1 00:00:00,340 --> 00:00:03,390 we now have a very important session 2 00:00:03,390 --> 00:00:07,020 for you on the future of United States . 3 00:00:07,020 --> 00:00:09,580 Special Operations were lucky to have 4 00:00:09,580 --> 00:00:11,850 us with here . General Richard Clarke 5 00:00:11,860 --> 00:00:14,400 who is the Commander of U . S . Special 6 00:00:14,400 --> 00:00:17,130 Operations Command . And of course you 7 00:00:17,130 --> 00:00:20,250 know our Special Ops are deployed all 8 00:00:20,260 --> 00:00:22,316 over the world . I think one article 9 00:00:22,316 --> 00:00:25,250 said in 70% of the world's countries 10 00:00:25,260 --> 00:00:27,370 there are U . S . Special Ops forces 11 00:00:27,370 --> 00:00:30,420 from Africa to the Middle East to Asia . 12 00:00:30,430 --> 00:00:32,541 These are the folks who are really on 13 00:00:32,541 --> 00:00:35,050 the front lines of keeping us safe of 14 00:00:35,050 --> 00:00:37,330 working with local military forces . 15 00:00:37,370 --> 00:00:39,314 They've been at the front lines of 16 00:00:39,314 --> 00:00:42,710 counterterrorism and General Clark is a 17 00:00:42,710 --> 00:00:44,932 great leader of this group . So General 18 00:00:44,932 --> 00:00:47,043 Clark and Michele Flournoy , will you 19 00:00:47,043 --> 00:00:49,160 join me up here please ? Thank you . 20 00:00:51,140 --> 00:00:54,970 Yeah . Yeah . So 21 00:00:54,970 --> 00:00:57,380 as commander of U . S . Special Ops , 22 00:00:57,390 --> 00:01:00,180 general Clark uh is responsible for the 23 00:01:00,180 --> 00:01:02,950 training and employment of all special 24 00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:05,270 operations forces including the navy 25 00:01:05,270 --> 00:01:08,610 seals , army rangers , the green Berets , 26 00:01:08,620 --> 00:01:10,342 the marine Raiders and the air 27 00:01:10,342 --> 00:01:14,220 commandos . Uh he has led he's been 28 00:01:14,230 --> 00:01:16,860 in the U . S . Military for his entire 29 00:01:16,860 --> 00:01:19,280 career . But what we learned backstage 30 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:21,280 is that he was also born in Germany 31 00:01:21,280 --> 00:01:23,391 went to high school in Berlin so near 32 00:01:23,391 --> 00:01:25,391 and dear to my heart because that's 33 00:01:25,391 --> 00:01:27,613 where I'm from as well . And there's no 34 00:01:27,613 --> 00:01:29,724 one better to be in conversation with 35 00:01:29,724 --> 00:01:31,960 General Clark than Michele Flournoy who 36 00:01:31,960 --> 00:01:35,130 is one of the great um defense experts 37 00:01:35,130 --> 00:01:37,510 and great patriots that has been 38 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:40,540 serving for us in the US Pentagon most 39 00:01:40,540 --> 00:01:42,830 recently as undersecretary of Defense 40 00:01:42,840 --> 00:01:45,250 for policy from february 2000 and nine 41 00:01:45,340 --> 00:01:48,290 2 2012 . She of course is also the co 42 00:01:48,290 --> 00:01:50,380 founder and managing partner of West 43 00:01:50,380 --> 00:01:52,770 Execs and the co founder and Ceo of the 44 00:01:52,770 --> 00:01:55,610 Center for a new american security and 45 00:01:55,610 --> 00:01:59,600 really no one knows more than the these 46 00:01:59,600 --> 00:02:01,740 two about our mission . So we'll let 47 00:02:01,740 --> 00:02:03,796 you take it away . Thank you . And a 48 00:02:03,796 --> 00:02:05,851 proud member of the Aspen Strategy . 49 00:02:06,140 --> 00:02:08,380 There we go . A proud member of the 50 00:02:08,380 --> 00:02:10,324 Aspen Strategy Group . Thank you . 51 00:02:10,340 --> 00:02:13,870 Thank you . Anya Well , I have been 52 00:02:13,870 --> 00:02:16,092 looking forward to this first because I 53 00:02:16,092 --> 00:02:18,259 think this is a really fascinating and 54 00:02:18,259 --> 00:02:20,440 important topic and second is one of 55 00:02:20,440 --> 00:02:22,662 those rare instances where I get to ask 56 00:02:22,662 --> 00:02:26,160 questions of my dear friend , General 57 00:02:26,160 --> 00:02:29,880 Clark . So um uh so 58 00:02:29,890 --> 00:02:31,946 great to see you all today . Um so I 59 00:02:31,946 --> 00:02:34,168 want to start with some kind of setting 60 00:02:34,168 --> 00:02:36,112 the scene . You know , we all talk 61 00:02:36,112 --> 00:02:39,240 about a paradigm shift 20 years since 9 62 00:02:39,240 --> 00:02:41,330 11 , we've had a focus on 63 00:02:41,340 --> 00:02:43,910 counterterrorism , counterinsurgency 64 00:02:43,910 --> 00:02:46,680 Afghanistan Iraq , the broader 65 00:02:46,690 --> 00:02:49,390 counterterrorism fight . And now we're 66 00:02:49,390 --> 00:02:52,830 really in a new situation where we've 67 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:56,110 got the rise of china and other powers . 68 00:02:56,110 --> 00:02:58,550 We've got this as we were hearing in 69 00:02:58,550 --> 00:03:00,383 the previous panel , a period of 70 00:03:00,383 --> 00:03:02,550 profound technological disruption . So 71 00:03:02,550 --> 00:03:04,772 I wanted to just give you an open ended 72 00:03:04,772 --> 00:03:07,520 question about how do you see The 73 00:03:07,520 --> 00:03:11,050 security environment today in contrast 74 00:03:11,050 --> 00:03:13,217 to the last 20 years and you know , in 75 00:03:13,217 --> 00:03:15,217 terms of how we need to be thinking 76 00:03:15,217 --> 00:03:17,106 about special Operations . Thanks 77 00:03:17,106 --> 00:03:18,994 Michel and Tanya , thanks for the 78 00:03:18,994 --> 00:03:21,530 introduction And Michelle was like you 79 00:03:21,530 --> 00:03:23,700 said about me , but I pay it back . 80 00:03:23,710 --> 00:03:26,970 You've been a great leader for inside 81 00:03:26,970 --> 00:03:29,248 the Pentagon and for national security . 82 00:03:29,248 --> 00:03:32,150 It's an honor to be here with you 1st . 83 00:03:32,150 --> 00:03:34,970 I think it It is important to talk 84 00:03:34,970 --> 00:03:37,470 about where we've been and what we've 85 00:03:37,470 --> 00:03:40,760 learned from it and the past 20 years 86 00:03:40,770 --> 00:03:43,650 for our force that's been heavily 87 00:03:43,650 --> 00:03:46,450 involved in the counterterrorism fight 88 00:03:46,480 --> 00:03:48,702 and the counter violent extremist fight 89 00:03:49,040 --> 00:03:51,310 that that shouldn't be forgotten . And 90 00:03:51,310 --> 00:03:54,360 we got we have now built over 20 years 91 00:03:54,360 --> 00:03:57,080 of battle tested great individuals who 92 00:03:57,080 --> 00:04:00,400 were especially selected and assessed 93 00:04:00,410 --> 00:04:02,640 what I look at is probably one of the 94 00:04:02,640 --> 00:04:06,240 most credible uh integrated 95 00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:09,270 capable forces that we've ever had . 96 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:13,030 And we should never throw that out and 97 00:04:13,030 --> 00:04:15,086 we got to continue to learn from the 98 00:04:15,086 --> 00:04:17,710 things that took place in the missions 99 00:04:17,720 --> 00:04:19,664 that they accomplished to keep our 100 00:04:19,664 --> 00:04:22,940 nation safe . So what I think in the 101 00:04:22,940 --> 00:04:24,940 security environment in which we go 102 00:04:24,940 --> 00:04:27,110 forward on that the counterterrorism 103 00:04:27,110 --> 00:04:29,054 mission is still going to remain . 104 00:04:29,054 --> 00:04:31,300 There still gonna be folks that want to 105 00:04:31,300 --> 00:04:33,522 come into our country , there's some of 106 00:04:33,522 --> 00:04:36,930 the folks that That would , if they had 107 00:04:36,930 --> 00:04:39,480 the opportunity would take a shot at 108 00:04:39,490 --> 00:04:41,657 the United States . I'm not saying the 109 00:04:41,657 --> 00:04:44,080 next 911 is around the corner , but I 110 00:04:44,090 --> 00:04:46,034 do think that we always have to be 111 00:04:46,034 --> 00:04:48,190 vigilant and be prepared . So that's 112 00:04:48,190 --> 00:04:50,920 one thing I think we got to keep to the 113 00:04:50,920 --> 00:04:54,330 forefront and Tripoli General Millie 114 00:04:54,330 --> 00:04:56,163 was here yesterday and he talked 115 00:04:56,163 --> 00:04:58,386 specifically about the counterterrorism 116 00:04:58,386 --> 00:05:00,570 aspect . But the other piece that I 117 00:05:00,570 --> 00:05:02,626 share with the audience and and it's 118 00:05:02,626 --> 00:05:05,820 it's the raison D tre for so common how 119 00:05:05,820 --> 00:05:08,660 we got started was for the crisis 120 00:05:08,660 --> 00:05:12,270 response . Uh and that 121 00:05:12,280 --> 00:05:15,330 capability that we provide for our 122 00:05:15,330 --> 00:05:19,260 nation uh to really reduce 123 00:05:19,270 --> 00:05:21,270 the threats abroad that we could 124 00:05:21,270 --> 00:05:23,670 actually respond . Whether it's yeah , 125 00:05:23,680 --> 00:05:26,660 whether it's a hostage rescue mission 126 00:05:26,670 --> 00:05:29,020 or whether it's reinforcement of an 127 00:05:29,020 --> 00:05:32,020 embassy or whether it's counter 128 00:05:32,030 --> 00:05:34,440 proliferation that could take place if 129 00:05:34,440 --> 00:05:36,710 something's coming near us , I don't 130 00:05:36,710 --> 00:05:39,380 think we should ever discount the 131 00:05:39,380 --> 00:05:41,213 ability of special operations to 132 00:05:41,213 --> 00:05:44,720 respond quickly to give our national 133 00:05:44,720 --> 00:05:47,840 decision makers a bit of a hedge and a 134 00:05:47,840 --> 00:05:50,170 bit of insurance . And with , Yeah , 135 00:05:50,180 --> 00:05:53,580 for us with only 2% of the the total 136 00:05:53,580 --> 00:05:56,330 joint forces so calm and about 3% of 137 00:05:56,330 --> 00:05:58,497 our budget , It's a pretty good return 138 00:05:58,497 --> 00:06:01,630 on investment and what you get . Uh and 139 00:06:01,640 --> 00:06:04,150 even if I just go back within the last 140 00:06:04,150 --> 00:06:07,720 90 days when , when there were forces 141 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:10,480 required for the afghan retrograde that 142 00:06:10,480 --> 00:06:13,590 happened in a short notice , self 143 00:06:13,590 --> 00:06:17,060 responded and gave options in Kabul . 144 00:06:17,640 --> 00:06:19,860 But what a lot of people don't realize 145 00:06:19,880 --> 00:06:22,050 is that while that mission in 146 00:06:22,050 --> 00:06:24,840 Afghanistan was ongoing , there was 147 00:06:24,840 --> 00:06:28,410 also , there was an earthquake that 148 00:06:28,410 --> 00:06:30,840 took place in Haiti and the force that 149 00:06:30,840 --> 00:06:34,520 responded in a humanitarian disaster 150 00:06:34,530 --> 00:06:37,550 was actually a navy seal . That was 151 00:06:37,550 --> 00:06:40,050 part of the special operations South 152 00:06:40,060 --> 00:06:42,650 that took a small cell and he went to 153 00:06:42,650 --> 00:06:46,250 Haiti uh and he provided capabilities . 154 00:06:46,260 --> 00:06:48,420 And so that that ability to respond 155 00:06:48,420 --> 00:06:50,790 quickly for whatever footprint is 156 00:06:50,790 --> 00:06:53,850 needed , it's something that's soft can 157 00:06:53,860 --> 00:06:57,830 do . So we're all anticipating the new 158 00:06:57,840 --> 00:07:00,007 national defense strategy coming out . 159 00:07:00,007 --> 00:07:02,007 I'm not going to ask you to preview 160 00:07:02,007 --> 00:07:04,170 that before it's published but but we 161 00:07:04,180 --> 00:07:07,430 it's very clear that is going to focus 162 00:07:07,430 --> 00:07:10,430 on the rise of china as a if not the 163 00:07:10,430 --> 00:07:13,240 primary challenge . And you know , the 164 00:07:13,240 --> 00:07:16,300 competition with china , particularly 165 00:07:16,300 --> 00:07:19,860 in the end of the pacific theater , but 166 00:07:19,860 --> 00:07:22,140 also more broadly . And so , You know , 167 00:07:22,140 --> 00:07:24,480 as you think about that larger context 168 00:07:24,480 --> 00:07:28,220 as sort of part of the framework , if 169 00:07:28,220 --> 00:07:30,442 you will or the framing context for the 170 00:07:30,442 --> 00:07:32,930 next the next 20 years . how does that 171 00:07:32,940 --> 00:07:35,980 change the way you're thinking about 172 00:07:35,980 --> 00:07:38,290 the roles and missions . First off are 173 00:07:38,290 --> 00:07:40,290 we sort of going back to the future 174 00:07:40,290 --> 00:07:42,830 from kind of soft origins in World War 175 00:07:42,830 --> 00:07:45,500 Two and through the Cold War , how are 176 00:07:45,500 --> 00:07:47,611 you thinking about this for the roles 177 00:07:47,611 --> 00:07:50,410 and missions in the future ? No thanks , 178 00:07:50,420 --> 00:07:53,870 a couple of big things I think Or were 179 00:07:53,870 --> 00:07:57,590 they looking at first Having my last 180 00:07:57,590 --> 00:07:59,479 job in the Pentagon is the J5 and 181 00:07:59,479 --> 00:08:01,890 looking closely at the strategies that 182 00:08:01,890 --> 00:08:04,390 have come , you know , I still remember 183 00:08:04,390 --> 00:08:06,668 general Dempsey , it was four plus one . 184 00:08:07,240 --> 00:08:10,150 It was china Russia north Korea Iran uh 185 00:08:10,160 --> 00:08:12,290 and then it got refined 22 plus two 186 00:08:12,290 --> 00:08:16,120 plus one . Uh And so I think your your 187 00:08:16,130 --> 00:08:18,297 your piece on it's really gonna be one 188 00:08:18,297 --> 00:08:22,080 plus four now in china as a pacing 189 00:08:22,090 --> 00:08:25,650 threat . Uh and the capabilities are 190 00:08:25,650 --> 00:08:27,970 developing and the activities that 191 00:08:27,970 --> 00:08:30,350 they're undertaking . I can't I don't 192 00:08:30,350 --> 00:08:33,030 think can be overstated but to your 193 00:08:33,040 --> 00:08:36,550 point for soft role in that and in in 194 00:08:36,550 --> 00:08:39,950 the competition space a couple of 195 00:08:39,960 --> 00:08:43,960 things is but this is a little 196 00:08:43,960 --> 00:08:46,300 bit back to the future . You know the 197 00:08:46,300 --> 00:08:49,580 origins of soft with everyone . You 198 00:08:49,580 --> 00:08:51,636 know , I think most people who study 199 00:08:51,636 --> 00:08:54,630 history understand while Bill Donovan 200 00:08:54,630 --> 00:08:57,800 who stood up the U . S . S . Uh and 201 00:08:57,810 --> 00:09:01,450 what he did there uh with really 202 00:09:01,540 --> 00:09:05,460 the origins of soft and the CIA both 203 00:09:05,460 --> 00:09:07,890 intel collection but also discrete 204 00:09:07,900 --> 00:09:10,370 operations . And most people 205 00:09:10,380 --> 00:09:12,269 immediately point to the european 206 00:09:12,269 --> 00:09:14,810 theater . I think it's also instructive 207 00:09:14,810 --> 00:09:17,330 to look at the pacific theater and 208 00:09:17,330 --> 00:09:20,460 things that took place by both . 209 00:09:21,140 --> 00:09:24,340 Yeah General Donovan but also other 210 00:09:24,340 --> 00:09:27,330 elements . And one one thing is is I 211 00:09:27,330 --> 00:09:30,760 look historically is 212 00:09:30,920 --> 00:09:33,198 everyone remembers what Macarthur said . 213 00:09:34,140 --> 00:09:36,362 You know when he left the Philippines , 214 00:09:36,362 --> 00:09:38,990 what do you say I shall return . But 215 00:09:38,990 --> 00:09:42,950 very few people know the history of at 216 00:09:42,950 --> 00:09:45,020 that time Captain Major Russell 217 00:09:45,020 --> 00:09:48,850 Volkmann who when Macarthur left the 218 00:09:48,860 --> 00:09:51,630 Philippines , he raised a guerilla 219 00:09:51,630 --> 00:09:55,590 force Of 22,000 Filipinos 220 00:09:55,850 --> 00:09:58,690 and fought an insurgency until the time 221 00:09:58,690 --> 00:10:01,800 MacArthur returned . And he then wrote 222 00:10:01,800 --> 00:10:04,360 a book that said we remained 223 00:10:05,540 --> 00:10:07,900 and I think as you look at history of 224 00:10:07,900 --> 00:10:10,880 what soft can do from an unconventional 225 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:13,280 side , not just in the european theater , 226 00:10:13,740 --> 00:10:16,400 but into the pacific theater and 227 00:10:16,400 --> 00:10:19,760 wherever we're able to partner 228 00:10:21,140 --> 00:10:24,660 with white minded individuals who had 229 00:10:24,660 --> 00:10:27,950 the same interest uh and and work 230 00:10:27,950 --> 00:10:30,090 resistance networks and build 231 00:10:30,090 --> 00:10:33,430 resilience within that . Uh , and at 232 00:10:33,430 --> 00:10:35,120 that time , Captain and then 233 00:10:35,120 --> 00:10:37,287 subsequently Brigadier General pokeman 234 00:10:37,287 --> 00:10:39,453 was really the emphasis of some of our 235 00:10:39,453 --> 00:10:41,564 green Berets and our special forces . 236 00:10:41,564 --> 00:10:44,530 So as we look at this and in 237 00:10:44,530 --> 00:10:48,330 competition as a continuum and 238 00:10:48,330 --> 00:10:52,120 really can't continuous campaign , it's 239 00:10:52,120 --> 00:10:54,231 not a phase and it's not , you know , 240 00:10:54,231 --> 00:10:56,287 you do competition and then you have 241 00:10:56,287 --> 00:10:58,287 crisis and then you have conflict . 242 00:10:58,287 --> 00:11:00,900 Competition is woven throughout this . 243 00:11:00,910 --> 00:11:04,660 So , um , so , but you started by 244 00:11:04,660 --> 00:11:06,670 saying that even as the shift is 245 00:11:06,670 --> 00:11:08,610 happening and you will be part of 246 00:11:08,610 --> 00:11:11,800 supporting that , it's not like the 247 00:11:11,800 --> 00:11:13,911 terrorism threat has gone away . It's 248 00:11:13,911 --> 00:11:16,022 not like some of the other challenges 249 00:11:16,022 --> 00:11:17,856 have gone away . So how as Socom 250 00:11:17,856 --> 00:11:20,022 Commander , how do you think about the 251 00:11:20,022 --> 00:11:22,133 trade offs and balancing across , you 252 00:11:22,133 --> 00:11:23,800 know , continuing to focus on 253 00:11:23,800 --> 00:11:25,967 counterterrorism , where it's needed , 254 00:11:25,967 --> 00:11:28,189 but also freeing up more of your band , 255 00:11:28,189 --> 00:11:30,522 not just your people and your resources , 256 00:11:30,522 --> 00:11:32,522 but your mental bandwidth to really 257 00:11:32,522 --> 00:11:35,070 think about shaping the future vis a 258 00:11:35,070 --> 00:11:38,090 vis china . It's great . I'm glad you 259 00:11:38,090 --> 00:11:40,630 specifically used that word of balance 260 00:11:40,640 --> 00:11:42,760 because we're first and foremost , 261 00:11:42,760 --> 00:11:46,000 we're looking at the rebalance , uh and 262 00:11:46,090 --> 00:11:49,650 we're okay , we have prioritized 263 00:11:50,540 --> 00:11:53,980 towards the counterterrorism fight for 264 00:11:53,980 --> 00:11:56,290 those threats . So we have to we have 265 00:11:56,290 --> 00:11:59,260 to we have to provide a sustainable 266 00:11:59,740 --> 00:12:03,020 uh priority towards the violent 267 00:12:03,020 --> 00:12:06,920 extremists so that so that our country , 268 00:12:06,920 --> 00:12:09,900 our homeland remain safe . So what I 269 00:12:09,900 --> 00:12:11,956 would say is that we've we've really 270 00:12:11,956 --> 00:12:13,844 looked hard at where the specific 271 00:12:13,844 --> 00:12:16,090 threats are . Uh and we really change 272 00:12:16,090 --> 00:12:19,020 some of our operating models where I 273 00:12:19,020 --> 00:12:22,970 can point back to 2009 , 2011 when 274 00:12:22,970 --> 00:12:26,120 I was in socom , uh there was network 275 00:12:26,120 --> 00:12:28,176 to defeat a network and where anyone 276 00:12:28,176 --> 00:12:30,231 would raise their hand and say I'm a 277 00:12:30,231 --> 00:12:32,453 violent extremist , it'll be let's send 278 00:12:32,453 --> 00:12:34,676 a team there , let's make sure we don't 279 00:12:34,676 --> 00:12:36,620 necessarily need to put our forces 280 00:12:36,620 --> 00:12:38,787 everywhere . We need to put them where 281 00:12:38,787 --> 00:12:41,350 the threat is the largest would be 282 00:12:41,360 --> 00:12:43,870 priority . But then we also need to 283 00:12:43,870 --> 00:12:46,760 look at other capabilities of our 284 00:12:46,760 --> 00:12:50,070 partners of our allies and where they 285 00:12:50,080 --> 00:12:51,969 can look at the violent extremist 286 00:12:51,969 --> 00:12:54,770 threats . But then as it looks to the 287 00:12:54,770 --> 00:12:57,350 capabilities in competition , 288 00:12:58,940 --> 00:13:01,900 as as we've been able to really bring 289 00:13:01,900 --> 00:13:04,450 back some of the force and really focus 290 00:13:04,450 --> 00:13:08,130 on a regional alignments for our 291 00:13:08,140 --> 00:13:10,860 for our elements that have cultural and 292 00:13:10,860 --> 00:13:13,440 have language expertise and that can 293 00:13:13,450 --> 00:13:15,910 work in specific regions and go back 294 00:13:15,910 --> 00:13:19,590 there again and again and again . Uh 295 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:21,433 And I think that's that's really 296 00:13:21,433 --> 00:13:24,760 important for our force with an 297 00:13:24,760 --> 00:13:28,440 emphasis not just on the 298 00:13:28,440 --> 00:13:31,420 direct action , but looking at all the 299 00:13:31,420 --> 00:13:35,260 core competencies that Socom provides 300 00:13:35,840 --> 00:13:38,930 because one of the biggest uh Michelle , 301 00:13:38,930 --> 00:13:41,100 I've heard you talk about this , most 302 00:13:41,110 --> 00:13:43,110 people when they think about soft , 303 00:13:43,540 --> 00:13:45,762 they immediately think about the direct 304 00:13:45,762 --> 00:13:48,140 action counterterrorism , the things 305 00:13:48,140 --> 00:13:51,740 that you know right away . And so 306 00:13:51,750 --> 00:13:55,560 what I , what I just focus is that 307 00:13:55,570 --> 00:13:58,260 soft provides unconventional warfare , 308 00:13:58,640 --> 00:14:00,807 It provides foreign internal defense , 309 00:14:00,807 --> 00:14:03,710 security force assistance , assistance . 310 00:14:03,930 --> 00:14:06,440 Now military information , support 311 00:14:06,440 --> 00:14:09,020 operations or psyops and civil affairs 312 00:14:09,030 --> 00:14:11,900 when when I get to travel and see our 313 00:14:11,900 --> 00:14:15,250 teams that are globally employed and to 314 00:14:15,250 --> 00:14:19,070 see a green Beret team that's 315 00:14:19,070 --> 00:14:21,250 co located with the civil affairs team 316 00:14:21,490 --> 00:14:24,300 is co located with the psychological 317 00:14:24,300 --> 00:14:26,300 operations team and they're working 318 00:14:26,300 --> 00:14:28,633 inside an embassy to afford us interest . 319 00:14:28,633 --> 00:14:30,633 I think that's what right starts to 320 00:14:30,633 --> 00:14:32,244 look like . It's part of the 321 00:14:32,244 --> 00:14:35,620 competition . Do you see a migration 322 00:14:35,620 --> 00:14:38,380 backed two More traditional division of 323 00:14:38,380 --> 00:14:40,324 labor ? So , you know , one of the 324 00:14:40,324 --> 00:14:44,200 demand was so high in Afghanistan Iraq 325 00:14:44,200 --> 00:14:46,367 and the broader thing you had ended up 326 00:14:46,367 --> 00:14:48,367 having , you know , seals , who are 327 00:14:48,367 --> 00:14:50,478 maritime force ending up , you know , 328 00:14:50,478 --> 00:14:52,533 in landlocked countries , you know , 329 00:14:52,533 --> 00:14:54,640 doing , doing all kinds of very high 330 00:14:54,640 --> 00:14:57,030 tempo of operations . But you know , in 331 00:14:57,030 --> 00:14:59,141 this environment we're moving to , is 332 00:14:59,141 --> 00:15:01,280 part of the rebalance sort of re 333 00:15:01,280 --> 00:15:05,060 emphasizing the , the advantage 334 00:15:05,070 --> 00:15:07,740 of green Berets , doing the work with 335 00:15:07,740 --> 00:15:10,560 partners and advise and assist or seals 336 00:15:10,570 --> 00:15:12,292 in a more the merrier maritime 337 00:15:12,292 --> 00:15:16,170 environment missions or So do you think 338 00:15:16,170 --> 00:15:18,170 going back to that more traditional 339 00:15:18,170 --> 00:15:20,337 division makes sense ? Or are we still 340 00:15:20,337 --> 00:15:22,114 going to expect everybody to do 341 00:15:22,114 --> 00:15:24,226 everything , you know , I think going 342 00:15:24,226 --> 00:15:26,059 back to that more traditional is 343 00:15:26,059 --> 00:15:28,570 exactly where we are already moving to , 344 00:15:28,580 --> 00:15:32,020 you bring it the seals as one 345 00:15:32,020 --> 00:15:34,187 example , you know , for a long time , 346 00:15:34,187 --> 00:15:36,560 it was small , last big L . A . In the 347 00:15:36,560 --> 00:15:40,530 acronym of sea Air Land . Uh now we're 348 00:15:40,530 --> 00:15:43,420 getting the big s back and seal with 349 00:15:43,430 --> 00:15:45,510 with with an increased emphasis on 350 00:15:45,510 --> 00:15:48,810 maritime . But when you think about the 351 00:15:48,810 --> 00:15:51,080 seals in the maritime domain , don't 352 00:15:51,090 --> 00:15:53,090 what I think about , it's still not 353 00:15:53,090 --> 00:15:55,610 just a direct action or just working 354 00:15:55,610 --> 00:15:58,830 independently . I got to watch our 355 00:15:58,830 --> 00:16:01,310 seals a few months ago working with the 356 00:16:01,310 --> 00:16:04,180 Norwegian special operations Forces , 357 00:16:04,190 --> 00:16:06,370 building up their capabilities and 358 00:16:06,370 --> 00:16:08,203 capacity and truthfully learning 359 00:16:08,203 --> 00:16:10,314 something from the Norwegian partners 360 00:16:10,314 --> 00:16:12,481 who are great in the maritime domain . 361 00:16:12,481 --> 00:16:14,592 So we're also learning and training , 362 00:16:14,592 --> 00:16:17,660 but we also , we have seals working in 363 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:20,373 the maritime domain with Ukrainian salt , 364 00:16:20,840 --> 00:16:24,340 but also uh in 365 00:16:24,350 --> 00:16:28,240 uh , in the Philippines in Thailand 366 00:16:28,350 --> 00:16:30,990 and other places that are all maritime 367 00:16:30,990 --> 00:16:33,240 powers . And so it's it's that 368 00:16:33,250 --> 00:16:36,240 continued training . Right . So let's 369 00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:38,296 talk about training a little bit and 370 00:16:38,296 --> 00:16:40,240 education and training . So as you 371 00:16:40,240 --> 00:16:42,462 think about where you're trying to take 372 00:16:42,462 --> 00:16:44,351 the force in the future , Does it 373 00:16:44,351 --> 00:16:47,050 change how you train people ? Are we do 374 00:16:47,050 --> 00:16:48,994 we need to invest in more mandarin 375 00:16:48,994 --> 00:16:51,217 speakers . Do we need to invest in more 376 00:16:51,217 --> 00:16:53,328 technologists who are going to do all 377 00:16:53,328 --> 00:16:55,494 the integration of the cool stuff that 378 00:16:55,494 --> 00:16:57,661 was talked about in the panel before . 379 00:16:57,661 --> 00:16:59,439 I mean , how do you think about 380 00:16:59,439 --> 00:17:01,383 educating and training the force a 381 00:17:01,383 --> 00:17:03,690 couple of things first on the actual 382 00:17:03,700 --> 00:17:05,867 training of our people , You mentioned 383 00:17:05,867 --> 00:17:09,770 mandarin . Okay , nice . But how about 384 00:17:10,640 --> 00:17:14,510 tag along and ty uh all the 385 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:17,470 all the partner regions . I'm more 386 00:17:17,470 --> 00:17:19,300 interested folks learning those 387 00:17:19,300 --> 00:17:21,640 languages and and taking the time with 388 00:17:21,640 --> 00:17:24,160 culture and become regionally 389 00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:26,630 affiliated . So when they are in 390 00:17:26,630 --> 00:17:29,960 another country that they understand 391 00:17:30,540 --> 00:17:32,596 and so it's gaining an understanding 392 00:17:32,596 --> 00:17:34,540 through education that's sometimes 393 00:17:34,540 --> 00:17:36,762 higher level of education but sometimes 394 00:17:36,762 --> 00:17:38,873 it's just day in day out training and 395 00:17:38,873 --> 00:17:41,040 actually their deployments is probably 396 00:17:41,040 --> 00:17:43,096 the best training that they get when 397 00:17:43,096 --> 00:17:44,984 they're actually deployed in that 398 00:17:44,984 --> 00:17:47,151 environment . But the more they can be 399 00:17:47,151 --> 00:17:50,040 attuned to uh you know , the specific 400 00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:52,096 cultures in which they're working is 401 00:17:52,096 --> 00:17:54,151 one of the most important thing . So 402 00:17:54,151 --> 00:17:56,373 there's there's a training part to that 403 00:17:56,373 --> 00:17:58,640 that's really important . But then 404 00:17:58,640 --> 00:18:02,560 there's our our our special operations 405 00:18:02,560 --> 00:18:05,360 are are part of a larger joint force 406 00:18:06,140 --> 00:18:08,720 and also working with the army , the 407 00:18:08,720 --> 00:18:11,070 navy , the Air Force marines and some 408 00:18:11,070 --> 00:18:13,590 of their higher end exercises and 409 00:18:13,590 --> 00:18:17,030 making sure that we can show and work 410 00:18:17,030 --> 00:18:19,980 with and integrate , you know , with 411 00:18:19,980 --> 00:18:22,360 the joint force is absolutely critical 412 00:18:22,740 --> 00:18:25,700 because we want them to see us as an as 413 00:18:25,700 --> 00:18:28,290 an able and capable force that helps 414 00:18:28,290 --> 00:18:30,179 them whether that's through joint 415 00:18:30,179 --> 00:18:32,179 forced entry or because we provided 416 00:18:32,179 --> 00:18:34,346 because we're already in the country , 417 00:18:34,840 --> 00:18:37,062 we may be the only ones in that country 418 00:18:37,062 --> 00:18:39,062 that we can provide them access and 419 00:18:39,062 --> 00:18:41,420 placement for the future ? I think that 420 00:18:41,430 --> 00:18:43,540 that's really important and then 421 00:18:43,550 --> 00:18:47,310 obviously the are are individuals 422 00:18:47,320 --> 00:18:49,560 learning that you know , how do we pull 423 00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:51,727 this all together ? The technology and 424 00:18:51,727 --> 00:18:53,560 learning and higher education is 425 00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:56,910 absolutely true . So we um we talk 426 00:18:56,910 --> 00:18:59,360 about new strategy , new focus . A lot 427 00:18:59,360 --> 00:19:01,830 of times we immediately go to the bells 428 00:19:01,830 --> 00:19:03,997 and whistles of a new technology , the 429 00:19:03,997 --> 00:19:06,090 new equipment , new procurement and 430 00:19:06,090 --> 00:19:08,870 that's very important . But in my mind 431 00:19:08,870 --> 00:19:10,814 the real long pole in the tent has 432 00:19:10,814 --> 00:19:12,981 always been operational concepts . How 433 00:19:12,981 --> 00:19:14,870 do you actually change how you're 434 00:19:14,870 --> 00:19:17,092 thinking about approaching mission in a 435 00:19:17,092 --> 00:19:19,259 different environment with a different 436 00:19:19,259 --> 00:19:22,590 challenger et cetera and the process 437 00:19:22,590 --> 00:19:25,010 for doing that because I think often 438 00:19:25,010 --> 00:19:26,850 times you know the Department of 439 00:19:26,850 --> 00:19:30,080 Defense is a very top down hierarchical 440 00:19:30,080 --> 00:19:32,670 deductive organization . So you have 441 00:19:33,040 --> 00:19:35,480 the joint operational concept starts at 442 00:19:35,490 --> 00:19:37,490 you know the joint staff level work 443 00:19:37,490 --> 00:19:40,020 stay way down . But a lot of times the 444 00:19:40,020 --> 00:19:42,480 real intellectual ferment comes from 445 00:19:42,480 --> 00:19:44,091 the bottom up through a more 446 00:19:44,091 --> 00:19:46,147 competitive process where people are 447 00:19:46,147 --> 00:19:48,313 trying different approaches to solving 448 00:19:48,313 --> 00:19:50,140 specific problems . So a Socom 449 00:19:50,140 --> 00:19:52,380 commander , how do you think about the 450 00:19:52,380 --> 00:19:54,047 work that needs to be done on 451 00:19:54,047 --> 00:19:56,269 operational concepts and how how do you 452 00:19:56,269 --> 00:19:58,324 structure that effort or incentivize 453 00:19:58,324 --> 00:20:00,547 that effort ? So it's really productive 454 00:20:00,547 --> 00:20:03,390 first I think you just , it starts with 455 00:20:03,400 --> 00:20:06,990 people , it starts with people , you've 456 00:20:06,990 --> 00:20:09,046 got to bring the right people in the 457 00:20:09,046 --> 00:20:11,212 force and then you you absolutely have 458 00:20:11,212 --> 00:20:13,379 to empower the people that their ideas 459 00:20:13,379 --> 00:20:15,434 will be accepted , that they will be 460 00:20:15,434 --> 00:20:17,546 listened to , they'll be brought up . 461 00:20:17,546 --> 00:20:19,657 It's not lost on me that , you know , 462 00:20:19,657 --> 00:20:23,440 stan McChrystal as he describes how he 463 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:26,680 took on the entire uh 464 00:20:26,690 --> 00:20:29,680 find fix finish , export analyzed and 465 00:20:29,690 --> 00:20:31,570 and turned it into a man hunting 466 00:20:31,570 --> 00:20:35,550 machine that was a bottom up uh 467 00:20:35,560 --> 00:20:38,030 and pull together and refined . So I 468 00:20:38,030 --> 00:20:40,910 have , we have to create really the 469 00:20:40,910 --> 00:20:44,400 leadership has to be attuned to and 470 00:20:44,400 --> 00:20:46,567 listen to those ideas because the best 471 00:20:46,567 --> 00:20:48,670 ideas come out of necessity and come 472 00:20:48,670 --> 00:20:51,550 from being forward and employed . And 473 00:20:51,550 --> 00:20:53,717 so the more we can , you know , we can 474 00:20:53,717 --> 00:20:55,772 take what's required from the top of 475 00:20:55,772 --> 00:20:58,850 resources that the forces need . But 476 00:20:58,850 --> 00:21:02,390 then take the bottom up uh and then 477 00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:06,320 derive what those concepts to be the 478 00:21:06,330 --> 00:21:08,163 better and what we're looking at 479 00:21:08,163 --> 00:21:10,610 specific . And Socom is stealing a page 480 00:21:10,610 --> 00:21:12,730 from the navy of actually coming up 481 00:21:12,730 --> 00:21:16,400 with key operational problems and 482 00:21:16,400 --> 00:21:19,650 then taking in the best inputs from 483 00:21:19,650 --> 00:21:22,290 across our theater special operations 484 00:21:22,290 --> 00:21:25,010 commands and our service component , 485 00:21:25,010 --> 00:21:26,954 Army , Navy , air force and marine 486 00:21:26,954 --> 00:21:29,177 components to go . How do we solve this 487 00:21:29,177 --> 00:21:31,370 as a joint force ? Right . Well maybe 488 00:21:31,380 --> 00:21:33,960 maybe we can zero in on one particular 489 00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:36,050 problem which is strengthening 490 00:21:36,050 --> 00:21:39,300 deterrence . You know , if you are in 491 00:21:39,310 --> 00:21:41,421 Beijing at the moment and you turn on 492 00:21:41,421 --> 00:21:43,421 the nightly news , all you see is a 493 00:21:43,421 --> 00:21:45,477 narrative of us decline . You know , 494 00:21:45,477 --> 00:21:48,240 look at January six look at their 495 00:21:48,240 --> 00:21:50,330 mishandling of COVID , look at their 496 00:21:50,340 --> 00:21:52,673 you know polarization , look , you know , 497 00:21:52,673 --> 00:21:54,673 the failure of democracy there down 498 00:21:54,673 --> 00:21:58,170 there out , this is our moment . Um and 499 00:21:58,180 --> 00:22:00,870 in that environment there's a real risk 500 00:22:00,880 --> 00:22:03,060 of , you know , at some point the 501 00:22:03,060 --> 00:22:05,060 leaders in Beijing kind of drinking 502 00:22:05,060 --> 00:22:07,227 their own kool aid and thinking okay , 503 00:22:07,227 --> 00:22:09,470 maybe we can take a risk and use 504 00:22:09,470 --> 00:22:12,870 military force to impose our will be it 505 00:22:12,870 --> 00:22:15,092 in the east china sea , the south china 506 00:22:15,092 --> 00:22:17,740 sea , Taiwan et cetera . So to me , the 507 00:22:17,750 --> 00:22:19,950 real watch word of the day is 508 00:22:19,950 --> 00:22:22,160 deterrence . How do we strengthen 509 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,010 deterrence ? And um that's obviously a 510 00:22:25,010 --> 00:22:27,670 big question . Way beyond soft , but 511 00:22:27,670 --> 00:22:30,880 I'd love to hear hear you talk think 512 00:22:30,880 --> 00:22:33,400 out loud a little bit about when you 513 00:22:33,410 --> 00:22:35,577 integrated deterrence is going to be a 514 00:22:35,577 --> 00:22:37,521 central portion of the new Defense 515 00:22:37,521 --> 00:22:39,466 Strategy Secretary . Austin's been 516 00:22:39,466 --> 00:22:42,560 talking about that a lot recently . Um 517 00:22:43,040 --> 00:22:45,040 how do we think about strengthening 518 00:22:45,040 --> 00:22:46,929 deterrence and what's the role of 519 00:22:46,929 --> 00:22:49,910 soften that ? I think one of our roles 520 00:22:49,910 --> 00:22:53,360 is undermining the adversaries . 521 00:22:53,840 --> 00:22:57,550 Yeah , confidence undermining 522 00:22:57,550 --> 00:22:59,772 that the adversary's competence so that 523 00:22:59,772 --> 00:23:03,010 he or she does not 524 00:23:03,010 --> 00:23:06,220 believe that the things that they want 525 00:23:06,220 --> 00:23:08,940 to accomplish can be done . So I think 526 00:23:08,940 --> 00:23:11,230 soft can play a tremendous role because 527 00:23:11,240 --> 00:23:14,040 you've studied deterrence , I 528 00:23:14,040 --> 00:23:16,262 understand that much of it has to be in 529 00:23:16,262 --> 00:23:20,160 the mind of the opponent And what soft 530 00:23:20,170 --> 00:23:22,580 brings into that I think are several 531 00:23:22,580 --> 00:23:24,860 things one we're responsible for the 532 00:23:24,860 --> 00:23:26,916 joint force for military information 533 00:23:26,916 --> 00:23:29,027 support office , the information . So 534 00:23:29,027 --> 00:23:31,249 what is out in that information space ? 535 00:23:31,249 --> 00:23:34,780 What do our uh information operations 536 00:23:34,780 --> 00:23:37,790 professionals uh message 537 00:23:37,800 --> 00:23:41,160 everything from public to private ? 538 00:23:41,540 --> 00:23:43,820 How do we ensure we're pointing in the 539 00:23:43,820 --> 00:23:46,153 right directions for both our adversary , 540 00:23:46,153 --> 00:23:48,450 but then also to Poland partners and 541 00:23:48,450 --> 00:23:51,610 allies into the information space would 542 00:23:51,620 --> 00:23:55,270 be one . The other one is we as saw 543 00:23:55,280 --> 00:23:57,113 through strategic reconnaissance 544 00:23:57,113 --> 00:23:59,169 through operation preparation of the 545 00:23:59,169 --> 00:24:01,224 environment to have an understanding 546 00:24:01,224 --> 00:24:04,290 for what the adversary holds dear . If 547 00:24:04,290 --> 00:24:06,950 they hold that dear , what can we hold 548 00:24:06,950 --> 00:24:09,560 at risk ? And 549 00:24:10,540 --> 00:24:14,230 that our adversaries in some cases are 550 00:24:14,230 --> 00:24:17,520 global and so you don't 551 00:24:17,520 --> 00:24:19,631 necessarily have to hold something at 552 00:24:19,631 --> 00:24:22,650 risk inside their territory inside 553 00:24:22,650 --> 00:24:24,940 their country . And I think as we look 554 00:24:24,940 --> 00:24:28,740 at soft as a global combatant command 555 00:24:28,740 --> 00:24:31,600 against global adversaries we're 556 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:33,711 looking across , we're looking across 557 00:24:33,711 --> 00:24:35,711 the whole spectrum . Uh and I think 558 00:24:35,711 --> 00:24:38,460 that's really important that through 559 00:24:38,460 --> 00:24:40,571 our strategic reconnaissance , we can 560 00:24:40,571 --> 00:24:42,738 see what is important to them . We can 561 00:24:42,738 --> 00:24:44,960 see where other bases are or where they 562 00:24:44,960 --> 00:24:46,516 may have in some cases , uh 563 00:24:46,516 --> 00:24:49,330 paramilitary groups that are out 564 00:24:49,330 --> 00:24:51,386 working in the fringes , that we can 565 00:24:51,386 --> 00:24:53,800 make sure that we call out that we 566 00:24:53,810 --> 00:24:56,450 understand what activities there . Mhm . 567 00:24:57,040 --> 00:24:59,690 Um one of the when the Secretary talks 568 00:24:59,690 --> 00:25:01,523 about integrated deterrence , he 569 00:25:01,523 --> 00:25:03,690 obviously talks about all domains , so 570 00:25:03,690 --> 00:25:06,900 not only undersea maritime air , space , 571 00:25:06,900 --> 00:25:10,070 land , but cyberspace space , but he's 572 00:25:10,070 --> 00:25:13,510 also been talking about integrated with 573 00:25:13,520 --> 00:25:15,687 allies and partners as you noted . And 574 00:25:15,687 --> 00:25:18,220 one of my favorite recent socom 575 00:25:18,220 --> 00:25:19,942 commander quotes was from your 576 00:25:19,942 --> 00:25:22,240 predecessor Tony thomas who said , you 577 00:25:22,240 --> 00:25:24,650 know , our job working with partners in 578 00:25:24,650 --> 00:25:27,560 a place like uh europe on Frontline 579 00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:30,720 States is making the Baltics look like 580 00:25:30,730 --> 00:25:33,290 indigestible porcupines for the Russian 581 00:25:33,290 --> 00:25:36,000 bear . And I just love so what does it 582 00:25:36,000 --> 00:25:38,490 look look like to make , you know , 583 00:25:38,500 --> 00:25:41,360 asean members or Taiwan an injured 584 00:25:41,370 --> 00:25:43,910 indigestible porcupine for the chinese 585 00:25:43,910 --> 00:25:46,130 dragon , you know , but there's a very 586 00:25:46,130 --> 00:25:49,140 rich history of soft working with 587 00:25:49,140 --> 00:25:52,340 partners in enhancing their own 588 00:25:52,350 --> 00:25:54,160 capacity to defend themselves . 589 00:25:54,160 --> 00:25:55,938 Complicated adversary , defense 590 00:25:55,938 --> 00:25:58,160 planning and so forth . So can you talk 591 00:25:58,160 --> 00:26:00,327 a little bit about that dimension ? So 592 00:26:00,327 --> 00:26:03,430 Tony thomas is great and I love him and 593 00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:05,900 he has a way with words and I think his 594 00:26:05,900 --> 00:26:07,956 description , everybody can envision 595 00:26:07,956 --> 00:26:11,160 that . But what was fantastic for me is 596 00:26:11,540 --> 00:26:13,429 just this past summer , I had the 597 00:26:13,429 --> 00:26:16,940 opportunity to visit the Baltics to see 598 00:26:16,940 --> 00:26:20,310 what really Tony and even before him , 599 00:26:20,310 --> 00:26:24,040 his predecessor have set in motion uh 600 00:26:24,050 --> 00:26:27,410 with with really building resistance 601 00:26:27,420 --> 00:26:31,140 networks that we we 602 00:26:31,140 --> 00:26:34,830 want an adversary to think 603 00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:37,390 that you know behind behind every rock 604 00:26:37,400 --> 00:26:40,200 is an I . E . D . And behind and inside 605 00:26:40,200 --> 00:26:43,130 you know , up in every tree is a sniper . 606 00:26:43,140 --> 00:26:46,050 Uh that if you were if you were willing 607 00:26:46,050 --> 00:26:48,161 to attack this country , you're gonna 608 00:26:48,161 --> 00:26:50,420 be , you're gonna be fighting all the 609 00:26:50,420 --> 00:26:52,730 way through . And the politics is just 610 00:26:52,730 --> 00:26:55,670 one example . But that that same 611 00:26:56,040 --> 00:26:58,420 building up resistance is really 612 00:26:58,420 --> 00:27:02,270 important in both the population but 613 00:27:02,270 --> 00:27:05,420 also with the various forces . Um and 614 00:27:05,430 --> 00:27:07,541 we don't always necessarily work with 615 00:27:07,541 --> 00:27:09,550 the Salt forces , it could be a 616 00:27:09,560 --> 00:27:11,449 paramilitary forces , it could be 617 00:27:11,449 --> 00:27:13,449 others . It's really dependent what 618 00:27:13,449 --> 00:27:15,671 what is best for that for that specific 619 00:27:15,671 --> 00:27:18,280 country . Just next month . Actually , 620 00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:20,660 in two weeks it's november now , in two 621 00:27:20,660 --> 00:27:22,827 weeks I'm going I'm going to europe to 622 00:27:22,827 --> 00:27:25,050 go specific through a resistance and 623 00:27:25,050 --> 00:27:27,820 resilience conference uh that's being 624 00:27:27,820 --> 00:27:30,850 hosted uh there by our special 625 00:27:30,850 --> 00:27:32,961 operations and bringing together some 626 00:27:32,961 --> 00:27:35,990 of the key interlocutors in in in 627 00:27:35,990 --> 00:27:38,157 really some of the concept development 628 00:27:38,157 --> 00:27:40,268 of this . I think the last thing I'll 629 00:27:40,268 --> 00:27:42,830 say on this Michelle is resistance , 630 00:27:42,830 --> 00:27:44,997 you can understand , but I put a finer 631 00:27:44,997 --> 00:27:48,910 point on resilience . Uh there's 632 00:27:48,910 --> 00:27:51,780 a resilience , it's the ability to take 633 00:27:51,780 --> 00:27:54,660 that punch and then get back up . 634 00:27:55,240 --> 00:27:58,360 Uh and what we have found within Salt . 635 00:27:58,370 --> 00:28:00,410 One of the best ways to do that is 636 00:28:00,410 --> 00:28:03,800 actually to the medical aspect that if 637 00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:07,000 someone knows that if they're going to 638 00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:09,730 be hurt wounded , something's going to 639 00:28:09,730 --> 00:28:12,660 happen . That the medical capabilities 640 00:28:12,670 --> 00:28:14,880 are there , they can be treated and 641 00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:17,047 they're gonna be taken care of . So as 642 00:28:17,047 --> 00:28:20,260 we build these networks , we put an 643 00:28:20,270 --> 00:28:24,070 incredible amount of emphasis on 644 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:26,780 that . Training , those networks , what 645 00:28:26,780 --> 00:28:29,420 were the field hospitals gonna be uh 646 00:28:29,430 --> 00:28:32,550 we're our covered sites that they can 647 00:28:32,550 --> 00:28:34,772 all go to and they'll know that they're 648 00:28:34,772 --> 00:28:36,828 there and they know they'll be taken 649 00:28:36,828 --> 00:28:38,994 care of and that builds the confidence 650 00:28:38,994 --> 00:28:41,050 and once , you know , you give , you 651 00:28:41,050 --> 00:28:40,680 give a force confidence that they can 652 00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:42,791 accomplish the mission and they'll be 653 00:28:42,791 --> 00:28:44,680 taken care of , you're going to , 654 00:28:44,680 --> 00:28:46,680 you're going to have a well trained 655 00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:48,847 force that's willing to fight a little 656 00:28:48,847 --> 00:28:50,958 bit harder than some others . Right ? 657 00:28:50,958 --> 00:28:53,069 I'm going to switch gears and ask one 658 00:28:53,069 --> 00:28:52,920 more question myself and then just put 659 00:28:52,920 --> 00:28:55,087 you well on notice . I'm going to open 660 00:28:55,087 --> 00:28:57,198 it up for the audience to be thinking 661 00:28:57,198 --> 00:28:59,364 of , you're thinking of your questions 662 00:28:59,364 --> 00:29:01,700 for the general . So so calm has a 663 00:29:01,700 --> 00:29:03,610 great reputation and I think it's 664 00:29:03,610 --> 00:29:05,610 pretty well deserved for being very 665 00:29:05,610 --> 00:29:08,400 forward leaning in and it's more agile 666 00:29:08,400 --> 00:29:11,600 approach to uh you know , demonstrating 667 00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:13,810 new technologies , prototyping , 668 00:29:13,820 --> 00:29:15,764 getting them into the hands of the 669 00:29:15,764 --> 00:29:18,042 operators , playing around with things . 670 00:29:18,042 --> 00:29:20,660 Um and then , you know , in many cases 671 00:29:20,670 --> 00:29:24,190 uh very quickly fielding uh new 672 00:29:24,190 --> 00:29:26,357 technologies , new capabilities to the 673 00:29:26,357 --> 00:29:28,523 forest . I think the larger department 674 00:29:28,523 --> 00:29:30,790 is really suffering with this problem 675 00:29:30,790 --> 00:29:33,123 of the Valley of Death where , you know , 676 00:29:33,123 --> 00:29:35,180 you had um you know , Mike Brown up 677 00:29:35,180 --> 00:29:37,330 here and D . I . U . Has done a great 678 00:29:37,330 --> 00:29:39,441 service in improving the department's 679 00:29:39,441 --> 00:29:41,441 ability along with people like dead 680 00:29:41,441 --> 00:29:43,608 back to scout for new technologies and 681 00:29:43,608 --> 00:29:46,670 solutions . But we still have a really 682 00:29:46,670 --> 00:29:49,880 hard time going from there to adoption 683 00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:52,030 of innovation at speed and at scale . 684 00:29:52,040 --> 00:29:55,460 So what , you know , what can we learn 685 00:29:55,460 --> 00:29:57,627 from the socom experience granted it's 686 00:29:57,627 --> 00:30:00,720 a much smaller , you know , ecosystem . 687 00:30:00,730 --> 00:30:03,290 And what are the things that we could 688 00:30:03,300 --> 00:30:05,411 import into the department that would 689 00:30:05,411 --> 00:30:08,860 be helpful i people 690 00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:13,420 and partners . Some wise 691 00:30:13,420 --> 00:30:15,720 person told me if we want to develop 692 00:30:15,720 --> 00:30:18,340 our force one you've got to bring the 693 00:30:18,340 --> 00:30:20,507 right people in which we we do through 694 00:30:20,507 --> 00:30:22,618 an assessment selection process . But 695 00:30:22,940 --> 00:30:26,660 in some of the specific things we need . 696 00:30:27,140 --> 00:30:31,010 Uh we're bringing in terms now uh 697 00:30:31,020 --> 00:30:34,600 during the summer months uh to help us 698 00:30:34,600 --> 00:30:37,540 with coding and ai uh we'll bring him 699 00:30:37,540 --> 00:30:40,730 in through some private organizations 700 00:30:40,740 --> 00:30:42,851 but we're also bringing through local 701 00:30:42,851 --> 00:30:44,851 colleges and others . But they come 702 00:30:44,851 --> 00:30:47,960 into our formation work on problem for 703 00:30:47,960 --> 00:30:50,016 four months . I been briefed him and 704 00:30:50,016 --> 00:30:52,320 I'll brief them when I when I in 705 00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:54,376 briefings that who wants to join who 706 00:30:54,376 --> 00:30:56,376 wants to join So calm . He wants to 707 00:30:56,376 --> 00:30:58,376 work for D . O . D . Beforehand and 708 00:30:58,376 --> 00:31:00,487 usually get nobody when I out breathe 709 00:31:00,487 --> 00:31:03,200 them . And they got to work with our 710 00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:05,256 people . They got to solve some real 711 00:31:05,256 --> 00:31:07,370 world problems . Usually the hands go 712 00:31:07,370 --> 00:31:09,703 up at the end and say who wants to come . 713 00:31:09,703 --> 00:31:11,926 In fact some of them we actually end up 714 00:31:11,926 --> 00:31:14,400 hiring so you got to bring new people 715 00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:17,710 in . But we we also trained our force 716 00:31:17,760 --> 00:31:21,750 we held and this 717 00:31:21,750 --> 00:31:24,410 is part of the partnership . I went to 718 00:31:24,410 --> 00:31:26,940 M . I . T . Two years ago met with the 719 00:31:26,940 --> 00:31:29,270 Dean of engineering from M . I . T . 720 00:31:29,280 --> 00:31:31,391 And said how do you know where can we 721 00:31:31,391 --> 00:31:35,080 partner ? He set up a course for 400 of 722 00:31:35,080 --> 00:31:37,570 our mid and senior grade officers to 723 00:31:37,570 --> 00:31:39,570 understand the basics of artificial 724 00:31:39,570 --> 00:31:42,110 intelligence and machine learning and 725 00:31:42,110 --> 00:31:44,460 data and what they had to do . So that 726 00:31:45,540 --> 00:31:48,770 Neophytes like me and the rest of the 727 00:31:48,770 --> 00:31:51,130 force would would would start to grasp 728 00:31:51,140 --> 00:31:53,480 and not ask the dumb questions waste 729 00:31:53,560 --> 00:31:56,230 the talented people's time . Uh So 730 00:31:56,230 --> 00:31:58,286 that's part of the partnership . But 731 00:31:58,286 --> 00:32:00,341 then chris lynch was just up here on 732 00:32:00,341 --> 00:32:04,290 stage from Rebellion . I met with 733 00:32:04,290 --> 00:32:07,740 Chris two weeks ago uh in Boston with 734 00:32:07,740 --> 00:32:09,851 his company with a venture capitalist 735 00:32:09,851 --> 00:32:11,907 and a couple other companies because 736 00:32:11,907 --> 00:32:13,962 we're always looking for partners of 737 00:32:13,962 --> 00:32:15,962 what's out there and I'm constantly 738 00:32:15,962 --> 00:32:18,520 learning but also with so with with 739 00:32:18,520 --> 00:32:22,400 private industry with academia is you 740 00:32:22,400 --> 00:32:24,400 know went to M . I . T . But I also 741 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:26,456 stopped by you know Harvard business 742 00:32:26,456 --> 00:32:29,040 school and tops uh and go out to 743 00:32:29,040 --> 00:32:32,300 stanford and Carnegie Mellon is a great 744 00:32:32,300 --> 00:32:34,450 partner with us so try to pull in the 745 00:32:34,450 --> 00:32:36,506 best from across our country and I'm 746 00:32:36,506 --> 00:32:38,970 just doing that at my level . But this 747 00:32:38,970 --> 00:32:41,210 is happening down in the formation with 748 00:32:41,220 --> 00:32:43,442 business academia . And then truthfully 749 00:32:43,442 --> 00:32:46,060 are some of the labs that are out there , 750 00:32:46,060 --> 00:32:49,390 they're not government uh that we that 751 00:32:49,390 --> 00:32:51,446 we work with , where there's Lincoln 752 00:32:51,446 --> 00:32:53,900 labs or draper labs or langer labs 753 00:32:53,910 --> 00:32:56,132 because they they're they're developing 754 00:32:56,132 --> 00:32:58,243 some great technologies that can help 755 00:32:58,243 --> 00:33:00,077 us . So I think pulling that all 756 00:33:00,077 --> 00:33:02,077 together and then you know last you 757 00:33:02,077 --> 00:33:04,188 know than having our soft acquisition 758 00:33:04,188 --> 00:33:07,280 team right ? And who comes with me on 759 00:33:07,280 --> 00:33:11,120 all those trips is our soft acquisition 760 00:33:11,130 --> 00:33:14,440 executive to follow on and then make 761 00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:16,551 those connections to go work . Can we 762 00:33:16,551 --> 00:33:18,607 go ? And they've had to be retrained 763 00:33:18,607 --> 00:33:20,829 and incentivized differently to to move 764 00:33:20,829 --> 00:33:22,718 more quickly , move faster to get 765 00:33:22,718 --> 00:33:24,884 things done . All right . The floor is 766 00:33:24,884 --> 00:33:26,996 open . We're gonna start right here . 767 00:33:26,996 --> 00:33:28,996 The young lady in the red sweater , 768 00:33:28,996 --> 00:33:30,940 please tell us who you are , where 769 00:33:30,940 --> 00:33:33,218 you're from and ask a question . Great . 770 00:33:33,218 --> 00:33:35,384 Thank you so much . I'm Tara chandra . 771 00:33:35,384 --> 00:33:37,384 I'm one of the rising leaders . I'm 772 00:33:37,384 --> 00:33:39,607 also a PhD candidate at UC Berkeley and 773 00:33:39,607 --> 00:33:41,329 my dissertation studies , uh , 774 00:33:41,329 --> 00:33:43,273 insurgency and counterinsurgency , 775 00:33:43,273 --> 00:33:45,273 which by looking at this conference 776 00:33:45,273 --> 00:33:47,496 that might be a little bit overshadowed 777 00:33:47,496 --> 00:33:49,662 by rising china . But I've just really 778 00:33:49,662 --> 00:33:49,570 appreciated your thoughts here . And 779 00:33:49,570 --> 00:33:51,810 I've kind of a two part question . So , 780 00:33:51,820 --> 00:33:54,810 um , you mentioned that um , there's a 781 00:33:54,810 --> 00:33:56,977 real importance of understanding local 782 00:33:56,977 --> 00:33:59,088 cultures and I really appreciate it . 783 00:33:59,088 --> 00:34:01,143 Especially your point about learning 784 00:34:01,143 --> 00:34:03,310 languages other than mandarin and sort 785 00:34:03,310 --> 00:34:05,421 of engaging with local partners . And 786 00:34:05,421 --> 00:34:07,532 that's been a real cornerstone of the 787 00:34:07,532 --> 00:34:09,699 coin doctrine sort of as we have known 788 00:34:09,699 --> 00:34:11,921 it or at least in my lifetime as I have 789 00:34:11,921 --> 00:34:13,977 known it . Um , and I'm wondering if 790 00:34:13,977 --> 00:34:15,977 you could speak to kind of how that 791 00:34:15,977 --> 00:34:18,143 will be prioritized and then also what 792 00:34:18,143 --> 00:34:18,100 you see the future of counterinsurgency 793 00:34:18,100 --> 00:34:20,190 doctrine looking like for the United 794 00:34:20,190 --> 00:34:22,190 States , given sort of a shift away 795 00:34:22,190 --> 00:34:24,550 from land operations and more towards 796 00:34:24,680 --> 00:34:27,013 kind of countering a rising great power ? 797 00:34:27,013 --> 00:34:29,690 Thank you so much . Great . Did you 798 00:34:29,700 --> 00:34:32,033 when I gave the Russell Folkman example , 799 00:34:32,033 --> 00:34:34,144 do you know who I was talking about ? 800 00:34:34,540 --> 00:34:37,680 Okay , good . Now you can I hope you 801 00:34:37,680 --> 00:34:40,160 can show your interest in that . No , 802 00:34:40,170 --> 00:34:43,260 it's it's an important question and 803 00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:47,660 and I think not just special 804 00:34:47,660 --> 00:34:51,150 operations but our entire joint 805 00:34:51,160 --> 00:34:54,870 force has to remain has to still have 806 00:34:54,880 --> 00:34:57,120 capability for counter insurance 807 00:34:57,130 --> 00:35:00,430 because it it's not going to go 808 00:35:00,440 --> 00:35:03,880 away . Uh And what I do think it's 809 00:35:03,880 --> 00:35:06,102 going to be , it's going to be where do 810 00:35:06,102 --> 00:35:08,050 we have to prioritize that effort 811 00:35:08,440 --> 00:35:11,730 depending upon U . S . National 812 00:35:11,730 --> 00:35:15,630 interest of where that is . And I do 813 00:35:15,630 --> 00:35:17,686 think that the Department of Defense 814 00:35:17,686 --> 00:35:19,970 did a great job by including an 815 00:35:19,970 --> 00:35:23,220 irregular warfare annex to the National 816 00:35:23,220 --> 00:35:25,780 Defense strategy that helps pull some 817 00:35:25,780 --> 00:35:28,100 of that and identifies that it is not 818 00:35:28,110 --> 00:35:31,710 just so calm and special operations 819 00:35:31,710 --> 00:35:34,800 forces that conduct coin or conduct a 820 00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:36,633 regular warfare . So I hope that 821 00:35:36,633 --> 00:35:39,970 distribution doug back . Mhm . 822 00:35:42,340 --> 00:35:45,000 Okay , I was aiming for one of your 823 00:35:45,000 --> 00:35:47,700 fellows , but you want to turn into one 824 00:35:47,700 --> 00:35:50,350 of your fellows . You can . 825 00:35:51,340 --> 00:35:53,440 So you already answered one of the 826 00:35:53,440 --> 00:35:55,440 questions I was going to ask . So I 827 00:35:55,440 --> 00:35:57,662 will pivot to a little of the different 828 00:35:57,662 --> 00:35:59,773 question that's tied to something you 829 00:35:59,773 --> 00:36:03,440 didn't talk about . Um The special 830 00:36:03,440 --> 00:36:05,440 operations force that we have today 831 00:36:05,440 --> 00:36:08,890 worldwide is uh is unbelievable . Bar 832 00:36:08,890 --> 00:36:11,630 none . And that is forged by 20 years 833 00:36:11,630 --> 00:36:14,000 of experience . Uh and an incredible 834 00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:16,630 amount of reps uh a talent base is just 835 00:36:16,630 --> 00:36:18,630 incredible . And at the root of the 836 00:36:18,630 --> 00:36:20,408 talent base is a culture that's 837 00:36:20,408 --> 00:36:22,463 incredibly powerful . So I guess the 838 00:36:22,463 --> 00:36:24,686 question I have for you is as you think 839 00:36:24,686 --> 00:36:26,797 about that culture now and turning it 840 00:36:26,797 --> 00:36:29,019 to the challenges that you talked about 841 00:36:29,019 --> 00:36:31,241 that are emerging . Which parts of that 842 00:36:31,241 --> 00:36:33,352 culture do you want to double down on 843 00:36:33,352 --> 00:36:33,230 and which parts of it do you think 844 00:36:33,240 --> 00:36:35,470 might need to change to meet any 845 00:36:35,470 --> 00:36:37,870 threats ? Hey Doug thanks . Good and 846 00:36:37,880 --> 00:36:40,840 always great to see you the culture 847 00:36:40,840 --> 00:36:43,850 that I never want us to let go off 848 00:36:45,230 --> 00:36:47,174 and whether that's double down and 849 00:36:47,174 --> 00:36:49,670 triple down is the fact that our 850 00:36:49,670 --> 00:36:53,030 individuals are problem solvers and 851 00:36:53,030 --> 00:36:55,640 that they will be that they will 852 00:36:55,640 --> 00:36:58,690 continuously adapt and look for those 853 00:36:58,690 --> 00:37:00,900 problems to overcome because that's 854 00:37:00,900 --> 00:37:02,789 that's what I think that's that's 855 00:37:02,789 --> 00:37:04,733 really as we sat down with all our 856 00:37:04,733 --> 00:37:06,900 commanders and talked about what's the 857 00:37:06,900 --> 00:37:09,122 soft unique value to the joint force it 858 00:37:09,122 --> 00:37:11,670 was that and that we can quickly get to 859 00:37:11,870 --> 00:37:14,110 solutions and then also look at long 860 00:37:14,110 --> 00:37:18,010 term solutions . I think the the the 861 00:37:18,010 --> 00:37:21,490 aspect of what , what do we want to and 862 00:37:21,490 --> 00:37:23,850 I won't say get rid of it completely . 863 00:37:24,230 --> 00:37:26,230 But I think the thing we have to be 864 00:37:26,230 --> 00:37:28,397 careful because well because of the 20 865 00:37:28,397 --> 00:37:31,660 years of engaged combat that 866 00:37:32,030 --> 00:37:34,380 everyone starts to look at direct 867 00:37:34,380 --> 00:37:37,080 action as the only thing that we do . 868 00:37:37,080 --> 00:37:39,390 And I talked about that . But you know , 869 00:37:39,400 --> 00:37:43,010 we're for a good part of that 20 years , 870 00:37:43,040 --> 00:37:44,984 that's what we also recruited to , 871 00:37:45,330 --> 00:37:47,570 That's what we also assessed to . 872 00:37:47,570 --> 00:37:49,950 That's what we also trained to . And 873 00:37:50,530 --> 00:37:53,760 when I came into the command and I 874 00:37:53,760 --> 00:37:55,982 would go out to see our forces training 875 00:37:55,982 --> 00:37:58,280 and prepping . It was always the direct 876 00:37:58,280 --> 00:38:00,447 action mission that they were training 877 00:38:00,447 --> 00:38:02,669 to . It was what some of the assessment 878 00:38:02,669 --> 00:38:04,780 courses were built around and I think 879 00:38:04,780 --> 00:38:07,470 we modified to that . But it's 880 00:38:07,470 --> 00:38:09,700 something we got to continue to take a 881 00:38:09,700 --> 00:38:13,340 look at . So yes , charlie . 882 00:38:19,020 --> 00:38:22,510 Sorry . Uh huh . Early Dunlap 883 00:38:22,510 --> 00:38:25,010 retired Air Force officer now teaching 884 00:38:25,010 --> 00:38:27,232 at Duke Law School . I hope we had Duke 885 00:38:27,232 --> 00:38:30,350 to your list of visits , sir . You 886 00:38:30,350 --> 00:38:32,730 might be aware that Jill Hazleton has 887 00:38:32,730 --> 00:38:34,900 written from the Naval War College has 888 00:38:34,900 --> 00:38:37,190 written a book called bullets not 889 00:38:37,200 --> 00:38:39,367 ballots where she challenges the whole 890 00:38:39,367 --> 00:38:42,240 notion that winning hearts and minds is 891 00:38:42,240 --> 00:38:44,530 a key to successful counterinsurgency . 892 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:47,200 In fact , she studies five different 893 00:38:47,210 --> 00:38:50,070 counterinsurgencies and she finds that 894 00:38:50,080 --> 00:38:53,500 the more brutal uh the counter 895 00:38:53,500 --> 00:38:55,970 insurgents are , the more successful 896 00:38:55,980 --> 00:38:58,147 they are . And she probably could have 897 00:38:58,147 --> 00:39:01,640 added sri Lanka and frankly , Syria to 898 00:39:01,640 --> 00:39:03,970 that list . Hey , what do you think of 899 00:39:03,970 --> 00:39:07,010 that and be is so calm trying to 900 00:39:07,020 --> 00:39:09,100 grapple with that particular 901 00:39:09,100 --> 00:39:11,550 perspective and I just want to have for 902 00:39:11,550 --> 00:39:13,661 Jill sake . She's not advocating that 903 00:39:13,661 --> 00:39:15,661 we become brutal . She's advocating 904 00:39:15,661 --> 00:39:17,883 that we not become involved . Thank you 905 00:39:17,883 --> 00:39:21,460 sir . Now , I have not read 906 00:39:21,460 --> 00:39:23,870 that . Uh so I'm a little bit of a 907 00:39:23,870 --> 00:39:26,520 disadvantage , but I still think that 908 00:39:26,520 --> 00:39:28,520 regardless , we have to go with our 909 00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:30,742 values . Obviously we'll always go with 910 00:39:30,742 --> 00:39:33,150 the rule of law and that we have , we 911 00:39:33,150 --> 00:39:35,880 have to know the long term implications 912 00:39:35,890 --> 00:39:38,740 to our forces and to the policy , 913 00:39:39,220 --> 00:39:41,380 uh , and that , you know , will will 914 00:39:41,380 --> 00:39:44,450 fall within that . So I , I , I 915 00:39:44,450 --> 00:39:47,040 understand the premise . Yeah . But I 916 00:39:47,040 --> 00:39:49,940 still , I I'm not the favor of 917 00:39:49,950 --> 00:39:53,310 brutality . Uh , in all circumstances 918 00:39:53,310 --> 00:39:55,477 we have to do what we have to do , but 919 00:39:55,477 --> 00:39:57,643 we're gonna , we're gonna do it within 920 00:39:57,643 --> 00:40:00,470 the com port of that rule of law and , 921 00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:03,300 and most importantly our values because 922 00:40:03,300 --> 00:40:05,522 the moral injury that could come from a 923 00:40:05,522 --> 00:40:07,830 brutality is something that has a , 924 00:40:08,010 --> 00:40:10,288 that none of us will have to live with . 925 00:40:11,710 --> 00:40:14,590 Yes . Right here . Thank you . Okay . 926 00:40:14,600 --> 00:40:17,450 There's one on the way back . Okay . Um , 927 00:40:17,460 --> 00:40:19,627 why don't we go here and then we'll go 928 00:40:19,627 --> 00:40:22,940 in the back . Yes , 929 00:40:25,610 --> 00:40:27,666 sure . George . Nicholson . Great to 930 00:40:27,666 --> 00:40:29,777 see you both again . Quick question . 931 00:40:29,777 --> 00:40:31,777 Michelle , is your son still in the 932 00:40:31,777 --> 00:40:35,480 seals ? Oh , I know nothing . No 933 00:40:35,480 --> 00:40:38,680 comment . I was at a breakfast last 934 00:40:38,680 --> 00:40:42,520 week with general eric smith who is the 935 00:40:42,530 --> 00:40:44,586 assistant commandant of Marine Corps 936 00:40:44,710 --> 00:40:46,766 and he talks about one of the common 937 00:40:46,766 --> 00:40:48,821 data . General burger may I speak to 938 00:40:48,821 --> 00:40:50,610 our next panel is basically the 939 00:40:50,620 --> 00:40:53,040 recruitment of individuals and he said 940 00:40:53,050 --> 00:40:54,994 training what they've done down at 941 00:40:54,994 --> 00:40:56,883 Quantico , their new modeling and 942 00:40:56,883 --> 00:40:59,050 simulation center to provide the basis 943 00:40:59,050 --> 00:41:01,272 for requirements . But then he said one 944 00:41:01,272 --> 00:41:03,550 of our highest priorities is retention . 945 00:41:03,550 --> 00:41:05,550 And he says , I've got people who , 946 00:41:05,550 --> 00:41:07,717 who've got 18 years of service , we've 947 00:41:07,717 --> 00:41:09,883 spent millions and millions of dollars 948 00:41:09,883 --> 00:41:13,180 on and they're getting out . And he 949 00:41:13,180 --> 00:41:15,347 says he's calling them in and saying , 950 00:41:15,347 --> 00:41:17,513 why are you getting out ? Well I'm not 951 00:41:17,513 --> 00:41:19,791 going to get promoted the full colonel . 952 00:41:19,791 --> 00:41:19,620 I'm not going to be promoted to general 953 00:41:19,620 --> 00:41:22,060 officer . How do you keep those people ? 954 00:41:22,070 --> 00:41:24,237 What initiatives ? And he said , we're 955 00:41:24,237 --> 00:41:26,292 looking at , you know , what kind of 956 00:41:26,292 --> 00:41:28,292 changes in policy or doctor are you 957 00:41:28,292 --> 00:41:30,181 having the same kinds of programs 958 00:41:30,181 --> 00:41:32,181 problems and so calm of retention . 959 00:41:32,181 --> 00:41:35,040 Yeah . Honestly George . Well I may 960 00:41:35,040 --> 00:41:37,630 have lagging indicator , but we're not , 961 00:41:38,010 --> 00:41:40,630 our folks are still focused on the 962 00:41:40,630 --> 00:41:43,760 mission and we lose some , but it is 963 00:41:43,760 --> 00:41:47,160 not significantly changed in the few 964 00:41:47,160 --> 00:41:49,382 years that I've been watching this . So 965 00:41:49,382 --> 00:41:51,549 we're not seeing it George because our 966 00:41:51,549 --> 00:41:53,493 people I think are enthused by the 967 00:41:53,493 --> 00:41:55,660 mission and , and the things that they 968 00:41:55,660 --> 00:41:57,827 get to do . I think there was somebody 969 00:41:57,827 --> 00:42:00,049 in the way back . Did I see him ? Yes . 970 00:42:00,049 --> 00:42:02,104 Thank you sir . You can stand up and 971 00:42:02,104 --> 00:42:03,716 then mike will come to you . 972 00:42:08,100 --> 00:42:10,211 Yes . Thanks very much chris nation . 973 00:42:10,211 --> 00:42:11,680 Uh , question about our 974 00:42:11,690 --> 00:42:13,523 counterterrorist capabilities in 975 00:42:13,523 --> 00:42:15,579 Afghanistan . What what , what do we 976 00:42:15,579 --> 00:42:17,820 lose with the withdrawal and to what 977 00:42:17,820 --> 00:42:20,740 degree can that be compensated by with 978 00:42:20,750 --> 00:42:24,220 over the horizon operations . Yeah . 979 00:42:25,500 --> 00:42:27,630 I think the biggest thing that we've 980 00:42:27,630 --> 00:42:31,430 lost with with that is our intel , 981 00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:35,510 our our actual ability to see and sense 982 00:42:35,510 --> 00:42:38,230 without having humans on the ground in 983 00:42:38,230 --> 00:42:40,470 this Michelle . And I've talked about 984 00:42:40,480 --> 00:42:43,600 this and that that's the piece that is 985 00:42:43,600 --> 00:42:46,310 going to be the hardest to make up for . 986 00:42:46,700 --> 00:42:50,000 I won't say it's impossible , but it is 987 00:42:50,000 --> 00:42:53,110 going to remain a challenge to be able 988 00:42:53,110 --> 00:42:55,480 to see and sense where the where the 989 00:42:55,480 --> 00:42:57,480 various groups within Afghanistan , 990 00:42:57,480 --> 00:42:59,536 what they're doing and where they're 991 00:42:59,536 --> 00:43:01,313 going . It doesn't mean it's an 992 00:43:01,313 --> 00:43:03,810 impossible task , but it's going to be 993 00:43:03,820 --> 00:43:06,640 more challenging going forward . Well , 994 00:43:06,650 --> 00:43:08,428 I can just say for myself as an 995 00:43:08,428 --> 00:43:12,010 american taxpayer , I feel good that 996 00:43:12,020 --> 00:43:14,190 our Special Operations Forces are well 997 00:43:14,190 --> 00:43:16,450 led and in great hands . And please 998 00:43:16,450 --> 00:43:18,672 join me in thanking General Clark for a 999 00:43:18,672 --> 00:43:21,730 great conversation . Yeah . Mhm . 1000 00:43:24,600 --> 00:43:25,500 And football