1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:02,650 a little less late 2 00:00:03,040 --> 00:00:06,160 today . Um Okay . Uh 3 00:00:06,740 --> 00:00:08,890 today I want to start the briefing by 4 00:00:08,890 --> 00:00:11,001 asking miss Lynn Rosenthal to come up 5 00:00:11,001 --> 00:00:13,057 and back brief you . I think you all 6 00:00:13,057 --> 00:00:15,780 know that the work of the Independent 7 00:00:15,780 --> 00:00:18,002 Review Commission on Sexual assault has 8 00:00:18,002 --> 00:00:20,058 completed . They have submitted that 9 00:00:20,058 --> 00:00:22,169 report and the secretary has made his 10 00:00:22,169 --> 00:00:24,391 recommendations uh to the President . I 11 00:00:24,391 --> 00:00:26,336 think you also saw the President's 12 00:00:26,336 --> 00:00:27,910 statement as well on these 13 00:00:27,910 --> 00:00:30,820 recommendations . Um and we've posted 14 00:00:30,820 --> 00:00:33,310 the report on our website , we posted 15 00:00:33,310 --> 00:00:35,490 the secretaries directive to the 16 00:00:35,490 --> 00:00:37,546 department as well for all of you to 17 00:00:37,546 --> 00:00:39,879 see , hopefully you've seen that by now . 18 00:00:39,879 --> 00:00:42,046 But I thought it was important for you 19 00:00:42,046 --> 00:00:44,101 get a chance to talk to MS Rosenthal 20 00:00:44,101 --> 00:00:46,323 herself about their work , the scope of 21 00:00:46,323 --> 00:00:48,379 uh of what they covered , um and the 22 00:00:48,379 --> 00:00:50,490 recommendations that they made to the 23 00:00:50,490 --> 00:00:52,657 department . So I'm going to bring her 24 00:00:52,657 --> 00:00:54,823 up here for uh sometimes she'll have I 25 00:00:54,823 --> 00:00:56,768 think some opening comments . Then 26 00:00:56,768 --> 00:00:58,990 we'll go to questions . We've got about 27 00:00:58,990 --> 00:01:01,046 30 minutes with with Lynn . So we'll 28 00:01:01,046 --> 00:01:03,212 try to be mindful of that . Um , since 29 00:01:03,212 --> 00:01:05,268 she doesn't know you as well as I do 30 00:01:05,268 --> 00:01:07,101 when you ask a question , please 31 00:01:07,101 --> 00:01:06,900 introduce yourself , who you are , 32 00:01:06,900 --> 00:01:08,844 where you're from and if you could 33 00:01:08,844 --> 00:01:11,011 please limit your follow up so that we 34 00:01:11,011 --> 00:01:13,560 can get people through her through many 35 00:01:13,560 --> 00:01:15,838 questions through her as possible . So , 36 00:01:19,940 --> 00:01:23,310 good afternoon . Yeah , I'm joined by 37 00:01:23,310 --> 00:01:25,590 Brigadier General Retired Jim Schwank , 38 00:01:25,590 --> 00:01:27,812 who was one of our legal experts on the 39 00:01:27,812 --> 00:01:29,979 I . R . C . And is here to help answer 40 00:01:29,979 --> 00:01:32,360 questions as I stand here today . I'm 41 00:01:32,360 --> 00:01:34,600 remembering when we announced this 42 00:01:34,600 --> 00:01:36,767 effort and when the secretary stood up 43 00:01:36,767 --> 00:01:39,510 the I . R . C . And I said on that day 44 00:01:39,510 --> 00:01:41,900 that in reading stories from victims of 45 00:01:41,900 --> 00:01:44,200 sexual assault , I noted that they 46 00:01:44,200 --> 00:01:46,144 often felt that the purpose of the 47 00:01:46,144 --> 00:01:48,200 sexual assault was to make them feel 48 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:50,533 like they didn't belong in the military , 49 00:01:50,533 --> 00:01:52,756 that they were someone who shouldn't be 50 00:01:52,756 --> 00:01:54,756 there . And I said on that day that 51 00:01:54,756 --> 00:01:57,470 this IRC was about ensuring them that 52 00:01:57,470 --> 00:01:59,600 they do belong in this military . I 53 00:01:59,600 --> 00:02:02,300 must say that that finding or my 54 00:02:02,300 --> 00:02:03,990 initial impressions held true 55 00:02:03,990 --> 00:02:05,880 throughout our process , that the 56 00:02:05,880 --> 00:02:07,547 purpose of sexual assault and 57 00:02:07,547 --> 00:02:09,547 harassment is often to make someone 58 00:02:09,547 --> 00:02:11,440 feel like they don't belong . And 59 00:02:11,440 --> 00:02:13,551 you'll hear that as a recurring theme 60 00:02:13,551 --> 00:02:16,490 in our recommendations . The IRC has 61 00:02:16,490 --> 00:02:18,546 completed our work and delivered our 62 00:02:18,546 --> 00:02:20,910 recommendations to Secretary Austin . I 63 00:02:20,910 --> 00:02:23,132 want to recognize the leadership of the 64 00:02:23,132 --> 00:02:25,299 secretary and president biden in their 65 00:02:25,299 --> 00:02:27,466 commitment to ending sexual assault in 66 00:02:27,466 --> 00:02:29,688 the military . And I also want to thank 67 00:02:29,688 --> 00:02:31,854 General Milley , chairman of the joint 68 00:02:31,854 --> 00:02:34,077 chiefs of staff , for his engagement in 69 00:02:34,077 --> 00:02:35,688 this process . And I want to 70 00:02:35,688 --> 00:02:37,910 acknowledge the support and cooperation 71 00:02:37,910 --> 00:02:41,140 of service leaders . We very much 72 00:02:41,140 --> 00:02:43,251 appreciated their willingness to come 73 00:02:43,251 --> 00:02:45,910 to the table and two have a dialogue 74 00:02:45,920 --> 00:02:48,031 even when they didn't agree with some 75 00:02:48,031 --> 00:02:50,440 of our recommendations . I want to give 76 00:02:50,440 --> 00:02:52,496 you a guide to the report . I'm sure 77 00:02:52,496 --> 00:02:54,607 you haven't had a chance to read it . 78 00:02:54,607 --> 00:02:56,773 It's 299 pages . So I want to tell you 79 00:02:56,773 --> 00:02:58,773 what you're looking at . There is a 80 00:02:58,773 --> 00:03:00,718 short overview that highlights our 81 00:03:00,718 --> 00:03:02,662 recommendations . There's a longer 82 00:03:02,662 --> 00:03:05,560 summer report that details our findings 83 00:03:05,740 --> 00:03:07,796 and then there are four reports from 84 00:03:07,796 --> 00:03:09,796 each line of effort . So there is a 85 00:03:09,796 --> 00:03:11,962 line of effort , one on accountability 86 00:03:11,962 --> 00:03:14,184 to on prevention , Three on climate and 87 00:03:14,184 --> 00:03:16,184 culture and four on victim care and 88 00:03:16,184 --> 00:03:18,240 support . So as much as I would love 89 00:03:18,240 --> 00:03:20,240 for you to read all 300 pages , you 90 00:03:20,240 --> 00:03:22,351 also could go directly to that report 91 00:03:22,351 --> 00:03:24,462 for that line of effort and you would 92 00:03:24,462 --> 00:03:26,684 find everything you need there . And in 93 00:03:26,684 --> 00:03:28,962 fact today with some of your questions , 94 00:03:28,962 --> 00:03:31,073 I'll refer you directly to the report 95 00:03:31,073 --> 00:03:33,460 As a part of our process . We met with 96 00:03:33,470 --> 00:03:35,640 over 600 individuals , including 97 00:03:35,640 --> 00:03:38,020 survivors , researchers , current and 98 00:03:38,020 --> 00:03:40,131 former service members , commanders , 99 00:03:40,131 --> 00:03:42,298 junior and senior enlisted members and 100 00:03:42,298 --> 00:03:44,131 advocates working against sexual 101 00:03:44,131 --> 00:03:46,340 assault . I want to begin by reminding 102 00:03:46,340 --> 00:03:48,173 all of us about the scope of the 103 00:03:48,173 --> 00:03:50,790 problem . 20,000 service members 104 00:03:50,790 --> 00:03:53,460 experienced sexual assault every year . 105 00:03:54,140 --> 00:03:56,580 Less than 8000 report those sexual 106 00:03:56,580 --> 00:03:58,950 assaults . Less than 5000 of those are 107 00:03:58,960 --> 00:04:01,127 unrestricted reports , meaning there's 108 00:04:01,127 --> 00:04:03,293 a victim has said that he or she wants 109 00:04:03,293 --> 00:04:06,200 a full investigation and only a tiny 110 00:04:06,200 --> 00:04:08,700 fraction of those end up with any kind 111 00:04:08,700 --> 00:04:10,533 of action at all in the military 112 00:04:10,533 --> 00:04:12,589 justice system . So that's the chasm 113 00:04:12,589 --> 00:04:15,060 that we're talking about . And in fact , 114 00:04:15,240 --> 00:04:18,050 that chasm about between the scope of 115 00:04:18,050 --> 00:04:20,106 the problem and the actions that are 116 00:04:20,106 --> 00:04:23,130 taken mirrors the chasm that we found 117 00:04:23,140 --> 00:04:25,530 between what senior leaders say about 118 00:04:25,530 --> 00:04:27,900 this problem and what junior enlisted 119 00:04:27,900 --> 00:04:30,380 members experience at the unit level . 120 00:04:30,390 --> 00:04:32,612 For decades , service leaders have said 121 00:04:32,612 --> 00:04:34,723 that there is no tolerance for sexual 122 00:04:34,723 --> 00:04:37,950 assault , But in practice all too often , 123 00:04:37,950 --> 00:04:40,172 there is nothing but tolerance . As one 124 00:04:40,172 --> 00:04:42,339 senior enlisted officer told us in our 125 00:04:42,339 --> 00:04:44,630 listening sessions , zero tolerance 126 00:04:44,640 --> 00:04:48,230 actually means 100% tolerance . This 127 00:04:48,230 --> 00:04:50,850 has resulted in broken trust between 128 00:04:50,860 --> 00:04:52,840 junior enlisted members and their 129 00:04:52,840 --> 00:04:55,210 commanders . We also found that the 130 00:04:55,210 --> 00:04:57,350 military justice system is not well 131 00:04:57,350 --> 00:04:59,430 equipped to handle sensitive crimes 132 00:04:59,430 --> 00:05:01,263 like sexual assault and domestic 133 00:05:01,263 --> 00:05:02,819 violence . These crimes are 134 00:05:02,819 --> 00:05:05,070 interpersonal in nature and have the 135 00:05:05,080 --> 00:05:07,300 potential to be re traumatizing for 136 00:05:07,300 --> 00:05:09,467 victims as their cases move forward so 137 00:05:09,467 --> 00:05:11,800 they need specialized care and handling . 138 00:05:12,140 --> 00:05:13,862 We note that there is a strong 139 00:05:13,862 --> 00:05:16,084 continuum between sexual harassment and 140 00:05:16,084 --> 00:05:18,251 sexual assault and that the connection 141 00:05:18,251 --> 00:05:20,084 between on and there is a strong 142 00:05:20,084 --> 00:05:22,230 connection between unchecked sexual 143 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:24,390 harassment when commanders take no 144 00:05:24,390 --> 00:05:26,910 action to address it and pour unit 145 00:05:26,910 --> 00:05:29,840 climates . We also found that the cyber 146 00:05:29,840 --> 00:05:32,180 domain domain can be a strong and 147 00:05:32,180 --> 00:05:35,300 influence on unit climate as real time 148 00:05:35,310 --> 00:05:37,720 interactions and that leaders are 149 00:05:37,720 --> 00:05:40,250 poorly equipped to deal with this ever 150 00:05:40,250 --> 00:05:43,310 changing situation . And in fact 30% of 151 00:05:43,310 --> 00:05:45,310 service women who experience sexual 152 00:05:45,310 --> 00:05:47,980 harassment in the 2018 workplace in 153 00:05:47,980 --> 00:05:50,280 gender relations assessment survey 154 00:05:50,290 --> 00:05:52,760 indicated that it took place online . 155 00:05:53,740 --> 00:05:55,962 We found , and this is critical because 156 00:05:55,962 --> 00:05:58,129 it ties to many of our recommendations 157 00:05:58,480 --> 00:06:00,702 that there are critical deficiencies in 158 00:06:00,702 --> 00:06:03,380 the workforce , including lack of 159 00:06:03,380 --> 00:06:05,830 expertise across the board . This is a 160 00:06:05,830 --> 00:06:09,660 system that has operated for decades 161 00:06:09,670 --> 00:06:11,900 with inexperienced lawyers and 162 00:06:11,900 --> 00:06:14,530 investigators collateral duty victim 163 00:06:14,530 --> 00:06:17,060 advocates and a near total lack of 164 00:06:17,060 --> 00:06:19,490 prevention specialist . As just one 165 00:06:19,490 --> 00:06:21,660 example , there are thousands of 166 00:06:21,740 --> 00:06:23,810 collateral duty victim advocates and 167 00:06:23,810 --> 00:06:25,699 what that means is that they have 168 00:06:25,699 --> 00:06:27,921 another job , they may be a mechanic or 169 00:06:27,921 --> 00:06:30,088 a logistic specialist or something and 170 00:06:30,088 --> 00:06:32,199 then they are often volunteer told to 171 00:06:32,199 --> 00:06:34,680 serve as their units victim advocate . 172 00:06:34,780 --> 00:06:37,060 But their job , what they're trained 173 00:06:37,060 --> 00:06:38,838 for is actually something quite 174 00:06:38,838 --> 00:06:41,060 different . Now , I want to say that we 175 00:06:41,060 --> 00:06:43,227 met with many of these collateral duty 176 00:06:43,227 --> 00:06:45,338 victim advocates and their passion is 177 00:06:45,338 --> 00:06:47,449 there and their intent is there . But 178 00:06:47,449 --> 00:06:49,990 somebody who's doing this as a , as a 179 00:06:50,000 --> 00:06:53,250 sort of part time position without 180 00:06:53,250 --> 00:06:55,250 expertise and experience . Although 181 00:06:55,250 --> 00:06:57,520 they received training , uh , it's this 182 00:06:57,530 --> 00:07:00,090 is not an appropriate way to respond to 183 00:07:00,090 --> 00:07:02,090 something as complicated as sexual 184 00:07:02,090 --> 00:07:04,610 assault , it's not appropriate . And we 185 00:07:04,610 --> 00:07:06,830 have recommendations to that effect . 186 00:07:06,840 --> 00:07:09,150 When you ask senior leaders what we 187 00:07:09,150 --> 00:07:11,780 should do about sexual assault , they 188 00:07:11,790 --> 00:07:14,380 almost uniform , aly say we have to get 189 00:07:14,380 --> 00:07:16,102 to the left of it . It's about 190 00:07:16,102 --> 00:07:18,324 prevention , but they don't really know 191 00:07:18,324 --> 00:07:20,850 what prevention is or how it's 192 00:07:20,850 --> 00:07:23,130 different from response . So as one 193 00:07:23,130 --> 00:07:25,130 sexual assault response coordinator 194 00:07:25,130 --> 00:07:27,930 told us giving someone a water bottle 195 00:07:27,930 --> 00:07:30,500 with the hotline number on it is too 196 00:07:30,500 --> 00:07:32,780 late . It's not prevention . We found 197 00:07:32,780 --> 00:07:34,947 that prevention and response are often 198 00:07:34,947 --> 00:07:38,190 conflated . We also found that outdated 199 00:07:38,200 --> 00:07:40,610 social and gender norms contribute to a 200 00:07:40,610 --> 00:07:42,900 culture of hostility toward women and 201 00:07:42,900 --> 00:07:45,290 the services . And I would refer you to 202 00:07:45,290 --> 00:07:47,900 the L . 03 report , which is quite 203 00:07:47,900 --> 00:07:50,740 detailed about this finding and it 204 00:07:50,740 --> 00:07:53,350 includes a stunning chart about what 205 00:07:53,350 --> 00:07:55,406 sometimes happens to women when they 206 00:07:55,406 --> 00:07:57,740 come into male dominated units . It is 207 00:07:57,750 --> 00:08:00,810 time for this to end . And I should 208 00:08:00,810 --> 00:08:03,570 also say that we found in our meetings 209 00:08:03,570 --> 00:08:05,792 on installations and with survivors and 210 00:08:05,792 --> 00:08:07,792 with junior enlisted members , that 211 00:08:07,792 --> 00:08:10,210 this hostility extends to anyone who is 212 00:08:10,210 --> 00:08:12,340 seen as the other as I talked about 213 00:08:12,340 --> 00:08:14,730 before , who doesn't belong . And for 214 00:08:14,730 --> 00:08:17,480 example , New Ram data tells us that 215 00:08:17,480 --> 00:08:19,536 gay men and the services experienced 216 00:08:19,536 --> 00:08:22,080 sexual assault at nine times the rate 217 00:08:22,080 --> 00:08:26,030 of other men . nine times we found 218 00:08:26,030 --> 00:08:29,010 that victims carry a heavy burden when 219 00:08:29,010 --> 00:08:31,177 they experience sexual assault . And I 220 00:08:31,177 --> 00:08:33,343 should say that this funding was a bit 221 00:08:33,343 --> 00:08:35,399 of a surprise to me . I've worked on 222 00:08:35,399 --> 00:08:37,621 this issue for years and there's been a 223 00:08:37,621 --> 00:08:39,566 lot of focus on trying to care for 224 00:08:39,566 --> 00:08:41,677 victims . But what we found our great 225 00:08:41,677 --> 00:08:44,440 deficiencies in that care , many cases 226 00:08:44,440 --> 00:08:46,162 are handled poorly with a near 227 00:08:46,162 --> 00:08:48,329 constantly shuffling of personnel . So 228 00:08:48,329 --> 00:08:50,551 that's what I talked about before . For 229 00:08:50,551 --> 00:08:52,773 example , one survivor that we met with 230 00:08:52,773 --> 00:08:54,884 told us over the course of her case , 231 00:08:54,884 --> 00:08:57,218 she had two different prosecution teams , 232 00:08:57,218 --> 00:08:59,384 four different special victims counsel 233 00:08:59,384 --> 00:09:01,551 and her victim advocate deployed right 234 00:09:01,551 --> 00:09:03,773 before the trial . So this kind of work 235 00:09:03,773 --> 00:09:05,884 force where there are constant change 236 00:09:05,884 --> 00:09:08,051 of stations and constant moves , which 237 00:09:08,051 --> 00:09:10,218 is appropriate uh for the way that the 238 00:09:10,218 --> 00:09:12,440 military needs to operate in most cases 239 00:09:12,440 --> 00:09:14,440 is not appropriate for addressing a 240 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:17,050 complex problem like sexual assault . 241 00:09:17,540 --> 00:09:19,830 Yeah , victims pay a high price for 242 00:09:19,830 --> 00:09:22,108 coming forward to report their assault . 243 00:09:22,108 --> 00:09:24,108 And again , this was a shocking and 244 00:09:24,108 --> 00:09:26,163 heartbreaking finding every survivor 245 00:09:26,163 --> 00:09:28,386 that we talked to had , who had made an 246 00:09:28,386 --> 00:09:30,441 unrestricted report , which means it 247 00:09:30,441 --> 00:09:32,663 would be fully investigated , told us I 248 00:09:32,663 --> 00:09:35,050 regretted it . Everyone 249 00:09:36,840 --> 00:09:40,270 most told us that they had contemplated 250 00:09:40,270 --> 00:09:43,350 or attempted suicide . And you know , 251 00:09:43,360 --> 00:09:45,550 it's true for sexual assault victims , 252 00:09:45,560 --> 00:09:47,820 wherever we find sexual assault , that 253 00:09:47,820 --> 00:09:49,598 there's a high correlation with 254 00:09:49,598 --> 00:09:51,490 suicidal ideation . But what's 255 00:09:51,490 --> 00:09:54,530 different in the military is that 24 256 00:09:54,540 --> 00:09:57,130 hour nature of life if you're sexually 257 00:09:57,130 --> 00:09:59,760 harassed or sexually assaulted , you 258 00:09:59,760 --> 00:10:02,540 can't just leave . You can get try to 259 00:10:02,540 --> 00:10:04,651 get your commander to follow protocol 260 00:10:04,651 --> 00:10:06,651 to have you transferred to have the 261 00:10:06,651 --> 00:10:08,762 alleged offender transferred . But if 262 00:10:08,762 --> 00:10:10,873 that process isn't working well , you 263 00:10:10,873 --> 00:10:13,096 can't just leave because in fact it's a 264 00:10:13,096 --> 00:10:15,096 crime for you to leave . So what we 265 00:10:15,096 --> 00:10:17,540 notice different and we often hear from 266 00:10:17,540 --> 00:10:19,762 military leaders that sexual assault is 267 00:10:19,762 --> 00:10:21,940 a problem in the civilian society and 268 00:10:21,940 --> 00:10:24,218 indeed it is . But it's different here . 269 00:10:24,218 --> 00:10:26,384 And I say that as someone who's worked 270 00:10:26,384 --> 00:10:28,551 with sexual assault victims for a long 271 00:10:28,551 --> 00:10:28,120 time on the civilian side , it is 272 00:10:28,120 --> 00:10:30,690 different when you're in a small unit 273 00:10:30,700 --> 00:10:33,170 where you live , eat , sleep and play 274 00:10:33,170 --> 00:10:35,281 with the same people and then there's 275 00:10:35,281 --> 00:10:37,392 an event and somebody's assaulted and 276 00:10:37,392 --> 00:10:39,614 people take sides and generally because 277 00:10:39,614 --> 00:10:42,220 of rape myths and bias against victims 278 00:10:42,220 --> 00:10:44,442 decide their side is not the one that's 279 00:10:44,442 --> 00:10:46,276 taken and then they're bullied , 280 00:10:46,276 --> 00:10:48,480 ostracized and that's when they start 281 00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:50,424 to feel suicidal because they feel 282 00:10:50,424 --> 00:10:52,647 trapped and they have no way out . I do 283 00:10:52,647 --> 00:10:54,591 want to say we believe that we can 284 00:10:54,591 --> 00:10:56,424 change this week . This is not a 285 00:10:56,424 --> 00:10:58,424 hopeless situation To address these 286 00:10:58,424 --> 00:11:00,270 deficiencies . We've made 28 287 00:11:00,280 --> 00:11:02,200 recommendations in 54 sub 288 00:11:02,200 --> 00:11:04,311 recommendations . I just want to give 289 00:11:04,311 --> 00:11:06,311 you a few of the highlights . We've 290 00:11:06,311 --> 00:11:08,144 recommended shifting prosecution 291 00:11:08,144 --> 00:11:10,367 decisions to special victim prosecutors 292 00:11:10,367 --> 00:11:12,311 outside the chain of command . And 293 00:11:12,311 --> 00:11:14,589 we've I think talked about that before . 294 00:11:14,589 --> 00:11:16,756 There is a detailed explanation of how 295 00:11:16,756 --> 00:11:18,700 we envision this could work in the 296 00:11:18,700 --> 00:11:20,756 Yellow one report and jim schwank is 297 00:11:20,756 --> 00:11:22,978 also here to help answer questions when 298 00:11:22,978 --> 00:11:25,033 it comes to prevention . Leaders are 299 00:11:25,033 --> 00:11:27,256 the linchpin to success , but they have 300 00:11:27,256 --> 00:11:29,200 not been equipped to lead with key 301 00:11:29,200 --> 00:11:30,922 competencies rooted in primary 302 00:11:30,922 --> 00:11:32,922 prevention , silent as science . So 303 00:11:32,922 --> 00:11:34,750 when they say prevention is the 304 00:11:34,750 --> 00:11:36,917 solution , we would say yes , it's the 305 00:11:36,917 --> 00:11:39,139 solution . And there's a science behind 306 00:11:39,139 --> 00:11:41,028 prevention and leaders need to be 307 00:11:41,028 --> 00:11:43,083 equipped with that science . You can 308 00:11:43,083 --> 00:11:45,250 learn all about that and the L O A T L 309 00:11:45,250 --> 00:11:47,194 O . E to report which in fact is a 310 00:11:47,194 --> 00:11:49,417 blueprint on exactly how the department 311 00:11:49,417 --> 00:11:51,840 and the services could implement a 312 00:11:51,840 --> 00:11:53,729 prevention workforce . This is an 313 00:11:53,729 --> 00:11:55,507 investment but we think it's an 314 00:11:55,507 --> 00:11:57,700 investment work worth making . We've 315 00:11:57,700 --> 00:11:59,700 made a series of recommendations to 316 00:11:59,700 --> 00:12:01,922 improve unit climate , including better 317 00:12:01,922 --> 00:12:03,700 methods to select , develop and 318 00:12:03,700 --> 00:12:05,756 evaluate leaders enhancements to the 319 00:12:05,756 --> 00:12:07,922 Climate survey process , which I think 320 00:12:07,922 --> 00:12:10,144 we talked about here before and greater 321 00:12:10,144 --> 00:12:12,478 transparency about disciplinary actions . 322 00:12:12,478 --> 00:12:14,533 The L . O . E three report will tell 323 00:12:14,533 --> 00:12:16,700 you much more about those . We've made 324 00:12:16,700 --> 00:12:18,867 a series of recommendations addressing 325 00:12:18,867 --> 00:12:18,560 the handing of sexual assault and those 326 00:12:18,560 --> 00:12:21,090 crossover lines of effort and we've 327 00:12:21,090 --> 00:12:23,090 made a series of recommendations to 328 00:12:23,090 --> 00:12:25,201 improve victim care and support those 329 00:12:25,201 --> 00:12:27,423 dynamics I talked about earlier . Those 330 00:12:27,423 --> 00:12:29,646 recommendations include shifting sexual 331 00:12:29,646 --> 00:12:31,701 assault salt coordinators and victim 332 00:12:31,701 --> 00:12:34,060 advocates out of the command structure , 333 00:12:34,540 --> 00:12:36,870 largely eliminating collateral duty 334 00:12:36,870 --> 00:12:38,981 victim advocates , although you might 335 00:12:38,981 --> 00:12:40,703 need them in isolated deployed 336 00:12:40,703 --> 00:12:43,270 environments or on ships . Uh , this 337 00:12:43,270 --> 00:12:45,214 kind of independent advocacy where 338 00:12:45,214 --> 00:12:47,440 someone is 100% focused on the victim 339 00:12:47,450 --> 00:12:49,760 and reporting outside of the command 340 00:12:49,760 --> 00:12:52,420 structure is the best practice . It's 341 00:12:52,420 --> 00:12:54,660 what victims need somebody 100% on 342 00:12:54,660 --> 00:12:57,350 their side at the same time , those 343 00:12:57,360 --> 00:12:59,416 sexual assault response coordinators 344 00:12:59,416 --> 00:13:01,638 and victim advocates should continue to 345 00:13:01,638 --> 00:13:03,749 serve as key advisers to commanders . 346 00:13:03,749 --> 00:13:06,950 So the command responsibility remains 347 00:13:06,960 --> 00:13:09,127 taking care of their people , ensuring 348 00:13:09,127 --> 00:13:11,060 that victims are treated fairly 349 00:13:11,340 --> 00:13:13,470 interrupting this pattern of bullying 350 00:13:13,470 --> 00:13:15,526 and ostracized in that victims often 351 00:13:15,526 --> 00:13:19,310 experience they'll have on their team a 352 00:13:19,310 --> 00:13:21,421 victim advocate who is independent of 353 00:13:21,421 --> 00:13:23,254 command but is still there . Key 354 00:13:23,254 --> 00:13:25,366 adviser . We believe this is critical 355 00:13:25,366 --> 00:13:27,366 and it mirrors the fort hood report 356 00:13:28,140 --> 00:13:30,251 when survivors are believed and cared 357 00:13:30,251 --> 00:13:32,473 for by commanders , it is life saving . 358 00:13:32,473 --> 00:13:34,696 We witnessed this and heard about it in 359 00:13:34,696 --> 00:13:36,918 our survivor interviews , it's not even 360 00:13:36,918 --> 00:13:39,196 so much the actual outcome of the case , 361 00:13:39,196 --> 00:13:41,418 but how the survivor was treated as the 362 00:13:41,418 --> 00:13:43,500 case moves forward . Many survivors 363 00:13:43,500 --> 00:13:45,556 dream their whole life of serving in 364 00:13:45,556 --> 00:13:47,444 the military and even after their 365 00:13:47,444 --> 00:13:49,500 sexual assault , most wanted to stay 366 00:13:49,500 --> 00:13:52,130 and do their jobs but they need care 367 00:13:52,130 --> 00:13:54,580 understanding and flexibility to do so 368 00:13:54,590 --> 00:13:56,423 and they need to know that their 369 00:13:56,423 --> 00:13:58,368 commander has their back . And the 370 00:13:58,368 --> 00:14:00,368 recommendations in L . A . I . Four 371 00:14:00,368 --> 00:14:02,701 described that in great detail . Lastly , 372 00:14:02,701 --> 00:14:04,757 I wanted to just mention the need to 373 00:14:04,757 --> 00:14:06,701 highlight the response to domestic 374 00:14:06,701 --> 00:14:08,923 violence . Domestic violence and sexual 375 00:14:08,923 --> 00:14:11,090 assault are integrally tied together . 376 00:14:11,090 --> 00:14:13,420 30% of active duty women have 377 00:14:13,420 --> 00:14:15,531 experienced violence from an intimate 378 00:14:15,531 --> 00:14:17,476 partner that often includes sexual 379 00:14:17,476 --> 00:14:19,364 violence and when sexual violence 380 00:14:19,364 --> 00:14:21,031 occurs in a domestic violence 381 00:14:21,031 --> 00:14:23,087 relationship , it is an indicator of 382 00:14:23,087 --> 00:14:25,253 increased lethality . So we need to be 383 00:14:25,253 --> 00:14:27,420 paying attention to these two problems 384 00:14:27,420 --> 00:14:29,531 together . I would just end by saying 385 00:14:29,531 --> 00:14:31,364 that commanders are essential to 386 00:14:31,364 --> 00:14:33,642 implementing all these recommendations . 387 00:14:33,642 --> 00:14:35,753 Most importantly , commanders are the 388 00:14:35,753 --> 00:14:37,587 key to improving unit climate is 389 00:14:37,587 --> 00:14:39,809 changing the culture protecting victims 390 00:14:39,809 --> 00:14:42,031 from negative consequences of reporting 391 00:14:42,031 --> 00:14:44,364 sexual assault . And I want to say this . 392 00:14:44,364 --> 00:14:46,420 Clearly , the IRC rejects the notion 393 00:14:46,420 --> 00:14:48,420 that shifting legal decisions about 394 00:14:48,420 --> 00:14:50,309 charging someone with a crime are 395 00:14:50,309 --> 00:14:52,420 sending that case to trial diminishes 396 00:14:52,420 --> 00:14:54,531 the role of commanders . Instead , it 397 00:14:54,531 --> 00:14:56,698 enhances their role and places them in 398 00:14:56,698 --> 00:14:59,031 the lead of taking care of their people , 399 00:14:59,031 --> 00:15:00,920 which is their number one job and 400 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:03,198 creating climates of real no tolerance . 401 00:15:03,198 --> 00:15:05,420 That is their job . And so I'm happy to 402 00:15:05,420 --> 00:15:07,476 end there and take questions and jim 403 00:15:07,476 --> 00:15:09,476 will join me in those questions . I 404 00:15:09,476 --> 00:15:11,642 don't know . But I think this thing is 405 00:15:11,642 --> 00:15:13,698 too high . I'm so used to that . You 406 00:15:13,698 --> 00:15:15,920 know , sometimes they bring me a little 407 00:15:15,920 --> 00:15:15,340 stool . 408 00:15:19,540 --> 00:15:22,000 Okay , Well , is that what you're 409 00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:24,222 thinking ? And Kirby , is that what you 410 00:15:24,222 --> 00:15:26,470 were thinking about the whole time ? It 411 00:15:26,470 --> 00:15:29,710 was on my mind . It was too high when I 412 00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:32,750 can't see me now that I'm sorry , I 413 00:15:32,760 --> 00:15:35,580 would have done it started . I would 414 00:15:35,580 --> 00:15:37,413 have done it during your opening 415 00:15:37,413 --> 00:15:39,413 statement , but they didn't want to 416 00:15:39,413 --> 00:15:39,130 break the element . That's okay . No 417 00:15:39,130 --> 00:15:41,297 problem , bob . We'll start with you . 418 00:15:41,297 --> 00:15:43,463 Hi bob . Burns from Associated Press . 419 00:15:43,463 --> 00:15:45,241 Yes , sir . At the outset , you 420 00:15:45,241 --> 00:15:47,450 mentioned that military leaders do 421 00:15:47,450 --> 00:15:49,790 tolerate sexual assault , despite what 422 00:15:49,790 --> 00:15:52,012 they say in public . I'm wondering what 423 00:15:52,012 --> 00:15:54,179 which of your recommendations ? And in 424 00:15:54,179 --> 00:15:56,700 what way will they change that ? Well , 425 00:15:56,700 --> 00:15:58,811 first , I should say , we visited six 426 00:15:58,811 --> 00:16:00,867 installations and talked to a number 427 00:16:00,867 --> 00:16:03,033 more , virtually . And in every single 428 00:16:03,033 --> 00:16:05,340 meeting with junior enlisted members , 429 00:16:05,470 --> 00:16:07,692 this emerged . The conversation was the 430 00:16:07,692 --> 00:16:09,637 same with every group we talked to 431 00:16:09,637 --> 00:16:11,803 across the services . So that's how we 432 00:16:11,803 --> 00:16:14,026 know that . That's true . And our focus 433 00:16:14,026 --> 00:16:16,081 on elderly three on really equipping 434 00:16:16,081 --> 00:16:17,914 and training leaders will make a 435 00:16:17,914 --> 00:16:19,914 difference . So selecting the right 436 00:16:19,914 --> 00:16:22,137 leaders using qualitative and narrative 437 00:16:22,137 --> 00:16:24,192 feedback to select the right leaders 438 00:16:24,340 --> 00:16:27,280 develop them on this particular issue 439 00:16:27,280 --> 00:16:29,420 with key competencies and then 440 00:16:29,420 --> 00:16:31,420 evaluating them on how well they're 441 00:16:31,420 --> 00:16:33,970 doing . Uh We also recommend a series 442 00:16:33,970 --> 00:16:36,026 of adjustments to the climate survey 443 00:16:36,026 --> 00:16:38,420 process . So I really want to commend 444 00:16:38,420 --> 00:16:40,420 the department and the work they're 445 00:16:40,420 --> 00:16:42,587 doing on climate surveys . There's a a 446 00:16:42,587 --> 00:16:44,531 complex tool that measures climate 447 00:16:44,531 --> 00:16:46,850 across several different issues and we 448 00:16:46,850 --> 00:16:49,650 would supplement that by a pulse survey . 449 00:16:49,650 --> 00:16:52,050 A quick check of the unit to see what 450 00:16:52,050 --> 00:16:54,106 the climate is around sexual assault 451 00:16:54,106 --> 00:16:56,161 and sexual harassment specifically . 452 00:16:56,161 --> 00:16:58,272 And then we can , when we can measure 453 00:16:58,272 --> 00:17:00,383 it , we can get commanders assistance 454 00:17:00,383 --> 00:17:02,550 and addressing it . Thank you . Yeah , 455 00:17:02,940 --> 00:17:06,020 mixture from PBS news hour . Uh , so 456 00:17:06,030 --> 00:17:08,252 you know off of bob's question and then 457 00:17:08,252 --> 00:17:10,550 I have one that's beyond the scope of 458 00:17:10,560 --> 00:17:12,616 the report off of bob's questions to 459 00:17:12,616 --> 00:17:15,050 use the word tolerance is different , 460 00:17:15,050 --> 00:17:17,050 Right ? You talked about conflating 461 00:17:17,050 --> 00:17:19,217 prevention response . You talked about 462 00:17:19,217 --> 00:17:21,328 that . They didn't gender norms . You 463 00:17:21,328 --> 00:17:21,270 talked about the structure being 464 00:17:21,420 --> 00:17:24,280 insufficient , but the word tolerate is 465 00:17:24,280 --> 00:17:27,230 an active verb . What do you account 466 00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:30,770 for commanders in your word tolerated 467 00:17:31,140 --> 00:17:33,307 sexual harassment and assault ? Well , 468 00:17:33,307 --> 00:17:35,470 I think there's two issues and I want 469 00:17:35,470 --> 00:17:38,340 to say that we didn't , we heard about 470 00:17:38,340 --> 00:17:41,010 toxic leaders . We didn't meet them 471 00:17:41,020 --> 00:17:43,220 many commanders that we talked to . 472 00:17:43,220 --> 00:17:45,250 Just didn't know what to do . They 473 00:17:45,260 --> 00:17:47,630 recognize that the problem is beyond 474 00:17:47,640 --> 00:17:50,960 their scope . So I want to say that 475 00:17:50,970 --> 00:17:54,400 from the onset . uh , and I I think 476 00:17:54,400 --> 00:17:56,733 there are two things that are happening . 477 00:17:56,733 --> 00:17:59,330 One is that sexual assault and 478 00:17:59,330 --> 00:18:01,441 harassment is not really tracked as a 479 00:18:01,441 --> 00:18:04,650 part of a readiness metric . So it's 480 00:18:04,650 --> 00:18:06,872 tracked in a lot of ways within D . O . 481 00:18:06,872 --> 00:18:08,983 D . And the services , but not within 482 00:18:08,983 --> 00:18:11,150 the main effort . So that's what's key 483 00:18:11,150 --> 00:18:12,928 is integrating . And the former 484 00:18:12,928 --> 00:18:15,150 commanders who served on our task force 485 00:18:15,150 --> 00:18:17,150 said that we have to integrate this 486 00:18:17,150 --> 00:18:19,317 into the main effort and track it is a 487 00:18:19,317 --> 00:18:21,483 part of readiness . You have to pay as 488 00:18:21,483 --> 00:18:23,483 much attention to this as you do to 489 00:18:23,483 --> 00:18:25,483 your broken down vehicles , Right ? 490 00:18:25,483 --> 00:18:27,706 That's what this is about . Do you have 491 00:18:27,706 --> 00:18:29,928 your workforce in order ? Have you done 492 00:18:29,928 --> 00:18:32,150 your climate surveys , have you address 493 00:18:32,150 --> 00:18:34,310 deficiencies ? Do you have People in 494 00:18:34,310 --> 00:18:36,720 your unit that are awaiting some sort 495 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:38,670 of judiciary proceeding related to 496 00:18:38,670 --> 00:18:41,060 sexual harassment or sexual assault ? 497 00:18:41,060 --> 00:18:43,840 So I think integrating it and there's 498 00:18:43,840 --> 00:18:46,007 much more detail about that in L . O . 499 00:18:46,007 --> 00:18:49,030 E3 gets to that piece . And the other 500 00:18:49,030 --> 00:18:51,252 is I think they just don't know what to 501 00:18:51,252 --> 00:18:53,363 do . You know much of this is why you 502 00:18:53,363 --> 00:18:55,474 have to have an experienced workforce 503 00:18:55,474 --> 00:18:57,697 to advise commanders because much of it 504 00:18:57,697 --> 00:19:01,330 is not intuitive or um it's hard to 505 00:19:01,330 --> 00:19:03,330 understand sometimes why victims do 506 00:19:03,330 --> 00:19:05,552 certain things that they do and they do 507 00:19:05,552 --> 00:19:07,386 those things as a way to protect 508 00:19:07,386 --> 00:19:09,608 themselves . But it's hard to recognize 509 00:19:09,608 --> 00:19:11,497 that they also are not trained in 510 00:19:11,497 --> 00:19:13,441 trauma . They don't understand the 511 00:19:13,441 --> 00:19:15,608 effects of trauma on the brain and and 512 00:19:15,608 --> 00:19:17,608 how that makes people behave . So I 513 00:19:17,608 --> 00:19:19,608 think it's all about equipping them 514 00:19:19,608 --> 00:19:21,608 with those key competency . So when 515 00:19:21,608 --> 00:19:23,830 when when you say tolerance is active , 516 00:19:23,830 --> 00:19:27,120 I don't necessarily believe in many 517 00:19:27,120 --> 00:19:30,270 cases that's hostile . I think it's all 518 00:19:30,270 --> 00:19:32,450 of that sort of toxic stew of not 519 00:19:32,450 --> 00:19:34,561 having the skills , not understanding 520 00:19:34,561 --> 00:19:36,672 it , not being properly trained and I 521 00:19:36,672 --> 00:19:38,783 think they want to get better at it . 522 00:19:38,783 --> 00:19:41,006 The other piece I noted with these very 523 00:19:41,006 --> 00:19:43,006 well intentioned commanders is that 524 00:19:43,006 --> 00:19:45,228 they when they step in , they then they 525 00:19:45,228 --> 00:19:47,283 want to take charge and so then they 526 00:19:47,283 --> 00:19:49,283 start telling the victim everything 527 00:19:49,283 --> 00:19:51,228 that he or she should be doing and 528 00:19:51,228 --> 00:19:50,910 that's not the right approach either . 529 00:19:50,910 --> 00:19:53,300 So that's why the reason we're hopeful 530 00:19:53,310 --> 00:19:55,032 is because those things can be 531 00:19:55,032 --> 00:19:56,810 addressed right ? Well intended 532 00:19:56,810 --> 00:19:58,866 commanders who need more information 533 00:19:58,866 --> 00:20:01,032 needs stronger competencies , but also 534 00:20:01,032 --> 00:20:03,260 the integration into the main effort . 535 00:20:03,540 --> 00:20:05,651 If we can integrate this and think of 536 00:20:05,651 --> 00:20:07,707 it as part of the main effort , that 537 00:20:07,707 --> 00:20:09,818 will go a long way to addressing that 538 00:20:09,818 --> 00:20:11,984 tolerance and beyond the scope of this 539 00:20:11,984 --> 00:20:14,096 report is of course , the question of 540 00:20:14,096 --> 00:20:16,429 other felonies . Right ? So as you know , 541 00:20:16,429 --> 00:20:18,596 Senator Gillibrand's legislation calls 542 00:20:18,596 --> 00:20:20,262 for not to sexual assault and 543 00:20:20,262 --> 00:20:22,484 harassment , but other felonies , other 544 00:20:22,484 --> 00:20:24,651 crimes to be taken out of the chain of 545 00:20:24,651 --> 00:20:26,707 command , the chairman , the service 546 00:20:26,707 --> 00:20:28,929 secretaries have resisted that . Do you 547 00:20:28,929 --> 00:20:30,818 believe that in order to fix this 548 00:20:30,818 --> 00:20:32,707 problem , you actually need to go 549 00:20:32,707 --> 00:20:34,429 beyond just sexual assault and 550 00:20:34,429 --> 00:20:36,540 harassment felonies that all felonies 551 00:20:36,540 --> 00:20:38,651 need to be taken out ? I just have to 552 00:20:38,651 --> 00:20:40,984 say that we didn't address that problem . 553 00:20:40,984 --> 00:20:40,460 That was beyond our scope . We were 554 00:20:40,460 --> 00:20:42,627 charged with addressing sexual assault 555 00:20:42,627 --> 00:20:44,760 and harassment and where we broadened 556 00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:47,370 it to include domestic violence . It 557 00:20:47,380 --> 00:20:49,540 was because that's where our data let 558 00:20:49,540 --> 00:20:52,000 us , so we didn't assess the larger 559 00:20:52,000 --> 00:20:54,111 picture . And I don't know jim if you 560 00:20:54,111 --> 00:20:56,222 want to add to that . I just say from 561 00:20:56,222 --> 00:20:58,444 yellowy one perspective , when we wrote 562 00:20:58,444 --> 00:21:01,770 the report , our report and the other 563 00:21:01,780 --> 00:21:03,780 members were briefed them on it and 564 00:21:03,780 --> 00:21:06,060 they voted on it . Our perspective was 565 00:21:06,060 --> 00:21:08,820 that you want me over here . I'm being 566 00:21:08,820 --> 00:21:11,098 getting stage directions from the back . 567 00:21:11,240 --> 00:21:15,060 Our perspective was that the 568 00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:17,830 problem , the sexual harassment , 569 00:21:17,830 --> 00:21:20,580 sexual assault problem could be handled 570 00:21:20,580 --> 00:21:22,802 by the recommendations in this report . 571 00:21:24,540 --> 00:21:26,151 If those recommendations are 572 00:21:26,151 --> 00:21:28,740 implemented fully , they're integrated . 573 00:21:28,740 --> 00:21:30,796 Because you can't just do prevention 574 00:21:30,796 --> 00:21:32,796 and not do climate . You know , you 575 00:21:32,796 --> 00:21:35,018 can't do climate and prevention and not 576 00:21:35,018 --> 00:21:37,018 do accountability and you've got to 577 00:21:37,018 --> 00:21:39,129 back up what you say with what you do 578 00:21:39,129 --> 00:21:41,184 on how you take care of victims . So 579 00:21:41,184 --> 00:21:43,470 victim care and support . If you can do 580 00:21:43,470 --> 00:21:45,930 all that , we think that will , I mean , 581 00:21:45,930 --> 00:21:48,041 you're never going to have zero , but 582 00:21:48,041 --> 00:21:49,930 it will greatly reduce and make a 583 00:21:49,930 --> 00:21:51,874 significant positive effect on the 584 00:21:51,874 --> 00:21:53,930 lives of the junior enlisted men and 585 00:21:53,930 --> 00:21:56,152 women in the military . We believe it , 586 00:21:56,152 --> 00:21:58,263 and that's why we wrote it the way we 587 00:21:58,263 --> 00:22:02,080 wrote it , Mr Rosenthal , um , 588 00:22:02,090 --> 00:22:04,368 when you were talking about the report , 589 00:22:04,368 --> 00:22:06,146 you said that the attacks , the 590 00:22:06,146 --> 00:22:08,312 assaults and the harassment were often 591 00:22:08,312 --> 00:22:10,479 done to make the victim feel like they 592 00:22:10,479 --> 00:22:10,260 did not belong in the military and your 593 00:22:10,260 --> 00:22:12,450 work . Did you also find that the 594 00:22:12,450 --> 00:22:14,339 response and the investigation by 595 00:22:14,339 --> 00:22:16,394 commanders and units also left those 596 00:22:16,394 --> 00:22:18,728 victims feeling like they didn't belong ? 597 00:22:18,728 --> 00:22:20,980 Sometimes when commanders , what we 598 00:22:20,980 --> 00:22:23,202 often heard about was the commander was 599 00:22:23,202 --> 00:22:25,536 ignoring what was happening in the unit , 600 00:22:25,536 --> 00:22:27,536 which is that everybody was picking 601 00:22:27,536 --> 00:22:29,758 sides and often not the victim's side . 602 00:22:29,758 --> 00:22:31,813 And so the victim felt very isolated 603 00:22:31,813 --> 00:22:31,630 and alone . And that's when we we 604 00:22:31,630 --> 00:22:33,797 identified that suicidal ideation as a 605 00:22:33,797 --> 00:22:36,560 part of that whole whole picture . And 606 00:22:36,560 --> 00:22:38,950 then secondly , by taking the 607 00:22:39,340 --> 00:22:41,396 investigation and prosecution out of 608 00:22:41,396 --> 00:22:43,860 the chain of command . Um , how do you 609 00:22:43,860 --> 00:22:46,680 envision like a permanent staff where 610 00:22:46,680 --> 00:22:49,750 they're not pcs sing out and how do you 611 00:22:49,750 --> 00:22:52,460 see that ? Maybe cost of being funded ? 612 00:22:53,140 --> 00:22:55,362 I'm going to turn to jim again . Okay . 613 00:22:55,362 --> 00:22:57,730 Um , so that's the specialization 614 00:22:57,730 --> 00:22:59,897 within the military justice system and 615 00:22:59,897 --> 00:23:01,897 the military criminal investigative 616 00:23:01,897 --> 00:23:04,340 organizations . Um , right now they 617 00:23:04,340 --> 00:23:07,350 have a mass of requirements . Military 618 00:23:07,350 --> 00:23:09,461 justice being part of it . And except 619 00:23:09,461 --> 00:23:11,628 for the navy on the military justice , 620 00:23:11,628 --> 00:23:13,628 the lawyers side , they do not have 621 00:23:13,628 --> 00:23:16,000 specialists in in military justice and 622 00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:18,380 criminal law . So you get a bunch of 623 00:23:18,380 --> 00:23:20,350 young people that come in well 624 00:23:20,350 --> 00:23:22,310 intentioned , smart , aggressive , 625 00:23:22,310 --> 00:23:25,390 dynamic , no experience . Um , we had 626 00:23:25,390 --> 00:23:27,612 several judges retired . We didn't talk 627 00:23:27,612 --> 00:23:29,834 to any active duty judges , but retired 628 00:23:29,834 --> 00:23:32,112 judges . Military judges who said that , 629 00:23:32,112 --> 00:23:34,820 um , that the Achilles Hill of Military 630 00:23:34,820 --> 00:23:37,830 Justice is experience in experience . 631 00:23:37,840 --> 00:23:40,670 Um , and so the whole specialization 632 00:23:40,670 --> 00:23:42,392 effort which we wrote about in 633 00:23:42,392 --> 00:23:45,590 recommendation 1.4 is repeat the people 634 00:23:45,590 --> 00:23:47,812 in the military justice billets if they 635 00:23:47,812 --> 00:23:50,000 have the ability . So it's not 636 00:23:50,010 --> 00:23:52,340 everybody that wants gets if they have 637 00:23:52,340 --> 00:23:54,618 the ability and they have the interest , 638 00:23:54,618 --> 00:23:56,784 they apply a board looks at him , they 639 00:23:56,784 --> 00:23:58,896 get selected and then you have bill , 640 00:23:58,896 --> 00:24:01,007 it's set aside where these people can 641 00:24:01,007 --> 00:24:02,896 repeat back and forth in military 642 00:24:02,896 --> 00:24:05,229 justice . So you develop that expertise . 643 00:24:05,229 --> 00:24:07,229 Um , it's not going to be that many 644 00:24:07,229 --> 00:24:09,396 more billets because we already have a 645 00:24:09,396 --> 00:24:11,562 caseload and the prosecutors , defence 646 00:24:11,562 --> 00:24:13,618 counsel etcetera to handle that case 647 00:24:13,618 --> 00:24:15,673 load . Um , If the caseload for some 648 00:24:15,673 --> 00:24:17,784 reason I went up significantly , then 649 00:24:17,784 --> 00:24:20,007 obviously you'd have to change it , but 650 00:24:20,007 --> 00:24:22,062 we don't anticipate a wood . So it's 651 00:24:22,062 --> 00:24:22,030 not more bill . It's it's better use of 652 00:24:22,030 --> 00:24:24,141 those billets and keeping people , as 653 00:24:24,141 --> 00:24:26,363 you said in the bill , it's so they can 654 00:24:26,363 --> 00:24:28,530 gain that experience . I was fortunate 655 00:24:28,530 --> 00:24:31,240 to be on an L . O . I . With two people , 656 00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:33,350 one of whom 15 years in the Dallas , 657 00:24:33,540 --> 00:24:37,060 the prosecution office , 15 years doing 658 00:24:37,060 --> 00:24:39,171 these kinds of cases and you put that 659 00:24:39,171 --> 00:24:41,400 up against , you know , when I did them 660 00:24:41,710 --> 00:24:43,950 two years . It's not a fair , it's not 661 00:24:43,950 --> 00:24:47,640 fair . And so that's our recommendation . 662 00:24:47,640 --> 00:24:49,960 I hope that helped answer . I mean , 663 00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:52,310 the complexity of this problem requires 664 00:24:52,310 --> 00:24:54,730 a specialized response . And I think 665 00:24:54,730 --> 00:24:56,841 that's where we've kind of gone wrong 666 00:24:56,841 --> 00:24:59,063 on this that we try to shoehorn it into 667 00:24:59,063 --> 00:25:00,841 existing structures and it just 668 00:25:00,841 --> 00:25:02,786 requires more than that . And that 669 00:25:02,786 --> 00:25:05,008 means that resources will be required . 670 00:25:05,008 --> 00:25:07,063 These are , these are investments in 671 00:25:07,063 --> 00:25:09,119 prevention and victim care as well . 672 00:25:09,119 --> 00:25:11,063 Maybe you mentioned the commanders 673 00:25:11,063 --> 00:25:13,174 being frustrated about not having the 674 00:25:13,174 --> 00:25:15,286 tools or you know , the experience to 675 00:25:15,286 --> 00:25:15,250 be able to set their own programs . 676 00:25:15,260 --> 00:25:17,560 What what specifically were their 677 00:25:17,560 --> 00:25:19,504 frustrations ? Was it finding good 678 00:25:19,504 --> 00:25:22,070 training or you know , standing up a 679 00:25:22,070 --> 00:25:23,959 good program ? And what was their 680 00:25:23,959 --> 00:25:26,014 feedback about the idea that some of 681 00:25:26,014 --> 00:25:28,014 these things would no longer become 682 00:25:28,014 --> 00:25:30,237 their responsibility ? I'll turn to jim 683 00:25:30,237 --> 00:25:32,348 on the last one . Just take the first 684 00:25:32,348 --> 00:25:34,570 part of your question . Uh I think that 685 00:25:34,570 --> 00:25:36,930 they have very basic questions 686 00:25:36,930 --> 00:25:39,041 sometimes . Like why the victim , why 687 00:25:39,041 --> 00:25:41,041 did the victim stay in contact with 688 00:25:41,041 --> 00:25:43,152 someone who may have assaulted them ? 689 00:25:43,152 --> 00:25:45,097 Why would that happen ? That's all 690 00:25:45,097 --> 00:25:47,319 about that sort of effects of trauma on 691 00:25:47,319 --> 00:25:49,430 the brain . Why did a victim not want 692 00:25:49,430 --> 00:25:49,400 to be transferred ? Why did she want to 693 00:25:49,400 --> 00:25:51,400 stay where ? Maybe she felt she had 694 00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:53,511 some support . They didn't understand 695 00:25:53,511 --> 00:25:55,567 that . So they wanted to immediately 696 00:25:55,567 --> 00:25:57,789 activate an expedited transfer when the 697 00:25:57,789 --> 00:25:59,900 victims saying I need more time . And 698 00:25:59,900 --> 00:26:02,233 then there's this thing that's happened . 699 00:26:02,233 --> 00:26:01,950 I can't tell you how many times we 700 00:26:01,950 --> 00:26:04,117 heard check the block about everything 701 00:26:04,117 --> 00:26:06,228 in this system . Like there are a lot 702 00:26:06,228 --> 00:26:08,172 of policies and there are a lot of 703 00:26:08,172 --> 00:26:10,172 structures , but what's happened in 704 00:26:10,172 --> 00:26:12,172 operations is that it's become just 705 00:26:12,172 --> 00:26:11,870 check , check , check . Have I done it ? 706 00:26:11,880 --> 00:26:14,750 So we noted that because there's this 707 00:26:14,750 --> 00:26:16,750 anxiety about compliance with which 708 00:26:16,750 --> 00:26:18,972 there should be , but when someone sits 709 00:26:18,972 --> 00:26:21,194 down with the victim , the commander or 710 00:26:21,194 --> 00:26:23,250 a collateral duty victim advocate or 711 00:26:23,250 --> 00:26:25,306 whoever it may be immediately , they 712 00:26:25,306 --> 00:26:27,528 jumped to hear your reporting options . 713 00:26:27,528 --> 00:26:29,583 Do you want unrestricted when really 714 00:26:29,583 --> 00:26:31,694 what they need to do ? Somebody is in 715 00:26:31,694 --> 00:26:33,861 crisis , what they actually need to do 716 00:26:33,861 --> 00:26:35,917 is say , how are you doing ? What do 717 00:26:35,917 --> 00:26:37,917 you need ? How can I help you ? And 718 00:26:37,917 --> 00:26:37,150 that would be the role of 719 00:26:37,150 --> 00:26:40,650 professionalized victim advocates on 720 00:26:40,650 --> 00:26:43,320 the issue of the commanders and their 721 00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:45,540 reaction . We didn't run into a single 722 00:26:45,540 --> 00:26:47,651 commander that said , oh yes , please 723 00:26:47,651 --> 00:26:49,818 take these arrows out of my quiver and 724 00:26:49,818 --> 00:26:51,707 give them to some lawyer down the 725 00:26:51,707 --> 00:26:54,600 street . Um , instead they said that in 726 00:26:54,600 --> 00:26:56,450 their view , uh , the they're 727 00:26:56,450 --> 00:26:58,283 responsible for everything their 728 00:26:58,283 --> 00:27:00,506 command does and does not do . And they 729 00:27:00,506 --> 00:27:02,839 therefore need every hour . They narrow , 730 00:27:02,839 --> 00:27:04,950 they can get in the quiver to be able 731 00:27:04,950 --> 00:27:07,180 to handle problems as they arise . So 732 00:27:07,180 --> 00:27:09,402 we asked them the question from , don't 733 00:27:09,402 --> 00:27:13,030 ask , don't tell days if , if Congress 734 00:27:13,030 --> 00:27:15,380 legislated and did away with your to 735 00:27:15,380 --> 00:27:18,250 your quivers are to your arrows in your 736 00:27:18,250 --> 00:27:20,590 quiver . Could you manage it ? And 737 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:23,510 every one of them said yes . So there 738 00:27:23,510 --> 00:27:25,740 might be an adverse effect , you know , 739 00:27:25,740 --> 00:27:27,860 within a unit here or there , but the 740 00:27:27,860 --> 00:27:30,193 commanders told us they could manage it . 741 00:27:30,193 --> 00:27:32,370 We also noted that , um , the 742 00:27:32,370 --> 00:27:34,290 department , Congress and the 743 00:27:34,290 --> 00:27:36,540 department have a long history of 744 00:27:36,540 --> 00:27:39,210 withholding arrows out of quivers in 745 00:27:39,210 --> 00:27:41,266 the Department of Defense . I mean , 746 00:27:41,266 --> 00:27:43,210 currently , if you're a lieutenant 747 00:27:43,210 --> 00:27:45,210 colonel and you think you're pretty 748 00:27:45,210 --> 00:27:47,321 cool and your battalion commander and 749 00:27:47,321 --> 00:27:49,543 you have a sexual assault problem , you 750 00:27:49,543 --> 00:27:51,710 are not taking when you reach for that 751 00:27:51,710 --> 00:27:53,877 arrow of , I'm going to take this to a 752 00:27:53,877 --> 00:27:53,860 court martial . There's no arrow there . 753 00:27:54,340 --> 00:27:56,451 There's a little note that says go to 754 00:27:56,451 --> 00:27:58,173 Euro six Special Court Martial 755 00:27:58,173 --> 00:28:00,340 Community Authority and recommend that 756 00:28:00,340 --> 00:28:02,284 that person he or she sent it to a 757 00:28:02,284 --> 00:28:04,507 court martial . And uh , you know , I'm 758 00:28:04,507 --> 00:28:06,673 sure from your experience , you know , 759 00:28:06,673 --> 00:28:08,784 there are lots of other with holdings 760 00:28:08,784 --> 00:28:10,618 within the department , um , Dus 761 00:28:10,618 --> 00:28:12,729 officer cases and that's just the way 762 00:28:12,729 --> 00:28:14,618 it is . Congress set up the whole 763 00:28:14,618 --> 00:28:16,729 system where the lieutenant's uh , we 764 00:28:16,729 --> 00:28:18,729 we were told over and over where is 765 00:28:18,729 --> 00:28:20,729 this going to be won or lost if you 766 00:28:20,729 --> 00:28:22,451 want to use those terms , that 767 00:28:22,451 --> 00:28:24,618 terminology and it's at the deck plate 768 00:28:24,618 --> 00:28:26,840 level . It's at that small unit level . 769 00:28:26,840 --> 00:28:29,170 And so what And so who's key ? The N . 770 00:28:29,170 --> 00:28:31,460 C . O . S . The enlist small enlisted 771 00:28:31,460 --> 00:28:33,460 leaders ? What kind of disciplinary 772 00:28:33,460 --> 00:28:35,460 authority has Congress given them ? 773 00:28:35,460 --> 00:28:37,780 Zero ? Okay . What kind of disciplinary 774 00:28:37,780 --> 00:28:39,836 authorities ? Congress given Platoon 775 00:28:39,836 --> 00:28:41,891 Commanders ? zero . And yet they are 776 00:28:41,891 --> 00:28:44,060 the key to solving this problem . So 777 00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:46,970 yes , there the commanders did think 778 00:28:46,970 --> 00:28:49,650 that there could be an adverse effect 779 00:28:49,650 --> 00:28:51,706 in good order and discipline . Yes , 780 00:28:51,706 --> 00:28:53,817 they thought it was manageable and we 781 00:28:53,817 --> 00:28:55,872 considered that carefully along with 782 00:28:55,872 --> 00:28:58,770 the history of removing arrows out of 783 00:28:58,770 --> 00:29:01,270 the quivers . The legal part . What I 784 00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:03,447 really mean is the idea that you would 785 00:29:03,447 --> 00:29:05,502 have a prevention specialist in your 786 00:29:05,502 --> 00:29:07,669 unit who would put together your Sabir 787 00:29:07,669 --> 00:29:09,724 program from you for you bring it to 788 00:29:09,724 --> 00:29:11,947 the commander and say , Sir , ma'am , I 789 00:29:11,947 --> 00:29:11,540 think this would be the best practices 790 00:29:11,540 --> 00:29:13,760 for us . Did they shudder at the idea 791 00:29:13,760 --> 00:29:15,482 that they wouldn't be the ones 792 00:29:15,482 --> 00:29:17,704 designing the training and doing all of 793 00:29:17,704 --> 00:29:19,927 that ? No , I don't think so at all . I 794 00:29:19,927 --> 00:29:21,982 think they would be welcomed to have 795 00:29:21,982 --> 00:29:24,149 this expertise so that they could make 796 00:29:24,149 --> 00:29:26,038 this sort of stated commitment to 797 00:29:26,038 --> 00:29:28,149 prevention real . I mean , they worry 798 00:29:28,149 --> 00:29:30,260 about there are people and their time 799 00:29:30,260 --> 00:29:32,204 commitments and being prepared for 800 00:29:32,204 --> 00:29:32,200 deployments . I mean they worry about 801 00:29:32,200 --> 00:29:34,367 how all of that could work . But those 802 00:29:34,367 --> 00:29:36,367 are implementation issues . But the 803 00:29:36,367 --> 00:29:38,422 idea in concept that they would have 804 00:29:38,422 --> 00:29:40,256 more tools at their disposal . I 805 00:29:40,256 --> 00:29:43,230 believe they would welcome we have time 806 00:29:43,240 --> 00:29:45,407 for two more . So we'll go to the ones 807 00:29:45,407 --> 00:29:47,407 on the phone dancing gallon . PBS . 808 00:29:47,407 --> 00:29:49,573 Thanks . I've got two questions victim 809 00:29:49,573 --> 00:29:52,180 advocates have told us that oftentimes 810 00:29:52,190 --> 00:29:54,134 sexual assault will be reported to 811 00:29:54,134 --> 00:29:56,357 commanders . Then commanders will say , 812 00:29:56,357 --> 00:29:58,579 oh , that was consensual and they don't 813 00:29:58,579 --> 00:30:01,940 report it and or people will get 814 00:30:01,940 --> 00:30:04,162 assaulted and they report it to the N . 815 00:30:04,162 --> 00:30:06,273 C . O . And they don't report it up . 816 00:30:06,273 --> 00:30:08,496 Did you encounter ? Did you did you did 817 00:30:08,496 --> 00:30:10,551 you talk to a lot of people who said 818 00:30:10,551 --> 00:30:12,718 they had that experience . Um and what 819 00:30:12,718 --> 00:30:14,773 do you what do you what is your what 820 00:30:14,773 --> 00:30:16,996 are your recommendations for that ? And 821 00:30:16,996 --> 00:30:19,162 then also your report recommended that 822 00:30:19,162 --> 00:30:21,218 a highly highly qualified experts be 823 00:30:21,218 --> 00:30:23,496 retained to see implementation through . 824 00:30:23,496 --> 00:30:24,990 Are you staying on in the 825 00:30:25,060 --> 00:30:27,020 administration to obviously the 826 00:30:27,030 --> 00:30:29,308 implementation of your recommendations . 827 00:30:29,308 --> 00:30:31,790 I'm not staying on . I didn't know note 828 00:30:31,790 --> 00:30:33,901 that we stated that in our report but 829 00:30:33,901 --> 00:30:36,123 we may have but we hope that several of 830 00:30:36,123 --> 00:30:38,179 our HQs who are real experts in this 831 00:30:38,179 --> 00:30:40,234 area will be staying on . I actually 832 00:30:40,234 --> 00:30:42,401 work at a center for domestic violence 833 00:30:42,401 --> 00:30:44,457 and child abuse in columbus Ohio and 834 00:30:44,457 --> 00:30:46,401 I'm due back there next week but I 835 00:30:46,401 --> 00:30:48,512 certainly want to be available to the 836 00:30:48,512 --> 00:30:50,790 department for whatever they need . So , 837 00:30:50,790 --> 00:30:52,568 all of us are very committed to 838 00:30:52,568 --> 00:30:54,623 following this through . And we hope 839 00:30:54,623 --> 00:30:56,790 that we will have HQs that will remain 840 00:30:56,790 --> 00:30:58,734 or that the department will employ 841 00:30:58,734 --> 00:31:00,957 other HQs . I mean , we don't we're not 842 00:31:00,957 --> 00:31:00,780 naive that this is a serious 843 00:31:00,780 --> 00:31:02,900 implementation effort . I think the 844 00:31:02,900 --> 00:31:05,067 department will move swiftly . We also 845 00:31:05,067 --> 00:31:07,289 urge them to move carefully and they're 846 00:31:07,289 --> 00:31:09,622 going to need help to do that . So , uh , 847 00:31:09,622 --> 00:31:11,511 thank you for that question about 848 00:31:11,511 --> 00:31:13,844 discouraging people from coming forward . 849 00:31:13,844 --> 00:31:15,622 You know , we didn't hear about 850 00:31:15,622 --> 00:31:17,678 circumstances quite that over when a 851 00:31:17,678 --> 00:31:19,844 report was made to the commander . But 852 00:31:19,844 --> 00:31:21,789 certainly there's a lot of ways to 853 00:31:21,789 --> 00:31:24,067 discourage somebody for moving forward . 854 00:31:24,067 --> 00:31:26,122 Like those kind of comments that you 855 00:31:26,122 --> 00:31:28,178 described . I mean , a commander who 856 00:31:28,178 --> 00:31:28,110 did that would be out of compliance 857 00:31:28,110 --> 00:31:30,277 with policy . If said , let's just not 858 00:31:30,340 --> 00:31:32,570 take this forward . They have to refer 859 00:31:32,570 --> 00:31:34,459 to an investigator . They have to 860 00:31:34,459 --> 00:31:36,403 follow the process . But certainly 861 00:31:36,403 --> 00:31:38,910 there's a lot of conversation and this 862 00:31:38,910 --> 00:31:41,132 is where they repeat some of those rape 863 00:31:41,132 --> 00:31:43,354 myths and biases that they may not even 864 00:31:43,354 --> 00:31:45,521 be aware of . Like were you drinking ? 865 00:31:45,521 --> 00:31:47,640 Were you flirting ? Why did you stay 866 00:31:47,640 --> 00:31:49,862 outside laid ? All that kind of stuff ? 867 00:31:49,862 --> 00:31:51,900 Those rape myths are what permeate 868 00:31:51,900 --> 00:31:54,370 people's views about how to address 869 00:31:54,370 --> 00:31:57,090 these problems . Those generally can be 870 00:31:57,090 --> 00:31:58,760 corrected with information . 871 00:32:00,940 --> 00:32:02,940 And the last question today goes to 872 00:32:02,940 --> 00:32:04,940 steven lucy from military dot com . 873 00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:09,407 All right . Thank you very much . Uh , 874 00:32:10,240 --> 00:32:13,570 the commission's report discussed the 875 00:32:13,580 --> 00:32:16,450 need for prevention specialists and the 876 00:32:16,450 --> 00:32:20,040 lack of , uh , people focus on 877 00:32:20,050 --> 00:32:21,939 prevention with the right kind of 878 00:32:21,939 --> 00:32:23,939 specialized skills . Can you talk a 879 00:32:23,939 --> 00:32:26,090 little bit more about precisely what 880 00:32:26,090 --> 00:32:28,920 sort of specialization the pentagon is 881 00:32:28,920 --> 00:32:31,110 going to the military as a whole is 882 00:32:31,110 --> 00:32:33,500 going to need to bring in to try to get 883 00:32:33,500 --> 00:32:35,820 at this issue ? That's terrific . They 884 00:32:35,830 --> 00:32:37,941 need public health , social science , 885 00:32:37,941 --> 00:32:39,830 behavioral health experts or some 886 00:32:39,830 --> 00:32:42,970 combination of that . So James johnson , 887 00:32:43,200 --> 00:32:45,820 retired Major General johnson has laid 888 00:32:45,820 --> 00:32:48,290 out in L . A . To a very careful plan 889 00:32:48,290 --> 00:32:51,770 that involves D . O . D . Creating a 890 00:32:51,770 --> 00:32:53,937 model workforce . What would that look 891 00:32:53,937 --> 00:32:56,159 like ? I don't know how many of them do 892 00:32:56,159 --> 00:32:58,214 we need , what sort of masters level 893 00:32:58,214 --> 00:33:00,437 public health experts do we need versus 894 00:33:00,437 --> 00:33:02,103 other kinds of researchers or 895 00:33:02,103 --> 00:33:04,159 specialists or evaluators . But they 896 00:33:04,159 --> 00:33:06,270 need some combination of those people 897 00:33:06,270 --> 00:33:08,437 and then they need people to carry out 898 00:33:08,437 --> 00:33:10,492 the programming . And so D . O . D . 899 00:33:10,492 --> 00:33:12,659 Will develop if this recommendation is 900 00:33:12,659 --> 00:33:14,603 adopted by the secretary , they'll 901 00:33:14,603 --> 00:33:16,937 develop this prevention workforce model . 902 00:33:16,937 --> 00:33:19,048 And then we're asking the services to 903 00:33:19,048 --> 00:33:21,270 do manpower studies on how to implement 904 00:33:21,270 --> 00:33:23,048 that . We do believe in service 905 00:33:23,048 --> 00:33:25,090 flexibility and and that each 906 00:33:25,090 --> 00:33:26,979 environment is different and each 907 00:33:26,979 --> 00:33:28,979 service is different , but they all 908 00:33:28,979 --> 00:33:30,979 need public health experts behave . 909 00:33:30,979 --> 00:33:33,430 This is a science . It's not impossible . 910 00:33:33,430 --> 00:33:35,652 I think that's what we're excited about 911 00:33:35,652 --> 00:33:37,630 and Lloyd's report , It's not 912 00:33:37,640 --> 00:33:39,650 impossible to move the needle if we 913 00:33:39,650 --> 00:33:42,100 employ evidence informed practices in 914 00:33:42,100 --> 00:33:44,310 public health science , uh , there's a 915 00:33:44,310 --> 00:33:46,690 model called the socio ecological model 916 00:33:46,700 --> 00:33:49,090 where you work on the individual level , 917 00:33:49,100 --> 00:33:51,460 the relationship level , the community 918 00:33:51,460 --> 00:33:53,682 level and the societal level . That's a 919 00:33:53,682 --> 00:33:55,516 standard public health model for 920 00:33:55,516 --> 00:33:57,580 creating change . We believe that's 921 00:33:57,580 --> 00:33:59,691 relevant here in L . A . We too has a 922 00:33:59,691 --> 00:34:01,870 version of that model specific for the 923 00:34:01,870 --> 00:34:05,470 military . Thank you so much . Thank 924 00:34:05,470 --> 00:34:07,692 you know , like if you have any closing 925 00:34:07,692 --> 00:34:09,803 thoughts , well , I would just say in 926 00:34:09,803 --> 00:34:12,430 closing again to repeat our 927 00:34:12,440 --> 00:34:14,910 appreciation to Secretary Austin for 928 00:34:14,910 --> 00:34:17,160 his faith in the I . R . C . And for 929 00:34:17,170 --> 00:34:20,170 his leadership on this issue . And I 930 00:34:20,170 --> 00:34:22,750 would say that I think our courage and 931 00:34:22,750 --> 00:34:24,880 I mean all of us , the Department 932 00:34:24,880 --> 00:34:28,560 Congress , the services are courage has 933 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:32,040 to match in addressing this issue . The 934 00:34:32,040 --> 00:34:34,110 courage and tenacity that survivors 935 00:34:34,110 --> 00:34:36,950 show every day when they work to 936 00:34:36,950 --> 00:34:39,117 rebuild their lives . That's what this 937 00:34:39,117 --> 00:34:40,617 is all about . Thank you . 938 00:34:56,140 --> 00:35:00,050 Okay . Some things to get through 939 00:35:01,040 --> 00:35:02,170 at the top here 940 00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:09,470 and I want to start by reiterating 941 00:35:10,140 --> 00:35:13,760 the secretaries , gratitude for the 942 00:35:13,760 --> 00:35:16,560 professionalism and the hard work of 943 00:35:16,570 --> 00:35:18,737 every member of the Independent Review 944 00:35:18,737 --> 00:35:21,250 Commission . Certainly , Mr Rosenthal's 945 00:35:21,260 --> 00:35:24,190 leadership and expertise prove critical 946 00:35:24,190 --> 00:35:27,130 here uh to producing this uh 947 00:35:27,140 --> 00:35:29,196 comprehensive report that that we're 948 00:35:29,196 --> 00:35:31,640 going to be working through in the 949 00:35:31,640 --> 00:35:33,751 weeks and months ahead . And in terms 950 00:35:33,751 --> 00:35:35,584 of implementation and review and 951 00:35:35,584 --> 00:35:37,807 assessment of those recommendations and 952 00:35:37,807 --> 00:35:39,751 the secretary again is very , very 953 00:35:39,751 --> 00:35:41,862 grateful for all the effort that they 954 00:35:41,862 --> 00:35:43,973 put into it . Um And he maintains and 955 00:35:43,973 --> 00:35:47,240 stands by his his goal to to not be 956 00:35:47,240 --> 00:35:49,420 afraid to think creatively and and to 957 00:35:49,420 --> 00:35:51,531 lead some change here . He has talked 958 00:35:51,531 --> 00:35:53,753 about this being a leadership issue and 959 00:35:53,753 --> 00:35:55,809 um he has made that clear throughout 960 00:35:55,809 --> 00:35:57,642 and uh you can expect to see his 961 00:35:57,642 --> 00:35:59,698 personal involvement in leading this 962 00:35:59,698 --> 00:36:01,642 change going forward . So again we 963 00:36:01,642 --> 00:36:03,364 offer our sincere gratitude to 964 00:36:03,364 --> 00:36:05,198 everybody on the I . R . C . For 965 00:36:05,198 --> 00:36:07,031 everything that they did . Now , 966 00:36:07,031 --> 00:36:09,142 shifting gears . Let me just give you 967 00:36:09,142 --> 00:36:11,309 an update on Afghanistan . Our mission 968 00:36:11,309 --> 00:36:13,690 in Afghanistan continues . We continue 969 00:36:13,690 --> 00:36:15,900 to execute a safe orderly drawdown in 970 00:36:15,900 --> 00:36:17,678 accordance with the President's 971 00:36:17,678 --> 00:36:19,789 guidance for U . S . Forces to be out 972 00:36:19,789 --> 00:36:21,789 of Afghanistan by the end of august 973 00:36:22,430 --> 00:36:25,030 safe orderly drawdown enables us to 974 00:36:25,030 --> 00:36:27,860 maintain an ongoing diplomatic presence , 975 00:36:27,860 --> 00:36:30,350 support the Afghan people and the 976 00:36:30,350 --> 00:36:32,572 government and prevent Afghanistan from 977 00:36:32,572 --> 00:36:34,628 once again becoming a safe haven for 978 00:36:34,628 --> 00:36:36,850 terrorism that threatens our homeland . 979 00:36:37,130 --> 00:36:39,810 As part of our ongoing drawdown process , 980 00:36:39,810 --> 00:36:43,310 the secretary approved a plan today to 981 00:36:43,310 --> 00:36:45,940 transfer command authority over our 982 00:36:45,940 --> 00:36:47,940 mission in Afghanistan from General 983 00:36:47,940 --> 00:36:50,218 scott Miller to General frank McKenzie . 984 00:36:50,400 --> 00:36:52,567 We expect that transfer to be affected 985 00:36:52,567 --> 00:36:55,210 later this month . General Miller will 986 00:36:55,210 --> 00:36:57,266 remain in theater in coming weeks to 987 00:36:57,266 --> 00:36:59,043 prepare for and to complete the 988 00:36:59,043 --> 00:37:00,654 turnover of these duties and 989 00:37:00,654 --> 00:37:02,877 responsibilities to General Mackenzie . 990 00:37:02,877 --> 00:37:04,932 Importantly , General Mackenzie will 991 00:37:04,932 --> 00:37:06,877 retain all existing authorities as 992 00:37:06,877 --> 00:37:09,099 commander of US forces in Afghanistan . 993 00:37:09,630 --> 00:37:11,930 He will continue to exercise authority 994 00:37:11,990 --> 00:37:13,810 over the conduct of any and all 995 00:37:13,810 --> 00:37:15,921 counterterrorism operations needed to 996 00:37:15,921 --> 00:37:17,810 protect the homeland from threats 997 00:37:17,810 --> 00:37:19,921 emanating out of Afghanistan . And he 998 00:37:19,921 --> 00:37:22,143 will lead us efforts to develop options 999 00:37:22,143 --> 00:37:24,088 for the logistical , financial and 1000 00:37:24,088 --> 00:37:26,310 technical support to Afghan forces once 1001 00:37:26,310 --> 00:37:29,080 our drawdown is complete now . As part 1002 00:37:29,080 --> 00:37:31,302 of this new arrangement , the Secretary 1003 00:37:31,302 --> 00:37:33,469 also approved the establishment of U . 1004 00:37:33,469 --> 00:37:35,610 S . Forces Afghanistan forward to be 1005 00:37:35,610 --> 00:37:37,960 led by Navy . Rear Admiral Peter vastly 1006 00:37:38,430 --> 00:37:40,541 where admiral vessels command will be 1007 00:37:40,541 --> 00:37:42,840 based in Kabul and will be supported by 1008 00:37:42,840 --> 00:37:45,550 Brigadier General Curtis Buzzard , who 1009 00:37:45,550 --> 00:37:47,440 will lead the Defense Security 1010 00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:49,107 Cooperation Management office 1011 00:37:49,107 --> 00:37:51,420 Afghanistan . That office will be based 1012 00:37:51,420 --> 00:37:53,570 in Qatar and will administer funding 1013 00:37:53,570 --> 00:37:55,792 support for the Afghan National Defence 1014 00:37:55,792 --> 00:37:58,014 and Security Forces to include over the 1015 00:37:58,014 --> 00:38:00,650 horizon aircraft maintenance support . 1016 00:38:01,820 --> 00:38:04,130 This change in leadership structure and 1017 00:38:04,130 --> 00:38:06,930 the turnover today of bagram airbase to 1018 00:38:06,930 --> 00:38:09,060 the Afghanistan National Afghan 1019 00:38:09,060 --> 00:38:11,116 National Defence and Security Forces 1020 00:38:11,116 --> 00:38:13,310 are key milestones in our drawdown 1021 00:38:13,310 --> 00:38:16,260 process reflecting a smaller US force 1022 00:38:16,260 --> 00:38:18,600 presence in Afghanistan . That presence 1023 00:38:19,220 --> 00:38:21,830 will remain focused on four things over 1024 00:38:21,830 --> 00:38:24,250 the course of the coming period . one 1025 00:38:24,480 --> 00:38:26,591 protecting our diplomatic presence in 1026 00:38:26,591 --> 00:38:29,050 the country too , Supporting security 1027 00:38:29,050 --> 00:38:30,661 requirements at Hamid Karzai 1028 00:38:30,661 --> 00:38:33,290 International Airport . three continued 1029 00:38:33,290 --> 00:38:35,068 advice and assistance to Afghan 1030 00:38:35,068 --> 00:38:37,290 national Defence and Security forces as 1031 00:38:37,290 --> 00:38:39,330 appropriate and for supporting our 1032 00:38:39,330 --> 00:38:42,540 counterterrorism efforts . Yeah , 1033 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:45,540 again on schedule now a different topic 1034 00:38:45,550 --> 00:38:47,606 earlier today , Secretary Austin met 1035 00:38:48,020 --> 00:38:51,360 with his excellency , see Roger Dean 1036 00:38:51,370 --> 00:38:53,370 More Dean , the Minister of Foreign 1037 00:38:53,370 --> 00:38:56,260 Affairs of Tajikistan to reaffirm our 1038 00:38:56,260 --> 00:38:58,800 security strategic Security Partnership 1039 00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:00,856 and to discuss the evolving security 1040 00:39:00,856 --> 00:39:03,140 situation in the Central Asia region . 1041 00:39:04,020 --> 00:39:06,020 Both leaders expressed their shared 1042 00:39:06,020 --> 00:39:08,187 desire to continue close collaboration 1043 00:39:08,187 --> 00:39:10,242 on issues such as counterterrorism , 1044 00:39:10,242 --> 00:39:12,464 border security and defence institution 1045 00:39:12,464 --> 00:39:14,687 capacity building . And they reiterated 1046 00:39:14,687 --> 00:39:16,909 their commitment to further promote the 1047 00:39:16,909 --> 00:39:19,020 goal of adorable political settlement 1048 00:39:19,020 --> 00:39:21,242 in Afghanistan . Moving to the european 1049 00:39:21,242 --> 00:39:23,464 theater exercise . Sea breeze continues 1050 00:39:23,464 --> 00:39:25,576 as scheduled in the Black Sea . It is 1051 00:39:25,576 --> 00:39:25,010 proving to be one of the most 1052 00:39:25,010 --> 00:39:27,232 successful iterations in terms of scope 1053 00:39:27,420 --> 00:39:29,531 building capability among NATO allies 1054 00:39:29,531 --> 00:39:31,476 and partners and demonstrating our 1055 00:39:31,476 --> 00:39:33,531 collective commitment to security in 1056 00:39:33,531 --> 00:39:35,531 this region . This week , our ships 1057 00:39:35,531 --> 00:39:37,809 began the at sea phase of the exercise , 1058 00:39:37,809 --> 00:39:39,920 rehearsing coordinated air , maritime 1059 00:39:39,920 --> 00:39:42,031 and land operations to build combined 1060 00:39:42,031 --> 00:39:44,253 capability . The ships and aircraft are 1061 00:39:44,253 --> 00:39:46,142 working together in international 1062 00:39:46,142 --> 00:39:48,142 waters and airspace to refine multi 1063 00:39:48,142 --> 00:39:50,142 domain operations together with our 1064 00:39:50,142 --> 00:39:52,253 partners and our allies . We continue 1065 00:39:52,253 --> 00:39:54,309 to be transparent and truthful about 1066 00:39:54,309 --> 00:39:56,420 these operations , building trust and 1067 00:39:56,420 --> 00:39:58,710 stability across europe . I'd also like 1068 00:39:58,710 --> 00:40:00,543 to highlight the women peace and 1069 00:40:00,543 --> 00:40:02,766 security congressional report signed by 1070 00:40:02,766 --> 00:40:04,988 President biden on Tuesday . The report 1071 00:40:04,988 --> 00:40:07,043 summarizes US government progress in 1072 00:40:07,043 --> 00:40:10,080 implementing the the US Women Peace and 1073 00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:12,490 Security Strategy . The report captures 1074 00:40:12,490 --> 00:40:14,712 the important role of the Department of 1075 00:40:14,712 --> 00:40:16,934 Defense and advancing gender equity and 1076 00:40:16,934 --> 00:40:19,046 equality at home and abroad as one of 1077 00:40:19,046 --> 00:40:21,046 the world's largest employers . The 1078 00:40:21,046 --> 00:40:20,980 department continues to make a 1079 00:40:20,980 --> 00:40:23,210 concerted effort each year to model 1080 00:40:23,210 --> 00:40:25,432 women peace and security by creating an 1081 00:40:25,432 --> 00:40:27,570 enabling environment for women and 1082 00:40:27,570 --> 00:40:29,737 gender minorities , both civilians and 1083 00:40:29,737 --> 00:40:33,060 in uniform as the US officially commits 1084 00:40:33,060 --> 00:40:35,004 to participating in the Generation 1085 00:40:35,004 --> 00:40:37,116 Equality Forum . The D . O . D . Will 1086 00:40:37,116 --> 00:40:39,227 build on our women peace and security 1087 00:40:39,227 --> 00:40:41,393 initiatives to strengthen the linkages 1088 00:40:41,393 --> 00:40:43,449 between gender equality and national 1089 00:40:43,449 --> 00:40:46,200 security . Uh and finally delighted to 1090 00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:48,089 be able to announce the Secretary 1091 00:40:48,089 --> 00:40:50,089 Austin will speak during the global 1092 00:40:50,089 --> 00:40:52,480 emergency emergent emerging technology 1093 00:40:52,480 --> 00:40:55,170 summit on July 13 . The summit hosted 1094 00:40:55,170 --> 00:40:57,337 by the National Security Commission on 1095 00:40:57,337 --> 00:40:59,337 artificial Intelligence , will also 1096 00:40:59,337 --> 00:41:01,170 host robert Wark , former Deputy 1097 00:41:01,170 --> 00:41:03,281 Secretary of Defense as a moderator . 1098 00:41:03,281 --> 00:41:05,448 And that's a lot of opening comments . 1099 00:41:05,448 --> 00:41:07,726 So with that we'll go to questions bob . 1100 00:41:07,726 --> 00:41:09,892 Yes . Thanks john . Yeah , there was a 1101 00:41:09,892 --> 00:41:11,640 lot there in Afghanistan . 1102 00:41:13,510 --> 00:41:16,000 You believe I heard you say that the 1103 00:41:16,010 --> 00:41:19,060 goal now is to be out . If you use that 1104 00:41:19,060 --> 00:41:21,420 word out by the end of august , I don't 1105 00:41:21,420 --> 00:41:23,253 believe I've heard that official 1106 00:41:23,253 --> 00:41:26,730 timeline before . Is that a new goal ? 1107 00:41:26,740 --> 00:41:28,962 I mean , I thought it was september , I 1108 00:41:28,962 --> 00:41:31,184 thought it was maybe this month . Why ? 1109 00:41:31,184 --> 00:41:31,090 At the end of august ? And also , could 1110 00:41:31,090 --> 00:41:33,090 you , I didn't quite catch what you 1111 00:41:33,090 --> 00:41:35,423 said about General Miller , did you say , 1112 00:41:35,423 --> 00:41:37,534 staying for another week or something 1113 00:41:37,534 --> 00:41:39,812 like that ? Yeah , So , both questions . 1114 00:41:39,812 --> 00:41:41,868 I mean , the president made it clear 1115 00:41:41,868 --> 00:41:44,300 that he wanted the drawdown complete by 1116 00:41:44,310 --> 00:41:47,610 early september . We believe we're uh 1117 00:41:47,620 --> 00:41:50,200 going to be able to uh complete this 1118 00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:52,210 process by the end of august . And 1119 00:41:52,210 --> 00:41:54,377 that's what , that's what I was trying 1120 00:41:54,377 --> 00:41:56,377 to state that process , meaning the 1121 00:41:56,377 --> 00:41:58,488 meeting , the meeting , the meeting , 1122 00:41:58,488 --> 00:42:01,600 the completion of our drawdown by the 1123 00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:03,790 end of august . And then that would be 1124 00:42:03,800 --> 00:42:06,810 then we would transition to uh this new 1125 00:42:06,810 --> 00:42:08,588 bilateral relationship with the 1126 00:42:08,588 --> 00:42:10,810 security forces of Afghanistan . So the 1127 00:42:10,810 --> 00:42:12,977 goal was early september uh we believe 1128 00:42:12,977 --> 00:42:15,143 we'll be able to make it by the end of 1129 00:42:15,143 --> 00:42:17,310 august , remain there until then . I'm 1130 00:42:17,310 --> 00:42:19,480 not gonna get into specific numbers . 1131 00:42:19,480 --> 00:42:23,170 But I mean uh well , we we 1132 00:42:23,170 --> 00:42:25,059 believe we'll be able to get this 1133 00:42:25,059 --> 00:42:28,190 wrapped up by the end of august and and 1134 00:42:28,200 --> 00:42:30,840 uh I'm sorry General Miller . Uh So as 1135 00:42:30,840 --> 00:42:32,620 I said , uh the general will be 1136 00:42:33,300 --> 00:42:36,210 remaining in the theater 1137 00:42:36,450 --> 00:42:40,440 for a number of weeks . I'd 1138 00:42:40,440 --> 00:42:43,940 rather not get too specific about his 1139 00:42:43,940 --> 00:42:47,180 specific travel plans , but he'll he'll 1140 00:42:47,190 --> 00:42:50,610 he'll stay out there for another couple 1141 00:42:50,610 --> 00:42:53,310 of weeks or so to help affect this 1142 00:42:53,700 --> 00:42:56,720 transition of of command authority uh 1143 00:42:56,730 --> 00:42:59,840 from himself to General Mackenzie . So 1144 00:42:59,840 --> 00:43:02,062 there's I mean , he's probably going to 1145 00:43:02,062 --> 00:43:04,100 be , I would I suspect he'll be 1146 00:43:04,110 --> 00:43:06,680 traveling around as he gets ready to 1147 00:43:06,680 --> 00:43:08,624 turn over these responsibilities . 1148 00:43:08,624 --> 00:43:10,750 He'll be probably traveling um in the 1149 00:43:10,750 --> 00:43:12,583 theater and even perhaps outside 1150 00:43:12,583 --> 00:43:14,694 Afghanistan as he does this . But the 1151 00:43:14,694 --> 00:43:17,530 idea is to have him remain there to 1152 00:43:17,530 --> 00:43:19,740 affect to affect all this the turnover 1153 00:43:19,740 --> 00:43:23,300 of responsibilities uh and make uh and 1154 00:43:23,300 --> 00:43:25,522 make preparations for General Mackenzie 1155 00:43:25,522 --> 00:43:27,800 to assume those those responsibilities . 1156 00:43:27,800 --> 00:43:30,390 So General Miller will remain the 1157 00:43:30,390 --> 00:43:33,060 commander for at least a couple more 1158 00:43:33,060 --> 00:43:35,282 weeks , correct ? It will be in and out 1159 00:43:35,282 --> 00:43:37,710 of Afghanistan . Yes , Eastern right 1160 00:43:37,710 --> 00:43:40,290 now . I'm not gonna get into his daily 1161 00:43:40,300 --> 00:43:42,430 travel . I'd rather not do that . I 1162 00:43:42,430 --> 00:43:44,530 think you can understand why , but I 1163 00:43:44,530 --> 00:43:46,697 would expect that over the next couple 1164 00:43:46,697 --> 00:43:48,960 of weeks . Um He will be travelling 1165 00:43:48,970 --> 00:43:51,110 about probably about Afghanistan and 1166 00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:53,410 and perhaps about the theater as he 1167 00:43:53,410 --> 00:43:55,760 begins to prepare the turnover of his 1168 00:43:55,760 --> 00:43:57,982 responsibilities to General Mackenzie . 1169 00:43:57,982 --> 00:43:59,927 But yes , he is still in command . 1170 00:43:59,927 --> 00:44:01,982 Thank you . And the plant I tried to 1171 00:44:01,982 --> 00:44:04,204 make clear in my opening that secretary 1172 00:44:04,204 --> 00:44:06,260 approved today this plan to transfer 1173 00:44:06,260 --> 00:44:08,530 authority . The authority has not 1174 00:44:08,540 --> 00:44:10,707 transferred today . It's going to take 1175 00:44:10,707 --> 00:44:12,762 a couple of weeks or so . Okay thank 1176 00:44:12,762 --> 00:44:14,984 you . I'm sorry go ahead verification . 1177 00:44:14,984 --> 00:44:17,096 And will he be setting up the U . S . 1178 00:44:17,096 --> 00:44:19,040 Forces Afghanistan and the U . S . 1179 00:44:19,040 --> 00:44:21,180 Forces Afghanistan forward ? Or will 1180 00:44:21,180 --> 00:44:22,902 that be something that General 1181 00:44:22,902 --> 00:44:24,910 Mackenzie ? Well , the secretary 1182 00:44:24,910 --> 00:44:26,970 approved the establishment of US 1183 00:44:26,970 --> 00:44:28,581 Afghanistan , U . S . Forces 1184 00:44:28,581 --> 00:44:30,880 Afghanistan forward which will be led 1185 00:44:30,880 --> 00:44:33,480 by Rear Admiral basically . So that 1186 00:44:33,490 --> 00:44:35,046 that that he's approved the 1187 00:44:35,046 --> 00:44:37,350 establishment of that new command and 1188 00:44:37,350 --> 00:44:39,461 now they're in the process of getting 1189 00:44:39,461 --> 00:44:42,920 it stood up time passed on 1190 00:44:43,290 --> 00:44:46,650 who kind of take a step back and talk 1191 00:44:46,650 --> 00:44:48,761 about the significance of the closure 1192 00:44:48,761 --> 00:44:51,070 of Bagram , the last operating U . S . 1193 00:44:51,070 --> 00:44:53,590 Base in Afghanistan . And is this the 1194 00:44:53,590 --> 00:44:56,720 end of a chapter ? It's um 1195 00:44:57,890 --> 00:45:00,430 I wouldn't describe it as the end of a 1196 00:45:00,440 --> 00:45:02,607 Chapter . Tara . I mean obviously it's 1197 00:45:02,607 --> 00:45:04,718 a it's a big air base that we've been 1198 00:45:04,718 --> 00:45:08,490 using for 20 years . But it was it was 1199 00:45:08,490 --> 00:45:11,290 important because of the The effort 1200 00:45:11,290 --> 00:45:13,512 that we were expanding in Afghanistan , 1201 00:45:13,512 --> 00:45:15,920 the size of the force that we once had 1202 00:45:15,920 --> 00:45:18,850 in Afghanistan . I mean , Bagram was a 1203 00:45:18,860 --> 00:45:22,300 key hub for air support for everything 1204 00:45:22,300 --> 00:45:24,411 that we were doing over there for the 1205 00:45:24,411 --> 00:45:26,633 last 20 years and not just us , but our 1206 00:45:26,633 --> 00:45:29,210 NATO partners as well . Um and we're 1207 00:45:29,210 --> 00:45:31,154 beginning , you know , the mission 1208 00:45:31,154 --> 00:45:32,877 continues , but it is going to 1209 00:45:32,877 --> 00:45:35,100 transition eventually to a completely 1210 00:45:35,100 --> 00:45:36,656 different kind of bilateral 1211 00:45:36,656 --> 00:45:39,040 relationship with Afghanistan . Um And 1212 00:45:39,050 --> 00:45:41,660 we as part of the drawdown process 1213 00:45:41,670 --> 00:45:44,530 eventually , we knew uh that that was 1214 00:45:44,530 --> 00:45:46,697 one of the bases that would have to be 1215 00:45:46,697 --> 00:45:49,430 turned over to the afghans . Um I don't 1216 00:45:49,430 --> 00:45:51,652 think it should come as any surprise to 1217 00:45:51,652 --> 00:45:53,652 you that it was , it was one of the 1218 00:45:53,652 --> 00:45:55,597 last to be done . We still have uh 1219 00:45:55,597 --> 00:45:57,740 facilities in Kabul because it's so 1220 00:45:57,740 --> 00:45:59,907 close to Kabul and because it has such 1221 00:45:59,907 --> 00:46:01,962 robust air capability , but we don't 1222 00:46:01,962 --> 00:46:04,240 need that kind of capability right now . 1223 00:46:04,240 --> 00:46:06,490 So it made sense for it to be the one 1224 00:46:06,490 --> 00:46:08,657 to be turned over at this point in the 1225 00:46:08,657 --> 00:46:10,590 process . But it was the last US 1226 00:46:10,590 --> 00:46:12,910 operating base besides the presence , I 1227 00:46:12,910 --> 00:46:15,021 guess that has now shifted to Kabul . 1228 00:46:15,380 --> 00:46:17,950 Right . I mean , but that was again it 1229 00:46:17,950 --> 00:46:19,672 was necessary for the kinds of 1230 00:46:19,672 --> 00:46:22,200 capabilities we had in country and uh 1231 00:46:22,210 --> 00:46:24,266 in the scope of the missions that we 1232 00:46:24,266 --> 00:46:26,570 were performing , that those missions 1233 00:46:26,570 --> 00:46:28,600 will change now as we work our way 1234 00:46:28,600 --> 00:46:30,711 through the summer , they'll continue 1235 00:46:30,711 --> 00:46:32,544 to change . And as I said in the 1236 00:46:32,544 --> 00:46:34,433 opening statement , I mean , this 1237 00:46:34,433 --> 00:46:36,600 arrangement , including the leadership 1238 00:46:36,600 --> 00:46:36,510 arrangement I talked about including 1239 00:46:36,510 --> 00:46:38,510 the closure of Bagram is in keeping 1240 00:46:38,510 --> 00:46:40,232 with having a smaller force in 1241 00:46:40,232 --> 00:46:42,200 Afghanistan for the aircraft that 1242 00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:44,380 departed Bagram . Are they now out of 1243 00:46:44,380 --> 00:46:46,980 the country or do or do we still have 1244 00:46:46,980 --> 00:46:49,400 air assets in Kabul to support the 1245 00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:52,320 remaining footprint ? I I think without 1246 00:46:52,320 --> 00:46:54,542 getting into too much specificity , I I 1247 00:46:54,542 --> 00:46:57,500 think uh you know , there there is , 1248 00:46:57,500 --> 00:47:01,100 there are some aviation elements that 1249 00:47:01,110 --> 00:47:04,090 that we retain at the airport . Um 1250 00:47:04,480 --> 00:47:08,350 but in terms of the the kinds of 1251 00:47:08,350 --> 00:47:10,350 strike capabilities that you're , I 1252 00:47:10,350 --> 00:47:12,572 think you're talking about those are no 1253 00:47:12,572 --> 00:47:14,683 longer in Afghanistan . I would and I 1254 00:47:14,683 --> 00:47:17,540 won't detail where every aircraft has 1255 00:47:17,540 --> 00:47:20,740 gone . Um But I would remind , as we 1256 00:47:20,740 --> 00:47:23,670 said this before , we have a robust uh 1257 00:47:23,680 --> 00:47:26,590 footprint uh in the region , even 1258 00:47:26,590 --> 00:47:28,701 outside Afghanistan and we still have 1259 00:47:28,701 --> 00:47:30,820 the capability to conduct over the 1260 00:47:30,820 --> 00:47:33,840 horizon missions as necessary for 1261 00:47:33,850 --> 00:47:36,960 counterterrorism . Then , just one last 1262 00:47:36,960 --> 00:47:40,530 for now , once the , once we hit the 1263 00:47:40,530 --> 00:47:42,700 end of august and troops have 1264 00:47:42,700 --> 00:47:45,033 completely have completed the departure , 1265 00:47:45,033 --> 00:47:47,256 will there be any sort of enduring over 1266 00:47:47,256 --> 00:47:49,478 the rise in support for Afghan forces ? 1267 00:47:49,478 --> 00:47:51,533 Will that , will we still have the , 1268 00:47:51,533 --> 00:47:53,811 will there still be an authority for U . 1269 00:47:53,811 --> 00:47:55,922 S . Forces to conduct air support for 1270 00:47:55,922 --> 00:47:58,230 Afghan forces ? If they are come in 1271 00:47:58,230 --> 00:48:00,452 contact with the taliban , I don't want 1272 00:48:00,452 --> 00:48:02,619 to get that far ahead of our process . 1273 00:48:02,619 --> 00:48:04,730 What I can tell you now is that those 1274 00:48:04,730 --> 00:48:06,619 authorities still exist ? General 1275 00:48:06,619 --> 00:48:08,786 Miller still has those authorities and 1276 00:48:08,786 --> 00:48:10,619 as I said in my comments when he 1277 00:48:10,619 --> 00:48:13,260 transfers command authority to General 1278 00:48:13,260 --> 00:48:15,204 Mackenzie , General Mackenzie will 1279 00:48:15,204 --> 00:48:18,830 retain those same authorities . Okay ? 1280 00:48:18,840 --> 00:48:21,360 Uh let me go to somebody on the phone . 1281 00:48:21,360 --> 00:48:24,660 Air , there's quite a few carla . Hey 1282 00:48:24,660 --> 00:48:26,827 john thanks for doing this . Just some 1283 00:48:26,827 --> 00:48:29,980 housekeeping . Um First on , let's talk 1284 00:48:29,980 --> 00:48:32,091 about Syria real quick for my Persian 1285 00:48:32,091 --> 00:48:34,202 Service . Um can you give us any more 1286 00:48:34,202 --> 00:48:36,360 details ? Are you any closer to 1287 00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:38,193 confirming that Kh or some other 1288 00:48:38,193 --> 00:48:40,360 Iranian backed specific Iranian backed 1289 00:48:40,360 --> 00:48:42,730 militia was were the responsible for 1290 00:48:42,730 --> 00:48:44,730 those rocket attacks in Syria . And 1291 00:48:44,730 --> 00:48:46,952 then I have a follow on Afghanistan . I 1292 00:48:46,952 --> 00:48:48,897 mean without getting into specific 1293 00:48:48,897 --> 00:48:51,119 attribution . I think as we said at the 1294 00:48:51,119 --> 00:48:53,286 time , uh we were confident that those 1295 00:48:53,286 --> 00:48:55,230 structures , those facilities were 1296 00:48:55,230 --> 00:48:59,070 being used by Iran backed militias 1297 00:48:59,080 --> 00:49:01,880 to attack our people , our facilities 1298 00:49:01,880 --> 00:49:03,890 and our Iraqi partners . And we're 1299 00:49:03,890 --> 00:49:05,946 confident in that . I'm not going to 1300 00:49:05,946 --> 00:49:08,001 get into specific attribution beyond 1301 00:49:08,001 --> 00:49:10,001 that right now . Okay . And then on 1302 00:49:10,001 --> 00:49:12,400 Afghanistan , um jen Psaki , the White 1303 00:49:12,400 --> 00:49:14,289 House spokeswoman , she said that 1304 00:49:14,289 --> 00:49:16,067 Austin was going to be making a 1305 00:49:16,067 --> 00:49:18,122 statement later today . Is secretary 1306 00:49:18,122 --> 00:49:20,344 else is going to be doing that in front 1307 00:49:20,344 --> 00:49:22,456 of the camera ? Is that just going to 1308 00:49:22,456 --> 00:49:21,880 be a written statement that you guys 1309 00:49:21,880 --> 00:49:25,140 push out to us and for for us reporters ? 1310 00:49:25,140 --> 00:49:27,196 What's left now ? Because bagram was 1311 00:49:27,196 --> 00:49:29,380 such a huge piece of the puzzle of the 1312 00:49:29,380 --> 00:49:31,324 U . S . Troop withdrawal . So what 1313 00:49:31,324 --> 00:49:33,436 exactly is left to do in the next few 1314 00:49:33,436 --> 00:49:35,491 weeks ? The statement that Misaki is 1315 00:49:35,491 --> 00:49:37,658 referring to is the one that I read at 1316 00:49:37,658 --> 00:49:39,920 the at the top of this briefing . Um 1317 00:49:39,920 --> 00:49:43,730 and uh without , you know , we want to 1318 00:49:43,730 --> 00:49:47,470 be very careful here . We still uh 1319 00:49:47,480 --> 00:49:49,950 we're still conducting this safe 1320 00:49:49,960 --> 00:49:52,260 orderly and deliberate drawdown . So as 1321 00:49:52,260 --> 00:49:54,540 for what's where and who's where I'm 1322 00:49:54,540 --> 00:49:57,530 going to be very careful but but 1323 00:49:57,530 --> 00:50:00,190 clearly with the closure of bagram , uh 1324 00:50:00,200 --> 00:50:02,980 the locus of our uh efforts are in and 1325 00:50:02,980 --> 00:50:04,924 around Kabul at this point . But I 1326 00:50:04,924 --> 00:50:07,147 won't go in any more detail beyond that 1327 00:50:08,460 --> 00:50:11,380 nick a couple of them just very brief 1328 00:50:11,380 --> 00:50:13,547 follow up again . Maybe you won't want 1329 00:50:13,547 --> 00:50:15,547 to confirm this but can you confirm 1330 00:50:15,547 --> 00:50:17,658 there are no US troops in Afghanistan 1331 00:50:17,658 --> 00:50:19,769 outside of college . I'm not going to 1332 00:50:19,769 --> 00:50:21,991 get into their specific location . Nick 1333 00:50:21,991 --> 00:50:24,213 a couple things on the maintenance that 1334 00:50:24,213 --> 00:50:26,047 we've been talking about and the 1335 00:50:26,047 --> 00:50:27,991 airport , is there an agreement to 1336 00:50:27,991 --> 00:50:30,158 maintain afghan helicopters outside of 1337 00:50:30,158 --> 00:50:32,730 Afghanistan ? Whether that's partially 1338 00:50:32,730 --> 00:50:34,508 in the gulf or perhaps north of 1339 00:50:34,508 --> 00:50:37,510 Afghanistan and how to have the 1340 00:50:37,520 --> 00:50:39,740 personnel who can do that again ? I 1341 00:50:39,740 --> 00:50:41,740 think General Buzzer is going to be 1342 00:50:41,740 --> 00:50:43,720 working on this as in concert with 1343 00:50:43,730 --> 00:50:45,563 General Mackenzie on the kind of 1344 00:50:45,563 --> 00:50:47,230 technical , financial and the 1345 00:50:47,230 --> 00:50:49,452 maintenance support that we're going to 1346 00:50:49,452 --> 00:50:51,674 be able to provide the afghans . We are 1347 00:50:51,674 --> 00:50:53,563 committed to doing that . It will 1348 00:50:53,563 --> 00:50:55,563 obviously be in an over the horizon 1349 00:50:55,563 --> 00:50:57,786 capacity . Uh and the details are still 1350 00:50:57,786 --> 00:50:59,730 being worked out airport . Are the 1351 00:50:59,730 --> 00:51:01,730 details still being worked out with 1352 00:51:01,730 --> 00:51:03,897 Turkey exactly what they need from the 1353 00:51:03,897 --> 00:51:06,008 U . S . Or in fact maybe nothing from 1354 00:51:06,008 --> 00:51:08,008 the US and how that transition will 1355 00:51:08,008 --> 00:51:10,063 take . We're still in talks with the 1356 00:51:10,063 --> 00:51:12,174 Turkey about what security footprints 1357 00:51:12,174 --> 00:51:14,008 gonna end up looking like at the 1358 00:51:14,008 --> 00:51:16,119 airport . I will only say , as I said 1359 00:51:16,119 --> 00:51:18,341 before , we all recognize that security 1360 00:51:18,341 --> 00:51:20,508 there is going to be critical to being 1361 00:51:20,508 --> 00:51:20,080 able to maintain a diplomatic presence 1362 00:51:20,080 --> 00:51:22,136 in Afghanistan regardless of who has 1363 00:51:22,136 --> 00:51:24,302 the authority . Whether it's basically 1364 00:51:24,302 --> 00:51:26,302 whether it's Miller or whether it's 1365 00:51:26,302 --> 00:51:28,413 Mackenzie , has there been a decision 1366 00:51:28,413 --> 00:51:30,524 made on what is what would require an 1367 00:51:30,524 --> 00:51:33,080 airstrike from over the horizon ? You 1368 00:51:33,080 --> 00:51:35,600 know , somebody about attacked the 1369 00:51:35,600 --> 00:51:37,878 embassy , somebody back to the airport , 1370 00:51:37,878 --> 00:51:40,044 somebody about to attack the palace in 1371 00:51:40,044 --> 00:51:42,044 Kabul . Has that decision . I'm not 1372 00:51:42,044 --> 00:51:44,156 going to get into rules of engagement 1373 00:51:44,156 --> 00:51:43,860 nick and you know , we don't do that 1374 00:51:43,870 --> 00:51:46,290 but we will retain over the horizon 1375 00:51:46,290 --> 00:51:48,346 counterterrorism capabilities . As I 1376 00:51:48,346 --> 00:51:50,290 said at the outset , certainly any 1377 00:51:50,290 --> 00:51:52,401 threats emanating from Afghanistan to 1378 00:51:52,401 --> 00:51:54,512 our homeland . We're going to be able 1379 00:51:54,512 --> 00:51:56,740 to retain the ability to to counter 1380 00:51:56,740 --> 00:51:58,962 those threats . And as I said to Tara , 1381 00:51:58,962 --> 00:52:01,250 the all the other authorities that 1382 00:52:01,250 --> 00:52:03,194 General Miller has right now , for 1383 00:52:03,194 --> 00:52:05,770 instance , in helping defend Afghan 1384 00:52:05,780 --> 00:52:09,500 national security forces uh still 1385 00:52:09,500 --> 00:52:11,940 exists , uh and those authorities will 1386 00:52:11,940 --> 00:52:13,996 transfer to General Mackenzie in the 1387 00:52:13,996 --> 00:52:16,218 coming weeks and he'll have those and I 1388 00:52:16,218 --> 00:52:18,384 won't really get beyond that . I don't 1389 00:52:18,384 --> 00:52:20,496 think it's helpful to speculate a for 1390 00:52:20,496 --> 00:52:22,670 how long and be exactly how they're 1391 00:52:22,670 --> 00:52:25,350 going to be executed . And just to ask 1392 00:52:25,350 --> 00:52:27,128 the question kind of the Afghan 1393 00:52:27,128 --> 00:52:29,294 government officials are asking how is 1394 00:52:29,294 --> 00:52:31,720 it possible at this point when when we 1395 00:52:31,720 --> 00:52:34,670 are essentially only in Kabul have 1396 00:52:34,670 --> 00:52:37,830 closed bagram . We are so close to kind 1397 00:52:37,830 --> 00:52:39,997 of an announcement , if you will about 1398 00:52:39,997 --> 00:52:42,040 the end of the U . S . Mission that 1399 00:52:42,040 --> 00:52:44,100 some of these other details haven't 1400 00:52:44,100 --> 00:52:46,044 been worked out already . They are 1401 00:52:46,044 --> 00:52:49,330 actively being uh worked right now nick . 1402 00:52:49,340 --> 00:52:52,850 Uh There's this is complicated stuff 1403 00:52:52,860 --> 00:52:55,530 uh and it's and it's more important for 1404 00:52:55,530 --> 00:52:58,210 us to do this right and to make sure 1405 00:52:58,210 --> 00:53:00,970 that the solutions are sustainable over 1406 00:53:00,970 --> 00:53:04,580 time . Uh then it is uh to 1407 00:53:04,580 --> 00:53:06,890 just slap a solution on it . Uh And 1408 00:53:06,890 --> 00:53:09,170 we're confident uh that in working in 1409 00:53:09,170 --> 00:53:11,114 concert with our colleagues at the 1410 00:53:11,114 --> 00:53:13,337 State Department , we're confident that 1411 00:53:13,337 --> 00:53:15,559 we're going to get there again . I want 1412 00:53:15,559 --> 00:53:17,559 to remind because sometimes I think 1413 00:53:17,559 --> 00:53:19,448 it's too easy for us to forget we 1414 00:53:19,448 --> 00:53:21,559 already possess capabilities over the 1415 00:53:21,559 --> 00:53:23,559 horizon capabilities , particularly 1416 00:53:23,559 --> 00:53:25,559 when it comes to counterterrorism . 1417 00:53:25,559 --> 00:53:27,781 You've heard the secretary said there's 1418 00:53:27,781 --> 00:53:29,948 not a scrap of Earth that we can't hit 1419 00:53:29,948 --> 00:53:32,059 if we really want to . I mean , you I 1420 00:53:32,059 --> 00:53:34,490 saw it play out over last weekend , 1421 00:53:34,500 --> 00:53:38,170 didn't you ? Uh With with manned 1422 00:53:38,170 --> 00:53:41,230 aircraft strikes in Iraq and in Syria 1423 00:53:41,240 --> 00:53:43,910 we have a capability uh and so we're 1424 00:53:43,910 --> 00:53:46,320 going to pursue that . Uh We also want 1425 00:53:46,320 --> 00:53:48,431 to pursue options . One of the one of 1426 00:53:48,431 --> 00:53:50,542 the things we're always after nick is 1427 00:53:50,542 --> 00:53:52,709 more options . Uh And so clearly we're 1428 00:53:52,709 --> 00:53:54,876 going to be discussing this again with 1429 00:53:54,876 --> 00:53:56,931 our State Department colleagues with 1430 00:53:56,931 --> 00:53:59,153 countries in the region to see what the 1431 00:53:59,153 --> 00:54:01,209 possibilities for additional options 1432 00:54:01,209 --> 00:54:05,190 are . Let me go to address 1433 00:54:05,190 --> 00:54:08,300 from Reuters . Hey john , thanks for 1434 00:54:08,300 --> 00:54:10,522 doing this . Um there's obviously still 1435 00:54:10,522 --> 00:54:12,800 a lot of things that require agreements 1436 00:54:12,800 --> 00:54:15,880 or decisions , you know , that it from 1437 00:54:15,880 --> 00:54:17,936 the basing in nearby countries too . 1438 00:54:17,936 --> 00:54:20,158 Where the S . I . V . S . Go , how many 1439 00:54:20,158 --> 00:54:21,769 specific troops will stay in 1440 00:54:21,769 --> 00:54:23,769 Afghanistan ? You know , a bunch of 1441 00:54:23,769 --> 00:54:25,936 things . Um and I was just wondering , 1442 00:54:25,936 --> 00:54:27,936 is the secretary confident that all 1443 00:54:27,936 --> 00:54:30,102 those things can be agreed and decided 1444 00:54:30,102 --> 00:54:32,380 upon before the withdrawal is complete ? 1445 00:54:32,380 --> 00:54:34,713 Or does he believe many of those things , 1446 00:54:34,713 --> 00:54:36,824 or at least some of those things will 1447 00:54:36,824 --> 00:54:38,936 need to be decided agreed upon ? Post 1448 00:54:38,936 --> 00:54:41,560 september obviously , we'd like to get 1449 00:54:42,240 --> 00:54:46,140 uh decisions on many of these 1450 00:54:46,150 --> 00:54:48,810 initiatives as soon as possible . And 1451 00:54:48,820 --> 00:54:51,180 you're seeing a lot of concerted effort 1452 00:54:51,190 --> 00:54:53,357 by the administration and certainly by 1453 00:54:53,357 --> 00:54:56,310 the Secretary to that end , uh he's in 1454 00:54:56,310 --> 00:54:58,088 constant touch with the General 1455 00:54:58,088 --> 00:55:00,310 Mackenzie , of course , the Chairman of 1456 00:55:00,310 --> 00:55:00,250 the Joint Chiefs , General Milley , 1457 00:55:00,260 --> 00:55:03,280 about the over the horizon support for 1458 00:55:03,280 --> 00:55:05,391 the Afghan National Security Forces . 1459 00:55:05,391 --> 00:55:07,502 He's in constant touch with the State 1460 00:55:07,502 --> 00:55:09,613 Department Secretary , blinking about 1461 00:55:09,613 --> 00:55:11,502 what we're doing on the on the uh 1462 00:55:11,502 --> 00:55:13,502 Special Immigrant Visa program , as 1463 00:55:13,502 --> 00:55:15,613 well as on working with other nations 1464 00:55:15,613 --> 00:55:17,850 about options there as well for over 1465 00:55:17,850 --> 00:55:20,017 the horizon support . So we're working 1466 00:55:20,017 --> 00:55:22,740 this very , very hard , uh and what he 1467 00:55:22,740 --> 00:55:24,796 wants to do , as I said to nick , he 1468 00:55:24,796 --> 00:55:26,796 wants to make sure that we get this 1469 00:55:26,796 --> 00:55:28,962 right and get it done in a sustainable 1470 00:55:28,962 --> 00:55:30,962 way uh rather than try to rush to a 1471 00:55:30,962 --> 00:55:33,184 solution that won't be sustainable over 1472 00:55:33,184 --> 00:55:35,296 the long term . So there's a sense of 1473 00:55:35,296 --> 00:55:37,370 urgency here , but just as uh 1474 00:55:37,380 --> 00:55:39,602 importantly , in fact , maybe even more 1475 00:55:39,602 --> 00:55:41,436 importantly , there's a sense of 1476 00:55:41,436 --> 00:55:43,658 propriety and that's and that's how the 1477 00:55:43,658 --> 00:55:43,580 secretary is approaching this . That's 1478 00:55:43,580 --> 00:55:46,460 a quick follow up . Sure . Um I used to 1479 00:55:46,460 --> 00:55:48,516 really want to confirm what you were 1480 00:55:48,516 --> 00:55:50,293 telling Carlos . So the U . S . 1481 00:55:50,293 --> 00:55:52,293 Military still has the authority to 1482 00:55:52,293 --> 00:55:54,071 protect Afghan forces until the 1483 00:55:54,071 --> 00:55:56,170 drawdown is complete after that is 1484 00:55:56,170 --> 00:55:58,170 unclear . Is that correct ? I don't 1485 00:55:58,170 --> 00:55:59,726 want to get to the last the 1486 00:55:59,726 --> 00:56:01,837 prepositional phrase you ended at the 1487 00:56:01,837 --> 00:56:03,892 last question . In terms of timing . 1488 00:56:03,892 --> 00:56:03,340 What I will tell you is that those 1489 00:56:03,340 --> 00:56:05,229 authorities still exist . General 1490 00:56:05,229 --> 00:56:07,790 Miller has them uh still and when he 1491 00:56:07,790 --> 00:56:10,860 transfers authority over us forces in 1492 00:56:10,860 --> 00:56:12,804 Afghanistan to General Mackenzie . 1493 00:56:12,804 --> 00:56:14,804 General Mackenzie will retain those 1494 00:56:14,804 --> 00:56:18,020 authorities , Stephen Lucey military 1495 00:56:18,020 --> 00:56:21,340 dot com . All right , thank you . 1496 00:56:21,350 --> 00:56:24,940 Uh earlier this week , the news broke 1497 00:56:24,950 --> 00:56:27,840 about the South Dakota National Guard 1498 00:56:28,230 --> 00:56:31,530 To the Mexican border being funded by 1499 00:56:31,530 --> 00:56:35,000 $1 million dollar donation um by a 1500 00:56:35,010 --> 00:56:37,121 private citizen . Does the D . O . Do 1501 00:56:37,121 --> 00:56:38,899 you have any thoughts about the 1502 00:56:38,899 --> 00:56:41,121 appropriateness of funding this mission 1503 00:56:41,121 --> 00:56:43,232 With a private donation ? Do you have 1504 00:56:43,232 --> 00:56:45,288 any concerns that this might suggest 1505 00:56:45,288 --> 00:56:47,399 the National Guard is effectively for 1506 00:56:47,399 --> 00:56:49,066 hire ? Uh We actually have no 1507 00:56:49,066 --> 00:56:52,650 additional information or uh comment to 1508 00:56:52,650 --> 00:56:55,660 make on uh Governor Gnomes decision . 1509 00:56:55,670 --> 00:56:59,210 Um as I understand it , the South 1510 00:56:59,210 --> 00:57:01,266 Dakota National Guard is not working 1511 00:57:01,266 --> 00:57:03,099 with the texas National Guard to 1512 00:57:03,099 --> 00:57:05,043 coordinate mission specifics uh in 1513 00:57:05,043 --> 00:57:07,600 dates . Uh and I would leave it to uh 1514 00:57:07,610 --> 00:57:10,130 the governor of South Dakota to speak 1515 00:57:10,140 --> 00:57:12,960 more to this decision of hers jenny , 1516 00:57:13,330 --> 00:57:17,220 Thank you on the reduction of the U . S . 1517 00:57:17,230 --> 00:57:20,320 Excuse me on the reduction of the U . S . 1518 00:57:20,320 --> 00:57:23,650 Process in Korea . South Korea , the U . 1519 00:57:23,650 --> 00:57:27,600 S . Companies proposed registration 1520 00:57:27,610 --> 00:57:31,440 to restrict on the reduction of U . 1521 00:57:31,440 --> 00:57:35,030 S . Forces in South Korea . It will be 1522 00:57:35,040 --> 00:57:37,100 reduced from 1523 00:57:37,110 --> 00:57:40,070 28,500 to 1524 00:57:40,080 --> 00:57:43,870 22,000,000 . What is the 1525 00:57:43,880 --> 00:57:47,070 duties position on this 1526 00:57:47,220 --> 00:57:50,750 proposal ? That the U . S . F . K 1527 00:57:51,130 --> 00:57:54,960 cannot be reduced Below 22,000 . 1528 00:57:55,430 --> 00:57:57,660 We're not going to comment on proposed 1529 00:57:57,660 --> 00:57:59,882 legislation janney . That's uh that's a 1530 00:57:59,882 --> 00:58:02,390 general rule of thumb . Um So I won't 1531 00:58:02,390 --> 00:58:04,501 comment specifically on that . Uh The 1532 00:58:04,501 --> 00:58:06,668 only thing I would say is , well , two 1533 00:58:06,668 --> 00:58:10,260 things uh one if the 1534 00:58:10,270 --> 00:58:13,090 if if there's a law passed that makes 1535 00:58:13,090 --> 00:58:15,201 such a restriction , we're gonna obey 1536 00:58:15,201 --> 00:58:17,840 the law number two . We remain 1537 00:58:18,920 --> 00:58:22,660 uh fully committed to our alliance with 1538 00:58:22,660 --> 00:58:24,910 South Korea . And part of that 1539 00:58:24,910 --> 00:58:27,570 commitment means having appropriate 1540 00:58:27,570 --> 00:58:30,780 readiness on the peninsula , as we say , 1541 00:58:30,790 --> 00:58:33,012 ready to fight tonight . And that means 1542 00:58:33,012 --> 00:58:35,270 having appropriate force levels and 1543 00:58:35,270 --> 00:58:37,560 what the secretary is focused on um is 1544 00:58:37,560 --> 00:58:39,616 making sure that we are ready in all 1545 00:58:39,616 --> 00:58:41,616 respects , all respects to meet our 1546 00:58:41,616 --> 00:58:43,782 security requirements to the people of 1547 00:58:43,782 --> 00:58:45,893 South Korea . As you know , there's a 1548 00:58:45,893 --> 00:58:48,004 global force posture review ongoing . 1549 00:58:48,004 --> 00:58:50,227 We expect that work to continue through 1550 00:58:50,227 --> 00:58:52,338 the summer . Um and I I have no doubt 1551 00:58:52,338 --> 00:58:54,227 that one of the things they'll be 1552 00:58:54,227 --> 00:58:53,910 looking at as they look at the end of 1553 00:58:53,910 --> 00:58:56,170 pacific region is our presence on the 1554 00:58:56,170 --> 00:58:58,281 peninsula . And whether we think that 1555 00:58:58,281 --> 00:59:00,114 that's appropriate appropriately 1556 00:59:00,114 --> 00:59:02,170 resourced to our strategy and to the 1557 00:59:02,170 --> 00:59:04,337 end of the threats and challenges that 1558 00:59:04,337 --> 00:59:06,640 are there ? Why why the defense budget 1559 00:59:06,650 --> 00:59:10,360 cannot use this for I mean 1560 00:59:10,370 --> 00:59:12,870 defense but the attorney Tony , why 1561 00:59:12,870 --> 00:59:15,510 can't the defense budget use what these 1562 00:59:15,520 --> 00:59:19,290 reductions for the south Koreans 1563 00:59:20,220 --> 00:59:23,610 usually a Congress , can they said the 1564 00:59:23,620 --> 00:59:26,670 defense budget cannot use for the 1565 00:59:26,680 --> 00:59:30,630 reductions of Yes , it's okay . 1566 00:59:30,640 --> 00:59:33,340 I'm not a parliamentary expert here . 1567 00:59:33,340 --> 00:59:36,420 So I I don't I think if I understand 1568 00:59:36,420 --> 00:59:39,890 your question , you're asking why why 1569 00:59:39,890 --> 00:59:43,640 can't they use the NDA too 1570 00:59:44,620 --> 00:59:47,890 to put this this idea in it ? 1571 00:59:47,900 --> 00:59:50,110 I if that's your question , I don't 1572 00:59:50,110 --> 00:59:52,110 know the answer to that is probably 1573 00:59:52,110 --> 00:59:54,740 better left to somebody who's uh , more 1574 00:59:54,740 --> 00:59:56,920 educated on this process than me . But 1575 00:59:56,920 --> 01:00:00,530 again , we obey the law and we're not 1576 01:00:00,530 --> 01:00:02,141 going to comment on proposed 1577 01:00:02,141 --> 01:00:03,974 legislation . Uh , when proposed 1578 01:00:03,974 --> 01:00:06,141 legislation becomes law , we obey that 1579 01:00:06,141 --> 01:00:08,252 law separate and distinct from that . 1580 01:00:08,252 --> 01:00:10,474 Our focus is on making sure we can meet 1581 01:00:10,474 --> 01:00:12,141 our security requirements and 1582 01:00:12,141 --> 01:00:14,086 commitments on the peninsula . And 1583 01:00:14,086 --> 01:00:13,530 that's where the secretary's head is . 1584 01:00:13,540 --> 01:00:15,596 And again , our global force posture 1585 01:00:15,596 --> 01:00:17,762 review will be a chance for us to take 1586 01:00:17,762 --> 01:00:20,210 a look at re sourcing on the peninsula 1587 01:00:20,210 --> 01:00:22,266 and whether we have that right given 1588 01:00:22,266 --> 01:00:24,154 the given the threats , given the 1589 01:00:24,154 --> 01:00:26,321 challenges and given the strategy that 1590 01:00:26,321 --> 01:00:26,040 we want to pursue in the end of pacific 1591 01:00:26,040 --> 01:00:29,430 region . Does this number included the 1592 01:00:30,090 --> 01:00:33,800 regular rotation of truth or again , 1593 01:00:33,800 --> 01:00:35,578 I'm not going to talk about the 1594 01:00:35,578 --> 01:00:37,710 proposed legislation . The details we 1595 01:00:37,710 --> 01:00:40,140 have ? What I think 1596 01:00:40,510 --> 01:00:44,440 20,000 20,500 right now . Um 1597 01:00:44,910 --> 01:00:48,860 right 20-22,000 . So there will 1598 01:00:48,860 --> 01:00:52,000 be 6500 . You're asking if it gets 1599 01:00:52,000 --> 01:00:54,040 reduced what that would look like . 1600 01:00:54,050 --> 01:00:56,272 Again , that's very speculative . Right 1601 01:00:56,272 --> 01:00:58,383 now , we're not in a position to talk 1602 01:00:58,383 --> 01:01:00,328 about that with any great detail . 1603 01:01:00,328 --> 01:01:02,494 Thank you . You're welcome . Dancing . 1604 01:01:02,494 --> 01:01:05,250 Alan is General Miller going to 1605 01:01:05,250 --> 01:01:08,670 Tajikistan ? I'm not going to do 1606 01:01:09,710 --> 01:01:11,766 Uh huh . Dan . I'm not going to talk 1607 01:01:11,766 --> 01:01:14,760 about . Did General Miller's travel 1608 01:01:14,760 --> 01:01:16,982 over the next couple of weeks . I think 1609 01:01:16,982 --> 01:01:19,149 you can all understand why we wouldn't 1610 01:01:19,149 --> 01:01:21,320 do that . As I said . Uh he remains in 1611 01:01:21,320 --> 01:01:24,570 command . Um he will remain in command 1612 01:01:24,580 --> 01:01:26,636 as he begins to prepare the turnover 1613 01:01:26,636 --> 01:01:28,858 responsibilities to General Mackenzie . 1614 01:01:28,858 --> 01:01:30,802 Some of that turnover process will 1615 01:01:30,802 --> 01:01:32,691 likely include some travel on his 1616 01:01:32,691 --> 01:01:34,858 behalf . But we're not gonna we're not 1617 01:01:34,858 --> 01:01:37,080 gonna get ahead of that travel or speak 1618 01:01:37,080 --> 01:01:39,640 to the details of it . Thanks . Yeah , 1619 01:01:39,650 --> 01:01:41,670 Lucas John The New York Post is 1620 01:01:41,670 --> 01:01:43,781 reporting that the Defense Department 1621 01:01:43,781 --> 01:01:47,040 gave about $42 million dollars to the 1622 01:01:47,040 --> 01:01:49,050 Eco Health Alliance , the nonprofit 1623 01:01:49,050 --> 01:01:50,883 that funneled money to the Wuhan 1624 01:01:50,883 --> 01:01:53,440 Institute of Virology , coronavirus 1625 01:01:53,440 --> 01:01:56,660 research and that included research on 1626 01:01:56,660 --> 01:01:58,882 countering biological weapons . Can you 1627 01:01:58,882 --> 01:02:00,882 confirm that ? Just all the story ? 1628 01:02:00,882 --> 01:02:02,771 I'll take the question , Take the 1629 01:02:02,771 --> 01:02:04,882 question one more just to follow , do 1630 01:02:04,882 --> 01:02:07,104 you know where former Defense Secretary 1631 01:02:07,104 --> 01:02:09,271 Rumsfeld will be buried ? I will leave 1632 01:02:09,271 --> 01:02:11,438 that discussion to the to the family . 1633 01:02:11,438 --> 01:02:13,327 It's really that's that's for the 1634 01:02:13,327 --> 01:02:15,271 family to speak to . And again our 1635 01:02:15,271 --> 01:02:17,382 thoughts and prayers go out to the uh 1636 01:02:17,382 --> 01:02:19,438 former Secretary Rumsfeld's family , 1637 01:02:19,438 --> 01:02:21,493 loved ones and friends . Uh we uh we 1638 01:02:21,493 --> 01:02:23,549 will respect their privacy and their 1639 01:02:23,549 --> 01:02:25,780 ability to speak to um to how they want 1640 01:02:25,780 --> 01:02:28,850 to handle that . Yes ma'am , thank you 1641 01:02:29,050 --> 01:02:32,370 to questions about on Turkey . One 1642 01:02:32,380 --> 01:02:34,710 Turkey rejects and regret that us 1643 01:02:34,710 --> 01:02:37,230 placed Ankara in the list of countries 1644 01:02:37,600 --> 01:02:40,410 using child soldiers in armed conflicts 1645 01:02:40,410 --> 01:02:42,299 and very brief from the statement 1646 01:02:42,600 --> 01:02:44,860 striking example of hypocrisy double 1647 01:02:44,860 --> 01:02:47,140 standards as the U . S . Open AIDS 1648 01:02:47,150 --> 01:02:49,860 provides weapons to pay KY PG that 1649 01:02:49,870 --> 01:02:52,590 forcibly recruits Children says Turkey . 1650 01:02:52,840 --> 01:02:54,896 And what is your response ? And then 1651 01:02:54,896 --> 01:02:57,580 I'll go ahead and ask another thing . I 1652 01:02:57,590 --> 01:02:59,701 can I can make this one easy . That's 1653 01:02:59,701 --> 01:03:01,646 really a question better put to my 1654 01:03:01,646 --> 01:03:03,757 State Department colleagues . Not for 1655 01:03:03,757 --> 01:03:03,000 the Defense Department . What's your 1656 01:03:03,000 --> 01:03:05,700 second question so much tomorrow ? 1657 01:03:05,710 --> 01:03:07,654 Turkey's President Erdogan will be 1658 01:03:07,654 --> 01:03:09,930 launching construction of a 1659 01:03:09,940 --> 01:03:12,130 controversial canal , manmade 1660 01:03:12,140 --> 01:03:15,050 artificial canal which is called canal 1661 01:03:15,050 --> 01:03:18,270 Istanbul . Uh Will there be an impact 1662 01:03:18,280 --> 01:03:20,447 on the access of warships ? There were 1663 01:03:20,447 --> 01:03:22,590 discussions over this and how does 1664 01:03:22,590 --> 01:03:25,770 pentagon away with ? I have no 1665 01:03:25,770 --> 01:03:28,730 idea . I'll tell you what , I'll take 1666 01:03:28,730 --> 01:03:30,810 the question . I'm not aware of this 1667 01:03:30,810 --> 01:03:33,060 canal or where it is or what kind of 1668 01:03:33,060 --> 01:03:35,282 impact it might have . So let me ask my 1669 01:03:35,282 --> 01:03:38,170 guys for Turkey for sure . But there 1670 01:03:38,170 --> 01:03:41,060 are other views I really don't know , 1671 01:03:41,060 --> 01:03:43,004 ma'am . I'll take the question and 1672 01:03:43,004 --> 01:03:45,060 we'll see if we can get you a better 1673 01:03:45,060 --> 01:03:48,280 answer . Sorry about that . Yeah , I 1674 01:03:48,290 --> 01:03:50,770 have two questions and one is on the 1675 01:03:50,770 --> 01:03:53,120 basic question Afghanistan . So when 1676 01:03:53,120 --> 01:03:56,200 did this with joy started ? Or was it 1677 01:03:56,210 --> 01:03:59,210 on May 1 ? Or is it a couple of days 1678 01:03:59,220 --> 01:04:01,940 earlier ? In the end of April , there 1679 01:04:01,940 --> 01:04:04,060 was a special official date for the 1680 01:04:04,060 --> 01:04:06,510 start of this . Look , I couldn't point 1681 01:04:06,510 --> 01:04:08,610 to a date on the calendar . The 1682 01:04:08,690 --> 01:04:11,600 president announced his decision in mid 1683 01:04:11,600 --> 01:04:14,550 april and I think you heard me say even 1684 01:04:14,550 --> 01:04:17,380 before May 1st that we had begun the 1685 01:04:17,380 --> 01:04:19,530 drawdown process and that some 1686 01:04:19,530 --> 01:04:22,010 equipment had uh had already moved 1687 01:04:22,010 --> 01:04:23,843 before May 1st . The president's 1688 01:04:23,843 --> 01:04:26,340 direction was to begin it by May 1st . 1689 01:04:26,350 --> 01:04:28,517 Uh and we were able to begin it before 1690 01:04:28,517 --> 01:04:30,350 May 1st , but I can't point to a 1691 01:04:30,350 --> 01:04:32,461 specific day on the calendar . I know 1692 01:04:32,461 --> 01:04:34,680 that it began before May 1st . And the 1693 01:04:34,690 --> 01:04:36,857 second question is , there hasn't been 1694 01:04:36,857 --> 01:04:38,634 a report that the United States 1695 01:04:38,634 --> 01:04:40,801 military and the Japanese Self Defense 1696 01:04:40,801 --> 01:04:42,579 Force has been conducting joint 1697 01:04:42,579 --> 01:04:45,590 exercise on the Taiwan crisis and can 1698 01:04:45,590 --> 01:04:49,410 confirm this report . We were we are uh 1699 01:04:49,420 --> 01:04:51,960 yes conducting bilateral exercise with 1700 01:04:51,960 --> 01:04:54,182 the Japan . I'm not going to talk about 1701 01:04:54,182 --> 01:04:56,640 the specific exercise scenarios . We 1702 01:04:56,650 --> 01:04:58,706 constantly look for opportunities to 1703 01:04:58,706 --> 01:05:00,780 prepare to train and to improve our 1704 01:05:00,780 --> 01:05:03,990 interoperability and uh and test our 1705 01:05:04,000 --> 01:05:06,600 our combined capabilities . But I won't 1706 01:05:06,600 --> 01:05:08,767 speak to specific exercise scenarios . 1707 01:05:09,090 --> 01:05:12,250 Uh huh . Trying to following up my 1708 01:05:12,250 --> 01:05:15,130 original question about august , um you 1709 01:05:15,130 --> 01:05:18,750 say that the plan is to be out by the 1710 01:05:18,750 --> 01:05:20,920 end of august , is that the same as 1711 01:05:20,920 --> 01:05:23,700 saying that the plan is to keep forces 1712 01:05:23,700 --> 01:05:26,650 there until the end of august . I don't 1713 01:05:26,650 --> 01:05:28,970 want to parse the words too much bob . 1714 01:05:28,980 --> 01:05:31,990 We , as I said at the outset , uh 1715 01:05:32,000 --> 01:05:34,167 President's direction was to be out by 1716 01:05:34,167 --> 01:05:36,389 early september . We believe that we'll 1717 01:05:36,389 --> 01:05:38,222 be able to complete the drawdown 1718 01:05:38,222 --> 01:05:41,570 process by the end of august and 1719 01:05:41,580 --> 01:05:44,930 that's our best uh our best estimate 1720 01:05:44,930 --> 01:05:47,041 right now , that when and that's what 1721 01:05:47,041 --> 01:05:48,874 we're driving towards , is to be 1722 01:05:48,874 --> 01:05:50,930 complete the drawdown process by the 1723 01:05:50,930 --> 01:05:53,152 end of august , there's a lot that goes 1724 01:05:53,152 --> 01:05:55,152 into the drawdown process . I won't 1725 01:05:55,152 --> 01:05:57,920 speak to specific numbers of of troops 1726 01:05:57,920 --> 01:06:00,660 at any one particular time . But what 1727 01:06:00,660 --> 01:06:03,820 will what we want to get to by the end 1728 01:06:03,820 --> 01:06:07,770 of august ? Um is that level of 1729 01:06:07,780 --> 01:06:10,350 force presence that's required to 1730 01:06:10,350 --> 01:06:12,572 protect our diplomatic presence there ? 1731 01:06:12,572 --> 01:06:14,739 Uh And that and that's going to be the 1732 01:06:14,739 --> 01:06:16,850 focus of that presence when , when we 1733 01:06:16,850 --> 01:06:19,017 get to that point , it's been a moving 1734 01:06:19,017 --> 01:06:21,250 target . Uh By definition , you said it 1735 01:06:21,250 --> 01:06:23,528 was gonna be september now it could be , 1736 01:06:23,960 --> 01:06:27,000 I would not want to speculate , but 1737 01:06:27,010 --> 01:06:28,843 right now we believe that we can 1738 01:06:28,843 --> 01:06:30,843 complete this process by the end of 1739 01:06:30,843 --> 01:06:32,843 august . The bombs question has the 1740 01:06:32,843 --> 01:06:34,732 pentagon in order to speed up the 1741 01:06:34,732 --> 01:06:36,843 withdrawal from Afghanistan ? There's 1742 01:06:36,843 --> 01:06:39,180 been no orders to speed up . She sounds 1743 01:06:39,180 --> 01:06:41,347 like it is , it was september now it's 1744 01:06:41,347 --> 01:06:44,250 august . How should we infer that isn't 1745 01:06:44,260 --> 01:06:46,600 that big of a difference ? Early , 1746 01:06:46,610 --> 01:06:49,050 early september to the end of august is 1747 01:06:49,480 --> 01:06:52,070 uh not a dramatic difference Lucas . 1748 01:06:52,350 --> 01:06:56,010 And as I said , we believe We can we 1749 01:06:56,010 --> 01:06:58,232 can be done by then because some people 1750 01:06:58,232 --> 01:07:00,590 uncomfortable with the 9-11 uh date . 1751 01:07:00,600 --> 01:07:02,544 Is that why the date has changed ? 1752 01:07:02,544 --> 01:07:04,830 There's no change to date . We have to 1753 01:07:04,830 --> 01:07:08,000 be out by early september . The 1754 01:07:08,010 --> 01:07:11,170 President said by early september we 1755 01:07:11,170 --> 01:07:13,281 said no change of date with them from 1756 01:07:13,281 --> 01:07:15,392 september to the end of august . That 1757 01:07:15,392 --> 01:07:17,337 sounds a change , it's a change of 1758 01:07:17,337 --> 01:07:19,337 month . I mean it's not a change of 1759 01:07:19,337 --> 01:07:21,448 date and it's based on our assessment 1760 01:07:21,448 --> 01:07:24,150 of progress to date . Um And we're 1761 01:07:24,160 --> 01:07:26,382 trying to be as transparent about it as 1762 01:07:26,382 --> 01:07:28,382 we can be . I can't give you a date 1763 01:07:28,382 --> 01:07:30,650 certain in august but that we believe 1764 01:07:30,660 --> 01:07:32,980 will be able to complete the process by 1765 01:07:32,980 --> 01:07:34,980 the end of august withdrawal is not 1766 01:07:34,980 --> 01:07:37,220 being sped up . The withdrawal is not 1767 01:07:37,230 --> 01:07:40,290 being sped up . No follow up on that . 1768 01:07:40,290 --> 01:07:42,290 I mean fundamentally are we talking 1769 01:07:42,290 --> 01:07:44,568 about the airport then ? Like if we're , 1770 01:07:44,568 --> 01:07:46,568 you know , if you say by the end of 1771 01:07:46,568 --> 01:07:48,512 august , the focus is on diplomats 1772 01:07:48,512 --> 01:07:50,568 right now we've just closed bagram , 1773 01:07:50,568 --> 01:07:52,568 what is left between bagram and the 1774 01:07:52,568 --> 01:07:54,679 embassy . It seems like we're talking 1775 01:07:54,679 --> 01:07:54,340 about the airport . I think there's a 1776 01:07:54,340 --> 01:07:57,080 lot of there's there's a security at 1777 01:07:57,080 --> 01:07:59,370 the airport is still a concern . Let me 1778 01:07:59,370 --> 01:08:01,630 just put it that way . And of course we 1779 01:08:01,630 --> 01:08:05,540 are um still obviously going to be 1780 01:08:05,540 --> 01:08:07,810 concerned with what the right presences 1781 01:08:07,810 --> 01:08:10,770 to do to protect our diplomatic 1782 01:08:10,770 --> 01:08:13,210 presence there . Uh and there's still 1783 01:08:13,210 --> 01:08:16,530 some analytical work being done to this . 1784 01:08:16,530 --> 01:08:18,419 And again , I won't get into more 1785 01:08:18,419 --> 01:08:20,880 detail than that . Tara follow facing 1786 01:08:20,890 --> 01:08:23,057 this week . The secretary has met with 1787 01:08:23,057 --> 01:08:24,723 the Foreign ministers of both 1788 01:08:24,723 --> 01:08:27,550 Uzbekistan and Tajikistan . Are those 1789 01:08:27,560 --> 01:08:29,910 the two primary candidates for maybe a 1790 01:08:29,920 --> 01:08:33,280 nearby base for operating and 1791 01:08:33,290 --> 01:08:35,430 continuing that over the horizon in 1792 01:08:35,430 --> 01:08:37,374 Afghanistan . I think it's safe to 1793 01:08:37,374 --> 01:08:40,340 assume that we , in concert with our 1794 01:08:40,340 --> 01:08:42,562 State Department colleagues are talking 1795 01:08:42,562 --> 01:08:46,290 to neighboring nations uh 1796 01:08:46,470 --> 01:08:50,190 and uh and trying to explore 1797 01:08:50,970 --> 01:08:53,450 Over the rising opportunities that 1798 01:08:53,450 --> 01:08:56,090 might exist there . I won't I'll let 1799 01:08:56,090 --> 01:08:59,130 those two nations speak for themselves . 1800 01:08:59,140 --> 01:09:01,850 But I think it's safe to assume we are 1801 01:09:01,860 --> 01:09:03,749 talking to a range of neighboring 1802 01:09:03,749 --> 01:09:05,527 nations about the possibilities 1803 01:09:05,527 --> 01:09:07,471 specific to Uzbekistan . It's also 1804 01:09:07,471 --> 01:09:10,300 almost 20 years To the day that us 1805 01:09:10,300 --> 01:09:12,790 forces first arrived at K2 in response 1806 01:09:12,790 --> 01:09:15,030 to September 11 attacks and many of 1807 01:09:15,030 --> 01:09:17,260 them subsequently became very sick or 1808 01:09:17,260 --> 01:09:19,204 died because of the toxic exposure 1809 01:09:19,204 --> 01:09:21,700 there has that been brought up in 1810 01:09:21,700 --> 01:09:24,250 discussions if U . S . Forces are sent 1811 01:09:24,250 --> 01:09:27,020 back to Uzbekistan with K . To be a 1812 01:09:27,020 --> 01:09:29,950 location or would there need to be some 1813 01:09:29,950 --> 01:09:32,006 clean up there for that to ever be a 1814 01:09:32,006 --> 01:09:34,228 candidate base ? Let's not get ahead of 1815 01:09:34,228 --> 01:09:36,339 process here . No decisions have been 1816 01:09:36,339 --> 01:09:38,506 made . I don't think that's helpful to 1817 01:09:38,506 --> 01:09:40,283 speculate . We are mindful that 1818 01:09:40,283 --> 01:09:42,740 secretaries mindful Of the toxic 1819 01:09:42,750 --> 01:09:45,890 exposure caused by K two . 1820 01:09:46,570 --> 01:09:49,140 And he has talked about this on more 1821 01:09:49,140 --> 01:09:51,020 than one occasion with Secretary 1822 01:09:51,020 --> 01:09:54,280 McDonough at the V . A . We know all of 1823 01:09:54,280 --> 01:09:57,650 us know uh that this has to be taken 1824 01:09:57,650 --> 01:09:59,400 seriously and and that we have 1825 01:09:59,970 --> 01:10:02,670 responsibilities to the service members 1826 01:10:02,680 --> 01:10:04,810 who are thus affected . That that's 1827 01:10:04,820 --> 01:10:07,050 never far from our minds . But I won't 1828 01:10:07,050 --> 01:10:10,160 get into specifics about what 1829 01:10:10,170 --> 01:10:12,003 facilities might be used in what 1830 01:10:12,003 --> 01:10:14,114 countries were just not at that point 1831 01:10:14,114 --> 01:10:16,281 right now . You are . I still got some 1832 01:10:16,281 --> 01:10:19,380 on the phone here . Uh , Tony Capezio . 1833 01:10:24,260 --> 01:10:28,210 Who maybe Tony can Jack , Can 1834 01:10:28,210 --> 01:10:30,670 you hear me ? I thought I got away 1835 01:10:30,670 --> 01:10:34,520 with . I got you . Okay . 1836 01:10:34,520 --> 01:10:36,742 Two quick ones . At what point will the 1837 01:10:36,742 --> 01:10:38,742 pentagon be able to outline in some 1838 01:10:38,742 --> 01:10:41,450 broad scale what this over the horizon 1839 01:10:41,450 --> 01:10:44,230 capability is going to consist of ? So 1840 01:10:44,230 --> 01:10:46,230 that internet seen as some mythical 1841 01:10:46,230 --> 01:10:48,690 capability that you're , you're laying 1842 01:10:48,690 --> 01:10:51,023 out . There's nothing mythical about it . 1843 01:10:51,023 --> 01:10:53,246 Tony it exists . It's tangible . All of 1844 01:10:53,246 --> 01:10:55,820 you have seen it . Uh , we have those 1845 01:10:55,820 --> 01:10:57,820 capabilities . We want to have more 1846 01:10:57,820 --> 01:10:59,653 options for those capabilities , 1847 01:10:59,653 --> 01:11:01,764 clearly . And that's why we're having 1848 01:11:01,764 --> 01:11:04,860 discussions with neighboring nations as 1849 01:11:04,860 --> 01:11:06,971 possibilities there . There's nothing 1850 01:11:06,971 --> 01:11:08,749 mythical about that . It's hard 1851 01:11:08,749 --> 01:11:10,916 spadework to make sure that we have as 1852 01:11:10,916 --> 01:11:13,138 many options and capabilities available 1853 01:11:13,138 --> 01:11:15,700 to us as possible as for the when as I 1854 01:11:15,710 --> 01:11:17,766 said earlier , we're working on this 1855 01:11:17,766 --> 01:11:19,920 very hard . The secretary certainly 1856 01:11:19,920 --> 01:11:22,170 understands the importance of 1857 01:11:22,170 --> 01:11:24,003 continuing the efforts on this , 1858 01:11:24,003 --> 01:11:26,226 Getting it right and getting it done in 1859 01:11:26,226 --> 01:11:28,226 a sustainable way . And that's what 1860 01:11:28,226 --> 01:11:30,448 he's focused on . What I can assure you 1861 01:11:30,448 --> 01:11:32,337 without pointing to a date on the 1862 01:11:32,337 --> 01:11:34,448 calendar . Is that when we're able to 1863 01:11:34,448 --> 01:11:36,720 speak uh , to the options that are 1864 01:11:36,720 --> 01:11:39,240 available to us , we'll be able to do 1865 01:11:39,240 --> 01:11:41,351 that . But obviously if we're talking 1866 01:11:41,351 --> 01:11:43,518 about doing this in a foreign nation , 1867 01:11:43,518 --> 01:11:45,629 that foreign nation also has equities 1868 01:11:45,629 --> 01:11:47,730 also has to have decision space and 1869 01:11:47,730 --> 01:11:50,990 also should be allowed uh , to speak uh , 1870 01:11:51,000 --> 01:11:53,400 for those equities and for those and 1871 01:11:53,400 --> 01:11:55,400 for those responsibilities . And so 1872 01:11:55,400 --> 01:11:57,567 we're going to respect that process as 1873 01:11:57,567 --> 01:11:59,789 well . Okay . Have a quick one on yet . 1874 01:11:59,789 --> 01:12:01,956 Yesterday the Air Force was allowed to 1875 01:12:01,956 --> 01:12:04,178 award a $2 billion contract to Raytheon 1876 01:12:04,178 --> 01:12:06,720 for a new nuclear cruise missile . My 1877 01:12:06,720 --> 01:12:09,350 question is this why award a contract 1878 01:12:09,360 --> 01:12:11,416 when you're just starting to Nate uh 1879 01:12:11,416 --> 01:12:15,270 this new nuclear posture review the 1880 01:12:15,750 --> 01:12:17,710 L . S . R . O . System that you're 1881 01:12:17,710 --> 01:12:20,070 talking about . That's a key component 1882 01:12:20,550 --> 01:12:24,320 of the modernized air leg of the 1883 01:12:24,320 --> 01:12:26,487 triad . And you've heard the secretary 1884 01:12:26,487 --> 01:12:28,840 talk about his belief that the nuclear 1885 01:12:28,840 --> 01:12:30,784 triad does remain a bedrock of our 1886 01:12:30,784 --> 01:12:32,784 national defence . Uh The Air Force 1887 01:12:32,784 --> 01:12:34,784 contract action that you're talking 1888 01:12:34,784 --> 01:12:37,007 about continues the engineering and the 1889 01:12:37,007 --> 01:12:39,173 development activities for the L . R . 1890 01:12:39,173 --> 01:12:41,380 S . O . Program . The budget 22 budget 1891 01:12:41,850 --> 01:12:43,628 request supports our efforts to 1892 01:12:43,628 --> 01:12:45,794 modernize the nuclear triad . It funds 1893 01:12:45,794 --> 01:12:47,739 all critical nuclear modernization 1894 01:12:47,739 --> 01:12:49,628 requirements and help ensure that 1895 01:12:49,628 --> 01:12:51,739 modern replacements will be available 1896 01:12:51,739 --> 01:12:54,160 before aging systems reached the end of 1897 01:12:54,160 --> 01:12:56,382 their extended service lives . So we're 1898 01:12:56,382 --> 01:12:58,327 going to continue to look at these 1899 01:12:58,327 --> 01:13:00,216 issues in the context of both the 1900 01:13:00,216 --> 01:13:02,327 nuclear posture review and the budget 1901 01:13:02,327 --> 01:13:04,216 process . And as we continue with 1902 01:13:04,216 --> 01:13:06,382 nuclear modernization , we're going to 1903 01:13:06,382 --> 01:13:08,549 continually review ongoing programs to 1904 01:13:08,549 --> 01:13:10,549 assess their performance , schedule 1905 01:13:10,549 --> 01:13:12,716 risks and projected costs , seeking to 1906 01:13:12,716 --> 01:13:12,400 find the right balance of maintaining 1907 01:13:12,400 --> 01:13:14,622 the necessary nuclear capabilities with 1908 01:13:14,622 --> 01:13:17,660 cost effective solutions . So I 1909 01:13:19,090 --> 01:13:21,160 I think Tony might have had one 1910 01:13:21,160 --> 01:13:24,960 objection . Go ahead Tony . Uh , 1911 01:13:24,970 --> 01:13:27,010 just like you gotta reviews just 1912 01:13:27,010 --> 01:13:29,010 starting and you're beginning $2 1913 01:13:29,010 --> 01:13:31,177 billion . What if the review comes out 1914 01:13:31,177 --> 01:13:33,177 and says , hey , we don't need this 1915 01:13:33,177 --> 01:13:35,232 missile , then you're on the hook to 1916 01:13:35,232 --> 01:13:37,343 cancel the contract . I don't want to 1917 01:13:37,343 --> 01:13:39,510 get ahead of the review process Tony . 1918 01:13:39,510 --> 01:13:38,940 But as I said , we're going to be 1919 01:13:38,940 --> 01:13:40,996 informed by both the nuclear posture 1920 01:13:40,996 --> 01:13:42,996 review and the budget process . The 1921 01:13:42,996 --> 01:13:45,329 budget process also has to be respected . 1922 01:13:45,329 --> 01:13:47,496 And I think we want to uh , we want to 1923 01:13:47,496 --> 01:13:50,510 make sure that that as we move forward , 1924 01:13:50,520 --> 01:13:52,660 uh it's moving forward in both lanes 1925 01:13:52,660 --> 01:13:54,604 and again , I don't know that . It 1926 01:13:54,604 --> 01:13:56,382 would be helpful to speculate , 1927 01:13:56,382 --> 01:13:58,604 speculate about the outcome there . But 1928 01:13:58,604 --> 01:14:00,493 it's been it's being reviewed and 1929 01:14:00,493 --> 01:14:02,493 looked at in the context of both of 1930 01:14:02,493 --> 01:14:04,827 those processes in parallel . Thank you . 1931 01:14:04,827 --> 01:14:06,820 Thank you john do you have any 1932 01:14:06,820 --> 01:14:08,920 information about the north korean 1933 01:14:08,920 --> 01:14:11,270 leader , kim jong un lose weight . 1934 01:14:12,440 --> 01:14:16,260 No I do not , ma'am . Yeah , 1935 01:14:17,140 --> 01:14:19,140 apologies if you've already covered 1936 01:14:19,140 --> 01:14:21,196 this . But as the concerns about the 1937 01:14:21,196 --> 01:14:23,084 delta variant rise in the general 1938 01:14:23,084 --> 01:14:24,862 population , has there been any 1939 01:14:24,862 --> 01:14:26,770 additional concerns about that 1940 01:14:26,780 --> 01:14:29,100 spreading within the military ? Were 1941 01:14:29,100 --> 01:14:31,211 watching the science very closely . I 1942 01:14:31,211 --> 01:14:33,433 don't have an update for you . We had a 1943 01:14:33,433 --> 01:14:33,270 briefing here with covid experts just 1944 01:14:33,270 --> 01:14:35,492 the other day on Wednesday . I couldn't 1945 01:14:35,492 --> 01:14:37,750 add to their expertise clearly . But 1946 01:14:37,750 --> 01:14:40,430 we're watching the science on this very 1947 01:14:40,430 --> 01:14:43,350 very closely . Our information tells us 1948 01:14:43,350 --> 01:14:44,906 that the vaccines that were 1949 01:14:44,906 --> 01:14:47,072 administering are safe and effective . 1950 01:14:47,072 --> 01:14:49,270 And again , we continue to encourage 1951 01:14:49,280 --> 01:14:51,280 everybody inside D . O . D . To get 1952 01:14:51,280 --> 01:14:54,460 vaccinated . All right , thank you guys . 1953 01:14:55,940 --> 01:14:56,770 Thank you .