1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,010 Hey everybody happy friday to 2 00:00:04,010 --> 00:00:05,010 you . 3 00:00:07,640 --> 00:00:09,560 Okay . Um 4 00:00:11,320 --> 00:00:15,090 My gift to you for a long 5 00:00:15,090 --> 00:00:18,540 weekend is no opening statement . So 6 00:00:18,650 --> 00:00:20,872 bob . I think we got you on the phone . 7 00:00:20,872 --> 00:00:24,520 We'll go to you . Thank you , john have 8 00:00:24,520 --> 00:00:26,798 a question about the Ukraine situation . 9 00:00:27,440 --> 00:00:30,010 Um I know the administration has said 10 00:00:30,010 --> 00:00:33,760 that would not commit 11 00:00:33,770 --> 00:00:37,480 combat forces in Ukraine . Um but I'm 12 00:00:37,480 --> 00:00:39,550 wondering what you can say about the 13 00:00:39,550 --> 00:00:41,830 extent to which the U . S . Military 14 00:00:41,830 --> 00:00:45,620 would continue support um for Ukrainian 15 00:00:45,620 --> 00:00:48,090 forces in the event of a Russian 16 00:00:48,090 --> 00:00:51,580 invasion . What form of support 17 00:00:51,890 --> 00:00:55,370 would you consider details ? And 18 00:00:55,370 --> 00:00:58,630 certainly no one wants to see another 19 00:00:58,630 --> 00:01:01,610 invasion and incursion of Ukraine . And 20 00:01:01,620 --> 00:01:03,787 as I said yesterday , we still here in 21 00:01:03,787 --> 00:01:05,842 the department believed that there's 22 00:01:05,842 --> 00:01:08,380 time and space for diplomacy . Um But 23 00:01:08,380 --> 00:01:11,060 what I also said stands true as well 24 00:01:11,340 --> 00:01:13,770 that we're gonna that we have and we 25 00:01:13,770 --> 00:01:16,700 will continue uh to provide security 26 00:01:16,700 --> 00:01:19,270 assistance to Ukraine uh to help them 27 00:01:19,270 --> 00:01:21,620 better defend themselves ? Uh And that 28 00:01:21,620 --> 00:01:22,620 will continue . 29 00:01:25,840 --> 00:01:29,340 Yeah . You know , we're watching the 30 00:01:29,340 --> 00:01:31,173 diplomatic talks this week , but 31 00:01:31,200 --> 00:01:33,311 nothing really seems to be changing . 32 00:01:33,311 --> 00:01:35,422 And we're not getting that commitment 33 00:01:35,422 --> 00:01:37,589 of de escalation that they were hoping 34 00:01:37,589 --> 00:01:37,520 to hear from Russia and the State 35 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:39,464 Department hinted on thursday that 36 00:01:39,464 --> 00:01:41,464 Russia is laying the groundwork for 37 00:01:41,464 --> 00:01:43,742 fabricating the pretext of an invasion . 38 00:01:43,742 --> 00:01:45,964 Could you confirm that ? And if this is 39 00:01:45,964 --> 00:01:48,187 Yes and Russia does this , how will the 40 00:01:48,187 --> 00:01:50,298 US prove it ? And how is the pentagon 41 00:01:50,298 --> 00:01:52,298 prepared to respond ? There's a lot 42 00:01:52,298 --> 00:01:56,260 there . I mean look , we've 43 00:01:56,640 --> 00:02:00,260 uh certainly seen this playbook before 44 00:02:00,840 --> 00:02:03,890 particularly in 2014 with their 45 00:02:04,340 --> 00:02:08,130 illegal annexation occupation of 46 00:02:08,140 --> 00:02:12,040 Crimea . Um without getting 47 00:02:12,040 --> 00:02:14,190 into too much detail , we do have 48 00:02:14,190 --> 00:02:17,240 information that uh indicates that 49 00:02:17,240 --> 00:02:20,520 Russia uh is already working actively 50 00:02:20,530 --> 00:02:23,660 to create a pretext for a for a 51 00:02:23,660 --> 00:02:26,490 potential invasion for , you know , a 52 00:02:26,490 --> 00:02:29,810 move on Ukraine . Um In fact , we have 53 00:02:29,810 --> 00:02:32,680 information that they pre positioned a 54 00:02:32,690 --> 00:02:35,990 group of operatives uh to conduct what 55 00:02:35,990 --> 00:02:39,600 we call a false flag operation . Um uh 56 00:02:39,610 --> 00:02:43,130 an operation uh designed to look like 57 00:02:43,130 --> 00:02:45,840 an attack on them or their people or 58 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:48,960 Russian speaking people in Ukraine . Um 59 00:02:48,970 --> 00:02:51,890 again , as an excuse to go in . 60 00:02:52,440 --> 00:02:56,150 Um ah and 61 00:02:57,240 --> 00:03:00,220 we already have in addition indications 62 00:03:00,220 --> 00:03:02,550 that Russian influence actors are 63 00:03:02,940 --> 00:03:04,884 already starting , they're already 64 00:03:04,884 --> 00:03:08,250 starting to fabricate Ukrainian 65 00:03:08,260 --> 00:03:11,220 provocations uh that 66 00:03:11,230 --> 00:03:14,650 uh in both state and social media to 67 00:03:14,650 --> 00:03:18,610 again uh try to justify uh in advance 68 00:03:18,610 --> 00:03:21,100 some sort of pretext for incursion . 69 00:03:21,110 --> 00:03:24,140 I'm not at liberty to go into a whole 70 00:03:24,140 --> 00:03:27,200 lot more detail than that . Um But I 71 00:03:27,210 --> 00:03:30,260 hope that by the fact that we can say 72 00:03:30,260 --> 00:03:32,980 this as confidently as we can , you you 73 00:03:32,980 --> 00:03:35,920 can take away that that there's a 74 00:03:35,920 --> 00:03:38,031 fidelity here to the information that 75 00:03:38,031 --> 00:03:41,010 we have um that we believe is is very 76 00:03:41,010 --> 00:03:44,650 credible . And again , we've seen this 77 00:03:44,650 --> 00:03:47,760 kind of thing before out of Russia um 78 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:50,296 when there isn't an actual crisis to 79 00:03:50,296 --> 00:03:52,573 suit their needs , They'll make one up . 80 00:03:53,140 --> 00:03:56,090 And so we're watching for that . Yeah , 81 00:03:56,640 --> 00:04:00,390 yesterday the National Security Advisor 82 00:04:00,390 --> 00:04:02,390 said that this information that you 83 00:04:02,390 --> 00:04:06,170 just mentioned Was downgraded and that 84 00:04:06,170 --> 00:04:08,680 he's going to update the media in 24 85 00:04:08,680 --> 00:04:11,840 hours . Should we take from your 86 00:04:11,850 --> 00:04:15,030 statement or answer right now that this 87 00:04:15,040 --> 00:04:18,500 information now is is more accurate and 88 00:04:18,510 --> 00:04:20,621 adequate . It's not believe that this 89 00:04:20,621 --> 00:04:22,732 is what the National Security Advisor 90 00:04:22,732 --> 00:04:24,954 was speaking to . But I certainly refer 91 00:04:24,954 --> 00:04:26,621 you to to the White House for 92 00:04:26,621 --> 00:04:28,788 additional context and information . I 93 00:04:28,788 --> 00:04:31,010 can't speak for Mr Sullivan . You can't 94 00:04:31,010 --> 00:04:33,177 speak for Mr Sullivan but it's you all 95 00:04:33,177 --> 00:04:35,177 speak for the same government . One 96 00:04:35,177 --> 00:04:37,288 question is yesterday he talked about 97 00:04:37,288 --> 00:04:39,288 the information but he described it 98 00:04:39,288 --> 00:04:41,343 says quote and unquote which has now 99 00:04:41,343 --> 00:04:45,140 been downgraded . So has 100 00:04:45,140 --> 00:04:47,120 been any that's what we're talking 101 00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:49,320 about . So it's it's that information 102 00:04:49,320 --> 00:04:51,209 is when you say when he says it's 103 00:04:51,209 --> 00:04:53,520 downgraded and your statement now , 104 00:04:53,520 --> 00:04:55,687 should we understand that there's more 105 00:04:55,687 --> 00:04:57,909 validity to the to the information that 106 00:04:57,909 --> 00:05:00,380 there's some kind of new indications 107 00:05:00,440 --> 00:05:02,551 I'm trying to understand ? Yeah , I'm 108 00:05:02,551 --> 00:05:04,607 not sure . I totally understand your 109 00:05:04,607 --> 00:05:07,880 question but let me try it this way . 110 00:05:07,890 --> 00:05:09,723 Okay . So based on his statement 111 00:05:09,723 --> 00:05:12,057 yesterday there's information , however , 112 00:05:12,057 --> 00:05:14,057 he described this information as as 113 00:05:14,057 --> 00:05:16,170 being downgraded , which means 114 00:05:16,170 --> 00:05:18,620 downgraded in classification so that we 115 00:05:18,620 --> 00:05:20,676 can talk about it as we've just done 116 00:05:20,676 --> 00:05:22,870 today . Thank you . Does that help ? I 117 00:05:22,870 --> 00:05:24,759 think we were hung up on the word 118 00:05:24,759 --> 00:05:26,870 downgraded . You and me both . Yeah . 119 00:05:26,870 --> 00:05:29,092 Okay . I got it . So would you say that 120 00:05:29,092 --> 00:05:31,670 this recent cyber attack on the 121 00:05:31,680 --> 00:05:34,040 websites in Ukraine is related to this 122 00:05:34,040 --> 00:05:37,960 false flag operation . Um I don't I 123 00:05:37,960 --> 00:05:40,430 don't think , I think it's too soon to 124 00:05:40,430 --> 00:05:42,652 say that it's it's part and parcel of a 125 00:05:42,652 --> 00:05:44,597 false flag . These were disruptive 126 00:05:44,597 --> 00:05:47,950 attacks uh cyberattacks . Um 127 00:05:48,540 --> 00:05:50,760 we are not at the point of attribution 128 00:05:50,760 --> 00:05:52,982 right now so I don't want to go there . 129 00:05:52,982 --> 00:05:56,070 But again jen this is of a piece of the 130 00:05:56,070 --> 00:05:58,181 same kind of playbook we've seen from 131 00:05:58,181 --> 00:06:00,348 Russia in the past . And what could be 132 00:06:00,348 --> 00:06:02,570 the point of a cyber attack like we saw 133 00:06:02,570 --> 00:06:05,460 last night . Um again you're asking me 134 00:06:05,460 --> 00:06:08,060 to speak for the actors responsible for 135 00:06:08,060 --> 00:06:10,790 this . But uh but one could imagine 136 00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:13,450 right that an attack like that is meant 137 00:06:13,450 --> 00:06:16,760 to disrupt capability uh to 138 00:06:16,770 --> 00:06:19,900 uh to try to dissuade action to try to 139 00:06:19,910 --> 00:06:23,040 to change the behaviors of the 140 00:06:23,040 --> 00:06:25,390 leadership decisions inside Ukraine . I 141 00:06:25,400 --> 00:06:27,730 mean any number of reasons uh not to 142 00:06:27,730 --> 00:06:30,060 mention just to intimidate now as I 143 00:06:30,060 --> 00:06:31,893 understand it . Uh most of these 144 00:06:31,893 --> 00:06:34,380 websites are coming back online now but 145 00:06:34,380 --> 00:06:36,269 I mean I think there's probably a 146 00:06:36,269 --> 00:06:39,620 multiple purposes that were excuse me 147 00:06:39,630 --> 00:06:41,690 that was salt sought by the by the 148 00:06:41,690 --> 00:06:44,480 actors in this case that you mentioned 149 00:06:44,490 --> 00:06:48,320 that are inside of Ukraine . Are 150 00:06:48,320 --> 00:06:50,590 they in the Donbass region or are they 151 00:06:50,600 --> 00:06:52,767 have they moved out into other areas ? 152 00:06:52,767 --> 00:06:56,600 I'm uh I'm not going to get into a very 153 00:06:56,610 --> 00:07:00,060 specific information about , about our 154 00:07:00,070 --> 00:07:02,490 knowledge of what these operatives are 155 00:07:02,500 --> 00:07:05,150 are capable of doing and where and when ? 156 00:07:05,150 --> 00:07:08,220 I think we've really spoken to it at 157 00:07:08,220 --> 00:07:10,331 about the farthest level we can right 158 00:07:10,331 --> 00:07:13,290 now vaccine mandates , what impact does 159 00:07:13,290 --> 00:07:15,380 the Supreme Court decision the OSHA 160 00:07:15,380 --> 00:07:17,590 decision have on the U . S . Military 161 00:07:17,590 --> 00:07:20,310 and its mandate as we understand it , 162 00:07:20,320 --> 00:07:22,940 it does not affect the federal 163 00:07:22,940 --> 00:07:25,107 contractors and the executive order by 164 00:07:25,107 --> 00:07:27,218 the president with respect to defense 165 00:07:27,218 --> 00:07:30,730 contractors specifically . Uh Well it's 166 00:07:30,740 --> 00:07:33,160 it's it's not yeah it has nothing to do 167 00:07:33,160 --> 00:07:35,327 with the National Guard has to do with 168 00:07:35,327 --> 00:07:37,438 civilian employers . With an employee 169 00:07:37,438 --> 00:07:39,604 level . I think of over 100 . That has 170 00:07:39,604 --> 00:07:41,827 nothing to do with the National Guard . 171 00:07:41,827 --> 00:07:44,410 And the the secretary again 172 00:07:45,540 --> 00:07:47,540 remains convinced that the vaccines 173 00:07:47,540 --> 00:07:50,460 work . The mandate remains in place for 174 00:07:50,500 --> 00:07:53,890 the total force . Um and uh and again 175 00:07:53,890 --> 00:07:55,980 we continue to encourage those who 176 00:07:55,980 --> 00:07:58,210 haven't been vaccinated and don't have 177 00:07:58,310 --> 00:08:00,440 an exemption to to get vaccinated and 178 00:08:00,440 --> 00:08:02,870 do the right thing working for the 179 00:08:02,880 --> 00:08:05,047 pentagon or D . O . D . Are they under 180 00:08:05,047 --> 00:08:07,158 a mandate right now or does the ocean 181 00:08:07,158 --> 00:08:09,010 But OSHA doesn't apply to them . 182 00:08:09,020 --> 00:08:12,220 They're still I mean there's the 183 00:08:12,230 --> 00:08:14,520 workforce mandate for our civilians is 184 00:08:14,520 --> 00:08:17,490 still in place here . Mike did you have 185 00:08:17,490 --> 00:08:20,250 a question jenny ? Thank you john I 186 00:08:20,260 --> 00:08:22,540 think you're aware of that . North 187 00:08:22,540 --> 00:08:25,160 Korea fired another missile yesterday 188 00:08:25,540 --> 00:08:28,460 and North Korea continues to fire 189 00:08:28,470 --> 00:08:32,370 missiles . Are we just watching and 190 00:08:32,380 --> 00:08:34,760 condemning on this ? And does the 191 00:08:34,760 --> 00:08:38,150 United States have any contemporary 192 00:08:38,150 --> 00:08:41,550 waiting any actions ? What we are 193 00:08:42,340 --> 00:08:45,400 You're right . There was another 194 00:08:45,410 --> 00:08:48,250 launch yesterday which we have assessed 195 00:08:48,250 --> 00:08:50,590 to be of a ballistic nature . We're 196 00:08:50,590 --> 00:08:52,701 continuing to consult with our allies 197 00:08:52,701 --> 00:08:54,701 and partners with the international 198 00:08:54,701 --> 00:08:57,260 community about best steps forward . Um 199 00:08:57,270 --> 00:09:00,920 uh , and as I think we've made clear , 200 00:09:00,920 --> 00:09:04,160 we're willing to sit down uh and and 201 00:09:04,170 --> 00:09:06,390 talk about these issues with North 202 00:09:06,390 --> 00:09:09,210 Korea and there's been no sign of any 203 00:09:09,210 --> 00:09:11,480 interest in doing it in Pyongyang's 204 00:09:11,480 --> 00:09:14,200 part here at the Department of Defense . 205 00:09:14,350 --> 00:09:16,572 To your question , what are you doing ? 206 00:09:16,572 --> 00:09:19,210 We're continuing to work very closely 207 00:09:19,210 --> 00:09:21,370 with our rok allies to make sure the 208 00:09:21,370 --> 00:09:23,592 alliance remains capable and strong and 209 00:09:23,592 --> 00:09:25,703 vibrant and we were just there as you 210 00:09:25,703 --> 00:09:28,700 know , not long ago . Um , so our focus 211 00:09:28,700 --> 00:09:30,756 here is making sure that we can meet 212 00:09:30,756 --> 00:09:32,978 our treaty commitments to the people of 213 00:09:32,978 --> 00:09:35,089 Korea and on the korean peninsula and 214 00:09:35,089 --> 00:09:38,080 in the region writ large and we're 215 00:09:38,080 --> 00:09:40,410 gonna continue to do that another 216 00:09:40,410 --> 00:09:43,320 vacation . A State Department 217 00:09:43,330 --> 00:09:46,550 spokesperson , Price said that reaping 218 00:09:46,560 --> 00:09:49,840 this week . Uh oh , there are many 219 00:09:49,840 --> 00:09:53,660 tools in the US arsenal and will 220 00:09:53,660 --> 00:09:56,750 use them when necessarily 221 00:09:57,840 --> 00:10:00,410 that means . Do you think any military 222 00:10:00,420 --> 00:10:04,010 options are possible in less 223 00:10:04,010 --> 00:10:07,650 path to North Korea ? Well , 224 00:10:08,340 --> 00:10:10,880 the spokesman is right . I mean , there 225 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:14,240 are lots of levels of power that the 226 00:10:14,240 --> 00:10:16,462 United States government and our allies 227 00:10:16,462 --> 00:10:18,629 and partners have at our disposal . Um 228 00:10:18,629 --> 00:10:20,851 Obviously President biden has been very 229 00:10:20,851 --> 00:10:23,073 clear diplomacy leads and that would be 230 00:10:23,073 --> 00:10:25,129 no different here when we're talking 231 00:10:25,129 --> 00:10:26,962 about North Korea and the korean 232 00:10:26,962 --> 00:10:30,840 peninsula . Um I it will it will it 233 00:10:30,840 --> 00:10:33,062 will be largely unsatisfactory to you . 234 00:10:33,062 --> 00:10:35,284 But I'm going to go back to what I just 235 00:10:35,284 --> 00:10:37,340 said before , which is from from the 236 00:10:37,340 --> 00:10:39,562 Department of Defense perspective , our 237 00:10:39,562 --> 00:10:41,970 priority is we already have security 238 00:10:41,970 --> 00:10:44,350 commitments on the peninsula and so our 239 00:10:44,350 --> 00:10:47,160 job here at D O . D is to make sure 240 00:10:47,160 --> 00:10:48,882 that we are able to meet those 241 00:10:48,882 --> 00:10:51,160 commitments to the best of our ability . 242 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:53,104 And that's why we've been to Korea 243 00:10:53,104 --> 00:10:55,216 twice now . That's why we continue to 244 00:10:55,216 --> 00:10:57,260 discuss and maintain a close 245 00:10:57,260 --> 00:11:00,770 relationship with our South korean 246 00:11:00,780 --> 00:11:02,558 counterparts and we're going to 247 00:11:02,558 --> 00:11:04,780 continue to make sure that the that the 248 00:11:04,780 --> 00:11:06,891 alliance is ready , as we say , ready 249 00:11:06,891 --> 00:11:09,240 to fight tonight . Okay . Was it a 250 00:11:09,250 --> 00:11:12,460 hypersonic missile test ? We're still 251 00:11:12,460 --> 00:11:14,910 conducting an intel assessment of it , 252 00:11:14,920 --> 00:11:17,087 jen we're not at the point where we're 253 00:11:17,087 --> 00:11:18,753 willing and able to go beyond 254 00:11:18,940 --> 00:11:20,930 classifying as a ballistic missile 255 00:11:20,930 --> 00:11:24,230 launch . You regarding Ukraine and 256 00:11:24,230 --> 00:11:25,897 Russia , you've used the word 257 00:11:25,897 --> 00:11:28,670 operatives several times for the public . 258 00:11:28,670 --> 00:11:30,781 Can you help them understand what you 259 00:11:30,781 --> 00:11:32,837 people understand what you mean when 260 00:11:32,837 --> 00:11:35,059 you say operatives , who are they , who 261 00:11:35,059 --> 00:11:37,226 are they working for ? Well , I mean , 262 00:11:38,640 --> 00:11:42,540 um of such high 263 00:11:42,550 --> 00:11:44,661 fidelity . Who are these people ? I'm 264 00:11:44,661 --> 00:11:46,772 not going to go into more detail than 265 00:11:46,772 --> 00:11:48,439 what we've been able to go to 266 00:11:48,439 --> 00:11:50,550 specifically today that said barb and 267 00:11:50,550 --> 00:11:52,772 again , we've seen this playbook before 268 00:11:52,772 --> 00:11:54,994 when we talk about Russian operatives , 269 00:11:54,994 --> 00:11:58,910 it's um , you know , it could represent 270 00:11:58,920 --> 00:12:02,870 a blend of , of , of 271 00:12:02,900 --> 00:12:04,622 individuals inside the Russian 272 00:12:04,622 --> 00:12:06,678 government , whether it's from their 273 00:12:06,678 --> 00:12:08,511 intelligence communities , their 274 00:12:08,511 --> 00:12:10,289 security services or even their 275 00:12:10,289 --> 00:12:13,650 military , um they they often hybridize 276 00:12:14,340 --> 00:12:15,880 um there , 277 00:12:18,840 --> 00:12:22,090 their personnel to such agree that the 278 00:12:22,090 --> 00:12:24,470 lines are not necessarily really clear 279 00:12:24,480 --> 00:12:28,010 who they specifically report to um in 280 00:12:28,010 --> 00:12:31,260 the conduct of some of these uh 281 00:12:31,270 --> 00:12:34,450 more covert and clandestine operations . 282 00:12:34,940 --> 00:12:36,996 Do you think I just have a couple of 283 00:12:36,996 --> 00:12:39,990 follow ups ? Do you think that again ? 284 00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:42,222 Because you're saying your intelligence 285 00:12:42,222 --> 00:12:46,220 is that good ? Um Would 286 00:12:46,230 --> 00:12:48,563 any of this ? Can I just stop you there ? 287 00:12:48,563 --> 00:12:50,890 What I said was , yeah . What I said 288 00:12:50,890 --> 00:12:54,000 was that we are able to share with you 289 00:12:54,000 --> 00:12:57,470 this finding in this belief . I think I 290 00:12:57,470 --> 00:12:59,692 would hope you would take away from the 291 00:12:59,692 --> 00:13:01,800 fact that there is enough supporting 292 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:04,140 evidence underneath that that we would 293 00:13:04,140 --> 00:13:06,084 not be willing and able to talk to 294 00:13:06,084 --> 00:13:08,140 publicly . That's what I meant . I I 295 00:13:08,140 --> 00:13:10,140 don't think I said it's so good . I 296 00:13:10,140 --> 00:13:12,084 just want to make sure I make that 297 00:13:12,084 --> 00:13:14,196 clear . So my question is I think you 298 00:13:14,196 --> 00:13:16,990 said hi fidelity . So , would you what 299 00:13:16,990 --> 00:13:20,240 would you assess ? Would any of this be 300 00:13:20,250 --> 00:13:23,870 happening without Vladimir Putin being 301 00:13:23,870 --> 00:13:27,120 directly knowledgeable about it . Again , 302 00:13:27,130 --> 00:13:30,360 um I want to be careful not to speak 303 00:13:30,360 --> 00:13:33,780 for another sovereign government . That 304 00:13:33,780 --> 00:13:37,530 said again , if if past is prologue , 305 00:13:37,540 --> 00:13:41,250 it is difficult to see um that 306 00:13:41,250 --> 00:13:44,700 these kinds of activities uh could be 307 00:13:44,700 --> 00:13:48,060 would be done without the knowledge if 308 00:13:48,060 --> 00:13:50,400 not the imprimatur of the very senior 309 00:13:50,400 --> 00:13:52,622 levels of the Russian government , very 310 00:13:52,622 --> 00:13:54,678 quick follow up on the FAA NORAD and 311 00:13:54,678 --> 00:13:56,511 air space . So , we have another 312 00:13:56,511 --> 00:13:58,930 statement from NORAD today saying that 313 00:13:59,230 --> 00:14:02,070 they did not warn of a missile threat 314 00:14:02,080 --> 00:14:04,550 to Canada or the United States . 315 00:14:06,040 --> 00:14:08,151 I believe that's a statement I gave . 316 00:14:09,440 --> 00:14:11,960 It is I'm so sorry you said it 317 00:14:11,960 --> 00:14:12,960 apparently . 318 00:14:15,540 --> 00:14:18,630 So you're clearly saying the FAA made a 319 00:14:18,630 --> 00:14:21,010 mistake . There's just no question that 320 00:14:21,010 --> 00:14:23,232 that's what you're saying . My question 321 00:14:23,232 --> 00:14:25,540 is this we've now seen two cases in 322 00:14:25,540 --> 00:14:29,190 recent years FAA and the incident in 323 00:14:29,190 --> 00:14:32,650 Hawaii . In both cases , 324 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:35,170 The Defense Department says other 325 00:14:35,170 --> 00:14:37,980 people made mistakes . But nonetheless , 326 00:14:37,980 --> 00:14:40,640 these are issues that two cases where 327 00:14:40,640 --> 00:14:43,220 americans were seriously impacted and 328 00:14:43,220 --> 00:14:45,331 there were real questions in people's 329 00:14:45,331 --> 00:14:47,498 minds about whether there was a threat 330 00:14:47,498 --> 00:14:49,276 to the United States , is there 331 00:14:49,276 --> 00:14:51,560 something that the Defense Department 332 00:14:51,560 --> 00:14:54,380 needs to do to make sure this doesn't 333 00:14:54,390 --> 00:14:57,580 happen a third time ? Well , number one , 334 00:14:57,580 --> 00:15:00,920 I'm I'm not blaming another agency or 335 00:15:00,930 --> 00:15:03,097 casting aspersions upon another agency 336 00:15:03,097 --> 00:15:05,097 or the decision making process that 337 00:15:06,050 --> 00:15:09,760 that they executed . Um to 338 00:15:09,760 --> 00:15:12,880 your larger point , I would tell you 339 00:15:12,880 --> 00:15:16,880 that we are a learning organization and 340 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:19,610 we're always trying to improve our 341 00:15:19,610 --> 00:15:22,020 processes and the manner in which 342 00:15:22,020 --> 00:15:24,131 information is processed and shared , 343 00:15:24,131 --> 00:15:26,020 not just within the Department of 344 00:15:26,020 --> 00:15:28,076 Defense but outside the Department , 345 00:15:28,076 --> 00:15:30,242 we're always looking at ways to try to 346 00:15:30,242 --> 00:15:32,750 improve that . Yeah , 347 00:15:34,250 --> 00:15:36,960 Back to Ukraine , given the 348 00:15:37,740 --> 00:15:40,930 operatives in Ukraine given the attacks 349 00:15:40,930 --> 00:15:44,190 on websites , 350 00:15:44,740 --> 00:15:47,330 is there still room for diplomacy to 351 00:15:47,340 --> 00:15:51,250 work in short , we believe 352 00:15:51,250 --> 00:15:55,100 there is . Um and it's certainly the 353 00:15:55,110 --> 00:15:57,380 department's hope that diplomacy can 354 00:15:57,380 --> 00:16:01,360 prevail , but uh the the administration 355 00:16:02,020 --> 00:16:05,720 is not willing to give up on ah on the 356 00:16:05,720 --> 00:16:08,360 effort to to solve this diplomatically . 357 00:16:09,890 --> 00:16:12,790 Like many of their Wagner group 358 00:16:12,790 --> 00:16:14,957 mercenaries in this or is it all going 359 00:16:14,957 --> 00:16:18,350 to be government ? I cannot . But your 360 00:16:18,350 --> 00:16:20,590 question gets to Barbara's question 361 00:16:20,590 --> 00:16:23,970 that they can hybridize their 362 00:16:23,980 --> 00:16:27,850 agencies and uh and their personnel um 363 00:16:27,860 --> 00:16:29,250 in very unique ways . 364 00:16:31,870 --> 00:16:34,037 I got to get to the phones here pretty 365 00:16:34,037 --> 00:16:36,037 quick . It's alright , go ahead . I 366 00:16:36,037 --> 00:16:38,570 called on , it's actually more reminder 367 00:16:38,580 --> 00:16:41,520 to me to get to the phones than it is 368 00:16:41,520 --> 00:16:45,070 to , you know , So so based 369 00:16:45,080 --> 00:16:47,302 again , to revisit the Ukraine . Thanks 370 00:16:47,302 --> 00:16:49,469 for sharing this information but based 371 00:16:49,469 --> 00:16:51,580 on the based on this information that 372 00:16:51,580 --> 00:16:53,700 you just mentioned , are you able to 373 00:16:53,700 --> 00:16:57,320 assess whether such a potential attack 374 00:16:57,840 --> 00:17:00,740 or invasion by Russia based on this 375 00:17:00,740 --> 00:17:03,380 pretext attack that might be coming , 376 00:17:03,400 --> 00:17:05,870 is something imminent ? Can you , can 377 00:17:05,870 --> 00:17:07,926 you put a certain time frame on it ? 378 00:17:07,926 --> 00:17:10,560 And what is the administration doing to 379 00:17:10,560 --> 00:17:14,320 try to dissuade Russia from carrying 380 00:17:14,320 --> 00:17:16,830 on this campaign ? We look we just 381 00:17:16,830 --> 00:17:20,060 spent two days uh you know , in europe 382 00:17:20,070 --> 00:17:22,250 as an administration and I won't speak 383 00:17:22,250 --> 00:17:24,361 for the State Department . But trying 384 00:17:24,361 --> 00:17:26,472 to do exactly that body , which is to 385 00:17:27,530 --> 00:17:30,670 two find ways to deescalate the 386 00:17:30,670 --> 00:17:33,050 tensions and to prevent an incursion 387 00:17:33,060 --> 00:17:35,116 diplomatically . So we're still very 388 00:17:35,116 --> 00:17:37,116 much into Jim's question . We still 389 00:17:37,116 --> 00:17:39,116 very much believe that there's room 390 00:17:39,116 --> 00:17:41,282 there's time and space for diplomacy , 391 00:17:41,282 --> 00:17:44,190 we do not believe that Mr Putin has 392 00:17:44,190 --> 00:17:46,680 made a final decision yet . Um So as 393 00:17:46,680 --> 00:17:48,840 long as that's the case , yes , we 394 00:17:48,840 --> 00:17:51,007 still believe there's there's time and 395 00:17:51,007 --> 00:17:53,062 space for diplomacy and we obviously 396 00:17:53,062 --> 00:17:55,900 want that that to prevail . Um but if 397 00:17:55,900 --> 00:17:57,810 it doesn't , we're also as an 398 00:17:57,810 --> 00:18:00,670 administration ready to continue to to 399 00:18:00,670 --> 00:18:03,350 look at options on the back end of that . 400 00:18:03,740 --> 00:18:07,550 Um and as for timing , I wouldn't uh 401 00:18:07,560 --> 00:18:09,893 I wouldn't begin to speculate right now . 402 00:18:09,893 --> 00:18:12,060 Again , we still think there's back to 403 00:18:12,060 --> 00:18:14,282 my time and space argument that there's 404 00:18:14,282 --> 00:18:16,282 time and space for diplomacy . So I 405 00:18:16,282 --> 00:18:18,116 wouldn't begin to hypothesize or 406 00:18:18,116 --> 00:18:19,949 speculate about um if there's an 407 00:18:19,949 --> 00:18:22,430 incursion when that could happen um 408 00:18:22,500 --> 00:18:25,110 that we are seeing these indications 409 00:18:26,140 --> 00:18:29,930 of pretextual moves by . Russia 410 00:18:29,930 --> 00:18:33,320 certainly gives us deep concern . Um 411 00:18:33,320 --> 00:18:35,376 and I think that's that's one of the 412 00:18:35,376 --> 00:18:37,720 reasons why we're willing to talk about 413 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:41,450 it now . Yeah , Jared from Al Monitor . 414 00:18:44,940 --> 00:18:47,162 Hi Mr Kirby , I'm just wondering if the 415 00:18:47,162 --> 00:18:49,162 department can confirm , We've seen 416 00:18:49,162 --> 00:18:51,273 reports uh particularly Iranian media 417 00:18:51,273 --> 00:18:54,110 that Iran has launched uh the Irgc has 418 00:18:54,110 --> 00:18:56,332 launched a solid state fuel rocket into 419 00:18:56,332 --> 00:18:58,221 space carrying a satellite . Just 420 00:18:58,221 --> 00:19:00,166 wondering if you can confirm , I'm 421 00:19:00,166 --> 00:19:02,277 afraid . I can't Jared I haven't seen 422 00:19:02,277 --> 00:19:04,166 those reports , we will take that 423 00:19:04,166 --> 00:19:06,332 question for you and if we can provide 424 00:19:06,332 --> 00:19:08,499 any context on it , we will , but I've 425 00:19:08,499 --> 00:19:09,888 not seen those reports . 426 00:19:12,540 --> 00:19:14,550 Okay , Tony carpaccio . 427 00:19:16,840 --> 00:19:20,110 Hey jen a couple of questions . Do you , 428 00:19:20,120 --> 00:19:22,231 can you review review the bidding and 429 00:19:22,231 --> 00:19:24,260 the US force training forces in the 430 00:19:24,270 --> 00:19:26,326 Ukraine ? I think there's a National 431 00:19:26,326 --> 00:19:29,140 Guard unit . That task force gator and 432 00:19:29,140 --> 00:19:31,780 Special Ops forces , roughly how many 433 00:19:31,780 --> 00:19:33,891 are there ? And the types of training 434 00:19:33,891 --> 00:19:37,160 they provide . Also , if the Russians 435 00:19:37,160 --> 00:19:39,430 decided to move , will those troops be 436 00:19:39,430 --> 00:19:42,140 pulled out of the Ukraine ? Or does the 437 00:19:42,140 --> 00:19:44,029 US have a deconfliction line with 438 00:19:44,029 --> 00:19:46,540 Russia ? Like we've had in Syria to 439 00:19:46,540 --> 00:19:48,540 give the locations of our troops so 440 00:19:48,540 --> 00:19:50,810 they would not be attacked . Tony , 441 00:19:50,810 --> 00:19:53,420 there's less than 200 florida National 442 00:19:53,420 --> 00:19:55,476 Guard . They're on a rotating advise 443 00:19:55,476 --> 00:19:57,642 and assist mission . This is something 444 00:19:57,642 --> 00:19:59,753 that we've been doing now for several 445 00:19:59,753 --> 00:20:02,070 years . Um , and they remain in Ukraine 446 00:20:02,070 --> 00:20:04,840 and at their task . I I talked about 447 00:20:04,840 --> 00:20:06,951 this a little bit yesterday . I got a 448 00:20:06,951 --> 00:20:09,062 similar question or maybe it was your 449 00:20:09,062 --> 00:20:11,062 question um about , you know , what 450 00:20:11,062 --> 00:20:13,062 would we do with them if there's an 451 00:20:13,062 --> 00:20:15,118 incursion ? Again , we don't want to 452 00:20:15,118 --> 00:20:17,007 see an incursion . We still think 453 00:20:17,007 --> 00:20:19,173 there's time and space for that not to 454 00:20:19,173 --> 00:20:21,118 happen . And we don't believe that 455 00:20:21,118 --> 00:20:20,690 President Putin has made a decision . 456 00:20:20,690 --> 00:20:22,950 So I'm not gonna speculate about what 457 00:20:22,950 --> 00:20:25,300 we would or wouldn't do uh if there's 458 00:20:25,300 --> 00:20:27,356 an incursion . But what I would tell 459 00:20:27,356 --> 00:20:29,450 you very clearly is that force 460 00:20:29,450 --> 00:20:31,630 protection remains paramount uh , in 461 00:20:31,630 --> 00:20:33,463 our minds . And certainly in the 462 00:20:33,463 --> 00:20:36,390 Secretary's mind and we will make all 463 00:20:36,390 --> 00:20:38,780 the appropriate and proper decisions to 464 00:20:38,780 --> 00:20:41,040 make sure that our people are safe in 465 00:20:41,050 --> 00:20:44,820 any event ? Uh Sylvie deacon , 466 00:20:44,830 --> 00:20:46,830 You had deconfliction line in Syria 467 00:20:46,830 --> 00:20:47,830 with Russia . 468 00:20:52,840 --> 00:20:56,350 Do I have it , do we ? What we in Syria ? 469 00:20:59,740 --> 00:21:01,407 Yeah . No , I mean there's no 470 00:21:01,407 --> 00:21:03,820 deconfliction line in Ukraine with 471 00:21:03,820 --> 00:21:05,987 Russia , but but but I think I get the 472 00:21:05,987 --> 00:21:08,590 gist of the question . Um we have many 473 00:21:08,590 --> 00:21:10,810 lines of communication with Russia , 474 00:21:10,810 --> 00:21:12,810 including direct communication with 475 00:21:12,810 --> 00:21:14,532 Russian military leaders . The 476 00:21:14,532 --> 00:21:16,754 secretary just spoke to Minister Shoigu 477 00:21:16,754 --> 00:21:18,977 a few days ago . Uh the chairman of the 478 00:21:18,977 --> 00:21:21,143 Joint Chiefs General Milley has spoken 479 00:21:21,143 --> 00:21:22,866 on numerous occasions with his 480 00:21:22,866 --> 00:21:25,088 counterpart and we have direct lines of 481 00:21:25,088 --> 00:21:24,490 communication with them . So I don't 482 00:21:24,490 --> 00:21:26,490 think we need a hotline necessarily 483 00:21:26,490 --> 00:21:28,657 with respect to Ukraine . Um again , I 484 00:21:28,657 --> 00:21:30,823 understand that just of the question , 485 00:21:30,823 --> 00:21:32,934 it's about what would you do with the 486 00:21:32,934 --> 00:21:35,157 trainers on the ground ? We will do the 487 00:21:35,157 --> 00:21:37,268 most appropriate thing to do uh to to 488 00:21:37,268 --> 00:21:39,268 make sure that we're always keeping 489 00:21:39,268 --> 00:21:41,212 their uh their safety and security 490 00:21:41,212 --> 00:21:43,157 foremost in our in our minds . But 491 00:21:43,157 --> 00:21:45,157 again , nobody wants to see another 492 00:21:45,157 --> 00:21:47,379 incursion . And uh we want to make sure 493 00:21:47,379 --> 00:21:49,601 that that doesn't occur . So we want to 494 00:21:49,601 --> 00:21:51,712 give time and space for our diplomats 495 00:21:51,712 --> 00:21:53,768 to see if there's a if there's a way 496 00:21:53,768 --> 00:21:55,601 for this to to to resolve itself 497 00:21:55,601 --> 00:21:58,050 without outright conflict . But we will 498 00:21:58,050 --> 00:22:00,106 do what we need to do . We will make 499 00:22:00,106 --> 00:22:02,217 the right decisions , we need to make 500 00:22:02,217 --> 00:22:04,328 to make sure that our people are safe 501 00:22:04,328 --> 00:22:08,300 and secure . Sylvie ? Yes . Good 502 00:22:08,300 --> 00:22:11,740 morning . Um um I know you don't want 503 00:22:11,750 --> 00:22:14,540 to um speak about the military 504 00:22:14,540 --> 00:22:18,430 assistance you may give to um to 505 00:22:18,430 --> 00:22:21,890 Ukraine in case of invasion . But would 506 00:22:21,890 --> 00:22:25,710 it be possible to provide 507 00:22:25,710 --> 00:22:28,330 them some weapons that were 508 00:22:29,940 --> 00:22:33,020 supposed to go to the afghan military 509 00:22:33,250 --> 00:22:36,360 and I'm now available 510 00:22:37,440 --> 00:22:41,030 Sylvie . We are , as I said , we're 511 00:22:41,030 --> 00:22:43,141 going to continue to provide security 512 00:22:43,141 --> 00:22:45,030 assistance to help Ukraine defend 513 00:22:45,030 --> 00:22:48,160 itself . And we're looking at a broad 514 00:22:48,160 --> 00:22:50,450 range of options for what that kind of 515 00:22:50,450 --> 00:22:52,506 material could be . I don't have any 516 00:22:52,506 --> 00:22:54,910 decisions to speak to today . Um so I 517 00:22:54,910 --> 00:22:58,680 don't want to get ahead of of that but 518 00:22:58,690 --> 00:23:01,280 we're gonna , we're gonna , we're going 519 00:23:01,280 --> 00:23:03,910 to continue to look for options to help 520 00:23:03,910 --> 00:23:06,740 them defend themselves . You announce 521 00:23:06,740 --> 00:23:10,740 it when you do it . That's uh 522 00:23:10,750 --> 00:23:12,750 I can't promise that there'll be an 523 00:23:12,750 --> 00:23:14,806 announcement every time something uh 524 00:23:14,806 --> 00:23:17,028 something goes that's not the way we've 525 00:23:17,028 --> 00:23:19,194 done it in the past . Um So I wouldn't 526 00:23:19,194 --> 00:23:21,417 look for that to happen in the future . 527 00:23:21,417 --> 00:23:23,583 What I can tell you is and I said this 528 00:23:23,583 --> 00:23:25,700 before um that that uh even as we 529 00:23:25,700 --> 00:23:27,930 completed the last tranche that we were 530 00:23:27,930 --> 00:23:30,041 going to continue to provide security 531 00:23:30,041 --> 00:23:32,310 assistance material to the Ukrainians 532 00:23:32,530 --> 00:23:36,490 and we will do that . Um The last 533 00:23:36,490 --> 00:23:38,601 question I think today unless there's 534 00:23:38,601 --> 00:23:40,823 more in the room will go to a show from 535 00:23:40,823 --> 00:23:43,640 Nippon tv . Thank you john . Uh it's 536 00:23:43,640 --> 00:23:45,529 about the spirit of the immigrant 537 00:23:45,529 --> 00:23:48,190 variant at the overseas basis uh 538 00:23:48,200 --> 00:23:50,144 infections at the U . S . Military 539 00:23:50,144 --> 00:23:52,144 bases in Japan and maybe also south 540 00:23:52,144 --> 00:23:54,367 Korea have been spreading since the end 541 00:23:54,367 --> 00:23:56,589 of the last year . And although the U . 542 00:23:56,589 --> 00:23:58,756 S . Military in Japan has strengthened 543 00:23:58,756 --> 00:24:01,730 its protocol uh some point out that the 544 00:24:01,740 --> 00:24:03,990 measures to prevent infection were 545 00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:06,920 insufficient or it was a little bit too 546 00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:09,720 late to strengthen the protocols . So 547 00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:12,230 what lessons has dut learned from this 548 00:24:12,230 --> 00:24:15,000 case and how will deliver improved 549 00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:17,222 communications between Japan and the US 550 00:24:17,222 --> 00:24:20,890 regarding border infection control ? We 551 00:24:20,900 --> 00:24:24,440 we we did make more stringent our own 552 00:24:24,440 --> 00:24:27,060 protocols in Japan . Um we obviously 553 00:24:27,060 --> 00:24:30,010 take very seriously not only our 554 00:24:30,020 --> 00:24:32,187 commitment to our own people and their 555 00:24:32,187 --> 00:24:33,964 health and readiness but to the 556 00:24:33,964 --> 00:24:35,687 Japanese people , certainly in 557 00:24:35,687 --> 00:24:37,909 surrounding communities to our bases in 558 00:24:37,909 --> 00:24:39,798 Japan . So we take that very very 559 00:24:39,798 --> 00:24:41,700 seriously . We are in constant 560 00:24:41,700 --> 00:24:45,260 communication with Japanese government 561 00:24:45,260 --> 00:24:47,482 officials and certainly in the Ministry 562 00:24:47,482 --> 00:24:49,260 of Defense and we're gonna keep 563 00:24:49,260 --> 00:24:51,204 watching omicron , just like we're 564 00:24:51,204 --> 00:24:53,371 doing it here and elsewhere around the 565 00:24:53,371 --> 00:24:55,482 world to see if we need to change our 566 00:24:55,482 --> 00:24:57,371 posture just recently here in the 567 00:24:57,371 --> 00:24:59,500 pentagon . We uh we increased our 568 00:24:59,510 --> 00:25:01,990 health protection conditions from bravo 569 00:25:01,990 --> 00:25:04,046 plus two charlie which obviously has 570 00:25:04,046 --> 00:25:05,934 resulted in a lot of very visible 571 00:25:05,934 --> 00:25:08,101 changes and we're going to continue to 572 00:25:08,101 --> 00:25:10,323 do that in Japan as well . And if there 573 00:25:10,323 --> 00:25:12,434 are changes that need to be made . Um 574 00:25:12,434 --> 00:25:14,540 if the the spread of the virus gets 575 00:25:14,540 --> 00:25:16,707 more severe then we will absolutely do 576 00:25:16,707 --> 00:25:18,429 that and we will do it in full 577 00:25:18,429 --> 00:25:20,373 transparency with our our Japanese 578 00:25:20,373 --> 00:25:23,170 allies . Yes ma'am , thanks for the 579 00:25:23,170 --> 00:25:25,226 second part of my question earlier . 580 00:25:25,226 --> 00:25:27,448 Just if Russia does follow through with 581 00:25:27,448 --> 00:25:29,448 the pretext for this invasion ? How 582 00:25:29,448 --> 00:25:31,337 will the US prove it ? How is the 583 00:25:31,337 --> 00:25:33,559 pentagon prepared to respond ? And does 584 00:25:33,559 --> 00:25:35,781 the pentagon have a warning to Russia ? 585 00:25:35,781 --> 00:25:37,837 I think we've been very clear , uh , 586 00:25:37,837 --> 00:25:40,059 through the multiple conversations that 587 00:25:40,059 --> 00:25:42,114 we've had with Russia , particularly 588 00:25:42,114 --> 00:25:44,337 President biden himself that there will 589 00:25:44,337 --> 00:25:44,110 be severe consequences if there's 590 00:25:44,110 --> 00:25:46,170 another incursion . So I think we we 591 00:25:46,170 --> 00:25:48,226 and many others in the international 592 00:25:48,226 --> 00:25:51,060 community to include the NATO alliance 593 00:25:51,060 --> 00:25:53,400 has been very clear about what the 594 00:25:53,410 --> 00:25:55,688 consequences and repercussions will be . 595 00:25:55,688 --> 00:25:58,300 Um , I won't speak to , 596 00:25:59,240 --> 00:26:01,390 uh , announcements that haven't come 597 00:26:01,390 --> 00:26:04,540 yet or how we might uh , communicate 598 00:26:04,540 --> 00:26:06,720 what we're seeing on the ground . Um , 599 00:26:06,730 --> 00:26:09,690 except to say that we do have evidence 600 00:26:09,690 --> 00:26:11,912 and indications that they are trying to 601 00:26:11,912 --> 00:26:14,460 set this pretext for another incursion . 602 00:26:14,470 --> 00:26:16,950 Um , and we believe it was important to 603 00:26:16,950 --> 00:26:19,820 make note of that that that we are 604 00:26:19,820 --> 00:26:22,120 aware that we that we do see What 605 00:26:22,120 --> 00:26:24,342 they're doing and that there are echoes 606 00:26:24,342 --> 00:26:27,860 of what they did in 2014 and whether 607 00:26:27,860 --> 00:26:29,916 whether or not that actually ends up 608 00:26:29,916 --> 00:26:32,027 happening or not and what we speak to 609 00:26:32,027 --> 00:26:34,138 at the time . I think I'll leave to a 610 00:26:34,138 --> 00:26:37,620 future setting . Yeah , that's pretty 611 00:26:37,620 --> 00:26:40,670 extraordinary for any administration to 612 00:26:40,670 --> 00:26:44,160 speak about this kind of information . 613 00:26:45,040 --> 00:26:48,560 So you could have chosen to communicate 614 00:26:48,560 --> 00:26:51,240 it privately to Moscow ? Can you tell 615 00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:53,780 us why the administration decided to go 616 00:26:53,790 --> 00:26:57,760 public . You're your question 617 00:26:57,760 --> 00:26:59,760 Presupposes that we didn't you know 618 00:26:59,760 --> 00:27:03,510 that we didn't um indicate whatever 619 00:27:03,510 --> 00:27:06,840 other communications . Yeah . I I think 620 00:27:06,850 --> 00:27:10,640 uh we just believed it was important 621 00:27:11,260 --> 00:27:14,560 to make it clear what we were seeing . 622 00:27:15,080 --> 00:27:16,270 Um and 623 00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:21,030 that we felt it was in the public's 624 00:27:21,030 --> 00:27:23,197 interest , not just here in the United 625 00:27:23,197 --> 00:27:26,790 States but around the world . Um to 626 00:27:26,790 --> 00:27:30,130 know that we know what's in this 627 00:27:30,130 --> 00:27:32,870 playbook and how it would potentially 628 00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:36,520 play out in Russian state and social 629 00:27:36,520 --> 00:27:40,350 media so that 630 00:27:40,830 --> 00:27:43,640 if it does happen , um it can be easily 631 00:27:43,640 --> 00:27:45,807 identified for what it is , which is a 632 00:27:45,807 --> 00:27:48,690 fabrication and a pretext you said a 633 00:27:48,690 --> 00:27:51,160 couple of times now what we are seeing . 634 00:27:51,540 --> 00:27:54,610 So from that , can we accurately assume 635 00:27:54,610 --> 00:27:57,410 that the intelligence is 636 00:27:58,880 --> 00:28:02,080 well first generated by the U . S . 637 00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:04,247 You're not getting this through second 638 00:28:04,247 --> 00:28:08,080 or third parties . And your assessment 639 00:28:08,090 --> 00:28:10,257 is a U . S . Assessment . So it's when 640 00:28:10,257 --> 00:28:12,730 you say what we are seeing the U . S . 641 00:28:12,740 --> 00:28:16,020 Is seeing the information directly . 642 00:28:16,140 --> 00:28:18,200 You're not getting it from other 643 00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:20,410 parties in the region . You know , 644 00:28:20,420 --> 00:28:23,560 intelligence is a fabric barb and it 645 00:28:23,560 --> 00:28:25,790 comes oftentimes from many different 646 00:28:25,790 --> 00:28:28,560 sources . Um , some organic and some 647 00:28:28,560 --> 00:28:30,560 not , I'm not going to speak to the 648 00:28:30,560 --> 00:28:32,560 nature of the specific intelligence 649 00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:36,360 other than to assert . Um are 650 00:28:37,140 --> 00:28:39,650 our confidence in it . And I think I'll 651 00:28:39,650 --> 00:28:42,590 leave it at that . Another 652 00:28:42,590 --> 00:28:45,860 one just to verify 653 00:28:47,210 --> 00:28:49,330 North korean kim jong said that 654 00:28:49,340 --> 00:28:52,170 hypersonic missile was the 655 00:28:52,740 --> 00:28:55,840 finally test fire the last 656 00:28:55,840 --> 00:28:59,630 monday . But this one yesterday one 657 00:28:59,640 --> 00:29:03,530 is not a hypothetic . It's possible , 658 00:29:03,530 --> 00:29:07,300 or we've classified it as a ballistic 659 00:29:07,300 --> 00:29:09,522 launch , and we're going to leave it at 660 00:29:09,522 --> 00:29:11,633 that right now . We're still doing an 661 00:29:11,633 --> 00:29:13,467 intelligence assessment . You're 662 00:29:13,467 --> 00:29:15,356 welcome . All right , Have a good 663 00:29:15,356 --> 00:29:17,522 weekend , everybody . We'll see you in 664 00:29:17,522 --> 00:29:16,350 a few days .