1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:02,307 All right . Good afternoon everybody . 2 00:00:02,307 --> 00:00:04,362 I'm Commander Beth teach . Thank you 3 00:00:04,362 --> 00:00:06,584 for joining us today . Just a couple of 4 00:00:06,584 --> 00:00:08,807 notes at the top . We have pressed both 5 00:00:08,807 --> 00:00:10,807 here in the room with us and on the 6 00:00:10,807 --> 00:00:12,918 phone . We're going to take questions 7 00:00:12,918 --> 00:00:15,140 from both . I would ask that you please 8 00:00:15,140 --> 00:00:17,251 introduce yourself and name your news 9 00:00:17,251 --> 00:00:19,251 organization . At the start of your 10 00:00:19,251 --> 00:00:21,251 question , our first two speakers , 11 00:00:21,251 --> 00:00:23,084 General Mackenzie and Lieutenant 12 00:00:23,084 --> 00:00:25,251 General Clark will frame today's brief 13 00:00:25,251 --> 00:00:26,973 and then we will hear from the 14 00:00:26,973 --> 00:00:28,973 investigation team . Uh and we will 15 00:00:28,973 --> 00:00:30,973 hold questions until the end . With 16 00:00:30,973 --> 00:00:33,029 that , I'll direct your attention to 17 00:00:33,029 --> 00:00:36,230 general frank McKenzie . Thank you . 18 00:00:36,230 --> 00:00:38,286 And good afternoon everybody . We're 19 00:00:38,286 --> 00:00:40,452 with you today to brief the results of 20 00:00:40,452 --> 00:00:42,619 the investigation that I directed into 21 00:00:42,619 --> 00:00:44,619 the ISIS K bombing at Abbey Gate At 22 00:00:44,619 --> 00:00:46,841 Hamad Karzai International Airport that 23 00:00:46,841 --> 00:00:49,810 occurred on 26 , 2021 that caused the 24 00:00:49,810 --> 00:00:52,300 deaths of 11 marines , one soldier and 25 00:00:52,300 --> 00:00:54,400 one sailor . We have completed our 26 00:00:54,400 --> 00:00:56,344 solemn duty of informing surviving 27 00:00:56,344 --> 00:00:58,567 family members about the results of the 28 00:00:58,567 --> 00:01:00,678 investigation and we're now providing 29 00:01:00,678 --> 00:01:02,678 it to the public in order to better 30 00:01:02,678 --> 00:01:04,678 inform you of the facts surrounding 31 00:01:04,678 --> 00:01:06,733 this tragic loss of life . While the 32 00:01:06,733 --> 00:01:08,956 majority of this detailed brief will be 33 00:01:08,956 --> 00:01:10,456 conducted in person by the 34 00:01:10,456 --> 00:01:12,678 investigating team who searched for the 35 00:01:12,678 --> 00:01:14,678 facts and interviewed more than 100 36 00:01:14,678 --> 00:01:16,789 people . I wanted to take a moment at 37 00:01:16,789 --> 00:01:19,011 the beginning to provide my thoughts on 38 00:01:19,011 --> 00:01:21,011 the investigation and what the team 39 00:01:21,011 --> 00:01:22,956 determined this brief will provide 40 00:01:22,956 --> 00:01:25,178 great context on the situation at Abbey 41 00:01:25,178 --> 00:01:27,067 Gate leading up to and during the 42 00:01:27,067 --> 00:01:29,067 attack as well as the aftermath . I 43 00:01:29,067 --> 00:01:31,067 found the results of the teams were 44 00:01:31,067 --> 00:01:33,400 comprehensive , credible and definitive . 45 00:01:33,400 --> 00:01:35,344 I found the brief you are about to 46 00:01:35,344 --> 00:01:37,570 receive to be powerful and moving The 47 00:01:37,570 --> 00:01:39,514 volume of evidence collected , the 48 00:01:39,514 --> 00:01:41,737 testimony of more than 100 people . The 49 00:01:41,737 --> 00:01:43,870 analysis of experts , the findings of 50 00:01:43,870 --> 00:01:46,060 fact and the conclusions of the team 51 00:01:46,090 --> 00:01:48,240 based upon that evidence gives a 52 00:01:48,240 --> 00:01:50,407 compelling and truthful examination of 53 00:01:50,407 --> 00:01:53,170 the event . The investigation found 54 00:01:53,270 --> 00:01:55,620 that a single explosive device killed 55 00:01:55,620 --> 00:01:59,190 at least 170 Afghan civilians and 13 US 56 00:01:59,190 --> 00:02:01,390 service members by explosively 57 00:02:01,390 --> 00:02:03,360 directing ball bearings through a 58 00:02:03,360 --> 00:02:05,740 packed crowd and into our men and women 59 00:02:05,740 --> 00:02:08,610 at Abbey Gate . The disturbing 60 00:02:08,610 --> 00:02:10,890 lethality of this device was confirmed 61 00:02:10,890 --> 00:02:13,360 by the 58 US service members who were 62 00:02:13,360 --> 00:02:15,360 killed and wounded despite the 63 00:02:15,360 --> 00:02:17,590 universal wear of body armor and 64 00:02:17,590 --> 00:02:19,790 helmets that did stop ball bearings 65 00:02:19,790 --> 00:02:21,840 that impacted them but could not 66 00:02:21,840 --> 00:02:24,130 prevent catastrophic injuries to areas 67 00:02:24,130 --> 00:02:26,880 not covered . The investigation found 68 00:02:26,880 --> 00:02:28,950 no definitive proof that anyone was 69 00:02:28,960 --> 00:02:32,460 ever hit or killed by gunfire either us 70 00:02:32,470 --> 00:02:35,070 or Afghan . This conclusion was based 71 00:02:35,070 --> 00:02:37,292 upon the careful consideration of sworn 72 00:02:37,292 --> 00:02:39,550 testimony of more than 100 witnesses 73 00:02:39,640 --> 00:02:41,584 and especially those witnesses and 74 00:02:41,584 --> 00:02:44,010 observation towers , both american and 75 00:02:44,010 --> 00:02:45,980 british who were in locations 76 00:02:45,990 --> 00:02:48,050 unaffected by the blast and that had 77 00:02:48,050 --> 00:02:50,720 commanding views of the scene before 78 00:02:50,750 --> 00:02:53,260 during and after the explosive attack . 79 00:02:54,140 --> 00:02:56,251 This conclusion was also confirmed by 80 00:02:56,251 --> 00:02:58,307 the findings and analysis of medical 81 00:02:58,307 --> 00:03:00,320 examiners and explosive experts . A 82 00:03:00,320 --> 00:03:02,153 review of all available physical 83 00:03:02,153 --> 00:03:04,320 evidence and a review of all available 84 00:03:04,320 --> 00:03:06,790 video evidence , including an MQ nine 85 00:03:06,800 --> 00:03:09,120 unmanned aerial aerial vehicle which 86 00:03:09,120 --> 00:03:11,231 began observing the scene about three 87 00:03:11,231 --> 00:03:13,710 minutes after the attack . At this 88 00:03:13,710 --> 00:03:15,877 point , I want to acknowledge that the 89 00:03:15,877 --> 00:03:17,821 investigation differs from what we 90 00:03:17,821 --> 00:03:19,877 initially believed on the day of the 91 00:03:19,877 --> 00:03:21,543 attack at the time . The best 92 00:03:21,543 --> 00:03:23,543 information we had in the immediate 93 00:03:23,543 --> 00:03:25,710 aftermath of the attack indicated that 94 00:03:25,710 --> 00:03:27,599 it was a complex attack by both a 95 00:03:27,599 --> 00:03:30,190 suicide bomber and ISIS K . Gunman . We 96 00:03:30,190 --> 00:03:32,380 now know that the explosively fired 97 00:03:32,380 --> 00:03:34,570 ball bearings cause wounds that look 98 00:03:34,570 --> 00:03:36,850 like gunshots and when combined with a 99 00:03:36,850 --> 00:03:39,500 small number of warning shots . That 100 00:03:39,500 --> 00:03:41,389 led many to assume that a complex 101 00:03:41,389 --> 00:03:43,389 attack had occurred . The fact that 102 00:03:43,389 --> 00:03:45,740 this investigation has contradicted our 103 00:03:45,740 --> 00:03:48,070 first impression demonstrates to me 104 00:03:48,140 --> 00:03:49,751 that the team went into this 105 00:03:49,751 --> 00:03:51,696 investigation with an open mind in 106 00:03:51,696 --> 00:03:53,862 search of the truth . It also confirms 107 00:03:53,862 --> 00:03:55,973 the age old fact that the battlefield 108 00:03:55,973 --> 00:03:57,640 is accused is a confusing and 109 00:03:57,640 --> 00:03:59,770 contradictory place and it gets more 110 00:03:59,770 --> 00:04:01,881 confusing . The closer you are to the 111 00:04:01,881 --> 00:04:04,490 actual action . That is why I ordered 112 00:04:04,490 --> 00:04:06,601 the investigation to find the truth . 113 00:04:06,640 --> 00:04:08,970 Our commitment to transparency has now 114 00:04:08,970 --> 00:04:10,900 led us to provide you our best 115 00:04:10,900 --> 00:04:13,500 information , information derived from 116 00:04:13,500 --> 00:04:15,390 a thorough and comprehensive 117 00:04:15,570 --> 00:04:18,440 investigation . The investigation found 118 00:04:18,440 --> 00:04:20,607 that military leadership on the ground 119 00:04:20,607 --> 00:04:22,551 was appropriately engaged on force 120 00:04:22,551 --> 00:04:24,496 protection measures throughout the 121 00:04:24,496 --> 00:04:26,551 operation of Abbey Gate and that the 122 00:04:26,551 --> 00:04:28,607 medical services that were available 123 00:04:28,607 --> 00:04:30,662 and they were ready saved every life 124 00:04:30,662 --> 00:04:32,607 they possibly could through heroic 125 00:04:32,607 --> 00:04:34,662 efforts . This was a terrible attack 126 00:04:34,662 --> 00:04:36,773 that resulted in tragic outcomes in a 127 00:04:36,773 --> 00:04:39,090 horrific loss of life . Both afghan and 128 00:04:39,090 --> 00:04:41,450 american . My hope is that by the time 129 00:04:41,450 --> 00:04:43,394 this brief is over you will have a 130 00:04:43,394 --> 00:04:45,617 clearer picture of the situation and of 131 00:04:45,617 --> 00:04:48,290 the attack . While nothing can bring 132 00:04:48,290 --> 00:04:50,410 back the 11 marines , the soldier and 133 00:04:50,410 --> 00:04:52,521 the sailor that we tragically lost in 134 00:04:52,521 --> 00:04:54,577 this attack , it's important that we 135 00:04:54,577 --> 00:04:56,743 fully understand what happened . Their 136 00:04:56,743 --> 00:04:59,390 sacrifice demands nothing less . With 137 00:04:59,390 --> 00:05:01,390 that , I'll now turn it over to the 138 00:05:01,390 --> 00:05:03,446 investigative team to provide you an 139 00:05:03,446 --> 00:05:05,390 extensive brief and following that 140 00:05:05,390 --> 00:05:07,501 brief , they will be prepared to take 141 00:05:07,501 --> 00:05:09,557 your questions with that . I'm gonna 142 00:05:09,557 --> 00:05:09,090 turn it over to Lieutenant General Ron 143 00:05:09,090 --> 00:05:11,370 Clark , the army forces Central Command 144 00:05:11,370 --> 00:05:13,426 component commander . Thank you very 145 00:05:13,426 --> 00:05:16,850 much . Thanks and good afternoon 146 00:05:17,240 --> 00:05:19,462 Mr Mackenzie just said , I'm Lieutenant 147 00:05:19,462 --> 00:05:21,629 General Ron Clark . I'm the commanding 148 00:05:21,629 --> 00:05:23,740 general of U . S . Army , Central and 149 00:05:23,740 --> 00:05:27,140 Third Army . On 15 September 2021 , I 150 00:05:27,140 --> 00:05:29,260 was tasked by Us Central Command to 151 00:05:29,260 --> 00:05:31,482 conduct an investigation into the facts 152 00:05:31,482 --> 00:05:33,371 and circumstances surrounding the 153 00:05:33,371 --> 00:05:35,960 attack on us forces navigate on 154 00:05:35,960 --> 00:05:39,930 26 August 2021 . The attack 155 00:05:39,930 --> 00:05:41,690 took place at Hamid Karzai 156 00:05:41,700 --> 00:05:43,450 International Airport in Kabul 157 00:05:43,450 --> 00:05:45,900 Afghanistan which we will refer to 158 00:05:45,900 --> 00:05:48,260 throughout this briefing as H Kaya . 159 00:05:50,120 --> 00:05:52,330 As a result of this attack , 13 of our 160 00:05:52,330 --> 00:05:55,760 nation's best and brightest , our 161 00:05:55,760 --> 00:05:58,730 heroes paid the ultimate sacrifice in 162 00:05:58,730 --> 00:06:00,952 an effort to save the lives of american 163 00:06:00,952 --> 00:06:02,841 citizens and thousands of afghans 164 00:06:03,130 --> 00:06:05,352 during the noncombatant evacuation of a 165 00:06:05,352 --> 00:06:08,690 Chinchilla . Our sincere condolences go 166 00:06:08,690 --> 00:06:11,250 out to the families , their loved ones 167 00:06:11,480 --> 00:06:13,647 and all those who suffered this tragic 168 00:06:13,647 --> 00:06:15,350 loss of our fallen comrades . 169 00:06:17,540 --> 00:06:19,596 Our multi service investigation team 170 00:06:19,596 --> 00:06:21,707 conducted a comprehensive examination 171 00:06:21,840 --> 00:06:24,500 of the tactical level actions on the 172 00:06:24,500 --> 00:06:27,450 ground by US personnel at Abbey Gate . 173 00:06:28,630 --> 00:06:30,741 The team focused on Gate Operations , 174 00:06:31,040 --> 00:06:33,850 force , protection force , posture , 175 00:06:34,340 --> 00:06:37,820 leadership , unit readiness and all 176 00:06:37,830 --> 00:06:40,760 other relevant actions before during 177 00:06:41,140 --> 00:06:44,140 and after the attack For this 178 00:06:44,140 --> 00:06:46,450 investigation , I appointed Brigadier 179 00:06:46,450 --> 00:06:48,561 General Lance Curtis , the commanding 180 00:06:48,561 --> 00:06:50,506 general of the third expeditionary 181 00:06:50,506 --> 00:06:52,283 sustainment command as our lead 182 00:06:52,283 --> 00:06:54,800 investigator . General Curtis and our 183 00:06:54,800 --> 00:06:56,800 investigative team will present the 184 00:06:56,800 --> 00:06:59,800 comprehensive , credible and compelling 185 00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:01,930 facts and findings of this 186 00:07:01,930 --> 00:07:05,500 investigation . Lance Good afternoon 187 00:07:05,500 --> 00:07:07,556 ladies and gentlemen , I'm Brigadier 188 00:07:07,556 --> 00:07:09,611 General Lance Curtis . I'm currently 189 00:07:09,611 --> 00:07:11,778 four deployed in the san Camilo are as 190 00:07:11,778 --> 00:07:14,500 a part of our scent . On 17 September , 191 00:07:14,880 --> 00:07:17,047 I was appointed as a lead investigator 192 00:07:17,047 --> 00:07:19,158 to look at the attack on us forces at 193 00:07:19,158 --> 00:07:21,330 Hamid Karzai International Airport on 194 00:07:21,330 --> 00:07:24,350 26 August at that time I appointed a 195 00:07:24,350 --> 00:07:26,683 team of seven and they're with me today , 196 00:07:26,683 --> 00:07:28,660 I have two marines Colonel C . J . 197 00:07:28,660 --> 00:07:32,030 Douglas of the Marcin G five and I have 198 00:07:32,030 --> 00:07:34,252 Lieutenant Colonel john Newton also the 199 00:07:34,252 --> 00:07:36,474 martian G five . I also have Lieutenant 200 00:07:36,474 --> 00:07:38,697 Colonel Bert smith , Major brad Hanan . 201 00:07:38,790 --> 00:07:41,130 Captain alec porter and Lieutenants 202 00:07:41,130 --> 00:07:43,350 Nicole Rodriguez and Sean Pollyanna . 203 00:07:43,940 --> 00:07:46,890 We have conducted 70 interviews of 204 00:07:46,890 --> 00:07:49,990 139 people in five different countries 205 00:07:49,990 --> 00:07:52,380 at seven different locations . Those 206 00:07:52,380 --> 00:07:55,450 interviews add average from 1 to 6 207 00:07:55,450 --> 00:07:58,070 hours . And we had a total of 250 208 00:07:58,070 --> 00:08:00,292 exhibits that were collected during the 209 00:08:00,292 --> 00:08:04,240 investigation . Ladies and gentlemen 210 00:08:04,240 --> 00:08:06,351 at this time I want to talk about the 211 00:08:06,351 --> 00:08:08,462 key point slide and at the end of the 212 00:08:08,462 --> 00:08:10,240 day this drives the rest of the 213 00:08:10,240 --> 00:08:13,000 discussion and quite frankly some of 214 00:08:13,000 --> 00:08:14,556 these key points will be in 215 00:08:14,556 --> 00:08:16,760 contradiction to earlier information 216 00:08:16,760 --> 00:08:18,871 that you may have heard today . We're 217 00:08:18,871 --> 00:08:21,110 going to show you why this was not a 218 00:08:21,110 --> 00:08:24,150 complex attack . It was a single blast 219 00:08:24,540 --> 00:08:26,818 and it did not have a follow on attack . 220 00:08:27,040 --> 00:08:29,470 There were a series of crossing fires 221 00:08:29,670 --> 00:08:31,837 to the front of the service members on 222 00:08:31,837 --> 00:08:33,892 the ground that created the illusion 223 00:08:34,040 --> 00:08:36,151 that there was a complex attack , but 224 00:08:36,151 --> 00:08:38,600 there absolutely was not . There were 225 00:08:38,600 --> 00:08:41,300 no gunshot wounds . We have universal 226 00:08:41,300 --> 00:08:43,244 agreement between the Armed forces 227 00:08:43,244 --> 00:08:45,356 medical examiners office and also the 228 00:08:45,356 --> 00:08:47,630 medical providers on the ground . There 229 00:08:47,630 --> 00:08:49,670 were absolutely no gunshot wounds . 230 00:08:50,140 --> 00:08:52,418 During the course of our investigation , 231 00:08:52,418 --> 00:08:55,580 we found no evidence that post blast us 232 00:08:55,580 --> 00:08:57,870 service members killed other U . S . 233 00:08:57,870 --> 00:09:01,230 Service members or afghans . We refer 234 00:09:01,230 --> 00:09:03,570 to the Taliban as unlikely partners 235 00:09:03,830 --> 00:09:05,886 leading up to the time when we asked 236 00:09:05,886 --> 00:09:08,430 them to partner with us on 16 August , 237 00:09:08,530 --> 00:09:10,500 we were conducting kinetic attacks 238 00:09:10,500 --> 00:09:13,300 against the Taliban . Finally , we will 239 00:09:13,300 --> 00:09:15,411 show you conclusively why the time of 240 00:09:15,411 --> 00:09:18,750 the attack was 1736 and 52 241 00:09:18,750 --> 00:09:20,920 seconds . We have two overhead 242 00:09:20,920 --> 00:09:23,530 persistent infrared platforms that both 243 00:09:23,540 --> 00:09:25,890 independently detect the blast at that 244 00:09:25,890 --> 00:09:28,480 time and we also have the classified 245 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:31,160 chat room which begins reporting the 246 00:09:31,160 --> 00:09:34,330 attack at 1738 . That was an indicator 247 00:09:34,330 --> 00:09:36,590 that the attack absolutely began before 248 00:09:36,590 --> 00:09:40,010 that . This is a timeline of key 249 00:09:40,010 --> 00:09:41,899 events that were important to our 250 00:09:41,899 --> 00:09:45,110 investigation . On 15 August , Kabul 251 00:09:45,110 --> 00:09:47,110 falls to the Taliban concurrently , 252 00:09:47,110 --> 00:09:51,020 President Ghani departs Kabul on 16 253 00:09:51,020 --> 00:09:53,040 August . We had the large security 254 00:09:53,040 --> 00:09:55,262 breach on the airfield and we asked the 255 00:09:55,262 --> 00:09:57,370 Taliban to assist us in clearing the 256 00:09:57,370 --> 00:10:00,070 airfield at that time and the airfield 257 00:10:00,070 --> 00:10:02,880 is cleared by 20 to 30 on the evening 258 00:10:02,880 --> 00:10:06,060 of the 16th , on the 19th of august we 259 00:10:06,060 --> 00:10:08,338 have second Battalion and First Marine , 260 00:10:08,338 --> 00:10:10,116 second Battalion , First Marine 261 00:10:10,116 --> 00:10:12,550 Regiment that opens in Man's Abbey Gate . 262 00:10:12,940 --> 00:10:14,980 Also the brits from two and three 263 00:10:14,980 --> 00:10:17,036 parrot begin their operations out of 264 00:10:17,036 --> 00:10:19,410 the Baron Hotel on the 19th of august 265 00:10:19,420 --> 00:10:22,000 on the 20th of august we in place the 266 00:10:22,000 --> 00:10:24,680 chevron which consisted of six shipping 267 00:10:24,680 --> 00:10:27,020 containers at Abbey Gate . The chevron 268 00:10:27,020 --> 00:10:29,242 is named because of the shape and we'll 269 00:10:29,242 --> 00:10:31,353 show you some pictures that will give 270 00:10:31,353 --> 00:10:33,464 you a very good view of the chevron . 271 00:10:33,464 --> 00:10:35,631 Later on , the chevron is in place for 272 00:10:35,631 --> 00:10:38,560 at least two reasons vehicle born IED 273 00:10:38,560 --> 00:10:41,030 threat mitigation and also it enables 274 00:10:41,030 --> 00:10:44,320 processing at Abbey Gate From the 20th 275 00:10:44,330 --> 00:10:46,940 through 22 August , the gates were 276 00:10:46,940 --> 00:10:49,470 closed at H . Kaya . This is because 277 00:10:49,470 --> 00:10:51,637 the intermediate staging bases were at 278 00:10:51,637 --> 00:10:54,850 capacity On 25 August 279 00:10:55,240 --> 00:10:57,530 east and North Gate closed permanently . 280 00:10:57,870 --> 00:11:00,037 Now we'll explain the reasons for that 281 00:11:00,340 --> 00:11:02,229 East Gate was more challenging to 282 00:11:02,229 --> 00:11:04,510 process given the geographic situation 283 00:11:04,510 --> 00:11:07,040 of the gate at Northgate , there were 284 00:11:07,040 --> 00:11:09,490 vehicle borne IED threats and that was 285 00:11:09,490 --> 00:11:11,546 a leading cause . In the decision to 286 00:11:11,546 --> 00:11:14,170 close Northgate . From the 25th through 287 00:11:14,170 --> 00:11:16,790 the 26 , we tracked the imminent threat 288 00:11:16,790 --> 00:11:19,340 streams at Abbey gate and some of the 289 00:11:19,340 --> 00:11:21,007 other threat streams across a 290 00:11:21,007 --> 00:11:23,880 chinchilla . There were at least four 291 00:11:23,890 --> 00:11:26,160 imminent threat streams that occurred 292 00:11:26,160 --> 00:11:28,400 between the 25th and the 26th at Abbey 293 00:11:28,400 --> 00:11:30,700 gate and what we found is that leaders 294 00:11:30,700 --> 00:11:32,811 took the appropriate measures tied to 295 00:11:32,811 --> 00:11:34,811 these eminent threat streams . They 296 00:11:34,811 --> 00:11:37,033 would lower their profiles , seek cover 297 00:11:37,033 --> 00:11:38,978 and at times they would even cease 298 00:11:38,978 --> 00:11:41,089 operations at the gate for periods of 299 00:11:41,089 --> 00:11:44,520 time . At 1600 on the 26 golf company 300 00:11:44,520 --> 00:11:46,930 changed out fourth platoon with first 301 00:11:46,930 --> 00:11:49,510 platoon . This was an hour earlier than 302 00:11:49,510 --> 00:11:51,566 scheduled , but this was because the 303 00:11:51,566 --> 00:11:53,690 high op tempo that was occurring and 304 00:11:53,690 --> 00:11:55,740 also the sensory overload . This 305 00:11:55,740 --> 00:11:57,907 demonstrated that leaders were keeping 306 00:11:57,907 --> 00:11:59,796 their fingers on the pulse of the 307 00:11:59,796 --> 00:12:02,920 situation on the ground . We assessed 308 00:12:02,930 --> 00:12:05,097 that leader presence was high at Abbey 309 00:12:05,097 --> 00:12:07,450 Gate , not only on the 26th of august 310 00:12:07,460 --> 00:12:10,980 but at all times at 1700 on the 26th , 311 00:12:10,980 --> 00:12:13,091 Brigadier General Sullivan , who is a 312 00:12:13,091 --> 00:12:14,924 Joint Task Force crisis response 313 00:12:14,924 --> 00:12:17,260 Commander was at Abbey Gate . That was 314 00:12:17,260 --> 00:12:19,690 36 minutes before the blast , he was 315 00:12:19,690 --> 00:12:21,857 there for a meeting with the brits and 316 00:12:21,857 --> 00:12:23,770 the Taliban . The 82nd Airborne 317 00:12:23,770 --> 00:12:26,100 Division Commander , the 24th Meu 318 00:12:26,100 --> 00:12:29,400 Commander . Uh We're also at Abbey Gate 319 00:12:29,410 --> 00:12:31,860 on the 26th of august . The second 320 00:12:31,860 --> 00:12:33,749 Battalion , first Marine Regiment 321 00:12:33,749 --> 00:12:35,860 Battalion Commander was physically on 322 00:12:35,860 --> 00:12:38,082 the ground at the time of the blast and 323 00:12:38,082 --> 00:12:39,916 he was wounded . And then we had 324 00:12:39,916 --> 00:12:41,971 multiple company commanders who were 325 00:12:41,971 --> 00:12:44,082 also on the ground at the time of the 326 00:12:44,082 --> 00:12:47,540 attack . At 17:36 and 52 seconds on the 327 00:12:47,540 --> 00:12:50,750 26 we have the actual attack . Then on 328 00:12:50,750 --> 00:12:52,917 the 31st of august we have all U . S . 329 00:12:52,917 --> 00:12:54,950 Aircraft and service members that 330 00:12:54,950 --> 00:12:57,620 depart . H kaya early in the morning at 331 00:12:57,620 --> 00:13:01,590 0002 . This 332 00:13:01,590 --> 00:13:04,460 is an overview of H kaya , the outline 333 00:13:04,460 --> 00:13:07,320 of H chi you see listed in red . The 334 00:13:07,320 --> 00:13:09,850 first of the 82nd First Brigade had 335 00:13:09,850 --> 00:13:12,050 half the perimeter leading from the 336 00:13:12,050 --> 00:13:14,050 South Gate up to the North gate and 337 00:13:14,050 --> 00:13:16,217 then the marines had the other half of 338 00:13:16,217 --> 00:13:18,217 the perimeter going from North Gate 339 00:13:18,217 --> 00:13:20,383 down to halfway between abby and South 340 00:13:20,383 --> 00:13:22,383 gates . There are two comfort areas 341 00:13:22,383 --> 00:13:24,550 that you see as the white goose eggs . 342 00:13:24,550 --> 00:13:26,494 These were areas where the afghans 343 00:13:26,494 --> 00:13:28,860 could have bed down food water and also 344 00:13:28,860 --> 00:13:30,950 medical care if required . And then 345 00:13:30,960 --> 00:13:33,182 additionally , the State Department had 346 00:13:33,182 --> 00:13:35,290 another chance to process afghans 347 00:13:35,290 --> 00:13:37,346 before they were actually put on the 348 00:13:37,346 --> 00:13:39,123 plane . There were four medical 349 00:13:39,123 --> 00:13:41,346 capabilities that you see listed on the 350 00:13:41,346 --> 00:13:43,346 map . The first one is the hospital 351 00:13:43,346 --> 00:13:45,457 that is at Camp Alvarado in the upper 352 00:13:45,457 --> 00:13:47,660 left there , This was run by 1st 353 00:13:47,660 --> 00:13:49,890 Brigade of the 82nd and it had one 354 00:13:49,890 --> 00:13:52,500 surgical team of four . The highest 355 00:13:52,500 --> 00:13:54,611 level medical capability was the main 356 00:13:54,611 --> 00:13:56,833 hospital and that's where the cursor is 357 00:13:56,833 --> 00:13:59,270 right now . This was a facility that 358 00:13:59,270 --> 00:14:01,640 was originally run by the Norwegians 359 00:14:01,950 --> 00:14:04,630 but it became a joint facility at any 360 00:14:04,630 --> 00:14:06,880 given time , it remained a coalition 361 00:14:06,880 --> 00:14:08,880 flavor and that you would have seen 362 00:14:08,880 --> 00:14:10,991 Norwegians there and frequently brits 363 00:14:10,991 --> 00:14:13,200 and Germans as well . This had eight 364 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:15,980 surgical teams of four , a very robust 365 00:14:15,980 --> 00:14:18,360 medical capability and it was sometimes 366 00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:21,080 referred to as the role to enhanced and 367 00:14:21,080 --> 00:14:23,024 this was because it had additional 368 00:14:23,024 --> 00:14:25,450 imaging capability . Think CT scan . 369 00:14:26,140 --> 00:14:28,307 There were two shock trauma platoons . 370 00:14:28,330 --> 00:14:30,580 The first was at the East gate in the 371 00:14:30,580 --> 00:14:32,790 hardened facility and that was run by 372 00:14:32,790 --> 00:14:34,790 the second Battalion , First Marine 373 00:14:34,790 --> 00:14:36,846 Regiment . The second was run by the 374 00:14:36,846 --> 00:14:39,068 24th Meu in very close proximity to the 375 00:14:39,068 --> 00:14:41,610 main hospital . There were high speed 376 00:14:41,610 --> 00:14:43,940 avenues of approach indicated by the 377 00:14:43,940 --> 00:14:46,740 white arrows , most notably along the N . 378 00:14:46,740 --> 00:14:48,740 S . U Gate and leading to the North 379 00:14:48,740 --> 00:14:50,684 gate which culminated in a traffic 380 00:14:50,684 --> 00:14:54,220 circle . This ultimately was a heavily 381 00:14:54,230 --> 00:14:56,590 influencing factor in the decision to 382 00:14:56,590 --> 00:14:59,170 close Northgate . Finally , I'll key in 383 00:14:59,170 --> 00:15:01,337 on Abbey Gate which is highlighted and 384 00:15:01,337 --> 00:15:03,559 white at the bottom in the next slide , 385 00:15:03,559 --> 00:15:05,670 we're going to show you a better view 386 00:15:05,670 --> 00:15:08,180 of Abbey Gate . But as we transition to 387 00:15:08,180 --> 00:15:10,347 the next slide , you'll see it will be 388 00:15:10,347 --> 00:15:12,513 inverse of what you presently see with 389 00:15:12,513 --> 00:15:14,736 the north seeking arrow in the opposite 390 00:15:14,736 --> 00:15:17,260 direction . When we began the 391 00:15:17,260 --> 00:15:19,316 investigation , there were different 392 00:15:19,316 --> 00:15:21,316 units that man to navigate and they 393 00:15:21,316 --> 00:15:23,371 called the sections of Abbey Gate by 394 00:15:23,371 --> 00:15:25,482 different names . We came to a common 395 00:15:25,482 --> 00:15:27,427 lexicon of three major portions of 396 00:15:27,427 --> 00:15:30,050 Abbey Gate , inter gate , outer gate 397 00:15:30,060 --> 00:15:32,171 and the chevron . I'll start with the 398 00:15:32,171 --> 00:15:34,393 inner gate which is in the yellow box . 399 00:15:34,393 --> 00:15:36,227 The inner gate is closest to the 400 00:15:36,227 --> 00:15:38,282 airfield and once again bear in mind 401 00:15:38,282 --> 00:15:40,449 this is an inverted view from what you 402 00:15:40,449 --> 00:15:42,504 just saw . There's an inner corridor 403 00:15:42,504 --> 00:15:44,671 that spans about three football fields 404 00:15:44,671 --> 00:15:46,893 leading down to the outer gate which is 405 00:15:46,893 --> 00:15:49,220 also in the yellow box . There's an 406 00:15:49,220 --> 00:15:51,540 additional outer corridor which is 407 00:15:51,540 --> 00:15:53,707 about two football fields leading down 408 00:15:53,707 --> 00:15:55,910 to the chevron . Once again named 409 00:15:55,910 --> 00:15:58,340 because of the shape The Chevron was in 410 00:15:58,340 --> 00:16:01,550 place on 20 August and was primarily 411 00:16:01,560 --> 00:16:03,600 oriented towards vehicle born IED 412 00:16:03,600 --> 00:16:05,930 threat mitigation and also allowed 413 00:16:05,930 --> 00:16:08,790 processing . There are three towers 414 00:16:08,870 --> 00:16:10,370 that were important to our 415 00:16:10,370 --> 00:16:12,990 investigation . The first is the 82nd 416 00:16:12,990 --> 00:16:15,157 tower and you can see where the cursor 417 00:16:15,157 --> 00:16:17,212 is right now . This was a little bit 418 00:16:17,212 --> 00:16:18,879 outside of Abbey gate And the 419 00:16:18,879 --> 00:16:20,934 individuals who were there gave us a 420 00:16:20,934 --> 00:16:23,046 very good picture of what happened on 421 00:16:23,046 --> 00:16:26,970 26 August before during and after the 422 00:16:26,970 --> 00:16:29,081 blast because they are outside of the 423 00:16:29,081 --> 00:16:31,460 blast zone and they are unaffected by 424 00:16:31,460 --> 00:16:34,860 the blast . The second tower is the 425 00:16:34,860 --> 00:16:37,210 marine sniper tower . I would ask you 426 00:16:37,210 --> 00:16:39,321 to use that as a point of orientation 427 00:16:39,321 --> 00:16:41,480 during the brief it figures very 428 00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:43,260 prominently . Additionally , it 429 00:16:43,260 --> 00:16:45,482 provided marines and Overwatch security 430 00:16:45,482 --> 00:16:48,230 position along the canal . And the last 431 00:16:48,230 --> 00:16:51,900 tower is the UK tower once again , also 432 00:16:51,910 --> 00:16:54,150 outside of the blast area . And we have 433 00:16:54,150 --> 00:16:56,261 individuals who are there who are not 434 00:16:56,261 --> 00:16:58,261 affected by the blast and they were 435 00:16:58,261 --> 00:17:00,350 able to tell us what , what happened 436 00:17:00,350 --> 00:17:02,730 both before , during and after the 437 00:17:02,730 --> 00:17:05,600 blast . The Baron Hotel is not a 438 00:17:05,600 --> 00:17:07,920 singular building . It's an entire 439 00:17:07,920 --> 00:17:10,110 complex and you see it outlined in 440 00:17:10,110 --> 00:17:12,360 yellow . We have a canal that runs the 441 00:17:12,360 --> 00:17:14,490 length of Abbey Gate and we have two 442 00:17:14,490 --> 00:17:17,470 footbridges , one that is 90 m east of 443 00:17:17,470 --> 00:17:20,000 the sniper tower and the second that is 444 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:22,580 next to the Baron Hotel complex . We 445 00:17:22,580 --> 00:17:24,570 have the actual blast location is 446 00:17:24,570 --> 00:17:28,210 pinpointed by post blast analysis and 447 00:17:28,210 --> 00:17:30,377 finally we have a water tower which is 448 00:17:30,377 --> 00:17:32,599 important to our findings of no complex 449 00:17:32,599 --> 00:17:34,766 attack and we'll talk about that later 450 00:17:34,766 --> 00:17:38,270 in the brief . Good afternoon . My name 451 00:17:38,270 --> 00:17:40,381 is Lieutenant Colonel john Naughton . 452 00:17:40,381 --> 00:17:42,437 And on this slide I'll be discussing 453 00:17:42,437 --> 00:17:44,381 the flow of evacuees at Abbey gate 454 00:17:44,381 --> 00:17:46,714 throughout the course of the neo mm hmm . 455 00:17:46,714 --> 00:17:48,714 I'll begin with how the process was 456 00:17:48,714 --> 00:17:50,881 originally designed to discuss how the 457 00:17:50,881 --> 00:17:50,830 process evolved as conditions changed 458 00:17:50,830 --> 00:17:52,850 on the ground , directing your 459 00:17:52,850 --> 00:17:54,961 attention to the top right portion of 460 00:17:54,961 --> 00:17:56,906 the slide , you'll see the chevron 461 00:17:56,906 --> 00:17:59,072 obstacle . We've referenced previously 462 00:17:59,072 --> 00:18:01,128 Again , the Chevron was comprised of 463 00:18:01,128 --> 00:18:03,183 six shipping containers put in place 464 00:18:03,183 --> 00:18:05,239 the morning of 20 August to mitigate 465 00:18:05,239 --> 00:18:04,870 against possible vehicle borne 466 00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:07,450 improvised explosive device attacks and 467 00:18:07,450 --> 00:18:09,672 to establish an entry control point for 468 00:18:09,672 --> 00:18:11,839 the primary point of entry to navigate 469 00:18:11,839 --> 00:18:13,672 the arrow on the top side of the 470 00:18:13,672 --> 00:18:15,672 chevron depicts the entrance to the 471 00:18:15,672 --> 00:18:17,839 entry control point while the arrow on 472 00:18:17,839 --> 00:18:19,672 the bottom depicts the exit . As 473 00:18:19,672 --> 00:18:21,450 originally intended . Potential 474 00:18:21,450 --> 00:18:23,339 evacuees would approach the Abbey 475 00:18:23,339 --> 00:18:25,450 corridor from the southwest and would 476 00:18:25,450 --> 00:18:27,561 be met by taliban members outside the 477 00:18:27,561 --> 00:18:29,783 chevron where the taliban would conduct 478 00:18:29,783 --> 00:18:31,783 an initial search and inspect their 479 00:18:31,783 --> 00:18:33,728 documentation . If allowed to pass 480 00:18:33,728 --> 00:18:35,617 through the entry control point , 481 00:18:35,617 --> 00:18:37,617 they'd be met inside the chevron by 482 00:18:37,617 --> 00:18:37,400 either U . K . Or U . S . Service 483 00:18:37,400 --> 00:18:40,120 members . If there are UK evacuees , 484 00:18:40,130 --> 00:18:42,352 they'd be escorted into the Baron Hotel 485 00:18:42,352 --> 00:18:44,519 compound where they'd be processed and 486 00:18:44,519 --> 00:18:46,519 eventually loaded onto vehicles and 487 00:18:46,519 --> 00:18:48,797 transported into H kaya for evacuation . 488 00:18:49,440 --> 00:18:51,607 If there were us evacuees would be met 489 00:18:51,607 --> 00:18:53,773 by marines from Second Battalion First 490 00:18:53,773 --> 00:18:55,773 Marines and escorted to the holding 491 00:18:55,773 --> 00:18:57,940 area they had established in the outer 492 00:18:57,940 --> 00:18:59,996 corridor . The following photo shows 493 00:18:59,996 --> 00:19:02,107 what the chevron looked like from the 494 00:19:02,107 --> 00:19:04,218 ground to orient you . This photo was 495 00:19:04,218 --> 00:19:06,329 taken from the outer corridor looking 496 00:19:06,329 --> 00:19:08,551 towards the southwest . The Baron Hotel 497 00:19:08,551 --> 00:19:10,773 compound is being circled on the left . 498 00:19:10,820 --> 00:19:12,987 The troops on the ground are primarily 499 00:19:12,987 --> 00:19:14,931 from two and three parallel the UK 500 00:19:14,931 --> 00:19:16,987 units are operating out of the Baron 501 00:19:16,987 --> 00:19:19,153 Hotel In the center of the photo , six 502 00:19:19,153 --> 00:19:21,320 shipping containers are arrayed in the 503 00:19:21,320 --> 00:19:23,264 shape of the Chevron and on top of 504 00:19:23,264 --> 00:19:25,042 several taliban members holding 505 00:19:25,042 --> 00:19:26,931 security as it did throughout the 506 00:19:26,931 --> 00:19:29,098 operation . On the left side , there's 507 00:19:29,098 --> 00:19:31,376 a vehicle lane used primarily by the U . 508 00:19:31,376 --> 00:19:33,487 K . And on the right side is Elaine . 509 00:19:33,487 --> 00:19:35,653 The marines utilized as a holding area 510 00:19:35,653 --> 00:19:37,620 for potential evacuees . Potential 511 00:19:37,620 --> 00:19:39,787 evacuees in the outer corridor holding 512 00:19:39,787 --> 00:19:41,676 area would wait there for varying 513 00:19:41,676 --> 00:19:43,398 lengths of time , depending on 514 00:19:43,398 --> 00:19:45,620 conditions on the airfield . These next 515 00:19:45,620 --> 00:19:47,842 two photos give you an idea of what the 516 00:19:47,842 --> 00:19:47,620 outer corridor would have looked like 517 00:19:47,620 --> 00:19:50,790 during the Neil . The photo on the left 518 00:19:50,800 --> 00:19:52,950 is from 22 August , it was taken from 519 00:19:52,950 --> 00:19:55,061 the inner corridor looking toward the 520 00:19:55,061 --> 00:19:57,394 outer corridor for a point of reference . 521 00:19:57,394 --> 00:19:59,561 The sniper towers being circled on the 522 00:19:59,561 --> 00:20:01,450 left and the actual outer gate is 523 00:20:01,450 --> 00:20:03,506 visible in the middle . In the outer 524 00:20:03,506 --> 00:20:05,506 corridor , you see a large crowd of 525 00:20:05,506 --> 00:20:07,450 potential evacuees gathered . This 526 00:20:07,450 --> 00:20:09,394 photo was taken on day three of no 527 00:20:09,394 --> 00:20:11,561 flights departing H kaya with evacuees 528 00:20:11,561 --> 00:20:13,783 due to the intermediate staging base is 529 00:20:13,783 --> 00:20:16,110 being at capacity . As a result , no 530 00:20:16,110 --> 00:20:18,277 additional evacuees were being allowed 531 00:20:18,277 --> 00:20:20,221 to enter the airfield . So the end 532 00:20:20,221 --> 00:20:22,277 state was the gates got backed up as 533 00:20:22,277 --> 00:20:24,388 depicted in this photo . The photo on 534 00:20:24,388 --> 00:20:26,610 the right was taken 25 August from just 535 00:20:26,610 --> 00:20:28,832 inside the outer gate . The Baron Hotel 536 00:20:28,832 --> 00:20:31,120 compound is in the background and on 537 00:20:31,120 --> 00:20:33,342 the left side of the photo is the chain 538 00:20:33,342 --> 00:20:35,176 link fence with the canal on the 539 00:20:35,176 --> 00:20:37,342 backside on the right side , there's a 540 00:20:37,342 --> 00:20:39,509 queue of potential evacuees stretching 541 00:20:39,509 --> 00:20:41,676 from the inner to the outer corridor . 542 00:20:41,676 --> 00:20:43,842 I'd like to draw your attention to the 543 00:20:43,842 --> 00:20:46,009 woman and Children in yellow Women and 544 00:20:46,009 --> 00:20:48,231 Children under the age of 13 would have 545 00:20:48,231 --> 00:20:50,398 been searched by members of the female 546 00:20:50,398 --> 00:20:52,342 search team Which was comprised of 547 00:20:52,342 --> 00:20:54,453 female marines and Corman , primarily 548 00:20:54,453 --> 00:20:56,620 from the 24th Meu who were tasked with 549 00:20:56,620 --> 00:20:56,400 searching and escorting women and 550 00:20:56,400 --> 00:20:58,289 Children and generally help to de 551 00:20:58,289 --> 00:21:00,456 escalate a variety of tense situations 552 00:21:00,456 --> 00:21:03,140 at the gates . The male evacuees would 553 00:21:03,140 --> 00:21:05,196 have been searched by male marines . 554 00:21:05,740 --> 00:21:07,851 All evacuees would have been searched 555 00:21:07,851 --> 00:21:09,962 initially in the outer corridor , but 556 00:21:09,962 --> 00:21:12,129 once they entered the inner corridor , 557 00:21:12,129 --> 00:21:11,630 they would have undergone a more 558 00:21:11,630 --> 00:21:13,852 thorough search where marines have gone 559 00:21:13,852 --> 00:21:15,963 through their bags to ensure they did 560 00:21:15,963 --> 00:21:15,800 not bring any contraband onto the 561 00:21:15,800 --> 00:21:18,820 airfield . These two photos illustrate 562 00:21:18,820 --> 00:21:20,764 the close personal contact between 563 00:21:20,764 --> 00:21:22,876 service members and evacuees required 564 00:21:22,876 --> 00:21:26,350 during these types of operations . Once 565 00:21:26,350 --> 00:21:28,572 potential evacuees moved into the inner 566 00:21:28,572 --> 00:21:30,572 corridor , they would enter another 567 00:21:30,572 --> 00:21:32,794 holding area before moving moving on to 568 00:21:32,794 --> 00:21:34,572 the inner gate area where state 569 00:21:34,572 --> 00:21:36,794 Department representatives will inspect 570 00:21:36,794 --> 00:21:38,739 their documentation . If the State 571 00:21:38,739 --> 00:21:38,640 Department representatives approved 572 00:21:38,640 --> 00:21:40,751 their documents , evacuees would pass 573 00:21:40,751 --> 00:21:42,950 through the inner gate load a bus and 574 00:21:42,950 --> 00:21:44,839 eventually get transported to the 575 00:21:44,839 --> 00:21:46,672 evacuation control center to get 576 00:21:46,672 --> 00:21:48,880 evacuated . If their documents were 577 00:21:48,880 --> 00:21:51,047 rejected , the potential evacuees will 578 00:21:51,047 --> 00:21:53,213 be turned back over to the marines who 579 00:21:53,213 --> 00:21:55,380 would them back out through the gate , 580 00:21:55,380 --> 00:21:57,602 either to the canal area or through the 581 00:21:57,602 --> 00:22:00,400 chevron of note during interviews 582 00:22:00,410 --> 00:22:02,521 Marine stated this is one of the most 583 00:22:02,521 --> 00:22:04,577 difficult and challenging tasks they 584 00:22:04,577 --> 00:22:06,688 dealt with throughout the neo as they 585 00:22:06,688 --> 00:22:08,521 literally had potential evacuees 586 00:22:08,521 --> 00:22:10,743 begging and pleading for their lives as 587 00:22:10,743 --> 00:22:10,660 they were being escorted back out . 588 00:22:12,540 --> 00:22:14,651 That's how the process was originally 589 00:22:14,651 --> 00:22:16,540 designed and if evacuate or moved 590 00:22:16,540 --> 00:22:18,707 straight from the chevron to the inner 591 00:22:18,707 --> 00:22:20,873 gate , it would have been about a five 592 00:22:20,873 --> 00:22:22,873 minute walk . However , that rarely 593 00:22:22,873 --> 00:22:24,929 happened as conditions on the ground 594 00:22:25,840 --> 00:22:27,896 changed the process for evacuee flow 595 00:22:27,896 --> 00:22:30,320 navigate evolved . One of the reasons 596 00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:32,320 the process evolved was the taliban 597 00:22:32,320 --> 00:22:34,542 became less and less cooperative at the 598 00:22:34,542 --> 00:22:36,542 Chevron and marines reported during 599 00:22:36,542 --> 00:22:38,709 interviews that there were entire days 600 00:22:38,709 --> 00:22:40,764 were not a single US document holder 601 00:22:40,764 --> 00:22:42,876 entered through the chevron . Marines 602 00:22:42,876 --> 00:22:45,098 also reported seeing the taliban turned 603 00:22:45,098 --> 00:22:46,876 potential evacuees away beating 604 00:22:46,876 --> 00:22:48,709 potential evacuees and even made 605 00:22:48,709 --> 00:22:50,653 allegations of Taliban shooting at 606 00:22:50,653 --> 00:22:52,820 potential evacuees . So as the Chevron 607 00:22:52,820 --> 00:22:55,042 became largely impassable and potential 608 00:22:55,042 --> 00:22:57,376 evacuees became more and more desperate . 609 00:22:57,376 --> 00:22:59,320 They began to seek out and utilize 610 00:22:59,320 --> 00:23:01,264 alternate ingress routes to bypass 611 00:23:01,264 --> 00:23:03,431 Taliban checkpoints . These routes are 612 00:23:03,431 --> 00:23:05,598 generally depicted by the large yellow 613 00:23:05,598 --> 00:23:05,370 arrows on the left hand side of the 614 00:23:05,370 --> 00:23:08,160 slide and what we found happened was 615 00:23:08,160 --> 00:23:10,290 post would go out on traditional or 616 00:23:10,290 --> 00:23:11,957 social media highlighting the 617 00:23:11,957 --> 00:23:14,000 conditions and locations of Taliban 618 00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:16,760 checkpoints around HkD This post on the 619 00:23:16,760 --> 00:23:18,871 left is calling out the conditions at 620 00:23:18,871 --> 00:23:21,190 the Chevron . On 25 August we also 621 00:23:21,190 --> 00:23:22,746 learned during , during the 622 00:23:22,746 --> 00:23:24,968 investigation that in order to maximize 623 00:23:24,968 --> 00:23:27,134 the number of evacuees U . S . Service 624 00:23:27,134 --> 00:23:29,246 members and government officials work 625 00:23:29,246 --> 00:23:31,079 directly with human intelligence 626 00:23:31,079 --> 00:23:33,301 personnel on the ground at HQ . As well 627 00:23:33,301 --> 00:23:35,523 as a number of private organizations to 628 00:23:35,523 --> 00:23:37,690 talk evacuees on two routes they could 629 00:23:37,690 --> 00:23:39,912 use to bypass the taliban checkpoints . 630 00:23:39,912 --> 00:23:42,134 So maps like the one on the right would 631 00:23:42,134 --> 00:23:43,912 be sent to an evacuee and would 632 00:23:43,912 --> 00:23:43,850 highlight the route they could use to 633 00:23:43,850 --> 00:23:45,961 bypass checkpoints and gain access to 634 00:23:45,961 --> 00:23:48,128 navigate . The result would be similar 635 00:23:48,128 --> 00:23:50,072 to what's seen in the photo in the 636 00:23:50,072 --> 00:23:52,183 center , which shows large numbers of 637 00:23:52,183 --> 00:23:54,406 potential evacuees using side roads and 638 00:23:54,406 --> 00:23:56,790 back alleys to get to HQ . So as 639 00:23:56,790 --> 00:23:59,012 potential evacuees would make their way 640 00:23:59,012 --> 00:24:00,846 down these alternate routes that 641 00:24:00,846 --> 00:24:03,012 eventually arrived in this parking lot 642 00:24:03,012 --> 00:24:05,234 area that's being circled now then then 643 00:24:05,234 --> 00:24:07,123 they would have a few options for 644 00:24:07,123 --> 00:24:06,660 getting close to the outer gate area . 645 00:24:07,120 --> 00:24:09,176 They can turn left down the far side 646 00:24:09,176 --> 00:24:11,342 canal walkway . They could utilize the 647 00:24:11,342 --> 00:24:13,564 canal itself where they could cross the 648 00:24:13,564 --> 00:24:15,731 footbridge and turn down the near side 649 00:24:15,731 --> 00:24:17,953 canal walk with This photo was taken 25 650 00:24:17,953 --> 00:24:20,064 August from the Sniper Tower and it's 651 00:24:20,064 --> 00:24:22,287 looking towards the Baron Hotel , which 652 00:24:22,287 --> 00:24:24,287 you can see in the background . The 653 00:24:24,287 --> 00:24:26,509 canal area is on the left and the canal 654 00:24:26,509 --> 00:24:28,509 itself is full , as is the far side 655 00:24:28,509 --> 00:24:30,600 walkway , we assess that the vast 656 00:24:30,600 --> 00:24:32,822 majority of people who see in the canal 657 00:24:32,822 --> 00:24:34,933 area would have gotten there by using 658 00:24:34,933 --> 00:24:37,044 one of the alternate ingress routes . 659 00:24:37,044 --> 00:24:39,100 This next photo was taken 26 August 660 00:24:39,150 --> 00:24:41,094 from further east down the canal , 661 00:24:41,094 --> 00:24:43,039 looking towards the Sniper Tower , 662 00:24:43,039 --> 00:24:45,260 which you see being circled the canal 663 00:24:45,260 --> 00:24:47,260 is in the middle of the photo , The 664 00:24:47,260 --> 00:24:49,427 left side of the canal is the far side 665 00:24:49,427 --> 00:24:51,593 walkway and the right side is the near 666 00:24:51,593 --> 00:24:54,240 side walkway . On the 26th . Both 667 00:24:54,240 --> 00:24:56,351 walkways were full with people trying 668 00:24:56,351 --> 00:24:58,351 to make their way towards the outer 669 00:24:58,351 --> 00:25:00,760 gate area . The next photo is also from 670 00:25:00,760 --> 00:25:03,160 the 26 and it's taken from the far side 671 00:25:03,160 --> 00:25:05,382 of the canal , looking towards the near 672 00:25:05,382 --> 00:25:07,549 side and the sniper tower , A group of 673 00:25:07,549 --> 00:25:09,604 marines is at the base of the sniper 674 00:25:09,604 --> 00:25:11,604 tower trying to control control the 675 00:25:11,604 --> 00:25:13,660 large crowd of potential evacuees on 676 00:25:13,660 --> 00:25:15,716 the near side canal walkway and they 677 00:25:15,716 --> 00:25:17,716 are separated by a series of Jersey 678 00:25:17,716 --> 00:25:19,882 barriers . The photo shows how densely 679 00:25:19,882 --> 00:25:21,993 packed the canal was on 26 August and 680 00:25:21,993 --> 00:25:23,993 this gives you an idea of why there 681 00:25:23,993 --> 00:25:26,160 were so many casualties as a result of 682 00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:28,271 the attack . As people were packed in 683 00:25:28,271 --> 00:25:30,216 the canal , shoulder to shoulder , 684 00:25:30,216 --> 00:25:32,438 chest to back , standing immediately in 685 00:25:32,438 --> 00:25:34,160 front of the blast site . It's 686 00:25:34,160 --> 00:25:36,382 important to highlight that early on in 687 00:25:36,382 --> 00:25:38,493 the operation , the canal facilitated 688 00:25:38,493 --> 00:25:40,271 crowd control and provided some 689 00:25:40,271 --> 00:25:42,438 standoff between US service members on 690 00:25:42,438 --> 00:25:44,160 the near side of the canal and 691 00:25:44,160 --> 00:25:46,271 potential evacuees on the far side of 692 00:25:46,271 --> 00:25:48,382 the canal . Additionally , because it 693 00:25:48,382 --> 00:25:50,604 was a sewage canal , potential evacuees 694 00:25:50,604 --> 00:25:52,660 were hesitant early in evacuation to 695 00:25:52,660 --> 00:25:54,938 use the canal as an avenue of approach . 696 00:25:54,938 --> 00:25:57,160 However , that changed dramatically and 697 00:25:57,160 --> 00:25:59,382 rapidly as desperation levels increased 698 00:25:59,382 --> 00:26:01,160 and more people began using the 699 00:26:01,160 --> 00:26:03,216 alternate ingress routes . It's also 700 00:26:03,216 --> 00:26:05,438 important to note that just about every 701 00:26:05,438 --> 00:26:07,604 person seen in the canal is holding up 702 00:26:07,604 --> 00:26:09,827 some form of documentation in an effort 703 00:26:09,827 --> 00:26:11,938 to get identified and pulled from the 704 00:26:11,938 --> 00:26:13,549 canal to be evacuated . This 705 00:26:13,549 --> 00:26:15,549 illustrates the complex and dynamic 706 00:26:15,549 --> 00:26:17,660 nature of this operation . As U . S . 707 00:26:17,660 --> 00:26:19,604 Service members at Abbey Gate were 708 00:26:19,604 --> 00:26:21,493 tasked with identifying potential 709 00:26:21,493 --> 00:26:23,716 evacuees in possession of the necessary 710 00:26:23,716 --> 00:26:25,716 documentation , pulling them from a 711 00:26:25,716 --> 00:26:27,716 large unruly crowd and then getting 712 00:26:27,716 --> 00:26:29,660 them transported to the evacuation 713 00:26:29,660 --> 00:26:31,660 control center . As a result of our 714 00:26:31,660 --> 00:26:33,940 investigation , we assess that is 715 00:26:33,940 --> 00:26:36,470 highly likely the attacker from 26 716 00:26:36,470 --> 00:26:38,870 August utilized one of the alternate 717 00:26:38,870 --> 00:26:41,092 ingress routes to access the abbey gate 718 00:26:41,092 --> 00:26:43,350 area because he would not have had to 719 00:26:43,350 --> 00:26:45,800 pass through a taliban checkpoint and 720 00:26:45,800 --> 00:26:47,467 he would not have had to show 721 00:26:47,467 --> 00:26:49,578 identification to get close enough to 722 00:26:49,578 --> 00:26:51,522 US service members to detonate his 723 00:26:51,522 --> 00:26:54,670 device . While the intent was to take 724 00:26:54,670 --> 00:26:56,837 advantage of the terrain at Abbey Gate 725 00:26:56,837 --> 00:26:58,670 to execute an orderly evacuation 726 00:26:58,670 --> 00:27:00,614 process , conditions on the ground 727 00:27:00,614 --> 00:27:02,781 changed . People became more desperate 728 00:27:02,830 --> 00:27:05,460 and the process evolved . Regardless of 729 00:27:05,460 --> 00:27:07,350 the process utilized , the nature 730 00:27:07,350 --> 00:27:09,406 evacuation operations requires close 731 00:27:09,406 --> 00:27:11,406 personal contact between US service 732 00:27:11,406 --> 00:27:13,990 members and evacuees . At some point 733 00:27:14,000 --> 00:27:15,000 along the way , 734 00:27:19,030 --> 00:27:21,490 This video is from the morning of 25 735 00:27:21,490 --> 00:27:23,770 August . The marines seen in the video 736 00:27:23,770 --> 00:27:25,492 are from echo Company , Second 737 00:27:25,492 --> 00:27:27,420 Battalion First Marines . The two 738 00:27:27,420 --> 00:27:29,642 marines you can see are standing on the 739 00:27:29,642 --> 00:27:31,587 Jersey barriers at the base of the 740 00:27:31,587 --> 00:27:33,698 sniper tower . The marine on the left 741 00:27:33,698 --> 00:27:35,920 is holding himself up in the chain link 742 00:27:35,920 --> 00:27:38,142 fence which runs adjacent to the sniper 743 00:27:38,142 --> 00:27:40,198 tower . The marine on the right will 744 00:27:40,198 --> 00:27:39,990 get pulled into the crowd by the muzzle 745 00:27:39,990 --> 00:27:42,046 of his weapon and his fellow marines 746 00:27:42,046 --> 00:27:44,101 will enter the crowd to assist him . 747 00:27:44,540 --> 00:27:46,484 Towards the end of the video , the 748 00:27:46,484 --> 00:27:48,651 marine will come into view on the left 749 00:27:48,651 --> 00:27:50,762 and you'll hear him call to reinforce 750 00:27:50,762 --> 00:27:52,873 the area . We show you this video for 751 00:27:52,873 --> 00:27:55,310 three reasons . First , it demonstrates 752 00:27:55,310 --> 00:27:57,366 how large , desperate and aggressive 753 00:27:57,366 --> 00:27:59,366 the crowds were navigate Bearing in 754 00:27:59,366 --> 00:28:01,588 mind that this video was taken a little 755 00:28:01,588 --> 00:28:03,754 more than 24 hours prior to the attack 756 00:28:03,754 --> 00:28:05,977 And we know from the investigation that 757 00:28:05,977 --> 00:28:07,810 the crowds at Abbey gate swelled 758 00:28:07,810 --> 00:28:09,921 exponentially the evening of the 25th 759 00:28:09,921 --> 00:28:12,088 and into the 26th . So the crowd would 760 00:28:12,088 --> 00:28:14,254 have been even larger , more desperate 761 00:28:14,254 --> 00:28:16,421 and more aggressive at the time of the 762 00:28:16,421 --> 00:28:18,254 attack . The second reason is to 763 00:28:18,254 --> 00:28:20,421 illustrate the level of discipline and 764 00:28:20,421 --> 00:28:22,421 restraint displayed by marines on a 765 00:28:22,421 --> 00:28:24,254 daily basis at Abbey Gate as the 766 00:28:24,254 --> 00:28:26,143 marines could have responded with 767 00:28:26,143 --> 00:28:28,199 deadly force after a man grabbed the 768 00:28:28,199 --> 00:28:30,421 marines rifle , but they opted not to . 769 00:28:30,421 --> 00:28:32,421 Finally , we show you this video to 770 00:28:32,421 --> 00:28:34,477 help understand why there was such a 771 00:28:34,477 --> 00:28:36,699 large number of marines concentrated at 772 00:28:36,699 --> 00:28:38,699 the base of the sniper tower at the 773 00:28:38,699 --> 00:28:40,866 time of the attack on the 26th as they 774 00:28:40,866 --> 00:28:43,199 needed to be there to control the large , 775 00:28:43,199 --> 00:28:42,690 desperate crowd and enable the 776 00:28:42,690 --> 00:28:44,857 evacuation to continue at Abbey Gate . 777 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:51,060 Short short thank you . 778 00:28:54,340 --> 00:28:55,340 Mhm . 779 00:28:59,640 --> 00:29:00,920 Mhm . Yeah . 780 00:29:09,940 --> 00:29:10,940 Take 781 00:29:17,540 --> 00:29:20,450 Hey Gretzky you to reinforce this , 782 00:29:21,540 --> 00:29:23,096 Get you guys to reinforce . 783 00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:28,913 The next video is the only known 784 00:29:28,913 --> 00:29:31,940 footage of the blast itself . This is 785 00:29:31,940 --> 00:29:34,960 48 m from the blast . There's a white 786 00:29:34,960 --> 00:29:37,340 hi Lux truck and three marines , a 787 00:29:37,340 --> 00:29:40,130 single individual dressed in all black , 788 00:29:40,130 --> 00:29:42,520 steps forward from the crowd . In that 789 00:29:42,520 --> 00:29:44,400 space between the marine in the 790 00:29:44,400 --> 00:29:46,289 foreground , his antenna is where 791 00:29:46,289 --> 00:29:48,456 you're gonna see that individual . The 792 00:29:48,456 --> 00:29:50,289 blast seems to emanate from this 793 00:29:50,289 --> 00:29:53,080 individual . The blast builds in the v 794 00:29:53,080 --> 00:29:55,620 where the cursor is right now , in 795 00:29:55,620 --> 00:29:57,453 between the two marines and then 796 00:29:57,453 --> 00:29:59,509 there's a building that is currently 797 00:29:59,509 --> 00:30:01,740 not on the screen , It's on the left 798 00:30:01,830 --> 00:30:04,052 and you will see the blast overpressure 799 00:30:04,052 --> 00:30:06,163 coming through that window , it looks 800 00:30:06,163 --> 00:30:08,219 like dust and that gives you an idea 801 00:30:08,219 --> 00:30:10,052 regarding the blast effects that 802 00:30:10,052 --> 00:30:12,163 service members on the ground . We're 803 00:30:12,163 --> 00:30:14,163 actually feeling even 48 m from the 804 00:30:14,163 --> 00:30:16,108 blast . Finally , you will see the 805 00:30:16,108 --> 00:30:18,163 marines orient towards the blast and 806 00:30:18,163 --> 00:30:20,274 they will seek cover . We'll play the 807 00:30:20,274 --> 00:30:22,497 video once and then we'll stop and slow 808 00:30:22,497 --> 00:30:24,552 down and show you key aspects of the 809 00:30:24,552 --> 00:30:26,608 video Alex . Play the video please . 810 00:30:26,608 --> 00:30:26,960 You 811 00:30:34,940 --> 00:30:37,670 The first thing you'll see is in that 812 00:30:37,670 --> 00:30:39,890 space between the marines marines 813 00:30:39,890 --> 00:30:42,001 antenna and his chest . You'll see an 814 00:30:42,001 --> 00:30:44,112 individual dressed in all black where 815 00:30:44,112 --> 00:30:46,730 the cursor is circling right now . The 816 00:30:46,730 --> 00:30:48,563 blast seems to emanate from this 817 00:30:48,563 --> 00:30:49,563 individual . 818 00:30:52,640 --> 00:30:55,530 You will see the blast build in that v 819 00:30:55,530 --> 00:30:57,474 between the marines antenna on the 820 00:30:57,474 --> 00:31:00,180 forefront and the marine in the center . 821 00:31:00,270 --> 00:31:02,548 And then you also see the overpressure . 822 00:31:02,548 --> 00:31:04,381 It looks like dust that's coming 823 00:31:04,381 --> 00:31:06,492 through the window there . That gives 824 00:31:06,492 --> 00:31:08,714 you an idea for what individuals on the 825 00:31:08,714 --> 00:31:10,659 ground we're feeling in the way of 826 00:31:10,659 --> 00:31:12,826 blast effects . Finally , you will see 827 00:31:12,826 --> 00:31:14,881 the marines orient towards the blast 828 00:31:15,140 --> 00:31:16,140 and seek cover . 829 00:31:20,940 --> 00:31:23,218 Good afternoon . I'm major brad hannon . 830 00:31:23,450 --> 00:31:25,672 The following video is from an overhead 831 00:31:25,672 --> 00:31:28,570 platform . The video begins 3:08 after 832 00:31:28,570 --> 00:31:31,080 the attack . This full video will be 833 00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:33,247 made available following this briefing 834 00:31:33,340 --> 00:31:35,396 and the edges of the video have been 835 00:31:35,396 --> 00:31:37,618 blurred to protect classified data from 836 00:31:37,618 --> 00:31:39,784 being displayed . In order to allow us 837 00:31:39,784 --> 00:31:41,840 to release this footage . The attack 838 00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:44,720 occurs at 17 36 and 52 seconds and it's 839 00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:46,887 time stamped by two different overhead 840 00:31:46,887 --> 00:31:49,580 persistent infrared ROP IR detection 841 00:31:49,580 --> 00:31:52,030 sensors . These detections of a single 842 00:31:52,030 --> 00:31:54,197 blast indicate the origin point of the 843 00:31:54,197 --> 00:31:56,363 blast who have been in the vicinity of 844 00:31:56,363 --> 00:31:58,308 Abbey Gate . The intelligence cell 845 00:31:58,308 --> 00:32:00,252 takes that report and provides the 846 00:32:00,252 --> 00:32:02,197 information of an explosion having 847 00:32:02,197 --> 00:32:04,030 occurred to the intelligence and 848 00:32:04,030 --> 00:32:06,086 information sharing platform . Those 849 00:32:06,086 --> 00:32:07,919 reports are used to redirect the 850 00:32:07,919 --> 00:32:10,200 aircraft that you're about to see as 851 00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:12,089 the footage begins . What you are 852 00:32:12,089 --> 00:32:14,089 seeing initially is the drone pilot 853 00:32:14,089 --> 00:32:16,200 orienting the camera to Abbey Gate at 854 00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:18,310 the Abbey Inner Gate . The initial 855 00:32:18,310 --> 00:32:20,670 movement scene is the marines reacting 856 00:32:20,670 --> 00:32:22,614 to the blast moving down the inner 857 00:32:22,614 --> 00:32:24,726 corridor to assist at the site of the 858 00:32:24,726 --> 00:32:26,770 attack . This is the inner corridor 859 00:32:26,770 --> 00:32:29,060 area and is where State Department 860 00:32:29,060 --> 00:32:31,282 personnel processed evacuees during the 861 00:32:31,282 --> 00:32:33,800 evacuation . There are quite a few 862 00:32:33,800 --> 00:32:35,744 vehicles in the corridor , some of 863 00:32:35,744 --> 00:32:37,856 which were pre positioned as blocking 864 00:32:37,856 --> 00:32:39,967 obstacles for the closure of the gate 865 00:32:39,967 --> 00:32:42,078 before the joint Tactical X ville and 866 00:32:42,078 --> 00:32:44,300 some were used to evacuate casualties . 867 00:32:44,300 --> 00:32:46,340 Following triage on the left , the 868 00:32:46,350 --> 00:32:48,406 drone pilot maneuvers over the outer 869 00:32:48,406 --> 00:32:50,350 gate now and as well as the outer 870 00:32:50,350 --> 00:32:52,930 corridor . On the left is the chevron 871 00:32:52,930 --> 00:32:55,190 and the Baron Hotel complex . Having 872 00:32:55,190 --> 00:32:57,301 reached the end of the corridor , the 873 00:32:57,301 --> 00:32:59,301 drone pilot research is back up the 874 00:32:59,301 --> 00:33:01,412 corridor for the site of the attack . 875 00:33:01,412 --> 00:33:03,523 The video will be paused here to show 876 00:33:03,523 --> 00:33:05,690 you a few things . The vehicle seen on 877 00:33:05,690 --> 00:33:07,912 the far left of the screen is the white 878 00:33:07,912 --> 00:33:09,579 truck that was in the for the 879 00:33:09,579 --> 00:33:11,801 background of the previous video of the 880 00:33:11,801 --> 00:33:13,912 blast . The previous video would have 881 00:33:13,912 --> 00:33:15,746 been filmed from right here . As 882 00:33:15,746 --> 00:33:17,801 brigadier General Curtis mentioned , 883 00:33:17,801 --> 00:33:20,023 this truck is 48 m from the blast . The 884 00:33:20,023 --> 00:33:22,079 site of the attack was right here on 885 00:33:22,079 --> 00:33:24,190 the bottom right of the screen , just 886 00:33:24,190 --> 00:33:26,190 out of view due to the angle of the 887 00:33:26,190 --> 00:33:28,412 camera and the aircraft . Later in this 888 00:33:28,412 --> 00:33:30,579 video , the drone pilot reoriented the 889 00:33:30,579 --> 00:33:30,560 camera and the aircraft to better view 890 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:32,930 the site of the attack . On the left 891 00:33:32,930 --> 00:33:35,041 hand side of the screen . You can see 892 00:33:35,041 --> 00:33:36,652 the building where the blast 893 00:33:36,652 --> 00:33:38,986 overpressure passed through that window . 894 00:33:38,986 --> 00:33:41,097 In the blast video . In the center of 895 00:33:41,097 --> 00:33:43,097 the screen is the U shape of Jersey 896 00:33:43,097 --> 00:33:45,319 barriers along with the high visibility 897 00:33:45,319 --> 00:33:47,374 orange panel that is attached to the 898 00:33:47,374 --> 00:33:49,430 fence . These points of reference to 899 00:33:49,430 --> 00:33:51,541 note the original hole in the fence , 900 00:33:51,541 --> 00:33:53,763 which is important because prior to the 901 00:33:53,763 --> 00:33:55,930 attack , marines would have Would have 902 00:33:55,930 --> 00:33:57,986 had to walk 30 m from the outer gate 903 00:33:57,986 --> 00:33:59,986 down the outer corridor Through the 904 00:33:59,986 --> 00:34:02,208 hole in the fence and then back another 905 00:34:02,208 --> 00:34:04,374 30 m to the base of the Sniper Tower . 906 00:34:04,374 --> 00:34:06,374 That 60 m distance is a long way to 907 00:34:06,374 --> 00:34:08,319 evacuate a casualty and exhibiting 908 00:34:08,319 --> 00:34:10,430 rapid response and adaptability . The 909 00:34:10,430 --> 00:34:12,263 marines shorten that distance by 910 00:34:12,263 --> 00:34:14,263 cutting two additional holes in the 911 00:34:14,263 --> 00:34:16,097 fence closer to the outer gate . 912 00:34:16,140 --> 00:34:18,362 Finally , I would like to point out the 913 00:34:18,362 --> 00:34:20,529 white vehicle on the far right , which 914 00:34:20,529 --> 00:34:22,307 is a visual indicator for being 915 00:34:22,307 --> 00:34:24,529 directly across the canal from the site 916 00:34:24,529 --> 00:34:26,640 of the attack . Next , the video will 917 00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:28,640 be fast forwarded to the two minute 918 00:34:28,640 --> 00:34:28,570 mark as the drone pilot is going to 919 00:34:28,570 --> 00:34:30,848 actually leave Abbey gate for a moment . 920 00:34:30,848 --> 00:34:32,903 So the footage is contextual but not 921 00:34:32,903 --> 00:34:35,126 relevant to the specific events as they 922 00:34:35,126 --> 00:34:37,550 occurred . Please be advised . The next 923 00:34:37,550 --> 00:34:39,772 segment of video is graphic and then it 924 00:34:39,772 --> 00:34:41,772 clearly depicts casualty evacuation 925 00:34:41,772 --> 00:34:43,994 after the attack . You will not be able 926 00:34:43,994 --> 00:34:45,883 to identify individuals , but the 927 00:34:45,883 --> 00:34:48,250 movement is clearly visible . As the 928 00:34:48,250 --> 00:34:50,194 next segment of video begins , The 929 00:34:50,194 --> 00:34:52,306 drone pilot has switched his electric 930 00:34:52,306 --> 00:34:54,361 optical infrared camera to IR mode , 931 00:34:54,361 --> 00:34:56,194 which is better for tracking and 932 00:34:56,194 --> 00:34:58,110 identifying movement . The camera 933 00:34:58,110 --> 00:35:00,221 orients first on the parking lot area 934 00:35:00,221 --> 00:35:02,166 and then pans past the site of the 935 00:35:02,166 --> 00:35:04,260 attack and focuses on an IR light on 936 00:35:04,260 --> 00:35:06,316 the ground near the original hole in 937 00:35:06,316 --> 00:35:08,320 the fence . For the next several 938 00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:10,542 seconds , the camera will focus on this 939 00:35:10,542 --> 00:35:12,598 area as marines continue to evacuate 940 00:35:12,598 --> 00:35:14,820 casualties through the original hole in 941 00:35:14,820 --> 00:35:17,340 the fence at this point , about 5.5 942 00:35:17,340 --> 00:35:19,396 minutes after the attack , the canal 943 00:35:19,396 --> 00:35:21,507 has emptied significantly as compared 944 00:35:21,507 --> 00:35:23,507 to the photos shown in the previous 945 00:35:23,507 --> 00:35:25,562 portion of this brief . The far side 946 00:35:25,562 --> 00:35:27,673 walkway across the canal also appears 947 00:35:27,673 --> 00:35:29,951 distinctly different from those photos . 948 00:35:30,580 --> 00:35:32,802 The natural inclination of the crowd is 949 00:35:32,802 --> 00:35:35,520 to move away from the blast . UK troops 950 00:35:35,520 --> 00:35:37,464 were not allowing passage from the 951 00:35:37,464 --> 00:35:39,409 canal towards the Baron Hotel as a 952 00:35:39,409 --> 00:35:41,680 security measure . The crowd then is 953 00:35:41,680 --> 00:35:43,736 forced together and pushed back down 954 00:35:43,736 --> 00:35:45,847 towards the east past the side of the 955 00:35:45,847 --> 00:35:48,480 attack . In many cases , people had to 956 00:35:48,480 --> 00:35:50,480 run behind and over the site of the 957 00:35:50,480 --> 00:35:51,480 attack . 958 00:35:58,940 --> 00:36:00,884 It's a location being shown now is 959 00:36:00,884 --> 00:36:03,051 where marine cut an additional hole in 960 00:36:03,051 --> 00:36:05,218 the fence about 10 m from the original 961 00:36:05,218 --> 00:36:07,273 hole , which shortens the evacuation 962 00:36:07,273 --> 00:36:09,840 distance by 20 m . Analysis of the 963 00:36:09,840 --> 00:36:11,784 video footage by the drone analyst 964 00:36:11,784 --> 00:36:13,840 specified the fact that they did not 965 00:36:13,840 --> 00:36:16,062 see any gunfire at any point throughout 966 00:36:16,062 --> 00:36:17,980 this video . Either incoming or 967 00:36:17,980 --> 00:36:18,980 outgoing . 968 00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:44,791 The location being pointed out now is 969 00:36:44,791 --> 00:36:46,847 the second hole that the marines cut 970 00:36:46,847 --> 00:36:49,013 into the fence . 10 m from the base of 971 00:36:49,013 --> 00:36:50,736 the Sniper Tower , which again 972 00:36:50,736 --> 00:36:52,902 significantly shortened the evacuation 973 00:36:52,902 --> 00:36:54,791 distance . The video continues as 974 00:36:54,791 --> 00:36:56,791 marines evacuate personnel and move 975 00:36:56,791 --> 00:36:59,013 them into the inner corridor where they 976 00:36:59,013 --> 00:37:01,069 had a preplanned casualty collection 977 00:37:01,069 --> 00:37:03,236 point for initial treatment and triage 978 00:37:03,430 --> 00:37:05,319 the movement of several personnel 979 00:37:05,319 --> 00:37:07,208 towards higher levels of care has 980 00:37:07,208 --> 00:37:09,152 already begun by this point in the 981 00:37:09,152 --> 00:37:11,790 footage really , 982 00:37:14,340 --> 00:37:16,396 the video is paused here in order to 983 00:37:16,396 --> 00:37:18,507 point out a few things about the site 984 00:37:18,507 --> 00:37:20,618 of the attack . What has shown now is 985 00:37:20,618 --> 00:37:24,160 7:21 post blast . The view clearly 986 00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:26,104 shows the site of the attack which 987 00:37:26,104 --> 00:37:29,510 originates from here . There were three 988 00:37:29,510 --> 00:37:31,454 distinct large groups of potential 989 00:37:31,454 --> 00:37:33,677 evacuees who were injured and killed in 990 00:37:33,677 --> 00:37:35,843 the blast . The first being identified 991 00:37:35,843 --> 00:37:38,010 right now was directly surrounding the 992 00:37:38,010 --> 00:37:40,232 attacker on the far side walkway . When 993 00:37:40,232 --> 00:37:42,920 he set off the device , the second is 994 00:37:42,920 --> 00:37:45,031 inside the canal below the wall where 995 00:37:45,031 --> 00:37:47,600 the device was detonated . The third 996 00:37:47,600 --> 00:37:49,767 large group of potential evacuees were 997 00:37:49,767 --> 00:37:51,656 near the base of the sniper tower 998 00:37:51,656 --> 00:37:53,656 crowded and trying to work with the 999 00:37:53,656 --> 00:37:55,850 marines in order to gain entry . This 1000 00:37:55,850 --> 00:37:58,183 is the central point of where the U . S . 1001 00:37:58,183 --> 00:38:00,240 Casualties which is being identified 1002 00:38:00,240 --> 00:38:03,200 now in addition to evacuation efforts , 1003 00:38:03,200 --> 00:38:05,367 marines moved to the outer corridor in 1004 00:38:05,367 --> 00:38:07,478 order to assist in providing security 1005 00:38:07,478 --> 00:38:09,589 along the wall but again , no out for 1006 00:38:09,589 --> 00:38:13,330 outgoing fire can be seen . This video 1007 00:38:13,330 --> 00:38:15,552 will end in about 30 seconds , which is 1008 00:38:15,552 --> 00:38:18,290 eight minutes post attack by 20 minutes . 1009 00:38:18,290 --> 00:38:20,512 Post attack all U . S . Casualties were 1010 00:38:20,512 --> 00:38:22,457 evacuated and moved into the inner 1011 00:38:22,457 --> 00:38:24,346 corridor area for triage . At the 1012 00:38:24,346 --> 00:38:27,160 casualty collection point , all U . S . 1013 00:38:27,160 --> 00:38:29,360 Personnel will will were pulled back 1014 00:38:29,360 --> 00:38:31,527 into the inner corridor and no U . S . 1015 00:38:31,527 --> 00:38:33,749 Personnel left the gate again until the 1016 00:38:33,749 --> 00:38:35,860 next morning when explosive ordinance 1017 00:38:35,860 --> 00:38:37,693 disposal team performs the blast 1018 00:38:37,693 --> 00:38:40,980 analysis at six am . Eventually two and 1019 00:38:40,980 --> 00:38:43,147 three perry units left the Baron Hotel 1020 00:38:43,147 --> 00:38:45,258 in order to secure the outer corridor 1021 00:38:45,258 --> 00:38:47,369 between the Baron Hotel and the outer 1022 00:38:47,369 --> 00:38:49,536 gate until the end of their evacuation 1023 00:38:49,536 --> 00:38:49,320 is complete . 1024 00:38:59,320 --> 00:39:03,280 Mhm . Good afternoon Ladies and 1025 00:39:03,280 --> 00:39:05,280 Gentlemen , Lieutenant Colonel Bert 1026 00:39:05,280 --> 00:39:07,558 smith . My first oriented to the slide . 1027 00:39:07,558 --> 00:39:09,724 The blast is located at the top of the 1028 00:39:09,724 --> 00:39:11,780 slide on the far side of the canal , 1029 00:39:11,780 --> 00:39:11,380 the two white arrows should the 1030 00:39:11,380 --> 00:39:13,102 fragmentation pattern from the 1031 00:39:13,102 --> 00:39:15,102 explosion they killed in action are 1032 00:39:15,102 --> 00:39:16,991 depicted in blue , the wounded in 1033 00:39:16,991 --> 00:39:18,936 action in yellow . The time of the 1034 00:39:18,936 --> 00:39:21,158 blast . Golf Company and Fox Company to 1035 00:39:21,158 --> 00:39:23,324 one marines were conducting evacuation 1036 00:39:23,324 --> 00:39:25,324 operations in the outer gate area . 1037 00:39:25,324 --> 00:39:27,213 First platoon of Golf company was 1038 00:39:27,213 --> 00:39:29,324 holding back the crowd at the base of 1039 00:39:29,324 --> 00:39:28,920 the tower of the Jersey barriers and 1040 00:39:28,920 --> 00:39:30,976 simultaneously conducting evacuation 1041 00:39:30,976 --> 00:39:33,142 screening of those in the canal area . 1042 00:39:33,142 --> 00:39:35,087 Echo Company weapons company of 21 1043 00:39:35,087 --> 00:39:37,253 marines were supporting from the inner 1044 00:39:37,253 --> 00:39:39,198 corridor and also conducting other 1045 00:39:39,198 --> 00:39:41,364 operations to prepare for the eventual 1046 00:39:41,364 --> 00:39:44,050 closure of Abbey Gate killed in action 1047 00:39:44,100 --> 00:39:46,267 and had the gate number 13 on the 26th 1048 00:39:46,267 --> 00:39:48,267 of august , the closest being three 1049 00:39:48,267 --> 00:39:50,489 service members , Approximately three m 1050 00:39:50,489 --> 00:39:52,810 from the blast or 10 ft they were 1051 00:39:52,810 --> 00:39:54,940 standing up the canal wall searching 1052 00:39:54,940 --> 00:39:57,107 potential evacuees amongst the crowd . 1053 00:39:57,820 --> 00:39:59,709 The farthest killed in action was 1054 00:39:59,709 --> 00:40:01,931 nearly 17 m from the blast located near 1055 00:40:01,931 --> 00:40:04,153 the vehicle . The outer corridor at the 1056 00:40:04,153 --> 00:40:06,153 bottom of the slide , There were 26 1057 00:40:06,153 --> 00:40:07,987 wounded in action treated at the 1058 00:40:07,987 --> 00:40:10,370 medical facilities at HQ on 26 August 1059 00:40:10,370 --> 00:40:13,280 19 of those were wounded . They were 1060 00:40:13,280 --> 00:40:16,440 medically evacuated on 27 August the 1061 00:40:16,440 --> 00:40:18,440 reason so many service members were 1062 00:40:18,440 --> 00:40:20,440 consolidated the base of the sniper 1063 00:40:20,440 --> 00:40:22,496 tower was the necessity to hold back 1064 00:40:22,496 --> 00:40:24,551 the crowd and you continue screening 1065 00:40:24,551 --> 00:40:26,440 potential evacuees for as long as 1066 00:40:26,440 --> 00:40:26,380 possible to save as many lives as 1067 00:40:26,380 --> 00:40:27,380 possible . 1068 00:40:30,510 --> 00:40:32,732 The fragmentation fragmentation pattern 1069 00:40:32,732 --> 00:40:34,954 shown on the previous slide is overlaid 1070 00:40:34,954 --> 00:40:37,066 here on the Abbey Gate terrain . It's 1071 00:40:37,066 --> 00:40:39,066 combined with data from the defense 1072 00:40:39,066 --> 00:40:41,232 threat reduction agency is boom tool , 1073 00:40:41,232 --> 00:40:43,399 which measures pressure over range and 1074 00:40:43,399 --> 00:40:45,121 determines blast effects of an 1075 00:40:45,121 --> 00:40:47,343 explosion Based on the size of device . 1076 00:40:47,343 --> 00:40:49,566 The blast effects were felt 50 m out at 1077 00:40:49,566 --> 00:40:51,677 Abbey gate amazonians martin and this 1078 00:40:51,677 --> 00:40:53,788 is where service members were exposed 1079 00:40:53,788 --> 00:40:53,380 to the fragmentation of the blast 1080 00:40:53,380 --> 00:40:55,890 itself as well as full blast effects . 1081 00:40:56,810 --> 00:40:58,699 Blackstone be marked in orange is 1082 00:40:58,699 --> 00:41:00,699 located in the outer corridor . The 1083 00:41:00,699 --> 00:41:02,810 service members there would have been 1084 00:41:02,810 --> 00:41:04,754 felt , would have felt unmitigated 1085 00:41:04,754 --> 00:41:06,810 blast effects . The three marines in 1086 00:41:06,810 --> 00:41:06,340 the video of the blast were located 1087 00:41:06,340 --> 00:41:08,507 just on the edge of Blackstone b . m . 1088 00:41:09,110 --> 00:41:11,332 You saw they involuntarily buckled when 1089 00:41:11,332 --> 00:41:13,332 the blast wave passed through their 1090 00:41:13,332 --> 00:41:15,450 location . Zone C is martin yellow . 1091 00:41:15,450 --> 00:41:17,506 It's located in the inner corridor . 1092 00:41:17,506 --> 00:41:19,506 The service members here would have 1093 00:41:19,506 --> 00:41:21,839 been exposed to mitigated blast effects . 1094 00:41:21,839 --> 00:41:21,430 The walls of the corridor and the 1095 00:41:21,430 --> 00:41:23,486 sniper tower would have offered them 1096 00:41:23,486 --> 00:41:25,597 some protection from the blast . It's 1097 00:41:25,597 --> 00:41:27,541 important to discuss blast effects 1098 00:41:27,541 --> 00:41:29,652 because it explains why the number of 1099 00:41:29,652 --> 00:41:29,590 wounded action has actually risen after 1100 00:41:29,590 --> 00:41:31,830 the attack is as units redeployed from 1101 00:41:31,830 --> 00:41:33,941 H Kaya , they conducted screening for 1102 00:41:33,941 --> 00:41:36,163 traumatic brain injury and I discovered 1103 00:41:36,163 --> 00:41:38,219 that additional service members were 1104 00:41:38,219 --> 00:41:40,386 wounded in this attack . There are now 1105 00:41:40,386 --> 00:41:42,552 45 G O . D . Service members listed as 1106 00:41:42,552 --> 00:41:45,790 wounded from this event . The explosive 1107 00:41:45,790 --> 00:41:47,568 ordnance disposal unit H . Kaya 1108 00:41:47,568 --> 00:41:49,623 conducted a post blast analysis . 13 1109 00:41:49,623 --> 00:41:51,734 hours after the attack on the morning 1110 00:41:51,734 --> 00:41:53,846 of 27 august the established location 1111 00:41:53,846 --> 00:41:55,846 of the blast at the far side of the 1112 00:41:55,846 --> 00:41:58,012 canal . The picture on the left is the 1113 00:41:58,012 --> 00:42:00,012 view from the bomber looking across 1114 00:42:00,012 --> 00:42:02,012 canal at the service members of the 1115 00:42:02,012 --> 00:42:03,901 base of the tower establishes the 1116 00:42:03,901 --> 00:42:06,012 location of the attacker because they 1117 00:42:06,012 --> 00:42:08,234 found fragmentation noted by the yellow 1118 00:42:08,234 --> 00:42:10,401 arrows and the inside of the near side 1119 00:42:10,401 --> 00:42:12,457 canal wall . The attacker would have 1120 00:42:12,457 --> 00:42:14,623 had have been standing on the far side 1121 00:42:14,623 --> 00:42:16,734 of the canal for the fragmentation to 1122 00:42:16,734 --> 00:42:18,846 end up in that location , the picture 1123 00:42:18,846 --> 00:42:18,290 on the right is the view of the service 1124 00:42:18,290 --> 00:42:20,346 members looking at the attacker from 1125 00:42:20,346 --> 00:42:22,568 the base of the tower , you can see the 1126 00:42:22,568 --> 00:42:24,401 charring on the fence behind the 1127 00:42:24,401 --> 00:42:26,457 silhouette we've placed there . It's 1128 00:42:26,457 --> 00:42:28,623 another indication the attacker was on 1129 00:42:28,623 --> 00:42:28,590 the far side of canal and the device 1130 00:42:28,590 --> 00:42:31,500 was exploded . Now you ? D determined 1131 00:42:31,500 --> 00:42:33,722 this was a directional device , command 1132 00:42:33,722 --> 00:42:36,290 detonated £20 of military grade 1133 00:42:36,290 --> 00:42:39,360 explosives and this person born , they 1134 00:42:39,360 --> 00:42:41,471 sought forensic analysis of potential 1135 00:42:41,471 --> 00:42:43,360 delivery device mechanisms . They 1136 00:42:43,360 --> 00:42:45,582 collected shards of backpacks and other 1137 00:42:45,582 --> 00:42:48,150 fabric and debris . The forensic 1138 00:42:48,280 --> 00:42:50,113 forensic are inconclusive and no 1139 00:42:50,113 --> 00:42:52,280 delivery mechanism could be determined 1140 00:42:52,280 --> 00:42:54,447 under the circumstances , which is why 1141 00:42:54,447 --> 00:42:56,730 we call it a person born I . D . Cody . 1142 00:42:56,730 --> 00:42:58,952 What is able to conclude however it was 1143 00:42:58,952 --> 00:43:01,119 delivered . The device would have been 1144 00:43:01,119 --> 00:43:03,286 elevated on the Attackers body when he 1145 00:43:03,286 --> 00:43:05,508 stepped up to the edge of the canal and 1146 00:43:05,508 --> 00:43:07,674 exploded . The audits , which explains 1147 00:43:07,674 --> 00:43:09,730 why fragmentation was projected both 1148 00:43:09,730 --> 00:43:11,900 into the canal , landing in that wall 1149 00:43:11,910 --> 00:43:13,743 and also across into the service 1150 00:43:13,743 --> 00:43:15,910 members on the far side of the canal . 1151 00:43:16,100 --> 00:43:18,156 The fragmentation found at the blast 1152 00:43:18,156 --> 00:43:20,433 site was five millimeter ball bearings . 1153 00:43:20,870 --> 00:43:22,814 The Armed Forces Medical Examiners 1154 00:43:22,814 --> 00:43:24,870 Office also find found ball bearings 1155 00:43:24,870 --> 00:43:26,926 during autopsies of the 13 killed in 1156 00:43:26,926 --> 00:43:28,814 action . The Armed forces medical 1157 00:43:28,814 --> 00:43:30,648 examiners office concluded . The 1158 00:43:30,648 --> 00:43:32,814 penetrative injuries suffered by those 1159 00:43:32,814 --> 00:43:34,981 killed in action were caused solely by 1160 00:43:34,981 --> 00:43:37,092 the ball bearings . They did not find 1161 00:43:37,092 --> 00:43:39,259 bullet fragmentation or other evidence 1162 00:43:39,259 --> 00:43:39,020 that gunshot wounds were suffered 1163 00:43:39,500 --> 00:43:41,389 during the attack . At Abbey Gate 1164 00:43:41,700 --> 00:43:43,422 wounds from ball bearings look 1165 00:43:43,422 --> 00:43:45,478 remarkably similar to gunshot wounds 1166 00:43:45,500 --> 00:43:47,720 and the first responders at Abbey Gate 1167 00:43:48,100 --> 00:43:50,044 may have confused the cause of the 1168 00:43:50,044 --> 00:43:52,200 injuries . Additionally , doctors 1169 00:43:52,200 --> 00:43:53,922 treating the casualties at the 1170 00:43:53,922 --> 00:43:56,033 hospitals at North H Kaya were openly 1171 00:43:56,033 --> 00:43:57,978 describing the injuries as gunshot 1172 00:43:57,978 --> 00:44:00,033 wounds in front of service members . 1173 00:44:00,033 --> 00:44:02,089 These descriptions were meant to aid 1174 00:44:02,089 --> 00:44:04,033 the providers treating the various 1175 00:44:04,033 --> 00:44:06,033 traumas and as a point of reference 1176 00:44:06,033 --> 00:44:08,089 amongst them , these are not medical 1177 00:44:08,089 --> 00:44:10,422 determinations of the cause of injuries . 1178 00:44:10,422 --> 00:44:12,367 The Armed Forces medical examiners 1179 00:44:12,367 --> 00:44:14,589 office , it does make determinations on 1180 00:44:14,589 --> 00:44:16,700 cause of injuries and found that ball 1181 00:44:16,700 --> 00:44:18,922 bearings cause catastrophic injuries to 1182 00:44:18,922 --> 00:44:21,144 the upper chest , neck and face as well 1183 00:44:21,144 --> 00:44:23,367 as the lower abdomen of those killed in 1184 00:44:23,367 --> 00:44:26,130 action . In aggregate , the number of 1185 00:44:26,130 --> 00:44:28,241 potential evacuees killed and injured 1186 00:44:28,241 --> 00:44:30,130 was difficult to determine . Open 1187 00:44:30,130 --> 00:44:32,074 source reporting for approximately 1188 00:44:32,074 --> 00:44:34,130 three days after the blast concluded 1189 00:44:34,130 --> 00:44:36,130 that over 160 to 170 were killed by 1190 00:44:36,130 --> 00:44:38,297 this explosion in this attack , facing 1191 00:44:38,297 --> 00:44:40,463 a number of potential evacuees outside 1192 00:44:40,463 --> 00:44:39,650 Abbey Gate , in the vicinity of the 1193 00:44:39,650 --> 00:44:42,050 canal area at the time of the blast and 1194 00:44:42,050 --> 00:44:44,217 showing the pictures of the upper left 1195 00:44:44,217 --> 00:44:45,883 and upper right combined with 1196 00:44:45,883 --> 00:44:47,883 statements from service members who 1197 00:44:47,883 --> 00:44:50,210 were at or at Abbey Gate post blast , 1198 00:44:50,210 --> 00:44:52,321 we found this number to be reasonable 1199 00:44:52,321 --> 00:44:54,654 under the circumstances . A few moments , 1200 00:44:54,654 --> 00:44:56,821 we'll talk , we'll discuss the lack of 1201 00:44:56,821 --> 00:44:56,490 a complex attack , but it should be 1202 00:44:56,490 --> 00:44:58,830 noted there was outgoing small arms 1203 00:44:58,830 --> 00:45:00,830 fire in the form of warning shots . 1204 00:45:00,830 --> 00:45:02,719 Post blast this came from U . S . 1205 00:45:02,719 --> 00:45:04,774 Service members as well as coalition 1206 00:45:04,774 --> 00:45:06,497 forces . Based on the evidence 1207 00:45:06,497 --> 00:45:08,719 collected during the investigation , we 1208 00:45:08,719 --> 00:45:10,774 concluded the shots fired post blast 1209 00:45:10,774 --> 00:45:10,150 did not contribute to the injuries 1210 00:45:10,150 --> 00:45:12,261 suffered by the potential evacuees at 1211 00:45:12,261 --> 00:45:14,483 Abbey Gate . The injuries suffered from 1212 00:45:14,483 --> 00:45:16,372 potential evacuees are attributed 1213 00:45:16,372 --> 00:45:17,920 solely to the blast . Mhm 1214 00:45:20,890 --> 00:45:23,210 I am Colonel C . J . Douglas and I will 1215 00:45:23,210 --> 00:45:25,432 discuss the details and the key finding 1216 00:45:25,432 --> 00:45:27,488 that this was not a complex attack . 1217 00:45:28,000 --> 00:45:30,111 The attack at Abbey Gate was a single 1218 00:45:30,111 --> 00:45:32,370 personal born improvised explosive 1219 00:45:32,370 --> 00:45:35,260 device with no associated enemy small 1220 00:45:35,260 --> 00:45:38,680 arms fire . Through a review of the 1221 00:45:38,680 --> 00:45:41,250 overhead persistent infrared detection 1222 00:45:41,430 --> 00:45:43,830 sensor data , the U . S . Explosive 1223 00:45:43,830 --> 00:45:46,170 ordinance disposal report and 1224 00:45:46,170 --> 00:45:48,550 subsequent interviews with personnel in 1225 00:45:48,550 --> 00:45:50,883 the Abbey corridor and surrounding area . 1226 00:45:51,190 --> 00:45:53,357 The investigation determined there was 1227 00:45:53,357 --> 00:45:57,220 only one explosion . Early reports 1228 00:45:57,590 --> 00:46:00,190 described a complex attack including 1229 00:46:00,190 --> 00:46:02,520 reports of gunfire and gunshot wounds . 1230 00:46:03,380 --> 00:46:05,300 We now know this is not true . 1231 00:46:05,980 --> 00:46:08,720 Additionally , there is no proof that 1232 00:46:08,720 --> 00:46:12,010 any US or afghan person was injured or 1233 00:46:12,010 --> 00:46:15,210 killed by gunfire . Several factors 1234 00:46:15,220 --> 00:46:17,387 contributed to the initial belief that 1235 00:46:17,387 --> 00:46:19,980 this attack was complex , including the 1236 00:46:19,980 --> 00:46:23,470 fog of war and disorientation due to 1237 00:46:23,470 --> 00:46:26,310 blast effects . The marines heightened 1238 00:46:26,310 --> 00:46:29,340 alert toward the taliban and the 1239 00:46:29,340 --> 00:46:31,560 presence of gunfire used for warning 1240 00:46:31,560 --> 00:46:35,080 shots . Within seconds of the 1241 00:46:35,080 --> 00:46:38,290 blast , Marines experienced mental and 1242 00:46:38,290 --> 00:46:41,140 physical friction mentally . They 1243 00:46:41,140 --> 00:46:43,196 worked through the uncertainty about 1244 00:46:43,196 --> 00:46:44,918 what had just occurred and the 1245 00:46:44,918 --> 00:46:47,029 possibility that the taliban could be 1246 00:46:47,029 --> 00:46:50,160 responsible very quickly . Marines 1247 00:46:50,160 --> 00:46:52,160 determined the taliban were neither 1248 00:46:52,160 --> 00:46:54,300 involved nor threatening US personnel 1249 00:46:54,780 --> 00:46:57,370 physically , marines experienced blast 1250 00:46:57,370 --> 00:46:59,481 effects which caused disorientation . 1251 00:47:00,080 --> 00:47:01,913 Several interviews discussed the 1252 00:47:01,913 --> 00:47:04,136 presence of tear gas which was released 1253 00:47:04,136 --> 00:47:06,320 when the CS canisters worn on the 1254 00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:08,640 marines equipment were punctured by 1255 00:47:08,640 --> 00:47:11,660 ball bearings from the blast . At this 1256 00:47:11,660 --> 00:47:13,960 point , marines were simultaneously 1257 00:47:13,960 --> 00:47:16,570 enduring tear gas and blast effects 1258 00:47:16,570 --> 00:47:18,570 while responding to a mass casualty 1259 00:47:18,570 --> 00:47:22,410 situation plainly put the blast 1260 00:47:22,410 --> 00:47:25,420 created instant chaos and sensory 1261 00:47:25,420 --> 00:47:27,520 overload and as you've seen from the 1262 00:47:27,520 --> 00:47:30,570 pictures and videos , this affected the 1263 00:47:30,580 --> 00:47:33,180 enormous potential evacuee population 1264 00:47:33,340 --> 00:47:35,910 as well . Through a number of 1265 00:47:35,910 --> 00:47:38,280 interviews with personnel who are not 1266 00:47:38,290 --> 00:47:41,470 impacted by the blast , witnesses 1267 00:47:41,470 --> 00:47:43,800 confirmed gunfire was present as 1268 00:47:43,800 --> 00:47:45,800 warning shots were fired from three 1269 00:47:45,800 --> 00:47:48,022 separate locations in order to maintain 1270 00:47:48,022 --> 00:47:52,010 crowd control for context . These 1271 00:47:52,010 --> 00:47:54,380 events all happened in a very short 1272 00:47:54,390 --> 00:47:58,390 amount of time . I'll explain how and 1273 00:47:58,390 --> 00:48:02,290 where the gunfire originated . The 1274 00:48:02,290 --> 00:48:04,234 two blue dots closest to the Baron 1275 00:48:04,234 --> 00:48:07,050 Hotel depict UK forces that fired 1276 00:48:07,050 --> 00:48:09,120 warning shots across the frontage of 1277 00:48:09,120 --> 00:48:11,160 marines in the quarter and over the 1278 00:48:11,160 --> 00:48:13,920 heads of evacuees . The shots were 1279 00:48:13,920 --> 00:48:16,210 fired in order to assist with 1280 00:48:16,210 --> 00:48:18,043 dispersing the crowds within the 1281 00:48:18,043 --> 00:48:21,370 quarter . The third blue dot depicts a 1282 00:48:21,370 --> 00:48:24,120 marine element that fired four warning 1283 00:48:24,120 --> 00:48:26,176 shots over the head of an individual 1284 00:48:26,176 --> 00:48:28,480 who displayed concerning behavior and 1285 00:48:28,480 --> 00:48:30,591 appeared to be observing the casualty 1286 00:48:30,591 --> 00:48:33,090 site . This individual of interest 1287 00:48:33,100 --> 00:48:36,520 ultimately fled unharmed . These events 1288 00:48:36,520 --> 00:48:39,470 occurred a short time after the attack 1289 00:48:39,830 --> 00:48:42,220 and resulted in nearly simultaneous 1290 00:48:42,220 --> 00:48:44,430 gunfire from three separate points 1291 00:48:44,870 --> 00:48:46,830 traveling across the frontage of 1292 00:48:46,830 --> 00:48:48,774 service members operating within a 1293 00:48:48,774 --> 00:48:51,240 confined space . That confined space 1294 00:48:51,240 --> 00:48:53,600 caused an echo , which created the 1295 00:48:53,600 --> 00:48:57,020 illusion of a firefight . The fourth 1296 00:48:57,020 --> 00:48:59,810 blue dot depicts the location of a team 1297 00:49:00,050 --> 00:49:02,520 of marines who observed gunfire going 1298 00:49:02,520 --> 00:49:04,520 across their frontage to the east . 1299 00:49:05,570 --> 00:49:07,403 During interviews , this team of 1300 00:49:07,403 --> 00:49:09,626 Marines stated they observed a military 1301 00:49:09,626 --> 00:49:13,500 age male armed with an AK 47 on top 1302 00:49:13,500 --> 00:49:15,770 of the two story building with the 1303 00:49:15,770 --> 00:49:18,680 water tower . Although the marines did 1304 00:49:18,680 --> 00:49:21,680 not see him fire , they believed he 1305 00:49:21,690 --> 00:49:23,634 exhibited hostile intent when they 1306 00:49:23,634 --> 00:49:25,890 observed him with a weapon and also 1307 00:49:25,890 --> 00:49:28,060 observed the subsequent gunfire across 1308 00:49:28,060 --> 00:49:30,227 their frontage . Following the blast , 1309 00:49:30,960 --> 00:49:33,016 they engaged him but did not see any 1310 00:49:33,016 --> 00:49:35,820 effect . Further interviews concluded 1311 00:49:36,160 --> 00:49:38,420 that no one had seen any effect on the 1312 00:49:38,420 --> 00:49:41,790 individual . In closing 1313 00:49:42,550 --> 00:49:44,680 Interviews with personnel located at 1314 00:49:44,690 --> 00:49:47,010 two positions that were outside the 1315 00:49:47,010 --> 00:49:50,480 blast effect area confirmed that the 1316 00:49:50,480 --> 00:49:52,800 gunfire observed with an Abbey gate 1317 00:49:52,810 --> 00:49:55,930 corridor was simply warning shots that 1318 00:49:55,930 --> 00:49:58,470 were fired to disperse the crowd and 1319 00:49:58,470 --> 00:50:00,280 there was no complex attack . 1320 00:50:03,460 --> 00:50:05,750 Another key aspect of the investigation 1321 00:50:05,750 --> 00:50:08,050 reviewed the medical capabilities . We 1322 00:50:08,050 --> 00:50:10,106 have universal agreement between the 1323 00:50:10,106 --> 00:50:12,217 armed forces medical examiners office 1324 00:50:12,217 --> 00:50:14,710 and also the highly experienced medical 1325 00:50:14,710 --> 00:50:16,990 providers on the ground that the wounds 1326 00:50:16,990 --> 00:50:19,046 sustained by the killed in action at 1327 00:50:19,046 --> 00:50:21,820 Abbey Gate were so catastrophic that 1328 00:50:21,820 --> 00:50:24,450 none can be saved the investigation 1329 00:50:24,450 --> 00:50:26,561 heard important witness accounts from 1330 00:50:26,561 --> 00:50:28,520 doctors and first responders who 1331 00:50:28,520 --> 00:50:30,770 explained that triage was very 1332 00:50:30,770 --> 00:50:33,370 effective at the point of injury and 1333 00:50:33,370 --> 00:50:35,600 there was a robust medical capability 1334 00:50:35,700 --> 00:50:38,340 including nine surgical teams of four 1335 00:50:38,400 --> 00:50:40,344 and a shock trauma platoon located 1336 00:50:40,344 --> 00:50:43,020 close to Abby and East Gates an E . R . 1337 00:50:43,020 --> 00:50:45,060 Doc assigned to the shock trauma 1338 00:50:45,060 --> 00:50:47,750 platoon directly contributed to the 1339 00:50:47,750 --> 00:50:50,250 save lives . Fortuitously leaders on 1340 00:50:50,250 --> 00:50:52,472 the ground kept medical capabilities in 1341 00:50:52,472 --> 00:50:54,890 place longer than originally planned . 1342 00:50:55,460 --> 00:50:57,404 This meant that at the time of the 1343 00:50:57,404 --> 00:50:59,404 attack we were in the best possible 1344 00:50:59,404 --> 00:51:01,627 position on the ground and to respond . 1345 00:51:01,627 --> 00:51:03,930 Although still tragic medical providers 1346 00:51:03,930 --> 00:51:06,520 assured that every service member that 1347 00:51:06,520 --> 00:51:10,230 could be was saved . Ladies and 1348 00:51:10,230 --> 00:51:12,452 gentlemen , it's been an honor to brief 1349 00:51:12,452 --> 00:51:14,674 you today with the intent of taking you 1350 00:51:14,674 --> 00:51:17,200 virtually to Abbey Gate all of that in 1351 00:51:17,200 --> 00:51:18,700 an effort to gain a better 1352 00:51:18,700 --> 00:51:20,867 understanding of the conditions on the 1353 00:51:20,867 --> 00:51:22,756 ground as well as the exceptional 1354 00:51:22,756 --> 00:51:24,867 professionalism , determination , and 1355 00:51:24,867 --> 00:51:26,978 courage of our marines , soldiers and 1356 00:51:26,978 --> 00:51:29,144 sailors . We look forward to answering 1357 00:51:29,440 --> 00:51:31,496 any or all of your questions at this 1358 00:51:31,496 --> 00:51:35,400 time . We'll start with a 1359 00:51:35,400 --> 00:51:37,090 p on the phone lita Baldor . 1360 00:51:39,240 --> 00:51:41,018 I love you to belgrade with the 1361 00:51:41,018 --> 00:51:43,310 Associated Press . I was wondering if 1362 00:51:43,310 --> 00:51:45,310 you could address a little bit more 1363 00:51:45,310 --> 00:51:49,250 fully . Um what if anything the taliban 1364 00:51:49,250 --> 00:51:51,250 may have been able to do to prevent 1365 00:51:51,250 --> 00:51:53,850 this ? I mean , was there because you 1366 00:51:53,850 --> 00:51:56,880 say there were a number of avenues that 1367 00:51:56,880 --> 00:52:00,130 were being used that people knew about 1368 00:52:00,130 --> 00:52:03,180 to some degree . Was there a deliberate , 1369 00:52:04,250 --> 00:52:06,900 I guess the lack of effort by the 1370 00:52:06,900 --> 00:52:08,910 taliban to control this ? Does the 1371 00:52:08,910 --> 00:52:11,870 taliban bear any responsibility ? 1372 00:52:14,350 --> 00:52:16,461 This general Curtis , What I can tell 1373 00:52:16,461 --> 00:52:18,628 you is that as we mentioned previously 1374 00:52:18,628 --> 00:52:21,450 in the brief there was a 1700 meeting 1375 00:52:21,770 --> 00:52:23,992 that occurred right before the attack , 1376 00:52:23,992 --> 00:52:26,210 36 minutes before the blast . This was 1377 00:52:26,210 --> 00:52:28,540 actually a topic of discussion that was 1378 00:52:28,540 --> 00:52:31,380 being discussed at that briefing 1379 00:52:31,420 --> 00:52:34,190 between Brigadier General Sullivan the 1380 00:52:34,190 --> 00:52:36,760 brits and the taliban . And I would 1381 00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:38,970 also like to point out that what also 1382 00:52:38,970 --> 00:52:40,692 is heavily influencing to this 1383 00:52:40,692 --> 00:52:44,210 situation is that the situation over a 1384 00:52:44,220 --> 00:52:47,060 very condensed time period changed 1385 00:52:47,060 --> 00:52:49,530 dramatically and the numbers that were 1386 00:52:49,530 --> 00:52:52,100 actually at Abbey Gate swelled 1387 00:52:52,100 --> 00:52:54,020 significantly and that certainly 1388 00:52:54,020 --> 00:52:55,530 impacted the situation 1389 00:52:58,950 --> 00:53:02,890 gen general Curtis . How can you rule 1390 00:53:02,890 --> 00:53:05,640 out that the taliban did not know that 1391 00:53:05,640 --> 00:53:07,440 this bomber was heading in that 1392 00:53:07,450 --> 00:53:10,680 direction ? Um is it possible that the 1393 00:53:10,680 --> 00:53:13,040 bomber knew about the 5:00 meeting and 1394 00:53:13,040 --> 00:53:16,000 was just late and missed trying to to 1395 00:53:16,000 --> 00:53:19,170 disrupt that meeting ? And how 1396 00:53:19,850 --> 00:53:22,170 later when you say that it was quickly 1397 00:53:22,170 --> 00:53:23,948 determined the taliban were not 1398 00:53:23,948 --> 00:53:26,170 involved by the marines there ? How can 1399 00:53:26,170 --> 00:53:28,170 you say that ? What evidence do you 1400 00:53:28,170 --> 00:53:31,970 have The 1401 00:53:31,980 --> 00:53:34,091 meeting ? Once again that occurred at 1402 00:53:34,091 --> 00:53:37,880 1736 minutes before the blast . This 1403 00:53:37,880 --> 00:53:40,900 was also an opportunity for the Taliban 1404 00:53:40,900 --> 00:53:43,067 to share any information that they had 1405 00:53:43,067 --> 00:53:45,540 with US forces and our best indicators 1406 00:53:45,540 --> 00:53:49,320 or that they did that we don't have any 1407 00:53:49,320 --> 00:53:51,264 evidence through the course of our 1408 00:53:51,264 --> 00:53:53,431 investigation that leads us to believe 1409 00:53:53,431 --> 00:53:55,764 that the Taliban knew about this attack . 1410 00:53:55,850 --> 00:53:58,017 But then why was the gate if there was 1411 00:53:58,020 --> 00:54:00,242 so much intelligence that morning , why 1412 00:54:00,242 --> 00:54:02,930 was the gate still open at 5 36 ? 1413 00:54:02,930 --> 00:54:05,263 Wasn't it supposed to be closed already ? 1414 00:54:05,263 --> 00:54:07,319 Was it kept open ? For some reason , 1415 00:54:07,319 --> 00:54:09,319 jennifer , there were several times 1416 00:54:09,319 --> 00:54:11,374 when there was discussion of closing 1417 00:54:11,374 --> 00:54:13,540 the gate And I don't want to anchor 1418 00:54:13,540 --> 00:54:15,762 everything on that 1700 meeting , but I 1419 00:54:15,762 --> 00:54:17,818 know for a fact that's another topic 1420 00:54:17,818 --> 00:54:19,860 that was being discussed . So there 1421 00:54:19,860 --> 00:54:22,090 there are several influencing factors 1422 00:54:22,100 --> 00:54:24,430 on , on the time , you know , and 1423 00:54:24,430 --> 00:54:26,760 keeping the gate open . One influencing 1424 00:54:26,760 --> 00:54:28,704 factor certainly is that there are 1425 00:54:28,704 --> 00:54:30,538 still individuals that are being 1426 00:54:30,538 --> 00:54:32,760 identified in that large crowd that fit 1427 00:54:32,760 --> 00:54:34,830 the criteria . A second influencing 1428 00:54:34,830 --> 00:54:37,470 factor is that we have coalition forces 1429 00:54:37,740 --> 00:54:39,962 who still have individuals that we know 1430 00:54:39,962 --> 00:54:42,350 they're trying to also evacuate . But 1431 00:54:42,350 --> 00:54:45,000 those are two lead influencing factors . 1432 00:54:45,080 --> 00:54:47,660 And then another is that we're also 1433 00:54:47,660 --> 00:54:50,050 very mindful of what happened on 16 1434 00:54:50,050 --> 00:54:52,670 August when we actually had Afghans 1435 00:54:52,890 --> 00:54:55,390 that flooded the airfield . We 1436 00:54:55,400 --> 00:54:57,570 absolutely want to prevent another 1437 00:54:57,570 --> 00:55:00,080 situation like that because we know 1438 00:55:00,300 --> 00:55:02,578 that that can influence several things . 1439 00:55:02,578 --> 00:55:04,522 It can throw off our timelines for 1440 00:55:04,522 --> 00:55:06,689 departure . And it also takes a lot of 1441 00:55:06,689 --> 00:55:08,911 time to clear those crowds . There were 1442 00:55:08,911 --> 00:55:11,450 reports at the time that the identity 1443 00:55:11,450 --> 00:55:13,561 of this bomber was known in advance . 1444 00:55:13,561 --> 00:55:17,060 Is that true , jennifer ? There is a 1445 00:55:17,060 --> 00:55:19,980 separate investigation that is being 1446 00:55:19,980 --> 00:55:22,036 conducted by the FBI that's taking a 1447 00:55:22,036 --> 00:55:24,258 look at that , that's outside the scope 1448 00:55:24,258 --> 00:55:26,650 of our investigation , Kourtney , QB 1449 00:55:26,650 --> 00:55:29,330 NBC two things . So I just want to be 1450 00:55:29,330 --> 00:55:31,441 clear that that meeting , that you're 1451 00:55:31,441 --> 00:55:33,608 referencing the five p.m. Meeting part 1452 00:55:33,608 --> 00:55:35,441 of that on the discussion of the 1453 00:55:35,441 --> 00:55:37,497 discussion of that was when to close 1454 00:55:37,497 --> 00:55:39,552 the gate . Just to be clear that the 1455 00:55:39,552 --> 00:55:41,774 decision was made there , that the gate 1456 00:55:41,774 --> 00:55:43,941 was not going to close yet , correct ? 1457 00:55:43,941 --> 00:55:45,941 What I would tell you , Courtney is 1458 00:55:45,941 --> 00:55:48,390 that it was a topic of discussion . I 1459 00:55:48,400 --> 00:55:50,400 would not say that the decision was 1460 00:55:50,400 --> 00:55:52,400 made in that meeting , but it was a 1461 00:55:52,400 --> 00:55:54,660 topic of discussion at that time . It 1462 00:55:54,660 --> 00:55:56,493 usually closed . I mean , was it 1463 00:55:56,493 --> 00:55:59,490 usually , Well , I think , I think 1464 00:55:59,490 --> 00:56:01,601 there's a difference between the gate 1465 00:56:01,601 --> 00:56:04,500 actually closing and ceasing operations 1466 00:56:04,510 --> 00:56:06,677 at the gate , there's a there's a very 1467 00:56:06,677 --> 00:56:08,732 big difference . So there are always 1468 00:56:08,732 --> 00:56:10,730 individuals that are there . But 1469 00:56:10,730 --> 00:56:12,508 whether or not they're actually 1470 00:56:12,508 --> 00:56:15,970 processing evacuees is different . So 1471 00:56:16,090 --> 00:56:19,680 ceasing operations lowering profile 1472 00:56:19,680 --> 00:56:22,600 seeking cover and also not processing 1473 00:56:22,600 --> 00:56:24,933 is very different from actually closing . 1474 00:56:24,933 --> 00:56:27,211 And then just one more on the timeline , 1475 00:56:27,211 --> 00:56:29,322 there's a 25 26 august reference that 1476 00:56:29,322 --> 00:56:31,267 says there were four minute threat 1477 00:56:31,267 --> 00:56:33,378 streams reported at Abbey Gate and to 1478 00:56:33,378 --> 00:56:35,489 one leaders take appropriate action . 1479 00:56:35,489 --> 00:56:37,711 Can you tell us about those four threat 1480 00:56:37,711 --> 00:56:39,960 streams , what specifically was there 1481 00:56:39,960 --> 00:56:42,500 were multiple threads streams during 1482 00:56:42,500 --> 00:56:46,460 the course of operations at HQ uh , 1483 00:56:46,470 --> 00:56:49,280 those particular threat streams , I 1484 00:56:49,280 --> 00:56:51,620 won't go into details on them . But 1485 00:56:51,630 --> 00:56:53,463 what I can tell you is they were 1486 00:56:53,463 --> 00:56:55,519 consistent with other reporting that 1487 00:56:55,519 --> 00:56:57,630 had occurred , but they were very non 1488 00:56:57,630 --> 00:56:59,900 specific . So there was nothing coming 1489 00:56:59,900 --> 00:57:02,067 out of those particular threat streams 1490 00:57:02,067 --> 00:57:04,289 at that time . That would have led them 1491 00:57:04,289 --> 00:57:06,580 to believe , you know that what 1492 00:57:06,590 --> 00:57:10,030 occurred at 17 36 and 52 seconds was 1493 00:57:10,030 --> 00:57:12,240 about to occur Now , I mean there's no 1494 00:57:12,240 --> 00:57:14,240 americans there . This operation is 1495 00:57:14,240 --> 00:57:16,462 completely over . Is there a reason you 1496 00:57:16,462 --> 00:57:16,100 can't tell us a little bit more about 1497 00:57:16,100 --> 00:57:18,580 what I'm , what I'm curious is we're 1498 00:57:18,580 --> 00:57:20,802 there , we're there threat streams that 1499 00:57:20,802 --> 00:57:23,024 were coming in . So you were focused on 1500 00:57:23,024 --> 00:57:25,080 your security more on something else 1501 00:57:25,080 --> 00:57:27,136 and that's maybe how this bomber was 1502 00:57:27,136 --> 00:57:29,358 able to get in . I'm wondering if , can 1503 00:57:29,358 --> 00:57:31,524 you , can you shed any light on that ? 1504 00:57:31,524 --> 00:57:33,747 As I mentioned , Courtney , I think the 1505 00:57:33,747 --> 00:57:35,747 threat streams were not specific at 1506 00:57:35,747 --> 00:57:37,969 that particular time and we'll take one 1507 00:57:37,969 --> 00:57:40,080 from the phone . Tera cop defense one 1508 00:57:40,080 --> 00:57:43,610 if you're on the line . I thank you 1509 00:57:43,620 --> 00:57:45,731 both , thank you all for doing this . 1510 00:57:45,731 --> 00:57:47,620 Um , I have a couple of follow up 1511 00:57:47,620 --> 00:57:49,970 questions . We haven't been able to see 1512 00:57:49,970 --> 00:57:52,026 the video of the marine being pulled 1513 00:57:52,026 --> 00:57:54,137 into the crowd , but after that event 1514 00:57:54,137 --> 00:57:56,248 happened , were there any discussions 1515 00:57:56,248 --> 00:57:58,510 about putting up additional defenses 1516 00:57:58,520 --> 00:58:01,170 for the marines there right along the 1517 00:58:01,170 --> 00:58:03,337 perimeter , if not a Jersey barrier or 1518 00:58:03,337 --> 00:58:05,503 something similar um , instead of just 1519 00:58:05,503 --> 00:58:08,440 more personnel . And then secondly , um 1520 00:58:08,820 --> 00:58:10,890 has there been any evidence gathered 1521 00:58:10,890 --> 00:58:13,410 from the scene , uh , fragments 1522 00:58:13,410 --> 00:58:16,420 etcetera that has helped in the law 1523 00:58:16,420 --> 00:58:18,031 enforcement investigation in 1524 00:58:18,031 --> 00:58:19,976 identifying the affiliation of the 1525 00:58:19,976 --> 00:58:21,150 bomber . Thank you 1526 00:58:23,700 --> 00:58:25,811 Volterra . Thanks for that question . 1527 00:58:26,120 --> 00:58:28,280 As we look at the , you couldn't see 1528 00:58:28,280 --> 00:58:30,950 the video , but basically it showed um , 1529 00:58:31,320 --> 00:58:33,264 two marines standing on top of the 1530 00:58:33,264 --> 00:58:36,320 Jersey barrier and one was pulled into 1531 00:58:36,320 --> 00:58:38,542 the crowd by the barrel of his weapon , 1532 00:58:38,542 --> 00:58:41,270 by a potential evacuee . In that case , 1533 00:58:41,270 --> 00:58:43,214 what I'd like to highlight is that 1534 00:58:43,214 --> 00:58:44,992 again , this is a non combatant 1535 00:58:44,992 --> 00:58:48,030 evacuation . So rather than using 1536 00:58:48,040 --> 00:58:50,040 deadly force or force really of any 1537 00:58:50,040 --> 00:58:51,818 kind , the marines showed great 1538 00:58:51,818 --> 00:58:55,480 restraint , discipline and courage by 1539 00:58:55,480 --> 00:58:57,890 just retrieving their teammate from the 1540 00:58:57,890 --> 00:59:00,060 crowd and moving on . Part of the 1541 00:59:00,060 --> 00:59:02,800 reason that there were no additional 1542 00:59:02,800 --> 00:59:05,210 barriers or constraints had to do with 1543 00:59:05,210 --> 00:59:07,043 the fact that they were actively 1544 00:59:07,043 --> 00:59:10,250 pulling potential evacuees from the 1545 00:59:10,250 --> 00:59:13,050 crowd which included american citizens 1546 00:59:13,050 --> 00:59:15,640 and others . So again , they had to 1547 00:59:15,640 --> 00:59:17,950 have access to the crowd and they had 1548 00:59:17,950 --> 00:59:20,260 to have close personal contact with 1549 00:59:20,260 --> 00:59:23,220 those that they were trying to uh move 1550 00:59:23,220 --> 00:59:26,610 to a location to get processed . I 1551 00:59:26,610 --> 00:59:28,721 don't , I'd also offer that if you go 1552 00:59:28,721 --> 00:59:30,880 back to the slide that showed uh , 1553 00:59:30,890 --> 00:59:33,001 where service members were wounded or 1554 00:59:33,001 --> 00:59:35,150 killed , a number of service members 1555 00:59:35,150 --> 00:59:37,372 were on top of the wall again , for the 1556 00:59:37,372 --> 00:59:39,840 purpose of trying to identify 1557 00:59:39,850 --> 00:59:42,070 individuals to be evacuated as a part 1558 00:59:42,080 --> 00:59:43,802 of the noncombatant evacuation 1559 00:59:43,802 --> 00:59:46,570 operation . So it sounds like there 1560 00:59:46,570 --> 00:59:48,750 wasn't really an option to add 1561 00:59:48,750 --> 00:59:51,590 additional barrier protection for all 1562 00:59:51,590 --> 00:59:53,757 of those service members on the wall . 1563 00:59:54,120 --> 00:59:56,398 They provided protection in other ways . 1564 00:59:56,810 --> 01:00:00,150 There were there were means through 1565 01:00:00,150 --> 01:00:03,790 which we know that that the 1566 01:00:03,790 --> 01:00:06,470 device was command detonated , not 1567 01:00:06,480 --> 01:00:08,720 detonated by some sort of phone or 1568 01:00:08,720 --> 01:00:11,070 remote control device because of 1569 01:00:11,080 --> 01:00:13,191 countermeasures that were used at the 1570 01:00:13,191 --> 01:00:15,450 gate at the time based on the threats . 1571 01:00:15,910 --> 01:00:17,910 Uh and the streams that the command 1572 01:00:17,910 --> 01:00:20,132 received and pushed all the way down to 1573 01:00:20,132 --> 01:00:22,188 company level . Uh commanders on the 1574 01:00:22,188 --> 01:00:24,410 ground took the appropriate measures to 1575 01:00:24,410 --> 01:00:26,950 lower their profile cease operations if 1576 01:00:26,950 --> 01:00:28,950 they needed to or close the gate if 1577 01:00:28,950 --> 01:00:32,590 necessary to protect the force . 1578 01:00:32,600 --> 01:00:36,470 Because the bottom line is We 1579 01:00:36,470 --> 01:00:40,050 evacuated 124,000 people out of each 1580 01:00:40,050 --> 01:00:43,930 car in order to get that kind of volume 1581 01:00:44,410 --> 01:00:46,243 through a screening process that 1582 01:00:46,243 --> 01:00:48,132 requires them to have appropriate 1583 01:00:48,132 --> 01:00:50,077 documentation and to be physically 1584 01:00:50,077 --> 01:00:52,299 checked on the ground . It's an arduous 1585 01:00:52,299 --> 01:00:54,188 task . But again , it takes close 1586 01:00:54,188 --> 01:00:56,354 personal contact on the part of marine 1587 01:00:56,354 --> 01:00:58,354 soldiers and sailors in order to do 1588 01:00:58,354 --> 01:01:02,090 that nancy . And In your presentation 1589 01:01:02,090 --> 01:01:04,090 you throughout described vegetarian 1590 01:01:04,090 --> 01:01:06,257 security situation on all fronts . The 1591 01:01:06,257 --> 01:01:08,312 Taliban wasn't checking documents or 1592 01:01:08,312 --> 01:01:10,257 leading in Americans or those with 1593 01:01:10,257 --> 01:01:12,368 documentation . These new routes that 1594 01:01:12,368 --> 01:01:14,590 opened up . And I was just wondering if 1595 01:01:14,590 --> 01:01:16,701 you could help me understand a couple 1596 01:01:16,701 --> 01:01:18,312 of things . one who made the 1597 01:01:18,312 --> 01:01:20,720 determination to not close the gate and 1598 01:01:20,720 --> 01:01:22,887 on one basis was , I mean , you talked 1599 01:01:22,887 --> 01:01:25,053 about these meetings but it seems that 1600 01:01:25,053 --> 01:01:26,776 there were several who had the 1601 01:01:26,776 --> 01:01:28,831 authority who decided let's keep the 1602 01:01:28,831 --> 01:01:31,580 gate open Commander on the ground ? Was 1603 01:01:31,580 --> 01:01:33,890 Rear Admiral P . Paisley . Um He he was 1604 01:01:33,890 --> 01:01:36,057 the Commander of US Forces Afghanistan 1605 01:01:36,057 --> 01:01:38,057 and all of the forces on the ground 1606 01:01:38,057 --> 01:01:40,001 were under his command and control 1607 01:01:40,001 --> 01:01:42,420 Every day , not just on this , not just 1608 01:01:42,420 --> 01:01:46,190 on the 26th , but every day . Forces on 1609 01:01:46,190 --> 01:01:48,190 the ground there , specifically the 1610 01:01:48,190 --> 01:01:50,940 Commander of JTF 82 Major General 1611 01:01:50,950 --> 01:01:53,750 Donahue was tasked by General Sullivan 1612 01:01:53,810 --> 01:01:56,740 to meet with the Taliban because like I 1613 01:01:56,740 --> 01:01:59,400 was basically a defense in depth . So 1614 01:01:59,410 --> 01:02:01,577 the Taliban being unlikely partners as 1615 01:02:01,577 --> 01:02:03,743 we described in the brief uh there was 1616 01:02:03,743 --> 01:02:07,410 an ongoing dialogue about how we were 1617 01:02:07,410 --> 01:02:09,870 to continue to work with them to 1618 01:02:09,870 --> 01:02:13,010 facilitate the evacuation . So I 1619 01:02:13,010 --> 01:02:15,066 appreciate that . But I guess what I 1620 01:02:15,066 --> 01:02:17,066 don't understand is there are those 1621 01:02:17,066 --> 01:02:19,288 yellow arrows coming in that showed how 1622 01:02:19,288 --> 01:02:21,177 people were bypassing sort of the 1623 01:02:21,177 --> 01:02:23,399 original checkpoint . Why was there not 1624 01:02:23,399 --> 01:02:25,566 additional security measures put in by 1625 01:02:25,566 --> 01:02:27,677 the U . S . At that point or some way 1626 01:02:27,677 --> 01:02:29,732 to sort of be able to inspect people 1627 01:02:29,732 --> 01:02:33,430 coming in that way Sir May . So 1628 01:02:34,100 --> 01:02:36,100 I think it's very important to once 1629 01:02:36,100 --> 01:02:38,211 again go back to the fact how quickly 1630 01:02:38,211 --> 01:02:40,810 this happened . And I also would 1631 01:02:40,820 --> 01:02:42,876 mention that it is vitally important 1632 01:02:42,876 --> 01:02:45,010 that at this time there is a constant 1633 01:02:45,020 --> 01:02:47,650 assessment that is going on between the 1634 01:02:47,650 --> 01:02:50,010 risk of force and the risk commission . 1635 01:02:50,020 --> 01:02:53,450 So trying to push potential U . S . 1636 01:02:53,450 --> 01:02:55,650 Service members out that far really 1637 01:02:55,650 --> 01:02:58,140 would have dramatically increased the 1638 01:02:58,140 --> 01:03:00,950 risk to our service members . My final 1639 01:03:00,950 --> 01:03:04,130 question is based on your findings . Is 1640 01:03:04,130 --> 01:03:06,186 there a scenario in which this could 1641 01:03:06,186 --> 01:03:08,186 have been prevented ? And if so how 1642 01:03:08,500 --> 01:03:10,710 based on our investigation at the 1643 01:03:10,710 --> 01:03:13,430 tactical level this was not preventable . 1644 01:03:13,900 --> 01:03:16,470 And the leaders on the ground followed 1645 01:03:16,470 --> 01:03:18,990 the proper measures and any time there 1646 01:03:18,990 --> 01:03:20,990 was an imminent threat warning they 1647 01:03:20,990 --> 01:03:23,101 followed the proper procedures . They 1648 01:03:23,101 --> 01:03:25,101 lowered their profile , they sought 1649 01:03:25,101 --> 01:03:27,101 cover and at times they even ceased 1650 01:03:27,101 --> 01:03:29,390 operations at the gate . And if I can 1651 01:03:29,390 --> 01:03:31,446 caveat , the reason that we identify 1652 01:03:31,446 --> 01:03:33,557 the number of leaders who were on the 1653 01:03:33,557 --> 01:03:35,779 ground Throughout the course of the day 1654 01:03:35,779 --> 01:03:37,850 on the 26th is because again it's 1655 01:03:38,600 --> 01:03:40,600 understanding of the hazards of our 1656 01:03:40,600 --> 01:03:42,767 chosen profession and knowing that the 1657 01:03:42,767 --> 01:03:44,767 leaders need to be on the ground to 1658 01:03:44,767 --> 01:03:46,878 share those same hardships with their 1659 01:03:46,878 --> 01:03:48,878 subordinates . So understanding the 1660 01:03:48,878 --> 01:03:51,211 mission is very difficult but necessary . 1661 01:03:51,211 --> 01:03:50,820 Those leaders were on the ground to 1662 01:03:50,820 --> 01:03:53,098 ensure that it was done properly . Yes , 1663 01:03:53,098 --> 01:03:55,320 general . But what I'm hearing you guys 1664 01:03:55,320 --> 01:03:57,542 say is with the resources available and 1665 01:03:57,542 --> 01:03:59,598 the mission before them . It was not 1666 01:03:59,598 --> 01:03:59,560 preventable . That's that's what I'm 1667 01:03:59,560 --> 01:04:02,400 hearing is correct . We have time for 1668 01:04:02,400 --> 01:04:04,622 one more question oren Liebermann CNN , 1669 01:04:05,820 --> 01:04:07,820 he spoke to us forces as well as as 1670 01:04:07,820 --> 01:04:09,987 well as coalition forces . What effort 1671 01:04:09,987 --> 01:04:11,931 was made if any to speak to Afghan 1672 01:04:11,931 --> 01:04:13,764 witnesses who were there through 1673 01:04:13,764 --> 01:04:13,710 intermediaries . It seems you have the 1674 01:04:13,710 --> 01:04:15,980 perspective of those of the U . S . 1675 01:04:15,980 --> 01:04:18,202 Forces who generally would have had HPV 1676 01:04:18,202 --> 01:04:20,424 behind them . So they're looking in one 1677 01:04:20,424 --> 01:04:22,647 direction , but not Afghan witnesses of 1678 01:04:22,647 --> 01:04:24,647 which there were certainly many who 1679 01:04:24,647 --> 01:04:26,424 survived , who had the opposite 1680 01:04:26,424 --> 01:04:28,900 perspective , 180° view . Is there any 1681 01:04:28,900 --> 01:04:31,011 effort made through intermediaries to 1682 01:04:31,011 --> 01:04:33,067 reach out to any of those ? Mm hmm . 1683 01:04:35,490 --> 01:04:37,980 A challenge for us was that by the time 1684 01:04:37,980 --> 01:04:39,758 we started investigating this , 1685 01:04:39,758 --> 01:04:42,000 obviously US forces had already left . 1686 01:04:42,390 --> 01:04:45,140 But I think a very important aspect 1687 01:04:45,150 --> 01:04:48,610 regarding that was that what we did 1688 01:04:48,610 --> 01:04:51,190 have was we had individuals who were 1689 01:04:51,190 --> 01:04:53,301 able to tell us , you know , I talked 1690 01:04:53,301 --> 01:04:55,357 about the individuals in the tower . 1691 01:04:55,357 --> 01:04:57,468 Those that's one example , unaffected 1692 01:04:57,468 --> 01:04:59,579 by the blast and able to tell us what 1693 01:04:59,579 --> 01:05:01,746 happened before , during and after the 1694 01:05:01,746 --> 01:05:03,870 blast and unaffected by what actually 1695 01:05:03,870 --> 01:05:07,310 happened . So , uh talking to actual 1696 01:05:07,310 --> 01:05:09,250 afghans very difficult given the 1697 01:05:09,250 --> 01:05:11,306 current structure of Afghanistan and 1698 01:05:11,306 --> 01:05:13,510 also the fact that US forces had 1699 01:05:13,510 --> 01:05:16,530 already left . We we use for example , 1700 01:05:16,630 --> 01:05:18,852 and I'm using this broadly , we were in 1701 01:05:18,852 --> 01:05:21,074 touch with Qatar to get us citizens out 1702 01:05:21,074 --> 01:05:23,241 even just a few days ago , there was a 1703 01:05:23,241 --> 01:05:25,186 flight , was there any effort made 1704 01:05:25,186 --> 01:05:25,050 through Qatar or through somebody else 1705 01:05:25,050 --> 01:05:27,217 that has people on the ground there to 1706 01:05:27,217 --> 01:05:29,383 reach out to the afghan witnesses . If 1707 01:05:29,383 --> 01:05:31,272 not , why not ? It seems that's a 1708 01:05:31,272 --> 01:05:33,439 valuable perspective . Yeah , that was 1709 01:05:33,439 --> 01:05:35,717 during the course of our investigation , 1710 01:05:35,717 --> 01:05:37,939 we did not have an opportunity to speak 1711 01:05:37,939 --> 01:05:40,161 with afghans on the ground And one more 1712 01:05:40,161 --> 01:05:42,383 question how many U . S . And coalition 1713 01:05:42,383 --> 01:05:44,439 service members ? It all opened fire 1714 01:05:44,439 --> 01:05:46,661 with the warning shots and you know how 1715 01:05:46,661 --> 01:05:48,550 many rounds were fired in total ? 1716 01:05:48,550 --> 01:05:52,360 Ballpark . So uh The from the Brett 1717 01:05:52,360 --> 01:05:56,310 locations the estimate was 25-30 rounds 1718 01:05:56,990 --> 01:06:00,740 uh from the third marine location . 1719 01:06:00,750 --> 01:06:03,390 Uh you know they had the individual 1720 01:06:03,390 --> 01:06:05,057 that caused concern to them , 1721 01:06:05,060 --> 01:06:07,140 approximately four rounds from there 1722 01:06:07,150 --> 01:06:09,650 and then from the last location . I 1723 01:06:09,650 --> 01:06:13,420 think that exact round count is unknown 1724 01:06:13,430 --> 01:06:16,870 uh at this time . Thanks . Okay we 1725 01:06:16,870 --> 01:06:18,759 gotta wrap it up . You guys quick 1726 01:06:18,759 --> 01:06:20,537 clarification about the five PM 1727 01:06:20,537 --> 01:06:22,426 meetings . Were you asked by your 1728 01:06:22,426 --> 01:06:24,537 partners to keep the gate open during 1729 01:06:24,537 --> 01:06:27,170 that meeting ? It was a topic of 1730 01:06:27,170 --> 01:06:30,300 discussion . I know that that's the 1731 01:06:30,300 --> 01:06:32,411 extent of my knowledge regarding that 1732 01:06:32,411 --> 01:06:34,633 meeting . Alright . We're gonna wrap it 1733 01:06:34,633 --> 01:06:34,800 up , you guys . Thanks so much .