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this Northern Command and North 

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american Aerospace Defense Command . 

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The war in Ukraine is a tragic reminder 

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of the importance of our work which as 

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I've always said is arguably the most 

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important and technical of any 

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committee in the House . Vladimir 

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Putin's recent announcement that he was 

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placing his nuclear forces on alert , 

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made clear to the world the risks of 

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miscalculation . The written testimony 

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today is voluminous , but I will ask 

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the witnesses to shorten their verbal 

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remarks to five minutes to make time 

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for questioning and I'm hopeful that we 

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can keep the open session as brief as 

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possible so we'll have more time in 

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closed session . We read much in the 

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testimony about new concepts , test 

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beds , labs , initial operating 

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capability and other jargon . But what 

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America and the world needs right now 

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is the capability to defend the free 

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world . That means not just keeping up 

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with commercial industry advances but 

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getting the pentagon to be years ahead 

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of industry , we must have the 

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capability to meet and beat any 

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competitor . Lord knows our defense 

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budgets are the envy of the world . We 

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need to get our money's worth with 

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capabilities that are also the envy of 

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the world . Although our witnesses 

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today are not responsible for the 

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development of space systems , they are 

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responsible for operating , are 

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deployed capabilities and establishing 

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requirements for what we will need in 

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the future . I am thankful that we're 

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finally moving forward to a more 

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resilient , diversified space 

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architecture rather than simply 

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replacing the aging , big juicy targets 

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currently on orbit . There's much more 

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work to be done however , and our 

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strategic posture must remain the top 

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priority for the Department of Defense . 

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I'm thankful that the biden 

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administration has stressed continuity 

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with past strategic policy and the 

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urgency of maintaining our nuclear 

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posture . We will move immediately to 

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closed session upon conclusion of the 

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open hearing and I yield now to the 

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ranking member , Mr Lamborn , Mr . 

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Chairman , thank you for holding 

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today's hearing . The backdrop of this 

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hearing as we all know , is Russia's 

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ongoing invasion of Ukraine , which 

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will be on the top of our minds for all 

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of us here today . Thank you to our 

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witnesses . Secretary baker , Admiral 

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Richard , General Dickinson and General 

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Van Herk for taking the time to be 

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before us today . In this form a year 

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ago , we all lamented the degree to 

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which the global security environment 

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was deteriorating . Admiral Richard . I 

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recall that you went to great lengths 

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giving your best military advice as to 

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how we must deter to nuclear peer 

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adversaries at the same time , it was a 

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sobering hearing In just 10 months 

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since that hearing , the global 

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security environment has become 

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exponentially worse China and Russia 

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are seeking to exploit our weaknesses 

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and we can't let our guard down as 

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Russian forces massed on the Ukrainian 

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border . Putin oversaw a strategic 

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nuclear forces exercise designed to 

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intimidate europe and the United States . 

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In his words , the intent was to 

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threaten , quote , consequences you 

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have never faced in your history , 

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quote unquote . For anyone who tries to 

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interfere with us , quote unquote the 

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next day as Ukrainian troops valiantly 

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repelled Russian advances . Putin 

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directed the elevation in the readiness 

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posture of his nuclear forces . Russia 

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is being run by a desperate Detached 

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from reality with up to 2000 nuclear 

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warheads that are not accountable under 

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the new start treaty , Russia may be 

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willing to say quote , a nuclear war 

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cannot be won so it must never be 

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fought unquote . But I'd remind my 

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colleagues Putin also said he had quote 

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no intention of invading Ukraine 

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unquote . Since last year . The 

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strategic threat posed by china has 

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also metastasized . We all know that 

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China intends to have at least 1000 

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nuclear warheads . By 2030 . They 

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conducted a hypersonic fractional 

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orbital bombardment test that surprised 

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the world and they have constructed new 

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I C . B . M . Fields that are sprouting 

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like weeds . These new I C . B . M 

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fields along with new Chinese road 

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mobile systems and hypersonic delivery 

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systems significantly increased the 

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number of targets stratcom must hold at 

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risk and they complicate the detection 

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and warning problem for missile defense 

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capabilities . And with everything else 

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going on . North Korea launched a 

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ballistic missile last week . It barely 

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even made the news . But there is press 

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reporting that the test had 

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applications for a space launch 

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capability . If true , this represents 

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a significant threat to our homeland 

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and the missile defense review which is 

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coming out soon must continue the 

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longstanding commitment to outpace the 

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North korean threat to the homeland and 

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get the next generation interceptor to 

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initial operating capability as soon as 

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possible . And to complicate matters 

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further . China and Russia have 

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demonstrated ability and intent to 

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weaponize and militarize space . 

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Russia's recent antisatellite weapon 

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test generated debris that threatens 

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human lives on orbit and shows that 

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space is no longer free from threat and 

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militarization . China's demonstration 

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of space warfare concepts is equally 

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disturbing . As they recently 

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demonstrated the capability to engage 

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and remove satellites from their 

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operational orbits . 

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The open demonstrations of these 

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abilities are intended as a direct 

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warning to the West Secretary baker . 

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Given these dynamics , I can't see how 

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the nuclear posture review could 

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recommend anything less than the 

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current nuclear triad modernization 

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plan . If President biden sheds or does 

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away in any way with nuclear 

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capabilities . As has been reported . I 

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predict bipartisan opposition in the 

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house and Senate that will override it 

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and continue to fund these systems . 

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This includes the sea launched nuclear 

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cruise missile or slick them in B the B 

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83 gravity bomb . The W 76 

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to warhead not doing so will cause 

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allies to question our strategic 

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deterrent that cannot happen especially 

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now and lastly any weakening or changes 

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in the U . S . Nuclear declaratory 

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policy must be expressly taken off the 

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table , europe is embroiled in the 

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largest war since World War two and 

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Ukraine faces an existential threat . 

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We cannot risk dividing NATO at this 

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precarious time . So I implore you 

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listen to our allies and maintain this 

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current strong american led strategic 

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deterrence posture . We can no longer 

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attack our deterrence problems in 

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isolation and it is vital that we 

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provide to this nation the viable 

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options needed to deter or defeat our 

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adversaries across strategic domains . 

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Thank you again to all of our witnesses 

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for joining us and I yield back . Mr 

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Chairman , thank you . Mr Lamborn , the 

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first witnesses . Secretary baker . 

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Thank you . Chairman Cooper , ranking 

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member Lamborn and distinguished 

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members of this committee . I 

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respectfully request that my written 

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statement be taken for the record and 

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I'll just do brief remarks . Thank you . 

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The department acknowledges that the 

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challenging moment we're in as we 

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witness the Russian invasion of Ukraine . 

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Such actions highlight Russia as an 

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acute threat even as the department 

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continues to pace to the people's 

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Republic of china . Further , the 

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United States faces a challenging 

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security environment amid intensifying 

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strategic competition , rapidly 

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evolving domains of conflict . Novel 

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military capabilities and the growing 

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assertiveness of our competitors 

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deterrence is challenged by competitors . 

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Gray zone operations below the 

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threshold of conflict combined with 

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increasingly complex escalation 

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dynamics which erodes strategic 

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stability . We must diligently 

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calibrate our strategic posture which 

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is underwritten by our nuclear missile 

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defense , space and hypersonic strike 

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capabilities . To these developments . 

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The forthcoming 2022 National Defense 

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Strategy will detail the department's 

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strategic approach at the core of the 

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NDS lies integrated deterrence and this 

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is a framework for working seamlessly 

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across warfighting domains theaters . 

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The spectrum of conflict in close 

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collaboration with all instruments of 

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national power , our allies and our 

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partners as such . The 2022 Nuclear 

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posture review and the Missile Defense 

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review will be nested within the NDS . 

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We recognize that we face an urgent 

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imperative to sustain and strengthen us 

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deterrence and we must bring together 

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all available tools of national power 

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to do so . Nuclear deterrence is the 

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department's highest priority mission . 

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Our nuclear posture continues to be the 

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backbone of our strategy to preserve 

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peace and stability by deterring 

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aggression against the United States . 

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Our allies and our partners , potential 

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U . S . Adversaries are modernizing 

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diversifying and expanding their 

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strategic capabilities , resulting in 

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growing risks . The PRC's ongoing 

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ambitious expansion of their nuclear 

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forces is a growing factor in how we 

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assess our nuclear posture . The PRC is 

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investing in a triad implementing a 

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launch on warning posture with advanced 

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command and control architecture and 

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increasing its stockpile . Russia's 

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modernization of its nuclear missile 

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space and hypersonic capabilities 

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coupled with its highly aggressive 

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military behavior witnessed in its 

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attack against Ukraine , also pose a 

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distinct and pressing challenge . North 

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Korea remains a persistent threat and 

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continues to develop nuclear weapons 

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and associated delivery systems that 

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threaten its region and increase risk 

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to the U . S . Homeland . Iran's 

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pursuit of nuclear activities continues 

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to be of deep concern . This year . The 

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department will release the 2022 

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nuclear posture review . As directed by 

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the president . The NPR has examined 

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opportunities to reduce the role of 

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nuclear weapons while maintaining a 

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safe , secure and effective nuclear 

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deterrent and incredible extended 

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deterrent . In order to do so , we will 

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continue to sustain and modernize us 

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nuclear capabilities and as we develop 

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and implement integrated deterrence 

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nuclear weapons will continue to serve 

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a unique role in our defense strategy . 

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Missile defenses contribute to tailored 

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US deterrence strategies and extended 

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deterrence to prevent attacks from 

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states like north Korea on the U . S . 

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Homeland and to protect our allies , 

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partners and U . S . Forces abroad . We 

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are seeking a layered and interoperable 

280
00:10:50,784 --> 00:10:52,951
approach to address the growing number 

281
00:10:52,951 --> 00:10:55,007
and type of missile threats from the 

282
00:10:55,007 --> 00:10:57,118
unmanned systems proliferated by Iran 

283
00:10:57,118 --> 00:10:59,284
to the higher end hypersonic threats . 

284
00:10:59,284 --> 00:11:01,507
The MDR will provide a framework for US 

285
00:11:01,507 --> 00:11:03,340
missile defense priorities and a 

286
00:11:03,340 --> 00:11:05,340
strategy for missile defense within 

287
00:11:05,340 --> 00:11:07,396
integrated deterrence . It will also 

288
00:11:07,396 --> 00:11:09,229
outline how the United States is 

289
00:11:09,229 --> 00:11:11,284
integrating missile defense with its 

290
00:11:11,284 --> 00:11:13,062
allies and partners in order to 

291
00:11:13,062 --> 00:11:15,118
strengthen international cooperation 

292
00:11:15,118 --> 00:11:17,229
against shared threats in space . The 

293
00:11:17,229 --> 00:11:19,118
PRC remains our primary long term 

294
00:11:19,118 --> 00:11:21,007
competitor seeking to exploit our 

295
00:11:21,007 --> 00:11:23,007
reliance on space space systems and 

296
00:11:23,007 --> 00:11:25,229
challenge our position . Russia remains 

297
00:11:25,229 --> 00:11:27,340
a key U . S . Competitor in the space 

298
00:11:27,340 --> 00:11:29,451
domain as well as its similarly seeks 

299
00:11:29,451 --> 00:11:31,396
to undermine and exploit the US in 

300
00:11:31,396 --> 00:11:33,562
space . Iran is continuing to pursue a 

301
00:11:33,562 --> 00:11:35,673
space program which could shorten the 

302
00:11:35,673 --> 00:11:35,550
pathway to long range missile 

303
00:11:35,550 --> 00:11:38,140
capability . We are focused on ensuring 

304
00:11:38,140 --> 00:11:40,251
the capabilities and the architecture 

305
00:11:40,251 --> 00:11:42,770
to deter deny and if necessary , defeat 

306
00:11:42,770 --> 00:11:45,570
hostile actions in space , recognizing 

307
00:11:45,570 --> 00:11:47,348
that assured access to space is 

308
00:11:47,348 --> 00:11:49,403
critical for our approach across all 

309
00:11:49,403 --> 00:11:51,292
domains . The development of us , 

310
00:11:51,292 --> 00:11:53,514
hypersonic strike weapons systems , all 

311
00:11:53,514 --> 00:11:55,570
strictly non nuclear is a department 

312
00:11:55,570 --> 00:11:57,570
priority . The combination of their 

313
00:11:57,570 --> 00:11:59,626
speed , maneuverability and altitude 

314
00:11:59,626 --> 00:12:01,848
provides clear and distinct operational 

315
00:12:01,848 --> 00:12:04,014
advantages . The department is working 

316
00:12:04,014 --> 00:12:06,126
to identify and invest in the optimal 

317
00:12:06,126 --> 00:12:08,237
mix of high and low end munitions for 

318
00:12:08,237 --> 00:12:10,459
deterrence and to ensure we achieve our 

319
00:12:10,459 --> 00:12:12,459
objectives and conflict . Were also 

320
00:12:12,459 --> 00:12:14,681
developing the concept of operations to 

321
00:12:14,681 --> 00:12:16,792
employ these systems that address and 

322
00:12:16,792 --> 00:12:18,626
minimize destabilization risks , 

323
00:12:18,626 --> 00:12:20,848
transparency and dialogue with Congress 

324
00:12:20,848 --> 00:12:22,848
remain critical to the evolution of 

325
00:12:22,848 --> 00:12:25,070
this capability . I'd like to thank you 

326
00:12:25,070 --> 00:12:24,510
for the support of the department 

327
00:12:24,510 --> 00:12:26,566
across all of these domains and with 

328
00:12:26,566 --> 00:12:28,399
that , I'll look forward to your 

329
00:12:28,399 --> 00:12:30,621
questions . Thank you . Secretary baker 

330
00:12:30,621 --> 00:12:34,030
now Admiral Richard . Chairman cooper 

331
00:12:34,040 --> 00:12:36,207
ranking member Lamborn . Distinguished 

332
00:12:36,207 --> 00:12:38,207
Committee members . First I want to 

333
00:12:38,207 --> 00:12:39,873
offer my appreciation for the 

334
00:12:39,873 --> 00:12:42,430
flexibility to allow me to testify 

335
00:12:42,440 --> 00:12:45,400
virtually with my fellow Panelist stew 

336
00:12:45,400 --> 00:12:47,344
to those unfolding events over the 

337
00:12:47,344 --> 00:12:49,456
weekend . I felt it prudent for me to 

338
00:12:49,456 --> 00:12:51,789
remain at my headquarters here in Omaha . 

339
00:12:51,789 --> 00:12:53,660
Aw . And in particular given the 

340
00:12:53,670 --> 00:12:56,360
ongoing , historically significant 

341
00:12:56,360 --> 00:12:58,780
crisis in Ukraine , I am going to defer 

342
00:12:58,780 --> 00:13:00,910
all questions relative to Russian . A 

343
00:13:00,920 --> 00:13:03,990
number related to our own forces to the 

344
00:13:03,990 --> 00:13:07,100
closed session . But before I begin , I 

345
00:13:07,100 --> 00:13:09,322
want to thank Secretary Austin Chairman 

346
00:13:09,322 --> 00:13:11,770
Milley for their continued support to 

347
00:13:11,770 --> 00:13:13,937
the strategic deterrence and strategic 

348
00:13:13,937 --> 00:13:16,103
defense of the nation as well as their 

349
00:13:16,103 --> 00:13:18,048
overall leadership under some very 

350
00:13:18,048 --> 00:13:19,992
trying conditions . And ladies and 

351
00:13:19,992 --> 00:13:22,159
gentlemen right up front , what I want 

352
00:13:22,159 --> 00:13:24,159
to assure you is that my command as 

353
00:13:24,159 --> 00:13:26,240
always , is ready to execute our 

354
00:13:26,240 --> 00:13:29,030
strategic deterrence mission . Chairman 

355
00:13:29,030 --> 00:13:30,863
Milley rightly stated that we're 

356
00:13:30,863 --> 00:13:33,260
experiencing one of the largest shifts 

357
00:13:33,530 --> 00:13:36,570
in global geo strategic power the world 

358
00:13:36,570 --> 00:13:40,510
has ever witnessed . Today we face two 

359
00:13:40,520 --> 00:13:43,540
nuclear capable near peers who have the 

360
00:13:43,540 --> 00:13:45,980
capability to unilaterally escalate a 

361
00:13:45,980 --> 00:13:49,030
conflict to any level of violence in 

362
00:13:49,030 --> 00:13:52,370
any domain worldwide with any 

363
00:13:52,370 --> 00:13:55,830
instrument of national power and that 

364
00:13:55,830 --> 00:13:59,060
is historically significant . Last fall , 

365
00:13:59,190 --> 00:14:01,412
I formally reported to the Secretary of 

366
00:14:01,412 --> 00:14:03,850
Defense , the PRC strategic breakout , 

367
00:14:04,340 --> 00:14:06,396
Their expansion and modernization in 

368
00:14:06,396 --> 00:14:09,670
2021 alone is breathtaking and the 

369
00:14:09,670 --> 00:14:11,670
concern I expressed in my testimony 

370
00:14:11,670 --> 00:14:14,760
last april has now become a reality . 

371
00:14:15,540 --> 00:14:18,320
I have previously emphasized our need 

372
00:14:18,320 --> 00:14:20,487
to be able to deter two adversaries at 

373
00:14:20,487 --> 00:14:22,840
the same time . That need is now an 

374
00:14:22,840 --> 00:14:25,950
imperative . I've said this before and 

375
00:14:25,950 --> 00:14:28,400
I think it's worth repeating every 

376
00:14:28,400 --> 00:14:30,511
operational plan in the Department of 

377
00:14:30,511 --> 00:14:33,550
Defense and every other capability we 

378
00:14:33,550 --> 00:14:36,420
have rests on an assumption that 

379
00:14:36,420 --> 00:14:38,730
strategic deterrence and in particular 

380
00:14:38,730 --> 00:14:40,980
nuclear deterrence is holding . And if 

381
00:14:40,980 --> 00:14:43,202
strategic or nuclear deterrence fails , 

382
00:14:43,330 --> 00:14:46,020
no other plan and no other capability 

383
00:14:46,020 --> 00:14:48,187
in the Department of Defense will work 

384
00:14:48,187 --> 00:14:50,430
as designed the nation's nuclear forces 

385
00:14:50,440 --> 00:14:53,240
underpin integrated deterrence and 

386
00:14:53,240 --> 00:14:55,240
enable the U . S . And our allies 

387
00:14:55,250 --> 00:14:57,700
partners to confront aggressive and 

388
00:14:57,700 --> 00:15:00,240
coercive behavior . The strategic 

389
00:15:00,240 --> 00:15:02,240
security environment is now a three 

390
00:15:02,240 --> 00:15:05,430
party nuclear near Pier reality . Our 

391
00:15:05,430 --> 00:15:07,652
existing nuclear forces are the minimum 

392
00:15:07,652 --> 00:15:09,486
required to achieve our national 

393
00:15:09,486 --> 00:15:11,319
strategy . We must modernize and 

394
00:15:11,319 --> 00:15:13,541
recapitalize the nation's nuclear triad 

395
00:15:13,541 --> 00:15:15,890
nuclear command and control nuclear 

396
00:15:15,890 --> 00:15:18,001
complex and supporting infrastructure 

397
00:15:18,340 --> 00:15:20,740
to meet presidential objectives . And 

398
00:15:20,740 --> 00:15:22,518
while modernization must be the 

399
00:15:22,518 --> 00:15:24,950
priority , please make no mistake 

400
00:15:25,340 --> 00:15:27,460
stratagems forces are ready today . 

401
00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:30,007
Thank you . And I look forward to your 

402
00:15:30,007 --> 00:15:32,910
questions . Thank you Admiral . Now we 

403
00:15:32,910 --> 00:15:36,150
will hear from General Dickinson . Good 

404
00:15:36,150 --> 00:15:38,094
afternoon ladies and gentlemen and 

405
00:15:38,094 --> 00:15:39,983
thank you Chairman cooper ranking 

406
00:15:39,983 --> 00:15:42,206
member Lamborn and members of the House 

407
00:15:42,206 --> 00:15:44,206
subcommittee on Strategic Forces As 

408
00:15:44,206 --> 00:15:46,428
always , I'm honored today to represent 

409
00:15:46,428 --> 00:15:48,594
the approximately 18,000 men and women 

410
00:15:48,594 --> 00:15:50,817
of the United States Space Command . We 

411
00:15:50,817 --> 00:15:52,761
are a diverse team that values the 

412
00:15:52,761 --> 00:15:54,817
honorable service of everyone within 

413
00:15:54,817 --> 00:15:56,817
our ranks . This month we honor the 

414
00:15:56,817 --> 00:15:58,983
contributions of the women on our team 

415
00:15:58,983 --> 00:16:01,094
as U . S . Space Command acknowledges 

416
00:16:01,094 --> 00:16:03,261
and celebrates women's history month . 

417
00:16:03,261 --> 00:16:05,372
Today we remain hard at work building 

418
00:16:05,372 --> 00:16:07,428
the command towards full operational 

419
00:16:07,428 --> 00:16:09,483
capability . We are steadily filling 

420
00:16:09,483 --> 00:16:11,650
out our headquarters . Its composition 

421
00:16:11,650 --> 00:16:13,428
reflects our joint combined and 

422
00:16:13,428 --> 00:16:15,428
partnered approach to executing our 

423
00:16:15,428 --> 00:16:17,594
critical mission . As of this month we 

424
00:16:17,594 --> 00:16:19,372
have approximately 1000 members 

425
00:16:19,372 --> 00:16:21,483
assigned to our headquarters with 339 

426
00:16:21,483 --> 00:16:24,340
active duty from all services . 227 

427
00:16:24,340 --> 00:16:26,396
from the Department of the Air Force 

428
00:16:26,396 --> 00:16:28,690
civilians , 323 contractors , 44 

429
00:16:28,690 --> 00:16:30,801
representatives from the inter agency 

430
00:16:30,801 --> 00:16:33,023
and 39 reserve component personnel from 

431
00:16:33,023 --> 00:16:35,330
the Garden Reserve . We are glad to 

432
00:16:35,330 --> 00:16:37,552
have them all on our team responding to 

433
00:16:37,552 --> 00:16:39,497
the threats the U . S . And allied 

434
00:16:39,497 --> 00:16:41,330
interests in space demands . The 

435
00:16:41,330 --> 00:16:43,552
capabilities and expertise of every one 

436
00:16:43,552 --> 00:16:45,663
of our team members . We are prepared 

437
00:16:45,663 --> 00:16:47,663
to execute our Unified Command plan 

438
00:16:47,663 --> 00:16:49,910
missions and responsibilities . Yet 

439
00:16:49,910 --> 00:16:52,021
acknowledged that the challenges from 

440
00:16:52,021 --> 00:16:53,910
our competitors in the domain are 

441
00:16:53,910 --> 00:16:57,110
substantial and growing china remains 

442
00:16:57,110 --> 00:16:59,140
our pacing challenge . Pl a 

443
00:16:59,140 --> 00:17:02,060
developments indirectly is directed to 

444
00:17:02,070 --> 00:17:04,010
creating a joint versatile power 

445
00:17:04,010 --> 00:17:06,040
projecting professional and lethal 

446
00:17:06,040 --> 00:17:08,262
force for the international stage . And 

447
00:17:08,262 --> 00:17:10,380
the space layer is critical to their 

448
00:17:10,380 --> 00:17:13,380
build out . In 2021 the PRC increased 

449
00:17:13,390 --> 00:17:17,330
on orbit assets by 20 7% . The 

450
00:17:17,330 --> 00:17:19,510
recent counter capability , their 

451
00:17:19,510 --> 00:17:21,720
recent counter space capability 

452
00:17:21,730 --> 00:17:24,180
demonstrate demonstrations include the 

453
00:17:24,180 --> 00:17:26,291
D . N . One and the D . N . To direct 

454
00:17:26,291 --> 00:17:28,236
descent antisatellite test and the 

455
00:17:28,236 --> 00:17:30,550
hypersonic glide vehicle test . In 

456
00:17:30,550 --> 00:17:34,210
january . The recently launched SJ 21 

457
00:17:34,220 --> 00:17:36,670
space debris mitigation satellite 

458
00:17:36,940 --> 00:17:39,720
docked with a defunct PRC satellite and 

459
00:17:39,720 --> 00:17:42,053
moved it to an entirely different orbit . 

460
00:17:42,540 --> 00:17:44,596
This activity demonstrated potential 

461
00:17:44,596 --> 00:17:47,380
dual use capability in SJ 21 

462
00:17:47,390 --> 00:17:50,520
interaction with other satellites . Us 

463
00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:52,742
Space Command is committed to deterring 

464
00:17:52,742 --> 00:17:54,909
the use of these types of capabilities 

465
00:17:54,909 --> 00:17:56,798
for nefarious purposes within the 

466
00:17:56,798 --> 00:17:58,520
framework of the Department of 

467
00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:00,298
Defense's Integrated deterrence 

468
00:18:00,298 --> 00:18:02,464
initiative and if called upon , we are 

469
00:18:02,464 --> 00:18:05,150
capable of providing options to protect 

470
00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:07,710
and defend against such threats . Key 

471
00:18:07,710 --> 00:18:10,210
to all this . You key to all of this is 

472
00:18:10,210 --> 00:18:12,290
US and allied space superiority 

473
00:18:12,450 --> 00:18:14,672
informed through space domain awareness 

474
00:18:14,672 --> 00:18:17,950
or SDA capabilities . SDA helps us 

475
00:18:17,950 --> 00:18:20,480
analyze . Not just identify what is 

476
00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:22,800
incurring in space which when combined 

477
00:18:22,800 --> 00:18:24,967
with information from our intelligence 

478
00:18:24,967 --> 00:18:26,522
agencies , helps develop an 

479
00:18:26,522 --> 00:18:28,300
understanding of why things are 

480
00:18:28,300 --> 00:18:31,270
happening in space . SDA remains my top 

481
00:18:31,270 --> 00:18:33,603
mission priority for US . Space Command . 

482
00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:36,030
SDA provides the backbone of US Space 

483
00:18:36,030 --> 00:18:38,100
Command's strategy for accomplishing 

484
00:18:38,100 --> 00:18:40,760
our mission . That strategy sets the 

485
00:18:40,760 --> 00:18:43,460
conditions to deter first and when 

486
00:18:43,460 --> 00:18:45,520
called upon to defend space 

487
00:18:45,520 --> 00:18:47,930
capabilities and deliver combat power 

488
00:18:47,930 --> 00:18:50,390
to the United States and its allies . 

489
00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:53,020
Our strategy has three main areas of 

490
00:18:53,020 --> 00:18:55,350
focus . one is countering competitor 

491
00:18:55,350 --> 00:18:57,560
influence to strengthening 

492
00:18:57,560 --> 00:18:59,393
relationships and attracting new 

493
00:18:59,393 --> 00:19:01,171
partners and three building and 

494
00:19:01,171 --> 00:19:03,171
maintaining a cooperative advantage 

495
00:19:03,740 --> 00:19:05,907
with continued support from Congress . 

496
00:19:05,907 --> 00:19:07,962
Us Space Command will do all of that 

497
00:19:07,962 --> 00:19:10,320
and more so on behalf of the most 

498
00:19:10,320 --> 00:19:12,320
critical asset in our command , the 

499
00:19:12,320 --> 00:19:14,542
soldiers , marines , sailors , airmen , 

500
00:19:14,542 --> 00:19:16,876
guardians , civilians and families of U . 

501
00:19:16,876 --> 00:19:18,653
S . Space Command . Thank you . 

502
00:19:18,653 --> 00:19:20,598
Chairman Cooper and ranking member 

503
00:19:20,598 --> 00:19:22,376
Lamborn and the members of this 

504
00:19:22,376 --> 00:19:24,264
committee for your support of our 

505
00:19:24,264 --> 00:19:26,376
mission to conduct operations in from 

506
00:19:26,376 --> 00:19:28,264
and to space . I am submitting my 

507
00:19:28,264 --> 00:19:30,264
statement for the record and I look 

508
00:19:30,264 --> 00:19:32,376
forward to your questions . Thank you 

509
00:19:32,376 --> 00:19:34,487
General Dickinson without objection . 

510
00:19:34,487 --> 00:19:36,487
Your statement will be submitted in 

511
00:19:36,487 --> 00:19:38,542
full for the record . Now we'll hear 

512
00:19:38,542 --> 00:19:40,876
from General Van Herk . Chairman Cooper , 

513
00:19:40,876 --> 00:19:42,376
ranking member Lamborn and 

514
00:19:42,376 --> 00:19:44,653
distinguished members of the committee . 

515
00:19:44,653 --> 00:19:46,876
Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

516
00:19:46,876 --> 00:19:49,042
today . It's my honor to represent the 

517
00:19:49,042 --> 00:19:48,760
men and women of the United States 

518
00:19:48,760 --> 00:19:50,760
Northern Command and North american 

519
00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:53,290
Aerospace Defense Command as we defend 

520
00:19:53,300 --> 00:19:55,244
the United States and Canada in an 

521
00:19:55,244 --> 00:19:57,500
increasingly complicated and dynamic 

522
00:19:57,500 --> 00:19:59,700
environment . I'm also pleased to 

523
00:19:59,700 --> 00:20:01,811
appear with Admiral Richard , General 

524
00:20:01,811 --> 00:20:03,978
Dickinson and deputy undersecretary of 

525
00:20:03,978 --> 00:20:06,144
Defense for Policy MS baker to discuss 

526
00:20:06,144 --> 00:20:08,089
the vital importance of integrated 

527
00:20:08,089 --> 00:20:10,256
deterrence especially as it relates to 

528
00:20:10,256 --> 00:20:12,440
the homeland defense mission . North 

529
00:20:12,440 --> 00:20:14,607
Common Nora had faced the most dynamic 

530
00:20:14,607 --> 00:20:16,718
and strategically complex environment 

531
00:20:16,718 --> 00:20:18,773
in their respective histories . Both 

532
00:20:18,773 --> 00:20:20,773
commands face multiple simultaneous 

533
00:20:20,773 --> 00:20:22,884
challenges from strategic competitors 

534
00:20:22,884 --> 00:20:25,250
who have openly declared their intent 

535
00:20:25,250 --> 00:20:27,500
to hold our homelands at risk in an 

536
00:20:27,500 --> 00:20:29,611
effort to advance their own interests 

537
00:20:29,611 --> 00:20:31,722
today , strategic competitors . Rogue 

538
00:20:31,722 --> 00:20:33,889
nations , non state actors possess the 

539
00:20:33,889 --> 00:20:36,250
ability to strike institutions and 

540
00:20:36,250 --> 00:20:38,361
critical infrastructure in the United 

541
00:20:38,361 --> 00:20:40,490
States and Canada . To put it bluntly 

542
00:20:40,500 --> 00:20:42,810
our country is already under attack 

543
00:20:42,820 --> 00:20:45,360
every day in the information space and 

544
00:20:45,360 --> 00:20:47,910
in the cyber domain . Our competitors , 

545
00:20:47,910 --> 00:20:50,030
especially Russia and china are 

546
00:20:50,030 --> 00:20:52,520
spreading disinformation actively 

547
00:20:52,520 --> 00:20:54,910
sowing division and internal discord 

548
00:20:54,920 --> 00:20:56,753
with the intent to undermine the 

549
00:20:56,753 --> 00:20:58,600
foundation of our nation , our 

550
00:20:58,600 --> 00:21:01,490
democracy and other democracies around 

551
00:21:01,490 --> 00:21:03,657
the world . We're seeing this play out 

552
00:21:03,657 --> 00:21:06,270
today with Russia's invasion in Ukraine . 

553
00:21:07,040 --> 00:21:09,151
Meanwhile those same competitors have 

554
00:21:09,151 --> 00:21:10,984
invested heavily in conventional 

555
00:21:10,984 --> 00:21:12,873
precision strike capabilities and 

556
00:21:12,873 --> 00:21:14,762
advanced delivery platforms which 

557
00:21:14,762 --> 00:21:16,873
Russia is currently displaying to the 

558
00:21:16,873 --> 00:21:18,707
world in pursuit of the regional 

559
00:21:18,707 --> 00:21:20,929
objectives . Russia and china intend to 

560
00:21:20,929 --> 00:21:22,984
hold targets in the homeland at risk 

561
00:21:22,984 --> 00:21:25,207
below the nuclear threshold in order to 

562
00:21:25,207 --> 00:21:27,207
limit decision space for our senior 

563
00:21:27,207 --> 00:21:28,984
leaders by threatening national 

564
00:21:28,984 --> 00:21:30,707
critical infrastructure and by 

565
00:21:30,707 --> 00:21:32,929
undermining our will and disrupting and 

566
00:21:32,929 --> 00:21:35,040
delaying our ability to project power 

567
00:21:35,040 --> 00:21:36,984
forward in a crisis . I want to be 

568
00:21:36,984 --> 00:21:39,020
clear . I believe the strategic 

569
00:21:39,020 --> 00:21:41,242
deterrent is the foundation of homeland 

570
00:21:41,242 --> 00:21:43,630
defense . I also believe is necessary 

571
00:21:43,630 --> 00:21:45,630
for the United States to maintain a 

572
00:21:45,630 --> 00:21:47,797
reliable and effective nuclear triad . 

573
00:21:47,840 --> 00:21:50,007
At the same time , I am concerned that 

574
00:21:50,007 --> 00:21:51,951
our reliance on deterrence by cost 

575
00:21:51,951 --> 00:21:54,400
imposition is currently overweighted 

576
00:21:54,400 --> 00:21:56,622
and does not adequately account for the 

577
00:21:56,622 --> 00:21:58,400
conventional capabilities . Our 

578
00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:00,567
competitors have already fielded . The 

579
00:22:00,567 --> 00:22:02,678
over reliance on this . Over reliance 

580
00:22:02,678 --> 00:22:04,733
increases the risk of miscalculation 

581
00:22:04,733 --> 00:22:06,789
and escalation because it limits our 

582
00:22:06,789 --> 00:22:08,956
national leaders options in crisis and 

583
00:22:08,956 --> 00:22:10,733
in conflict . Our competitors , 

584
00:22:10,770 --> 00:22:12,992
advanced conventional capabilities make 

585
00:22:12,992 --> 00:22:15,214
it necessary to move forward to a model 

586
00:22:15,214 --> 00:22:17,326
of integrated deterrence that employs 

587
00:22:17,326 --> 00:22:19,381
all elements of national influence , 

588
00:22:19,381 --> 00:22:21,381
leverages allies and partnerships , 

589
00:22:21,381 --> 00:22:23,492
provides leaders with a wide range of 

590
00:22:23,492 --> 00:22:25,830
timely deterrence options . We must 

591
00:22:25,830 --> 00:22:27,560
continually demonstrate to our 

592
00:22:27,560 --> 00:22:29,782
potential aggressors that they will not 

593
00:22:29,782 --> 00:22:31,616
be successful in achieving their 

594
00:22:31,616 --> 00:22:33,671
objectives by demonstrating homeland 

595
00:22:33,671 --> 00:22:37,500
readiness responsiveness resiliency and 

596
00:22:37,500 --> 00:22:39,611
displaying a range of kinetic and non 

597
00:22:39,611 --> 00:22:41,556
kinetic capabilities to defend the 

598
00:22:41,556 --> 00:22:43,667
homeland and respond to any potential 

599
00:22:43,667 --> 00:22:45,722
threat or aggression . Us North comp 

600
00:22:45,722 --> 00:22:47,556
support of civil authorities and 

601
00:22:47,556 --> 00:22:49,611
security cooperation , relationships 

602
00:22:49,611 --> 00:22:51,722
with allies and partners are critical 

603
00:22:51,722 --> 00:22:53,944
to that effort as is NORAD's mission to 

604
00:22:53,944 --> 00:22:55,667
provide warning and defend the 

605
00:22:55,667 --> 00:22:57,770
approaches to North America . The 

606
00:22:57,770 --> 00:22:59,510
reality is that this strategic 

607
00:22:59,510 --> 00:23:01,510
environment is the new normal north 

608
00:23:01,510 --> 00:23:04,020
America is and will be continually 

609
00:23:04,020 --> 00:23:06,820
challenged day today and in crisis are 

610
00:23:06,820 --> 00:23:08,820
operating model that assumed we can 

611
00:23:08,820 --> 00:23:10,987
project power globally from a safe and 

612
00:23:10,987 --> 00:23:13,209
secure homeland is eroding and has been 

613
00:23:13,209 --> 00:23:15,480
eroding for more than a decade in order 

614
00:23:15,480 --> 00:23:17,702
to provide national leaders with timely 

615
00:23:17,702 --> 00:23:19,869
and informed options that they need to 

616
00:23:19,869 --> 00:23:21,924
achieve favorable outcomes . We must 

617
00:23:21,924 --> 00:23:24,147
improve our ability to detect and track 

618
00:23:24,147 --> 00:23:26,369
potential threats anywhere in the world 

619
00:23:26,369 --> 00:23:28,258
while delivering data to decision 

620
00:23:28,258 --> 00:23:30,424
makers as rapidly as possible wherever 

621
00:23:30,424 --> 00:23:32,758
they might be in pursuit of those goals . 

622
00:23:32,758 --> 00:23:34,980
North Command NORAD are focused on four 

623
00:23:34,980 --> 00:23:37,036
strategic principles in our homeland 

624
00:23:37,036 --> 00:23:39,147
defense design , all domain awareness 

625
00:23:39,147 --> 00:23:41,202
that's from under C two on orbit and 

626
00:23:41,202 --> 00:23:43,313
everything in between including cyber 

627
00:23:43,340 --> 00:23:45,507
information dominance . That's the use 

628
00:23:45,507 --> 00:23:47,340
of advanced capabilities such as 

629
00:23:47,340 --> 00:23:49,118
machine learning and artificial 

630
00:23:49,118 --> 00:23:51,118
intelligence to analyze and process 

631
00:23:51,118 --> 00:23:53,396
data much sooner and deliver that data , 

632
00:23:53,396 --> 00:23:55,618
what I call decision superiority to key 

633
00:23:55,618 --> 00:23:57,673
decision makers in a timely manner . 

634
00:23:57,673 --> 00:23:59,784
And finally , global integration . No 

635
00:23:59,784 --> 00:24:01,896
problem is regional anymore . They're 

636
00:24:01,896 --> 00:24:03,784
all all domain and global . These 

637
00:24:03,784 --> 00:24:05,618
principles are vital elements to 

638
00:24:05,618 --> 00:24:07,562
integrated deterrence and they are 

639
00:24:07,562 --> 00:24:09,562
critical to our nation's ability to 

640
00:24:09,562 --> 00:24:11,507
deter in competition de escalating 

641
00:24:11,507 --> 00:24:13,507
crisis and if necessary , defeat in 

642
00:24:13,507 --> 00:24:15,618
conflict . I continue to work closely 

643
00:24:15,618 --> 00:24:17,618
with my fellow commanders including 

644
00:24:17,618 --> 00:24:19,840
Admiral Richard and General Dickinson . 

645
00:24:19,840 --> 00:24:21,951
The services , the department and all 

646
00:24:21,951 --> 00:24:24,007
of our interagency and international 

647
00:24:24,007 --> 00:24:23,880
partners to defend our nation . I'd 

648
00:24:23,880 --> 00:24:25,880
like to thank the committee and all 

649
00:24:25,880 --> 00:24:27,658
that you've done to support our 

650
00:24:27,658 --> 00:24:29,880
soldiers , sailors , airmen marines and 

651
00:24:29,880 --> 00:24:31,824
our guardians . The Fy 22 national 

652
00:24:31,824 --> 00:24:33,769
defense authorization continues to 

653
00:24:33,769 --> 00:24:35,991
advance our national defense priorities 

654
00:24:35,991 --> 00:24:38,213
and the mission of Northern Command and 

655
00:24:38,213 --> 00:24:40,213
NORAD . However , today's strategic 

656
00:24:40,213 --> 00:24:42,102
environment calls for sustained , 

657
00:24:42,102 --> 00:24:44,213
sufficient and predictable funding in 

658
00:24:44,213 --> 00:24:46,102
order to prevail while presenting 

659
00:24:46,102 --> 00:24:47,824
persistently operating under a 

660
00:24:47,824 --> 00:24:49,936
continuing resolution has accelerated 

661
00:24:49,936 --> 00:24:52,158
the erosion of our nation's competitive 

662
00:24:52,158 --> 00:24:54,213
advantage . Over the last decade , I 

663
00:24:54,213 --> 00:24:56,324
joined my fellow commanders , service 

664
00:24:56,324 --> 00:24:56,070
Chiefs and the secretary and expressing 

665
00:24:56,070 --> 00:24:58,070
our concerns in need to arrest this 

666
00:24:58,070 --> 00:25:00,100
degradation , bypassing the Fy 22 

667
00:25:00,100 --> 00:25:02,350
omnibus and restoring normal order to 

668
00:25:02,350 --> 00:25:04,517
the appropriations process as a matter 

669
00:25:04,517 --> 00:25:06,572
of national security . Again , thank 

670
00:25:06,572 --> 00:25:08,906
you for the opportunity to appear today . 

671
00:25:08,906 --> 00:25:10,850
I look forward to your questions . 

672
00:25:11,540 --> 00:25:13,651
Thank you . General Van Hurt . Let me 

673
00:25:13,651 --> 00:25:15,929
just add an amen to what you just said . 

674
00:25:16,540 --> 00:25:18,484
Um I would ask all members to keep 

675
00:25:18,484 --> 00:25:20,596
questions as brief as possible during 

676
00:25:20,596 --> 00:25:22,651
open sessions so that we can rapidly 

677
00:25:22,651 --> 00:25:24,818
move to closed session . I just have a 

678
00:25:24,818 --> 00:25:27,490
few questions for secretary baker I 

679
00:25:27,490 --> 00:25:29,520
think . Um and the secretary , you 

680
00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:32,090
would agree that if a major nuclear 

681
00:25:32,090 --> 00:25:34,910
power were to suddenly double the 

682
00:25:34,910 --> 00:25:37,077
lethality of their nuclear component , 

683
00:25:37,077 --> 00:25:39,410
that would be a significant development . 

684
00:25:39,410 --> 00:25:42,400
Right ? Yes . Mr Chairman . I agree . 

685
00:25:43,340 --> 00:25:45,451
It might even be what Admiral Richard 

686
00:25:45,451 --> 00:25:48,100
calls a strategic break out . So it's 

687
00:25:48,110 --> 00:25:51,670
truly alarming development . Um , 

688
00:25:52,440 --> 00:25:54,607
and I don't know what's in the nuclear 

689
00:25:54,607 --> 00:25:56,829
posture . Review that's coming up . But 

690
00:25:56,829 --> 00:25:59,051
my guess is we're not going to advocate 

691
00:25:59,051 --> 00:26:00,940
anything like doubling us nuclear 

692
00:26:00,940 --> 00:26:04,150
capability . right . Mr Chairman , I 

693
00:26:04,160 --> 00:26:06,327
apologize . Unfortunately , I'm not at 

694
00:26:06,327 --> 00:26:08,382
liberty to talk about the details of 

695
00:26:08,382 --> 00:26:10,438
the NPR . I'd be willing to bet that 

696
00:26:10,438 --> 00:26:12,549
we're not going to advocate that . So 

697
00:26:12,549 --> 00:26:14,216
that's fine . But there was a 

698
00:26:14,216 --> 00:26:16,327
Washington post article that appeared 

699
00:26:16,327 --> 00:26:18,438
last october that troubles me because 

700
00:26:18,438 --> 00:26:20,216
it claims , citing National Lab 

701
00:26:20,216 --> 00:26:22,104
Director who's retired , that the 

702
00:26:22,104 --> 00:26:24,049
United States has just doubled the 

703
00:26:24,049 --> 00:26:27,310
lethality of its nuclear arsenal . And 

704
00:26:27,310 --> 00:26:29,530
there has been no denial from the 

705
00:26:29,540 --> 00:26:32,670
pentagon . Now , I checked into it to 

706
00:26:32,670 --> 00:26:34,892
see if this claim was true or not . And 

707
00:26:34,892 --> 00:26:37,003
it seems by all authorities to not be 

708
00:26:37,003 --> 00:26:39,830
true . We have not doubled the 

709
00:26:39,830 --> 00:26:42,750
lethality of our nuclear capabilities . 

710
00:26:43,640 --> 00:26:46,760
So the continuing pentagon silence 

711
00:26:46,770 --> 00:26:49,340
troubles me . And I know that some 

712
00:26:49,340 --> 00:26:51,507
folks like to appear 10ft tall even if 

713
00:26:51,507 --> 00:26:54,430
they're not . But um , this doesn't 

714
00:26:54,430 --> 00:26:58,160
seem to fit with um , clear and 

715
00:26:58,160 --> 00:27:00,520
honest communications on nuclear 

716
00:27:00,520 --> 00:27:03,330
matters . So perhaps the pentagon wants 

717
00:27:03,330 --> 00:27:05,386
to discount the post as a source . I 

718
00:27:05,386 --> 00:27:07,400
can understand that . But the 

719
00:27:07,410 --> 00:27:09,354
continuing silence to me is nearly 

720
00:27:09,354 --> 00:27:11,577
deafening . And I would hate for a near 

721
00:27:11,577 --> 00:27:14,010
peer adversaries to mistake the post 

722
00:27:14,010 --> 00:27:16,232
article for something approaching truth 

723
00:27:16,940 --> 00:27:18,920
and using that as an excuse to 

724
00:27:18,920 --> 00:27:20,976
accelerate their nuclear development 

725
00:27:21,340 --> 00:27:23,396
when in fact we haven't done a thing 

726
00:27:23,396 --> 00:27:25,860
really . So I just want to get this on 

727
00:27:25,860 --> 00:27:28,160
the record so that we can have clearer 

728
00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:31,400
communications with the world . MR 

729
00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:33,456
Chairman , I'm not familiar with the 

730
00:27:33,456 --> 00:27:35,567
post article that you reference . But 

731
00:27:35,567 --> 00:27:38,150
certainly we will uh dig into it . And 

732
00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:41,890
I agree with you that when it comes 

733
00:27:41,890 --> 00:27:44,130
to our nuclear posture and our nuclear 

734
00:27:44,130 --> 00:27:45,963
capabilities , we ought to be as 

735
00:27:45,963 --> 00:27:48,130
transparent as we can be , wherever we 

736
00:27:48,130 --> 00:27:51,670
can be . Thank you . Um , 

737
00:27:51,930 --> 00:27:54,480
Mr Lamborn . Thank you . Mr Chairman 

738
00:27:54,490 --> 00:27:56,657
Admiral Richard . I'll just jump right 

739
00:27:56,657 --> 00:27:58,712
in for the sake of time . I think it 

740
00:27:58,712 --> 00:28:00,768
would be a mistake to discard any of 

741
00:28:00,768 --> 00:28:02,823
our nuclear capabilities in light of 

742
00:28:02,823 --> 00:28:05,860
our uh to near peers and the nuclear 

743
00:28:05,860 --> 00:28:07,860
buildups and posturing that they're 

744
00:28:07,860 --> 00:28:11,400
currently displaying . If the United 

745
00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:13,860
States were to just jettison any of 

746
00:28:13,860 --> 00:28:15,804
these three following things . The 

747
00:28:15,804 --> 00:28:17,916
nuclear sea launched cruise missile , 

748
00:28:17,916 --> 00:28:21,810
the B 83 gravity bomb or the w 76 

749
00:28:21,820 --> 00:28:24,770
to low yield submarine launched missile 

750
00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:27,610
in the four in the upcoming nuclear 

751
00:28:27,610 --> 00:28:29,721
posture review . What kind of message 

752
00:28:29,721 --> 00:28:31,888
would that send to our adversaries and 

753
00:28:31,888 --> 00:28:35,720
our allies . Remember if 

754
00:28:35,730 --> 00:28:37,563
if you would given that that's a 

755
00:28:37,563 --> 00:28:39,619
discussion of our own capabilities . 

756
00:28:39,619 --> 00:28:41,786
I'd like to defer my answer to that to 

757
00:28:41,786 --> 00:28:43,786
the closed session , please , sir . 

758
00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:00,773
Okay , let me ask another question then . 

759
00:29:00,940 --> 00:29:04,400
Um is it your best military advice that 

760
00:29:04,400 --> 00:29:08,220
our missile defenses are matching the 

761
00:29:08,230 --> 00:29:11,050
growing uh people's republic , 

762
00:29:11,060 --> 00:29:14,480
democratic uh republic of North Korea 

763
00:29:14,490 --> 00:29:15,160
threat . 

764
00:29:17,640 --> 00:29:20,930
So ranking member . My best military 

765
00:29:20,930 --> 00:29:22,874
advice here is that that that very 

766
00:29:22,874 --> 00:29:25,400
question is at the core of the missile 

767
00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:27,440
defense review . It's a question of 

768
00:29:27,440 --> 00:29:29,662
what is our national policy in terms of 

769
00:29:29,662 --> 00:29:31,773
what we expect to do from our missile 

770
00:29:31,773 --> 00:29:34,060
defenses . Uh My best military advice 

771
00:29:34,060 --> 00:29:36,227
was applied inside the missile defense 

772
00:29:36,227 --> 00:29:38,260
review . Uh and I think it would be 

773
00:29:38,260 --> 00:29:40,600
best for that process to complete to 

774
00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:42,711
give you the formal department answer 

775
00:29:42,711 --> 00:29:46,660
on that sir . Um General Dickinson , 

776
00:29:47,340 --> 00:29:49,590
reliable space launch options are 

777
00:29:49,590 --> 00:29:51,910
critical to the continued success of 

778
00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:54,770
the national Security space launch 

779
00:29:54,770 --> 00:29:58,460
program and for assured United States 

780
00:29:58,460 --> 00:30:01,730
access to space . Can you outline the 

781
00:30:01,730 --> 00:30:04,100
strategic advantages that we have by 

782
00:30:04,110 --> 00:30:06,950
having launched options on both coasts 

783
00:30:07,740 --> 00:30:11,180
and what are we doing to protect these 

784
00:30:11,190 --> 00:30:15,070
national missions ? Uh Given the fact 

785
00:30:15,070 --> 00:30:17,292
that we have adversaries who are trying 

786
00:30:17,292 --> 00:30:19,292
to challenge our ability to operate 

787
00:30:19,292 --> 00:30:22,840
freely in space . So ranking 

788
00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:24,840
member Lamborn . So if I understand 

789
00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:26,896
your question correctly , it's about 

790
00:30:26,896 --> 00:30:28,896
responsive launch as well as how we 

791
00:30:28,896 --> 00:30:31,118
protect those types of capabilities and 

792
00:30:31,118 --> 00:30:33,670
having east coast and west coast 

793
00:30:33,680 --> 00:30:36,060
options . Certainly . So I think from a 

794
00:30:36,070 --> 00:30:38,300
perspective of of from a combatant 

795
00:30:38,300 --> 00:30:40,530
Commander's perspective , having many 

796
00:30:40,530 --> 00:30:42,586
different options available to us is 

797
00:30:42,586 --> 00:30:44,586
very important in other words , not 

798
00:30:44,586 --> 00:30:46,752
just relying on one type of capability 

799
00:30:46,752 --> 00:30:48,863
in this case , relying on the ability 

800
00:30:48,863 --> 00:30:52,210
to rapidly or quickly respond to any 

801
00:30:52,210 --> 00:30:54,432
events that we might have on orbit with 

802
00:30:54,432 --> 00:30:56,654
the capability to put something else up 

803
00:30:56,654 --> 00:30:58,890
in orbit to provide us resiliency and 

804
00:30:58,890 --> 00:31:01,160
quite frankly , redundancy having them 

805
00:31:01,160 --> 00:31:04,160
geographically separated obviously has 

806
00:31:04,170 --> 00:31:07,260
some survivability uh benefits to that . 

807
00:31:07,270 --> 00:31:09,326
So east coast , west coast , it also 

808
00:31:09,326 --> 00:31:12,560
lets us allows us to um deploying 

809
00:31:12,560 --> 00:31:14,393
different orbital regimes and in 

810
00:31:14,393 --> 00:31:16,620
different slots if you will ? And so 

811
00:31:16,620 --> 00:31:18,787
from that perspective I support that . 

812
00:31:18,787 --> 00:31:20,509
I think it's part of a layered 

813
00:31:20,509 --> 00:31:22,509
resiliency type of concept where we 

814
00:31:22,509 --> 00:31:24,676
rely on that plus other things to make 

815
00:31:24,676 --> 00:31:26,898
sure that we have resiliency in space . 

816
00:31:26,898 --> 00:31:28,787
And it was mentioned I believe by 

817
00:31:28,787 --> 00:31:30,953
Chairman Cooper in his opening remarks 

818
00:31:30,953 --> 00:31:33,120
about a resilient space architecture . 

819
00:31:33,120 --> 00:31:35,287
And that's very important that we have 

820
00:31:35,287 --> 00:31:37,287
that that is part of it . The other 

821
00:31:37,287 --> 00:31:39,340
piece of my mind is having a 

822
00:31:39,350 --> 00:31:41,440
constellation of satellites for 

823
00:31:41,440 --> 00:31:43,662
different types of functions whether it 

824
00:31:43,662 --> 00:31:46,460
be communications or I . S . R . Or 

825
00:31:46,460 --> 00:31:48,238
missile warning that provide us 

826
00:31:48,238 --> 00:31:50,127
redundancy and resiliency through 

827
00:31:50,127 --> 00:31:52,127
numbers of satellites as opposed to 

828
00:31:52,127 --> 00:31:56,100
just a few . Thank you . General 

829
00:31:56,100 --> 00:31:59,290
Van Herk . Can you elaborate as to how 

830
00:31:59,290 --> 00:32:02,040
china is developing its hypersonic 

831
00:32:02,050 --> 00:32:05,500
capabilities in this open context . And 

832
00:32:05,510 --> 00:32:07,930
um how does that compare with our own 

833
00:32:07,930 --> 00:32:11,860
progress ? Ranking member 

834
00:32:11,860 --> 00:32:14,310
Lamborn they're aggressively pursuing 

835
00:32:14,310 --> 00:32:17,930
hypersonic capability tenfold uh to 

836
00:32:17,930 --> 00:32:19,960
what we have done as far as testing 

837
00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:22,800
within the last year or so uh 

838
00:32:22,810 --> 00:32:24,970
significantly outpacing us with their 

839
00:32:24,970 --> 00:32:27,840
capabilities , ours we're picking it up 

840
00:32:27,840 --> 00:32:30,062
in the department . I'm confident we'll 

841
00:32:30,062 --> 00:32:32,173
see when the budget comes out . We'll 

842
00:32:32,173 --> 00:32:34,173
see additional resources applied uh 

843
00:32:34,173 --> 00:32:36,340
into the hypersonic area as well as uh 

844
00:32:36,340 --> 00:32:38,562
in threat warning and attack assessment 

845
00:32:38,562 --> 00:32:40,729
for those capabilities . Thank you for 

846
00:32:40,729 --> 00:32:43,980
the opportunity . Okay thank you and 

847
00:32:43,990 --> 00:32:47,090
Secretary baker . Uh I imagine that the 

848
00:32:47,090 --> 00:32:49,090
department is diligently consulting 

849
00:32:49,090 --> 00:32:51,410
with our allies and partners these days 

850
00:32:51,410 --> 00:32:53,900
as Russia invades Ukraine and is 

851
00:32:53,900 --> 00:32:56,320
threatening veiled threats or maybe not 

852
00:32:56,320 --> 00:32:59,310
so veiled threats on uh nuclear 

853
00:32:59,320 --> 00:33:02,930
action in these conversations ? Have 

854
00:33:02,930 --> 00:33:05,640
you found a single NATO ally that is 

855
00:33:05,640 --> 00:33:08,760
advocating for us to change or weaken 

856
00:33:08,770 --> 00:33:11,350
our nuclear declaratory policy 

857
00:33:13,240 --> 00:33:15,296
congressman ? Yes of course . We are 

858
00:33:15,296 --> 00:33:17,351
consulting closely with our partners 

859
00:33:17,351 --> 00:33:19,407
and allies on on a daily if not more 

860
00:33:19,407 --> 00:33:23,130
regular basis . Um the substance of 

861
00:33:23,130 --> 00:33:25,186
those conversations is largely about 

862
00:33:25,186 --> 00:33:27,408
the current ongoing events in Ukraine . 

863
00:33:27,408 --> 00:33:29,519
But no I can't say that I've found an 

864
00:33:29,519 --> 00:33:31,741
ally who is urging us to reduce our our 

865
00:33:31,741 --> 00:33:34,350
nuclear deterrence or are declaratory 

866
00:33:34,350 --> 00:33:37,810
policy in particular . Yes sir . 

867
00:33:38,150 --> 00:33:40,317
Okay thank you so much . Mr Chairman , 

868
00:33:40,317 --> 00:33:42,261
I yield back to you . Thank you Mr 

869
00:33:42,261 --> 00:33:45,460
Carvajal . Thank you . Mr Chair General 

870
00:33:45,460 --> 00:33:47,900
Dickinson . Us space officials noted 

871
00:33:47,900 --> 00:33:50,170
recently that Russia will employ 

872
00:33:50,180 --> 00:33:52,830
counter space capabilities like jamming 

873
00:33:52,830 --> 00:33:54,997
and spoofing of the global positioning 

874
00:33:54,997 --> 00:33:57,060
system . GPS and communications 

875
00:33:57,060 --> 00:33:59,430
satellites in support of its Ukraine 

876
00:33:59,430 --> 00:34:01,910
invasion . In addition , the N . R . O . 

877
00:34:01,910 --> 00:34:04,077
Director urged military and commercial 

878
00:34:04,077 --> 00:34:06,630
space operators to prepare for possible 

879
00:34:06,630 --> 00:34:09,040
cyberattacks from Russia . These 

880
00:34:09,040 --> 00:34:11,740
warnings are deeply concerning to me as 

881
00:34:11,740 --> 00:34:13,796
I represent Vandenberg's space force 

882
00:34:13,796 --> 00:34:15,900
base home to the US Space Command's 

883
00:34:15,900 --> 00:34:19,060
Combined CS Box Space Operations Center 

884
00:34:19,440 --> 00:34:22,840
which provides gPS navigation and space 

885
00:34:22,840 --> 00:34:26,050
based data that supports US european 

886
00:34:26,050 --> 00:34:28,970
Command and partners and critical to 

887
00:34:28,970 --> 00:34:31,560
our command and control of space forces 

888
00:34:32,240 --> 00:34:34,240
with this increased threat of cyber 

889
00:34:34,240 --> 00:34:36,518
attacks and counter space capabilities . 

890
00:34:36,640 --> 00:34:39,700
How is US space com working to sustain 

891
00:34:39,700 --> 00:34:42,080
GPS and critical communications 

892
00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:44,030
networks that support coalition 

893
00:34:44,030 --> 00:34:47,610
partners . Thank you 

894
00:34:47,610 --> 00:34:50,070
congressman for that question . So at 

895
00:34:50,070 --> 00:34:52,237
US Space Command , we prepare for that 

896
00:34:52,237 --> 00:34:54,514
every day . That is part of what we do . 

897
00:34:54,514 --> 00:34:56,459
Uh throughout the command that you 

898
00:34:56,459 --> 00:34:58,570
mentioned the sea speak at Vandenberg 

899
00:34:58,570 --> 00:35:00,681
Space Force , space , those guardians 

900
00:35:00,681 --> 00:35:02,903
and warriors out there do that each and 

901
00:35:02,903 --> 00:35:04,848
every day ensuring that our global 

902
00:35:04,848 --> 00:35:06,959
positioning satellites , our state of 

903
00:35:06,959 --> 00:35:09,070
the art in our operational to include 

904
00:35:09,070 --> 00:35:10,903
satellite communications that we 

905
00:35:10,903 --> 00:35:12,959
provide as well as missile warning . 

906
00:35:12,959 --> 00:35:15,014
And so we continue to do that . Each 

907
00:35:15,014 --> 00:35:17,014
and every day , we take very active 

908
00:35:17,014 --> 00:35:18,903
measures to make sure that we are 

909
00:35:18,903 --> 00:35:20,848
protecting ourselves and defending 

910
00:35:20,848 --> 00:35:23,014
ourselves from cyberattacks . So in my 

911
00:35:23,014 --> 00:35:25,237
mind , we're we are in a position right 

912
00:35:25,237 --> 00:35:25,130
now where I'm very comfortable with our 

913
00:35:25,130 --> 00:35:27,230
strategic posture for the space 

914
00:35:27,230 --> 00:35:29,560
enterprise in support of not only 

915
00:35:29,600 --> 00:35:31,822
european command , General Todd Walters 

916
00:35:31,822 --> 00:35:33,600
over there , but also the other 

917
00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:35,711
combatant commands around the world . 

918
00:35:35,711 --> 00:35:37,711
So with our global mission , that's 

919
00:35:37,711 --> 00:35:39,822
what we do each and every day . Thank 

920
00:35:39,822 --> 00:35:42,980
you to continue General Dickinson . The 

921
00:35:42,980 --> 00:35:44,869
space enterprise has increasingly 

922
00:35:44,869 --> 00:35:47,340
become a contested domain as Russia and 

923
00:35:47,340 --> 00:35:49,680
china continue to develop and filled 

924
00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:52,240
space capabilities in this contested 

925
00:35:52,240 --> 00:35:54,407
space environment . Do you have enough 

926
00:35:54,407 --> 00:35:57,370
resources to assure us access and 

927
00:35:57,370 --> 00:36:00,980
superiority in the space domain And to 

928
00:36:00,990 --> 00:36:02,879
how are you leveraging commercial 

929
00:36:02,879 --> 00:36:05,250
capabilities to feel current and future 

930
00:36:05,830 --> 00:36:09,490
capability gaps ? So our 

931
00:36:09,490 --> 00:36:12,140
relationship with the commercial 

932
00:36:12,140 --> 00:36:14,720
industry is uh is advancing and 

933
00:36:14,720 --> 00:36:16,887
developing and maturing very quickly . 

934
00:36:16,887 --> 00:36:19,470
We have had a number of commercial 

935
00:36:19,470 --> 00:36:21,581
companies , I think we're up over 100 

936
00:36:21,581 --> 00:36:23,692
that we work with right now . What we 

937
00:36:23,692 --> 00:36:25,859
call our commercial integration cell . 

938
00:36:25,859 --> 00:36:27,914
That's out at Vandenberg Space Force 

939
00:36:27,914 --> 00:36:30,630
space so much so that we are developing 

940
00:36:30,630 --> 00:36:33,180
a new framework for our integration 

941
00:36:33,180 --> 00:36:35,124
with the commercial industry . And 

942
00:36:35,124 --> 00:36:37,458
we're doing that right now at the U . S . 

943
00:36:37,458 --> 00:36:39,458
Space Command because we're finding 

944
00:36:39,458 --> 00:36:41,624
that our commercial partners can bring 

945
00:36:41,624 --> 00:36:43,624
a lot of capability very quickly to 

946
00:36:43,624 --> 00:36:43,370
what we do each and every day . And 

947
00:36:43,370 --> 00:36:44,870
that starts with satellite 

948
00:36:44,870 --> 00:36:46,870
communications . That's really been 

949
00:36:46,870 --> 00:36:48,870
kind of our older relationship that 

950
00:36:48,870 --> 00:36:51,092
we've had for many years . But now it's 

951
00:36:51,092 --> 00:36:53,203
expanding into space domain awareness 

952
00:36:53,203 --> 00:36:55,037
that gives us commercial type of 

953
00:36:55,037 --> 00:36:57,960
products that we can use from the 

954
00:36:57,960 --> 00:36:59,849
commercial perspective and that's 

955
00:36:59,849 --> 00:37:02,016
actually out in Colorado Springs where 

956
00:37:02,016 --> 00:37:04,127
the headquarters is right now . And I 

957
00:37:04,127 --> 00:37:06,127
think we've had ranking member land 

958
00:37:06,127 --> 00:37:08,182
born there . So in other words , the 

959
00:37:08,182 --> 00:37:10,349
integration of commercial capabilities 

960
00:37:10,349 --> 00:37:12,571
within US , Space Command helps us with 

961
00:37:12,571 --> 00:37:12,420
what we were just describing in terms 

962
00:37:12,420 --> 00:37:14,720
of providing of resiliency , as well as 

963
00:37:14,720 --> 00:37:16,887
redundancy and some of the things that 

964
00:37:16,887 --> 00:37:18,942
we need in capabilities we provide . 

965
00:37:18,942 --> 00:37:21,109
Thank you and I'll just remind us that 

966
00:37:21,109 --> 00:37:23,220
to be able to achieve that commercial 

967
00:37:23,220 --> 00:37:25,164
framework enhancement , we need to 

968
00:37:25,164 --> 00:37:26,609
continue to invest in the 

969
00:37:26,609 --> 00:37:28,700
infrastructure of those ranges to be 

970
00:37:28,700 --> 00:37:31,050
able to achieve these goals . So um 

971
00:37:31,060 --> 00:37:32,838
that's something I've been also 

972
00:37:32,838 --> 00:37:34,782
advocating for Secretary baker and 

973
00:37:34,782 --> 00:37:37,070
Admiral Richard . We all saw President 

974
00:37:37,070 --> 00:37:39,190
Putin's unwarranted escalation of the 

975
00:37:39,190 --> 00:37:41,720
Ukrainian crisis by ordering Russian 

976
00:37:41,720 --> 00:37:44,510
nuclear forces to be put on high alert . 

977
00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:47,380
What steps are you all taking within 

978
00:37:47,380 --> 00:37:49,602
the coalition to manage this unprovoked 

979
00:37:49,602 --> 00:37:53,470
escalation congressman ? I 

980
00:37:53,480 --> 00:37:55,591
would just say in this open session . 

981
00:37:55,591 --> 00:37:58,220
You know , we're assessing President 

982
00:37:58,220 --> 00:38:01,630
Putin's directive at this time . As the 

983
00:38:01,630 --> 00:38:03,741
Secretary said , I believe last night 

984
00:38:03,741 --> 00:38:06,220
we are comfortable with our strategic 

985
00:38:06,220 --> 00:38:09,140
defensive posture and and I'll turn to 

986
00:38:09,150 --> 00:38:11,206
maybe Admiral Richard if he wants to 

987
00:38:11,206 --> 00:38:14,230
add anything to that congressman . Uh 

988
00:38:14,240 --> 00:38:16,980
one that's part of why I'm in Omaha . 

989
00:38:16,980 --> 00:38:20,520
Aw is a part of our ability to assess 

990
00:38:20,520 --> 00:38:22,353
and be satisfied in terms of our 

991
00:38:22,353 --> 00:38:25,430
defensive posture . Um , I am satisfied 

992
00:38:25,430 --> 00:38:27,597
with the posture of my forces . I have 

993
00:38:27,597 --> 00:38:29,630
made no recommendations to make any 

994
00:38:29,630 --> 00:38:32,660
changes . And part of that is because 

995
00:38:32,660 --> 00:38:34,604
right now , all I will say in open 

996
00:38:34,604 --> 00:38:36,827
session is the nation's nuclear command 

997
00:38:36,827 --> 00:38:39,850
and control is in its most defended , 

998
00:38:39,850 --> 00:38:41,906
most resilient lineup that it's ever 

999
00:38:41,906 --> 00:38:44,770
been in in its history . Uh , and I'll 

1000
00:38:44,770 --> 00:38:46,910
be happy to go into more detail as to 

1001
00:38:46,910 --> 00:38:49,730
why I say that as well as uh more 

1002
00:38:49,730 --> 00:38:51,674
discussion of what we see and what 

1003
00:38:51,674 --> 00:38:53,841
we're doing about it in closed session 

1004
00:38:53,841 --> 00:38:56,008
sir . Thank you . I'm out of time . Mr 

1005
00:38:56,008 --> 00:38:58,119
Chair . I yield back . Thank you . Mr 

1006
00:38:58,119 --> 00:39:00,560
Carvajal Mr brooks . Thank you . Mr 

1007
00:39:00,560 --> 00:39:02,890
Chairman . Um Admiral Richard always 

1008
00:39:02,890 --> 00:39:05,057
good to see someone from the Tennessee 

1009
00:39:05,057 --> 00:39:07,740
valley up there . As you mentioned in 

1010
00:39:07,740 --> 00:39:10,170
your opening statement in September 

1011
00:39:10,170 --> 00:39:12,114
2021 . You stated China to be in a 

1012
00:39:12,114 --> 00:39:14,440
quote , strategic breakout end , quote 

1013
00:39:15,020 --> 00:39:16,970
In February 2021 , you wrote in an 

1014
00:39:16,970 --> 00:39:19,880
essay titled forging 21st Century 

1015
00:39:19,880 --> 00:39:22,250
Strategic Deterrence that you expected 

1016
00:39:22,250 --> 00:39:24,306
China's nuclear weapons stockpile is 

1017
00:39:24,306 --> 00:39:26,528
expected to double , if not , triple or 

1018
00:39:26,528 --> 00:39:28,472
quadruple . Over the next decade . 

1019
00:39:28,820 --> 00:39:30,931
We've all been paying close attention 

1020
00:39:30,931 --> 00:39:33,042
to the conflict in eastern europe and 

1021
00:39:33,042 --> 00:39:35,209
Russia's recent movement toward a more 

1022
00:39:35,209 --> 00:39:37,376
aggressive nuclear posture . With what 

1023
00:39:37,376 --> 00:39:39,376
we know about these two adversarial 

1024
00:39:39,376 --> 00:39:41,542
powers , is that in the best interests 

1025
00:39:41,542 --> 00:39:41,400
of the United States national security 

1026
00:39:41,400 --> 00:39:43,122
to make changes to our nuclear 

1027
00:39:43,122 --> 00:39:44,750
declaratory policy 

1028
00:39:46,420 --> 00:39:48,642
congressman . You know , I've testified 

1029
00:39:48,642 --> 00:39:50,642
to that effect several times in the 

1030
00:39:50,642 --> 00:39:53,420
past and it remains my best military 

1031
00:39:53,420 --> 00:39:55,760
advice . That changes would not have 

1032
00:39:55,760 --> 00:39:58,340
benefit to us strategic deterrent , but 

1033
00:39:58,340 --> 00:40:00,610
would have a negative effect of 

1034
00:40:00,610 --> 00:40:02,554
significant negative effect on our 

1035
00:40:02,554 --> 00:40:04,820
assurance of our allies more 

1036
00:40:04,820 --> 00:40:06,987
specifically , how would a change away 

1037
00:40:06,987 --> 00:40:08,987
from strategic ambiguity affect our 

1038
00:40:08,987 --> 00:40:11,153
allies ? And what message does it send 

1039
00:40:11,153 --> 00:40:13,910
to our adversaries ? Well , it 

1040
00:40:13,920 --> 00:40:17,780
certainly does not help and has a very 

1041
00:40:17,780 --> 00:40:19,780
negative effect on the assurance of 

1042
00:40:19,780 --> 00:40:22,710
those allies . And uh bottom line in 

1043
00:40:22,710 --> 00:40:25,390
terms of any potential adversary , I 

1044
00:40:25,390 --> 00:40:27,612
don't think fundamentally they're gonna 

1045
00:40:27,612 --> 00:40:29,723
believe one way or the other what our 

1046
00:40:29,723 --> 00:40:32,090
policy is any more than we do in some 

1047
00:40:32,090 --> 00:40:34,312
cases . Again , that's my best military 

1048
00:40:34,312 --> 00:40:36,534
advice that's being addressed as a part 

1049
00:40:36,534 --> 00:40:38,534
of the nuclear posture . Review . I 

1050
00:40:38,534 --> 00:40:40,646
know my place in the chain of command 

1051
00:40:40,646 --> 00:40:42,646
and we're ready to execute whatever 

1052
00:40:42,646 --> 00:40:44,646
decisions are reached . Thank you . 

1053
00:40:44,646 --> 00:40:46,757
Admiral Richard , General Dickinson . 

1054
00:40:46,757 --> 00:40:48,979
Good to see you again . In your opening 

1055
00:40:48,979 --> 00:40:50,757
statement , you outline china's 

1056
00:40:50,757 --> 00:40:52,812
intentions to obtain superiority and 

1057
00:40:52,812 --> 00:40:54,701
space . We know china has various 

1058
00:40:54,701 --> 00:40:56,701
abilities to conduct attacks on our 

1059
00:40:56,701 --> 00:40:58,812
satellites including laser blinding , 

1060
00:40:58,812 --> 00:41:00,590
high powered microwaves , radio 

1061
00:41:00,590 --> 00:41:02,534
frequency jammers and ground based 

1062
00:41:02,534 --> 00:41:04,646
missiles that can reach satellites in 

1063
00:41:04,646 --> 00:41:06,812
low earth orbit . Can you describe the 

1064
00:41:06,812 --> 00:41:08,979
problems we face and the challenges of 

1065
00:41:08,979 --> 00:41:10,590
responding to such attacks . 

1066
00:41:13,210 --> 00:41:14,877
So thank you for the question 

1067
00:41:14,877 --> 00:41:17,099
congressman . Good to see you as well . 

1068
00:41:17,099 --> 00:41:19,154
Um for us Space Command , what we're 

1069
00:41:19,154 --> 00:41:21,043
working on right now is all those 

1070
00:41:21,043 --> 00:41:22,988
events that you just described our 

1071
00:41:22,988 --> 00:41:25,210
ability to understand what those events 

1072
00:41:25,210 --> 00:41:27,432
are and our awareness of those events . 

1073
00:41:27,432 --> 00:41:29,210
So one of the priorities or the 

1074
00:41:29,210 --> 00:41:31,099
priority within the U . S . Space 

1075
00:41:31,099 --> 00:41:33,210
command right now is building out the 

1076
00:41:33,210 --> 00:41:35,432
capability to do space domain awareness 

1077
00:41:35,432 --> 00:41:37,266
so that I'm able to understand , 

1078
00:41:37,266 --> 00:41:39,210
interpret and characterize what is 

1079
00:41:39,210 --> 00:41:41,266
happening on orbit . And we're doing 

1080
00:41:41,266 --> 00:41:43,488
that through a couple of means . One is 

1081
00:41:43,488 --> 00:41:45,599
we're looking at what our terrestrial 

1082
00:41:45,599 --> 00:41:47,821
based radars can see in space . Some of 

1083
00:41:47,821 --> 00:41:49,821
those are the traditional ones that 

1084
00:41:49,821 --> 00:41:49,490
we've known about for many many years 

1085
00:41:49,490 --> 00:41:51,601
and you've used those others are ones 

1086
00:41:51,601 --> 00:41:53,900
that we hadn't used before in that in 

1087
00:41:53,900 --> 00:41:56,220
that uh in that role is doing space 

1088
00:41:56,220 --> 00:41:58,442
domain awareness in other words looking 

1089
00:41:58,442 --> 00:42:00,664
up and seeing what they can see . So we 

1090
00:42:00,664 --> 00:42:02,887
over the last two years have done a lot 

1091
00:42:02,887 --> 00:42:05,053
of integration of those nontraditional 

1092
00:42:05,053 --> 00:42:07,276
Space domain awareness sensors in order 

1093
00:42:07,276 --> 00:42:09,498
to understand better what's going on in 

1094
00:42:09,498 --> 00:42:11,276
the space domain . And that was 

1095
00:42:11,276 --> 00:42:13,220
highlighted for us when we had the 

1096
00:42:13,220 --> 00:42:15,164
noodle test a couple of months ago 

1097
00:42:15,164 --> 00:42:17,331
where we were able to characterize for 

1098
00:42:17,331 --> 00:42:17,280
the National Command Authority , what 

1099
00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:19,391
we saw in space . So in other words , 

1100
00:42:19,391 --> 00:42:21,447
battlespace awareness is key to what 

1101
00:42:21,447 --> 00:42:23,669
I'm doing right now to make sure that I 

1102
00:42:23,669 --> 00:42:25,891
can understand what's happening . Thank 

1103
00:42:25,891 --> 00:42:28,058
you . And this one will be for General 

1104
00:42:28,058 --> 00:42:30,002
Van Herk . Hopefully I can get the 

1105
00:42:30,002 --> 00:42:29,830
question and quick enough for you to 

1106
00:42:29,830 --> 00:42:32,320
answer . The missile Defense agency 

1107
00:42:32,320 --> 00:42:33,931
launched the next generation 

1108
00:42:33,931 --> 00:42:35,876
interceptor program to protect the 

1109
00:42:35,876 --> 00:42:37,653
United States against potential 

1110
00:42:37,653 --> 00:42:39,876
ballistic missile threats stemming from 

1111
00:42:39,876 --> 00:42:42,098
north Korea and Iran . How is north com 

1112
00:42:42,098 --> 00:42:44,264
continuing to work with M . D . A . To 

1113
00:42:44,264 --> 00:42:46,431
ensure the N . G . I . Program remains 

1114
00:42:46,431 --> 00:42:48,542
on schedule and will meet the need of 

1115
00:42:48,542 --> 00:42:50,376
the combatant command when it is 

1116
00:42:50,376 --> 00:42:52,153
delivered in the 2029 timeframe 

1117
00:42:52,500 --> 00:42:54,722
Congressman thanks for the question . I 

1118
00:42:54,722 --> 00:42:56,611
routinely meet and talk with Vice 

1119
00:42:56,611 --> 00:42:58,778
Admiral John Hill from M . D . A . and 

1120
00:42:58,778 --> 00:43:00,889
stressed the importance of staying on 

1121
00:43:00,889 --> 00:43:03,290
time with delivery in 2028 . If not 

1122
00:43:03,290 --> 00:43:06,380
sooner they have structured the the 

1123
00:43:06,380 --> 00:43:09,430
competition to reward fielding quicker 

1124
00:43:09,430 --> 00:43:11,263
and faster to meet those demands 

1125
00:43:11,263 --> 00:43:13,374
signals . I'd like to reiterate , I'm 

1126
00:43:13,374 --> 00:43:15,597
comfortable with where we are today and 

1127
00:43:15,597 --> 00:43:17,597
my capability to defend against the 

1128
00:43:17,597 --> 00:43:19,486
rogue actor that were designed to 

1129
00:43:19,486 --> 00:43:21,652
defend against Capacity and capability 

1130
00:43:21,652 --> 00:43:23,874
going forward could be challenged . And 

1131
00:43:23,874 --> 00:43:25,930
that's why it's crucial that we keep 

1132
00:43:25,930 --> 00:43:28,097
the NG I on time or bring it forward . 

1133
00:43:28,097 --> 00:43:31,870
Even even sooner than 2028 . Thank you . 

1134
00:43:31,880 --> 00:43:34,630
Mr Chairman . I yield back . Thank you . 

1135
00:43:34,630 --> 00:43:36,130
Mr brooks Mr Garamendi . 

1136
00:43:43,900 --> 00:43:46,233
Thank you . Mr Chairman for the meeting . 

1137
00:43:46,233 --> 00:43:48,810
And Admirals generals , thank you for 

1138
00:43:48,820 --> 00:43:52,390
being here . My first question goes 

1139
00:43:52,390 --> 00:43:54,930
to Admiral Richards 

1140
00:43:56,600 --> 00:43:59,810
of Ronald Reagan and Nicole kubichek 

1141
00:44:00,190 --> 00:44:02,510
said , a nuclear war cannot be won and 

1142
00:44:02,510 --> 00:44:05,220
must never be fought . Is that your 

1143
00:44:05,220 --> 00:44:08,920
view congressman ? Absolutely 

1144
00:44:11,790 --> 00:44:15,190
did your organization authorized the 

1145
00:44:16,320 --> 00:44:18,710
and pay for or authorized and then 

1146
00:44:18,720 --> 00:44:20,831
secondly , pay for a guide to nuclear 

1147
00:44:20,831 --> 00:44:22,887
deterrence in the age of great power 

1148
00:44:22,887 --> 00:44:24,930
competition . A document written by 

1149
00:44:24,930 --> 00:44:27,220
Louisiana Tech Research Institute . 

1150
00:44:28,890 --> 00:44:31,112
Uh Sir , if you'd like , I'll take that 

1151
00:44:31,112 --> 00:44:33,279
question for the record . I don't know 

1152
00:44:33,279 --> 00:44:35,057
off the top of my head . It was 

1153
00:44:35,057 --> 00:44:37,057
distributed . Apparently , this was 

1154
00:44:37,057 --> 00:44:39,890
distributed to all of your commanders 

1155
00:44:39,890 --> 00:44:43,630
and your force certainly not under my 

1156
00:44:43,630 --> 00:44:46,480
direction , sir . Then you have no 

1157
00:44:46,480 --> 00:44:50,280
knowledge of this . No , the not from 

1158
00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:52,580
memory . But I'd be happy to go look 

1159
00:44:52,580 --> 00:44:55,730
into it for you sir . I'd be happy for 

1160
00:44:55,730 --> 00:44:58,800
you to do that . And you believed that 

1161
00:44:58,800 --> 00:45:01,530
this was not distributed to the 30,000 

1162
00:45:01,540 --> 00:45:04,830
people congressman . I don't know the 

1163
00:45:04,830 --> 00:45:07,080
document you're referring to . So I 

1164
00:45:07,090 --> 00:45:09,820
regret that maybe I should have . But I 

1165
00:45:09,820 --> 00:45:11,987
don't know the document referring to . 

1166
00:45:11,987 --> 00:45:15,010
I'd be happy to go look into it . Well , 

1167
00:45:15,010 --> 00:45:18,720
I will erase your prompt investigation 

1168
00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:22,320
of it . It's a fascinating document and 

1169
00:45:22,320 --> 00:45:24,520
apparently it was distributed to most 

1170
00:45:24,520 --> 00:45:27,290
everybody in your organization and it 

1171
00:45:27,300 --> 00:45:29,244
essentially says that we can win a 

1172
00:45:29,244 --> 00:45:33,100
nuclear war . Food for 

1173
00:45:33,100 --> 00:45:37,040
thought . So do you believe we can win 

1174
00:45:37,040 --> 00:45:40,770
a limited nuclear war ? Actually , 

1175
00:45:40,770 --> 00:45:42,714
congressman ? I think my job is to 

1176
00:45:42,714 --> 00:45:45,240
deter limited use of nuclear weapons . 

1177
00:45:45,250 --> 00:45:47,083
And you have no opinion upon the 

1178
00:45:47,083 --> 00:45:50,700
question . I just asked you my point . 

1179
00:45:51,060 --> 00:45:54,600
My job . My job is to deter limited 

1180
00:45:54,600 --> 00:45:58,060
nuclear use and if deterrence fails to 

1181
00:45:58,060 --> 00:45:59,504
restore that deterrence . 

1182
00:46:02,980 --> 00:46:05,490
Yeah , I think we probably ought to get 

1183
00:46:05,500 --> 00:46:08,700
to a classified I yield back . 

1184
00:46:10,480 --> 00:46:12,758
Thank you . Mr Garamendi Mr Desjarlais . 

1185
00:46:12,980 --> 00:46:15,202
Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank you all 

1186
00:46:15,202 --> 00:46:17,536
for being here today . Admiral Richards , 

1187
00:46:17,536 --> 00:46:19,702
I know you've indicated that you would 

1188
00:46:19,702 --> 00:46:21,758
like to speak further about the B 83 

1189
00:46:21,758 --> 00:46:23,924
nuclear capable hypersonic weapons and 

1190
00:46:23,924 --> 00:46:25,830
the W 76 to low yield in a closed 

1191
00:46:25,840 --> 00:46:28,380
setting . In light of the conversation . 

1192
00:46:28,380 --> 00:46:30,760
If you wouldn't care to share with the 

1193
00:46:30,760 --> 00:46:32,871
committee , can you explain how the W 

1194
00:46:32,871 --> 00:46:35,093
76 to strengthens our nuclear deterrent 

1195
00:46:35,093 --> 00:46:37,204
and what gap in the U . S . Deterrent 

1196
00:46:37,204 --> 00:46:40,600
does this capability Phil fundamentally 

1197
00:46:40,600 --> 00:46:43,040
congressman . What that enables us to 

1198
00:46:43,040 --> 00:46:46,430
do is to deter limited low yield and or 

1199
00:46:46,430 --> 00:46:48,680
combinations of that threats from our 

1200
00:46:48,680 --> 00:46:50,902
opponents . I'll go into more detail on 

1201
00:46:50,902 --> 00:46:53,013
the classified session , sir . Okay . 

1202
00:46:53,013 --> 00:46:54,736
And both Russia and china have 

1203
00:46:54,736 --> 00:46:56,680
warfighting plans that utilize low 

1204
00:46:56,680 --> 00:46:59,750
yield weapons correct congressman . 

1205
00:46:59,750 --> 00:47:01,750
Better if I answer that in a closed 

1206
00:47:01,750 --> 00:47:03,972
session . Okay . I'll move on . General 

1207
00:47:03,972 --> 00:47:06,139
Dickinson . I know you're eager to get 

1208
00:47:06,139 --> 00:47:08,250
the permanent location for us . Space 

1209
00:47:08,250 --> 00:47:10,139
command settled . Can you discuss 

1210
00:47:10,139 --> 00:47:12,361
briefly how this long drawn out process 

1211
00:47:12,361 --> 00:47:14,583
has affected your ability to reach full 

1212
00:47:14,583 --> 00:47:16,528
operational capability and what it 

1213
00:47:16,528 --> 00:47:18,694
would mean if you had to restart for a 

1214
00:47:18,694 --> 00:47:20,806
third time , a search for a permanent 

1215
00:47:20,806 --> 00:47:23,350
location . So thank you congressman . 

1216
00:47:23,360 --> 00:47:25,790
Uh you know when I look at , you know 

1217
00:47:26,580 --> 00:47:28,720
Declaring IOC about a year ago , last 

1218
00:47:28,720 --> 00:47:31,930
August 2021 , that was a milestone 

1219
00:47:31,930 --> 00:47:34,041
within the command as we were able to 

1220
00:47:34,041 --> 00:47:36,208
have enough of the experts that I need 

1221
00:47:36,208 --> 00:47:38,152
on the team to be able to generate 

1222
00:47:38,152 --> 00:47:40,490
those types of strategic effects that 

1223
00:47:40,500 --> 00:47:42,333
that we saw when we were able to 

1224
00:47:42,333 --> 00:47:44,500
characterize the noodle event a couple 

1225
00:47:44,500 --> 00:47:46,667
of months ago . So we're on our way to 

1226
00:47:46,667 --> 00:47:49,050
full operational capability where where 

1227
00:47:49,050 --> 00:47:51,210
I see it right now is I'm looking 

1228
00:47:51,210 --> 00:47:53,580
forward to the the results and the 

1229
00:47:53,580 --> 00:47:55,747
conclusion of both the D . O . D . I . 

1230
00:47:55,747 --> 00:47:58,240
G . Um evaluation that has been done as 

1231
00:47:58,240 --> 00:48:00,810
long as well as the G . A . O . Um 

1232
00:48:00,820 --> 00:48:03,930
audit that has been um that is ongoing . 

1233
00:48:03,940 --> 00:48:07,850
Those two um assessments , I'm , I'm 

1234
00:48:07,860 --> 00:48:10,190
confident that they'll be done soon and 

1235
00:48:10,190 --> 00:48:12,240
I look forward to the final basing 

1236
00:48:12,240 --> 00:48:14,351
decision whatever that might come out 

1237
00:48:14,351 --> 00:48:16,407
of that out of that process . And so 

1238
00:48:16,407 --> 00:48:18,407
for me it's about the decision like 

1239
00:48:18,407 --> 00:48:20,573
that . I have a decision . Once I have 

1240
00:48:20,573 --> 00:48:22,184
a decision then I can do the 

1241
00:48:22,184 --> 00:48:24,351
appropriate planning to make sure that 

1242
00:48:24,351 --> 00:48:26,462
I've got the right types of people in 

1243
00:48:26,462 --> 00:48:28,684
the organization to bring me to where I 

1244
00:48:28,684 --> 00:48:30,351
am today which is IOC to full 

1245
00:48:30,351 --> 00:48:32,518
operational capability and really just 

1246
00:48:32,518 --> 00:48:34,684
based on the the challenges that we're 

1247
00:48:34,684 --> 00:48:36,796
articulating from the chinese and the 

1248
00:48:36,796 --> 00:48:38,684
space domain . We need to do that 

1249
00:48:38,684 --> 00:48:40,851
sooner rather than later . All right , 

1250
00:48:40,851 --> 00:48:40,690
thank you . I'll look forward to 

1251
00:48:40,700 --> 00:48:42,867
continuing these discussions in closed 

1252
00:48:42,867 --> 00:48:45,089
settings . You'll back . Thank you . Mr 

1253
00:48:45,089 --> 00:48:46,422
Desjarlais Mr Morelli . 

1254
00:48:49,070 --> 00:48:51,410
Thank you Mr Chair and thank you to the 

1255
00:48:51,480 --> 00:48:53,591
panel for being here for your service 

1256
00:48:53,591 --> 00:48:56,270
to the country . I am . I just want to 

1257
00:48:56,280 --> 00:48:59,460
talk briefly about um the mission of 

1258
00:48:59,460 --> 00:49:01,682
the stockpile stewardship program which 

1259
00:49:01,682 --> 00:49:04,090
this committee has continued to support 

1260
00:49:04,570 --> 00:49:06,681
and specifically it's science efforts 

1261
00:49:06,681 --> 00:49:08,681
to ensure safe and reliable nuclear 

1262
00:49:08,681 --> 00:49:10,792
deterrent . Um These programs already 

1263
00:49:10,792 --> 00:49:12,459
make stockpile management and 

1264
00:49:12,459 --> 00:49:14,740
modernization successful . I'm very 

1265
00:49:14,740 --> 00:49:16,900
proud that my district is home to the 

1266
00:49:16,910 --> 00:49:19,160
and then essay funded laboratory for 

1267
00:49:19,160 --> 00:49:21,216
laser energetic at the University of 

1268
00:49:21,216 --> 00:49:23,327
Rochester , which plays a unique role 

1269
00:49:23,327 --> 00:49:25,049
of both conducting world class 

1270
00:49:25,049 --> 00:49:27,104
stewardship science and training the 

1271
00:49:27,104 --> 00:49:29,049
next generation of scientists that 

1272
00:49:29,049 --> 00:49:30,882
support the readiness of of your 

1273
00:49:30,882 --> 00:49:33,120
important critical mission . Uh I am 

1274
00:49:33,120 --> 00:49:35,287
concerned . I remain concerned that an 

1275
00:49:35,287 --> 00:49:37,398
N . S . A . Does not request adequate 

1276
00:49:37,398 --> 00:49:39,620
resources for the stockpile stewardship 

1277
00:49:39,620 --> 00:49:41,787
program . Considering our reliance now 

1278
00:49:41,787 --> 00:49:43,620
and in the foreseeable future on 

1279
00:49:43,620 --> 00:49:45,453
science to ensure the safety and 

1280
00:49:45,453 --> 00:49:47,676
readiness of our deterrent force . So I 

1281
00:49:47,676 --> 00:49:49,898
wondered if any of you could comment on 

1282
00:49:49,898 --> 00:49:51,676
the importance of these science 

1283
00:49:51,676 --> 00:49:54,120
programs to the mission that uh that 

1284
00:49:54,120 --> 00:49:57,770
you have before you congressman . I'm 

1285
00:49:57,770 --> 00:50:00,380
probably the most appropriate person to 

1286
00:50:00,380 --> 00:50:02,600
answer that question . I think , you 

1287
00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:05,830
know , I am required by law annually to 

1288
00:50:05,830 --> 00:50:09,200
do an assessment of the uh stockpile uh 

1289
00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:12,000
and uh as recently as late last 

1290
00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:15,650
november uh certified the safety 

1291
00:50:15,650 --> 00:50:17,539
security and effectiveness of our 

1292
00:50:17,539 --> 00:50:19,594
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile . 

1293
00:50:19,760 --> 00:50:21,982
That stockpile stewardship program that 

1294
00:50:21,982 --> 00:50:24,770
you talked about is a key element of uh 

1295
00:50:24,780 --> 00:50:27,058
the ability to make that certification . 

1296
00:50:27,058 --> 00:50:28,947
Which fundamentally this is about 

1297
00:50:28,947 --> 00:50:31,002
confidence in the stockpile . That's 

1298
00:50:31,002 --> 00:50:33,113
fundamentally what it comes down to . 

1299
00:50:33,113 --> 00:50:35,169
But that's not the only element that 

1300
00:50:35,169 --> 00:50:37,280
goes into this right . Uh In order to 

1301
00:50:37,280 --> 00:50:39,391
have that confidence in addition to a 

1302
00:50:39,391 --> 00:50:41,391
stockpile stewardship program , you 

1303
00:50:41,391 --> 00:50:43,558
have to have a flexible and responsive 

1304
00:50:43,558 --> 00:50:45,780
stockpile itself , which requires us to 

1305
00:50:45,780 --> 00:50:48,002
modernize those weapons and you have to 

1306
00:50:48,002 --> 00:50:49,669
have a resilient and adaptive 

1307
00:50:49,670 --> 00:50:52,240
infrastructure , all of which require 

1308
00:50:52,250 --> 00:50:55,230
adequate funding to N . N . S . A . Um , 

1309
00:50:55,240 --> 00:50:57,620
of course were statutorily obligated as 

1310
00:50:57,620 --> 00:50:59,731
a part of the Nuclear Weapons Council 

1311
00:50:59,731 --> 00:51:01,898
to do an assessment on the budget as a 

1312
00:51:01,898 --> 00:51:04,231
whole as well as some individual pieces . 

1313
00:51:04,231 --> 00:51:06,509
Um , that process is ongoing . In fact , 

1314
00:51:06,509 --> 00:51:08,231
we're very close to our annual 

1315
00:51:08,231 --> 00:51:10,176
certification . I'd offer that the 

1316
00:51:10,176 --> 00:51:12,231
relationship between N . N . S . A . 

1317
00:51:12,231 --> 00:51:14,398
And D . O . D . Or D . O . E . And D . 

1318
00:51:14,398 --> 00:51:17,350
O . D . R . At large uh is never been 

1319
00:51:17,350 --> 00:51:20,070
better or at a high watermark with 

1320
00:51:20,070 --> 00:51:22,292
regard to that , intend to keep it that 

1321
00:51:22,292 --> 00:51:24,514
way and then you'll see a formal answer 

1322
00:51:24,514 --> 00:51:26,681
from the department as to the Adequacy 

1323
00:51:26,681 --> 00:51:28,348
of Vanessa's budget shortly . 

1324
00:51:32,160 --> 00:51:34,370
Thank you if I could die . Admiral . 

1325
00:51:34,370 --> 00:51:37,020
Thank you for the response . Um uh 

1326
00:51:37,030 --> 00:51:38,974
regarding the People's Republic of 

1327
00:51:38,974 --> 00:51:40,808
China during last year's posture 

1328
00:51:40,808 --> 00:51:42,586
hearing , you stated that it is 

1329
00:51:42,586 --> 00:51:44,808
important to look at what they do , not 

1330
00:51:44,808 --> 00:51:46,919
what they say and where they're going 

1331
00:51:46,919 --> 00:51:48,863
and not where they are . Um That's 

1332
00:51:48,863 --> 00:51:50,752
almost prophetic considering last 

1333
00:51:50,752 --> 00:51:52,974
august , the PRC successfully conducted 

1334
00:51:52,974 --> 00:51:55,230
a nuclear capable hypersonic missile 

1335
00:51:55,230 --> 00:51:57,341
test that traveled around the world . 

1336
00:51:57,341 --> 00:51:59,397
And the PRC simply dismissed it as a 

1337
00:51:59,397 --> 00:52:02,100
routine uh spacecraft experiment . As I 

1338
00:52:02,100 --> 00:52:04,370
as I remember this demonstrated 

1339
00:52:04,370 --> 00:52:06,259
intercontinental intercontinental 

1340
00:52:06,259 --> 00:52:08,203
capability . It's obviously deeply 

1341
00:52:08,203 --> 00:52:10,037
concerning to all of us . Do you 

1342
00:52:10,037 --> 00:52:11,870
believe that the U . S . Current 

1343
00:52:11,870 --> 00:52:13,814
investments in the ongoing nuclear 

1344
00:52:13,814 --> 00:52:15,814
modernization programs will provide 

1345
00:52:15,814 --> 00:52:17,926
sufficient capabilities for the US to 

1346
00:52:17,926 --> 00:52:20,037
remain a credible strategic deterrent 

1347
00:52:20,037 --> 00:52:21,981
to our enemies and to our allies , 

1348
00:52:22,850 --> 00:52:24,961
congressman ? Of course , I'm waiting 

1349
00:52:24,961 --> 00:52:27,128
to see what the budget looks like just 

1350
00:52:27,128 --> 00:52:29,239
like everybody else's . I'm confident 

1351
00:52:29,239 --> 00:52:31,461
that it will in the main but there's an 

1352
00:52:31,461 --> 00:52:33,628
important point here that you bring up 

1353
00:52:33,628 --> 00:52:36,030
about china uh and it applies to others 

1354
00:52:36,030 --> 00:52:38,770
as well , which is we don't know the 

1355
00:52:38,780 --> 00:52:41,510
endpoint of where china is going in 

1356
00:52:41,510 --> 00:52:43,232
terms of the capabilities it's 

1357
00:52:43,232 --> 00:52:45,880
developing and the capacities that it's 

1358
00:52:45,880 --> 00:52:47,658
developing . And while I'm very 

1359
00:52:47,658 --> 00:52:49,713
confident we're gonna wind up with a 

1360
00:52:49,713 --> 00:52:51,830
very good strategy . I think it will 

1361
00:52:51,830 --> 00:52:53,997
need to be a question that we continue 

1362
00:52:53,997 --> 00:52:56,620
to ask ourselves as we see where china 

1363
00:52:56,620 --> 00:52:59,540
goes as we see where others go ? What 

1364
00:52:59,540 --> 00:53:01,762
are the overall capability and capacity 

1365
00:53:01,762 --> 00:53:03,940
that the United States requires in 

1366
00:53:03,940 --> 00:53:07,190
order to execute that strategy against 

1367
00:53:07,190 --> 00:53:09,190
a changing threat . And we're gonna 

1368
00:53:09,190 --> 00:53:11,190
have to ask that question much more 

1369
00:53:11,190 --> 00:53:13,190
frequently than we have in the past 

1370
00:53:13,190 --> 00:53:16,890
over . Right thank you Admiral . Mr 

1371
00:53:16,890 --> 00:53:19,320
Chairman I yield back my time . Thank 

1372
00:53:19,320 --> 00:53:20,931
you . Mr Morelli . MS Cheney 

1373
00:53:27,850 --> 00:53:30,440
MS Cheney , are you still with us ? Um 

1374
00:53:30,690 --> 00:53:33,070
if not , who's next on the list ? She's 

1375
00:53:33,070 --> 00:53:35,770
coming . Okay . Okay . MS Cheney 

1376
00:53:36,750 --> 00:53:38,750
thanks . Sorry . Mr Chairman I will 

1377
00:53:38,750 --> 00:53:40,972
reserve my questions for the classified 

1378
00:53:40,972 --> 00:53:42,972
session . Thank you . Thank you . I 

1379
00:53:42,972 --> 00:53:44,917
appreciate your consideration . Mr 

1380
00:53:44,917 --> 00:53:44,170
Langevin . 

1381
00:53:52,750 --> 00:53:54,972
Mhm . Thank you . Mr Chairman , can you 

1382
00:53:54,972 --> 00:53:55,972
hear me ? Okay . 

1383
00:53:58,750 --> 00:54:00,528
Very good . I want to thank our 

1384
00:54:00,528 --> 00:54:02,639
witnesses for their testimony today . 

1385
00:54:02,639 --> 00:54:06,270
Um If I could mistake , I'll start with 

1386
00:54:06,270 --> 00:54:10,090
you . Can you update us on the status 

1387
00:54:10,100 --> 00:54:11,989
of the testing infrastructure for 

1388
00:54:12,000 --> 00:54:13,778
hypersonic programs of record ? 

1389
00:54:15,940 --> 00:54:17,990
Yes congressman , thank you for the 

1390
00:54:17,990 --> 00:54:21,750
question , I can assure you and ensure 

1391
00:54:21,750 --> 00:54:23,528
the committee that we have made 

1392
00:54:23,528 --> 00:54:25,528
substantial investments in the test 

1393
00:54:25,528 --> 00:54:28,830
infrastructure . Both uh air and ground 

1394
00:54:28,830 --> 00:54:31,200
in order to accommodate hypersonic 

1395
00:54:31,200 --> 00:54:33,410
testing and other advanced technology 

1396
00:54:33,410 --> 00:54:35,354
testing that we anticipate will be 

1397
00:54:35,354 --> 00:54:37,577
coming down the road . Happy to get you 

1398
00:54:37,577 --> 00:54:39,410
more detail on that if that's of 

1399
00:54:39,410 --> 00:54:42,430
interest it is of interest ? I'm 

1400
00:54:42,430 --> 00:54:45,670
particularly interested in the uh in 

1401
00:54:45,670 --> 00:54:48,540
the wind tunnel , is that part of the 

1402
00:54:48,550 --> 00:54:50,661
infrastructure upgrade you're talking 

1403
00:54:50,661 --> 00:54:53,390
about or is that outside of your your 

1404
00:54:53,390 --> 00:54:57,230
purview uh Congressman ? I just to 

1405
00:54:57,230 --> 00:54:59,230
make sure I get my facts straight . 

1406
00:54:59,230 --> 00:55:01,341
Take that for the record and happy to 

1407
00:55:01,341 --> 00:55:03,508
get back to you with with a little bit 

1408
00:55:03,508 --> 00:55:05,452
more detail . Okay thank you . Are 

1409
00:55:05,452 --> 00:55:07,286
there any additional investments 

1410
00:55:07,286 --> 00:55:09,452
required beyond those mentioned in the 

1411
00:55:09,452 --> 00:55:11,940
science and technology or testing and 

1412
00:55:11,940 --> 00:55:14,080
infrastructure milk on unfunded 

1413
00:55:14,080 --> 00:55:17,580
requirements submissions , congressman . 

1414
00:55:17,580 --> 00:55:19,747
This is something that we've looked at 

1415
00:55:19,747 --> 00:55:21,550
over the course of of of of the 

1416
00:55:21,550 --> 00:55:24,010
National Defense Strategy and NPR uh 

1417
00:55:24,020 --> 00:55:26,650
MDR process uh and we are working 

1418
00:55:26,650 --> 00:55:28,539
closely with our colleagues other 

1419
00:55:28,539 --> 00:55:30,539
components of OsD to make sure that 

1420
00:55:30,539 --> 00:55:32,872
what is included in the budget requests . 

1421
00:55:32,872 --> 00:55:35,094
The forthcoming budget request reflects 

1422
00:55:35,094 --> 00:55:37,317
that need good . Well you're gonna have 

1423
00:55:37,317 --> 00:55:39,539
substantial support from the hill uh to 

1424
00:55:39,539 --> 00:55:41,706
upgrade the infrastructure . Given the 

1425
00:55:41,706 --> 00:55:43,761
fact that we are behind right now on 

1426
00:55:43,761 --> 00:55:45,872
developing hypersonic weapons . So um 

1427
00:55:45,872 --> 00:55:47,761
and with Richard I'll turn to you 

1428
00:55:47,761 --> 00:55:49,539
electromagnetic electromagnetic 

1429
00:55:49,539 --> 00:55:51,539
spectrum operations underpin nearly 

1430
00:55:51,539 --> 00:55:53,372
every aspect of U . S . Military 

1431
00:55:53,372 --> 00:55:55,539
operations from command and control to 

1432
00:55:55,539 --> 00:55:57,428
electronic warfare to sensing and 

1433
00:55:57,428 --> 00:55:59,650
seeing surely our adversaries however , 

1434
00:55:59,650 --> 00:56:01,817
recognize the US military's historical 

1435
00:56:01,817 --> 00:56:03,928
advantage and seek to deny the use of 

1436
00:56:03,928 --> 00:56:06,094
the electromagnetic spectrum Russia in 

1437
00:56:06,094 --> 00:56:09,400
particular has invested heavily in this 

1438
00:56:09,400 --> 00:56:11,950
area as we've seen leading up to the 

1439
00:56:11,950 --> 00:56:14,630
recent conflict in Ukraine . The 

1440
00:56:14,630 --> 00:56:16,970
Department of Defense obviously as 

1441
00:56:16,980 --> 00:56:19,202
absolutely must be structured to ensure 

1442
00:56:19,202 --> 00:56:21,750
dominance in this area . Uh In fact the 

1443
00:56:21,750 --> 00:56:24,240
2021 . Nd a requires that strap com 

1444
00:56:24,240 --> 00:56:26,500
transfer its responsibilities for 

1445
00:56:26,510 --> 00:56:28,677
electromagnetic spectrum operations to 

1446
00:56:28,677 --> 00:56:30,899
another entity within the Department of 

1447
00:56:30,899 --> 00:56:32,899
Defense . Can you please provide an 

1448
00:56:32,899 --> 00:56:35,010
update on the status of these efforts 

1449
00:56:35,010 --> 00:56:37,232
and your and and share your thoughts on 

1450
00:56:37,232 --> 00:56:39,399
where the department uh , where in the 

1451
00:56:39,399 --> 00:56:41,399
department these critical functions 

1452
00:56:41,399 --> 00:56:43,288
should rest Congressman one . I'm 

1453
00:56:43,288 --> 00:56:45,399
pleased to see that my department has 

1454
00:56:45,399 --> 00:56:47,621
finally understood the importance of us 

1455
00:56:47,621 --> 00:56:49,010
being able to operate an 

1456
00:56:49,010 --> 00:56:51,232
electromagnetic spectrum and I was very 

1457
00:56:51,232 --> 00:56:53,399
pleased to see the department released 

1458
00:56:53,399 --> 00:56:52,860
the electromagnetic spectrum 

1459
00:56:52,860 --> 00:56:55,690
superiority plan , which has a detailed 

1460
00:56:55,690 --> 00:56:57,412
implementation plan that we're 

1461
00:56:57,412 --> 00:56:59,023
executing . One of my direct 

1462
00:56:59,023 --> 00:57:00,968
responsibilities inside that is to 

1463
00:57:00,968 --> 00:57:03,380
stand up a two star directly reporting 

1464
00:57:03,380 --> 00:57:05,980
to me organization designed to be the 

1465
00:57:05,980 --> 00:57:09,230
operational proponent . And so before 

1466
00:57:09,240 --> 00:57:11,407
uh , those responsibilities stratagems 

1467
00:57:11,407 --> 00:57:13,573
responsibilities , transfer , transfer 

1468
00:57:13,573 --> 00:57:15,750
anywhere . Which is still an open 

1469
00:57:15,750 --> 00:57:17,250
question . I think it's my 

1470
00:57:17,250 --> 00:57:19,361
responsibility to get the operational 

1471
00:57:19,361 --> 00:57:22,610
house in order to basically fix it and 

1472
00:57:22,610 --> 00:57:24,610
then have it in a position where we 

1473
00:57:24,610 --> 00:57:26,499
might consider transferring it to 

1474
00:57:26,499 --> 00:57:28,832
another combatant command fundamentally . 

1475
00:57:28,832 --> 00:57:30,888
My job here is to be the operational 

1476
00:57:30,888 --> 00:57:32,943
proponent to make sure the standards 

1477
00:57:32,943 --> 00:57:34,388
are correct and make sure 

1478
00:57:34,388 --> 00:57:36,499
certifications are correct . And then 

1479
00:57:36,499 --> 00:57:38,388
to make sure that the operational 

1480
00:57:38,388 --> 00:57:40,221
implications of the programmatic 

1481
00:57:40,221 --> 00:57:42,388
decisions we make are considered going 

1482
00:57:42,388 --> 00:57:44,499
to fix it first and then we'll figure 

1483
00:57:44,499 --> 00:57:46,666
out if anybody else needs to have it . 

1484
00:57:46,666 --> 00:57:48,666
Thank you . Thank you . And we look 

1485
00:57:48,666 --> 00:57:50,554
forward to the outcome of the you 

1486
00:57:50,554 --> 00:57:52,721
fixing it and see where that lands and 

1487
00:57:52,721 --> 00:57:54,721
then where we'll go from there . So 

1488
00:57:54,721 --> 00:57:56,777
I'll be following that closely . But 

1489
00:57:56,777 --> 00:57:58,943
thank you for your answer . Uh General 

1490
00:57:58,943 --> 00:58:01,054
Dickinson . I've long said that we'll 

1491
00:58:01,054 --> 00:58:03,054
never fight another war without the 

1492
00:58:03,054 --> 00:58:05,221
involvement of cyber . And the same is 

1493
00:58:05,221 --> 00:58:07,277
true for space . Can you discuss the 

1494
00:58:07,277 --> 00:58:08,943
cyber resilience of our space 

1495
00:58:08,943 --> 00:58:12,430
architecture ? Thank you congressman 

1496
00:58:12,430 --> 00:58:15,290
for that question . So the cyber 

1497
00:58:15,290 --> 00:58:17,512
resiliency , what's what's unique about 

1498
00:58:17,512 --> 00:58:19,679
us ? Space command is as we formed and 

1499
00:58:19,679 --> 00:58:22,890
organized ourselves . We started out by 

1500
00:58:22,890 --> 00:58:25,057
embedding cybersecurity right from the 

1501
00:58:25,057 --> 00:58:27,112
very beginning . So when I looked at 

1502
00:58:27,112 --> 00:58:28,779
the command right now we just 

1503
00:58:28,779 --> 00:58:32,050
established RJ CC or our joint cyber 

1504
00:58:32,060 --> 00:58:34,620
joint cyber center within the command 

1505
00:58:34,620 --> 00:58:37,250
that is responsible for looking at the 

1506
00:58:37,260 --> 00:58:39,482
systems within the architecture that we 

1507
00:58:39,482 --> 00:58:41,593
need to defend . So that was starting 

1508
00:58:41,593 --> 00:58:43,760
point number one . The second piece is 

1509
00:58:43,760 --> 00:58:45,760
our relationship with U . S . Cyber 

1510
00:58:45,760 --> 00:58:47,982
command . General Nakasone Tony and his 

1511
00:58:47,982 --> 00:58:50,204
team which has embedded a small element 

1512
00:58:50,204 --> 00:58:52,149
within us . Space command and vice 

1513
00:58:52,149 --> 00:58:53,816
versa . I've I've inserted or 

1514
00:58:53,816 --> 00:58:56,150
established a cadre within his command 

1515
00:58:56,150 --> 00:58:58,470
as well . And when we look at the 

1516
00:58:58,480 --> 00:59:01,220
service component , See across us Space 

1517
00:59:01,220 --> 00:59:03,350
Command two of my five service 

1518
00:59:03,350 --> 00:59:05,294
components are dual hatted as both 

1519
00:59:05,294 --> 00:59:07,990
space as well as cyber . So given all 

1520
00:59:07,990 --> 00:59:09,934
of that synergy , if you will with 

1521
00:59:09,934 --> 00:59:11,934
cyber we are taking a we've taken a 

1522
00:59:11,934 --> 00:59:13,823
very deliberate look at how do we 

1523
00:59:13,823 --> 00:59:16,157
protect our space our architecture from , 

1524
00:59:16,157 --> 00:59:18,400
from cyber activity . So I'm confident 

1525
00:59:18,400 --> 00:59:20,289
right now that we're making great 

1526
00:59:20,289 --> 00:59:22,622
strides in that regards and that we are . 

1527
00:59:22,622 --> 00:59:24,511
In fact , as I believe as Admiral 

1528
00:59:24,511 --> 00:59:26,678
Richard said at our highest posture at 

1529
00:59:26,678 --> 00:59:28,678
this point , I'm encouraged by that 

1530
00:59:28,678 --> 00:59:30,678
answer . Thank you . General and my 

1531
00:59:30,678 --> 00:59:32,567
time is expired on your back . Mr 

1532
00:59:32,567 --> 00:59:34,400
Chairman . Yeah , thank you . Mr 

1533
00:59:34,400 --> 00:59:36,456
Langevin . Mr waltz . Thank you . Mr 

1534
00:59:36,456 --> 00:59:40,300
Chairman . Jim Dickinson . Good , Good 

1535
00:59:40,300 --> 00:59:42,078
to see you , miss baker . Quick 

1536
00:59:42,078 --> 00:59:43,967
question for you on Space Guard . 

1537
00:59:45,920 --> 00:59:47,531
I don't think there's a full 

1538
00:59:47,531 --> 00:59:49,753
appreciation for how valuable the Guard 

1539
00:59:49,753 --> 00:59:51,698
is to the current mission . Just a 

1540
00:59:51,698 --> 00:59:53,753
couple of Quick data points . Alaska 

1541
00:59:53,753 --> 00:59:57,100
provides 80% of the 24 7 Combat mission 

1542
00:59:57,110 --> 00:59:58,888
ready space Warfighters for the 

1543
00:59:58,888 --> 01:00:01,720
upgraded early warning radar , new york 

1544
01:00:01,720 --> 01:00:03,998
provides a surge capacity to the N . R . 

1545
01:00:03,998 --> 01:00:06,250
O . S . Op center Ohio Direct Support . 

1546
01:00:06,250 --> 01:00:08,630
The combined Space op center florida . 

1547
01:00:10,110 --> 01:00:12,790
The state that I'm proud to uh to come 

1548
01:00:12,790 --> 01:00:15,190
from , they provide a rapid mobility 

1549
01:00:15,200 --> 01:00:17,470
surge to war space electronic warfare 

1550
01:00:17,470 --> 01:00:20,650
capability . My understanding is that 

1551
01:00:20,650 --> 01:00:23,810
the White House uh would like to move 

1552
01:00:23,820 --> 01:00:26,790
all of these missions into U . S . 

1553
01:00:26,790 --> 01:00:30,290
Space force by 2025 . Um , 

1554
01:00:30,300 --> 01:00:32,300
I think you would , would you agree 

1555
01:00:32,300 --> 01:00:34,522
General Dickinson that the Guard brings 

1556
01:00:34,522 --> 01:00:37,260
a significant private sector capability 

1557
01:00:37,260 --> 01:00:40,360
is kind of a bridging function . Uh and 

1558
01:00:40,370 --> 01:00:42,890
and obviously there are more cost 

1559
01:00:42,890 --> 01:00:44,834
effective or at least they're less 

1560
01:00:44,834 --> 01:00:46,668
expensive than their active duty 

1561
01:00:46,668 --> 01:00:48,834
counterparts . Would do you agree with 

1562
01:00:48,834 --> 01:00:51,001
both of those assertions Congressman . 

1563
01:00:51,001 --> 01:00:53,057
Thank you for that question . I am a 

1564
01:00:53,057 --> 01:00:55,450
big proponent and fan of the reserve 

1565
01:00:55,450 --> 01:00:57,550
component in general . Both the 

1566
01:00:57,550 --> 01:00:59,717
National Guard and the Reserves . What 

1567
01:00:59,717 --> 01:01:01,883
you just stated in terms of the talent 

1568
01:01:01,883 --> 01:01:04,050
and the expertise that they bring from 

1569
01:01:04,050 --> 01:01:06,161
the civilian sector is powerful . And 

1570
01:01:06,161 --> 01:01:08,272
as U . S . Space Command stood up two 

1571
01:01:08,272 --> 01:01:11,250
years ago , We actually had over 140 

1572
01:01:11,410 --> 01:01:13,840
Reserve Component Guard and Reserves 

1573
01:01:13,850 --> 01:01:15,850
show up at the front door and say I 

1574
01:01:15,850 --> 01:01:17,961
want to be part of US Space Command . 

1575
01:01:17,961 --> 01:01:20,128
It has been that reserve component C . 

1576
01:01:20,128 --> 01:01:21,850
That was in the command at the 

1577
01:01:21,850 --> 01:01:24,072
beginning and exists today . That gives 

1578
01:01:24,072 --> 01:01:26,183
us that combat capability that allows 

1579
01:01:26,183 --> 01:01:28,350
us to get quick . That's great . And I 

1580
01:01:28,350 --> 01:01:30,461
know in the in the case of florida in 

1581
01:01:30,461 --> 01:01:32,517
particular coming from the big space 

1582
01:01:32,517 --> 01:01:34,517
companies putting on that uniform , 

1583
01:01:34,517 --> 01:01:36,628
serving and then going back and forth 

1584
01:01:36,628 --> 01:01:38,628
to the private sector has certainly 

1585
01:01:38,628 --> 01:01:40,517
been valuable . Would you support 

1586
01:01:40,517 --> 01:01:42,683
absorbing those missions in the Active 

1587
01:01:42,683 --> 01:01:44,906
Duty Space Guard and and and requesting 

1588
01:01:44,906 --> 01:01:47,072
the funding for that force structure ? 

1589
01:01:47,090 --> 01:01:49,201
As I said , congressman , I think the 

1590
01:01:49,201 --> 01:01:51,257
Guard brings in the Reserves bring a 

1591
01:01:51,257 --> 01:01:53,368
lot of capability to us . And just in 

1592
01:01:53,368 --> 01:01:55,534
the interest of Time General , sorry , 

1593
01:01:55,534 --> 01:01:57,590
MS baker any any comments there . Uh 

1594
01:01:57,590 --> 01:01:59,710
Congressman , I think the question of 

1595
01:01:59,710 --> 01:02:01,877
the of the Space Guard is a little bit 

1596
01:02:01,877 --> 01:02:03,821
out of my policy job jar . So I'll 

1597
01:02:03,821 --> 01:02:06,043
defer to general worries . I think it's 

1598
01:02:06,043 --> 01:02:08,210
worth noting that the Guard Bureau was 

1599
01:02:08,210 --> 01:02:10,432
aligned the Space Guard uh Forces under 

1600
01:02:10,432 --> 01:02:12,210
a National Guard Bureau . Space 

1601
01:02:12,210 --> 01:02:14,950
Directorate for a relatively in the big 

1602
01:02:14,950 --> 01:02:17,061
picture of things . De Minimus cost . 

1603
01:02:17,300 --> 01:02:19,250
Uh and and my understanding that 

1604
01:02:19,250 --> 01:02:21,306
director can be converted into Space 

1605
01:02:21,306 --> 01:02:23,472
National Guard , we established in the 

1606
01:02:23,472 --> 01:02:25,990
house version of the Fy 22 . Nd a look 

1607
01:02:25,990 --> 01:02:27,934
forward to getting that across the 

1608
01:02:27,934 --> 01:02:31,070
finish line . Uh that this Congress um 

1609
01:02:31,080 --> 01:02:34,640
I'm tactically a responsive launch . Uh 

1610
01:02:34,650 --> 01:02:36,650
General Congress has supported this 

1611
01:02:36,650 --> 01:02:38,950
effort . Uh there was a successful 

1612
01:02:38,950 --> 01:02:41,850
demonstration . Uh , the ability to 

1613
01:02:41,850 --> 01:02:44,390
rapidly reconstitute degraded systems 

1614
01:02:44,390 --> 01:02:46,334
from are relatively limited launch 

1615
01:02:46,334 --> 01:02:48,112
sites . I think you'd agree was 

1616
01:02:48,112 --> 01:02:50,890
important and in fact some have said 

1617
01:02:50,890 --> 01:02:52,668
it's key to deterring near peer 

1618
01:02:52,668 --> 01:02:55,560
competitors . But despite this , 

1619
01:02:55,570 --> 01:02:58,060
neither the requirements nor funding 

1620
01:02:58,060 --> 01:03:00,760
for this important responsive space 

1621
01:03:00,760 --> 01:03:02,927
launch Missionary have been identified 

1622
01:03:02,927 --> 01:03:05,204
by the Space command or the department . 

1623
01:03:05,204 --> 01:03:07,371
Do you expect that to happen in in the 

1624
01:03:07,371 --> 01:03:10,930
near future congressman ? That 

1625
01:03:11,400 --> 01:03:13,511
that that is part of the requirements 

1626
01:03:13,511 --> 01:03:15,678
and the concepts that we're looking at 

1627
01:03:15,678 --> 01:03:17,900
it at US Space Command . Now , in terms 

1628
01:03:17,900 --> 01:03:17,800
of how to build that resilient 

1629
01:03:17,810 --> 01:03:21,280
architecture in space . Do you see this 

1630
01:03:21,280 --> 01:03:23,558
this tactically responsive launch as a , 

1631
01:03:23,558 --> 01:03:25,669
as a key component . Do you expect uh 

1632
01:03:25,669 --> 01:03:27,891
request funding towards it ? I see that 

1633
01:03:27,891 --> 01:03:29,613
as a capability , a one of the 

1634
01:03:29,613 --> 01:03:31,613
capabilities that we should have in 

1635
01:03:31,613 --> 01:03:33,836
order to do that rapid replenishment of 

1636
01:03:33,836 --> 01:03:36,400
capabilities on order in addition to uh 

1637
01:03:36,410 --> 01:03:38,160
constellations that have many 

1638
01:03:38,160 --> 01:03:40,520
satellites and it that constitute the 

1639
01:03:40,600 --> 01:03:43,270
make a constellation if you couldn't 

1640
01:03:43,270 --> 01:03:45,159
agree more and I think as we move 

1641
01:03:45,159 --> 01:03:47,270
towards a resilient architecture ? We 

1642
01:03:47,270 --> 01:03:49,437
have to be prepared if we start losing 

1643
01:03:49,437 --> 01:03:51,492
assets , how are we going to rapidly 

1644
01:03:51,492 --> 01:03:54,170
replace them just in that limited um 

1645
01:03:54,180 --> 01:03:56,347
time remaining in the public session ? 

1646
01:03:58,500 --> 01:04:00,444
Oh I think we lost the admiral . I 

1647
01:04:00,444 --> 01:04:03,380
didn't I wasn't expecting that and I 

1648
01:04:03,380 --> 01:04:05,491
think I will reserve my time then for 

1649
01:04:05,491 --> 01:04:07,820
the thank you . Mr walls . Mr Panetta , 

1650
01:04:09,490 --> 01:04:11,712
thank you Mr Chairman , just briefly so 

1651
01:04:11,712 --> 01:04:13,990
we can get onto the classified session . 

1652
01:04:13,990 --> 01:04:16,460
Um I'm aware that the joint all domain 

1653
01:04:16,460 --> 01:04:19,920
command and control J . D . C to uh is 

1654
01:04:19,920 --> 01:04:21,864
key to integrating missile defense 

1655
01:04:21,864 --> 01:04:24,220
systems as is harmonizing our efforts 

1656
01:04:24,220 --> 01:04:26,530
with allies and partners . But I'm also 

1657
01:04:26,530 --> 01:04:28,800
aware of how challenging uh missile 

1658
01:04:28,800 --> 01:04:30,856
defense roles can be , especially if 

1659
01:04:30,856 --> 01:04:32,856
they're broken up under the Unified 

1660
01:04:32,856 --> 01:04:35,490
Command plan . Um That being said , I 

1661
01:04:35,490 --> 01:04:37,730
was just wondering , General Dickinson 

1662
01:04:37,740 --> 01:04:40,600
or General Van Herk , can you just kind 

1663
01:04:40,600 --> 01:04:43,450
of give a description of how we're 

1664
01:04:43,450 --> 01:04:45,394
trying to improve interoperability 

1665
01:04:45,394 --> 01:04:47,630
among the combatant commands as well as 

1666
01:04:47,630 --> 01:04:49,680
our allies in their communication 

1667
01:04:49,680 --> 01:04:51,513
networks in order to bolster our 

1668
01:04:51,513 --> 01:04:55,410
missile defense systems congressman , 

1669
01:04:55,410 --> 01:04:57,521
I'll take that question . General Van 

1670
01:04:57,521 --> 01:05:00,150
Herk there's multiple efforts ongoing 

1671
01:05:00,160 --> 01:05:02,780
to improve collaboration and 

1672
01:05:02,780 --> 01:05:04,836
coordination and I'll talk about one 

1673
01:05:04,836 --> 01:05:07,058
that I'm currently doing that . We just 

1674
01:05:07,058 --> 01:05:09,224
finished and we're gonna start again . 

1675
01:05:09,224 --> 01:05:11,447
Information hold on . Mr Chairman , can 

1676
01:05:11,447 --> 01:05:14,360
you tell Mr Davis Arleta mute himself . 

1677
01:05:14,370 --> 01:05:16,460
Mr Day charlie , can you mute your 

1678
01:05:16,460 --> 01:05:20,220
microphone please ? Thank you . 

1679
01:05:20,790 --> 01:05:22,901
Please continue . General thank you . 

1680
01:05:22,901 --> 01:05:25,123
So the one that we're working on at our 

1681
01:05:25,123 --> 01:05:27,012
headquarters that involves all 11 

1682
01:05:27,012 --> 01:05:29,012
combatant commands is called global 

1683
01:05:29,012 --> 01:05:31,068
information dominance experiment And 

1684
01:05:31,068 --> 01:05:33,234
it's about taking data and information 

1685
01:05:33,234 --> 01:05:35,290
from all domains from global sensors 

1686
01:05:35,290 --> 01:05:35,150
around the world to include allies and 

1687
01:05:35,150 --> 01:05:37,372
partners to include the missile defense 

1688
01:05:37,372 --> 01:05:39,372
capabilities that you mentioned and 

1689
01:05:39,372 --> 01:05:41,206
sharing them through a cloud and 

1690
01:05:41,206 --> 01:05:42,928
utilizing machine learning and 

1691
01:05:42,928 --> 01:05:45,039
artificial intelligence to process it 

1692
01:05:45,039 --> 01:05:47,261
in a real time . And that gives you the 

1693
01:05:47,261 --> 01:05:49,206
ability to collaborate amongst the 

1694
01:05:49,206 --> 01:05:50,817
various functions to include 

1695
01:05:50,817 --> 01:05:53,039
intelligence operations and logistics . 

1696
01:05:53,039 --> 01:05:54,928
To be able to develop a picture , 

1697
01:05:54,928 --> 01:05:56,983
develop options and evaluate whether 

1698
01:05:56,983 --> 01:05:58,872
those options are realistic . The 

1699
01:05:58,872 --> 01:06:00,483
Deputy secretary has done an 

1700
01:06:00,483 --> 01:06:02,650
outstanding job by providing forces at 

1701
01:06:02,650 --> 01:06:04,761
each combatant command and funding to 

1702
01:06:04,761 --> 01:06:06,928
additionally work on integrating these 

1703
01:06:06,928 --> 01:06:08,817
capabilities across the Combatant 

1704
01:06:08,817 --> 01:06:10,928
commands , her ada uh effort . And so 

1705
01:06:10,928 --> 01:06:13,150
we're we're proudly partnering with the 

1706
01:06:13,150 --> 01:06:15,317
department and all the commands to get 

1707
01:06:15,317 --> 01:06:15,300
after what you're talking about . 

1708
01:06:16,380 --> 01:06:18,380
Outstanding General Dickinson , you 

1709
01:06:18,380 --> 01:06:20,436
have anything to add to that ? Thank 

1710
01:06:20,436 --> 01:06:22,658
you congressman . I would just add that 

1711
01:06:22,658 --> 01:06:24,824
uh Glenn has done a great job in terms 

1712
01:06:24,824 --> 01:06:26,713
of inclusiveness on some of these 

1713
01:06:26,713 --> 01:06:28,824
experiments that we have done that he 

1714
01:06:28,824 --> 01:06:30,713
just outlined and it's equally as 

1715
01:06:30,713 --> 01:06:32,713
important that were incorporated or 

1716
01:06:32,713 --> 01:06:34,880
integrated into those efforts in terms 

1717
01:06:34,880 --> 01:06:36,880
of missile warning as well as space 

1718
01:06:36,880 --> 01:06:36,870
domain awareness . So as we move 

1719
01:06:36,870 --> 01:06:39,220
forward , one of the priorities for us , 

1720
01:06:39,220 --> 01:06:41,331
Space command is to make sure that we 

1721
01:06:41,331 --> 01:06:43,710
have digital superiority and part of 

1722
01:06:43,710 --> 01:06:45,890
that is being able to integrate uh 

1723
01:06:45,900 --> 01:06:48,780
those very complex missionaries so that 

1724
01:06:48,780 --> 01:06:50,910
we have one common operating picture 

1725
01:06:50,920 --> 01:06:52,920
that we can all look at in order to 

1726
01:06:52,920 --> 01:06:55,300
make decisions and recommendations to 

1727
01:06:55,310 --> 01:06:58,720
the national level leadership . Great 

1728
01:06:58,730 --> 01:07:00,786
gentlemen , uh and ma'am , thank you 

1729
01:07:00,786 --> 01:07:02,786
very much for your service and your 

1730
01:07:02,786 --> 01:07:05,119
time today . I yield back . Mr Chairman . 

1731
01:07:05,119 --> 01:07:07,008
Thank you . Mr Panetta . Mr horse 

1732
01:07:07,008 --> 01:07:09,490
furred . Thank you . Mr Chairman uh 

1733
01:07:09,500 --> 01:07:11,556
General Dickinson . It's good to see 

1734
01:07:11,556 --> 01:07:13,556
you . I appreciated the opportunity 

1735
01:07:13,556 --> 01:07:15,722
yesterday to discuss the importance of 

1736
01:07:15,722 --> 01:07:17,670
tactically responsive space launch 

1737
01:07:17,670 --> 01:07:19,610
capability with you and as the 

1738
01:07:19,610 --> 01:07:22,010
combatant commander responsible for the 

1739
01:07:22,010 --> 01:07:24,750
space domain , your perspective is 

1740
01:07:24,750 --> 01:07:27,790
invaluable as the joint force works to 

1741
01:07:27,790 --> 01:07:30,370
filled this capability . I'm glad to be 

1742
01:07:30,370 --> 01:07:32,800
working with Congressman WALZ . And I 

1743
01:07:32,800 --> 01:07:35,420
know we led a letter requesting the 

1744
01:07:35,430 --> 01:07:37,486
funding . So look forward to working 

1745
01:07:37,486 --> 01:07:39,590
with you on that . I wanted to talk 

1746
01:07:39,590 --> 01:07:42,650
about the nuclear posture review and 

1747
01:07:42,650 --> 01:07:46,200
test readiness though from 1951 to 

1748
01:07:46,200 --> 01:07:49,810
1990 to nearly 928 

1749
01:07:49,820 --> 01:07:53,520
explosive uh nuclear tests were 

1750
01:07:53,520 --> 01:07:55,800
conducted at the Nevada national 

1751
01:07:56,280 --> 01:07:58,336
security site which is located in my 

1752
01:07:58,336 --> 01:08:00,830
congressional district . Since the test 

1753
01:08:00,830 --> 01:08:04,310
moratorium went into effect in 1992 . 

1754
01:08:04,970 --> 01:08:07,760
has continued to play a vital role in 

1755
01:08:07,760 --> 01:08:10,260
maintaining the safety and reliability 

1756
01:08:10,270 --> 01:08:12,990
of the nuclear deterrent through NN 

1757
01:08:12,990 --> 01:08:16,000
essays stockpile stewardship programs 

1758
01:08:16,370 --> 01:08:20,240
today . Scientists at NN SS used used 

1759
01:08:20,250 --> 01:08:22,460
advanced methods to conduct sub 

1760
01:08:22,460 --> 01:08:24,650
critical experiments that ensure the 

1761
01:08:24,650 --> 01:08:27,400
readiness of the nuclear stockpile . 

1762
01:08:27,770 --> 01:08:29,659
These experiments are safe to the 

1763
01:08:29,659 --> 01:08:31,870
public and the environment and provide 

1764
01:08:31,870 --> 01:08:33,981
decision makers . The information and 

1765
01:08:33,981 --> 01:08:37,230
data needed to have no doubt in the 

1766
01:08:37,230 --> 01:08:39,500
readiness of our nuclear deterrent . 

1767
01:08:40,170 --> 01:08:43,960
The Fy 22 nd a included $135 

1768
01:08:43,960 --> 01:08:47,030
million to further expand stockpile 

1769
01:08:47,030 --> 01:08:48,890
stewardship programs through 

1770
01:08:48,890 --> 01:08:51,490
construction in the in A in an S . S . 

1771
01:08:51,500 --> 01:08:54,460
You want a complex providing high 

1772
01:08:54,460 --> 01:08:56,530
skilled high paying jobs to the 

1773
01:08:56,530 --> 01:08:58,690
community and a highly advanced 

1774
01:08:58,700 --> 01:09:01,520
scientific capability to the N . N . S . 

1775
01:09:01,520 --> 01:09:04,890
A . Every expert and commander that 

1776
01:09:04,890 --> 01:09:06,950
I've discussed the issue with has 

1777
01:09:06,950 --> 01:09:09,230
agreed that the experiments conducted 

1778
01:09:09,230 --> 01:09:12,400
at NN SS and across the N . S . A 

1779
01:09:12,410 --> 01:09:14,550
enterprise provide an extremely high 

1780
01:09:14,550 --> 01:09:17,080
degree of competence in the nuclear 

1781
01:09:17,110 --> 01:09:20,720
stockpile . However , I understand that 

1782
01:09:20,730 --> 01:09:23,370
in an essay still has a requirement to 

1783
01:09:23,370 --> 01:09:25,592
be able to conduct an explosive nuclear 

1784
01:09:25,592 --> 01:09:28,450
test within 12 months if ordered to do 

1785
01:09:28,450 --> 01:09:30,920
so by the president ? I remain deeply 

1786
01:09:30,920 --> 01:09:33,670
concerned that any such test would not 

1787
01:09:33,670 --> 01:09:36,630
only be belligerent and unnecessary but 

1788
01:09:36,630 --> 01:09:39,960
likely conducted at NN Ss . Even the 

1789
01:09:39,960 --> 01:09:42,690
remote risk of such a test test is 

1790
01:09:42,690 --> 01:09:45,730
unacceptable to my constituents . The 

1791
01:09:45,730 --> 01:09:48,720
trump administration's 2018 nuclear 

1792
01:09:48,720 --> 01:09:50,860
posture review stated that the United 

1793
01:09:50,860 --> 01:09:53,840
States will not seek ratification of 

1794
01:09:53,840 --> 01:09:56,170
the comprehensive nuclear Test ban 

1795
01:09:56,180 --> 01:09:58,660
treaty and that we will not resume 

1796
01:09:58,670 --> 01:10:01,270
nuclear explosive testing unless 

1797
01:10:01,270 --> 01:10:03,630
necessary to ensure the safety and 

1798
01:10:03,630 --> 01:10:06,020
effectiveness of the U . S . Nuclear 

1799
01:10:06,030 --> 01:10:08,640
arsenal . So secretary baker , do you 

1800
01:10:08,640 --> 01:10:11,260
agree that current methods of stockpile 

1801
01:10:11,260 --> 01:10:13,620
stewardship ensure the safety and 

1802
01:10:13,620 --> 01:10:16,090
effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal 

1803
01:10:16,100 --> 01:10:18,810
and will the ongoing nuclear posture 

1804
01:10:18,810 --> 01:10:20,270
review reverse the trump 

1805
01:10:20,270 --> 01:10:22,350
administration's opposition to 

1806
01:10:22,350 --> 01:10:24,380
ratification of the comprehensive 

1807
01:10:24,390 --> 01:10:28,270
nuclear test ban treaty congressman ? 

1808
01:10:28,280 --> 01:10:30,980
Thank you for the question . Uh let me 

1809
01:10:30,980 --> 01:10:33,091
just say that , I think the stockpile 

1810
01:10:33,091 --> 01:10:34,980
stewardship program is one of the 

1811
01:10:34,980 --> 01:10:37,090
remarkable successes of our of our 

1812
01:10:37,090 --> 01:10:39,890
nuclear architecture over the last uh 

1813
01:10:39,900 --> 01:10:43,310
30 30 years . The work that is done uh 

1814
01:10:43,320 --> 01:10:45,264
in terms of scientific analysis to 

1815
01:10:45,264 --> 01:10:47,290
allow Admiral Richard to have that 

1816
01:10:47,360 --> 01:10:50,370
assurance of our of our of our of our 

1817
01:10:50,370 --> 01:10:53,000
nuclear enterprise is absolutely 

1818
01:10:53,000 --> 01:10:55,650
essential . It is the policy of this 

1819
01:10:55,650 --> 01:10:58,480
administration to support efforts to 

1820
01:10:58,480 --> 01:11:00,702
bring into force the Comprehensive Test 

1821
01:11:00,702 --> 01:11:02,813
Ban treaty . It is also the policy of 

1822
01:11:02,813 --> 01:11:06,080
this administration that we will not uh 

1823
01:11:06,090 --> 01:11:09,290
change our unilateral moratorium on 

1824
01:11:09,290 --> 01:11:11,880
testing . Thank you . Admiral Richard 

1825
01:11:12,040 --> 01:11:14,207
as the combatant commander responsible 

1826
01:11:14,207 --> 01:11:16,207
for the nuclear deterrent . Are you 

1827
01:11:16,207 --> 01:11:18,100
confident that nN S . A stockpile 

1828
01:11:18,100 --> 01:11:20,440
stewardship programs will continue to 

1829
01:11:20,440 --> 01:11:23,490
provide you certainty that the nuclear 

1830
01:11:23,490 --> 01:11:25,280
deterrent is safe and effective 

1831
01:11:26,260 --> 01:11:28,038
congressman ? As you know , I'm 

1832
01:11:28,038 --> 01:11:29,871
required to formally report that 

1833
01:11:29,871 --> 01:11:31,982
assessment in writing and last fall , 

1834
01:11:31,982 --> 01:11:33,871
as a part of my overall stockpile 

1835
01:11:33,871 --> 01:11:36,630
assessment , I did uh in writing , 

1836
01:11:36,630 --> 01:11:39,120
state that I saw no conditions uh 

1837
01:11:39,130 --> 01:11:41,352
necessitating consideration of a return 

1838
01:11:41,352 --> 01:11:44,330
to testing . But what I would offer is 

1839
01:11:44,330 --> 01:11:46,552
that stockpile stewardship alone is not 

1840
01:11:46,552 --> 01:11:48,719
all that's necessary to make sure that 

1841
01:11:48,719 --> 01:11:50,830
we have confidence that we don't need 

1842
01:11:50,830 --> 01:11:52,608
to go do a test to restore that 

1843
01:11:52,608 --> 01:11:54,663
confidence . It's not only stockpile 

1844
01:11:54,663 --> 01:11:56,774
stewardship ? I have great confidence 

1845
01:11:56,774 --> 01:11:58,941
in that program , but you have to have 

1846
01:11:58,941 --> 01:12:01,190
a flexible and modernized inventory 

1847
01:12:01,190 --> 01:12:03,523
stockpile , which requires an N . S . A . 

1848
01:12:03,523 --> 01:12:06,400
To hold to its um requirements with the 

1849
01:12:06,400 --> 01:12:08,289
programs . And you have to have a 

1850
01:12:08,289 --> 01:12:10,456
flexible and responsive infrastructure 

1851
01:12:10,456 --> 01:12:13,590
which is also necessary . So as long as 

1852
01:12:13,590 --> 01:12:15,923
N N . S . A continues to meet D . O . D . 

1853
01:12:15,923 --> 01:12:18,130
Requirements , then I will have that 

1854
01:12:18,130 --> 01:12:20,610
confidence . If not , it would require 

1855
01:12:20,610 --> 01:12:23,770
revisiting over . Thank you . Mr 

1856
01:12:23,770 --> 01:12:26,103
Chairman . And I yield back . Thank you . 

1857
01:12:26,103 --> 01:12:28,260
Mr . Horse furred . Mr moulton . Mr 

1858
01:12:28,260 --> 01:12:30,371
Chairman . I defer my class questions 

1859
01:12:30,371 --> 01:12:32,649
for the classified session . Thank you . 

1860
01:12:32,649 --> 01:12:34,260
I appreciate the gentleman's 

1861
01:12:34,260 --> 01:12:38,060
consideration . Mr Khanna Mr Chairman . 

1862
01:12:38,060 --> 01:12:41,410
I defer my questions . I also welcome 

1863
01:12:41,410 --> 01:12:44,030
your consideration . Then we will move 

1864
01:12:44,030 --> 01:12:46,220
post haste to the classified session . 

1865
01:12:46,470 --> 01:12:48,192
This portion of the hearing is 

1866
01:12:48,192 --> 01:12:48,680
adjourned .