1 00:00:00,340 --> 00:00:02,173 Thank you Mr Chair and committee 2 00:00:02,173 --> 00:00:04,284 members and two generals Mackenzie in 3 00:00:04,284 --> 00:00:06,340 towns and thank you for your service 4 00:00:06,340 --> 00:00:08,230 and for your frequent and always 5 00:00:08,230 --> 00:00:10,230 illuminating appearances before the 6 00:00:10,230 --> 00:00:12,286 Committee General Townsend I want to 7 00:00:12,286 --> 00:00:14,341 talk to you about a situation that's 8 00:00:14,341 --> 00:00:16,452 not getting a lot of attention in the 9 00:00:16,452 --> 00:00:18,397 media these days . And that is the 10 00:00:18,397 --> 00:00:20,980 humanitarian crisis and war crimes 11 00:00:20,980 --> 00:00:22,880 being committed by many sides in 12 00:00:22,890 --> 00:00:26,260 Ethiopia and the Tigre region . The 13 00:00:26,270 --> 00:00:29,380 ongoing battle . 20 months now between 14 00:00:29,390 --> 00:00:32,330 the Ethiopian military and the two gray 15 00:00:32,330 --> 00:00:35,560 region forces has created a huge 16 00:00:35,940 --> 00:00:38,760 humanitarian crisis . War crimes , 17 00:00:39,240 --> 00:00:42,680 famine . You know , it is 18 00:00:42,680 --> 00:00:45,230 important that we focus as much energy 19 00:00:45,230 --> 00:00:47,960 as we are focusing on the situation in 20 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:49,904 Ukraine right now . But one of the 21 00:00:49,904 --> 00:00:51,960 things that I grieve a little bit is 22 00:00:51,960 --> 00:00:54,127 when we focus on one part of the world 23 00:00:54,240 --> 00:00:56,518 atrocities in other parts of the world , 24 00:00:56,518 --> 00:00:58,740 sort of go below the radar screen . And 25 00:00:58,740 --> 00:01:00,851 so whether it's an Ethiopian Tigre or 26 00:01:00,851 --> 00:01:03,120 whether it's persecution of the 27 00:01:03,250 --> 00:01:05,361 Rohingya in Burma or whether it's the 28 00:01:05,361 --> 00:01:08,160 ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen . 29 00:01:08,480 --> 00:01:10,313 Some of these crises grabbed the 30 00:01:10,313 --> 00:01:12,313 world's attention grabbed America's 31 00:01:12,313 --> 00:01:14,690 attention and and some of these crises 32 00:01:14,690 --> 00:01:17,500 don't . And there's many , many reasons 33 00:01:17,720 --> 00:01:19,900 for that . I'm not going to speculate 34 00:01:19,910 --> 00:01:23,150 on them now , but in a situation like 35 00:01:24,240 --> 00:01:28,120 um the the ongoing atrocities in 36 00:01:28,120 --> 00:01:31,640 Ethiopia , um which are internal civil 37 00:01:31,640 --> 00:01:33,862 strife , although there are presence of 38 00:01:33,862 --> 00:01:37,700 foreign actors inciting that strife 39 00:01:37,710 --> 00:01:39,850 or supporting signs in that strife . 40 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:43,180 What can africom do . What can the 41 00:01:43,180 --> 00:01:46,990 United States due to try to advance a 42 00:01:46,990 --> 00:01:49,960 better chapter for people of Ethiopia . 43 00:01:52,640 --> 00:01:55,410 Thanks Senator . As you stated , you 44 00:01:55,410 --> 00:01:58,260 know , that civil war erupted in the 45 00:01:58,260 --> 00:02:01,830 late 2020 . Uh and so civil war played 46 00:02:01,830 --> 00:02:04,360 out for over a year . They're on top of 47 00:02:04,740 --> 00:02:07,170 humanitarian crisis there , famine 48 00:02:07,170 --> 00:02:09,470 etcetera . And uh it started 49 00:02:09,470 --> 00:02:11,526 culminating there at the end of last 50 00:02:11,526 --> 00:02:13,748 year , it looked like the capital addis 51 00:02:13,748 --> 00:02:17,030 may fall . Uh the Ethiopian government 52 00:02:17,040 --> 00:02:18,929 rallied and they pushed the teddy 53 00:02:18,929 --> 00:02:21,980 grahams back into Tigre and today it's 54 00:02:21,990 --> 00:02:24,820 sort of quiet , but we think we're 55 00:02:24,820 --> 00:02:27,660 maybe in a period in between conflict 56 00:02:27,670 --> 00:02:29,837 erupting again . I hope that's not the 57 00:02:29,837 --> 00:02:31,837 case . I know that there's a lot of 58 00:02:31,837 --> 00:02:34,890 diplomacy going on . There's a U . S . 59 00:02:34,890 --> 00:02:36,779 Special envoy , there's a U . N . 60 00:02:36,779 --> 00:02:39,710 Special envoy to work this . 61 00:02:40,740 --> 00:02:43,200 I think both sides right now are trying 62 00:02:43,200 --> 00:02:46,650 to reset themselves and gather strength . 63 00:02:47,140 --> 00:02:50,450 Um and this diplomacy includes our 64 00:02:50,450 --> 00:02:52,394 efforts as well . We've we've been 65 00:02:52,394 --> 00:02:54,310 involved in supporting the State 66 00:02:54,310 --> 00:02:56,366 Department diplomatic efforts in the 67 00:02:56,366 --> 00:02:59,700 region right now for africom . 68 00:02:59,710 --> 00:03:02,330 We're watching and assisting uh 69 00:03:02,340 --> 00:03:05,110 buttressing the State Department . I 70 00:03:05,110 --> 00:03:07,166 appreciate that . And I just want to 71 00:03:07,166 --> 00:03:09,388 again underline this point when there's 72 00:03:09,388 --> 00:03:11,443 crises and challenges in the world , 73 00:03:11,443 --> 00:03:13,499 people turn to the United States for 74 00:03:13,499 --> 00:03:15,750 help . Um you know , it is interesting 75 00:03:15,750 --> 00:03:19,190 that again , and it's it's worthy and 76 00:03:19,190 --> 00:03:20,968 important that we be paying the 77 00:03:20,968 --> 00:03:23,079 attention we're paying to the Russian 78 00:03:23,079 --> 00:03:25,350 illegal war against Ukraine . 79 00:03:26,840 --> 00:03:29,030 And yet in Ethiopia , there are war 80 00:03:29,030 --> 00:03:31,270 crimes occurring . There's genocidal 81 00:03:31,270 --> 00:03:35,240 activity occurring . It may not be an 82 00:03:35,240 --> 00:03:37,660 invasion of sovereignty by a neighbor . 83 00:03:38,040 --> 00:03:39,929 But there are neighbors and other 84 00:03:39,929 --> 00:03:42,750 nations that are inciting violence and 85 00:03:42,750 --> 00:03:45,790 supporting violence . And , you know , 86 00:03:45,790 --> 00:03:48,110 I hope that we may all strive to be 87 00:03:48,110 --> 00:03:50,332 evenhanded in the attention that we pay 88 00:03:50,332 --> 00:03:52,332 to humanitarian crises all over the 89 00:03:52,332 --> 00:03:54,388 world . With that Mr Chair , I yield 90 00:03:54,388 --> 00:03:56,860 back . Thank you very much . Senator 91 00:03:56,860 --> 00:03:58,916 Kaine , let me now recognize Senator 92 00:03:58,916 --> 00:04:01,240 Tuberville , please . Well , thank you 93 00:04:01,240 --> 00:04:03,800 very much . Mr Chairman , thank thank 94 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:05,967 you guys for your , for your service . 95 00:04:06,440 --> 00:04:08,607 I know you're looking forward to doing 96 00:04:08,607 --> 00:04:10,773 something else , possibly for the next 97 00:04:10,773 --> 00:04:12,940 few years . Ah , General Townsend , as 98 00:04:12,940 --> 00:04:15,162 you mentioned your testimony , Russia's 99 00:04:15,162 --> 00:04:17,162 continued to encourage chaos in the 100 00:04:17,640 --> 00:04:20,250 Africom a or via the Wagner group . 101 00:04:22,540 --> 00:04:24,762 What what what has been done to counter 102 00:04:24,762 --> 00:04:26,762 their efforts and what do you think 103 00:04:26,762 --> 00:04:30,580 needs to be continued to be done ? So , 104 00:04:30,690 --> 00:04:33,490 the Russian efforts , as I mentioned 105 00:04:33,490 --> 00:04:35,546 earlier , predominantly done through 106 00:04:35,546 --> 00:04:37,657 these private military companies like 107 00:04:37,657 --> 00:04:39,990 Wagner and they're , they're quite , uh , 108 00:04:39,990 --> 00:04:42,480 they're present in Libya in number , to 109 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:45,050 a lesser extent , in Sudan . They 110 00:04:45,050 --> 00:04:47,700 essentially run the Central African 111 00:04:47,700 --> 00:04:51,530 Republic , um , and they're now in 112 00:04:51,530 --> 00:04:53,586 mali and then gathering strength and 113 00:04:53,586 --> 00:04:55,752 molly over 1000 Wagner operators there 114 00:04:55,752 --> 00:04:57,697 now . Uh , what we're , we've been 115 00:04:57,697 --> 00:04:59,880 doing is shining a spotlight on that 116 00:04:59,880 --> 00:05:02,230 with information operations and uh , 117 00:05:02,240 --> 00:05:04,830 some public diplomacy , uh , that's and 118 00:05:04,830 --> 00:05:07,400 and advising our African partners to to 119 00:05:07,400 --> 00:05:10,350 try to steer clear of these uh groups . 120 00:05:10,360 --> 00:05:13,370 I think that uh , they're not going to 121 00:05:13,370 --> 00:05:15,650 help our African partners and I think 122 00:05:15,650 --> 00:05:18,050 that the government and the people of 123 00:05:18,050 --> 00:05:20,880 mali are going to regret uh inviting 124 00:05:20,890 --> 00:05:23,990 Wagner into their country as we speak . 125 00:05:23,990 --> 00:05:27,230 We have one military base in Africa in 126 00:05:27,230 --> 00:05:28,850 your opinion , do we need to 127 00:05:31,240 --> 00:05:33,462 um in my view , I don't I don't believe 128 00:05:33,462 --> 00:05:36,180 we do need any other permanent U . S . 129 00:05:36,190 --> 00:05:38,600 Installations . Our presence and our 130 00:05:38,600 --> 00:05:40,770 activities there are is not dependent 131 00:05:40,770 --> 00:05:44,640 on permanent bases in Africa . Okay , 132 00:05:44,650 --> 00:05:47,930 thank you . Um john McKenzie 133 00:05:47,940 --> 00:05:50,540 recently we've seen several attempts to 134 00:05:50,540 --> 00:05:54,030 block weapons sales to Saudi and U . A . 135 00:05:54,030 --> 00:05:56,800 E . And uh in Egypt those attempts 136 00:05:56,800 --> 00:05:58,930 could we we all know could severely 137 00:05:58,930 --> 00:06:01,070 weaken , you know , our influence and 138 00:06:01,080 --> 00:06:03,680 centcom kor even President biden 139 00:06:03,680 --> 00:06:06,960 recognizes that and has changed his 140 00:06:06,960 --> 00:06:09,320 mind on some of these in the last last 141 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:13,130 year , one of the Saudis and 142 00:06:13,130 --> 00:06:15,270 the Emiratis and the Egyptians 143 00:06:15,270 --> 00:06:18,330 specifically requested that we haven't 144 00:06:18,330 --> 00:06:22,120 given them senator . Let me just 145 00:06:22,130 --> 00:06:24,241 begin by saying we remain the partner 146 00:06:24,241 --> 00:06:26,241 of choice for all these countries . 147 00:06:26,241 --> 00:06:28,580 Egypt . Saudi Arabia , you a they value 148 00:06:28,580 --> 00:06:30,636 their relationship with us . Uh they 149 00:06:30,636 --> 00:06:33,180 find it frustrating that uh if they in 150 00:06:33,180 --> 00:06:35,347 the case of you a they've expressed an 151 00:06:35,347 --> 00:06:37,347 interest in the F 35 5th generation 152 00:06:37,347 --> 00:06:39,347 fighter and we're in a process with 153 00:06:39,347 --> 00:06:41,347 them right now uh to see how that's 154 00:06:41,347 --> 00:06:43,420 gonna work out uh that's that's one 155 00:06:43,420 --> 00:06:45,430 example . Saudi Arabia is also 156 00:06:45,430 --> 00:06:47,620 interested in advanced uh advanced 157 00:06:47,620 --> 00:06:49,842 aircraft , advanced air defense systems 158 00:06:49,842 --> 00:06:51,842 which generally speaking we've been 159 00:06:51,842 --> 00:06:53,953 able to give Saudi Arabia in the case 160 00:06:53,953 --> 00:06:56,009 of Egypt . I think we have good news 161 00:06:56,009 --> 00:06:58,064 and that we're going to provide them 162 00:06:58,064 --> 00:07:00,231 with F fifteen's which was a long hard 163 00:07:00,231 --> 00:07:02,453 slog . They felt it was too long . They 164 00:07:02,453 --> 00:07:04,398 took took too long . And Senator , 165 00:07:04,398 --> 00:07:06,287 that's the basic criticism of our 166 00:07:06,287 --> 00:07:08,176 ability to provide weapons to our 167 00:07:08,176 --> 00:07:10,176 friends and partners . It takes too 168 00:07:10,176 --> 00:07:12,398 long to actually get them . It moves in 169 00:07:12,398 --> 00:07:14,453 fits and starts . And of course with 170 00:07:14,453 --> 00:07:16,564 our weapons come our values senator . 171 00:07:16,564 --> 00:07:18,731 And so they're gonna not gonna be able 172 00:07:18,731 --> 00:07:20,731 to do anything they want with those 173 00:07:20,731 --> 00:07:20,330 weapons . They're going to have to be 174 00:07:20,330 --> 00:07:22,552 applied in a manner consistent with the 175 00:07:22,552 --> 00:07:24,608 law of armed conflict and the law of 176 00:07:24,608 --> 00:07:26,830 war . You don't have that caveat if you 177 00:07:26,830 --> 00:07:28,886 buy a Russian or chinese system . On 178 00:07:28,886 --> 00:07:28,480 the other hand the Russia and the 179 00:07:28,480 --> 00:07:30,647 chinese system cannot compete with the 180 00:07:30,647 --> 00:07:32,758 ability of an american system . Thank 181 00:07:32,758 --> 00:07:35,970 you . Uh general Townsend in in 182 00:07:35,980 --> 00:07:39,530 2021 china unveiled its plan to 183 00:07:39,530 --> 00:07:42,530 complete several thorium powered 184 00:07:42,530 --> 00:07:45,060 nuclear reactors in africa 185 00:07:46,540 --> 00:07:49,260 throw them unlike uranium cannot be 186 00:07:49,260 --> 00:07:51,093 used for nuclear weapons but can 187 00:07:51,093 --> 00:07:54,670 provide cheap clean energy that china 188 00:07:54,720 --> 00:07:57,300 can export and impose on low income 189 00:07:57,570 --> 00:07:59,760 countries . The most concerning part . 190 00:07:59,810 --> 00:08:03,770 This to me is ah we realized 191 00:08:03,770 --> 00:08:06,180 this years ago but our department of 192 00:08:06,180 --> 00:08:09,520 Energy gave this technology to china as 193 00:08:09,520 --> 00:08:11,853 you mentioned in your opening statement , 194 00:08:11,940 --> 00:08:14,730 these there are many reasons and 195 00:08:14,730 --> 00:08:17,700 resources within your a r that are tied 196 00:08:17,700 --> 00:08:20,710 to the US transition to clean energy if 197 00:08:20,710 --> 00:08:24,130 china integrates thorium nuclear actors 198 00:08:24,130 --> 00:08:26,352 to the belt and road initiative , would 199 00:08:26,352 --> 00:08:28,463 that pose a threat to United States ? 200 00:08:30,740 --> 00:08:33,300 Senator , I don't know enough about the 201 00:08:33,300 --> 00:08:36,100 chinese nuclear reactor program to see 202 00:08:36,100 --> 00:08:38,267 if it say that it proposes a threat to 203 00:08:38,267 --> 00:08:40,322 the United States . However , I know 204 00:08:40,322 --> 00:08:43,940 that Africa is a source of vast 205 00:08:43,950 --> 00:08:47,150 uh deposits of strategic minerals that 206 00:08:47,150 --> 00:08:51,050 America and the world needs uh to to uh 207 00:08:51,140 --> 00:08:53,418 for our technology in the 21st century . 208 00:08:53,418 --> 00:08:56,540 And uh china is working hard to corner 209 00:08:56,540 --> 00:08:58,740 the market on those resources . I'm 210 00:08:58,740 --> 00:09:01,400 more worried about that I think than uh 211 00:09:01,410 --> 00:09:03,360 chinese nuclear energy projects in 212 00:09:03,360 --> 00:09:05,850 Africa . Again , thank you both of you 213 00:09:05,850 --> 00:09:09,730 for your service . Mr Thank you very 214 00:09:09,730 --> 00:09:11,452 much Senator Bill . Let me now 215 00:09:11,452 --> 00:09:13,674 recognize Senator Warren . Please thank 216 00:09:13,674 --> 00:09:15,880 you mr Chairman and thank you to both 217 00:09:15,880 --> 00:09:17,991 of our witnesses for being here today 218 00:09:17,991 --> 00:09:20,560 and for your many years of service to 219 00:09:20,560 --> 00:09:23,370 our nation . The rand Corporation , a 220 00:09:23,370 --> 00:09:25,592 non partisan research organization that 221 00:09:25,592 --> 00:09:27,426 studies national security issues 222 00:09:27,540 --> 00:09:29,940 recently published a report that found 223 00:09:29,940 --> 00:09:32,470 a number of pitfalls in the way that 224 00:09:32,480 --> 00:09:35,150 our military prevents investigates and 225 00:09:35,150 --> 00:09:38,210 responds to reports of civilian harm 226 00:09:38,220 --> 00:09:40,331 including and I want to read from the 227 00:09:40,331 --> 00:09:42,930 report . D . O . D . Is not adequately 228 00:09:42,940 --> 00:09:45,280 organized , trained or equipped to 229 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:47,890 fulfill its current responsibilities 230 00:09:48,010 --> 00:09:50,670 for addressing civilian harm . End , 231 00:09:50,670 --> 00:09:52,930 quote now , I think that's a pretty 232 00:09:52,930 --> 00:09:56,920 damning finding particularly as this is 233 00:09:56,930 --> 00:10:00,010 far from a new issue for the United 234 00:10:00,010 --> 00:10:02,650 States . I know that Secretary Austin 235 00:10:02,660 --> 00:10:05,090 has asked D . O . D . To develop an 236 00:10:05,090 --> 00:10:07,890 action plan and I agree with him that 237 00:10:07,890 --> 00:10:10,380 protection of civilians is both a 238 00:10:10,380 --> 00:10:14,050 strategic and a moral imperative . So I 239 00:10:14,050 --> 00:10:16,350 want to learn more about your work to 240 00:10:16,350 --> 00:10:18,017 prevent civilian harm in your 241 00:10:18,017 --> 00:10:20,430 respective commands . General 2000 . If 242 00:10:20,430 --> 00:10:22,541 I can , I'll start with you on this . 243 00:10:22,541 --> 00:10:25,700 Africom provides a quarterly report 244 00:10:25,710 --> 00:10:27,920 updating the public on the status of 245 00:10:27,930 --> 00:10:31,420 all reports of civilian casualties and 246 00:10:31,420 --> 00:10:33,750 it issued one just late last week . 247 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:37,370 What benefit do you see in regular 248 00:10:37,370 --> 00:10:40,010 reporting of civilian casualties to the 249 00:10:40,010 --> 00:10:43,960 public ? Senator ? I 250 00:10:43,960 --> 00:10:46,230 believe that being transparent is 251 00:10:46,230 --> 00:10:48,860 probably , or you know , it it shows 252 00:10:48,860 --> 00:10:51,850 the difference between us and uh well , 253 00:10:51,850 --> 00:10:54,110 for example , the Russians in Ukraine 254 00:10:54,110 --> 00:10:55,920 right now . So I believe that 255 00:10:55,920 --> 00:10:58,130 publishing those reports publicly and 256 00:10:58,130 --> 00:11:01,220 regularly on a on a routine basis is 257 00:11:01,220 --> 00:11:03,510 our best tool for gaining the trust of 258 00:11:03,510 --> 00:11:05,680 the american public . And I agree with 259 00:11:05,680 --> 00:11:07,847 you and I commend you for doing this . 260 00:11:07,847 --> 00:11:09,624 You know , that kind of regular 261 00:11:09,624 --> 00:11:12,700 transparency shows that the command is 262 00:11:12,700 --> 00:11:15,550 prioritizing and investigating claims 263 00:11:15,550 --> 00:11:17,930 of civilian harm . And I'd like to see 264 00:11:17,930 --> 00:11:20,560 that kind of regular reporting from all 265 00:11:20,560 --> 00:11:22,510 of the combatant commanders . So , 266 00:11:22,520 --> 00:11:24,576 general , now let me ask you another 267 00:11:24,576 --> 00:11:26,687 question about this , Would you agree 268 00:11:26,687 --> 00:11:28,630 that there are several reputable 269 00:11:28,630 --> 00:11:31,800 trusted Ngos and independent observers 270 00:11:31,800 --> 00:11:35,330 in civil society that produce reliable 271 00:11:35,330 --> 00:11:37,050 reporting on civilian harm ? 272 00:11:39,740 --> 00:11:43,590 I think I would . Good has africom 273 00:11:43,600 --> 00:11:46,460 undertaken a formal process to 274 00:11:46,460 --> 00:11:48,810 incorporate feedback from these groups 275 00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:51,780 uh to improve how it tracks and 276 00:11:51,780 --> 00:11:55,490 responds to civilian harm . Yes , 277 00:11:55,490 --> 00:11:57,670 Senator , we take their feedback with 278 00:11:57,680 --> 00:12:00,410 every report they make . Well , that's 279 00:12:00,410 --> 00:12:02,466 important . And I think , but let me 280 00:12:02,466 --> 00:12:04,632 ask you , do you have a formal process 281 00:12:04,632 --> 00:12:06,577 for doing this or you just kind of 282 00:12:06,577 --> 00:12:08,743 integrated as you go along ? We have a 283 00:12:08,743 --> 00:12:11,240 portal that anyone that has access to 284 00:12:11,240 --> 00:12:13,200 the internet can report civilian 285 00:12:13,200 --> 00:12:15,520 casualties or take exception to our 286 00:12:15,520 --> 00:12:17,870 evaluation of those . Good . I'm glad 287 00:12:17,870 --> 00:12:20,037 to hear this . You know , these groups 288 00:12:20,037 --> 00:12:22,510 can provide essential information , not 289 00:12:22,520 --> 00:12:26,070 only to accurately identify where you 290 00:12:26,070 --> 00:12:28,237 need to investigate claims of civilian 291 00:12:28,237 --> 00:12:31,730 harm , but also to help and prevent the 292 00:12:31,730 --> 00:12:34,420 killing of civilians in future strikes . 293 00:12:34,940 --> 00:12:37,660 Uh , rand's report recommended that D . 294 00:12:37,660 --> 00:12:40,440 O . D engaged with outside groups more 295 00:12:40,450 --> 00:12:42,728 and I'm I'm glad to see you doing this . 296 00:12:42,728 --> 00:12:44,839 General Mackenzie , If I can . Let me 297 00:12:44,839 --> 00:12:46,894 let me talk with you a minute here . 298 00:12:46,894 --> 00:12:48,783 The vast majority of the civilian 299 00:12:48,783 --> 00:12:50,839 casualties caused by the US military 300 00:12:50,839 --> 00:12:53,860 operations have occurred . In Centcom's 301 00:12:53,870 --> 00:12:56,750 A . O . R not only that , but reporting 302 00:12:56,750 --> 00:12:58,750 from the new york times found major 303 00:12:58,750 --> 00:13:02,190 instances of civilian harm in Syria 304 00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:05,220 that had been covered up . Does centcom 305 00:13:05,220 --> 00:13:07,150 have an established process for 306 00:13:07,150 --> 00:13:10,250 incorporating feedback from trusted 307 00:13:10,250 --> 00:13:13,010 civil society groups to improve the 308 00:13:13,010 --> 00:13:16,260 ways that it prevents and responds to 309 00:13:16,270 --> 00:13:20,120 instances of civilian harm , Sen . We 310 00:13:20,120 --> 00:13:22,080 did . And it was not as robust as 311 00:13:22,090 --> 00:13:24,257 straightforward a program as it should 312 00:13:24,257 --> 00:13:26,146 have been in the wake of the Rand 313 00:13:26,146 --> 00:13:28,312 report and other reports . We've taken 314 00:13:28,312 --> 00:13:30,423 10 discrete actions that are designed 315 00:13:30,423 --> 00:13:32,530 all two more formalized and provide 316 00:13:32,530 --> 00:13:34,752 additional oversight on the possibility 317 00:13:34,752 --> 00:13:36,980 of civilian casualties . Good . I'm 318 00:13:36,980 --> 00:13:39,250 very glad to hear that general because 319 00:13:39,280 --> 00:13:41,870 given their expertise , I think we have 320 00:13:41,870 --> 00:13:44,310 a lot to learn from these groups and it 321 00:13:44,310 --> 00:13:46,650 can help improve processes and it's 322 00:13:46,650 --> 00:13:49,390 long past time that the United States 323 00:13:49,390 --> 00:13:52,010 took seriously the impact of the way 324 00:13:52,010 --> 00:13:54,310 that it treats civilian harm . And I'm 325 00:13:54,310 --> 00:13:56,150 glad that Secretary Austin is 326 00:13:56,150 --> 00:13:58,620 addressing this , but meaningful change 327 00:13:58,620 --> 00:14:00,850 is going to take buy in from the two of 328 00:14:00,850 --> 00:14:03,440 you from your successors and from the 329 00:14:03,440 --> 00:14:05,660 rest of the D . O . D . Leadership . 330 00:14:05,670 --> 00:14:08,060 I'm working on legislation to address 331 00:14:08,060 --> 00:14:10,630 these problems , but in the meantime , 332 00:14:10,640 --> 00:14:12,751 I'll be paying close attention to the 333 00:14:12,751 --> 00:14:15,200 department's action plan and to your 334 00:14:15,200 --> 00:14:17,770 work implementing it in the hopes that 335 00:14:17,770 --> 00:14:19,659 some of the principles that we've 336 00:14:19,659 --> 00:14:22,510 talked about today will be implemented 337 00:14:22,510 --> 00:14:24,621 soon . So thank you very much . Thank 338 00:14:24,621 --> 00:14:26,843 you for your work on this . Thank you . 339 00:14:26,843 --> 00:14:28,732 Mr Chairman , thank you . Senator 340 00:14:28,732 --> 00:14:31,490 Warren , Senator Tillis , please thank 341 00:14:31,490 --> 00:14:33,601 you . Mr Chairman . Gentlemen , thank 342 00:14:33,601 --> 00:14:36,120 you for being here , John Townsend 343 00:14:36,120 --> 00:14:39,460 Prior administration reduced nearly all 344 00:14:39,460 --> 00:14:42,580 of the 700 troops that we had in 345 00:14:42,580 --> 00:14:44,802 Somalia . And now you're commuting from 346 00:14:44,802 --> 00:14:47,150 Djibouti and kenya for counterterrorism 347 00:14:47,160 --> 00:14:49,740 over the horizon operations . How is 348 00:14:49,740 --> 00:14:51,684 that working now ? And what are we 349 00:14:51,684 --> 00:14:53,796 going to do to increase effectiveness 350 00:14:53,796 --> 00:14:57,440 and reduce risk . Senator , In my 351 00:14:57,440 --> 00:15:01,370 view , we are marching in place 352 00:15:01,430 --> 00:15:05,110 at best . We may be backsliding than 353 00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:07,670 the security in Somalia , the security 354 00:15:07,670 --> 00:15:10,840 situation and um that's for a number of 355 00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:13,140 reasons . Not just our commuting to 356 00:15:13,140 --> 00:15:15,370 work but it's also political 357 00:15:15,370 --> 00:15:18,030 dysfunction in mogadishu . It's also in 358 00:15:18,030 --> 00:15:21,910 activity by the Somali by the amazon 359 00:15:21,910 --> 00:15:25,650 partners . Those also factor in . I 360 00:15:25,660 --> 00:15:29,500 just think that what we're doing is not 361 00:15:29,510 --> 00:15:32,740 providing sufficient pressure and the 362 00:15:32,740 --> 00:15:35,180 best we can do is maintain a secure 363 00:15:35,180 --> 00:15:38,110 area around the bases that we return to 364 00:15:38,110 --> 00:15:40,550 and we really can't get at the al 365 00:15:40,550 --> 00:15:44,270 Shabaab problems . Uh john 366 00:15:44,270 --> 00:15:46,860 McKenzie you've had a similar challenge 367 00:15:46,860 --> 00:15:49,210 with the withdrawal from Afghanistan . 368 00:15:49,240 --> 00:15:53,170 And uh we haven't seen any any strikes 369 00:15:53,170 --> 00:15:55,114 since our withdrawal last year . I 370 00:15:55,114 --> 00:15:56,948 suspect some of that information 371 00:15:56,948 --> 00:15:58,614 gathering a lot of logistical 372 00:15:58,614 --> 00:16:00,559 challenges . But what are we doing 373 00:16:00,559 --> 00:16:03,170 there to overcome the massive reduction 374 00:16:03,170 --> 00:16:05,590 in R . C . T . Efforts in Afghanistan ? 375 00:16:05,600 --> 00:16:07,820 And if you could give me an update on 376 00:16:07,820 --> 00:16:10,340 how IsIS and Al Qaeda are doing uh 377 00:16:10,350 --> 00:16:13,180 rebuilding their uh their efforts in 378 00:16:13,180 --> 00:16:15,610 Afghanistan . Sen , let me preface what 379 00:16:15,610 --> 00:16:17,721 I'm gonna say by saying in the in the 380 00:16:17,721 --> 00:16:19,832 closed session that will follow . I'm 381 00:16:19,832 --> 00:16:21,943 prepared to provide an exhaustive lay 382 00:16:21,943 --> 00:16:23,943 down of exactly what we're doing in 383 00:16:23,943 --> 00:16:26,166 Afghanistan at a very granular level of 384 00:16:26,166 --> 00:16:28,277 detail . So I'm prepared to do that . 385 00:16:28,277 --> 00:16:27,660 But I will tell you I would tell you we 386 00:16:27,660 --> 00:16:29,604 have not undertaken any strikes in 387 00:16:29,604 --> 00:16:31,827 Afghanistan since since one September . 388 00:16:31,940 --> 00:16:34,670 We continue to watch carefully as ISIS 389 00:16:35,140 --> 00:16:37,310 grows gone . They've gone through the 390 00:16:37,310 --> 00:16:39,532 winter . They've been able to carry out 391 00:16:39,532 --> 00:16:41,754 some high profile attacks Uh They still 392 00:16:41,754 --> 00:16:43,921 aspire to attack the United States and 393 00:16:43,921 --> 00:16:46,032 our partners abroad . Uh And so we're 394 00:16:46,032 --> 00:16:48,032 gonna watch very carefully what the 395 00:16:48,032 --> 00:16:50,143 taliban is able to do and not able to 396 00:16:50,143 --> 00:16:52,366 do in terms of controlling ISIS because 397 00:16:52,366 --> 00:16:54,532 as we all know , taliban actually will 398 00:16:54,532 --> 00:16:56,254 fight ISIS and and they have a 399 00:16:56,254 --> 00:16:58,421 theological dispute and so they are in 400 00:16:58,421 --> 00:17:00,588 opposition . Al Qaeda is a little more 401 00:17:00,588 --> 00:17:02,532 difficult to understand because of 402 00:17:02,532 --> 00:17:04,588 their cultural interweaving with the 403 00:17:04,588 --> 00:17:06,199 Taliban . They still have an 404 00:17:06,199 --> 00:17:08,310 aspirational desire to attack us . It 405 00:17:08,310 --> 00:17:10,254 will be harder for the Taliban , I 406 00:17:10,254 --> 00:17:12,254 predict to ultimately control their 407 00:17:12,254 --> 00:17:14,310 actions . That was with Haqqani's in 408 00:17:14,310 --> 00:17:16,421 the Taliban government . How well are 409 00:17:16,421 --> 00:17:16,350 they doing countering the Al Qaeda 410 00:17:16,350 --> 00:17:18,572 threat in Afghanistan ? I think they've 411 00:17:18,572 --> 00:17:20,990 taken some , they've done some things 412 00:17:20,990 --> 00:17:23,157 that are very public in order to limit 413 00:17:23,157 --> 00:17:25,379 them . I think it remains to be seen if 414 00:17:25,379 --> 00:17:27,379 that's actually gonna be translated 415 00:17:27,379 --> 00:17:29,490 into action . Um I doubt that it will 416 00:17:30,540 --> 00:17:32,762 general Townsend when you look at these 417 00:17:32,762 --> 00:17:35,060 maps that you have about the footprint 418 00:17:35,840 --> 00:17:39,550 and your area of responsibility for 419 00:17:39,550 --> 00:17:42,970 Russia and china . Um Are we kind of 420 00:17:42,970 --> 00:17:45,081 used the words marching in place with 421 00:17:45,081 --> 00:17:47,610 respect to the C . T . Threat ? Uh An 422 00:17:47,610 --> 00:17:49,721 answer to the prior question , are we 423 00:17:49,721 --> 00:17:51,943 more or less marching in place ? Are we 424 00:17:51,943 --> 00:17:53,999 gaining any ground particularly over 425 00:17:53,999 --> 00:17:57,120 China's uh What I see is a massive 426 00:17:57,120 --> 00:17:59,287 investment and increasing footprint in 427 00:17:59,287 --> 00:18:03,010 Africa Center . 428 00:18:03,540 --> 00:18:05,780 You're right , You just said china's 429 00:18:05,780 --> 00:18:07,891 massive investment . We don't have to 430 00:18:07,891 --> 00:18:10,300 compete with china everywhere . Uh , we 431 00:18:10,300 --> 00:18:12,520 have to be selective about where we 432 00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:15,670 compete with china and um , I think we 433 00:18:15,670 --> 00:18:19,130 are being successful in that targeted 434 00:18:19,140 --> 00:18:22,930 competition on the PMcs that Russia has 435 00:18:22,930 --> 00:18:25,410 the four or 5000 . You , you mentioned 436 00:18:25,410 --> 00:18:27,521 that uh , a part of what you're doing 437 00:18:27,521 --> 00:18:29,830 is exposing their activities , their 438 00:18:29,840 --> 00:18:32,520 malign activities in the area . Give me 439 00:18:32,520 --> 00:18:34,409 an example of one or two that are 440 00:18:34,409 --> 00:18:36,631 publicly known that the american people 441 00:18:36,631 --> 00:18:38,853 should be aware of . That , that , that 442 00:18:38,853 --> 00:18:41,020 Russia's malign savage influence , not 443 00:18:41,020 --> 00:18:43,187 only in Ukraine , but down in Africa , 444 00:18:43,187 --> 00:18:46,560 I think some great examples were in 445 00:18:46,570 --> 00:18:49,690 um , spring of 20 , 446 00:18:50,430 --> 00:18:54,080 when Russia provided fighters 447 00:18:54,090 --> 00:18:57,530 to their mercenaries in Libya and we 448 00:18:57,530 --> 00:18:59,730 were able to conduct an aerial 449 00:18:59,740 --> 00:19:03,240 photography ambush and expose to the 450 00:19:03,240 --> 00:19:05,410 world the provision of those fighters 451 00:19:05,410 --> 00:19:07,410 going to Libya that wound up in the 452 00:19:07,410 --> 00:19:09,950 hands of Wagner . I think the , 453 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:12,127 probably the best one though to get at 454 00:19:12,127 --> 00:19:14,293 the heart of the matter you're talking 455 00:19:14,293 --> 00:19:16,650 about there is as the fighting ended . 456 00:19:16,660 --> 00:19:19,860 Uh , the civil war ended in Libya , 457 00:19:20,340 --> 00:19:23,000 Wagner began to withdrawal from along 458 00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:25,890 the line of contact there and they left 459 00:19:25,900 --> 00:19:28,180 behind the anti tank mines , 460 00:19:28,180 --> 00:19:30,790 antipersonnel mines and booby traps I E . 461 00:19:30,790 --> 00:19:34,050 D s in their wake . And uh , one of the 462 00:19:34,050 --> 00:19:36,650 most heinous ones was uh , found in a 463 00:19:36,650 --> 00:19:39,700 teddy bear when they withdrew . Thank 464 00:19:39,700 --> 00:19:42,120 you . Mr Chair , thank you very much . 465 00:19:42,120 --> 00:19:44,453 Senator Tillis . Senator kelly , please . 466 00:19:44,453 --> 00:19:47,050 Thank you . Mr Chairman and General 467 00:19:47,060 --> 00:19:49,116 Mackenzie . General Townsend , thank 468 00:19:49,116 --> 00:19:51,393 you for being here . General Mackenzie , 469 00:19:51,393 --> 00:19:53,227 Congratulations on your upcoming 470 00:19:53,227 --> 00:19:57,090 Retirement on one April uh , General 471 00:19:57,090 --> 00:19:59,160 Townsend , I want to follow up on 472 00:19:59,940 --> 00:20:02,600 question that Senator Tillis and 473 00:20:02,600 --> 00:20:05,050 Tuberville asked specific specifically 474 00:20:05,050 --> 00:20:08,440 about the Wagner group . Um , I 475 00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:11,530 know you know that you share this 476 00:20:11,530 --> 00:20:14,160 committee's concern about the Russian 477 00:20:14,640 --> 00:20:17,420 illegal invasion of Ukraine and our 478 00:20:17,420 --> 00:20:19,990 allies have come together to to cut off 479 00:20:19,990 --> 00:20:23,350 Putin support around the world and um 480 00:20:23,840 --> 00:20:25,900 the influence that he has . And I'm 481 00:20:25,900 --> 00:20:27,956 really glad we've taken these strong 482 00:20:27,956 --> 00:20:30,178 measures necessary and we we need to do 483 00:20:30,178 --> 00:20:32,840 more . Um , but we also need to 484 00:20:32,840 --> 00:20:35,090 continue to monitor Russian backed 485 00:20:35,090 --> 00:20:36,812 activity around the world . So 486 00:20:36,812 --> 00:20:39,170 specifically , with regards to the 487 00:20:39,180 --> 00:20:42,500 Wagner group in Africa , um , you know , 488 00:20:42,500 --> 00:20:44,800 I find this increasing presence 489 00:20:44,810 --> 00:20:48,610 disturbing and uh , affects 490 00:20:48,620 --> 00:20:51,250 our strategic goals in the area . So , 491 00:20:51,390 --> 00:20:53,940 general , specifically , how do you see 492 00:20:53,940 --> 00:20:57,050 the Wagner groups activity impacting 493 00:20:57,540 --> 00:21:01,460 Our efforts to one suppress violent 494 00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:04,170 extremist groups and to support 495 00:21:04,640 --> 00:21:07,410 transition to democratic governance in 496 00:21:07,410 --> 00:21:11,330 the region . Thanks 497 00:21:11,330 --> 00:21:13,490 Senator , I think , um in a number of 498 00:21:13,490 --> 00:21:16,770 ways . First , for example , 499 00:21:17,140 --> 00:21:19,780 overflight permissions . So with a 500 00:21:19,790 --> 00:21:22,350 continent as vast as Africa , we 501 00:21:22,350 --> 00:21:24,461 absolutely depend on , you know , air 502 00:21:24,461 --> 00:21:26,890 movement for everything . And uh , when 503 00:21:26,890 --> 00:21:30,550 we see Wagner movin , uh , they impose 504 00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:32,727 overflight restrictions either through 505 00:21:32,727 --> 00:21:34,893 the government withdrawing permissions 506 00:21:34,893 --> 00:21:37,060 for overflight or in the case of Libya 507 00:21:37,060 --> 00:21:39,282 Wagner importing sophisticated advanced 508 00:21:39,282 --> 00:21:41,171 surface to air missile systems to 509 00:21:41,171 --> 00:21:43,800 protect their activities there , but 510 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:46,500 also deny the airspace . Uh , we can 511 00:21:46,500 --> 00:21:49,640 see some of this playing out in mali as 512 00:21:49,650 --> 00:21:51,940 Wagner's first started arriving there 513 00:21:51,940 --> 00:21:53,884 and now overflight permissions are 514 00:21:53,884 --> 00:21:56,710 becoming uh more challenging there then 515 00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:59,770 secondly , uh , usurping partnerships . 516 00:22:00,140 --> 00:22:03,380 So , um as we've seen and it just 517 00:22:03,380 --> 00:22:06,440 happened just now in mali , the malian 518 00:22:06,440 --> 00:22:09,310 government has asked the french forces 519 00:22:09,310 --> 00:22:11,710 to depart and instead have invited in 520 00:22:11,710 --> 00:22:15,350 this Russian PMC . And um , I think 521 00:22:15,350 --> 00:22:17,310 that is disturbing . It's it's 522 00:22:17,310 --> 00:22:19,310 impacting our partnership with that 523 00:22:19,310 --> 00:22:21,510 same government as well . Uh and I 524 00:22:21,510 --> 00:22:23,843 think that's not good for Mali's future . 525 00:22:23,950 --> 00:22:25,950 And what do you think the strategic 526 00:22:25,950 --> 00:22:29,730 goals that they might be advancing for 527 00:22:29,730 --> 00:22:32,260 Russian leadership would be , what's 528 00:22:32,260 --> 00:22:34,371 the overall , what's the overall goal 529 00:22:34,371 --> 00:22:37,700 here ? So for Wagner , they are guns 530 00:22:37,700 --> 00:22:39,478 for hire , they're a for profit 531 00:22:39,478 --> 00:22:42,190 organization and they are going to be 532 00:22:42,190 --> 00:22:44,750 extracting natural resources out of 533 00:22:44,760 --> 00:22:46,649 Africa and we see this in all the 534 00:22:46,649 --> 00:22:48,816 countries that are located and whether 535 00:22:48,816 --> 00:22:51,330 it's oil , gas , gold diamonds , 536 00:22:51,340 --> 00:22:53,173 strategic minerals , that's what 537 00:22:53,173 --> 00:22:55,284 they're going to be going after . And 538 00:22:55,284 --> 00:22:57,451 that's how they're probably gonna earn 539 00:22:57,451 --> 00:22:59,618 their Remittance . But at what they're 540 00:22:59,618 --> 00:23:01,840 doing for the Kremlin though is they're 541 00:23:01,840 --> 00:23:03,951 usurping those partnerships , they're 542 00:23:03,951 --> 00:23:06,850 displacing Western influence like 543 00:23:07,240 --> 00:23:10,460 France , for example , in mali and I 544 00:23:10,460 --> 00:23:12,460 think that's what they're trying to 545 00:23:12,460 --> 00:23:14,920 block us out and Wagner is trying to 546 00:23:14,920 --> 00:23:17,142 make a profit while they do it . And it 547 00:23:17,142 --> 00:23:19,087 sounds like they're being somewhat 548 00:23:19,087 --> 00:23:18,650 successful . So what do we need to be 549 00:23:18,650 --> 00:23:20,761 doing , what , what what what kind of 550 00:23:20,761 --> 00:23:23,280 changes do we need to make ? Um either 551 00:23:23,280 --> 00:23:26,260 alone or with our partners to counter 552 00:23:26,260 --> 00:23:28,590 this expanding Russian influence in the 553 00:23:28,590 --> 00:23:32,110 region . Uh center despite their 554 00:23:32,110 --> 00:23:35,390 recent gain or success in mali , and I 555 00:23:35,390 --> 00:23:37,530 think that remains to be seen whether 556 00:23:37,530 --> 00:23:39,697 they will be successful there or not , 557 00:23:39,697 --> 00:23:41,808 I predict they will not be successful 558 00:23:41,808 --> 00:23:44,086 in the long run . Um an example though , 559 00:23:44,086 --> 00:23:46,360 is in Libya where they are run , they 560 00:23:46,360 --> 00:23:48,471 have worn out their welcome there and 561 00:23:48,471 --> 00:23:50,638 the libyans , even the libyans who the 562 00:23:50,638 --> 00:23:52,940 Russians supported in the civil war now 563 00:23:52,940 --> 00:23:55,340 want them to depart . So actually , I 564 00:23:55,340 --> 00:23:57,720 think that uh they're probably their 565 00:23:57,720 --> 00:24:00,150 own worst enemy . So , so the libyan 566 00:24:00,150 --> 00:24:04,070 people are now against this , I 567 00:24:04,080 --> 00:24:06,191 don't want to call it an occupation , 568 00:24:06,191 --> 00:24:08,530 but this force being there and amongst 569 00:24:08,540 --> 00:24:10,960 the community , it seems that in mali 570 00:24:11,340 --> 00:24:14,070 um they do have support , general 571 00:24:14,070 --> 00:24:16,530 support from the public . Do you see 572 00:24:16,530 --> 00:24:19,800 that turning at some point ? I do , and 573 00:24:19,800 --> 00:24:22,022 I think it's , we're very in their very 574 00:24:22,022 --> 00:24:24,189 early early stages , they've only been 575 00:24:24,189 --> 00:24:26,411 arriving in the last couple of months . 576 00:24:26,411 --> 00:24:28,356 Uh and they're preparing to to get 577 00:24:28,356 --> 00:24:30,411 under operations . So I think that I 578 00:24:30,411 --> 00:24:32,689 think they will wear out their welcome . 579 00:24:32,689 --> 00:24:35,022 I do believe that . Thank you . General , 580 00:24:35,022 --> 00:24:37,022 thank you Mr Chairman , thank you . 581 00:24:37,022 --> 00:24:39,356 Senator kelly , Senator Cotton , please , 582 00:24:39,356 --> 00:24:41,356 I want to return to uh what Senator 583 00:24:41,356 --> 00:24:43,467 kelly and earlier Senator rounds were 584 00:24:43,467 --> 00:24:45,710 speaking about the Wagner group . Um 585 00:24:45,720 --> 00:24:47,942 General Mackenzie , the Wagner group is 586 00:24:47,942 --> 00:24:51,040 a Russian paramilitary organization run 587 00:24:51,040 --> 00:24:54,650 by jenny . Precaution a close ally of 588 00:24:54,650 --> 00:24:57,750 Vladimir Putin . Sorry , I believe , I 589 00:24:57,750 --> 00:25:00,320 believe it is , sir . Um and I know 590 00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:02,700 that they're active in , in Africa . Uh 591 00:25:02,710 --> 00:25:04,877 there's also been reports that they've 592 00:25:04,877 --> 00:25:07,043 recently been deployed into Ukraine as 593 00:25:07,043 --> 00:25:09,210 well . I'll give this to either one of 594 00:25:09,210 --> 00:25:11,377 you . Um the Wagner group , is it fair 595 00:25:11,377 --> 00:25:13,432 to characterize it as essentially an 596 00:25:13,432 --> 00:25:17,120 arm of the Russian state ? That's my 597 00:25:17,120 --> 00:25:19,231 view of it . Yeah , that's my view of 598 00:25:19,231 --> 00:25:21,398 it . Too much more so than , say , any 599 00:25:21,398 --> 00:25:23,342 american security company would be 600 00:25:23,342 --> 00:25:25,620 linked to the United States government , 601 00:25:25,620 --> 00:25:24,620 correct . General Townsend . I would 602 00:25:24,620 --> 00:25:26,676 agree with that . General McKenzie , 603 00:25:26,676 --> 00:25:28,898 This is the year before your time , but 604 00:25:28,898 --> 00:25:30,842 I bet you remember it uh something 605 00:25:30,842 --> 00:25:33,064 called the Battle of Cash um in Syria . 606 00:25:33,064 --> 00:25:35,287 Do you wanna tell us a little bit about 607 00:25:35,287 --> 00:25:37,453 what happened in Syria in early 2018 ? 608 00:25:37,453 --> 00:25:39,231 I believe it was in February of 609 00:25:39,231 --> 00:25:41,342 February of that year , a large group 610 00:25:41,342 --> 00:25:43,730 of Wagner centered fighters tried to 611 00:25:43,730 --> 00:25:45,841 cross the Euphrates river down around 612 00:25:45,841 --> 00:25:48,008 their ears . Are we brought them under 613 00:25:48,008 --> 00:25:50,119 fire and killed several 100 of them ? 614 00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:52,310 It was a direct attack on us and I 615 00:25:52,310 --> 00:25:54,199 think we defeated him in a pretty 616 00:25:54,199 --> 00:25:56,088 shocking manner . That was widely 617 00:25:56,088 --> 00:25:57,977 reported . Um do you remember the 618 00:25:58,040 --> 00:26:00,900 numerical superiority that these Wagner 619 00:26:01,020 --> 00:26:03,460 mercenaries had against US forces . It 620 00:26:03,460 --> 00:26:06,190 was probably 10-1 , They outnumbered us 621 00:26:06,190 --> 00:26:08,850 forces probably . Um I believe at the 622 00:26:08,850 --> 00:26:10,850 time , probably still do . We had a 623 00:26:10,850 --> 00:26:12,870 deconfliction hotline set up with 624 00:26:12,870 --> 00:26:14,814 Russian commanders in the region . 625 00:26:14,814 --> 00:26:16,926 Right , That is correct . Senator and 626 00:26:16,926 --> 00:26:19,092 Secretary Mattis at the time testified 627 00:26:19,092 --> 00:26:21,130 that we use that deconfliction um 628 00:26:21,140 --> 00:26:23,440 hotline to ensure with Russian 629 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:25,273 counterparts that these were not 630 00:26:25,273 --> 00:26:27,500 Russian soldiers . Is that right ? I'm 631 00:26:27,510 --> 00:26:29,566 sorry . I believe that's correct . I 632 00:26:29,566 --> 00:26:31,788 think his exact testimony here was that 633 00:26:31,788 --> 00:26:33,899 once we confirmed that Russia did not 634 00:26:33,899 --> 00:26:36,010 claim these soldiers as their own , I 635 00:26:36,010 --> 00:26:38,232 ordered that they be destroyed and they 636 00:26:38,232 --> 00:26:40,454 were destroyed . Sir , That's correct . 637 00:26:40,454 --> 00:26:42,510 Do you think that tells us about the 638 00:26:42,510 --> 00:26:44,399 quality of Wagner's mercenaries ? 639 00:26:44,399 --> 00:26:46,566 Whether they're in Syria Africa or now 640 00:26:46,566 --> 00:26:48,621 in Ukraine ? Well , I think it tells 641 00:26:48,621 --> 00:26:50,732 you that any mercenary force is gonna 642 00:26:50,732 --> 00:26:52,788 have a qualitative disadvantage . It 643 00:26:52,788 --> 00:26:52,360 also tells you a lot about our 644 00:26:52,360 --> 00:26:54,527 capability center . Yeah . And also if 645 00:26:54,527 --> 00:26:56,638 they're fighting against an extremely 646 00:26:56,638 --> 00:26:58,804 determined people , they're digging in 647 00:26:58,804 --> 00:27:00,916 their heels , defend their homeland . 648 00:27:00,916 --> 00:27:03,082 Lucky the Ukrainian army that maybe we 649 00:27:03,082 --> 00:27:02,960 shouldn't think that they , or even 650 00:27:02,960 --> 00:27:05,790 Russian regulars are 10 ft tall . Sorry , 651 00:27:05,790 --> 00:27:08,280 I couldn't agree more . Um General 652 00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:10,002 Townsend , I want to return to 653 00:27:10,002 --> 00:27:12,224 something that you mentioned to Senator 654 00:27:12,224 --> 00:27:14,700 Tuberville . Uh , that Africa has vast 655 00:27:14,710 --> 00:27:16,932 strategic minerals , which is correct . 656 00:27:16,932 --> 00:27:19,099 Um It's also the case that they're not 657 00:27:19,099 --> 00:27:21,310 exclusive to Africa . Um you can find 658 00:27:21,310 --> 00:27:23,254 these minerals and a lot of places 659 00:27:23,254 --> 00:27:25,310 around the world . It's just that we 660 00:27:25,310 --> 00:27:27,254 have largely declined to mind them 661 00:27:27,254 --> 00:27:27,190 around the world . And now it's 662 00:27:27,190 --> 00:27:29,412 predominantly mined in Africa . Is that 663 00:27:29,412 --> 00:27:31,810 right ? That's right . Senator . 664 00:27:32,020 --> 00:27:34,020 Senator kelly and I have introduced 665 00:27:34,020 --> 00:27:36,131 something called the restore act with 666 00:27:36,131 --> 00:27:38,440 goals to shore up domestic and defense 667 00:27:38,440 --> 00:27:40,273 supply chains for these critical 668 00:27:40,273 --> 00:27:42,510 minerals . Um Do you think that china 669 00:27:42,510 --> 00:27:44,732 is targeting these minerals in its belt 670 00:27:44,732 --> 00:27:48,260 and road initiative in Africa ? Um I do 671 00:27:48,270 --> 00:27:51,100 there are some minerals and I think I 672 00:27:51,100 --> 00:27:53,156 don't I didn't provide the chart now 673 00:27:53,156 --> 00:27:55,267 but I can have it in closed session . 674 00:27:55,267 --> 00:27:57,489 There are some minerals that are if not 675 00:27:57,489 --> 00:27:59,044 unique to Africa . They are 676 00:27:59,044 --> 00:28:01,211 predominantly found there . And all of 677 00:28:01,211 --> 00:28:03,540 our countries to include us rely on 678 00:28:03,540 --> 00:28:05,707 those imports . And I believe china is 679 00:28:05,707 --> 00:28:07,873 maneuvering to secure those probably a 680 00:28:07,873 --> 00:28:10,096 bad idea to make ourselves dependent on 681 00:28:10,096 --> 00:28:12,096 china ourselves being the civilized 682 00:28:12,096 --> 00:28:14,210 world dependent on china mining these 683 00:28:14,210 --> 00:28:16,432 minerals in Africa . Wouldn't you say ? 684 00:28:16,540 --> 00:28:19,010 I would agree General Mackenzie . I 685 00:28:19,010 --> 00:28:21,066 want to turn to a topic that Senator 686 00:28:21,066 --> 00:28:23,288 Reid and Senator King addressed as well 687 00:28:23,288 --> 00:28:25,399 about a nuclear deal with Iran . They 688 00:28:25,399 --> 00:28:27,566 both asked you kind of in the abstract 689 00:28:27,566 --> 00:28:29,677 if it's better to have a nuclear deal 690 00:28:29,677 --> 00:28:31,566 with Iran that prevents them from 691 00:28:31,566 --> 00:28:33,677 getting a nuclear weapon irrespective 692 00:28:33,677 --> 00:28:35,843 of their aggression in the region . In 693 00:28:35,843 --> 00:28:38,121 the abstract . I would agree with that . 694 00:28:38,121 --> 00:28:37,840 And I think you did as well . But the 695 00:28:37,840 --> 00:28:39,951 deal actually needs to stop them from 696 00:28:39,951 --> 00:28:42,118 getting a nuclear weapon or becoming a 697 00:28:42,118 --> 00:28:44,284 threshold state to achieve that goal . 698 00:28:44,284 --> 00:28:46,396 Right . Sen . I would I would agree . 699 00:28:46,396 --> 00:28:48,507 Yes sir . Yeah . And I would say that 700 00:28:48,507 --> 00:28:51,390 just like the 2015 deal did not achieve 701 00:28:51,390 --> 00:28:53,446 that objective . Certainly the media 702 00:28:53,446 --> 00:28:55,446 reports about the directions of the 703 00:28:55,446 --> 00:28:57,557 current negotiations wouldn't achieve 704 00:28:57,557 --> 00:28:59,779 that objective either . Um What kind of 705 00:28:59,779 --> 00:29:02,140 message are we sending to ? Both Iran 706 00:29:02,140 --> 00:29:05,070 and Russia who's acting as Iran's 707 00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:07,160 lawyer in these negotiations and two 708 00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:09,430 allies like the United Arab Emirates 709 00:29:09,790 --> 00:29:13,170 and Saudi Arabia when Iran is 710 00:29:13,540 --> 00:29:16,340 itself shooting ballistic missiles into 711 00:29:16,340 --> 00:29:18,451 our bill as they did over the weekend 712 00:29:18,451 --> 00:29:20,680 or supplies . You said their proxies in 713 00:29:20,680 --> 00:29:23,170 Yemen with the missiles and drones to 714 00:29:23,170 --> 00:29:26,570 shoot into downtown Dubai or downtown 715 00:29:26,580 --> 00:29:29,590 Abu Dhabi or into the Al Dhafra base 716 00:29:29,590 --> 00:29:31,701 where we have soldiers . What kind of 717 00:29:31,701 --> 00:29:33,868 message does that send Iran and Russia 718 00:29:33,868 --> 00:29:35,979 on the one hand . And our allies like 719 00:29:35,979 --> 00:29:38,090 Senator . The primary my share of the 720 00:29:38,090 --> 00:29:40,400 task is to deter Iran from large scale 721 00:29:40,400 --> 00:29:42,590 attacks and we have had some success 722 00:29:42,590 --> 00:29:44,701 doing that . Our success has not been 723 00:29:44,701 --> 00:29:46,701 perfect , but Iran has largely been 724 00:29:46,701 --> 00:29:48,868 deterred from launching direct attacks 725 00:29:48,868 --> 00:29:51,150 on us over the past couple of years . I 726 00:29:51,150 --> 00:29:53,372 wouldn't speak for the future and I and 727 00:29:53,372 --> 00:29:55,372 I would agree that they're actively 728 00:29:55,372 --> 00:29:57,539 fomenting malign activities across the 729 00:29:57,539 --> 00:29:59,706 region . Their intent is to do it at a 730 00:29:59,706 --> 00:30:01,872 low enough level that it will not , in 731 00:30:01,872 --> 00:30:03,650 their view at least disrupt the 732 00:30:03,650 --> 00:30:06,680 negotiating process again from it is my 733 00:30:06,680 --> 00:30:08,736 judgment that's a dangerous position 734 00:30:08,736 --> 00:30:10,847 for them to have . And well that that 735 00:30:10,847 --> 00:30:13,230 would be the intent usually of weaker 736 00:30:13,240 --> 00:30:15,351 revisionist powers throughout history 737 00:30:15,351 --> 00:30:17,573 to always operate right below the level 738 00:30:17,573 --> 00:30:19,710 of retaliation and to therefore 739 00:30:19,720 --> 00:30:21,720 gradually accumulate more strategic 740 00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:23,442 advantage . Right ? So it's an 741 00:30:23,442 --> 00:30:25,553 asymmetric approach that's founded in 742 00:30:25,553 --> 00:30:27,664 in history as you noted . All right . 743 00:30:27,664 --> 00:30:29,831 Thank you . Thank you Senator Cotton . 744 00:30:29,831 --> 00:30:31,276 Senator Cramer , please . 745 00:30:33,940 --> 00:30:35,940 Thank you . MR Chairman , thank you 746 00:30:35,940 --> 00:30:38,190 both for being here and for your 747 00:30:38,190 --> 00:30:40,880 service . Um , I want to drill down a 748 00:30:40,880 --> 00:30:43,250 little bit on where we just wrapped up 749 00:30:43,260 --> 00:30:45,260 General Mackenzie with with Senator 750 00:30:45,260 --> 00:30:48,850 Cotton as he ran out of time . I guess 751 00:30:48,860 --> 00:30:51,100 for me , there are a couple of things 752 00:30:51,100 --> 00:30:53,267 and by the way , your characterization 753 00:30:53,267 --> 00:30:55,267 of centcom is the land of imperfect 754 00:30:55,267 --> 00:30:57,378 solutions describes the United States 755 00:30:57,378 --> 00:30:59,544 Senate as well . And we were something 756 00:30:59,544 --> 00:31:01,322 would do better to realize that 757 00:31:01,322 --> 00:31:03,544 sometimes as a as a body . But anyway , 758 00:31:03,544 --> 00:31:06,590 that said , um , there are a couple of 759 00:31:06,590 --> 00:31:08,780 things specific to I think where 760 00:31:08,780 --> 00:31:10,724 Senator Cotton was going and where 761 00:31:10,724 --> 00:31:12,724 you're going . When is when are the 762 00:31:12,724 --> 00:31:14,669 timelines themselves , the sunsets 763 00:31:14,669 --> 00:31:17,100 create almost an implication of 764 00:31:17,100 --> 00:31:19,930 licensed to accumulate the very thing 765 00:31:19,930 --> 00:31:22,097 we're trying to prevent them from from 766 00:31:22,097 --> 00:31:24,190 getting um , there's that and then 767 00:31:24,190 --> 00:31:26,412 there's just how to compel compliance . 768 00:31:26,412 --> 00:31:28,740 And maybe you could elaborate a little 769 00:31:28,740 --> 00:31:31,250 bit for me and a better understanding 770 00:31:31,250 --> 00:31:34,350 of , um , you know , the relief of 771 00:31:34,350 --> 00:31:36,350 sanctions . Again , getting back to 772 00:31:36,350 --> 00:31:38,128 Senator King asked the relevant 773 00:31:38,128 --> 00:31:40,294 questions in the give and take so that 774 00:31:40,294 --> 00:31:42,640 the sanctions relief that provides 775 00:31:42,640 --> 00:31:44,770 money and then the time that the 776 00:31:44,770 --> 00:31:48,360 sunsets provide . How are we 777 00:31:48,360 --> 00:31:50,900 balancing that ? Right ? Maybe that's 778 00:31:50,900 --> 00:31:53,122 the way to ask the question . I would I 779 00:31:53,122 --> 00:31:55,289 would defer to the Department of State 780 00:31:55,289 --> 00:31:57,456 and our negotiators for the details on 781 00:31:57,456 --> 00:31:59,567 that . But I would tell you just from 782 00:31:59,567 --> 00:32:01,733 where I sit , I my guidance is clearly 783 00:32:01,733 --> 00:32:03,956 we don't want Iran to possess a nuclear 784 00:32:03,956 --> 00:32:06,122 weapon and and so that that you know , 785 00:32:06,122 --> 00:32:08,344 the best way to get to that solution is 786 00:32:08,344 --> 00:32:10,567 to for them to agree not to pursue it . 787 00:32:10,567 --> 00:32:12,789 They may be closer than we like when we 788 00:32:12,789 --> 00:32:12,420 reach that level of agreement . I don't 789 00:32:12,420 --> 00:32:14,142 know . That's a matter for the 790 00:32:14,142 --> 00:32:17,380 diplomats . Not for me . Let me ask 791 00:32:17,380 --> 00:32:21,200 this . And do you in your opinion , do 792 00:32:21,200 --> 00:32:24,510 you think that the Irgc belongs on the 793 00:32:24,540 --> 00:32:26,762 foreign terrorist organization list And 794 00:32:26,762 --> 00:32:29,350 should that be under consideration in 795 00:32:29,350 --> 00:32:31,090 this negotiation ? Well , from 796 00:32:31,090 --> 00:32:33,257 everything that I can see from where I 797 00:32:33,257 --> 00:32:34,923 sit , the Irgc is a terrorist 798 00:32:34,923 --> 00:32:37,090 organization . Well , I'd say you have 799 00:32:37,090 --> 00:32:39,201 a pretty good seat . Pretty good view 800 00:32:39,201 --> 00:32:41,590 of of that . So thank you for that . I 801 00:32:41,590 --> 00:32:43,757 also then want to none of these by the 802 00:32:43,757 --> 00:32:46,020 way , we're in my original my original 803 00:32:46,020 --> 00:32:48,187 list of things to talk about . But you 804 00:32:48,187 --> 00:32:50,187 in your response to um I think with 805 00:32:50,187 --> 00:32:52,298 Senator Tuberville , you talked about 806 00:32:52,298 --> 00:32:54,353 the other relationships , the allied 807 00:32:54,353 --> 00:32:56,187 relationships . You specifically 808 00:32:56,187 --> 00:32:58,242 brought up F 35 sales to U . A . For 809 00:32:58,242 --> 00:33:01,040 example as an example and you talked 810 00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:04,800 about the long slog um specifically 811 00:33:04,810 --> 00:33:07,360 to the U . A . E and F . 30 fives and 812 00:33:07,370 --> 00:33:09,481 in fact , let me back up a second . I 813 00:33:09,481 --> 00:33:11,703 just read a report , I can't keep track 814 00:33:11,703 --> 00:33:13,926 of my weeks either earlier this week or 815 00:33:13,926 --> 00:33:16,148 last , I think it was last week reports 816 00:33:16,148 --> 00:33:17,814 of uh leadership . U ie Saudi 817 00:33:17,814 --> 00:33:19,981 leadership not even taking phone calls 818 00:33:19,981 --> 00:33:22,148 from U . S . Leadership as a result of 819 00:33:22,148 --> 00:33:24,259 some of this . Um do you think the F- 820 00:33:24,259 --> 00:33:26,270 35 sell to you a should have gone 821 00:33:26,270 --> 00:33:29,870 through sooner and should we be doing 822 00:33:29,870 --> 00:33:31,870 it as soon as possible ? Should you 823 00:33:31,870 --> 00:33:33,759 know what what's the what are the 824 00:33:33,759 --> 00:33:35,981 ramifications if we don't do it in this 825 00:33:35,981 --> 00:33:38,203 you know , imperfect solution world you 826 00:33:38,203 --> 00:33:40,580 live in I think in general anytime we 827 00:33:40,580 --> 00:33:42,636 undertake weapons sales to a foreign 828 00:33:42,636 --> 00:33:44,747 nation , you want to do it as soon as 829 00:33:44,747 --> 00:33:46,580 practically possible In an in an 830 00:33:46,580 --> 00:33:48,636 advanced system like the F- 35 . And 831 00:33:48,636 --> 00:33:50,691 I'm not an expert on the procurement 832 00:33:50,691 --> 00:33:52,802 and delivery of that weapons system . 833 00:33:52,802 --> 00:33:52,390 It's gonna take some time to get there . 834 00:33:52,390 --> 00:33:54,501 It's not a it's not a system that you 835 00:33:54,501 --> 00:33:56,446 can build rapidly beyond the exact 836 00:33:56,446 --> 00:33:58,112 exact exact existing scale of 837 00:33:58,112 --> 00:34:00,168 production . So it's gonna take some 838 00:34:00,168 --> 00:34:02,112 time to be there . But I think our 839 00:34:02,112 --> 00:34:04,223 friends sometimes find it frustrating 840 00:34:04,223 --> 00:34:04,190 when the , you know , when the when the 841 00:34:04,190 --> 00:34:06,246 timeline slips and goes on well into 842 00:34:06,246 --> 00:34:10,130 the future . So do you have a 843 00:34:10,140 --> 00:34:12,196 basic philosophy of how you have the 844 00:34:12,196 --> 00:34:14,650 appropriate guardrails in in in our 845 00:34:14,650 --> 00:34:18,570 system that prevents provides a comfort 846 00:34:18,580 --> 00:34:21,710 level for your overseers who have to 847 00:34:21,710 --> 00:34:23,877 provide a comfort level for the people 848 00:34:23,877 --> 00:34:26,050 we work for and um you know and then 849 00:34:26,440 --> 00:34:28,940 maintaining those relationships so I 850 00:34:28,940 --> 00:34:30,996 can talk more about it in the closed 851 00:34:30,996 --> 00:34:33,218 session . But briefly the answer is yes 852 00:34:33,218 --> 00:34:35,496 I am comfortable with those guardrails . 853 00:34:35,496 --> 00:34:37,718 Alright thank you . General Mackenzie . 854 00:34:37,718 --> 00:34:37,660 General Thompson in my last minute . 855 00:34:37,670 --> 00:34:40,200 Just some questions of my favorite 856 00:34:40,200 --> 00:34:43,330 topic and I honestly we all I think 857 00:34:43,330 --> 00:34:45,552 struggle with the maintenance of legacy 858 00:34:45,552 --> 00:34:47,497 systems and making room for modern 859 00:34:47,497 --> 00:34:49,830 systems , particularly in the I . S . R . 860 00:34:49,830 --> 00:34:51,830 Realm . So I'm just gonna ask you a 861 00:34:51,830 --> 00:34:53,990 very open ended question . Are you 862 00:34:53,990 --> 00:34:56,046 getting the I . S . Are you need are 863 00:34:56,046 --> 00:34:59,030 you concerned about um any gaps in I . 864 00:34:59,030 --> 00:35:03,020 S . Our coverage ? Um And do you have 865 00:35:03,020 --> 00:35:05,930 any thoughts or literally and seriously 866 00:35:05,940 --> 00:35:08,660 and sincerely any thoughts for us as we 867 00:35:08,670 --> 00:35:11,260 consider uh the balance of all of that . 868 00:35:12,340 --> 00:35:15,300 Thanks Senator . No combatant commander 869 00:35:15,300 --> 00:35:18,160 has the I . S . Are they wish to have 870 00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:22,140 um africom does the best work we can 871 00:35:22,140 --> 00:35:24,084 with the I . I . S . R . That were 872 00:35:24,084 --> 00:35:27,710 allocated . I could certainly use more 873 00:35:27,710 --> 00:35:29,932 I . S . Are your point about the legacy 874 00:35:29,932 --> 00:35:32,043 I . S . R . Systems and transitioning 875 00:35:32,043 --> 00:35:33,950 to more capable systems . I think 876 00:35:33,950 --> 00:35:35,894 that's something that our nation's 877 00:35:35,894 --> 00:35:38,230 doing and our services are doing for 878 00:35:38,230 --> 00:35:40,452 the future , we have to do that because 879 00:35:40,452 --> 00:35:42,674 we need platforms that are more capable 880 00:35:42,674 --> 00:35:44,730 against the higher end competitors . 881 00:35:44,730 --> 00:35:47,840 However uh in theaters like mine and 882 00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:50,200 even General Mackenzie's the legacy I . 883 00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:53,490 S . R . Systems that we have work just 884 00:35:53,500 --> 00:35:56,050 fine . We don't need exquisite high end 885 00:35:56,050 --> 00:35:58,272 capabilities to do the work we're doing 886 00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:00,622 in Africa , but I do understand why our 887 00:36:00,622 --> 00:36:02,456 department needs those for other 888 00:36:02,456 --> 00:36:04,622 theaters . Appreciate you both . Thank 889 00:36:04,622 --> 00:36:06,733 you . Thank you . Mr Chairman , thank 890 00:36:06,733 --> 00:36:06,470 you . Senator Kerry and Senator Rosen . 891 00:36:06,470 --> 00:36:09,700 Please thank you Chairman Reed and 892 00:36:09,710 --> 00:36:11,932 ranking member in half for holding this 893 00:36:11,932 --> 00:36:13,766 hearing . I'd also like to thank 894 00:36:13,766 --> 00:36:15,766 generals Mackenzie and Townsend for 895 00:36:15,766 --> 00:36:17,988 testifying today And of course for your 896 00:36:17,988 --> 00:36:20,010 service to our country and General 897 00:36:20,010 --> 00:36:22,560 Mackenzie as this will be the last time 898 00:36:22,560 --> 00:36:24,690 before our committee . Thank you for 899 00:36:24,690 --> 00:36:26,801 your decades of distinguished service 900 00:36:26,801 --> 00:36:29,680 uh to our nation for leading brave men 901 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:31,690 and women of our armed forces and 902 00:36:31,690 --> 00:36:33,801 navigating the many challenges within 903 00:36:33,801 --> 00:36:36,430 central command . Thank you . And 904 00:36:36,440 --> 00:36:38,800 General Mackenzie . Um I want to talk a 905 00:36:38,800 --> 00:36:40,744 little bit about combating Iranian 906 00:36:40,744 --> 00:36:42,856 aggression , as I've noted in several 907 00:36:42,856 --> 00:36:44,911 previous hearings , Iran and Iranian 908 00:36:44,911 --> 00:36:47,200 Iranian backed militia groups are 909 00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:49,990 increasingly targeting us installations 910 00:36:49,990 --> 00:36:52,046 and service members in both Iraq and 911 00:36:52,046 --> 00:36:55,030 Syria via drone and rocket attacks . We 912 00:36:55,030 --> 00:36:57,030 don't even have to look beyond this 913 00:36:57,030 --> 00:36:59,086 weekend when the Irgc claimed credit 914 00:36:59,086 --> 00:37:01,086 for missile attacks and the U . S . 915 00:37:01,086 --> 00:37:03,480 Consulate in Erbil on a regular basis , 916 00:37:03,480 --> 00:37:05,313 Iran , the world's leading state 917 00:37:05,313 --> 00:37:07,424 sponsor of terrorism threatens us and 918 00:37:07,424 --> 00:37:09,647 allied interests in the Middle East and 919 00:37:09,647 --> 00:37:11,480 around the world via both direct 920 00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:13,702 attacks like the ones we just witnessed 921 00:37:13,702 --> 00:37:15,924 and threw its support for Hezbollah and 922 00:37:15,924 --> 00:37:17,869 Islamic Republic's other terrorist 923 00:37:17,869 --> 00:37:20,091 proxies . So can you discuss the threat 924 00:37:20,091 --> 00:37:22,540 Iranian aligned militia groups in the 925 00:37:22,540 --> 00:37:24,800 Middle East posed to U . S . Troops and 926 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:26,970 our allies and how do you believe uh 927 00:37:26,980 --> 00:37:29,036 the U . S . Should respond ? How are 928 00:37:29,036 --> 00:37:31,258 you addressing the threat and dissent ? 929 00:37:31,258 --> 00:37:33,570 Come have the necessary authorities to 930 00:37:33,570 --> 00:37:36,120 target these militias um other than the 931 00:37:36,120 --> 00:37:38,250 ability to act in self defense . 932 00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:41,210 Senator . First of all , you're right . 933 00:37:41,220 --> 00:37:44,330 Iran is a foments , a particularly 934 00:37:44,330 --> 00:37:46,560 virulent form of anti Americanism 935 00:37:46,560 --> 00:37:48,782 across the across the theater . It is a 936 00:37:48,782 --> 00:37:51,530 long term objective of Iran for the 937 00:37:51,530 --> 00:37:53,697 United States to be forced to exit the 938 00:37:53,697 --> 00:37:55,474 region . They see the principal 939 00:37:55,474 --> 00:37:57,474 battleground for that as being Iraq 940 00:37:57,730 --> 00:37:59,730 because that's where we're the most 941 00:37:59,730 --> 00:38:01,786 distributed , that's where we're the 942 00:38:01,786 --> 00:38:04,008 most vulnerable and for the last couple 943 00:38:04,008 --> 00:38:03,710 of years they've actually tried to 944 00:38:03,710 --> 00:38:05,710 pursue a political solution to that 945 00:38:05,710 --> 00:38:07,877 that has not worked out for them . The 946 00:38:07,877 --> 00:38:09,988 seeding the seated government of Iraq 947 00:38:09,988 --> 00:38:11,988 is interested in maintaining a long 948 00:38:11,988 --> 00:38:11,690 term relationship with the United 949 00:38:11,690 --> 00:38:13,950 States and in fact with NATO and what 950 00:38:13,960 --> 00:38:16,071 what's that done , What that has done 951 00:38:16,071 --> 00:38:18,660 is it has driven Iran and its proxies 952 00:38:18,670 --> 00:38:20,660 as proxies in particular to seek 953 00:38:20,670 --> 00:38:22,892 kinetic solutions to push us out . They 954 00:38:22,892 --> 00:38:25,114 believe that by causing a significantly 955 00:38:25,114 --> 00:38:27,337 high level of pain we're going to leave 956 00:38:27,337 --> 00:38:29,281 and that actually of course is not 957 00:38:29,281 --> 00:38:31,281 proven to be the case for one thing 958 00:38:31,281 --> 00:38:33,448 over the past several months they have 959 00:38:33,448 --> 00:38:33,290 attacked us . They have not been 960 00:38:33,290 --> 00:38:35,234 particularly successful with those 961 00:38:35,234 --> 00:38:37,123 attacks and there are a number of 962 00:38:37,123 --> 00:38:38,901 reasons for that . First of all 963 00:38:38,901 --> 00:38:38,750 commanders on the ground . Our 964 00:38:38,750 --> 00:38:40,972 commanders on the ground have been very 965 00:38:40,972 --> 00:38:43,139 uh very aggressive in protecting their 966 00:38:43,139 --> 00:38:45,250 men and women by actions that we take 967 00:38:45,250 --> 00:38:47,361 when we learned when we learned of an 968 00:38:47,361 --> 00:38:49,306 impending attack . Second are anti 969 00:38:49,306 --> 00:38:51,528 drone systems are beginning to work has 970 00:38:51,528 --> 00:38:53,639 taken taken us a while to get to this 971 00:38:53,639 --> 00:38:55,750 point , but I'm gratified to see that 972 00:38:55,750 --> 00:38:57,972 capability coming forward . Uh and then 973 00:38:57,972 --> 00:39:00,139 and finally their own attacks have not 974 00:39:00,139 --> 00:38:59,650 always been the most artfully conceived 975 00:38:59,650 --> 00:39:01,650 and executed . At one point I would 976 00:39:01,650 --> 00:39:03,706 make we do not believe the attack of 977 00:39:03,706 --> 00:39:05,594 this last weekend . The ballistic 978 00:39:05,594 --> 00:39:07,761 missiles was actually targeted against 979 00:39:07,761 --> 00:39:09,817 us . We believe it was going against 980 00:39:09,817 --> 00:39:11,928 other targets hit near us . And could 981 00:39:11,928 --> 00:39:14,150 the effect would have been the same and 982 00:39:14,150 --> 00:39:13,140 I can talk more about in a closed 983 00:39:13,150 --> 00:39:15,150 session . But in order to close out 984 00:39:15,150 --> 00:39:17,261 your question , ma'am , I do have the 985 00:39:17,261 --> 00:39:19,150 authorities , I need to act in us 986 00:39:19,150 --> 00:39:21,483 Central command against Iranian proxies . 987 00:39:21,483 --> 00:39:23,650 Should should the threat require me to 988 00:39:23,650 --> 00:39:25,872 do that . Thank you . I wanna move on a 989 00:39:25,872 --> 00:39:28,370 little bit too . Uh Israel and now that 990 00:39:28,370 --> 00:39:30,340 Israel is within centcom's area of 991 00:39:30,340 --> 00:39:32,340 responsibility . It is my sincere , 992 00:39:32,340 --> 00:39:34,580 sincere hope that this transfer will 993 00:39:34,580 --> 00:39:36,802 potentially eight even greater military 994 00:39:36,802 --> 00:39:38,969 military cooperation between us Israel 995 00:39:38,969 --> 00:39:41,380 and our shared goals as well as greater 996 00:39:41,380 --> 00:39:43,213 cooperation between our arab and 997 00:39:43,213 --> 00:39:45,860 Israeli partners . So Senator McKenzie , 998 00:39:45,860 --> 00:39:47,693 building on Senator Gillibrand's 999 00:39:47,693 --> 00:39:49,638 question on leveraging the abraham 1000 00:39:49,638 --> 00:39:51,804 accords . Are there plans to integrate 1001 00:39:51,804 --> 00:39:54,010 joint exercises with Israel and Arab 1002 00:39:54,010 --> 00:39:56,020 states who signed normalization 1003 00:39:56,020 --> 00:39:58,187 agreements with Israel and what do you 1004 00:39:58,187 --> 00:40:00,020 see as the greatest benefits and 1005 00:40:00,020 --> 00:40:02,170 opportunities to Israeli inclusion in 1006 00:40:02,170 --> 00:40:04,930 centcom ? Senator I would say that the 1007 00:40:04,940 --> 00:40:07,080 bringing centcom into the A . O . R . 1008 00:40:07,090 --> 00:40:09,800 Really operationalize is the Abraham 1009 00:40:09,800 --> 00:40:12,070 accord and and sort of makes it puts a 1010 00:40:12,070 --> 00:40:14,650 military component to the normal broad 1011 00:40:14,650 --> 00:40:16,317 normalization that is already 1012 00:40:16,317 --> 00:40:18,483 proceeding with Israel and many of its 1013 00:40:18,483 --> 00:40:20,317 arab neighbors now . In terms of 1014 00:40:20,317 --> 00:40:22,483 practical things we can do right now , 1015 00:40:22,483 --> 00:40:24,317 Number one is integrated air and 1016 00:40:24,317 --> 00:40:26,206 missile defense . Everyone in the 1017 00:40:26,206 --> 00:40:28,372 region is seized by the Iranian threat 1018 00:40:28,372 --> 00:40:30,317 and they want to be able to defend 1019 00:40:30,317 --> 00:40:32,539 themselves against that threat and that 1020 00:40:32,539 --> 00:40:34,650 threat is primarily in the air that's 1021 00:40:34,650 --> 00:40:36,872 remote . With setting aside the proxies 1022 00:40:36,872 --> 00:40:36,540 which we talked about is primarily 1023 00:40:36,540 --> 00:40:38,429 Iran's ballistic missiles , their 1024 00:40:38,429 --> 00:40:40,540 cruise missiles and their U . S . S . 1025 00:40:40,540 --> 00:40:42,596 So that's gonna that's a significant 1026 00:40:42,596 --> 00:40:44,484 issue for nations in the region . 1027 00:40:44,484 --> 00:40:46,707 Israel is going to be able to assist us 1028 00:40:46,707 --> 00:40:48,873 in all of those areas . Additionally , 1029 00:40:48,873 --> 00:40:50,984 in specific answer to your question , 1030 00:40:50,984 --> 00:40:53,096 we all we have been and will continue 1031 00:40:53,096 --> 00:40:55,096 to expand Israel's participation in 1032 00:40:55,096 --> 00:40:57,318 exercises across the region . That's an 1033 00:40:57,318 --> 00:40:59,540 invaluable tool for getting partners to 1034 00:40:59,540 --> 00:41:01,651 know each other . Uh you know and and 1035 00:41:01,651 --> 00:41:03,873 laying plans for the future . Thank you 1036 00:41:03,873 --> 00:41:06,040 and Mr Chairman , I have questions for 1037 00:41:06,040 --> 00:41:08,151 the record for General Townsend about 1038 00:41:08,151 --> 00:41:10,040 Chinese technology in Africa will 1039 00:41:10,040 --> 00:41:12,207 submit them for the record . Thank you 1040 00:41:12,207 --> 00:41:12,030 both . Thank you . Senator Rosen . 1041 00:41:12,030 --> 00:41:15,200 Senator Blackburn , please ? Thank you 1042 00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:17,890 Mr Chairman and thank you to each of 1043 00:41:17,890 --> 00:41:21,340 you for being with us today . Um 1044 00:41:21,350 --> 00:41:23,461 General Mackenzie . I want to go back 1045 00:41:23,461 --> 00:41:27,080 to this Iran deal because the threat 1046 00:41:27,080 --> 00:41:28,802 assessment , the annual threat 1047 00:41:28,802 --> 00:41:31,980 assessment noted that they 1048 00:41:31,990 --> 00:41:34,510 anticipated that Iran would continue to 1049 00:41:34,510 --> 00:41:37,780 threaten us interest us individuals . 1050 00:41:37,780 --> 00:41:40,260 I've read public reports of them 1051 00:41:40,260 --> 00:41:44,190 threatening you . Um I know that this 1052 00:41:44,190 --> 00:41:47,060 Iran deal would unlock billions of 1053 00:41:47,060 --> 00:41:50,300 dollars for Iran and I'm very 1054 00:41:50,300 --> 00:41:52,630 concerned about what they would do with 1055 00:41:52,630 --> 00:41:55,650 that money . They've already recently 1056 00:41:55,660 --> 00:41:58,810 in the recent past , the past decade , 1057 00:41:58,810 --> 00:42:02,320 $16 billion is what we know of that 1058 00:42:02,320 --> 00:42:04,360 they have transferred to these 1059 00:42:04,370 --> 00:42:08,340 terrorist groups . So the Irgc 1060 00:42:08,340 --> 00:42:10,800 you mentioned uh Senator Rosen just 1061 00:42:10,800 --> 00:42:14,320 talked about the attack this week but 1062 00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:16,780 Iran goes in to fill these power 1063 00:42:16,790 --> 00:42:19,970 vacuums um we have seen and we've 1064 00:42:19,970 --> 00:42:23,520 talked a good bit about Africom and 1065 00:42:23,530 --> 00:42:27,130 Wagner and the way they're filling that . 1066 00:42:27,140 --> 00:42:29,920 And General Carrillo when he was with 1067 00:42:29,920 --> 00:42:32,970 us for his confirmation hearing touched 1068 00:42:32,980 --> 00:42:36,620 on the risk that sanctions relief 1069 00:42:36,800 --> 00:42:40,540 to Iran would make to 1070 00:42:40,540 --> 00:42:43,590 us and to our interest 1071 00:42:43,600 --> 00:42:46,930 because of this money transfer . 1072 00:42:47,300 --> 00:42:51,220 And I do you agree with General 1073 00:42:51,230 --> 00:42:54,750 Carillon as we're talking about a new J . 1074 00:42:54,750 --> 00:42:57,880 C . P . O . A or a new Iran deal and 1075 00:42:57,890 --> 00:43:01,180 unleashing all of this money to 1076 00:43:01,180 --> 00:43:04,120 them . Are you concerned about that and 1077 00:43:04,130 --> 00:43:07,110 how that would be used by these proxy 1078 00:43:07,110 --> 00:43:11,020 groups and the way they would 1079 00:43:11,020 --> 00:43:14,390 benefit from that senator . Our primary 1080 00:43:14,400 --> 00:43:16,960 policy objective with Iran is to 1081 00:43:16,960 --> 00:43:18,904 prevent them from having a nuclear 1082 00:43:18,904 --> 00:43:20,950 weapon and and we realize that and 1083 00:43:20,950 --> 00:43:23,250 appreciate that . And so I am not an 1084 00:43:23,250 --> 00:43:25,250 expert on the negotiations that are 1085 00:43:25,250 --> 00:43:27,340 currently going on . So I'm not I am 1086 00:43:27,340 --> 00:43:29,396 not able to get the expectation they 1087 00:43:29,396 --> 00:43:31,451 would be more lethal that they would 1088 00:43:31,451 --> 00:43:34,310 move forward with . It is I would say 1089 00:43:34,310 --> 00:43:36,366 that there is a risk that they could 1090 00:43:36,366 --> 00:43:38,421 use that money in ways that we would 1091 00:43:38,421 --> 00:43:40,643 not want them to use that money . I can 1092 00:43:40,643 --> 00:43:40,310 certainly say that that is that is a 1093 00:43:40,310 --> 00:43:42,520 risk . But I think that we would have 1094 00:43:42,520 --> 00:43:44,390 to balance that if we got a good 1095 00:43:44,390 --> 00:43:46,334 agreement that prevented them from 1096 00:43:46,334 --> 00:43:48,557 obtaining a nuclear weapon . Okay . All 1097 00:43:48,557 --> 00:43:52,460 right . Um so I know that the J . 1098 00:43:52,460 --> 00:43:54,627 C . P . O . A under the terms for that 1099 00:43:54,627 --> 00:43:57,780 they could buy uh weapons from Russia 1100 00:43:57,780 --> 00:44:00,500 and china as of october 2020 and they 1101 00:44:00,500 --> 00:44:03,200 would be able to buy advanced weaponry 1102 00:44:03,210 --> 00:44:05,560 and ballistic missiles from Russia 1103 00:44:05,570 --> 00:44:08,420 Russia next year . So what is your 1104 00:44:08,420 --> 00:44:11,410 concern about their ability to purchase 1105 00:44:11,410 --> 00:44:13,930 arms from Russia or china ? Would they 1106 00:44:13,930 --> 00:44:17,150 be able to purchase even more lethal 1107 00:44:17,210 --> 00:44:19,450 weapons if they get that sanctions 1108 00:44:19,460 --> 00:44:23,240 release ? And how what would 1109 00:44:23,240 --> 00:44:25,750 that do with the capabilities for the 1110 00:44:25,750 --> 00:44:29,510 houthis or for any of these 1111 00:44:29,520 --> 00:44:32,300 other terrorist organizations ? Senator 1112 00:44:32,300 --> 00:44:34,467 over the last four or five years under 1113 00:44:34,467 --> 00:44:36,960 a very significant sanctions regime , 1114 00:44:37,140 --> 00:44:39,610 Iran has made remarkable advances in 1115 00:44:39,610 --> 00:44:41,832 their ballistic missiles . I believe it 1116 00:44:41,832 --> 00:44:43,888 open to bringing in advanced weapons 1117 00:44:43,888 --> 00:44:45,832 from other states such as you have 1118 00:44:45,832 --> 00:44:48,054 named it would increase the risk in the 1119 00:44:48,054 --> 00:44:51,410 theater considerably . Have we provided 1120 00:44:51,420 --> 00:44:54,160 everything to the Israeli government 1121 00:44:54,160 --> 00:44:56,470 that they've requested in order to 1122 00:44:56,470 --> 00:45:00,300 respond to an Iranian nuclear build up 1123 00:45:01,890 --> 00:45:04,001 senator at my level , at the Chief of 1124 00:45:04,001 --> 00:45:05,890 Defense level , we're in complete 1125 00:45:05,890 --> 00:45:08,112 agreement about the way ahead and about 1126 00:45:08,112 --> 00:45:10,223 what we're giving them . I can't talk 1127 00:45:10,223 --> 00:45:12,279 about other , I can't talk about the 1128 00:45:12,279 --> 00:45:12,270 whole of government but I can't talk 1129 00:45:12,270 --> 00:45:14,880 about it . And I was pleased to see the 1130 00:45:14,880 --> 00:45:18,790 realignment of Israel from Yukon to 1131 00:45:18,790 --> 00:45:20,734 centcom . I felt like that was the 1132 00:45:20,734 --> 00:45:23,090 right move and I was happy to see 1133 00:45:23,090 --> 00:45:26,500 sitcoms combined naval 1134 00:45:26,510 --> 00:45:30,090 exercise involving Israel , the U . A . 1135 00:45:30,090 --> 00:45:33,580 E bahrain . Um that was last november . 1136 00:45:33,590 --> 00:45:37,240 So how are you actively working 1137 00:45:37,250 --> 00:45:40,730 with partner nations to integrate 1138 00:45:40,740 --> 00:45:43,120 the I . D . F . Into the regional 1139 00:45:43,120 --> 00:45:46,020 security architecture ? I think the low 1140 00:45:46,020 --> 00:45:48,187 hanging fruit is an integrated air and 1141 00:45:48,187 --> 00:45:50,510 missile defense . All of these nations 1142 00:45:50,520 --> 00:45:52,242 see the threat from Iran , the 1143 00:45:52,242 --> 00:45:54,131 ballistic missile threat that the 1144 00:45:54,131 --> 00:45:56,187 cruise missile threat , the unmanned 1145 00:45:56,187 --> 00:45:58,298 aerial system threat and they want to 1146 00:45:58,298 --> 00:46:00,353 be able to defend themselves . And I 1147 00:46:00,353 --> 00:46:02,409 think that's where we can make great 1148 00:46:02,409 --> 00:46:04,631 headway involving Israel but also other 1149 00:46:04,631 --> 00:46:06,798 nations in the region and I'll be able 1150 00:46:06,798 --> 00:46:05,930 to talk a little bit more about that in 1151 00:46:05,930 --> 00:46:08,050 a closed session . Thank you all . 1152 00:46:08,050 --> 00:46:10,050 Thank you Mr Chairman , Thank you . 1153 00:46:10,050 --> 00:46:11,994 Senator Blackburn . Senator Peters 1154 00:46:11,994 --> 00:46:14,272 please . Hey , thank you . Mr Chairman . 1155 00:46:14,380 --> 00:46:16,130 Well gentlemen first , let me 1156 00:46:16,140 --> 00:46:18,860 congratulate both of you on your 1157 00:46:18,870 --> 00:46:21,640 upcoming retirements and thank you for 1158 00:46:21,640 --> 00:46:25,480 your collective 82 years of experience 1159 00:46:25,490 --> 00:46:27,601 between the two of you . That's truly 1160 00:46:27,601 --> 00:46:29,712 remarkable and outstanding service to 1161 00:46:29,712 --> 00:46:31,768 our country and certainly our nation 1162 00:46:31,768 --> 00:46:33,823 owes both of you a debt of gratitude 1163 00:46:33,823 --> 00:46:36,046 for for your sacrifice and commitment . 1164 00:46:36,046 --> 00:46:38,212 So so thank you so much . Uh in the in 1165 00:46:38,212 --> 00:46:40,323 the last few months the United States 1166 00:46:40,323 --> 00:46:42,800 has announced the rerouting of $67 1167 00:46:42,800 --> 00:46:45,570 million dollars of security assistance 1168 00:46:45,570 --> 00:46:47,970 to the Lebanese armed forces to support 1169 00:46:47,980 --> 00:46:51,200 members of the military . As Lebanon 1170 00:46:51,200 --> 00:46:53,480 grapples with some very severe 1171 00:46:53,480 --> 00:46:56,610 financial challenges , notably the aid 1172 00:46:56,610 --> 00:46:58,666 package will include some livelihood 1173 00:46:58,666 --> 00:47:00,610 support payments and these will go 1174 00:47:00,610 --> 00:47:02,832 directly to troops to help them whether 1175 00:47:02,832 --> 00:47:04,888 the extreme economic conditions that 1176 00:47:04,888 --> 00:47:06,943 the country is facing right now . So 1177 00:47:06,943 --> 00:47:09,166 General Mackenzie , my question for you 1178 00:47:09,166 --> 00:47:11,054 sir , is can you just discuss why 1179 00:47:11,054 --> 00:47:14,100 supporting the Lebanese armed forces is 1180 00:47:14,100 --> 00:47:16,250 a national security interest for the 1181 00:47:16,250 --> 00:47:18,472 United States and more broadly what the 1182 00:47:18,472 --> 00:47:20,361 U . S . Can do to support Lebanon 1183 00:47:20,361 --> 00:47:23,490 during this in time of severe crisis 1184 00:47:23,490 --> 00:47:26,040 there , Senator , I support the $67 1185 00:47:26,040 --> 00:47:27,929 million and and I support it more 1186 00:47:27,929 --> 00:47:29,984 broadly as well . It's our view that 1187 00:47:29,984 --> 00:47:32,207 the the laugh the Lebanese armed forces 1188 00:47:32,207 --> 00:47:34,250 are the sole representative of the 1189 00:47:34,250 --> 00:47:36,417 state of Lebanon in terms of defending 1190 00:47:36,417 --> 00:47:38,139 itself as you know , there are 1191 00:47:38,139 --> 00:47:40,139 competitor entities in Lebanon , LH 1192 00:47:40,139 --> 00:47:42,310 Lebanese Hezbollah as an example that 1193 00:47:42,310 --> 00:47:44,250 that haven't exercised a malign 1194 00:47:44,250 --> 00:47:46,472 influence , not only inside Lebanon but 1195 00:47:46,472 --> 00:47:48,806 indeed regionally from the Lebanon base ? 1196 00:47:48,806 --> 00:47:50,930 Our best , our best hope to keep the 1197 00:47:50,930 --> 00:47:52,763 lid on Lebanon is to continue to 1198 00:47:52,763 --> 00:47:54,986 support the laugh as the representative 1199 00:47:54,986 --> 00:47:57,208 of the state of Lebanon . And I'll just 1200 00:47:57,208 --> 00:47:59,097 say briefly , I the the financial 1201 00:47:59,097 --> 00:48:01,319 situation in Lebanon is dire . I am not 1202 00:48:01,319 --> 00:48:03,541 an economist , but I I can recognize it 1203 00:48:03,541 --> 00:48:05,708 probably is the worst I have ever seen 1204 00:48:05,708 --> 00:48:07,652 it . And this money is going to be 1205 00:48:07,652 --> 00:48:09,874 critical to maintaining cohesion inside 1206 00:48:09,874 --> 00:48:12,041 the laugh and they have performed very 1207 00:48:12,041 --> 00:48:14,263 well in the aftermath of the Lebanese . 1208 00:48:14,263 --> 00:48:16,319 The Beirut port explosion . It was a 1209 00:48:16,319 --> 00:48:18,263 laugh that did a lot of great work 1210 00:48:18,263 --> 00:48:20,208 there . So I think it's in all our 1211 00:48:20,208 --> 00:48:20,160 interests for the laugh to be supported 1212 00:48:20,170 --> 00:48:22,337 and supported appropriately . And that 1213 00:48:22,337 --> 00:48:24,503 would include allowing its soldiers to 1214 00:48:24,503 --> 00:48:26,670 feed their families John McKenzie . My 1215 00:48:26,670 --> 00:48:28,781 my next question is for you as well . 1216 00:48:28,781 --> 00:48:31,880 According to UNICEF , at least 47 1217 00:48:31,880 --> 00:48:34,500 Children have been killed or maimed in 1218 00:48:34,500 --> 00:48:37,460 Yemen just in January and February of 1219 00:48:37,470 --> 00:48:40,940 this year . In total , at least 10,000 1220 00:48:40,940 --> 00:48:42,884 miners have been killed or injured 1221 00:48:42,884 --> 00:48:44,996 since the Saudi-led coalition began . 1222 00:48:45,070 --> 00:48:48,780 They're bombing in 2015 . And this is 1223 00:48:48,780 --> 00:48:50,891 in the context of a conflict in which 1224 00:48:50,891 --> 00:48:54,330 the U.N . estimates nearly 377,000 1225 00:48:54,340 --> 00:48:56,670 people have died since the conflict 1226 00:48:56,680 --> 00:48:59,330 began . And now the World Food Program 1227 00:48:59,330 --> 00:49:02,840 is warning that 13 million Yemenis are 1228 00:49:02,840 --> 00:49:06,260 facing starvation ? My question for you . 1229 00:49:06,260 --> 00:49:08,510 General is straightforward , what what 1230 00:49:08,510 --> 00:49:10,732 leverage does the United States have to 1231 00:49:10,732 --> 00:49:12,843 bring all the parties to the table to 1232 00:49:12,843 --> 00:49:15,280 end this conflict ? And what are we 1233 00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:17,447 doing to make it happen , Senator ? So 1234 00:49:17,447 --> 00:49:19,669 it's my assessment . And again , I only 1235 00:49:19,669 --> 00:49:21,780 see a part of the problem . We have a 1236 00:49:21,780 --> 00:49:23,947 we have a negotiator who works this at 1237 00:49:23,947 --> 00:49:25,947 a higher level . I believe that the 1238 00:49:25,947 --> 00:49:25,850 kingdom of Saudi Arabia is willing to 1239 00:49:25,850 --> 00:49:27,961 come to an agreement uh and with with 1240 00:49:27,961 --> 00:49:29,961 events in Yemen , I believe that is 1241 00:49:29,961 --> 00:49:31,961 attainable from their end . I think 1242 00:49:31,961 --> 00:49:33,906 it's the houthis who are intent on 1243 00:49:33,906 --> 00:49:36,072 continue to prosecute this fight . And 1244 00:49:36,072 --> 00:49:38,239 I believe they are prodded directly by 1245 00:49:38,239 --> 00:49:40,461 their Iranian masters . And that that's 1246 00:49:40,461 --> 00:49:42,517 the reason that the situation exists 1247 00:49:42,517 --> 00:49:44,628 now where they're firing almost daily 1248 00:49:44,628 --> 00:49:46,572 weapons into Saudi Arabia . And of 1249 00:49:46,572 --> 00:49:46,370 course as recently as several weeks ago 1250 00:49:46,380 --> 00:49:48,491 began to fire ballistic missiles into 1251 00:49:48,491 --> 00:49:50,710 you . A in both cases , they they they 1252 00:49:50,720 --> 00:49:53,040 were and are prodded to do it again by 1253 00:49:53,050 --> 00:49:55,130 their sponsors , Iran who has no 1254 00:49:55,130 --> 00:49:57,297 interest actually in this war . Coming 1255 00:49:57,297 --> 00:49:59,463 to an end , no interest in solving the 1256 00:49:59,463 --> 00:50:01,463 humanitarian dispute . And I do not 1257 00:50:01,463 --> 00:50:03,519 dispute the tragedy , the tremendous 1258 00:50:03,519 --> 00:50:05,741 tragedy of Children being made by these 1259 00:50:05,741 --> 00:50:08,019 weapons . I understand that completely . 1260 00:50:08,019 --> 00:50:10,130 But there is a path forward . Some of 1261 00:50:10,130 --> 00:50:12,186 the parties are willing to take that 1262 00:50:12,186 --> 00:50:14,186 path . Unfortunately not all of the 1263 00:50:14,186 --> 00:50:13,490 parties are willing to take that path . 1264 00:50:14,560 --> 00:50:16,616 Well , I appreciate your efforts and 1265 00:50:16,616 --> 00:50:18,671 working to try to get to that path . 1266 00:50:18,671 --> 00:50:20,838 Thank you for that General Townsend in 1267 00:50:20,838 --> 00:50:23,060 the spring of 2020 , some of Michigan's 1268 00:50:23,060 --> 00:50:24,838 national guardsmen engaged with 1269 00:50:24,838 --> 00:50:27,940 military partners in Liberia as part of 1270 00:50:27,940 --> 00:50:30,320 Africom Command advice , investigations 1271 00:50:30,320 --> 00:50:33,700 and coordination initiative . I'd like 1272 00:50:33,700 --> 00:50:35,520 to hear your assessment of how 1273 00:50:35,530 --> 00:50:38,120 effective this initiative has been in 1274 00:50:38,120 --> 00:50:40,630 promoting effective military legal 1275 00:50:40,630 --> 00:50:43,490 frameworks within a variety of our 1276 00:50:43,500 --> 00:50:44,556 African partners . 1277 00:50:48,060 --> 00:50:51,380 Well , Senator , much like our 1278 00:50:51,380 --> 00:50:54,780 values and our democracy . We also try 1279 00:50:54,780 --> 00:50:58,500 to pass on our views of the rule of 1280 00:50:58,500 --> 00:51:00,722 law whenever we engage with our African 1281 00:51:00,722 --> 00:51:02,889 partners . So that program that you're 1282 00:51:02,889 --> 00:51:05,190 talking about is a part of that effort 1283 00:51:05,430 --> 00:51:07,890 and every training that we do has 1284 00:51:07,900 --> 00:51:09,956 discussion about the rule of law and 1285 00:51:09,956 --> 00:51:12,560 the law of armed conflict . And I think 1286 00:51:12,560 --> 00:51:16,330 that program , you can debate 1287 00:51:16,330 --> 00:51:18,330 whether how effective it is . But I 1288 00:51:18,330 --> 00:51:20,500 think we have to actually try every 1289 00:51:20,500 --> 00:51:22,278 time we engage with our African 1290 00:51:22,278 --> 00:51:24,444 partners . It's important that we talk 1291 00:51:24,444 --> 00:51:26,500 about our values and the rule of law 1292 00:51:26,500 --> 00:51:28,556 and civilian control of the military 1293 00:51:28,556 --> 00:51:30,778 etcetera . So I think it's an important 1294 00:51:30,778 --> 00:51:32,889 program . Thank you . General Again , 1295 00:51:32,889 --> 00:51:35,056 Congratulations to both of you on your 1296 00:51:35,056 --> 00:51:37,222 retirement . A well deserved thank you 1297 00:51:37,222 --> 00:51:39,444 for your service to our country . Thank 1298 00:51:39,444 --> 00:51:39,410 you . Mr Chairman . Thank you . Senator 1299 00:51:39,410 --> 00:51:41,632 Peter Center Holly . Please . Thank you 1300 00:51:41,632 --> 00:51:43,743 Mr . Chairman . Thanks to both of you 1301 00:51:43,743 --> 00:51:43,720 for being here . General Mackenzie . If 1302 00:51:43,720 --> 00:51:46,010 I could start with you , you directed 1303 00:51:46,010 --> 00:51:47,954 us army Central to investigate the 1304 00:51:47,954 --> 00:51:49,843 events surrounding the Abbey Gate 1305 00:51:49,843 --> 00:51:51,732 bombing on august 26 2021 Is that 1306 00:51:51,732 --> 00:51:54,230 correct ? That is correct . And they 1307 00:51:54,230 --> 00:51:56,140 issued in fact a report , Is that 1308 00:51:56,140 --> 00:51:59,220 correct ? Totaling about I think 2000 1309 00:51:59,220 --> 00:52:01,520 pages you said in a letter to the 1310 00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:03,670 Secretary , I have reviewed the 1311 00:52:03,670 --> 00:52:05,920 investigation completed at my direction 1312 00:52:05,920 --> 00:52:08,650 by US Army Central and concur with and 1313 00:52:08,650 --> 00:52:10,650 endorsed the findings in quote . Is 1314 00:52:10,650 --> 00:52:12,872 that correct ? And do you stand by that 1315 00:52:12,872 --> 00:52:15,039 general ? Let's talk about some of the 1316 00:52:15,039 --> 00:52:16,928 findings if we if we could . This 1317 00:52:16,928 --> 00:52:18,983 committee has been told repeatedly , 1318 00:52:18,983 --> 00:52:21,094 was told repeatedly that the collapse 1319 00:52:21,094 --> 00:52:23,317 of the Afghan security forces on such a 1320 00:52:23,317 --> 00:52:25,539 rapid timetable couldn't be predicted . 1321 00:52:25,539 --> 00:52:27,706 For example , General Miller testified 1322 00:52:27,706 --> 00:52:29,872 to this committee . I'm going to quote 1323 00:52:29,872 --> 00:52:32,039 him Now quote , there was nothing I or 1324 00:52:32,039 --> 00:52:33,880 anyone else saw end quote that 1325 00:52:33,880 --> 00:52:36,047 suggested the rapid collapse of Afghan 1326 00:52:36,047 --> 00:52:38,158 security forces on the timetable that 1327 00:52:38,158 --> 00:52:40,213 they did collapse the centcom report 1328 00:52:40,213 --> 00:52:42,269 that you ordered . I think to put it 1329 00:52:42,269 --> 00:52:44,324 gently cast some doubt on that . For 1330 00:52:44,324 --> 00:52:46,790 example , it says General Miller that's 1331 00:52:46,790 --> 00:52:49,123 the commander on the ground . Of course , 1332 00:52:49,123 --> 00:52:51,179 as you know , General General Miller 1333 00:52:51,179 --> 00:52:53,123 was extremely worried from May 2nd 1334 00:52:53,123 --> 00:52:55,290 onward about the rapid collapse of the 1335 00:52:55,290 --> 00:52:57,850 security forces , especially as he was 1336 00:52:57,850 --> 00:53:00,750 seeing key districts fall . Of course . 1337 00:53:00,750 --> 00:53:02,806 General Miller also has testified to 1338 00:53:02,806 --> 00:53:04,806 this committee that he warned you , 1339 00:53:04,806 --> 00:53:06,972 General Milley and Secretary Austin as 1340 00:53:06,972 --> 00:53:09,194 early as March or april about the rapid 1341 00:53:09,194 --> 00:53:11,306 collapse of the security forces . The 1342 00:53:11,306 --> 00:53:13,528 report also says , quote , Rear Admiral 1343 00:53:13,528 --> 00:53:15,583 basically provided assessments weeks 1344 00:53:15,583 --> 00:53:17,361 prior to the fall of the Afghan 1345 00:53:17,361 --> 00:53:19,410 government that the trajectory of 1346 00:53:19,410 --> 00:53:21,510 Afghanistan was in a downward spiral 1347 00:53:21,520 --> 00:53:24,660 and likely not recoverable . End , 1348 00:53:24,660 --> 00:53:27,320 quote , General , can you confirm for 1349 00:53:27,320 --> 00:53:29,487 us based on the findings in the report 1350 00:53:29,487 --> 00:53:31,487 that the administration was in fact 1351 00:53:31,487 --> 00:53:33,653 warned that Afghan security forces and 1352 00:53:33,653 --> 00:53:35,764 the government could collapse rapidly 1353 00:53:35,764 --> 00:53:37,931 after we left and by we , I mean , our 1354 00:53:37,931 --> 00:53:40,098 military forces who evacuated fully in 1355 00:53:40,098 --> 00:53:42,209 july senator . I'll answer that . But 1356 00:53:42,209 --> 00:53:44,209 first , I'd like to very briefly to 1357 00:53:44,209 --> 00:53:46,542 talk about the Abbey Gate investigation . 1358 00:53:46,542 --> 00:53:46,420 There was a narrowly scoped 1359 00:53:46,420 --> 00:53:48,198 investigation to determine what 1360 00:53:48,198 --> 00:53:50,253 happened at Abbey Gate . The the the 1361 00:53:50,253 --> 00:53:52,420 the the quotations you're drawing from 1362 00:53:52,420 --> 00:53:54,476 testimony inside it were not part of 1363 00:53:54,476 --> 00:53:56,309 the formal final findings of the 1364 00:53:56,309 --> 00:53:56,170 investigation . That doesn't mean 1365 00:53:56,170 --> 00:53:58,003 they're accurate or inaccurate . 1366 00:53:58,003 --> 00:54:00,059 They're just simply not there in the 1367 00:54:00,059 --> 00:53:59,990 report , the general correct their 1368 00:54:00,000 --> 00:54:02,040 their 14,000 pages in the report of 1369 00:54:02,040 --> 00:54:04,262 involving a lot of testimony from a lot 1370 00:54:04,262 --> 00:54:06,318 of people and I'm sure that I'm sure 1371 00:54:06,318 --> 00:54:08,207 they're in the report . However , 1372 00:54:08,207 --> 00:54:07,960 they're not the reason the report was 1373 00:54:07,960 --> 00:54:10,071 created and that they were not in the 1374 00:54:10,071 --> 00:54:12,071 final , They were not in the formal 1375 00:54:12,071 --> 00:54:14,127 final findings of the report , which 1376 00:54:14,127 --> 00:54:13,820 was focused on the nature of the attack 1377 00:54:13,820 --> 00:54:15,987 at Abbey Gate . Now , having said that 1378 00:54:15,987 --> 00:54:19,010 uh as early as and I've testified here 1379 00:54:19,010 --> 00:54:21,170 earlier today and in the past , I as 1380 00:54:21,170 --> 00:54:23,690 early as the fall of 2020 . Uh my 1381 00:54:23,690 --> 00:54:26,660 recommendation was that if my my uh not 1382 00:54:26,660 --> 00:54:28,660 my recommendation , but my view was 1383 00:54:28,660 --> 00:54:30,690 That if you go below 4500 in 1384 00:54:30,690 --> 00:54:33,380 Afghanistan That would that would be a 1385 00:54:33,380 --> 00:54:35,602 mistake put us on a slope that we would 1386 00:54:35,602 --> 00:54:37,769 not be able to recover from . And then 1387 00:54:37,769 --> 00:54:40,550 also in the spring of 2021 , uh General 1388 00:54:40,550 --> 00:54:43,020 Miller and I were both agreed that 2500 1389 00:54:43,020 --> 00:54:45,187 was a number that we could maintain in 1390 00:54:45,187 --> 00:54:47,409 Afghanistan . That's not ultimately the 1391 00:54:47,409 --> 00:54:49,520 number that was selected . But we had 1392 00:54:49,520 --> 00:54:51,742 the opportunity of full and free airing 1393 00:54:51,742 --> 00:54:53,964 of our views , which I think is all any 1394 00:54:53,964 --> 00:54:53,810 commander can ask . Another decision 1395 00:54:53,810 --> 00:54:56,032 was made , which is the way the process 1396 00:54:56,032 --> 00:54:58,032 is supposed to work . Fair enough , 1397 00:54:58,032 --> 00:55:00,199 fair enough . Um Did you did In fact , 1398 00:55:00,199 --> 00:55:02,199 it sounds like to me and the report 1399 00:55:02,199 --> 00:55:03,810 certainly indicates that the 1400 00:55:03,810 --> 00:55:05,977 administration was warned and that and 1401 00:55:05,977 --> 00:55:07,588 that you were ignored . This 1402 00:55:07,588 --> 00:55:09,810 investigation contains other remarkable 1403 00:55:09,810 --> 00:55:09,710 testimony about the State Department of 1404 00:55:09,710 --> 00:55:11,821 the White House's disengagement . Let 1405 00:55:11,821 --> 00:55:14,154 me just go through a little bit of that . 1406 00:55:14,154 --> 00:55:16,321 Multiple sources said for the record , 1407 00:55:16,321 --> 00:55:18,321 uh for the testimony that the State 1408 00:55:18,321 --> 00:55:20,543 Department refused even to talk about a 1409 00:55:20,543 --> 00:55:22,599 civilian evacuation until it was too 1410 00:55:22,599 --> 00:55:24,821 late that they delayed efforts to start 1411 00:55:24,821 --> 00:55:26,877 evacuating americans . For example , 1412 00:55:26,877 --> 00:55:28,654 Brigadier General Sullivan told 1413 00:55:28,654 --> 00:55:30,710 investigators and I'm going to quote 1414 00:55:30,710 --> 00:55:30,670 him now , quote , trying to get the 1415 00:55:30,670 --> 00:55:32,900 embassy to discuss noncombatant 1416 00:55:32,900 --> 00:55:35,067 evacuation operations was like pulling 1417 00:55:35,067 --> 00:55:37,540 teeth until early august . He goes on 1418 00:55:37,540 --> 00:55:39,318 to say the embassy didn't fully 1419 00:55:39,318 --> 00:55:41,380 participate in evacuation planning 1420 00:55:41,390 --> 00:55:44,610 until a week prior to the fall of Kabul . 1421 00:55:44,620 --> 00:55:46,990 Another marine said that as a result of 1422 00:55:46,990 --> 00:55:49,157 the State Department's intransigence . 1423 00:55:49,157 --> 00:55:51,101 Quote , we essentially planned the 1424 00:55:51,101 --> 00:55:54,170 evacuation in about five days end quote . 1425 00:55:55,340 --> 00:55:57,507 Ah General is it fair to say the State 1426 00:55:57,507 --> 00:55:59,396 Department's delays undermine the 1427 00:55:59,396 --> 00:56:01,451 broader evacuation efforts . I think 1428 00:56:01,451 --> 00:56:03,673 the Department of State always tries to 1429 00:56:03,673 --> 00:56:05,840 find a solution to remain engaged in a 1430 00:56:05,840 --> 00:56:08,062 country . It's alien to their nature to 1431 00:56:08,062 --> 00:56:10,229 to cut and run . They prefer to not do 1432 00:56:10,229 --> 00:56:12,284 that . I would tell you that we were 1433 00:56:12,284 --> 00:56:11,760 involved in a lot of a lot of 1434 00:56:11,760 --> 00:56:13,760 discussions back and forth with the 1435 00:56:13,760 --> 00:56:15,649 State Department beginning in the 1436 00:56:15,649 --> 00:56:17,538 spring of that year . Uh And even 1437 00:56:17,538 --> 00:56:19,316 earlier in fact as we looked at 1438 00:56:19,316 --> 00:56:21,482 possible contingencies for departure . 1439 00:56:21,482 --> 00:56:23,649 So yeah you said that you were engaged 1440 00:56:23,649 --> 00:56:25,316 in discussions with the State 1441 00:56:25,316 --> 00:56:27,427 Department . What the report shows is 1442 00:56:27,427 --> 00:56:29,538 that the State Department refused and 1443 00:56:29,538 --> 00:56:31,482 frankly the White House refused to 1444 00:56:31,482 --> 00:56:33,704 engage until the very last minute . For 1445 00:56:33,704 --> 00:56:35,816 example , this is the testimony again 1446 00:56:35,816 --> 00:56:37,927 of Rear Admiral Vasily on the morning 1447 00:56:37,927 --> 00:56:40,038 of august 14th he says the ambassador 1448 00:56:40,040 --> 00:56:42,207 there in Kabul finally got a call from 1449 00:56:42,207 --> 00:56:43,984 the national security adviser , 1450 00:56:43,984 --> 00:56:46,040 Sullivan the secretary Blinken , who 1451 00:56:46,040 --> 00:56:48,096 told him the ambassador we needed to 1452 00:56:48,096 --> 00:56:50,151 move . We had heard the night before 1453 00:56:50,151 --> 00:56:49,830 that they were looking at a two week 1454 00:56:49,830 --> 00:56:51,830 plan to get 250 personnel U . S . 1455 00:56:51,830 --> 00:56:53,997 Personnel to H . Kaya and get them out 1456 00:56:53,997 --> 00:56:56,100 by 31 august I basically told him he 1457 00:56:56,100 --> 00:56:58,267 didn't have two weeks that he only had 1458 00:56:58,267 --> 00:57:02,160 24 to 48 hours Basil goes on ? I'd 1459 00:57:02,160 --> 00:57:03,993 like to know where this level of 1460 00:57:03,993 --> 00:57:06,104 urgency to get these people in before 1461 00:57:06,104 --> 00:57:08,271 August 15 was before because it didn't 1462 00:57:08,271 --> 00:57:10,480 exist until it became a crisis . I 1463 00:57:10,480 --> 00:57:12,591 could go on and on here . Generally , 1464 00:57:12,591 --> 00:57:14,702 you're right . There are thousands of 1465 00:57:14,702 --> 00:57:14,080 pages here . And I want to I want to 1466 00:57:14,090 --> 00:57:15,980 thank you for ordering this 1467 00:57:15,980 --> 00:57:18,036 investigation . I think that was the 1468 00:57:18,036 --> 00:57:19,813 right thing to do . I wish this 1469 00:57:19,813 --> 00:57:21,924 committee would show some interest in 1470 00:57:21,924 --> 00:57:24,036 it , my staff and I have been through 1471 00:57:24,036 --> 00:57:26,202 all of it that is publicly available . 1472 00:57:26,202 --> 00:57:28,313 It is astounding , frankly . So thank 1473 00:57:28,313 --> 00:57:28,190 you for ordering it . Thank you for 1474 00:57:28,190 --> 00:57:30,412 what you were able to uncover . I again 1475 00:57:30,412 --> 00:57:32,634 call on this committee to have hearings 1476 00:57:32,634 --> 00:57:34,579 on this report which is now in the 1477 00:57:34,579 --> 00:57:36,740 public domain much of it , and that 1478 00:57:36,740 --> 00:57:39,550 frankly contains shocking information 1479 00:57:39,560 --> 00:57:41,450 about this administration's total 1480 00:57:41,450 --> 00:57:43,672 failure to plan for the collapse of the 1481 00:57:43,672 --> 00:57:45,839 Afghan security forces . Despite being 1482 00:57:45,839 --> 00:57:48,006 warned about it for months upon months 1483 00:57:48,006 --> 00:57:50,210 and to withdraw american civilians in 1484 00:57:50,210 --> 00:57:52,432 time before the tragedy at Abbey Gate , 1485 00:57:52,432 --> 00:57:54,488 which led to the death Of 13 service 1486 00:57:54,488 --> 00:57:56,599 members . I've got more questions for 1487 00:57:56,599 --> 00:57:58,710 you for the record . Thank you . Mr . 1488 00:57:58,710 --> 00:57:57,790 Chairman chairman is a member of the 1489 00:57:57,790 --> 00:58:00,070 Intelligence Committee . I can assure 1490 00:58:00,070 --> 00:58:02,237 the senator that there were not months 1491 00:58:02,237 --> 00:58:04,126 and months of warning of imminent 1492 00:58:04,126 --> 00:58:06,348 collapse . That is categorically untrue 1493 00:58:06,348 --> 00:58:08,570 and I wish the senator would get off of 1494 00:58:08,570 --> 00:58:10,292 this hobby horse . Gentlemen . 1495 00:58:10,292 --> 00:58:13,560 Gentlemen , I will now recognize Mr 1496 00:58:13,560 --> 00:58:15,727 Chairman that the senator just invoked 1497 00:58:15,727 --> 00:58:17,949 me . Has the senator read the 2000 plus 1498 00:58:17,949 --> 00:58:20,470 pages ? Senator Hawley , would you , 1499 00:58:20,480 --> 00:58:23,060 would you like Senator King ? You have 1500 00:58:23,060 --> 00:58:26,790 any interest in it ? I doubt what I'm 1501 00:58:26,790 --> 00:58:28,957 quoting you saying that I'm misquoting 1502 00:58:28,957 --> 00:58:31,870 these , this evidence before the 1503 00:58:31,870 --> 00:58:33,926 senator impugning my integrity in an 1504 00:58:33,926 --> 00:58:36,148 open session . I'd like him to at least 1505 00:58:36,148 --> 00:58:38,037 do me the courtesy of reading the 1506 00:58:38,037 --> 00:58:40,092 material that I'm quoting and engage 1507 00:58:40,092 --> 00:58:41,926 with it . I'd be glad to do so . 1508 00:58:42,920 --> 00:58:45,540 Senator Solomon . Please thank you Mr 1509 00:58:45,540 --> 00:58:48,280 Chairman And gentlemen , I want to also 1510 00:58:48,290 --> 00:58:50,530 reiterate what many have said here . 1511 00:58:50,530 --> 00:58:52,141 Thank you for your service , 1512 00:58:52,520 --> 00:58:54,631 exceptional service to our nation . I 1513 00:58:54,631 --> 00:58:56,650 know facing retirement and your 1514 00:58:57,120 --> 00:58:59,287 probably one of the things you're most 1515 00:58:59,287 --> 00:58:59,250 happy about is you probably don't have 1516 00:58:59,250 --> 00:59:01,361 to testify in front of this committee 1517 00:59:01,361 --> 00:59:03,417 again , but we really appreciate all 1518 00:59:03,417 --> 00:59:05,528 you've done for our nation . I wanted 1519 00:59:05,528 --> 00:59:07,861 to follow up on the important questions . 1520 00:59:07,861 --> 00:59:10,083 Senator Warren had asked about civilian 1521 00:59:10,083 --> 00:59:13,460 casualties . Um , nobody wants civilian 1522 00:59:13,460 --> 00:59:16,210 casualties . Of course . One question 1523 00:59:16,210 --> 00:59:18,210 that wasn't asked so . I think it's 1524 00:59:18,210 --> 00:59:21,400 important . Uh , we don't target 1525 00:59:21,410 --> 00:59:24,250 civilians ever . Our military do we ? 1526 00:59:24,720 --> 00:59:26,720 General Mackenzie , john Townsend , 1527 00:59:26,720 --> 00:59:28,887 Senator . We do not target civilians . 1528 00:59:29,020 --> 00:59:31,131 General Townsend in your experience . 1529 00:59:31,131 --> 00:59:33,242 You're absolutely right . So we never 1530 00:59:33,242 --> 00:59:35,187 what we see in Ukraine right now . 1531 00:59:35,187 --> 00:59:37,131 Right . And but other countries do 1532 00:59:37,131 --> 00:59:39,040 correct . I can only observe what 1533 00:59:39,040 --> 00:59:41,330 you're seeing in Ukraine . Ukraine . 1534 00:59:41,340 --> 00:59:43,290 Syria . Perhaps many , many other 1535 00:59:43,290 --> 00:59:46,710 places . IsIS Al Qaeda . So we don't do 1536 00:59:46,710 --> 00:59:48,932 that . It's just important to recognize 1537 00:59:48,932 --> 00:59:51,099 and say that for the record and I know 1538 00:59:51,099 --> 00:59:53,099 that's been your experience in your 1539 00:59:53,099 --> 00:59:55,154 command . You know , I was in like a 1540 00:59:55,154 --> 00:59:58,140 lot of senators as part of a bipartisan 1541 00:59:58,140 --> 01:00:00,029 delegation to the Munich security 1542 01:00:00,029 --> 01:00:03,100 conference . I went on to do 1543 01:00:03,100 --> 01:00:05,740 consultation with allies in NATO and 1544 01:00:05,740 --> 01:00:08,330 the EU and London and it was mostly 1545 01:00:08,330 --> 01:00:11,230 about Ukraine some asia pacific issues . 1546 01:00:11,420 --> 01:00:14,850 I was actually quite 1547 01:00:14,850 --> 01:00:16,880 surprised how literally in every 1548 01:00:16,880 --> 01:00:20,520 meeting , our allies raised with me , 1549 01:00:21,110 --> 01:00:23,740 ah the Afghanistan withdrawal 1550 01:00:25,180 --> 01:00:28,090 and how it undermines us credibility 1551 01:00:28,710 --> 01:00:30,877 and trust , particularly as it related 1552 01:00:30,877 --> 01:00:32,988 to NATO allies that we're also in the 1553 01:00:32,988 --> 01:00:35,210 country general . What what what do you 1554 01:00:35,210 --> 01:00:37,210 recommend as our best way to regain 1555 01:00:37,210 --> 01:00:39,266 that credibility was I know I didn't 1556 01:00:39,266 --> 01:00:41,377 raise it . It was raised in literally 1557 01:00:41,377 --> 01:00:44,650 every meeting with me and it was quite 1558 01:00:44,650 --> 01:00:47,520 a important experience that I had that 1559 01:00:47,520 --> 01:00:49,687 hey , this is still having an impact . 1560 01:00:49,687 --> 01:00:51,798 What would you say is the best way to 1561 01:00:51,798 --> 01:00:53,909 re establish that kind of credibility 1562 01:00:53,909 --> 01:00:55,464 and trust with our allies , 1563 01:00:55,464 --> 01:00:57,687 particularly NATO allies , senator . So 1564 01:00:57,687 --> 01:00:59,798 I think there's still a thirst for us 1565 01:00:59,798 --> 01:01:01,853 leadership . Uh there is certainly a 1566 01:01:01,853 --> 01:01:03,798 thirst for it in my region where I 1567 01:01:03,798 --> 01:01:05,909 interact with Chiefs of Defense daily 1568 01:01:05,909 --> 01:01:08,076 and visited literally everyone several 1569 01:01:08,076 --> 01:01:10,242 times since we left Afghanistan , they 1570 01:01:10,242 --> 01:01:12,353 they they're taken aback by it . They 1571 01:01:12,353 --> 01:01:14,409 still believe that the United States 1572 01:01:14,409 --> 01:01:16,576 remains their partner of choice and in 1573 01:01:16,576 --> 01:01:18,742 fact their preferred choice . Now NATO 1574 01:01:18,742 --> 01:01:20,798 is a little bit out of my wheelhouse 1575 01:01:20,798 --> 01:01:22,909 but I would tell you that I think the 1576 01:01:22,909 --> 01:01:25,131 things that we're doing with NATO right 1577 01:01:25,131 --> 01:01:27,020 now are things that absolutely uh 1578 01:01:27,020 --> 01:01:29,187 restore some of that . I think I think 1579 01:01:29,187 --> 01:01:31,242 from what I see from my perch on the 1580 01:01:31,242 --> 01:01:33,353 sideline at centcom looking into what 1581 01:01:33,353 --> 01:01:35,464 european command is doing and NATO is 1582 01:01:35,464 --> 01:01:37,742 doing and this administration is doing . 1583 01:01:37,742 --> 01:01:37,620 I think they're doing all the right 1584 01:01:37,620 --> 01:01:39,898 things to reestablish that . Okay good . 1585 01:01:39,898 --> 01:01:42,290 Thank you . I noticed that in your 1586 01:01:42,300 --> 01:01:44,900 centcom priorities deter Iran . Is that 1587 01:01:44,910 --> 01:01:47,132 listed at the top ? Is that your number 1588 01:01:47,132 --> 01:01:49,354 one priority ? So that is my number one 1589 01:01:49,354 --> 01:01:51,410 priority . And let me um let me talk 1590 01:01:51,410 --> 01:01:53,410 about I'm sure you're familiar with 1591 01:01:53,410 --> 01:01:55,410 this . The could for codes for us . 1592 01:01:55,410 --> 01:01:57,410 General Soleimani starting in about 1593 01:01:57,410 --> 01:02:00,940 2004 2005 supplied very 1594 01:02:00,940 --> 01:02:02,884 sophisticated I . E . D . S to the 1595 01:02:02,884 --> 01:02:06,350 Iraqi Shia militias In 1596 01:02:06,350 --> 01:02:10,230 Iraq over 2000 American soldiers 1597 01:02:11,300 --> 01:02:13,990 wounded in actions over 600 killed in 1598 01:02:13,990 --> 01:02:17,930 action because of those E . 1599 01:02:17,930 --> 01:02:21,920 F . P . S . For years we didn't do much 1600 01:02:22,700 --> 01:02:25,550 to hold Soleimani the kids force for 1601 01:02:25,550 --> 01:02:28,400 accountable for this very devastating 1602 01:02:28,400 --> 01:02:31,680 killing of our best and brightest . I 1603 01:02:31,680 --> 01:02:34,600 was in a hearing when the chairman then 1604 01:02:34,600 --> 01:02:37,150 General Dunford mentioned that 1605 01:02:37,160 --> 01:02:38,993 Soleimani in particular may have 1606 01:02:38,993 --> 01:02:42,000 learned the wrong lesson back then you 1607 01:02:42,000 --> 01:02:44,056 could attack americans with impunity 1608 01:02:44,460 --> 01:02:46,682 and not pay a price . Do you agree with 1609 01:02:46,682 --> 01:02:48,738 that ? I know you were very familiar 1610 01:02:48,738 --> 01:02:50,627 with that and this is prior to of 1611 01:02:50,627 --> 01:02:52,793 course him being killed . Well I think 1612 01:02:53,700 --> 01:02:55,867 I think he's an object lesson and that 1613 01:02:55,867 --> 01:02:57,644 you can't attack americans with 1614 01:02:57,644 --> 01:02:59,720 impunity . So you think that were we 1615 01:02:59,720 --> 01:03:01,498 able to reestablish some of the 1616 01:03:01,498 --> 01:03:03,498 deterrents that General Dunford had 1617 01:03:03,498 --> 01:03:06,370 talked about by killing him when he was 1618 01:03:06,370 --> 01:03:08,680 looking . Thing that contributed to 1619 01:03:08,690 --> 01:03:10,910 deterrence being reestablished . And I 1620 01:03:10,910 --> 01:03:12,799 think there was a factor in their 1621 01:03:12,799 --> 01:03:14,910 calculation . The Iranians have never 1622 01:03:14,910 --> 01:03:17,021 doubted our capability . Occasionally 1623 01:03:17,021 --> 01:03:19,100 they doubt our will . And you think 1624 01:03:19,100 --> 01:03:21,690 that's been reestablished now ? I think 1625 01:03:21,700 --> 01:03:23,922 yes but I think as with all things with 1626 01:03:23,922 --> 01:03:25,978 Iran it's an extraordinarily complex 1627 01:03:25,978 --> 01:03:28,200 subject and I think there is a there is 1628 01:03:28,200 --> 01:03:30,311 deterrence but it's what I would call 1629 01:03:30,311 --> 01:03:32,478 contested deterrence . They still seek 1630 01:03:32,478 --> 01:03:34,470 they still seek to push us out by 1631 01:03:34,470 --> 01:03:36,692 hurting us and they will continue to do 1632 01:03:36,692 --> 01:03:38,748 so . Let me ask one final question . 1633 01:03:38,748 --> 01:03:40,970 You were quoted in a New Yorker article 1634 01:03:40,970 --> 01:03:43,470 in December 2020 titled The Looming 1635 01:03:43,470 --> 01:03:46,250 Threat of a Nuclear Crisis with Iran ? 1636 01:03:47,000 --> 01:03:49,167 Where you were quoted as saying that a 1637 01:03:49,167 --> 01:03:51,880 more immediate threat than the nuclear 1638 01:03:52,500 --> 01:03:55,730 program is Iran's missiles . 1639 01:03:56,100 --> 01:03:59,310 Um Do very quick questions . Did the 1640 01:03:59,310 --> 01:04:01,910 Iranians target the consulate with this 1641 01:04:01,910 --> 01:04:05,470 most recent missile attack in on 1642 01:04:05,470 --> 01:04:08,510 Northern Iraq and would re entering the 1643 01:04:08,510 --> 01:04:10,400 J . C . P . O . A positively or 1644 01:04:10,400 --> 01:04:13,590 negatively impact Iranian ballistic 1645 01:04:13,600 --> 01:04:15,656 missile capability which you I think 1646 01:04:15,656 --> 01:04:18,500 have rightly called out back in 1647 01:04:18,500 --> 01:04:20,820 december as a much more immediate 1648 01:04:20,820 --> 01:04:22,987 threat from them . So two questions on 1649 01:04:22,987 --> 01:04:25,209 that were they targeting us ? They were 1650 01:04:25,209 --> 01:04:27,209 not they were not targeting us . So 1651 01:04:27,209 --> 01:04:29,487 we're sure of that . I am sure of that . 1652 01:04:29,487 --> 01:04:31,431 Okay . And the second question the 1653 01:04:31,431 --> 01:04:33,487 second question is I think it's like 1654 01:04:33,487 --> 01:04:35,542 that's a hard question . I think you 1655 01:04:35,542 --> 01:04:37,598 know what you would like to do is if 1656 01:04:37,598 --> 01:04:39,820 you executed JcPOa you would want to go 1657 01:04:39,820 --> 01:04:41,709 to limiting other elements of the 1658 01:04:41,709 --> 01:04:43,820 Iranian portfolio and that would be a 1659 01:04:43,820 --> 01:04:45,820 bridge to get to where you're maybe 1660 01:04:45,820 --> 01:04:47,820 ballistic missiles . You're talking 1661 01:04:47,820 --> 01:04:47,660 about proxy activities . So that would 1662 01:04:47,660 --> 01:04:49,827 give you an opportunity to try to work 1663 01:04:49,827 --> 01:04:51,938 that diplomatically . But should that 1664 01:04:51,938 --> 01:04:54,104 be part of the agreement it's Sandra . 1665 01:04:54,104 --> 01:04:56,330 I don't believe that the current it is 1666 01:04:56,330 --> 01:04:58,386 under the current profile that we're 1667 01:04:58,386 --> 01:05:00,608 looking right now . I'm saying it could 1668 01:05:00,608 --> 01:05:02,552 be if you if you are successful in 1669 01:05:02,552 --> 01:05:04,719 negotiating an agreement it might lead 1670 01:05:04,719 --> 01:05:06,608 you to an opportunity for further 1671 01:05:06,608 --> 01:05:08,941 successful negotiations on other issues . 1672 01:05:08,941 --> 01:05:10,774 But I'm just asking , sorry Mr . 1673 01:05:10,774 --> 01:05:12,886 Chairman , in your personal opinion , 1674 01:05:12,886 --> 01:05:12,690 do you think that threat , what you 1675 01:05:12,690 --> 01:05:15,640 said is actually more immediate than 1676 01:05:15,640 --> 01:05:17,640 the nuclear threat ? Should that be 1677 01:05:17,640 --> 01:05:19,862 part of any agreement that we're trying 1678 01:05:19,862 --> 01:05:19,800 to do with them right now . In your 1679 01:05:19,800 --> 01:05:21,856 personal opinion , I know you're not 1680 01:05:21,856 --> 01:05:24,078 negotiating right ? I I would I would I 1681 01:05:24,078 --> 01:05:26,189 do not believe it is feasible to come 1682 01:05:26,189 --> 01:05:28,244 into it to come to an agreement that 1683 01:05:28,244 --> 01:05:28,160 incorporates both elements right now . 1684 01:05:28,170 --> 01:05:30,226 I don't believe it's feasible in the 1685 01:05:30,226 --> 01:05:32,281 world . We live in with the state of 1686 01:05:32,281 --> 01:05:34,170 our negotiations with Iran . It's 1687 01:05:34,170 --> 01:05:34,090 feasible to get to both those things at 1688 01:05:34,090 --> 01:05:36,201 the same time right now . Thank you . 1689 01:05:36,201 --> 01:05:39,270 Thank you again gentlemen , thank you 1690 01:05:39,270 --> 01:05:41,437 very much . Senator . Sullivan Senator 1691 01:05:41,437 --> 01:05:44,950 scott , please . I want to thank both 1692 01:05:44,950 --> 01:05:47,117 of you for your service and I wish you 1693 01:05:47,117 --> 01:05:49,339 the best of luck in your retirement . I 1694 01:05:49,339 --> 01:05:51,283 hope you moved to florida . You'll 1695 01:05:51,283 --> 01:05:53,450 enjoy the weather and the taxes . Uh , 1696 01:05:53,450 --> 01:05:55,617 joe McKenzie . I'm hearing that Middle 1697 01:05:55,617 --> 01:05:57,617 East Eastern fighters are right now 1698 01:05:57,617 --> 01:05:57,320 joining the Russians in attacking the 1699 01:05:57,320 --> 01:05:59,320 Ukraine . Do you have any knowledge 1700 01:05:59,320 --> 01:06:01,820 that this is true ? We believe that out 1701 01:06:01,820 --> 01:06:04,390 of Syria there perhaps small , small , 1702 01:06:04,390 --> 01:06:06,720 very small groups of people that may be 1703 01:06:06,720 --> 01:06:08,620 trying to make their way uh , to 1704 01:06:08,620 --> 01:06:10,731 Ukraine . But I've got nothing beyond 1705 01:06:10,731 --> 01:06:12,731 that . And I can talk a little more 1706 01:06:12,731 --> 01:06:12,690 about that in a closed session . Very 1707 01:06:12,690 --> 01:06:14,690 small right now . It's a very small 1708 01:06:14,690 --> 01:06:18,280 trickle , joe McKenzie , the , The 1709 01:06:18,280 --> 01:06:20,502 State Department says there's about 182 1710 01:06:20,502 --> 01:06:22,280 citizens left in Afghanistan to 1711 01:06:22,280 --> 01:06:24,391 evacuate . Uh , do you know if that's 1712 01:06:24,391 --> 01:06:26,224 accurate ? And is there anything 1713 01:06:26,224 --> 01:06:28,391 centcom's doing to help them ? So my , 1714 01:06:28,391 --> 01:06:30,613 the number I'm tracking is about 153 US 1715 01:06:30,613 --> 01:06:33,100 citizens in about 2100 long long term 1716 01:06:33,100 --> 01:06:35,322 permanent residents that are there some 1717 01:06:35,322 --> 01:06:37,600 of this , some people want to come out . 1718 01:06:37,600 --> 01:06:39,656 Some people don't want to come out . 1719 01:06:39,656 --> 01:06:39,620 It's my understanding that if someone 1720 01:06:39,620 --> 01:06:41,676 wants to leave and they're a U . S . 1721 01:06:41,676 --> 01:06:43,787 Citizen , they're going to be able to 1722 01:06:43,787 --> 01:06:43,730 leave and we have regularly scheduled 1723 01:06:43,730 --> 01:06:45,840 flights that actually fly centcom is 1724 01:06:45,840 --> 01:06:48,070 prepared to repatriate them when they 1725 01:06:48,070 --> 01:06:50,181 come to what we would call a lily pad 1726 01:06:50,181 --> 01:06:52,126 in the theater . Whether that's in 1727 01:06:52,126 --> 01:06:54,126 Qatar or in you a where they can be 1728 01:06:54,126 --> 01:06:56,237 medically assessed and moved on , you 1729 01:06:56,237 --> 01:06:55,920 know , back to the United States if 1730 01:06:55,920 --> 01:06:58,087 they're an american citizen and we are 1731 01:06:58,087 --> 01:07:00,031 fully prepared to support the lead 1732 01:07:00,031 --> 01:07:02,198 agency in this , who is the Department 1733 01:07:02,198 --> 01:07:04,087 of State ? Thank you . Um What is 1734 01:07:04,087 --> 01:07:06,142 Central Command been doing to punish 1735 01:07:06,142 --> 01:07:07,920 ISIS K . For the killing of our 1736 01:07:07,920 --> 01:07:09,698 military military personnel and 1737 01:07:09,698 --> 01:07:11,809 navigate . And right now do you think 1738 01:07:11,809 --> 01:07:14,031 that ISIS K . Is getting stronger under 1739 01:07:14,031 --> 01:07:16,198 the taliban or are weaker ? I think we 1740 01:07:16,198 --> 01:07:18,309 are concerned about the developmental 1741 01:07:18,309 --> 01:07:20,531 trajectory of ISIS K . In Afghanistan . 1742 01:07:20,531 --> 01:07:22,698 And in the closed session , I can talk 1743 01:07:22,698 --> 01:07:22,370 a little bit more about what we're 1744 01:07:22,370 --> 01:07:24,092 looking at . When we look into 1745 01:07:24,092 --> 01:07:26,430 Afghanistan in particularly at the ISIS 1746 01:07:26,430 --> 01:07:28,652 elements that were associated with that 1747 01:07:28,652 --> 01:07:31,170 attack . All right , move on to the 1748 01:07:31,170 --> 01:07:33,281 randy . Oh that it appears . And that 1749 01:07:33,281 --> 01:07:35,170 you talked to Senator Blackburn a 1750 01:07:35,170 --> 01:07:37,226 little bit about this that about $90 1751 01:07:37,226 --> 01:07:39,281 billion in sanctions relief might be 1752 01:07:39,281 --> 01:07:41,503 awarded to the Iranian government which 1753 01:07:41,503 --> 01:07:43,670 then they'll be able to use to ferment 1754 01:07:43,670 --> 01:07:46,470 more terrorism . So if that happens , 1755 01:07:46,480 --> 01:07:48,591 what resources would centcom happened 1756 01:07:48,591 --> 01:07:50,970 are always have to put up to be able to 1757 01:07:50,970 --> 01:07:53,290 fight uh these proxies . So Senator , I 1758 01:07:53,290 --> 01:07:55,457 gotta be honest with you . I'm not I'm 1759 01:07:55,457 --> 01:07:57,457 not an economist , I'm not familiar 1760 01:07:57,457 --> 01:07:59,734 with the economic impacts of that deal . 1761 01:07:59,734 --> 01:08:01,957 I would say this from where I sit , The 1762 01:08:01,957 --> 01:08:01,280 number one objective that I've been 1763 01:08:01,280 --> 01:08:03,502 given is we don't want to run to have a 1764 01:08:03,502 --> 01:08:05,613 nuclear weapon . And it would seem to 1765 01:08:05,613 --> 01:08:07,558 me that approaching that through a 1766 01:08:07,558 --> 01:08:09,669 diplomatic solution would be the best 1767 01:08:09,669 --> 01:08:11,391 way to get get to that end . I 1768 01:08:11,391 --> 01:08:13,224 recognize there are second order 1769 01:08:13,224 --> 01:08:15,447 effects that might proceed from that in 1770 01:08:15,447 --> 01:08:17,669 terms of sanctions relief and and , and 1771 01:08:17,669 --> 01:08:19,780 I acknowledge that good . You spoke a 1772 01:08:19,780 --> 01:08:21,613 little bit earlier about um more 1773 01:08:21,613 --> 01:08:23,669 cooperation with Israel . Is there , 1774 01:08:23,669 --> 01:08:23,550 are there things that we need to be 1775 01:08:23,550 --> 01:08:26,360 doing in the NBA that would help make 1776 01:08:26,360 --> 01:08:28,082 sure we continue to expand our 1777 01:08:28,082 --> 01:08:30,249 opportunities with Israel . So I think 1778 01:08:30,249 --> 01:08:32,416 right now we're in a pretty good place 1779 01:08:32,416 --> 01:08:34,527 in terms of cooperation with Israel , 1780 01:08:34,527 --> 01:08:36,582 you know , as as as as as the latest 1781 01:08:36,582 --> 01:08:38,693 member of the central command area of 1782 01:08:38,693 --> 01:08:40,916 responsibility . I think I have all the 1783 01:08:40,916 --> 01:08:43,138 authorities uh , and permissions I need 1784 01:08:43,138 --> 01:08:45,249 to move forward on that . Okay , john 1785 01:08:45,249 --> 01:08:47,249 Townsend . Um , we've , you look at 1786 01:08:47,249 --> 01:08:47,160 these maps , you see comments , china 1787 01:08:47,160 --> 01:08:49,382 has got a lot of goal , has , has quite 1788 01:08:49,382 --> 01:08:51,470 a few goals in , in Africa wants to 1789 01:08:51,480 --> 01:08:53,702 continue to develop military bases . So 1790 01:08:53,702 --> 01:08:55,924 if there continue to be able to develop 1791 01:08:55,924 --> 01:08:58,170 more military bases um , including um , 1792 01:08:58,180 --> 01:09:00,860 the one in equatorial guinea . Um , 1793 01:09:00,870 --> 01:09:03,810 what what threats will that pose to the 1794 01:09:03,810 --> 01:09:07,720 United States a center , 1795 01:09:07,730 --> 01:09:10,320 I can be more specific in closed 1796 01:09:10,330 --> 01:09:12,497 session and look forward to that . But 1797 01:09:12,497 --> 01:09:14,386 suffice to say they're not on the 1798 01:09:14,386 --> 01:09:16,608 atlantic coast of Africa . That's gonna 1799 01:09:16,608 --> 01:09:18,719 put them several 1000 miles closer to 1800 01:09:18,719 --> 01:09:20,941 the U . S . Homeland if they get a base 1801 01:09:20,941 --> 01:09:23,390 on the atlantic coast of Africa . So 1802 01:09:23,390 --> 01:09:25,557 this is a general question for both of 1803 01:09:25,557 --> 01:09:27,779 you . You know , we've watched with the 1804 01:09:27,779 --> 01:09:29,890 Ukraine situation and we've been able 1805 01:09:29,890 --> 01:09:32,057 to do sanctions against Russia , which 1806 01:09:32,057 --> 01:09:34,112 it sure seems like that could have a 1807 01:09:34,112 --> 01:09:36,334 positive impact and hopefully um reduce 1808 01:09:36,334 --> 01:09:38,501 their ability to , you know , fund the 1809 01:09:38,501 --> 01:09:40,723 war effort . How important do you think 1810 01:09:40,723 --> 01:09:42,612 it is when we have an adversary , 1811 01:09:42,612 --> 01:09:44,668 whether it's Russia or china or Iran 1812 01:09:44,668 --> 01:09:46,723 that we do everything we can to make 1813 01:09:46,723 --> 01:09:48,834 sure they don't have the resources to 1814 01:09:48,834 --> 01:09:51,057 to continue to develop and we should do 1815 01:09:51,057 --> 01:09:53,279 everything we can to make sure that our 1816 01:09:53,279 --> 01:09:55,446 citizens are not depending on them for 1817 01:09:55,446 --> 01:09:57,557 any resources such as in china's case 1818 01:09:57,557 --> 01:09:59,779 pharmaceuticals , things like that . Do 1819 01:09:59,779 --> 01:09:58,750 you think this is important to make 1820 01:09:58,750 --> 01:10:01,310 sure makes your job easier if we're not 1821 01:10:01,310 --> 01:10:03,477 dependent on other countries . Senator 1822 01:10:03,477 --> 01:10:05,643 makes my job a lot easier if we have a 1823 01:10:05,643 --> 01:10:07,643 whole of government approach to the 1824 01:10:07,643 --> 01:10:09,810 problems that we confront , you know , 1825 01:10:09,810 --> 01:10:09,470 the Department of Treasury , all the 1826 01:10:09,470 --> 01:10:11,581 economic power of the United States , 1827 01:10:11,581 --> 01:10:13,748 all the diplomatic power of the United 1828 01:10:13,748 --> 01:10:15,581 States is wielded in concert and 1829 01:10:15,581 --> 01:10:17,526 preferably as a substitute for the 1830 01:10:17,526 --> 01:10:19,748 military element of power that's by far 1831 01:10:19,748 --> 01:10:21,803 the most effective way to obtain our 1832 01:10:21,803 --> 01:10:24,137 goals ? I can't say it better than that . 1833 01:10:24,137 --> 01:10:26,192 Yeah . And do you think our military 1834 01:10:26,192 --> 01:10:28,414 power should be the last thing we use ? 1835 01:10:28,414 --> 01:10:30,303 I think the military , yes . As a 1836 01:10:30,303 --> 01:10:32,303 general principle there we have far 1837 01:10:32,303 --> 01:10:34,414 more effective tools to address these 1838 01:10:34,414 --> 01:10:36,359 problems . The military element of 1839 01:10:36,359 --> 01:10:38,581 power should be in support of all other 1840 01:10:38,581 --> 01:10:40,692 elements of the US national power . I 1841 01:10:40,692 --> 01:10:42,914 agree . Thank you . Thank you . Senator 1842 01:10:42,914 --> 01:10:44,900 Scott . Uh , at this point I will 1843 01:10:44,900 --> 01:10:47,900 adjourn the open hearing . The closed 1844 01:10:47,910 --> 01:10:50,980 session will reconvene at 12 noon , 1845 01:10:51,460 --> 01:10:54,960 Uh , in s . v . c . to 17 again . Thank 1846 01:10:54,960 --> 01:10:57,127 you , gentlemen for your testimony and 1847 01:10:57,127 --> 01:10:58,290 we'll see you shortly .