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pacing threat in the pacific , How 

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should the new National Defense 

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Strategy contend with china ? Please 

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welcome Senator Jack Reed , Secretary , 

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Christine War meth , General David 

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Berger , Mr Elbridge Colby , MS Kathy 

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warden and moderator Kathy Gilson in 

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from the atlantic . Mhm . 

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Mhm . 

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Hello , should we get started ? Let's 

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do this . Um It's great to be here . I 

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just I wanna I wanna thank the Reagan 

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Institute for putting together this 

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wonderful panel of lots of intellectual 

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firepower on a very serious problem . 

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Um I also wanted to let everybody know 

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that uh as with most of these panels 

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you can submit questions via the R . N . 

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D . F . App or via twitter at the 

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hashtag R . N . D . F . Um I've got my 

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little ipad here and so I can take your 

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questions as the panel gets going . Um 

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I wanted to do this , you will know , I 

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think probably everyone on this stage , 

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but very quickly Senator Jack Reed is 

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obviously the chairman of the Senate 

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Armed Services Committee . Army 

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Secretary , Christine war meth is the 

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Army Secretary , uh General David 

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Berger is the commandant of the Marine 

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Corps Bridge Colby , the father and or 

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godfather of of the national security 

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strategy of 2018 and Kathy warden . Uh 

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Ceo , president of Northrop Grumman . 

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So thank you all for being here . Um 

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This panel is dedicated of course to 

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the china pacing challenge which is a 

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phrase that I think has has come into 

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vogue just in the past few years or so . 

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So I have a few questions about what we 

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think about when , when we're talking 

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about the pacing challenge . Um why we 

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speak about it this way and where we're 

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going um while we're pacing china . But 

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I wanted to start with a question that 

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I thought was original when I came up 

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with it , but I've heard posed to 

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several panelists today . Um , but I 

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think that means it's a good one , 

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which is what keeps you up at night and 

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I just want to go down the hear it from 

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everybody . Well what keeps me up at 

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night is the technological advances 

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that the chinese are making . And also 

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the question of , can they 

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operationalize those ? Because there's 

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a difference between having great 

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technology and being able to use it in 

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an effective way . And that drives the 

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other question that keeps me up at 

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night is what are we doing in terms of 

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technology and are we operationalize ng 

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our technology and my sense is that You 

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have to have both and we have to put 

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the pedal to the metal because I think 

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we were in a period of time where we 

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thought we could cruise along at 30 mph 

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and stay ahead of anybody else . And 

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now China is really accelerating 

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secretary Kathy , I think two things 

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also keep me up at night in particular . 

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One is um , the progress china has 

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made in terms of their cyber 

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capabilities which are substantial and , 

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and I'm particularly concerned about 

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them in terms of what they might do in 

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terms of cyber attacks on our critical 

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infrastructure here in the United 

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States . You know , I think there is a 

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real possibility that if we ever got 

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into a conflict , you could see attacks 

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on our power grid for example , or the 

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transportation sector , which would 

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have implications not only for how we 

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would be able to project our military 

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power out of the country , but also 

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would have I think very substantial 

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consequences for the american public 

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here at home . And I think we need to 

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do a lot more To work with the private 

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sector which has 85% of our critical 

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infrastructure to make ourselves more 

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resilient for that kind of a challenge . 

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General burger tactically I would 

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probably nothing new , but it would be 

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a miscalculation , an accident , bad 

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decisions between a couple of 

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commanders , a couple liters forward 

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that quickly spins into something and 

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we're trying to figure it out quick . I 

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think on a bigger scale , it's probably 

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not much different than the senators . 

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What are we didn't we are not moving 

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fast enough . So you constantly think 

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we think every day there's something 

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some obstacle that's slowing us down 

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there , urgency is there ? So we I 

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think for me just something that you 

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overlooked something that you didn't do 

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that you're gonna , you know , you're , 

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you know , the generation of leaders 

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today is going to need and the ones to 

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follow just not moving fast enough . 

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Well , first of all , thanks , thanks 

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Cathy and thanks to the Reagan 

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Institute is not going to be on this 

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panel , I would say what actually 

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really worries me . What keeps me kind 

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of thinking and up at night is 

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something a little bit different than 

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what the secretary said just now , 

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where he said nobody wants a war in in 

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in Asia . And I think that's true in a 

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kind of narrow sense , but I'm actually 

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not convinced that that's true in a way 

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that's more meaningful , which is , he 

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mentioned , he talked about china's 

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enormously growing military 

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capabilities . We know they have 

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revanchist aspirations against Taiwan 

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and their ambitions are far greater 

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than that . And from what I can tell , 

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we're heading into a position where 

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China will have the ability to fight 

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and win what they call , you know , 

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local war or under informational ized 

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conditions . And I think we would be 

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naive if we assume that they don't want 

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a war because I think if they are going 

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to um achieve their sort of hegemonic 

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goals in Asia , which they appear to be 

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intent on doing , they are going to 

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have to confront us at some point . And 

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if they can win without fighting by 

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being clear about who would prevail so 

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much the better . But if it involves 

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the risk of war , I think they will be 

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prepared to countenance . And if you 

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look at Xi Jinping , he's a man who 

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lived in a cave for five years . I 

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believe he's resolute , he's tied the 

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great rejuvenation of the chinese 

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nation to the resolution the Taiwan 

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issue . So what worries me is that it 

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might actually , you know , if I were 

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advising the leadership in Beijing , I 

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might actually recommend precipitating 

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a conflict or risking a very serious 

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conflict in the coming years . And 

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that's what really worries me , hmm . 

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MS warden what keeps me up at night is 

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a common theme that you've heard 

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through the panel and that is the speed 

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at which china is both innovating and 

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amassing capability . And I'm reminded 

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often that this is not just a 

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competition of the U . S . Military 

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against the chinese military . It's a 

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competition of the U . S . Industrial 

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base against the chinese industrial 

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base and the responsibility that we 

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have to ensure optionality for the 

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others on this stage as well as the 

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ability to deter conflict often 

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comes because there is a perception 

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that our nation is capable of out 

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innovating others and that would deter 

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us from getting to conflict in the 

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first place and that's what the role we 

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want to play in the industrial basis . 

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So bridge I want to turn to you since 

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we're talking about the the successor 

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national defense strategy to the one 

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that you shepherded back in 2018 . Um 

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and back then , you folks identified 

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what you called an eroding competitive 

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military advantage . Um and said , 

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we're emerging from strategic atrophy . 

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So it's three years later . And my 

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question now is , in your view , have 

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we emerged yet from strategic atrophy 

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and also in the interim I hear us 

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saying we're not going fast enough but 

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we've been thinking about these 

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problems for three years . So what to 

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your mind have been the biggest missed 

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opportunities . Um And and what what do 

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you think needs to be in the next 

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iteration of this strategy ? Well 

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thanks for asking . I think the answer 

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is no we in fact we may even have 

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relatively speaking fallen behind 

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because what matters is the relative 

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context not absolute . We might be 

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moving faster but if the chinese are 

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accelerating and we're still behind 

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them that's that's um that that's not 

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good enough . And so I think what you 

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know the national Defense strategy as I 

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understand it from Secretary Mattis was 

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attempting to initiate was an overhaul 

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of the U . S . Military to sustain or 

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restore our conventional edge . Uh you 

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know for our alliance and partnership 

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network in the pacific in particular 

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china is the top the top challenge . 

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And I'm not just saying that because 

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he's sitting next to me but I think the 

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marine corps is leading the way that's 

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the kind of thing that we were trying 

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that I think we were trying to initiate 

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because it's not going to be the 

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pentagon that's gonna solve all the 

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problems it's going to be the creative 

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application , the force redesign force 

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posture redesign that is going to 

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involve fundamental changes and I think 

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what the marines have been doing in 

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retiring , you know , politically 

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popular parts of the force that is that 

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is that they are the pacing services 

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for I mean I think the General General 

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Brown the Air force are now very vocal 

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in this way as well . But I mean I have 

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to tell you that you know , a key 

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underlying point was great power , 

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competition , focused on the most 

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significant powers and focus on war 

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fighting not the other missions . And 

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in some sense , I detect a little bit 

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of an erosion and I detected an erosion 

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of the sense of urgency even as the 

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situation is becoming more perilous . 

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And so at this point I think we may 

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need to we really need to consider 

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things that seem extreme because if 

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we're not gonna do that now we're going 

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to continue in this uh , you know , in 

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a sense , not even sleepwalking but 

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just walking towards disaster , which 

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is seems to be kind of what we're doing 

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right now . General burger . Are you 

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seeing , are you seeing this erosion 

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that that bridge is talking about ? And 

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and also can you comment on what it's 

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been like for you trying to reorient a 

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service in this direction rapidly . I 

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think if you separate conventional 

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deterrence from strategic , um , I 

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think you could make an argument that 

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the forms of deterrence that we've been 

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using for the last several years are 

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not working that china is advancing 

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their strategy . And although there's 

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not a hot war , they're they're moving 

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forward on their goals . So if we 

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continue to do the same thing for three 

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more years , I'm not sure that it's 

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even gonna be status quo . So we we 

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have to operate in a different way for 

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sure . And I think you heard the 

272
00:09:46,360 --> 00:09:49,130
secretary and and I think his team has 

273
00:09:49,130 --> 00:09:51,186
described the approach of integrated 

274
00:09:51,186 --> 00:09:54,220
deterrence , which he mentioned at 

275
00:09:54,220 --> 00:09:56,220
lunch today . And I think the other 

276
00:09:56,220 --> 00:09:59,120
part that that we talked about in terms 

277
00:09:59,120 --> 00:10:02,000
of campaigning at the services and the 

278
00:10:02,000 --> 00:10:04,450
Secretary talked about and that we're 

279
00:10:04,450 --> 00:10:06,561
not very good at . We haven't been we 

280
00:10:06,561 --> 00:10:08,894
haven't done that in a long time either , 

281
00:10:08,894 --> 00:10:11,172
really . The active sort of every week . 

282
00:10:11,172 --> 00:10:13,283
What are we doing to deter and how do 

283
00:10:13,283 --> 00:10:15,617
we measure that ? A lot of conversation ? 

284
00:10:15,617 --> 00:10:17,728
It probably didn't happen three years 

285
00:10:17,728 --> 00:10:20,006
ago , but now it's now its centerpiece . 

286
00:10:20,006 --> 00:10:21,950
Can I just follow up on it in what 

287
00:10:21,950 --> 00:10:24,061
specific ways do you think deterrence 

288
00:10:24,061 --> 00:10:26,061
is failing right now ? We're not we 

289
00:10:26,061 --> 00:10:28,006
were not involved in a large scale 

290
00:10:28,006 --> 00:10:30,006
conflict . What what are they doing 

291
00:10:30,006 --> 00:10:32,228
that we should have been deterring ? If 

292
00:10:32,228 --> 00:10:34,600
the metric is a large scale war , then 

293
00:10:34,600 --> 00:10:36,489
you could make that argument that 

294
00:10:36,489 --> 00:10:38,656
deterrence is working . But that isn't 

295
00:10:38,656 --> 00:10:40,489
that the essence of our strategy 

296
00:10:40,489 --> 00:10:42,600
protecting our national interests and 

297
00:10:43,040 --> 00:10:45,290
Stabilizing , providing the free and 

298
00:10:45,290 --> 00:10:48,050
open seas and skies and all that goes 

299
00:10:48,050 --> 00:10:50,106
along with it . That's that's that's 

300
00:10:50,106 --> 00:10:52,106
the erosion , I think that that was 

301
00:10:52,106 --> 00:10:54,560
reflected in 2018 . And was that the 

302
00:10:54,560 --> 00:10:56,616
secretary spoke about this morning . 

303
00:10:56,616 --> 00:10:58,727
They've expanded into the South China 

304
00:10:58,727 --> 00:11:00,840
Sea . Their coercive activities are 

305
00:11:00,840 --> 00:11:04,230
definitely not slowing down . Oh , if 

306
00:11:04,230 --> 00:11:07,820
deterrence is not , is more than just 

307
00:11:07,820 --> 00:11:10,042
the prevention of a hot war , If it's a 

308
00:11:10,042 --> 00:11:12,209
broader definition than that , then we 

309
00:11:12,209 --> 00:11:14,487
have to change the way we're operating . 

310
00:11:14,487 --> 00:11:16,598
Secretary of War meth . I know you've 

311
00:11:16,598 --> 00:11:18,876
addressed this in recent days at C . S . 

312
00:11:18,876 --> 00:11:20,931
I . S . Um which is great . Um There 

313
00:11:20,931 --> 00:11:22,931
have there have been many questions 

314
00:11:22,931 --> 00:11:25,042
about the army's specific role in the 

315
00:11:25,042 --> 00:11:27,098
pacific especially should a conflict 

316
00:11:27,098 --> 00:11:29,320
break out . But even in terms of things 

317
00:11:29,320 --> 00:11:31,542
like deterrents , can , can you discuss 

318
00:11:31,542 --> 00:11:33,598
with us a little bit and your vision 

319
00:11:33,598 --> 00:11:35,653
for for the army of the future given 

320
00:11:35,653 --> 00:11:37,653
this context . Sure . I think , you 

321
00:11:37,653 --> 00:11:39,930
know , sort of in a in the campaigning 

322
00:11:39,930 --> 00:11:42,152
phase of things , if you will . I think 

323
00:11:42,152 --> 00:11:44,097
one of the key roles that the army 

324
00:11:44,097 --> 00:11:47,300
plays is um making sure that our 

325
00:11:47,300 --> 00:11:49,740
relationships on the ground in host 

326
00:11:49,740 --> 00:11:51,796
nation countries are really , really 

327
00:11:51,796 --> 00:11:53,907
strong . Most of the countries in the 

328
00:11:53,907 --> 00:11:55,962
indo pacific uh you know , have have 

329
00:11:55,962 --> 00:11:57,962
large armies or their their army is 

330
00:11:57,962 --> 00:12:00,020
kind of their core service in many 

331
00:12:00,020 --> 00:12:02,076
cases that they're equivalent to the 

332
00:12:02,076 --> 00:12:04,560
chairman is often an army general . And 

333
00:12:04,560 --> 00:12:06,671
so we have a real , I think advantage 

334
00:12:06,671 --> 00:12:08,640
in terms of um building on those 

335
00:12:08,640 --> 00:12:10,584
relationships being present on the 

336
00:12:10,584 --> 00:12:12,620
ground . The army a few years ago 

337
00:12:12,620 --> 00:12:14,620
established a type of unit called a 

338
00:12:14,620 --> 00:12:17,020
security force assistance brigade . We 

339
00:12:17,020 --> 00:12:19,680
have our fifth S . Fab which is always 

340
00:12:19,680 --> 00:12:21,990
hard to say is aligned to indo pay calm 

341
00:12:22,000 --> 00:12:24,770
and elements of that unit are you know , 

342
00:12:24,770 --> 00:12:26,881
dispersed in countries all around the 

343
00:12:26,881 --> 00:12:29,103
theater , working every day to build an 

344
00:12:29,103 --> 00:12:31,326
interoperability and to kind of set the 

345
00:12:31,326 --> 00:12:34,220
conditions for us to expand our access 

346
00:12:34,220 --> 00:12:36,331
if you will . So I think they're very 

347
00:12:36,331 --> 00:12:38,498
useful in in deterrent and then trying 

348
00:12:38,498 --> 00:12:40,810
to deter an actual conflict if we were 

349
00:12:40,810 --> 00:12:42,921
to get into a conflict , you know , I 

350
00:12:42,921 --> 00:12:44,977
think there are a few roles that the 

351
00:12:44,977 --> 00:12:47,199
army can play . I like to call us . You 

352
00:12:47,199 --> 00:12:49,421
know , I think we would be the linchpin 

353
00:12:49,421 --> 00:12:51,032
service in terms of going in 

354
00:12:51,032 --> 00:12:54,410
establishing and securing staging 

355
00:12:54,410 --> 00:12:57,590
bases , joint operating bases providing 

356
00:12:57,590 --> 00:12:59,980
protection for those bases so that our 

357
00:12:59,990 --> 00:13:02,650
air and maritime forces can operate and 

358
00:13:02,650 --> 00:13:04,761
do the kinds of things that they need 

359
00:13:04,761 --> 00:13:06,761
to do . I think we would have a big 

360
00:13:06,761 --> 00:13:08,983
role to play in terms of setting up the 

361
00:13:08,983 --> 00:13:10,983
distribution network to sustain the 

362
00:13:10,983 --> 00:13:13,206
joint force . We are well positioned to 

363
00:13:13,206 --> 00:13:15,428
provide command and control because our 

364
00:13:15,428 --> 00:13:17,483
division and corps headquarters have 

365
00:13:17,483 --> 00:13:19,483
such great planning and operational 

366
00:13:19,483 --> 00:13:22,430
capabilities . We would bring um from 

367
00:13:22,430 --> 00:13:24,730
an offensive perspective long range 

368
00:13:24,730 --> 00:13:26,786
fires . You know , one place where I 

369
00:13:26,786 --> 00:13:29,008
think we have been in the army having a 

370
00:13:29,008 --> 00:13:31,119
lot of urgency and having quite a bit 

371
00:13:31,119 --> 00:13:33,119
of success , is developing our long 

372
00:13:33,119 --> 00:13:35,008
range precision fire systems like 

373
00:13:35,008 --> 00:13:37,180
precision strike missile , the long 

374
00:13:37,180 --> 00:13:39,810
range hypersonic weapon , the midrange 

375
00:13:40,040 --> 00:13:43,980
um capacity systems so and then you 

376
00:13:43,980 --> 00:13:45,924
know last but not least if we were 

377
00:13:45,924 --> 00:13:48,147
needed we would provide maneuver forces 

378
00:13:48,147 --> 00:13:50,091
for counter attack . So you know I 

379
00:13:50,091 --> 00:13:52,202
think there's a role to play but it's 

380
00:13:52,202 --> 00:13:54,420
very much in enabling the joint force 

381
00:13:54,430 --> 00:13:56,486
got it . I don't want to stay on the 

382
00:13:56,486 --> 00:13:58,597
joint force for just a minute because 

383
00:13:58,597 --> 00:14:00,763
it is a nice opportunity since we have 

384
00:14:00,763 --> 00:14:02,819
both the marines and the army on the 

385
00:14:02,819 --> 00:14:04,874
stage here I feel very safe and very 

386
00:14:04,874 --> 00:14:07,097
free . Um How can you , can you speak a 

387
00:14:07,097 --> 00:14:09,263
little bit more general burger ? I can 

388
00:14:09,263 --> 00:14:11,319
I can kick it back to you about your 

389
00:14:11,319 --> 00:14:13,541
vision for joint operations in the indo 

390
00:14:13,541 --> 00:14:15,597
picon theater Should should conflict 

391
00:14:15,597 --> 00:14:19,550
break out . Um It's not 

392
00:14:19,550 --> 00:14:22,550
my vision first of all . But I think 

393
00:14:23,740 --> 00:14:25,740
We've come out , first of all we've 

394
00:14:25,740 --> 00:14:27,796
come a long way in 30 years in joint 

395
00:14:27,796 --> 00:14:30,018
operations period . In a in a very good 

396
00:14:30,018 --> 00:14:32,129
way . Which obviously when the if you 

397
00:14:32,129 --> 00:14:34,129
look at the P . L . A . And they're 

398
00:14:34,129 --> 00:14:36,351
trying to catch up they're mimicking us 

399
00:14:36,351 --> 00:14:38,518
because they see the value of fighting 

400
00:14:38,518 --> 00:14:40,740
as a team . Vice fighting as services . 

401
00:14:40,740 --> 00:14:44,060
So come a long way . I think the whole 

402
00:14:44,440 --> 00:14:47,640
depth of what the U . S . Military can 

403
00:14:47,640 --> 00:14:49,830
provide . Admiral Aquilino and indo 

404
00:14:49,830 --> 00:14:52,220
Peckham is really powerful . It's not 

405
00:14:52,230 --> 00:14:54,341
in other words one dimensional . It's 

406
00:14:54,341 --> 00:14:56,640
not just up close or not just at at a 

407
00:14:56,640 --> 00:14:59,990
distance it's the whole depth the 

408
00:14:59,990 --> 00:15:02,101
ability to stitch all that together , 

409
00:15:02,101 --> 00:15:03,712
which the secretary spoke of 

410
00:15:03,712 --> 00:15:05,879
logistically and command and control , 

411
00:15:05,879 --> 00:15:08,950
Nobody else can do that . Well the in 

412
00:15:08,950 --> 00:15:11,117
terms of deterrence we have to make it 

413
00:15:11,117 --> 00:15:13,339
a calculus for them that when they look 

414
00:15:13,339 --> 00:15:15,450
at the response from the U . S . It's 

415
00:15:15,450 --> 00:15:17,617
gonna be that's gonna be really wicked 

416
00:15:17,617 --> 00:15:19,839
hard . We have to make it that hard for 

417
00:15:19,839 --> 00:15:22,006
them . But I think it's it's more than 

418
00:15:22,006 --> 00:15:24,006
the individual capabilities of each 

419
00:15:24,006 --> 00:15:25,950
service , it's the ability under a 

420
00:15:25,950 --> 00:15:28,061
combatant command to fight as one one 

421
00:15:28,061 --> 00:15:30,283
unit . And and do you feel that there's 

422
00:15:30,283 --> 00:15:32,506
um do you feel that you're sufficiently 

423
00:15:32,506 --> 00:15:34,617
integrated at this point ? I'm trying 

424
00:15:34,617 --> 00:15:36,728
to get it I guess the specifics of if 

425
00:15:36,728 --> 00:15:38,950
there were a Taiwan contingency , where 

426
00:15:38,950 --> 00:15:41,172
do you see right now that there is work 

427
00:15:41,172 --> 00:15:44,450
to be done in , in integrating the 

428
00:15:44,450 --> 00:15:48,280
services for 

429
00:15:48,280 --> 00:15:51,290
me , I think we we are very comfortable , 

430
00:15:51,300 --> 00:15:53,300
all the services working as a joint 

431
00:15:53,300 --> 00:15:55,411
force and then that and I'm including 

432
00:15:55,411 --> 00:15:57,411
special operations forces , space , 

433
00:15:57,411 --> 00:15:59,189
calm and cyber com , We're very 

434
00:15:59,189 --> 00:16:01,189
comfortable . It's not forced , Not 

435
00:16:01,189 --> 00:16:03,411
awkward anymore at all . It's natural . 

436
00:16:03,411 --> 00:16:05,689
That's that is the way that we operate . 

437
00:16:05,840 --> 00:16:07,896
Is that how you see it as well ? Yes 

438
00:16:07,896 --> 00:16:10,118
and I would I would put out there , you 

439
00:16:10,118 --> 00:16:12,229
know um the army just recently hosted 

440
00:16:12,229 --> 00:16:14,173
and concluded what we call project 

441
00:16:14,173 --> 00:16:16,550
convergence 21 we looked at sort of 

442
00:16:16,550 --> 00:16:19,010
seven different scenarios just sort of 

443
00:16:19,010 --> 00:16:20,954
operational challenges in terms of 

444
00:16:20,954 --> 00:16:22,954
getting after , you know , the anti 

445
00:16:22,954 --> 00:16:24,899
access area denial challenges that 

446
00:16:24,899 --> 00:16:26,788
we're facing and that was a joint 

447
00:16:26,788 --> 00:16:29,121
effort . The marines were there with us , 

448
00:16:29,121 --> 00:16:31,288
the air force was there , the navy was 

449
00:16:31,288 --> 00:16:33,399
there , the space force was there and 

450
00:16:33,399 --> 00:16:35,566
we really were looking at in some very 

451
00:16:35,566 --> 00:16:37,710
specific ways how do we connect our 

452
00:16:37,720 --> 00:16:39,880
sensors and shooters you know , 

453
00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:42,630
collectively across our various 

454
00:16:42,630 --> 00:16:44,797
platforms . And we still have a lot of 

455
00:16:44,797 --> 00:16:46,797
work to do . And I think scaling up 

456
00:16:46,797 --> 00:16:48,700
What we were experimenting within 

457
00:16:48,700 --> 00:16:51,090
project convergence 21 there's a lot of 

458
00:16:51,090 --> 00:16:53,560
work to be done there but it was very 

459
00:16:53,560 --> 00:16:56,730
much a joint experimentation exercise 

460
00:16:56,730 --> 00:16:58,786
that I think was very valuable . And 

461
00:16:58,786 --> 00:17:00,730
the feedback I got from my from my 

462
00:17:00,730 --> 00:17:02,674
service peers was that it was very 

463
00:17:02,674 --> 00:17:04,730
valuable . The and the censors . The 

464
00:17:04,730 --> 00:17:06,841
censors point brings up obviously the 

465
00:17:06,841 --> 00:17:08,952
cyber security domain . Um and I know 

466
00:17:08,952 --> 00:17:10,841
Senator Reid you've you've spoken 

467
00:17:10,841 --> 00:17:13,240
publicly about about your , I think you 

468
00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:15,870
said you'd bet money on it that that in 

469
00:17:15,870 --> 00:17:17,981
the event hostilities broke out . The 

470
00:17:17,990 --> 00:17:19,934
first thing that would happen is a 

471
00:17:19,934 --> 00:17:23,020
major cyberattack . Um can can you tell 

472
00:17:23,020 --> 00:17:25,950
us how , how you see that playing out . 

473
00:17:25,960 --> 00:17:29,030
Um and where you see the United States 

474
00:17:29,030 --> 00:17:31,252
needing to better prepare for something 

475
00:17:31,252 --> 00:17:33,141
like that ? Well , as a secretary 

476
00:17:33,141 --> 00:17:35,308
alluded to many of the aspects of that 

477
00:17:35,308 --> 00:17:37,474
answer wanted there would I think be a 

478
00:17:37,474 --> 00:17:40,570
cyber attack . In fact there are 

479
00:17:40,570 --> 00:17:43,120
probably a low level cyber operations 

480
00:17:43,120 --> 00:17:46,190
going on constantly . But it would be a 

481
00:17:46,200 --> 00:17:48,920
major I think attack and it could be 

482
00:17:48,920 --> 00:17:51,460
very disruptive to american 

483
00:17:51,980 --> 00:17:54,340
society so that you'd have the american 

484
00:17:54,350 --> 00:17:57,720
people , you know , confused , upset 

485
00:17:57,730 --> 00:18:00,740
and that is not a very good situation . 

486
00:18:00,750 --> 00:18:02,910
I think also too it would be targeted 

487
00:18:02,910 --> 00:18:06,200
at critical assets . You know we have a 

488
00:18:06,210 --> 00:18:08,600
reserve aviation fleet which would be 

489
00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:11,960
required to ferry troops into the they 

490
00:18:11,960 --> 00:18:14,016
could attack those systems and those 

491
00:18:14,016 --> 00:18:16,182
planes might not be operational . Same 

492
00:18:16,182 --> 00:18:18,520
with our maritime fleet reserve , they 

493
00:18:18,520 --> 00:18:20,742
could be attacked and you would have to 

494
00:18:20,742 --> 00:18:23,076
see all those things . I think going on . 

495
00:18:23,076 --> 00:18:27,050
I think one of the uh and looking 

496
00:18:27,050 --> 00:18:29,420
at the issue of Taiwan in particular , 

497
00:18:29,840 --> 00:18:31,740
I don't think it would be the 

498
00:18:31,740 --> 00:18:34,280
traditional D day because that would 

499
00:18:34,280 --> 00:18:36,790
take months to organize your landing 

500
00:18:36,790 --> 00:18:38,846
forces and we would know that and we 

501
00:18:38,846 --> 00:18:41,140
would have time to either take action 

502
00:18:41,140 --> 00:18:43,251
or to negotiate . So it would be more 

503
00:18:43,251 --> 00:18:46,800
like I think what we saw in uh Crimea 

504
00:18:46,810 --> 00:18:50,780
which would be uh the cyber operations 

505
00:18:50,790 --> 00:18:53,210
uh infiltrating , getting people in 

506
00:18:53,210 --> 00:18:56,350
there quickly by air . But cyber will 

507
00:18:56,350 --> 00:18:59,180
be a big part of it throughout and uh 

508
00:18:59,190 --> 00:19:02,210
and we have to build our defenses which 

509
00:19:02,210 --> 00:19:05,650
were trying and to uh be able to 

510
00:19:05,650 --> 00:19:08,140
counteract what they're doing . And and 

511
00:19:08,140 --> 00:19:10,430
you've also worked very much on the 

512
00:19:10,430 --> 00:19:12,319
pacific deterrence initiative and 

513
00:19:12,319 --> 00:19:14,930
spoken a lot about it . Um and and I 

514
00:19:14,930 --> 00:19:17,041
understand that it's modeled at least 

515
00:19:17,041 --> 00:19:18,763
to some extent on the european 

516
00:19:18,763 --> 00:19:20,930
deterrence initiative , which as we're 

517
00:19:20,930 --> 00:19:23,850
looking now at the european theater 

518
00:19:24,440 --> 00:19:27,800
deterrence also seems likely to fail . 

519
00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:31,150
So what lessons can or possible it's 

520
00:19:31,150 --> 00:19:33,094
possible that it could fail . What 

521
00:19:33,094 --> 00:19:35,370
lessons can we draw from that as well ? 

522
00:19:35,380 --> 00:19:38,360
I think the first issue is it 

523
00:19:38,840 --> 00:19:41,730
focused attention and in some respects 

524
00:19:41,730 --> 00:19:43,786
it was a breakthrough moment for the 

525
00:19:43,786 --> 00:19:45,841
Congress where we finally said , you 

526
00:19:45,841 --> 00:19:48,008
know , and not just rhetorically , but 

527
00:19:48,008 --> 00:19:49,952
in legislation china is the pacing 

528
00:19:49,952 --> 00:19:52,119
threat as the secretary defenses . And 

529
00:19:52,119 --> 00:19:54,300
we have to do something about it . And 

530
00:19:54,310 --> 00:19:56,421
working close to the center in half , 

531
00:19:56,421 --> 00:19:59,390
we put together a way which we could 

532
00:19:59,390 --> 00:20:01,860
assess the resources that we're going 

533
00:20:01,860 --> 00:20:04,490
into the pacific and we also emphasize 

534
00:20:04,490 --> 00:20:06,712
and I think it reflects the comments of 

535
00:20:06,712 --> 00:20:08,720
general burger and the secretary is 

536
00:20:08,720 --> 00:20:12,160
that joint operations are the key and a 

537
00:20:12,160 --> 00:20:14,510
lot of the resources we put in place 

538
00:20:14,510 --> 00:20:16,970
were designed for actual joint 

539
00:20:16,970 --> 00:20:18,970
operations , starting with tabletop 

540
00:20:18,970 --> 00:20:21,770
exercises moving to the to the fleets 

541
00:20:21,780 --> 00:20:25,000
and then getting our allies together 

542
00:20:25,000 --> 00:20:26,944
also , because I think in terms of 

543
00:20:26,944 --> 00:20:30,140
deterrence , uh we're much better off 

544
00:20:30,140 --> 00:20:32,380
and the Secretary of uh Austin Center 

545
00:20:32,380 --> 00:20:34,491
today , we're much better off for the 

546
00:20:34,491 --> 00:20:37,460
coalition that is capable to operate 

547
00:20:37,540 --> 00:20:39,760
together . I don't think we have that 

548
00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:42,200
quite yet . But the more exercises we 

549
00:20:42,200 --> 00:20:45,670
do , the more uh we try 

550
00:20:45,680 --> 00:20:48,710
literally to practice what we hope will 

551
00:20:48,710 --> 00:20:51,050
work . We'll learn more about what's 

552
00:20:51,050 --> 00:20:53,230
effective , what technology we need , 

553
00:20:53,240 --> 00:20:56,050
uh what technology one services has , 

554
00:20:56,230 --> 00:20:58,960
that may benefit all services and you 

555
00:20:58,960 --> 00:21:01,990
don't find that out usually by sitting 

556
00:21:01,990 --> 00:21:04,046
around a table in Washington talking 

557
00:21:04,046 --> 00:21:05,934
about the problem . What about if 

558
00:21:05,934 --> 00:21:07,823
you're sitting on a stage in Simi 

559
00:21:07,823 --> 00:21:09,934
Valley , would you find it out ? Well 

560
00:21:09,934 --> 00:21:11,823
I'd like to organize this side as 

561
00:21:11,823 --> 00:21:14,150
chinese uh and general burger , you're 

562
00:21:14,150 --> 00:21:16,360
in charge of the american forces . And 

563
00:21:17,540 --> 00:21:19,800
and then at the end of the day we'll 

564
00:21:19,800 --> 00:21:23,420
see who won . Um the technology piece 

565
00:21:23,420 --> 00:21:25,531
of it obviously brings us to industry 

566
00:21:25,531 --> 00:21:28,390
um and MS warden and and your role in 

567
00:21:28,390 --> 00:21:31,430
this . Um Obviously in the Cold War 

568
00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:33,570
Russia had the conventional advantage 

569
00:21:33,580 --> 00:21:35,802
which we offset with the tech advantage 

570
00:21:35,802 --> 00:21:38,100
and I wanted to put to you um can we 

571
00:21:38,100 --> 00:21:40,940
rely on our tech advantage in the china 

572
00:21:40,940 --> 00:21:43,670
competition now um and can the U . S . 

573
00:21:43,670 --> 00:21:45,781
Defense industry compete with china's 

574
00:21:45,781 --> 00:21:48,830
industrial effort ? I believe we can 

575
00:21:48,830 --> 00:21:50,941
compete . I wouldn't limit it just to 

576
00:21:50,941 --> 00:21:52,719
the contribution of the defense 

577
00:21:52,719 --> 00:21:54,719
industrial base . I think this is a 

578
00:21:54,719 --> 00:21:56,774
whole of country activity just as it 

579
00:21:56,774 --> 00:21:58,663
has been when we have faced great 

580
00:21:58,663 --> 00:22:00,886
challenge and competition in the past . 

581
00:22:00,886 --> 00:22:02,997
And so the defense industrial base is 

582
00:22:02,997 --> 00:22:04,980
open and actively engaging and 

583
00:22:04,980 --> 00:22:07,091
partnering with commercial technology 

584
00:22:07,091 --> 00:22:09,390
companies . And when I look at the 

585
00:22:09,390 --> 00:22:11,680
talent base that we all draw upon , its 

586
00:22:11,680 --> 00:22:13,880
not what industry individuals are 

587
00:22:13,880 --> 00:22:15,990
working on , it's what problems are 

588
00:22:15,990 --> 00:22:18,090
they trying to solve and when we put 

589
00:22:18,090 --> 00:22:19,979
the best minds in this country up 

590
00:22:19,979 --> 00:22:22,160
against the toughest challenges , I'm 

591
00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,610
very confident in our ability to drive 

592
00:22:25,620 --> 00:22:27,953
innovation at the speed that we need it , 

593
00:22:27,953 --> 00:22:30,120
What we as leaders need to do is break 

594
00:22:30,120 --> 00:22:31,953
down the barriers that keep that 

595
00:22:31,953 --> 00:22:34,176
innovation from coming to the forefront 

596
00:22:34,176 --> 00:22:36,120
from getting the resources that it 

597
00:22:36,120 --> 00:22:38,287
needs from being adopted because we're 

598
00:22:38,287 --> 00:22:40,460
too risk averse to to want to embrace 

599
00:22:40,460 --> 00:22:42,571
the change and the innovation that is 

600
00:22:42,571 --> 00:22:45,420
available to us . And so if I were to 

601
00:22:45,420 --> 00:22:47,590
say with the greatest challenges to 

602
00:22:47,590 --> 00:22:49,868
speed of innovation are in our country , 

603
00:22:49,868 --> 00:22:51,646
it's not the talent base or the 

604
00:22:51,646 --> 00:22:54,300
industrial base , it's the way in which 

605
00:22:54,310 --> 00:22:56,366
all of that capability is brought to 

606
00:22:56,366 --> 00:22:58,800
bear on national security challenges . 

607
00:22:58,810 --> 00:23:00,977
And that's that's an interesting point 

608
00:23:00,977 --> 00:23:03,530
about about barriers because um in the 

609
00:23:03,530 --> 00:23:06,120
tech space , you know , the innovation 

610
00:23:06,120 --> 00:23:08,231
that that you need , that we need for 

611
00:23:08,231 --> 00:23:10,176
national defense isn't necessarily 

612
00:23:10,176 --> 00:23:12,310
residing with , with the big dogs 

613
00:23:12,310 --> 00:23:14,254
anymore with Northrop . And so I'm 

614
00:23:14,254 --> 00:23:17,670
curious , um I'm curious how you see 

615
00:23:17,940 --> 00:23:19,940
the relationship with some of these 

616
00:23:19,940 --> 00:23:21,940
companies dispersed through Silicon 

617
00:23:21,940 --> 00:23:24,051
Valley that are , that are working on 

618
00:23:24,051 --> 00:23:26,218
things that we need um that may or may 

619
00:23:26,218 --> 00:23:28,107
not be reluctant to step into the 

620
00:23:28,107 --> 00:23:30,273
defense space . Um , but that arguably 

621
00:23:30,273 --> 00:23:32,384
should be encouraged to do so well on 

622
00:23:32,384 --> 00:23:34,440
behalf of all of the great americans 

623
00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:36,607
who have chosen to work in the defense 

624
00:23:36,607 --> 00:23:38,829
industrial base . I would challenge you 

625
00:23:38,829 --> 00:23:41,051
on the first point that you made uh and 

626
00:23:41,051 --> 00:23:43,107
say that we have great talent in the 

627
00:23:43,107 --> 00:23:45,329
Defense industrial East , just as we do 

628
00:23:45,329 --> 00:23:47,273
in the great commercial technology 

629
00:23:47,273 --> 00:23:49,384
companies in this country . And so we 

630
00:23:49,384 --> 00:23:51,662
can't have it be an either or equation . 

631
00:23:51,662 --> 00:23:53,770
It needs to be both . And there is 

632
00:23:53,770 --> 00:23:56,100
phenomenal mission expertise that the 

633
00:23:56,100 --> 00:23:58,267
defense industrial base has built over 

634
00:23:58,267 --> 00:24:00,322
decades , that is highly relevant to 

635
00:24:00,322 --> 00:24:02,544
partnering with commercial companies to 

636
00:24:02,544 --> 00:24:05,150
ensure that we can integrate these 

637
00:24:05,150 --> 00:24:07,440
technologies in ways that are relevant 

638
00:24:07,440 --> 00:24:09,610
and solve the problems that those on 

639
00:24:09,610 --> 00:24:12,410
the stage represent . So can we do that ? 

640
00:24:12,420 --> 00:24:14,650
Absolutely . Are we doing that ? Yes , 

641
00:24:14,650 --> 00:24:17,110
we are doing that today . Do we need to 

642
00:24:17,110 --> 00:24:20,010
break down the barriers that exist by 

643
00:24:20,120 --> 00:24:22,210
providing information ? Not over 

644
00:24:22,210 --> 00:24:25,470
classifying programs that could use 

645
00:24:25,480 --> 00:24:28,160
access to technologies , but we can't 

646
00:24:28,170 --> 00:24:30,790
involve people because things are over 

647
00:24:30,790 --> 00:24:32,957
classified . These are all things that 

648
00:24:32,957 --> 00:24:35,179
we could work on together to break down 

649
00:24:35,179 --> 00:24:37,346
barriers to getting the best talent in 

650
00:24:37,346 --> 00:24:39,457
this country , no matter what company 

651
00:24:39,457 --> 00:24:41,512
they go to work for . And that's the 

652
00:24:41,512 --> 00:24:43,568
kind of mindset I think we need , if 

653
00:24:43,568 --> 00:24:45,790
we're gonna move it paste and it's , it 

654
00:24:45,790 --> 00:24:48,012
can't be at this part of the industrial 

655
00:24:48,012 --> 00:24:50,179
base is good . This part is bad . Uh , 

656
00:24:50,179 --> 00:24:52,290
discussion , it has to be . How do we 

657
00:24:52,290 --> 00:24:54,179
tap into the talent of the entire 

658
00:24:54,179 --> 00:24:56,234
industrial base ? Um , the other the 

659
00:24:56,234 --> 00:24:58,179
other question I wanted to raise , 

660
00:24:58,179 --> 00:25:00,100
which was brought up , I think by 

661
00:25:00,110 --> 00:25:03,040
Secretary Austin's speech earlier , he 

662
00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:05,240
spoke about competition . Obviously 

663
00:25:05,240 --> 00:25:06,907
there's there's been a lot of 

664
00:25:06,907 --> 00:25:09,073
discussion on all these panels about , 

665
00:25:09,073 --> 00:25:10,962
about the china pacing , threat , 

666
00:25:10,962 --> 00:25:12,740
competition , competition , not 

667
00:25:12,740 --> 00:25:14,907
necessarily leading to conflict . Um , 

668
00:25:14,907 --> 00:25:16,684
he spoke about competition with 

669
00:25:16,684 --> 00:25:18,796
guardrails . And I'm curious for your 

670
00:25:18,796 --> 00:25:20,740
thoughts bridge um having , having 

671
00:25:20,740 --> 00:25:22,796
thought a lot about what this I mean 

672
00:25:22,796 --> 00:25:22,350
everybody on this stage just thought 

673
00:25:22,350 --> 00:25:24,461
about this competition , but you just 

674
00:25:24,461 --> 00:25:27,050
wrote a book about it . Um what what do 

675
00:25:27,050 --> 00:25:29,106
you see as the guardrails that would 

676
00:25:29,106 --> 00:25:31,217
that would keep this in the deterrent 

677
00:25:31,217 --> 00:25:34,020
and competitive realm versus the the 

678
00:25:34,030 --> 00:25:36,086
conflict realm ? Well look , I think 

679
00:25:36,086 --> 00:25:38,370
that everybody should want guardrails . 

680
00:25:38,370 --> 00:25:40,592
The question is how much the rhetorical 

681
00:25:40,592 --> 00:25:42,814
emphasis and deliberate sort of pursuit 

682
00:25:42,814 --> 00:25:44,870
of that as a part of our policy with 

683
00:25:44,870 --> 00:25:46,926
china makes a lot of sense . I think 

684
00:25:46,926 --> 00:25:48,814
rather I actually believe that we 

685
00:25:48,814 --> 00:25:50,814
should be clear about our long term 

686
00:25:50,814 --> 00:25:52,759
goal , which I believe is actually 

687
00:25:52,759 --> 00:25:54,981
something like detente with china and I 

688
00:25:54,981 --> 00:25:54,450
differ with some of my my friends on 

689
00:25:54,450 --> 00:25:56,700
this point , but in order to get to 

690
00:25:56,700 --> 00:25:58,756
that point we need to be negotiating 

691
00:25:58,756 --> 00:26:00,867
from a position of strength . What we 

692
00:26:00,867 --> 00:26:02,756
don't want to do and what I'm I'm 

693
00:26:02,756 --> 00:26:04,700
fearing that sometimes I hear from 

694
00:26:04,700 --> 00:26:04,570
people in the administration is that 

695
00:26:04,570 --> 00:26:06,403
there's gonna be competition and 

696
00:26:06,403 --> 00:26:08,626
cooperation at the same time as if it's 

697
00:26:08,626 --> 00:26:10,792
this sort of I think the term actually 

698
00:26:10,792 --> 00:26:13,014
used in new york times was like there's 

699
00:26:13,014 --> 00:26:12,730
gonna be jousting in the south china 

700
00:26:12,730 --> 00:26:14,730
sea . But then cooperation on these 

701
00:26:14,730 --> 00:26:16,897
other things and the chinese have been 

702
00:26:16,897 --> 00:26:16,110
cleared . They were clear to Deputy 

703
00:26:16,110 --> 00:26:17,999
Secretary Sherman that they don't 

704
00:26:17,999 --> 00:26:20,166
accept that model . So I think what we 

705
00:26:20,166 --> 00:26:22,332
need to do is actually really focus on 

706
00:26:22,332 --> 00:26:24,332
building up our strength . The best 

707
00:26:24,540 --> 00:26:27,600
source of chinese restraint will be the 

708
00:26:27,610 --> 00:26:29,554
their confidence that they will be 

709
00:26:29,554 --> 00:26:31,554
frustrated in their goal , not just 

710
00:26:31,554 --> 00:26:33,610
that they will suffer costs but they 

711
00:26:33,610 --> 00:26:35,943
will be frustrated and and suffer costs . 

712
00:26:35,943 --> 00:26:38,054
And then at the same time we manifest 

713
00:26:38,054 --> 00:26:40,277
our restraint in our overall goals that 

714
00:26:40,277 --> 00:26:40,080
we're not , you know , we're not trying 

715
00:26:40,080 --> 00:26:42,302
to collapse the country or dismember it 

716
00:26:42,302 --> 00:26:44,302
and so forth . But I believe that's 

717
00:26:44,302 --> 00:26:46,358
actually more of like a linear thing 

718
00:26:46,358 --> 00:26:48,524
that we need to go through a period of 

719
00:26:48,524 --> 00:26:50,524
strengthening and confrontation and 

720
00:26:50,524 --> 00:26:52,691
then we'll be in a good position for a 

721
00:26:52,691 --> 00:26:54,969
more collaborative relationship . I do , 

722
00:26:54,969 --> 00:26:54,580
which I do think it's possible , but I 

723
00:26:54,580 --> 00:26:57,080
think right now if we don't focus 

724
00:26:57,080 --> 00:26:59,024
enough on our strengthening part , 

725
00:26:59,024 --> 00:27:01,247
we're already so behind . I mean Harold 

726
00:27:01,247 --> 00:27:03,302
Brown famously said about the soviet 

727
00:27:03,302 --> 00:27:03,180
Union there was an arms race but they 

728
00:27:03,180 --> 00:27:05,291
were racing and we weren't , you know 

729
00:27:05,291 --> 00:27:07,402
after after the sixties and seventies 

730
00:27:07,402 --> 00:27:09,624
and that's to some extent people say oh 

731
00:27:09,624 --> 00:27:11,736
there's an arms race in Asia . Well , 

732
00:27:11,736 --> 00:27:13,958
our position posture has barely changed 

733
00:27:13,958 --> 00:27:13,460
in Asia . They've been increasing by 

734
00:27:13,750 --> 00:27:17,360
Something like 10% for 25 years . So I 

735
00:27:17,360 --> 00:27:19,416
think are are much more serious risk 

736
00:27:19,416 --> 00:27:21,360
right now is that the chinese will 

737
00:27:21,360 --> 00:27:22,916
perceive an opportunity and 

738
00:27:22,916 --> 00:27:25,138
particularly a window of opportunity as 

739
00:27:25,138 --> 00:27:27,193
our defense establishment is clearly 

740
00:27:27,193 --> 00:27:29,304
shifting , but it's doing so somewhat 

741
00:27:29,304 --> 00:27:31,471
slowly divest to invest makes a lot of 

742
00:27:31,471 --> 00:27:33,582
sense . But it does potentially leave 

743
00:27:33,582 --> 00:27:35,804
vulnerability . And if you look back at 

744
00:27:35,804 --> 00:27:38,027
why major wars have tended to happen in 

745
00:27:38,027 --> 00:27:40,249
the past , they've they've really often 

746
00:27:40,249 --> 00:27:42,138
been because and and an aggressor 

747
00:27:42,138 --> 00:27:44,304
perceives a window of opportunity that 

748
00:27:44,304 --> 00:27:44,120
that may be closing . So I think it's 

749
00:27:44,130 --> 00:27:46,510
you know , I fully back that we should 

750
00:27:46,510 --> 00:27:48,621
be restrained in our in our goals and 

751
00:27:48,621 --> 00:27:50,566
our object in our rhetoric . But I 

752
00:27:50,566 --> 00:27:52,732
think we really need to emphasize much 

753
00:27:52,732 --> 00:27:52,720
more the strengthening part right now 

754
00:27:52,720 --> 00:27:54,609
and that's also part of coalition 

755
00:27:54,609 --> 00:27:56,776
formation . You know , you talk people 

756
00:27:56,776 --> 00:27:58,887
are talking about allies and partners 

757
00:27:58,887 --> 00:28:00,831
but everybody in Asia is wondering 

758
00:28:00,831 --> 00:28:02,942
whether it's prudent to step up stand 

759
00:28:02,942 --> 00:28:05,109
up to china because they don't want to 

760
00:28:05,109 --> 00:28:07,387
be put under the microscope by Beijing , 

761
00:28:07,387 --> 00:28:07,210
you know like Australia is now and so 

762
00:28:07,210 --> 00:28:09,321
it's very critical to show them we're 

763
00:28:09,321 --> 00:28:11,488
strong and resolute enough for them to 

764
00:28:11,488 --> 00:28:13,654
do so and that will form the coalition 

765
00:28:13,654 --> 00:28:15,821
that will then allow us to take a more 

766
00:28:15,821 --> 00:28:17,877
in a sense moderate approach . But I 

767
00:28:17,877 --> 00:28:19,821
think that's more of a question of 

768
00:28:19,821 --> 00:28:21,877
sequencing . Not at the same time do 

769
00:28:21,877 --> 00:28:24,099
you do the do the military services see 

770
00:28:24,099 --> 00:28:26,266
any specifics in terms of guardrails ? 

771
00:28:26,266 --> 00:28:28,099
That that could telegraph to the 

772
00:28:28,099 --> 00:28:30,266
chinese that our intentions are purely 

773
00:28:30,266 --> 00:28:32,377
deterrent . And I mean we hear this , 

774
00:28:32,377 --> 00:28:34,543
we hear people say this at conferences 

775
00:28:34,543 --> 00:28:36,599
but what are we communicating to the 

776
00:28:36,599 --> 00:28:40,000
chinese through our actions ? We 

777
00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:43,470
haven't um I don't know , I can't 

778
00:28:43,470 --> 00:28:45,470
recall a discussion specifically on 

779
00:28:45,470 --> 00:28:47,780
guard rails using the term . We have 

780
00:28:47,780 --> 00:28:50,360
talked a lot about making sure that 

781
00:28:50,360 --> 00:28:52,650
actions don't spill out sideways where 

782
00:28:52,650 --> 00:28:55,120
we I don't have a means to communicate 

783
00:28:55,120 --> 00:28:57,120
to our counterparts . For example , 

784
00:28:57,440 --> 00:28:59,551
guardrails , in other words , through 

785
00:28:59,551 --> 00:29:01,607
one lens might be her ability or our 

786
00:29:01,607 --> 00:29:03,496
our ability to communicate to our 

787
00:29:03,496 --> 00:29:05,607
counterparts going don't misread this 

788
00:29:05,607 --> 00:29:07,773
or vice versa . So guardrails can help 

789
00:29:07,773 --> 00:29:10,010
things from spinning sideways just 

790
00:29:10,020 --> 00:29:12,076
because we failed . We didn't have a 

791
00:29:12,076 --> 00:29:14,353
good way to communicate back and forth . 

792
00:29:14,353 --> 00:29:16,409
Not not not in terms of limiting our 

793
00:29:16,409 --> 00:29:18,576
will to do something , but in terms of 

794
00:29:18,576 --> 00:29:20,742
making sure that both sides understand 

795
00:29:20,742 --> 00:29:24,140
what we're doing . How do you think 

796
00:29:24,140 --> 00:29:26,196
Senator Reid about this , about this 

797
00:29:27,010 --> 00:29:29,220
competition versus cooperation ? 

798
00:29:29,220 --> 00:29:31,870
Dichotomy . And whether I am curious 

799
00:29:32,940 --> 00:29:35,051
about the extent to which this really 

800
00:29:35,051 --> 00:29:37,360
is zero sum does the idea that we need 

801
00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:39,082
to be building up our strength 

802
00:29:39,082 --> 00:29:40,920
necessarily preclude things like 

803
00:29:41,070 --> 00:29:43,126
negotiations on climate agreements , 

804
00:29:43,126 --> 00:29:47,050
trade deals , things like that ? No , I 

805
00:29:47,050 --> 00:29:49,217
don't think so . But I think the point 

806
00:29:49,217 --> 00:29:51,050
that bridge made is that if they 

807
00:29:51,050 --> 00:29:54,220
perceive us increasing our military 

808
00:29:54,230 --> 00:29:57,890
potential in the pacific at a rapid 

809
00:29:57,890 --> 00:30:01,070
rate that it will give them pours in 

810
00:30:01,070 --> 00:30:03,070
terms of doing something that might 

811
00:30:03,070 --> 00:30:06,090
otherwise do . Um but I think we still 

812
00:30:06,090 --> 00:30:09,120
have , you know , the reality that 

813
00:30:09,130 --> 00:30:11,019
there are a huge commercial force 

814
00:30:11,019 --> 00:30:14,930
throughout the globe . They will not 

815
00:30:14,930 --> 00:30:16,819
deal successfully . These climate 

816
00:30:16,819 --> 00:30:19,270
issues without some type of support or 

817
00:30:19,270 --> 00:30:21,326
cooperation of china . I don't think 

818
00:30:21,326 --> 00:30:23,326
you put them off but I think at the 

819
00:30:23,326 --> 00:30:25,160
same time as we've I think all 

820
00:30:25,160 --> 00:30:28,870
suggested we have to organize ourselves 

821
00:30:28,880 --> 00:30:31,030
not just within the services but with 

822
00:30:31,030 --> 00:30:33,990
our allies . I think Aucas in terms of 

823
00:30:33,990 --> 00:30:35,934
what's happened recently to send a 

824
00:30:35,934 --> 00:30:37,934
signal to china that it's a new day 

825
00:30:38,140 --> 00:30:40,170
when we took office together with 

826
00:30:40,180 --> 00:30:42,402
Britain Australia and the United States 

827
00:30:42,710 --> 00:30:45,120
building submarines for nuclear 

828
00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:47,960
submarines for Australia . Uh that is 

829
00:30:47,970 --> 00:30:50,280
beginning to operationalize what we 

830
00:30:50,280 --> 00:30:52,224
were thinking about in the pacific 

831
00:30:52,224 --> 00:30:54,280
Defense Initiative . I let's get our 

832
00:30:54,280 --> 00:30:56,580
allies together again , get them around 

833
00:30:56,580 --> 00:30:58,747
the table , get them out and see . But 

834
00:30:58,747 --> 00:31:00,747
when you now have a system that was 

835
00:31:00,747 --> 00:31:03,200
jointly produced and can communicate 

836
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:05,033
much more effectively with other 

837
00:31:05,033 --> 00:31:07,089
systems , both british United States 

838
00:31:07,140 --> 00:31:09,510
that adds to the forces of the chinese 

839
00:31:09,510 --> 00:31:12,420
are trying to do here . Um and some of 

840
00:31:12,420 --> 00:31:16,080
the programs that we invest in there 

841
00:31:16,090 --> 00:31:18,350
must be concerned about submarines are 

842
00:31:18,350 --> 00:31:21,020
still a significant factor in the 

843
00:31:21,020 --> 00:31:24,040
pacific and and we are , we have those 

844
00:31:24,050 --> 00:31:26,217
and we're gonna we're building more of 

845
00:31:26,217 --> 00:31:29,670
them . So we are trying to pursue 

846
00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:33,650
uh strengthening rapidly . But I think 

847
00:31:33,660 --> 00:31:37,570
again we 

848
00:31:37,570 --> 00:31:39,700
have to recognize and this makes it 

849
00:31:39,710 --> 00:31:41,488
much different I think than the 

850
00:31:41,488 --> 00:31:43,850
conflict of Cold War . This is a very 

851
00:31:44,340 --> 00:31:47,870
globally sophisticated economic power 

852
00:31:47,880 --> 00:31:50,640
which the soviet union wasn't and also 

853
00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:53,680
we're now in a situation where we have 

854
00:31:53,690 --> 00:31:57,690
much more obviously a global crisis of 

855
00:31:57,690 --> 00:32:01,480
climate change which might be more 

856
00:32:01,730 --> 00:32:03,952
not only destructive in the long term , 

857
00:32:04,010 --> 00:32:06,850
but more destabilizing . You know , if 

858
00:32:06,860 --> 00:32:10,030
what does china do when populations 

859
00:32:10,030 --> 00:32:13,570
start moving in or around them , et 

860
00:32:13,580 --> 00:32:15,720
cetera because of drought and other 

861
00:32:15,730 --> 00:32:17,940
situations . So again , I don't think 

862
00:32:17,940 --> 00:32:20,162
you've abandoned . And one last point I 

863
00:32:20,162 --> 00:32:22,230
want to make is that we have got to 

864
00:32:22,230 --> 00:32:25,460
have a way to communicate uh , 

865
00:32:25,830 --> 00:32:28,070
directly to their leadership in a 

866
00:32:28,070 --> 00:32:31,420
crisis situation because without that 

867
00:32:31,430 --> 00:32:33,652
you go to the point that general Berger 

868
00:32:33,652 --> 00:32:35,950
said somebody , you know , some kernel 

869
00:32:35,950 --> 00:32:39,560
decided that his mission is to go blow 

870
00:32:39,560 --> 00:32:41,980
up something and groups where you've 

871
00:32:41,980 --> 00:32:43,536
got to be able to have that 

872
00:32:43,536 --> 00:32:45,702
communication . So I would set that up 

873
00:32:45,702 --> 00:32:47,702
very quickly and we don't currently 

874
00:32:47,702 --> 00:32:49,813
have , I don't think we have the kind 

875
00:32:49,813 --> 00:32:52,147
of uh , and I'll defer to the secretary . 

876
00:32:52,147 --> 00:32:54,369
It's not , I mean , my understanding is 

877
00:32:54,369 --> 00:32:56,091
it's not always very real time 

878
00:32:56,091 --> 00:32:58,091
communication . I mean , you know , 

879
00:32:58,091 --> 00:32:59,924
there there is a hotline type of 

880
00:32:59,924 --> 00:33:02,990
configuration , but um , we don't have 

881
00:33:02,990 --> 00:33:05,212
the kind of pick up the phone talking , 

882
00:33:05,212 --> 00:33:07,323
a crisis capability that , you know , 

883
00:33:07,323 --> 00:33:09,323
we would like to have . And I think 

884
00:33:09,323 --> 00:33:11,323
that's because china is reticent to 

885
00:33:11,323 --> 00:33:13,046
have that given their style of 

886
00:33:13,046 --> 00:33:15,212
governing inside the Communist Party . 

887
00:33:15,212 --> 00:33:17,379
Yeah , that was gonna be my question , 

888
00:33:17,379 --> 00:33:17,290
what would it take to set something 

889
00:33:17,290 --> 00:33:19,290
like that up ? It's , I mean from , 

890
00:33:19,290 --> 00:33:21,512
from a layman's perspective , it sounds 

891
00:33:21,512 --> 00:33:23,820
like a pretty simple thing to do . Uh , 

892
00:33:23,830 --> 00:33:27,090
unfortunately , uh , culture is very 

893
00:33:27,090 --> 00:33:29,201
much determinative of things that are 

894
00:33:29,201 --> 00:33:31,420
easy to do and hard to do . I think 

895
00:33:31,420 --> 00:33:33,642
you've got to start , that's my point . 

896
00:33:33,642 --> 00:33:35,753
You've got to go to them and make the 

897
00:33:35,753 --> 00:33:37,753
point and we would be supported , I 

898
00:33:37,753 --> 00:33:39,642
think by everyone , including the 

899
00:33:39,642 --> 00:33:42,170
Russians that this is just a basic oh 

900
00:33:42,540 --> 00:33:44,770
predicate , particularly as they expand 

901
00:33:44,770 --> 00:33:48,170
their their nuclear capacity and we've , 

902
00:33:48,180 --> 00:33:50,291
you know , we for their protection as 

903
00:33:50,291 --> 00:33:52,291
well as ours . The other question I 

904
00:33:52,291 --> 00:33:54,458
have , and this is this is potentially 

905
00:33:54,458 --> 00:33:56,624
for you senator . Reid potentially for 

906
00:33:56,624 --> 00:33:56,390
your bridge or anybody else who wants 

907
00:33:56,390 --> 00:33:58,557
it , because I'm because I'm detecting 

908
00:33:58,557 --> 00:34:00,700
a little bit , I mean , the security 

909
00:34:00,700 --> 00:34:03,130
dilemma , I think is a concept that 

910
00:34:03,140 --> 00:34:05,950
remains selling it today . Um , and I'm 

911
00:34:05,950 --> 00:34:08,490
hearing it come out in terms of , okay , 

912
00:34:08,490 --> 00:34:10,601
well , we need to do a rapid build up 

913
00:34:10,601 --> 00:34:12,823
in the pacific and indo pay com to show 

914
00:34:12,823 --> 00:34:14,879
that we're serious . But then at the 

915
00:34:14,879 --> 00:34:16,879
same time , you know , bridge , you 

916
00:34:16,879 --> 00:34:18,657
said , the likeliest chance for 

917
00:34:18,657 --> 00:34:20,712
conflict is where is where the power 

918
00:34:20,712 --> 00:34:23,560
sees seize the window closing for for 

919
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:25,671
an opportunity to do something like a 

920
00:34:25,671 --> 00:34:27,838
charge of the light brigade across the 

921
00:34:27,838 --> 00:34:30,590
Taiwan strait or something . Um , so 

922
00:34:30,590 --> 00:34:33,200
how how do you think about the security 

923
00:34:33,200 --> 00:34:35,422
dilemma in this context ? And again , I 

924
00:34:35,422 --> 00:34:37,589
suppose this gets back to guardrails , 

925
00:34:37,589 --> 00:34:39,644
There's a question from the audience 

926
00:34:39,644 --> 00:34:39,620
about , you know , whether , whether 

927
00:34:39,620 --> 00:34:42,590
we're whether we're stumbling toward an 

928
00:34:42,590 --> 00:34:44,780
eventual war with china despite what's 

929
00:34:44,780 --> 00:34:48,220
being said publicly by officials ? Well , 

930
00:34:48,230 --> 00:34:50,940
I think there's a bridge brought up an 

931
00:34:50,940 --> 00:34:53,051
excellent point , are they looking at 

932
00:34:53,051 --> 00:34:56,260
us and saying , you know , the irony is 

933
00:34:56,490 --> 00:34:59,110
they finally figured out that we're 

934
00:34:59,110 --> 00:35:01,110
going to do something , but they're 

935
00:35:01,110 --> 00:35:03,332
going to if we give them time , they'll 

936
00:35:03,332 --> 00:35:05,630
comport us the other side . And it's 

937
00:35:05,640 --> 00:35:08,440
again , life is complicated is they're 

938
00:35:08,440 --> 00:35:10,551
also looking down the road internally 

939
00:35:10,551 --> 00:35:12,930
in china with incredible demographic 

940
00:35:12,930 --> 00:35:15,680
challenges , economic challenges , 

941
00:35:15,680 --> 00:35:17,970
etcetera . And the the other part of 

942
00:35:17,970 --> 00:35:20,081
the calculation might be , well , not 

943
00:35:20,081 --> 00:35:22,560
only are they building out , but we're 

944
00:35:22,560 --> 00:35:24,620
reaching perhaps the zenith of our 

945
00:35:24,630 --> 00:35:27,380
power or at least what we can devote to 

946
00:35:27,390 --> 00:35:29,612
military versus just taking care of our 

947
00:35:29,612 --> 00:35:32,530
people . So this is an issue I don't 

948
00:35:32,530 --> 00:35:34,808
think there's frankly a good answer to , 

949
00:35:34,900 --> 00:35:37,640
but that's why it's I think it's 

950
00:35:37,640 --> 00:35:41,330
necessary to take away the idea that 

951
00:35:41,340 --> 00:35:43,562
this would be easy whatever they wanted 

952
00:35:43,562 --> 00:35:45,284
to do , whether it's Taiwan or 

953
00:35:45,284 --> 00:35:47,740
elsewhere . And second to begin to talk 

954
00:35:47,740 --> 00:35:50,840
about , you know , how do we reach some 

955
00:35:50,840 --> 00:35:53,750
type of understanding and collaboration ? 

956
00:35:53,760 --> 00:35:56,870
So you two have to be joined . Yeah , 

957
00:35:56,870 --> 00:35:59,037
well , just to build on the chairman's 

958
00:35:59,037 --> 00:36:01,092
point and I think , I mean , I think 

959
00:36:01,092 --> 00:36:03,092
this is the other thing here is and 

960
00:36:03,092 --> 00:36:05,092
this is why the separate deterrence 

961
00:36:05,092 --> 00:36:05,040
initiative that he's led is so 

962
00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:07,040
important is not only that it helps 

963
00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:08,984
fill the gap , but it's manifestly 

964
00:36:08,984 --> 00:36:11,207
defensive . I mean , that's some at the 

965
00:36:11,207 --> 00:36:13,318
end of the day they can say what they 

966
00:36:13,318 --> 00:36:15,262
want , but this is in what general 

967
00:36:15,262 --> 00:36:14,990
burger and General Brown and others are 

968
00:36:14,990 --> 00:36:17,212
doing that . This is not a force that's 

969
00:36:17,212 --> 00:36:19,157
meant to be intrude on the chinese 

970
00:36:19,157 --> 00:36:21,323
mainland and dismember the territory . 

971
00:36:21,323 --> 00:36:23,546
It is a man is strike or what Secretary 

972
00:36:23,546 --> 00:36:25,657
warmth was talking about . Long range 

973
00:36:25,657 --> 00:36:25,500
strike . These are manifestly defensive 

974
00:36:25,500 --> 00:36:27,500
weapons now . They could be used to 

975
00:36:27,500 --> 00:36:29,611
strike the mainland but they couldn't 

976
00:36:29,611 --> 00:36:31,833
be realistically be used to uh you know 

977
00:36:31,833 --> 00:36:34,000
project and sustain uh you know ground 

978
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:36,056
power to to hold territory . So it's 

979
00:36:36,056 --> 00:36:38,278
very clearly designed for instance some 

980
00:36:38,278 --> 00:36:40,278
of the long range fires and and the 

981
00:36:40,278 --> 00:36:42,333
capabilities that are in P . D . I . 

982
00:36:42,333 --> 00:36:44,444
And that the army and the marines are 

983
00:36:44,444 --> 00:36:46,611
working . You know their ranges can be 

984
00:36:46,611 --> 00:36:46,600
limited so it's limited what they can 

985
00:36:46,600 --> 00:36:48,600
do . And I think that's the kind of 

986
00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:50,822
area where the security dilemma is very 

987
00:36:50,822 --> 00:36:52,600
real . I mean it's it's real as 

988
00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:54,822
chairman is putting it . I mean life is 

989
00:36:54,822 --> 00:36:56,878
complicated but we have to say , you 

990
00:36:56,878 --> 00:36:58,933
know to me it's like the the Federal 

991
00:36:58,933 --> 00:36:58,410
Reserve , you know you can't you can't 

992
00:36:58,410 --> 00:37:00,521
go too far one direction or the other 

993
00:37:00,521 --> 00:37:02,743
direction and now we need to err on the 

994
00:37:02,743 --> 00:37:04,910
side of of strength in order to get to 

995
00:37:04,910 --> 00:37:06,966
a place where we can be kind of more 

996
00:37:06,966 --> 00:37:09,077
moderate . But I think I think that's 

997
00:37:09,077 --> 00:37:11,299
the um that's the key challenge . But I 

998
00:37:11,299 --> 00:37:13,521
I really think you know and P . G . I . 

999
00:37:13,521 --> 00:37:15,688
Is very relevant now because it's also 

1000
00:37:15,688 --> 00:37:17,743
designed as I understand it and he's 

1001
00:37:17,743 --> 00:37:19,966
the expert of course but to help us get 

1002
00:37:19,966 --> 00:37:22,077
through this this nearer period which 

1003
00:37:22,077 --> 00:37:23,910
has tended to be neglected for a 

1004
00:37:23,910 --> 00:37:25,854
variety of institutional and other 

1005
00:37:25,854 --> 00:37:27,966
reasons , but but congress has really 

1006
00:37:27,966 --> 00:37:27,950
led the way on that and I think it's so 

1007
00:37:27,950 --> 00:37:30,061
critical that that that that happened 

1008
00:37:30,061 --> 00:37:32,172
because we do need to worry about the 

1009
00:37:32,172 --> 00:37:31,940
next two years and for some of the 

1010
00:37:31,940 --> 00:37:33,996
reasons that he mentioned as well as 

1011
00:37:33,996 --> 00:37:36,107
the one I mentioned , I think we also 

1012
00:37:36,107 --> 00:37:38,218
have to remember , you know , another 

1013
00:37:38,218 --> 00:37:40,440
really important piece of the deterrent 

1014
00:37:40,440 --> 00:37:42,810
picture is Taiwan itself and what 

1015
00:37:42,810 --> 00:37:46,170
Taiwan does to make itself much 

1016
00:37:46,170 --> 00:37:49,750
more um much , much less easy to 

1017
00:37:49,750 --> 00:37:51,861
swallow if you will . You know , some 

1018
00:37:51,861 --> 00:37:53,972
people use the word porcupine or what 

1019
00:37:53,972 --> 00:37:56,139
have you , but you know , I remember I 

1020
00:37:56,139 --> 00:37:58,250
I actually went to Taiwan 100 million 

1021
00:37:58,250 --> 00:38:00,250
years ago when I was a young action 

1022
00:38:00,250 --> 00:38:02,417
officer in the office of the Secretary 

1023
00:38:02,417 --> 00:38:04,639
of Defense and you know , the Taiwanese 

1024
00:38:04,639 --> 00:38:06,806
then we're very much attracted to sort 

1025
00:38:06,806 --> 00:38:08,861
of buying all of the shiny objects , 

1026
00:38:08,861 --> 00:38:10,917
you know , fighter planes and things 

1027
00:38:10,917 --> 00:38:13,610
like that when um really now when you 

1028
00:38:13,610 --> 00:38:15,554
talk about urgency in the way that 

1029
00:38:15,554 --> 00:38:17,777
bridge is talking about it , you know , 

1030
00:38:17,777 --> 00:38:19,666
we need Taiwan to be investing in 

1031
00:38:19,666 --> 00:38:22,130
things like sea mines in anti ship 

1032
00:38:22,130 --> 00:38:24,050
missiles , in coastal defense and 

1033
00:38:24,050 --> 00:38:25,994
really working on the readiness of 

1034
00:38:25,994 --> 00:38:28,217
their forces . I mean , you know what , 

1035
00:38:28,217 --> 00:38:30,380
you know , at what level of unit can 

1036
00:38:30,380 --> 00:38:32,713
the Taiwanese army for example , really , 

1037
00:38:32,713 --> 00:38:34,769
you know , what's their readiness at 

1038
00:38:34,769 --> 00:38:37,047
kind of the battalion or brigade level . 

1039
00:38:37,047 --> 00:38:39,324
So that's something I think , you know , 

1040
00:38:39,324 --> 00:38:41,269
we need to all be messaging to the 

1041
00:38:41,269 --> 00:38:43,491
Taiwanese government . You know , it is 

1042
00:38:43,491 --> 00:38:45,324
time past time to get after it . 

1043
00:38:45,324 --> 00:38:47,324
Absolutely . Um and this is another 

1044
00:38:47,324 --> 00:38:49,491
question from the audience . I'm sorry 

1045
00:38:49,491 --> 00:38:51,500
to pick on you , chairman . But the 

1046
00:38:51,510 --> 00:38:53,566
question is how do we keep pace with 

1047
00:38:53,566 --> 00:38:55,566
China under a budget process ? That 

1048
00:38:55,566 --> 00:38:57,621
hasn't changed since Robert McNamara 

1049
00:38:57,621 --> 00:38:59,820
instituted it in the 1960s . I 

1050
00:38:59,830 --> 00:39:00,830
submitted that 

1051
00:39:00,830 --> 00:39:04,250
question . 

1052
00:39:05,230 --> 00:39:08,600
Uh , you're absolutely right . 

1053
00:39:08,610 --> 00:39:12,470
We have in language of the 

1054
00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:14,730
agenda that we're currently negotiating 

1055
00:39:15,120 --> 00:39:18,390
a commission first , that's going to go 

1056
00:39:18,390 --> 00:39:21,620
and take apart PP B . E . 

1057
00:39:21,720 --> 00:39:24,470
And we have to come up with a different 

1058
00:39:24,470 --> 00:39:26,581
way to do business . I think everyone 

1059
00:39:26,581 --> 00:39:29,060
who spoke today on this issue said it's 

1060
00:39:29,060 --> 00:39:31,116
too long . The valley of death , the 

1061
00:39:31,116 --> 00:39:33,282
Secretary of Defense said we're that's 

1062
00:39:33,282 --> 00:39:35,504
one of our major priorities . One of my 

1063
00:39:35,504 --> 00:39:37,940
major priorities in the committee is to 

1064
00:39:37,940 --> 00:39:41,400
try to make it simpler and more 

1065
00:39:41,400 --> 00:39:45,330
effective to Um get things done 

1066
00:39:45,340 --> 00:39:47,570
in the pentagon . We've made some small 

1067
00:39:47,800 --> 00:39:51,170
adjustments . We gave the services uh 

1068
00:39:51,180 --> 00:39:53,291
sort of freedom to spend up to what I 

1069
00:39:53,291 --> 00:39:55,458
think the total now is five million or 

1070
00:39:55,458 --> 00:39:57,680
15 . Yeah . So they can do , you know , 

1071
00:39:57,680 --> 00:39:59,680
small acquisitions , but we have to 

1072
00:39:59,680 --> 00:40:01,736
think beyond that , you know , maybe 

1073
00:40:01,736 --> 00:40:03,902
it's a much larger total where there's 

1074
00:40:03,902 --> 00:40:06,013
autonomy for the agency , the service 

1075
00:40:06,013 --> 00:40:08,069
to do it . But no , the PPB we're we 

1076
00:40:08,069 --> 00:40:10,870
are in a 1960 model which worked very 

1077
00:40:10,870 --> 00:40:13,380
well industrial age . But this is the 

1078
00:40:13,460 --> 00:40:16,380
cyber age and you know , two years , 

1079
00:40:16,380 --> 00:40:19,370
you know , I'm sure that back in 1960 , 

1080
00:40:19,380 --> 00:40:22,340
uh Secretary McNamara , you know , 

1081
00:40:22,350 --> 00:40:24,517
could design afford for five years and 

1082
00:40:24,517 --> 00:40:27,700
then market it . You can't do , you 

1083
00:40:27,700 --> 00:40:29,644
know , software for five years and 

1084
00:40:29,644 --> 00:40:31,700
marketed . Forget it . So we have to 

1085
00:40:31,700 --> 00:40:33,867
get there . We understand that . And I 

1086
00:40:33,867 --> 00:40:35,978
think you're going to see both in the 

1087
00:40:35,978 --> 00:40:37,978
department because the secretary is 

1088
00:40:37,978 --> 00:40:40,200
concerned about this too . He mentioned 

1089
00:40:40,200 --> 00:40:42,422
it and in the congress ways that we can 

1090
00:40:42,422 --> 00:40:44,200
cut out some of the unnecessary 

1091
00:40:44,610 --> 00:40:46,832
paperwork that you have to do . And I'm 

1092
00:40:46,832 --> 00:40:48,999
assuming you're no fan of crs either . 

1093
00:40:48,999 --> 00:40:52,020
Is there ? How what are the prospects 

1094
00:40:52,610 --> 00:40:54,950
for getting a defense budget passed in 

1095
00:40:54,950 --> 00:40:58,580
a timely fashion ? Uh , I'm not a 

1096
00:40:58,580 --> 00:41:01,320
fantasy are for for all the reasons I , 

1097
00:41:01,330 --> 00:41:03,552
my estimate is that the department will 

1098
00:41:03,552 --> 00:41:06,530
lose $36 billion cr for the year . 

1099
00:41:07,110 --> 00:41:09,221
That's a rough estimate . But it also 

1100
00:41:09,221 --> 00:41:11,221
paralyzes , I think many people say 

1101
00:41:11,350 --> 00:41:13,730
their ability to do anything . And it's 

1102
00:41:13,740 --> 00:41:15,962
ironically , we've been talking about , 

1103
00:41:15,962 --> 00:41:18,630
you know , china , I think they they're 

1104
00:41:18,630 --> 00:41:20,870
they're really big fans of Crs , they 

1105
00:41:20,870 --> 00:41:23,000
like crs we've got to get a budget 

1106
00:41:23,000 --> 00:41:25,770
passed . We're out to february uh , now 

1107
00:41:25,780 --> 00:41:28,970
and that we can't go beyond that . 

1108
00:41:28,980 --> 00:41:31,147
We've got to get it done and we've got 

1109
00:41:31,147 --> 00:41:33,424
to get the resources to the department . 

1110
00:41:34,490 --> 00:41:36,530
But I mean as an elected official 

1111
00:41:36,540 --> 00:41:38,670
because because here we hear a lot of 

1112
00:41:38,680 --> 00:41:41,200
about , oh how great how bipartisan it 

1113
00:41:41,200 --> 00:41:43,533
is that everybody is finally , you know , 

1114
00:41:43,533 --> 00:41:45,422
you saw that graph , everybody is 

1115
00:41:45,422 --> 00:41:47,644
finally waking up to the china threat . 

1116
00:41:47,644 --> 00:41:49,867
And yet when it , when it comes to nuts 

1117
00:41:49,867 --> 00:41:52,089
and bolts sort of in Congress , somehow 

1118
00:41:52,089 --> 00:41:54,200
that bipartisanship evaporates , what 

1119
00:41:54,200 --> 00:41:54,060
do you think it's going to take to ? 

1120
00:41:55,610 --> 00:41:58,840
Well , I , I hope it doesn't take a 

1121
00:41:58,850 --> 00:42:01,210
serious wake up call . I hope we can 

1122
00:42:01,210 --> 00:42:05,020
get up on our own . And you know , 

1123
00:42:05,020 --> 00:42:07,750
one of the things that I believe will 

1124
00:42:07,750 --> 00:42:11,080
help us get ultimately our omnibus 

1125
00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:14,760
budget is the realization that defense 

1126
00:42:14,760 --> 00:42:17,370
spending cannot be squeezed so 

1127
00:42:17,370 --> 00:42:20,690
difficult and so significantly . Uh in 

1128
00:42:20,690 --> 00:42:22,857
fact , that's , you know , sort of the 

1129
00:42:22,857 --> 00:42:26,260
leverage on our side is the defense 

1130
00:42:26,260 --> 00:42:28,870
budget and you know , we also want to 

1131
00:42:28,880 --> 00:42:31,730
fund other programs , but I think that 

1132
00:42:31,730 --> 00:42:33,563
would probably get my republican 

1133
00:42:33,563 --> 00:42:35,563
colleagues more interested in being 

1134
00:42:35,563 --> 00:42:38,190
supportive than anything else . I would 

1135
00:42:38,190 --> 00:42:41,460
like to turn to the survey results from , 

1136
00:42:41,470 --> 00:42:43,800
from the Reagan Institute poll that 

1137
00:42:43,800 --> 00:42:46,570
they did . I think it generally takes a 

1138
00:42:46,570 --> 00:42:48,737
few seconds to get the slide up here . 

1139
00:42:48,737 --> 00:42:50,780
So I'll just tee it up while we're 

1140
00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:53,650
there we go . Um , so this , this one 

1141
00:42:53,650 --> 00:42:57,170
is a little bit confusing . So I'm I'm 

1142
00:42:57,170 --> 00:42:59,150
just gonna , I'm gonna give some 

1143
00:42:59,150 --> 00:43:01,230
context to it . Um , and and the 

1144
00:43:01,230 --> 00:43:03,341
questions that were asked surrounding 

1145
00:43:03,341 --> 00:43:05,260
it on the question , the Reagan 

1146
00:43:05,260 --> 00:43:07,260
Institute asked the question of the 

1147
00:43:07,260 --> 00:43:09,427
single greatest concern americans have 

1148
00:43:09,427 --> 00:43:12,120
regarding china again , given the slide , 

1149
00:43:12,120 --> 00:43:13,842
we all saw earlier that it's a 

1150
00:43:13,842 --> 00:43:15,676
bipartisan concern and china has 

1151
00:43:15,676 --> 00:43:17,842
overtaken every other nation as a as a 

1152
00:43:17,842 --> 00:43:19,676
key threat , perceived threat to 

1153
00:43:19,676 --> 00:43:22,310
americans . Um The greatest concern of 

1154
00:43:22,310 --> 00:43:24,900
five options given the prospect of 

1155
00:43:24,900 --> 00:43:27,120
china invading Taiwan is the bottom of 

1156
00:43:27,120 --> 00:43:29,860
the concern list . So 77% were worried 

1157
00:43:29,860 --> 00:43:32,340
about it . Six out of 10 americans 

1158
00:43:32,350 --> 00:43:36,230
view Taiwan as an ally . Um 

1159
00:43:36,700 --> 00:43:39,300
However , assuming a Taiwan invasion , 

1160
00:43:39,700 --> 00:43:43,360
71 percent of respondents support 

1161
00:43:43,360 --> 00:43:45,700
recognizing Taiwan as an independent 

1162
00:43:45,710 --> 00:43:48,090
country . Um and then and then other 

1163
00:43:48,090 --> 00:43:51,510
results , you know , it drops off for 

1164
00:43:51,520 --> 00:43:54,090
other types of military response is 

1165
00:43:54,100 --> 00:43:57,290
what we what we see on this chart here 

1166
00:43:57,290 --> 00:43:59,910
is it's actually showing the movement 

1167
00:43:59,920 --> 00:44:02,031
from from the last time they did this 

1168
00:44:02,031 --> 00:44:04,200
survey survey , the movement of people 

1169
00:44:04,200 --> 00:44:06,350
who oppose this or don't don't know 

1170
00:44:06,360 --> 00:44:09,350
what what they would like to see . And 

1171
00:44:09,350 --> 00:44:11,017
so what you're seeing is that 

1172
00:44:11,017 --> 00:44:13,183
opposition opposition to some of these 

1173
00:44:13,183 --> 00:44:15,780
responses is going down . Um but more 

1174
00:44:15,780 --> 00:44:17,891
people are moving into the don't know 

1175
00:44:17,891 --> 00:44:20,750
category which uh which makes sense to 

1176
00:44:20,750 --> 00:44:22,861
me because it bespeaks a certain kind 

1177
00:44:22,861 --> 00:44:24,861
of confusion about about what we're 

1178
00:44:24,861 --> 00:44:27,460
actually about out there . Um and so I 

1179
00:44:27,460 --> 00:44:31,210
I just wanted to put to all of you what 

1180
00:44:31,220 --> 00:44:33,442
what you think the appropriate messages 

1181
00:44:33,442 --> 00:44:35,609
for the american people with regard to 

1182
00:44:35,609 --> 00:44:37,750
our commitments ambiguous as they may 

1183
00:44:37,750 --> 00:44:40,410
be towards Taiwan and why this is in 

1184
00:44:40,410 --> 00:44:43,380
our interest . Yes , well , I think the 

1185
00:44:43,380 --> 00:44:47,290
most important message is that it's 

1186
00:44:47,290 --> 00:44:50,570
not specifically about Taiwan and in 

1187
00:44:50,570 --> 00:44:52,737
some respects , it's not about china , 

1188
00:44:52,737 --> 00:44:55,680
it's about maintaining a system of 

1189
00:44:55,680 --> 00:44:59,430
international law and interaction which 

1190
00:44:59,430 --> 00:45:01,650
has persisted because of the United 

1191
00:45:01,650 --> 00:45:03,820
States , primarily for decades and 

1192
00:45:03,820 --> 00:45:05,990
decades and decades . Its freedom of 

1193
00:45:05,990 --> 00:45:08,760
navigation , it's being able to to move 

1194
00:45:08,760 --> 00:45:12,710
about and it's also to advance uh not 

1195
00:45:14,190 --> 00:45:16,023
principally by coercion , but by 

1196
00:45:16,023 --> 00:45:19,220
example , our ideals of freedom 

1197
00:45:19,590 --> 00:45:22,910
of individual respect and 

1198
00:45:22,910 --> 00:45:26,600
autonomy , et cetera . And that is a 

1199
00:45:26,610 --> 00:45:29,770
notion that we share with many other 

1200
00:45:29,770 --> 00:45:32,640
countries . And so this is basically 

1201
00:45:32,650 --> 00:45:36,080
maintaining uh you know , the 

1202
00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:39,610
world that we grew up in which is one 

1203
00:45:39,610 --> 00:45:43,380
of of law and not autocracy and one 

1204
00:45:43,390 --> 00:45:47,310
of um free trade which was 

1205
00:45:47,320 --> 00:45:50,340
was prosperity that is fairly widely 

1206
00:45:50,340 --> 00:45:52,284
distributed , including the United 

1207
00:45:52,284 --> 00:45:54,284
States and that's that's what we're 

1208
00:45:54,284 --> 00:45:57,010
trying to do . I think focusing in on 

1209
00:45:57,390 --> 00:46:00,760
you know , specific issues people you 

1210
00:46:00,760 --> 00:46:03,520
know , that category don't know , grows 

1211
00:46:03,520 --> 00:46:05,520
a lot . And the only final point is 

1212
00:46:05,520 --> 00:46:08,420
that a lot of I think what is being 

1213
00:46:08,420 --> 00:46:12,390
seen now in china is another 

1214
00:46:12,390 --> 00:46:14,970
fallout from the pandemic associating 

1215
00:46:14,970 --> 00:46:17,192
china with the pandemic ? We don't like 

1216
00:46:17,192 --> 00:46:19,359
those people that are twitter and that 

1217
00:46:19,359 --> 00:46:20,950
factor has to be put in 

1218
00:46:23,280 --> 00:46:25,391
secretary . Do you think there's room 

1219
00:46:25,391 --> 00:46:27,558
for clarity , what what would you want 

1220
00:46:27,558 --> 00:46:29,780
to explain to to move people out of the 

1221
00:46:29,780 --> 00:46:31,947
don't know category . Well , I thought 

1222
00:46:31,947 --> 00:46:33,891
one of the most interesting things 

1223
00:46:33,891 --> 00:46:36,058
about the survey results was it seemed 

1224
00:46:36,058 --> 00:46:38,170
to me to indicate sort of a both an 

1225
00:46:38,180 --> 00:46:40,347
openness and an interest in wanting to 

1226
00:46:40,347 --> 00:46:42,458
better understand sort of what , what 

1227
00:46:42,458 --> 00:46:44,513
the stakes are for the United States 

1228
00:46:44,513 --> 00:46:46,513
and the indo pacific and you know , 

1229
00:46:46,513 --> 00:46:48,791
this is framed obviously around Taiwan , 

1230
00:46:48,791 --> 00:46:50,791
but also the fact , I think that it 

1231
00:46:50,791 --> 00:46:52,791
shows that , you know , we probably 

1232
00:46:52,791 --> 00:46:54,958
need to be doing more to talk about to 

1233
00:46:54,958 --> 00:46:57,069
the american public , what the stakes 

1234
00:46:57,069 --> 00:46:59,124
really are for the country and why , 

1235
00:46:59,124 --> 00:47:01,460
you know , a small island called Taiwan 

1236
00:47:01,470 --> 00:47:04,060
matters to americans , you know , all 

1237
00:47:04,060 --> 00:47:05,949
around the country . I mean , for 

1238
00:47:05,949 --> 00:47:07,782
example , in my hometown college 

1239
00:47:07,782 --> 00:47:09,949
station and I think um you know , when 

1240
00:47:09,949 --> 00:47:12,004
I think about it , you know , one of 

1241
00:47:12,004 --> 00:47:14,060
the other things that keeps me up at 

1242
00:47:14,060 --> 00:47:16,227
night is the , is the possibility that 

1243
00:47:16,227 --> 00:47:18,060
china continues to sort of , and 

1244
00:47:18,060 --> 00:47:20,282
Secretary Austin , I think talked about 

1245
00:47:20,282 --> 00:47:22,393
this in his keynote continues to sort 

1246
00:47:22,393 --> 00:47:25,450
of export the tools of authoritarianism 

1247
00:47:25,450 --> 00:47:28,000
and um you know , sort of a 

1248
00:47:28,000 --> 00:47:30,167
surveillance state if you will . And I 

1249
00:47:30,167 --> 00:47:32,280
think , you know , we , you know , I 

1250
00:47:32,280 --> 00:47:34,391
certainly don't want to see that um , 

1251
00:47:34,391 --> 00:47:36,447
spreading around the world , I don't 

1252
00:47:36,447 --> 00:47:38,502
want to see them eroding the current 

1253
00:47:38,502 --> 00:47:40,724
international order , which I think has 

1254
00:47:40,724 --> 00:47:43,002
kind of helped raise everybody's boats . 

1255
00:47:43,002 --> 00:47:45,360
And to me it's um making it clear to 

1256
00:47:45,360 --> 00:47:47,880
china that they can't violate the laws 

1257
00:47:47,880 --> 00:47:51,070
of territorial sovereignty is why 

1258
00:47:51,070 --> 00:47:53,292
Taiwan matters because we want the indo 

1259
00:47:53,292 --> 00:47:56,510
pacific to remain stable and free , but 

1260
00:47:56,510 --> 00:47:59,170
I think that that's not talked about 

1261
00:47:59,170 --> 00:48:01,170
very often , you know , we don't we 

1262
00:48:01,170 --> 00:48:03,337
don't talk enough about the stakes for 

1263
00:48:03,337 --> 00:48:05,337
our country in the indo pacific and 

1264
00:48:05,337 --> 00:48:07,559
it's also difficult by design difficult 

1265
00:48:07,559 --> 00:48:09,614
to talk about Taiwan's sovereignty , 

1266
00:48:09,614 --> 00:48:12,030
which is not something we absolutely um 

1267
00:48:12,040 --> 00:48:15,710
general burger . Do you perhaps a 

1268
00:48:15,710 --> 00:48:17,932
couple of thoughts first ? I think it's 

1269
00:48:17,932 --> 00:48:20,850
the wrong question . This assumes 

1270
00:48:20,860 --> 00:48:24,080
well by that , I mean it's probably 

1271
00:48:24,080 --> 00:48:27,020
helpful to some but this assumes 

1272
00:48:27,030 --> 00:48:29,720
strategy has failed , this assumes 

1273
00:48:29,720 --> 00:48:32,600
deterrence has failed . More important 

1274
00:48:32,610 --> 00:48:34,832
or before that is what is it , what are 

1275
00:48:34,832 --> 00:48:36,943
we willing to do to prevent that from 

1276
00:48:36,943 --> 00:48:38,999
happening ? So this assumes strategy 

1277
00:48:38,999 --> 00:48:42,010
failure which we don't . Um but that 

1278
00:48:42,010 --> 00:48:44,232
said maybe a couple of other thoughts . 

1279
00:48:44,232 --> 00:48:46,870
There's nothing on there . I saw about 

1280
00:48:46,880 --> 00:48:48,880
our what we would do to rally the 

1281
00:48:48,880 --> 00:48:50,769
allies partners part this is this 

1282
00:48:50,769 --> 00:48:53,730
paints it is bilateral US china very 

1283
00:48:53,730 --> 00:48:56,250
dangerous . I believe we would be 

1284
00:48:56,250 --> 00:48:58,250
pretty active with everybody in the 

1285
00:48:58,250 --> 00:49:01,000
region in sort of a collective manner . 

1286
00:49:01,000 --> 00:49:02,833
What's our response , not the US 

1287
00:49:02,833 --> 00:49:04,833
responsible ? What's the collective 

1288
00:49:04,833 --> 00:49:06,833
response ? 3rd part , I think it is 

1289
00:49:06,833 --> 00:49:09,000
healthy though to start to have a menu 

1290
00:49:09,000 --> 00:49:11,056
too . Think about this as a whole of 

1291
00:49:11,056 --> 00:49:13,278
government response , not just what are 

1292
00:49:13,278 --> 00:49:15,389
we gonna do with our military if they 

1293
00:49:15,389 --> 00:49:17,556
invade Taiwan ? This starts America to 

1294
00:49:17,556 --> 00:49:19,500
think about , okay , we have other 

1295
00:49:19,500 --> 00:49:21,667
tools , we're gonna need , all of them 

1296
00:49:21,667 --> 00:49:23,670
against this pacing threat . We're 

1297
00:49:23,670 --> 00:49:26,040
gonna need all of that and more . It's 

1298
00:49:26,040 --> 00:49:28,110
not just what would we do with our 

1299
00:49:28,110 --> 00:49:30,860
military from that aspect . I think 

1300
00:49:30,860 --> 00:49:34,320
it's healthy . Well , I think it's very 

1301
00:49:34,320 --> 00:49:36,542
interesting poll , I think that the the 

1302
00:49:36,542 --> 00:49:38,542
overall growth in the perception of 

1303
00:49:38,542 --> 00:49:40,542
china as a as the primary threat is 

1304
00:49:40,542 --> 00:49:42,598
very noteworthy across the political 

1305
00:49:42,598 --> 00:49:44,764
spectrum . But also what's interesting 

1306
00:49:44,764 --> 00:49:46,487
to me and and from this really 

1307
00:49:46,487 --> 00:49:46,190
important poll and how the Reagan 

1308
00:49:46,190 --> 00:49:48,301
institute has attracted over a number 

1309
00:49:48,301 --> 00:49:50,470
of years is actually that , you know , 

1310
00:49:50,470 --> 00:49:52,470
you could have a situation in which 

1311
00:49:52,470 --> 00:49:54,359
people saw the threat of of china 

1312
00:49:54,359 --> 00:49:56,414
rising but didn't didn't support for 

1313
00:49:56,414 --> 00:49:58,581
for intervening on Taiwan's behalf did 

1314
00:49:58,581 --> 00:50:00,692
not grow and that's not what happened 

1315
00:50:00,692 --> 00:50:02,748
actually . They do move in tandem it 

1316
00:50:02,748 --> 00:50:04,859
seems . And I think you what you show 

1317
00:50:04,859 --> 00:50:04,760
actually they don't know . And we were 

1318
00:50:04,760 --> 00:50:06,760
talking about this with some of the 

1319
00:50:06,760 --> 00:50:08,816
Reagans to people earlier . I mean I 

1320
00:50:08,816 --> 00:50:08,680
actually think that's reasonable . I 

1321
00:50:08,680 --> 00:50:10,958
mean these are pretty technical issues . 

1322
00:50:10,958 --> 00:50:13,069
I mean , even people in this room may 

1323
00:50:13,069 --> 00:50:15,013
not know all the various bells and 

1324
00:50:15,013 --> 00:50:17,236
whistles politically and diplomatically 

1325
00:50:17,236 --> 00:50:17,070
associated with some of these things . 

1326
00:50:17,080 --> 00:50:19,620
So I think what it's saying is actually 

1327
00:50:19,620 --> 00:50:21,564
the general burgers point . Okay , 

1328
00:50:21,564 --> 00:50:23,342
what's the strategy then ? What 

1329
00:50:23,342 --> 00:50:25,453
Secretary warmth was saying about how 

1330
00:50:25,453 --> 00:50:27,564
does this fit into the bigger picture 

1331
00:50:27,564 --> 00:50:29,620
and then like what's the plan here . 

1332
00:50:29,620 --> 00:50:31,676
But it's it's showing to me that the 

1333
00:50:31,676 --> 00:50:33,898
american people are willing to consider 

1334
00:50:33,898 --> 00:50:35,953
this very seriously , you know , and 

1335
00:50:35,953 --> 00:50:38,120
they understand the challenge from the 

1336
00:50:38,120 --> 00:50:40,231
primary rival , but they kind of into 

1337
00:50:40,231 --> 00:50:42,398
it the importance . I mean , I often I 

1338
00:50:42,398 --> 00:50:41,800
don't know , I mean , you know , 

1339
00:50:41,810 --> 00:50:43,921
Chairman Reed deals with people , you 

1340
00:50:43,921 --> 00:50:46,088
know , more more voters . But I mean , 

1341
00:50:46,088 --> 00:50:48,310
I get the sense actually that the china 

1342
00:50:48,310 --> 00:50:50,477
sense and I think this poll shows it , 

1343
00:50:50,477 --> 00:50:52,699
people get it out there , they felt the 

1344
00:50:52,699 --> 00:50:51,730
impact of deindustrialization , 

1345
00:50:51,730 --> 00:50:53,452
obviously the pandemic that he 

1346
00:50:53,452 --> 00:50:55,619
mentioned so forth . So so they get it 

1347
00:50:55,619 --> 00:50:57,730
and now they're kind of willing to to 

1348
00:50:57,730 --> 00:50:59,730
hear , okay , well , what's the way 

1349
00:50:59,730 --> 00:51:01,730
that we do this ? And so that's but 

1350
00:51:01,730 --> 00:51:03,619
that's ultimately on the national 

1351
00:51:03,619 --> 00:51:05,730
security establishment , whatever you 

1352
00:51:05,730 --> 00:51:05,310
wanna call it , to come up with a 

1353
00:51:05,310 --> 00:51:07,421
coherent plan , it's not people's job 

1354
00:51:07,421 --> 00:51:09,477
to come off the the factory floor or 

1355
00:51:09,477 --> 00:51:11,477
the law firm or whatever and figure 

1356
00:51:11,477 --> 00:51:13,588
this out . It's kind of our job , you 

1357
00:51:13,588 --> 00:51:15,366
know , large to say this is the 

1358
00:51:15,366 --> 00:51:17,588
coherent plan and we're gonna get ahead 

1359
00:51:17,588 --> 00:51:19,532
of the problem . And that's what I 

1360
00:51:19,532 --> 00:51:21,643
think we've really got to focus on is 

1361
00:51:21,643 --> 00:51:21,370
trying to get ahead out there . So we 

1362
00:51:21,370 --> 00:51:23,592
don't get to your point general that we 

1363
00:51:23,592 --> 00:51:25,759
don't get to this point . God forbid . 

1364
00:51:25,860 --> 00:51:28,027
I should also say just quickly , since 

1365
00:51:28,027 --> 00:51:30,249
these are relative numbers , um half of 

1366
00:51:30,249 --> 00:51:32,460
Americans according to this poll would 

1367
00:51:32,460 --> 00:51:34,830
support establishing again , in the 

1368
00:51:34,830 --> 00:51:37,310
unlikely event the strategy fails . Um 

1369
00:51:37,320 --> 00:51:39,240
half of Americans would support 

1370
00:51:39,240 --> 00:51:41,240
establishing a no fly zone over the 

1371
00:51:41,240 --> 00:51:43,462
area , which is a pretty large number , 

1372
00:51:43,462 --> 00:51:46,390
although again , 25% didn't know um and 

1373
00:51:46,390 --> 00:51:48,057
only four in 10 would support 

1374
00:51:48,057 --> 00:51:50,279
committing U . S . Ground troops to the 

1375
00:51:50,279 --> 00:51:52,390
defense of Taiwan . But sorry Kathy I 

1376
00:51:52,390 --> 00:51:54,446
think the number opposing the use of 

1377
00:51:54,446 --> 00:51:54,260
ground troops in Taiwan is actually 

1378
00:51:54,260 --> 00:51:56,427
lower than that . So it's right . It's 

1379
00:51:56,427 --> 00:51:58,593
kind of isn't it ? If I'm not mistaken 

1380
00:51:58,593 --> 00:52:02,410
35 good 350.35% would oppose . So it's 

1381
00:52:02,410 --> 00:52:04,850
kind of to me it suggests like an 

1382
00:52:04,850 --> 00:52:07,017
unsettled and and I mean ground troops 

1383
00:52:07,017 --> 00:52:08,920
is obviously is a huge escalation 

1384
00:52:08,920 --> 00:52:10,864
actually it's one of the three red 

1385
00:52:10,864 --> 00:52:12,920
lines which so but it just shows you 

1386
00:52:12,920 --> 00:52:14,976
that to me that's not not to quibble 

1387
00:52:14,976 --> 00:52:17,142
but that people are kind of okay we're 

1388
00:52:17,142 --> 00:52:19,364
willing to do some hairy stuff but give 

1389
00:52:19,364 --> 00:52:21,476
us a plan MS warden . Do you have any 

1390
00:52:21,476 --> 00:52:23,698
more comments and I do on this matter ? 

1391
00:52:23,698 --> 00:52:25,920
And we saw this morning the increase in 

1392
00:52:25,920 --> 00:52:28,031
the american public saying they don't 

1393
00:52:28,031 --> 00:52:30,142
know what the appropriate response is 

1394
00:52:30,142 --> 00:52:32,253
is a message to us that we need to be 

1395
00:52:32,253 --> 00:52:34,309
discussing national security matters 

1396
00:52:34,309 --> 00:52:36,587
more with the american public not less . 

1397
00:52:36,587 --> 00:52:38,890
And you know I go home at night and 

1398
00:52:38,890 --> 00:52:40,940
read the D . O . D . S . Military 

1399
00:52:40,950 --> 00:52:43,180
report on chinese capability . Most 

1400
00:52:43,180 --> 00:52:45,960
americans don't do that . And I talked 

1401
00:52:45,960 --> 00:52:48,930
to a very learned individuals other C . 

1402
00:52:48,930 --> 00:52:51,180
E . O . S . They're not doing that . So 

1403
00:52:51,180 --> 00:52:53,800
we have to serve up information and 

1404
00:52:53,800 --> 00:52:56,380
digestible ways to the american public 

1405
00:52:56,450 --> 00:52:58,390
if we want them to be able to be 

1406
00:52:58,390 --> 00:53:00,446
informed when we ask a question like 

1407
00:53:00,446 --> 00:53:02,557
this . If we want them to be informed 

1408
00:53:02,557 --> 00:53:04,480
as voters about what their 

1409
00:53:04,480 --> 00:53:06,591
representatives in Congress should be 

1410
00:53:06,591 --> 00:53:08,813
supporting from a budgetary perspective 

1411
00:53:08,813 --> 00:53:10,758
and if we want them to support our 

1412
00:53:10,758 --> 00:53:12,869
military and other senior leaders and 

1413
00:53:12,869 --> 00:53:14,980
taking action when necessary . I just 

1414
00:53:14,980 --> 00:53:17,147
think this is a really important issue 

1415
00:53:17,147 --> 00:53:19,424
for us , not specific to this question , 

1416
00:53:19,424 --> 00:53:22,200
but much more broadly . I suppose the 

1417
00:53:22,200 --> 00:53:24,800
media has a role to play in it . Um 

1418
00:53:24,810 --> 00:53:27,330
well , I think we're just about running 

1419
00:53:27,330 --> 00:53:29,441
out of time if there's an if you want 

1420
00:53:29,441 --> 00:53:31,497
to do a lightning round of like what 

1421
00:53:31,497 --> 00:53:33,663
what country are we ignoring or what , 

1422
00:53:33,663 --> 00:53:35,830
what big thing have we left out ? No , 

1423
00:53:36,050 --> 00:53:39,760
but if you want a 

1424
00:53:39,760 --> 00:53:42,070
lightning round , uh when when we think 

1425
00:53:42,070 --> 00:53:44,490
about conflict with china , we also 

1426
00:53:44,490 --> 00:53:47,230
better think about escalation because 

1427
00:53:47,240 --> 00:53:50,890
when you get there , uh the options 

1428
00:53:50,900 --> 00:53:53,740
diminished quickly and significantly 

1429
00:53:53,750 --> 00:53:56,150
and that's something we have to worry 

1430
00:53:56,150 --> 00:53:58,317
about . You know , that's another stay 

1431
00:53:58,317 --> 00:54:01,320
up that late at night , one minute , 

1432
00:54:01,330 --> 00:54:04,760
any escalation is already happening , 

1433
00:54:04,760 --> 00:54:06,982
particularly in the cyber and the space 

1434
00:54:06,982 --> 00:54:09,204
domain and that again , is an area that 

1435
00:54:09,204 --> 00:54:12,330
isn't very public , but very important 

1436
00:54:12,330 --> 00:54:14,600
for us to recognize that this isn't a 

1437
00:54:14,610 --> 00:54:17,610
red line that is going to be crossed 

1438
00:54:17,610 --> 00:54:19,666
and we all know it , I think it is a 

1439
00:54:19,666 --> 00:54:21,832
gradual escalation as the senator said 

1440
00:54:21,832 --> 00:54:25,580
and one that is quite finessed . Maybe 

1441
00:54:25,580 --> 00:54:28,080
I'll just say building on Kathy's point . 

1442
00:54:28,080 --> 00:54:29,969
I mean , I think it's critical to 

1443
00:54:29,969 --> 00:54:32,080
explain american people , but also to 

1444
00:54:32,080 --> 00:54:33,969
be concrete with them , about the 

1445
00:54:33,969 --> 00:54:35,802
urgency , about the scale of the 

1446
00:54:35,802 --> 00:54:37,858
challenge to be kind of real because 

1447
00:54:37,858 --> 00:54:40,310
this escalation risks , the costs 

1448
00:54:40,310 --> 00:54:42,366
etcetera are very real . But I think 

1449
00:54:42,366 --> 00:54:44,643
the american people will understand it . 

1450
00:54:44,643 --> 00:54:46,866
Um but it's going to be very costly and 

1451
00:54:46,866 --> 00:54:49,088
risky , but if we ignore the problem it 

1452
00:54:49,088 --> 00:54:51,310
will be much worse . So I think I think 

1453
00:54:51,310 --> 00:54:53,421
we have to do and I know I'm sure you 

1454
00:54:53,421 --> 00:54:52,920
agree but we have to do it in a spirit 

1455
00:54:52,920 --> 00:54:54,809
of realism and not kind of just a 

1456
00:54:54,809 --> 00:54:57,240
hortatory sort of foggy way . Like it's 

1457
00:54:57,240 --> 00:54:59,296
gotta be this is this is very real , 

1458
00:54:59,296 --> 00:55:01,462
It's the first time we face an arrival 

1459
00:55:01,462 --> 00:55:03,573
that's our own size economically ever 

1460
00:55:03,573 --> 00:55:05,880
basically . And one that we're much 

1461
00:55:05,880 --> 00:55:08,330
more economically entangled with . You 

1462
00:55:08,330 --> 00:55:12,270
ever worked with . Alright . On that 

1463
00:55:12,270 --> 00:55:14,830
happy note . Um Please join me in 

1464
00:55:14,830 --> 00:55:16,886
thanking our panelists and thank you 

1465
00:55:16,886 --> 00:55:19,470
all for . Mhm .