1 00:00:00,640 --> 00:00:02,751 afternoon , everybody , just a couple 2 00:00:02,751 --> 00:00:04,029 of things at the top . 3 00:00:07,040 --> 00:00:10,860 I think you saw a day or 4 00:00:10,860 --> 00:00:13,360 so ago or uh 5 00:00:14,520 --> 00:00:16,464 I announced that the secretary was 6 00:00:16,464 --> 00:00:18,576 heading to brussels next week for the 7 00:00:18,576 --> 00:00:21,390 NATO defense ministerial in person . Um 8 00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:24,700 He will follow up his visit to 9 00:00:24,710 --> 00:00:27,090 brussels for the defense ministerial 10 00:00:27,090 --> 00:00:31,050 with a visit to Slovakia where he will 11 00:00:31,050 --> 00:00:34,950 visit with senior civilian and military 12 00:00:34,950 --> 00:00:38,810 leaders there to again make 13 00:00:38,810 --> 00:00:41,710 clear our firm commitment to to NATO's 14 00:00:41,710 --> 00:00:44,170 eastern flank and talk about ways to 15 00:00:44,170 --> 00:00:47,700 deepen the US Slovakia relationship . 16 00:00:48,840 --> 00:00:52,070 A quick exercise notify might us Africa 17 00:00:52,070 --> 00:00:55,520 command's exercise . Obeng Gami Express , 18 00:00:55,530 --> 00:00:57,474 the largest multinational maritime 19 00:00:57,474 --> 00:00:59,530 exercise in Western Africa will kick 20 00:00:59,530 --> 00:01:02,360 off its 11th year today . 32 nations 21 00:01:02,360 --> 00:01:04,582 are participating in the exercise which 22 00:01:04,582 --> 00:01:06,804 is hosted by Senegal exercises designed 23 00:01:06,804 --> 00:01:08,693 to improve regional cooperation , 24 00:01:08,693 --> 00:01:10,916 maritime domain awareness , information 25 00:01:10,916 --> 00:01:12,638 sharing practices and tactical 26 00:01:12,638 --> 00:01:15,480 interdiction expertise to enhance the 27 00:01:15,480 --> 00:01:17,424 collective capabilities of all the 28 00:01:17,424 --> 00:01:19,536 participating nations with respect to 29 00:01:19,536 --> 00:01:21,758 countering sea based illicit activity . 30 00:01:21,758 --> 00:01:23,870 So that's starting today . That will 31 00:01:23,870 --> 00:01:26,380 take questions , bob . Thank you . A 32 00:01:26,390 --> 00:01:29,860 couple of questions on Ukraine . The 33 00:01:30,340 --> 00:01:32,880 air strikes in the west on I think two 34 00:01:32,880 --> 00:01:36,400 airfields . Um does that to you , Does 35 00:01:36,400 --> 00:01:38,800 that suggest a whitening of the war 36 00:01:38,810 --> 00:01:40,940 effort by Russia ? And the second 37 00:01:40,940 --> 00:01:42,773 question has to do with the much 38 00:01:42,773 --> 00:01:46,060 discussed convoy north or northwest of 39 00:01:46,540 --> 00:01:50,090 Kiev do changes in the 40 00:01:50,090 --> 00:01:53,170 positioning of elements of that convoy 41 00:01:53,180 --> 00:01:55,810 portend like an imminent assault on 42 00:01:55,820 --> 00:01:58,050 Kiev or any significant military 43 00:01:58,050 --> 00:02:01,700 movement . Well , I'd say that the 44 00:02:01,710 --> 00:02:03,821 people of Kiev would tell you they're 45 00:02:03,821 --> 00:02:06,480 under assault right now . Um there's a 46 00:02:06,490 --> 00:02:08,657 Russian bombardment and shelling going 47 00:02:08,657 --> 00:02:11,770 on quite violently as we speak . Uh , 48 00:02:11,770 --> 00:02:14,060 and we do assess that the Russians are 49 00:02:14,480 --> 00:02:16,850 beginning to make more momentum on the 50 00:02:16,850 --> 00:02:18,961 ground towards Kiev particularly from 51 00:02:18,961 --> 00:02:21,820 the east , not quite so much from the 52 00:02:21,830 --> 00:02:23,941 north . I don't want to make too much 53 00:02:23,941 --> 00:02:26,390 of the fact that there's satellite 54 00:02:26,390 --> 00:02:28,446 imagery is talking about this , this 55 00:02:28,446 --> 00:02:30,446 convoy , you know , moving off into 56 00:02:30,446 --> 00:02:32,557 tree lines or dispersing . That could 57 00:02:32,557 --> 00:02:34,612 just be force protection because the 58 00:02:34,612 --> 00:02:36,723 Ukrainians have continued to threaten 59 00:02:36,723 --> 00:02:38,334 that convoy and its progress 60 00:02:38,334 --> 00:02:40,710 essentially bob we don't see any 61 00:02:41,440 --> 00:02:44,940 progress by it to to re supply and 62 00:02:44,940 --> 00:02:48,010 support operations to the south . But 63 00:02:48,020 --> 00:02:50,131 but again , I I I'd be careful making 64 00:02:50,131 --> 00:02:52,242 too much about this dispersal stuff . 65 00:02:52,440 --> 00:02:54,740 Um , I don't do that . I feel like I 66 00:02:54,740 --> 00:02:57,050 missed one . Did I get the west the 67 00:02:57,050 --> 00:02:59,328 attacks in the west ? Yeah , thank you . 68 00:02:59,328 --> 00:03:01,494 Um yeah , difficult to know with great 69 00:03:01,494 --> 00:03:03,606 certainty what the Russians are doing 70 00:03:03,606 --> 00:03:05,550 here . Our assessment is that they 71 00:03:05,550 --> 00:03:07,550 struck a couple of airfields in the 72 00:03:07,550 --> 00:03:09,717 west . Um , It's not like there hasn't 73 00:03:09,717 --> 00:03:12,010 been any airstrikes in western Ukraine 74 00:03:12,010 --> 00:03:14,121 since the beginning of this Operation 75 00:03:14,121 --> 00:03:16,980 16 days ago . It's just that we haven't 76 00:03:16,980 --> 00:03:19,147 seen that as a routine matter . So now 77 00:03:19,147 --> 00:03:21,091 you've got two in one day . That's 78 00:03:21,091 --> 00:03:22,869 notable what it means , what it 79 00:03:22,869 --> 00:03:24,980 portends where the Russians are going 80 00:03:24,980 --> 00:03:27,202 with this . We don't really know . Um , 81 00:03:27,202 --> 00:03:29,424 we believe the targets were airfields . 82 00:03:29,424 --> 00:03:31,660 So from a military perspective , you 83 00:03:31,660 --> 00:03:33,882 could see a certain logical sense there 84 00:03:33,882 --> 00:03:35,993 to deny the Ukrainians the ability to 85 00:03:35,993 --> 00:03:38,160 use some some airstrips in the western 86 00:03:38,160 --> 00:03:40,490 part of the country , but by and large , 87 00:03:40,500 --> 00:03:42,667 and to the vast majority of the combat 88 00:03:42,667 --> 00:03:44,556 power that they are exercising in 89 00:03:44,556 --> 00:03:46,778 Ukraine . It is on , it's in the east , 90 00:03:46,778 --> 00:03:48,889 it's everything east of Kiev . That's 91 00:03:48,889 --> 00:03:50,889 where the violence is , uh , is the 92 00:03:50,889 --> 00:03:52,778 worst . That's where their , uh , 93 00:03:53,340 --> 00:03:55,229 putting a lot of their energy and 94 00:03:55,229 --> 00:03:57,451 resources in . Those are the population 95 00:03:57,451 --> 00:03:57,450 centers that they're going after 96 00:03:57,450 --> 00:04:01,190 Kharkiv , Kiev , uh , mary a pole , 97 00:04:01,200 --> 00:04:04,800 uh , Nikolaev down to the south , um , 98 00:04:04,800 --> 00:04:06,689 and they're still fighting in the 99 00:04:06,689 --> 00:04:08,911 Donbas . So it's really two more to the 100 00:04:08,911 --> 00:04:10,911 east marginal change . Or is that a 101 00:04:10,911 --> 00:04:13,078 reflective widening of their efforts ? 102 00:04:13,078 --> 00:04:15,300 Again , I think it's too soon to know . 103 00:04:15,300 --> 00:04:17,133 I mean , we're talking about two 104 00:04:17,133 --> 00:04:19,244 strikes on two fields . Um , um , and 105 00:04:19,244 --> 00:04:21,300 it's not like we haven't seen any in 106 00:04:21,300 --> 00:04:23,411 the past there . So I think it's just 107 00:04:23,411 --> 00:04:25,633 too soon to be able to divine some sort 108 00:04:25,633 --> 00:04:27,967 of larger purpose here or some strategy ? 109 00:04:27,967 --> 00:04:30,133 Um , Again , the vast vast majority of 110 00:04:30,133 --> 00:04:32,189 their combat power is being spent in 111 00:04:32,189 --> 00:04:34,640 the east . Yeah . What kind of weapon 112 00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:36,751 was used to fire at those airfields ? 113 00:04:36,751 --> 00:04:38,696 Was it a missile that came in from 114 00:04:38,696 --> 00:04:40,973 Belarus ? So what , what do you assess ? 115 00:04:40,973 --> 00:04:43,029 We don't really have point of origin 116 00:04:43,029 --> 00:04:45,196 here , don't have types of munitions . 117 00:04:45,196 --> 00:04:45,180 The Russians themselves admitted that 118 00:04:45,180 --> 00:04:47,990 they used long range precision guided 119 00:04:48,050 --> 00:04:51,640 weapons . Certainly we would we would 120 00:04:51,640 --> 00:04:53,640 agree with the long range aspect of 121 00:04:53,640 --> 00:04:55,584 this , since they don't have force 122 00:04:55,584 --> 00:04:57,990 structure in Ukraine that is really 123 00:04:57,990 --> 00:05:00,370 concentrated in the west ? All of their 124 00:05:00,370 --> 00:05:02,490 ground power is in the east . So I 125 00:05:02,490 --> 00:05:04,657 don't think we push back on the notion 126 00:05:04,657 --> 00:05:06,712 that's long range , but what kind of 127 00:05:06,712 --> 00:05:08,823 missile , what kind of munition ? You 128 00:05:08,823 --> 00:05:10,990 know , what the what the warhead was ? 129 00:05:10,990 --> 00:05:13,212 We don't have that level of detail your 130 00:05:13,212 --> 00:05:13,060 assessment that those fields were 131 00:05:13,060 --> 00:05:15,282 targeted . Because there's been so much 132 00:05:15,282 --> 00:05:17,338 talk of these MiG 20 nine's and they 133 00:05:17,338 --> 00:05:19,560 would have been airfields that the MIgs 134 00:05:19,560 --> 00:05:19,550 would have flown from ? We don't know . 135 00:05:20,140 --> 00:05:23,710 And what will the U . S . Do if Russia 136 00:05:23,710 --> 00:05:26,110 uses a chemical weapon in Ukraine ? 137 00:05:26,250 --> 00:05:28,028 Well , I don't want to get into 138 00:05:28,028 --> 00:05:30,950 speculating , I think you heard the 139 00:05:30,950 --> 00:05:34,410 president very clearly today say that 140 00:05:34,410 --> 00:05:36,577 there would be severe consequences for 141 00:05:36,577 --> 00:05:39,120 Russia um should that happen ? And I 142 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:41,287 don't think it would be helpful for me 143 00:05:41,287 --> 00:05:43,342 to go beyond that right now from the 144 00:05:43,342 --> 00:05:45,509 Defense Department . Do you think , do 145 00:05:45,509 --> 00:05:45,040 you have any indications that those 146 00:05:45,040 --> 00:05:47,096 attacks on the airfields in the west 147 00:05:47,096 --> 00:05:49,200 could have been because any foreign 148 00:05:49,200 --> 00:05:51,311 military equipment or anything that's 149 00:05:51,311 --> 00:05:53,311 been flowing through there and they 150 00:05:53,311 --> 00:05:55,422 were trying to target ? I'm not going 151 00:05:55,422 --> 00:05:57,144 to speak for Russian targeting 152 00:05:57,144 --> 00:05:59,100 procedures here court what we know 153 00:05:59,100 --> 00:06:01,156 those airfields will hit exactly why 154 00:06:01,156 --> 00:06:02,989 and what was in the Russian mind 155 00:06:02,989 --> 00:06:05,322 mindset , it's difficult for us to know . 156 00:06:05,322 --> 00:06:07,544 And then can you update on two things ? 157 00:06:07,544 --> 00:06:09,711 One , have there been any developments 158 00:06:09,711 --> 00:06:11,878 or changes on the nuclear front ? Like 159 00:06:11,878 --> 00:06:13,878 are you seeing any indications that 160 00:06:13,878 --> 00:06:15,989 Russia maybe considering planning for 161 00:06:15,989 --> 00:06:18,100 the use of a nuclear tactical nuclear 162 00:06:18,100 --> 00:06:20,100 weapon ? And then on the chemical , 163 00:06:20,100 --> 00:06:22,100 biological biological weapons . Are 164 00:06:22,100 --> 00:06:24,322 there any indications that they've been 165 00:06:24,322 --> 00:06:26,433 bringing any of those into Ukraine or 166 00:06:26,433 --> 00:06:28,656 into the area to potentially prepare to 167 00:06:28,656 --> 00:06:30,878 use so on the nuclear stuff ? Again , I 168 00:06:30,878 --> 00:06:30,380 want to be very careful here and 169 00:06:30,380 --> 00:06:32,820 talking about intelligence assessments , 170 00:06:32,830 --> 00:06:36,130 I would just say . And this is 171 00:06:36,130 --> 00:06:39,790 something we look at every day that 172 00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:42,670 that we are confident in the strategic 173 00:06:42,680 --> 00:06:45,520 deterrent posture that we have in place 174 00:06:47,170 --> 00:06:49,281 in order to defend the homeland , our 175 00:06:49,281 --> 00:06:53,040 allies and our partners . I can't I 176 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:55,262 would not speak to anything specific on 177 00:06:55,262 --> 00:06:57,318 the Russian side . I would just tell 178 00:06:57,318 --> 00:07:00,680 you that um that we've seen nothing um 179 00:07:00,690 --> 00:07:04,300 that that that gives us 180 00:07:06,840 --> 00:07:10,350 cause or reason to to uh to change our 181 00:07:10,350 --> 00:07:12,294 deterrent posture at this time . I 182 00:07:12,294 --> 00:07:14,406 think that's really about as far as I 183 00:07:14,406 --> 00:07:16,628 can go on the cam bio thing . Again , I 184 00:07:16,628 --> 00:07:18,628 don't want to get into intelligence 185 00:07:18,628 --> 00:07:20,683 assessments . We're watching this as 186 00:07:20,683 --> 00:07:22,517 closely as we can . I don't have 187 00:07:22,517 --> 00:07:24,294 anything to report with respect 188 00:07:24,294 --> 00:07:27,900 specific Russian came bio capabilities 189 00:07:27,900 --> 00:07:30,050 inside Ukraine . I would only say two 190 00:07:30,050 --> 00:07:32,170 things court one , this is a country 191 00:07:32,170 --> 00:07:35,620 that has a a reputation for 192 00:07:35,630 --> 00:07:38,680 using those kinds of weapons on people . 193 00:07:38,690 --> 00:07:41,540 Uh and we know they have a program uh 194 00:07:41,540 --> 00:07:45,330 and two we continue to watch 195 00:07:45,330 --> 00:07:48,320 for the potential . And I and I want to 196 00:07:48,320 --> 00:07:50,431 stress the word potential potential , 197 00:07:50,431 --> 00:07:53,260 that they could be banging this drum 198 00:07:53,260 --> 00:07:55,371 with the intent of creating some sort 199 00:07:55,371 --> 00:07:57,970 of uh false flag event , that they 200 00:07:57,970 --> 00:08:00,550 could use that as an excuse uh , to 201 00:08:00,560 --> 00:08:03,360 escalate the conflict even more . Again , 202 00:08:03,610 --> 00:08:05,777 watching this every day . I don't have 203 00:08:05,777 --> 00:08:09,360 any specific um , uh , 204 00:08:09,840 --> 00:08:11,951 indication now to talk about , but it 205 00:08:11,951 --> 00:08:14,007 is something we're concerned about . 206 00:08:14,007 --> 00:08:16,229 You might have heard President Zelensky 207 00:08:16,229 --> 00:08:18,340 in his nightly address last night say 208 00:08:18,340 --> 00:08:20,284 that exact thing that you gotta be 209 00:08:20,284 --> 00:08:22,173 careful what you see the Russians 210 00:08:22,173 --> 00:08:24,340 accuse others of because it oftentimes 211 00:08:24,340 --> 00:08:24,170 ends up being what , what they're 212 00:08:24,170 --> 00:08:26,281 planning to do . Now again , that's , 213 00:08:26,281 --> 00:08:28,337 we don't have firm indications right 214 00:08:28,337 --> 00:08:30,503 now , it's just something that we that 215 00:08:30,503 --> 00:08:32,670 could happen that we want to watch out 216 00:08:32,670 --> 00:08:34,448 for , yep , thanks , john , the 217 00:08:34,448 --> 00:08:36,614 Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported 218 00:08:36,614 --> 00:08:38,781 earlier today that Russia launched two 219 00:08:38,781 --> 00:08:41,020 airstrikes inside Belarus potentially 220 00:08:41,020 --> 00:08:43,340 to try and drag sellers into the work . 221 00:08:43,340 --> 00:08:45,451 And the Pentagon confirmed this . And 222 00:08:45,640 --> 00:08:47,807 has there been any outreach or attempt 223 00:08:47,807 --> 00:08:50,060 to try and keep Belarus out of the war 224 00:08:50,060 --> 00:08:52,970 you've mentioned there have been 225 00:08:52,970 --> 00:08:55,390 missiles launched from within Belarus 226 00:08:55,400 --> 00:08:58,260 into Ukraine already . Yeah , we can't 227 00:08:58,260 --> 00:09:00,390 confirm these reports . Um , um , 228 00:09:00,400 --> 00:09:03,210 seeing the open source reporting on it . 229 00:09:03,220 --> 00:09:05,164 Uh , Tara , but we have nothing to 230 00:09:05,164 --> 00:09:07,750 corroborate that . Um , and I would 231 00:09:07,750 --> 00:09:11,600 just tell you that uh uh we 232 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:13,489 haven't seen any indications that 233 00:09:13,489 --> 00:09:15,489 Belarusian troops , our forces have 234 00:09:15,489 --> 00:09:19,100 moved inside Ukraine . Um we did 235 00:09:19,100 --> 00:09:22,960 note that uh the President of Belarus 236 00:09:22,960 --> 00:09:24,960 made comments the other day through 237 00:09:24,960 --> 00:09:26,790 state media that he felt it was 238 00:09:26,790 --> 00:09:29,070 important for Belarusian forces to come 239 00:09:29,070 --> 00:09:32,300 to the defense of the rear of Russian 240 00:09:32,300 --> 00:09:34,356 forces . Should they be attacked the 241 00:09:34,356 --> 00:09:36,522 supply line route if you will ? That's 242 00:09:36,522 --> 00:09:38,467 the first time that he's ever said 243 00:09:38,467 --> 00:09:40,990 anything about Belarus perhaps getting 244 00:09:40,990 --> 00:09:43,101 involved , but no indications at this 245 00:09:43,101 --> 00:09:45,310 time that they have or that that's in 246 00:09:45,310 --> 00:09:48,660 the offing separate topic . Um 247 00:09:49,040 --> 00:09:51,200 as these sanctions have gone into 248 00:09:51,210 --> 00:09:53,480 effect , you started to see global food 249 00:09:53,480 --> 00:09:56,830 prices spike . And there's concerns 250 00:09:56,830 --> 00:09:58,774 that , you know , this could raise 251 00:09:58,774 --> 00:10:01,030 additional um risk of conflict in 252 00:10:01,030 --> 00:10:02,919 countries that are already facing 253 00:10:02,919 --> 00:10:05,141 hunger such as Afghanistan and likewise 254 00:10:05,141 --> 00:10:07,252 is a DVD looking at this , is there a 255 00:10:07,252 --> 00:10:09,474 greater risk of global conflict because 256 00:10:09,474 --> 00:10:11,697 it will become that much harder to feel 257 00:10:11,697 --> 00:10:13,808 to feed people and that already faced 258 00:10:13,808 --> 00:10:17,000 great food insecurity . Uh The 259 00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:20,050 administration is obviously looking at 260 00:10:20,440 --> 00:10:23,410 the humanitarian crisis that this that 261 00:10:23,420 --> 00:10:26,840 this war of choice is causing . Um 262 00:10:26,840 --> 00:10:30,100 and exploring , excuse me , let me try 263 00:10:30,100 --> 00:10:32,710 that again with english exploring um 264 00:10:32,720 --> 00:10:34,776 lots of opportunities to work inside 265 00:10:34,776 --> 00:10:36,498 the international community to 266 00:10:36,498 --> 00:10:38,664 alleviate that . Um I know of no plans 267 00:10:38,664 --> 00:10:41,770 in D . O . D . Two to augment or to 268 00:10:41,780 --> 00:10:45,680 prevent or to uh subside the effects 269 00:10:45,690 --> 00:10:49,300 of of uh of food insecurity . Um 270 00:10:49,310 --> 00:10:52,150 So I don't have any D . O . D role here 271 00:10:52,160 --> 00:10:56,080 to to speak to . Um But I do 272 00:10:56,080 --> 00:10:58,320 you wanna just pivot off , you know , 273 00:10:58,320 --> 00:11:00,376 one thing you had in your question , 274 00:11:00,376 --> 00:11:02,487 which was this risk of escalation and 275 00:11:02,487 --> 00:11:04,653 obviously that is something that we're 276 00:11:04,653 --> 00:11:06,820 constantly concerned about the risk of 277 00:11:06,820 --> 00:11:09,042 of this conflict escalating beyond what 278 00:11:09,042 --> 00:11:08,650 it already is and it's already 279 00:11:10,140 --> 00:11:13,110 dangerous enough inside Ukraine . So , 280 00:11:13,120 --> 00:11:16,020 um so , you know , to , to courts , 281 00:11:16,020 --> 00:11:17,853 questions about the things we're 282 00:11:17,853 --> 00:11:20,020 looking at and what we're monitoring , 283 00:11:20,020 --> 00:11:22,242 we're constantly uh concerned about the 284 00:11:22,242 --> 00:11:24,464 potential escalation here . I guess the 285 00:11:24,464 --> 00:11:26,520 question is just the overall trickle 286 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:28,631 down effects . You have this conflict 287 00:11:28,631 --> 00:11:30,742 inside Ukraine that is having already 288 00:11:30,742 --> 00:11:32,909 global ripple effects . And whether or 289 00:11:32,909 --> 00:11:34,964 not the pentagon is taking a broader 290 00:11:34,964 --> 00:11:37,020 view of already hot zones , conflict 291 00:11:37,020 --> 00:11:39,187 zones . And if this will make it worse 292 00:11:39,187 --> 00:11:41,298 because hunger becomes worse , Access 293 00:11:41,298 --> 00:11:43,464 to food becomes worse . Yeah , again , 294 00:11:43,464 --> 00:11:45,576 we haven't seen any , I get where the 295 00:11:45,576 --> 00:11:47,687 questions going . Oftentimes when you 296 00:11:47,687 --> 00:11:49,798 have instability in one area , it can 297 00:11:49,798 --> 00:11:51,909 bleed over to others , either in that 298 00:11:51,909 --> 00:11:54,070 region or without . And I , and I 299 00:11:54,070 --> 00:11:57,060 understand that , I would tell you 300 00:11:57,840 --> 00:11:59,840 broadly speaking , we're constantly 301 00:11:59,840 --> 00:12:01,729 looking at threats and challenges 302 00:12:01,729 --> 00:12:03,562 around the world . And we're not 303 00:12:03,562 --> 00:12:05,729 unmindful of the fact that threats and 304 00:12:05,729 --> 00:12:07,784 challenges do spill over and and and 305 00:12:07,784 --> 00:12:10,007 and can cause instability and therefore 306 00:12:10,007 --> 00:12:12,062 insecurity in places that aren't the 307 00:12:12,062 --> 00:12:14,118 origin of the conflict . Um so we're 308 00:12:14,118 --> 00:12:16,610 obviously taking a global view , we do 309 00:12:16,610 --> 00:12:18,777 that every day , we're certainly doing 310 00:12:18,777 --> 00:12:20,943 that uh in light of what's going on in 311 00:12:20,943 --> 00:12:23,420 Ukraine . Uh I don't know . Well , let 312 00:12:23,420 --> 00:12:26,250 me put it another way we haven't seen 313 00:12:26,250 --> 00:12:30,240 any uh any specific indications that 314 00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:34,390 um that there are going to 315 00:12:34,390 --> 00:12:37,670 be any imminent insecurity issues , 316 00:12:37,670 --> 00:12:39,940 challenges , threats in in other 317 00:12:39,940 --> 00:12:42,860 regions as a result of this that we're 318 00:12:42,860 --> 00:12:45,027 gonna have to address . I think that's 319 00:12:45,027 --> 00:12:47,249 what you were trying to get at . And uh 320 00:12:47,249 --> 00:12:49,471 I just think it's too soon to know that 321 00:12:49,471 --> 00:12:51,416 right now . Too soon to tell . But 322 00:12:51,416 --> 00:12:53,249 obviously we're watching clearly 323 00:12:53,249 --> 00:12:55,471 because of the potential for escalation 324 00:12:55,471 --> 00:12:57,638 here . And I just want to say if I can 325 00:12:57,638 --> 00:13:00,080 again , it's a war of choice . Mr Putin 326 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:03,450 can stop this war right now by agreeing 327 00:13:03,450 --> 00:13:05,506 to a diplomatic solution or at least 328 00:13:05,506 --> 00:13:08,230 just stopping the bombing and the death 329 00:13:08,230 --> 00:13:10,397 and the destruction that he is causing 330 00:13:10,397 --> 00:13:12,920 against a nation that provoked nobody 331 00:13:12,930 --> 00:13:15,290 against the nation that presented no 332 00:13:15,290 --> 00:13:18,120 threat to Russia . All of this is by 333 00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:20,670 his choice and and all that blood is on 334 00:13:20,670 --> 00:13:22,837 his hands . And he could stop it right 335 00:13:22,837 --> 00:13:25,870 now if he wanted to John there is a 336 00:13:25,870 --> 00:13:28,190 discussion that some NATO allies might 337 00:13:28,190 --> 00:13:30,810 send there as 300 to Ukraine . Is the 338 00:13:30,810 --> 00:13:33,143 US involved in any of these discussions . 339 00:13:33,143 --> 00:13:35,360 And will the us green light give a 340 00:13:35,360 --> 00:13:37,770 green light ? It should some allies 341 00:13:37,780 --> 00:13:39,947 move forward with that . I have talked 342 00:13:39,947 --> 00:13:42,490 before that sovereign nations are 343 00:13:42,490 --> 00:13:44,601 making decisions for themselves about 344 00:13:44,601 --> 00:13:46,546 how to help Ukraine and we respect 345 00:13:46,546 --> 00:13:48,601 those sovereign decisions . It's not 346 00:13:48,601 --> 00:13:50,657 about the United States giving green 347 00:13:50,657 --> 00:13:52,712 lights or or or having vito's here . 348 00:13:52,712 --> 00:13:54,879 What I will tell you . And I said this 349 00:13:54,879 --> 00:13:56,879 the other day , we are working with 350 00:13:56,879 --> 00:13:59,046 allies and partners , uh , to help get 351 00:13:59,046 --> 00:14:01,212 the kinds of capabilities that we know 352 00:14:01,212 --> 00:14:03,434 that Ukrainians need and are using very 353 00:14:03,434 --> 00:14:05,490 well inside Ukraine get more of that 354 00:14:05,490 --> 00:14:07,601 stuff to them . Some of the , some of 355 00:14:07,601 --> 00:14:09,434 that material we have and we are 356 00:14:09,434 --> 00:14:11,490 providing Some of that material . We 357 00:14:11,490 --> 00:14:13,657 don't have but we know others have and 358 00:14:13,657 --> 00:14:15,879 we're helping coordinate that as well . 359 00:14:15,879 --> 00:14:15,760 And uh , and that security assistance 360 00:14:15,760 --> 00:14:17,760 is flowing even in just the last 24 361 00:14:17,760 --> 00:14:20,500 hours . Uh , I'm not gonna talk about 362 00:14:20,500 --> 00:14:22,556 individual systems , you know that I 363 00:14:22,556 --> 00:14:24,556 haven't done that yet . And I'm not 364 00:14:24,556 --> 00:14:26,444 going to start today , but we are 365 00:14:26,444 --> 00:14:28,556 working hard to , to to canvass other 366 00:14:28,556 --> 00:14:30,778 allies and partners that we know , uh , 367 00:14:30,778 --> 00:14:32,833 could could possibly help . And it's 368 00:14:32,833 --> 00:14:35,450 really up to those nations . Kassem to 369 00:14:35,450 --> 00:14:37,617 make these decisions and then to to to 370 00:14:37,617 --> 00:14:39,783 speak to them if they want to speak to 371 00:14:39,783 --> 00:14:41,783 them that they can do that . And we 372 00:14:41,783 --> 00:14:43,839 have to respect that . What's what's 373 00:14:43,839 --> 00:14:46,006 important and what I don't want you to 374 00:14:46,006 --> 00:14:48,117 walk away . Not understanding is that 375 00:14:48,117 --> 00:14:49,950 we're having these conversations 376 00:14:49,950 --> 00:14:52,006 actively . We are helping coordinate 377 00:14:52,006 --> 00:14:54,061 the assistance as best we can . Um , 378 00:14:54,061 --> 00:14:53,710 and we're going to continue to talk to 379 00:14:53,710 --> 00:14:56,000 the Ukrainians about what they need uh , 380 00:14:56,010 --> 00:14:58,343 to , to better defend themselves . Okay , 381 00:14:58,740 --> 00:15:01,150 another question , we have seen the US 382 00:15:01,150 --> 00:15:03,206 patriot batteries along the problems 383 00:15:03,540 --> 00:15:05,707 border with Ukraine ? I know you won't 384 00:15:05,707 --> 00:15:07,873 get into details , but can you tell us 385 00:15:07,873 --> 00:15:10,150 if the rules of engagement have changed 386 00:15:10,240 --> 00:15:12,518 since the war began in that part of it ? 387 00:15:12,518 --> 00:15:14,851 We don't talk about rules of engagement , 388 00:15:15,140 --> 00:15:18,450 David , mm hmm . A couple of questions . 389 00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:22,360 Can you update us on any uses of the 390 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:26,520 deconfliction line ? And has 391 00:15:27,030 --> 00:15:29,360 Secretary Austen attempted to 392 00:15:30,240 --> 00:15:33,900 communicate with his counterpart , the 393 00:15:33,910 --> 00:15:37,880 Russian defense Minister ? And you 394 00:15:37,880 --> 00:15:40,260 just said you're helping coordinate 395 00:15:41,140 --> 00:15:43,670 assistance . Does that include 396 00:15:43,680 --> 00:15:47,250 providing Carolyn from 397 00:15:47,740 --> 00:15:50,170 donor countries to transshipment points 398 00:15:52,640 --> 00:15:55,580 on the deconfliction line , David ? Uh , 399 00:15:55,590 --> 00:15:57,980 no specific interactions to , to speak 400 00:15:57,980 --> 00:16:01,760 to in other words , no , no content , 401 00:16:02,340 --> 00:16:04,630 uh , has has been needed , but we do 402 00:16:04,630 --> 00:16:08,450 test it once or twice a day , uh , and , 403 00:16:08,460 --> 00:16:11,900 and that continues and um , thus far 404 00:16:11,910 --> 00:16:14,188 with maybe only a couple of exceptions , 405 00:16:14,188 --> 00:16:16,132 the Russians have picked up on the 406 00:16:16,132 --> 00:16:18,354 other end and we know they we know that 407 00:16:18,354 --> 00:16:20,299 they know what the ringtone is and 408 00:16:20,299 --> 00:16:22,466 they'll pick up an answer and um , and 409 00:16:22,466 --> 00:16:24,188 uh , and , and so we know it's 410 00:16:24,188 --> 00:16:27,150 functional . Um , I have no 411 00:16:27,150 --> 00:16:30,320 conversations between Secretary Austin 412 00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:32,670 and Minister Shoigu to speak to . Um , 413 00:16:32,670 --> 00:16:34,448 and I have , uh , you know , no 414 00:16:34,450 --> 00:16:37,080 expectation that um , that that's going 415 00:16:37,080 --> 00:16:40,790 to change anytime soon . Um , uh , and 416 00:16:40,790 --> 00:16:42,734 then on the helping coordinate , I 417 00:16:42,734 --> 00:16:44,901 really don't want to get into too much 418 00:16:44,901 --> 00:16:47,068 detail here . I think the coordination 419 00:16:47,068 --> 00:16:49,123 is in two planes . One , it's in the 420 00:16:49,123 --> 00:16:51,290 conversations with allies and partners 421 00:16:51,290 --> 00:16:53,670 about these capabilities and and their 422 00:16:53,670 --> 00:16:57,400 willingness to provide . Um , and 423 00:16:57,400 --> 00:17:00,430 then uh , and then on another plane , 424 00:17:00,440 --> 00:17:02,329 it's , you know , it's it's about 425 00:17:02,329 --> 00:17:04,850 helping with the logistics . Um um and 426 00:17:04,850 --> 00:17:07,840 it really um it really varies from 427 00:17:07,850 --> 00:17:09,906 country to country and capability to 428 00:17:09,906 --> 00:17:13,710 capability , but but we we are we are 429 00:17:13,710 --> 00:17:15,490 trying to help help with that 430 00:17:15,490 --> 00:17:17,601 coordination function . And the brits 431 00:17:17,601 --> 00:17:19,601 have been to in fact , they've been 432 00:17:19,601 --> 00:17:21,940 very very vocal about their efforts to 433 00:17:21,940 --> 00:17:24,630 help coordinate and and uh and and work 434 00:17:24,630 --> 00:17:26,630 through that and we're grateful for 435 00:17:26,630 --> 00:17:28,420 their assistance . Jim answered 436 00:17:28,420 --> 00:17:30,870 questions really . The Russians have 437 00:17:30,870 --> 00:17:34,860 occupied a lot of area in in Ukraine . 438 00:17:34,870 --> 00:17:38,850 Do you know if the if if the Ukrainians , 439 00:17:39,340 --> 00:17:41,562 is there any assessment if they've gone 440 00:17:41,562 --> 00:17:43,490 into like a Guerilla war in these 441 00:17:43,490 --> 00:17:45,850 occupied areas and a separate question , 442 00:17:47,440 --> 00:17:49,440 I imagine the Russians have to have 443 00:17:49,440 --> 00:17:51,496 captured Ukrainian service members . 444 00:17:51,940 --> 00:17:54,162 Are they treating those service members 445 00:17:54,162 --> 00:17:56,660 as captured ? POWs with Geneva 446 00:17:57,080 --> 00:18:00,100 Convention protections . I don't have 447 00:18:00,100 --> 00:18:02,110 any information about the captured 448 00:18:02,120 --> 00:18:04,890 soldiers on either side . I really 449 00:18:04,890 --> 00:18:07,112 don't and I certainly couldn't get into 450 00:18:07,112 --> 00:18:10,880 uh into how they're being treated . I 451 00:18:10,880 --> 00:18:13,460 mean , obviously ah Mhm . 452 00:18:14,540 --> 00:18:16,980 We're not involved in this war , but 453 00:18:16,980 --> 00:18:19,980 our expectation would be that um that 454 00:18:19,980 --> 00:18:22,330 both parties would abide by the Geneva 455 00:18:22,330 --> 00:18:26,040 Convention uh requirements and uh and 456 00:18:26,040 --> 00:18:28,910 to treat any soldiers that are captured 457 00:18:28,920 --> 00:18:30,920 humanely and in accordance with the 458 00:18:30,920 --> 00:18:33,087 rule of law , that would be that would 459 00:18:33,087 --> 00:18:35,087 be the United States expectation as 460 00:18:35,087 --> 00:18:37,142 well as so many other nations side , 461 00:18:37,142 --> 00:18:39,309 but I don't have any information about 462 00:18:39,309 --> 00:18:39,290 what that looks like in terms of 463 00:18:39,290 --> 00:18:41,570 numbers and what what what what that 464 00:18:41,580 --> 00:18:44,370 what that treatment actually is And on 465 00:18:44,370 --> 00:18:46,426 your question about guerilla tactics 466 00:18:46,426 --> 00:18:49,450 jim I again , I I'd let the Ukrainians 467 00:18:49,450 --> 00:18:51,561 describe for themselves the manner in 468 00:18:51,561 --> 00:18:53,783 which they're they're fighting but they 469 00:18:53,783 --> 00:18:56,260 are fighting . Um and they're uh 470 00:18:56,860 --> 00:18:58,860 they're fighting skillfully bravely 471 00:18:58,860 --> 00:19:01,020 quite creatively . And the fighting 472 00:19:01,020 --> 00:19:04,800 isn't just um by their armed forces . I 473 00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:06,930 mean , average citizens , you've seen 474 00:19:06,930 --> 00:19:10,090 it for yourself um picking up arms , 475 00:19:10,100 --> 00:19:12,820 you know , getting , getting arms given 476 00:19:12,820 --> 00:19:14,709 to them by the government and and 477 00:19:14,709 --> 00:19:17,042 learning how to use them and using them . 478 00:19:17,042 --> 00:19:19,042 And some of the resistance has been 479 00:19:19,042 --> 00:19:20,820 nonviolent . You've seen it for 480 00:19:20,820 --> 00:19:22,931 yourself with crowds of of Ukrainians 481 00:19:22,931 --> 00:19:25,060 blocking city streets um and actually 482 00:19:25,060 --> 00:19:28,180 stopping in their tracks , some Russian 483 00:19:28,190 --> 00:19:31,100 units . Um so that the resistance 484 00:19:31,110 --> 00:19:33,420 resides on many levels and it's quite 485 00:19:33,420 --> 00:19:35,198 inspiring whether you call that 486 00:19:35,198 --> 00:19:37,360 guerilla tactics or not . I I don't 487 00:19:37,360 --> 00:19:39,527 know , and I don't even know if that's 488 00:19:39,527 --> 00:19:41,693 uh you know , worth having that debate 489 00:19:41,693 --> 00:19:43,582 over they are resisting , they're 490 00:19:43,582 --> 00:19:45,416 defending uh and we are going to 491 00:19:45,416 --> 00:19:47,582 continue to look for ways to help them 492 00:19:47,582 --> 00:19:49,800 do that better going forward , divert 493 00:19:49,810 --> 00:19:51,643 for just a minute to North Korea 494 00:19:51,643 --> 00:19:55,220 question . Um can you now that several 495 00:19:55,220 --> 00:19:57,442 parts of the administration have talked 496 00:19:57,442 --> 00:19:59,498 about your public announcement , Can 497 00:19:59,498 --> 00:20:01,664 you tell us why the pentagon in dope a 498 00:20:01,664 --> 00:20:03,498 com but essentially the Pentagon 499 00:20:03,740 --> 00:20:06,270 decided to take the seemingly 500 00:20:06,280 --> 00:20:09,150 unprecedented step of making a public 501 00:20:09,150 --> 00:20:11,290 statement , being sure the North 502 00:20:11,290 --> 00:20:13,234 Koreans would see it that you were 503 00:20:13,234 --> 00:20:14,957 going to increase intelligence 504 00:20:14,957 --> 00:20:17,610 collection against them on there ? I . 505 00:20:17,610 --> 00:20:20,560 C . B . M . Program . Why would you 506 00:20:20,940 --> 00:20:23,110 make that public statement letting the 507 00:20:23,110 --> 00:20:25,860 North Koreans know you're going to 508 00:20:26,340 --> 00:20:28,451 collect , increase your collection of 509 00:20:28,451 --> 00:20:31,050 classified intelligence . What is the 510 00:20:31,050 --> 00:20:34,100 state of your current concern about how 511 00:20:34,100 --> 00:20:36,660 close they are to an I . C . B . M . 512 00:20:37,540 --> 00:20:40,920 And is this disclosure , this 513 00:20:40,920 --> 00:20:44,330 candor about a potential adversary ? Is 514 00:20:44,330 --> 00:20:46,670 this is this potentially a lesson 515 00:20:46,670 --> 00:20:49,190 learned from the Russia situation ? Put 516 00:20:49,190 --> 00:20:51,970 everything you know out there , hoping 517 00:20:51,970 --> 00:20:53,248 it will be a deterrent 518 00:20:57,440 --> 00:20:58,360 who just did . 519 00:21:01,640 --> 00:21:03,850 Um But then I have one of them . 520 00:21:06,440 --> 00:21:08,607 Of course you do . All right . There's 521 00:21:08,607 --> 00:21:10,773 a lot there . Look I I think I said in 522 00:21:10,773 --> 00:21:13,770 my statement uh were we made , we made 523 00:21:13,770 --> 00:21:16,700 these um uh these revelations public , 524 00:21:16,700 --> 00:21:18,950 we announced some of the additional I . 525 00:21:18,950 --> 00:21:20,950 S . R . And enhanced readiness were 526 00:21:20,950 --> 00:21:23,172 taken because we believe it's important 527 00:21:23,172 --> 00:21:25,470 uh to to call out the behavior that 528 00:21:25,470 --> 00:21:27,840 we've been seeing um particularly in 529 00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:30,600 the last few weeks . Um and that we 530 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:32,711 believe it's important for the entire 531 00:21:32,711 --> 00:21:34,822 international community to speak with 532 00:21:34,822 --> 00:21:36,878 one voice about the concerns that uh 533 00:21:36,878 --> 00:21:38,989 that we know they have over DP DP are 534 00:21:38,989 --> 00:21:41,490 the Dprk s uh continued ballistic 535 00:21:41,490 --> 00:21:43,657 missile program . I'm not going to get 536 00:21:43,657 --> 00:21:45,712 into any more detail in terms of the 537 00:21:45,712 --> 00:21:47,934 assessments we've made , it's all there 538 00:21:47,934 --> 00:21:49,879 out in the public eye . I won't go 539 00:21:49,879 --> 00:21:51,990 beyond my public statements . But but 540 00:21:51,990 --> 00:21:54,157 clearly these uh these continued tests 541 00:21:54,157 --> 00:21:56,170 are a provocation . Uh they are a 542 00:21:56,170 --> 00:21:58,281 violation of U . N . Security Council 543 00:21:58,281 --> 00:22:01,490 resolutions uh and they give us as well 544 00:22:01,490 --> 00:22:04,110 as so many other nations added concern 545 00:22:04,110 --> 00:22:06,360 about the kinds of capabilities that 546 00:22:06,370 --> 00:22:09,770 the North is trying to develop . Um and 547 00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:12,230 so again , we feel uh it was important 548 00:22:12,230 --> 00:22:14,397 to to make that case and to lay it out 549 00:22:14,397 --> 00:22:16,740 there . Um and as for whether it's a 550 00:22:16,740 --> 00:22:20,060 lesson learned , I I would be careful 551 00:22:20,060 --> 00:22:22,590 drawing a direct bright line between 552 00:22:22,600 --> 00:22:24,950 these revelations about this program 553 00:22:24,950 --> 00:22:27,270 and revelations that we made early on 554 00:22:27,280 --> 00:22:29,391 even before the invasion of Ukraine . 555 00:22:29,391 --> 00:22:32,990 Um when we believe that 556 00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:35,111 information should be in the public , 557 00:22:35,140 --> 00:22:38,760 um , we're we're gonna put it in the 558 00:22:38,760 --> 00:22:41,060 public , we're gonna , we're gonna 559 00:22:41,070 --> 00:22:43,070 state it as best we can . Obviously 560 00:22:43,070 --> 00:22:45,181 there's some stuff we know that we're 561 00:22:45,181 --> 00:22:47,014 not going to talk about , but we 562 00:22:47,014 --> 00:22:49,181 believe that calling them out publicly 563 00:22:49,181 --> 00:22:51,348 for these tests was the right thing to 564 00:22:51,348 --> 00:22:53,237 do . One follow up quickly on the 565 00:22:53,237 --> 00:22:55,403 deconfliction line . Two things I take 566 00:22:55,403 --> 00:22:58,300 it , they have never called the United 567 00:22:58,300 --> 00:23:00,633 States . It's all been you calling them . 568 00:23:00,633 --> 00:23:02,970 Is that right ? To my knowledge ? It 569 00:23:02,970 --> 00:23:05,280 has been us using it to check in once 570 00:23:05,280 --> 00:23:08,080 or twice a day with you . Okay . And 571 00:23:08,080 --> 00:23:10,302 you said that they know your ringtone . 572 00:23:10,302 --> 00:23:13,490 So can you tell us every day ? It was a 573 00:23:13,500 --> 00:23:16,860 it was a poor attempt at being uh 574 00:23:17,540 --> 00:23:19,707 it was a poor attempt at humor . I did 575 00:23:19,707 --> 00:23:21,929 not mean that we have an exact ringtone 576 00:23:21,929 --> 00:23:25,730 here just that we know they know how to 577 00:23:25,730 --> 00:23:29,560 use the system . John 578 00:23:29,570 --> 00:23:31,737 you mentioned the secretary's upcoming 579 00:23:31,737 --> 00:23:34,070 trip to NATO . Um what kind of things 580 00:23:34,070 --> 00:23:36,181 is he going to be discussing with the 581 00:23:36,181 --> 00:23:38,190 NATO partners ? And we have been 582 00:23:38,190 --> 00:23:40,301 talking about the NATO response force 583 00:23:40,301 --> 00:23:42,579 being activated and potentially some U . 584 00:23:42,579 --> 00:23:44,860 S . Forces would be dedicated to it . 585 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:47,370 Um What what is the current count of 586 00:23:47,380 --> 00:23:49,602 how many U . S . Personnel are actively 587 00:23:49,602 --> 00:23:51,824 participating in the NATO responsible ? 588 00:23:51,824 --> 00:23:53,658 Again , we're still working that 589 00:23:53,658 --> 00:23:55,950 through with with with with NATO , what 590 00:23:55,960 --> 00:23:58,090 uh what the response force would look 591 00:23:58,090 --> 00:24:00,201 like to be composed of where it would 592 00:24:00,201 --> 00:24:02,312 go . So I don't have any I don't have 593 00:24:02,312 --> 00:24:05,060 any sourced requirements to speak to 594 00:24:05,060 --> 00:24:06,949 today . I'm sorry you had another 595 00:24:06,949 --> 00:24:08,893 question that yeah what about what 596 00:24:08,893 --> 00:24:10,838 exactly is going to be the tone of 597 00:24:10,838 --> 00:24:12,838 these meetings that he's gonna have 598 00:24:12,838 --> 00:24:15,004 with his counterparts in brussels next 599 00:24:15,004 --> 00:24:17,171 week actively seeking . I mean I think 600 00:24:17,171 --> 00:24:21,050 this second defense ministerial now um 601 00:24:21,060 --> 00:24:24,220 in light of this issue comes at a 602 00:24:24,220 --> 00:24:26,220 critical time here two weeks . That 603 00:24:26,220 --> 00:24:28,276 will be more likely three weeks into 604 00:24:28,276 --> 00:24:32,050 this conflict and I don't know what 605 00:24:32,050 --> 00:24:34,383 things are going to look like next week . 606 00:24:34,383 --> 00:24:36,383 But obviously the we can expect the 607 00:24:36,383 --> 00:24:39,360 defense ministers to to talk seriously 608 00:24:39,370 --> 00:24:42,590 about what NATO is doing to better 609 00:24:42,590 --> 00:24:46,410 shore up its defenses and making 610 00:24:46,410 --> 00:24:49,450 sure that we all have a common sight 611 00:24:49,450 --> 00:24:52,490 picture of the threat environment And 612 00:24:52,500 --> 00:24:54,970 what needs to be done again to uh to 613 00:24:54,970 --> 00:24:57,220 meet our Article five commitments ? So 614 00:24:57,220 --> 00:24:59,870 there's no like is there an agenda that 615 00:24:59,880 --> 00:25:01,880 is there something specifically the 616 00:25:01,880 --> 00:25:04,213 tops the agenda with regards to Ukraine ? 617 00:25:04,213 --> 00:25:06,158 I would let NATO and the Secretary 618 00:25:06,158 --> 00:25:08,269 General speak to the it's his defense 619 00:25:08,269 --> 00:25:10,491 ministerial , I don't want to get ahead 620 00:25:10,491 --> 00:25:12,602 of his agenda . That's really for him 621 00:25:12,602 --> 00:25:14,769 to speak to . The Secretary is pleased 622 00:25:14,769 --> 00:25:16,991 to be able to go in person and be there 623 00:25:16,991 --> 00:25:18,991 to meet with other Defense Minister 624 00:25:18,991 --> 00:25:21,269 ministers whoever is going to be there . 625 00:25:21,269 --> 00:25:25,080 Um and we know that there's a lot to 626 00:25:25,080 --> 00:25:27,247 talk about . I mean there's there's an 627 00:25:27,247 --> 00:25:29,524 awful lot going on inside the alliance . 628 00:25:29,524 --> 00:25:32,220 Um the alliance is more relevant than 629 00:25:32,220 --> 00:25:34,220 ever . It's more united than ever . 630 00:25:34,220 --> 00:25:36,220 It's certainly more viable alliance 631 00:25:36,220 --> 00:25:38,890 than it's ever been . Um and again 632 00:25:38,890 --> 00:25:41,380 there's going to be uh a lot of 633 00:25:41,380 --> 00:25:43,602 material to go through both in terms of 634 00:25:43,602 --> 00:25:46,030 what we're seeing happening in Ukraine 635 00:25:46,040 --> 00:25:48,220 and the effect that that needs to have 636 00:25:48,220 --> 00:25:49,998 on the alliance going forward , 637 00:25:49,998 --> 00:25:52,500 including the application of the NATO 638 00:25:52,500 --> 00:25:54,833 response force and what that looks like , 639 00:25:54,833 --> 00:25:58,370 where and who and when . Um all that we 640 00:25:58,370 --> 00:26:00,890 expect will will be discussed in the 641 00:26:00,890 --> 00:26:03,180 back there . Thank you . I want to 642 00:26:03,180 --> 00:26:05,730 follow up about North Korea in the 643 00:26:05,730 --> 00:26:08,460 paper or increase the redness amongst 644 00:26:08,460 --> 00:26:10,390 the missile defense forces in the 645 00:26:10,390 --> 00:26:12,660 region earlier this week . So could you 646 00:26:12,660 --> 00:26:15,150 tell us a sense of what steps in the 647 00:26:15,150 --> 00:26:18,180 paper has taken since then . What has 648 00:26:18,180 --> 00:26:20,520 changed before and after this new 649 00:26:20,520 --> 00:26:23,180 direction ? What what has changed is 650 00:26:23,180 --> 00:26:25,420 we've increased uh s our coverage in 651 00:26:25,420 --> 00:26:28,340 the in the Yellow Sea and the end up a 652 00:26:28,340 --> 00:26:30,830 com has increased their ballistic 653 00:26:30,830 --> 00:26:33,052 missile defense readiness . And I think 654 00:26:33,052 --> 00:26:34,997 you can understand why we wouldn't 655 00:26:34,997 --> 00:26:38,460 detail every bit of that effort . Okay . 656 00:26:39,440 --> 00:26:43,390 Yeah . On cold response , which you 657 00:26:43,390 --> 00:26:46,370 briefed on on Wednesday , the Russians 658 00:26:46,370 --> 00:26:48,481 told the Norwegians I think last week 659 00:26:48,481 --> 00:26:50,537 that they wouldn't send observers to 660 00:26:50,537 --> 00:26:52,426 exercise . And we've already seen 661 00:26:52,426 --> 00:26:54,648 Russian jets fly over Swedish territory 662 00:26:54,648 --> 00:26:56,759 in the Baltic sea . So are the forces 663 00:26:56,759 --> 00:26:59,330 involved in cold response on guard or 664 00:26:59,330 --> 00:27:01,441 wary about any attempted provocations 665 00:27:01,441 --> 00:27:03,830 or other interference ? Look , we 666 00:27:03,830 --> 00:27:06,730 always take force protection at a 667 00:27:06,740 --> 00:27:09,370 premium here . Um , it's always a 668 00:27:09,380 --> 00:27:12,280 factor . Um , it is an exercise 669 00:27:13,140 --> 00:27:15,050 and here's the deal . We actually 670 00:27:15,060 --> 00:27:17,060 announced it . In fact , we've been 671 00:27:17,060 --> 00:27:19,004 talking about the preps for it for 672 00:27:19,004 --> 00:27:21,830 quite some time . It's a defensive 673 00:27:21,830 --> 00:27:25,290 exercise and I stood up here the other 674 00:27:25,290 --> 00:27:27,620 day and walked through all the 675 00:27:27,620 --> 00:27:29,620 capabilities that we're going to be 676 00:27:29,620 --> 00:27:31,980 training too . And what those marines 677 00:27:31,980 --> 00:27:35,770 are uh , and sailors are up to will 678 00:27:35,770 --> 00:27:37,992 continue to be as transparent about the 679 00:27:37,992 --> 00:27:39,881 exercise as possible . There's no 680 00:27:39,881 --> 00:27:43,060 reason for anyone to view this as some 681 00:27:43,060 --> 00:27:45,227 kind of threat . Therefore there would 682 00:27:45,227 --> 00:27:47,338 be no reason for anyone including the 683 00:27:47,338 --> 00:27:49,560 Russians to threaten it . But obviously 684 00:27:49,560 --> 00:27:51,560 force protection is always always a 685 00:27:51,560 --> 00:27:53,893 paramount concern . We don't anticipate , 686 00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:57,570 uh , at this time that , that there 687 00:27:57,580 --> 00:28:00,350 there would be a specific threat to the 688 00:28:00,350 --> 00:28:04,280 exercise . And a few minutes ago 689 00:28:04,280 --> 00:28:06,391 you mentioned that you you don't talk 690 00:28:06,391 --> 00:28:08,391 about the specifics of the security 691 00:28:08,391 --> 00:28:10,502 assistance . Um , but obviously a lot 692 00:28:10,502 --> 00:28:12,669 of that assistance is being publicized 693 00:28:12,669 --> 00:28:14,836 just mentioned of javelins obviously , 694 00:28:14,836 --> 00:28:16,947 but also some of stingers . So I just 695 00:28:16,947 --> 00:28:16,320 wondered , you know , it's kind of 696 00:28:16,330 --> 00:28:18,620 background , could you talk about the 697 00:28:18,620 --> 00:28:20,731 decision process there about what the 698 00:28:20,731 --> 00:28:22,676 pentagon does and doesn't disclose 699 00:28:22,676 --> 00:28:25,330 about it its security systems ? We have 700 00:28:25,330 --> 00:28:28,210 been very consistent since before Mr 701 00:28:28,210 --> 00:28:30,220 Putin decided to launch a war on 702 00:28:30,220 --> 00:28:32,270 Ukraine that we were going to help 703 00:28:32,940 --> 00:28:35,051 Ukraine with the capabilities that it 704 00:28:35,051 --> 00:28:36,996 needs to defend itself and that we 705 00:28:36,996 --> 00:28:39,051 weren't going to get into a shopping 706 00:28:39,051 --> 00:28:41,218 list . I haven't done that yet and I'm 707 00:28:41,218 --> 00:28:43,384 not going to start today . I think you 708 00:28:43,384 --> 00:28:45,384 can understand why we don't believe 709 00:28:45,384 --> 00:28:47,607 it's helpful for the Ukrainians to have 710 00:28:47,607 --> 00:28:49,790 us publicizing and put out in great 711 00:28:49,790 --> 00:28:52,130 detail the kinds of capabilities that 712 00:28:52,130 --> 00:28:54,297 we're getting into their hands if they 713 00:28:54,297 --> 00:28:56,610 want to speak to what they have and 714 00:28:56,610 --> 00:28:58,610 what they're using . That certainly 715 00:28:58,610 --> 00:29:00,666 their right , but we aren't going to 716 00:29:00,666 --> 00:29:02,721 violate that little bit of Opsec for 717 00:29:02,721 --> 00:29:02,610 them . That wouldn't be the right thing 718 00:29:02,610 --> 00:29:05,290 to do . It's it's a prudent operator . 719 00:29:05,300 --> 00:29:07,356 You know , we always worry about our 720 00:29:07,356 --> 00:29:09,578 own operational security in this case . 721 00:29:09,578 --> 00:29:11,467 We also want to observe Ukrainian 722 00:29:11,467 --> 00:29:13,522 operational security paul , Shenkman 723 00:29:13,522 --> 00:29:16,460 from U . S . News . Yeah . Hi john , 724 00:29:16,470 --> 00:29:18,700 one question to follow up on Belarus . 725 00:29:18,710 --> 00:29:20,710 So the Ukrainian government or 726 00:29:20,710 --> 00:29:23,310 officials in Ukraine have also warned 727 00:29:23,310 --> 00:29:25,260 about the pending invasion by 728 00:29:25,260 --> 00:29:27,990 Belarusian forces as soon as this 729 00:29:27,990 --> 00:29:30,157 afternoon ? So you said that there was 730 00:29:30,157 --> 00:29:32,323 no indication that they were moving in 731 00:29:32,323 --> 00:29:34,790 response to real or imagined attacks on 732 00:29:34,790 --> 00:29:36,901 their territory . But do you have any 733 00:29:36,901 --> 00:29:38,790 response to those claims from the 734 00:29:38,790 --> 00:29:40,846 Ukrainian officials ? I haven't seen 735 00:29:40,846 --> 00:29:43,068 those Ukrainian reports as I I can only 736 00:29:43,068 --> 00:29:45,430 tell you what we're seeing . And we're 737 00:29:45,430 --> 00:29:49,210 not tracking any imminent 738 00:29:49,220 --> 00:29:52,030 involvement by by Belarusian forces . 739 00:29:52,040 --> 00:29:54,810 Uh , that's not to say that it couldn't 740 00:29:54,810 --> 00:29:57,280 happen or that it wouldn't happen or 741 00:29:57,280 --> 00:29:59,260 that that , that they could get 742 00:29:59,260 --> 00:30:01,427 involved in a way that maybe we didn't 743 00:30:01,427 --> 00:30:03,371 see . But I can just tell you what 744 00:30:03,371 --> 00:30:06,520 we're seeing right now . Other 745 00:30:06,520 --> 00:30:08,353 Ukrainian officials claimed this 746 00:30:08,353 --> 00:30:10,242 morning that Ukrainian forces had 747 00:30:10,242 --> 00:30:13,210 killed a third Russian general in the 748 00:30:13,220 --> 00:30:15,164 ongoing conflict . Can you confirm 749 00:30:15,164 --> 00:30:17,420 whether that has taken place in any 750 00:30:17,430 --> 00:30:20,030 observations about what that indicates 751 00:30:20,030 --> 00:30:22,840 about the Russian offensive ? I can't 752 00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:26,020 confirm those reports , paul Tony 753 00:30:26,020 --> 00:30:28,360 carpaccio . Mm hmm . 754 00:30:30,800 --> 00:30:33,720 Yeah . Did you just call me ? I did 755 00:30:33,720 --> 00:30:36,180 Tony . Okay . Sorry , sorry , I missed 756 00:30:36,180 --> 00:30:38,069 that . two questions . One budget 757 00:30:38,069 --> 00:30:40,850 question and one air defense question . 758 00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:43,440 The president is about to sign this 759 00:30:43,440 --> 00:30:47,200 $13.5 trillion dollar package . Excuse 760 00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:51,050 me . The $1.5 trillion $3.5 761 00:30:51,050 --> 00:30:53,900 billion defense equipment , defensive 762 00:30:53,900 --> 00:30:55,956 equipment . three billion of that is 763 00:30:55,956 --> 00:30:57,860 going to be new equipment to the 764 00:30:57,860 --> 00:31:00,490 Ukraine . How quickly will the Pentagon 765 00:31:00,490 --> 00:31:02,780 be able to send over this neutrons of 766 00:31:02,790 --> 00:31:05,430 equipment . Yeah , I'm not gonna get 767 00:31:05,430 --> 00:31:08,570 ahead uh , of that process right now , 768 00:31:08,570 --> 00:31:11,720 Tony . I would just tell you , as we've 769 00:31:11,720 --> 00:31:13,776 said before . I mean , we're still , 770 00:31:13,776 --> 00:31:17,180 we're still delivering Assistance on 771 00:31:17,180 --> 00:31:19,124 the last drawdown package that the 772 00:31:19,124 --> 00:31:21,560 president signed , the $350 million . 773 00:31:21,720 --> 00:31:23,831 We're still delivering as a matter of 774 00:31:23,831 --> 00:31:25,942 fact , even in just the last 24 hours 775 00:31:25,980 --> 00:31:29,600 and in the next 24 hours . Um , and 776 00:31:29,610 --> 00:31:32,230 uh , and obviously we will , as I've 777 00:31:32,230 --> 00:31:34,119 said before , we will continue to 778 00:31:34,119 --> 00:31:36,063 provide security assistance to the 779 00:31:36,063 --> 00:31:38,174 Ukrainians for as long as we can , as 780 00:31:38,174 --> 00:31:39,952 fast as we can . And that would 781 00:31:39,952 --> 00:31:42,174 certainly include under the authorities 782 00:31:42,174 --> 00:31:44,870 and funding that would be provided by 783 00:31:44,870 --> 00:31:46,703 this spending bill when when the 784 00:31:46,703 --> 00:31:48,870 president signs as he's indicated that 785 00:31:48,870 --> 00:31:50,648 that he's gonna assign it . And 786 00:31:50,648 --> 00:31:53,120 obviously , broadly speaking , we're 787 00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:55,660 grateful that to uh , to be able to 788 00:31:55,660 --> 00:31:58,830 have an appropriations bill signed into 789 00:31:58,830 --> 00:32:00,890 law and not have to live under the 790 00:32:00,890 --> 00:32:03,740 threat of yet more continuing 791 00:32:03,740 --> 00:32:06,660 resolutions . Anything more in the room . 792 00:32:07,340 --> 00:32:09,562 Okay . That will close this out today . 793 00:32:09,562 --> 00:32:09,950 Thank you very much