1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:09,850 --> 00:00:13,740 near everybody today . The briefing 3 00:00:13,740 --> 00:00:16,390 will be well belong to General 4 00:00:16,390 --> 00:00:18,501 Mackenzie , Commander of US . Central 5 00:00:18,501 --> 00:00:20,668 Command General . Can you hear me okay 6 00:00:20,668 --> 00:00:22,834 john I can see and hear you fine thank 7 00:00:22,834 --> 00:00:25,057 you sir . Uh The general will have some 8 00:00:25,057 --> 00:00:27,223 brief opening remarks . Well obviously 9 00:00:27,223 --> 00:00:29,279 address the events in Kabul today as 10 00:00:29,279 --> 00:00:31,223 well as the evacuation mission and 11 00:00:31,223 --> 00:00:33,446 where we are and where we're going . Uh 12 00:00:33,446 --> 00:00:33,150 then we'll take questions . I will 13 00:00:33,150 --> 00:00:35,317 moderate the questions as we have done 14 00:00:35,317 --> 00:00:37,261 before . I will call on you please 15 00:00:37,261 --> 00:00:39,094 before you ask your question and 16 00:00:39,094 --> 00:00:41,206 identify yourselves and your outlet . 17 00:00:41,206 --> 00:00:43,372 So the general has an idea of who he's 18 00:00:43,372 --> 00:00:45,539 talking to And just a reminder , we've 19 00:00:45,539 --> 00:00:47,706 got 30 minutes and we have a hard stop 20 00:00:47,706 --> 00:00:49,428 at 3.30 . So with that General 21 00:00:49,428 --> 00:00:51,761 Mackenzie over to you sir , john thanks . 22 00:00:51,761 --> 00:00:53,872 It's a hard day today . As you know , 23 00:00:53,872 --> 00:00:55,928 two suicide bombers assessed to have 24 00:00:55,928 --> 00:00:58,350 been ISIS fighters detonated in the 25 00:00:58,350 --> 00:01:00,350 vicinity of the Abbey Gate at Hamid 26 00:01:00,350 --> 00:01:02,572 Karzai International Airport and in the 27 00:01:02,572 --> 00:01:04,628 vicinity of the Baron hotel which is 28 00:01:04,628 --> 00:01:06,683 immediately adjacent . The attack on 29 00:01:06,683 --> 00:01:08,906 the Abbey Gate was followed by a number 30 00:01:08,906 --> 00:01:10,794 of ISIS gunmen who opened fire on 31 00:01:10,794 --> 00:01:13,017 civilians and military forces . At this 32 00:01:13,017 --> 00:01:15,239 time we know that 12 US service members 33 00:01:15,239 --> 00:01:17,350 have been killed in the attack and 15 34 00:01:17,350 --> 00:01:19,628 more service members have been injured . 35 00:01:19,628 --> 00:01:21,794 A number of Afghan civilians were also 36 00:01:21,794 --> 00:01:23,906 killed and injured in the attack were 37 00:01:23,906 --> 00:01:26,183 treating some of them aboard H . Kaaya , 38 00:01:26,183 --> 00:01:28,294 many other Afghan civilians have been 39 00:01:28,294 --> 00:01:28,170 taken out to hospitals in town . We're 40 00:01:28,170 --> 00:01:30,226 still working to calculate the total 41 00:01:30,226 --> 00:01:32,226 losses . We just don't know it . Uh 42 00:01:32,226 --> 00:01:34,226 what that is right now . Their loss 43 00:01:34,226 --> 00:01:36,226 weighs heavily on us all . And I'll 44 00:01:36,226 --> 00:01:38,392 talk a little bit more about that . As 45 00:01:38,392 --> 00:01:40,559 we go through my prepared remarks , we 46 00:01:40,559 --> 00:01:42,726 continue to focus on the protection of 47 00:01:42,726 --> 00:01:44,670 our forces and the evacuees as the 48 00:01:44,670 --> 00:01:46,837 evacuation continues . Let me be clear 49 00:01:46,837 --> 00:01:48,892 while we are saddened by the loss of 50 00:01:48,892 --> 00:01:51,059 life , both U . S . And Afghan , we'll 51 00:01:51,059 --> 00:01:53,170 continue to execute the mission . Our 52 00:01:53,170 --> 00:01:55,226 mission is to evacuate US citizens , 53 00:01:55,226 --> 00:01:57,114 third country nationals , special 54 00:01:57,114 --> 00:01:59,114 immigrant visa holders , US embassy 55 00:01:59,114 --> 00:02:01,680 staff and afghans at risk . Despite 56 00:02:01,680 --> 00:02:03,680 this attack , we are continuing the 57 00:02:03,680 --> 00:02:05,910 mission , the evacuation at best speed 58 00:02:05,920 --> 00:02:08,142 and is that today we have approximately 59 00:02:08,142 --> 00:02:10,290 5000 evacuees on the ramp at HK 60 00:02:10,300 --> 00:02:12,610 awaiting airlift . Since august the 61 00:02:12,610 --> 00:02:14,443 14th . We've evacuated more than 62 00:02:14,443 --> 00:02:17,550 104,000 civilians from the from h Kyle , 63 00:02:18,140 --> 00:02:20,870 Over 66,000 by the United States and 64 00:02:20,870 --> 00:02:23,360 over 37,000 by our allies and partners . 65 00:02:23,740 --> 00:02:25,796 And that includes bringing out about 66 00:02:25,796 --> 00:02:28,570 5000 Americans . As the Secretary of 67 00:02:28,570 --> 00:02:30,840 State said yesterday , We believe that 68 00:02:30,840 --> 00:02:33,007 there are about 1000 , probably little 69 00:02:33,007 --> 00:02:35,118 more than 1000 American citizens left 70 00:02:35,118 --> 00:02:37,284 in Afghanistan . At this point , we're 71 00:02:37,284 --> 00:02:39,507 doing everything we can in concert with 72 00:02:39,507 --> 00:02:41,507 our Department of State partners to 73 00:02:41,507 --> 00:02:43,451 reach out to them and to help them 74 00:02:43,451 --> 00:02:45,340 leave if they want to leave . And 75 00:02:45,340 --> 00:02:47,673 remember , not everybody wants to leave . 76 00:02:47,673 --> 00:02:49,618 Yesterday . We brought in over 500 77 00:02:49,618 --> 00:02:51,396 American citizens . It would be 78 00:02:51,396 --> 00:02:53,618 difficult to overestimate the number of 79 00:02:53,618 --> 00:02:55,451 unusual challenges and competing 80 00:02:55,451 --> 00:02:57,562 demands that our forces on the ground 81 00:02:57,562 --> 00:02:59,590 face . The threat to our forces , 82 00:02:59,590 --> 00:03:01,812 particularly from ISIS K . Is very real 83 00:03:02,030 --> 00:03:04,350 as we have seen today . I would also 84 00:03:04,350 --> 00:03:06,461 like to express the sense of profound 85 00:03:06,461 --> 00:03:08,183 pride I have in the creative , 86 00:03:08,183 --> 00:03:10,239 determined and professional way that 87 00:03:10,239 --> 00:03:11,961 our forces have overcome those 88 00:03:11,961 --> 00:03:13,850 challenges and to deliver the the 89 00:03:13,850 --> 00:03:15,794 results that we talked about in my 90 00:03:15,794 --> 00:03:17,850 opening portion of the remarks , the 91 00:03:17,850 --> 00:03:17,350 number of people that we've been able 92 00:03:17,350 --> 00:03:19,990 to extract from Afghanistan . It would 93 00:03:19,990 --> 00:03:22,101 also be remiss of me , not to mention 94 00:03:22,101 --> 00:03:24,101 the tremendous contributions of our 95 00:03:24,101 --> 00:03:26,268 many coalition partners and they stood 96 00:03:26,268 --> 00:03:28,379 with us on the ground at age , kaya . 97 00:03:28,379 --> 00:03:29,990 And also the Interagency and 98 00:03:29,990 --> 00:03:32,046 international partners who supported 99 00:03:32,046 --> 00:03:34,101 the evacuation . The many soldiers , 100 00:03:34,101 --> 00:03:33,600 sailors , airmen , marines and coast 101 00:03:33,600 --> 00:03:35,767 guardsmen who supported this operation 102 00:03:35,767 --> 00:03:38,110 down range across the Central Command , 103 00:03:38,110 --> 00:03:40,221 the european Command and the Northern 104 00:03:40,221 --> 00:03:42,110 Command areas of responsibility . 105 00:03:42,110 --> 00:03:44,332 Moreover , this evacuation could simply 106 00:03:44,332 --> 00:03:46,499 not have been done without the amazing 107 00:03:46,499 --> 00:03:48,610 flexibility of U . S . Transportation 108 00:03:48,610 --> 00:03:50,777 Command in the airlift provided by the 109 00:03:50,777 --> 00:03:52,721 United States Air Force . No other 110 00:03:52,721 --> 00:03:54,943 military in the world has anything like 111 00:03:54,943 --> 00:03:56,999 it . I'd also like to thank the host 112 00:03:56,999 --> 00:03:59,110 nations that have generously provided 113 00:03:59,110 --> 00:04:01,054 access to their facilities for the 114 00:04:01,054 --> 00:04:03,221 processing the care and feeding of our 115 00:04:03,221 --> 00:04:05,332 evacuees . I also need to acknowledge 116 00:04:05,332 --> 00:04:07,388 the temporary suffering that some of 117 00:04:07,388 --> 00:04:09,277 our evacuees have had to endure . 118 00:04:09,277 --> 00:04:11,499 Please know that we continue to execute 119 00:04:11,499 --> 00:04:13,554 our number one mission , which is to 120 00:04:13,554 --> 00:04:15,777 get as many american citizens and other 121 00:04:15,777 --> 00:04:17,388 evacuated as possible out of 122 00:04:17,388 --> 00:04:19,277 Afghanistan . We also continue to 123 00:04:19,277 --> 00:04:21,499 expand the capacity at our intermediate 124 00:04:21,499 --> 00:04:23,666 facilities to ensure safe sanitary and 125 00:04:23,666 --> 00:04:25,740 humane conditions for evacuees while 126 00:04:25,740 --> 00:04:27,962 continuing to look for ultimate ways to 127 00:04:27,962 --> 00:04:29,907 expedite their processing and also 128 00:04:29,907 --> 00:04:32,073 transfer to the United States or other 129 00:04:32,073 --> 00:04:34,650 destinations . I'd like to close out my 130 00:04:34,650 --> 00:04:36,761 remarks today by just taking a moment 131 00:04:36,761 --> 00:04:38,594 to describe the heroism that our 132 00:04:38,594 --> 00:04:40,428 marines soldiers and sailors are 133 00:04:40,428 --> 00:04:42,550 exhibiting as they screen the people 134 00:04:42,560 --> 00:04:45,590 who are coming onto the airfield . This 135 00:04:45,590 --> 00:04:47,790 is close up work . The breath of the 136 00:04:47,790 --> 00:04:49,957 person you are searching is upon you . 137 00:04:50,540 --> 00:04:52,710 While we have over watching place , we 138 00:04:52,710 --> 00:04:54,766 still have to touch the close of the 139 00:04:54,766 --> 00:04:56,877 person that's coming in . I think you 140 00:04:56,877 --> 00:04:59,043 all can appreciate the courage and the 141 00:04:59,043 --> 00:05:01,266 dedication that is necessary to do this 142 00:05:01,266 --> 00:05:03,360 job and to do it time after time . 143 00:05:04,140 --> 00:05:06,251 Please remember that we have screened 144 00:05:06,251 --> 00:05:09,750 over 104,000 people . Finally , I'd 145 00:05:09,750 --> 00:05:11,861 like to offer my profound condolences 146 00:05:11,861 --> 00:05:13,972 to the families of our servicemen and 147 00:05:13,972 --> 00:05:15,972 women and Afghan civilians who lost 148 00:05:15,972 --> 00:05:18,420 their lives . Today We have put more 149 00:05:18,420 --> 00:05:20,642 than 5000 U.S . service members at risk 150 00:05:20,940 --> 00:05:23,051 to save as many civilians as we can . 151 00:05:23,240 --> 00:05:25,580 It's a noble mission and today we have 152 00:05:25,580 --> 00:05:27,469 seen firsthand how dangerous that 153 00:05:27,469 --> 00:05:29,790 mission is . IsIS will not deter us 154 00:05:29,790 --> 00:05:31,957 from accomplishing the mission . I can 155 00:05:31,957 --> 00:05:34,040 assure you of that all americans can 156 00:05:34,040 --> 00:05:35,984 and should be proud of the men and 157 00:05:35,984 --> 00:05:38,096 women of the armed forces were facing 158 00:05:38,096 --> 00:05:40,040 these dangerous head on with their 159 00:05:40,040 --> 00:05:41,984 international partners and all our 160 00:05:41,984 --> 00:05:44,096 other friends that are with us And we 161 00:05:44,096 --> 00:05:46,151 appreciate your thoughts and prayers 162 00:05:46,151 --> 00:05:46,120 for all our service members who are 163 00:05:46,120 --> 00:05:48,231 carrying on this mission today . John 164 00:05:48,231 --> 00:05:50,453 I'm not ready to take questions . Thank 165 00:05:50,453 --> 00:05:52,398 you . General we'll start with the 166 00:05:52,398 --> 00:05:54,564 leader . Thank you . General Mackenzie 167 00:05:54,564 --> 00:05:57,080 lead a bald or with a p . Thank you for 168 00:05:57,090 --> 00:06:00,280 taking the time to do this . Um Can you 169 00:06:00,280 --> 00:06:02,880 give us your assessment of the ISIS 170 00:06:02,880 --> 00:06:05,030 threat going forward ? What are you 171 00:06:05,030 --> 00:06:07,840 seeing on the ground now ? Does this 172 00:06:07,840 --> 00:06:11,430 cut the evacuation short do you believe ? 173 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:15,190 Um And are people able to get onto 174 00:06:15,200 --> 00:06:19,010 uh the airport now and then finally 175 00:06:19,200 --> 00:06:22,030 the president has warned that any 176 00:06:22,030 --> 00:06:24,086 attacks against the U . S . Would be 177 00:06:24,086 --> 00:06:27,300 answered . Will this attack be answered 178 00:06:27,310 --> 00:06:31,250 militarily by the U . S . A 179 00:06:31,260 --> 00:06:33,427 number of questions there ? Let me try 180 00:06:33,427 --> 00:06:35,649 to take them in order . So first of all 181 00:06:35,649 --> 00:06:37,927 the threat from ISIS is extremely real . 182 00:06:37,927 --> 00:06:37,710 We've been talking about this several 183 00:06:37,710 --> 00:06:39,654 days . We saw it actually manifest 184 00:06:39,654 --> 00:06:41,821 itself here in the last few hours with 185 00:06:41,821 --> 00:06:43,821 an actual attack . We believe it is 186 00:06:43,821 --> 00:06:46,099 their desire to continue those attacks . 187 00:06:46,099 --> 00:06:48,432 And we expect those attacks to continue . 188 00:06:48,432 --> 00:06:50,654 And we're doing everything we can to be 189 00:06:50,654 --> 00:06:50,440 prepared for those attacks . That 190 00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:52,650 includes reaching out to the Taliban 191 00:06:52,650 --> 00:06:54,706 who are actually providing the outer 192 00:06:54,706 --> 00:06:56,872 security cordon around the airfield to 193 00:06:56,872 --> 00:06:59,094 make sure they know what we expect them 194 00:06:59,094 --> 00:07:00,872 to do to protect us and we will 195 00:07:00,872 --> 00:07:02,872 continue to coordinate with them as 196 00:07:02,872 --> 00:07:05,039 they go forward ? We are continuing to 197 00:07:05,039 --> 00:07:07,039 bring people onto the airfield ? We 198 00:07:07,039 --> 00:07:09,317 just brought a number of buses of , uh , 199 00:07:09,317 --> 00:07:08,840 aboard the airfield over the last 200 00:07:08,840 --> 00:07:11,007 couple of three hours . So we continue 201 00:07:11,007 --> 00:07:12,896 to process will continue to float 202 00:07:12,896 --> 00:07:14,951 people out . The plan is designed to 203 00:07:14,951 --> 00:07:17,007 operate while under stress and under 204 00:07:17,007 --> 00:07:19,284 attack and we will continue to do that . 205 00:07:19,284 --> 00:07:21,340 We will coordinate very carefully to 206 00:07:21,340 --> 00:07:23,451 make sure that it's safe for american 207 00:07:23,451 --> 00:07:25,562 citizens to come to the airfield . If 208 00:07:25,562 --> 00:07:27,729 it's not , we'll tell them to hold and 209 00:07:27,729 --> 00:07:26,870 then we'll , you know , we'll work 210 00:07:26,880 --> 00:07:28,936 other ways to try to get them to the 211 00:07:28,936 --> 00:07:30,880 airfield . But I think our mission 212 00:07:30,880 --> 00:07:32,824 remains . We're still committed to 213 00:07:32,824 --> 00:07:34,547 flowing people out up until we 214 00:07:34,547 --> 00:07:36,602 terminate operations at some point , 215 00:07:36,602 --> 00:07:38,936 you know , towards the end of the month . 216 00:07:38,936 --> 00:07:38,270 But I think we have the ability to 217 00:07:38,280 --> 00:07:40,490 actually to do all of those things as 218 00:07:40,490 --> 00:07:42,880 we go forward . Let me just come back 219 00:07:42,880 --> 00:07:45,890 one moment . And you talked about going 220 00:07:45,890 --> 00:07:48,200 after ISIS . Yes , if we can find who 221 00:07:48,200 --> 00:07:50,256 is associated with this , we will go 222 00:07:50,256 --> 00:07:52,478 after them . We've been clear all along 223 00:07:52,478 --> 00:07:54,700 that we're going to retain the right to 224 00:07:54,700 --> 00:07:56,811 operate against ISIS in Afghanistan . 225 00:07:56,811 --> 00:07:58,978 And we are working very hard right now 226 00:07:58,978 --> 00:08:01,089 to determine attribution to determine 227 00:08:01,089 --> 00:08:00,910 who is associated with this cowardly 228 00:08:00,910 --> 00:08:02,910 attack . And we're prepared to take 229 00:08:02,910 --> 00:08:05,240 action against them , 24 7 . We are 230 00:08:05,240 --> 00:08:08,850 looking for them . David , 231 00:08:09,740 --> 00:08:12,350 General David Barton with Cbs , 232 00:08:13,540 --> 00:08:16,650 27 casualties is a terrible number . 233 00:08:17,340 --> 00:08:20,600 Um 12 dead . Could you 234 00:08:20,600 --> 00:08:24,510 explain the circumstances of 235 00:08:24,510 --> 00:08:27,060 these attacks which resulted in such 236 00:08:27,840 --> 00:08:30,340 high casualties for the U . S . Yeah , 237 00:08:30,840 --> 00:08:33,173 sure , sure , David . So , first of all , 238 00:08:33,173 --> 00:08:35,229 you will understand that we're still 239 00:08:35,229 --> 00:08:37,451 investigating the exact circumstances . 240 00:08:37,451 --> 00:08:39,451 But what I can tell you is this the 241 00:08:39,451 --> 00:08:41,673 attack occurred at a gate at the gate . 242 00:08:41,673 --> 00:08:41,420 We have to check people before they get 243 00:08:41,420 --> 00:08:43,531 onto the airfield . We have to ensure 244 00:08:43,531 --> 00:08:45,476 they're not carrying a bomb or any 245 00:08:45,476 --> 00:08:47,253 other kind of weapon that could 246 00:08:47,253 --> 00:08:49,031 ultimately make its way onto an 247 00:08:49,031 --> 00:08:50,809 aircraft that requires physical 248 00:08:50,809 --> 00:08:50,400 screening . You can't do that with 249 00:08:50,400 --> 00:08:52,511 standoff . You ultimately have to get 250 00:08:52,511 --> 00:08:54,567 very close to that person . So while 251 00:08:54,567 --> 00:08:56,733 the air base itself is surrounded with 252 00:08:56,733 --> 00:08:58,789 the walls , we're well bunkered in . 253 00:08:58,789 --> 00:09:00,678 We've done a variety of things to 254 00:09:00,678 --> 00:09:02,733 protect ourselves at these interface 255 00:09:02,733 --> 00:09:04,511 points these gates where people 256 00:09:04,511 --> 00:09:06,733 actually come on the airfield , there's 257 00:09:06,733 --> 00:09:08,956 no substitute for a young , for a young 258 00:09:08,956 --> 00:09:11,122 man or woman . Young , United States , 259 00:09:11,122 --> 00:09:10,870 man or woman standing up there 260 00:09:10,870 --> 00:09:13,210 conducting a search uh of that person 261 00:09:13,210 --> 00:09:15,432 before we let them on . Now the Taliban 262 00:09:15,432 --> 00:09:17,654 have conducted searches before they get 263 00:09:17,654 --> 00:09:19,654 to that point . And sometimes those 264 00:09:19,654 --> 00:09:19,560 searches have been good and sometimes 265 00:09:19,560 --> 00:09:21,616 not . I will simply note that before 266 00:09:21,616 --> 00:09:23,520 this attack we had passed 104,000 267 00:09:23,520 --> 00:09:25,940 people through . So this attack is one 268 00:09:25,940 --> 00:09:28,051 too many . But we will we'll evaluate 269 00:09:28,051 --> 00:09:29,996 what happened . We'll find ways to 270 00:09:29,996 --> 00:09:32,107 always get better . But the key thing 271 00:09:32,107 --> 00:09:34,329 is you don't want to let somebody on an 272 00:09:34,329 --> 00:09:36,440 airplane carrying a bomb because that 273 00:09:36,440 --> 00:09:38,607 could result even massive loss of life 274 00:09:38,607 --> 00:09:40,384 if an if an airplane were to be 275 00:09:40,384 --> 00:09:40,190 destroyed . So you got to do the 276 00:09:40,190 --> 00:09:42,134 searches . We work with our afghan 277 00:09:42,134 --> 00:09:44,412 partners on the ground , the N . S . U . 278 00:09:44,412 --> 00:09:46,468 Elements to conduct those searches . 279 00:09:46,468 --> 00:09:48,690 But ultimately americans have got to be 280 00:09:48,690 --> 00:09:48,600 in danger to do these searches . 281 00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:50,767 There's really there's really no other 282 00:09:50,767 --> 00:09:52,656 way to do it . And uh again , I I 283 00:09:52,656 --> 00:09:55,410 cannot tell you how impressed I am with 284 00:09:55,410 --> 00:09:57,850 the daily heroism of the men and women 285 00:09:57,850 --> 00:09:59,906 that are out there doing this work . 286 00:09:59,906 --> 00:10:01,739 Typically soldiers , sailors and 287 00:10:01,739 --> 00:10:03,794 marines that are doing that work and 288 00:10:03,794 --> 00:10:05,961 they're right up close to thousands of 289 00:10:05,961 --> 00:10:07,961 people that are flowing through the 290 00:10:07,961 --> 00:10:07,560 airfield . You've all seen the images 291 00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:10,151 and uh we'll be able to get up and do 292 00:10:10,151 --> 00:10:12,460 it day after day . It's remarkable and 293 00:10:12,470 --> 00:10:14,830 this time looks like somebody got close 294 00:10:14,830 --> 00:10:17,052 to us . We'll find out why we'll try to 295 00:10:17,052 --> 00:10:19,219 improve our procedures . Uh it is 12 , 296 00:10:19,219 --> 00:10:21,386 12 , 12 service members dying . Nobody 297 00:10:21,386 --> 00:10:23,600 feels that more closely more directly 298 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:25,767 than me and everyone else in the chain 299 00:10:25,767 --> 00:10:27,878 of command . And we recognize that we 300 00:10:27,878 --> 00:10:29,711 need to continue to evaluate our 301 00:10:29,711 --> 00:10:31,767 procedures as we go forward . At the 302 00:10:31,767 --> 00:10:31,310 same time . There's a tension there . 303 00:10:31,330 --> 00:10:33,441 We have to continue to let people own 304 00:10:33,441 --> 00:10:35,663 the airfield because that is why we are 305 00:10:35,663 --> 00:10:37,386 there were not there to defend 306 00:10:37,386 --> 00:10:39,219 ourselves , were there to defend 307 00:10:39,219 --> 00:10:41,219 ourselves while we process american 308 00:10:41,219 --> 00:10:43,219 citizens first , but also the other 309 00:10:43,219 --> 00:10:42,930 categories of people that I've 310 00:10:42,930 --> 00:10:45,041 mentioned ? Get them to a place where 311 00:10:45,041 --> 00:10:47,263 we can fly them out to a safer , better 312 00:10:47,263 --> 00:10:49,263 future . So just to be clear , this 313 00:10:49,263 --> 00:10:53,030 suicide bomber was going through the 314 00:10:53,030 --> 00:10:56,440 gate being search checked 315 00:10:56,450 --> 00:10:59,130 by U . S . Service members when he 316 00:10:59,130 --> 00:11:02,680 detonated his vest , David . That 317 00:11:02,690 --> 00:11:04,634 that's uh that would be my working 318 00:11:04,634 --> 00:11:06,746 assumption . I know this . He did not 319 00:11:06,746 --> 00:11:08,857 get inside me . He did not get on the 320 00:11:08,857 --> 00:11:11,023 installation . It was at the interface 321 00:11:11,023 --> 00:11:10,610 point where they try to come in with 322 00:11:10,610 --> 00:11:12,777 this attack occurred and we just don't 323 00:11:12,777 --> 00:11:14,888 know more . Right now we're gathering 324 00:11:14,888 --> 00:11:16,777 that information because you will 325 00:11:16,777 --> 00:11:16,710 understand what we're investigating 326 00:11:16,710 --> 00:11:18,821 that . But right now our focus really 327 00:11:18,821 --> 00:11:20,821 we have other active threat strings 328 00:11:20,821 --> 00:11:22,710 extremely active threat . Strange 329 00:11:22,710 --> 00:11:24,877 against the airfield . We want to make 330 00:11:24,877 --> 00:11:27,099 sure that we've taken the steps we need 331 00:11:27,099 --> 00:11:26,960 to take to protect ourselves there . 332 00:11:26,970 --> 00:11:29,137 But our focus is on that over the next 333 00:11:29,137 --> 00:11:31,303 few hours a day or two . We'll learn a 334 00:11:31,303 --> 00:11:33,526 lot more about what happened here . And 335 00:11:33,526 --> 00:11:35,581 I'm sure we'll be able to share that 336 00:11:35,581 --> 00:11:37,470 with you Right now , our focus is 337 00:11:37,470 --> 00:11:39,526 actually going forward ensuring that 338 00:11:39,526 --> 00:11:41,692 another attack of this nature does not 339 00:11:41,692 --> 00:11:43,914 occur because , as you know , typically 340 00:11:43,914 --> 00:11:46,081 the pattern is multiple attacks and we 341 00:11:46,081 --> 00:11:45,360 want to be prepared to be ready to 342 00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:49,110 defend against that Kourtney , you take 343 00:11:49,280 --> 00:11:51,391 Mackenzie ? It's Courtney QB FROM NBC 344 00:11:51,391 --> 00:11:53,391 News . Can you tell us a little bit 345 00:11:53,391 --> 00:11:55,620 more about the these extremely real 346 00:11:55,630 --> 00:11:57,890 additional threats from ISIS is a 347 00:11:57,900 --> 00:12:00,990 concern about more suicide attacks . Um 348 00:12:01,000 --> 00:12:03,150 and and also about some of the steps 349 00:12:03,150 --> 00:12:05,094 that you may be taking to mitigate 350 00:12:05,094 --> 00:12:06,928 future attacks . I mean would it 351 00:12:06,928 --> 00:12:08,817 include putting U . S . Troops or 352 00:12:08,817 --> 00:12:11,490 marines outside the gates outside of 353 00:12:11,490 --> 00:12:13,546 the airport for additional perimeter 354 00:12:13,546 --> 00:12:15,768 security . And then finally with all of 355 00:12:15,768 --> 00:12:17,823 this , is there any discussion about 356 00:12:17,823 --> 00:12:19,934 sending any additional U . S . Troops 357 00:12:19,934 --> 00:12:21,712 to Kabul airport for additional 358 00:12:21,712 --> 00:12:23,879 security measures ? So let me actually 359 00:12:23,879 --> 00:12:25,934 answer the last part of the question 360 00:12:25,934 --> 00:12:28,157 first . We assess we have the forces we 361 00:12:28,157 --> 00:12:30,268 need to protect ourselves there . I'm 362 00:12:30,268 --> 00:12:32,434 always in a constant dialogue with the 363 00:12:32,434 --> 00:12:34,657 secretary . If I needed anything else , 364 00:12:34,657 --> 00:12:34,030 I'll be talking to him immediately . 365 00:12:34,030 --> 00:12:36,030 But I think we have what we need to 366 00:12:36,030 --> 00:12:38,030 protect ourselves . So let's talk a 367 00:12:38,030 --> 00:12:40,141 little bit about the threat strings . 368 00:12:40,141 --> 00:12:42,197 So very , very real threats . Dreams 369 00:12:42,197 --> 00:12:44,900 very very what we would call tactical , 370 00:12:44,900 --> 00:12:47,067 that means imminent could occur at any 371 00:12:47,067 --> 00:12:49,067 moment . And they range from rocket 372 00:12:49,067 --> 00:12:51,233 attacks . We know that they would like 373 00:12:51,233 --> 00:12:53,567 to live a rocket in there if they could . 374 00:12:53,567 --> 00:12:53,490 Now we actually have pretty good 375 00:12:53,490 --> 00:12:55,601 protection against that . We have our 376 00:12:55,601 --> 00:12:57,920 our anti rocket and mortar system , the 377 00:12:57,920 --> 00:12:59,976 gun systems that those who have been 378 00:12:59,976 --> 00:13:02,087 out there are very familiar with that 379 00:13:02,087 --> 00:13:04,031 are pretty effective against these 380 00:13:04,031 --> 00:13:03,930 kinds of attacks . We have well 381 00:13:03,930 --> 00:13:06,041 positioned around the boundary of the 382 00:13:06,041 --> 00:13:08,152 airfield and we feel that would be we 383 00:13:08,152 --> 00:13:10,319 will be in good shape for that kind of 384 00:13:10,319 --> 00:13:12,541 attack occur . We also know they aim to 385 00:13:12,541 --> 00:13:14,541 get a suicide vehicle borne suicide 386 00:13:14,541 --> 00:13:16,486 attack in if they can from a small 387 00:13:16,486 --> 00:13:18,541 vehicle to a large vehicle , they're 388 00:13:18,541 --> 00:13:20,486 working all those options and then 389 00:13:20,486 --> 00:13:20,010 we've just seen their ability to 390 00:13:20,010 --> 00:13:22,200 deliver a walk in a best wearing 391 00:13:22,210 --> 00:13:25,200 suicide , uh suicide attacker , all of 392 00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:27,200 those things we look at . Now , the 393 00:13:27,200 --> 00:13:29,500 other thing we do is we share versions 394 00:13:29,510 --> 00:13:32,540 of this information with the Taliban so 395 00:13:32,540 --> 00:13:34,310 that they can actually do some 396 00:13:34,310 --> 00:13:36,310 searching out there for us . And we 397 00:13:36,310 --> 00:13:38,310 believe that some attacks have been 398 00:13:38,310 --> 00:13:40,421 thwarted by . Then again , we've been 399 00:13:40,421 --> 00:13:42,366 doing this for a long , we've been 400 00:13:42,366 --> 00:13:44,532 doing this since the 14th . Uh this is 401 00:13:44,532 --> 00:13:44,330 a this is an attack has been carried 402 00:13:44,330 --> 00:13:46,330 out , we believe it's possible that 403 00:13:46,330 --> 00:13:48,552 others have been thwarted . We cut down 404 00:13:48,552 --> 00:13:50,774 the information , we give the taliban . 405 00:13:50,774 --> 00:13:50,580 They don't get the full range of 406 00:13:50,580 --> 00:13:52,747 information we have , but we give them 407 00:13:52,747 --> 00:13:54,913 enough to act in time and space to try 408 00:13:54,913 --> 00:13:56,969 to prevent these attacks . The other 409 00:13:56,969 --> 00:13:59,136 thing we try to do is we tried to push 410 00:13:59,136 --> 00:14:01,247 out the boundary even further so that 411 00:14:01,247 --> 00:14:03,302 we don't get large crowds massing at 412 00:14:03,302 --> 00:14:05,636 the gate . Clearly at a big eight today , 413 00:14:05,636 --> 00:14:07,636 we had a larger crowd there that we 414 00:14:07,636 --> 00:14:07,530 would like , which goes to show you 415 00:14:07,530 --> 00:14:09,752 that the system is not perfect , but we 416 00:14:09,752 --> 00:14:11,919 have gained large elements of standoff 417 00:14:11,919 --> 00:14:14,141 at other gates and we want to keep that 418 00:14:14,141 --> 00:14:16,363 kind of standoff in place as you know , 419 00:14:16,363 --> 00:14:18,252 standoff for attacks like this is 420 00:14:18,252 --> 00:14:20,586 always the best defense . Unfortunately , 421 00:14:20,586 --> 00:14:22,530 we just don't have the opportunity 422 00:14:22,530 --> 00:14:24,697 given the geography of the ground that 423 00:14:24,697 --> 00:14:24,670 were owned Always gain that kind of 424 00:14:24,670 --> 00:14:27,290 standoff . So we take let me close up 425 00:14:27,290 --> 00:14:29,550 your question by saying we take the 426 00:14:29,560 --> 00:14:31,838 threat of these attacks very seriously . 427 00:14:31,838 --> 00:14:34,060 We're working very hard . We were doing 428 00:14:34,060 --> 00:14:36,227 a variety of things . We got uh as you 429 00:14:36,227 --> 00:14:38,449 know , we have a H64 attack helicopters 430 00:14:38,449 --> 00:14:40,671 on the ground that we're flying to take 431 00:14:40,671 --> 00:14:42,727 a look . They have very good thermal 432 00:14:42,727 --> 00:14:44,949 and optical imaging systems . We've got 433 00:14:44,949 --> 00:14:47,060 aircraft overhead that also have very 434 00:14:47,060 --> 00:14:49,282 good imaging systems . We have unmanned 435 00:14:49,282 --> 00:14:51,449 aircraft MQ nine that have the ability 436 00:14:51,449 --> 00:14:53,393 to look . All of these systems are 437 00:14:53,393 --> 00:14:55,171 being applied in defense of the 438 00:14:55,171 --> 00:14:57,171 airfield , all of it on a continual 439 00:14:57,171 --> 00:14:59,171 basis , all of them vectored by the 440 00:14:59,171 --> 00:14:59,140 intelligence that we receive and that 441 00:14:59,140 --> 00:15:01,307 we and then we also use the Taliban as 442 00:15:01,307 --> 00:15:03,084 a tool to protect us as much as 443 00:15:03,084 --> 00:15:04,973 possible . I'm going to go to the 444 00:15:04,973 --> 00:15:07,307 phones . I haven't done that yet , Alex , 445 00:15:07,307 --> 00:15:06,860 Horton Washington post 446 00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:16,780 Alex . You there , yep , you have a 447 00:15:16,780 --> 00:15:19,980 meeting uh agent all this is Alex Orton 448 00:15:19,980 --> 00:15:22,091 with the Washington post . Thanks for 449 00:15:22,091 --> 00:15:24,313 doing this . Uh can you give us a sense 450 00:15:24,313 --> 00:15:25,924 of where you are in casualty 451 00:15:25,924 --> 00:15:28,036 notification for , for these folks on 452 00:15:28,036 --> 00:15:30,147 the ground . Uh you know how long you 453 00:15:30,147 --> 00:15:32,313 expect to take given that it's a large 454 00:15:32,313 --> 00:15:34,424 number . Um , and also can you talk a 455 00:15:34,424 --> 00:15:36,680 little bit about , you know , how the 456 00:15:36,690 --> 00:15:38,912 forces have reacted ? You said that you 457 00:15:38,912 --> 00:15:41,340 introduced a little probably more 458 00:15:41,340 --> 00:15:43,451 standoff at this point , But what are 459 00:15:43,451 --> 00:15:45,507 other measures are taken to increase 460 00:15:45,507 --> 00:15:47,729 security after the attack ? Sure , So I 461 00:15:47,729 --> 00:15:49,951 would I would actually referring to the 462 00:15:49,951 --> 00:15:52,118 service discipline for notification of 463 00:15:52,118 --> 00:15:54,284 casualties . That's the point . That's 464 00:15:54,284 --> 00:15:56,396 super to provide . And I believe that 465 00:15:56,396 --> 00:15:58,451 process is ongoing , but I just I do 466 00:15:58,451 --> 00:16:00,173 not have visibility on it . My 467 00:16:00,173 --> 00:16:02,396 visibility is fully forward against the 468 00:16:02,396 --> 00:16:04,507 day to day , practical threat that we 469 00:16:04,507 --> 00:16:03,970 face in the theater , but there are 470 00:16:03,970 --> 00:16:06,026 other people who can probably answer 471 00:16:06,026 --> 00:16:08,081 that question for you . I'm just I'm 472 00:16:08,081 --> 00:16:10,303 just not that person Alex . So in terms 473 00:16:10,303 --> 00:16:12,359 of practical things that we're doing 474 00:16:12,359 --> 00:16:14,581 okay . Again , we've reached out to the 475 00:16:14,581 --> 00:16:16,526 Taliban , we told them you need to 476 00:16:16,526 --> 00:16:18,414 continue to push out the security 477 00:16:18,414 --> 00:16:20,637 perimeter . We've identified some roads 478 00:16:20,637 --> 00:16:20,020 that we would like for them to close . 479 00:16:20,020 --> 00:16:22,076 They've identified that they will be 480 00:16:22,076 --> 00:16:24,298 willing to close those roads because we 481 00:16:24,298 --> 00:16:26,298 assess the threat of a suicide born 482 00:16:26,298 --> 00:16:28,409 vehicle threat is high right now . So 483 00:16:28,409 --> 00:16:30,464 we want to reduce the possibility of 484 00:16:30,464 --> 00:16:32,576 one of those vehicles getting close . 485 00:16:32,576 --> 00:16:32,500 So we're actually moving very 486 00:16:32,500 --> 00:16:34,611 aggressively to do that . We talked a 487 00:16:34,611 --> 00:16:36,500 little bit about the the over the 488 00:16:36,500 --> 00:16:38,611 Overwatch that we have in place , but 489 00:16:38,611 --> 00:16:40,556 I'll review it again , we have our 490 00:16:40,556 --> 00:16:42,722 unmanned aircraft RM Q nines and other 491 00:16:42,722 --> 00:16:44,833 unmanned drone systems that have very 492 00:16:44,833 --> 00:16:47,056 good optical and other means of looking 493 00:16:47,056 --> 00:16:49,167 down ? So we look at what's happening 494 00:16:49,167 --> 00:16:48,730 around the gate , We try to identify 495 00:16:48,730 --> 00:16:50,674 patterns and we got highly trained 496 00:16:50,674 --> 00:16:52,730 people that take a look at that . We 497 00:16:52,730 --> 00:16:54,690 also have our aircraft that we fly 498 00:16:54,690 --> 00:16:57,400 locally uh at the age 64 . Is that I 499 00:16:57,400 --> 00:16:59,511 mentioned a few moments ago , as well 500 00:16:59,511 --> 00:17:01,678 as other manned aircraft that come off 501 00:17:01,678 --> 00:17:03,844 the USs , off the carrier that we have 502 00:17:03,844 --> 00:17:06,067 off the Micron coast as well as U . S . 503 00:17:06,067 --> 00:17:08,067 Air Force aircraft that we bring up 504 00:17:08,067 --> 00:17:10,178 from out of from out of Afghanistan . 505 00:17:10,178 --> 00:17:12,178 Everything ranging from 15 to 81 30 506 00:17:12,178 --> 00:17:14,122 gunships And as you know , the 130 507 00:17:14,122 --> 00:17:16,011 gunship has a very highly capable 508 00:17:16,011 --> 00:17:18,122 targeting system and it's also a very 509 00:17:18,122 --> 00:17:20,289 visible platform . And we know we know 510 00:17:20,289 --> 00:17:22,090 from long experience visible 511 00:17:22,090 --> 00:17:24,550 demonstration of these kinds of S . R 512 00:17:24,560 --> 00:17:26,727 tends to dissuade the attacker because 513 00:17:26,727 --> 00:17:29,060 they know that if we can see them do it , 514 00:17:29,060 --> 00:17:31,171 we're gonna strike them immediately . 515 00:17:31,171 --> 00:17:33,338 So we'll be prepared to do that should 516 00:17:33,338 --> 00:17:35,616 it become necessary to defend the base ? 517 00:17:35,616 --> 00:17:37,727 We're looking very hard . We assess , 518 00:17:37,727 --> 00:17:37,270 we are in a period of heightened 519 00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:39,280 warning right now and we're working 520 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:41,447 through that as aggressively as we can 521 00:17:41,447 --> 00:17:45,110 over . Gordon ? General 522 00:17:45,120 --> 00:17:47,176 Gordon Wolf of Wall Street Journal . 523 00:17:47,176 --> 00:17:49,650 Can you tell us if you think that your 524 00:17:49,660 --> 00:17:51,827 recommendation for staying potentially 525 00:17:51,827 --> 00:17:54,190 after August 31 would change because of 526 00:17:54,190 --> 00:17:57,090 this threat stream ? Uh or are you 527 00:17:57,090 --> 00:17:59,257 concerned about the threat stream ? Um 528 00:17:59,257 --> 00:18:02,120 And also you know the U . S . Military 529 00:18:02,120 --> 00:18:04,287 and the taliban been coordinating very 530 00:18:04,287 --> 00:18:08,050 closely on various things . Do you 531 00:18:08,840 --> 00:18:10,950 still trust the taliban ? And is it 532 00:18:10,950 --> 00:18:14,610 possible that they let this happen ? So 533 00:18:14,610 --> 00:18:16,943 as to whether or not they let it happen ? 534 00:18:16,943 --> 00:18:18,999 I don't know . I don't think there's 535 00:18:18,999 --> 00:18:21,110 anything anything to convince me that 536 00:18:21,110 --> 00:18:20,920 they let it happen as to whether or not 537 00:18:20,920 --> 00:18:22,864 I trust them . That's a that's not 538 00:18:22,864 --> 00:18:25,031 necessarily a that's a word I use very 539 00:18:25,031 --> 00:18:27,309 carefully . You've heard me say before . 540 00:18:27,309 --> 00:18:29,531 It's not what they say , it's what they 541 00:18:29,531 --> 00:18:31,642 do . They have a practical reason for 542 00:18:31,642 --> 00:18:33,642 wanting us to get out of here by 31 543 00:18:33,642 --> 00:18:35,698 August and that they want to reclaim 544 00:18:35,698 --> 00:18:37,864 they want to reclaim the airfield . We 545 00:18:37,864 --> 00:18:40,031 want to get out by that day to if it's 546 00:18:40,031 --> 00:18:40,010 going to be possible to do so . So we 547 00:18:40,010 --> 00:18:42,890 share a common purpose to as long as we 548 00:18:42,890 --> 00:18:45,810 kept that common purpose aligned , 549 00:18:45,820 --> 00:18:47,987 they've been they've been uh useful to 550 00:18:47,987 --> 00:18:49,987 work with . They've cut some of our 551 00:18:49,987 --> 00:18:52,153 security mitigate some of our security 552 00:18:52,153 --> 00:18:54,264 concerns down and they've been useful 553 00:18:54,264 --> 00:18:56,376 to work with going forward . Now long 554 00:18:56,376 --> 00:18:58,542 term I don't know what that's going to 555 00:18:58,542 --> 00:19:00,653 be . I will tell you this anytime you 556 00:19:00,653 --> 00:19:02,709 build a noncombatant evacuation plan 557 00:19:02,709 --> 00:19:04,598 like this you bring in forces you 558 00:19:04,598 --> 00:19:06,820 expect to be attacked . So we expect we 559 00:19:06,820 --> 00:19:08,820 didn't we thought this would happen 560 00:19:08,820 --> 00:19:10,931 sooner or later . It's tragic that it 561 00:19:10,931 --> 00:19:10,470 happened today is tragic . There is 562 00:19:10,470 --> 00:19:12,248 this much loss of life . We are 563 00:19:12,248 --> 00:19:14,470 prepared to continue the mission . I've 564 00:19:14,470 --> 00:19:16,248 had a great opportunity to have 565 00:19:16,248 --> 00:19:18,470 dialogue with my chain of command on it 566 00:19:18,470 --> 00:19:18,200 and I'm not gonna be able to share with 567 00:19:18,200 --> 00:19:20,730 you what my advice has been as you know , 568 00:19:20,730 --> 00:19:22,841 and understand . Gordon ? But I think 569 00:19:22,841 --> 00:19:25,008 we can continue to conduct our mission 570 00:19:25,008 --> 00:19:27,230 even while we're receiving attacks like 571 00:19:27,230 --> 00:19:30,170 this here . Yeah , they were met with 572 00:19:30,170 --> 00:19:32,337 the new york times even before today's 573 00:19:32,337 --> 00:19:34,530 attack . You are just four days or so 574 00:19:34,540 --> 00:19:38,480 from uh from from leaving . How 575 00:19:38,490 --> 00:19:40,712 soon will you have to start diminishing 576 00:19:40,712 --> 00:19:42,768 the evacuation flights ? If indeed , 577 00:19:42,768 --> 00:19:44,823 those can continue to make space and 578 00:19:44,823 --> 00:19:47,046 time for the military retrograde , that 579 00:19:47,046 --> 00:19:48,990 is the withdrawal of the remaining 580 00:19:48,990 --> 00:19:51,150 troops there in their equipment . So 581 00:19:51,150 --> 00:19:53,372 eric without getting into specifics , I 582 00:19:53,372 --> 00:19:55,150 would tell you that the plan is 583 00:19:55,150 --> 00:19:57,094 designed to maximize throughput of 584 00:19:57,094 --> 00:19:59,261 evacuees , even as we begin to prepare 585 00:19:59,261 --> 00:20:01,428 to draw down the force on the ground , 586 00:20:01,428 --> 00:20:03,372 so we recognize there is a need to 587 00:20:03,372 --> 00:20:02,910 balance the two . So we're not gonna 588 00:20:02,910 --> 00:20:05,021 get to a point where suddenly we turn 589 00:20:05,021 --> 00:20:07,132 off the spigot , it will draw down as 590 00:20:07,132 --> 00:20:09,188 we get closer to the end date . It's 591 00:20:09,188 --> 00:20:11,243 not useful for me to share that that 592 00:20:11,243 --> 00:20:13,410 date with you right now , when we will 593 00:20:13,410 --> 00:20:15,577 begin to draw down those flights . But 594 00:20:15,577 --> 00:20:17,743 but we will do it at some point at the 595 00:20:17,743 --> 00:20:19,854 same time . I wanna emphasize again , 596 00:20:19,854 --> 00:20:21,688 the plan is designed to maximize 597 00:20:21,688 --> 00:20:23,354 pushing people out even as we 598 00:20:23,354 --> 00:20:25,243 reconfigure the force continue to 599 00:20:25,243 --> 00:20:27,466 defend ourselves and get ready to bring 600 00:20:27,466 --> 00:20:29,410 out our own equipment , military , 601 00:20:29,410 --> 00:20:29,270 ultimately our own military person . 602 00:20:29,740 --> 00:20:31,851 And you know , if I could just follow 603 00:20:31,851 --> 00:20:34,073 up follow up on that , will you have to 604 00:20:34,073 --> 00:20:36,240 also develop alternative routes beyond 605 00:20:36,240 --> 00:20:36,220 those that you already have to get the 606 00:20:36,220 --> 00:20:38,331 remaining americans in Kabul who want 607 00:20:38,331 --> 00:20:40,970 to leave safely to the airport ? So I 608 00:20:40,970 --> 00:20:43,192 would tell you that we have worked over 609 00:20:43,192 --> 00:20:45,460 the last week , we have brought in 610 00:20:45,470 --> 00:20:47,910 hundreds of americans by working 611 00:20:47,920 --> 00:20:50,280 alternate routes to get them in by 612 00:20:50,290 --> 00:20:52,360 establishing contact with them by 613 00:20:52,370 --> 00:20:55,170 directing them down . A steady 614 00:20:55,170 --> 00:20:57,337 different ways to get to the airport . 615 00:20:57,337 --> 00:20:59,448 Our task force , R . J . Sock element 616 00:20:59,448 --> 00:21:01,059 does that on the ground very 617 00:21:01,059 --> 00:21:03,059 effectively in coordination with uh 618 00:21:03,059 --> 00:21:05,226 with Admiral Vasili who is the overall 619 00:21:05,226 --> 00:21:07,392 commander there . So we continue to do 620 00:21:07,392 --> 00:21:09,559 that . That's not something that we're 621 00:21:09,559 --> 00:21:09,380 beginning now we've done that all along 622 00:21:09,390 --> 00:21:11,334 and we will continue to do that up 623 00:21:11,334 --> 00:21:14,940 until the last moment , jennifer 624 00:21:14,940 --> 00:21:18,460 Griffin Fox news , can you say , was 625 00:21:18,460 --> 00:21:21,320 there one or two suicide bombers at the 626 00:21:21,330 --> 00:21:23,170 Abbey Gate ? And can you say for 627 00:21:23,170 --> 00:21:25,392 certain that it was a male bomber ? And 628 00:21:25,392 --> 00:21:27,559 can you give us any more details about 629 00:21:27,559 --> 00:21:29,670 the second explosion that occurred at 630 00:21:29,670 --> 00:21:31,940 Baron Hotel ? Was that a V Bed ? Was 631 00:21:31,940 --> 00:21:34,180 that a car bomb ? Or was that also a 632 00:21:34,180 --> 00:21:37,610 suicide bomber ? Um Finally there are 633 00:21:37,610 --> 00:21:39,832 State Department employees who are side 634 00:21:39,832 --> 00:21:41,999 by side with us marines at that gate ? 635 00:21:41,999 --> 00:21:44,110 Were there any other U . S . Citizens 636 00:21:44,110 --> 00:21:46,221 killed in the attack and why were the 637 00:21:46,221 --> 00:21:48,388 marines so close together that so many 638 00:21:48,388 --> 00:21:51,920 were killed in one strike ? So we think 639 00:21:51,930 --> 00:21:54,450 one suicide bomb at Abbey Gate , 640 00:21:55,340 --> 00:21:57,229 uh , I don't know if it's male or 641 00:21:57,229 --> 00:21:58,896 female , Just don't have that 642 00:21:58,896 --> 00:22:01,070 information . Um , uh , don't , uh , 643 00:22:01,080 --> 00:22:03,302 don't know much about the second bomb , 644 00:22:03,302 --> 00:22:05,469 except one went off in the vicinity of 645 00:22:05,469 --> 00:22:07,469 the Baron Hotel , which is , you're 646 00:22:07,469 --> 00:22:09,747 aware , as a deeply bunkered structure . 647 00:22:09,747 --> 00:22:11,913 And as far as I know , no , there were 648 00:22:11,913 --> 00:22:14,024 no UK military casualties as a result 649 00:22:14,024 --> 00:22:16,080 of that , there may have been afghan 650 00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:18,024 casualties and I'm sure there were 651 00:22:18,024 --> 00:22:20,247 afghan casualties , but it will take us 652 00:22:20,247 --> 00:22:22,413 a little bit of time to actually learn 653 00:22:22,413 --> 00:22:24,358 how many afghans came casualties . 654 00:22:24,358 --> 00:22:26,580 While we took some of them on board the 655 00:22:26,580 --> 00:22:28,747 installation , many of them were taken 656 00:22:28,747 --> 00:22:28,320 to hospitals out in town . So , I , 657 00:22:28,330 --> 00:22:30,386 what I see is what I , what I get an 658 00:22:30,386 --> 00:22:32,441 open source reporting uh , about the 659 00:22:32,441 --> 00:22:34,640 nature of those casualties , but we're 660 00:22:34,640 --> 00:22:36,862 trying to gather more information about 661 00:22:36,862 --> 00:22:39,084 it . So , the last point , uh , I would 662 00:22:39,084 --> 00:22:41,251 tell you , I don't know , I don't know 663 00:22:41,251 --> 00:22:43,307 the size of the bomb and the size of 664 00:22:43,307 --> 00:22:43,220 the bomb is directly related to how 665 00:22:43,220 --> 00:22:45,500 many people are going to be affected by 666 00:22:45,500 --> 00:22:47,630 the blast radius of the weapon . Uh , 667 00:22:47,640 --> 00:22:50,050 and so I we're gonna investigate that , 668 00:22:50,060 --> 00:22:52,116 as I've noted before . You're at the 669 00:22:52,116 --> 00:22:54,282 interface point there at these Gates , 670 00:22:54,282 --> 00:22:56,504 Somebody's actually got to look someone 671 00:22:56,504 --> 00:22:58,338 else in the eyes and decide that 672 00:22:58,338 --> 00:23:00,560 they're ready to come in . And so we'll 673 00:23:00,560 --> 00:23:02,671 find out exactly what happened beyond 674 00:23:02,671 --> 00:23:04,893 that . I would not want to speculate at 675 00:23:04,893 --> 00:23:07,060 this time , jennifer , thank you . Any 676 00:23:07,060 --> 00:23:09,227 other american citizens from the State 677 00:23:09,227 --> 00:23:11,393 Department who were killed ? None that 678 00:23:11,393 --> 00:23:13,616 I am aware of now . Okay , I need to go 679 00:23:13,616 --> 00:23:15,727 back to the phones , Laura Seligman , 680 00:23:15,740 --> 00:23:17,962 Hi , general , thanks so much for doing 681 00:23:17,962 --> 00:23:20,018 this . A couple questions . First of 682 00:23:20,018 --> 00:23:21,962 all , can you tell me ? Um , we've 683 00:23:21,962 --> 00:23:24,420 heard reports of a third and possibly 684 00:23:24,420 --> 00:23:26,830 1/4 attack in Kabul today . Can you 685 00:23:26,830 --> 00:23:29,860 confirm those ? And then also , can you 686 00:23:29,860 --> 00:23:32,470 tell us , how exactly are you still 687 00:23:32,470 --> 00:23:34,900 conducting these evacuation flights ? 688 00:23:34,910 --> 00:23:37,360 Are you concerned about manpads and 689 00:23:37,360 --> 00:23:39,138 other threats to the aircraft ? 690 00:23:40,840 --> 00:23:43,770 Well , indications of other attacks in 691 00:23:43,770 --> 00:23:45,826 Kabul , but we have not been able to 692 00:23:45,826 --> 00:23:47,992 run that information down . Uh , so we 693 00:23:47,992 --> 00:23:50,048 we see it , we , you know , we could 694 00:23:50,048 --> 00:23:52,048 open source reporting on it , but I 695 00:23:52,048 --> 00:23:53,992 can't confirm that there have been 696 00:23:53,992 --> 00:23:55,992 other attacks in Kabul away from HK 697 00:23:55,992 --> 00:23:58,103 today . We continue to take a look at 698 00:23:58,103 --> 00:24:00,326 that very hard . I will tell you this , 699 00:24:00,326 --> 00:23:59,930 the safety of our aircraft coming in 700 00:23:59,930 --> 00:24:01,880 and out is a paramount importance 701 00:24:01,890 --> 00:24:03,612 because obviously you have the 702 00:24:03,612 --> 00:24:05,920 opportunity there to for 450 or more 703 00:24:05,920 --> 00:24:08,142 people to die if you have a significant 704 00:24:08,142 --> 00:24:10,142 mishap of the aircraft . We we know 705 00:24:10,142 --> 00:24:12,364 that ISIS would like to get after those 706 00:24:12,364 --> 00:24:14,540 aircraft if they can . We don't know 707 00:24:14,540 --> 00:24:16,651 that . They don't believe they have a 708 00:24:16,651 --> 00:24:18,762 man pad capable of doing it . Uh they 709 00:24:18,762 --> 00:24:20,762 have taken shots at our aircraft on 710 00:24:20,762 --> 00:24:22,818 occasion . Without effect , we think 711 00:24:22,818 --> 00:24:24,873 that's going to continue . Uh and we 712 00:24:24,873 --> 00:24:26,762 will , but as you know , military 713 00:24:26,762 --> 00:24:28,984 aircraft have a variety of self defense 714 00:24:28,984 --> 00:24:28,610 systems . What's more vulnerable 715 00:24:28,610 --> 00:24:30,721 actually are the charter aircraft and 716 00:24:30,721 --> 00:24:32,888 other aircraft that are coming in that 717 00:24:32,888 --> 00:24:34,888 do not have those do not have those 718 00:24:34,888 --> 00:24:37,110 systems . So we with our is are we look 719 00:24:37,110 --> 00:24:39,277 very carefully at the approach pattern 720 00:24:39,277 --> 00:24:41,221 and the departure pattern off that 721 00:24:41,221 --> 00:24:43,388 runway to see what we , you know , see 722 00:24:43,388 --> 00:24:45,443 if we see any sign of something that 723 00:24:45,443 --> 00:24:47,332 might pose a threat to aircraft . 724 00:24:47,332 --> 00:24:46,930 That's one of the things that we look 725 00:24:46,930 --> 00:24:49,420 at religiously uh , throughout the day 726 00:24:49,420 --> 00:24:51,142 and throughout the night as we 727 00:24:51,142 --> 00:24:53,198 conducted as we conduct operations . 728 00:24:53,198 --> 00:24:55,364 Because really the aircraft , the only 729 00:24:55,364 --> 00:24:55,260 way we're gonna get people out of there . 730 00:24:55,270 --> 00:24:57,381 So we are keenly sensitive threats to 731 00:24:57,381 --> 00:25:01,240 our aircraft . We're going to uh , I'm 732 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:03,518 sorry guys guys , we gotta keep moving . 733 00:25:03,518 --> 00:25:05,740 Guys take one more question then , give 734 00:25:05,740 --> 00:25:07,629 the general a chance to close out 735 00:25:07,629 --> 00:25:09,907 injuries . General . I know it's early . 736 00:25:09,907 --> 00:25:12,018 Bye . At this moment in time . How do 737 00:25:12,018 --> 00:25:14,240 you believe the suicide bombers made it 738 00:25:14,240 --> 00:25:16,462 through several checkpoints where there 739 00:25:16,462 --> 00:25:18,462 was taliban or afghan forces to the 740 00:25:18,462 --> 00:25:20,573 marines . He believes it was it was a 741 00:25:20,573 --> 00:25:22,629 failure or they were able to somehow 742 00:25:22,629 --> 00:25:24,851 evade them and make it to the marines . 743 00:25:24,851 --> 00:25:27,073 Well , clearly , if we were able to get 744 00:25:27,073 --> 00:25:29,184 up to the marines at the screening at 745 00:25:29,184 --> 00:25:31,129 the at the entry point of the base 746 00:25:31,129 --> 00:25:31,010 because a failure somewhere it was a 747 00:25:31,010 --> 00:25:33,940 failure by uh Taliban operate with 748 00:25:33,940 --> 00:25:36,162 varying degrees of confidence . Some of 749 00:25:36,162 --> 00:25:38,384 those guys are very scrupulously good . 750 00:25:38,384 --> 00:25:40,384 Some of them are not . I just don't 751 00:25:40,384 --> 00:25:42,496 know the answer to that question . Uh 752 00:25:42,496 --> 00:25:44,551 but we will you can be assured we're 753 00:25:44,551 --> 00:25:44,260 going to continue to take a look at it 754 00:25:44,260 --> 00:25:46,038 and try to make all our all our 755 00:25:46,038 --> 00:25:48,038 practices better as we go forward . 756 00:25:48,038 --> 00:25:49,982 Okay . General General sir , we're 757 00:25:49,982 --> 00:25:52,093 gonna let the general we're gonna let 758 00:25:52,093 --> 00:25:54,204 the general close out . General sir . 759 00:25:54,204 --> 00:25:53,900 For any closing thoughts you might have , 760 00:25:53,900 --> 00:25:56,490 sir . Hey john thanks again . I would 761 00:25:56,490 --> 00:25:58,768 just like to say , today is a hard day . 762 00:25:58,840 --> 00:26:02,480 Uh but but the thing I come back to is 763 00:26:02,570 --> 00:26:04,570 remarkable professionalism that the 764 00:26:04,570 --> 00:26:06,570 force on the ground is showing , as 765 00:26:06,570 --> 00:26:08,792 I've noted before . Ultimately , at the 766 00:26:08,792 --> 00:26:11,014 screening points in particular , you've 767 00:26:11,014 --> 00:26:13,126 got to get very up close and personal 768 00:26:13,126 --> 00:26:13,100 to the people that you're bringing out . 769 00:26:13,120 --> 00:26:15,287 There is no way to do that safely from 770 00:26:15,287 --> 00:26:17,287 a distance . And we should all just 771 00:26:17,287 --> 00:26:19,509 bear in mind that that we've been doing 772 00:26:19,509 --> 00:26:21,564 it for well over a week . We brought 773 00:26:21,564 --> 00:26:23,231 104,000 people out . That's a 774 00:26:23,231 --> 00:26:25,176 tremendous number of contacts that 775 00:26:25,176 --> 00:26:27,120 every individual marine soldier or 776 00:26:27,120 --> 00:26:29,064 sailor has had to have as we bring 777 00:26:29,064 --> 00:26:31,231 people aboard the airfield . Uh It's a 778 00:26:31,231 --> 00:26:33,342 very heavy heart , you know , that we 779 00:26:33,342 --> 00:26:34,953 that I that I do this , uh , 780 00:26:34,953 --> 00:26:37,009 conversation with you today . Nobody 781 00:26:37,009 --> 00:26:36,630 feels it more than me or the other 782 00:26:36,630 --> 00:26:38,852 members of the chain of command . We'll 783 00:26:38,852 --> 00:26:40,852 do everything we can to improve our 784 00:26:40,852 --> 00:26:43,019 practice is there to make sure it's as 785 00:26:43,019 --> 00:26:44,963 safe as possible for our , for our 786 00:26:44,963 --> 00:26:47,297 folks on the ground that are doing this , 787 00:26:47,297 --> 00:26:47,060 dangerous work , john , thanks very 788 00:26:47,060 --> 00:26:49,227 much . Thank you general . Thank you . 789 00:26:49,227 --> 00:26:51,338 Appreciate it . Questions No , that's 790 00:26:51,338 --> 00:26:51,660 going to be .