increments , it 

1806
01:06:41,154 --> 01:06:43,210
was against the maneuvering threat , 

1807
01:06:43,210 --> 01:06:44,932
but it was still pretty much a 

1808
01:06:44,932 --> 01:06:46,766
ballistic missile . But when you 

1809
01:06:46,766 --> 01:06:46,670
actually take a look at the maneuver 

1810
01:06:46,670 --> 01:06:48,837
space of where we are today . And with 

1811
01:06:48,837 --> 01:06:50,948
the increment to capability , that is 

1812
01:06:50,948 --> 01:06:52,850
hypersonic threat because it is 

1813
01:06:52,850 --> 01:06:54,940
maneuvering at very high Gs and it's 

1814
01:06:54,950 --> 01:06:57,061
going at a very high speed . So we're 

1815
01:06:57,061 --> 01:06:59,283
building upon that , that is that first 

1816
01:06:59,283 --> 01:07:01,394
layer . And when I talk about a glide 

1817
01:07:01,394 --> 01:07:03,617
phase interceptor , that is the layered 

1818
01:07:03,617 --> 01:07:05,839
defense to where we go after it earlier 

1819
01:07:05,839 --> 01:07:08,006
in the trajectory before it comes down 

1820
01:07:08,006 --> 01:07:10,006
into the atmosphere and becomes the 

1821
01:07:10,006 --> 01:07:12,061
maneuvering problem . Does that make 

1822
01:07:12,061 --> 01:07:14,730
sense ? So as a mission capable kill 

1823
01:07:14,730 --> 01:07:16,770
vehicle for currently filled at 

1824
01:07:16,770 --> 01:07:19,380
hypersonic weapons is the 

1825
01:07:19,390 --> 01:07:22,780
interceptor capable 

1826
01:07:22,790 --> 01:07:26,060
of performing this function . It is 

1827
01:07:26,070 --> 01:07:28,710
capable of performing that function in 

1828
01:07:28,710 --> 01:07:30,960
the atmosphere against a series of 

1829
01:07:30,960 --> 01:07:33,650
threats . And its limit would be the 

1830
01:07:33,660 --> 01:07:35,993
airframe which I can't talk about today . 

1831
01:07:37,480 --> 01:07:40,840
And that question for miss uh tomorrow 

1832
01:07:40,850 --> 01:07:43,350
other than the deployed Egypt systems , 

1833
01:07:43,360 --> 01:07:45,527
how are we currently defending against 

1834
01:07:45,527 --> 01:07:47,850
or mitigating the hypersonic threat for 

1835
01:07:47,850 --> 01:07:50,030
our forces deployed in the end of 

1836
01:07:50,030 --> 01:07:50,710
pacific 

1837
01:07:54,280 --> 01:07:58,220
congressman ? So uh we are uh 

1838
01:07:58,230 --> 01:08:00,397
as mentioned focusing the priority for 

1839
01:08:00,397 --> 01:08:02,490
hypersonic defense as as a regional 

1840
01:08:02,490 --> 01:08:05,890
threat . We're also looking at um 

1841
01:08:06,270 --> 01:08:08,860
uh increasing the defense of Guam as 

1842
01:08:08,860 --> 01:08:12,790
well uh in the context of a conflict in 

1843
01:08:12,790 --> 01:08:15,160
the indo pacific uh And so those are 

1844
01:08:15,160 --> 01:08:18,960
all uh capabilities that are 

1845
01:08:18,970 --> 01:08:21,750
being further studied uh and looked at 

1846
01:08:21,750 --> 01:08:25,460
both uh from the missile defense agency 

1847
01:08:25,470 --> 01:08:28,720
uh and also with the Office of Cost 

1848
01:08:28,720 --> 01:08:31,920
Assessment um and program evaluation uh 

1849
01:08:31,930 --> 01:08:35,490
And so increasing those investments 

1850
01:08:35,500 --> 01:08:38,430
and prioritizing capabilities will fit 

1851
01:08:38,430 --> 01:08:42,250
into Um the FY 23 um budget 

1852
01:08:42,250 --> 01:08:46,250
request . Thank you . Mr 

1853
01:08:46,250 --> 01:08:48,472
Chairman . I have a few other questions 

1854
01:08:48,472 --> 01:08:52,410
that I will ask . Take off line . So 

1855
01:08:52,420 --> 01:08:54,364
proceeding . Thank you . Thank the 

1856
01:08:54,364 --> 01:08:56,253
gentleman . He's given me back 19 

1857
01:08:56,253 --> 01:08:58,790
seconds . Very grateful . Mr Desjarlais . 

1858
01:08:59,170 --> 01:09:01,337
I'll try to do a little better because 

1859
01:09:01,337 --> 01:09:03,559
a lot of my questions have already been 

1860
01:09:03,559 --> 01:09:05,781
answered in General Van Herck . I think 

1861
01:09:05,781 --> 01:09:07,892
your opening statement laid out a lot 

1862
01:09:07,892 --> 01:09:10,114
of those . It's clear that the Homeland 

1863
01:09:10,114 --> 01:09:12,170
defense is bearing the brunt of real 

1864
01:09:12,170 --> 01:09:14,450
dollar defense cuts uh and uh that's 

1865
01:09:14,450 --> 01:09:17,200
gonna require to allocate some risks . 

1866
01:09:17,200 --> 01:09:21,090
So um just briefly , General Van 

1867
01:09:21,090 --> 01:09:23,146
Herk and then Vice Admiral Hill , if 

1868
01:09:23,146 --> 01:09:25,940
you don't mind , can you each provide 

1869
01:09:25,940 --> 01:09:27,996
an assessment of the threat posed by 

1870
01:09:27,996 --> 01:09:30,107
our adversaries to homeland below the 

1871
01:09:30,107 --> 01:09:32,107
nuclear threshold . Things like the 

1872
01:09:32,107 --> 01:09:34,273
colonial pipeline , cyber attack . And 

1873
01:09:34,273 --> 01:09:36,384
then how comfortable are you with the 

1874
01:09:36,384 --> 01:09:38,607
current defense capabilities to address 

1875
01:09:38,607 --> 01:09:41,280
these threats , congressman , thank you 

1876
01:09:41,280 --> 01:09:43,502
for that . First of all , I believe the 

1877
01:09:43,502 --> 01:09:45,613
foundation of homeland defense is the 

1878
01:09:45,613 --> 01:09:47,780
nuclear deterrent . But right now what 

1879
01:09:47,780 --> 01:09:49,669
you see is after three decades of 

1880
01:09:49,669 --> 01:09:51,558
watching the way we project power 

1881
01:09:51,558 --> 01:09:53,780
forward . Russia and china specifically 

1882
01:09:53,780 --> 01:09:56,002
are developing capabilities to hold the 

1883
01:09:56,002 --> 01:09:57,947
homeland at risk below the nuclear 

1884
01:09:57,947 --> 01:10:00,002
threshold . Those capabilities would 

1885
01:10:00,002 --> 01:10:02,058
include very quiet submarines . They 

1886
01:10:02,058 --> 01:10:04,690
just fielded Russia . Uh , just fielded 

1887
01:10:04,690 --> 01:10:06,920
their second sub class submarine which 

1888
01:10:06,930 --> 01:10:09,097
is on par with ours within a five year 

1889
01:10:09,097 --> 01:10:11,110
period or so . They'll have 8-9 of 

1890
01:10:11,110 --> 01:10:12,943
those submarines which will be a 

1891
01:10:12,943 --> 01:10:15,130
persistent proximate threat off of our 

1892
01:10:15,140 --> 01:10:17,750
east and west coast that we haven't had 

1893
01:10:17,760 --> 01:10:20,720
ever in the past . China will be about 

1894
01:10:20,720 --> 01:10:23,510
a decade behind . Russia has upgraded 

1895
01:10:23,510 --> 01:10:25,454
all their bombers to include their 

1896
01:10:25,454 --> 01:10:27,010
nuclear bombers and nuclear 

1897
01:10:27,010 --> 01:10:28,899
capabilities . Russia has fielded 

1898
01:10:28,899 --> 01:10:30,788
already hypersonic glide vehicles 

1899
01:10:30,788 --> 01:10:32,454
launched off of I C . B . M . 

1900
01:10:32,454 --> 01:10:34,510
Capabilities to hold the homeland at 

1901
01:10:34,510 --> 01:10:36,343
risk with regards to non kinetic 

1902
01:10:36,343 --> 01:10:38,566
capabilities . I think if you just look 

1903
01:10:38,566 --> 01:10:40,732
at recent history that you'll see that 

1904
01:10:40,732 --> 01:10:42,843
there are significant vulnerabilities 

1905
01:10:42,843 --> 01:10:44,954
in the non kinetic , especially cyber 

1906
01:10:44,954 --> 01:10:47,010
that we need to take a look at and 

1907
01:10:47,010 --> 01:10:49,700
probably look more broadly at policy 

1908
01:10:49,710 --> 01:10:51,930
across the board and make sure that 

1909
01:10:51,930 --> 01:10:53,986
were as efficient effective with the 

1910
01:10:53,986 --> 01:10:55,986
limited resources we have for cyber 

1911
01:10:55,986 --> 01:10:57,874
defense , which includes homeland 

1912
01:10:57,874 --> 01:11:00,041
security as well as D . O . D . I hope 

1913
01:11:00,041 --> 01:11:02,152
that clarifies that . That does thank 

1914
01:11:02,152 --> 01:11:04,374
you . Admiral will do everything to add 

1915
01:11:04,374 --> 01:11:06,597
to that . What I'll just go down to the 

1916
01:11:06,597 --> 01:11:08,874
specifics of ballistic missile defense , 

1917
01:11:08,874 --> 01:11:10,874
I would say what's changed over the 

1918
01:11:10,874 --> 01:11:10,830
last couple of years and you can read 

1919
01:11:10,830 --> 01:11:12,941
about in the white press , you know , 

1920
01:11:12,941 --> 01:11:15,163
you look at some of those launches that 

1921
01:11:15,163 --> 01:11:17,330
occurred back in 2018 Dogleg maneuvers 

1922
01:11:17,330 --> 01:11:19,497
right , just right right off the bat , 

1923
01:11:19,497 --> 01:11:19,140
maneuvering in space . What I call 

1924
01:11:19,140 --> 01:11:20,910
range extensions , they're all 

1925
01:11:20,910 --> 01:11:23,132
hypersonic when they come back into the 

1926
01:11:23,132 --> 01:11:25,370
atmosphere . So the what used to be a 

1927
01:11:25,560 --> 01:11:27,900
very predictable ballistic profile that 

1928
01:11:27,900 --> 01:11:30,122
has now changed and it's a challenge to 

1929
01:11:30,122 --> 01:11:32,289
the sensor architecture . Goes back to 

1930
01:11:32,289 --> 01:11:34,289
general ban hurts comment about all 

1931
01:11:34,289 --> 01:11:36,233
domain awareness because it's very 

1932
01:11:36,233 --> 01:11:36,040
important that we continue to invest in 

1933
01:11:36,040 --> 01:11:37,873
the sensor capacity that we have 

1934
01:11:37,873 --> 01:11:39,873
against ballistic , hyper sonic and 

1935
01:11:39,873 --> 01:11:41,984
Cruze because they are converging and 

1936
01:11:41,984 --> 01:11:44,040
they're coming at us . Uh you know , 

1937
01:11:44,040 --> 01:11:46,151
across that that whole integrated air 

1938
01:11:46,151 --> 01:11:45,970
missile defense domain . All right , 

1939
01:11:45,980 --> 01:11:47,924
thank you . And Chairman , I think 

1940
01:11:47,924 --> 01:11:50,091
that's like real time there . I reeled 

1941
01:11:50,091 --> 01:11:52,100
back . Well , Mr Desjarlais is the 

1942
01:11:52,100 --> 01:11:54,211
prize winner . Two minutes returned . 

1943
01:11:54,211 --> 01:11:57,670
We're grateful . Mr Garamendi . Thank 

1944
01:11:57,670 --> 01:12:00,700
you Mr Chairman , really a very 

1945
01:12:00,710 --> 01:12:02,932
important hearing . Thank you gentlemen 

1946
01:12:02,932 --> 01:12:06,160
and lady for a participating today . 

1947
01:12:07,250 --> 01:12:09,470
Um I'm gonna take this in a slightly 

1948
01:12:09,470 --> 01:12:11,359
different way . I've been on this 

1949
01:12:11,359 --> 01:12:13,790
committee 10 years now and we've spent 

1950
01:12:13,800 --> 01:12:17,110
billions upon billions trying to create 

1951
01:12:17,110 --> 01:12:21,070
a defense . And it seems the faster 

1952
01:12:21,070 --> 01:12:22,770
we go . The behind do we get 

1953
01:12:24,250 --> 01:12:26,600
General Van Herk ? You just mentioned 

1954
01:12:26,610 --> 01:12:29,670
getting behind on submarines , getting 

1955
01:12:29,670 --> 01:12:33,320
behind on hypersonic missiles , Getting 

1956
01:12:33,320 --> 01:12:35,380
behind on intercontinental ballistic 

1957
01:12:35,380 --> 01:12:37,602
missiles , ground based missile defense 

1958
01:12:37,602 --> 01:12:40,870
and so forth . Um The president is 

1959
01:12:40,870 --> 01:12:44,170
going to be in Geneva 

1960
01:12:45,950 --> 01:12:48,670
tomorrow to talk to Putin . 

1961
01:12:50,750 --> 01:12:54,140
Should he be talking about arms control 

1962
01:12:54,150 --> 01:12:56,090
in the domain in which you are 

1963
01:12:56,100 --> 01:12:58,480
operating . Mr Morrow 1st . 

1964
01:13:00,450 --> 01:13:03,370
Uh Chairman Garamendi . Yes . That we 

1965
01:13:03,370 --> 01:13:06,320
anticipate that there will be uh focus 

1966
01:13:06,320 --> 01:13:09,180
on um the need for increased strategic 

1967
01:13:09,180 --> 01:13:11,090
stability uh and building on the 

1968
01:13:11,090 --> 01:13:13,700
progress of arms control and building 

1969
01:13:13,700 --> 01:13:15,811
on on the foundation of extending new 

1970
01:13:15,811 --> 01:13:18,720
start uh And and so within the 

1971
01:13:18,720 --> 01:13:20,950
Department of Defense , that will be 

1972
01:13:20,950 --> 01:13:23,670
part of the uh look at integrated 

1973
01:13:23,670 --> 01:13:25,670
deterrence . Having arms control is 

1974
01:13:25,670 --> 01:13:27,892
part of that . But also again , looking 

1975
01:13:27,892 --> 01:13:30,003
at across domains and and the risk of 

1976
01:13:30,003 --> 01:13:32,360
escalation across domains including 

1977
01:13:32,360 --> 01:13:34,527
nuclear . So the quick answer is yes . 

1978
01:13:34,527 --> 01:13:38,420
With regard to each of you ? General 

1979
01:13:38,430 --> 01:13:40,980
Admiral , General General , 

1980
01:13:42,550 --> 01:13:44,550
what would be the first thing you'd 

1981
01:13:44,550 --> 01:13:47,680
want discussed in an arms control 

1982
01:13:47,760 --> 01:13:48,770
negotiation ? 

1983
01:13:52,050 --> 01:13:55,080
Uh Congressman , first of all , I think 

1984
01:13:55,450 --> 01:13:57,630
that any arms control discussion these 

1985
01:13:57,630 --> 01:13:59,797
days should not be unilaterally with a 

1986
01:13:59,797 --> 01:14:01,630
single country with the two peer 

1987
01:14:01,630 --> 01:14:03,852
competitors that we have . And it would 

1988
01:14:03,852 --> 01:14:05,908
be nice to have that discussion with 

1989
01:14:05,908 --> 01:14:07,963
both Russia and china . I do believe 

1990
01:14:07,963 --> 01:14:10,074
there's opportunities to discuss arms 

1991
01:14:10,074 --> 01:14:12,186
including non kinetic , such as cyber 

1992
01:14:12,186 --> 01:14:14,352
and space where we can establish lanes 

1993
01:14:14,352 --> 01:14:13,930
on the road where I'm very concerned 

1994
01:14:13,930 --> 01:14:16,170
about unintentional escalation in those 

1995
01:14:16,170 --> 01:14:18,580
areas , ideally I would love to get rid 

1996
01:14:18,580 --> 01:14:21,310
of all nuclear weapons , uh , that gene , 

1997
01:14:21,320 --> 01:14:23,653
that bottle at genius out of the bottle . 

1998
01:14:23,653 --> 01:14:25,653
And I don't think we can . So there 

1999
01:14:25,653 --> 01:14:27,764
ought to be a discussion on strategic 

2000
01:14:27,764 --> 01:14:29,876
stability with the three nations that 

2001
01:14:29,876 --> 01:14:29,500
we're talking about with regards to 

2002
01:14:29,500 --> 01:14:31,389
nuclear weapons , with regards to 

2003
01:14:31,389 --> 01:14:33,556
hypersonic capabilities , with regards 

2004
01:14:33,556 --> 01:14:35,611
to space capabilities as well . I'll 

2005
01:14:35,611 --> 01:14:37,833
defer to give them some more time . And 

2006
01:14:37,833 --> 01:14:40,056
congressman , I'm not a policy person , 

2007
01:14:40,056 --> 01:14:42,167
so it's probably just not appropriate 

2008
01:14:42,167 --> 01:14:44,222
for me . But as a technical geek , I 

2009
01:14:44,222 --> 01:14:46,333
will tell you that the reality is the 

2010
01:14:46,333 --> 01:14:46,320
threat does evolve , it becomes more 

2011
01:14:46,320 --> 01:14:48,490
complex and uh , we're gonna have to 

2012
01:14:48,490 --> 01:14:50,657
make a decision whether or not we want 

2013
01:14:50,657 --> 01:14:54,270
to deal with that . You know , I'm not 

2014
01:14:54,270 --> 01:14:56,437
gonna let you off the hook that easy . 

2015
01:14:56,437 --> 01:14:58,270
But let's move on . Mr Cobbler , 

2016
01:14:58,540 --> 01:15:00,890
congressman again , I'm not a policy 

2017
01:15:00,890 --> 01:15:02,890
expert , I'm an air missile defense 

2018
01:15:02,890 --> 01:15:05,001
officer . And so wait , wait , wait . 

2019
01:15:06,040 --> 01:15:08,270
Yeah , the four of you know more about 

2020
01:15:08,270 --> 01:15:11,390
this than most anybody else . So I 

2021
01:15:11,390 --> 01:15:13,279
understand you're not policy . My 

2022
01:15:13,279 --> 01:15:15,390
question is what would you want to be 

2023
01:15:15,390 --> 01:15:18,960
discussed ? Any discussion on arms 

2024
01:15:18,960 --> 01:15:21,127
control ? We got to make sure that the 

2025
01:15:21,127 --> 01:15:23,450
parties uh participate uh whatever's 

2026
01:15:23,450 --> 01:15:25,561
agreed to would be verifiable by both 

2027
01:15:25,561 --> 01:15:27,783
by both countries or whatever countries 

2028
01:15:27,783 --> 01:15:30,000
are parties to that trust . But verify 

2029
01:15:30,010 --> 01:15:32,010
I've heard that before . And that's 

2030
01:15:32,010 --> 01:15:35,320
worked before General shaw congressman . 

2031
01:15:35,320 --> 01:15:38,790
So uh so the space domain is uh it's 

2032
01:15:38,790 --> 01:15:41,012
not a global comments , an extra global 

2033
01:15:41,012 --> 01:15:42,901
common . And so I would echo what 

2034
01:15:42,901 --> 01:15:44,957
General Van Herck said that whenever 

2035
01:15:44,957 --> 01:15:47,179
you talk about um some something in the 

2036
01:15:47,179 --> 01:15:49,346
space domain , you have to involve all 

2037
01:15:49,346 --> 01:15:48,940
the parties that are participant in 

2038
01:15:48,940 --> 01:15:51,107
that . So we have to be multilateral . 

2039
01:15:51,107 --> 01:15:53,218
I would think the first thing I would 

2040
01:15:53,218 --> 01:15:55,218
want to look at the space domain is 

2041
01:15:55,218 --> 01:15:57,162
norms of of responsible behavior . 

2042
01:15:57,162 --> 01:15:59,218
Within that domain , expectations of 

2043
01:15:59,218 --> 01:16:01,700
what is uh , what is professional 

2044
01:16:01,700 --> 01:16:03,533
behavior versus non professional 

2045
01:16:03,533 --> 01:16:05,756
behavior ? Things that would help us to 

2046
01:16:05,756 --> 01:16:07,756
avoid escalation , that domain that 

2047
01:16:07,756 --> 01:16:09,811
could lead to a crisis quibbling . I 

2048
01:16:09,811 --> 01:16:11,922
think Putin has put that on the table 

2049
01:16:11,922 --> 01:16:14,370
already . And two of you . Two of the 

2050
01:16:14,370 --> 01:16:16,537
four have already said that would be a 

2051
01:16:16,537 --> 01:16:19,850
good starting point . I appreciate your 

2052
01:16:20,930 --> 01:16:23,640
comments on this Admiral Hill . You 

2053
01:16:23,640 --> 01:16:25,862
know , I'm coming back at you and going 

2054
01:16:25,862 --> 01:16:28,084
to get into detail and general car blew 

2055
01:16:28,084 --> 01:16:30,196
the same . Uh , well , you say you're 

2056
01:16:30,196 --> 01:16:32,418
not policy . There's nobody around that 

2057
01:16:32,418 --> 01:16:34,640
knows more about policy than the two of 

2058
01:16:34,640 --> 01:16:36,807
you or the four of you . five of you . 

2059
01:16:36,807 --> 01:16:38,751
Thank you very much on your back . 

2060
01:16:38,751 --> 01:16:40,900
Thank you , gentlemen . Mr waltz . 

2061
01:16:41,630 --> 01:16:43,797
They've called votes so we're going to 

2062
01:16:43,797 --> 01:16:45,741
have four people remaining . We're 

2063
01:16:45,741 --> 01:16:47,741
going to end this public hearing in 

2064
01:16:47,741 --> 01:16:50,540
about 10 minutes . So shorter you are . 

2065
01:16:50,550 --> 01:16:53,190
I'll be quick . I'll be quick . Thank 

2066
01:16:53,190 --> 01:16:55,640
you . Thank you . Mr Chairman General 

2067
01:16:55,640 --> 01:16:58,410
Van Herck just wanted to commend north 

2068
01:16:58,410 --> 01:17:01,630
com for its arctic strategy which 

2069
01:17:01,630 --> 01:17:04,250
called it was pretty comprehensive , 

2070
01:17:04,250 --> 01:17:06,028
called for developing strategic 

2071
01:17:06,028 --> 01:17:08,083
partnerships in the region enhancing 

2072
01:17:08,083 --> 01:17:09,917
arctic operations capabilities , 

2073
01:17:09,917 --> 01:17:12,060
infrastructure , uh an incredible 

2074
01:17:12,060 --> 01:17:14,390
defense presence . I noticed in your 

2075
01:17:14,390 --> 01:17:16,612
Senate testimony in response to Senator 

2076
01:17:16,612 --> 01:17:19,750
Sullivan's question where the various 

2077
01:17:19,750 --> 01:17:21,583
services were implementing their 

2078
01:17:21,583 --> 01:17:23,806
respective arctic strategies as part of 

2079
01:17:23,806 --> 01:17:25,972
the president's budget . Your response 

2080
01:17:25,972 --> 01:17:28,194
was we didn't move the ball very far uh 

2081
01:17:28,194 --> 01:17:30,900
this year uh in the budget with regards 

2082
01:17:30,900 --> 01:17:34,110
to resources in the arctic . Uh , can 

2083
01:17:34,110 --> 01:17:36,388
you flush that out ? What capabilities , 

2084
01:17:36,388 --> 01:17:38,499
what infrastructure would you like to 

2085
01:17:38,499 --> 01:17:40,721
see prioritized by that ? Congress that 

2086
01:17:40,721 --> 01:17:42,960
went unfunded in the budget ? Yeah , 

2087
01:17:44,630 --> 01:17:46,519
Congressman , I would point to my 

2088
01:17:46,519 --> 01:17:48,741
unfunded priority list first for domain 

2089
01:17:48,741 --> 01:17:50,852
awareness with over the horizon radar 

2090
01:17:50,852 --> 01:17:53,420
capabilities , arctic communications 

2091
01:17:53,430 --> 01:17:56,470
capabilities as well as polar over the 

2092
01:17:56,470 --> 01:17:58,692
rising . You mentioned infrastructure . 

2093
01:17:58,692 --> 01:18:00,914
Infrastructure in the arctic is crucial 

2094
01:18:01,020 --> 01:18:03,650
to be able to project power not only 

2095
01:18:03,660 --> 01:18:05,604
during conflict or crisis , but to 

2096
01:18:05,604 --> 01:18:08,250
campaign and create deterrence on a day 

2097
01:18:08,250 --> 01:18:10,670
to day basis . Additional 

2098
01:18:10,670 --> 01:18:12,837
infrastructure . I I think it would be 

2099
01:18:12,837 --> 01:18:14,670
helpful . And when we talk about 

2100
01:18:14,670 --> 01:18:16,614
competing in the arctic , what I'm 

2101
01:18:16,614 --> 01:18:18,614
talking about is persistence and to 

2102
01:18:18,614 --> 01:18:20,837
have persistence , you have to have the 

2103
01:18:20,837 --> 01:18:22,948
ability to remain in place . And that 

2104
01:18:22,948 --> 01:18:26,280
would include having a potential port 

2105
01:18:26,290 --> 01:18:28,600
north of Dutch harbor for vessels to 

2106
01:18:28,600 --> 01:18:30,711
refuel whether they be Coast Guard or 

2107
01:18:30,711 --> 01:18:34,030
Navy vessels as well . Additionally , 

2108
01:18:34,040 --> 01:18:36,207
some things I think we could do better 

2109
01:18:36,207 --> 01:18:38,429
to compete in the arctic . I believe in 

2110
01:18:38,429 --> 01:18:40,484
a crisis or conflict with the forces 

2111
01:18:40,484 --> 01:18:42,484
that we have . And we're blessed to 

2112
01:18:42,484 --> 01:18:44,596
have significant forces in the arctic 

2113
01:18:44,596 --> 01:18:46,651
that are assigned to Indo pak . Um , 

2114
01:18:46,651 --> 01:18:48,707
but in the north Kamio are More than 

2115
01:18:48,707 --> 01:18:50,818
105th Generation fighters . I believe 

2116
01:18:50,818 --> 01:18:52,707
those fighters will likely deploy 

2117
01:18:52,707 --> 01:18:54,770
especially to a european or a indo 

2118
01:18:54,770 --> 01:18:58,080
pacific crisis in that situation . I 

2119
01:18:58,080 --> 01:19:00,247
would love to have the ability to have 

2120
01:19:00,247 --> 01:19:02,302
forces that would backfill them that 

2121
01:19:02,302 --> 01:19:04,524
are organized , trained and equipped to 

2122
01:19:04,524 --> 01:19:06,747
operate in the arctic . Unfortunately , 

2123
01:19:06,747 --> 01:19:06,690
we don't have that today and we need to 

2124
01:19:06,690 --> 01:19:08,857
identify some of those forces . I hope 

2125
01:19:08,857 --> 01:19:10,746
that lays out a little bit of the 

2126
01:19:10,746 --> 01:19:10,250
picture 

2127
01:19:14,420 --> 01:19:17,310
uh , that does , that does general . 

2128
01:19:17,310 --> 01:19:19,710
Thank you . And just to be clear , we 

2129
01:19:19,710 --> 01:19:21,654
do not currently have a persistent 

2130
01:19:21,654 --> 01:19:23,770
naval presence or a persistent ground 

2131
01:19:23,780 --> 01:19:27,750
presence uh facing north in the arctic . 

2132
01:19:27,750 --> 01:19:29,639
And I think that's something this 

2133
01:19:29,639 --> 01:19:31,740
committee overall should take a hard 

2134
01:19:31,740 --> 01:19:33,962
look at . I just wanted to very quickly 

2135
01:19:33,962 --> 01:19:36,870
follow up Admiral Hill . What if your 

2136
01:19:36,880 --> 01:19:38,824
conversations been like with their 

2137
01:19:38,824 --> 01:19:40,990
Israeli counterpart with regards to 

2138
01:19:40,990 --> 01:19:43,880
their recent conflict ? President Biden 

2139
01:19:43,880 --> 01:19:45,950
is committed to re supplying Israel 

2140
01:19:45,960 --> 01:19:48,320
with iron dome , uh iron dome 

2141
01:19:48,320 --> 01:19:50,390
interceptors that were extended . Uh 

2142
01:19:50,400 --> 01:19:53,290
Can you give us a status on that ? Um I 

2143
01:19:53,290 --> 01:19:55,580
I can uh tell you about our input to 

2144
01:19:55,580 --> 01:19:57,524
that . As you know , we've got the 

2145
01:19:57,524 --> 01:19:59,810
partnership co production on iron dome 

2146
01:19:59,820 --> 01:20:02,080
uh co development work that we do with 

2147
01:20:02,080 --> 01:20:04,191
the aero system and with David Slaine 

2148
01:20:04,191 --> 01:20:06,524
uh the conversations that we had with I . 

2149
01:20:06,524 --> 01:20:08,840
M . B . O . Uh we're really uh to kind 

2150
01:20:08,840 --> 01:20:10,970
of back check , you know , costing of 

2151
01:20:10,980 --> 01:20:13,290
of of what what we developed . So as 

2152
01:20:13,290 --> 01:20:15,530
they put together there there there's 

2153
01:20:15,530 --> 01:20:17,630
some middle for that special 

2154
01:20:17,630 --> 01:20:19,797
appropriation . Uh They kind of wanted 

2155
01:20:19,797 --> 01:20:21,908
to back check on that and that's just 

2156
01:20:21,908 --> 01:20:23,852
part of our partnership . But it's 

2157
01:20:23,852 --> 01:20:25,852
better for Mr Merrill to answer the 

2158
01:20:25,852 --> 01:20:25,260
question because it's really within the 

2159
01:20:25,260 --> 01:20:27,149
department now for for decision . 

2160
01:20:31,510 --> 01:20:34,190
Uh Yeah that that is uh being 

2161
01:20:34,190 --> 01:20:37,020
considered now and again , we'll feed 

2162
01:20:37,020 --> 01:20:38,530
into to our reviews . 

2163
01:20:40,310 --> 01:20:42,940
The President's made the commitment . 

2164
01:20:42,950 --> 01:20:46,740
So I'm curious as to what the holdup is 

2165
01:20:46,740 --> 01:20:48,796
within the department . If it's been 

2166
01:20:48,796 --> 01:20:50,962
costed out , the relationship exists , 

2167
01:20:50,962 --> 01:20:53,073
The commander in chief has said we're 

2168
01:20:53,073 --> 01:20:55,296
going to do this . What when when do we 

2169
01:20:55,296 --> 01:20:57,960
expect this to free from the bowels of 

2170
01:20:57,960 --> 01:21:01,320
Osd ? The again it's um 

2171
01:21:02,210 --> 01:21:04,580
the department is working through it uh 

2172
01:21:04,580 --> 01:21:08,500
And we expect that um This will be 

2173
01:21:08,510 --> 01:21:11,660
uh justice of as a high priority . It's 

2174
01:21:11,660 --> 01:21:13,930
being prioritized at the highest levels 

2175
01:21:13,930 --> 01:21:17,390
of the department . Weeks , 

2176
01:21:17,390 --> 01:21:19,970
months . I don't know , I don't know 

2177
01:21:19,970 --> 01:21:22,026
when the Israelis can expect another 

2178
01:21:22,026 --> 01:21:23,026
attack . 

2179
01:21:25,210 --> 01:21:27,970
I'll get back to you with an answer . I 

2180
01:21:27,970 --> 01:21:29,914
don't expect . It will be months . 

2181
01:21:30,310 --> 01:21:33,230
Again it's being thank you guys at the 

2182
01:21:33,230 --> 01:21:36,670
highest level . Um , and there are the 

2183
01:21:36,670 --> 01:21:38,892
department is conducting meetings on it 

2184
01:21:38,892 --> 01:21:40,948
uh , this week , as we speak . Yes , 

2185
01:21:42,210 --> 01:21:45,440
thank you . Mr Chairman Mr Panetta . 

2186
01:21:46,210 --> 01:21:48,154
This will be the last questioner . 

2187
01:21:49,610 --> 01:21:52,010
Thank you . Mr Chairman , I appreciate 

2188
01:21:52,010 --> 01:21:54,530
that . Uh , just quickly , Lieutenant 

2189
01:21:54,530 --> 01:21:57,910
General Shaw , how is space com 

2190
01:21:57,920 --> 01:22:00,740
integrating new roles as the global 

2191
01:22:00,740 --> 01:22:01,910
sensor monitor ? 

2192
01:22:04,100 --> 01:22:06,350
So , congressman , I think what we what 

2193
01:22:06,350 --> 01:22:08,461
we are witnessing is a convergence of 

2194
01:22:08,461 --> 01:22:10,628
those mission sets that I mentioned my 

2195
01:22:10,628 --> 01:22:13,500
in my opening remarks of space domain 

2196
01:22:13,500 --> 01:22:15,730
awareness , missile defense and missile 

2197
01:22:15,730 --> 01:22:19,240
warning , meaning that the as the 

2198
01:22:19,250 --> 01:22:22,550
threats diversify um 

2199
01:22:22,560 --> 01:22:25,590
the needs to track those at various 

2200
01:22:25,590 --> 01:22:28,830
stages all start to converge a ground 

2201
01:22:28,830 --> 01:22:31,540
launched anti satellite weapon and anti 

2202
01:22:31,540 --> 01:22:33,318
satellite weapon in space and a 

2203
01:22:33,318 --> 01:22:35,660
hypersonic or hyper glide vehicle . 

2204
01:22:35,670 --> 01:22:37,892
They all start to occupy the same kinds 

2205
01:22:37,892 --> 01:22:39,948
of timelines and needs . And so what 

2206
01:22:39,948 --> 01:22:42,170
we're doing in our roles , global sense 

2207
01:22:42,170 --> 01:22:44,337
of managers , finding ways that we can 

2208
01:22:44,337 --> 01:22:46,559
network together sensors against all of 

2209
01:22:46,559 --> 01:22:50,520
those threats at speed . Great , 

2210
01:22:50,520 --> 01:22:53,080
Great . Thank you . And just one final 

2211
01:22:53,080 --> 01:22:55,310
question . So at least get a question 

2212
01:22:55,310 --> 01:22:57,730
in there . I see her on the phone . Uh , 

2213
01:22:57,740 --> 01:22:59,684
one question though , to deal with 

2214
01:22:59,684 --> 01:23:01,684
something that's important near and 

2215
01:23:01,684 --> 01:23:03,907
dear to me and that's the Central coast 

2216
01:23:03,907 --> 01:23:06,184
and that's a Navy Post Graduate school . 

2217
01:23:06,184 --> 01:23:08,184
Can how do you think other entities 

2218
01:23:08,184 --> 01:23:08,130
within the D . O . D . Enterprise , 

2219
01:23:08,140 --> 01:23:10,610
like naval postgraduate school work 

2220
01:23:10,610 --> 01:23:12,721
with Space . Com to develop new space 

2221
01:23:12,721 --> 01:23:15,020
based educational requirements 

2222
01:23:16,500 --> 01:23:18,778
that the programs are already aware of ? 

2223
01:23:18,778 --> 01:23:21,000
An mps are exceptional when it comes to 

2224
01:23:21,000 --> 01:23:23,222
space education . I think we would want 

2225
01:23:23,222 --> 01:23:25,167
to continue to be that part of our 

2226
01:23:25,167 --> 01:23:28,130
educational infrastructure . Great , so 

2227
01:23:28,130 --> 01:23:30,352
do I look forward to working with you , 

2228
01:23:30,352 --> 01:23:32,408
Mr Chairman . I'm gonna yield back . 

2229
01:23:35,700 --> 01:23:39,210
Mr phonic . Thank you so much . 

2230
01:23:39,210 --> 01:23:41,321
Chairman . Thank you . Mr Panetta . I 

2231
01:23:41,321 --> 01:23:43,543
just wanted to make sure they knew that 

2232
01:23:43,543 --> 01:23:45,821
I was here on the republican side . Um , 

2233
01:23:45,821 --> 01:23:47,932
my question is simple . Section 16 48 

2234
01:23:47,932 --> 01:23:50,950
of the Fy 21 . Nd a required a report 

2235
01:23:50,960 --> 01:23:53,016
on a layered homeland defense system 

2236
01:23:53,016 --> 01:23:56,240
which was to be submitted no later than 

2237
01:23:56,240 --> 01:23:59,150
March 1st 2021 . Well , obviously past 

2238
01:23:59,150 --> 01:24:01,094
that deadline report has yet to be 

2239
01:24:01,094 --> 01:24:03,150
delivered to Congress after numerous 

2240
01:24:03,150 --> 01:24:05,150
delays . Admiral Hill . Congress is 

2241
01:24:05,150 --> 01:24:07,206
still awaiting its report on layered 

2242
01:24:07,206 --> 01:24:09,380
homeland missile defense required by 

2243
01:24:09,380 --> 01:24:12,800
the Fy 21 N . D . A . Has M . D . I has 

2244
01:24:12,810 --> 01:24:15,460
India provided all of its input for 

2245
01:24:15,460 --> 01:24:18,190
this report to the pentagon . Uh , 

2246
01:24:18,200 --> 01:24:20,430
congressman Spike . The answer to that 

2247
01:24:20,430 --> 01:24:22,760
is yes . It's really a policy question 

2248
01:24:22,770 --> 01:24:25,760
technically . Uh , I see no barriers , 

2249
01:24:25,770 --> 01:24:27,770
but it is a policy question that we 

2250
01:24:27,770 --> 01:24:29,826
need to come through . Yeah , I just 

2251
01:24:29,826 --> 01:24:31,937
wanted to get you on record , Admiral 

2252
01:24:31,937 --> 01:24:33,881
Hill , Mr marrow . So we need this 

2253
01:24:33,881 --> 01:24:36,048
report to complete our work for the Fy 

2254
01:24:36,048 --> 01:24:38,610
22 N . D . A . When will osd submit 

2255
01:24:38,610 --> 01:24:42,550
this to Congress ? Uh 

2256
01:24:42,560 --> 01:24:44,671
let me get you a better answer on the 

2257
01:24:44,671 --> 01:24:47,180
timeline . But I can assure you that 

2258
01:24:47,190 --> 01:24:51,180
that um looking at how uh what 

2259
01:24:51,180 --> 01:24:53,170
investments we make for a layered 

2260
01:24:53,170 --> 01:24:55,850
homeland defense , what priorities um , 

2261
01:24:55,860 --> 01:24:59,840
are made uh being uh are the 

2262
01:24:59,840 --> 01:25:02,300
subject of studies again in 

2263
01:25:02,300 --> 01:25:04,610
consultation with the Defense Agency 

2264
01:25:04,610 --> 01:25:08,400
with the Office of Cost Assessment and 

2265
01:25:08,400 --> 01:25:10,590
Program Evolution , Cape . Uh and so 

2266
01:25:10,590 --> 01:25:13,450
looking at um what the options are , 

2267
01:25:13,450 --> 01:25:15,940
what the costs , um some of it can be 

2268
01:25:15,940 --> 01:25:18,720
scaled , what can uh feed into make 

2269
01:25:18,720 --> 01:25:22,340
improvements uh and what can be done in 

2270
01:25:22,340 --> 01:25:25,620
terms of uh cost reduction . And so um 

2271
01:25:25,630 --> 01:25:28,620
we've made an initial investment on 

2272
01:25:29,090 --> 01:25:32,730
This in Fy 21 . I'm sorry , in Fy 

2273
01:25:32,730 --> 01:25:36,060
22 . Uh , and so those studies are 

2274
01:25:36,060 --> 01:25:38,227
gonna inform further investments in Fy 

2275
01:25:38,227 --> 01:25:40,338
23 . And so we will get you an answer 

2276
01:25:40,338 --> 01:25:43,880
on those studies . Great . That study 

2277
01:25:43,880 --> 01:25:46,047
is , it's not optional . That deadline 

2278
01:25:46,047 --> 01:25:49,830
is in law required by the Fy 21 . Nd A . 

2279
01:25:49,840 --> 01:25:52,007
So I'll expect that answer from you in 

2280
01:25:52,007 --> 01:25:54,173
your office in OSD this week . Us when 

2281
01:25:54,173 --> 01:25:56,284
we can expect that . My next question 

2282
01:25:56,284 --> 01:25:58,560
is regarding um , the threats and how 

2283
01:25:58,560 --> 01:26:00,690
they have intensified . We know , 

2284
01:26:00,690 --> 01:26:02,912
according to open source reporting that 

2285
01:26:02,912 --> 01:26:05,250
North Korea has capabilities striking 

2286
01:26:05,250 --> 01:26:07,417
anywhere in the US . And there is also 

2287
01:26:07,417 --> 01:26:09,417
open source reporting that Iran and 

2288
01:26:09,417 --> 01:26:11,472
North Korea are working in tandem on 

2289
01:26:11,472 --> 01:26:13,528
missile development . Additionally , 

2290
01:26:13,528 --> 01:26:15,694
open source reporting uh , talks about 

2291
01:26:15,694 --> 01:26:18,440
how the IrgC oversees Iran's civilian 

2292
01:26:18,440 --> 01:26:20,930
space launch program , which is obvious 

2293
01:26:20,930 --> 01:26:23,870
dual use benefits and capabilities . Do 

2294
01:26:23,870 --> 01:26:26,092
you believe that the missile threats to 

2295
01:26:26,092 --> 01:26:29,080
the United States increase during and 

2296
01:26:29,080 --> 01:26:31,247
since the Obama administration And the 

2297
01:26:31,247 --> 01:26:33,270
reason why I go back to the Obama 

2298
01:26:33,270 --> 01:26:35,159
administration is that admitted , 

2299
01:26:35,159 --> 01:26:37,103
administration said that we should 

2300
01:26:37,103 --> 01:26:39,214
build a third continental interceptor 

2301
01:26:39,214 --> 01:26:41,103
site if missile threats to the US 

2302
01:26:41,103 --> 01:26:43,270
increase . So I want to know on record 

2303
01:26:43,270 --> 01:26:45,600
if you believe the threats to the 

2304
01:26:45,600 --> 01:26:47,822
homeland have increased since the Obama 

2305
01:26:47,822 --> 01:26:51,340
administration . Uh huh . I um 

2306
01:26:51,350 --> 01:26:53,940
yes , that's for Mr marrow . Yes , both 

2307
01:26:53,940 --> 01:26:56,107
North Korea and Iran are continuing to 

2308
01:26:56,107 --> 01:26:59,290
increase their missile capabilities And 

2309
01:26:59,290 --> 01:27:03,060
having system and 2010 and we know that 

2310
01:27:03,070 --> 01:27:05,040
the West Coast has a more robust 

2311
01:27:05,040 --> 01:27:07,096
protection from missile threats from 

2312
01:27:07,096 --> 01:27:09,280
the pacific relative to the west coast 

2313
01:27:09,290 --> 01:27:12,150
Is the East Coast as protected from 

2314
01:27:12,150 --> 01:27:14,490
threats like a potential Iranian I C B 

2315
01:27:14,490 --> 01:27:17,080
M . Or an S L B M . From somewhere in 

2316
01:27:17,080 --> 01:27:20,150
the atlantic . Yes , All of the United 

2317
01:27:20,150 --> 01:27:23,010
States is protected with missile 

2318
01:27:23,010 --> 01:27:26,590
defense today . Um switching gears to 

2319
01:27:26,590 --> 01:27:28,757
the N . G . I . There are reports that 

2320
01:27:28,757 --> 01:27:30,534
the M . D . A . Plans to buy 10 

2321
01:27:30,534 --> 01:27:32,646
developmental interceptors as part of 

2322
01:27:32,646 --> 01:27:34,701
the N . G . I . Programme . Uh Would 

2323
01:27:34,701 --> 01:27:36,812
any of those interceptors go anywhere 

2324
01:27:36,812 --> 01:27:39,100
outside of the current G . B . I . Silo 

2325
01:27:39,100 --> 01:27:41,370
infrastructure sites at Fort Really or 

2326
01:27:41,370 --> 01:27:42,926
Vandenberg Air Force Base . 

2327
01:27:42,926 --> 01:27:44,814
Specifically . Could any of those 

2328
01:27:44,814 --> 01:27:46,648
interceptors go to an East Coast 

2329
01:27:46,648 --> 01:27:47,926
missile defense site ? 

2330
01:27:50,280 --> 01:27:53,270
I'll defer to buy sentinel Hill on on 

2331
01:27:53,270 --> 01:27:55,381
where intercepting interceptors could 

2332
01:27:55,381 --> 01:27:58,310
be placed . Yes ma'am . Right now we're 

2333
01:27:58,310 --> 01:28:00,366
focused on getting to the production 

2334
01:28:00,366 --> 01:28:02,699
numbers and those initial test articles . 

2335
01:28:02,770 --> 01:28:04,992
Uh It will be a global force management 

2336
01:28:04,992 --> 01:28:07,159
discussion on you know anything beyond 

2337
01:28:07,159 --> 01:28:09,048
Fort Greely . But right now we're 

2338
01:28:09,048 --> 01:28:11,103
planning for Fort Greely . We've got 

2339
01:28:11,103 --> 01:28:13,214
the room , their missile field for uh 

2340
01:28:13,214 --> 01:28:15,270
we have all 20 silos installed . Now 

2341
01:28:15,270 --> 01:28:15,270
we're doing the integration works so we 

2342
01:28:15,270 --> 01:28:17,326
can house them in Fort Greely at the 

2343
01:28:17,326 --> 01:28:19,437
nation . Makes the decision to open a 

2344
01:28:19,437 --> 01:28:21,548
battle space by having a third site . 

2345
01:28:21,548 --> 01:28:23,659
Uh that that conversation will come . 

2346
01:28:24,370 --> 01:28:26,930
Okay thank you . I will back Mr 

2347
01:28:26,930 --> 01:28:29,208
Keheliya is recognized for two minutes . 

2348
01:28:29,208 --> 01:28:31,319
Thank you . Mr Chair . My question is 

2349
01:28:31,319 --> 01:28:33,541
for the homeland defense radar Hawaii . 

2350
01:28:33,541 --> 01:28:35,652
I was disappointed to see that it was 

2351
01:28:35,652 --> 01:28:35,290
zeroed out in the president's budget . 

2352
01:28:35,770 --> 01:28:39,180
A program a sensor that the previous 

2353
01:28:39,180 --> 01:28:42,400
combatant commander had quoted as 

2354
01:28:42,400 --> 01:28:44,400
saying the best program solution to 

2355
01:28:44,400 --> 01:28:46,567
enable incredible in depth under layer 

2356
01:28:46,567 --> 01:28:48,733
defense for our forces in Hawaii . You 

2357
01:28:48,733 --> 01:28:50,844
know in reviewing all the testimony , 

2358
01:28:50,844 --> 01:28:53,067
whether it's the department's the North 

2359
01:28:53,067 --> 01:28:55,233
com commander , the M . D . Director . 

2360
01:28:55,233 --> 01:28:57,400
We all talk about north Korea kim jong 

2361
01:28:57,400 --> 01:28:59,622
un and how increasing that threat is to 

2362
01:28:59,622 --> 01:29:01,733
the United States and the development 

2363
01:29:01,733 --> 01:29:03,990
of their I . C . B . M . S . And 

2364
01:29:04,000 --> 01:29:06,800
nuclear missiles . So my question is 

2365
01:29:06,810 --> 01:29:08,820
for miss tomorrow , what is the 

2366
01:29:08,820 --> 01:29:10,931
Department of Defense current plan to 

2367
01:29:10,931 --> 01:29:13,042
protect Hawaii and address the gap in 

2368
01:29:13,042 --> 01:29:15,000
our ability to detect track 

2369
01:29:15,010 --> 01:29:17,460
discriminate and defeat a ballistic 

2370
01:29:17,470 --> 01:29:20,680
missile for harvey and for Guam . 

2371
01:29:21,370 --> 01:29:23,820
Mhm . Thank you , congressman . I just 

2372
01:29:23,820 --> 01:29:25,709
want to make clear that Hawaii is 

2373
01:29:25,709 --> 01:29:27,876
currently protected today . How is how 

2374
01:29:27,876 --> 01:29:30,170
I protected ? It is protected with the 

2375
01:29:30,170 --> 01:29:32,170
current capabilities we have . What 

2376
01:29:32,170 --> 01:29:35,600
sensor protects Hawaii ? Well we have 

2377
01:29:35,610 --> 01:29:38,600
SbX . SBX is in the northern pacific . 

2378
01:29:40,470 --> 01:29:42,550
What sensor protects the state of 

2379
01:29:42,550 --> 01:29:45,170
Hawaii from a ballistic missile threat 

2380
01:29:45,180 --> 01:29:47,560
from the Dprk . We have a network of 

2381
01:29:47,560 --> 01:29:50,890
sensors uh including the tracking 

2382
01:29:50,890 --> 01:29:53,790
sensors O . P . I . R . Uh And then as 

2383
01:29:53,790 --> 01:29:56,110
I mentioned we have spx that 

2384
01:29:56,120 --> 01:29:58,690
contributes to improve discrimination . 

2385
01:29:58,700 --> 01:30:01,850
Um So if we need to use Spx for Hawaii 

2386
01:30:01,850 --> 01:30:03,961
then we are unable to use the SBX for 

2387
01:30:03,961 --> 01:30:05,906
the homeland . Is that correct for 

2388
01:30:05,906 --> 01:30:09,770
North . Com ? Um , I 

2389
01:30:09,780 --> 01:30:13,060
would defer to kill or general friend 

2390
01:30:13,060 --> 01:30:15,050
Mark on the on the details of the 

2391
01:30:15,050 --> 01:30:17,383
capabilities from . I think the fact is , 

2392
01:30:17,383 --> 01:30:19,494
and I know we need to adjourn is that 

2393
01:30:19,494 --> 01:30:21,606
we do not have an adequate sensor for 

2394
01:30:21,606 --> 01:30:23,717
the Hawaiian Islands . If we're going 

2395
01:30:23,717 --> 01:30:25,772
to depend on our Ages ages systems , 

2396
01:30:25,772 --> 01:30:27,790
that is a capability that Admiral 

2397
01:30:27,800 --> 01:30:29,790
Aquilino cannot use in the Western 

2398
01:30:29,790 --> 01:30:31,901
pacific . If we're going to depend on 

2399
01:30:31,901 --> 01:30:34,012
SBX , that is a capability that North 

2400
01:30:34,012 --> 01:30:36,900
com cannot use to defend the 

2401
01:30:36,910 --> 01:30:39,021
continental United States . And it is 

2402
01:30:39,021 --> 01:30:42,200
why we need a sensor in the Hawaiian 

2403
01:30:42,200 --> 01:30:44,560
islands to defend against a ballistic 

2404
01:30:44,560 --> 01:30:46,504
missile threat from a rogue nation 

2405
01:30:46,504 --> 01:30:48,930
state . Like the Dprk congressman . I'd 

2406
01:30:48,930 --> 01:30:50,874
like to talk from the North korean 

2407
01:30:50,874 --> 01:30:52,986
perspective . If you don't mind about 

2408
01:30:52,986 --> 01:30:55,208
that . Even without spx , I'm confident 

2409
01:30:55,208 --> 01:30:57,097
in my ability to defend against a 

2410
01:30:57,097 --> 01:30:59,470
threat from DpRK to Hawaii . Today I 

2411
01:30:59,470 --> 01:31:01,950
support the Hawaii radar . I believe it 

2412
01:31:01,950 --> 01:31:04,061
gives us additional capability for an 

2413
01:31:04,061 --> 01:31:06,230
under layer that would support defense 

2414
01:31:06,230 --> 01:31:07,950
of Hawaii specifically giving 

2415
01:31:07,950 --> 01:31:10,006
additional capability and capacity . 

2416
01:31:10,110 --> 01:31:12,500
But let's be clear at this moment in 

2417
01:31:12,500 --> 01:31:14,667
time , I'm comfortable with my ability 

2418
01:31:14,667 --> 01:31:16,833
to defend Hawaii . That doesn't mean I 

2419
01:31:16,833 --> 01:31:19,111
don't support the sensor though . Okay . 

2420
01:31:19,760 --> 01:31:22,730
Oh sorry . I would add uh that that we 

2421
01:31:22,730 --> 01:31:25,900
are looking at how to best improve the 

2422
01:31:25,900 --> 01:31:27,844
defense of Hawaii . The defense of 

2423
01:31:27,844 --> 01:31:30,011
Hawaii . I suggest we look at both the 

2424
01:31:30,011 --> 01:31:32,067
defense of Hawaii and the defense of 

2425
01:31:32,067 --> 01:31:34,122
the territory of Guam as we shift to 

2426
01:31:34,122 --> 01:31:33,920
the pacific Thank you . Mr . Chair 

2427
01:31:33,920 --> 01:31:36,142
ideal back both of the gentleman's time 

2428
01:31:36,142 --> 01:31:38,309
has expired . The Subcommittee will be 

2429
01:31:38,309 --> 01:31:40,970
adjourned until about 5:00 or as soon 

2430
01:31:40,970 --> 01:31:44,060
as votes have ended And we will meet in 

2431
01:31:44,070 --> 01:31:46,970
20-12 for the closed session . Thank 

2432
01:31:46,970 --> 01:31:47,280
you .