1 00:00:02,140 --> 00:00:05,290 Okay , good afternoon everybody . Uh I 2 00:00:05,290 --> 00:00:07,401 am going to kick off today's briefing 3 00:00:07,401 --> 00:00:10,450 by uh inviting Lieutenant General SAM 4 00:00:10,450 --> 00:00:12,820 side the U . S . Air Force Inspector 5 00:00:12,820 --> 00:00:15,610 General to come up Um and speak to you 6 00:00:15,610 --> 00:00:18,500 about his findings and recommendations . 7 00:00:18,510 --> 00:00:21,830 With respect to the August 29 Airstrike 8 00:00:21,840 --> 00:00:24,970 near Hamid Karzai International Airport 9 00:00:24,980 --> 00:00:27,770 in Afghanistan . As you know , the 10 00:00:27,770 --> 00:00:30,510 general was tasked by the Secretary of 11 00:00:30,510 --> 00:00:33,010 the Air Force frank Kendall to conduct 12 00:00:33,010 --> 00:00:35,860 a review and investigation of that 13 00:00:35,870 --> 00:00:37,981 strike . He has completed that work . 14 00:00:37,981 --> 00:00:40,203 He has briefed it out to senior leaders 15 00:00:40,203 --> 00:00:42,203 here at the pentagon to include the 16 00:00:42,203 --> 00:00:44,426 secretary and now he's prepared to talk 17 00:00:44,426 --> 00:00:46,648 to you about his findings and what some 18 00:00:46,648 --> 00:00:46,530 of his recommendations were going 19 00:00:46,530 --> 00:00:48,697 forward . He will take questions after 20 00:00:48,697 --> 00:00:50,808 that . I will as before be up here to 21 00:00:50,808 --> 00:00:52,919 moderate them . So I will call on you 22 00:00:52,919 --> 00:00:55,086 and we'll try to get to as many people 23 00:00:55,086 --> 00:00:57,308 as we can in the time that we have with 24 00:00:57,308 --> 00:01:01,120 that . I'll say sir take your mask off 25 00:01:01,120 --> 00:01:02,120 here . 26 00:01:05,940 --> 00:01:08,107 So folks , good afternoon , appreciate 27 00:01:08,107 --> 00:01:10,162 a few minutes of your time . So this 28 00:01:10,162 --> 00:01:12,051 investigation was directed by the 29 00:01:12,051 --> 00:01:13,773 Secretary of Defense who asked 30 00:01:13,773 --> 00:01:15,996 Secretary of the Air Force to designate 31 00:01:15,996 --> 00:01:17,940 a three star to conduct it . I was 32 00:01:17,940 --> 00:01:19,884 chosen to do it but it came in the 33 00:01:19,884 --> 00:01:22,051 direction of the Secretary Defense and 34 00:01:22,051 --> 00:01:22,010 ultimately it went back to the 35 00:01:22,010 --> 00:01:25,480 Secretary of Defense . Uh the whole 36 00:01:25,480 --> 00:01:27,702 point of it and selecting me is to make 37 00:01:27,702 --> 00:01:29,702 sure it's independent . I'm nowhere 38 00:01:29,702 --> 00:01:31,924 close to the strike on the department's 39 00:01:31,924 --> 00:01:34,091 Air Force Inspector General so that we 40 00:01:34,091 --> 00:01:36,036 conduct a thorough and independent 41 00:01:36,036 --> 00:01:38,202 investigation of what happened and why 42 00:01:38,202 --> 00:01:40,258 why it happened . We did not rely on 43 00:01:40,258 --> 00:01:42,610 any previous investigations or analysis 44 00:01:42,740 --> 00:01:44,851 that had been done up to that point . 45 00:01:44,851 --> 00:01:46,740 We rebuilt what happened from the 46 00:01:46,740 --> 00:01:48,962 ground up . That's critically important 47 00:01:48,962 --> 00:01:51,129 because for us to make conclusions and 48 00:01:51,129 --> 00:01:52,907 recommendations , we have to be 49 00:01:52,907 --> 00:01:55,130 confident in the underlying data . So 50 00:01:55,130 --> 00:01:57,186 we reconstructed everything from the 51 00:01:57,186 --> 00:01:59,408 ground up . We did review what was done 52 00:01:59,408 --> 00:02:01,519 before , but we certainly didn't rely 53 00:02:01,519 --> 00:02:03,630 on it . And that included pulling all 54 00:02:03,630 --> 00:02:05,741 The imagery , all the Intel streams , 55 00:02:05,741 --> 00:02:08,250 interviewing 29 individuals , 22 56 00:02:08,540 --> 00:02:10,762 directly involved with the strike . And 57 00:02:10,820 --> 00:02:14,090 under oath uh the report of 58 00:02:14,090 --> 00:02:16,460 investigation is classified and I know 59 00:02:16,460 --> 00:02:18,627 you're probably not happy about that . 60 00:02:18,627 --> 00:02:20,571 But let me tell you , it has to be 61 00:02:20,571 --> 00:02:22,460 because the methods , sources and 62 00:02:22,460 --> 00:02:24,516 methods and tactics , techniques and 63 00:02:24,516 --> 00:02:26,850 procedures used in executing such 64 00:02:26,850 --> 00:02:29,290 strikes are classified and for me to 65 00:02:29,290 --> 00:02:31,512 figure out what happened with any level 66 00:02:31,512 --> 00:02:33,512 of confidence , I have to deal with 67 00:02:33,512 --> 00:02:35,623 this classified material . So overall 68 00:02:35,623 --> 00:02:37,846 the report is classified , I'm going to 69 00:02:37,846 --> 00:02:39,930 be , do my best to give you the data 70 00:02:39,930 --> 00:02:42,041 that you need , the insights that you 71 00:02:42,041 --> 00:02:44,208 need . And I'll be as transparent as I 72 00:02:44,208 --> 00:02:46,319 can Mindful of the fact that we're in 73 00:02:46,319 --> 00:02:49,350 an unclassified setting here . Uh If 74 00:02:49,350 --> 00:02:51,572 you had the report in in front of you , 75 00:02:51,572 --> 00:02:53,683 uh the front end of it , at least the 76 00:02:53,683 --> 00:02:55,794 pages about the context at the time . 77 00:02:55,794 --> 00:02:57,961 And it's important to preface on about 78 00:02:57,961 --> 00:02:59,961 to say in terms of conclusions with 79 00:02:59,961 --> 00:03:02,072 that because you have to put yourself 80 00:03:02,072 --> 00:03:04,294 into the conditions that existed at the 81 00:03:04,294 --> 00:03:07,190 time . Uh , and what I mean by that is 82 00:03:07,190 --> 00:03:11,120 the risk to force At HK area 83 00:03:11,130 --> 00:03:13,186 and the multiple threat streams that 84 00:03:13,186 --> 00:03:15,130 they were receiving of an imminent 85 00:03:15,130 --> 00:03:17,352 attack attack . Mindful that three days 86 00:03:17,352 --> 00:03:19,574 prior , such an attack took place where 87 00:03:19,574 --> 00:03:22,850 we lost 13 soldiers or lost 13 members 88 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:26,560 and a lot of afghan civilians . Uh , 89 00:03:26,940 --> 00:03:30,390 we were one day from the X ville . So 90 00:03:30,390 --> 00:03:32,710 the ability for defense had declined 91 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:35,500 were concentrated in one location with 92 00:03:35,500 --> 00:03:37,444 a lot of threat streams indicating 93 00:03:37,444 --> 00:03:39,556 imminent attacks . That looks similar 94 00:03:39,556 --> 00:03:41,722 to the attack that happened three days 95 00:03:41,722 --> 00:03:43,833 prior . So you can imagine the stress 96 00:03:43,833 --> 00:03:45,889 on the force is high and the risk to 97 00:03:45,889 --> 00:03:48,056 force is high and not appreciating one 98 00:03:48,056 --> 00:03:50,000 about to say through that lens , I 99 00:03:50,000 --> 00:03:52,180 think would be inappropriate . The 100 00:03:52,180 --> 00:03:54,402 other thing I want to say up front is , 101 00:03:54,402 --> 00:03:56,624 uh , this strike was unique . So as I'm 102 00:03:56,624 --> 00:03:58,820 talking you through it , if you try to 103 00:03:58,820 --> 00:04:01,140 equate it or correlate it to uh , 104 00:04:01,150 --> 00:04:03,317 strikes , you're familiar with classic 105 00:04:03,317 --> 00:04:05,340 over the horizon . CT strikes , you 106 00:04:05,340 --> 00:04:07,507 would be comparing apples to oranges . 107 00:04:07,507 --> 00:04:09,729 So please don't do that . It was unique 108 00:04:09,729 --> 00:04:12,280 in the sense that , uh , it was a , a 109 00:04:12,290 --> 00:04:15,670 self defense , uh , strike executed in 110 00:04:15,670 --> 00:04:17,970 self defense . Unlike what you're 111 00:04:17,970 --> 00:04:20,420 accustomed to , which is by far the 112 00:04:20,420 --> 00:04:22,830 norm where you have a long time to do 113 00:04:22,830 --> 00:04:24,997 things like pattern of life . You have 114 00:04:24,997 --> 00:04:27,540 days to assess that the intelligence 115 00:04:27,540 --> 00:04:29,484 and determine how are you going to 116 00:04:29,484 --> 00:04:31,318 execute the strike . It's a very 117 00:04:31,318 --> 00:04:33,484 different construct and very different 118 00:04:33,484 --> 00:04:35,450 execution . So I wouldn't conclude 119 00:04:35,450 --> 00:04:37,850 anything from this particular strike 120 00:04:37,860 --> 00:04:41,570 which was very unique to the norm that 121 00:04:41,570 --> 00:04:43,792 is exercised with over the horizon . Ct 122 00:04:43,792 --> 00:04:47,180 strikes . Um the and I mentioned the 123 00:04:47,180 --> 00:04:49,480 fact that the report is classified . So 124 00:04:49,480 --> 00:04:51,591 bear with me on that . So let me give 125 00:04:51,591 --> 00:04:53,758 you some highlights and we'll get to Q 126 00:04:53,758 --> 00:04:55,813 and a quickly so I can see what's on 127 00:04:55,813 --> 00:04:57,758 your mind . One is , I don't think 128 00:04:57,758 --> 00:04:57,450 you'll be surprised that as the 129 00:04:57,450 --> 00:04:59,561 department has already acknowledged , 130 00:04:59,561 --> 00:05:01,617 the report confirmed that the strike 131 00:05:01,617 --> 00:05:03,561 resulted in the death of 10 Afghan 132 00:05:03,561 --> 00:05:06,510 civilians including three men and seven 133 00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:10,180 Children . Individuals involved in the 134 00:05:10,180 --> 00:05:11,902 strike interviewed during this 135 00:05:11,902 --> 00:05:15,340 investigation truly believed at the 136 00:05:15,340 --> 00:05:17,173 time that they were targeting an 137 00:05:17,173 --> 00:05:19,590 imminent threat to U . S . Forces on H . 138 00:05:19,590 --> 00:05:22,150 Kaaya , the intended target of the 139 00:05:22,150 --> 00:05:24,280 strike . The vehicle , the white 140 00:05:24,290 --> 00:05:26,940 Corolla , its contents and occupant 141 00:05:26,950 --> 00:05:29,117 were genuinely assessed at the time to 142 00:05:29,117 --> 00:05:32,140 be a threat to U . S . Forces . That 143 00:05:32,140 --> 00:05:35,300 assessment was primarily driven by 144 00:05:35,300 --> 00:05:38,280 interpretation of intelligence and 145 00:05:38,280 --> 00:05:40,336 correlating that to observe movement 146 00:05:40,336 --> 00:05:42,280 throughout an eight hour window in 147 00:05:42,280 --> 00:05:43,947 which the vehicle was tracked 148 00:05:43,947 --> 00:05:45,780 throughout the day before it was 149 00:05:45,780 --> 00:05:47,891 ultimately struck . Regrettably , the 150 00:05:47,891 --> 00:05:49,947 interpretation of the correlation of 151 00:05:49,947 --> 00:05:51,891 the intelligence to what was being 152 00:05:51,891 --> 00:05:54,380 perceived at the time in real time was 153 00:05:54,390 --> 00:05:57,150 inaccurate . In fact , the vehicle , 154 00:05:57,150 --> 00:05:59,510 its occupants and contents did not pose 155 00:05:59,510 --> 00:06:02,870 any risk to U . S . Forces . In 156 00:06:02,870 --> 00:06:04,814 addition , the assessment prior to 157 00:06:04,814 --> 00:06:06,814 strike at the compound at which the 158 00:06:06,814 --> 00:06:09,360 vehicle was struck Of the individuals 159 00:06:09,370 --> 00:06:12,100 in the area itself was inaccurate and 160 00:06:12,100 --> 00:06:14,100 you're probably going to uh We know 161 00:06:14,100 --> 00:06:17,640 that given the results uh but it's 162 00:06:17,640 --> 00:06:19,751 inaccurate in the sense that when you 163 00:06:19,751 --> 00:06:22,000 do the analysis you can see that there 164 00:06:22,000 --> 00:06:23,860 are opportunities to potentially 165 00:06:24,140 --> 00:06:26,550 conduct the assessment more carefully 166 00:06:26,550 --> 00:06:28,880 given time . Uh So therefore it was 167 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:31,047 inaccurate given what was known at the 168 00:06:31,047 --> 00:06:33,400 time . Uh The authorities and rules of 169 00:06:33,400 --> 00:06:35,640 engagement utilized to execute this 170 00:06:35,640 --> 00:06:37,807 regrettable strike were understandable 171 00:06:37,810 --> 00:06:39,921 and they were understandable based on 172 00:06:39,921 --> 00:06:42,032 the information available at the time 173 00:06:42,032 --> 00:06:44,366 and the perceived very high threat to U . 174 00:06:44,366 --> 00:06:47,980 S . Forces at H . Kaaya . The 175 00:06:47,980 --> 00:06:50,880 investigation found no violation of law 176 00:06:50,890 --> 00:06:53,770 including the law of war did find 177 00:06:53,770 --> 00:06:56,290 execution errors confirmed by 178 00:06:56,300 --> 00:06:58,120 confirmation or combined with 179 00:06:58,120 --> 00:07:00,880 confirmation bias and communication 180 00:07:00,890 --> 00:07:03,490 breakdowns that regrettably led to 181 00:07:03,490 --> 00:07:06,250 civilian casualties . Um 182 00:07:07,110 --> 00:07:09,320 The investigation made three 183 00:07:09,320 --> 00:07:11,320 recommendations . They were brought 184 00:07:11,320 --> 00:07:13,376 enough but important enough based on 185 00:07:13,376 --> 00:07:15,750 the analysis of in the investigation of 186 00:07:15,750 --> 00:07:18,480 what , what didn't go as well as it 187 00:07:18,480 --> 00:07:22,030 could have . And um the recommendations 188 00:07:22,040 --> 00:07:24,262 are unique to this type of strike which 189 00:07:24,262 --> 00:07:26,373 again is very time constrained . It's 190 00:07:26,373 --> 00:07:28,596 not what you're used to in the over the 191 00:07:28,596 --> 00:07:30,818 horizon . CT strike where you have time 192 00:07:30,818 --> 00:07:33,040 to soak a target , do pattern of life . 193 00:07:33,040 --> 00:07:35,151 This is a self defense strike because 194 00:07:35,151 --> 00:07:37,040 the vehicle is getting closer and 195 00:07:37,040 --> 00:07:39,151 closer . two H . Kaaya and got within 196 00:07:39,151 --> 00:07:41,262 three km and was perceived to contain 197 00:07:41,262 --> 00:07:43,429 explosives and thus an imminent threat 198 00:07:43,429 --> 00:07:45,930 to U . S . Forces on H . Kaaya . But 199 00:07:45,930 --> 00:07:48,440 the recommendations are focused on this 200 00:07:48,440 --> 00:07:50,900 type of strike where the time is 201 00:07:50,900 --> 00:07:53,350 constrained . The scenario is dynamic 202 00:07:53,360 --> 00:07:56,360 and it's in a in an urban terrain and 203 00:07:56,370 --> 00:07:58,537 let me just give you the highlights of 204 00:07:58,537 --> 00:08:00,537 them . The first one we can talk in 205 00:08:00,537 --> 00:08:02,759 detail what they mean if you want . But 206 00:08:02,759 --> 00:08:04,426 the first one is implementing 207 00:08:04,426 --> 00:08:06,770 procedures in a strike cell where if we 208 00:08:06,770 --> 00:08:08,900 find ourselves in a similar situation 209 00:08:08,900 --> 00:08:11,122 where we're time constrained conducting 210 00:08:11,122 --> 00:08:13,240 strikes very quickly because of the 211 00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:15,462 need to exercise self defense and urban 212 00:08:15,740 --> 00:08:18,170 terrain . And we're trying to interpret 213 00:08:18,170 --> 00:08:20,392 or correlate intelligence to what we're 214 00:08:20,392 --> 00:08:22,559 seeing in a rapid fashion implementing 215 00:08:22,559 --> 00:08:24,503 procedures to mitigate the risk of 216 00:08:24,503 --> 00:08:26,990 confirmation bias which we can talk 217 00:08:26,990 --> 00:08:29,820 more about that is why it was of 218 00:08:29,820 --> 00:08:32,060 interest in this particular case . The 219 00:08:32,070 --> 00:08:34,920 second recommendation uh is 220 00:08:34,930 --> 00:08:38,130 enhancing situational awareness by 221 00:08:38,130 --> 00:08:41,140 sharing information that is very 222 00:08:41,140 --> 00:08:43,251 thoroughly shared within the confines 223 00:08:43,251 --> 00:08:45,418 of the strike cell and within a bubble 224 00:08:45,418 --> 00:08:47,570 within that strike cell . But sharing 225 00:08:47,570 --> 00:08:50,150 that situational awareness and analysis 226 00:08:50,150 --> 00:08:52,740 more broadly across the strike cell . 227 00:08:52,750 --> 00:08:55,160 But also outside two elements 228 00:08:55,160 --> 00:08:56,938 supporting the strike cell from 229 00:08:56,938 --> 00:09:00,730 elsewhere . That additional information 230 00:09:00,740 --> 00:09:02,573 will enhance overall situational 231 00:09:02,573 --> 00:09:04,462 awareness and will provide better 232 00:09:04,462 --> 00:09:07,260 insight and better cross check of what 233 00:09:07,260 --> 00:09:09,830 exactly are we looking at ? What are we 234 00:09:09,830 --> 00:09:12,520 seeing ? What else could it be ? Are we 235 00:09:12,520 --> 00:09:14,520 interpreting the intelligence in an 236 00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:16,650 appropriate way or not ? So that 237 00:09:16,650 --> 00:09:18,872 sharing information can be approved and 238 00:09:18,872 --> 00:09:21,280 should be ? And the last I mentioned 239 00:09:21,280 --> 00:09:24,820 that the assessment of the presence of 240 00:09:24,830 --> 00:09:27,950 civilians , specifically Children uh in 241 00:09:27,950 --> 00:09:30,040 the compound was inaccurate . So 242 00:09:30,050 --> 00:09:33,180 recommended a review of how the 243 00:09:33,190 --> 00:09:35,500 assessment is conducted again under 244 00:09:35,500 --> 00:09:37,722 rapid strikes , where you're exercising 245 00:09:37,722 --> 00:09:39,611 something in the time constrained 246 00:09:39,611 --> 00:09:41,990 fashion for more deliberate lengthy 247 00:09:42,000 --> 00:09:44,690 days , time type type strikes which are 248 00:09:44,690 --> 00:09:47,320 accustomed to . Uh I think that's 249 00:09:47,320 --> 00:09:49,209 pretty tight because you have the 250 00:09:49,209 --> 00:09:51,209 luxury of time . You don't have the 251 00:09:51,209 --> 00:09:53,320 luxury of time when you're perceiving 252 00:09:53,320 --> 00:09:55,264 something to be an imminent threat 253 00:09:55,264 --> 00:09:54,770 that's approaching you . And you need 254 00:09:54,770 --> 00:09:57,030 to have lockdown procedures of how we 255 00:09:57,030 --> 00:09:59,141 might be able to improve that to pick 256 00:09:59,141 --> 00:10:02,810 up on on what's there . The 257 00:10:02,820 --> 00:10:05,300 uh we've shared at the direction of the 258 00:10:05,300 --> 00:10:07,578 Secretary Defense who owns this report . 259 00:10:07,578 --> 00:10:10,740 Uh This report was shared with the 260 00:10:10,740 --> 00:10:12,790 operational commanders so they can 261 00:10:12,790 --> 00:10:14,910 assess the recommendations within and 262 00:10:14,910 --> 00:10:17,210 decide what else they might want to do 263 00:10:17,210 --> 00:10:20,000 to implement uh corrective measures . 264 00:10:20,010 --> 00:10:22,120 Uh It was also shared again by the 265 00:10:22,120 --> 00:10:24,342 direction of Secretary Defense with the 266 00:10:24,342 --> 00:10:26,564 chain of command so they can assess the 267 00:10:26,564 --> 00:10:29,230 analysis within and determine if as 268 00:10:29,240 --> 00:10:31,400 appropriate if any accountability is 269 00:10:31,400 --> 00:10:33,910 appropriate . They can see in 270 00:10:33,920 --> 00:10:36,220 excruciating detail exactly what played 271 00:10:36,220 --> 00:10:39,180 out and how it played out . Uh And if 272 00:10:39,190 --> 00:10:41,920 uh performance wise uh didn't meet 273 00:10:41,920 --> 00:10:44,142 their bar that's commander business and 274 00:10:44,142 --> 00:10:46,364 that's why we refer such investigations 275 00:10:46,364 --> 00:10:48,531 to the chain of command . They've only 276 00:10:48,531 --> 00:10:50,642 had it for two days , Right ? So it's 277 00:10:50,642 --> 00:10:52,587 not like they had it for a while . 278 00:10:52,587 --> 00:10:52,500 They've had it for two days and they're 279 00:10:52,500 --> 00:10:54,500 digesting it to try to work through 280 00:10:54,500 --> 00:10:57,370 that . Um I do need to mention 281 00:10:57,370 --> 00:11:01,070 something Because we're also uh asked 282 00:11:01,070 --> 00:11:03,390 to look at the initial investigation 283 00:11:03,390 --> 00:11:05,650 and the messaging that followed . I'm 284 00:11:05,650 --> 00:11:08,010 talking specifically to the 156 and 285 00:11:08,020 --> 00:11:10,140 what we initially message versus what 286 00:11:10,150 --> 00:11:12,760 we eventually evolved to and then what 287 00:11:12,760 --> 00:11:14,704 I'm telling you right now and what 288 00:11:14,704 --> 00:11:18,140 caused that . Um And uh so you can 289 00:11:18,140 --> 00:11:20,196 imagine , given the severity and the 290 00:11:20,196 --> 00:11:22,362 significance of the strike , there was 291 00:11:22,362 --> 00:11:24,700 a high desire to get information as 292 00:11:24,700 --> 00:11:26,644 soon as possible , not only to the 293 00:11:26,644 --> 00:11:29,000 chain of command , but up to the CIA or 294 00:11:29,000 --> 00:11:31,140 the pentagon to you all to the public 295 00:11:31,140 --> 00:11:33,740 to the hill . So the investigation was 296 00:11:33,740 --> 00:11:36,580 conducted . But the investigation was 297 00:11:36,580 --> 00:11:38,530 conducted very quickly again with 298 00:11:38,530 --> 00:11:40,697 pristine intent to provide information 299 00:11:40,697 --> 00:11:42,900 as quickly as possible . But the time 300 00:11:42,900 --> 00:11:45,122 frame it was conducted was insufficient 301 00:11:45,122 --> 00:11:47,780 to drill down sufficiently to provide 302 00:11:47,790 --> 00:11:49,900 sufficient insight and reach 303 00:11:49,910 --> 00:11:52,021 conclusions that are really sound and 304 00:11:52,021 --> 00:11:54,680 based on on facts . So I didn't find 305 00:11:54,690 --> 00:11:57,080 any indication at all of anybody slow 306 00:11:57,080 --> 00:11:59,310 leaking information or twisting 307 00:11:59,310 --> 00:12:00,980 information , it was merely 308 00:12:00,990 --> 00:12:03,450 investigation done . It was appropriate 309 00:12:03,460 --> 00:12:05,600 and justified for everyone to assume 310 00:12:05,610 --> 00:12:07,721 that investigation contained accurate 311 00:12:07,721 --> 00:12:09,832 information . And we all thought that 312 00:12:09,832 --> 00:12:12,180 right . But uh when you look back at it 313 00:12:12,190 --> 00:12:14,460 as to what else could have been done . 314 00:12:14,540 --> 00:12:16,596 I'm just telling you , I don't think 315 00:12:16,596 --> 00:12:18,818 anybody could have done a better job in 316 00:12:18,818 --> 00:12:20,818 4-5 days ? It's just not possible , 317 00:12:20,818 --> 00:12:23,380 right ? It takes more time to do such 318 00:12:23,380 --> 00:12:25,450 work as it's very complicated and I 319 00:12:25,450 --> 00:12:27,617 just want to put that out to make sure 320 00:12:27,617 --> 00:12:29,339 that you'll understand why the 321 00:12:29,339 --> 00:12:32,160 messaging was different at 1st 322 00:12:33,280 --> 00:12:35,391 and I'll leave you with this and then 323 00:12:35,391 --> 00:12:38,350 we'll go to Q . And a look . We had the 324 00:12:38,350 --> 00:12:41,310 benefit of time to conduct this review . 325 00:12:41,320 --> 00:12:43,540 I used the same data that folks 326 00:12:43,540 --> 00:12:45,762 conducting the strike on the day of the 327 00:12:45,762 --> 00:12:47,762 strike . Hat , that's the only fair 328 00:12:47,762 --> 00:12:49,873 thing to do . Right ? We can't second 329 00:12:49,873 --> 00:12:52,040 guess with additional information that 330 00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:54,207 they didn't have . Although I did look 331 00:12:54,207 --> 00:12:53,730 at that to see if there was something 332 00:12:53,730 --> 00:12:55,841 they should have had that they didn't 333 00:12:55,841 --> 00:12:58,008 have . There's not much of that , that 334 00:12:58,008 --> 00:13:00,063 would have made a difference . But I 335 00:13:00,063 --> 00:13:02,174 had the luxury of time to review that 336 00:13:02,174 --> 00:13:04,286 data over weeks . They didn't right . 337 00:13:04,286 --> 00:13:06,397 They had the same data , but they had 338 00:13:06,397 --> 00:13:08,619 to assimilate it , digest it and make a 339 00:13:08,619 --> 00:13:10,674 decision in a matter of hours . So I 340 00:13:10,674 --> 00:13:12,786 have to acknowledge that yes . When I 341 00:13:12,786 --> 00:13:14,674 had weeks to figure it out and do 342 00:13:14,674 --> 00:13:16,800 analysis and reach conclusions , uh 343 00:13:16,810 --> 00:13:19,070 I've highlighted the breakdowns for you 344 00:13:19,080 --> 00:13:21,500 but they seemed simpler now than they 345 00:13:21,500 --> 00:13:23,278 were at the time given the time 346 00:13:23,278 --> 00:13:25,280 constraints . So let me stop that 347 00:13:25,290 --> 00:13:27,401 because I don't want to keep battling 348 00:13:27,401 --> 00:13:29,401 for too long and maybe take some of 349 00:13:29,401 --> 00:13:33,130 your questions ? Yeah . Hi general , 350 00:13:33,240 --> 00:13:36,600 can you say whether any of the 351 00:13:36,610 --> 00:13:38,332 evaluation you found made this 352 00:13:38,332 --> 00:13:40,440 avoidable ? If any of those changes 353 00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:42,551 have been made , would this have been 354 00:13:42,551 --> 00:13:45,090 avoidable ? And you're saying you found 355 00:13:45,090 --> 00:13:47,320 no illegalities . 356 00:13:48,740 --> 00:13:52,580 Why no discipline ? Why did you 357 00:13:52,580 --> 00:13:54,780 find that there was no one needing 358 00:13:54,790 --> 00:13:57,250 discipline when it was such a major 359 00:13:57,260 --> 00:13:59,371 failure ? Yeah , no great questions . 360 00:13:59,371 --> 00:14:01,260 Let me hit the second one first , 361 00:14:01,260 --> 00:14:03,427 because I'm sure that's on everybody's 362 00:14:03,427 --> 00:14:05,371 mind . Let me just be up front . I 363 00:14:05,371 --> 00:14:08,030 didn't uh didn't eliminate the 364 00:14:08,030 --> 00:14:10,141 possibility of accountability that is 365 00:14:10,141 --> 00:14:12,252 commander business . What I concluded 366 00:14:12,252 --> 00:14:15,760 at our level in this investigation , um 367 00:14:16,810 --> 00:14:20,410 that I didn't find violations of law 368 00:14:20,420 --> 00:14:24,310 or the law of war . Um I didn't 369 00:14:24,310 --> 00:14:26,588 find when I was doing a process review . 370 00:14:26,588 --> 00:14:28,810 Remember this is about to strike in the 371 00:14:28,810 --> 00:14:31,380 process had I found an individual that 372 00:14:31,380 --> 00:14:33,860 failed to perform to the level of 373 00:14:33,870 --> 00:14:35,920 criminal misconduct or criminal 374 00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:38,220 negligence and that was the cause of 375 00:14:38,220 --> 00:14:40,442 failure for this whole thing . We would 376 00:14:40,442 --> 00:14:42,387 have spun that off into a separate 377 00:14:42,387 --> 00:14:45,640 investigation into an individual so 378 00:14:45,650 --> 00:14:48,320 that we were eyes wide open to go , Did 379 00:14:48,330 --> 00:14:50,330 any individual rise to that level ? 380 00:14:50,330 --> 00:14:52,108 That we're going to spin off an 381 00:14:52,108 --> 00:14:53,608 investigation , a criminal 382 00:14:53,608 --> 00:14:55,163 investigation or misconduct 383 00:14:55,163 --> 00:14:57,386 investigation ? And what I found is the 384 00:14:57,386 --> 00:14:59,980 disconnects were an aggregate process 385 00:14:59,980 --> 00:15:01,924 breakdown in which many people are 386 00:15:01,924 --> 00:15:04,210 involved and it wasn't any particular 387 00:15:04,210 --> 00:15:06,720 individual that was causal to that 388 00:15:06,730 --> 00:15:08,897 certainly nothing rose to the level of 389 00:15:08,897 --> 00:15:11,180 criminal conduct . Break , break the 390 00:15:11,180 --> 00:15:13,291 fact that I've sent this to the chain 391 00:15:13,291 --> 00:15:15,630 of command ? Uh that's where it belongs . 392 00:15:15,630 --> 00:15:17,686 It doesn't mean the chain of command 393 00:15:17,686 --> 00:15:19,741 will read it and say , I'm not doing 394 00:15:19,741 --> 00:15:21,908 anything , They could read it and go , 395 00:15:21,908 --> 00:15:24,019 this is subpar performance , it's not 396 00:15:24,019 --> 00:15:26,241 an objective assessment . There isn't a 397 00:15:26,241 --> 00:15:28,463 checklist to go , if you do this , it's 398 00:15:28,463 --> 00:15:28,060 okay if you do that , it's not okay . 399 00:15:28,440 --> 00:15:30,496 Uh but they can go this up , this is 400 00:15:30,496 --> 00:15:32,662 subpar performance and decided to take 401 00:15:32,662 --> 00:15:34,720 adverse action . They can decrypt 402 00:15:34,720 --> 00:15:37,053 Henschel folks , they can retrain folks , 403 00:15:37,053 --> 00:15:39,053 they can fire folks , they can do a 404 00:15:39,053 --> 00:15:41,730 variety of different things . So you 405 00:15:41,730 --> 00:15:44,430 should not uh you should not perceive 406 00:15:44,430 --> 00:15:46,970 the fact that I didn't call any 407 00:15:46,970 --> 00:15:50,160 individual out uh with accountability . 408 00:15:50,430 --> 00:15:52,650 That does not mean that the chain of 409 00:15:52,650 --> 00:15:55,250 came in , won't . Uh And to your second 410 00:15:55,250 --> 00:15:58,380 point , I can't play hypotheticals and 411 00:15:58,380 --> 00:16:00,720 say if we implement the recommendations 412 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:02,887 were guaranteed this will never happen 413 00:16:02,887 --> 00:16:04,887 again . Here's what I will tell you 414 00:16:04,887 --> 00:16:06,831 based on the circumstances in this 415 00:16:06,831 --> 00:16:08,831 particular strike , which is a very 416 00:16:08,831 --> 00:16:10,998 unique strike under self defense . And 417 00:16:10,998 --> 00:16:12,942 I told you the constraints of that 418 00:16:12,942 --> 00:16:14,998 these measures will go a long way to 419 00:16:14,998 --> 00:16:16,887 greatly mitigate the risk of this 420 00:16:16,887 --> 00:16:18,850 happening again , because they all 421 00:16:18,850 --> 00:16:20,950 contributed to the ultimate strike . 422 00:16:21,340 --> 00:16:24,450 Right ? So these measures will allow us 423 00:16:24,450 --> 00:16:26,228 to kind of mitigate the risk of 424 00:16:26,228 --> 00:16:28,228 confirmation bias , The situational 425 00:16:28,228 --> 00:16:30,339 awareness will enhance the collective 426 00:16:30,339 --> 00:16:32,506 and trying to question what is it that 427 00:16:32,506 --> 00:16:34,339 we're looking at and what are we 428 00:16:34,339 --> 00:16:36,450 interpreting and will also help us in 429 00:16:36,450 --> 00:16:38,561 the analysis of individuals at the at 430 00:16:38,561 --> 00:16:40,728 the strike area when you're conducting 431 00:16:40,728 --> 00:16:42,728 a rapid strike , not just strikes , 432 00:16:42,728 --> 00:16:44,783 you're used to over the horizon . Ct 433 00:16:44,783 --> 00:16:47,150 Yeah . No . two Questions . Where did 434 00:16:47,150 --> 00:16:50,860 the process break down ? Yes . He had 435 00:16:51,440 --> 00:16:54,340 in the original explanation of what 436 00:16:54,340 --> 00:16:57,270 went wrong , it all tracks back to that 437 00:16:57,940 --> 00:17:01,360 Corolla being seen at a location that 438 00:17:01,370 --> 00:17:04,260 was associated with ISIS and everything 439 00:17:04,260 --> 00:17:06,316 after that seemed to be confirmation 440 00:17:06,316 --> 00:17:09,930 bias . So was that original 441 00:17:09,940 --> 00:17:13,690 determination that that car , which 442 00:17:13,690 --> 00:17:15,690 actually was at that guy's place of 443 00:17:15,690 --> 00:17:19,000 work that that was in an ISIS location ? 444 00:17:19,000 --> 00:17:22,020 Was that the original fall from which 445 00:17:22,030 --> 00:17:25,160 everything else follow ? Yes sir . But 446 00:17:25,170 --> 00:17:27,170 with some nuances . Let me walk you 447 00:17:27,170 --> 00:17:29,503 through that . This is a critical point . 448 00:17:29,503 --> 00:17:31,559 So the question for everybody is how 449 00:17:31,559 --> 00:17:33,726 did this particular vehicle become the 450 00:17:33,726 --> 00:17:35,892 vehicle of interest that we ultimately 451 00:17:35,892 --> 00:17:37,892 struck ? And it's what I alluded to 452 00:17:37,892 --> 00:17:40,210 before . Uh , it's , it boiled down to 453 00:17:40,210 --> 00:17:42,560 the interpretation of intelligence 454 00:17:42,570 --> 00:17:44,820 available and trying to correlate it to 455 00:17:44,820 --> 00:17:48,000 what you're seeing in real time . And 456 00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:50,570 trying to determine is the intelligence 457 00:17:50,580 --> 00:17:52,413 giving you enough information to 458 00:17:52,413 --> 00:17:55,040 conclude that this area or this 459 00:17:55,040 --> 00:17:57,920 particular compound and associated 460 00:17:57,920 --> 00:18:00,740 vehicles are the compound and vehicles 461 00:18:00,740 --> 00:18:02,962 of interest , right ? There's an art to 462 00:18:02,962 --> 00:18:05,018 that . Uh , it's not pristine , it's 463 00:18:05,018 --> 00:18:08,010 not always totally accurate . There's 464 00:18:08,020 --> 00:18:10,420 interpretation involved . But to your 465 00:18:10,420 --> 00:18:12,476 point that is how it started . There 466 00:18:12,476 --> 00:18:14,970 was intelligence available to say at 467 00:18:14,970 --> 00:18:17,090 that correlated the Corolla to 468 00:18:17,100 --> 00:18:19,910 particular locations and the way it was 469 00:18:19,910 --> 00:18:23,040 interpreted is this was the Corolla of 470 00:18:23,040 --> 00:18:25,207 interest . Now , obviously incorrectly 471 00:18:25,207 --> 00:18:27,660 in hindsight , but it didn't stop there 472 00:18:27,660 --> 00:18:29,660 When I'm talking about confirmation 473 00:18:29,660 --> 00:18:32,000 bias . Uh the initial correlation , I 474 00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:34,222 think if you all saw it in a classified 475 00:18:34,222 --> 00:18:36,810 setting , uh would be reasonable to 476 00:18:36,810 --> 00:18:38,977 conclude that that should be a vehicle 477 00:18:38,977 --> 00:18:42,200 of interest , Right ? Um and I think 478 00:18:42,200 --> 00:18:44,256 that would be very , very reasonable 479 00:18:44,256 --> 00:18:46,144 given the information that you're 480 00:18:46,144 --> 00:18:48,367 having that you're receiving and you're 481 00:18:48,367 --> 00:18:50,533 trying to assess . But what transpired 482 00:18:50,533 --> 00:18:52,589 over eight hours cumulative right is 483 00:18:52,589 --> 00:18:54,756 the observed pattern of movement . The 484 00:18:54,756 --> 00:18:56,980 observed behavior and activity that all 485 00:18:56,980 --> 00:18:58,930 has to aggregate and connect with 486 00:18:58,940 --> 00:19:01,590 intelligence to see is it reaffirming 487 00:19:01,590 --> 00:19:03,479 that this is truly the vehicle of 488 00:19:03,479 --> 00:19:05,720 interest uh to reach a point where 489 00:19:05,720 --> 00:19:07,831 you're so confident that you're going 490 00:19:07,831 --> 00:19:10,530 to strike it . Uh One of the 491 00:19:10,530 --> 00:19:12,752 recommendations that goes to this issue 492 00:19:12,752 --> 00:19:15,640 central to this issue is uh red teaming . 493 00:19:15,640 --> 00:19:17,807 If you will to break confirmation bias 494 00:19:17,807 --> 00:19:19,918 by somebody going , you can interpret 495 00:19:19,918 --> 00:19:21,973 the intelligence in a way that leads 496 00:19:21,973 --> 00:19:24,196 you to further believe that this is the 497 00:19:24,196 --> 00:19:26,362 vehicle of interest . But you can also 498 00:19:26,362 --> 00:19:28,418 interpret it as benign . So somebody 499 00:19:28,418 --> 00:19:30,584 pushing back to break the confirmation 500 00:19:30,584 --> 00:19:32,696 bias and the red team function if you 501 00:19:32,696 --> 00:19:34,918 will and dedicated threat team function 502 00:19:34,918 --> 00:19:34,850 going , hey , it could be this but it 503 00:19:34,850 --> 00:19:37,072 could also be that why do we think it's 504 00:19:37,072 --> 00:19:39,128 this ? Because human nature , we all 505 00:19:39,128 --> 00:19:41,128 seen it right . Everybody knows the 506 00:19:41,128 --> 00:19:41,080 confirmation bias is when you're 507 00:19:41,080 --> 00:19:43,340 consciously or subconsciously start to 508 00:19:43,340 --> 00:19:46,370 perceive something and you go that is a 509 00:19:46,370 --> 00:19:49,150 suspicious person . Every activity they 510 00:19:49,150 --> 00:19:51,206 take their after you start seeing it 511 00:19:51,206 --> 00:19:54,200 through that lens and what to me not 512 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:56,367 knowing that you might be a suspicious 513 00:19:56,367 --> 00:19:59,000 person appears totally benign to you . 514 00:19:59,010 --> 00:20:00,788 Where you have this pre cum pre 515 00:20:00,788 --> 00:20:02,899 conceived notion based on information 516 00:20:02,899 --> 00:20:05,232 that you have , you might be suspicious . 517 00:20:05,232 --> 00:20:07,288 You start reading that activity as . 518 00:20:07,288 --> 00:20:09,343 Yeah that is affirming of suspicious 519 00:20:09,343 --> 00:20:11,510 behavior that actually happened during 520 00:20:11,510 --> 00:20:13,454 the eight hour window . There were 521 00:20:13,454 --> 00:20:15,510 instances where the intelligence was 522 00:20:15,510 --> 00:20:18,400 being correlated to real time uh 523 00:20:18,410 --> 00:20:20,577 information or what was being observed 524 00:20:20,577 --> 00:20:22,590 in a way that we could have had a 525 00:20:22,590 --> 00:20:25,220 chance to inject and go what else could 526 00:20:25,220 --> 00:20:27,442 this be ? I know you could interpret it 527 00:20:27,442 --> 00:20:29,890 this way . What about this ? So to your 528 00:20:29,890 --> 00:20:32,001 point though that is accurate . There 529 00:20:32,001 --> 00:20:34,223 was intelligence that led us to believe 530 00:20:34,223 --> 00:20:37,790 that was the Corolla of interest but as 531 00:20:37,790 --> 00:20:39,957 we all know . And as I said it's not . 532 00:20:40,440 --> 00:20:42,780 So when you say there was a breakdown 533 00:20:42,790 --> 00:20:45,760 process is that because there was 534 00:20:46,740 --> 00:20:49,510 nobody to push back . So it's a 535 00:20:49,510 --> 00:20:51,566 combination of things . Right ? So I 536 00:20:51,566 --> 00:20:53,899 made three recommendations for a reason . 537 00:20:53,899 --> 00:20:56,010 It's not just one thing . This is how 538 00:20:56,010 --> 00:20:58,232 the ball started rolling if you will of 539 00:20:58,232 --> 00:21:00,399 what made it a vehicle of interest and 540 00:21:00,399 --> 00:21:02,566 over time made it high enough interest 541 00:21:02,566 --> 00:21:04,788 vehicle that the threshold to strike it 542 00:21:04,788 --> 00:21:06,899 was met . But I also said information 543 00:21:06,899 --> 00:21:09,010 sharing laterally not only within the 544 00:21:09,010 --> 00:21:11,121 strike cell but outside to supporting 545 00:21:11,121 --> 00:21:12,732 elements could have produced 546 00:21:12,732 --> 00:21:14,843 situational awareness that would have 547 00:21:14,843 --> 00:21:17,590 helped the strike cell in avoiding uh 548 00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:20,470 this uh , this if cast uh and last but 549 00:21:20,470 --> 00:21:22,748 not least this is critically important . 550 00:21:22,748 --> 00:21:24,914 Obviously the clearing and determining 551 00:21:24,914 --> 00:21:26,770 who is in the strike area in the 552 00:21:26,770 --> 00:21:29,880 compound where we struck it uh also 553 00:21:29,890 --> 00:21:31,946 needs to be reviewed . So it's not a 554 00:21:31,946 --> 00:21:33,890 one thing , but if you were saying 555 00:21:33,890 --> 00:21:36,112 causal factor , that's what started the 556 00:21:36,112 --> 00:21:38,334 ball rolling for sure . What could they 557 00:21:38,334 --> 00:21:40,390 have warned if they had gone outside 558 00:21:40,390 --> 00:21:42,612 the strikes ? It ? Uh so again , I need 559 00:21:42,612 --> 00:21:44,279 to be careful what I share on 560 00:21:44,279 --> 00:21:46,390 classification , but let me just give 561 00:21:46,390 --> 00:21:48,501 you as much as I can where that would 562 00:21:48,501 --> 00:21:51,920 have come in helpful is the awareness 563 00:21:51,930 --> 00:21:55,240 of the imminence of the , the 564 00:21:55,250 --> 00:21:57,361 likelihood of imminence of the strike 565 00:21:57,361 --> 00:21:59,560 would have allowed folks to provide 566 00:21:59,570 --> 00:22:02,900 additional context and information that 567 00:22:02,900 --> 00:22:05,290 might have been helpful to maybe delay 568 00:22:05,290 --> 00:22:08,150 the strike for a few minutes , do 569 00:22:08,150 --> 00:22:10,428 additional clearing of the target area . 570 00:22:10,640 --> 00:22:14,550 Uh but the , the information sharing 571 00:22:14,550 --> 00:22:16,550 laterally and certainly outside the 572 00:22:16,550 --> 00:22:19,310 strike cell was not optimum . Uh it 573 00:22:19,310 --> 00:22:21,477 could definitely be improved . Again , 574 00:22:21,477 --> 00:22:23,643 I'm sorry , I'm being slightly very or 575 00:22:23,643 --> 00:22:25,810 quite a bit vague . It's just to avoid 576 00:22:25,810 --> 00:22:28,032 the classification . This would be much 577 00:22:28,032 --> 00:22:30,143 much easier in a classified setting . 578 00:22:30,143 --> 00:22:32,400 Okay , I'm sorry . Follow up a little 579 00:22:32,400 --> 00:22:34,567 bit about what you just said , Are you 580 00:22:34,567 --> 00:22:36,789 saying that if they had stepped outside 581 00:22:36,789 --> 00:22:38,956 the bubble and consulted people , they 582 00:22:38,956 --> 00:22:40,844 may have learned that a strike on 583 00:22:40,844 --> 00:22:42,789 troops was not as imminent as they 584 00:22:42,789 --> 00:22:45,011 thought it was No , that's not what I'm 585 00:22:45,011 --> 00:22:47,122 saying . So there was nowhere to step 586 00:22:47,122 --> 00:22:49,344 outside the bubble and ask somebody and 587 00:22:49,344 --> 00:22:51,233 somebody will say it's not , it's 588 00:22:51,233 --> 00:22:53,400 imagine yourself sitting in the strike 589 00:22:53,400 --> 00:22:55,678 cell . By the way , I have to say this , 590 00:22:55,678 --> 00:22:57,844 we're fixated on one threat . You have 591 00:22:57,844 --> 00:23:00,060 to realize that strikes l was dealing 592 00:23:00,070 --> 00:23:02,292 with multiple threat streams , tracking 593 00:23:02,292 --> 00:23:04,930 multiple vehicles at any given time . 594 00:23:04,940 --> 00:23:07,162 Right ? This is not the only thing they 595 00:23:07,162 --> 00:23:09,384 were tracking , but what they're trying 596 00:23:09,384 --> 00:23:11,607 to do is as intelligence is coming in , 597 00:23:11,607 --> 00:23:13,662 they're trying to correlate what the 598 00:23:13,662 --> 00:23:15,718 intelligence is telling them to what 599 00:23:15,718 --> 00:23:17,829 they're seeing in their own eyes with 600 00:23:17,829 --> 00:23:19,662 the assets that are tracking and 601 00:23:19,662 --> 00:23:21,662 they're trying to correlate is that 602 00:23:21,662 --> 00:23:23,773 intelligence connecting to what we're 603 00:23:23,773 --> 00:23:25,829 seeing sufficiently . So to conclude 604 00:23:25,829 --> 00:23:27,996 that is the vehicle of interest that's 605 00:23:27,996 --> 00:23:30,107 going to be involved in the attack on 606 00:23:30,107 --> 00:23:32,280 the 29th . If you had somebody sitting 607 00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:34,230 in the strike cell is the issue of 608 00:23:34,230 --> 00:23:36,550 confirmation bias saying , look , 609 00:23:36,840 --> 00:23:38,951 you're correlating this piece of info 610 00:23:38,951 --> 00:23:41,160 to reaffirm that that is the vehicle . 611 00:23:41,540 --> 00:23:43,484 But what you're reaffirming in the 612 00:23:43,484 --> 00:23:45,262 activity you're seeing could be 613 00:23:45,262 --> 00:23:47,318 nefarious if you will , but it could 614 00:23:47,318 --> 00:23:49,570 also be very benign . This is why it 615 00:23:49,570 --> 00:23:51,570 could be why are we not choosing to 616 00:23:51,570 --> 00:23:53,626 interpret ? So pushing back a little 617 00:23:53,626 --> 00:23:55,626 bit , playing that dialogue to go , 618 00:23:55,626 --> 00:23:57,737 what is it exactly that we're looking 619 00:23:57,737 --> 00:23:59,792 at uh to make sure because it's hard 620 00:23:59,792 --> 00:24:01,681 when you're the one executing the 621 00:24:01,681 --> 00:24:03,681 strike to be in the second guessing 622 00:24:03,681 --> 00:24:05,570 mode at the same time when you're 623 00:24:05,570 --> 00:24:07,514 responsible for so many assets and 624 00:24:07,514 --> 00:24:09,737 targets that you're tracking . And it's 625 00:24:09,737 --> 00:24:11,737 only a factor while I say only it's 626 00:24:11,737 --> 00:24:13,792 particularly a factor in this unique 627 00:24:13,792 --> 00:24:16,014 scenario , right ? And the over horizon 628 00:24:16,014 --> 00:24:18,237 cT strikes when you have so much time , 629 00:24:18,237 --> 00:24:20,237 it's deliberate and you're doing it 630 00:24:20,237 --> 00:24:22,403 over hours and days and you're soaking 631 00:24:22,403 --> 00:24:22,330 targets . It's less of an issue because 632 00:24:22,330 --> 00:24:23,997 there's a lot of time to have 633 00:24:23,997 --> 00:24:26,052 discussions and second guess and red 634 00:24:26,052 --> 00:24:28,052 team and walk around it when you're 635 00:24:28,052 --> 00:24:30,108 doing a strike so rapidly . You need 636 00:24:30,108 --> 00:24:32,930 that . I think I don't think I'm 637 00:24:32,930 --> 00:24:35,152 convinced you need that push back to be 638 00:24:35,152 --> 00:24:37,486 sure that you're interpreting something , 639 00:24:37,486 --> 00:24:39,374 you're not interpreting something 640 00:24:39,374 --> 00:24:41,486 through your very biased lens , which 641 00:24:41,486 --> 00:24:43,708 is human nature by the way I put myself 642 00:24:43,708 --> 00:24:45,874 in the same scenario . If I started to 643 00:24:45,874 --> 00:24:48,097 perceive that car is a is a risk of U . 644 00:24:48,097 --> 00:24:50,263 S . Forces , I will start to read what 645 00:24:50,263 --> 00:24:52,486 it's doing and its occupants throughout 646 00:24:52,486 --> 00:24:54,374 the day through that lens because 647 00:24:54,374 --> 00:24:56,430 subconsciously I'm starting to think 648 00:24:56,430 --> 00:24:58,430 that's a threat . Somebody stepping 649 00:24:58,430 --> 00:25:00,486 back on that could be totally benign 650 00:25:00,486 --> 00:25:02,652 would challenge me enough for me to go 651 00:25:02,652 --> 00:25:02,280 in . Okay , let's slow down a bit . Why 652 00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:04,613 are we why is it elevated to that level ? 653 00:25:04,613 --> 00:25:06,836 Does that make sense ? Very different ? 654 00:25:06,836 --> 00:25:09,002 That's where things are moving quickly 655 00:25:09,002 --> 00:25:11,113 and there is an imminent threat . How 656 00:25:11,113 --> 00:25:13,058 can you step outside and make that 657 00:25:13,058 --> 00:25:13,030 procedure better ? It's not step 658 00:25:13,030 --> 00:25:15,530 outside you're sitting and how can you , 659 00:25:15,540 --> 00:25:18,060 how can you institutionalize ? That's 660 00:25:18,060 --> 00:25:20,570 what the that's what the operational 661 00:25:20,570 --> 00:25:22,737 commanders are currently assessing the 662 00:25:22,737 --> 00:25:24,737 report to figure out in such unique 663 00:25:24,737 --> 00:25:26,460 circumstances . Again , I keep 664 00:25:26,460 --> 00:25:28,293 emphasize this because you can't 665 00:25:28,293 --> 00:25:30,740 compare to the 99.9% of strikes you're 666 00:25:30,740 --> 00:25:32,851 familiar with . This is unique by the 667 00:25:32,851 --> 00:25:34,950 way , in the retrograde window over 668 00:25:34,950 --> 00:25:37,117 four months , this was the only strike 669 00:25:37,117 --> 00:25:39,450 conducted under self defense . Actually , 670 00:25:39,450 --> 00:25:41,394 if you go back a year , I'm almost 671 00:25:41,394 --> 00:25:43,450 confident with this uh , in the last 672 00:25:43,450 --> 00:25:45,617 year in Afghanistan , we didn't do any 673 00:25:45,617 --> 00:25:47,617 self defense strike . So it is very 674 00:25:47,617 --> 00:25:49,561 unique and the urgency is palpable 675 00:25:49,561 --> 00:25:51,640 right by the nature of the imminent 676 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:54,180 threat . We're defending us forces at 677 00:25:54,190 --> 00:25:56,190 HK and it was only three kilometers 678 00:25:56,190 --> 00:25:59,940 away from Thanks . Just where was the 679 00:25:59,940 --> 00:26:02,162 strike self that you're talking about ? 680 00:26:02,162 --> 00:26:05,590 Where they physically located ? It's it 681 00:26:05,590 --> 00:26:09,530 is since you rebuilt this from the 682 00:26:09,540 --> 00:26:12,230 beginning . When when was it evident 683 00:26:12,230 --> 00:26:14,452 that there were kids at the compound in 684 00:26:14,452 --> 00:26:18,190 your timeline ? Um , so the 685 00:26:18,200 --> 00:26:22,090 first time we had confirmation of 686 00:26:22,100 --> 00:26:25,450 kids was at the two minute time frame 687 00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:29,760 before , before the trigger pull ? 688 00:26:29,770 --> 00:26:32,890 Before the Yes , 689 00:26:32,900 --> 00:26:36,810 yes , Yes . But I gotta 690 00:26:36,820 --> 00:26:39,960 I gotta I'll give you some some data 691 00:26:39,960 --> 00:26:43,680 here . So , uh just to be 692 00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:46,560 fair , so , and this is important when 693 00:26:46,560 --> 00:26:50,220 we review available video feeds at the 694 00:26:50,220 --> 00:26:53,910 time . Uh I can't we did independent 695 00:26:53,910 --> 00:26:56,021 analysis by two separate teams to see 696 00:26:56,021 --> 00:26:58,132 what they see in the video and I have 697 00:26:58,132 --> 00:26:59,910 to preface with this context is 698 00:26:59,910 --> 00:27:02,077 critically important . Had I been able 699 00:27:02,077 --> 00:27:04,243 to find anybody on the planet that's a 700 00:27:04,243 --> 00:27:06,299 trained screener or image analysts . 701 00:27:06,299 --> 00:27:08,243 Those are the folks that view such 702 00:27:08,243 --> 00:27:10,299 things to determine that didn't know 703 00:27:10,299 --> 00:27:12,466 that we had had a sip gas event on the 704 00:27:12,466 --> 00:27:14,577 29th . I would have chosen them to do 705 00:27:14,577 --> 00:27:16,577 the review because I'm telling them 706 00:27:16,577 --> 00:27:18,800 review this video and you don't know 707 00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:20,967 what you're looking for , tell me what 708 00:27:20,967 --> 00:27:23,189 you see . I couldn't do that just to be 709 00:27:23,189 --> 00:27:25,410 fair here in context . They knew they 710 00:27:25,410 --> 00:27:27,420 were looking for kids . That's very 711 00:27:27,420 --> 00:27:29,531 different when you're sitting down to 712 00:27:29,531 --> 00:27:31,753 review something , you know what you're 713 00:27:31,753 --> 00:27:33,642 looking for and you're being very 714 00:27:33,642 --> 00:27:35,864 attentive to that , but I couldn't find 715 00:27:35,864 --> 00:27:37,753 anybody didn't know . So they are 716 00:27:37,753 --> 00:27:39,809 predisposed to looking for kids . We 717 00:27:39,809 --> 00:27:41,920 have to understand that context . But 718 00:27:41,920 --> 00:27:43,642 two independent reviews that I 719 00:27:43,642 --> 00:27:46,440 conducted for this investigation , the 720 00:27:46,450 --> 00:27:50,140 physical evidence of a child was 721 00:27:50,140 --> 00:27:52,670 apparent about the two minute point , 722 00:27:53,140 --> 00:27:55,251 but I'm just telling you , I put eyes 723 00:27:55,251 --> 00:27:57,251 on myself . I just didn't have what 724 00:27:57,251 --> 00:27:59,362 they were doing it for me . But I had 725 00:27:59,362 --> 00:28:01,529 to see it for myself . I'm just saying 726 00:28:01,529 --> 00:28:03,960 it is 100% not obvious , you have to be 727 00:28:03,960 --> 00:28:06,800 like , no kidding looking for it but 728 00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:08,967 when you're looking for it . Certainly 729 00:28:08,967 --> 00:28:11,022 after the fact if you asked me , was 730 00:28:11,022 --> 00:28:13,078 there evidence of a presence ? Yes , 731 00:28:13,210 --> 00:28:16,460 there was just two minutes before the 732 00:28:16,470 --> 00:28:18,940 launch , not two minutes before impact 733 00:28:19,260 --> 00:28:21,204 and then just one more thing , the 734 00:28:21,204 --> 00:28:23,038 communication breakdown that you 735 00:28:23,038 --> 00:28:25,149 mentioned in your opening ? I'm still 736 00:28:25,149 --> 00:28:27,204 unclear about exactly what what that 737 00:28:27,204 --> 00:28:29,260 means . And can you explain a little 738 00:28:29,260 --> 00:28:28,880 bit more ? Is that the sharing 739 00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:31,213 situation where I just don't understand ? 740 00:28:31,213 --> 00:28:33,740 Good question . Let me just , let me 741 00:28:33,740 --> 00:28:36,050 give you an example of what I mean by 742 00:28:36,050 --> 00:28:38,650 that is , uh , if you're sitting there 743 00:28:38,660 --> 00:28:41,840 and your job is to track a particular 744 00:28:41,860 --> 00:28:43,860 target of interest in this case , a 745 00:28:43,860 --> 00:28:46,680 vehicle and you're tracking it without 746 00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:49,260 specific information of what are we 747 00:28:49,260 --> 00:28:51,482 about to do with this vehicle ? When is 748 00:28:51,482 --> 00:28:53,649 a strike imminent ? Or we just , we've 749 00:28:53,649 --> 00:28:55,871 been tracking it for eight hours . What 750 00:28:55,871 --> 00:28:57,927 is it exactly that I'm looking for ? 751 00:28:57,927 --> 00:29:00,149 What additional intel have you received 752 00:29:00,149 --> 00:29:02,316 that I need to be assessing outside of 753 00:29:02,316 --> 00:29:04,482 the strike cell . In the strike cell . 754 00:29:04,482 --> 00:29:06,316 It's pretty tight because you're 755 00:29:06,316 --> 00:29:08,371 sitting there in the room and people 756 00:29:08,371 --> 00:29:10,427 are talking out live and everybody's 757 00:29:10,427 --> 00:29:12,593 hearing what's being shared . But even 758 00:29:12,593 --> 00:29:11,670 then it's just in a smaller bubble 759 00:29:11,670 --> 00:29:13,837 because there's so many , uh , targets 760 00:29:13,837 --> 00:29:16,250 being tracked when your remote and 761 00:29:16,250 --> 00:29:18,250 outside the strikes out and all you 762 00:29:18,250 --> 00:29:20,083 have is communication via chat . 763 00:29:20,083 --> 00:29:22,150 Normally it's not voice , its chat . 764 00:29:22,150 --> 00:29:24,790 We're sharing like text on secure chat . 765 00:29:24,800 --> 00:29:27,220 If you lose the context of that is 766 00:29:27,220 --> 00:29:29,460 being built in the strike cell of 767 00:29:29,540 --> 00:29:31,720 here's new intelligence that's telling 768 00:29:31,720 --> 00:29:33,831 us to look for this . You're , you're 769 00:29:33,831 --> 00:29:35,998 looking at it from a remote location , 770 00:29:35,998 --> 00:29:38,109 here's what we should be seeing now . 771 00:29:38,109 --> 00:29:40,053 Are you seeing it ? Here's what we 772 00:29:40,053 --> 00:29:42,220 intend to do and we're going to strike 773 00:29:42,220 --> 00:29:44,331 within a few minutes if you lose that 774 00:29:44,331 --> 00:29:46,553 situational awareness , your ability to 775 00:29:46,553 --> 00:29:49,180 help the strike cell put context on 776 00:29:49,180 --> 00:29:51,560 what they're seeing greatly diminishes . 777 00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:53,504 And I'm being a little bit evasive 778 00:29:53,504 --> 00:29:55,616 because of the classification of some 779 00:29:55,616 --> 00:29:57,171 of the things , but it is a 780 00:29:57,171 --> 00:29:59,282 contributing factor . It's not like a 781 00:29:59,282 --> 00:30:01,116 make believe thing . There was a 782 00:30:01,116 --> 00:30:03,282 disconnect in the level of situational 783 00:30:03,282 --> 00:30:05,550 awareness outside the strike cell that 784 00:30:05,550 --> 00:30:08,470 could have helped . Was that if it was 785 00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:11,260 available And frankly it's one of the 786 00:30:11,740 --> 00:30:15,040 uh , contributing factors to this 787 00:30:15,050 --> 00:30:17,272 assessment that I just mentioned to you 788 00:30:17,272 --> 00:30:20,570 about picking up a child . Um , had 789 00:30:20,570 --> 00:30:22,626 that situational awareness been more 790 00:30:22,626 --> 00:30:25,310 widely spread and acknowledged that hey 791 00:30:25,310 --> 00:30:27,700 look , we're getting so close to 792 00:30:27,700 --> 00:30:30,610 striking uh , folks that are looking at 793 00:30:30,610 --> 00:30:33,550 those images and trying to make sure 794 00:30:33,550 --> 00:30:36,960 that they clear their sense of 795 00:30:36,970 --> 00:30:39,960 urgency and in clearing would be 796 00:30:39,960 --> 00:30:42,127 different because if you're looking at 797 00:30:42,127 --> 00:30:44,071 something for eight hours , you're 798 00:30:44,071 --> 00:30:45,904 desensitized . Okay , we've been 799 00:30:45,904 --> 00:30:45,360 tracking it . We could be tracking it 800 00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:47,740 for five more days . But if you have an 801 00:30:47,740 --> 00:30:49,851 essay to go , hey , we're starting to 802 00:30:49,851 --> 00:30:51,796 see this . It's starting to really 803 00:30:51,796 --> 00:30:54,073 becoming a threat . It is now a threat . 804 00:30:54,073 --> 00:30:56,073 It's an acknowledged strike . We're 805 00:30:56,073 --> 00:30:58,296 going to strike it . It's two minutes , 806 00:30:58,296 --> 00:31:00,462 your urgency of what you're looking at 807 00:31:00,462 --> 00:31:00,460 what you're trying to clear when it 808 00:31:00,460 --> 00:31:03,210 pulls into a brand new compound is just 809 00:31:03,220 --> 00:31:05,164 naturally different , right ? As a 810 00:31:05,164 --> 00:31:07,387 human being , you would go , you're not 811 00:31:07,387 --> 00:31:09,498 desensitized anymore . I've I've been 812 00:31:09,498 --> 00:31:09,170 doing this for eight hours . What's , 813 00:31:09,180 --> 00:31:11,402 you know , what's different simply , is 814 00:31:11,402 --> 00:31:13,513 it fair to say that the people on the 815 00:31:13,513 --> 00:31:15,458 ground weren't sharing information 816 00:31:15,458 --> 00:31:15,420 enough with the strike cell back in 817 00:31:15,420 --> 00:31:17,587 Qatar and that was the communication , 818 00:31:17,587 --> 00:31:19,642 I don't know , it's the it's not the 819 00:31:19,642 --> 00:31:21,809 people on the ground because we didn't 820 00:31:21,809 --> 00:31:24,000 have anybody outside . Uh it's the uh 821 00:31:24,010 --> 00:31:26,121 it's the elements that are supporting 822 00:31:26,121 --> 00:31:28,232 the strike itself . Don't just sit in 823 00:31:28,232 --> 00:31:30,288 the strike sell itself . There's the 824 00:31:30,288 --> 00:31:32,177 strike selling and their external 825 00:31:32,177 --> 00:31:34,177 elements that support it from other 826 00:31:34,177 --> 00:31:35,954 locations remotely . And I just 827 00:31:35,954 --> 00:31:38,177 recommended that the information that's 828 00:31:38,177 --> 00:31:40,288 available to the inner circle and the 829 00:31:40,288 --> 00:31:42,399 strikes , because the strike cells is 830 00:31:42,399 --> 00:31:44,677 big enough and there's too much things , 831 00:31:44,677 --> 00:31:44,130 too many things going on . But not 832 00:31:44,130 --> 00:31:46,186 everybody even in the strike cell is 833 00:31:46,186 --> 00:31:48,297 aware of the nuances . One enhance it 834 00:31:48,297 --> 00:31:50,463 within the strikes . They'll make sure 835 00:31:50,463 --> 00:31:52,574 everybody knows everything about that 836 00:31:52,574 --> 00:31:54,574 target . But externally when you're 837 00:31:54,574 --> 00:31:56,574 only messaging via chat , the folks 838 00:31:56,574 --> 00:31:58,574 supporting you remotely , make sure 839 00:31:58,574 --> 00:32:00,741 they have context that they don't have 840 00:32:00,741 --> 00:32:00,530 because they're not there with you . 841 00:32:00,540 --> 00:32:02,540 The only context you have is if you 842 00:32:02,540 --> 00:32:04,762 choose to share it with them via chat . 843 00:32:04,762 --> 00:32:06,984 I can't by osmosis , pick it up because 844 00:32:06,984 --> 00:32:09,040 I hear you talking , I'm like , oh , 845 00:32:09,040 --> 00:32:11,151 another threat stream . And they said 846 00:32:11,151 --> 00:32:13,318 something else . Another thing and I'm 847 00:32:13,318 --> 00:32:15,540 building my essay throughout the day by 848 00:32:15,540 --> 00:32:15,540 just sitting there physically being 849 00:32:15,540 --> 00:32:17,429 there very different for somebody 850 00:32:17,429 --> 00:32:19,484 remote that is tasked to support the 851 00:32:19,484 --> 00:32:21,710 strike in a very significant way . But 852 00:32:21,710 --> 00:32:23,766 all they're getting is what is being 853 00:32:23,766 --> 00:32:26,360 shared via the text . It's called chat . 854 00:32:26,840 --> 00:32:29,062 There was a definite disconnect there . 855 00:32:29,062 --> 00:32:31,284 That could have helped dramatically . I 856 00:32:31,284 --> 00:32:33,870 want to go to Alex morton Washington 857 00:32:33,870 --> 00:32:34,870 post . 858 00:32:40,140 --> 00:32:43,080 Hey , thanks for taking me on . Um , I 859 00:32:43,080 --> 00:32:45,660 wanted to go back to the idea of contra 860 00:32:45,660 --> 00:32:47,660 bait confirmation bias that you had 861 00:32:47,660 --> 00:32:50,780 mentioned um , and the link to the 862 00:32:50,780 --> 00:32:54,610 earlier attack um at H Kaya . Uh , you 863 00:32:54,610 --> 00:32:56,666 know , some , some defense officials 864 00:32:56,666 --> 00:32:58,777 have told reporters that , you know , 865 00:32:58,777 --> 00:33:00,832 they believe their explosives in the 866 00:33:00,832 --> 00:33:03,310 car based on the idea that those 867 00:33:03,310 --> 00:33:05,532 packages may have been the same size as 868 00:33:05,532 --> 00:33:08,370 the bomb used at Kaya , which I think 869 00:33:08,380 --> 00:33:11,550 is a link in their mind to , you know , 870 00:33:11,560 --> 00:33:14,080 this , this uh , strike happened at the 871 00:33:14,080 --> 00:33:16,247 airport and the airport is going to be 872 00:33:16,247 --> 00:33:18,413 another um event . So can you speak to 873 00:33:18,413 --> 00:33:21,740 the confirmation bias of the attack at 874 00:33:21,740 --> 00:33:25,200 h chi a few days before and the belief 875 00:33:25,210 --> 00:33:27,870 that they were connected . Did it lend 876 00:33:27,870 --> 00:33:30,760 to commanders or analysts the idea um 877 00:33:30,770 --> 00:33:32,992 that this was likely just because there 878 00:33:32,992 --> 00:33:35,040 was an attack earlier . No , I 879 00:33:35,040 --> 00:33:37,262 appreciate that question . I'm glad you 880 00:33:37,262 --> 00:33:39,318 asked that . It's a great question . 881 00:33:39,318 --> 00:33:41,429 I'll give you a great example of what 882 00:33:41,429 --> 00:33:43,596 would be confirmation bias . So uh you 883 00:33:43,596 --> 00:33:45,460 all saw the reporting about the 884 00:33:45,470 --> 00:33:47,637 computer bag that was exchanged at the 885 00:33:47,637 --> 00:33:49,470 first location where the vehicle 886 00:33:49,470 --> 00:33:53,210 stopped ? Uh And that was uh that was 887 00:33:53,210 --> 00:33:55,660 significant , Uh significant for the 888 00:33:55,660 --> 00:33:58,120 reasons you're alluding to the three 889 00:33:58,120 --> 00:34:00,970 days prior to the attack that killed 13 890 00:34:00,970 --> 00:34:02,970 of our service members and a lot of 891 00:34:02,970 --> 00:34:05,700 Afghan civilians . Uh it was believed 892 00:34:05,710 --> 00:34:09,470 that the the method or at least 893 00:34:09,470 --> 00:34:11,600 the container that had the explosives 894 00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:15,200 in it was a computer back . Uh so the 895 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:18,530 fact that on that day , on the 29th , 896 00:34:18,530 --> 00:34:20,697 we're watching this White Corolla , uh 897 00:34:20,697 --> 00:34:23,350 we saw an exchange of a computer bag , 898 00:34:23,740 --> 00:34:26,440 uh it wasn't lost on people to go , you 899 00:34:26,440 --> 00:34:29,200 know what , that's what was used to 900 00:34:29,200 --> 00:34:31,750 contain the explosives three days prior . 901 00:34:32,140 --> 00:34:34,790 Uh and that is potentially indicative 902 00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:36,578 of , Here we go again , another 903 00:34:36,578 --> 00:34:38,800 computer bag that contains explosives . 904 00:34:38,800 --> 00:34:40,930 Uh True , I can understand that , but 905 00:34:40,930 --> 00:34:43,330 could also be just a computer bag . And 906 00:34:43,330 --> 00:34:45,650 as it turns out , and we can affirm it , 907 00:34:45,660 --> 00:34:47,910 it was a computer back . Right . But 908 00:34:47,910 --> 00:34:50,060 you could see that correlation of , 909 00:34:50,070 --> 00:34:53,140 I've seen this movie before , and I'm 910 00:34:53,140 --> 00:34:55,362 gonna equate it to that automatically . 911 00:34:55,362 --> 00:34:57,529 Now , it's not a one off . That wasn't 912 00:34:57,529 --> 00:34:59,696 the thing that went computer bag , and 913 00:34:59,696 --> 00:34:59,650 therefore it's a target of interest . 914 00:34:59,660 --> 00:35:02,030 It starts to build on itself in 915 00:35:02,030 --> 00:35:04,650 multiple different settings throughout 916 00:35:04,650 --> 00:35:06,940 the eight hour window to the point that 917 00:35:06,940 --> 00:35:08,884 it became that is the target . And 918 00:35:08,884 --> 00:35:11,050 we've met the threshold to strike it 919 00:35:13,940 --> 00:35:17,620 nancy . Youssef ? Thank you , 920 00:35:17,680 --> 00:35:19,624 ma'am , sir . How many people were 921 00:35:19,624 --> 00:35:21,347 involved in the reading of the 922 00:35:21,347 --> 00:35:23,680 intelligence and the decision to strike ? 923 00:35:23,680 --> 00:35:25,569 And also on what basis did the US 924 00:35:25,569 --> 00:35:27,736 determine that the target was a member 925 00:35:27,736 --> 00:35:31,430 of ISIS ? And finally you said in your 926 00:35:31,430 --> 00:35:34,370 second recommendation that one thing 927 00:35:34,370 --> 00:35:36,648 that needs to happen is that the U . S . 928 00:35:36,648 --> 00:35:38,481 Needs to enhance its situational 929 00:35:38,481 --> 00:35:40,592 awareness . I guess I'm having a hard 930 00:35:40,592 --> 00:35:42,426 time understanding how much more 931 00:35:42,426 --> 00:35:44,592 awareness us could have after 20 years 932 00:35:44,592 --> 00:35:46,759 of war . You also mentioned that there 933 00:35:46,759 --> 00:35:48,759 was a disconnect in the strike cell 934 00:35:48,759 --> 00:35:51,037 where everyone wasn't aware of nuances . 935 00:35:51,037 --> 00:35:53,259 And so I guess my question is given how 936 00:35:53,259 --> 00:35:55,481 long you've been in Afghanistan and how 937 00:35:55,481 --> 00:35:57,592 wrong they got the strike ? Why isn't 938 00:35:57,592 --> 00:35:59,703 the recommendation to revamp how such 939 00:35:59,703 --> 00:35:59,670 strikes are conducted ? From what I can 940 00:35:59,670 --> 00:36:01,614 tell , you're talking about tweaks 941 00:36:01,614 --> 00:36:03,559 around the edges , but what you're 942 00:36:03,559 --> 00:36:05,670 describing our fundamental problems . 943 00:36:05,670 --> 00:36:07,837 Yeah , no , I appreciate questions and 944 00:36:07,837 --> 00:36:10,030 I think I caught three of them . So in 945 00:36:10,030 --> 00:36:11,974 terms of the total number of folks 946 00:36:11,974 --> 00:36:14,160 involved in the strike itself , it's 947 00:36:14,530 --> 00:36:16,650 it's I'll give you the exact exact 948 00:36:16,650 --> 00:36:18,817 number . I don't have top of my head , 949 00:36:18,817 --> 00:36:21,660 but it's quite a few , I think 950 00:36:22,530 --> 00:36:25,550 uh in the innermost circle of decision 951 00:36:25,550 --> 00:36:27,772 making and an assessment and analysis , 952 00:36:27,772 --> 00:36:29,661 it would be fair to say somewhere 953 00:36:29,661 --> 00:36:31,828 between five and 10 . Uh but there are 954 00:36:31,828 --> 00:36:34,480 broader folks supporting the overall 955 00:36:34,480 --> 00:36:36,702 strike . But we can give you give you a 956 00:36:36,702 --> 00:36:38,813 little bit more specific numbers , if 957 00:36:38,813 --> 00:36:41,090 you'd like on the assessment that the 958 00:36:41,090 --> 00:36:44,590 individual was a member of ISIS K and 959 00:36:44,590 --> 00:36:48,220 or the locations . Again , it was the 960 00:36:48,220 --> 00:36:51,790 correlation of what at the time was 961 00:36:51,790 --> 00:36:55,200 viewed as credible intelligence to what 962 00:36:55,200 --> 00:36:57,440 was being observed in real time . What 963 00:36:57,440 --> 00:36:59,218 I mean by that , let me just be 964 00:36:59,218 --> 00:37:01,850 specific , we have no reason to 965 00:37:01,860 --> 00:37:05,840 question the intelligence . What what 966 00:37:05,850 --> 00:37:09,240 likely broke down is the , it was not 967 00:37:09,240 --> 00:37:11,407 the intelligence , but the correlation 968 00:37:11,407 --> 00:37:13,660 of that intelligence to a specific 969 00:37:13,660 --> 00:37:15,771 house , the influence that , what the 970 00:37:15,771 --> 00:37:17,882 intelligence is talking about is that 971 00:37:17,882 --> 00:37:21,080 house and that car and there's an art 972 00:37:21,080 --> 00:37:23,200 to that . Uh , and that's where the 973 00:37:23,200 --> 00:37:25,580 disconnect and correlation broke down 974 00:37:25,590 --> 00:37:28,550 throughout the day on the issue of 975 00:37:28,550 --> 00:37:30,700 awareness . I wasn't talking about 976 00:37:30,710 --> 00:37:33,750 enhancing overall US situational 977 00:37:33,750 --> 00:37:36,370 awareness . I'm talking about enhancing 978 00:37:36,380 --> 00:37:39,120 the sharing information and the overall 979 00:37:39,130 --> 00:37:42,660 awareness of a pending strike or a high 980 00:37:42,660 --> 00:37:45,030 interest track within the strike sell 981 00:37:45,030 --> 00:37:47,160 itself and the supporting elements . 982 00:37:47,330 --> 00:37:49,552 But you raise an interesting point that 983 00:37:49,552 --> 00:37:51,970 I should have raised . Uh , so the 984 00:37:51,970 --> 00:37:54,600 intelligence that we had that day , 985 00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:57,660 although significant is , was also , 986 00:37:57,670 --> 00:37:59,726 this should be common sense to you , 987 00:37:59,726 --> 00:38:01,781 right ? We're exfiltrate ng the next 988 00:38:01,781 --> 00:38:04,550 day . So you can imagine the level of 989 00:38:04,550 --> 00:38:06,790 intelligence has been dramatically 990 00:38:06,790 --> 00:38:08,901 reduced by that point . We don't have 991 00:38:08,901 --> 00:38:10,846 afghan partners on the ground . We 992 00:38:10,846 --> 00:38:13,179 don't have our own forces on the ground . 993 00:38:13,179 --> 00:38:16,330 So sources and intelligence streams are 994 00:38:16,330 --> 00:38:18,790 constrained . Uh , but that was 995 00:38:18,790 --> 00:38:20,901 obviously because of the fact that we 996 00:38:20,901 --> 00:38:23,068 were retro grading and the expo is the 997 00:38:23,068 --> 00:38:25,068 very next day . So , but just to be 998 00:38:25,068 --> 00:38:27,000 clear , I'm not addressing uh 999 00:38:27,010 --> 00:38:29,390 situational awareness broadly about us , 1000 00:38:29,390 --> 00:38:31,668 situational awareness and intelligence . 1001 00:38:31,668 --> 00:38:33,612 I didn't assess that . I'm talking 1002 00:38:33,612 --> 00:38:35,668 about intelligence within the strike 1003 00:38:35,668 --> 00:38:37,723 cell and they have to work with what 1004 00:38:37,723 --> 00:38:39,890 they have and they got a high priority 1005 00:38:39,890 --> 00:38:42,140 and received uh , there was , I didn't 1006 00:38:42,150 --> 00:38:45,260 I didn't see any breakdown in receipt 1007 00:38:45,270 --> 00:38:47,580 of intelligence . If it was available , 1008 00:38:47,590 --> 00:38:49,701 it was given to them . But we have to 1009 00:38:49,701 --> 00:38:51,980 acknowledge uh , the intelligence we 1010 00:38:51,980 --> 00:38:54,202 had given that we're one day out from X 1011 00:38:54,202 --> 00:38:56,810 ville was not what we've been used to 1012 00:38:56,810 --> 00:38:58,921 when we had boots on the ground . And 1013 00:38:58,921 --> 00:39:00,977 we had a lot of afghan partners that 1014 00:39:00,977 --> 00:39:03,143 could help us and eyes , your eyes and 1015 00:39:03,143 --> 00:39:05,490 ears are very helpful . Or How is it 1016 00:39:05,490 --> 00:39:07,379 possible to say with 10 civilians 1017 00:39:07,379 --> 00:39:09,657 killed and no terror threat eliminated , 1018 00:39:09,657 --> 00:39:11,823 that this wasn't a violation of law or 1019 00:39:11,823 --> 00:39:13,934 the law of war here , given the level 1020 00:39:13,934 --> 00:39:15,990 of this mistake , if the strikes had 1021 00:39:15,990 --> 00:39:17,990 had more time and yet made the same 1022 00:39:17,990 --> 00:39:20,046 mistake , is that a violation of the 1023 00:39:20,046 --> 00:39:22,268 law or the law of war or is it not time 1024 00:39:22,268 --> 00:39:24,379 dependent and it simply wouldn't have 1025 00:39:24,379 --> 00:39:26,546 been in violation of ? Yeah , no , I'm 1026 00:39:26,546 --> 00:39:25,560 glad you asked that question . It's 1027 00:39:25,560 --> 00:39:27,671 important because it's not lost on us 1028 00:39:27,671 --> 00:39:29,671 the severity of the outcome and the 1029 00:39:29,671 --> 00:39:32,004 fact that we killed 10 Afghan civilians . 1030 00:39:32,004 --> 00:39:34,227 But I don't have to tell this , you all 1031 00:39:34,227 --> 00:39:36,338 know this right mistakes do happen in 1032 00:39:36,338 --> 00:39:38,616 military operations and the assessment . 1033 00:39:38,616 --> 00:39:40,838 Let me tell you my assessment of how we 1034 00:39:40,838 --> 00:39:42,893 walk through this . Uh I'm trying to 1035 00:39:42,893 --> 00:39:45,060 figure out or what I did figure out is 1036 00:39:45,060 --> 00:39:48,260 where the interpretation at the time 1037 00:39:48,270 --> 00:39:50,270 reasonable based on the information 1038 00:39:50,270 --> 00:39:52,940 that they had were the associated 1039 00:39:52,940 --> 00:39:55,162 decisions based on the information they 1040 00:39:55,162 --> 00:39:57,970 had reasonable . Where they are . If 1041 00:39:57,970 --> 00:40:00,081 they weren't if they were arbitrary , 1042 00:40:00,081 --> 00:40:03,560 capricious , uh random . I asked why 1043 00:40:03,560 --> 00:40:05,727 did you think that was a threat ? They 1044 00:40:05,727 --> 00:40:07,838 had no intel stream to say that was a 1045 00:40:07,838 --> 00:40:09,893 threat ? They just made it up mike . 1046 00:40:09,893 --> 00:40:11,671 Okay . That that that is a very 1047 00:40:11,671 --> 00:40:13,893 different ballgame , right ? You're now 1048 00:40:13,893 --> 00:40:16,060 being it's dereliction at that point . 1049 00:40:16,060 --> 00:40:18,004 But when you look at a complicated 1050 00:40:18,004 --> 00:40:20,060 operation like this in a complicated 1051 00:40:20,060 --> 00:40:22,282 setting that I described in the context 1052 00:40:22,282 --> 00:40:24,227 of what's going on is going on any 1053 00:40:24,227 --> 00:40:26,338 given day and what they had available 1054 00:40:26,338 --> 00:40:28,800 to them and uh bless you and the time 1055 00:40:28,800 --> 00:40:31,022 constraints of a perceived threat to US 1056 00:40:31,022 --> 00:40:33,189 forces where we just lost 13 members , 1057 00:40:33,189 --> 00:40:35,560 you know , three days prior . In that 1058 00:40:35,560 --> 00:40:38,530 context , I found given the information 1059 00:40:38,530 --> 00:40:41,530 they had and the analysis that they did . 1060 00:40:41,580 --> 00:40:43,580 I understand they reached the wrong 1061 00:40:43,580 --> 00:40:45,691 conclusions . But you could have said 1062 00:40:45,691 --> 00:40:47,858 it's this or that was it reasonable to 1063 00:40:47,858 --> 00:40:49,969 conclude what they concluded based on 1064 00:40:49,969 --> 00:40:52,302 what they had . It was not unreasonable . 1065 00:40:52,302 --> 00:40:54,524 It just turned out to be incorrect . So 1066 00:40:54,524 --> 00:40:56,636 my point is we've had mistakes in the 1067 00:40:56,636 --> 00:40:58,469 conduct of military operations . 1068 00:40:58,469 --> 00:41:00,524 Unfortunately , we'll have others in 1069 00:41:00,524 --> 00:41:02,800 the future more in the future . The 1070 00:41:02,810 --> 00:41:04,810 issue here is to figure out what we 1071 00:41:04,810 --> 00:41:06,810 could have done better to make sure 1072 00:41:06,810 --> 00:41:08,754 this never happens again . I never 1073 00:41:08,754 --> 00:41:10,977 found an instance where somebody is . I 1074 00:41:10,977 --> 00:41:13,032 ask a question of why did you decide 1075 00:41:13,032 --> 00:41:15,330 that ? And I got crickets or I got an 1076 00:41:15,340 --> 00:41:18,340 illogical answer . I got no reason . I 1077 00:41:18,340 --> 00:41:20,396 got a random decision . I didn't see 1078 00:41:20,396 --> 00:41:22,340 that at all . And again , I wish I 1079 00:41:22,340 --> 00:41:24,618 could share the classified information . 1080 00:41:24,618 --> 00:41:26,840 I'm confident you would agree with me . 1081 00:41:26,840 --> 00:41:26,760 It's just unfortunate when you're 1082 00:41:26,760 --> 00:41:28,816 getting that volume of data , you're 1083 00:41:28,816 --> 00:41:30,982 tracking so many threat streams . This 1084 00:41:30,982 --> 00:41:33,204 confirmation bias thing starts to build 1085 00:41:33,204 --> 00:41:35,204 your trying to interpret things the 1086 00:41:35,204 --> 00:41:37,260 best you can and you don't have time 1087 00:41:37,260 --> 00:41:37,250 because I'm just telling you , I mean , 1088 00:41:37,250 --> 00:41:39,460 just think about it this way , if this 1089 00:41:39,460 --> 00:41:42,170 was a real threat and it did kill us 1090 00:41:42,170 --> 00:41:44,360 forces on Hk area and and the and the 1091 00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:46,582 folks involved didn't do anything about 1092 00:41:46,582 --> 00:41:48,582 it , we might be investigating them 1093 00:41:48,582 --> 00:41:52,180 today . So it's a tough scenario to be 1094 00:41:52,180 --> 00:41:54,291 in . And it was a mistake . It was an 1095 00:41:54,291 --> 00:41:56,458 honest mistake . It's important to say 1096 00:41:56,458 --> 00:41:58,180 throughout the investigation , 1097 00:41:58,180 --> 00:42:00,347 everybody I interviewed under oath , I 1098 00:42:00,347 --> 00:42:02,513 didn't have people saying I thought it 1099 00:42:02,513 --> 00:42:04,624 was this and I was uncomfortable here 1100 00:42:04,624 --> 00:42:06,624 and I voiced a concern by the way I 1101 00:42:06,624 --> 00:42:08,791 interviewed them separately . I didn't 1102 00:42:08,791 --> 00:42:08,240 put them in a group . So there's no 1103 00:42:08,240 --> 00:42:11,150 groupthink here and I instructed them 1104 00:42:11,150 --> 00:42:13,317 not to talk to each other . So there's 1105 00:42:13,317 --> 00:42:16,150 no cross feeding going on and they all 1106 00:42:16,150 --> 00:42:18,410 had a genuine belief based on the 1107 00:42:18,410 --> 00:42:19,799 information they had and 1108 00:42:19,799 --> 00:42:21,966 interpretations that that was a threat 1109 00:42:21,966 --> 00:42:24,132 to U . S . Forces , an imminent threat 1110 00:42:24,132 --> 00:42:26,299 to U . S . Forces . That's a mistake . 1111 00:42:26,299 --> 00:42:28,354 It's a regrettable mistake . It's an 1112 00:42:28,354 --> 00:42:30,243 honest mistake . I understand the 1113 00:42:30,243 --> 00:42:32,299 consequences , but it's not criminal 1114 00:42:32,299 --> 00:42:34,410 conduct , random conduct negligence , 1115 00:42:35,100 --> 00:42:38,180 Right ? Thank you . Thank you . Just 1116 00:42:39,390 --> 00:42:41,520 a couple of pieces of information , 1117 00:42:41,530 --> 00:42:44,140 would you ? So the car that was 1118 00:42:44,150 --> 00:42:47,770 targeted was During at that moment , it 1119 00:42:47,770 --> 00:42:49,992 was part it wasn't moving right ? Yes . 1120 00:42:50,110 --> 00:42:53,220 And it was part of the 1st 3 km , but 1121 00:42:53,220 --> 00:42:55,442 then you said two km from the airport , 1122 00:42:55,442 --> 00:42:57,480 it's approximately three km west 1123 00:42:57,480 --> 00:42:59,591 southwest of the airport . It started 1124 00:42:59,591 --> 00:43:01,790 farther away , But throughout the day 1125 00:43:01,800 --> 00:43:04,250 it moved and made multiple stops and 1126 00:43:04,260 --> 00:43:06,371 ultimately got within three km and it 1127 00:43:06,371 --> 00:43:09,150 was stopped . It was in a compound and 1128 00:43:09,150 --> 00:43:11,540 then it was parked in a civilian urban 1129 00:43:11,540 --> 00:43:15,040 area . Yes . So a car that was 1130 00:43:15,050 --> 00:43:18,560 part of Anything between 3-2 1131 00:43:18,560 --> 00:43:22,430 km from the airport in a civilian area . 1132 00:43:22,800 --> 00:43:25,650 Can you help me understand how was that 1133 00:43:25,650 --> 00:43:28,020 considered an imminent threat ? Yeah . 1134 00:43:28,530 --> 00:43:31,010 Yeah , I'm glad you , it's a car parked 1135 00:43:31,010 --> 00:43:33,066 in a civilian area . So by default , 1136 00:43:33,066 --> 00:43:35,177 whoever was in charge of targeting it 1137 00:43:35,177 --> 00:43:37,177 should take into consideration that 1138 00:43:37,177 --> 00:43:38,899 there will be civilians or the 1139 00:43:38,899 --> 00:43:40,843 possibility of civilians including 1140 00:43:40,843 --> 00:43:43,040 Children . Yes . How these two things 1141 00:43:43,050 --> 00:43:45,110 happen and I have a follow up at the 1142 00:43:45,110 --> 00:43:48,440 end . Yeah . So uh glad you asked these 1143 00:43:48,440 --> 00:43:50,607 questions . So on the imminence of the 1144 00:43:50,607 --> 00:43:52,607 threat , the fact that it was three 1145 00:43:52,607 --> 00:43:54,829 kilometers by the way , it doesn't take 1146 00:43:54,829 --> 00:43:56,718 that long to try to to move three 1147 00:43:56,718 --> 00:43:58,940 kilometers get to h kaya , but remember 1148 00:43:59,940 --> 00:44:02,560 my understanding is sometimes it took 1149 00:44:02,560 --> 00:44:05,640 you like an hour to just drive short 1150 00:44:05,640 --> 00:44:07,751 distances because of the chaos in the 1151 00:44:07,751 --> 00:44:09,918 city and I was in the airport . Sure , 1152 00:44:09,918 --> 00:44:13,440 sure . But uh so here's the 1153 00:44:13,450 --> 00:44:16,770 critical issue though , what the folks 1154 00:44:16,770 --> 00:44:18,992 thought they were targeting at the time 1155 00:44:18,992 --> 00:44:21,420 where a vehicle that contained somebody 1156 00:44:21,420 --> 00:44:23,230 associated with ISIS K but more 1157 00:44:23,230 --> 00:44:26,020 importantly , they believed the vehicle 1158 00:44:26,020 --> 00:44:29,190 contained explosives and here's the 1159 00:44:29,190 --> 00:44:31,370 risk where people , the folks 1160 00:44:31,370 --> 00:44:33,550 conducting the strike have to balance 1161 00:44:33,560 --> 00:44:37,200 the risk to force is if it 1162 00:44:37,200 --> 00:44:39,590 contains explosives and it parks and 1163 00:44:39,590 --> 00:44:42,350 let's say it has s vests right ? 1164 00:44:42,360 --> 00:44:46,160 Uh explosive vests and they're removed 1165 00:44:46,160 --> 00:44:48,490 from the car . I had a constant 1166 00:44:48,500 --> 00:44:50,780 concentrated uh you know , a bunch of 1167 00:44:50,790 --> 00:44:52,957 ESF sitting in the car the minute they 1168 00:44:52,957 --> 00:44:55,123 removed from the car and 10 people are 1169 00:44:55,123 --> 00:44:57,123 wearing esfs running around uh it's 1170 00:44:57,123 --> 00:44:59,179 impossible for us to neutralize that 1171 00:44:59,179 --> 00:45:01,234 threat . I need to neutralize , they 1172 00:45:01,234 --> 00:45:03,457 need to neutralize the explosives while 1173 00:45:03,457 --> 00:45:05,570 their aggregated . And they believed 1174 00:45:05,580 --> 00:45:07,636 although incorrectly I got it at the 1175 00:45:07,636 --> 00:45:09,469 time , they believe based on the 1176 00:45:09,469 --> 00:45:11,524 intelligence that that car contained 1177 00:45:11,524 --> 00:45:13,413 explosive material , they weren't 1178 00:45:13,413 --> 00:45:15,840 certain was it ? S vest or pieces of 1179 00:45:15,840 --> 00:45:17,673 explosive material that could be 1180 00:45:17,673 --> 00:45:19,784 inserted into a computer bag like the 1181 00:45:19,784 --> 00:45:21,673 attack three days prior , but you 1182 00:45:21,673 --> 00:45:23,810 cannot take the risk of allowing that 1183 00:45:24,190 --> 00:45:26,640 You could but you can't overcome it . 1184 00:45:26,650 --> 00:45:28,428 Take the risk of allowing those 1185 00:45:28,428 --> 00:45:30,539 explosives that are concentrated that 1186 00:45:30,539 --> 00:45:32,761 you can take out with one strike to get 1187 00:45:32,761 --> 00:45:34,817 this aggregated and distributed very 1188 00:45:34,817 --> 00:45:37,039 quickly . By the way . All they have to 1189 00:45:37,039 --> 00:45:39,094 do is take it out of the car and you 1190 00:45:39,094 --> 00:45:39,070 can't hit the same thing . So there was 1191 00:45:39,070 --> 00:45:41,930 a deliberate decision of I need to deal 1192 00:45:41,930 --> 00:45:44,208 with this aggregated threat while it's , 1193 00:45:44,208 --> 00:45:46,610 it's concentrated , I can deal with it 1194 00:45:46,990 --> 00:45:50,200 on the , on the civilian 1195 00:45:50,200 --> 00:45:54,040 area . Yeah . So it's , you know , it's 1196 00:45:54,040 --> 00:45:56,096 highly unusual to conduct operations 1197 00:45:56,096 --> 00:45:58,630 downtown Kabul . But again , you know , 1198 00:45:58,640 --> 00:46:01,060 self defense and risk the force . But 1199 00:46:01,070 --> 00:46:04,140 uh , the report articulates uh , 1200 00:46:04,150 --> 00:46:07,150 measures that were taken to as much as 1201 00:46:07,150 --> 00:46:09,560 possible to mitigate the risk of , of 1202 00:46:09,560 --> 00:46:11,782 casualties . And what I mean by that is 1203 00:46:12,080 --> 00:46:15,100 they thought that they had cleared the 1204 00:46:15,100 --> 00:46:17,156 compound . It's not like people were 1205 00:46:17,156 --> 00:46:19,240 didn't know uh , the number of 1206 00:46:19,240 --> 00:46:21,462 individuals in the compound . They were 1207 00:46:21,462 --> 00:46:23,184 all convinced . Everybody . We 1208 00:46:23,184 --> 00:46:25,407 interviewed under oath , we listened to 1209 00:46:25,407 --> 00:46:27,518 the communications of the strike . We 1210 00:46:27,518 --> 00:46:29,740 looked at the text which we have of the 1211 00:46:29,740 --> 00:46:31,851 strike to see if they're just telling 1212 00:46:31,851 --> 00:46:33,629 us that everybody believed they 1213 00:46:33,629 --> 00:46:35,740 understood what was in the compound , 1214 00:46:35,740 --> 00:46:35,670 unfortunately incorrectly . Right ? 1215 00:46:36,260 --> 00:46:38,460 There aren't Children there . That's 1216 00:46:38,460 --> 00:46:41,040 one . The second thing is they 1217 00:46:41,050 --> 00:46:43,106 attempted to minimize the collateral 1218 00:46:43,106 --> 00:46:45,590 damage by uh , we gotta be careful and 1219 00:46:45,590 --> 00:46:48,220 classification . But the way you weapon 1220 00:46:48,220 --> 00:46:50,740 era strike , you can adjust diffusing 1221 00:46:50,740 --> 00:46:53,070 to minimize the collateral damage 1222 00:46:53,080 --> 00:46:55,900 estimate . And they went to that 1223 00:46:55,900 --> 00:46:58,067 measure , although they were executing 1224 00:46:58,067 --> 00:47:00,233 it rapidly , They went to that extreme 1225 00:47:00,233 --> 00:47:02,400 to go , let's try to defuse the weapon 1226 00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:04,620 in such a way to dramatically reduce 1227 00:47:04,620 --> 00:47:07,270 the collateral damage . So they saw the 1228 00:47:07,270 --> 00:47:09,960 compound with relatively high walls , A 1229 00:47:09,960 --> 00:47:11,950 gate is closed , so containing the 1230 00:47:11,950 --> 00:47:15,910 blast . Um , so to your point , 1231 00:47:15,910 --> 00:47:17,966 it's not a random , it's not like we 1232 00:47:17,966 --> 00:47:20,077 showed up at the house and somebody , 1233 00:47:20,077 --> 00:47:22,188 you know , destroyed the house . Uh , 1234 00:47:22,188 --> 00:47:24,354 you could hear the calms of the weapon 1235 00:47:24,354 --> 00:47:26,354 earing what they're trying to do to 1236 00:47:26,354 --> 00:47:26,280 mitigate the threat . They were 1237 00:47:26,280 --> 00:47:28,840 convinced that the compound didn't have 1238 00:47:28,850 --> 00:47:31,540 Children in . It turns out to be wrong . 1239 00:47:31,560 --> 00:47:33,838 Right ? Had they not taken these steps , 1240 00:47:33,838 --> 00:47:35,838 I might have reached the point like 1241 00:47:35,838 --> 00:47:38,004 your colleague was talking . Hey , how 1242 00:47:38,004 --> 00:47:40,171 are you , what steps are you taking to 1243 00:47:40,171 --> 00:47:42,449 try to minimize the risk of casualties ? 1244 00:47:42,449 --> 00:47:46,280 Uh , question of the lower floor ? 1245 00:47:46,290 --> 00:47:49,040 And I'm sorry , on the law of war . So 1246 00:47:49,050 --> 00:47:51,328 you said there were no violations here . 1247 00:47:51,328 --> 00:47:54,600 Uh , I mean , is it because there was 1248 00:47:54,610 --> 00:47:56,470 no intention ? Because there was 1249 00:47:56,480 --> 00:47:58,510 military necessity ? Was it 1250 00:47:58,520 --> 00:48:01,630 proportional ? What what I'm getting at 1251 00:48:01,630 --> 00:48:04,250 here is basically , in theory , any 1252 00:48:04,250 --> 00:48:06,460 nation can claim impunity because they 1253 00:48:06,460 --> 00:48:08,660 have classified information . They can 1254 00:48:08,660 --> 00:48:10,850 talk about imminent threat conducting 1255 00:48:10,850 --> 00:48:13,190 something in self defense and say we 1256 00:48:13,190 --> 00:48:16,020 didn't violate any law . Yeah , that's 1257 00:48:16,020 --> 00:48:18,187 a good question . I think you all know 1258 00:48:18,187 --> 00:48:20,242 the overall principles of the law of 1259 00:48:20,242 --> 00:48:21,798 war of military necessity , 1260 00:48:21,798 --> 00:48:23,710 proportionality distinction and 1261 00:48:23,710 --> 00:48:25,543 discrimination . That's what I'm 1262 00:48:25,543 --> 00:48:27,766 talking about when you're talking about 1263 00:48:27,766 --> 00:48:29,988 that . And then uh specifically applied 1264 00:48:29,988 --> 00:48:32,154 to this particular scenario scenario , 1265 00:48:32,154 --> 00:48:34,266 which is self defense . It's it's the 1266 00:48:34,266 --> 00:48:36,432 two key elements there to trigger that 1267 00:48:36,432 --> 00:48:38,620 for necessity would would be hostile 1268 00:48:38,630 --> 00:48:41,990 act or hostile intent . So again , had 1269 00:48:41,990 --> 00:48:43,934 I questioned the team reviewed the 1270 00:48:43,934 --> 00:48:46,220 material to go , There is no way on the 1271 00:48:46,220 --> 00:48:48,840 planet any reasonable person would 1272 00:48:48,840 --> 00:48:51,920 conclude that that is in any way shape 1273 00:48:51,920 --> 00:48:54,180 or form a risk to U . S . Forces or a 1274 00:48:54,180 --> 00:48:56,236 threat . That would have been a very 1275 00:48:56,236 --> 00:48:58,402 different outcome in the investigation 1276 00:48:58,402 --> 00:49:00,513 that that is unreasonable . That is a 1277 00:49:00,513 --> 00:49:02,347 violation . That is almost there 1278 00:49:02,347 --> 00:49:04,569 election because it's random . But when 1279 00:49:04,569 --> 00:49:06,736 you see the information that they have 1280 00:49:06,736 --> 00:49:08,736 in the analysis supply and you go , 1281 00:49:08,736 --> 00:49:10,624 okay , I can see how they can get 1282 00:49:10,624 --> 00:49:12,847 wrapped into this . Is the threat , not 1283 00:49:12,847 --> 00:49:15,013 only a threat but the threat . Uh , it 1284 00:49:15,013 --> 00:49:17,236 was a mistake . It was a mistake . Just 1285 00:49:17,236 --> 00:49:19,740 a couple more focus , general Lucas , 1286 00:49:19,740 --> 00:49:21,770 Tomlinson Fox news . Why were you 1287 00:49:21,770 --> 00:49:23,992 looking at that car to begin with ? And 1288 00:49:23,992 --> 00:49:27,890 who approved the strike ? So again , 1289 00:49:27,900 --> 00:49:29,400 you need to be careful and 1290 00:49:29,400 --> 00:49:31,067 classification , but uh , the 1291 00:49:31,067 --> 00:49:33,178 intelligence that we were receiving , 1292 00:49:33,178 --> 00:49:35,520 uh highlighted 1293 00:49:36,970 --> 00:49:38,780 particular vehicles or types of 1294 00:49:38,780 --> 00:49:41,880 vehicles and also painted a picture or 1295 00:49:41,880 --> 00:49:44,710 of where the vehicles might go and that 1296 00:49:44,710 --> 00:49:47,180 such vehicles would be associated with 1297 00:49:47,180 --> 00:49:50,990 the attack on the 29th . The reason we 1298 00:49:50,990 --> 00:49:53,212 fixated on that particular vehicle , is 1299 00:49:53,212 --> 00:49:55,268 it correlated to some of these intel 1300 00:49:55,268 --> 00:49:58,420 streams in terms of color and type and 1301 00:49:58,420 --> 00:50:00,870 then MS correlation started to happen 1302 00:50:00,870 --> 00:50:04,730 in terms of location . Uh , but it's 1303 00:50:04,730 --> 00:50:06,674 not hard . Again , if I could talk 1304 00:50:06,674 --> 00:50:08,452 classified to go , how did they 1305 00:50:08,452 --> 00:50:10,397 correlate ? It's , you wouldn't be 1306 00:50:10,397 --> 00:50:12,508 going . That is crazy . You're like , 1307 00:50:12,508 --> 00:50:14,730 okay , I can see it . It just turns out 1308 00:50:14,730 --> 00:50:16,786 to be wrong . Uh , but that's how we 1309 00:50:16,786 --> 00:50:18,841 started on that particular vehicle . 1310 00:50:18,841 --> 00:50:20,841 It's make color . Uh , and then its 1311 00:50:20,841 --> 00:50:23,008 movements throughout the day and where 1312 00:50:23,008 --> 00:50:25,230 it might have gone made it a vehicle of 1313 00:50:25,230 --> 00:50:27,286 interest . I'm sorry . What was your 1314 00:50:27,286 --> 00:50:26,660 second question ? Who approved the 1315 00:50:26,660 --> 00:50:29,190 strike ? Yeah . The uh , the target 1316 00:50:29,190 --> 00:50:31,860 engagement authority is the Ground 1317 00:50:31,860 --> 00:50:35,840 Force Commander . Yeah . It's a general , 1318 00:50:35,840 --> 00:50:39,090 major general Donahue . And Are you 1319 00:50:39,090 --> 00:50:41,312 also investigating the strike on August 1320 00:50:41,312 --> 00:50:43,990 27 in Nangahar ? I don't know . Coming . 1321 00:50:44,760 --> 00:50:48,270 Yeah . On the card , was there actually 1322 00:50:48,280 --> 00:50:51,770 a Toyota that was tracked 1323 00:50:52,160 --> 00:50:55,500 to the U . S . Forces or you just hit 1324 00:50:55,500 --> 00:50:58,160 the wrong car ? Four ? Was there 1325 00:50:58,160 --> 00:51:00,210 actually non existent to trap as a 1326 00:51:00,210 --> 00:51:03,940 whole ? Was . So to your question , I 1327 00:51:03,940 --> 00:51:06,460 think I understand it . We we actually 1328 00:51:06,470 --> 00:51:09,080 never ended up tracking the actual 1329 00:51:09,760 --> 00:51:12,780 uh , Toyota Corolla . Um , 1330 00:51:14,160 --> 00:51:16,730 We didn't , it certainly wasn't the one 1331 00:51:16,730 --> 00:51:18,619 we did track and struck . We just 1332 00:51:18,619 --> 00:51:21,120 didn't pick up the Toyota Corolla that 1333 00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:23,120 we believe we should have picked up 1334 00:51:23,120 --> 00:51:25,190 that might have been involved in 1335 00:51:25,200 --> 00:51:27,200 something that was forced them . So 1336 00:51:27,200 --> 00:51:29,830 some intelligence officials speaking to 1337 00:51:29,830 --> 00:51:32,450 the press saying that actually seconds 1338 00:51:32,450 --> 00:51:35,800 after the launch it was reported to the 1339 00:51:35,810 --> 00:51:38,350 strikes out that actually the target is 1340 00:51:38,350 --> 00:51:40,650 wrong . Was there , Have you seen 1341 00:51:40,660 --> 00:51:42,716 during your investigation that there 1342 00:51:42,716 --> 00:51:44,438 were certain attempts from the 1343 00:51:44,438 --> 00:51:46,660 intelligence to , to inform the strikes 1344 00:51:46,660 --> 00:51:48,771 out that actually the target is wrong 1345 00:51:48,771 --> 00:51:51,890 or just a single . Uh , no . Uh , 1346 00:51:52,260 --> 00:51:56,160 so the initial indication that , uh , 1347 00:51:56,170 --> 00:51:58,392 so every time we do a strike , you do a 1348 00:51:58,392 --> 00:52:00,570 pre strike analysis of what , what did 1349 00:52:00,570 --> 00:52:02,850 we just strike that combined with media 1350 00:52:02,850 --> 00:52:05,220 coverage and for folks on the ground is 1351 00:52:05,220 --> 00:52:07,276 how we first started to , you know , 1352 00:52:07,276 --> 00:52:09,276 understand that they were civilians 1353 00:52:09,276 --> 00:52:12,170 involved in this . Um , but in terms of 1354 00:52:12,180 --> 00:52:14,900 intelligence saying that you struck the 1355 00:52:14,900 --> 00:52:17,780 wrong vehicle , that there is no , that 1356 00:52:17,780 --> 00:52:19,560 didn't happen . No . 1357 00:52:22,450 --> 00:52:25,160 The thing you said about two minutes 1358 00:52:25,170 --> 00:52:27,760 before the strike , when you reviewed 1359 00:52:27,760 --> 00:52:29,760 the tapes , you saw that there were 1360 00:52:29,760 --> 00:52:32,890 Children . One , one more job in real 1361 00:52:32,890 --> 00:52:36,410 time . Did anybody watching the 1362 00:52:36,410 --> 00:52:40,290 feed see That child or did 1363 00:52:40,300 --> 00:52:42,356 all of this awareness come after the 1364 00:52:42,356 --> 00:52:45,290 fact after the fact . So , uh , they 1365 00:52:45,290 --> 00:52:47,512 100% did not pick up on the child . And 1366 00:52:47,512 --> 00:52:49,734 it's not because they said that again , 1367 00:52:49,734 --> 00:52:51,568 I have their chats from the time 1368 00:52:51,568 --> 00:52:53,679 preserved . We have their cops . Uh , 1369 00:52:53,679 --> 00:52:56,650 we have their testimony under oath and 1370 00:52:56,650 --> 00:52:58,650 what they perceived to exist at the 1371 00:52:58,650 --> 00:53:00,817 compound at the time . Did not include 1372 00:53:00,817 --> 00:53:04,520 any women or Children . Uh , last 1373 00:53:04,520 --> 00:53:07,780 question , sorry to interrupt you after , 1374 00:53:07,900 --> 00:53:09,900 after the strike , they immediately 1375 00:53:09,900 --> 00:53:11,956 came out and said there were subsidy 1376 00:53:11,956 --> 00:53:14,011 subsidy explosions that were so huge 1377 00:53:14,011 --> 00:53:15,956 could leave no doubt that it was a 1378 00:53:15,956 --> 00:53:18,122 righteous target . How do you get that 1379 00:53:18,122 --> 00:53:20,178 wrong ? I mean you're looking at the 1380 00:53:20,178 --> 00:53:22,178 video , you would know if there was 1381 00:53:22,178 --> 00:53:23,956 other explosions . Another good 1382 00:53:23,956 --> 00:53:26,450 question . So we did an analysis on 1383 00:53:26,450 --> 00:53:28,710 that pretty detailed technical analysis 1384 00:53:28,710 --> 00:53:30,266 to figure out for ourselves 1385 00:53:30,266 --> 00:53:32,880 independently if that strike or the 1386 00:53:32,890 --> 00:53:35,001 what they perceived to be a secondary 1387 00:53:35,001 --> 00:53:37,168 and therefore , aha , we hit a weapons 1388 00:53:37,168 --> 00:53:39,334 cache in the car was just that and the 1389 00:53:39,334 --> 00:53:41,501 technical analysis concluded which was 1390 00:53:41,501 --> 00:53:43,668 shared prior . But we did our own uh , 1391 00:53:43,668 --> 00:53:45,860 was no , the secondary was very muted 1392 00:53:45,870 --> 00:53:48,050 and highly unlikely . That was any 1393 00:53:48,100 --> 00:53:51,260 explosives in the car . More likely 1394 00:53:51,260 --> 00:53:53,482 that I mean we don't know what it was , 1395 00:53:53,482 --> 00:53:55,593 but it could be a propane tack in the 1396 00:53:55,593 --> 00:53:57,649 backyard . Typical in Afghanistan or 1397 00:53:57,649 --> 00:53:59,760 something else . But to be fair , you 1398 00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:01,316 could infer a little bit of 1399 00:54:01,316 --> 00:54:03,427 confirmation bias in here . But to be 1400 00:54:03,427 --> 00:54:05,593 fair to those observing the strike , I 1401 00:54:05,593 --> 00:54:07,704 looked at it . Um , there's a typical 1402 00:54:07,704 --> 00:54:09,760 pattern of explosion when you employ 1403 00:54:09,760 --> 00:54:11,816 the weapon that was employed in that 1404 00:54:11,816 --> 00:54:14,720 particular day . And this one was more 1405 00:54:14,720 --> 00:54:16,498 pronounced than normal . That's 1406 00:54:16,498 --> 00:54:18,720 acknowledged by all , even anybody that 1407 00:54:18,720 --> 00:54:20,942 looks at to go . You know what , that's 1408 00:54:20,942 --> 00:54:22,831 more pronounced . That what we've 1409 00:54:22,831 --> 00:54:24,942 normally seen everybody I interviewed 1410 00:54:24,942 --> 00:54:26,831 under oath that we saw the actual 1411 00:54:26,831 --> 00:54:28,942 explosion said the same thing . We've 1412 00:54:28,942 --> 00:54:30,998 seen hundreds of such weapon strikes 1413 00:54:30,998 --> 00:54:34,130 and this one seemed significantly more 1414 00:54:34,130 --> 00:54:36,520 pronounced . I put eyes on it , it is 1415 00:54:36,520 --> 00:54:39,480 more pronounced . But again uh I'm not 1416 00:54:39,480 --> 00:54:41,536 saying this is the cause but you can 1417 00:54:41,536 --> 00:54:43,702 infer into it . It's confirmation bias 1418 00:54:43,702 --> 00:54:45,813 as well of slightly more pronounced . 1419 00:54:45,813 --> 00:54:47,920 Ha ha ! We hit the explosives in the 1420 00:54:47,920 --> 00:54:50,142 car . It could be something else . Like 1421 00:54:50,142 --> 00:54:52,253 I said a propane tank in the backyard 1422 00:54:52,253 --> 00:54:54,420 in afghan backyard or something else . 1423 00:54:54,420 --> 00:54:56,420 But the conclusive analysis is it's 1424 00:54:56,420 --> 00:54:58,531 highly , highly unlikely that we have 1425 00:54:58,531 --> 00:55:00,531 any explosives in that car . Thanks 1426 00:55:00,531 --> 00:55:02,364 everybody . But the general will 1427 00:55:02,364 --> 00:55:04,531 appreciate . Thank you all have a good 1428 00:55:04,531 --> 00:55:08,190 afternoon . Oh you got more to do . 1429 00:55:08,190 --> 00:55:11,810 Right . That's right yeah , 1430 00:55:11,820 --> 00:55:14,042 sorry I drank the water trying to bring 1431 00:55:14,042 --> 00:55:16,470 them . Alright , appreciate it . Yeah . 1432 00:55:19,840 --> 00:55:21,896 Kanye we've been at this for an hour 1433 00:55:21,896 --> 00:55:24,118 but I do have a just a couple of things 1434 00:55:24,240 --> 00:55:27,850 at the top here . Um 1435 00:55:28,390 --> 00:55:30,334 Do you think you saw yesterday the 1436 00:55:30,334 --> 00:55:31,890 White House announced a new 1437 00:55:31,890 --> 00:55:31,870 comprehensive suicide prevention 1438 00:55:31,870 --> 00:55:34,092 strategy to reduce military and veteran 1439 00:55:34,092 --> 00:55:35,981 suicide strategy is built on five 1440 00:55:35,981 --> 00:55:38,410 priorities improving lethal means 1441 00:55:38,420 --> 00:55:40,980 safety enhancing crisis care , 1442 00:55:40,980 --> 00:55:43,230 increasing access to effective care , 1443 00:55:43,240 --> 00:55:46,330 addressing upstream risk and protective 1444 00:55:46,330 --> 00:55:48,200 factors and increasing research 1445 00:55:48,200 --> 00:55:50,033 coordination , data sharing . An 1446 00:55:50,033 --> 00:55:52,320 evaluation strategy is aligned with the 1447 00:55:52,320 --> 00:55:54,153 department's approach to suicide 1448 00:55:54,153 --> 00:55:56,320 prevention and ongoing efforts as well 1449 00:55:56,320 --> 00:55:58,098 as including additional federal 1450 00:55:58,098 --> 00:56:00,153 partners which the the Department of 1451 00:56:00,153 --> 00:56:02,320 Energy Departments of Energy Justice , 1452 00:56:02,320 --> 00:56:04,487 Labor and Homeland Security which will 1453 00:56:04,487 --> 00:56:06,653 help us enhance interagency and public 1454 00:56:06,653 --> 00:56:08,764 private collaboration to address this 1455 00:56:08,764 --> 00:56:10,764 very important issue . Obviously we 1456 00:56:10,764 --> 00:56:10,660 refer to the White House for more 1457 00:56:10,660 --> 00:56:12,604 information on this cross sector , 1458 00:56:12,604 --> 00:56:14,660 evidence informed approach . But the 1459 00:56:14,660 --> 00:56:17,300 department is uh uh honored to be a 1460 00:56:17,300 --> 00:56:19,244 part of this larger effort . And I 1461 00:56:19,244 --> 00:56:21,356 think you've heard the secretary talk 1462 00:56:21,356 --> 00:56:23,467 about the need to continue to do much 1463 00:56:23,467 --> 00:56:25,689 more on suicide prevention Uh today , I 1464 00:56:25,689 --> 00:56:27,578 think you also saw the department 1465 00:56:27,578 --> 00:56:29,633 released its 2021 report on military 1466 00:56:29,633 --> 00:56:31,856 and security developments involving the 1467 00:56:31,856 --> 00:56:33,911 People's Republic of China . You can 1468 00:56:33,911 --> 00:56:36,022 find the full report on our website . 1469 00:56:36,022 --> 00:56:37,911 The congressional mandated report 1470 00:56:37,911 --> 00:56:40,022 serves as an authoritative assessment 1471 00:56:40,022 --> 00:56:42,133 on military and security developments 1472 00:56:42,133 --> 00:56:43,856 involving the PRC . The report 1473 00:56:43,856 --> 00:56:45,967 illustrates the importance of meeting 1474 00:56:45,967 --> 00:56:48,133 the department's top facing challenges 1475 00:56:48,133 --> 00:56:50,133 presented by the PRC's increasingly 1476 00:56:50,133 --> 00:56:50,060 capable military and its regional 1477 00:56:50,060 --> 00:56:53,200 global ambitions . Uh And then lastly 1478 00:56:53,200 --> 00:56:55,422 on the schedule . No , I think you also 1479 00:56:55,422 --> 00:56:57,460 saw the secretary met today with 1480 00:56:57,470 --> 00:56:59,248 Singapore , Minister of Defense 1481 00:56:59,248 --> 00:57:02,780 Minister of Defense at the pentagon to 1482 00:57:02,780 --> 00:57:04,891 discuss ways to broaden our bilateral 1483 00:57:04,891 --> 00:57:07,002 defense cooperation . This meeting is 1484 00:57:07,002 --> 00:57:08,920 their second face to face meeting 1485 00:57:08,930 --> 00:57:10,874 following the Secretary's visit to 1486 00:57:10,874 --> 00:57:13,380 Singapore in july , he and the minister 1487 00:57:13,390 --> 00:57:16,420 today affirmed the enduring nature of 1488 00:57:16,420 --> 00:57:18,087 the U . S . Singapore defense 1489 00:57:18,087 --> 00:57:20,087 partnership as well as their shared 1490 00:57:20,087 --> 00:57:22,087 vision of building an even stronger 1491 00:57:22,087 --> 00:57:24,087 foundation for future cooperation . 1492 00:57:24,087 --> 00:57:26,309 Secretary Austin reiterated the U . S . 1493 00:57:26,309 --> 00:57:28,420 Commitment to continue joint training 1494 00:57:28,420 --> 00:57:30,420 and growing bilateral force posture 1495 00:57:30,420 --> 00:57:30,220 opportunities with Singapore . While 1496 00:57:30,220 --> 00:57:32,220 collaboratively addressing security 1497 00:57:32,220 --> 00:57:34,276 challenges in the indo pacific we'll 1498 00:57:34,276 --> 00:57:36,331 have a much more fulsome read out of 1499 00:57:36,331 --> 00:57:38,520 this meeting later today . Uh and with 1500 00:57:38,520 --> 00:57:40,631 that we'll start with any questions . 1501 00:57:40,631 --> 00:57:42,820 Sylvie . Hello john 1502 00:57:43,520 --> 00:57:47,250 the Iranians have said that 1503 00:57:47,730 --> 00:57:50,670 us tried to seize 1504 00:57:51,380 --> 00:57:55,170 some Iranian oil and they prevented 1505 00:57:55,170 --> 00:57:58,820 it . And I wanted to have your side of 1506 00:57:58,830 --> 00:58:01,052 the story to explain me what happened . 1507 00:58:01,052 --> 00:58:03,163 I've seen the Iranian claims they are 1508 00:58:03,163 --> 00:58:05,430 absolutely totally false and untrue . 1509 00:58:05,670 --> 00:58:08,500 There was no such effort by U . S . 1510 00:58:08,500 --> 00:58:12,140 Naval assets to seize anything . Uh 1511 00:58:12,150 --> 00:58:14,750 what this refers to is back on 24 1512 00:58:14,750 --> 00:58:17,890 October U . S . Navy assets did monitor 1513 00:58:17,890 --> 00:58:20,440 Iranian forces illegally boarding and 1514 00:58:20,440 --> 00:58:22,051 seizing a merchant vessel in 1515 00:58:22,051 --> 00:58:24,051 international waters in the gulf of 1516 00:58:24,051 --> 00:58:26,620 Oman . The United States 5th fleet 1517 00:58:26,620 --> 00:58:28,787 directed to ships and aerial assets to 1518 00:58:28,787 --> 00:58:31,080 closely monitor that situation at no 1519 00:58:31,080 --> 00:58:33,770 time where U . S . Forces attempting to 1520 00:58:33,770 --> 00:58:35,659 retake or otherwise engage in the 1521 00:58:35,659 --> 00:58:37,950 situations situation were acted 1522 00:58:37,960 --> 00:58:40,182 completely in accordance with the law . 1523 00:58:40,182 --> 00:58:42,710 So it's a bogus claim . They said that 1524 00:58:42,720 --> 00:58:45,370 actually there were two tankers that 1525 00:58:45,370 --> 00:58:47,950 the U . S . Sees the oil from the first 1526 00:58:47,950 --> 00:58:50,780 tanker had put it in a second tanker , 1527 00:58:50,790 --> 00:58:53,210 you don't confirm that I not only don't 1528 00:58:53,210 --> 00:58:55,510 confirm it . It's a ridiculous claim . 1529 00:58:55,510 --> 00:58:57,566 It's absolutely not true and I would 1530 00:58:57,566 --> 00:58:59,788 add that Iran's actions , the ones that 1531 00:58:59,788 --> 00:59:02,210 are true of them illegally boarding and 1532 00:59:02,210 --> 00:59:04,377 seizing a merchant vessel constitute a 1533 00:59:04,377 --> 00:59:06,543 blatant violation of international law 1534 00:59:06,543 --> 00:59:08,654 that undermines freedom of navigation 1535 00:59:08,654 --> 00:59:10,654 and the free flow of commerce . You 1536 00:59:10,654 --> 00:59:12,710 know that's the only season that was 1537 00:59:12,710 --> 00:59:14,654 done was by Iran . Do you know the 1538 00:59:14,654 --> 00:59:16,877 nationality of the tanker they seized ? 1539 00:59:16,877 --> 00:59:19,043 I do , but I'm not at liberty to say , 1540 00:59:19,060 --> 00:59:22,510 I think we would refer to that 1541 00:59:22,520 --> 00:59:24,576 individual nation to speak to that . 1542 00:59:26,810 --> 00:59:30,530 Yeah . So based on the video from from 1543 00:59:30,530 --> 00:59:32,670 the Iranian side and which you just 1544 00:59:32,670 --> 00:59:36,450 stated , um there were uh US uh 1545 00:59:36,460 --> 00:59:40,380 navy assets and airplanes uh 1546 00:59:40,390 --> 00:59:43,310 monitoring . Uh my question is about 1547 00:59:43,320 --> 00:59:46,030 the monitoring part . I mean you have 1548 00:59:46,030 --> 00:59:48,980 naps and and you have the I . M . S . C . 1549 00:59:48,980 --> 00:59:51,220 C . Combined together . Their mission 1550 00:59:51,220 --> 00:59:54,280 is basically to 1551 00:59:54,420 --> 00:59:57,530 maritime to ensure maritime 1552 00:59:57,540 --> 01:00:00,710 stability , security of the sea lines 1553 01:00:00,710 --> 01:00:03,300 of communication . The state sponsored 1554 01:00:03,310 --> 01:00:06,340 a malign activity reassure the merchant 1555 01:00:06,340 --> 01:00:09,830 shipping um in that region . 1556 01:00:10,310 --> 01:00:13,920 I mean evidently the US didn't do any 1557 01:00:13,920 --> 01:00:15,850 of that . I mean , where's the 1558 01:00:15,860 --> 01:00:18,050 assurance and where's the deterrent 1559 01:00:18,050 --> 01:00:20,350 effect of your presence ? What I can 1560 01:00:20,350 --> 01:00:22,572 tell you is we acted in accordance with 1561 01:00:22,572 --> 01:00:24,906 international law . Unlike the Iranians , 1562 01:00:25,010 --> 01:00:27,500 uh and I'll leave it at . That was an 1563 01:00:27,500 --> 01:00:29,760 intentional effort not to escalate . We 1564 01:00:29,760 --> 01:00:31,927 acted in accordance with international 1565 01:00:31,927 --> 01:00:33,927 law . Unlike the Iranians and we do 1566 01:00:33,927 --> 01:00:35,982 believe our forward presence in that 1567 01:00:35,982 --> 01:00:38,204 part of the world has and will continue 1568 01:00:38,204 --> 01:00:40,482 and can continue to act as a deterrent . 1569 01:00:40,482 --> 01:00:42,538 Does it deter every action by uh the 1570 01:00:42,538 --> 01:00:45,240 Iranians and particularly the Irgc 1571 01:00:45,250 --> 01:00:47,660 Maybe no , but it's one of the reasons 1572 01:00:47,660 --> 01:00:50,360 why we're there to help to help , As I 1573 01:00:50,360 --> 01:00:54,290 said , uh 1574 01:00:54,300 --> 01:00:56,620 support freedom of navigation and uh 1575 01:00:56,620 --> 01:00:58,731 and free commerce . That's one of the 1576 01:00:58,731 --> 01:01:00,787 reasons why we have a naval presence 1577 01:01:00,787 --> 01:01:03,009 there as well as many of our allies and 1578 01:01:03,009 --> 01:01:05,120 partners . But we acted in accordance 1579 01:01:05,120 --> 01:01:07,176 with international law . And I think 1580 01:01:07,176 --> 01:01:09,509 your question would also be well put uh , 1581 01:01:09,509 --> 01:01:09,440 to the folks in Tehran . Our 1582 01:01:09,440 --> 01:01:12,080 correspondents in Tehran . Uh my my 1583 01:01:12,080 --> 01:01:14,247 follow up on this is what what did the 1584 01:01:14,247 --> 01:01:16,650 Pentagon wait until today to come out 1585 01:01:16,650 --> 01:01:18,650 with its version of what happened ? 1586 01:01:18,710 --> 01:01:21,230 There was no waiting body we were 1587 01:01:21,230 --> 01:01:23,063 monitoring . We monitor a lot of 1588 01:01:23,063 --> 01:01:25,286 activity in that part of the world . It 1589 01:01:25,286 --> 01:01:28,640 was not about waiting . Uh , We are 1590 01:01:28,640 --> 01:01:31,010 reacting to false claims that the 1591 01:01:31,010 --> 01:01:32,954 Iranians made today . So if you're 1592 01:01:32,954 --> 01:01:35,177 asking me , why am I talking about this 1593 01:01:35,177 --> 01:01:37,343 today ? Because you're asking me about 1594 01:01:37,343 --> 01:01:39,288 it today because the Iranians lied 1595 01:01:39,288 --> 01:01:41,066 about it today , but we monitor 1596 01:01:41,066 --> 01:01:43,232 maritime traffic every day out there . 1597 01:01:43,232 --> 01:01:45,454 And not all of it rises to the level of 1598 01:01:45,454 --> 01:01:44,890 us putting out a press release or 1599 01:01:44,890 --> 01:01:46,779 talking about it overtly from the 1600 01:01:46,779 --> 01:01:49,150 podium . White Patti , you look at the 1601 01:01:49,160 --> 01:01:51,860 video those small ships , small boats 1602 01:01:51,870 --> 01:01:53,981 were really close to that destroyer . 1603 01:01:54,310 --> 01:01:56,477 As you know , and you know , after the 1604 01:01:56,477 --> 01:01:58,532 coal . That was a huge concern . Did 1605 01:01:58,532 --> 01:02:00,699 the captain of the crew do anything to 1606 01:02:00,699 --> 01:02:02,699 try and sort of swat away the small 1607 01:02:02,699 --> 01:02:04,477 boats ? Were they allowed to do 1608 01:02:04,477 --> 01:02:06,477 anything or it's the order to avoid 1609 01:02:06,480 --> 01:02:08,536 escalation . I don't know . I mean I 1610 01:02:08,536 --> 01:02:10,647 wasn't there patty , so I'm not going 1611 01:02:10,647 --> 01:02:12,813 to speak for the commanding officer of 1612 01:02:12,813 --> 01:02:15,280 the destroyer . And what , what force 1613 01:02:15,280 --> 01:02:17,280 protection measures they might have 1614 01:02:17,280 --> 01:02:19,502 taken . What I can tell you is that the 1615 01:02:19,502 --> 01:02:21,724 commanding officers of our ships always 1616 01:02:21,724 --> 01:02:23,669 have the right of self defense and 1617 01:02:23,669 --> 01:02:25,891 multiple ways uh , to defend their ship 1618 01:02:25,891 --> 01:02:28,620 and their crew . Uh , and they know 1619 01:02:28,620 --> 01:02:30,842 they have those authorities , they know 1620 01:02:30,842 --> 01:02:33,064 they have those capabilities . Now what 1621 01:02:33,064 --> 01:02:34,842 actually transpired aboard that 1622 01:02:34,842 --> 01:02:36,953 particular destroyer , I wouldn't get 1623 01:02:36,953 --> 01:02:39,064 into , I'd refer to the navy or two , 1624 01:02:39,064 --> 01:02:41,231 the central command to talk about that 1625 01:02:41,231 --> 01:02:44,540 in more detail . Yeah . Um , was there 1626 01:02:44,540 --> 01:02:48,350 any possibility that the the ship was 1627 01:02:48,350 --> 01:02:50,630 engaged in piracy of any sort or 1628 01:02:50,640 --> 01:02:53,210 illicit oil transfers or anything like 1629 01:02:53,210 --> 01:02:55,154 that ? I don't have any additional 1630 01:02:55,154 --> 01:02:57,410 information about the ship that the 1631 01:02:57,410 --> 01:02:59,750 Iranians illegally boarded and seized 1632 01:02:59,800 --> 01:03:02,660 again . I just don't have more , we're 1633 01:03:02,660 --> 01:03:06,300 tracking , we're why we were 1634 01:03:06,300 --> 01:03:09,820 tracking , we monitor a lot of traffic 1635 01:03:09,830 --> 01:03:12,240 in that part of the world . Yeah . 1636 01:03:12,250 --> 01:03:14,417 Abraham . Yeah . Thanks . I've got two 1637 01:03:14,417 --> 01:03:16,528 questions . One on the china military 1638 01:03:16,528 --> 01:03:19,020 power report . Who went to the hill to 1639 01:03:19,020 --> 01:03:22,070 brief and who did they brief ? And yes , 1640 01:03:22,070 --> 01:03:24,430 there was a classified briefing . Could 1641 01:03:24,430 --> 01:03:26,541 you kind of provide a little bit more 1642 01:03:26,541 --> 01:03:28,541 detail on that ? You know , I don't 1643 01:03:28,541 --> 01:03:32,290 know if I have the exact uh , details 1644 01:03:32,290 --> 01:03:35,710 of who briefed whom . So let me take 1645 01:03:35,710 --> 01:03:37,877 that question . I just don't have that 1646 01:03:37,877 --> 01:03:39,932 level of detail here . But obviously 1647 01:03:39,932 --> 01:03:42,154 this is a report mandated by Congress . 1648 01:03:42,154 --> 01:03:45,040 So we had an obligation to uh brief , 1649 01:03:45,050 --> 01:03:48,040 uh , appropriate committees , uh , 1650 01:03:48,050 --> 01:03:50,161 appropriate people on the hill and we 1651 01:03:50,161 --> 01:03:52,272 did that . But exactly who did it And 1652 01:03:52,272 --> 01:03:54,550 when I don't have that level of detail . 1653 01:03:54,550 --> 01:03:56,772 Okay , so the second question on as you 1654 01:03:56,772 --> 01:03:58,828 know , Air force released some covid 1655 01:03:58,828 --> 01:04:00,717 exemption vaccination requirement 1656 01:04:00,717 --> 01:04:02,883 deadline was yesterday . They released 1657 01:04:02,883 --> 01:04:04,994 some numbers about that . I wonder if 1658 01:04:04,994 --> 01:04:07,050 Secretary Austin is pleased with the 1659 01:04:07,050 --> 01:04:09,272 Air Force's effort to get vaccination . 1660 01:04:09,272 --> 01:04:11,272 Are there lessons learned ? Is he , 1661 01:04:11,272 --> 01:04:13,494 does he talk regularly with the service 1662 01:04:13,494 --> 01:04:16,430 chiefs about how they are conducting 1663 01:04:16,430 --> 01:04:18,652 their vaccination efforts on deadline ? 1664 01:04:19,090 --> 01:04:20,923 Can you kind of elaborate on his 1665 01:04:20,923 --> 01:04:23,060 rolling around ? The Secretary is 1666 01:04:23,070 --> 01:04:25,292 pleased by the level of effort that the 1667 01:04:25,292 --> 01:04:28,050 military departments have taken uh , to 1668 01:04:28,060 --> 01:04:30,920 enact this mandatory vaccine regimen . 1669 01:04:31,290 --> 01:04:33,512 As a matter of fact , he was encouraged 1670 01:04:33,512 --> 01:04:35,290 by the activity by the military 1671 01:04:35,290 --> 01:04:37,401 departments before we had to make the 1672 01:04:37,401 --> 01:04:39,512 vaccine mandatory . As you know , the 1673 01:04:39,512 --> 01:04:41,457 delta variant , the very much more 1674 01:04:41,457 --> 01:04:43,679 lethal delta variant really contributed 1675 01:04:43,679 --> 01:04:46,350 to his decision to go ahead and make 1676 01:04:46,350 --> 01:04:48,840 this a mandatory regiment . But yes , 1677 01:04:48,840 --> 01:04:50,951 he's pleased by the leadership of the 1678 01:04:50,951 --> 01:04:53,940 department . He is aware of their 1679 01:04:53,940 --> 01:04:55,773 progress and each of them have a 1680 01:04:55,773 --> 01:04:58,450 different set of deadlines , both for 1681 01:04:58,450 --> 01:05:00,617 their active component and the reserve 1682 01:05:00,617 --> 01:05:02,283 and in some cases their guard 1683 01:05:02,283 --> 01:05:04,283 components . Uh , he respects those 1684 01:05:04,283 --> 01:05:06,228 differences . They are keeping him 1685 01:05:06,228 --> 01:05:08,394 informed As a matter of fact , there's 1686 01:05:08,394 --> 01:05:10,450 a regular update to Deputy secretary 1687 01:05:10,450 --> 01:05:12,990 hicks . Uh , so she too is staying 1688 01:05:13,000 --> 01:05:15,111 right on top of this issue as we move 1689 01:05:15,111 --> 01:05:17,900 forward . 10,000 number for the air 1690 01:05:17,900 --> 01:05:20,880 force at the deadline . That's okay . I 1691 01:05:20,890 --> 01:05:23,420 didn't say that . I didn't say that way 1692 01:05:23,420 --> 01:05:25,531 abraham ? I said he's comfortable and 1693 01:05:25,531 --> 01:05:27,587 pleased with the leadership that the 1694 01:05:27,587 --> 01:05:29,642 military departments are are showing 1695 01:05:29,642 --> 01:05:31,930 here . He's not unmindful of the fact 1696 01:05:31,930 --> 01:05:33,541 that in each of the military 1697 01:05:33,541 --> 01:05:35,730 departments there are some members who 1698 01:05:35,730 --> 01:05:38,200 are declining refusing to take the 1699 01:05:38,200 --> 01:05:42,030 vaccine , some that are applying for 1700 01:05:42,040 --> 01:05:44,180 exemptions , some exemptions that are 1701 01:05:44,180 --> 01:05:46,740 being granted . And he trusts that the 1702 01:05:46,750 --> 01:05:48,861 leaders of the military departments , 1703 01:05:48,861 --> 01:05:51,083 the service secretaries and the Service 1704 01:05:51,083 --> 01:05:53,110 chiefs will continue to manage this 1705 01:05:53,110 --> 01:05:54,920 mandatory vaccine regimen and a 1706 01:05:54,990 --> 01:05:57,212 compassionate and professional manner . 1707 01:05:57,212 --> 01:05:59,268 That's what he's comfortable of . He 1708 01:05:59,268 --> 01:06:01,120 continues to believe that these 1709 01:06:01,130 --> 01:06:03,610 vaccines are safe and effective and he 1710 01:06:03,610 --> 01:06:06,460 continues to want to see every member 1711 01:06:06,470 --> 01:06:09,230 of the armed forces get the vaccine so 1712 01:06:09,230 --> 01:06:11,370 that they can be safer . They can be 1713 01:06:11,370 --> 01:06:13,400 more ready um and that they can 1714 01:06:13,400 --> 01:06:15,344 contribute to more ready units and 1715 01:06:15,344 --> 01:06:17,456 frankly that they can help contribute 1716 01:06:17,456 --> 01:06:20,400 to the health and welfare of their own 1717 01:06:20,400 --> 01:06:22,511 families and there in the communities 1718 01:06:22,511 --> 01:06:24,622 in which they live . So he absolutely 1719 01:06:24,622 --> 01:06:26,844 nothing has changed about his desire to 1720 01:06:26,844 --> 01:06:29,140 see every member of the armed forces 1721 01:06:29,150 --> 01:06:32,240 get vaccinated obviously excluding 1722 01:06:32,240 --> 01:06:34,370 those who for medical purposes , you 1723 01:06:34,370 --> 01:06:37,580 know , at their doctor's discretion are 1724 01:06:37,580 --> 01:06:39,524 not able to but short of that . He 1725 01:06:39,524 --> 01:06:41,524 wants to see everybody vaccinated . 1726 01:06:41,524 --> 01:06:45,490 Yeah , okay on Turkey . Turkey is 1727 01:06:45,490 --> 01:06:48,160 insisting that the U . S . Must cease 1728 01:06:48,160 --> 01:06:50,490 its support to the Syrian partners SdF 1729 01:06:50,880 --> 01:06:52,824 And they have reinforced troops in 1730 01:06:52,824 --> 01:06:55,550 Syria for a possible attack on your 1731 01:06:55,560 --> 01:06:57,540 Syrian partners . What is the 1732 01:06:57,550 --> 01:06:59,494 pentagon's position on the Turkish 1733 01:06:59,494 --> 01:07:01,920 request our position with respect to 1734 01:07:01,920 --> 01:07:04,040 our cooperation with the SdF has not 1735 01:07:04,040 --> 01:07:06,300 changed . Nor has our mission in Syria 1736 01:07:06,300 --> 01:07:08,630 which is solely focused on the ISIS 1737 01:07:08,630 --> 01:07:11,800 threat . That threat remains . Those 1738 01:07:11,800 --> 01:07:13,890 missions continue that cooperation 1739 01:07:13,890 --> 01:07:16,710 continues . Anything else back there ? 1740 01:07:17,280 --> 01:07:19,640 Thank you Sarah Army General Stephen 1741 01:07:19,640 --> 01:07:22,000 Townsend , commander of U . S . Africa 1742 01:07:22,010 --> 01:07:24,177 and the assistant to the President for 1743 01:07:24,177 --> 01:07:25,954 Homeland Security . Dr Sherwood 1744 01:07:25,954 --> 01:07:28,630 recently visited uh U . S . Personnel 1745 01:07:28,630 --> 01:07:32,590 in kenya , Djibouti , Somalia and . Are 1746 01:07:32,590 --> 01:07:34,312 there any more they talk about 1747 01:07:34,312 --> 01:07:36,534 counterterrorism plans to add more sold 1748 01:07:36,534 --> 01:07:38,701 us troops to those regions in a studio 1749 01:07:38,701 --> 01:07:40,820 in East Africa . I have no troop 1750 01:07:40,820 --> 01:07:42,931 announcements or personnel changes to 1751 01:07:42,931 --> 01:07:44,931 make with respect to our posture in 1752 01:07:44,931 --> 01:07:47,710 Africa , as you can probably tell from 1753 01:07:47,880 --> 01:07:50,102 uh the agenda of that trip . There is a 1754 01:07:50,102 --> 01:07:52,269 lot to talk about . There are a lot of 1755 01:07:52,269 --> 01:07:54,380 partners doing a lot of critical work 1756 01:07:54,380 --> 01:07:56,213 in the counterterrorism Rome and 1757 01:07:56,213 --> 01:07:58,380 General Townsend remains laser focused 1758 01:07:58,380 --> 01:08:00,047 on that ? But I have no troop 1759 01:08:00,047 --> 01:08:02,158 announcements to make . Yes , ma'am , 1760 01:08:02,158 --> 01:08:04,102 can you characterize in sort of an 1761 01:08:04,102 --> 01:08:06,102 overview of how the discussion went 1762 01:08:06,102 --> 01:08:08,660 this morning between Secretary and that 1763 01:08:08,660 --> 01:08:10,604 was a very good discussion again . 1764 01:08:10,604 --> 01:08:13,100 Follow up to our visit to Singapore in 1765 01:08:13,100 --> 01:08:14,933 july and the secretaries . First 1766 01:08:14,933 --> 01:08:16,878 meeting with the Minister and with 1767 01:08:16,878 --> 01:08:19,500 officials there . Uh there is a lot of 1768 01:08:19,510 --> 01:08:21,510 things . And you'll see this in our 1769 01:08:21,510 --> 01:08:23,621 read out , we'll have more details on 1770 01:08:23,621 --> 01:08:25,621 the meeting in terms of cooperative 1771 01:08:25,621 --> 01:08:27,454 initiatives that we are going to 1772 01:08:27,454 --> 01:08:29,677 undertake going forward . But we have a 1773 01:08:29,677 --> 01:08:31,732 strong we have a strong uh bilateral 1774 01:08:31,732 --> 01:08:33,954 relationship from a defense perspective 1775 01:08:33,954 --> 01:08:35,843 with with Singapore , and we look 1776 01:08:35,843 --> 01:08:38,177 forward to deepening that going forward . 1777 01:08:38,177 --> 01:08:39,710 Okay . Thanks everybody . Mhm . Yeah .