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Okay , good afternoon . Uh today I'm 

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very honored and privileged to be 

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joined by general frank McKenzie 

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Commander , U . S . Central Command . 

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The general's got some opening comments 

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for you um Uh , that that were 

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related to uh , the August 29 air 

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strike that was taken in Kabul . Uh and 

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then he'll stick around for some 

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questions . I will moderate those 

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questions as we've done before . Uh and 

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since we got pretty much a full house 

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here and he's had limited time , I'd 

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ask you to keep your follow ups to an 

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absolute minimum . So that we can be as 

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fair as we can to to everybody when the 

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generals done . Uh I'll come back up 

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and uh and brief on some other topics 

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as well . So with that , General 

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Mackenzie , can you hear and see me ? 

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Okay , john , I can hear and see it 

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fine . How many of them ? All ? Good 

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here sir . I'll turn the floor over to 

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you . Thanks john , Good afternoon . 

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I'm here to brief the results of the 

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investigation . I directed following 

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the report of civilian casualties from 

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our strike in Kabul on 29 August . 

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Having thoroughly reviewed the findings 

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of the investigation and the supporting 

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analysis by interagency partners , I am 

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now convinced that as many as 10 

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civilians , including up to seven 

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Children were tragically killed in that 

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strike . Moreover , we now assess that 

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it is unlikely that the vehicle and 

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those who died were associated with 

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ISIS K or were a direct threat to U . S . 

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Forces . I offer my profound 

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condolences to the family and friends 

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of those who were killed . This strike 

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was taken in the earnest belief that it 

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would prevent an imminent threat to our 

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forces and the evacuees at the airport . 

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But it was a mistake and I offer my 

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sincere apology as the combatant 

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commander . I am fully responsible for 

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this strike in this tragic outcome . 

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Well , I have begun with the most 

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important findings of our investigation . 

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I do want to provide the background 

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leading up to the strike and include an 

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explanation as to why we felt 

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reasonably certain that this was a 

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legitimate strike on an imminent ISIS K 

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threat . With no indication that the 

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strike would result in civilian 

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casualties . As we asserted in our 

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initial statements , the strike on 29 

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august must be considered in the 

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context of the situation on the ground 

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in Kabul at Hamid Karzai International 

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Airport following the ISIS K . Attack 

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that resulted in the deaths of 13 

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soldiers , sailors and marines And more 

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than 100 civilians at Abbey gate on 26 

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August and also with a substantial body 

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of intelligence indicating the 

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imminence of another attack In the 48 

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hours prior to the strike Sensitive 

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intelligence indicated that the 

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compound at Point # one on the map . 

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And let's bring the map up now please . 

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And we're just gonna bring this up . 

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Hopefully you have an opportunity to 

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see it here as we go forward . Thanks 

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john , can you see the map there ? 

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I have disabled . 

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Hey john , can you , can you hear me 

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now ? The press have hard copies . 

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Okay . Roger then . I'm just gonna , 

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I'm gonna continue based on that . Then 

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john . In the 48 hours prior to the 

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strike sensitive intelligence indicated 

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that the compound at point number one 

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on the map was being used by ISIS K . 

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Planners used to facilitate future 

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attacks . We were also receiving a 

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significant number of reports 

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indicating multiple avenues of attack 

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which were being planned simultaneously 

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through which ISIS K would attempt to 

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harm our forces , including with 

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rockets , suicide explosive vests and 

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vehicle borne improvised explosive 

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devices . In fact , in the 36 hours 

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preceding the strike , our leaders on 

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the ground at the airport and in the 

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strike cell received more than 60 

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different pieces of intelligence 

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related to imminent threats . With some 

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intelligence corroborating and some 

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conflicting with events observed from 

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our waves which were flying above Kabul 

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throughout the day . One of the most 

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recurring aspects of the intelligence 

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was that ISIS K would utilize a White 

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Toyota Corolla as a key element in the 

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next attack . Because the compound at 

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point number one was our strongest lead 

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for this series of imminent attacks , 

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we initiated an intense surveillance of 

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the compound with as many as six mq 

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nine reapers on the morning of 29 

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august At 8:52 AM . Local time . On 

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29 August White Toyota Corolla arrived 

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at Point # one . The compound we 

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believed to be a key area of interest 

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associated with imminent threats to the 

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airport . two adult males exited the 

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vehicle met with an adult male in the 

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compound and received a bag from him . 

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The Corolla then departed the compound 

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heading south and we followed the 

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vehicle at 905 A . M . The Toyota 

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Corolla picked up a third adult male 

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carrying a bag at point number two and 

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then continued south . At 9 35 the 

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Corolla arrived at the compound at 

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point number three , which we now know 

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to include an office of nutrition and 

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education international and all three 

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adult males in the vehicle entered the 

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building on the compound At 

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11:19 AM . Three adult males unloaded 

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bags and jugs from the trunk of the 

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vehicle before departing the compound 

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at 1122 am heading south . At 

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approximately this time , U . S . 

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Forces were notified of a sensitive 

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intelligence collection indicating that 

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an ISIS case cell leader in Kabul was 

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dropping off supplies . At 12 11 PM , 

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the Corolla arrived at point number 

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four and at least two adult male 

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occupants exited the vehicle in front 

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of an office building before returning 

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to their vehicle and departing at 1 27 

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PM heading west and then south two 

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o'clock P . M . The Corolla returned to 

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the compound at point number three . 

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Subsequently multiple adult males were 

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observed loading the truck of the 

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vehicle , the trunk of the vehicle with 

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items assessed at the time to be 

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explosives Before departing at 3:47 p . 

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m . with four adult males heading north 

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at 4 11 PM , the Corolla returned to 

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point number two and dropped off one 

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adult male carrying a bag , then 

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continued knowing after driving near 

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point number one , the Corolla dropped 

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off one adult male on the road at point 

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number five , Which is roughly several 

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100 m north of Point # one . At 

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4:39 PM , the Corolla dropped off its 

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last passenger on the road at Point # 

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six . At 4:51 pm , 

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The Corolla arrived at point # seven 

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and backed into a compound that was 

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approximately three km from the airport , 

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which was the closest it came to the 

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airport all day . We were very 

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concerned that the vehicle could move 

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quickly and be at the airport boundary 

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in a matter of moments . By this time , 

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we observed the vehicle for about eight 

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hours . While in the compound , the 

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vehicle was observed being approached 

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by a single adult male assessed at the 

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time to be a co conspirator . The 

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strike was executed at this time 

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because the vehicle was stationary and 

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to reduce the potential for civilian 

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casualties , the single hellfire 

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hellfire missile was fused to detonate 

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inside the vehicle . To further 

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minimize the chance for civilian 

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casualties , It struck the vehicle 

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vehicle at 4:53 pm , which produced an 

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explosive event and follow on flames 

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significantly larger than a hellfire 

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missile would have been expected to 

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produce . It is my assessment that 

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leaders on the ground and the Strike 

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Cell had achieved a reasonable 

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certainty at the time of the strike to 

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designate the vehicle as an imminent 

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threat to U . S . Forces at the airport 

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and that they made this self defense 

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strike . In accordance with established 

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rules of engagement . That assessment 

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is based upon interviews with leaders 

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on the ground and members of the strike 

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cell own a review of the intelligence 

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available to the team at the time of 

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the strike and on the team's 

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interpretation of how this vehicle and 

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its occupants actions were confirming 

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the intelligence that they were seeing . 

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It is further my assessment that the 

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strike team were convinced at the time 

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of the strike , that the area was clear 

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civilians and that they had taken 

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prudent steps in regards to weapons 

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during the strike , to minimize the 

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potential for civilian casualties . 

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Finally , it is my assessment that they 

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did believe as reported that there was 

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a secondary explosion . Our 

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investigation now concludes that the 

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strike was a tragic mistake . First , I 

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will stress this was not a rush strike . 

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The strike sell deliberately followed 

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and observed this vehicle and its 

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occupants for eight hours while cross 

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checking what they were seeing all 

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available intelligence to develop a 

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reasonable certainty of the imminent 

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threat that this vehicle posed to our 

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forces . Second , while the initial 

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reports indicated a secondary explosion , 

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the initial investigation could only 

235
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conclude that it was a possible to 

236
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probable presence of external 

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accelerants that could include either 

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explosive material in the vehicle or an 

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ignition of the gas tank of the vehicle . 

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Subsequent analysis could not rule out 

241
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the presence of a small amount of 

242
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explosive material but determined that 

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the most likely cause was the ignition 

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of gas from a propane tank located 

245
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immediately behind the car . Such an 

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ignition would have created a brief but 

247
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massive fireball oriented directly up 

248
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and out of the compound that was 

249
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observed in the video and displayed in 

250
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this photo . If we could get that next 

251
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photo up , please , They have me 

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disabled , sir . 

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Mhm . Finally , while the strikes are 

254
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reported , john can hear me . Okay . I 

255
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got you , sir . Rogers . Finally , 

256
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while the strikes , l reported the 

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presence of two adult males , one 

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inside the vehicle , and went outside 

259
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the vehicle at the time of the strike . 

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The sale initiated a review of their 

261
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footage immediately following the 

262
00:10:36,757 --> 00:10:38,646
report of civilian casualties and 

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determined that a few , a few partially 

264
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obscured forms were briefly visible 

265
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moving in the compound . This led to my 

266
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initiation of an investigation within 

267
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24 hours of the strike . A 

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comprehensive review of all the 

269
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available footage and reporting on the 

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matter led us to a final conclusion 

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That as many as 10 civilians were 

272
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killed in the strike , including up to 

273
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seven Children at the time of the 

274
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strike based upon all the intelligence 

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and what was being reported , I was 

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confident that the strike had averted 

277
00:11:09,771 --> 00:11:11,993
an imminent threat to our forces at the 

278
00:11:11,993 --> 00:11:14,160
airport . Based upon that assessment . 

279
00:11:14,160 --> 00:11:16,271
I and other leaders in the department 

280
00:11:16,271 --> 00:11:18,271
repeatedly asserted the validity of 

281
00:11:18,271 --> 00:11:20,493
this strike . I'm here today to set the 

282
00:11:20,493 --> 00:11:22,493
record straight and acknowledge our 

283
00:11:22,493 --> 00:11:25,200
mistakes . I will end my remarks with 

284
00:11:25,200 --> 00:11:27,311
the same note of sincere and profound 

285
00:11:27,311 --> 00:11:29,422
condolences to the family and friends 

286
00:11:29,422 --> 00:11:31,756
of those who died in this tragic strike . 

287
00:11:32,140 --> 00:11:34,307
We are exploring the possibility of ex 

288
00:11:34,307 --> 00:11:36,670
gratia payments and I'll finish by 

289
00:11:36,670 --> 00:11:37,670
saying 

290
00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:43,496
preventing an imminent attack on our 

291
00:11:43,496 --> 00:11:45,800
forces and civilian evacuees . We now 

292
00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:48,230
understand that to be incorrect with 

293
00:11:48,230 --> 00:11:50,563
that . I'm ready to take your questions . 

294
00:11:50,940 --> 00:11:54,610
Thank you , general . Um tom general . 

295
00:11:54,700 --> 00:11:56,867
This is a complete and utter failure . 

296
00:11:56,867 --> 00:11:59,089
Can you explain how this possibly could 

297
00:11:59,089 --> 00:12:02,580
have happened ? So this particular 

298
00:12:02,580 --> 00:12:04,750
strike ? We certainly was a terrible 

299
00:12:04,750 --> 00:12:06,917
mistake and we and we certainly regret 

300
00:12:06,917 --> 00:12:09,028
that and I've been very clear that we 

301
00:12:09,028 --> 00:12:11,083
take full responsibility for it . At 

302
00:12:11,083 --> 00:12:13,194
the same time . We were carrying on a 

303
00:12:13,194 --> 00:12:15,306
number of complex operations designed 

304
00:12:15,306 --> 00:12:17,361
to defend ourselves . We conducted a 

305
00:12:17,361 --> 00:12:17,120
strike a couple of days before the 

306
00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:19,342
Nangarhar that was very successful , we 

307
00:12:19,342 --> 00:12:21,453
conducted other operations across the 

308
00:12:21,453 --> 00:12:23,453
battle space to to defend ourselves 

309
00:12:23,453 --> 00:12:25,470
during this very difficult 48 hour 

310
00:12:25,470 --> 00:12:27,800
period when so many imminent threats 

311
00:12:27,800 --> 00:12:29,911
were manifest . So while I agree with 

312
00:12:29,911 --> 00:12:32,022
it , this , this strike certainly did 

313
00:12:32,022 --> 00:12:33,967
not come up to our standards and I 

314
00:12:33,967 --> 00:12:35,911
profoundly regret it . I would not 

315
00:12:35,911 --> 00:12:38,022
qualify the entire operation in those 

316
00:12:38,022 --> 00:12:37,920
terms . And will anybody be held 

317
00:12:37,920 --> 00:12:40,430
responsible from ? We are in the 

318
00:12:40,430 --> 00:12:42,640
process right now of continuing that 

319
00:12:42,640 --> 00:12:44,862
continuing that line of investigation . 

320
00:12:44,862 --> 00:12:47,029
And I have nothing for you now because 

321
00:12:47,029 --> 00:12:49,251
that involves personnel issues . Please 

322
00:12:49,251 --> 00:12:51,251
identify yourself and your outlet . 

323
00:12:51,251 --> 00:12:53,307
When you ask your question , David , 

324
00:12:53,307 --> 00:12:56,710
more cBS news . So you said that 

325
00:12:56,720 --> 00:13:00,590
the uh you started following this car 

326
00:13:00,600 --> 00:13:03,940
after it showed up at a place 

327
00:13:03,940 --> 00:13:06,570
associated with ISIS 

328
00:13:08,420 --> 00:13:11,170
in retrospect ? Is that was that place 

329
00:13:11,640 --> 00:13:15,510
associated with ISIS ? And this was 

330
00:13:15,520 --> 00:13:18,430
described as and over the horizon 

331
00:13:18,430 --> 00:13:21,500
strike , which is what the U . S . Is 

332
00:13:21,500 --> 00:13:24,350
going to be relying on from now on in 

333
00:13:24,350 --> 00:13:27,880
Afghanistan . So what is what is this 

334
00:13:27,890 --> 00:13:31,580
incident say about the reliability of 

335
00:13:31,590 --> 00:13:34,470
future strikes against terrorist 

336
00:13:34,470 --> 00:13:37,450
threats in Afghanistan ? Sure . David . 

337
00:13:37,450 --> 00:13:39,450
So I'll take the first part of your 

338
00:13:39,450 --> 00:13:41,672
question and begin with that . So , 0.1 

339
00:13:41,672 --> 00:13:43,520
on the map , we do assess , very 

340
00:13:43,520 --> 00:13:45,687
definitely associated with ISIS cave . 

341
00:13:45,687 --> 00:13:47,798
In fact , a little less than 24 hours 

342
00:13:47,798 --> 00:13:49,909
later , rockets will be launched from 

343
00:13:49,909 --> 00:13:52,131
that point against the airfield . So we 

344
00:13:52,131 --> 00:13:54,242
had very good intelligence to make us 

345
00:13:54,242 --> 00:13:56,298
think 240.0.1 on the map was in fact 

346
00:13:56,298 --> 00:13:58,298
area where ISIS was centered . So I 

347
00:13:58,298 --> 00:14:00,298
think that that was that was a very 

348
00:14:00,298 --> 00:14:02,520
good intelligence supported that . That 

349
00:14:02,520 --> 00:14:04,631
uh that belief now is the second part 

350
00:14:04,631 --> 00:14:06,631
of your question about whether this 

351
00:14:06,631 --> 00:14:08,853
isn't this will affect future . Oh , th 

352
00:14:08,853 --> 00:14:11,076
operations . Let me be clear . This was 

353
00:14:11,076 --> 00:14:13,700
a self defense strike taken under self 

354
00:14:13,700 --> 00:14:16,320
defense rules of engagement based on an 

355
00:14:16,330 --> 00:14:18,690
imminent threat to attack us . That is 

356
00:14:18,690 --> 00:14:20,746
not the way that we would strike and 

357
00:14:20,746 --> 00:14:23,060
over . And o th mission going into 

358
00:14:23,060 --> 00:14:25,550
Afghanistan against ISIS K targets , 

359
00:14:25,550 --> 00:14:27,661
for one thing that will not be a self 

360
00:14:27,661 --> 00:14:29,717
defense strike , it'll be done under 

361
00:14:29,717 --> 00:14:31,717
different , it'll be different done 

362
00:14:31,717 --> 00:14:33,828
under different rules of engagement . 

363
00:14:33,828 --> 00:14:33,470
So , and we would have a lot more 

364
00:14:33,470 --> 00:14:35,450
opportunity , probably than we had 

365
00:14:35,460 --> 00:14:37,620
under this extreme time pressure to 

366
00:14:37,620 --> 00:14:40,060
take a look at the target to do use a 

367
00:14:40,060 --> 00:14:42,227
phrase that you'll be familiar with to 

368
00:14:42,227 --> 00:14:44,560
soak the target with multiple platforms , 

369
00:14:44,560 --> 00:14:46,449
to have an opportunity to develop 

370
00:14:46,449 --> 00:14:48,393
extended pattern of life . None of 

371
00:14:48,393 --> 00:14:50,616
these things were available to us given 

372
00:14:50,616 --> 00:14:52,727
the urgent and pressing nature of the 

373
00:14:52,727 --> 00:14:55,800
imminent threat to our forces Phil are 

374
00:14:55,800 --> 00:14:57,800
you considering reparations for the 

375
00:14:57,800 --> 00:14:59,578
victims here ? And what is what 

376
00:14:59,578 --> 00:15:01,744
happened with the strikes ? Say to you 

377
00:15:01,744 --> 00:15:03,744
about the over horizon capability ? 

378
00:15:03,744 --> 00:15:05,856
We've been hearing so much about what 

379
00:15:05,856 --> 00:15:05,170
are the risks involved with carrying 

380
00:15:05,170 --> 00:15:07,337
out strikes when you don't have people 

381
00:15:07,337 --> 00:15:09,281
on the ground in Afghanistan going 

382
00:15:09,281 --> 00:15:11,390
forward ? Sure . So as I said in my 

383
00:15:11,390 --> 00:15:14,180
statement , we are considering X gracia 

384
00:15:14,190 --> 00:15:16,220
or reparations for this and that 

385
00:15:16,220 --> 00:15:18,498
ultimately be a matter for policy . So , 

386
00:15:18,498 --> 00:15:20,609
we're in consultation with the Office 

387
00:15:20,609 --> 00:15:22,331
of the Secretary of Defense to 

388
00:15:22,331 --> 00:15:24,387
determine the way forward there . As 

389
00:15:24,387 --> 00:15:23,640
you will also understand , it's very 

390
00:15:23,640 --> 00:15:25,862
difficult to reach out on the ground in 

391
00:15:25,862 --> 00:15:27,918
Afghanistan , you know , to actually 

392
00:15:27,918 --> 00:15:29,640
reach people . But we are very 

393
00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:31,807
interested in doing that and we'll and 

394
00:15:31,807 --> 00:15:34,029
we'll and we'll move on it based on our 

395
00:15:34,029 --> 00:15:36,251
ability to do that . So , your question 

396
00:15:36,251 --> 00:15:38,251
about this . And so th I'll sort of 

397
00:15:38,251 --> 00:15:38,190
echo When I said that to David , I 

398
00:15:38,190 --> 00:15:40,246
would reject a parallel between this 

399
00:15:40,246 --> 00:15:42,579
operation and a and an over the horizon . 

400
00:15:42,579 --> 00:15:45,170
Strike against an ISIS K . Target again . 

401
00:15:45,170 --> 00:15:47,337
Because we will have an opportunity to 

402
00:15:47,337 --> 00:15:50,010
further develop the target in time to 

403
00:15:50,010 --> 00:15:52,232
look at pattern of life . That time was 

404
00:15:52,232 --> 00:15:54,288
not available to us because this was 

405
00:15:54,288 --> 00:15:56,343
imminent threat to our forces . It's 

406
00:15:56,343 --> 00:15:58,510
important that I emphasize that we did 

407
00:15:58,510 --> 00:16:00,677
not have the luxury of time to develop 

408
00:16:00,677 --> 00:16:02,788
pattern of life and to do a number of 

409
00:16:02,788 --> 00:16:04,732
other things . We struck under the 

410
00:16:04,732 --> 00:16:06,954
theory of reasonable certainty probably 

411
00:16:06,954 --> 00:16:08,788
are strikes in Afghanistan going 

412
00:16:08,788 --> 00:16:11,121
forward will be under a higher standard . 

413
00:16:11,121 --> 00:16:13,232
That's a policy matter , not a purely 

414
00:16:13,232 --> 00:16:15,454
military matter . But I don't think you 

415
00:16:15,454 --> 00:16:14,950
should draw any conclusions about our 

416
00:16:14,950 --> 00:16:16,783
ability to strike in Afghanistan 

417
00:16:16,783 --> 00:16:18,672
against IsIS . K . Targets in the 

418
00:16:18,672 --> 00:16:20,950
future based on this particular strike . 

419
00:16:21,040 --> 00:16:24,970
So , you know , Sylvie , not from a 

420
00:16:24,970 --> 00:16:27,490
F . P . Uh You said that you had the 

421
00:16:27,490 --> 00:16:30,810
intelligence about a threat emanating 

422
00:16:30,810 --> 00:16:34,300
from a White Toyota . So , was it 

423
00:16:34,310 --> 00:16:38,160
this intelligence was not good 

424
00:16:38,170 --> 00:16:40,960
or there was another White Toyota , 

425
00:16:40,970 --> 00:16:43,680
which was dangerous . And nothing 

426
00:16:43,680 --> 00:16:46,270
happened from another White Toyota . 

427
00:16:47,540 --> 00:16:50,540
So so I would tell you this clearly , 

428
00:16:50,550 --> 00:16:52,494
our intelligence was wrong on this 

429
00:16:52,494 --> 00:16:55,440
particular White Toyota Corolla uh at 

430
00:16:55,440 --> 00:16:57,790
the same time , we undertook a variety 

431
00:16:57,790 --> 00:17:00,380
of things to make it hard for them to 

432
00:17:00,390 --> 00:17:02,557
get at us during this period of time . 

433
00:17:02,557 --> 00:17:04,501
We close the gates , uh , which we 

434
00:17:04,501 --> 00:17:06,668
didn't want to do at H chi during this 

435
00:17:06,668 --> 00:17:09,001
period of time as , as force protection . 

436
00:17:09,001 --> 00:17:11,001
Uh , you know , we were very active 

437
00:17:11,001 --> 00:17:13,112
with our I . S . Are overhead , which 

438
00:17:13,112 --> 00:17:15,334
we know is very often has a suppressive 

439
00:17:15,334 --> 00:17:17,390
effect on their activities . Uh , we 

440
00:17:17,390 --> 00:17:19,446
still took rockets the next day , as 

441
00:17:19,446 --> 00:17:21,668
you know , and they fired those rockets 

442
00:17:21,668 --> 00:17:21,650
from near .1 and from other places 

443
00:17:21,650 --> 00:17:23,983
actually near the route of this vehicle . 

444
00:17:23,983 --> 00:17:26,094
But I would tell you unequivocally in 

445
00:17:26,094 --> 00:17:28,150
this case , clearly the intelligence 

446
00:17:28,150 --> 00:17:29,983
was wrong on this vehicle and we 

447
00:17:29,983 --> 00:17:32,206
certainly regret that as I've been very 

448
00:17:32,206 --> 00:17:34,094
clear , let me go to the phones , 

449
00:17:34,094 --> 00:17:36,150
jennifer steinhauer new york times , 

450
00:17:40,040 --> 00:17:44,010
jennifer you there ? My 

451
00:17:44,230 --> 00:17:46,452
question is a different matter john for 

452
00:17:46,452 --> 00:17:48,580
after this . All right , okay . Louis 

453
00:17:48,580 --> 00:17:49,660
Martinez abc . 

454
00:17:55,840 --> 00:17:56,840
You there , louis 

455
00:17:59,540 --> 00:18:01,707
okay , nothing heard nancy . Youssef , 

456
00:18:03,040 --> 00:18:05,096
thank you general . Please clarify a 

457
00:18:05,096 --> 00:18:06,818
couple of points for me if I'm 

458
00:18:06,818 --> 00:18:08,707
understanding these frankly , you 

459
00:18:08,707 --> 00:18:10,762
follow the wrong photo full from the 

460
00:18:10,762 --> 00:18:12,651
beginning and that is you weren't 

461
00:18:12,651 --> 00:18:14,762
following one vehicle and mistaken it 

462
00:18:14,762 --> 00:18:16,707
for another one . And also in your 

463
00:18:16,707 --> 00:18:18,929
initial statement , you said that there 

464
00:18:18,929 --> 00:18:18,200
was no initial reports of civilian 

465
00:18:18,200 --> 00:18:20,478
casualties . It appears to the release . 

466
00:18:20,478 --> 00:18:22,644
Some concern about civilian casualties 

467
00:18:22,644 --> 00:18:24,700
very early on . So on what basis did 

468
00:18:24,700 --> 00:18:26,922
you make that statement . And finally , 

469
00:18:26,922 --> 00:18:28,867
was any intelligence that you were 

470
00:18:28,867 --> 00:18:31,500
using gathered from the taliban ? Thank 

471
00:18:31,500 --> 00:18:33,580
you . So let me begin with the last 

472
00:18:33,580 --> 00:18:35,747
question . Nothing we did was gathered 

473
00:18:35,747 --> 00:18:37,970
from the taliban . Um , and I should be 

474
00:18:37,980 --> 00:18:40,202
and I should be very clear about that . 

475
00:18:40,202 --> 00:18:42,960
Uh , we selected this car based on its 

476
00:18:42,970 --> 00:18:45,790
movement , a targeted area of interest 

477
00:18:45,790 --> 00:18:47,630
to us . A known targeted area of 

478
00:18:47,630 --> 00:18:49,408
interest to us . And we held it 

479
00:18:49,408 --> 00:18:51,630
throughout the day clearly based on the 

480
00:18:51,630 --> 00:18:53,960
end result . That was a mistake . And I 

481
00:18:53,960 --> 00:18:57,530
have acknowledged that from 

482
00:18:57,530 --> 00:18:59,697
military times during this time , Were 

483
00:18:59,697 --> 00:19:01,586
you tracking any other suspicious 

484
00:19:01,586 --> 00:19:03,752
activity in Kabul that might have also 

485
00:19:03,752 --> 00:19:05,863
been part of this threat ? And do you 

486
00:19:05,863 --> 00:19:07,974
have any intelligence from after this 

487
00:19:07,974 --> 00:19:09,752
drone strike that suggests what 

488
00:19:09,752 --> 00:19:11,530
happened to the imminent threat 

489
00:19:11,530 --> 00:19:14,570
afterward . sure . So as I noted in my 

490
00:19:14,570 --> 00:19:18,530
comments , we had over 60 , uh very , 

491
00:19:18,540 --> 00:19:21,400
very high caliber uh , reports of 

492
00:19:21,410 --> 00:19:23,466
imminent threat to our forces in and 

493
00:19:23,466 --> 00:19:25,466
around and around Kabul . Typically 

494
00:19:25,466 --> 00:19:27,610
those are signals based . Uh , but 

495
00:19:27,610 --> 00:19:29,610
there are also some human and other 

496
00:19:29,610 --> 00:19:31,832
human intelligence as well . So we have 

497
00:19:31,832 --> 00:19:34,054
a variety of sources for the , for that 

498
00:19:34,054 --> 00:19:35,999
intelligence . We believe that the 

499
00:19:35,999 --> 00:19:38,110
strike we took a couple of days prior 

500
00:19:38,110 --> 00:19:39,999
of the Nangarhar actually have an 

501
00:19:39,999 --> 00:19:42,166
effect on quieting down because we got 

502
00:19:42,166 --> 00:19:44,277
a key attack planner in that strike . 

503
00:19:44,277 --> 00:19:46,499
We believe that disrupted some of their 

504
00:19:46,499 --> 00:19:48,721
plans . Additionally , we did things to 

505
00:19:48,721 --> 00:19:50,888
make it harder for them to get to us . 

506
00:19:50,888 --> 00:19:53,110
For example , we closed the gates , the 

507
00:19:53,110 --> 00:19:55,054
gates as we know , or a particular 

508
00:19:55,054 --> 00:19:57,110
point where we're vulnerable . So we 

509
00:19:57,110 --> 00:19:59,166
decided not to process people and we 

510
00:19:59,166 --> 00:20:01,221
hunker down for a little bit of time 

511
00:20:01,221 --> 00:20:01,180
while this threat was still there . So 

512
00:20:01,180 --> 00:20:04,250
there were over 60 clear threat 

513
00:20:04,250 --> 00:20:06,300
vectors that we were dealing with 

514
00:20:06,300 --> 00:20:08,467
during this period of time , including 

515
00:20:08,467 --> 00:20:10,356
as I've noted before , the rocket 

516
00:20:10,356 --> 00:20:12,411
attacks that occurred . You know , a 

517
00:20:12,411 --> 00:20:14,467
little bit after this from locations 

518
00:20:14,467 --> 00:20:16,633
that are displayed on the graphic that 

519
00:20:16,633 --> 00:20:18,856
you have a really quick follow up . Not 

520
00:20:18,856 --> 00:20:21,078
in terms of the number of threats , but 

521
00:20:21,078 --> 00:20:23,189
the number of other cars or groups of 

522
00:20:23,189 --> 00:20:23,070
people that you were following that day . 

523
00:20:23,070 --> 00:20:24,903
Were you tracking anybody else's 

524
00:20:24,903 --> 00:20:27,260
closely ? We tracked a lot of other 

525
00:20:27,260 --> 00:20:29,371
people . Uh , we didn't track anybody 

526
00:20:29,371 --> 00:20:31,427
as well as as closely as we did this 

527
00:20:31,427 --> 00:20:33,316
because of the limitations on our 

528
00:20:33,316 --> 00:20:35,538
resources . And frankly , you know , we 

529
00:20:35,538 --> 00:20:37,593
we thought this was a good lead . We 

530
00:20:37,593 --> 00:20:39,760
were wrong . Thanks Alex . Thanks john 

531
00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:41,593
General Mackenzie , this is Alex 

532
00:20:41,593 --> 00:20:43,704
Marquardt from CNN Uh , you mentioned 

533
00:20:43,704 --> 00:20:45,927
that immediately following the attack . 

534
00:20:45,927 --> 00:20:47,982
You saw shapes in the video that led 

535
00:20:47,982 --> 00:20:50,093
you to believe that this necessitated 

536
00:20:50,093 --> 00:20:52,093
investigation that there could have 

537
00:20:52,093 --> 00:20:54,260
been more civilians there on September 

538
00:20:54,260 --> 00:20:56,427
one . We heard from General Milley who 

539
00:20:56,427 --> 00:20:56,320
called this a righteous strike . And 

540
00:20:56,320 --> 00:20:58,500
this was several days later . Did you 

541
00:20:58,500 --> 00:21:00,722
at the time , several days later , also 

542
00:21:00,722 --> 00:21:02,722
believed that this was the right to 

543
00:21:02,722 --> 00:21:04,778
strike and could you talk about your 

544
00:21:04,778 --> 00:21:06,500
erosion of confidence over the 

545
00:21:06,500 --> 00:21:08,722
following the next subsequent two weeks 

546
00:21:08,722 --> 00:21:10,667
of the investigation ? Sure . So I 

547
00:21:10,667 --> 00:21:12,667
think we issued a statement from us 

548
00:21:12,667 --> 00:21:14,778
Central Command about six hours after 

549
00:21:14,778 --> 00:21:16,389
the strike acknowledging the 

550
00:21:16,389 --> 00:21:18,611
possibility civilian casualties . So we 

551
00:21:18,611 --> 00:21:18,320
knew from the very beginning there was 

552
00:21:18,320 --> 00:21:20,880
a possibility civilian casualties . Uh , 

553
00:21:20,890 --> 00:21:22,946
I think we still thought we had good 

554
00:21:22,946 --> 00:21:25,168
reason to have taken that strike and it 

555
00:21:25,168 --> 00:21:27,380
took us gathering the facts to change 

556
00:21:27,380 --> 00:21:29,950
that we took we didn't think as you 

557
00:21:29,950 --> 00:21:31,839
will understand and appreciate we 

558
00:21:31,839 --> 00:21:33,728
didn't take the strike because we 

559
00:21:33,728 --> 00:21:35,728
thought we were wrong . We took the 

560
00:21:35,728 --> 00:21:37,950
strike because we thought we had a good 

561
00:21:37,950 --> 00:21:39,950
target . It takes a little while to 

562
00:21:39,950 --> 00:21:39,880
uncover some of those things . We moved 

563
00:21:39,880 --> 00:21:42,102
and worked as rapidly as we could . And 

564
00:21:42,102 --> 00:21:44,269
actually , I think we worked extremely 

565
00:21:44,269 --> 00:21:46,491
rapidly to get this information out and 

566
00:21:46,491 --> 00:21:48,491
make it public . Fine , thank you . 

567
00:21:48,491 --> 00:21:50,640
Thank you . General . So on . Despite 

568
00:21:50,650 --> 00:21:52,539
numerous intelligence reports and 

569
00:21:52,539 --> 00:21:55,520
warnings On the 26th , we had that 

570
00:21:55,520 --> 00:21:58,750
tragic attack on on the airport . 13 US 

571
00:21:58,760 --> 00:22:01,220
service members were killed in addition 

572
00:22:01,220 --> 00:22:04,290
to tens of Afghan civilians again on 

573
00:22:04,290 --> 00:22:07,050
the 29th in this strike . Another 

574
00:22:07,050 --> 00:22:09,161
tragedy took place . As you said , 10 

575
00:22:09,161 --> 00:22:11,690
civilians were killed among them seven 

576
00:22:11,700 --> 00:22:14,630
Children . Is that a failure of 

577
00:22:14,640 --> 00:22:16,830
intelligence or leadership in 

578
00:22:16,830 --> 00:22:19,052
Afghanistan . And what do you intend to 

579
00:22:19,052 --> 00:22:21,340
do about that ? Thank you . Well , I 

580
00:22:21,340 --> 00:22:23,562
will tell you . So , we had to events , 

581
00:22:23,562 --> 00:22:25,729
we have the attacker navigate , we had 

582
00:22:25,729 --> 00:22:27,784
this uh , and we had this strike the 

583
00:22:27,784 --> 00:22:29,951
aggregate attack , you're you're in uh 

584
00:22:29,951 --> 00:22:32,007
in combat with an enemy who is alive 

585
00:22:32,007 --> 00:22:34,229
and has his own will and sometimes that 

586
00:22:34,229 --> 00:22:36,451
enemy is gonna is gonna , his plans are 

587
00:22:36,451 --> 00:22:38,507
just going to work . You can't cover 

588
00:22:38,507 --> 00:22:40,673
every eventuality all the time despite 

589
00:22:40,673 --> 00:22:42,840
our very best efforts to do that . And 

590
00:22:42,840 --> 00:22:44,896
we took every precaution we could at 

591
00:22:44,896 --> 00:22:47,007
Abbey gate . In fact when we had when 

592
00:22:47,007 --> 00:22:48,951
we had threats develop over the 48 

593
00:22:48,951 --> 00:22:51,062
hours that followed . As I've noted , 

594
00:22:51,062 --> 00:22:52,840
we closed the gates in order to 

595
00:22:52,840 --> 00:22:55,062
recognizing it would reduce our ability 

596
00:22:55,062 --> 00:22:54,680
to bring people in . But at the same 

597
00:22:54,680 --> 00:22:56,902
time we thought that was the best thing 

598
00:22:56,902 --> 00:22:58,847
we could do to actually reduce our 

599
00:22:58,847 --> 00:23:00,958
attack surface if you will to protect 

600
00:23:00,958 --> 00:23:03,180
our forces . There are also a number of 

601
00:23:03,180 --> 00:23:05,347
attacks that were thwarted . These are 

602
00:23:05,347 --> 00:23:07,569
two that you know about because they're 

603
00:23:07,569 --> 00:23:09,791
high visibility and we're talking about 

604
00:23:09,791 --> 00:23:12,069
others were thwarted and did not occur . 

605
00:23:12,069 --> 00:23:11,870
So the silence of those attacks should 

606
00:23:11,870 --> 00:23:14,037
mean something to unfortunately , it's 

607
00:23:14,037 --> 00:23:17,200
very difficult to prove a negative Tony 

608
00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:19,584
Tony capacity with Bloomberg . Two 

609
00:23:19,584 --> 00:23:21,418
quick questions are you going to 

610
00:23:21,418 --> 00:23:23,529
release the report of investigation ? 

611
00:23:24,440 --> 00:23:27,050
Two in your fact gathering to what 

612
00:23:27,050 --> 00:23:29,106
extent that you will rely on the new 

613
00:23:29,106 --> 00:23:30,772
york times is extensive video 

614
00:23:30,772 --> 00:23:34,200
investigation and then talks with N . G . 

615
00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:36,730
O . S or civilian eyewitnesses at the 

616
00:23:36,730 --> 00:23:40,360
scene . Okay . Mhm . So 

617
00:23:40,370 --> 00:23:42,481
repeat the first question again . For 

618
00:23:42,481 --> 00:23:44,426
me , you'll be releasing the final 

619
00:23:44,426 --> 00:23:46,570
report of investigation , The final 

620
00:23:46,570 --> 00:23:48,514
report that the report is a highly 

621
00:23:48,514 --> 00:23:50,514
classified document . There will be 

622
00:23:50,514 --> 00:23:52,348
procedures that would have to be 

623
00:23:52,348 --> 00:23:54,570
followed to declassify elements of that 

624
00:23:54,570 --> 00:23:56,626
document . If it were to be released 

625
00:23:56,626 --> 00:23:56,070
and I'll just leave that . I'll just 

626
00:23:56,070 --> 00:23:58,292
leave that question there as we in fact 

627
00:23:58,292 --> 00:24:00,403
worked our investigation , we use all 

628
00:24:00,403 --> 00:24:02,403
available sources of information to 

629
00:24:02,403 --> 00:24:04,126
inform us as we went forward . 

630
00:24:04,126 --> 00:24:06,126
Certainly that included some of the 

631
00:24:06,126 --> 00:24:08,292
stuff the new york times did . It also 

632
00:24:08,292 --> 00:24:10,514
included our own extensive resources in 

633
00:24:10,514 --> 00:24:12,570
this area which we looked at . So we 

634
00:24:12,570 --> 00:24:12,320
tried to go everywhere we could and not 

635
00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:14,487
overlook anything as we sort of try to 

636
00:24:14,487 --> 00:24:16,780
build a picture Alabama at all in the 

637
00:24:16,780 --> 00:24:18,891
investigation or the fact gathering . 

638
00:24:19,540 --> 00:24:23,150
No thanks Lucas . General Mackenzie , 

639
00:24:23,150 --> 00:24:25,206
Lucas , tomlinson Fox news . Did you 

640
00:24:25,206 --> 00:24:27,317
have forces on the ground that helped 

641
00:24:27,317 --> 00:24:28,761
you conduct this strike ? 

642
00:24:31,640 --> 00:24:35,190
No , we did not . As you know , no time 

643
00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:38,400
where our forces really away from uh 

644
00:24:38,400 --> 00:24:40,511
Hamid Karzai International airfield . 

645
00:24:40,511 --> 00:24:42,678
So there was nobody there nobody there 

646
00:24:42,678 --> 00:24:45,200
on the ground to have to play that role . 

647
00:24:45,210 --> 00:24:47,266
I think you can see from the graphic 

648
00:24:47,266 --> 00:24:49,266
that the position of the strike was 

649
00:24:49,266 --> 00:24:51,432
about 3 to 4 kilometers to the west of 

650
00:24:51,432 --> 00:24:53,488
Hk area . So no there was there were 

651
00:24:53,488 --> 00:24:55,654
there were there was nobody either bus 

652
00:24:55,654 --> 00:24:55,650
or a proxy of virus that was involved 

653
00:24:55,650 --> 00:24:57,317
in this that includes special 

654
00:24:57,317 --> 00:25:00,770
Operations forces explicitly . Can you 

655
00:25:00,770 --> 00:25:02,826
talk about the challenges conducting 

656
00:25:02,826 --> 00:25:05,048
these drone strikes without any U . S . 

657
00:25:05,048 --> 00:25:07,600
Troops on the ground . So we conducted 

658
00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:09,822
a very successful drone strike two days 

659
00:25:09,822 --> 00:25:12,560
earlier up in Nangarhar province and we 

660
00:25:12,560 --> 00:25:14,671
got the target and I think that had a 

661
00:25:14,671 --> 00:25:16,840
significant event on dislocating and 

662
00:25:16,840 --> 00:25:19,460
suppressing ISIS K's ability to attack 

663
00:25:19,460 --> 00:25:22,040
us during this period of time . So we 

664
00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:24,800
actually had success with that this one 

665
00:25:24,800 --> 00:25:26,856
we did not have success with success 

666
00:25:26,856 --> 00:25:28,911
with and we've been very clear about 

667
00:25:28,911 --> 00:25:31,078
owning up to our responsibility . This 

668
00:25:31,078 --> 00:25:33,022
we're going Lucas you've had three 

669
00:25:33,022 --> 00:25:35,133
questions . We've got time for just a 

670
00:25:35,133 --> 00:25:38,420
couple more Tara cop . Thank you . 

671
00:25:38,430 --> 00:25:40,320
General Mackenzie . Tara cop with 

672
00:25:40,320 --> 00:25:42,870
defense one . Since there are no more U . 

673
00:25:42,870 --> 00:25:44,926
S . Forces on the ground , how would 

674
00:25:44,926 --> 00:25:47,230
the ex gratia payments be provided to 

675
00:25:47,230 --> 00:25:49,286
surviving family members if they are 

676
00:25:49,286 --> 00:25:51,750
provided ? And then I know you walked 

677
00:25:51,750 --> 00:25:53,472
us through the timeline at the 

678
00:25:53,472 --> 00:25:55,694
beginning of this , but can you give us 

679
00:25:55,694 --> 00:25:58,180
the overall amount of time spent 

680
00:25:58,190 --> 00:26:00,290
actually identifying and confirming 

681
00:26:00,290 --> 00:26:02,860
this target before the strike was taken ? 

682
00:26:04,140 --> 00:26:06,500
Sure . So as for the ex gratia payments 

683
00:26:06,510 --> 00:26:08,732
were working that right now and it will 

684
00:26:08,732 --> 00:26:10,677
be difficult . As as I noted in my 

685
00:26:10,677 --> 00:26:12,621
remarks , I think one of the first 

686
00:26:12,621 --> 00:26:14,677
questions it will be difficult to do 

687
00:26:14,677 --> 00:26:16,788
that without a presence on the ground 

688
00:26:16,788 --> 00:26:15,910
and that's just something we're gonna 

689
00:26:15,910 --> 00:26:18,021
have to work through . I don't have a 

690
00:26:18,021 --> 00:26:20,132
better answer for you right now other 

691
00:26:20,132 --> 00:26:22,188
than we recognize the obligation and 

692
00:26:22,188 --> 00:26:24,410
we'll continue to work . We'll continue 

693
00:26:24,410 --> 00:26:26,132
to work that problem . So in a 

694
00:26:26,132 --> 00:26:28,354
situation like this to go to the second 

695
00:26:28,354 --> 00:26:30,466
part of your question As you continue 

696
00:26:30,466 --> 00:26:30,060
to look at the target over the course 

697
00:26:30,060 --> 00:26:32,171
of the day , you know , you you begin 

698
00:26:32,171 --> 00:26:34,393
to build probabilities , you begin to , 

699
00:26:34,393 --> 00:26:36,650
you begin to uh you begin to weigh what 

700
00:26:36,660 --> 00:26:38,882
are we going to take a strike ? Why why 

701
00:26:38,882 --> 00:26:40,938
are we going to take the strike when 

702
00:26:40,938 --> 00:26:43,104
the vehicle came up to the final point 

703
00:26:43,104 --> 00:26:45,216
at .7 on your map ? Which is actually 

704
00:26:45,216 --> 00:26:47,327
as I've noted as close the closest to 

705
00:26:47,327 --> 00:26:49,438
the airfield it had been all day . We 

706
00:26:49,438 --> 00:26:49,360
are very concerned about a white 

707
00:26:49,360 --> 00:26:51,490
Corolla being involved in a in an 

708
00:26:51,490 --> 00:26:53,712
attack . So the cumulative force of all 

709
00:26:53,712 --> 00:26:56,530
those uh all those , the intelligence 

710
00:26:56,530 --> 00:26:58,641
that we gathered throughout the day . 

711
00:26:58,641 --> 00:27:00,530
The position of the vehicle , its 

712
00:27:00,530 --> 00:27:02,752
nearness to the airport , the imminence 

713
00:27:02,752 --> 00:27:04,919
of the threat and the other uh segment 

714
00:27:04,919 --> 00:27:07,030
that we're getting throughout the day 

715
00:27:07,030 --> 00:27:09,141
all lead us to the moment of deciding 

716
00:27:09,141 --> 00:27:11,141
to take the strike and and one last 

717
00:27:11,141 --> 00:27:13,086
follow up who actually ordered the 

718
00:27:13,086 --> 00:27:15,308
strike , who had the final authority to 

719
00:27:15,308 --> 00:27:18,110
say fire . So in this case the target 

720
00:27:18,110 --> 00:27:20,260
engagement authority is held by the 

721
00:27:20,270 --> 00:27:22,570
over the horizon commander whose 

722
00:27:22,570 --> 00:27:26,070
florida in the theater , the over the 

723
00:27:26,070 --> 00:27:28,070
horizon . Strike sale commander , I 

724
00:27:28,070 --> 00:27:30,126
should say , okay , we have time for 

725
00:27:30,126 --> 00:27:32,237
one more and then we're gonna have to 

726
00:27:32,237 --> 00:27:34,403
let the general go Jeff . Selden via a 

727
00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:36,696
Jeff seldom from the L a thanks very 

728
00:27:36,696 --> 00:27:39,210
much for doing this general . Um given 

729
00:27:39,210 --> 00:27:41,432
how this over the horizon strike went , 

730
00:27:41,640 --> 00:27:43,700
where do things stand in terms of 

731
00:27:43,700 --> 00:27:45,756
getting at least closer presence . A 

732
00:27:45,756 --> 00:27:48,080
closer basing agreement for future over 

733
00:27:48,080 --> 00:27:50,136
the horizon strikes . And we've been 

734
00:27:50,136 --> 00:27:52,358
told that the Taliban have made various 

735
00:27:52,358 --> 00:27:54,358
commitments to counterterrorism . I 

736
00:27:54,358 --> 00:27:56,524
know you said that they didn't provide 

737
00:27:56,524 --> 00:27:58,636
any information for this strike , but 

738
00:27:58,636 --> 00:28:00,691
did they provide any sort of help in 

739
00:28:00,691 --> 00:28:02,913
the closing days in terms of preventing 

740
00:28:02,913 --> 00:28:05,080
the threat against uh from IsIS K ? Or 

741
00:28:05,080 --> 00:28:07,136
have they been helpful since then in 

742
00:28:07,136 --> 00:28:08,913
cracking down on ISIS K as they 

743
00:28:08,913 --> 00:28:11,420
continue to plot against us western 

744
00:28:11,420 --> 00:28:14,730
targets . So I think the best I can 

745
00:28:14,730 --> 00:28:16,952
answer your question is to sort of take 

746
00:28:16,952 --> 00:28:19,119
the middle part of the question in the 

747
00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:21,230
final days . And really in the second 

748
00:28:21,230 --> 00:28:23,397
half of our of our time at h chi as we 

749
00:28:23,397 --> 00:28:25,563
continued our evacuation , the taliban 

750
00:28:25,563 --> 00:28:27,674
were helpful in establishing an outer 

751
00:28:27,674 --> 00:28:29,841
security perimeter , which actually we 

752
00:28:29,841 --> 00:28:31,841
believe prevented some attacks from 

753
00:28:31,841 --> 00:28:33,841
developing . Now , look , there's a 

754
00:28:33,841 --> 00:28:36,008
downside to that too . It also allowed 

755
00:28:36,008 --> 00:28:35,940
them to screen people that might 

756
00:28:35,950 --> 00:28:38,300
otherwise have gotten to the airfield . 

757
00:28:38,310 --> 00:28:40,532
And that's just a hard harsh fact . And 

758
00:28:40,532 --> 00:28:42,532
you have to balance those two force 

759
00:28:42,532 --> 00:28:44,620
protection of our forces which is 

760
00:28:44,620 --> 00:28:47,310
supported by taliban uh external 

761
00:28:47,310 --> 00:28:49,660
presence against the fact that it may 

762
00:28:49,660 --> 00:28:51,882
prevent some people that you would like 

763
00:28:51,882 --> 00:28:54,049
to bring out from being able to get to 

764
00:28:54,049 --> 00:28:56,271
you unmolested . And that's a difficult 

765
00:28:56,271 --> 00:28:58,327
balance . I frankly came down that I 

766
00:28:58,327 --> 00:29:00,271
wanted to protect our forces and I 

767
00:29:00,271 --> 00:29:02,438
needed that outer boundary and to that 

768
00:29:02,438 --> 00:29:04,604
degree we were able to work together . 

769
00:29:04,604 --> 00:29:06,604
I have no uh , I have no particular 

770
00:29:06,604 --> 00:29:08,716
affection for the taliban and I don't 

771
00:29:08,716 --> 00:29:10,938
know that they're doing anything at all 

772
00:29:10,938 --> 00:29:13,104
for us right now . But those questions 

773
00:29:13,104 --> 00:29:12,910
would probably better go to the 

774
00:29:12,910 --> 00:29:14,632
Department of State along with 

775
00:29:14,632 --> 00:29:16,632
questions about basing and where we 

776
00:29:16,632 --> 00:29:18,854
might be able to get closer basing than 

777
00:29:18,854 --> 00:29:21,021
where we are right now . I know all of 

778
00:29:21,021 --> 00:29:20,570
those things are actively being worked 

779
00:29:20,570 --> 00:29:23,320
by our diplomats as we speak . Thank 

780
00:29:23,320 --> 00:29:25,376
you . General , appreciate your time 

781
00:29:25,376 --> 00:29:27,487
this afternoon . I'll turn it over to 

782
00:29:27,487 --> 00:29:27,430
you for any last closing comments you 

783
00:29:27,430 --> 00:29:30,010
might want to make , sir . No , john , 

784
00:29:30,010 --> 00:29:32,232
I I just , I appreciate the opportunity 

785
00:29:32,232 --> 00:29:33,899
to come on . I appreciate the 

786
00:29:33,899 --> 00:29:36,066
opportunity to take responsibility for 

787
00:29:36,066 --> 00:29:38,232
this because I do feel responsible for 

788
00:29:38,232 --> 00:29:40,232
it . And I appreciate the questions 

789
00:29:40,232 --> 00:29:42,566
from the , from the media . Thanks john , 

790
00:29:42,566 --> 00:29:46,160
thank you very much . Okay . Yeah . Me 

791
00:29:46,540 --> 00:29:49,520
referred to a picture which didn't come 

792
00:29:49,520 --> 00:29:51,650
up are the are their individual 

793
00:29:51,650 --> 00:29:54,670
pictures of these little blocks in here . 

794
00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:57,013
I'll have to check with Central Command , 

795
00:29:57,013 --> 00:29:59,124
David . I'm sure if they were able to 

796
00:29:59,124 --> 00:30:01,013
make that graphic , there must be 

797
00:30:01,013 --> 00:30:02,680
imagery of it . But what what 

798
00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:04,847
resolution there in and all that we'll 

799
00:30:04,847 --> 00:30:07,069
check , we sent out to the networks for 

800
00:30:07,069 --> 00:30:09,180
anybody . I don't believe it was . It 

801
00:30:09,180 --> 00:30:11,291
was designed for this briefing and we 

802
00:30:11,291 --> 00:30:13,180
wanted to make sure you have hard 

803
00:30:13,180 --> 00:30:13,120
copies of it . Uh , but we can check 

804
00:30:13,120 --> 00:30:15,850
with Central Command , that's fair . Um 

805
00:30:16,340 --> 00:30:19,320
so The secretary was briefed by General 

806
00:30:19,320 --> 00:30:21,431
Mackenzie this morning at 8:00 on the 

807
00:30:21,431 --> 00:30:24,160
results of his investigation and uh on 

808
00:30:24,160 --> 00:30:26,104
behalf of the men and women of the 

809
00:30:26,104 --> 00:30:28,160
Department of Defense , uh He offers 

810
00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:30,216
his deepest condolences to surviving 

811
00:30:30,216 --> 00:30:32,549
family members of those who were killed , 

812
00:30:32,549 --> 00:30:34,771
including Mr Ramadi and to the staff of 

813
00:30:34,771 --> 00:30:36,882
nutrition and Education International 

814
00:30:36,882 --> 00:30:38,993
Mr Ramadi's employer . And you should 

815
00:30:38,993 --> 00:30:41,104
have in your inbox is now a statement 

816
00:30:41,104 --> 00:30:43,438
uh that I'm basically paraphrasing from . 

817
00:30:44,740 --> 00:30:47,870
Uh as the secretary says in this 

818
00:30:47,870 --> 00:30:50,630
statement , we apologize and we will 

819
00:30:50,630 --> 00:30:52,686
endeavor to learn from this horrible 

820
00:30:52,686 --> 00:30:54,630
mistake . And to that end , he has 

821
00:30:54,630 --> 00:30:56,519
directed a thorough review of the 

822
00:30:56,519 --> 00:30:58,463
investigation just completed by US 

823
00:30:58,463 --> 00:31:01,140
Central Command . And he has asked for 

824
00:31:01,140 --> 00:31:03,700
this review to consider the degree to 

825
00:31:03,700 --> 00:31:05,867
which the investigation considered all 

826
00:31:05,867 --> 00:31:08,089
available context and information , the 

827
00:31:08,089 --> 00:31:10,311
degree to which accountability measures 

828
00:31:10,311 --> 00:31:12,256
need to be taken at what level and 

829
00:31:12,256 --> 00:31:14,144
agree to which strike authorities 

830
00:31:14,144 --> 00:31:16,144
procedures and processes need to be 

831
00:31:16,144 --> 00:31:18,040
altered going forward . And he 

832
00:31:18,040 --> 00:31:20,262
reiterates that of course , no military 

833
00:31:20,262 --> 00:31:22,570
works harder than we do to avoid 

834
00:31:22,570 --> 00:31:24,514
civilian casualties . When we have 

835
00:31:24,514 --> 00:31:26,570
reason to believe that we have taken 

836
00:31:26,570 --> 00:31:28,737
innocent life we investigated . And if 

837
00:31:28,737 --> 00:31:30,959
it's true , we acknowledge it just like 

838
00:31:30,959 --> 00:31:33,630
we did today . But he also notes that 

839
00:31:33,630 --> 00:31:35,852
we have to work just as hard to prevent 

840
00:31:35,852 --> 00:31:37,352
recurrence , no matter the 

841
00:31:37,352 --> 00:31:39,019
circumstances , no matter the 

842
00:31:39,019 --> 00:31:41,074
intelligence stream and certainly no 

843
00:31:41,074 --> 00:31:42,908
matter the operational pressures 

844
00:31:42,908 --> 00:31:46,390
pressures under which we labor On 

845
00:31:46,390 --> 00:31:48,501
another matter altogether today ? The 

846
00:31:48,501 --> 00:31:50,612
Secretary approved a request from the 

847
00:31:50,612 --> 00:31:52,668
Capitol Hill Police Board to provide 

848
00:31:52,668 --> 00:31:54,779
100 members of the Washington D . C . 

849
00:31:54,779 --> 00:31:57,001
National Guard who will be stationed at 

850
00:31:57,001 --> 00:31:58,834
the D . C . Armory as a physical 

851
00:31:58,834 --> 00:32:01,280
security task force this weekend to 

852
00:32:01,290 --> 00:32:04,800
augment law enforcement . Um uh over 

853
00:32:04,810 --> 00:32:06,699
over the weekend uh covering this 

854
00:32:06,699 --> 00:32:08,870
September 18 demonstration on Capitol 

855
00:32:08,870 --> 00:32:11,210
Hill the D . C . National Guard will 

856
00:32:11,210 --> 00:32:13,377
join a number of local law enforcement 

857
00:32:13,377 --> 00:32:15,321
agencies in supporting the capitol 

858
00:32:15,321 --> 00:32:17,266
police . Should the capitol police 

859
00:32:17,266 --> 00:32:19,321
require assistance . They will first 

860
00:32:19,321 --> 00:32:21,620
utilize local state and federal law 

861
00:32:21,620 --> 00:32:23,398
enforcement capabilities before 

862
00:32:23,398 --> 00:32:25,231
requesting the deployment of the 

863
00:32:25,231 --> 00:32:27,780
physical security task force . The task 

864
00:32:27,780 --> 00:32:29,613
force will only be deployed upon 

865
00:32:29,613 --> 00:32:31,724
request of the capitol police to help 

866
00:32:31,724 --> 00:32:33,780
protect the U . S . Capitol building 

867
00:32:33,780 --> 00:32:35,891
and congressional office buildings by 

868
00:32:35,891 --> 00:32:37,780
manning building entry points and 

869
00:32:37,780 --> 00:32:39,947
screening individuals that are seeking 

870
00:32:39,947 --> 00:32:42,058
access to the building . They will be 

871
00:32:42,058 --> 00:32:45,150
unarmed with that I can take some 

872
00:32:45,150 --> 00:32:47,890
questions . Yeah Travis I'm I had a 

873
00:32:47,890 --> 00:32:50,630
question about that Guard troops going 

874
00:32:50,630 --> 00:32:53,540
to the hill obviously back in january 

875
00:32:53,540 --> 00:32:56,190
became kind of a big Issue that there 

876
00:32:56,190 --> 00:32:58,301
were veterans and I think in a couple 

877
00:32:58,301 --> 00:33:00,670
cases active duty troops are involved 

878
00:33:00,680 --> 00:33:03,650
in January six incident and I'm just 

879
00:33:03,650 --> 00:33:07,650
wondering if there's been any effort uh 

880
00:33:07,660 --> 00:33:10,630
two say something to troops ahead of 

881
00:33:10,630 --> 00:33:12,686
this about if they're thinking about 

882
00:33:12,686 --> 00:33:14,797
going what they should consider first 

883
00:33:14,797 --> 00:33:17,900
and if that's too many levels below the 

884
00:33:17,950 --> 00:33:20,820
road to speak from the podium , can you 

885
00:33:20,830 --> 00:33:23,890
talk at all about what the Secretary 

886
00:33:23,890 --> 00:33:25,668
might say to the troops who are 

887
00:33:25,668 --> 00:33:27,723
thinking about going to a rally like 

888
00:33:27,723 --> 00:33:30,860
this on saturday ? I don't know of any 

889
00:33:30,870 --> 00:33:33,160
official communication that's come out 

890
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:35,280
from the department at any level 

891
00:33:35,280 --> 00:33:38,320
specifically to uh to troops who might 

892
00:33:38,330 --> 00:33:42,170
consider uh being a part of uh of a 

893
00:33:42,170 --> 00:33:45,140
protest . Um There are already limits 

894
00:33:45,140 --> 00:33:47,600
to what they can do uh in uniform . And 

895
00:33:47,600 --> 00:33:49,600
clearly political protest is one of 

896
00:33:49,600 --> 00:33:52,410
those things are not allowed to do . Uh 

897
00:33:52,420 --> 00:33:55,830
But I don't know of any specific uh you 

898
00:33:55,830 --> 00:33:59,340
know , guidance that's been issued . Um 

899
00:33:59,350 --> 00:34:02,350
They are american citizens , um and 

900
00:34:02,360 --> 00:34:06,070
uh and in their off duty hours . Uh 

901
00:34:06,080 --> 00:34:08,850
they're allowed to um 

902
00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,770
uh to participate in um in social 

903
00:34:12,770 --> 00:34:14,770
events like that . Social political 

904
00:34:14,770 --> 00:34:17,070
events like that . Uh but they can't do 

905
00:34:17,070 --> 00:34:20,460
it in uniform and obviously should 

906
00:34:20,470 --> 00:34:22,692
things turn violent , then they will be 

907
00:34:22,692 --> 00:34:24,859
held accountable for any violence that 

908
00:34:24,859 --> 00:34:26,914
they participate in ? Uh Of course , 

909
00:34:26,914 --> 00:34:29,520
Travis , nobody wants to see it get to 

910
00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:33,500
that point here , and I the secretary 

911
00:34:33,500 --> 00:34:35,611
has confidence that the men and women 

912
00:34:35,611 --> 00:34:38,690
of the department understand the limits 

913
00:34:38,690 --> 00:34:41,380
and the constraints on their behavior 

914
00:34:41,380 --> 00:34:44,080
in these kinds of circumstances . Is 

915
00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:46,247
the Secretary satisfied with the level 

916
00:34:46,247 --> 00:34:48,469
of accountability so far following from 

917
00:34:48,469 --> 00:34:50,691
this investigation , or is he concerned 

918
00:34:50,691 --> 00:34:52,358
that there hasn't been enough 

919
00:34:52,358 --> 00:34:54,524
accountability following this strike . 

920
00:34:54,524 --> 00:34:56,580
I'm not going to characterize it one 

921
00:34:56,580 --> 00:34:56,300
way or the other right now . As I said 

922
00:34:56,310 --> 00:34:58,532
just a few minutes ago , he's asked for 

923
00:34:58,532 --> 00:35:00,588
a review of this investigation . And 

924
00:35:00,588 --> 00:35:02,588
one of the things that he wants the 

925
00:35:02,588 --> 00:35:04,310
review to do is take a look at 

926
00:35:04,310 --> 00:35:06,477
accountability and the degree to which 

927
00:35:06,477 --> 00:35:08,660
uh accountability measures need to be 

928
00:35:08,660 --> 00:35:11,040
considered and if so at what level . So 

929
00:35:11,050 --> 00:35:12,939
I'm not going to get ahead of his 

930
00:35:12,939 --> 00:35:15,050
decision making on that has ruled out 

931
00:35:15,050 --> 00:35:17,161
firing anybody . I'm not going to get 

932
00:35:17,161 --> 00:35:19,050
ahead of the secretary's decision 

933
00:35:19,050 --> 00:35:21,106
making . That's why he's asked for a 

934
00:35:21,106 --> 00:35:23,161
review so he can get a look . Yeah . 

935
00:35:23,161 --> 00:35:25,439
Mike bread for the Washington examiner . 

936
00:35:25,439 --> 00:35:24,870
Will there be a review of the first 

937
00:35:24,870 --> 00:35:27,870
strike At all ? The one in Nangahar ? 

938
00:35:27,880 --> 00:35:31,260
Yeah , I know . Yes . 

939
00:35:35,020 --> 00:35:38,340
So today the 

940
00:35:38,350 --> 00:35:42,160
Joint Operations comment 

941
00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:45,120
announced an agreement security 

942
00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:48,750
agreement with the US to reduce the uh 

943
00:35:48,760 --> 00:35:52,290
combat troops in a trial asad airbase 

944
00:35:52,290 --> 00:35:56,260
and Erbil by 

945
00:35:56,270 --> 00:35:59,630
the end of september . The IR statement 

946
00:35:59,640 --> 00:36:03,190
didn't mention any reduction of the 

947
00:36:03,200 --> 00:36:05,490
troop level . Can you please clarify 

948
00:36:05,490 --> 00:36:07,570
what's going on in Iraq now , why 

949
00:36:07,580 --> 00:36:09,691
there's like misunderstanding between 

950
00:36:09,691 --> 00:36:13,220
the Iraqi part and the coalition And 

951
00:36:13,230 --> 00:36:16,400
also can you confirm that their level 

952
00:36:16,410 --> 00:36:18,840
of troops will remain the same through 

953
00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:21,080
at least september and I I can't 

954
00:36:21,080 --> 00:36:23,730
confirm that . And you're gonna have to 

955
00:36:23,730 --> 00:36:25,750
let me take your question on the 

956
00:36:25,760 --> 00:36:27,927
statements because I just haven't seen 

957
00:36:27,927 --> 00:36:30,190
those today and I don't want to venture 

958
00:36:30,190 --> 00:36:32,412
a guess right now . So let me take your 

959
00:36:32,412 --> 00:36:34,579
question will get you an answer back . 

960
00:36:34,579 --> 00:36:36,730
Uh , okay , if you can just explain a 

961
00:36:36,730 --> 00:36:39,470
little bit about the capabilities that 

962
00:36:39,480 --> 00:36:41,647
the U . S . Forces will maintain after 

963
00:36:41,647 --> 00:36:44,650
december and Ira will they be able to 

964
00:36:44,650 --> 00:36:48,650
conduct airstrikes targeting ? Uh , 

965
00:36:49,030 --> 00:36:51,660
yeah , we're obviously , we're still in 

966
00:36:51,660 --> 00:36:53,771
technical talks with the Iraqis about 

967
00:36:53,771 --> 00:36:55,993
the president's going forward . I'm not 

968
00:36:55,993 --> 00:36:58,049
going to get ahead of those talks or 

969
00:36:58,049 --> 00:37:00,160
what decisions they might make . So I 

970
00:37:00,160 --> 00:37:02,327
think it's better for me to just leave 

971
00:37:02,327 --> 00:37:04,327
it where we are right now . And the 

972
00:37:04,327 --> 00:37:06,438
shift the mission , the nature of the 

973
00:37:06,438 --> 00:37:08,604
mission in Iraq will affect in any way 

974
00:37:08,604 --> 00:37:10,771
the mission in Syria . Again , I'm not 

975
00:37:10,771 --> 00:37:12,827
going to get ahead of decisions that 

976
00:37:12,827 --> 00:37:14,771
haven't been made or policies that 

977
00:37:14,771 --> 00:37:16,993
haven't been decided upon were in talks 

978
00:37:16,993 --> 00:37:19,160
with the Iraqis about what the posture 

979
00:37:19,160 --> 00:37:21,271
is going to go forward . Um , uh , we 

980
00:37:21,271 --> 00:37:23,493
have a much smaller presence in Syria , 

981
00:37:23,493 --> 00:37:25,549
but it's aligned to the same mission 

982
00:37:25,549 --> 00:37:27,690
which is to continue to counter ISIS 

983
00:37:27,690 --> 00:37:29,746
and their influence in both Iraq and 

984
00:37:29,746 --> 00:37:31,746
Syria . So while they are different 

985
00:37:31,746 --> 00:37:33,750
places , different force postures , 

986
00:37:34,000 --> 00:37:36,167
same ultimate goal . But I'm not going 

987
00:37:36,167 --> 00:37:39,300
to speak about the policy decisions or 

988
00:37:39,300 --> 00:37:41,522
operational decisions that haven't been 

989
00:37:41,522 --> 00:37:44,520
made yet , jay . Thank you , dan listen 

990
00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:46,631
to the North korean leader , kim jong 

991
00:37:46,631 --> 00:37:49,550
un Central victory message to the 

992
00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:53,020
Taliban and urging the U . S . 

993
00:37:53,020 --> 00:37:56,390
Military to quit . What is your comment 

994
00:37:56,470 --> 00:38:00,180
did not see the comment by kim jong un . 

995
00:38:00,190 --> 00:38:03,120
Um , so he can speak for his own 

996
00:38:03,120 --> 00:38:05,710
communications with the Taliban . Uh 

997
00:38:05,720 --> 00:38:09,680
what I can tell you is that uh we we 

998
00:38:09,680 --> 00:38:11,902
no longer have a presence on the ground 

999
00:38:11,902 --> 00:38:14,070
in Afghanistan . Our involvement in 

1000
00:38:14,070 --> 00:38:17,960
that war on the ground is over . Uh the 

1001
00:38:17,970 --> 00:38:20,081
president made clear his intention to 

1002
00:38:20,081 --> 00:38:22,248
do that . The retrograde withdrawal is 

1003
00:38:22,248 --> 00:38:24,640
done as well as uh the military part 

1004
00:38:24,650 --> 00:38:27,590
military element of evacuating 

1005
00:38:27,600 --> 00:38:30,060
americans and special immigrant visa 

1006
00:38:30,060 --> 00:38:31,838
holders . That said the U . S . 

1007
00:38:31,838 --> 00:38:34,350
Government is still very much going to 

1008
00:38:34,350 --> 00:38:36,310
stay involved . I'm trying to help 

1009
00:38:36,310 --> 00:38:38,490
people leave who want to leave and and 

1010
00:38:38,490 --> 00:38:41,930
who qualified to leave . Um and as you 

1011
00:38:41,930 --> 00:38:44,041
heard , General Mackenzie say , we're 

1012
00:38:44,041 --> 00:38:46,660
also going to stay focused on the 

1013
00:38:46,670 --> 00:38:48,670
terrorist threat that could emanate 

1014
00:38:48,670 --> 00:38:51,440
from Afghanistan . Yeah , Sylvie . Um 

1015
00:38:52,120 --> 00:38:54,370
Hello , I would like to ask you a few 

1016
00:38:54,380 --> 00:38:58,020
details about the Aucas agreement 

1017
00:38:58,030 --> 00:39:00,630
announced yesterday on the military 

1018
00:39:00,630 --> 00:39:04,320
side , the Australian 

1019
00:39:04,320 --> 00:39:07,750
defence minister spoke about basing 

1020
00:39:08,120 --> 00:39:10,880
does it mean that the U . S . Wants to 

1021
00:39:10,890 --> 00:39:14,050
deploy U . S . Troops on 

1022
00:39:14,060 --> 00:39:17,180
Australian soil permanently ? Well , we 

1023
00:39:17,180 --> 00:39:19,440
already have a rotational Marine corps 

1024
00:39:19,440 --> 00:39:21,560
deployment there , which Australians 

1025
00:39:21,560 --> 00:39:23,449
have been incredibly gracious and 

1026
00:39:23,449 --> 00:39:27,340
generous and helping host . Uh and I 

1027
00:39:27,350 --> 00:39:29,128
don't want to speak for again , 

1028
00:39:29,128 --> 00:39:31,294
decisions that haven't been made . But 

1029
00:39:31,294 --> 00:39:33,350
one of the things that was discussed 

1030
00:39:33,350 --> 00:39:35,410
was the opportunity to expand that 

1031
00:39:35,410 --> 00:39:37,299
presence in in Australia and that 

1032
00:39:37,299 --> 00:39:39,900
access to Australia . But no decisions 

1033
00:39:39,900 --> 00:39:42,560
came out of yesterday's uh Osman two 

1034
00:39:42,560 --> 00:39:45,210
plus two . But that is something that I 

1035
00:39:45,220 --> 00:39:47,331
think you can expect , we're going to 

1036
00:39:47,331 --> 00:39:49,331
continue to talk to the Australians 

1037
00:39:49,331 --> 00:39:51,442
about going forward . And in terms of 

1038
00:39:51,442 --> 00:39:54,460
uh , missiles . Did you did you get any ? 

1039
00:39:54,680 --> 00:39:56,740
I think you heard both the Secretary 

1040
00:39:56,740 --> 00:39:58,907
and the Minister Minister doesn't talk 

1041
00:39:58,907 --> 00:40:01,129
about this yesterday , that there was a 

1042
00:40:01,129 --> 00:40:03,240
range of capabilities uh , that we're 

1043
00:40:03,240 --> 00:40:05,480
going to continue to explore with our 

1044
00:40:05,490 --> 00:40:08,050
Australian allies . Um , no decisions 

1045
00:40:08,050 --> 00:40:09,994
have been made . The only decision 

1046
00:40:09,994 --> 00:40:12,161
really , uh , in terms of capabilities 

1047
00:40:12,161 --> 00:40:14,050
that came out of yesterday was of 

1048
00:40:14,050 --> 00:40:16,490
course the decision to help the 

1049
00:40:16,490 --> 00:40:19,060
Australian Navy acquire nuclear 

1050
00:40:19,060 --> 00:40:21,500
submarines . But as part of the meeting 

1051
00:40:21,500 --> 00:40:23,611
yesterday , they talked about a range 

1052
00:40:23,611 --> 00:40:25,778
of other types of capabilities that we 

1053
00:40:25,778 --> 00:40:27,889
might want to continue to pursue with 

1054
00:40:27,889 --> 00:40:30,056
Australia . But um , those discussions 

1055
00:40:30,056 --> 00:40:32,167
are , are really just starting . Uh , 

1056
00:40:32,167 --> 00:40:34,333
and again , these are going to be uh , 

1057
00:40:34,333 --> 00:40:37,210
bilateral decisions made by both the 

1058
00:40:37,210 --> 00:40:39,099
United States and Australia going 

1059
00:40:39,099 --> 00:40:41,154
forward outside of Aucas . Of course 

1060
00:40:41,154 --> 00:40:43,266
the great Britain will be involved in 

1061
00:40:43,266 --> 00:40:45,432
in august related things as well . But 

1062
00:40:45,432 --> 00:40:47,321
my point is , these are sovereign 

1063
00:40:47,321 --> 00:40:49,543
decisions that these nation states have 

1064
00:40:49,543 --> 00:40:51,432
to make and and I just don't have 

1065
00:40:51,432 --> 00:40:51,100
anything additional to to read out 

1066
00:40:51,100 --> 00:40:53,100
today , Tony , thank you , john , I 

1067
00:40:53,100 --> 00:40:55,156
have two separate questions . So the 

1068
00:40:55,156 --> 00:40:58,690
first one is on the 26th 29th attack . 

1069
00:40:58,710 --> 00:41:01,630
As General Mackenzie upset the 

1070
00:41:01,640 --> 00:41:04,860
statement from centcom on that day . At 

1071
00:41:04,860 --> 00:41:07,027
the end , it mentioned the possibility 

1072
00:41:07,027 --> 00:41:09,310
of civilian casualties . So I'm still 

1073
00:41:09,320 --> 00:41:13,060
wondering why General Milley on 

1074
00:41:13,060 --> 00:41:16,870
september 1st , still called this , uh , 

1075
00:41:16,880 --> 00:41:19,102
this strike graduate righteous attack . 

1076
00:41:19,102 --> 00:41:21,324
I think General Mackenzie answered that 

1077
00:41:21,324 --> 00:41:23,436
question quite well Freddie , I'm not 

1078
00:41:23,436 --> 00:41:25,570
sure that I can add to that . I'm not 

1079
00:41:25,570 --> 00:41:27,626
going to speak for Chairman Millie . 

1080
00:41:27,626 --> 00:41:31,250
But As you saw from General 

1081
00:41:31,250 --> 00:41:33,280
Mackenzie within 24 hours of an 

1082
00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:35,391
indication that there could have been 

1083
00:41:35,391 --> 00:41:37,447
civilian casualties . He launched an 

1084
00:41:37,447 --> 00:41:39,613
investigation as is his responsibility 

1085
00:41:39,613 --> 00:41:41,830
And he just completed it and they did 

1086
00:41:41,830 --> 00:41:44,800
it fairly quickly . But I think they 

1087
00:41:44,800 --> 00:41:46,750
wanted to take the time to be as 

1088
00:41:46,750 --> 00:41:48,917
contextual as possible . So I think he 

1089
00:41:48,917 --> 00:41:50,972
already spoke to that . But you said 

1090
00:41:50,972 --> 00:41:53,570
within 24 hours , but general nearly 

1091
00:41:53,580 --> 00:41:56,060
came on September one . That's more 

1092
00:41:56,060 --> 00:41:59,120
than 24 hours . Again , again , I'm not 

1093
00:41:59,120 --> 00:42:02,160
gonna I'm not gonna relitigate the past 

1094
00:42:02,160 --> 00:42:05,770
statements here . Uh as General 

1095
00:42:05,770 --> 00:42:08,900
Mackenzie mentioned every leader in the 

1096
00:42:08,900 --> 00:42:11,080
department that spoke to this in the 

1097
00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:13,970
moment that it was spoken to was 

1098
00:42:13,980 --> 00:42:16,250
speaking to you in good faith based on 

1099
00:42:16,250 --> 00:42:18,360
the information that we had and that 

1100
00:42:18,360 --> 00:42:20,527
includes me , by the way , things that 

1101
00:42:20,527 --> 00:42:22,749
I said obviously have not turned out to 

1102
00:42:22,749 --> 00:42:26,740
be correct , but it was done uh 

1103
00:42:26,750 --> 00:42:28,972
in as good faith and effort as possible 

1104
00:42:28,972 --> 00:42:31,083
to be as transparent as we could with 

1105
00:42:31,083 --> 00:42:33,306
what we knew at the time . Obviously we 

1106
00:42:33,306 --> 00:42:35,450
now know more things and different 

1107
00:42:35,450 --> 00:42:37,617
things that has completely changed the 

1108
00:42:37,617 --> 00:42:40,020
character of the strike . And again , 

1109
00:42:40,500 --> 00:42:42,222
we're trying to be as open and 

1110
00:42:42,222 --> 00:42:44,167
transparent as we can when we know 

1111
00:42:44,167 --> 00:42:46,167
things on august which seems France 

1112
00:42:46,167 --> 00:42:48,389
just recalled its ambassador to the U . 

1113
00:42:48,389 --> 00:42:51,530
S . Um And this is the fallout from the 

1114
00:42:51,540 --> 00:42:54,700
submarine issue . So when you're in the 

1115
00:42:54,700 --> 00:42:56,422
department , you know that the 

1116
00:42:56,422 --> 00:42:58,930
government effort to bolster uh 

1117
00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:01,456
Australia's defenses and the and the 

1118
00:43:01,456 --> 00:43:04,810
pacific strategy to counter china . 

1119
00:43:05,200 --> 00:43:07,920
Um It seems you're having growing issue 

1120
00:43:07,920 --> 00:43:10,090
with France . How concerned are you 

1121
00:43:10,100 --> 00:43:12,260
first about the future of defense 

1122
00:43:12,260 --> 00:43:14,470
cooperation with France ? And was the 

1123
00:43:14,470 --> 00:43:17,660
french government notified ahead of 

1124
00:43:17,660 --> 00:43:20,970
time of this movie ? Senior Minister uh 

1125
00:43:20,980 --> 00:43:22,702
Straight senior administration 

1126
00:43:22,702 --> 00:43:24,924
officials have been in touch with their 

1127
00:43:24,924 --> 00:43:27,580
french counterparts to discuss uh this 

1128
00:43:27,580 --> 00:43:29,620
arrangement uh including before the 

1129
00:43:29,620 --> 00:43:32,360
announcement . Um The secretary spoke 

1130
00:43:32,360 --> 00:43:34,590
with the french Minister Defense this 

1131
00:43:34,590 --> 00:43:38,010
morning . Um and uh and 

1132
00:43:38,500 --> 00:43:41,220
I won't characterize the french side of 

1133
00:43:41,220 --> 00:43:44,460
course , but uh it was clear from the 

1134
00:43:44,460 --> 00:43:46,460
discussion that there is still much 

1135
00:43:46,460 --> 00:43:48,404
work to do in terms of our defence 

1136
00:43:48,404 --> 00:43:50,900
relationship with with France . I mean 

1137
00:43:50,910 --> 00:43:53,800
more things to work on uh that there 

1138
00:43:53,800 --> 00:43:56,550
are uh that there are opportunities um 

1139
00:43:56,550 --> 00:43:58,383
and shared challenges and shared 

1140
00:43:58,383 --> 00:44:01,110
interests that both ministers uh 

1141
00:44:01,120 --> 00:44:04,390
committed to continue to explore . Um 

1142
00:44:04,400 --> 00:44:08,080
And there's as the President said , 

1143
00:44:08,080 --> 00:44:10,560
there's no regional divide that uh 

1144
00:44:10,570 --> 00:44:12,792
separates the interests of our atlantic 

1145
00:44:12,792 --> 00:44:15,220
and pacific partners um ensuring a free 

1146
00:44:15,220 --> 00:44:17,280
and open indo pacific is a shared 

1147
00:44:17,280 --> 00:44:19,447
interest between the United States and 

1148
00:44:19,447 --> 00:44:21,558
europe and we will continue our close 

1149
00:44:21,558 --> 00:44:23,613
cooperation with NATO and the EU and 

1150
00:44:23,613 --> 00:44:25,780
other partners uh that that kind of an 

1151
00:44:25,780 --> 00:44:29,310
endeavor . Okay , um the Australia . I 

1152
00:44:29,310 --> 00:44:31,366
want to have a follow up there going 

1153
00:44:31,366 --> 00:44:33,310
forward . Now . What role with the 

1154
00:44:33,310 --> 00:44:35,088
pentagon and the Navy play with 

1155
00:44:35,088 --> 00:44:37,440
Australia in terms of smoothing the way 

1156
00:44:37,440 --> 00:44:39,218
for the introduction of nuclear 

1157
00:44:39,218 --> 00:44:41,329
submarines . You know , they're gonna 

1158
00:44:41,329 --> 00:44:43,551
buy diesel subs now . They're gonna buy 

1159
00:44:43,551 --> 00:44:45,662
nukes over the next 10 months or so . 

1160
00:44:45,662 --> 00:44:45,630
What's going to happen ? What's the 

1161
00:44:45,630 --> 00:44:47,963
role of the Defense Department and Navy ? 

1162
00:44:47,963 --> 00:44:50,074
Yeah , Tony . Obviously we're still , 

1163
00:44:50,074 --> 00:44:52,074
we're gonna be putting together the 

1164
00:44:52,074 --> 00:44:54,130
framework of what this is gonna look 

1165
00:44:54,130 --> 00:44:53,870
like this process going forward . But I 

1166
00:44:53,870 --> 00:44:56,092
think you can obviously expect that the 

1167
00:44:56,092 --> 00:44:58,670
United States Navy uh and Navy nuclear 

1168
00:44:58,670 --> 00:45:01,530
reactors will be very much involved in 

1169
00:45:01,530 --> 00:45:03,700
helping with the acquisition of this 

1170
00:45:03,700 --> 00:45:05,811
capability . Are there any particular 

1171
00:45:05,811 --> 00:45:07,922
questions that need to be answered to 

1172
00:45:07,922 --> 00:45:10,144
the Navy satisfaction ? But Australia's 

1173
00:45:10,144 --> 00:45:12,311
capability to build nuclear submarines 

1174
00:45:12,311 --> 00:45:14,590
are having contractors ? Yeah , I don't 

1175
00:45:14,590 --> 00:45:16,757
think all that's been worked out right 

1176
00:45:16,757 --> 00:45:18,979
now , Tony . But yes , there's a lot of 

1177
00:45:18,979 --> 00:45:18,960
questions that have to be answered here 

1178
00:45:18,960 --> 00:45:21,230
then this is uh , this is a significant 

1179
00:45:21,230 --> 00:45:23,470
undertaking and it will add significant 

1180
00:45:23,470 --> 00:45:25,970
capability to the Australian Navy uh as 

1181
00:45:25,970 --> 00:45:28,270
well as reach . Uh and there's gonna be 

1182
00:45:28,270 --> 00:45:30,103
a lot of questions and technical 

1183
00:45:30,103 --> 00:45:32,159
details that have to be worked out . 

1184
00:45:32,159 --> 00:45:34,326
But to your first question of course , 

1185
00:45:34,326 --> 00:45:33,890
the United States Navy and Navy nuclear 

1186
00:45:33,890 --> 00:45:37,220
actors will be very much involved . And 

1187
00:45:37,230 --> 00:45:39,174
it takes you a million questions . 

1188
00:45:39,174 --> 00:45:40,897
General Milley question of the 

1189
00:45:40,897 --> 00:45:42,730
controversy with the book is the 

1190
00:45:42,730 --> 00:45:44,619
department of the defense mulling 

1191
00:45:44,619 --> 00:45:46,674
reviewing and releasing and redacted 

1192
00:45:46,674 --> 00:45:50,470
form the transcripts or classified 

1193
00:45:50,470 --> 00:45:52,960
notes of the mili china conversations 

1194
00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:55,016
that were leaked to the Woodward for 

1195
00:45:55,016 --> 00:45:56,960
his book and he thought about just 

1196
00:45:56,960 --> 00:45:59,182
releasing them like the White House did 

1197
00:45:59,182 --> 00:46:01,300
last year with the trump president of 

1198
00:46:01,300 --> 00:46:03,420
Ukraine transcript . I know no such 

1199
00:46:03,420 --> 00:46:05,531
plans to do that and I'd refer you to 

1200
00:46:05,531 --> 00:46:08,760
the joint staff to speak to uh whatever 

1201
00:46:08,760 --> 00:46:11,450
notes they might have on a counterpart 

1202
00:46:11,450 --> 00:46:13,830
call that the chairman conducted . I 

1203
00:46:13,840 --> 00:46:16,062
think I got to get to the phones here , 

1204
00:46:16,062 --> 00:46:18,284
jennifer , are you still there ? Yeah , 

1205
00:46:18,284 --> 00:46:20,451
I am . Thank you about the Afghanistan 

1206
00:46:20,451 --> 00:46:22,507
refugee situation on bases . Are you 

1207
00:46:22,507 --> 00:46:24,618
still monitoring and you know of more 

1208
00:46:24,618 --> 00:46:26,729
measles or other communicable disease 

1209
00:46:26,729 --> 00:46:28,951
cases . And are you obligated to report 

1210
00:46:28,951 --> 00:46:31,007
those at least domestically to local 

1211
00:46:31,007 --> 00:46:33,229
health officials ? Well , we're working 

1212
00:46:33,229 --> 00:46:35,396
with HHS very closely . So of course , 

1213
00:46:35,396 --> 00:46:37,396
uh , if , if we find any additional 

1214
00:46:37,396 --> 00:46:39,930
cases , we certainly are keeping HHS 

1215
00:46:39,930 --> 00:46:42,830
informed and we're obviously uh , 

1216
00:46:42,840 --> 00:46:45,550
making sure that to the degree there 

1217
00:46:45,550 --> 00:46:48,870
are any cases on domestic bases that 

1218
00:46:48,880 --> 00:46:50,936
are based commanders and people that 

1219
00:46:50,936 --> 00:46:52,936
work in uh , and families that live 

1220
00:46:52,936 --> 00:46:55,090
there are kept abreast . I don't have 

1221
00:46:55,090 --> 00:46:57,034
any additional updates in terms of 

1222
00:46:57,034 --> 00:46:59,870
additional cases to report out to today . 

1223
00:46:59,870 --> 00:47:02,180
But again we still remain in a pause 

1224
00:47:02,190 --> 00:47:05,900
for flights uh , coming from any of the 

1225
00:47:05,900 --> 00:47:07,844
lily pad locations overseas to the 

1226
00:47:07,844 --> 00:47:09,900
United States as we continue to work 

1227
00:47:09,900 --> 00:47:12,122
this out with HHS Megan . So all of the 

1228
00:47:12,122 --> 00:47:14,289
services have released their mandatory 

1229
00:47:14,289 --> 00:47:16,400
covid vaccination policies . The army 

1230
00:47:16,400 --> 00:47:18,511
is giving itself at least its reserve 

1231
00:47:18,511 --> 00:47:20,622
and National Guard components through 

1232
00:47:20,622 --> 00:47:22,956
the end of june to get fully vaccinated . 

1233
00:47:22,956 --> 00:47:25,011
Does the secretary have any concerns 

1234
00:47:25,011 --> 00:47:27,011
about that long of a timeline given 

1235
00:47:27,280 --> 00:47:29,400
that there's been a surge in the past 

1236
00:47:29,400 --> 00:47:31,511
month or so of military deaths in the 

1237
00:47:31,511 --> 00:47:33,567
bulk of military deaths have been in 

1238
00:47:33,567 --> 00:47:35,844
army reservists and National guardsmen . 

1239
00:47:35,844 --> 00:47:37,844
Secretary has made it clear that he 

1240
00:47:37,844 --> 00:47:39,970
expects the services to move out as 

1241
00:47:39,980 --> 00:47:41,869
energetically as they can on this 

1242
00:47:41,869 --> 00:47:44,480
because he is concerned about the rise 

1243
00:47:44,490 --> 00:47:47,310
in deaths and the impact that the delta 

1244
00:47:47,310 --> 00:47:49,421
variant has had on the force . That's 

1245
00:47:49,421 --> 00:47:51,588
one of the driving reasons why he went 

1246
00:47:51,588 --> 00:47:54,320
to a mandatory regimen for in this case 

1247
00:47:54,320 --> 00:47:57,590
the Pfizer vaccine . He spoke to the 

1248
00:47:57,980 --> 00:48:00,202
service secretaries just a few days ago 

1249
00:48:00,202 --> 00:48:02,424
about this very topic and they reported 

1250
00:48:02,424 --> 00:48:04,369
out to him their progress and what 

1251
00:48:04,369 --> 00:48:06,536
their implementation guidelines were . 

1252
00:48:06,536 --> 00:48:08,591
He's satisfied that they are working 

1253
00:48:08,591 --> 00:48:10,702
hard enough and fast enough to try to 

1254
00:48:10,702 --> 00:48:12,647
improve the vaccination population 

1255
00:48:12,647 --> 00:48:14,813
inside each of the services . But it's 

1256
00:48:14,813 --> 00:48:17,036
not something that he's just gonna lose 

1257
00:48:17,036 --> 00:48:19,091
focus on . He's going to continue to 

1258
00:48:19,091 --> 00:48:21,147
engage with the services continue to 

1259
00:48:21,147 --> 00:48:20,450
get updates . And certainly if the 

1260
00:48:20,450 --> 00:48:23,130
secretary feels like a change in 

1261
00:48:23,130 --> 00:48:25,352
implementation needs to occur in anyone 

1262
00:48:25,352 --> 00:48:27,463
service based on whatever the data is 

1263
00:48:27,463 --> 00:48:30,180
or what the rate of infection is . 

1264
00:48:30,190 --> 00:48:32,412
Certainly the rate of deaths . I mean , 

1265
00:48:32,412 --> 00:48:34,600
he will absolutely do that . Yeah . Is 

1266
00:48:34,600 --> 00:48:37,190
the secretary satisfied with the where 

1267
00:48:37,190 --> 00:48:39,090
the authorities are right now to 

1268
00:48:39,090 --> 00:48:41,090
conduct any further strikes against 

1269
00:48:41,090 --> 00:48:43,790
ISIS K . In Afghanistan or given what's 

1270
00:48:43,800 --> 00:48:46,000
been uncovered here ? Is there some 

1271
00:48:46,000 --> 00:48:48,111
thought to kind of raise elevating uh 

1272
00:48:48,120 --> 00:48:50,453
the ability to authorize another strike ? 

1273
00:48:50,470 --> 00:48:52,526
Well , without getting into specific 

1274
00:48:52,526 --> 00:48:55,770
decisions on authorities ? Uh I know 

1275
00:48:55,770 --> 00:48:58,620
that he has had conversations with 

1276
00:48:58,630 --> 00:49:00,574
General Mackenzie and with General 

1277
00:49:00,574 --> 00:49:02,519
Milley about the authorities going 

1278
00:49:02,519 --> 00:49:04,574
forward and I can tell you that with 

1279
00:49:04,574 --> 00:49:06,408
respect to the authorities going 

1280
00:49:06,408 --> 00:49:08,630
forward , particularly in Afghanistan . 

1281
00:49:08,630 --> 00:49:08,290
Yes , the secretary is very comfortable 

1282
00:49:08,290 --> 00:49:10,880
as what the arrangement is . Secondly , 

1283
00:49:10,880 --> 00:49:13,380
as I announced at the top there in this 

1284
00:49:13,380 --> 00:49:15,324
review that he has ordered on this 

1285
00:49:15,324 --> 00:49:17,547
particular investigation . He does want 

1286
00:49:17,547 --> 00:49:20,600
uh the review to factor in any changes 

1287
00:49:20,600 --> 00:49:22,420
in procedures , processes and 

1288
00:49:22,420 --> 00:49:24,642
authorities for strikes going forward . 

1289
00:49:24,642 --> 00:49:26,976
That might be that might be recommended . 

1290
00:49:26,976 --> 00:49:29,142
So it's going to be part of the review 

1291
00:49:29,142 --> 00:49:33,110
Yes . On august the submarines , long 

1292
00:49:33,110 --> 00:49:35,332
range missiles , the rotations of air , 

1293
00:49:35,332 --> 00:49:38,090
sea and naval forces . What is it about 

1294
00:49:38,090 --> 00:49:40,034
the deployment and the rotation of 

1295
00:49:40,034 --> 00:49:42,257
these forces ? That's going to help the 

1296
00:49:42,257 --> 00:49:44,368
US achieve its strategic goals in the 

1297
00:49:44,368 --> 00:49:47,090
end of pacific , it's not about just 

1298
00:49:47,090 --> 00:49:49,870
achieving U . S . Goals in the indo 

1299
00:49:49,870 --> 00:49:51,926
pacific , it's about . And you heard 

1300
00:49:51,926 --> 00:49:53,703
the Secretary talked about this 

1301
00:49:53,703 --> 00:49:55,703
yesterday . It's about uh improving 

1302
00:49:55,703 --> 00:49:57,703
what he calls integrated deterrence 

1303
00:49:57,703 --> 00:50:00,600
which is really about being able to in 

1304
00:50:00,600 --> 00:50:03,640
a networked way uh improve 

1305
00:50:03,650 --> 00:50:07,480
the capabilities of not just all the 

1306
00:50:07,480 --> 00:50:10,160
joint force but our allies and partners 

1307
00:50:10,160 --> 00:50:13,100
as well . Uh And as he said , this will 

1308
00:50:13,110 --> 00:50:16,180
improve the Australian Navy's reach and 

1309
00:50:16,180 --> 00:50:18,370
it will improve their capability . Um 

1310
00:50:18,370 --> 00:50:20,400
and in a highly contested security 

1311
00:50:20,400 --> 00:50:22,456
environment , as we have seen in the 

1312
00:50:22,456 --> 00:50:24,567
indo pacific . The Secretary believes 

1313
00:50:24,567 --> 00:50:26,789
the United States believes that this is 

1314
00:50:26,789 --> 00:50:29,820
a worthwhile endeavor . Yeah . Or on 

1315
00:50:29,820 --> 00:50:32,040
the National Guard was the initial 

1316
00:50:32,040 --> 00:50:34,151
request that came in from the capitol 

1317
00:50:34,151 --> 00:50:36,990
police to include arms national 

1318
00:50:36,990 --> 00:50:39,212
guardsmen . And was that something that 

1319
00:50:39,212 --> 00:50:41,323
was considered ? Yeah , I've seen the 

1320
00:50:41,323 --> 00:50:43,379
press reporting on this matter . I'm 

1321
00:50:43,379 --> 00:50:43,270
not going to get into the sausage 

1322
00:50:43,270 --> 00:50:45,660
making process . What I can tell you is 

1323
00:50:45,660 --> 00:50:48,070
that we did approve an official request 

1324
00:50:48,070 --> 00:50:51,140
for a physical security task force and 

1325
00:50:51,140 --> 00:50:53,830
they will be at the armory and they 

1326
00:50:53,830 --> 00:50:56,240
will be unarmed , strictly unarmed . 

1327
00:50:57,260 --> 00:50:58,990
Okay , thanks everybody appreciate it .