1 00:00:00,340 --> 00:00:04,180 afternoon . Um As you 2 00:00:04,180 --> 00:00:06,520 know we have a special guest briefer 3 00:00:06,520 --> 00:00:08,742 today . General steve Lyons , Commander 4 00:00:08,742 --> 00:00:10,853 of U . S . Transportation Command and 5 00:00:10,853 --> 00:00:12,687 I'm going to turn it over to the 6 00:00:12,687 --> 00:00:14,798 general in just a minute uh to update 7 00:00:14,798 --> 00:00:17,020 you on the incredible effort that Trans 8 00:00:17,020 --> 00:00:19,540 Transportation command uh and all their 9 00:00:19,540 --> 00:00:22,250 suborn commands and and air crews are 10 00:00:22,640 --> 00:00:26,140 expending on trying to get as many 11 00:00:26,140 --> 00:00:28,362 people out of Afghanistan as possible . 12 00:00:28,362 --> 00:00:30,584 So he'll have his uh he'll have a brief 13 00:00:30,584 --> 00:00:32,640 set of comments and then we'll start 14 00:00:32,640 --> 00:00:34,862 taking questions . But before I do that 15 00:00:34,862 --> 00:00:36,862 I do want to give just an update on 16 00:00:36,862 --> 00:00:39,084 Haiti . If you don't mind , life saving 17 00:00:39,084 --> 00:00:41,196 aid and assistance continues arriving 18 00:00:41,196 --> 00:00:43,529 as our Joint Task Force , Haiti under U . 19 00:00:43,529 --> 00:00:45,696 S . Southern Command continues to move 20 00:00:45,696 --> 00:00:47,696 people and equipment uh to ease the 21 00:00:47,696 --> 00:00:49,696 suffering of the people of Haiti to 22 00:00:49,696 --> 00:00:51,900 date . Joint Task Force Haiti has 23 00:00:51,900 --> 00:00:54,067 conducted more than 200 missions saved 24 00:00:54,067 --> 00:00:57,420 more than 300 people and delivered over 25 00:00:57,430 --> 00:01:00,550 £88,000 of vital aid as Department of 26 00:01:00,550 --> 00:01:02,717 Defense capabilities and U . S . Coast 27 00:01:02,717 --> 00:01:04,828 Guard assets which are now underneath 28 00:01:04,828 --> 00:01:07,050 the JTF . The joint task force continue 29 00:01:07,050 --> 00:01:10,530 to rapidly respond uh by delivering aid 30 00:01:10,530 --> 00:01:12,810 assistance where it's most needed . Um 31 00:01:12,820 --> 00:01:14,680 Just to give you a sense , US 32 00:01:14,680 --> 00:01:17,020 government assets are providing unique 33 00:01:17,030 --> 00:01:19,252 air medical and logistical capabilities 34 00:01:19,252 --> 00:01:21,490 under the G . D . F include 19 35 00:01:21,490 --> 00:01:23,712 helicopters , both U . S . Military and 36 00:01:23,712 --> 00:01:26,370 Coast Guard A U . S . Coast Guard C 1 37 00:01:26,370 --> 00:01:30,130 30 an H . C 1 40 for two U . S . Navy p 38 00:01:30,130 --> 00:01:33,180 eight maritime reconnaissance aircraft , 39 00:01:33,190 --> 00:01:35,412 the U . S . Naval ship Burlington which 40 00:01:35,412 --> 00:01:38,980 is providing scan eagle so more eyes on 41 00:01:38,980 --> 00:01:41,410 overhead ? Uh the USs billings 42 00:01:41,410 --> 00:01:43,577 providing a refueling station afloat ? 43 00:01:43,577 --> 00:01:45,743 The USs Arlington providing refuelling 44 00:01:45,743 --> 00:01:47,743 and logistics and two U . S . Coast 45 00:01:47,743 --> 00:01:50,270 Guard cutters , the Coast Guard cutters 46 00:01:50,280 --> 00:01:53,040 Tampa and reliance . We are of course 47 00:01:53,040 --> 00:01:55,040 working with allies and partners as 48 00:01:55,040 --> 00:01:57,320 well in this whole of government effort 49 00:01:57,330 --> 00:01:59,530 in support of us I . D . So there are 50 00:01:59,540 --> 00:02:01,818 many nations like great Britain France , 51 00:02:01,818 --> 00:02:03,790 Netherlands contributions from 52 00:02:03,800 --> 00:02:05,633 neighboring nations . Colombia , 53 00:02:05,633 --> 00:02:07,633 Dominican republic , chile Panama , 54 00:02:07,633 --> 00:02:09,689 Argentina . The Dominican republic . 55 00:02:09,689 --> 00:02:11,967 I'm sorry I mentioned that one already , 56 00:02:11,967 --> 00:02:14,189 Costa rica , Mexico and spain . We know 57 00:02:14,189 --> 00:02:16,411 there is much , much more work to do in 58 00:02:16,411 --> 00:02:18,910 Haiti to help the Haitian people and 59 00:02:18,910 --> 00:02:20,910 we're committed to being there into 60 00:02:20,910 --> 00:02:23,090 doing that for as long as possible . 61 00:02:23,100 --> 00:02:25,100 We're very proud of all the men and 62 00:02:25,100 --> 00:02:26,933 women of the department that are 63 00:02:26,933 --> 00:02:29,044 assisting in this effort uh and truly 64 00:02:29,044 --> 00:02:31,267 making a difference on the ground . And 65 00:02:31,267 --> 00:02:33,433 speaking of making a difference on the 66 00:02:33,433 --> 00:02:35,600 ground and making a difference through 67 00:02:35,600 --> 00:02:37,822 US military capabilities . I do want to 68 00:02:37,822 --> 00:02:40,050 know , turn the microphone over to 69 00:02:40,060 --> 00:02:42,282 General steve Lyons again Commander U . 70 00:02:42,282 --> 00:02:44,504 S . Transportation Command . He'll have 71 00:02:44,504 --> 00:02:46,560 some opening comments and then we'll 72 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:46,540 get the Q . And A . I will come back to 73 00:02:46,540 --> 00:02:48,707 the podium and monitor the Q . And a . 74 00:02:48,707 --> 00:02:51,210 Uh we have a limited amount of time 75 00:02:51,210 --> 00:02:53,432 with the general obviously got a lot on 76 00:02:53,432 --> 00:02:55,599 his plate today . So we'll try to keep 77 00:02:55,599 --> 00:02:57,710 it moving And with that general sir , 78 00:02:57,710 --> 00:02:59,877 can you hear me ? And are you ready to 79 00:02:59,877 --> 00:03:02,154 go john I got you . Can you hear me ok ? 80 00:03:02,154 --> 00:03:04,154 Yes sir , loud and clear . It's the 81 00:03:04,154 --> 00:03:07,980 floor is yours sir . Uh You sure ? I 82 00:03:07,990 --> 00:03:10,740 am pleased to join you today as well as 83 00:03:10,740 --> 00:03:12,573 the press to talk about Transcom 84 00:03:12,573 --> 00:03:14,760 payroll in this monumental logistics 85 00:03:14,760 --> 00:03:16,871 efforts of 40 noncombatant evacuation 86 00:03:16,871 --> 00:03:19,590 operations . I just would say that from 87 00:03:19,590 --> 00:03:21,646 the time Transcom received orders to 88 00:03:21,646 --> 00:03:23,812 commence deployment , initial elements 89 00:03:23,812 --> 00:03:26,090 were airborne in less than three hours . 90 00:03:26,140 --> 00:03:28,251 These forces were critical to quickly 91 00:03:28,251 --> 00:03:30,473 secure the Kabul International airfield 92 00:03:30,473 --> 00:03:32,696 simultaneously . We commence support to 93 00:03:32,696 --> 00:03:34,862 neo operations and continue around the 94 00:03:34,862 --> 00:03:36,862 clock operations to ensure the safe 95 00:03:36,862 --> 00:03:38,973 evacuation of american citizens , our 96 00:03:38,973 --> 00:03:41,196 afghan friends and those cleared by the 97 00:03:41,196 --> 00:03:43,251 State Department . I'm just reminded 98 00:03:43,251 --> 00:03:45,196 that the United States is the only 99 00:03:45,196 --> 00:03:47,196 nation capable of rapidly deploying 100 00:03:47,196 --> 00:03:49,307 forces and providing non stop airlift 101 00:03:49,307 --> 00:03:51,473 operations at this scale . I'd like to 102 00:03:51,473 --> 00:03:53,640 specifically highlight the role of our 103 00:03:53,640 --> 00:03:55,640 outstanding air component , the Air 104 00:03:55,640 --> 00:03:57,807 Mobility Command led by General Jackie 105 00:03:57,807 --> 00:03:59,751 Van overdosed Air mobility command 106 00:03:59,751 --> 00:04:02,029 continues to operate the C seventeen's . 107 00:04:02,029 --> 00:04:04,084 You senior news footage less visible 108 00:04:04,084 --> 00:04:05,807 but equally important is their 109 00:04:05,807 --> 00:04:08,029 Contingency Response group operating at 110 00:04:08,029 --> 00:04:10,084 the Kabul airport and a multitude of 111 00:04:10,084 --> 00:04:12,418 other forces providing en route support . 112 00:04:12,418 --> 00:04:14,529 This incredibly dedicated team of air 113 00:04:14,529 --> 00:04:16,696 force professionals is the best in the 114 00:04:16,696 --> 00:04:18,918 world . I did have the opportunity this 115 00:04:18,918 --> 00:04:20,973 week to speak with the crew callsign 116 00:04:20,973 --> 00:04:24,020 reached 871 the C17 flight that carried 117 00:04:24,030 --> 00:04:26,760 the 823 Afghans from Kabul to safety . 118 00:04:27,540 --> 00:04:29,830 The iconic photo of hundreds of Afghans 119 00:04:29,830 --> 00:04:32,430 on the floor of the C17 illustrates the 120 00:04:32,430 --> 00:04:34,541 desperation , fear and uncertainty of 121 00:04:34,541 --> 00:04:36,610 the afghan people but also the life 122 00:04:36,610 --> 00:04:39,370 saving capability and compassion of our 123 00:04:39,370 --> 00:04:41,540 military members . These herculean 124 00:04:41,540 --> 00:04:43,596 efforts underscore the United States 125 00:04:43,596 --> 00:04:45,596 commitment to our afghan allies and 126 00:04:45,596 --> 00:04:47,707 provide them an opportunity for a new 127 00:04:47,707 --> 00:04:49,818 beginning , a safer life and a better 128 00:04:49,818 --> 00:04:52,040 future . To be clear . This is a global 129 00:04:52,040 --> 00:04:54,040 effort . I want to thank our many , 130 00:04:54,040 --> 00:04:56,300 many coalition partners . We could not 131 00:04:56,300 --> 00:04:58,522 be successful without the more than two 132 00:04:58,522 --> 00:05:00,633 dozen like minded nations that expand 133 00:05:00,633 --> 00:05:02,411 our global logistics network by 134 00:05:02,411 --> 00:05:04,578 providing important access and transit 135 00:05:04,578 --> 00:05:06,356 centers . And finally I want to 136 00:05:06,356 --> 00:05:08,300 acknowledge and thank our industry 137 00:05:08,300 --> 00:05:10,467 partners who routinely provide airlift 138 00:05:10,467 --> 00:05:12,689 and supported defense needs Many of you 139 00:05:12,689 --> 00:05:14,911 reported on the secretary's decision to 140 00:05:14,911 --> 00:05:17,133 activate stage one of the Civil Reserve 141 00:05:17,133 --> 00:05:19,356 Air fleet and we greatly appreciate the 142 00:05:19,356 --> 00:05:21,244 teamwork and contributions of our 143 00:05:21,244 --> 00:05:23,356 commercial aviation partners . Let me 144 00:05:23,356 --> 00:05:25,578 just close by saying that for me , like 145 00:05:25,578 --> 00:05:27,467 all of our veterans who served in 146 00:05:27,467 --> 00:05:29,411 Afghanistan , this mission is very 147 00:05:29,411 --> 00:05:31,467 personal . I assure you that we will 148 00:05:31,467 --> 00:05:33,860 not rest until the military is complete . 149 00:05:33,860 --> 00:05:35,920 The mission is complete and we have 150 00:05:35,920 --> 00:05:38,087 evacuated americans who are seeking to 151 00:05:38,087 --> 00:05:40,309 be evacuated as many afghan partners as 152 00:05:40,309 --> 00:05:42,860 humanly possible . I could not be more 153 00:05:42,860 --> 00:05:44,693 proud of the Transcom team . Our 154 00:05:44,693 --> 00:05:46,804 relationship with the U . S . Central 155 00:05:46,804 --> 00:05:48,860 Command and our contribution to this 156 00:05:48,860 --> 00:05:51,027 vitally important effort and john will 157 00:05:51,027 --> 00:05:52,971 be happy to take any questions the 158 00:05:52,971 --> 00:05:55,138 press may have . Thank you . Thank you 159 00:05:55,138 --> 00:05:55,100 general . We'll start with the bob 160 00:05:55,100 --> 00:05:57,510 Burns associated Press thank you 161 00:05:57,520 --> 00:05:59,690 general . This bob burns with a P . 162 00:05:59,700 --> 00:06:02,390 Thank you very much couple of questions 163 00:06:03,540 --> 00:06:05,530 currently . What is what is your 164 00:06:05,540 --> 00:06:08,260 maximum capacity for airlifting out of 165 00:06:08,270 --> 00:06:10,560 Kabul airport ? In terms of the number 166 00:06:10,560 --> 00:06:12,671 of people you can get out in a single 167 00:06:12,671 --> 00:06:15,350 day based on the aircraft and crews and 168 00:06:15,350 --> 00:06:17,572 so forth that you have available to you 169 00:06:17,640 --> 00:06:19,751 as of today . And the second question 170 00:06:19,751 --> 00:06:22,040 is regarding fuel . I'm wondering if 171 00:06:22,040 --> 00:06:24,262 you could describe how are you managing 172 00:06:24,262 --> 00:06:26,429 to keep sufficient fuel on hand at the 173 00:06:26,429 --> 00:06:29,380 airport given the limitations of that 174 00:06:29,380 --> 00:06:33,250 facility ? Thanks . Mhm . Yeah bob . 175 00:06:33,250 --> 00:06:35,417 Thanks for the questions . Let me take 176 00:06:35,417 --> 00:06:38,000 fuel first . Uh We do manage fuel and 177 00:06:38,010 --> 00:06:40,310 uh we are we we intentionally do not 178 00:06:40,310 --> 00:06:43,200 take fuel on on the ground . So we we 179 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:45,810 make sure we have enough fuel to go in 180 00:06:45,810 --> 00:06:47,977 and go out without taking fuel on . So 181 00:06:47,977 --> 00:06:50,050 we don't stress the logistic posture 182 00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:52,496 there and and if the legs are longer 183 00:06:52,496 --> 00:06:55,740 coming out uh well area , you know , 184 00:06:55,740 --> 00:06:58,080 will provide area refuel and route uh 185 00:06:58,090 --> 00:07:01,770 if necessary . We had The last 186 00:07:01,770 --> 00:07:03,826 24 hours as you saw on the news more 187 00:07:03,826 --> 00:07:05,826 than 10,000 , well more than 10,000 188 00:07:05,826 --> 00:07:07,840 evacuees moved . I'm very very 189 00:07:07,840 --> 00:07:09,951 confident that will will sustain that 190 00:07:09,951 --> 00:07:12,118 effort and improve that effort . To be 191 00:07:12,118 --> 00:07:14,229 honest with you . My commitment is to 192 00:07:14,229 --> 00:07:16,062 ensure that airlift is never the 193 00:07:16,062 --> 00:07:18,320 constraint in this operation and and as 194 00:07:18,320 --> 00:07:20,431 you know and appreciate and I've seen 195 00:07:20,431 --> 00:07:22,376 your reporting ? I mean airlift is 196 00:07:22,376 --> 00:07:24,598 extremely important but critical to the 197 00:07:24,598 --> 00:07:26,820 throughput is also ground operation and 198 00:07:26,820 --> 00:07:28,987 we're trying to synchronize that as we 199 00:07:28,987 --> 00:07:31,042 go . But we are we are clearly razor 200 00:07:31,042 --> 00:07:32,709 focused on clearing the Kabul 201 00:07:32,709 --> 00:07:34,431 International Airport of every 202 00:07:34,431 --> 00:07:38,010 evacuated that can move dark . Thank 203 00:07:38,010 --> 00:07:40,232 you for doing Mr Lyons . Could you talk 204 00:07:40,232 --> 00:07:43,700 a little bit about the threat that your 205 00:07:43,700 --> 00:07:46,040 aircraft are facing as they fly into 206 00:07:46,040 --> 00:07:48,110 and fly out of Kabul ? We've seen a 207 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:50,770 french cargo plane have to shoot out 208 00:07:50,770 --> 00:07:53,090 flares as it was taking off . What are 209 00:07:53,090 --> 00:07:56,190 your crews preparing for ? And can you 210 00:07:56,190 --> 00:07:58,190 put this in context of other threat 211 00:07:58,190 --> 00:08:00,430 environments that your cargo aircraft 212 00:08:00,430 --> 00:08:02,486 had to fly into over the last couple 213 00:08:02,486 --> 00:08:06,150 years ? Yeah , thank you . I mean , the 214 00:08:06,150 --> 00:08:08,317 threat is significant as as you know , 215 00:08:08,317 --> 00:08:10,428 I won't get into details were closely 216 00:08:10,428 --> 00:08:12,539 aligned to centcom and other agencies 217 00:08:12,539 --> 00:08:14,706 on threat reporting a potential threat 218 00:08:14,706 --> 00:08:17,070 to airlift operations . I would just 219 00:08:17,070 --> 00:08:20,000 say as we watch that , you know , our 220 00:08:20,010 --> 00:08:23,040 our crews are the best in the world Uh 221 00:08:23,050 --> 00:08:25,220 that that machine , the C- 17 is the 222 00:08:25,220 --> 00:08:27,830 best in the world . And and and I'm 223 00:08:27,830 --> 00:08:29,941 confident that we're taking the right 224 00:08:29,941 --> 00:08:31,941 measures to mitigate the threat and 225 00:08:31,941 --> 00:08:33,997 we're connected to the right sources 226 00:08:33,997 --> 00:08:36,108 and taking the right kind of measures 227 00:08:36,108 --> 00:08:38,219 and I'll probably leave it at that uh 228 00:08:38,219 --> 00:08:40,360 for reasons for good reasons . Uh huh 229 00:08:40,740 --> 00:08:43,350 ground operations . We were discussing 230 00:08:43,350 --> 00:08:45,670 earlier today , the briefing about just 231 00:08:45,680 --> 00:08:47,513 the one hour on the ground quick 232 00:08:47,513 --> 00:08:49,402 rotation . Can you talk about how 233 00:08:49,402 --> 00:08:51,513 you're managing that , How the planes 234 00:08:51,513 --> 00:08:54,670 and the crews are managing that ? Yeah , 235 00:08:54,680 --> 00:08:57,200 it's uh it's quite remarkable . Um you 236 00:08:57,200 --> 00:08:59,367 know , we've got a number of planes in 237 00:08:59,367 --> 00:09:01,422 the system but we have twice as many 238 00:09:01,422 --> 00:09:03,530 crews and the idea is to keep those 239 00:09:03,530 --> 00:09:06,410 planes moving all the time . Either by 240 00:09:06,410 --> 00:09:08,700 extending the crew day or preferably by 241 00:09:08,700 --> 00:09:10,922 swapping cruise and keeping the iron in 242 00:09:10,922 --> 00:09:13,144 motion . And so there's a very uh , you 243 00:09:13,144 --> 00:09:15,033 know , it's a very tight detailed 244 00:09:15,033 --> 00:09:17,256 management system to do that . Critical 245 00:09:17,256 --> 00:09:19,033 to that of course , is what you 246 00:09:19,033 --> 00:09:21,200 mentioned , which is ground time . The 247 00:09:21,200 --> 00:09:23,200 faster we can turn either loaded or 248 00:09:23,200 --> 00:09:25,200 discharged , the faster we can turn 249 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:27,311 that aircraft and we're razor focused 250 00:09:27,311 --> 00:09:28,978 on bringing down and I really 251 00:09:28,978 --> 00:09:30,922 appreciate the work ongoing and in 252 00:09:30,922 --> 00:09:33,060 Afghanistan to bring down the time on 253 00:09:33,060 --> 00:09:34,660 ground to under an hour 254 00:09:37,240 --> 00:09:41,180 nancy . Can you give us a sense how you 255 00:09:41,190 --> 00:09:44,890 foresee the mission ? Um changing as 256 00:09:44,890 --> 00:09:47,057 the US draws down the number of ground 257 00:09:47,057 --> 00:09:49,279 forces in Afghanistan in the final days 258 00:09:49,279 --> 00:09:51,446 of the month and what the mission will 259 00:09:51,446 --> 00:09:53,557 look like if there is one post august 260 00:09:53,557 --> 00:09:57,390 31st . Yeah , I mean every day we take 261 00:09:57,390 --> 00:10:01,100 as the day comes um we are we are 262 00:10:01,100 --> 00:10:04,780 razor focused on Neo . We know and are 263 00:10:04,780 --> 00:10:06,613 linked very closely with central 264 00:10:06,613 --> 00:10:08,558 command on potential operations to 265 00:10:08,558 --> 00:10:10,558 close out the mission by the 31st . 266 00:10:10,558 --> 00:10:12,558 That was the direction given by the 267 00:10:12,558 --> 00:10:14,836 president . We're committed to do that . 268 00:10:14,836 --> 00:10:16,836 And my commitment is to ensure that 269 00:10:16,836 --> 00:10:18,780 airlift is never the constraint to 270 00:10:18,780 --> 00:10:20,947 execute those operations and were well 271 00:10:20,947 --> 00:10:23,870 sync with with Central Command have a 272 00:10:23,870 --> 00:10:25,981 great relationship , great teamwork . 273 00:10:26,240 --> 00:10:30,070 And so I think we're we we we are we 274 00:10:30,070 --> 00:10:32,830 are we are pushing the limits uh to do 275 00:10:32,830 --> 00:10:35,490 everything we can to get every single 276 00:10:35,490 --> 00:10:38,910 evacuate out of Kabul . Do 277 00:10:38,920 --> 00:10:42,100 you foresee fewer flights in the , say 278 00:10:42,100 --> 00:10:44,890 the 28 , 29 , 30 31st of the month as 279 00:10:44,890 --> 00:10:46,557 there are fewer ground forces 280 00:10:46,557 --> 00:10:48,050 presumably in Kabul ? 281 00:10:50,840 --> 00:10:53,370 Well , I prefer not to get into numbers 282 00:10:53,370 --> 00:10:56,450 of flights by day . I would not say 283 00:10:56,450 --> 00:10:59,220 that uh , we're gonna let up , we're 284 00:10:59,220 --> 00:11:02,400 not gonna let up uh , you know , full 285 00:11:02,400 --> 00:11:05,280 accelerator . We're not gonna let up as 286 00:11:05,280 --> 00:11:07,058 long as there's a mission to be 287 00:11:07,058 --> 00:11:09,336 accomplished . Uh , we'll be out there . 288 00:11:09,840 --> 00:11:11,673 I forgot to ask you to introduce 289 00:11:11,673 --> 00:11:13,840 yourself because the general can't see 290 00:11:13,840 --> 00:11:15,784 you . So Courtney . Okay . General 291 00:11:15,784 --> 00:11:17,896 Lines , this is Courtney QB Calling , 292 00:11:17,896 --> 00:11:20,173 calling this Courtney QB from NBC News , 293 00:11:20,173 --> 00:11:22,507 you said that you're pushing the limits . 294 00:11:22,507 --> 00:11:24,673 Um , can you just explain a little bit 295 00:11:24,673 --> 00:11:26,896 more what you mean by that when you say 296 00:11:26,896 --> 00:11:26,520 you're pushing the limits to get as 297 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:28,631 many people out and then are you able 298 00:11:28,631 --> 00:11:30,853 to kind of give us like a big picture . 299 00:11:30,853 --> 00:11:33,620 Look at how many um , C . 17 and C . 300 00:11:33,620 --> 00:11:35,860 One thirties out of the total Air Force 301 00:11:35,860 --> 00:11:37,860 fleet are dedicated to this mission 302 00:11:37,860 --> 00:11:39,860 right now out of the entire U . S . 303 00:11:39,860 --> 00:11:43,690 Military fleet . Well it's , 304 00:11:43,700 --> 00:11:46,980 you know , it's all mobility resources 305 00:11:46,990 --> 00:11:49,550 are focused on this , on this effort . 306 00:11:50,040 --> 00:11:52,262 Uh There's a number of ways I could cut 307 00:11:52,262 --> 00:11:54,373 the numbers that might not be helpful 308 00:11:54,373 --> 00:11:56,596 to you to be honest . Um You know right 309 00:11:56,596 --> 00:11:59,430 now the air component has uh uh well 310 00:11:59,430 --> 00:12:02,310 over 200 aircraft committed operations . 311 00:12:02,310 --> 00:12:05,110 Some some of these are even Casey tens 312 00:12:05,120 --> 00:12:07,287 are committed to the operation in some 313 00:12:07,287 --> 00:12:10,580 way or some fashion . So when I say , 314 00:12:10,580 --> 00:12:13,970 when I say we're all in uh I mean to to 315 00:12:13,970 --> 00:12:15,990 present to meet the President and 316 00:12:15,990 --> 00:12:18,101 secretary is directive to ensure that 317 00:12:18,101 --> 00:12:20,210 every evacuee that is cleared and 318 00:12:20,220 --> 00:12:23,780 cleared to move can move and uh and and 319 00:12:23,780 --> 00:12:26,002 our crews are absolutely incredible . I 320 00:12:26,002 --> 00:12:28,540 won't lie to you . They're tired . Uh 321 00:12:28,550 --> 00:12:30,494 They're probably exhausted in some 322 00:12:30,494 --> 00:12:32,550 cases . I know that the leaders from 323 00:12:32,550 --> 00:12:34,661 time to time are pulling crews out to 324 00:12:34,661 --> 00:12:36,883 make sure we don't have safety issues . 325 00:12:36,883 --> 00:12:39,106 But they are motivated . They are fired 326 00:12:39,106 --> 00:12:41,217 up and they are committed to complete 327 00:12:41,217 --> 00:12:45,190 this mission . One more about any 328 00:12:45,190 --> 00:12:47,810 covid mitigation efforts that you're 329 00:12:47,810 --> 00:12:49,930 taking ? Are you doing anything to 330 00:12:49,930 --> 00:12:53,700 ensure that your crews are safe from 331 00:12:53,700 --> 00:12:55,756 covid ? And can you give us a little 332 00:12:55,756 --> 00:12:57,922 bit of the detail of what that that is 333 00:12:57,922 --> 00:13:00,150 that looks like ? Well all the it's a 334 00:13:00,150 --> 00:13:01,872 great question . You know , we 335 00:13:01,872 --> 00:13:04,039 shouldn't forget that we're doing this 336 00:13:04,039 --> 00:13:06,261 operation in the middle of a pandemic . 337 00:13:06,261 --> 00:13:08,539 So all the crews are obviously masking . 338 00:13:08,539 --> 00:13:12,510 Uh , but , but the afghans that are , 339 00:13:12,520 --> 00:13:14,631 that are , you know , on the aircraft 340 00:13:14,631 --> 00:13:16,600 are not masked . So that's one of 341 00:13:16,600 --> 00:13:18,767 mitigation . There is some , uh , some 342 00:13:18,767 --> 00:13:21,160 screening that occurs before they load . 343 00:13:21,540 --> 00:13:23,762 And then as we reach the temporary safe 344 00:13:23,762 --> 00:13:26,690 havens , these other hubs and lily pads , 345 00:13:26,700 --> 00:13:29,790 uh , there are , there are resources 346 00:13:29,790 --> 00:13:32,580 being applied to further test the 347 00:13:32,580 --> 00:13:35,100 evacuees upon arrival to these various 348 00:13:35,110 --> 00:13:37,480 temporary safe havens . Are you all of 349 00:13:37,480 --> 00:13:39,424 your cruise vaccinated or are they 350 00:13:39,424 --> 00:13:42,410 getting tested periodically to ensure 351 00:13:42,410 --> 00:13:46,010 that they're safe ? You know , the vast 352 00:13:46,010 --> 00:13:48,280 majority are certainly tested . I can't 353 00:13:48,280 --> 00:13:50,750 say conclusively that they all are . 354 00:13:51,140 --> 00:13:53,490 Although great news today from the , 355 00:13:53,500 --> 00:13:55,611 from the FDA . So pretty soon they'll 356 00:13:55,611 --> 00:13:59,390 be vaccinated jennifer General Lyon , 357 00:13:59,400 --> 00:14:01,780 Jennifer Griffin from Fox News . Can 358 00:14:01,780 --> 00:14:03,891 you talk a little bit more about some 359 00:14:03,891 --> 00:14:05,947 of the constraints you faced and how 360 00:14:05,947 --> 00:14:08,510 you resolve them ? And also in the last 361 00:14:08,510 --> 00:14:12,360 24 hours you've gotten 18,000 or 11,000 362 00:14:12,390 --> 00:14:14,470 passengers out of Kabul clearing the 363 00:14:14,470 --> 00:14:17,130 backlog ? Are you concerned that there 364 00:14:17,140 --> 00:14:19,251 are not enough people cleared through 365 00:14:19,440 --> 00:14:21,551 into the airport that you may have to 366 00:14:21,551 --> 00:14:23,662 take off with empty planes . Is there 367 00:14:23,662 --> 00:14:25,884 any sign that you're having to take off 368 00:14:25,884 --> 00:14:27,829 because that quick turnaround with 369 00:14:27,829 --> 00:14:30,700 empty planes . Great question . Uh , 370 00:14:30,710 --> 00:14:32,890 not , not at this time . And uh , you 371 00:14:32,890 --> 00:14:35,001 know , I'm in , we're in contact with 372 00:14:35,001 --> 00:14:37,112 centcom constantly . I talked to john 373 00:14:37,112 --> 00:14:39,112 McKenzie on a continuous basis . So 374 00:14:39,112 --> 00:14:41,360 we're sync up . And the idea is we 375 00:14:41,360 --> 00:14:43,750 never want to leave Kabul Airport on an 376 00:14:43,750 --> 00:14:45,806 empty plane or even a partially full 377 00:14:45,806 --> 00:14:47,972 plane if we can avoid it . So we are , 378 00:14:47,972 --> 00:14:50,139 we are not doing that . As a matter of 379 00:14:50,139 --> 00:14:52,306 fact , we're filling the aircraft Uh , 380 00:14:52,306 --> 00:14:56,160 to about 400 , uh , passengers 381 00:14:56,170 --> 00:14:59,380 in the floor load configuration . I 382 00:14:59,390 --> 00:15:01,334 just say to the , to the , to your 383 00:15:01,334 --> 00:15:03,279 first question . It's an excellent 384 00:15:03,279 --> 00:15:05,334 question . You know , any , any time 385 00:15:05,334 --> 00:15:07,612 that we move this fast in an operation , 386 00:15:07,612 --> 00:15:09,779 there's going to be fog and friction . 387 00:15:09,779 --> 00:15:11,668 And it's , you know , it's , it's 388 00:15:11,668 --> 00:15:13,890 trying to achieve equilibrium in a very 389 00:15:13,890 --> 00:15:16,001 large network of not just airplanes , 390 00:15:16,001 --> 00:15:18,223 but ground operations and multiple uh , 391 00:15:18,223 --> 00:15:20,334 nodes throughout the network . And so 392 00:15:20,334 --> 00:15:22,557 there's a , you know , initially it's , 393 00:15:22,557 --> 00:15:24,612 it's moving quick . You're trying to 394 00:15:24,612 --> 00:15:26,834 grow capacity or they're moving as fast 395 00:15:26,834 --> 00:15:29,057 as you can . Sometimes you get ahead of 396 00:15:29,057 --> 00:15:28,660 yourself and then it's trying to 397 00:15:28,660 --> 00:15:30,870 equalize out and making sure you got a 398 00:15:30,870 --> 00:15:34,230 critical path open . But again , right 399 00:15:34,230 --> 00:15:37,390 now we'll sacrifice the back end of the 400 00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:39,567 uh , of all of all the architecture in 401 00:15:39,567 --> 00:15:41,789 the notes to make sure that we're clear 402 00:15:41,789 --> 00:15:43,956 in Kabul International and that's what 403 00:15:43,956 --> 00:15:46,178 we're doing . Now , I need to go to the 404 00:15:46,178 --> 00:15:48,233 phones . You haven't done that yet . 405 00:15:48,233 --> 00:15:51,710 Stephen Lucey Hi , yes , thanks very 406 00:15:51,710 --> 00:15:54,430 much . Uh , so there are the reports 407 00:15:54,430 --> 00:15:56,710 about the some of the threats that ISIS 408 00:15:56,710 --> 00:15:58,877 is made and I know you're not to speak 409 00:15:58,877 --> 00:16:01,180 about a specific threat environment , 410 00:16:01,180 --> 00:16:03,180 but can you talk to us a little bit 411 00:16:03,180 --> 00:16:04,902 more about how the military is 412 00:16:04,902 --> 00:16:07,124 communicated with the taliban regarding 413 00:16:07,124 --> 00:16:09,124 these threats ? Are you telling the 414 00:16:09,124 --> 00:16:11,180 taliban it's their responsibility to 415 00:16:11,180 --> 00:16:13,291 keep ISIS away from the airport . And 416 00:16:13,291 --> 00:16:15,069 what happens if ISIS decided to 417 00:16:15,069 --> 00:16:17,080 embarrass the taliban by launching 418 00:16:17,090 --> 00:16:19,480 terrorist attacks on the perimeter or 419 00:16:19,480 --> 00:16:21,536 the civilians trying to get into the 420 00:16:21,536 --> 00:16:23,424 airport steven ? I'll take that . 421 00:16:23,424 --> 00:16:25,647 That's that's more appropriate for me . 422 00:16:25,647 --> 00:16:27,813 I think then for General Lions . Um as 423 00:16:27,813 --> 00:16:29,980 we've talked about many times over the 424 00:16:29,980 --> 00:16:33,310 last several days , we are in uh daily 425 00:16:33,310 --> 00:16:35,254 communication with taliban leaders 426 00:16:35,254 --> 00:16:37,032 outside the airport , sometimes 427 00:16:37,032 --> 00:16:39,560 multiple times a day , uh , to again 428 00:16:39,570 --> 00:16:43,360 deconflict as best as we can and 429 00:16:43,360 --> 00:16:46,740 to help ensure healthy access to the 430 00:16:46,750 --> 00:16:49,150 airfield for american citizens in 431 00:16:49,150 --> 00:16:51,200 particular . Uh and that that 432 00:16:51,200 --> 00:16:54,340 communication continues to happen . We 433 00:16:54,340 --> 00:16:56,900 are also mindful of the threat that 434 00:16:56,910 --> 00:16:59,021 ISIS poses . And without speaking for 435 00:16:59,021 --> 00:17:01,132 the taliban . And I think it's a safe 436 00:17:01,132 --> 00:17:03,354 assumption to assume that that they too 437 00:17:03,354 --> 00:17:05,410 are mindful of that threat . I won't 438 00:17:05,410 --> 00:17:09,230 begin to hypothesize uh 439 00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:11,870 what could or could not happen . And I 440 00:17:11,870 --> 00:17:13,926 think you can understand that at the 441 00:17:13,926 --> 00:17:16,092 podium , we wouldn't get into specific 442 00:17:16,092 --> 00:17:18,380 intelligence streams or what we're 443 00:17:18,380 --> 00:17:21,410 watching . Nobody wants to see um 444 00:17:21,420 --> 00:17:23,890 anybody else hurt . And and certainly 445 00:17:23,890 --> 00:17:26,112 nobody wants to see anything that could 446 00:17:26,112 --> 00:17:28,001 impact our ability to continue to 447 00:17:28,001 --> 00:17:30,223 conduct this evacuation operation . All 448 00:17:30,223 --> 00:17:32,279 I would tell you is we're focused on 449 00:17:32,279 --> 00:17:34,446 this every single day , hour by hour . 450 00:17:34,446 --> 00:17:36,668 We're monitoring the threat environment 451 00:17:36,668 --> 00:17:38,834 very very carefully . Um And as I said 452 00:17:38,834 --> 00:17:40,779 the communication with the taliban 453 00:17:40,779 --> 00:17:42,980 continues so . Uh huh . Thank you . 454 00:17:42,990 --> 00:17:45,212 This is Lauren Seligman with politico . 455 00:17:45,212 --> 00:17:47,320 First of all . Can you tell us the 456 00:17:47,330 --> 00:17:50,270 total estimated cost of the evacuation ? 457 00:17:50,640 --> 00:17:53,370 And then also can you explain the 458 00:17:53,370 --> 00:17:56,030 discrepancy between the state and D . O . 459 00:17:56,030 --> 00:17:58,030 D . Numbers on the number of people 460 00:17:58,030 --> 00:18:00,880 evacuated state is saying 25,000 since 461 00:18:00,880 --> 00:18:03,230 the operation began . But Major General 462 00:18:03,230 --> 00:18:05,452 taylor earlier today I believe you said 463 00:18:05,452 --> 00:18:08,310 37,000 . So what is that discrepancy 464 00:18:08,320 --> 00:18:10,920 the numbers question I mean I can't 465 00:18:10,930 --> 00:18:14,150 speak for I don't know uh I don't know 466 00:18:14,160 --> 00:18:16,216 where the the other number came from 467 00:18:16,216 --> 00:18:18,720 but um but I think we're all in the 468 00:18:18,720 --> 00:18:20,776 inter agency were all tracking these 469 00:18:20,776 --> 00:18:22,887 numbers . The numbers that we put out 470 00:18:22,887 --> 00:18:25,053 this morning . You I think you saw the 471 00:18:25,053 --> 00:18:26,998 the White House actually put those 472 00:18:26,998 --> 00:18:28,887 numbers out before we did so that 473 00:18:28,887 --> 00:18:31,800 37,000 since the 14th is is what we're 474 00:18:31,800 --> 00:18:35,030 counting on . Um And I'll turn it over 475 00:18:35,030 --> 00:18:38,080 to the general on your first question 476 00:18:38,090 --> 00:18:40,560 but it's whatever the costs are gonna 477 00:18:40,560 --> 00:18:43,130 be laura are bigger than just the 478 00:18:43,140 --> 00:18:46,980 airlift . Um And I can tell you that we 479 00:18:46,980 --> 00:18:49,430 don't have an estimate right now . Our 480 00:18:49,430 --> 00:18:51,970 focus and the focus of the entire inter 481 00:18:51,970 --> 00:18:54,690 agency is to get as many people out as 482 00:18:54,690 --> 00:18:57,110 fast as we can and as safely as we can . 483 00:18:57,240 --> 00:19:00,990 Um And we're not uh letting cost 484 00:19:01,000 --> 00:19:04,670 drive the factor here cost drive the 485 00:19:04,670 --> 00:19:06,990 operation . Uh The operation is driving 486 00:19:06,990 --> 00:19:09,101 the operation and the need to do this 487 00:19:09,101 --> 00:19:11,268 in a very urgent and orderly way . But 488 00:19:11,268 --> 00:19:13,434 I'll turn it over to the general if he 489 00:19:13,434 --> 00:19:15,546 has any more data for you in terms of 490 00:19:15,546 --> 00:19:19,050 the cost from his perspective . Yeah I 491 00:19:19,050 --> 00:19:21,272 I couldn't have said it any better than 492 00:19:21,272 --> 00:19:23,328 Mr Kirby just said it . I mean we're 493 00:19:23,328 --> 00:19:25,272 aware and we're tracking costs but 494 00:19:25,272 --> 00:19:27,439 we're nowhere close to accumulating uh 495 00:19:27,439 --> 00:19:29,772 that that data for public dissemination . 496 00:19:29,772 --> 00:19:31,883 And I'm sure laura that when when all 497 00:19:31,883 --> 00:19:33,883 is said and done . I mean uh at the 498 00:19:33,883 --> 00:19:36,106 appropriate time will certainly be able 499 00:19:36,106 --> 00:19:38,328 to provide an overall sense of what the 500 00:19:38,328 --> 00:19:40,328 cost is . I just would add that the 501 00:19:40,328 --> 00:19:43,670 real costs that were Focused on now is 502 00:19:43,670 --> 00:19:45,892 human life . That's the cost that we're 503 00:19:45,892 --> 00:19:48,680 focused on . Just follow up during 504 00:19:48,680 --> 00:19:50,900 Lions . Are you concerned about the 505 00:19:50,900 --> 00:19:53,220 Taliban's ultimatum that they issued if 506 00:19:53,230 --> 00:19:55,610 the US has to stay past August 31 to 507 00:19:55,610 --> 00:19:57,832 complete the evacuation and what is the 508 00:19:57,832 --> 00:20:00,260 plan to protect our forces and the 509 00:20:00,260 --> 00:20:04,160 evacuees in that case ? Well , again , 510 00:20:04,160 --> 00:20:06,340 as I said , you know , we watched the 511 00:20:06,350 --> 00:20:09,770 all risks and threats very closely 512 00:20:10,140 --> 00:20:12,820 and you know , I I would defer to us , 513 00:20:12,820 --> 00:20:15,042 Central command on most of the parts of 514 00:20:15,042 --> 00:20:17,400 those questions were in direct contact 515 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:20,070 with them regularly continuously . And 516 00:20:20,070 --> 00:20:22,450 then uh we you know , we have our own 517 00:20:22,840 --> 00:20:24,900 processes and defensive measures and 518 00:20:24,900 --> 00:20:27,360 techniques , tactics and procedures to 519 00:20:27,740 --> 00:20:30,080 to take uh you know , to protect our 520 00:20:30,080 --> 00:20:32,302 crews and to protect our aircraft going 521 00:20:32,302 --> 00:20:34,524 in and out . We got time for two more . 522 00:20:34,524 --> 00:20:36,747 I'm gonna go to Sylvia and then Therese 523 00:20:36,747 --> 00:20:39,070 go ahead Sylvie . Um you know , General 524 00:20:39,080 --> 00:20:41,980 Sylvie , long term from a F . P . Can 525 00:20:41,980 --> 00:20:44,840 you speak to us about the cooperation 526 00:20:44,850 --> 00:20:48,210 with the Turkish forces at the airport ? 527 00:20:48,220 --> 00:20:50,540 Uh What kind of relationship do you 528 00:20:50,540 --> 00:20:51,540 have with them ? 529 00:20:56,440 --> 00:20:59,850 Yeah , I would defer to us Central 530 00:20:59,850 --> 00:21:03,490 Command for that question . Um I would 531 00:21:03,490 --> 00:21:05,268 not be able to characterize the 532 00:21:05,268 --> 00:21:07,268 relationship on the ground . I know 533 00:21:07,268 --> 00:21:09,490 there is a relationship but I would not 534 00:21:09,490 --> 00:21:11,657 be able to characterize that for you . 535 00:21:11,657 --> 00:21:13,879 So if you remember the Turks are on the 536 00:21:13,879 --> 00:21:15,823 ground , really more of a security 537 00:21:15,823 --> 00:21:17,990 perspective . And so it is really more 538 00:21:17,990 --> 00:21:20,157 of a central command relationship that 539 00:21:20,157 --> 00:21:22,323 they're that they're managing with the 540 00:21:22,323 --> 00:21:24,434 Turks every day . The Turks are still 541 00:21:24,434 --> 00:21:26,546 there . And of course , you know , at 542 00:21:26,546 --> 00:21:28,768 what scale that were there to race . Uh 543 00:21:28,768 --> 00:21:30,823 Thank you john , I'm curious Garnier 544 00:21:30,823 --> 00:21:32,990 with newsy um General Lions are medics 545 00:21:32,990 --> 00:21:35,212 being provided for each flight . I know 546 00:21:35,212 --> 00:21:37,046 there's a concern about capacity 547 00:21:37,046 --> 00:21:39,101 because you're trying to get as many 548 00:21:39,101 --> 00:21:40,934 people on . But our medics being 549 00:21:40,934 --> 00:21:40,720 provided . And the reason why I ask 550 00:21:40,720 --> 00:21:42,887 that is because there are reports that 551 00:21:42,887 --> 00:21:44,942 a woman had a baby during one of the 552 00:21:44,942 --> 00:21:46,942 flights . And so do you have medics 553 00:21:46,942 --> 00:21:49,164 that will be on board that will be able 554 00:21:49,164 --> 00:21:50,942 to handle any sort of emergency 555 00:21:50,942 --> 00:21:53,109 situations that may come up if someone 556 00:21:53,109 --> 00:21:53,020 has a baby or you know , falls and gets 557 00:21:53,020 --> 00:21:55,076 sick or something in that instance . 558 00:21:56,940 --> 00:21:59,107 Yeah , that's a great question . We do 559 00:21:59,107 --> 00:22:01,162 not have medics on every flight . Uh 560 00:22:01,162 --> 00:22:04,430 There is a medical screen as part of 561 00:22:04,430 --> 00:22:06,597 the screening and boarding process and 562 00:22:06,597 --> 00:22:08,486 but I'll confess to you that many 563 00:22:08,486 --> 00:22:10,652 people would have to self identify any 564 00:22:10,652 --> 00:22:13,050 kind of medical issue . Uh Really 565 00:22:13,050 --> 00:22:15,272 exciting . I mean , I really appreciate 566 00:22:15,272 --> 00:22:17,328 the news reporting on the baby being 567 00:22:17,328 --> 00:22:19,790 born as that flight came into Ramstein . 568 00:22:19,790 --> 00:22:21,870 Matter of fact , uh There's actually 569 00:22:21,870 --> 00:22:23,981 been more than that . So it's just uh 570 00:22:23,981 --> 00:22:26,930 just an incredible incredible operation 571 00:22:26,940 --> 00:22:30,830 ongoing . Uh You know , just just 572 00:22:30,830 --> 00:22:32,941 impressive work by our great airman . 573 00:22:33,340 --> 00:22:37,320 Alright , Chicago . Yeah , I'm sorry . 574 00:22:37,330 --> 00:22:38,441 What did you mean ? 575 00:22:40,690 --> 00:22:44,260 More than one baby ? 576 00:22:48,540 --> 00:22:52,180 Yeah . My my my my well my last data 577 00:22:52,180 --> 00:22:54,500 point was three . I don't have a formal 578 00:22:54,500 --> 00:22:56,950 tracker but those were , you know , so 579 00:22:56,950 --> 00:22:59,172 we'll keep you posted . All right sir . 580 00:22:59,172 --> 00:23:01,283 All right , we'll follow we'll follow 581 00:23:01,283 --> 00:23:03,339 up and try to get you information on 582 00:23:03,339 --> 00:23:05,506 the other to listen . We gotta let the 583 00:23:05,506 --> 00:23:07,672 general we have to let the general get 584 00:23:07,672 --> 00:23:11,590 supplies at General Lions . We've 585 00:23:11,590 --> 00:23:13,534 had heard some concerns that there 586 00:23:13,534 --> 00:23:15,757 wasn't enough food or water for all the 587 00:23:15,757 --> 00:23:17,757 evacuees at the airport . Could you 588 00:23:17,757 --> 00:23:19,979 just talk about the efforts to fly in ? 589 00:23:19,979 --> 00:23:22,090 More sanitation , More cameras . More 590 00:23:22,090 --> 00:23:24,312 water for those that are trying to flee 591 00:23:24,312 --> 00:23:26,490 cobble . Sure . Uh Well you see all 592 00:23:26,490 --> 00:23:28,546 those aircraft going in there and we 593 00:23:28,546 --> 00:23:30,768 never want to send an aircraft empty if 594 00:23:30,768 --> 00:23:32,823 we can't if we don't have to . So uh 595 00:23:32,823 --> 00:23:34,879 centcom is managing that . We've got 596 00:23:34,879 --> 00:23:36,990 plenty of capacity going in there and 597 00:23:36,990 --> 00:23:39,212 there and there is sustainment on those 598 00:23:39,212 --> 00:23:41,212 flights coming in that we're taking 599 00:23:41,212 --> 00:23:43,620 evacuees out . So uh you know , centcom 600 00:23:43,620 --> 00:23:45,676 is addressing that issue . Thank you 601 00:23:46,140 --> 00:23:48,362 general . We're gonna let you go unless 602 00:23:48,362 --> 00:23:50,140 you have any closing thoughts . 603 00:23:50,140 --> 00:23:52,196 Anything that you might want to just 604 00:23:52,196 --> 00:23:54,362 hit at the end here . Well john I just 605 00:23:54,362 --> 00:23:56,362 again thanks for being part of this 606 00:23:56,362 --> 00:23:58,529 today . But I you know again how proud 607 00:23:58,529 --> 00:24:00,362 I am of our mobility airmen just 608 00:24:00,362 --> 00:24:02,529 operating around the globe . It's just 609 00:24:02,529 --> 00:24:04,670 impressive to see . And uh you know 610 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:08,270 everybody is just in this all 611 00:24:08,270 --> 00:24:10,780 in uh rowing as hard as we can and 612 00:24:10,780 --> 00:24:12,891 we're going to make this happen . I'm 613 00:24:12,891 --> 00:24:15,002 absolutely confident that . Thank you 614 00:24:15,002 --> 00:24:17,169 general . Thanks for your time today . 615 00:24:17,169 --> 00:24:16,910 Thanks everybody . We'll see you back 616 00:24:16,910 --> 00:24:19,140 here mid morning tomorrow . Thanks very 617 00:24:19,140 --> 00:24:23,080 much . I 618 00:24:23,090 --> 00:24:25,460 don't know I please and asking 619 00:24:26,940 --> 00:24:28,760 sure you want , yeah , 620 00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:03,290 could be evacuated from Kabul 621 00:25:03,300 --> 00:25:06,190 after the U . S . Military leave the 622 00:25:06,190 --> 00:25:10,050 airport . So who would be uh 623 00:25:10,640 --> 00:25:13,900 secure who would secure the apart the 624 00:25:13,910 --> 00:25:17,430 Turks ? How would it work ? I don't 625 00:25:17,430 --> 00:25:20,360 know . So my point was simply that 626 00:25:20,940 --> 00:25:24,380 that it's certainly 627 00:25:24,380 --> 00:25:26,330 possible that the airport would 628 00:25:26,340 --> 00:25:28,820 maintain operations going forward . I 629 00:25:28,820 --> 00:25:30,820 mean that would be for local 630 00:25:30,820 --> 00:25:34,500 authorities to figure out but that um 631 00:25:34,510 --> 00:25:36,490 but it is certainly possible that 632 00:25:36,500 --> 00:25:39,090 commercial traffic and charter traffic 633 00:25:39,090 --> 00:25:40,868 can still flow once the U . S . 634 00:25:40,868 --> 00:25:42,979 Military mission is over . I couldn't 635 00:25:42,979 --> 00:25:45,146 speak to that with you know with great 636 00:25:45,146 --> 00:25:47,034 specificity because that would be 637 00:25:47,034 --> 00:25:49,120 beyond what we're doing . But I just 638 00:25:49,120 --> 00:25:51,990 was making the point that just by 639 00:25:51,990 --> 00:25:54,330 virtue of the United States military 640 00:25:54,330 --> 00:25:56,600 leaving doesn't mean that everybody 641 00:25:56,600 --> 00:25:59,610 else is going to leave and not and not 642 00:25:59,610 --> 00:26:01,832 continue to fly aircraft out of there . 643 00:26:01,832 --> 00:26:03,999 That's all that's all that's all I was 644 00:26:03,999 --> 00:26:05,999 saying . So it means that you would 645 00:26:05,999 --> 00:26:08,120 count on the taliban to accept that 646 00:26:08,130 --> 00:26:09,990 people would live . It's not us 647 00:26:09,990 --> 00:26:12,800 counting on the taliban sylvie . Uh We 648 00:26:12,800 --> 00:26:15,920 have a mandate to continue to conduct 649 00:26:15,920 --> 00:26:17,976 this evacuation until the end of the 650 00:26:17,976 --> 00:26:19,976 month . You heard the general we're 651 00:26:19,976 --> 00:26:22,031 focused on that . Uh that's the goal 652 00:26:22,031 --> 00:26:24,031 we're shooting for . Uh Beyond that 653 00:26:24,031 --> 00:26:25,864 when there's no U . S . Military 654 00:26:25,864 --> 00:26:27,920 mission there , it's I'm not I'm not 655 00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:29,920 able to speculate or hypothesize of 656 00:26:29,920 --> 00:26:32,087 what that would look like . I'm just , 657 00:26:32,087 --> 00:26:34,253 all I was saying to Courtney's earlier 658 00:26:34,253 --> 00:26:36,364 question was it's possible that other 659 00:26:36,364 --> 00:26:38,420 carriers and other aircraft would be 660 00:26:38,420 --> 00:26:41,560 able to take off and land out of Hamid 661 00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:43,282 Karzai international airport , 662 00:26:45,140 --> 00:26:47,560 recording the incident outside the 663 00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:50,760 North gate . The at the airport . We've 664 00:26:50,770 --> 00:26:54,140 heard reports that actually american 665 00:26:54,140 --> 00:26:56,870 gunfire caused the injuries of the 666 00:26:56,870 --> 00:27:00,850 afghans . Can you confirm that I 667 00:27:00,850 --> 00:27:04,600 cannot uh I've seen similar reports . I 668 00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:06,711 think it's really important wafa that 669 00:27:06,711 --> 00:27:10,560 we uh that we let the that we let the 670 00:27:10,570 --> 00:27:13,620 people on the ground uh get their best 671 00:27:13,620 --> 00:27:16,180 estimate an idea of what happened and 672 00:27:16,190 --> 00:27:18,750 that we don't try to do the forensics 673 00:27:18,750 --> 00:27:22,570 here at the pentagon um fluid situation , 674 00:27:22,580 --> 00:27:24,870 dynamic situation , serious threat 675 00:27:24,870 --> 00:27:27,092 environment . Our troops have the right 676 00:27:27,092 --> 00:27:29,092 to defend themselves . They believe 677 00:27:29,092 --> 00:27:31,790 they were under threat and they reacted 678 00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:34,340 accordingly . I don't want to get into 679 00:27:34,340 --> 00:27:36,430 a second guessing that right now and 680 00:27:36,430 --> 00:27:38,830 certainly in such a short span of time 681 00:27:38,830 --> 00:27:41,540 after the event . And those ones that 682 00:27:41,540 --> 00:27:44,710 were civilians or armed do you have it 683 00:27:44,710 --> 00:27:47,240 is my understanding and I caveat this 684 00:27:47,240 --> 00:27:50,450 with all reports coming out originally 685 00:27:50,460 --> 00:27:52,349 usually are not always completely 686 00:27:52,349 --> 00:27:54,830 accurate but it's my understanding that 687 00:27:54,840 --> 00:27:56,784 the wounds were sustained by other 688 00:27:56,784 --> 00:28:00,310 afghan forces . When you said one 689 00:28:00,310 --> 00:28:03,160 member of the Afghan forces was killed 690 00:28:03,740 --> 00:28:06,230 during this incident . How did you 691 00:28:06,310 --> 00:28:09,940 identify that he was like the 692 00:28:10,220 --> 00:28:12,190 commanders on the ground ? He in 693 00:28:12,190 --> 00:28:14,510 uniform ? How you can you couldn't tell 694 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:17,000 if he's Taliban or ? Well if I don't 695 00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:19,222 know what what clothes he was wearing . 696 00:28:19,222 --> 00:28:21,333 Our commanders on the ground reported 697 00:28:21,333 --> 00:28:23,278 that it was a member of the Afghan 698 00:28:23,278 --> 00:28:25,333 forces who was killed in action . We 699 00:28:25,333 --> 00:28:27,444 have no reason to doubt that . Report 700 00:28:27,444 --> 00:28:29,667 anything else . Laura . Yeah . Just you 701 00:28:29,667 --> 00:28:31,556 mentioned earlier today , I can't 702 00:28:31,556 --> 00:28:33,722 remember if it was your general taylor 703 00:28:33,722 --> 00:28:36,380 that there was a second rotary airlift 704 00:28:36,380 --> 00:28:38,840 evacuation mission out of Kabul . Can 705 00:28:38,840 --> 00:28:41,118 you talk a little bit about what U . S . 706 00:28:41,118 --> 00:28:43,340 S . Is the threat to these missions and 707 00:28:43,340 --> 00:28:45,451 these aircraft from ISIS K . From the 708 00:28:45,451 --> 00:28:48,500 Taliban . Um Are there issues with RPGS ? 709 00:28:48,740 --> 00:28:51,018 How do you make sure that these , Yeah , 710 00:28:51,018 --> 00:28:53,184 I think you can understand , I want to 711 00:28:53,184 --> 00:28:55,129 be a little careful here laura , I 712 00:28:55,129 --> 00:28:57,240 would just say that commanders on the 713 00:28:57,240 --> 00:28:59,296 ground have the authority to conduct 714 00:28:59,296 --> 00:29:01,518 local missions as they deem appropriate 715 00:29:01,518 --> 00:29:04,730 to the need and we charge them with 716 00:29:04,740 --> 00:29:07,270 assessing the risk with anything that 717 00:29:07,270 --> 00:29:09,326 they're doing . Um And the secretary 718 00:29:09,326 --> 00:29:12,200 trusts that they understand what the 719 00:29:12,200 --> 00:29:14,340 risks are and are appropriately 720 00:29:14,340 --> 00:29:16,062 factoring in whatever the risk 721 00:29:16,062 --> 00:29:18,640 environment is before they actually 722 00:29:18,640 --> 00:29:21,260 before they do anything . So while I 723 00:29:21,260 --> 00:29:24,090 can't speak and won't speak to a 724 00:29:24,590 --> 00:29:27,210 specific threat streams around the 725 00:29:27,210 --> 00:29:30,010 airport . I can tell you that our 726 00:29:30,010 --> 00:29:32,960 commanders are factoring in all all 727 00:29:32,960 --> 00:29:35,016 manner of potential risk before they 728 00:29:35,016 --> 00:29:37,127 conduct any operation , Jake Sullivan 729 00:29:37,127 --> 00:29:39,127 earlier and talked about the threat 730 00:29:39,127 --> 00:29:41,349 from ISIS K . To the airport . Is there 731 00:29:41,349 --> 00:29:43,127 a threat from ISIS K . To these 732 00:29:43,127 --> 00:29:45,238 operations as well ? I won't speak to 733 00:29:45,238 --> 00:29:47,580 specifics of the threat but uh we know 734 00:29:47,580 --> 00:29:51,440 that ISIS uh is uh is certainly in 735 00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:54,360 Afghanistan . Um And uh and we're 736 00:29:54,360 --> 00:29:56,416 mindful of the potential threat that 737 00:29:56,416 --> 00:29:58,638 they compose to security at the airport 738 00:29:58,638 --> 00:30:00,749 and to the safe movement of of people 739 00:30:00,749 --> 00:30:02,940 or has the US paid the taliban for the 740 00:30:02,950 --> 00:30:05,172 freedom of movement or transport of any 741 00:30:05,172 --> 00:30:07,790 U . S . Citizens ? Yeah . Has there 742 00:30:07,790 --> 00:30:10,012 been any financial consideration to pay 743 00:30:10,012 --> 00:30:12,346 to the Taliban ? Over that I'm aware of ? 744 00:30:12,640 --> 00:30:15,160 Okay , you bet . Thanks guys .