1 00:00:00,840 --> 00:00:03,330 mm hmm . Okay , good afternoon 2 00:00:03,330 --> 00:00:05,680 everybody . And thanks for for joining 3 00:00:05,680 --> 00:00:08,320 here today . We got a special purpose 4 00:00:08,320 --> 00:00:10,990 briefing on tap for you . We're here to 5 00:00:10,990 --> 00:00:13,212 brief you on the results of the U . S . 6 00:00:13,212 --> 00:00:15,046 Africa Command , Army regulation 7 00:00:15,046 --> 00:00:17,480 investigation and the independent 8 00:00:17,490 --> 00:00:19,660 review that Secretary Austin directed 9 00:00:20,140 --> 00:00:23,090 of the january 5th 2020 attack on 10 00:00:23,090 --> 00:00:25,312 cooperative security location Manda Bay 11 00:00:25,312 --> 00:00:27,660 in kenya . Secretary Austin's intent 12 00:00:28,240 --> 00:00:30,129 for the independent review was to 13 00:00:30,129 --> 00:00:32,351 provide added insight , perspective and 14 00:00:32,351 --> 00:00:34,462 the ability to assess the totality of 15 00:00:34,462 --> 00:00:36,629 this event involving multiple military 16 00:00:36,629 --> 00:00:38,573 services and Department of Defense 17 00:00:38,573 --> 00:00:40,796 components . Secretary has accepted the 18 00:00:40,796 --> 00:00:42,796 findings and recommendations of the 19 00:00:42,796 --> 00:00:44,962 independent review . Since 2018 US Air 20 00:00:44,962 --> 00:00:47,184 Forces Africa have been responsible for 21 00:00:47,184 --> 00:00:49,240 the synchronization of based support 22 00:00:49,240 --> 00:00:51,462 functions including force protection at 23 00:00:51,462 --> 00:00:53,684 Manda Bay . As a result of the findings 24 00:00:53,684 --> 00:00:55,296 of the investigation and the 25 00:00:55,296 --> 00:00:57,518 independent review , the Air Force took 26 00:00:57,518 --> 00:00:57,420 action to address accountability 27 00:00:57,420 --> 00:00:59,476 recommendations . I think you have a 28 00:00:59,476 --> 00:01:01,860 statement now from the Air Force about 29 00:01:01,870 --> 00:01:03,926 those accountability recommendations 30 00:01:04,020 --> 00:01:06,270 and I would direct any of your 31 00:01:06,270 --> 00:01:08,390 questions about that directly to the 32 00:01:08,390 --> 00:01:11,430 Air Force . Today , we're gonna start 33 00:01:11,430 --> 00:01:13,319 with remarks from General Stephen 34 00:01:13,319 --> 00:01:15,319 Townsend Commander , U . S . Africa 35 00:01:15,319 --> 00:01:17,652 Command and General paul Funk Commander , 36 00:01:17,652 --> 00:01:19,763 US Army training and doctrine Command 37 00:01:19,763 --> 00:01:21,763 who led the independent review . We 38 00:01:21,763 --> 00:01:21,640 also have Lieutenant General steven 39 00:01:21,640 --> 00:01:23,751 Basham , Deputy Commander U . S . Air 40 00:01:23,751 --> 00:01:25,862 Forces Africa joining us virtually to 41 00:01:25,862 --> 00:01:27,973 brief on the investigation and in the 42 00:01:27,973 --> 00:01:29,973 room , Major General Tom Wilcox tom 43 00:01:29,973 --> 00:01:32,700 right tom Wilcox from the Independent 44 00:01:32,700 --> 00:01:34,533 Review Team as well as Brigadier 45 00:01:34,533 --> 00:01:36,644 General Roy Collins , Director of Air 46 00:01:36,644 --> 00:01:38,867 Force Security . Uh I'm sorry Air Force 47 00:01:38,867 --> 00:01:40,870 Security Forces . Finally , at one 48 00:01:40,870 --> 00:01:42,481 point as we move through the 49 00:01:42,481 --> 00:01:44,537 presentation today , we want to make 50 00:01:44,537 --> 00:01:46,370 sure that it's clear how much we 51 00:01:46,370 --> 00:01:48,481 appreciate our partnership with kenya 52 00:01:48,481 --> 00:01:50,648 and will continue to work closely with 53 00:01:50,648 --> 00:01:50,330 them in the fight against al Shabaab 54 00:01:50,330 --> 00:01:52,960 and other terrorist organizations . The 55 00:01:52,970 --> 00:01:55,192 briefers will take questions at the end 56 00:01:55,192 --> 00:01:57,414 of the entire presentation so we'll get 57 00:01:57,414 --> 00:01:59,637 through each presentation and then when 58 00:01:59,637 --> 00:02:01,748 that's all done , I will stay up here 59 00:02:01,748 --> 00:02:03,748 and I will moderate the Q and A . I 60 00:02:03,748 --> 00:02:05,803 think we all told we've got about an 61 00:02:05,803 --> 00:02:07,970 hour to work our way through that so I 62 00:02:07,970 --> 00:02:10,081 won't delay anymore . Will tee up the 63 00:02:10,081 --> 00:02:13,950 video of General Townsend . Good 64 00:02:13,950 --> 00:02:16,550 afternoon . I'm General steve Townsend , 65 00:02:16,720 --> 00:02:19,053 the commander of U . S . Africa Command , 66 00:02:19,053 --> 00:02:21,560 also known as Africom . We're here 67 00:02:21,560 --> 00:02:23,671 today to formally briefed the results 68 00:02:23,930 --> 00:02:26,210 of the investigation . I directed into 69 00:02:26,210 --> 00:02:29,960 the January 5 , 2020 attack Al Shabaab 70 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:33,400 on cooperative security location or CSL 71 00:02:33,800 --> 00:02:36,530 Manda Bay kenya that claimed the lives 72 00:02:36,530 --> 00:02:38,890 of a U . S . Soldier and to US 73 00:02:38,890 --> 00:02:41,750 contractors and injured two other U . S . 74 00:02:41,750 --> 00:02:44,080 Service members , A U . S . Contractor 75 00:02:44,480 --> 00:02:47,920 and a Kenyan soldier . We honor the 76 00:02:47,920 --> 00:02:50,380 bravery and ultimate sacrifice of US 77 00:02:50,380 --> 00:02:52,602 Army Specialist Henry J . Mayfield . Jr 78 00:02:54,140 --> 00:02:56,960 Mr Bruce triplet and mr Dustin Harrison . 79 00:02:57,530 --> 00:03:01,290 They are heroes . It is a solemn duty 80 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:03,420 to provide their families and the 81 00:03:03,420 --> 00:03:05,880 american people with answers about what 82 00:03:05,880 --> 00:03:08,930 happened that day . There are no words 83 00:03:09,240 --> 00:03:11,296 that can take away from their loss . 84 00:03:12,640 --> 00:03:14,862 You will also hear about the results of 85 00:03:14,862 --> 00:03:16,751 the Secretary of Defense directed 86 00:03:16,840 --> 00:03:19,062 independent review of our investigation 87 00:03:19,840 --> 00:03:22,007 which was conducted by US Army General 88 00:03:22,007 --> 00:03:25,290 paul Funk . Us Africom took our 89 00:03:25,290 --> 00:03:27,920 investigation seriously and has taken 90 00:03:27,920 --> 00:03:30,020 extensive steps since the attack to 91 00:03:30,020 --> 00:03:32,730 make CSL Manda Bay and all of our 92 00:03:32,740 --> 00:03:34,940 operating locations across africa more 93 00:03:34,940 --> 00:03:38,400 secure . I found the investigation 94 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:40,350 teams work to be comprehensive , 95 00:03:41,040 --> 00:03:44,400 credible and thorough . The independent 96 00:03:44,400 --> 00:03:46,456 review conducted by General Funk and 97 00:03:46,456 --> 00:03:48,733 his team validated that extensive work . 98 00:03:49,340 --> 00:03:51,396 All recommendations from the U . S . 99 00:03:51,396 --> 00:03:53,173 Africom investigation have been 100 00:03:53,173 --> 00:03:55,350 implemented some in the hours and days 101 00:03:55,350 --> 00:03:57,572 immediately after the attack and others 102 00:03:57,572 --> 00:04:00,840 over the following months . We are also 103 00:04:00,840 --> 00:04:02,562 well along in implementing the 104 00:04:02,562 --> 00:04:04,618 recommendations from the Independent 105 00:04:04,618 --> 00:04:08,530 review At 5.20 a . m . on 106 00:04:08,530 --> 00:04:11,540 January 5 , 2020 . A ruthless and 107 00:04:11,540 --> 00:04:14,170 determined enemy force . Approximately 108 00:04:14,170 --> 00:04:17,350 30 to 40 al Shabaab fighters conducted 109 00:04:17,350 --> 00:04:19,790 a complex attack against U . S . Forces 110 00:04:19,790 --> 00:04:23,270 and assets and Manda Bay , kenya in a 111 00:04:23,270 --> 00:04:25,610 few short minutes . The attacking enemy 112 00:04:25,860 --> 00:04:28,350 inflicted casualties and destroyed 113 00:04:28,350 --> 00:04:30,900 seven contracted light aircraft and 114 00:04:30,900 --> 00:04:32,870 other property before they were 115 00:04:32,870 --> 00:04:34,926 effectively engaged by US and Kenyan 116 00:04:34,926 --> 00:04:37,420 forces and forced to withdraw . The 117 00:04:37,420 --> 00:04:41,410 loss of at least six enemy killed . The 118 00:04:41,410 --> 00:04:43,577 investigation determined the proximate 119 00:04:43,577 --> 00:04:45,799 cause of the loss of lives and material 120 00:04:45,840 --> 00:04:48,520 was the attack by mass force of 121 00:04:48,520 --> 00:04:51,030 determined discipline and well 122 00:04:51,030 --> 00:04:54,370 resourced al Shabaab fighters . The 123 00:04:54,370 --> 00:04:56,314 investigation also identified four 124 00:04:56,314 --> 00:04:58,900 broad factors that contributed to the 125 00:04:58,900 --> 00:05:01,330 outcome of the attack and the result of 126 00:05:01,330 --> 00:05:04,870 losses . First and 127 00:05:04,880 --> 00:05:07,160 inadequate focus on potential threats 128 00:05:07,750 --> 00:05:10,160 and force protection at multiple levels . 129 00:05:10,840 --> 00:05:12,784 For a number of successive years , 130 00:05:12,810 --> 00:05:14,870 there was complacent leadership and 131 00:05:14,870 --> 00:05:16,870 command and control at the tactical 132 00:05:16,870 --> 00:05:19,220 level and poor oversight at the 133 00:05:19,220 --> 00:05:22,620 operational level . Second , there was 134 00:05:22,620 --> 00:05:24,842 an inadequate understanding of the true 135 00:05:24,842 --> 00:05:27,320 threat to the base of and obey that had 136 00:05:27,320 --> 00:05:29,264 been perpetuated by years of local 137 00:05:29,264 --> 00:05:31,700 threat assessments . There were also 138 00:05:31,700 --> 00:05:33,422 shortcomings identified in the 139 00:05:33,422 --> 00:05:36,390 resourcing sharing and dissemination of 140 00:05:36,390 --> 00:05:39,440 intelligence . Third , there were 141 00:05:39,440 --> 00:05:41,384 deficiencies in the organization , 142 00:05:41,840 --> 00:05:44,130 preparation and training of security 143 00:05:44,130 --> 00:05:47,080 forces which contributed to inadequate 144 00:05:47,080 --> 00:05:50,550 defensive plans . Fourth , there were 145 00:05:50,550 --> 00:05:52,328 problems with mission command , 146 00:05:52,328 --> 00:05:54,730 including poor unity of command at the 147 00:05:54,730 --> 00:05:57,430 tactical level and flawed staff 148 00:05:57,430 --> 00:05:59,640 processes that failed to account for 149 00:05:59,640 --> 00:06:01,630 the growth of CSL Manda Bay from a 150 00:06:01,630 --> 00:06:04,430 training base to a counterterrorism 151 00:06:04,430 --> 00:06:08,330 support an airbase . As I 152 00:06:08,330 --> 00:06:11,100 said in March 2020 , we were not as 153 00:06:11,100 --> 00:06:13,211 prepared at Manda Bay as we needed to 154 00:06:13,211 --> 00:06:16,410 be . Security on a key part of the base 155 00:06:16,410 --> 00:06:18,730 proved inadequate . With the security 156 00:06:18,730 --> 00:06:20,897 force that was insufficiently prepared 157 00:06:21,040 --> 00:06:24,190 for their mission , US Africom has 158 00:06:24,190 --> 00:06:26,190 implemented a series of measures to 159 00:06:26,190 --> 00:06:28,460 address the shortfalls uncovered during 160 00:06:28,460 --> 00:06:30,627 this investigation and the independent 161 00:06:30,627 --> 00:06:33,090 review . These include adjustments to 162 00:06:33,090 --> 00:06:35,690 training operations , threat 163 00:06:35,690 --> 00:06:38,390 assessments , leadership and force 164 00:06:38,390 --> 00:06:42,240 protection practices . We are grateful 165 00:06:42,240 --> 00:06:44,320 to our Kenyan Defense Force partners 166 00:06:44,330 --> 00:06:47,710 who responded quickly and bravely to 167 00:06:47,710 --> 00:06:49,599 help fight off the terrorists who 168 00:06:49,599 --> 00:06:52,120 attacked mega Goni airfield . The quick 169 00:06:52,120 --> 00:06:54,630 thinking , swift action and bravery of 170 00:06:54,630 --> 00:06:56,800 U . S . Marines and airmen . First 171 00:06:56,800 --> 00:06:59,480 responders in concert with the Canadian 172 00:06:59,480 --> 00:07:01,860 armed forces was critical to containing 173 00:07:02,440 --> 00:07:04,496 and ultimately repelling this attack 174 00:07:05,880 --> 00:07:07,824 service and parts of Africa can be 175 00:07:07,824 --> 00:07:10,310 challenging even dangerous at times . 176 00:07:11,440 --> 00:07:13,384 The threat from Al Shabaab remains 177 00:07:13,384 --> 00:07:16,020 dangerous and Real Al Shabaab is the 178 00:07:16,020 --> 00:07:18,590 largest and most lethal arm of Al Qaeda . 179 00:07:19,530 --> 00:07:21,641 An enemy . America knows all too well 180 00:07:21,641 --> 00:07:23,970 for its ambitions , an appetite for 181 00:07:23,970 --> 00:07:26,560 destruction . What we do with our 182 00:07:26,560 --> 00:07:28,671 African and international partners to 183 00:07:28,671 --> 00:07:31,440 counter violent extremism in Africa is 184 00:07:31,440 --> 00:07:34,690 more important than ever . We hold the 185 00:07:34,690 --> 00:07:37,150 responsibility to specialist Mayfield , 186 00:07:37,900 --> 00:07:41,380 Mr Triplett and mr Harrison to work 187 00:07:41,380 --> 00:07:43,380 every day to learn from this tragic 188 00:07:43,380 --> 00:07:45,520 event and to keep an attack like this 189 00:07:45,520 --> 00:07:47,840 from happening again . I will 190 00:07:47,840 --> 00:07:49,951 personally remember these three brave 191 00:07:49,951 --> 00:07:52,870 americans and their families . We honor 192 00:07:52,870 --> 00:07:55,770 their legacies and their sacrifice by 193 00:07:55,770 --> 00:07:57,937 faithfully implementing the lessons we 194 00:07:57,937 --> 00:08:00,103 have learned from this attack not only 195 00:08:00,103 --> 00:08:03,360 at Manda Bay but across Africa as we 196 00:08:03,360 --> 00:08:05,027 continue to fight , they were 197 00:08:05,027 --> 00:08:08,050 supporting with that , I'll turn it 198 00:08:08,050 --> 00:08:10,161 over to the team who will provide you 199 00:08:10,161 --> 00:08:12,161 with a more detailed brief and take 200 00:08:12,161 --> 00:08:14,560 your questions . Thank you . 201 00:08:23,940 --> 00:08:26,260 Good afternoon . I'm General Paul Funk , 202 00:08:26,380 --> 00:08:28,324 the commander of the United States 203 00:08:28,324 --> 00:08:30,491 Army's training and doctrine command . 204 00:08:30,840 --> 00:08:32,896 I am grateful for the opportunity to 205 00:08:32,896 --> 00:08:35,260 speak with you today and I thank you 206 00:08:35,260 --> 00:08:38,470 all for being here As you just heard 207 00:08:38,480 --> 00:08:40,647 from General Stephen Townsend . United 208 00:08:40,647 --> 00:08:42,960 States Africa Command conducted an 209 00:08:42,960 --> 00:08:45,610 extensive investigation into every 210 00:08:45,610 --> 00:08:48,910 aspect of the january 5th 2020 attack 211 00:08:48,920 --> 00:08:51,470 on cooperative security location . 212 00:08:51,480 --> 00:08:54,500 Manda Bay kenya and the result of 213 00:08:54,500 --> 00:08:56,850 deaths of three patriots who are in the 214 00:08:56,850 --> 00:09:00,220 valiant service to our nation on behalf 215 00:09:00,220 --> 00:09:02,770 of the entire United States Army . I 216 00:09:02,770 --> 00:09:04,381 want to extend our heartfelt 217 00:09:04,381 --> 00:09:06,720 condolences to the families of 218 00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:09,660 specialists . Henry mitch Mayfield , Jr 219 00:09:10,240 --> 00:09:13,110 mr Dustin , Harrison and mr Bruce . 220 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:16,030 Triplet . These brave americans will 221 00:09:16,030 --> 00:09:19,140 never be forgotten . In fact , we are 222 00:09:19,140 --> 00:09:21,860 all here today to ensure we know what 223 00:09:21,860 --> 00:09:24,600 went right that day , what went wrong 224 00:09:24,920 --> 00:09:27,150 and what we must learn and improve upon 225 00:09:27,440 --> 00:09:29,773 to ensure their deaths were not in vain . 226 00:09:31,540 --> 00:09:33,810 So let me talk a little bit about the 227 00:09:33,810 --> 00:09:36,950 process . We used to do just that . In 228 00:09:36,950 --> 00:09:39,061 March of last year , the Secretary of 229 00:09:39,061 --> 00:09:41,510 Defense directed the US Army appointed 230 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:44,420 four star general to conduct an 231 00:09:44,420 --> 00:09:46,380 independent review of the U . S . 232 00:09:46,380 --> 00:09:49,590 Africom investigation . To ensure the 233 00:09:49,590 --> 00:09:52,210 department had a complete look at the 234 00:09:52,210 --> 00:09:55,530 causes of the attack . The secretary of 235 00:09:55,530 --> 00:09:58,110 the army appointed me to execute that 236 00:09:58,110 --> 00:10:00,330 review and I with the support of our 237 00:10:00,330 --> 00:10:02,960 sister services , assembled a panel of 238 00:10:02,960 --> 00:10:05,350 11 senior officers and noncommissioned 239 00:10:05,350 --> 00:10:07,690 officers from across the Department of 240 00:10:07,690 --> 00:10:10,460 the Defense with experience in deployed 241 00:10:10,460 --> 00:10:13,900 environments , command force protection , 242 00:10:13,910 --> 00:10:15,760 training and intelligence . 243 00:10:16,340 --> 00:10:19,500 Collectively , the panel had 412 years 244 00:10:19,500 --> 00:10:22,420 of military service . Over 53 years of 245 00:10:22,420 --> 00:10:25,470 combat service and approximately 107 246 00:10:25,470 --> 00:10:28,150 years in command billets , their 247 00:10:28,150 --> 00:10:30,290 expertise and knowledge were critical 248 00:10:30,290 --> 00:10:33,130 throughout the review process . The 249 00:10:33,130 --> 00:10:34,940 Secretary of Defense tasked the 250 00:10:34,940 --> 00:10:37,320 independent review to assess the entire 251 00:10:37,320 --> 00:10:40,260 U . S . Africom investigation to 252 00:10:40,260 --> 00:10:43,110 include if the pre deployment training 253 00:10:43,130 --> 00:10:45,620 and the assignment process for the U . 254 00:10:45,620 --> 00:10:48,230 S . Persons assigned to Manda Bay were 255 00:10:48,230 --> 00:10:50,710 appropriate for the mission . The 256 00:10:50,710 --> 00:10:52,720 secretary of the Army then added 257 00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:55,040 additional focus areas by directing the 258 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:58,370 independent review to address whether 259 00:10:58,370 --> 00:11:00,940 the actions or inactions of leaders and 260 00:11:00,940 --> 00:11:03,210 staff contributed to a poor 261 00:11:03,210 --> 00:11:06,520 understanding of the threat and an 262 00:11:06,530 --> 00:11:08,660 inadequate force protection posture . 263 00:11:09,740 --> 00:11:11,907 Whether the findings from the original 264 00:11:11,907 --> 00:11:14,610 investigation of no criminal negligence 265 00:11:14,620 --> 00:11:16,930 or other misconduct by the U . S . 266 00:11:16,930 --> 00:11:19,350 Personnel were consistent with the 267 00:11:19,350 --> 00:11:22,060 evidence and whether further 268 00:11:22,060 --> 00:11:24,780 investigation was warranted concerning 269 00:11:24,780 --> 00:11:26,760 potential organizational and 270 00:11:26,760 --> 00:11:29,870 institutional issues . So we began a 271 00:11:29,870 --> 00:11:32,540 thorough review of the complete US 272 00:11:32,540 --> 00:11:36,210 africom investigation . I should note 273 00:11:36,220 --> 00:11:38,480 my independent review benefited from a 274 00:11:38,480 --> 00:11:40,700 vast amount of additional information 275 00:11:41,240 --> 00:11:43,129 that was not available during the 276 00:11:43,129 --> 00:11:46,120 original investigation such as the US 277 00:11:46,120 --> 00:11:49,390 Air Forces africa investigation that 278 00:11:49,390 --> 00:11:52,210 had already begun documents from the 279 00:11:52,220 --> 00:11:54,910 Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 280 00:11:54,910 --> 00:11:57,600 U . S . Air Force's Office of Special 281 00:11:57,600 --> 00:12:00,140 investigations as well as multiple 282 00:12:00,140 --> 00:12:03,140 responses US africom provided in 283 00:12:03,140 --> 00:12:06,900 response to our queries . Our review 284 00:12:06,900 --> 00:12:09,040 was comprehensive and I hope that the 285 00:12:09,050 --> 00:12:11,200 attention to detail we applied 286 00:12:11,300 --> 00:12:13,890 demonstrates to you the importance with 287 00:12:13,890 --> 00:12:16,490 which the Secretary of Defense , the 288 00:12:16,490 --> 00:12:19,390 Secretary of the Army and I address 289 00:12:19,390 --> 00:12:22,010 this undertaking . We lost three 290 00:12:22,010 --> 00:12:24,177 americans who were willing to serve in 291 00:12:24,177 --> 00:12:26,190 an austere and dangerous location . 292 00:12:27,140 --> 00:12:29,220 Every member of my dedicated review 293 00:12:29,220 --> 00:12:31,630 team was committed to getting this 294 00:12:31,630 --> 00:12:35,560 right fundamentally . I found that 295 00:12:35,560 --> 00:12:38,920 the U . S . Africom investigation was 296 00:12:38,930 --> 00:12:41,480 thorough , detailed and supported by 297 00:12:41,480 --> 00:12:43,860 the evidence . I concurred that the 298 00:12:43,860 --> 00:12:45,971 proximate cause of the death of three 299 00:12:45,971 --> 00:12:48,690 us citizens injuries to three other U . 300 00:12:48,690 --> 00:12:51,100 S . Citizens and the loss of U . S . 301 00:12:51,100 --> 00:12:54,140 Aircraft and property . Was the attack 302 00:12:54,150 --> 00:12:57,050 by a masked force of determined 303 00:12:57,080 --> 00:13:00,020 disciplined and well resourced al 304 00:13:00,020 --> 00:13:03,280 Shabaab fighters . No single point of 305 00:13:03,290 --> 00:13:05,490 failure directly caused the loss of 306 00:13:05,490 --> 00:13:08,260 life and damage to the property at 307 00:13:08,260 --> 00:13:11,510 Manda Bay . As general Townsend noted , 308 00:13:11,740 --> 00:13:14,180 his investigation identified four 309 00:13:14,180 --> 00:13:17,170 causal factors that contributed to the 310 00:13:17,170 --> 00:13:19,750 outcome of the attack . I concurred 311 00:13:19,750 --> 00:13:22,630 with these casual factors . Major 312 00:13:22,630 --> 00:13:24,990 General Tom Wilcox , a senior member of 313 00:13:24,990 --> 00:13:27,570 my review team will provide additional 314 00:13:27,570 --> 00:13:29,626 details about the independent review 315 00:13:29,626 --> 00:13:32,570 for you today . Both General Townsend's 316 00:13:32,570 --> 00:13:35,200 investigation and my review found that 317 00:13:35,200 --> 00:13:37,620 neither criminal negligence , enormous 318 00:13:37,620 --> 00:13:40,370 conduct by any U . S . Personnel was 319 00:13:40,370 --> 00:13:43,160 the proximate cause of loss of life or 320 00:13:43,160 --> 00:13:45,250 property at cooperative security 321 00:13:45,250 --> 00:13:48,730 location Manda Bay . But because the 322 00:13:48,730 --> 00:13:50,720 charter of the independent review 323 00:13:50,720 --> 00:13:53,710 resulted in a more in depth analysis of 324 00:13:53,710 --> 00:13:56,170 individual leader actions . I was able 325 00:13:56,170 --> 00:13:58,770 to identify multiple personnel whom I 326 00:13:58,770 --> 00:14:01,650 deemed negligent in their actions or 327 00:14:01,650 --> 00:14:05,370 inactions which contributed to creating 328 00:14:05,390 --> 00:14:08,690 a vulnerable airfield . I submitted all 329 00:14:08,690 --> 00:14:10,801 of my findings and recommendations to 330 00:14:10,801 --> 00:14:13,020 the Secretary of Defense . And thanks 331 00:14:13,020 --> 00:14:15,350 to the hard work of the panel I found 332 00:14:15,350 --> 00:14:18,370 no further investigation was necessary 333 00:14:19,340 --> 00:14:22,110 to the families of our fallen as well 334 00:14:22,110 --> 00:14:24,360 as those injured in the attack . I 335 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:26,850 commit to you our full accounting of 336 00:14:26,850 --> 00:14:30,580 the event and I am deeply respectful of 337 00:14:30,580 --> 00:14:31,580 your sacrifice . 338 00:14:34,740 --> 00:14:37,640 Well that over to Lieutenant General 339 00:14:37,640 --> 00:14:40,020 Bush , um Deputy Commander of US Air 340 00:14:40,020 --> 00:14:42,187 Forces africa , he'll be joining us as 341 00:14:42,187 --> 00:14:44,570 you see virtually too to brief you out 342 00:14:44,580 --> 00:14:47,160 on the 15 6 investigation . General 343 00:14:47,160 --> 00:14:49,327 blossom . Can you hear me ? Are you or 344 00:14:49,327 --> 00:14:50,327 do you have us 345 00:14:57,040 --> 00:14:59,151 one More time ? Can you hear me now ? 346 00:14:59,151 --> 00:15:01,262 We got you sir . All good to go . I'm 347 00:15:01,262 --> 00:15:03,429 gonna So I'm gonna turn it over to you 348 00:15:03,429 --> 00:15:06,270 now . Thank you . Good afternoon . I'm 349 00:15:06,270 --> 00:15:08,437 Lieutenant General steven Basham , the 350 00:15:08,437 --> 00:15:10,548 deputy Commander of United States Air 351 00:15:10,548 --> 00:15:12,500 Forces in europe and Air Forces in 352 00:15:12,500 --> 00:15:15,180 Africa . I'm speaking to you from 353 00:15:15,190 --> 00:15:17,100 Ramstein Air Base Germany and 354 00:15:17,100 --> 00:15:19,211 representing the United States Africa 355 00:15:19,211 --> 00:15:21,420 command building upon General 356 00:15:21,420 --> 00:15:23,753 Townsend's and general function remarks . 357 00:15:24,240 --> 00:15:26,573 I will describe the attack on Manda Bay . 358 00:15:27,140 --> 00:15:28,973 The findings of the Africom Army 359 00:15:28,973 --> 00:15:32,490 Regulation 15-6 investigation and the 360 00:15:32,490 --> 00:15:34,930 corrective action taken by Africom and 361 00:15:34,930 --> 00:15:37,550 supported their commands . Following my 362 00:15:37,550 --> 00:15:40,220 comments . Major General thomas Wilcox 363 00:15:40,220 --> 00:15:42,387 will provide additional insight and an 364 00:15:42,387 --> 00:15:44,164 independent review . It will be 365 00:15:44,164 --> 00:15:46,053 followed by Brigadier General Roy 366 00:15:46,053 --> 00:15:48,164 Collins who will speak to the U . S . 367 00:15:48,164 --> 00:15:50,370 Air Force Security Forces training As 368 00:15:50,370 --> 00:15:53,340 you heard from general Townsend on five 369 00:15:53,340 --> 00:15:56,870 January 2020 At 5 20 local . A well 370 00:15:56,870 --> 00:15:59,550 prepared team of about 30 to 40 al 371 00:15:59,550 --> 00:16:02,280 Shabaab fighters conducted a complex 372 00:16:02,290 --> 00:16:04,500 attack against security cooperative 373 00:16:04,500 --> 00:16:06,650 security location . Manda Bay , kenya 374 00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:10,240 cooperative security location or CSL 375 00:16:10,240 --> 00:16:12,600 Manda Bay . This comprised of three 376 00:16:12,600 --> 00:16:16,250 main parts the Kenyan Naval Base Manda 377 00:16:16,250 --> 00:16:19,670 Bay which encompasses US Camp 378 00:16:19,670 --> 00:16:23,150 Simba As a base within a base 379 00:16:23,740 --> 00:16:26,030 And the nearby Maga Goni airfield 380 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:29,440 located about one mile south of Camp 381 00:16:29,440 --> 00:16:33,000 Simba that morning , al Shabaab 382 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:35,600 members conducted near simultaneous 383 00:16:35,600 --> 00:16:38,150 attacks at both camps Simba , which is 384 00:16:38,150 --> 00:16:40,150 where U . S . Forces are housed and 385 00:16:40,150 --> 00:16:42,660 most work . And the nearby air film 386 00:16:43,840 --> 00:16:45,951 Alice and Bob members initially fired 387 00:16:45,951 --> 00:16:48,890 10 mortar rounds at Camp Simba , which 388 00:16:48,890 --> 00:16:50,723 caused only slight damage to the 389 00:16:50,723 --> 00:16:53,460 facility and no casualties . It is 390 00:16:53,460 --> 00:16:56,140 assessed that the attack on Camp Simba 391 00:16:56,230 --> 00:16:58,570 was designed to distract personnel and 392 00:16:58,570 --> 00:17:01,560 delay us response to the main attack 393 00:17:01,560 --> 00:17:05,550 location of macaroni airfield at 394 00:17:05,550 --> 00:17:07,620 the airfield . While the attack was 395 00:17:07,620 --> 00:17:11,000 starting at Camp Simba , two us service 396 00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:13,350 members were driving along the runway 397 00:17:13,360 --> 00:17:16,770 in a small truck , Clearing the runway 398 00:17:16,770 --> 00:17:19,460 of animals and other hazards to allow a 399 00:17:19,460 --> 00:17:22,390 King Air B- 350 aircraft to depart 400 00:17:22,390 --> 00:17:25,450 safely . During the routine early 401 00:17:25,450 --> 00:17:27,617 morning clearing process . The service 402 00:17:27,617 --> 00:17:29,880 members saw thermal images through a 403 00:17:29,880 --> 00:17:31,991 handheld scope , which they initially 404 00:17:31,991 --> 00:17:34,990 thought where I am is as they approach 405 00:17:34,990 --> 00:17:37,550 to better identify the images , they 406 00:17:37,560 --> 00:17:39,338 realized too late that they had 407 00:17:39,338 --> 00:17:41,227 actually identified a group of al 408 00:17:41,227 --> 00:17:43,060 Shabaab fighters fighting in the 409 00:17:43,060 --> 00:17:46,590 vegetation . The al Shabaab fighters 410 00:17:46,600 --> 00:17:49,060 fired two rocket propelled grenades or 411 00:17:49,060 --> 00:17:51,500 RPGS at the service members in the 412 00:17:51,500 --> 00:17:54,660 truck . The first RPG penetrated the 413 00:17:54,660 --> 00:17:57,950 front windshield but did not explode 414 00:17:59,040 --> 00:18:01,207 and one service member quickly escaped 415 00:18:01,207 --> 00:18:03,720 from the vehicle . The second RPG 416 00:18:03,720 --> 00:18:06,180 penetrated the driver's side door . A 417 00:18:06,180 --> 00:18:09,200 moment later , this device detonated 418 00:18:09,210 --> 00:18:11,377 and killed . Specialist Henry Mayville 419 00:18:11,420 --> 00:18:15,110 instantly Next , the fighters 420 00:18:15,110 --> 00:18:18,120 engaged the aircraft with RPG and small 421 00:18:18,120 --> 00:18:20,170 arms fire . As it was beginning its 422 00:18:20,170 --> 00:18:23,260 takeoff roll , the plane caught fire 423 00:18:23,270 --> 00:18:26,010 and the pilots Mr Dustin Harris Mr 424 00:18:26,010 --> 00:18:29,070 Bruce triplet were killed . The 425 00:18:29,070 --> 00:18:31,126 aircraft came to rest on the side of 426 00:18:31,126 --> 00:18:33,348 the runway and it was assessed that the 427 00:18:33,348 --> 00:18:35,459 pilots purposely steered the aircraft 428 00:18:35,459 --> 00:18:37,530 off the runway to keep it free for 429 00:18:37,530 --> 00:18:41,350 future operations . The 3rd contractor , 430 00:18:41,360 --> 00:18:43,730 who was in the back was able to escape 431 00:18:43,730 --> 00:18:46,340 the burning aircraft . The contractor 432 00:18:46,340 --> 00:18:48,451 ran to meet up with other maintenance 433 00:18:48,451 --> 00:18:50,880 contractors in a nearby hangar and they 434 00:18:50,880 --> 00:18:54,500 drove to camp Simba . In addition to 435 00:18:54,500 --> 00:18:57,050 killing three U . S . Personnel , The 436 00:18:57,050 --> 00:18:59,050 fighters also destroyed six U . S . 437 00:18:59,050 --> 00:19:01,050 aircraft , one Kenyan aircraft , 438 00:19:01,640 --> 00:19:04,240 several vehicles and other property . 439 00:19:04,740 --> 00:19:06,740 During the first few minutes of the 440 00:19:06,740 --> 00:19:10,230 attack , US and kenan forces engaged 441 00:19:10,230 --> 00:19:12,870 the fighters for several hours until 442 00:19:12,870 --> 00:19:14,926 they eventually cleared the airfield 443 00:19:15,140 --> 00:19:17,560 and the East African Response force 444 00:19:17,690 --> 00:19:21,230 arrived . Further details on the attack 445 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:23,296 are included in the redacted Africom 446 00:19:23,296 --> 00:19:25,960 Army Regulation 15-6 and I will 447 00:19:25,960 --> 00:19:28,127 continue , I will discuss the findings 448 00:19:28,127 --> 00:19:30,570 with you but before I moved to the 449 00:19:30,570 --> 00:19:33,120 findings , I want to emphasize the 450 00:19:33,120 --> 00:19:35,470 importance and bravery of the Kenyan 451 00:19:35,470 --> 00:19:37,740 Defense Force personnel . Through the 452 00:19:37,740 --> 00:19:40,660 events of January 5 , 2020 453 00:19:41,940 --> 00:19:43,996 Union forces engaged Al Shabaab both 454 00:19:43,996 --> 00:19:46,300 side by side with US personnel and 455 00:19:46,310 --> 00:19:48,860 independently a Kenyan helicopter 456 00:19:48,860 --> 00:19:51,027 provided close air support to suppress 457 00:19:51,027 --> 00:19:53,640 AL ShabAAB fighters and a separate 458 00:19:53,640 --> 00:19:55,862 Kenyan helicopter transported a wounded 459 00:19:55,862 --> 00:19:57,920 member to a civilian airport for 460 00:19:57,920 --> 00:20:01,670 evacuation without question . The swift , 461 00:20:02,040 --> 00:20:04,460 skillful and courageous response of the 462 00:20:04,460 --> 00:20:07,020 Kenyan defense force saved many lives . 463 00:20:07,020 --> 00:20:09,430 That day . We are grateful for their 464 00:20:09,430 --> 00:20:12,020 strong relationship we have with these 465 00:20:12,020 --> 00:20:15,410 partners in kenya and especially for 466 00:20:15,410 --> 00:20:17,790 the bravery and skill they demonstrated 467 00:20:17,790 --> 00:20:21,080 that day . Now to the findings , 468 00:20:22,340 --> 00:20:24,396 the africom investigation found that 469 00:20:24,396 --> 00:20:26,507 the proximate cause of death , injury 470 00:20:26,507 --> 00:20:28,680 and property damage was the attack 471 00:20:28,680 --> 00:20:32,060 itself by a masked force of determined , 472 00:20:32,060 --> 00:20:34,190 disciplined and well resourced al 473 00:20:34,190 --> 00:20:37,460 Shabaab fighters . No one act or 474 00:20:37,460 --> 00:20:39,890 omission by us personnel would have 475 00:20:39,890 --> 00:20:43,850 avoided the attack . However , The 476 00:20:43,850 --> 00:20:45,810 investigation also identified four 477 00:20:45,810 --> 00:20:48,032 causal factors which contributed to the 478 00:20:48,032 --> 00:20:50,970 outcome of the attack . These findings 479 00:20:50,980 --> 00:20:53,100 are bent into four main categories , 480 00:20:54,040 --> 00:20:56,151 inadequate force protection , focus , 481 00:20:57,140 --> 00:20:59,960 inadequate understanding of the threat , 482 00:21:01,240 --> 00:21:03,760 inadequate security force preparation 483 00:21:04,840 --> 00:21:06,729 and problems with mission command 484 00:21:08,240 --> 00:21:10,462 following the attack . African directed 485 00:21:10,462 --> 00:21:12,351 subordinate component commands to 486 00:21:12,351 --> 00:21:14,296 implement the following corrective 487 00:21:14,296 --> 00:21:16,090 actions at all locations on the 488 00:21:16,090 --> 00:21:17,960 continent , not just Manda Bay . 489 00:21:19,240 --> 00:21:21,390 Prioritize physical defense 490 00:21:21,440 --> 00:21:24,200 improvements , conduct more frequent 491 00:21:24,200 --> 00:21:26,130 leadership visits and security 492 00:21:26,130 --> 00:21:29,310 inspections , enhance intelligence 493 00:21:29,320 --> 00:21:32,240 sharing , increase the size of security 494 00:21:32,240 --> 00:21:34,940 forces and adapt their focus and 495 00:21:34,940 --> 00:21:37,310 capability according to the threat at 496 00:21:37,310 --> 00:21:40,550 the location include defensive plans 497 00:21:40,550 --> 00:21:44,140 and pre deployment training , ensure 498 00:21:44,140 --> 00:21:46,362 clear command and control relationships 499 00:21:46,362 --> 00:21:49,060 especially regarding force protection 500 00:21:49,440 --> 00:21:52,460 and employ mobile surgical teams 501 00:21:53,940 --> 00:21:56,930 specific to Manda Bay . The 502 00:21:56,930 --> 00:21:58,597 improvements include clearing 503 00:21:58,597 --> 00:22:00,819 vegetation around mega Goni airfield to 504 00:22:00,819 --> 00:22:02,770 improve fields of observation . 505 00:22:03,740 --> 00:22:06,560 Established 360° defense at the 506 00:22:06,560 --> 00:22:09,330 airfield , improving defenses , 507 00:22:09,330 --> 00:22:11,386 fighting positions and indirect fire 508 00:22:11,386 --> 00:22:14,470 protection at Camp Simba , increasing 509 00:22:14,470 --> 00:22:16,500 Kenyan participation in security 510 00:22:16,500 --> 00:22:20,250 operations , increasing frequency and 511 00:22:20,250 --> 00:22:23,400 range of patrols and improving 512 00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:26,400 communications function and capability 513 00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:28,567 of the base defense operation center . 514 00:22:29,940 --> 00:22:31,773 We continue to mourn the loss of 515 00:22:31,773 --> 00:22:34,130 specialist Henry mitch , Mayfield , Mr 516 00:22:34,130 --> 00:22:36,750 Dustin , Harrison and mr Bruce triplet . 517 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:39,807 Their memory remains strong and in the 518 00:22:39,807 --> 00:22:41,918 forefront of our minds as we continue 519 00:22:41,918 --> 00:22:44,570 to enhance security at Manda Bay and 520 00:22:44,580 --> 00:22:47,790 across the continent . These tragic 521 00:22:47,790 --> 00:22:49,590 losses served as a catalyst for 522 00:22:49,590 --> 00:22:51,423 significant improvement to force 523 00:22:51,423 --> 00:22:53,510 protection , Intelligence sharing , 524 00:22:53,940 --> 00:22:56,500 Security force preparation and mission 525 00:22:56,500 --> 00:22:59,020 commander for U . S . Forces across 526 00:22:59,020 --> 00:23:02,870 Africa . As we counter ongoing 527 00:23:02,870 --> 00:23:04,720 threats from violent extremist 528 00:23:04,730 --> 00:23:07,500 organizations . These improvements will 529 00:23:07,500 --> 00:23:09,556 better protect our service members . 530 00:23:11,840 --> 00:23:14,007 This concludes my remarks . I will now 531 00:23:14,007 --> 00:23:16,240 turn the podium over to Major General 532 00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:20,190 Wilcox . Good afternoon and thank 533 00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:22,256 everybody . Thank you for being here 534 00:23:22,256 --> 00:23:24,311 today . I'm Major General Tom Wilcox 535 00:23:24,311 --> 00:23:26,600 and I was appointed along with other 536 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:28,940 officers and noncommissioned officers 537 00:23:28,950 --> 00:23:31,810 from across the services to assist 538 00:23:31,810 --> 00:23:34,960 General Funk with an independent review 539 00:23:34,970 --> 00:23:37,860 of US Africa . Command's investigation 540 00:23:38,240 --> 00:23:40,730 into the attack at cooperative security 541 00:23:40,730 --> 00:23:43,390 location . Manda Bay . I appreciate the 542 00:23:43,390 --> 00:23:45,334 opportunity to be chosen to assist 543 00:23:45,334 --> 00:23:47,446 General Funk in his efforts and to be 544 00:23:47,446 --> 00:23:49,501 here today to share with you to keep 545 00:23:49,501 --> 00:23:51,612 findings and recommendations from his 546 00:23:51,612 --> 00:23:54,090 independent review . I should note that 547 00:23:54,090 --> 00:23:55,979 before the independent review was 548 00:23:55,979 --> 00:23:57,646 directed , I was appointed to 549 00:23:57,646 --> 00:24:00,020 investigate aspects of the attack at 550 00:24:00,020 --> 00:24:03,020 Manda Bay by Africom is Air component 551 00:24:03,020 --> 00:24:05,610 commander . That investigation was 552 00:24:05,610 --> 00:24:07,770 stopped when the independent review 553 00:24:07,770 --> 00:24:10,560 began but not before I was able to walk 554 00:24:10,560 --> 00:24:12,450 the ground at Manda Bay , which 555 00:24:12,450 --> 00:24:14,728 definitely helped us during the review . 556 00:24:15,740 --> 00:24:18,410 The Independent review first focused on 557 00:24:18,410 --> 00:24:20,840 understanding the facts , findings , 558 00:24:20,850 --> 00:24:23,110 exhibits and supporting documents 559 00:24:23,120 --> 00:24:25,460 included in the original investigation . 560 00:24:26,140 --> 00:24:28,360 After exhaustive efforts by the 561 00:24:28,370 --> 00:24:31,060 Independent Review team . We concurred 562 00:24:31,060 --> 00:24:33,080 with the investigation on every 563 00:24:33,080 --> 00:24:35,750 significant issue . However , as 564 00:24:35,750 --> 00:24:38,330 General Funk explained , we benefited 565 00:24:38,330 --> 00:24:40,219 from a great amount of additional 566 00:24:40,219 --> 00:24:42,950 information not available at the time 567 00:24:42,950 --> 00:24:46,720 Africom conducted its investigation and 568 00:24:46,720 --> 00:24:49,040 we were able to expand on the four 569 00:24:49,040 --> 00:24:51,510 broad categories identified in the 570 00:24:51,510 --> 00:24:54,440 original investigation that contributed 571 00:24:54,450 --> 00:24:57,170 to the outcome of the attack . Some 572 00:24:57,170 --> 00:25:00,170 highlights include for Force Protection . 573 00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:02,862 The Independent review found that there 574 00:25:02,862 --> 00:25:04,880 was an unacceptably long processing 575 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:07,330 time for the planning approval and 576 00:25:07,330 --> 00:25:10,060 execution of force protection projects . 577 00:25:10,440 --> 00:25:12,510 The review recommended that more 578 00:25:12,510 --> 00:25:14,920 frequent reviews and rehearsals of 579 00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:16,920 force protection measures and based 580 00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:19,450 defense plans occur and that higher 581 00:25:19,450 --> 00:25:21,800 headquarters increase their oversight 582 00:25:21,970 --> 00:25:25,070 of force protection issues . Looking at 583 00:25:25,070 --> 00:25:26,681 intelligence re sourcing and 584 00:25:26,681 --> 00:25:28,820 structuring . The Independent review 585 00:25:28,820 --> 00:25:30,320 found that there was not a 586 00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:32,230 comprehensive analysis of threat 587 00:25:32,230 --> 00:25:34,590 information for Manda Bay and that 588 00:25:34,590 --> 00:25:37,220 insufficient resourcing and sharing of 589 00:25:37,220 --> 00:25:39,850 an inch of intelligence was an issue . 590 00:25:40,540 --> 00:25:43,060 This led to a recommendation that a 591 00:25:43,060 --> 00:25:45,400 holistic review of the intelligence 592 00:25:45,410 --> 00:25:48,410 architecture be conducted to ensure 593 00:25:48,410 --> 00:25:50,900 appropriate intelligence staffing 594 00:25:50,910 --> 00:25:54,050 resourcing and sharing of threat 595 00:25:54,060 --> 00:25:56,830 information on security forces 596 00:25:56,830 --> 00:25:59,100 preparation and training , pre 597 00:25:59,100 --> 00:26:00,933 deployment training , collective 598 00:26:00,933 --> 00:26:03,360 training and overall readiness were 599 00:26:03,360 --> 00:26:06,190 found to be insufficient , as was the 600 00:26:06,190 --> 00:26:08,110 tactical response of the Security 601 00:26:08,110 --> 00:26:10,950 forces personnel at Manda Bay , which 602 00:26:10,950 --> 00:26:12,650 leads back to some into that 603 00:26:12,650 --> 00:26:14,817 intelligence piece that I talked about 604 00:26:14,817 --> 00:26:17,330 getting the threat right . The review 605 00:26:17,330 --> 00:26:19,340 recommended restructuring pre 606 00:26:19,340 --> 00:26:21,560 deployment training and certification 607 00:26:21,570 --> 00:26:23,750 to take advantage of collective 608 00:26:23,750 --> 00:26:26,290 training , rehearsals and and in 609 00:26:26,290 --> 00:26:29,050 theater training . Then for mission 610 00:26:29,050 --> 00:26:31,510 command . It was found that flawed 611 00:26:31,510 --> 00:26:34,510 operational processes in inadequate 612 00:26:34,510 --> 00:26:36,510 command and control at the tactical 613 00:26:36,510 --> 00:26:38,732 level contributed to the outcome of the 614 00:26:38,732 --> 00:26:41,140 attack . Additionally , it was 615 00:26:41,140 --> 00:26:43,890 recommended that a single commander be 616 00:26:43,890 --> 00:26:46,140 given authority over the joint 617 00:26:46,140 --> 00:26:48,740 operating area where Amanda Bay was 618 00:26:48,740 --> 00:26:51,130 located to include oversight of force 619 00:26:51,130 --> 00:26:54,580 protection , intelligence training and 620 00:26:54,580 --> 00:26:57,570 other responsibilities beyond the 621 00:26:57,570 --> 00:26:59,740 overarching review of the initial 622 00:26:59,740 --> 00:27:01,790 inquiry . General Funk was also 623 00:27:01,790 --> 00:27:03,990 directed to answer specific questions 624 00:27:03,990 --> 00:27:05,860 during the Independent review 625 00:27:06,310 --> 00:27:08,366 concerning pre deployment training , 626 00:27:08,540 --> 00:27:11,290 the personal personnel assignment 627 00:27:11,290 --> 00:27:13,640 process , and whether the initial 628 00:27:13,640 --> 00:27:16,050 investigation of no negligence or 629 00:27:16,050 --> 00:27:18,740 misconduct was appropriate . Whether 630 00:27:18,740 --> 00:27:21,210 the initial investigations , finding of 631 00:27:21,210 --> 00:27:23,060 no negligence or misconduct was 632 00:27:23,060 --> 00:27:25,430 appropriate , both at lower levels and 633 00:27:25,430 --> 00:27:28,260 for more senior leaders . In short , 634 00:27:28,270 --> 00:27:30,159 the Independent Review found that 635 00:27:30,159 --> 00:27:32,326 certain personnel at Manda Bay and its 636 00:27:32,326 --> 00:27:34,437 higher headquarters were negligent in 637 00:27:34,437 --> 00:27:36,492 performing their duties . The review 638 00:27:36,492 --> 00:27:39,020 also found that certain senior officers 639 00:27:39,030 --> 00:27:41,030 contributed to the inadequate force 640 00:27:41,030 --> 00:27:44,000 protection posture at Manda Bay and to 641 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:46,470 some extent allowed a climate of 642 00:27:46,470 --> 00:27:49,160 complacency and poor understanding of 643 00:27:49,160 --> 00:27:51,850 the threat in the end though , while 644 00:27:51,850 --> 00:27:54,017 some individuals could and should have 645 00:27:54,017 --> 00:27:56,110 done better . The negligence of the 646 00:27:56,110 --> 00:27:58,700 individuals identified in the review 647 00:27:58,710 --> 00:28:01,180 was not the cause of the losses 648 00:28:01,180 --> 00:28:03,390 suffered in the attack , although it 649 00:28:03,390 --> 00:28:05,168 may have made the airfield more 650 00:28:05,168 --> 00:28:07,700 vulnerable . The Independent review 651 00:28:07,700 --> 00:28:09,630 also reconfirmed the bravery and 652 00:28:09,630 --> 00:28:12,010 heroism of dozens of outstanding 653 00:28:12,010 --> 00:28:14,590 service members , civilians and Kenyan 654 00:28:14,590 --> 00:28:18,110 forces like others speaking today , I 655 00:28:18,110 --> 00:28:20,820 to extend my sincere condolences to the 656 00:28:20,820 --> 00:28:22,876 families of those americans who lost 657 00:28:22,876 --> 00:28:25,380 their lives in this attack . We're all 658 00:28:25,380 --> 00:28:27,380 encouraged by the improvements that 659 00:28:27,380 --> 00:28:29,510 have been made by africom and the Air 660 00:28:29,510 --> 00:28:31,770 Force . As a result of this event , 661 00:28:32,940 --> 00:28:35,000 Lieutenant General Basham discussed 662 00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:37,760 many of those already and I will now be 663 00:28:37,760 --> 00:28:39,649 followed by Brigadier General Roy 664 00:28:39,649 --> 00:28:42,150 Collins who will discuss some others . 665 00:28:42,160 --> 00:28:45,350 Thank you . Thank you sir . 666 00:28:48,040 --> 00:28:50,560 Good afternoon , I'm Brigadier General 667 00:28:50,560 --> 00:28:52,560 Roy Collins . Air Force Director of 668 00:28:52,560 --> 00:28:55,000 Security Forces , The Department of 669 00:28:55,000 --> 00:28:57,222 Defense Investigation findings from the 670 00:28:57,222 --> 00:28:59,230 five January 2020 attack at car 671 00:28:59,240 --> 00:29:01,990 security location , Manda Bay drove the 672 00:29:01,990 --> 00:29:03,879 need for enhanced security forces 673 00:29:03,879 --> 00:29:06,060 training scenarios and a modification 674 00:29:06,060 --> 00:29:08,500 of pre deployment preparation in order 675 00:29:08,500 --> 00:29:11,020 to support us africom current force 676 00:29:11,020 --> 00:29:13,780 protection threat based on the tactical 677 00:29:13,780 --> 00:29:16,002 training deficiencies identified in the 678 00:29:16,002 --> 00:29:18,113 investigation . Our Regional Training 679 00:29:18,113 --> 00:29:20,002 Center developed a robust mission 680 00:29:20,002 --> 00:29:21,891 focused rehearsal training course 681 00:29:21,891 --> 00:29:24,002 designed to close the gaps identified 682 00:29:24,002 --> 00:29:25,780 with collective training , team 683 00:29:25,780 --> 00:29:27,724 cohesion and leadership core skill 684 00:29:27,724 --> 00:29:30,630 training rehearsals , battle drills and 685 00:29:30,630 --> 00:29:33,300 mission preparation . Additionally , 686 00:29:33,310 --> 00:29:35,366 the need existed to develop tailored 687 00:29:35,366 --> 00:29:37,930 complex attacks scenarios informed by 688 00:29:37,930 --> 00:29:40,440 real world threat information to ensure 689 00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:42,800 relevant , hard and realistic training 690 00:29:42,800 --> 00:29:45,670 environment existed for our defenders . 691 00:29:46,540 --> 00:29:48,707 Prior to the rehearsal training course 692 00:29:48,707 --> 00:29:50,818 completion aggregated security forces 693 00:29:50,818 --> 00:29:52,818 members must complete a culminating 694 00:29:52,818 --> 00:29:55,040 capstone field training event to ensure 695 00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:57,270 deploying forces , our mission ready . 696 00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:00,351 The rehearsal training course greatly 697 00:30:00,351 --> 00:30:02,351 exceeds the previous pre deployment 698 00:30:02,351 --> 00:30:04,407 courses and focused on providing the 699 00:30:04,407 --> 00:30:06,129 base defense mindset and force 700 00:30:06,129 --> 00:30:08,351 protection posture needed to operate in 701 00:30:08,351 --> 00:30:10,760 a hostile environment while at the same 702 00:30:10,760 --> 00:30:12,704 time ensuring the highest level of 703 00:30:12,704 --> 00:30:14,760 protection for our personnel and our 704 00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:16,704 resources no matter where they are 705 00:30:16,704 --> 00:30:19,910 planning The updated rehearsal training 706 00:30:19,910 --> 00:30:22,560 course was implemented in fall of 2020 707 00:30:23,440 --> 00:30:25,773 and all following forces into the U . S . 708 00:30:25,773 --> 00:30:28,110 Africom A are are now receiving this 709 00:30:28,110 --> 00:30:30,540 training following the establishment 710 00:30:30,550 --> 00:30:32,661 and the execution of this course as a 711 00:30:32,661 --> 00:30:34,772 member of a joint team . We conducted 712 00:30:34,772 --> 00:30:36,717 an on the ground assessment of the 713 00:30:36,717 --> 00:30:38,661 deployed forces within the U . S . 714 00:30:38,661 --> 00:30:40,828 Africom kor to validate the training , 715 00:30:40,828 --> 00:30:42,717 met the force protection required 716 00:30:42,717 --> 00:30:45,780 standards in closing the response to 717 00:30:45,780 --> 00:30:47,780 the findings , generated a security 718 00:30:47,780 --> 00:30:49,970 forces enterprise wide review that 719 00:30:49,970 --> 00:30:51,970 ensured pre deployment training was 720 00:30:51,970 --> 00:30:53,914 revamped , collective training was 721 00:30:53,914 --> 00:30:56,137 being conducted prior to deployment and 722 00:30:56,137 --> 00:30:58,260 in theater and ensure training and 723 00:30:58,260 --> 00:31:00,640 preparation is tailored to the deployed 724 00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:03,510 locations threat . I will now turn the 725 00:31:03,510 --> 00:31:05,843 floor over to Lieutenant General Basham , 726 00:31:12,550 --> 00:31:14,790 I think you're on mute . They're still 727 00:31:14,800 --> 00:31:18,540 in general and mr 728 00:31:18,540 --> 00:31:20,818 Kirby I'm showing that I'm all for you . 729 00:31:20,818 --> 00:31:23,620 Can you hear me okay ? I'll turn the 730 00:31:23,620 --> 00:31:25,453 floor over to you and then we're 731 00:31:25,453 --> 00:31:27,731 prepared to take questions . Thank you . 732 00:31:27,731 --> 00:31:29,898 All right , general thank you . Okay . 733 00:31:29,898 --> 00:31:32,064 We'll go to questions Leader , I'm not 734 00:31:32,064 --> 00:31:34,940 sure exactly who to who can swing at 735 00:31:34,940 --> 00:31:37,107 this , but I have a couple of things . 736 00:31:37,440 --> 00:31:40,680 Um One you talked about , improvements 737 00:31:40,690 --> 00:31:43,130 to training etcetera . I'm wondering it 738 00:31:43,130 --> 00:31:45,390 sounds like that is probably applicable 739 00:31:45,390 --> 00:31:48,270 to all forces going to africom . But 740 00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:50,950 was there any effort to consider 741 00:31:50,950 --> 00:31:52,790 whether whether or not similar 742 00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:55,460 deficiencies were in at other areas at 743 00:31:55,460 --> 00:31:57,740 other bases ? That also could be could 744 00:31:57,740 --> 00:31:59,851 benefit from some of the changes that 745 00:31:59,851 --> 00:32:02,080 were made here , including staffing 746 00:32:02,080 --> 00:32:04,280 shortfalls . And then 747 00:32:04,290 --> 00:32:08,170 secondarily , can 748 00:32:08,170 --> 00:32:11,490 you assess the ongoing al Shabaab 749 00:32:11,500 --> 00:32:14,020 threat and whether sort of overall has 750 00:32:14,020 --> 00:32:17,040 that changed increased at that at Manda 751 00:32:17,040 --> 00:32:19,910 Bay and or um in that region . And I 752 00:32:19,910 --> 00:32:22,021 have one thing that I don't know that 753 00:32:22,021 --> 00:32:24,299 you can address but on the punishments . 754 00:32:24,299 --> 00:32:26,810 Um I know there's not a lot of detail 755 00:32:26,810 --> 00:32:28,840 about the discipline but can anyone 756 00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:31,020 address whether anyone was fired , 757 00:32:31,020 --> 00:32:34,380 relieved of duty in any way other from 758 00:32:34,380 --> 00:32:36,670 their jobs and not remove him service . 759 00:32:36,670 --> 00:32:39,540 But anything like that . Let me jump in 760 00:32:39,540 --> 00:32:41,650 before the generals on the 761 00:32:41,650 --> 00:32:43,761 accountability thing . We would refer 762 00:32:43,761 --> 00:32:45,428 to the Air Force . These were 763 00:32:45,428 --> 00:32:49,180 administrative um administrative 764 00:32:49,180 --> 00:32:51,291 actions that were taken . So it would 765 00:32:51,291 --> 00:32:53,458 really be up to the Air Force to to be 766 00:32:53,458 --> 00:32:55,569 able to decide for themselves how and 767 00:32:55,569 --> 00:32:57,791 to what degree they would speak to that 768 00:32:57,791 --> 00:32:59,958 the the general's here would not be uh 769 00:32:59,958 --> 00:32:59,440 in a position to talk about 770 00:32:59,440 --> 00:33:01,607 accountability and I will turn it over 771 00:33:01,607 --> 00:33:03,830 to any of you on the other questions on 772 00:33:03,830 --> 00:33:07,610 who might be best for for those joe 773 00:33:07,610 --> 00:33:09,554 Collins all offered to you for the 774 00:33:09,554 --> 00:33:11,721 training and then I'll touch on the Al 775 00:33:11,721 --> 00:33:13,832 Shabaab threat , That's a good copy , 776 00:33:13,832 --> 00:33:15,832 sir . So ma'am , in relation to the 777 00:33:15,832 --> 00:33:17,888 training in relation to the training 778 00:33:17,888 --> 00:33:20,940 that impacts all all the US African 779 00:33:20,940 --> 00:33:23,340 theater . So every security forces 780 00:33:23,340 --> 00:33:25,790 member deploying into US africom is 781 00:33:25,790 --> 00:33:28,610 required to treat to complete a 27 day 782 00:33:28,620 --> 00:33:30,731 mission focused reading this training 783 00:33:30,731 --> 00:33:32,842 course , that course focuses on those 784 00:33:32,842 --> 00:33:35,120 rehearsal drills , those battle drills , 785 00:33:35,120 --> 00:33:38,020 those core skills and allows them to 786 00:33:38,030 --> 00:33:40,410 collectively come together and train as 787 00:33:40,410 --> 00:33:42,710 a team so that when they're in the A . 788 00:33:42,710 --> 00:33:45,930 R . In the fight um they understand 789 00:33:45,930 --> 00:33:48,540 from a command and control perspective 790 00:33:48,550 --> 00:33:50,780 what should happen , how how it should 791 00:33:50,780 --> 00:33:52,891 happen in any environment that we put 792 00:33:52,891 --> 00:33:55,002 them in regardless of the size of the 793 00:33:55,002 --> 00:33:56,669 threat . So that training was 794 00:33:56,669 --> 00:33:58,836 implemented in the fall of 2020 and it 795 00:33:58,836 --> 00:34:01,100 is now set in for any forces going into 796 00:34:01,100 --> 00:34:03,780 the U . S . Africom kor in relation to 797 00:34:03,790 --> 00:34:06,320 how do we do this across um 798 00:34:06,330 --> 00:34:10,150 38,000 personnel enterprise . Um We've 799 00:34:10,150 --> 00:34:12,094 started you know with the with the 800 00:34:12,094 --> 00:34:15,380 current 38,000 we have but we also um 801 00:34:15,380 --> 00:34:17,491 went into our officers course and our 802 00:34:17,491 --> 00:34:19,713 sessions course for our enlisted airmen 803 00:34:19,713 --> 00:34:22,600 and we embedded based defense as the 804 00:34:22,610 --> 00:34:25,570 foundational skill set required for any 805 00:34:25,570 --> 00:34:28,500 location that they are assigned to or 806 00:34:28,500 --> 00:34:30,770 deployed to in in alignment with the 807 00:34:30,770 --> 00:34:32,326 National Defense strategy . 808 00:34:35,040 --> 00:34:37,151 Follow up to the do we consider Alice 809 00:34:37,151 --> 00:34:39,460 bob to still be a threat ? The answer 810 00:34:39,460 --> 00:34:41,460 is yes . We would still consider Al 811 00:34:41,460 --> 00:34:43,750 Shabab in this region to be a threat . 812 00:34:43,750 --> 00:34:45,750 However , the actions that we have 813 00:34:45,750 --> 00:34:48,230 taken not only at Manda Bay but other 814 00:34:48,240 --> 00:34:50,860 locations uh to put force protections 815 00:34:50,870 --> 00:34:52,814 in place , appropriate training in 816 00:34:52,814 --> 00:34:56,410 place as well as to appropriately equip 817 00:34:56,420 --> 00:34:58,530 and provide the oversight gives us 818 00:34:58,530 --> 00:35:01,450 confidence that we still have a while . 819 00:35:01,450 --> 00:35:03,672 We still have a threat in the area . We 820 00:35:03,672 --> 00:35:05,894 have a process with force protection in 821 00:35:05,894 --> 00:35:07,910 place to be able to protect our 822 00:35:07,920 --> 00:35:10,560 military members and to further enable 823 00:35:10,570 --> 00:35:13,230 our partners in kenya as well as 824 00:35:13,240 --> 00:35:15,296 Somalia and fighting back against Al 825 00:35:15,296 --> 00:35:19,120 Shabaab . I think you 826 00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:21,176 touched on this , but um part of the 827 00:35:21,176 --> 00:35:23,490 question was physical with their other 828 00:35:23,490 --> 00:35:25,960 sort of security improvements at other 829 00:35:25,960 --> 00:35:28,860 bases around Africa resulting from the 830 00:35:28,860 --> 00:35:32,030 scrutiny at Manda Bay . Great thank you 831 00:35:32,030 --> 00:35:34,086 for that . Follow up . The answer is 832 00:35:34,086 --> 00:35:36,480 actually yes . I'll start by saying 833 00:35:36,480 --> 00:35:38,536 that there was a complete assessment 834 00:35:38,536 --> 00:35:41,420 across all installations across africom 835 00:35:41,430 --> 00:35:43,780 and then each installation based upon 836 00:35:43,790 --> 00:35:45,846 its physical capabilities as well as 837 00:35:45,846 --> 00:35:48,250 the personnel was assessed for 838 00:35:48,260 --> 00:35:50,260 increased level of force protection 839 00:35:50,260 --> 00:35:54,030 equipment or or personnel . We 840 00:35:54,040 --> 00:35:56,151 certainly have moved out on Manda Bay 841 00:35:56,151 --> 00:35:58,120 and providing uh force protection 842 00:35:58,120 --> 00:35:59,842 measures around the airfield , 843 00:35:59,842 --> 00:36:02,009 improving force protection measures at 844 00:36:02,009 --> 00:36:04,009 Camp Simba , but at the same time , 845 00:36:04,009 --> 00:36:07,040 each location now goes under an annual 846 00:36:07,050 --> 00:36:09,000 assessment as well as any time 847 00:36:09,000 --> 00:36:10,980 commanders changeover , they do a 848 00:36:10,980 --> 00:36:13,140 review of the overall integrated 849 00:36:13,140 --> 00:36:15,307 defense plan for those installations . 850 00:36:16,530 --> 00:36:18,900 Okay , any questions here elsewhere in 851 00:36:18,900 --> 00:36:21,122 the room ? Okay . We'll go to the phone 852 00:36:21,122 --> 00:36:23,480 lines , Jeff Vogel , task and purpose . 853 00:36:24,730 --> 00:36:27,800 Thank you . I if I heard General Wilcox 854 00:36:27,800 --> 00:36:31,330 correctly , he said the review found 855 00:36:31,330 --> 00:36:34,740 that some senior commanders uh may have 856 00:36:34,740 --> 00:36:37,810 contributed to the issues leading up to 857 00:36:37,810 --> 00:36:40,410 the delinquencies . Found . Who are 858 00:36:40,410 --> 00:36:42,632 these senior commanders and what did or 859 00:36:42,632 --> 00:36:43,960 they did not do . 860 00:36:46,730 --> 00:36:50,030 Okay . We took a look uh let me walk 861 00:36:50,030 --> 00:36:53,590 you back to the 15 6 because the 15 6 862 00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:56,150 and I'll kind of explain how these are 863 00:36:56,150 --> 00:36:58,870 nested together . Uh 15 6 . The 864 00:36:58,870 --> 00:37:02,000 original 15 6 by africom identified 865 00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:04,940 folks by name in the report uh and said , 866 00:37:04,940 --> 00:37:07,310 hey , these folks could be found 867 00:37:07,320 --> 00:37:09,610 negligent . Uh the way that process 868 00:37:09,610 --> 00:37:12,320 works is the 15 6 typically gets done . 869 00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:14,680 The Combatant command releases the 15 6 870 00:37:14,680 --> 00:37:16,610 back to the components and the 871 00:37:16,610 --> 00:37:18,166 components work through the 872 00:37:18,166 --> 00:37:20,277 accountability and whether the person 873 00:37:20,277 --> 00:37:22,350 was negligent . Um I was actually on 874 00:37:22,350 --> 00:37:24,370 that team as part of the Air Force 875 00:37:24,370 --> 00:37:28,080 Africa , uh prior to the Secretary of 876 00:37:28,080 --> 00:37:30,990 Defense initiating in order in the 877 00:37:30,990 --> 00:37:33,200 independent review . So as part of the 878 00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:35,800 independent review , we took that and 879 00:37:35,800 --> 00:37:39,670 we also looked across the spectrum of 880 00:37:39,670 --> 00:37:42,910 everybody that operates in that area , 881 00:37:42,920 --> 00:37:46,390 from africom to uh the Air Force 882 00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:50,360 Special Operations Forces , the 883 00:37:50,370 --> 00:37:53,470 CJ Combined Joint Task Force HOA and 884 00:37:53,470 --> 00:37:55,930 the individuals there at Manda Bay 885 00:37:55,940 --> 00:37:58,620 because General Funk was charged to go 886 00:37:58,620 --> 00:38:01,190 take a look at who by their in actions 887 00:38:01,190 --> 00:38:04,160 or inactions uh potentially was 888 00:38:04,160 --> 00:38:07,150 negligent . So we did that and we 889 00:38:07,150 --> 00:38:09,940 looked and we found and and we said 890 00:38:09,940 --> 00:38:11,718 senior officers , we didn't say 891 00:38:11,718 --> 00:38:13,662 anything about commanders . In the 892 00:38:13,662 --> 00:38:15,718 statement , General Funk said senior 893 00:38:15,718 --> 00:38:17,900 officers , he found some senior 894 00:38:17,900 --> 00:38:21,480 officers at the level above Manda 895 00:38:21,480 --> 00:38:24,510 Bay . Uh you know and recommended 896 00:38:24,510 --> 00:38:28,120 negligence on those officers basically 897 00:38:28,120 --> 00:38:30,360 because of the insufficient oversight 898 00:38:30,360 --> 00:38:32,410 that they had or provided their 899 00:38:32,410 --> 00:38:35,150 inaction on that oversight for force 900 00:38:35,150 --> 00:38:37,330 protection , intelligence etcetera at 901 00:38:37,330 --> 00:38:39,780 Manda Bay . And then the remaining 902 00:38:39,780 --> 00:38:42,930 folks were obviously uh you know 903 00:38:42,930 --> 00:38:45,100 officers senior N . C . O . S down to 904 00:38:45,100 --> 00:38:48,130 enlisted at Manda Bay that were 905 00:38:48,130 --> 00:38:51,190 included in those uh negligent findings 906 00:38:51,190 --> 00:38:53,246 that we turned over to the secretary 907 00:38:53,246 --> 00:38:55,412 and then that Mr Kirby was saying were 908 00:38:55,412 --> 00:38:57,412 turned over to the Air Force . So I 909 00:38:57,412 --> 00:38:59,634 direct you to the Air Force to find out 910 00:38:59,634 --> 00:39:01,830 the outcomes of those . But that's 911 00:39:01,830 --> 00:39:04,052 basically that process and what we took 912 00:39:04,052 --> 00:39:06,970 a look at . Okay Uh Yeah go ahead . 913 00:39:07,060 --> 00:39:09,560 Please identify yourself . My name is 914 00:39:09,560 --> 00:39:11,870 Roger . I worked for media network . My 915 00:39:11,870 --> 00:39:14,280 question is on the Attackers . I 916 00:39:14,280 --> 00:39:16,502 believe he said six of them were killed 917 00:39:16,502 --> 00:39:18,336 and they were about 30 . But the 918 00:39:18,336 --> 00:39:20,558 investigation also look at who if there 919 00:39:20,558 --> 00:39:22,669 was a particular al-Shabaab leader or 920 00:39:22,669 --> 00:39:24,558 figure that was behind the attack 921 00:39:28,020 --> 00:39:31,800 offer them following the attack . 922 00:39:32,220 --> 00:39:34,442 There there was a process to go through 923 00:39:34,442 --> 00:39:37,430 to see if we could find out who was 924 00:39:37,430 --> 00:39:40,980 behind the attack during in 925 00:39:40,990 --> 00:39:44,540 2020 there were upwards of 926 00:39:44,920 --> 00:39:48,440 50 attacks on Al Shabaab and in 2021 927 00:39:48,450 --> 00:39:51,340 upwards of 10 attacks on Al Shabaab . I 928 00:39:51,340 --> 00:39:53,507 can say that from talking with general 929 00:39:53,507 --> 00:39:55,618 Townsend that we would assess that at 930 00:39:55,618 --> 00:39:57,840 least one individual that was connected 931 00:39:57,840 --> 00:40:01,760 to Al Shabaab was in one of those one 932 00:40:01,760 --> 00:40:04,130 of those attacks . But as far as any 933 00:40:04,130 --> 00:40:06,297 additional information or intelligence 934 00:40:06,297 --> 00:40:09,580 as to what has been done to 935 00:40:09,590 --> 00:40:11,420 locate individuals that were 936 00:40:11,430 --> 00:40:13,940 specifically involved and maybe even on 937 00:40:13,940 --> 00:40:15,551 the airfield , no additional 938 00:40:15,551 --> 00:40:18,570 information at this time . Okay . We'll 939 00:40:18,570 --> 00:40:20,650 go to uh Qasim on the phone there . 940 00:40:22,320 --> 00:40:24,153 Hi john thank you very much . My 941 00:40:24,153 --> 00:40:26,264 question is covered . I will defer my 942 00:40:26,264 --> 00:40:28,320 chance for the next briefing . Thank 943 00:40:28,320 --> 00:40:30,431 you . No more questions in the room . 944 00:40:30,820 --> 00:40:32,876 Okay gentlemen , thank you very much 945 00:40:32,876 --> 00:40:35,380 for a really thoughtful and 946 00:40:35,390 --> 00:40:37,557 comprehensive presentation . We really 947 00:40:37,557 --> 00:40:39,890 appreciate your time and general Basham . 948 00:40:39,890 --> 00:40:42,112 Thanks for joining us virtually again , 949 00:40:42,112 --> 00:40:44,279 we appreciate that that this concludes 950 00:40:44,279 --> 00:40:46,446 the briefing for today and again , for 951 00:40:46,446 --> 00:40:46,230 any other questions regarding 952 00:40:46,230 --> 00:40:48,610 accountability . Please refer those to 953 00:40:48,620 --> 00:40:49,750 the Air Force . Thank you