1 00:00:00,540 --> 00:00:02,970 obviously with with Vladimir Putin's 2 00:00:02,980 --> 00:00:06,030 brutal and violent decision to violate 3 00:00:06,040 --> 00:00:08,610 the fundamental laws of the world and 4 00:00:08,610 --> 00:00:10,666 invade Ukraine . And the way that he 5 00:00:10,666 --> 00:00:12,920 has a lot of attention has focused 6 00:00:12,920 --> 00:00:15,750 their um but the bottom line is why we 7 00:00:15,750 --> 00:00:17,972 do need to prioritize , we also need to 8 00:00:17,972 --> 00:00:20,139 be aware of , you know , we we live in 9 00:00:20,139 --> 00:00:22,250 a robust threat environment . We have 10 00:00:22,250 --> 00:00:24,472 got to be paying attention to all of it 11 00:00:24,472 --> 00:00:26,639 and and trying to make sure that we're 12 00:00:26,639 --> 00:00:28,806 meeting all of those challenges . Um , 13 00:00:28,806 --> 00:00:30,806 first of all , because they are all 14 00:00:30,806 --> 00:00:30,720 important and second of all , because 15 00:00:30,720 --> 00:00:33,053 they all tend to be interconnected . Um , 16 00:00:33,053 --> 00:00:34,998 certainly in the two theaters that 17 00:00:34,998 --> 00:00:37,164 we're talking about today , both china 18 00:00:37,164 --> 00:00:40,030 and Russia are factors um , in in the 19 00:00:40,040 --> 00:00:42,100 great power competition that we find 20 00:00:42,100 --> 00:00:44,267 ourselves in . So we want to make sure 21 00:00:44,267 --> 00:00:46,378 that we are addressing those issues . 22 00:00:46,378 --> 00:00:48,267 So , so taking them one at a time 23 00:00:48,267 --> 00:00:50,322 starting for the Africa command . Um 24 00:00:50,322 --> 00:00:52,267 China is incredibly active in that 25 00:00:52,267 --> 00:00:54,544 region , looking to build partnerships , 26 00:00:54,544 --> 00:00:56,600 you know , the goal of ultimately um 27 00:00:56,600 --> 00:00:58,822 you know , building bases wherever they 28 00:00:58,822 --> 00:01:00,933 can . It is incredibly important that 29 00:01:00,933 --> 00:01:02,933 we keep an eye on that maintain our 30 00:01:02,933 --> 00:01:05,156 relationships in Africa and try to deal 31 00:01:05,156 --> 00:01:07,433 with that challenge . At the same time , 32 00:01:07,433 --> 00:01:09,544 the transnational terrorism threat is 33 00:01:09,544 --> 00:01:11,267 still very real throughout the 34 00:01:11,267 --> 00:01:13,267 continent . Um , things have gotten 35 00:01:13,267 --> 00:01:15,322 more complicated on the horn , given 36 00:01:15,322 --> 00:01:17,378 that the conflict in Ethiopia , I've 37 00:01:17,378 --> 00:01:19,544 always felt that the partnerships that 38 00:01:19,544 --> 00:01:21,767 we built to deal with the challenges in 39 00:01:21,767 --> 00:01:23,767 Somalia and the challenges that are 40 00:01:23,767 --> 00:01:26,080 presented by a Q um in the Arabian 41 00:01:26,080 --> 00:01:28,247 peninsula between , you know , between 42 00:01:28,247 --> 00:01:30,302 Yemen and Somalia . The partnerships 43 00:01:30,302 --> 00:01:32,358 that we've built with with kenya and 44 00:01:32,358 --> 00:01:34,302 Ethiopia and Rwanda and Uganda and 45 00:01:34,302 --> 00:01:36,524 others in the region have really been a 46 00:01:36,524 --> 00:01:38,580 great model for how partnerships can 47 00:01:38,580 --> 00:01:40,524 help us meet our national security 48 00:01:40,524 --> 00:01:42,747 threats so that we , we don't do it all 49 00:01:42,747 --> 00:01:44,691 alone . Um , we have a similar and 50 00:01:44,691 --> 00:01:47,010 growing challenges in West Africa , um 51 00:01:47,020 --> 00:01:49,020 as there are a variety of different 52 00:01:49,020 --> 00:01:51,187 transnational terrorist elements there 53 00:01:51,187 --> 00:01:53,353 that we need to work with . And in the 54 00:01:53,353 --> 00:01:55,353 midst of all that , Russia is , you 55 00:01:55,353 --> 00:01:57,520 know , aggressively through the Wagner 56 00:01:57,520 --> 00:01:59,409 group , uh providing , you know , 57 00:01:59,409 --> 00:02:01,464 security in that region . Um that is 58 00:02:01,464 --> 00:02:03,687 having a very destabilizing effect . It 59 00:02:03,687 --> 00:02:05,909 is not a coincidence that the increased 60 00:02:05,909 --> 00:02:08,076 presence of Wagner as a security force 61 00:02:08,076 --> 00:02:10,242 has matched up with an increase in the 62 00:02:10,242 --> 00:02:12,464 number of coos throughout West Africa . 63 00:02:12,464 --> 00:02:14,687 We've got a lot of challenges in Africa 64 00:02:14,687 --> 00:02:16,520 and look forward to hearing from 65 00:02:16,520 --> 00:02:18,464 General Townsend about his take on 66 00:02:18,464 --> 00:02:20,409 those challenges and answering our 67 00:02:20,409 --> 00:02:22,242 questions on that . Um , Central 68 00:02:22,242 --> 00:02:24,409 Command also has a lot of challenges . 69 00:02:24,409 --> 00:02:26,576 Certainly , we've seen the drawdown in 70 00:02:26,576 --> 00:02:28,910 both Afghanistan and Iraq over the 71 00:02:28,910 --> 00:02:31,077 course of the last 10 years , that has 72 00:02:31,077 --> 00:02:33,188 changed that , but the challenges are 73 00:02:33,188 --> 00:02:35,354 very real and I know General Mackenzie 74 00:02:35,354 --> 00:02:37,577 knows that one of the central questions 75 00:02:37,577 --> 00:02:37,530 that this committee will have is what 76 00:02:37,530 --> 00:02:40,230 now in Afghanistan , there is still a 77 00:02:40,230 --> 00:02:42,230 threat there from Al Qaeda and from 78 00:02:42,230 --> 00:02:44,560 Isis . And what is our plan for dealing 79 00:02:44,560 --> 00:02:46,727 with that threat now that we have have 80 00:02:46,727 --> 00:02:48,838 pulled out of Afghanistan . Um and in 81 00:02:48,838 --> 00:02:50,727 the Middle East we still have the 82 00:02:50,727 --> 00:02:52,893 challenges from ISIS , the instability 83 00:02:52,893 --> 00:02:55,630 in Syria , the instability in Yemen . I 84 00:02:55,630 --> 00:02:57,797 am particularly interested to hear the 85 00:02:57,797 --> 00:02:59,908 latest on what what Iran is up to and 86 00:02:59,908 --> 00:03:02,130 how we are working with partners in the 87 00:03:02,130 --> 00:03:04,130 region to contain that threat . And 88 00:03:04,130 --> 00:03:06,408 also I'd be curious to hear , you know , 89 00:03:06,408 --> 00:03:08,297 as Russia gets you no further and 90 00:03:08,297 --> 00:03:10,408 further bogged down in Ukraine . What 91 00:03:10,408 --> 00:03:12,463 does that mean for their activity in 92 00:03:12,463 --> 00:03:14,519 Syria ? Where as we know , they have 93 00:03:14,519 --> 00:03:16,686 been very involved going forward . The 94 00:03:16,686 --> 00:03:18,519 bottom line is and my my written 95 00:03:18,519 --> 00:03:20,741 statement gets into a lot more detail . 96 00:03:20,741 --> 00:03:20,710 Uh we we can talk about both of these 97 00:03:20,720 --> 00:03:22,942 areas of responsibility for a very long 98 00:03:22,942 --> 00:03:24,998 time . There was a lot to do . There 99 00:03:24,998 --> 00:03:27,164 are a lot of challenges . Um There are 100 00:03:27,164 --> 00:03:28,942 a huge part of our our national 101 00:03:28,942 --> 00:03:31,164 security posture going forward and look 102 00:03:31,164 --> 00:03:33,220 forward to hearing more details from 103 00:03:33,220 --> 00:03:35,387 all three of our witnesses on how best 104 00:03:35,387 --> 00:03:35,030 we should meet those challenges going 105 00:03:35,030 --> 00:03:37,430 forward with that . I was Mr Rogers is 106 00:03:37,430 --> 00:03:39,910 out till this morning and ably filling 107 00:03:39,910 --> 00:03:42,077 in as Mr Whitman is the ranking member 108 00:03:42,077 --> 00:03:44,299 and I will yield to him for his opening 109 00:03:44,299 --> 00:03:46,077 statement . Well , thank you Mr 110 00:03:46,077 --> 00:03:48,021 Chairman , I deeply appreciate our 111 00:03:48,021 --> 00:03:48,000 witnesses coming to testify before us 112 00:03:48,000 --> 00:03:49,889 today and thanks so much for your 113 00:03:49,889 --> 00:03:52,010 service , General Townsend as was 114 00:03:52,010 --> 00:03:54,066 discussed last week . The threats in 115 00:03:54,066 --> 00:03:57,180 Africa are multifaceted and they 116 00:03:57,180 --> 00:03:59,800 continue to grow , But spending on 117 00:03:59,800 --> 00:04:02,520 africom comprises only about 3/10 of 118 00:04:02,520 --> 00:04:06,210 one the entire defense budget not 119 00:04:06,220 --> 00:04:08,760 related to the magnitude of what I 120 00:04:08,760 --> 00:04:11,120 believe is the building threat and it's 121 00:04:11,120 --> 00:04:13,120 these meager resources that are now 122 00:04:13,120 --> 00:04:15,064 spread even thinner because of the 123 00:04:15,064 --> 00:04:16,953 challenges we face before us with 124 00:04:16,953 --> 00:04:19,030 Russia and china and that's not just 125 00:04:19,030 --> 00:04:21,086 worldwide that specifically there on 126 00:04:21,086 --> 00:04:23,308 the African continent , Russia has been 127 00:04:23,308 --> 00:04:25,363 entering into a disturbing number of 128 00:04:25,363 --> 00:04:27,363 arms sales and basing agreements in 129 00:04:27,363 --> 00:04:29,419 African nations . China is using the 130 00:04:29,419 --> 00:04:31,419 belt and road initiative to extract 131 00:04:31,419 --> 00:04:33,252 African national natural natural 132 00:04:33,252 --> 00:04:35,419 resources and gain permanent footholds 133 00:04:35,419 --> 00:04:37,419 on the continent . The chinese have 134 00:04:37,419 --> 00:04:39,586 built an overseas military base in the 135 00:04:39,586 --> 00:04:41,586 strategically important area of the 136 00:04:41,586 --> 00:04:43,586 Horn of Africa and they're actively 137 00:04:43,586 --> 00:04:45,752 scouting other locations including the 138 00:04:45,752 --> 00:04:47,919 atlantic coast . Make no mistake about 139 00:04:47,919 --> 00:04:50,141 their intentions . The growing presence 140 00:04:50,141 --> 00:04:52,141 of china and Russia and Africa as a 141 00:04:52,141 --> 00:04:52,090 threat to our national security And 142 00:04:52,090 --> 00:04:54,130 it's imperative that we increase 143 00:04:54,130 --> 00:04:56,220 investments there as well as other 144 00:04:56,220 --> 00:04:58,300 places around the world . I look 145 00:04:58,300 --> 00:05:00,411 forward to hearing from you , General 146 00:05:00,411 --> 00:05:02,356 Townsend about how we can maximize 147 00:05:02,356 --> 00:05:04,300 diplomatic and military efforts to 148 00:05:04,300 --> 00:05:06,244 counter Russia and china's growing 149 00:05:06,244 --> 00:05:08,790 global ambitions in china in Sandakan . 150 00:05:08,790 --> 00:05:10,901 General Mackenzie , we're also seeing 151 00:05:10,901 --> 00:05:12,957 increased chinese presence , China's 152 00:05:12,957 --> 00:05:15,179 building ports and other infrastructure 153 00:05:15,179 --> 00:05:17,346 throughout the region and it's entered 154 00:05:17,346 --> 00:05:19,512 into trade and telecom agreements with 155 00:05:19,512 --> 00:05:21,568 allies in the region but what I find 156 00:05:21,568 --> 00:05:23,568 most concerning is that President G 157 00:05:23,568 --> 00:05:25,679 continues to cozy up to the Ayatollah 158 00:05:25,840 --> 00:05:28,050 china signed valuable trade deals with 159 00:05:28,050 --> 00:05:31,320 Iran , bought Iranian oil in defiance 160 00:05:31,320 --> 00:05:33,570 of international sanctions and joined 161 00:05:33,570 --> 00:05:36,440 Russia in conducting joint drills with 162 00:05:36,440 --> 00:05:38,900 the Iranian Navy . These actions 163 00:05:38,900 --> 00:05:40,956 provide a lifeline to Iran at a very 164 00:05:40,956 --> 00:05:43,280 dangerous time . The Ayatollah 165 00:05:43,280 --> 00:05:45,447 continues to fund and equip terrorists 166 00:05:45,447 --> 00:05:47,860 targeting american troops . His cronies 167 00:05:47,860 --> 00:05:49,638 are prolonging a civil war in a 168 00:05:49,638 --> 00:05:52,430 humanitarian crisis in Syria and his 169 00:05:52,430 --> 00:05:54,780 regime is aggressively pursuing nuclear 170 00:05:54,780 --> 00:05:58,350 weapons . We absolutely cannot allow 171 00:05:58,350 --> 00:06:01,070 this to happen . I do not believe that 172 00:06:01,070 --> 00:06:03,181 reentering the J . C . P . O . A will 173 00:06:03,181 --> 00:06:05,292 stop them . I look forward to hearing 174 00:06:05,292 --> 00:06:07,348 more about the administration's plan 175 00:06:07,348 --> 00:06:09,459 for ending the Ayatollahs quest for a 176 00:06:09,459 --> 00:06:11,570 nuclear weapon and how they intend to 177 00:06:11,570 --> 00:06:13,514 deal with the rest of the regime's 178 00:06:13,514 --> 00:06:15,570 destabilizing actions . Finally , to 179 00:06:15,570 --> 00:06:17,403 both you , General Mackenzie and 180 00:06:17,403 --> 00:06:19,626 General Townsend , you continue to face 181 00:06:19,626 --> 00:06:21,570 tremendous challenges . Snuffing , 182 00:06:21,570 --> 00:06:23,570 snuffing out hardened terrorists in 183 00:06:23,570 --> 00:06:25,792 both A . RS and I'm very concerned that 184 00:06:25,792 --> 00:06:28,014 we're backsliding on the progress we've 185 00:06:28,014 --> 00:06:30,237 made in combating terrorism in africa , 186 00:06:30,237 --> 00:06:32,459 the repositioning of U . S . And french 187 00:06:32,459 --> 00:06:34,626 forces further from terrorist hotspots 188 00:06:34,840 --> 00:06:36,784 is making it much harder for us to 189 00:06:36,784 --> 00:06:38,896 successfully conduct counterterrorism 190 00:06:38,896 --> 00:06:41,240 operations . In centcom President 191 00:06:41,240 --> 00:06:43,296 biden's decision to unilaterally and 192 00:06:43,296 --> 00:06:45,462 unconditionally withdraw all us forces 193 00:06:45,462 --> 00:06:47,700 from Afghanistan has undermined our 194 00:06:47,700 --> 00:06:51,320 national security as anticipated by 195 00:06:51,320 --> 00:06:53,487 nearly everyone except the President . 196 00:06:53,487 --> 00:06:55,653 The taliban has overrun the government 197 00:06:55,653 --> 00:06:57,709 and Afghanistan is reverting back to 198 00:06:57,709 --> 00:06:59,987 being a breeding ground for terrorists . 199 00:06:59,987 --> 00:07:02,098 The president assures us that this so 200 00:07:02,098 --> 00:07:04,209 called over the horizon strategy will 201 00:07:04,209 --> 00:07:06,376 prevent that from happening . But this 202 00:07:06,376 --> 00:07:08,730 is completely devoid of reality in the 203 00:07:08,730 --> 00:07:11,063 six months since , since the withdrawal , 204 00:07:11,063 --> 00:07:13,174 we have not been informed of a single 205 00:07:13,174 --> 00:07:15,660 successful over the horizon strike . I 206 00:07:15,660 --> 00:07:17,771 guess it's possible that Al Qaeda and 207 00:07:17,771 --> 00:07:19,827 Isis K . Have thrown down their arms 208 00:07:19,827 --> 00:07:21,604 and decided to live in peaceful 209 00:07:21,604 --> 00:07:23,771 coexistence with the West . But I fear 210 00:07:23,771 --> 00:07:25,993 what's more likely is that we no longer 211 00:07:25,993 --> 00:07:27,771 have a good handle on where the 212 00:07:27,771 --> 00:07:29,938 terrorists are or what they're doing . 213 00:07:30,140 --> 00:07:32,360 The truth is without persistent s r 214 00:07:32,740 --> 00:07:34,740 reliable partners on the ground and 215 00:07:34,740 --> 00:07:36,962 nearby facilities to launch assets . We 216 00:07:36,962 --> 00:07:39,129 lack the capability we need to conduct 217 00:07:39,129 --> 00:07:41,000 a successful strike . We know 218 00:07:41,000 --> 00:07:43,167 previously human intelligence , signal 219 00:07:43,167 --> 00:07:45,470 intelligence in theater , close to the 220 00:07:45,470 --> 00:07:48,470 adversary is critically important . And 221 00:07:48,470 --> 00:07:50,414 I look forward to this afternoon's 222 00:07:50,414 --> 00:07:52,081 classified discussion on what 223 00:07:52,081 --> 00:07:54,248 capabilities we've lost and how we can 224 00:07:54,248 --> 00:07:56,248 help restore them as to our posture 225 00:07:56,248 --> 00:07:58,359 shifts in the indo pacific we need to 226 00:07:58,359 --> 00:08:00,526 ensure other combatant commanders , we 227 00:08:00,526 --> 00:08:02,470 have the capabilities they need to 228 00:08:02,470 --> 00:08:04,526 carry out their missions . We cannot 229 00:08:04,526 --> 00:08:07,150 allow for blind spots , especially in 230 00:08:07,150 --> 00:08:10,080 your two A . O . R . S . Before I wrap 231 00:08:10,080 --> 00:08:12,270 up , I'd like to thank both of you for 232 00:08:12,270 --> 00:08:14,159 your service . General Townsend . 233 00:08:14,159 --> 00:08:16,326 General Mackenzie , incredible service 234 00:08:16,326 --> 00:08:18,437 to our nation . General Mackenzie . I 235 00:08:18,437 --> 00:08:20,603 wish you the best in your retirement . 236 00:08:20,603 --> 00:08:22,659 Uh just make sure that you have your 237 00:08:22,659 --> 00:08:25,720 number available on speed dial . And 238 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:27,942 again , Mr Chairman , I thank you and I 239 00:08:27,942 --> 00:08:30,500 yield back . Thank you very much . Mr 240 00:08:30,500 --> 00:08:32,444 baker . You're recognized for your 241 00:08:32,444 --> 00:08:34,810 opening statement . Thank you Mr 242 00:08:34,810 --> 00:08:36,754 Chairman and congressman wittman . 243 00:08:36,940 --> 00:08:39,218 Distinguished members of the committee . 244 00:08:39,218 --> 00:08:41,384 Thank you for inviting me to testify . 245 00:08:41,384 --> 00:08:43,496 And I asked that my written statement 246 00:08:43,496 --> 00:08:45,718 be entered into the record for the past 247 00:08:45,718 --> 00:08:47,718 year . The biden administration has 248 00:08:47,718 --> 00:08:49,829 placed a priority on revitalizing and 249 00:08:49,829 --> 00:08:51,496 expanding the US alliance and 250 00:08:51,496 --> 00:08:53,551 partnership architecture in bringing 251 00:08:53,551 --> 00:08:55,773 together our partners capabilities with 252 00:08:55,773 --> 00:08:57,996 our own . The department is building an 253 00:08:57,996 --> 00:09:00,218 integrated deterrence framework that we 254 00:09:00,218 --> 00:09:00,020 believe creates advantages for 255 00:09:00,020 --> 00:09:01,742 ourselves and dilemmas for our 256 00:09:01,742 --> 00:09:04,000 adversaries in the Middle East and 257 00:09:04,000 --> 00:09:05,722 Africa . The department builds 258 00:09:05,722 --> 00:09:07,778 partnership through an approach that 259 00:09:07,778 --> 00:09:09,833 draws on all of our tools to include 260 00:09:09,833 --> 00:09:11,778 security cooperation , exercises , 261 00:09:11,778 --> 00:09:13,889 defense diplomacy and force posture . 262 00:09:14,940 --> 00:09:16,884 The department's priorities in the 263 00:09:16,884 --> 00:09:18,773 Middle East are to defend against 264 00:09:18,773 --> 00:09:20,662 Iranian backed threats to counter 265 00:09:20,662 --> 00:09:22,829 violent extremist organizations and to 266 00:09:22,829 --> 00:09:24,996 deepen cooperation with our partners . 267 00:09:24,996 --> 00:09:26,884 We are committed to deterring and 268 00:09:26,884 --> 00:09:29,107 defending against threats posed by Iran 269 00:09:29,107 --> 00:09:30,940 and its proxies . The department 270 00:09:30,940 --> 00:09:33,107 continuously evaluates the appropriate 271 00:09:33,107 --> 00:09:35,162 mix of forces to defend US personnel 272 00:09:35,162 --> 00:09:37,760 and interests if necessary . In Iraq 273 00:09:37,760 --> 00:09:39,982 and Syria , the department is committed 274 00:09:39,982 --> 00:09:41,704 to the enduring defeat of ISIS 275 00:09:41,704 --> 00:09:43,871 supporting a broad whole of government 276 00:09:43,871 --> 00:09:45,704 strategy designed to address the 277 00:09:45,704 --> 00:09:47,927 underlying conditions that gave rise to 278 00:09:47,927 --> 00:09:50,038 ISIS in Yemen . Our policy objectives 279 00:09:50,038 --> 00:09:52,038 are to end the conflict , alleviate 280 00:09:52,038 --> 00:09:54,260 human humanitarian suffering and defeat 281 00:09:54,260 --> 00:09:56,093 the threat from Al Qaeda and the 282 00:09:56,093 --> 00:09:57,927 Arabian peninsula and ISIS Yemen 283 00:09:58,040 --> 00:10:00,096 separately . The department supports 284 00:10:00,096 --> 00:10:02,318 the U . A . E . And Saudi Arabia in the 285 00:10:02,318 --> 00:10:04,429 defense of their territory and people 286 00:10:04,429 --> 00:10:06,596 from cross border Houthi attacks . The 287 00:10:06,596 --> 00:10:08,651 department is committed to deepening 288 00:10:08,651 --> 00:10:10,707 cooperation and coordination between 289 00:10:10,707 --> 00:10:12,929 the United States , Israel and Partners 290 00:10:12,929 --> 00:10:15,096 in the Middle East and Africa . Recent 291 00:10:15,096 --> 00:10:17,262 normalization agreements have laid the 292 00:10:17,262 --> 00:10:19,373 groundwork for Israel's entrance into 293 00:10:19,373 --> 00:10:21,373 the U . S . Central Command , which 294 00:10:21,373 --> 00:10:21,320 will in turn we believe enhanced 295 00:10:21,320 --> 00:10:24,310 cooperation in the security sphere in 296 00:10:24,310 --> 00:10:26,254 Afghanistan . Our military service 297 00:10:26,254 --> 00:10:28,088 members served honorably for two 298 00:10:28,088 --> 00:10:30,310 decades . Although we have withdrawn US 299 00:10:30,310 --> 00:10:32,366 forces , the department continues to 300 00:10:32,366 --> 00:10:34,477 advance US interests in Afghanistan . 301 00:10:34,477 --> 00:10:36,699 This includes monitoring indicators and 302 00:10:36,699 --> 00:10:38,866 warnings for counter terrorism threats 303 00:10:38,866 --> 00:10:41,199 against U . S . Interests and the U . S . 304 00:10:41,199 --> 00:10:43,366 Homeland . It also includes supporting 305 00:10:43,366 --> 00:10:45,421 the Department of State's efforts to 306 00:10:45,421 --> 00:10:45,390 facilitate the departure of american 307 00:10:45,390 --> 00:10:47,501 citizens , lawful permanent residents 308 00:10:47,501 --> 00:10:49,490 and our afghan allies as well as 309 00:10:49,500 --> 00:10:51,611 efforts to alleviate the humanitarian 310 00:10:51,611 --> 00:10:54,500 crisis . We continue to support inter 311 00:10:54,500 --> 00:10:56,650 agency partners in the care and 312 00:10:56,650 --> 00:10:58,817 resettlement of afghan evacuees in the 313 00:10:58,817 --> 00:11:01,200 United States in Central Asia . We are 314 00:11:01,200 --> 00:11:03,030 continuing to develop long term 315 00:11:03,030 --> 00:11:05,197 security cooperation programs that are 316 00:11:05,197 --> 00:11:06,919 focused on bolstering regional 317 00:11:06,919 --> 00:11:08,940 capabilities to help counter a wide 318 00:11:08,940 --> 00:11:11,051 range of threats in the region and to 319 00:11:11,051 --> 00:11:12,730 the U . S . Homeland . In our 320 00:11:12,730 --> 00:11:14,910 relationship with Pakistan , counter 321 00:11:14,910 --> 00:11:16,966 terrorism remains a focus as violent 322 00:11:16,966 --> 00:11:19,132 extremist organizations seek to target 323 00:11:19,132 --> 00:11:21,188 our shared interests and destabilize 324 00:11:21,188 --> 00:11:23,354 the region . Pakistan has participated 325 00:11:23,354 --> 00:11:25,410 robustly in counter piracy efforts , 326 00:11:25,410 --> 00:11:27,580 for example , meant to ensure a free 327 00:11:27,580 --> 00:11:31,140 and open maritime transit in Africa . 328 00:11:31,140 --> 00:11:33,029 The department remains focused on 329 00:11:33,029 --> 00:11:34,640 countering violent extremist 330 00:11:34,640 --> 00:11:36,862 organizations that pose a threat to the 331 00:11:36,862 --> 00:11:38,807 U . S . Homeland and interests and 332 00:11:38,807 --> 00:11:40,473 addressing targeted strategic 333 00:11:40,473 --> 00:11:42,529 competition concerns to those ends . 334 00:11:42,529 --> 00:11:44,751 The department is building partnerships 335 00:11:44,751 --> 00:11:46,696 that support conflict resolution , 336 00:11:46,696 --> 00:11:48,640 improving defense institutions and 337 00:11:48,640 --> 00:11:50,640 attempting to strengthen democratic 338 00:11:50,640 --> 00:11:52,696 norms . D . U . D . S . Training and 339 00:11:52,696 --> 00:11:54,918 exercises promote a respect for the law 340 00:11:54,918 --> 00:11:56,640 of armed conflict for civilian 341 00:11:56,640 --> 00:11:58,862 oversight of the military and for human 342 00:11:58,862 --> 00:12:00,918 rights . We employ employ a holistic 343 00:12:00,918 --> 00:12:02,973 approach . Working with our partners 344 00:12:02,973 --> 00:12:04,807 across the U . S . Government to 345 00:12:04,807 --> 00:12:06,918 include State and U . S . A . I . D . 346 00:12:06,918 --> 00:12:09,084 We're reviewing all of our deployments 347 00:12:09,084 --> 00:12:08,950 to ensure that they are right sized to 348 00:12:08,950 --> 00:12:11,061 balance our near term challenges with 349 00:12:11,061 --> 00:12:12,839 our long term modernization and 350 00:12:12,839 --> 00:12:15,061 readiness requirements . In the Horn of 351 00:12:15,061 --> 00:12:16,839 Africa . We remain committed to 352 00:12:16,839 --> 00:12:18,950 supporting our amazon partners and in 353 00:12:18,950 --> 00:12:21,117 the east and in the Sahel were focused 354 00:12:21,117 --> 00:12:22,950 on inter agency and multilateral 355 00:12:22,950 --> 00:12:25,117 efforts to stabilize the region and to 356 00:12:25,117 --> 00:12:27,228 improve our counter V . EO efforts in 357 00:12:27,228 --> 00:12:29,172 North Africa , we support a common 358 00:12:29,172 --> 00:12:31,228 security objectives on the continent 359 00:12:31,228 --> 00:12:33,339 and in the Southern Mediterranean and 360 00:12:33,339 --> 00:12:35,506 in the maritime domain . Alongside the 361 00:12:35,506 --> 00:12:37,561 Department of State , we are working 362 00:12:37,561 --> 00:12:39,617 with regional partners to secure the 363 00:12:39,617 --> 00:12:41,117 atlantic from maritime and 364 00:12:41,117 --> 00:12:42,672 transnational threats . The 365 00:12:42,672 --> 00:12:44,672 department's approach to the Middle 366 00:12:44,672 --> 00:12:46,839 East and Africa is informed by threats 367 00:12:46,839 --> 00:12:48,394 to a free , stable and open 368 00:12:48,394 --> 00:12:50,394 international order including those 369 00:12:50,394 --> 00:12:52,339 posed by Russia and the PRC Russia 370 00:12:52,339 --> 00:12:54,394 seeks to reshape security structures 371 00:12:54,394 --> 00:12:56,617 exploiting governance vacuums and using 372 00:12:56,617 --> 00:12:58,839 private military companies and resource 373 00:12:58,839 --> 00:13:01,006 extraction to undermine US interests . 374 00:13:01,006 --> 00:13:02,839 Beijing is establishing overseas 375 00:13:02,839 --> 00:13:04,950 infrastructure to project and sustain 376 00:13:04,950 --> 00:13:06,894 military power while expanding its 377 00:13:06,894 --> 00:13:09,140 influence and its access as the 378 00:13:09,140 --> 00:13:11,362 department coordinates with partners to 379 00:13:11,362 --> 00:13:13,418 address our shared threats and their 380 00:13:13,418 --> 00:13:15,529 security needs . It will also seek to 381 00:13:15,529 --> 00:13:17,529 limit Russian and chinese influence 382 00:13:17,529 --> 00:13:19,251 through sustained engagement , 383 00:13:19,251 --> 00:13:21,307 demonstrating the superiority of the 384 00:13:21,307 --> 00:13:23,362 United States as a , as a partner of 385 00:13:23,362 --> 00:13:25,696 choice with the support of the Congress . 386 00:13:25,696 --> 00:13:27,807 The department remains , we believe , 387 00:13:27,807 --> 00:13:27,650 well positioned to support our allies 388 00:13:27,650 --> 00:13:30,090 and partners to compete with Russia and 389 00:13:30,090 --> 00:13:32,460 the PRC and to deter and defeat our 390 00:13:32,460 --> 00:13:34,627 adversaries across the Middle East and 391 00:13:34,627 --> 00:13:36,760 North Africa . In closing , I'd just 392 00:13:36,760 --> 00:13:39,170 like to echo on behalf of the 393 00:13:39,170 --> 00:13:41,320 department are thanks to both General 394 00:13:41,320 --> 00:13:43,264 Mackenzie and General Townsend for 395 00:13:43,264 --> 00:13:46,660 their long service to our nation and 396 00:13:46,660 --> 00:13:48,604 with that , I'll conclude and look 397 00:13:48,604 --> 00:13:50,716 forward to your questions . Thank you 398 00:13:50,716 --> 00:13:52,660 very much . Um , I before Attorney 399 00:13:52,660 --> 00:13:54,771 General Townsend one programming note 400 00:13:54,771 --> 00:13:56,993 that I neglected to mention we're going 401 00:13:56,993 --> 00:13:59,216 in reverse order of questioning today . 402 00:13:59,216 --> 00:14:01,660 We try to give the uh freshman or 403 00:14:01,660 --> 00:14:03,882 junior members a chance to go first and 404 00:14:03,882 --> 00:14:06,104 somebody hearing . So we'll be starting 405 00:14:06,104 --> 00:14:08,271 with the least senior and working your 406 00:14:08,271 --> 00:14:10,438 way up today . Just make sure everyone 407 00:14:10,438 --> 00:14:12,216 is aware of that . Um , General 408 00:14:12,216 --> 00:14:14,382 Townsend , you are recognized for your 409 00:14:14,382 --> 00:14:17,630 opening statement . Chairman smith 410 00:14:18,080 --> 00:14:20,080 congressman wittman . Distinguished 411 00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:22,413 members of the committee . Good morning . 412 00:14:22,413 --> 00:14:24,413 Thank you for inviting me to appear 413 00:14:24,413 --> 00:14:26,636 today even as the eyes of the world are 414 00:14:26,636 --> 00:14:28,747 focused on Russia's lawless attack on 415 00:14:28,747 --> 00:14:31,330 the Ukraine an unjust war which impacts 416 00:14:31,330 --> 00:14:34,550 Africa as well for nearly three years , 417 00:14:35,040 --> 00:14:37,207 it's been the greatest privilege of my 418 00:14:37,207 --> 00:14:39,096 career to represent the dedicated 419 00:14:39,096 --> 00:14:41,207 members of U . S . Africa . Command . 420 00:14:41,340 --> 00:14:43,396 Thank you for your steadfast support 421 00:14:43,396 --> 00:14:46,370 for them and for our mission . I'm here 422 00:14:46,370 --> 00:14:48,481 this morning with my battle buddy and 423 00:14:48,481 --> 00:14:50,426 command . Senior enlisted leader , 424 00:14:50,426 --> 00:14:52,537 Sergeant Major Richard , thresher and 425 00:14:52,537 --> 00:14:54,759 colleagues . Dr Sasha baker and general 426 00:14:54,759 --> 00:14:56,981 frank McKenzie for General McKenzie and 427 00:14:56,981 --> 00:14:59,259 I it's our final appearance before you . 428 00:14:59,940 --> 00:15:01,662 Our joint testimony highlights 429 00:15:01,662 --> 00:15:03,773 continued and pressing challenges and 430 00:15:03,773 --> 00:15:06,370 opportunities faced by our respective 431 00:15:06,370 --> 00:15:09,970 commands and our nation together with 432 00:15:09,970 --> 00:15:12,460 our interagency teammates , us Africom 433 00:15:13,040 --> 00:15:15,560 protects and advances US interests , 434 00:15:16,740 --> 00:15:18,970 prevents strategic distraction and 435 00:15:18,970 --> 00:15:21,770 preserves America's options all in 436 00:15:21,770 --> 00:15:25,450 concert with our allies and partners As 437 00:15:25,450 --> 00:15:27,617 Africans . Fifth commander , I've come 438 00:15:27,617 --> 00:15:29,940 to learn five truths about Africa . 439 00:15:30,130 --> 00:15:33,460 First , America cannot ignore Africa . 440 00:15:35,340 --> 00:15:37,562 Africa's challenges , opportunities and 441 00:15:37,562 --> 00:15:39,784 security interests are inseparable from 442 00:15:39,784 --> 00:15:42,580 our own weak or poor governance 443 00:15:42,580 --> 00:15:45,080 conflict and climate change , stress 444 00:15:45,240 --> 00:15:47,462 the stability of many African nations , 445 00:15:48,640 --> 00:15:50,751 which in turn will impact us security 446 00:15:50,751 --> 00:15:53,530 and prosperity . Second , our 447 00:15:53,530 --> 00:15:56,350 competitors clearly see Africa's rich 448 00:15:56,360 --> 00:15:59,560 potential china and Russia . Both seek 449 00:16:00,140 --> 00:16:01,862 to convert soft and hard power 450 00:16:01,862 --> 00:16:04,029 investments into political influence , 451 00:16:04,029 --> 00:16:06,560 strategic access and military advantage . 452 00:16:07,340 --> 00:16:10,480 Both seek to bolster autocrats and 453 00:16:10,480 --> 00:16:12,480 change international norms in their 454 00:16:12,480 --> 00:16:15,270 favor . For china , Africa is their 455 00:16:15,270 --> 00:16:19,080 second continent . Across Africa , 456 00:16:19,080 --> 00:16:21,191 mercenaries from the Kremlin's Wagner 457 00:16:21,191 --> 00:16:23,460 group offer their services for profit 458 00:16:25,040 --> 00:16:27,090 regime , protection , resource 459 00:16:27,090 --> 00:16:29,770 exploitation and horrific violence 460 00:16:29,770 --> 00:16:32,390 against Africans just as we see in 461 00:16:32,390 --> 00:16:36,040 Ukraine today . Third , deadly 462 00:16:36,040 --> 00:16:38,460 terrorism has metastasized to Africa . 463 00:16:39,540 --> 00:16:41,660 Al Qaeda's Al Shabaab in East Africa 464 00:16:42,340 --> 00:16:44,430 and ISIS and Al Qaeda groups in West 465 00:16:44,430 --> 00:16:47,230 Africa and elsewhere are among the 466 00:16:47,230 --> 00:16:50,070 world's fastest growing , wealthiest 467 00:16:50,540 --> 00:16:52,520 and deadliest terrorist groups and 468 00:16:52,520 --> 00:16:56,090 remain grave and growing threats that 469 00:16:56,090 --> 00:16:59,260 aspire to kill americans both there in 470 00:16:59,260 --> 00:17:03,010 our homeland . Fourth , the 471 00:17:03,010 --> 00:17:04,621 battle between democracy and 472 00:17:04,621 --> 00:17:06,510 authoritarianism is raging across 473 00:17:06,510 --> 00:17:10,400 Africa despite a recent surge in 474 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:13,600 democratic backsliding our values , our 475 00:17:13,600 --> 00:17:16,500 democracy , our willingness to work 476 00:17:16,500 --> 00:17:18,500 with African partners create a huge 477 00:17:18,500 --> 00:17:21,140 demand for US engagement and US 478 00:17:21,140 --> 00:17:25,030 partnership . Fifth in Africa . 479 00:17:25,270 --> 00:17:28,220 A few troops and a few bucks still go a 480 00:17:28,220 --> 00:17:30,960 long way modest and predictable 481 00:17:30,960 --> 00:17:33,230 resource . Ng yields outsized returns 482 00:17:33,840 --> 00:17:36,610 for us and Africa African security 483 00:17:36,610 --> 00:17:39,840 interests as an economy of force and 484 00:17:39,840 --> 00:17:42,280 posture limited theater Africom 485 00:17:42,280 --> 00:17:45,380 employees just 0.3% of D O . D . S 486 00:17:45,380 --> 00:17:48,920 operating budget and manpower , modest 487 00:17:48,920 --> 00:17:51,930 investments today can yield a continent 488 00:17:51,940 --> 00:17:55,100 of partners . Tomorrow we are most 489 00:17:55,100 --> 00:17:57,433 effective when we synchronize diplomacy , 490 00:17:57,640 --> 00:18:00,540 development and defense . So we are 491 00:18:00,540 --> 00:18:02,707 grateful for your continued leadership 492 00:18:02,707 --> 00:18:04,929 and backing to resource our interagency 493 00:18:04,929 --> 00:18:07,207 partners at the State Department U . S . 494 00:18:07,207 --> 00:18:09,350 A . I . D . And the intel community . 495 00:18:10,640 --> 00:18:12,862 Thanks to the authorities and resources 496 00:18:12,862 --> 00:18:15,630 you provide and your continued interest 497 00:18:15,640 --> 00:18:17,770 and support in the capabilities that 498 00:18:17,770 --> 00:18:19,810 Africom requires to accomplish our 499 00:18:19,810 --> 00:18:23,210 mission in summary US Africom remains 500 00:18:23,210 --> 00:18:25,488 cheap insurance for America's security . 501 00:18:26,340 --> 00:18:28,396 Thank you and I look forward to your 502 00:18:28,396 --> 00:18:30,280 questions . Thank you . General 503 00:18:30,280 --> 00:18:33,330 Mackenzie . Chairman smith 504 00:18:33,510 --> 00:18:35,510 Representative Whitman , Ladies and 505 00:18:35,510 --> 00:18:37,510 gentlemen of the committee , it's a 506 00:18:37,510 --> 00:18:39,732 pleasure to be here today . Besides the 507 00:18:39,732 --> 00:18:41,954 honorable Sasha baker and General steve 508 00:18:41,954 --> 00:18:43,843 Townsend and in the company of my 509 00:18:43,843 --> 00:18:46,066 senior enlisted leader , Fleet Master , 510 00:18:46,066 --> 00:18:48,121 Chief Jamie hurdle . I want to thank 511 00:18:48,121 --> 00:18:47,790 you for allowing me this opportunity to 512 00:18:47,790 --> 00:18:50,290 testify for the final time Regarding us 513 00:18:50,290 --> 00:18:52,512 Central Command's posture in an area of 514 00:18:52,512 --> 00:18:54,457 responsibility that encompasses 21 515 00:18:54,457 --> 00:18:56,800 nations , 600 million people and lies 516 00:18:56,800 --> 00:18:58,911 at the strategic nexus of the world's 517 00:18:58,911 --> 00:19:00,911 most important corridors of trade . 518 00:19:00,911 --> 00:19:02,744 Much has transpired since I last 519 00:19:02,744 --> 00:19:04,967 delivered my annual posture testimony , 520 00:19:04,967 --> 00:19:06,911 most notably the conclusion of our 521 00:19:06,911 --> 00:19:09,078 military campaign in Afghanistan . And 522 00:19:09,078 --> 00:19:11,189 of course Russia's recent invasion of 523 00:19:11,189 --> 00:19:13,189 Ukraine . America's interest in the 524 00:19:13,189 --> 00:19:15,244 central region and the challenges we 525 00:19:15,244 --> 00:19:17,356 confront their have proven remarkably 526 00:19:17,356 --> 00:19:20,320 resilient . Centcom's mission to direct 527 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:22,480 and enable military operations and 528 00:19:22,480 --> 00:19:24,710 activities with allies and partners to 529 00:19:24,710 --> 00:19:26,932 increase regional stability and support 530 00:19:26,932 --> 00:19:29,154 of enduring US interests is essentially 531 00:19:29,154 --> 00:19:31,321 unchanged from the day of the commands 532 00:19:31,321 --> 00:19:33,377 founding the primary threats to that 533 00:19:33,377 --> 00:19:35,432 security and stability are also very 534 00:19:35,432 --> 00:19:37,432 familiar . Even today , Centcom was 535 00:19:37,432 --> 00:19:39,377 established nearly 40 years ago to 536 00:19:39,377 --> 00:19:41,266 counter the malign influence of a 537 00:19:41,266 --> 00:19:43,321 revolutionary regime that had seized 538 00:19:43,321 --> 00:19:45,432 power in Tehran and to compete with a 539 00:19:45,432 --> 00:19:47,377 great power that had , in spite of 540 00:19:47,377 --> 00:19:49,432 international condemnation , invaded 541 00:19:49,432 --> 00:19:51,599 the sovereign state of Afghanistan and 542 00:19:51,599 --> 00:19:53,766 imposed a puppet regime . Today . Iran 543 00:19:53,766 --> 00:19:55,710 is no less of a threat to American 544 00:19:55,710 --> 00:19:57,599 interests or the stability of the 545 00:19:57,599 --> 00:19:59,599 region than it was in 1979 . To the 546 00:19:59,599 --> 00:20:01,766 contrary , the threat posed by Iran is 547 00:20:01,766 --> 00:20:03,980 graver than ever Russia's invasion of 548 00:20:03,980 --> 00:20:05,950 Ukraine moreover , has violently 549 00:20:05,950 --> 00:20:08,117 demonstrated its willful disregard for 550 00:20:08,117 --> 00:20:10,228 international norms , just as we have 551 00:20:10,228 --> 00:20:12,394 seen through Russia's actions in Syria 552 00:20:12,394 --> 00:20:14,617 and elsewhere . In fact , anywhere , it 553 00:20:14,617 --> 00:20:16,394 sees an opportunity to diminish 554 00:20:16,394 --> 00:20:18,617 confidence in America's leadership In a 555 00:20:18,617 --> 00:20:20,728 more measured fashion . China is also 556 00:20:20,728 --> 00:20:22,561 vying for increased influence at 557 00:20:22,561 --> 00:20:24,450 American expense in a region that 558 00:20:24,450 --> 00:20:26,672 depends upon for over 40% of its fossil 559 00:20:26,672 --> 00:20:28,783 fuels . Meanwhile , violent extremist 560 00:20:28,783 --> 00:20:30,894 organizations , or V . E . O S in the 561 00:20:30,894 --> 00:20:32,672 centcom area continue to pose a 562 00:20:32,672 --> 00:20:34,728 credible threat to the homeland . In 563 00:20:34,728 --> 00:20:37,061 some , the central region remains today , 564 00:20:37,061 --> 00:20:38,820 a vital and volatile arena for 565 00:20:38,820 --> 00:20:40,987 strategic competition and the decisive 566 00:20:40,987 --> 00:20:43,320 theater in the campaign against the Eos , 567 00:20:43,540 --> 00:20:45,596 the campaign to defeat the so called 568 00:20:45,596 --> 00:20:47,596 Islamic state in Iraq and Syria has 569 00:20:47,596 --> 00:20:49,818 entered a new phase . As of one January 570 00:20:49,818 --> 00:20:51,873 of this year , Iraq has assumed sole 571 00:20:51,873 --> 00:20:54,040 responsibility for counter ISIS combat 572 00:20:54,040 --> 00:20:57,010 operations on its own soil . In Syria 573 00:20:57,190 --> 00:20:59,301 sent commonest partners are degrading 574 00:20:59,301 --> 00:21:01,400 ISIS's ability to regenerate by 575 00:21:01,400 --> 00:21:03,456 improving the security of facilities 576 00:21:03,456 --> 00:21:05,678 for detained ISIS fighters , as well as 577 00:21:05,678 --> 00:21:07,789 for the displaced persons camps where 578 00:21:07,789 --> 00:21:10,011 their families and others reside . More 579 00:21:10,011 --> 00:21:12,233 than half of this population comes from 580 00:21:12,233 --> 00:21:14,178 other countries and addressing the 581 00:21:14,178 --> 00:21:16,178 threat of ISIS in Northeast , Syria 582 00:21:16,178 --> 00:21:18,400 ultimately will require those countries 583 00:21:18,400 --> 00:21:20,344 to reclaim and repatriate whatever 584 00:21:20,344 --> 00:21:22,289 citizens of theirs remain in these 585 00:21:22,289 --> 00:21:24,400 prisons and camps , ending one of the 586 00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:26,511 world's worst humanitarian crises and 587 00:21:26,511 --> 00:21:28,511 depriving ISIS of what currently is 588 00:21:28,511 --> 00:21:30,511 fertile soil for indoctrination and 589 00:21:30,511 --> 00:21:32,622 spreading terror in Afghanistan . Our 590 00:21:32,622 --> 00:21:34,567 campaign against Al Qaeda and Isis 591 00:21:34,567 --> 00:21:36,789 Khorasan has also entered a new phase . 592 00:21:36,789 --> 00:21:38,789 We are now conducting this campaign 593 00:21:38,789 --> 00:21:40,900 from bases over the horizon . As I've 594 00:21:40,900 --> 00:21:43,011 said before , this is difficult , but 595 00:21:43,011 --> 00:21:45,011 it is not impossible . I should add 596 00:21:45,011 --> 00:21:47,011 today that we will be able to do so 597 00:21:47,011 --> 00:21:46,900 only so long as centcom has the 598 00:21:46,900 --> 00:21:49,750 requisite resources to find fix and 599 00:21:49,750 --> 00:21:51,972 finish threats to the homeland . Before 600 00:21:51,972 --> 00:21:54,194 those threats develop the capability to 601 00:21:54,194 --> 00:21:56,083 conduct external operations . I'm 602 00:21:56,083 --> 00:21:58,250 talking specifically about I . S . Our 603 00:21:58,250 --> 00:22:00,306 assets and strike platform , Centcom 604 00:22:00,306 --> 00:22:02,472 has the tools it needs to perform this 605 00:22:02,472 --> 00:22:04,639 mission . But the margins are thin and 606 00:22:04,639 --> 00:22:06,417 the risk will increase . Should 607 00:22:06,417 --> 00:22:08,639 resources diminish in the Middle East , 608 00:22:08,639 --> 00:22:10,639 Iran continues to pose the greatest 609 00:22:10,639 --> 00:22:12,861 threat to US interests and the security 610 00:22:12,861 --> 00:22:14,917 of the region as a whole through its 611 00:22:14,917 --> 00:22:17,139 proxies and clients . Iran has fomented 612 00:22:17,139 --> 00:22:19,250 conflict in an arc tracing from Yemen 613 00:22:19,250 --> 00:22:21,306 through the Arabian peninsula across 614 00:22:21,306 --> 00:22:23,306 Iraq and Syria and Lebanon into the 615 00:22:23,306 --> 00:22:25,417 very borders of Israel . Saudi Arabia 616 00:22:25,417 --> 00:22:27,583 endures regular attacks on the Houthis 617 00:22:27,583 --> 00:22:29,528 who will some of the most advanced 618 00:22:29,528 --> 00:22:31,472 unmanned aerial systems and cruise 619 00:22:31,472 --> 00:22:33,583 missiles in the region . All courtesy 620 00:22:33,583 --> 00:22:35,750 of the Iranians . Recently the Houthis 621 00:22:35,750 --> 00:22:37,972 expanded these attacks to include urban 622 00:22:37,972 --> 00:22:40,194 centers and bases with US forces in the 623 00:22:40,194 --> 00:22:42,139 United Arab Emirates . Tehran also 624 00:22:42,139 --> 00:22:44,250 enables it's aligned militias in Iraq 625 00:22:44,250 --> 00:22:46,417 and Syria to carry on a persistent low 626 00:22:46,417 --> 00:22:48,583 level campaign of indirect fire and US 627 00:22:48,583 --> 00:22:50,806 attacks against US and coalition forces 628 00:22:50,806 --> 00:22:52,861 hoping to drive US from the region . 629 00:22:52,861 --> 00:22:54,639 Iran's ballistic missile forces 630 00:22:54,639 --> 00:22:56,639 constitute an exigent threat to the 631 00:22:56,639 --> 00:22:58,861 security of every state in the region . 632 00:22:58,861 --> 00:23:00,750 Among them are most important and 633 00:23:00,750 --> 00:23:02,806 enduring partners . They continue to 634 00:23:02,806 --> 00:23:05,028 look to the United States for assurance 635 00:23:05,028 --> 00:23:07,194 that we the historic partner of choice 636 00:23:07,194 --> 00:23:07,040 in the region will remain a reliable 637 00:23:07,040 --> 00:23:09,170 one . China and Russia are also 638 00:23:09,170 --> 00:23:11,114 watching closely for any sign that 639 00:23:11,114 --> 00:23:13,281 America's commitment to the collective 640 00:23:13,281 --> 00:23:15,448 security of the region is wavering and 641 00:23:15,448 --> 00:23:17,281 they are poised to capitalize on 642 00:23:17,281 --> 00:23:19,114 whatever opportunities emerge in 643 00:23:19,114 --> 00:23:21,170 closing . Let me thank you again for 644 00:23:21,170 --> 00:23:23,337 this opportunity to testify . I'd also 645 00:23:23,337 --> 00:23:25,503 like to thank the soldiers , sailors , 646 00:23:25,503 --> 00:23:27,670 marines , airmen , Coast guardsmen and 647 00:23:27,670 --> 00:23:29,337 guardians who have served and 648 00:23:29,337 --> 00:23:31,503 sacrificed in the centcom kor . It has 649 00:23:31,503 --> 00:23:33,614 been the greatest honor of my life to 650 00:23:33,614 --> 00:23:33,560 serve as their commander . Thank you . 651 00:23:34,440 --> 00:23:37,330 Thank you . Just two quick questions . 652 00:23:37,330 --> 00:23:39,386 General Townsend , could you walk us 653 00:23:39,386 --> 00:23:41,670 through what you think china is doing 654 00:23:41,670 --> 00:23:44,010 in Africa ? When I met with you you get 655 00:23:44,010 --> 00:23:46,177 a pretty good brief and I know some of 656 00:23:46,177 --> 00:23:48,288 it would have to do in the classified 657 00:23:48,288 --> 00:23:50,454 session later . But what what what are 658 00:23:50,454 --> 00:23:52,399 they doing in Africa ? How does it 659 00:23:52,399 --> 00:23:54,343 threaten us ? And what what are we 660 00:23:54,343 --> 00:23:58,170 doing to address it ? Thanks for the 661 00:23:58,170 --> 00:24:00,281 question chairman . There's should be 662 00:24:00,281 --> 00:24:02,448 some handouts that your place is there 663 00:24:02,448 --> 00:24:04,559 that you can refer to . There's a one 664 00:24:04,559 --> 00:24:06,781 on china there that depicts what I just 665 00:24:06,781 --> 00:24:09,540 kind of briefly talk to . They compete 666 00:24:09,550 --> 00:24:12,270 with us in Africa . First of all , 667 00:24:12,640 --> 00:24:15,410 china has made a decision a deliberate 668 00:24:15,410 --> 00:24:17,466 decision to compete with America and 669 00:24:17,466 --> 00:24:20,120 Africa and win that competition . They 670 00:24:20,120 --> 00:24:22,064 compete primarily through economic 671 00:24:22,064 --> 00:24:24,660 means and diplomatic means . And you 672 00:24:24,660 --> 00:24:26,716 can see that they're with their belt 673 00:24:26,716 --> 00:24:29,049 and road initiative . They're competing , 674 00:24:29,049 --> 00:24:31,104 they are investing everywhere across 675 00:24:31,104 --> 00:24:33,327 the content . We don't actually have to 676 00:24:33,327 --> 00:24:36,600 meet that competition in every location 677 00:24:36,610 --> 00:24:39,000 head on . We have to pick and choose 678 00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:41,220 where we're going to do that . And 679 00:24:41,230 --> 00:24:43,010 there are countries where it's 680 00:24:43,010 --> 00:24:45,670 important that we do in the military 681 00:24:45,670 --> 00:24:47,660 sphere . You heard in the the 682 00:24:47,660 --> 00:24:49,771 chairman's opening remarks there that 683 00:24:49,771 --> 00:24:51,827 they have their one overseas base in 684 00:24:51,827 --> 00:24:54,030 Djibouti . The primary thing that 685 00:24:54,030 --> 00:24:56,550 concerns me with china's military 686 00:24:57,340 --> 00:24:59,507 competition in Africa is that they are 687 00:24:59,507 --> 00:25:02,090 seeking actively seeking a military 688 00:25:02,090 --> 00:25:04,670 base on the atlantic coast of Africa . 689 00:25:05,240 --> 00:25:07,240 And for a variety of reasons that I 690 00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:09,410 will go to in closed session . That 691 00:25:09,410 --> 00:25:11,521 would be bad for America's security . 692 00:25:11,940 --> 00:25:15,480 Uh and uh we as a first priority , we 693 00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:19,450 need to prevent uh deter a chinese 694 00:25:19,450 --> 00:25:21,672 space in the atlantic coast of Africa . 695 00:25:22,540 --> 00:25:24,762 Thank you and General Mackenzie on just 696 00:25:24,762 --> 00:25:26,818 a quick specific question on Yemen , 697 00:25:26,818 --> 00:25:28,984 the you know , the humanitarian crisis 698 00:25:28,984 --> 00:25:31,040 in Yemen continues to be great . The 699 00:25:31,040 --> 00:25:33,262 fight has gone back and forth there . I 700 00:25:33,262 --> 00:25:35,207 know we have our envoys there have 701 00:25:35,207 --> 00:25:37,318 tried to get to a peace agreement but 702 00:25:37,318 --> 00:25:39,318 unable to do that . But in terms of 703 00:25:39,318 --> 00:25:41,596 getting food , humanitarian assistance , 704 00:25:41,596 --> 00:25:43,540 basic supplies into Yemen . We 705 00:25:43,540 --> 00:25:46,460 continually hear about , you know , the 706 00:25:46,470 --> 00:25:48,880 the blockade of Yemen , um that Saudi 707 00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:50,824 Arabia is like leading this effort 708 00:25:50,824 --> 00:25:52,880 blocking the ability the supplies to 709 00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:55,102 get in . Is there more that we could do 710 00:25:55,102 --> 00:25:57,500 to free up the ability to get supplies ? 711 00:25:57,510 --> 00:25:59,510 You know , basic you know the basic 712 00:25:59,510 --> 00:26:01,510 supplies of you know food , medical 713 00:26:01,510 --> 00:26:04,040 supplies , humanitarian aid indian and 714 00:26:04,040 --> 00:26:06,310 and and what's really going on in terms 715 00:26:06,310 --> 00:26:09,040 of the effort to blockade that by Saudi 716 00:26:09,040 --> 00:26:12,500 Arabia or by anybody else Chairman , 717 00:26:12,510 --> 00:26:14,621 you're correct . It is very difficult 718 00:26:14,621 --> 00:26:16,732 to get humanitarian aid into Yemen is 719 00:26:16,732 --> 00:26:18,732 further compounded by the fact that 720 00:26:18,732 --> 00:26:20,788 their distribution problems that the 721 00:26:20,788 --> 00:26:22,899 Houthis are associated with once that 722 00:26:22,899 --> 00:26:25,066 aid gets in . I would agree that there 723 00:26:25,066 --> 00:26:24,790 is more that we could do with our with 724 00:26:24,790 --> 00:26:26,901 our with our friends in the region to 725 00:26:26,901 --> 00:26:29,510 allow more humanity humanitarian aid to 726 00:26:29,520 --> 00:26:31,687 enter Yemen . And I would support that 727 00:26:31,687 --> 00:26:33,798 action . However , I think the larger 728 00:26:33,798 --> 00:26:35,964 problem is the distribution of the aid 729 00:26:35,964 --> 00:26:38,131 once it enters Yemen and actually gets 730 00:26:38,131 --> 00:26:40,187 out to the people that need it . You 731 00:26:40,187 --> 00:26:39,830 know , the U . N . Special 732 00:26:39,830 --> 00:26:42,290 representative is working very hard and 733 00:26:42,300 --> 00:26:44,300 but that remains , I think the most 734 00:26:44,300 --> 00:26:46,356 significant problem when it comes to 735 00:26:46,356 --> 00:26:48,180 distribution of aid to the many 736 00:26:48,190 --> 00:26:50,412 hundreds of thousands of people who are 737 00:26:50,412 --> 00:26:52,579 experienced food insecurity in Yemen . 738 00:26:52,740 --> 00:26:55,600 But but before it gets in the Saudis in 739 00:26:55,600 --> 00:26:58,370 particular are searching ships blocking 740 00:26:58,370 --> 00:27:00,481 ships from getting in because they're 741 00:27:00,481 --> 00:27:02,703 afraid that arms are being shipped in . 742 00:27:02,940 --> 00:27:04,884 Sure they are . And they have also 743 00:27:04,884 --> 00:27:07,107 allowed aid ships to enter . It's not a 744 00:27:07,107 --> 00:27:09,162 perfect solution . Uh You know it is 745 00:27:09,162 --> 00:27:10,884 not a perfect solution . And I 746 00:27:10,884 --> 00:27:12,607 acknowledge that . Well that's 747 00:27:12,607 --> 00:27:14,773 something I'd like to continue to work 748 00:27:14,773 --> 00:27:13,800 with you on . Because as you know the 749 00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:16,430 humanitarian crisis there is is extreme . 750 00:27:16,440 --> 00:27:19,040 Um and with that I will yield to Mr 751 00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:22,490 Whitman for his question . Well thank 752 00:27:22,490 --> 00:27:24,601 you Mr Chairman again I want to thank 753 00:27:24,601 --> 00:27:26,768 our witnesses . I want to follow up on 754 00:27:26,768 --> 00:27:28,879 what the chairman talked about . It's 755 00:27:28,879 --> 00:27:31,101 concerning to me , not just the dynamic 756 00:27:31,101 --> 00:27:31,100 that's happening between Yemen and 757 00:27:31,100 --> 00:27:33,830 Saudi Arabia but the support that Iran 758 00:27:33,830 --> 00:27:36,850 is providing to Yemen that to me allows 759 00:27:36,850 --> 00:27:38,794 them to do the things that they're 760 00:27:38,794 --> 00:27:40,961 doing that are very very disruptive in 761 00:27:40,961 --> 00:27:43,183 that area . As we know , they've looted 762 00:27:43,183 --> 00:27:45,183 U . N . Food convoys . They've laid 763 00:27:45,183 --> 00:27:47,461 over a million minds in civilian areas . 764 00:27:47,461 --> 00:27:49,517 They've recruited thousands of child 765 00:27:49,517 --> 00:27:51,739 soldiers and have taken over the closed 766 00:27:51,739 --> 00:27:53,850 US embassy . They're holding at least 767 00:27:53,850 --> 00:27:56,560 11 former US embassy staffers hostage . 768 00:27:56,940 --> 00:27:58,940 And they've stepped up cross border 769 00:27:58,940 --> 00:28:01,250 attacks by drones and missiles against 770 00:28:01,250 --> 00:28:03,194 the U . A . E . That have actually 771 00:28:03,194 --> 00:28:05,472 targeted and killed civilians in the U . 772 00:28:05,472 --> 00:28:07,806 S . A . And as the Chairman pointed out , 773 00:28:07,806 --> 00:28:09,806 they completely completely rebuffed 774 00:28:09,806 --> 00:28:11,917 efforts by the current administration 775 00:28:11,940 --> 00:28:13,884 to enter into any kind of talks to 776 00:28:13,884 --> 00:28:15,773 resolve these particular issues . 777 00:28:16,140 --> 00:28:18,362 General Mackenzie . I want to go to you 778 00:28:18,362 --> 00:28:20,418 first and ask what are your thoughts 779 00:28:20,418 --> 00:28:23,070 about what we can do in interrupting 780 00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:25,420 the relationship between Iran and the 781 00:28:25,420 --> 00:28:28,090 houthis which allow them unfortunately 782 00:28:28,090 --> 00:28:30,470 to continue to keep this unsettled 783 00:28:30,470 --> 00:28:32,950 state in Yemen . And that in turn 784 00:28:32,950 --> 00:28:35,770 antagonizes the Saudis and this just 785 00:28:35,770 --> 00:28:37,992 continues to escalate . Can you give us 786 00:28:37,992 --> 00:28:40,159 your perspective on that , sir ? I can 787 00:28:40,159 --> 00:28:42,270 And I'd like to note at the beginning 788 00:28:42,270 --> 00:28:44,381 that while the supply of humanitarian 789 00:28:44,381 --> 00:28:46,548 aid to Yemen has been imperfect and uh 790 00:28:46,548 --> 00:28:48,714 and not consistent throughout the long 791 00:28:48,714 --> 00:28:50,937 history of this crisis , Iran has never 792 00:28:50,937 --> 00:28:52,992 imported a single bag of rice or any 793 00:28:52,992 --> 00:28:55,214 other food stuff into Yemen . In fact , 794 00:28:55,214 --> 00:28:57,214 the only material they brought into 795 00:28:57,214 --> 00:28:59,492 Yemen is stuff designed to kill people . 796 00:28:59,492 --> 00:28:59,260 So we should just remember that when we 797 00:28:59,260 --> 00:29:01,371 when we when we talk about the people 798 00:29:01,371 --> 00:29:03,149 here sir , I believe there's an 799 00:29:03,149 --> 00:29:05,093 opportunity for a for a negotiated 800 00:29:05,093 --> 00:29:07,149 settlement here . I believe that the 801 00:29:07,149 --> 00:29:06,890 parties , I believe that the Kingdom of 802 00:29:06,890 --> 00:29:08,946 Saudi Arabia and I believe you a are 803 00:29:08,946 --> 00:29:11,112 open to that solution . I believe that 804 00:29:11,112 --> 00:29:13,057 the houthis uh have an opportunity 805 00:29:13,057 --> 00:29:15,168 should they choose to negotiate . But 806 00:29:15,168 --> 00:29:17,112 under prompting from their Iranian 807 00:29:17,112 --> 00:29:19,223 masters , they haven't said chosen to 808 00:29:19,223 --> 00:29:19,070 double down , they continue their 809 00:29:19,070 --> 00:29:21,014 attacks into Saudi Arabia . As you 810 00:29:21,014 --> 00:29:23,014 noted , they have ramped up attacks 811 00:29:23,014 --> 00:29:24,959 into you and a very disturbing new 812 00:29:24,959 --> 00:29:27,070 phase of operations . But I believe I 813 00:29:27,070 --> 00:29:29,014 think there is an opportunity here 814 00:29:29,014 --> 00:29:31,126 under the under the U . N . Uh on the 815 00:29:31,126 --> 00:29:33,181 United Nations to get to a truce and 816 00:29:33,181 --> 00:29:35,403 the truce would be the best of possible 817 00:29:35,403 --> 00:29:37,514 worlds . We would be able to begin to 818 00:29:37,514 --> 00:29:39,570 open her day to get food stuffs into 819 00:29:39,570 --> 00:29:41,514 the data and distributed under the 820 00:29:41,514 --> 00:29:41,510 auspices of someone other than the 821 00:29:41,510 --> 00:29:43,677 Houthis and their ability to interfere 822 00:29:43,677 --> 00:29:45,843 with it when enough pressure be put on 823 00:29:45,843 --> 00:29:48,010 Iran and Saudi Arabia to kind of force 824 00:29:48,010 --> 00:29:49,954 the houthis to the table and say , 825 00:29:49,954 --> 00:29:52,010 listen , you got to resolve this . I 826 00:29:52,010 --> 00:29:54,066 think I don't believe it's in Iran's 827 00:29:54,066 --> 00:29:56,121 interest to end the war in Yemen . I 828 00:29:56,121 --> 00:29:58,177 think it's a fairly low cost war for 829 00:29:58,177 --> 00:30:00,121 them . As you noted it embarrasses 830 00:30:00,121 --> 00:30:02,343 Saudi Arabia . It embarrasses you A and 831 00:30:02,343 --> 00:30:04,399 I think they're not they're actually 832 00:30:04,399 --> 00:30:06,566 not motivated to do that right now . I 833 00:30:06,566 --> 00:30:06,090 think it is certainly in the who these 834 00:30:06,090 --> 00:30:08,200 best interest to cut a deal . So the 835 00:30:08,200 --> 00:30:10,311 ball is sort of in their court , they 836 00:30:10,311 --> 00:30:12,478 have some opportunities . They need to 837 00:30:12,478 --> 00:30:14,367 seize those opportunities because 838 00:30:14,367 --> 00:30:13,860 frankly , sir , I don't think those 839 00:30:13,860 --> 00:30:15,693 opportunities are gonna be there 840 00:30:15,693 --> 00:30:17,693 forever . Let me ask you briefly to 841 00:30:17,693 --> 00:30:20,270 about the growing threat from IsIS K . 842 00:30:20,270 --> 00:30:22,550 In Afghanistan as we had heard before 843 00:30:22,550 --> 00:30:24,828 by complete withdrawal of forces there . 844 00:30:24,828 --> 00:30:26,939 We knew that the risks we're going to 845 00:30:26,939 --> 00:30:28,883 increase . Obviously they have the 846 00:30:28,883 --> 00:30:30,994 concern is is that that risk is gonna 847 00:30:30,994 --> 00:30:32,606 extend beyond the borders of 848 00:30:32,606 --> 00:30:34,550 Afghanistan . That they'll have an 849 00:30:34,550 --> 00:30:36,661 opportunity or a capability to pursue 850 00:30:36,661 --> 00:30:38,772 attacks outside of Afghanistan . That 851 00:30:38,772 --> 00:30:41,240 is incredibly troubling . Also , our 852 00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:44,790 ability to do significant CT 853 00:30:44,790 --> 00:30:48,320 operations in Afghanistan . The issues 854 00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:50,542 of what we used to have as far as human 855 00:30:50,542 --> 00:30:52,487 intelligence . Signal intelligence 856 00:30:52,487 --> 00:30:54,487 greatly degraded . Now the over the 857 00:30:54,487 --> 00:30:56,209 horizon capability is just not 858 00:30:56,209 --> 00:30:58,376 something that's realistic in relation 859 00:30:58,376 --> 00:31:00,487 to the threat that we face . I wanted 860 00:31:00,487 --> 00:31:02,431 to get your best military judgment 861 00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:05,010 regarding the adequacy of the current 862 00:31:05,010 --> 00:31:07,160 force structure in centcom following 863 00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:09,271 our departure from Afghanistan , what 864 00:31:09,271 --> 00:31:11,493 do we have in place ? Is it enough with 865 00:31:11,493 --> 00:31:13,493 this over the horizon capability to 866 00:31:13,493 --> 00:31:16,060 really keep a handle and keep ISIS K 867 00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:18,640 from growing to a point where it can 868 00:31:18,650 --> 00:31:20,761 perpetrate attacks outside the border 869 00:31:20,761 --> 00:31:23,800 there . And what are the risks with our 870 00:31:23,800 --> 00:31:26,022 current force structure on what are the 871 00:31:26,022 --> 00:31:28,189 risks that are there before us today ? 872 00:31:28,189 --> 00:31:30,300 And how do you think those risks will 873 00:31:30,300 --> 00:31:32,411 continue to grow ? So , in the closed 874 00:31:32,411 --> 00:31:32,020 session a little later this afternoon , 875 00:31:32,020 --> 00:31:34,020 I'm gonna exhaustively drilled down 876 00:31:34,020 --> 00:31:35,964 into our force posture and all the 877 00:31:35,964 --> 00:31:38,131 disciplines of intelligence that we're 878 00:31:38,131 --> 00:31:40,187 applying in Afghanistan and give you 879 00:31:40,187 --> 00:31:42,187 very detailed and specific granular 880 00:31:42,187 --> 00:31:42,050 answers to those questions . But I 881 00:31:42,050 --> 00:31:44,272 prefer to do it in a closed session . I 882 00:31:44,272 --> 00:31:46,272 will say that we are very concerned 883 00:31:46,272 --> 00:31:48,494 about the potential for ISIS K . Growth 884 00:31:48,494 --> 00:31:50,606 in Afghanistan . You know , we assess 885 00:31:50,606 --> 00:31:52,772 that they do retain a desire to attack 886 00:31:52,772 --> 00:31:52,240 us in our homeland here in the United 887 00:31:52,240 --> 00:31:54,410 States and absent effective pressure . 888 00:31:54,410 --> 00:31:56,132 That threat will only grow and 889 00:31:56,132 --> 00:31:58,230 metastasize over time . Okay , very 890 00:31:58,230 --> 00:32:00,397 good . That's that's one when I get to 891 00:32:00,397 --> 00:32:02,563 is that you continue to see it growing 892 00:32:02,563 --> 00:32:04,508 then in the years to come . Unless 893 00:32:04,508 --> 00:32:04,460 something significant is done in the 894 00:32:04,460 --> 00:32:06,404 meantime , I'll talk about that in 895 00:32:06,404 --> 00:32:08,627 great detail a little bit later today ? 896 00:32:09,340 --> 00:32:11,396 Thank you Mr Chairman without a year 897 00:32:11,396 --> 00:32:13,173 bag . Thank you Mr Whitman , in 898 00:32:13,173 --> 00:32:14,896 accordance with the chairman's 899 00:32:14,896 --> 00:32:16,896 extraordinary procedure today , the 900 00:32:16,896 --> 00:32:18,729 chair recognizes Mr Panetta from 901 00:32:18,729 --> 00:32:21,750 California . Thank you . Thank you . Mr 902 00:32:21,750 --> 00:32:23,361 Chairman , I appreciate this 903 00:32:23,361 --> 00:32:25,550 opportunity . I just wish I would have 904 00:32:25,550 --> 00:32:27,740 had a little more insight as to the 905 00:32:27,740 --> 00:32:29,960 order , but thank you very much . Um 906 00:32:30,940 --> 00:32:33,107 that being said , Gentlemen , Doctor , 907 00:32:33,107 --> 00:32:35,273 thank you very much for being here . I 908 00:32:35,273 --> 00:32:35,110 appreciate your time , I appreciate 909 00:32:35,110 --> 00:32:37,270 your testimony . I'm gonna focus uh 910 00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:40,150 focus it down to West Africa obviously 911 00:32:40,150 --> 00:32:41,928 and and more particular in mali 912 00:32:41,928 --> 00:32:44,830 especially um We know that the French 913 00:32:44,830 --> 00:32:47,430 came in back in 2013 Operation Bar Kane . 914 00:32:47,840 --> 00:32:49,480 They , they had us support 915 00:32:49,490 --> 00:32:51,850 unfortunately now the french are 916 00:32:51,850 --> 00:32:54,430 leaving Unfortunately now there is a 917 00:32:54,430 --> 00:32:56,541 void , I don't have confidence in the 918 00:32:56,541 --> 00:32:58,710 15,000 blue hats that are there on the 919 00:32:58,710 --> 00:33:01,310 ground to fill that void . I'm very 920 00:33:01,310 --> 00:33:03,620 skeptical of Mall , the malian 921 00:33:03,620 --> 00:33:05,930 government to actually contract with 922 00:33:05,930 --> 00:33:09,360 the Wagner group as well to do that . I 923 00:33:09,360 --> 00:33:11,650 know that we provided support in 924 00:33:11,650 --> 00:33:13,817 operation bar cane and maybe this is a 925 00:33:13,817 --> 00:33:15,817 conversation we can have later this 926 00:33:15,817 --> 00:33:17,928 afternoon . But my question to you is 927 00:33:17,928 --> 00:33:20,460 one , why are the french leaving ? Two 928 00:33:21,040 --> 00:33:23,096 that , Where do you see , who do you 929 00:33:23,096 --> 00:33:25,318 see filling that void ? three . Why did 930 00:33:25,318 --> 00:33:27,540 they contract with the Wagner group and 931 00:33:27,540 --> 00:33:29,707 if you can go into that a little bit . 932 00:33:29,707 --> 00:33:31,707 And then my last question is , does 933 00:33:31,707 --> 00:33:33,873 China have a strategy , you know , you 934 00:33:33,873 --> 00:33:35,818 have this nice map here that shows 935 00:33:35,818 --> 00:33:37,762 their involvement in Africa . Does 936 00:33:37,762 --> 00:33:39,929 China have a strategy to deal with the 937 00:33:39,929 --> 00:33:41,929 extreme of the violent extremism in 938 00:33:41,929 --> 00:33:45,470 Africa . Thanks 939 00:33:45,470 --> 00:33:49,410 congressman . So , uh first 940 00:33:49,420 --> 00:33:52,960 the the french aren't leaving , they 941 00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:55,182 are repositioning in West Africa , they 942 00:33:55,182 --> 00:33:57,016 are leaving . As you point out , 943 00:33:57,130 --> 00:33:59,910 correct , that's their their their plan 944 00:33:59,910 --> 00:34:02,750 is to go to and co driver and maybe a 945 00:34:02,750 --> 00:34:05,320 few other places . So there they are 946 00:34:05,330 --> 00:34:08,210 repositioning their forces . Uh you 947 00:34:08,210 --> 00:34:10,720 asked the question why are they leaving ? 948 00:34:10,720 --> 00:34:13,250 So um in our interactions with the 949 00:34:13,250 --> 00:34:14,917 french , they had come to the 950 00:34:14,917 --> 00:34:17,180 realization that it was time to reset 951 00:34:17,190 --> 00:34:21,040 their campaign there and um maybe 952 00:34:21,040 --> 00:34:23,262 gain new efficiencies . And so they had 953 00:34:23,262 --> 00:34:25,740 already made a decision which the 954 00:34:25,740 --> 00:34:27,796 french government had announced that 955 00:34:27,796 --> 00:34:29,629 they were going to reposition re 956 00:34:29,629 --> 00:34:31,684 posture in West Africa . Then we had 957 00:34:31,684 --> 00:34:35,480 successive coups in Mali and Mali , as 958 00:34:35,480 --> 00:34:38,030 you know , has invited in Wagner , I 959 00:34:38,030 --> 00:34:40,252 think they've invited that gets to your 960 00:34:40,252 --> 00:34:42,474 second question , why have they invited 961 00:34:42,474 --> 00:34:44,586 Wagner ? And they've invited Wagner ? 962 00:34:44,586 --> 00:34:47,350 And because they believe that Wagner 963 00:34:47,360 --> 00:34:51,350 will replace the french and do a better 964 00:34:51,350 --> 00:34:54,300 job . I when I learned of this , I 965 00:34:54,300 --> 00:34:56,980 traveled to mali and I met with the 966 00:34:56,990 --> 00:34:59,830 president there , uh the junta 967 00:34:59,830 --> 00:35:03,020 president there and I explained that I 968 00:35:03,020 --> 00:35:05,020 thought it was a bad idea to invite 969 00:35:05,020 --> 00:35:07,131 Wagner in because we've seen them , I 970 00:35:07,131 --> 00:35:09,242 have seen them in Syria and I've seen 971 00:35:09,242 --> 00:35:11,298 them in other places in Africa , And 972 00:35:11,298 --> 00:35:14,000 Wagner obeys no rules . They won't 973 00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:16,278 follow the direction of the government . 974 00:35:16,278 --> 00:35:18,500 They won't partner more effectively . I 975 00:35:18,500 --> 00:35:20,722 think they will only bring bad . Was he 976 00:35:20,722 --> 00:35:23,270 listening ? Will he listen ? He told me 977 00:35:23,340 --> 00:35:26,480 that um he told me that it wasn't 978 00:35:26,480 --> 00:35:28,647 Wagner that they were dealing with the 979 00:35:28,647 --> 00:35:30,591 french and the Russian Ministry of 980 00:35:30,591 --> 00:35:33,040 Defense . Except I think President 981 00:35:33,040 --> 00:35:35,880 Putin later said there are no Russian 982 00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:38,060 military and molly they're private 983 00:35:38,060 --> 00:35:41,260 military cos they're Wagner . 984 00:35:41,740 --> 00:35:45,710 So um I think that it will only 985 00:35:45,710 --> 00:35:47,932 bad will come from that . I think there 986 00:35:47,932 --> 00:35:49,821 may be some initial gains . We're 987 00:35:49,821 --> 00:35:51,877 seeing Wagner deploy and build their 988 00:35:51,877 --> 00:35:53,710 base camps . They haven't really 989 00:35:53,710 --> 00:35:55,932 started significant operations yet . Uh 990 00:35:55,932 --> 00:35:58,043 I think they've already suffered some 991 00:35:58,043 --> 00:36:00,099 casualties . I think casualties from 992 00:36:00,099 --> 00:36:02,154 violent extremism . Yes I think that 993 00:36:02,154 --> 00:36:04,099 the only bad is going to come from 994 00:36:04,099 --> 00:36:06,266 their deployment there . You ask about 995 00:36:06,266 --> 00:36:08,800 china . We don't see china having a 996 00:36:08,810 --> 00:36:10,921 counter violent extremist role . They 997 00:36:10,921 --> 00:36:12,921 are in mali though they're there as 998 00:36:12,921 --> 00:36:15,032 part of they have a substantial force 999 00:36:15,032 --> 00:36:17,199 there as part of minusma . The U . N . 1000 00:36:17,199 --> 00:36:19,199 Mission there but we don't see them 1001 00:36:19,199 --> 00:36:21,421 doing we see them doing a little bit of 1002 00:36:21,421 --> 00:36:23,254 counterterrorism training on the 1003 00:36:23,254 --> 00:36:25,254 continent but we do not see them uh 1004 00:36:25,254 --> 00:36:27,310 conducting any counter Vo operations 1005 00:36:27,310 --> 00:36:29,643 And a lot of our role then will be from . 1006 00:36:29,643 --> 00:36:31,810 Is that correct In regards to any sort 1007 00:36:31,810 --> 00:36:35,620 of what we do . We we currently 1008 00:36:35,620 --> 00:36:39,060 have forces in and 1009 00:36:39,070 --> 00:36:41,430 I'm working with the Department of 1010 00:36:41,430 --> 00:36:44,840 Defense on a strategy for West Africa 1011 00:36:44,850 --> 00:36:47,017 that will take into account the french 1012 00:36:47,017 --> 00:36:48,850 re posturing that will take into 1013 00:36:48,850 --> 00:36:51,620 account the malign actors like Wagner 1014 00:36:51,720 --> 00:36:54,050 in the region . And it sounds like you 1015 00:36:54,050 --> 00:36:57,000 don't necessarily believe this Malayan 1016 00:36:57,000 --> 00:36:59,530 official who you spoke to in regards to 1017 00:36:59,540 --> 00:37:02,810 that was a Russian organized Russian 1018 00:37:02,810 --> 00:37:04,810 group . It was you believe it's the 1019 00:37:04,820 --> 00:37:06,987 Wagner group who's in there now . It's 1020 00:37:06,987 --> 00:37:09,490 the Wagner group supported by the 1021 00:37:09,490 --> 00:37:11,601 Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin . 1022 00:37:11,601 --> 00:37:13,657 The Russian air force flew them in . 1023 00:37:13,657 --> 00:37:15,712 Thank you once again . Thank you . I 1024 00:37:15,712 --> 00:37:17,934 yield back . Thank you . Mr Panetta was 1025 00:37:17,934 --> 00:37:20,046 closely watching the portraits of the 1026 00:37:20,046 --> 00:37:18,940 past chairman . There was no 1027 00:37:18,940 --> 00:37:21,150 disturbance of the universe . So nice 1028 00:37:21,150 --> 00:37:23,850 job the chair now recognizes Mr Fallon . 1029 00:37:24,230 --> 00:37:26,397 Thank you . Mr I just thought this was 1030 00:37:26,397 --> 00:37:28,508 a gift that you're giving an Irishman 1031 00:37:28,508 --> 00:37:30,508 on ST Patrick's Day so I appreciate 1032 00:37:30,508 --> 00:37:32,619 that . Thank you all for your service 1033 00:37:32,619 --> 00:37:32,580 and thanks for being here today . Um 1034 00:37:32,590 --> 00:37:35,260 General Mackenzie , I was a bit 1035 00:37:35,260 --> 00:37:37,482 dumbfounded about a week and a half ago 1036 00:37:37,482 --> 00:37:39,538 I read an article report in the Wall 1037 00:37:39,538 --> 00:37:41,990 Street Journal that the U . A . S . 1038 00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:43,960 Chic and the Crown Prince of Saudi 1039 00:37:43,960 --> 00:37:46,130 Arabia would not take a call from the 1040 00:37:46,130 --> 00:37:48,186 President of United States . I found 1041 00:37:48,186 --> 00:37:50,186 that alarming . I wanted it just to 1042 00:37:50,186 --> 00:37:52,186 hear what you your thoughts on that 1043 00:37:52,230 --> 00:37:54,119 relationships at that level would 1044 00:37:54,119 --> 00:37:56,341 probably be better with with Miss baker 1045 00:37:56,341 --> 00:37:58,508 or the Department of State than me . I 1046 00:37:58,508 --> 00:38:00,730 can tell you that at my level I have no 1047 00:38:00,730 --> 00:38:00,450 trouble talking to the Chiefs of 1048 00:38:00,450 --> 00:38:02,617 Defense of each of those two countries 1049 00:38:02,617 --> 00:38:04,894 and I talked to them frequently . Okay , 1050 00:38:04,894 --> 00:38:04,860 Miss baker , If you'd like to comment , 1051 00:38:04,860 --> 00:38:08,140 Thank you , congressman . Thank you . I 1052 00:38:08,140 --> 00:38:10,370 can't speak to the specifics of of the 1053 00:38:10,380 --> 00:38:12,436 President's phone calls . What I can 1054 00:38:12,436 --> 00:38:14,047 tell you is from the defense 1055 00:38:14,047 --> 00:38:16,380 perspective . As General Mackenzie said , 1056 00:38:16,380 --> 00:38:18,491 we have a long and enduring strategic 1057 00:38:18,491 --> 00:38:21,220 partnerships with both Saudi Arabia and 1058 00:38:21,220 --> 00:38:23,276 U A . E . Those have existed for any 1059 00:38:23,276 --> 00:38:25,387 number of years . I know that's why I 1060 00:38:25,387 --> 00:38:27,500 find it so alarming and shocking that 1061 00:38:27,510 --> 00:38:29,510 they weren't taken . I thought they 1062 00:38:29,510 --> 00:38:31,621 were allies of ours in the region and 1063 00:38:31,621 --> 00:38:33,621 not to take the President of United 1064 00:38:33,621 --> 00:38:35,621 States phone call to me , didn't it 1065 00:38:35,621 --> 00:38:37,732 spoke volumes about the deteriorating 1066 00:38:37,732 --> 00:38:39,954 relationship . Again , I can't speak to 1067 00:38:39,954 --> 00:38:41,954 the President's phone calls . I can 1068 00:38:41,954 --> 00:38:44,288 tell you that as General Mackenzie said , 1069 00:38:44,288 --> 00:38:46,510 we pick up the phone and we talked with 1070 00:38:46,510 --> 00:38:46,400 these folks every day and we have a 1071 00:38:46,410 --> 00:38:48,800 very close and enduring partnership 1072 00:38:48,810 --> 00:38:50,977 from the defense perspective . General 1073 00:38:50,977 --> 00:38:53,199 Mackenzie in Syria , I would love to if 1074 00:38:53,199 --> 00:38:55,366 you could just touch on the influences 1075 00:38:55,366 --> 00:38:57,580 that Turkey Russia and Iran have . It 1076 00:38:57,580 --> 00:38:59,747 seems to be absolute mess , you know , 1077 00:38:59,747 --> 00:39:01,802 from everything we read and then the 1078 00:39:01,802 --> 00:39:03,969 maps didn't help too much either . But 1079 00:39:03,969 --> 00:39:03,460 I just wanted to get your thoughts on 1080 00:39:03,460 --> 00:39:07,030 that . Sure , so in Syria , Iran uses 1081 00:39:07,030 --> 00:39:09,780 Syria principally as a land bridge to 1082 00:39:09,780 --> 00:39:12,002 move advanced conventional weapons into 1083 00:39:12,002 --> 00:39:14,113 Lebanon to be employed against Israel 1084 00:39:14,113 --> 00:39:15,780 as a possibility . There also 1085 00:39:15,780 --> 00:39:17,780 interested in operating against our 1086 00:39:17,780 --> 00:39:19,947 forces that are there in in Syria , as 1087 00:39:19,947 --> 00:39:22,113 in Yemen , Iran , generally speaking , 1088 00:39:22,113 --> 00:39:24,169 has no positive objective in Syria , 1089 00:39:24,169 --> 00:39:26,280 whether their goals are almost wholly 1090 00:39:26,280 --> 00:39:28,502 negative disruption is disruption , but 1091 00:39:28,502 --> 00:39:30,669 also they view it again , we shouldn't 1092 00:39:30,669 --> 00:39:32,558 understate the importance of that 1093 00:39:32,558 --> 00:39:34,447 corridor that allows them to move 1094 00:39:34,447 --> 00:39:36,502 weapons to position against and what 1095 00:39:36,502 --> 00:39:36,020 they consider their greatest foe . And 1096 00:39:36,160 --> 00:39:38,300 the nation they've sworn to destroy . 1097 00:39:38,310 --> 00:39:41,790 Israel Russia's obviously has a client 1098 00:39:41,790 --> 00:39:44,120 state in Syria . They came in and right 1099 00:39:44,120 --> 00:39:46,287 after the beginning of the Civil war , 1100 00:39:46,287 --> 00:39:48,453 they've been there for quite a while , 1101 00:39:48,453 --> 00:39:50,620 it allows them to do several things by 1102 00:39:50,620 --> 00:39:52,620 being in their first of all , it is 1103 00:39:52,620 --> 00:39:54,842 opportunistic . I don't see a long term 1104 00:39:54,842 --> 00:39:54,840 strategy in the Russian action . 1105 00:39:55,020 --> 00:39:56,964 They've got an air base in Western 1106 00:39:56,964 --> 00:39:59,187 Syria , they've got a naval base in the 1107 00:39:59,187 --> 00:40:01,353 Eastern Mediterranean , which they had 1108 00:40:01,353 --> 00:40:03,520 during the Cold War , I might add . So 1109 00:40:03,520 --> 00:40:05,742 it's not a new thing necessarily . Uh , 1110 00:40:05,742 --> 00:40:07,853 it also gives them the opportunity to 1111 00:40:07,853 --> 00:40:07,620 attempt a posture on the global stage 1112 00:40:07,630 --> 00:40:09,574 and to throw sand in our gearbox . 1113 00:40:09,574 --> 00:40:11,630 Again , it's an act of opportunism . 1114 00:40:11,630 --> 00:40:13,630 Opportunism . That is sort of , you 1115 00:40:13,630 --> 00:40:15,797 know , that we see is typical of a lot 1116 00:40:15,797 --> 00:40:17,852 of Russian activity . The Turks have 1117 00:40:17,852 --> 00:40:20,074 genuine national security concerns that 1118 00:40:20,074 --> 00:40:22,186 the kurds are they are they concerned 1119 00:40:22,186 --> 00:40:24,330 about the kurds . The Turks are yes , 1120 00:40:24,340 --> 00:40:26,507 we would we would argue that there are 1121 00:40:26,507 --> 00:40:28,618 different elements within the kurds . 1122 00:40:28,618 --> 00:40:30,618 And we , we disagree with Turkey on 1123 00:40:30,618 --> 00:40:32,673 that on all the kurds being uh , you 1124 00:40:32,673 --> 00:40:34,729 know , devoted to attacking Turkey . 1125 00:40:34,729 --> 00:40:34,530 But there's a , but they do have 1126 00:40:34,530 --> 00:40:36,808 legitimate security concerns . We also , 1127 00:40:36,808 --> 00:40:38,974 as you know , partner heavily with the 1128 00:40:38,974 --> 00:40:40,919 Syrian democratic forces , another 1129 00:40:40,919 --> 00:40:42,919 Syrian kurdish elements to actually 1130 00:40:42,919 --> 00:40:44,919 conduct the fight against ISIS . So 1131 00:40:44,919 --> 00:40:47,141 there's a genuine dispute there between 1132 00:40:47,141 --> 00:40:47,020 us and our NATO partners over that . 1133 00:40:47,030 --> 00:40:49,141 But when all is said and done , we do 1134 00:40:49,141 --> 00:40:51,363 recognize they have legitimate security 1135 00:40:51,363 --> 00:40:53,530 concerns . Thank you . General General 1136 00:40:53,530 --> 00:40:55,363 Townsend . I was noticing in the 1137 00:40:55,363 --> 00:40:57,586 foreign aid Were we crushed the Chinese 1138 00:40:57,586 --> 00:40:59,419 11 billion to about 2.5 . But in 1139 00:40:59,419 --> 00:41:01,590 economic trade , they're almost 1140 00:41:01,590 --> 00:41:04,600 quadruple hours in Africa . Um , what I 1141 00:41:04,600 --> 00:41:06,770 wanted to ask you is , who's china , 1142 00:41:06,780 --> 00:41:09,220 the chummy ist with whose relationships 1143 00:41:09,220 --> 00:41:11,220 are the best . As far as the nation 1144 00:41:11,220 --> 00:41:13,331 states they have in uh relations they 1145 00:41:13,331 --> 00:41:15,442 have in Africa . And what worries you 1146 00:41:15,442 --> 00:41:16,887 most about that theater ? 1147 00:41:20,010 --> 00:41:22,330 Well , congressman , thanks . I don't 1148 00:41:22,330 --> 00:41:24,386 think anybody's asked me who china's 1149 00:41:24,386 --> 00:41:26,552 chummy ist within africa before . So I 1150 00:41:26,552 --> 00:41:28,608 don't think I've contemplated that . 1151 00:41:28,608 --> 00:41:30,774 They have pretty good relations with a 1152 00:41:30,774 --> 00:41:32,886 lot of the countries on the continent 1153 00:41:33,110 --> 00:41:36,400 where the relations are strained is in 1154 00:41:36,400 --> 00:41:39,230 there earlier economic investments 1155 00:41:39,230 --> 00:41:41,452 where they have lured African countries 1156 00:41:41,452 --> 00:41:43,786 into what we call debt , trap diplomacy . 1157 00:41:43,786 --> 00:41:45,563 And there are a number of those 1158 00:41:45,563 --> 00:41:47,674 countries where a large percentage of 1159 00:41:47,674 --> 00:41:49,897 foreign debt is held by china and china 1160 00:41:49,897 --> 00:41:51,800 has extended leases on critical 1161 00:41:51,800 --> 00:41:54,078 infrastructure like ports and airports . 1162 00:41:54,810 --> 00:41:57,600 Um , the thing I think I'm most worried 1163 00:41:57,600 --> 00:42:01,240 about is , uh , this military 1164 00:42:01,240 --> 00:42:03,460 base on the atlantic coast and where 1165 00:42:03,460 --> 00:42:05,627 they have the most traction for that . 1166 00:42:05,627 --> 00:42:07,930 Today is an equatorial guinea . They've 1167 00:42:07,940 --> 00:42:09,829 laid markers down up and down the 1168 00:42:09,829 --> 00:42:12,051 coastline , but the place where they've 1169 00:42:12,051 --> 00:42:14,218 actually made progress towards this is 1170 00:42:14,218 --> 00:42:16,218 equatorial guinea and we have had a 1171 00:42:16,218 --> 00:42:18,273 recent interagency delegation travel 1172 00:42:18,273 --> 00:42:19,996 there to discuss that with the 1173 00:42:19,996 --> 00:42:21,884 government there . It concerns me 1174 00:42:21,884 --> 00:42:24,051 because it's like almost an end around 1175 00:42:24,051 --> 00:42:26,218 to the Monroe doctrine in some ways to 1176 00:42:26,218 --> 00:42:28,329 have a chinese based gentleman's time 1177 00:42:28,329 --> 00:42:30,496 has expired . The chair now recognizes 1178 00:42:30,496 --> 00:42:33,690 congresswoman Loria . Well , thank you . 1179 00:42:33,690 --> 00:42:35,912 And and general Mackenzie , I'd like to 1180 00:42:35,912 --> 00:42:38,134 start with a quote that that you made . 1181 00:42:38,134 --> 00:42:40,301 Um , you said the proximate causes for 1182 00:42:40,301 --> 00:42:42,468 the establishment of centcom nearly 40 1183 00:42:42,468 --> 00:42:45,370 years ago was Iran . And today Iran is 1184 00:42:45,380 --> 00:42:47,290 no less of a threat to American 1185 00:42:47,290 --> 00:42:49,179 interests or the stability of the 1186 00:42:49,179 --> 00:42:51,068 region than it was in 1979 to the 1187 00:42:51,068 --> 00:42:53,234 contrary , the threat posed by Iran is 1188 00:42:53,234 --> 00:42:55,810 graver than ever . So I'd like to ask 1189 00:42:55,810 --> 00:42:58,090 you from a perspective of centcom , how 1190 00:42:58,090 --> 00:43:00,312 is the United States and how the United 1191 00:43:00,312 --> 00:43:02,201 States and our allies prepared to 1192 00:43:02,201 --> 00:43:04,312 respond to this threat from Iran . So 1193 00:43:04,312 --> 00:43:06,870 the actual operational expression of 1194 00:43:06,870 --> 00:43:08,830 the Iranian threat is in the vast 1195 00:43:08,830 --> 00:43:11,163 improvements in their ballistic missile , 1196 00:43:11,163 --> 00:43:13,219 their land attack cruise missile and 1197 00:43:13,219 --> 00:43:15,219 their small unmanned aerial vehicle 1198 00:43:15,219 --> 00:43:17,219 platforms , which over the last 5-7 1199 00:43:17,219 --> 00:43:19,386 years have dramatically increased both 1200 00:43:19,386 --> 00:43:21,600 in number and in accuracy and ability 1201 00:43:21,600 --> 00:43:23,767 to fly in relatively undetected ways . 1202 00:43:24,100 --> 00:43:26,044 All of that directly threatens the 1203 00:43:26,044 --> 00:43:28,410 immediate partners . So the 5-7 years , 1204 00:43:28,420 --> 00:43:30,642 what year did we enter into the J . c . 1205 00:43:30,642 --> 00:43:32,920 p . O . A . It's about that time frame . 1206 00:43:32,920 --> 00:43:34,920 About that time frame . But um so I 1207 00:43:34,920 --> 00:43:37,031 just wanted to shift and maybe we can 1208 00:43:37,031 --> 00:43:39,087 have a more thorough conversation on 1209 00:43:39,087 --> 00:43:41,309 the first part of the question . But so 1210 00:43:41,309 --> 00:43:43,531 if the United States returns to the J . 1211 00:43:43,531 --> 00:43:45,476 C . P . O . A , what impact do you 1212 00:43:45,476 --> 00:43:47,309 foresee that on having on Iran's 1213 00:43:47,309 --> 00:43:49,364 regional activities ? What impact on 1214 00:43:49,364 --> 00:43:51,587 the flow of additional resources to the 1215 00:43:51,587 --> 00:43:53,642 Houthis to Hezbollah Hamas and their 1216 00:43:53,642 --> 00:43:55,531 actions in the region against the 1217 00:43:55,531 --> 00:43:57,753 United States , Israel and our allies . 1218 00:43:57,753 --> 00:43:57,640 So I will note that the principal 1219 00:43:57,640 --> 00:43:59,807 foreign policy objective we have vis a 1220 00:43:59,807 --> 00:44:01,918 vis Iran is for them not to possess a 1221 00:44:01,918 --> 00:44:03,918 nuclear weapon project . Polo would 1222 00:44:03,918 --> 00:44:03,860 presumably give that assurance the 1223 00:44:03,860 --> 00:44:06,060 current agreement and has allowed them 1224 00:44:06,060 --> 00:44:08,116 to have additional resources to fund 1225 00:44:08,116 --> 00:44:09,949 these proxy organizations . So I 1226 00:44:09,949 --> 00:44:12,004 believe that what they do with their 1227 00:44:12,004 --> 00:44:14,171 ballistic missiles , their proxies and 1228 00:44:14,171 --> 00:44:16,393 other things or not necessarily coupled 1229 00:44:16,393 --> 00:44:18,616 directly to the to the Jig Poet . But I 1230 00:44:18,616 --> 00:44:17,590 will acknowledge that there could be 1231 00:44:17,590 --> 00:44:19,812 second order effects of that . I do not 1232 00:44:19,812 --> 00:44:21,979 know what the terms of the pending Jig 1233 00:44:21,979 --> 00:44:24,201 Pole will be . I I just don't have that 1234 00:44:24,201 --> 00:44:26,312 information . So perhaps I'll turn to 1235 00:44:26,312 --> 00:44:28,479 MS baker and I really don't think it's 1236 00:44:28,479 --> 00:44:30,646 a disputed fact by the fact that we've 1237 00:44:30,646 --> 00:44:32,868 eased pressure . We've lifted sanctions 1238 00:44:32,868 --> 00:44:32,300 around , has more resources and those 1239 00:44:32,300 --> 00:44:34,356 resources are flowing to these proxy 1240 00:44:34,356 --> 00:44:36,300 groups and terrorist organizations 1241 00:44:36,300 --> 00:44:38,522 throughout the region . So if a nuclear 1242 00:44:38,522 --> 00:44:40,522 deal is reached with Iran , I think 1243 00:44:40,522 --> 00:44:42,744 that it's likely that Tehran will use a 1244 00:44:42,744 --> 00:44:44,800 significant part of those associated 1245 00:44:44,800 --> 00:44:46,967 sanctions reliefs to attack Israel and 1246 00:44:46,967 --> 00:44:49,078 support these terrorist proxies . Are 1247 00:44:49,078 --> 00:44:50,911 we open to supplying Israel with 1248 00:44:50,911 --> 00:44:52,856 additional security assistance and 1249 00:44:52,856 --> 00:44:54,744 other support In uh light of this 1250 00:44:54,744 --> 00:44:56,856 potential situation , Congresswoman , 1251 00:44:56,856 --> 00:44:59,022 our commitment to Israel's security is 1252 00:44:59,022 --> 00:45:01,078 ironclad . We consult with them on a 1253 00:45:01,078 --> 00:45:03,022 near daily basis . Are they at the 1254 00:45:03,022 --> 00:45:05,356 table in the negotiations for the J C P . 1255 00:45:05,356 --> 00:45:07,467 O . A . Right now , congressman , the 1256 00:45:07,467 --> 00:45:09,633 Department of course does not have the 1257 00:45:09,633 --> 00:45:11,633 lead on those negotiations . But my 1258 00:45:11,633 --> 00:45:13,744 understanding is the Israelis are not 1259 00:45:13,744 --> 00:45:15,911 at the table . We do consult with them 1260 00:45:15,911 --> 00:45:17,689 regularly and we are in regular 1261 00:45:17,689 --> 00:45:19,800 conversations about how we can better 1262 00:45:19,800 --> 00:45:19,630 bolster their security in the region . 1263 00:45:19,630 --> 00:45:21,690 So if we consult with them regularly 1264 00:45:21,690 --> 00:45:23,801 have they expressed concerns over the 1265 00:45:23,801 --> 00:45:25,912 pending re entry into the Iran deal . 1266 00:45:25,990 --> 00:45:28,430 Um you know , I think this is a subject 1267 00:45:28,430 --> 00:45:30,900 of active conversation and I don't know 1268 00:45:30,900 --> 00:45:33,370 that there's a unified opinion on that 1269 00:45:33,380 --> 00:45:35,491 that being said , we are committed to 1270 00:45:35,491 --> 00:45:37,547 their security . We are committed to 1271 00:45:37,547 --> 00:45:39,324 giving them the equipment , the 1272 00:45:39,324 --> 00:45:41,547 capabilities that they need , the the Q 1273 00:45:41,547 --> 00:45:43,769 and me that we've committed to . Okay , 1274 00:45:43,769 --> 00:45:45,991 so I'll ship back to general McKenzie ? 1275 00:45:45,991 --> 00:45:48,130 And you know , I wanted to ask why 1276 00:45:48,130 --> 00:45:50,460 hasn't there been a more forceful us 1277 00:45:50,470 --> 00:45:52,581 response to Iran's aggression against 1278 00:45:52,581 --> 00:45:54,914 our allies and our troops in the region . 1279 00:45:54,914 --> 00:45:57,026 For example , we just saw this strike 1280 00:45:57,026 --> 00:45:59,192 this weekend um towards or Bill in the 1281 00:45:59,192 --> 00:46:01,303 vicinity of the U . S . Consulate and 1282 00:46:01,303 --> 00:46:03,414 Iran directly took responsibility for 1283 00:46:03,414 --> 00:46:05,581 that strike , Ma'am . I'd like to talk 1284 00:46:05,581 --> 00:46:07,581 about that in a closed session if I 1285 00:46:07,581 --> 00:46:07,500 could . And I'll be prepared to go into 1286 00:46:07,510 --> 00:46:09,677 great detail . I would tell you that . 1287 00:46:09,677 --> 00:46:11,843 I think our response has been measured 1288 00:46:11,843 --> 00:46:14,010 balanced . You know , and we after the 1289 00:46:14,010 --> 00:46:16,232 strike on you hee , by the Houthis , we 1290 00:46:16,232 --> 00:46:18,010 deployed 1/5 generation fighter 1291 00:46:18,010 --> 00:46:20,177 squadron to Al Dhafra Air Force Base . 1292 00:46:20,177 --> 00:46:22,121 I sent a ballistic missile capable 1293 00:46:22,121 --> 00:46:24,232 destroyer uh to us waters . And we've 1294 00:46:24,232 --> 00:46:26,121 done a variety of other things to 1295 00:46:26,121 --> 00:46:28,343 enhance their protection . So sometimes 1296 00:46:28,343 --> 00:46:28,300 it's , you know , it doesn't require an 1297 00:46:28,300 --> 00:46:30,467 immediate kinetic response in order to 1298 00:46:30,467 --> 00:46:32,578 show a measured response that assures 1299 00:46:32,578 --> 00:46:34,920 our partners and allies . So has our 1300 00:46:34,930 --> 00:46:37,041 current policy of not having a 1.00 , 1301 00:46:37,041 --> 00:46:39,374 continuous carrier presence in the Gulf . 1302 00:46:39,374 --> 00:46:41,486 Um have you seen any change in Iran's 1303 00:46:41,486 --> 00:46:43,486 activities due to that ? And do you 1304 00:46:43,486 --> 00:46:45,208 think a carrier in the Gulf is 1305 00:46:45,208 --> 00:46:47,263 essential for a deterrent and lastly 1306 00:46:47,263 --> 00:46:47,210 balancing that versus the need for that 1307 00:46:47,210 --> 00:46:49,680 asset within the seventh fleet a or for 1308 00:46:49,680 --> 00:46:51,510 pay calm . So as I think about 1309 00:46:51,510 --> 00:46:53,732 deterring Iran , I don't think in terms 1310 00:46:53,732 --> 00:46:55,788 of individual platforms . I think in 1311 00:46:55,788 --> 00:46:58,010 terms of the holistic capability of the 1312 00:46:58,010 --> 00:47:00,066 Joint force , land based air carrier 1313 00:47:00,066 --> 00:47:02,177 based air and and so one's up , one's 1314 00:47:02,177 --> 00:47:04,288 down . We need we have other uses for 1315 00:47:04,288 --> 00:47:04,190 those carriers . They can't be 1316 00:47:04,190 --> 00:47:06,079 everywhere . But you know , we do 1317 00:47:06,079 --> 00:47:08,190 innovative things . We bring bomber , 1318 00:47:08,190 --> 00:47:10,301 bomber task force task forces in from 1319 00:47:10,301 --> 00:47:12,523 the United States . There are a variety 1320 00:47:12,523 --> 00:47:14,634 of things I can display to ensure the 1321 00:47:14,634 --> 00:47:16,357 Iranians know that we have the 1322 00:47:16,357 --> 00:47:18,468 capability to defend ourselves and to 1323 00:47:18,468 --> 00:47:18,350 punish them if they continue their 1324 00:47:18,350 --> 00:47:20,517 malign activities . Right ? So in your 1325 00:47:20,517 --> 00:47:22,239 assessment , these shore based 1326 00:47:22,239 --> 00:47:24,461 squadrons are providing essentially you 1327 00:47:24,461 --> 00:47:26,572 as the combatant commander , the same 1328 00:47:26,572 --> 00:47:28,739 equivalent capability as a deterrent . 1329 00:47:28,739 --> 00:47:30,906 Yes . And other capabilities as well . 1330 00:47:30,906 --> 00:47:33,017 Beyond that . Thank you . I feel back 1331 00:47:33,017 --> 00:47:35,183 Thank you mrs McLean is recognized for 1332 00:47:35,183 --> 00:47:38,450 five minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman , 1333 00:47:38,570 --> 00:47:41,500 I just want to perhaps I didn't hear 1334 00:47:41,500 --> 00:47:43,660 that correctly , so I'll apologize in 1335 00:47:43,660 --> 00:47:46,710 advance . Did I hear you say that 1336 00:47:47,080 --> 00:47:49,870 Israel doesn't have an opinion or a 1337 00:47:49,870 --> 00:47:53,470 position on the J . C P O a No ma'am I 1338 00:47:53,470 --> 00:47:55,414 I believe that they have expressed 1339 00:47:55,414 --> 00:47:58,990 concerns and they want us to go back in 1340 00:47:58,990 --> 00:48:01,212 or not go back in what is their opinion 1341 00:48:02,470 --> 00:48:05,250 and congresswoman ? You know , I think 1342 00:48:05,250 --> 00:48:07,361 it's a it's a complex situation . I'm 1343 00:48:07,361 --> 00:48:09,530 not sure that there is a unified point 1344 00:48:09,530 --> 00:48:11,586 of view . That's interesting because 1345 00:48:11,586 --> 00:48:13,586 when I was in Israel it was clearly 1346 00:48:13,586 --> 00:48:16,940 unified . So I'm just we we've heard 1347 00:48:16,940 --> 00:48:19,162 we've heard Israel's concerns about the 1348 00:48:19,162 --> 00:48:21,218 J . C . P . O . A loud and clear , I 1349 00:48:21,218 --> 00:48:23,273 want to acknowledge , I just want to 1350 00:48:23,273 --> 00:48:25,384 make sure I understood that because I 1351 00:48:25,384 --> 00:48:27,384 didn't catch that . What what we've 1352 00:48:27,384 --> 00:48:29,329 committed to in response is to the 1353 00:48:29,329 --> 00:48:31,273 ongoing conversation we have about 1354 00:48:31,273 --> 00:48:33,273 ensuring Israel's Q . And me , it's 1355 00:48:33,273 --> 00:48:35,496 security . That was the case before the 1356 00:48:35,496 --> 00:48:37,384 J . C . P . O . A . It's the case 1357 00:48:37,384 --> 00:48:39,551 during when we were in the J . C . P . 1358 00:48:39,551 --> 00:48:39,490 O . And it will continue . But to be 1359 00:48:39,490 --> 00:48:41,712 clear they do have a response , they do 1360 00:48:41,712 --> 00:48:43,546 have an opinion . They do have a 1361 00:48:43,546 --> 00:48:45,601 position and we are clearly aware of 1362 00:48:45,601 --> 00:48:47,712 what that position is , congressman . 1363 00:48:47,712 --> 00:48:49,823 That's my understanding . Yes , thank 1364 00:48:49,823 --> 00:48:49,570 you . Thank you . I just wanted to 1365 00:48:49,570 --> 00:48:52,930 clear that up . Thank you all for being 1366 00:48:52,930 --> 00:48:56,140 here . Um General Mackenzie , um the D . 1367 00:48:56,140 --> 00:48:58,270 O . D . Inspector general and in a 1368 00:48:58,270 --> 00:49:01,080 recent report stated that Iran and Iran 1369 00:49:01,080 --> 00:49:03,450 aligned militias continue to have 1370 00:49:03,450 --> 00:49:06,140 strong ties to some elements of Iraq's 1371 00:49:06,140 --> 00:49:07,807 traditional security forces . 1372 00:49:07,807 --> 00:49:09,807 Especially pointing out that Iraq's 1373 00:49:09,807 --> 00:49:11,862 Federal Police under the Ministry of 1374 00:49:11,862 --> 00:49:14,590 Interior . Does my question is this 1375 00:49:14,690 --> 00:49:17,820 does the department or any agency of 1376 00:49:17,820 --> 00:49:20,010 the U . S . Government to continue to 1377 00:49:20,010 --> 00:49:23,240 provide assistance for Iraq's Federal 1378 00:49:23,240 --> 00:49:26,690 Police and Ministry of the Interior , 1379 00:49:27,770 --> 00:49:29,437 Do we provide funds to them , 1380 00:49:29,437 --> 00:49:31,603 Congresswoman ? I'll have to answer to 1381 00:49:31,603 --> 00:49:31,380 take that one for the record . I'll 1382 00:49:31,380 --> 00:49:33,602 come back with a precise answer to that 1383 00:49:33,602 --> 00:49:35,602 question . Okay , thank you . My my 1384 00:49:35,602 --> 00:49:38,880 next question is um just this weekend , 1385 00:49:38,880 --> 00:49:41,800 Iran directly launched missiles in the 1386 00:49:41,800 --> 00:49:44,500 vicinity of our consulate . Right ? And 1387 00:49:44,510 --> 00:49:48,510 in in Herbal Kurdistan . I'm 1388 00:49:48,510 --> 00:49:51,770 just I'm trying to understand this and 1389 00:49:51,770 --> 00:49:53,990 come to grips with this is how can we 1390 00:49:53,990 --> 00:49:56,480 justify using taxpayer dollars to go to 1391 00:49:56,480 --> 00:49:59,120 a police force that supports that or 1392 00:49:59,120 --> 00:50:02,470 dollars to support that ? I would , 1393 00:50:02,480 --> 00:50:04,647 I'll go into more detail in the closed 1394 00:50:04,647 --> 00:50:06,869 session , but I can I can tell you that 1395 00:50:06,869 --> 00:50:08,980 they were not targeting us with those 1396 00:50:08,980 --> 00:50:11,313 strikes . I think I want to believe you . 1397 00:50:11,313 --> 00:50:13,313 I think the american people want to 1398 00:50:13,313 --> 00:50:15,313 believe you . I'm just not much for 1399 00:50:15,313 --> 00:50:17,313 coincidences . It's it's scary when 1400 00:50:17,313 --> 00:50:19,536 you're on the outside looking in . So I 1401 00:50:19,536 --> 00:50:21,702 look forward to to the belief briefing 1402 00:50:21,702 --> 00:50:23,702 to make us feel a little bit better 1403 00:50:23,702 --> 00:50:25,910 about that . Um , and then my second 1404 00:50:25,910 --> 00:50:28,077 question is are you familiar obviously 1405 00:50:28,077 --> 00:50:31,490 with the battered corpse ? I am okay . 1406 00:50:32,060 --> 00:50:35,070 Um , my question is do you believe that 1407 00:50:35,070 --> 00:50:37,310 that organization is best described as 1408 00:50:37,310 --> 00:50:38,810 a terrorist organization ? 1409 00:50:41,860 --> 00:50:44,510 It has let me come back to you on that . 1410 00:50:44,520 --> 00:50:46,576 If you want to , I'll have to let me 1411 00:50:46,576 --> 00:50:48,798 put it better . I prefer to answer that 1412 00:50:48,798 --> 00:50:50,909 in a closed session if I can and I'll 1413 00:50:50,909 --> 00:50:53,076 be prepared to do that without a yield 1414 00:50:53,076 --> 00:50:51,780 back . 1415 00:50:58,860 --> 00:51:01,138 Slotkin is recognized for five minutes . 1416 00:51:01,138 --> 00:51:03,193 Thanks thanks for you all being here 1417 00:51:03,193 --> 00:51:05,570 and having served I think with all 1418 00:51:05,570 --> 00:51:07,737 three of you in different capacities , 1419 00:51:07,737 --> 00:51:10,300 really appreciate your service and all 1420 00:51:10,300 --> 00:51:12,189 the work that you've done for the 1421 00:51:12,189 --> 00:51:14,870 country over many , many years . Um I 1422 00:51:14,880 --> 00:51:17,047 just want to continue the conversation 1423 00:51:17,047 --> 00:51:19,430 on Iran and and General Mackenzie . Um 1424 00:51:19,440 --> 00:51:21,551 you know , I was reading through your 1425 00:51:21,551 --> 00:51:23,273 testimony and there's a lot of 1426 00:51:23,273 --> 00:51:25,162 discussion about Iran's nefarious 1427 00:51:25,162 --> 00:51:27,384 activities in the Middle East and their 1428 00:51:27,384 --> 00:51:29,384 ballistic missile program . Can you 1429 00:51:29,384 --> 00:51:31,440 give us as much as possible just for 1430 00:51:31,440 --> 00:51:33,551 the american public to understand the 1431 00:51:33,551 --> 00:51:35,662 stakes of their nuclear program , how 1432 00:51:35,662 --> 00:51:37,551 close they are to turning fissile 1433 00:51:37,551 --> 00:51:39,773 material into nuclear , you know , in a 1434 00:51:39,773 --> 00:51:42,300 weapons grade material and your 1435 00:51:42,300 --> 00:51:44,720 assessment of the threat where it falls 1436 00:51:44,730 --> 00:51:46,952 vis a vis the other threats coming from 1437 00:51:46,952 --> 00:51:49,230 Iran . Thank you . And it's good to see 1438 00:51:49,230 --> 00:51:51,590 you again , ma'am . I would note , 1439 00:51:51,590 --> 00:51:53,812 first of all , I think the Iranians are 1440 00:51:53,812 --> 00:51:56,034 close . I don't think that they've made 1441 00:51:56,034 --> 00:51:57,979 a decision to to to go forward . I 1442 00:51:57,979 --> 00:52:00,146 think they actually , my assessment is 1443 00:52:00,146 --> 00:51:59,930 they want the sanctions relief that's 1444 00:51:59,930 --> 00:52:02,097 already been discussed here . And so I 1445 00:52:02,097 --> 00:52:04,208 think that the best solution would be 1446 00:52:04,208 --> 00:52:06,319 to get an agreement where they're not 1447 00:52:06,319 --> 00:52:06,180 going to pursue a nuclear weapon . So 1448 00:52:06,180 --> 00:52:09,450 I'll say that as a is number one , what 1449 00:52:09,460 --> 00:52:11,627 really concerns me more , much more on 1450 00:52:11,627 --> 00:52:13,793 a day to day basis are their ballistic 1451 00:52:13,793 --> 00:52:15,849 missiles , their cruise missiles and 1452 00:52:15,849 --> 00:52:17,849 their land attack cruise missiles , 1453 00:52:17,849 --> 00:52:20,016 which they have invested in heavily at 1454 00:52:20,016 --> 00:52:22,238 great cost to their population over the 1455 00:52:22,238 --> 00:52:24,460 past several years . Those capabilities 1456 00:52:24,460 --> 00:52:26,460 directly threatened their neighbors 1457 00:52:26,460 --> 00:52:28,571 today . And we saw an example of that 1458 00:52:28,571 --> 00:52:30,849 in the attack on Iraq over the weekend . 1459 00:52:30,849 --> 00:52:30,240 Their ability to fire very accurate 1460 00:52:30,240 --> 00:52:32,351 missiles into a neighboring country . 1461 00:52:32,351 --> 00:52:34,129 Something they've done before , 1462 00:52:34,129 --> 00:52:36,351 including the attack on Al Asad airbase 1463 00:52:36,351 --> 00:52:38,573 in January of 2020 , those capabilities 1464 00:52:38,573 --> 00:52:40,796 concerned me and I believe they concern 1465 00:52:40,796 --> 00:52:40,520 our neighbors and friends in the region 1466 00:52:40,520 --> 00:52:42,960 as well . And that's actually the one 1467 00:52:42,960 --> 00:52:45,182 of the opportunities I'll talk a little 1468 00:52:45,182 --> 00:52:47,404 bit more in the closed session about is 1469 00:52:47,404 --> 00:52:49,293 we have an opportunity to work on 1470 00:52:49,293 --> 00:52:48,990 integrated air and missile defense . 1471 00:52:49,030 --> 00:52:50,974 That's the great opportunity in US 1472 00:52:50,974 --> 00:52:52,974 central Command right now , because 1473 00:52:52,974 --> 00:52:55,141 that will address a cogent uh imminent 1474 00:52:55,141 --> 00:52:57,252 threat to all of our neighbors in the 1475 00:52:57,252 --> 00:52:58,974 region . And it's a tremendous 1476 00:52:58,974 --> 00:53:01,086 opportunity . What that doesn't do is 1477 00:53:01,086 --> 00:53:03,141 address the proxies and they're very 1478 00:53:03,141 --> 00:53:05,308 they're proxy forces are very active . 1479 00:53:05,308 --> 00:53:07,363 You know , principally we we look at 1480 00:53:07,363 --> 00:53:06,530 Iraq and in Syria , but they're 1481 00:53:06,540 --> 00:53:08,707 obviously active in Yemen and in other 1482 00:53:08,707 --> 00:53:10,984 places , both in and out of the region . 1483 00:53:10,984 --> 00:53:12,873 And that's another that's another 1484 00:53:12,873 --> 00:53:14,984 significant element that we work with 1485 00:53:14,984 --> 00:53:14,960 our partners against . I mean , 1486 00:53:14,970 --> 00:53:17,081 certainly as someone who used to work 1487 00:53:17,081 --> 00:53:19,137 on Iraq and work in Iraq there , the 1488 00:53:19,137 --> 00:53:21,400 Iran's terrorist activities , um , 1489 00:53:21,400 --> 00:53:23,530 we're in everyday , uh , you know , a 1490 00:53:23,540 --> 00:53:25,596 fact of life , frankly , if you were 1491 00:53:25,596 --> 00:53:28,600 over there . Um , and I but I guess the 1492 00:53:28,610 --> 00:53:30,666 question I have is , you know , from 1493 00:53:30,666 --> 00:53:32,710 from the chairman on down the best 1494 00:53:32,710 --> 00:53:35,190 military advice on a deal that would 1495 00:53:35,190 --> 00:53:38,080 focus just on the nuclear parts of the 1496 00:53:38,090 --> 00:53:40,312 Iranian threat . You know , we're we're 1497 00:53:40,312 --> 00:53:42,201 going to be asked in some form or 1498 00:53:42,201 --> 00:53:44,423 fashion to weigh in on this , there's I 1499 00:53:44,423 --> 00:53:46,479 think a lot of briefing and a lot of 1500 00:53:46,479 --> 00:53:48,479 work that's still going to go on to 1501 00:53:48,479 --> 00:53:50,479 bring people up to speed . But as I 1502 00:53:50,479 --> 00:53:52,646 understand it , the deal like the last 1503 00:53:52,646 --> 00:53:52,480 deal doesn't include the ballistic 1504 00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:54,480 missile program and the terrorism . 1505 00:53:54,650 --> 00:53:56,817 What was the best military advice from 1506 00:53:56,817 --> 00:53:59,039 the Chairman on closing such a deal ? I 1507 00:53:59,039 --> 00:54:01,039 would defer to the Chairman on that 1508 00:54:01,039 --> 00:54:03,317 deal on that . On that military advice . 1509 00:54:03,317 --> 00:54:05,483 I would I would note the last deal did 1510 00:54:05,483 --> 00:54:07,539 not include those ancillary elements 1511 00:54:07,539 --> 00:54:09,539 that you talked about and that that 1512 00:54:09,539 --> 00:54:09,500 that that's concerning . But your best 1513 00:54:09,500 --> 00:54:11,500 military advice at your level since 1514 00:54:11,500 --> 00:54:13,500 this is your a Oh are you support a 1515 00:54:13,500 --> 00:54:15,667 deal that would just be focused on the 1516 00:54:15,667 --> 00:54:17,889 nuclear parts of the threat . I support 1517 00:54:17,889 --> 00:54:20,056 Iran not having a nuclear weapon and I 1518 00:54:20,056 --> 00:54:22,278 would support the most effective way to 1519 00:54:22,278 --> 00:54:24,444 get there . Uh that will not solve all 1520 00:54:24,444 --> 00:54:26,333 our problems that would solve one 1521 00:54:26,333 --> 00:54:28,556 problem . There are other areas that we 1522 00:54:28,556 --> 00:54:27,930 need to work in . And I know that we've 1523 00:54:27,930 --> 00:54:29,986 expressed interest in broadening the 1524 00:54:29,986 --> 00:54:32,041 agreement and my my understanding is 1525 00:54:32,041 --> 00:54:34,208 around has resisted that . But I think 1526 00:54:34,208 --> 00:54:34,200 we do need to get to a broader 1527 00:54:34,200 --> 00:54:36,256 agreement . But I but our number one 1528 00:54:36,256 --> 00:54:38,200 priority is for them not to have a 1529 00:54:38,200 --> 00:54:40,256 nuclear weapon , appreciate that . I 1530 00:54:40,256 --> 00:54:43,380 yield back . Thank you miss bice is 1531 00:54:43,380 --> 00:54:46,220 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 1532 00:54:46,220 --> 00:54:47,550 Mr Chairman . Mhm . 1533 00:54:50,240 --> 00:54:52,460 Um I appreciate the witnesses being 1534 00:54:52,460 --> 00:54:54,820 here this morning . General Mackenzie . 1535 00:54:54,830 --> 00:54:57,200 Has there been an impact to your a . O . 1536 00:54:57,200 --> 00:54:59,750 R since the Russian invasion of Ukraine ? 1537 00:55:00,240 --> 00:55:02,073 And if so , can you describe the 1538 00:55:02,073 --> 00:55:04,129 movement of the fighters potentially 1539 00:55:04,129 --> 00:55:06,540 from Syria or elsewhere from the hour 1540 00:55:06,540 --> 00:55:09,300 into Ukraine ? So you know , we watched 1541 00:55:09,300 --> 00:55:11,578 the Russians closely across the region . 1542 00:55:11,578 --> 00:55:13,800 They have not done much force balancing 1543 00:55:13,800 --> 00:55:15,967 as a result of the Ukraine operation . 1544 00:55:15,967 --> 00:55:15,930 I can talk a little bit more about that 1545 00:55:15,930 --> 00:55:18,152 in a closed session ? Not much really . 1546 00:55:18,152 --> 00:55:20,680 None significant . Um We have not seen 1547 00:55:20,680 --> 00:55:22,791 a flow of fighters and I can give you 1548 00:55:22,791 --> 00:55:24,736 some precise numbers in the closed 1549 00:55:24,736 --> 00:55:26,847 session but we just haven't seen much 1550 00:55:26,847 --> 00:55:26,700 of that yet . Out of out of Syria , I 1551 00:55:26,700 --> 00:55:28,700 know there's a lot of discussion of 1552 00:55:28,700 --> 00:55:30,922 that , we just it's just not evident to 1553 00:55:30,922 --> 00:55:33,144 us and we look at that pretty closely . 1554 00:55:33,144 --> 00:55:33,080 That could change , but that's sort of 1555 00:55:33,080 --> 00:55:36,100 what we see right now . Um I want to 1556 00:55:36,110 --> 00:55:37,777 take a step back when we were 1557 00:55:37,777 --> 00:55:39,980 discussing um in previous question 1558 00:55:39,980 --> 00:55:42,430 lines of questioning uh the taliban and 1559 00:55:42,430 --> 00:55:44,541 what's happened in Afghanistan during 1560 00:55:44,541 --> 00:55:46,652 the N . D . A . Markup ? I offered an 1561 00:55:46,652 --> 00:55:48,930 amendment which required the D . O . D . 1562 00:55:48,930 --> 00:55:50,874 To report to Congress the security 1563 00:55:50,874 --> 00:55:53,097 impacts of the release of the prisoners 1564 00:55:53,097 --> 00:55:55,319 from bagram air base . Um can you share 1565 00:55:55,319 --> 00:55:57,208 some of the security impacts that 1566 00:55:57,208 --> 00:55:59,208 you've seen from ST Camilo are as a 1567 00:55:59,208 --> 00:56:01,430 result of the prisoners releases . Sure 1568 00:56:01,430 --> 00:56:03,597 what the release of the prisoners from 1569 00:56:03,597 --> 00:56:06,020 bagram parwan and polish Arche which 1570 00:56:06,020 --> 00:56:08,020 the taliban overran on or about the 1571 00:56:08,020 --> 00:56:10,131 13th to the 15th of august 1st of all 1572 00:56:10,131 --> 00:56:12,700 injected about 1000 ISIS fighters back 1573 00:56:12,700 --> 00:56:14,867 into the battle space of Afghanistan . 1574 00:56:14,867 --> 00:56:17,560 And that rejuvenated ISIS K and was A 1575 00:56:17,570 --> 00:56:19,792 and and I believe the taliban are going 1576 00:56:19,792 --> 00:56:22,260 to grow to reject that regret the 1577 00:56:22,260 --> 00:56:24,371 decision to release those prisoners . 1578 00:56:24,371 --> 00:56:26,482 It also released thousands of Taliban 1579 00:56:26,482 --> 00:56:28,704 fighters and others who returned to who 1580 00:56:28,704 --> 00:56:30,816 returned to the taliban . But I think 1581 00:56:30,816 --> 00:56:33,038 that their action shortsighted actually 1582 00:56:33,038 --> 00:56:32,770 has had a profoundly profoundly 1583 00:56:32,850 --> 00:56:34,906 negative effect on conditions inside 1584 00:56:34,906 --> 00:56:37,380 Afghanistan . I believe ultimately , 1585 00:56:37,390 --> 00:56:39,557 unless we're able to keep effective CT 1586 00:56:39,557 --> 00:56:41,612 pressure on ISIS in particular , you 1587 00:56:41,612 --> 00:56:43,723 know , they will have the opportunity 1588 00:56:43,723 --> 00:56:45,834 to grow and seek to strike us here in 1589 00:56:45,834 --> 00:56:47,946 the homeland . And you mentioned that 1590 00:56:47,946 --> 00:56:49,890 earlier . Last question um , it is 1591 00:56:49,890 --> 00:56:52,001 widely known that large swaths of the 1592 00:56:52,001 --> 00:56:51,600 telecom infrastructure throughout the 1593 00:56:51,600 --> 00:56:53,920 continent of Africa are run on chinese 1594 00:56:53,920 --> 00:56:56,087 produced hardware including huawei and 1595 00:56:56,087 --> 00:56:59,100 Zte . I've long been concerned with the 1596 00:56:59,100 --> 00:57:01,920 network security threats um , that from 1597 00:57:01,920 --> 00:57:04,660 compromise , chinese produced hardware 1598 00:57:05,030 --> 00:57:07,030 um , have , can you talk about your 1599 00:57:07,030 --> 00:57:09,086 level of concern with these types of 1600 00:57:09,086 --> 00:57:10,660 threats ? From africom kor 1601 00:57:14,530 --> 00:57:18,090 Yes . So , uh , part of that extensive 1602 00:57:18,100 --> 00:57:19,989 chinese investment on the African 1603 00:57:19,989 --> 00:57:22,044 continent is telecommunications , as 1604 00:57:22,044 --> 00:57:24,330 you just mentioned , huawei is endemic 1605 00:57:24,330 --> 00:57:26,430 across the continent There they're 1606 00:57:26,430 --> 00:57:29,660 building a smart city safe cities 1607 00:57:29,670 --> 00:57:33,160 which are going to make , 1608 00:57:33,830 --> 00:57:35,997 you know , connect everything in those 1609 00:57:35,997 --> 00:57:38,480 cities and it will report back to 1610 00:57:38,480 --> 00:57:40,536 Beijing . Usually it reports back to 1611 00:57:40,536 --> 00:57:42,758 Beijing before . It reports to the host 1612 00:57:42,758 --> 00:57:45,590 nation's capital . So this is that's 1613 00:57:45,600 --> 00:57:48,080 fairly significant threat that I don't 1614 00:57:48,080 --> 00:57:49,747 think we truly understand the 1615 00:57:49,747 --> 00:57:52,650 implications of and and and we won't 1616 00:57:52,660 --> 00:57:54,771 until sometime in the future . Do you 1617 00:57:54,771 --> 00:57:56,827 think our allies are aware of that ? 1618 00:57:56,827 --> 00:58:00,040 Yes . I believe that they are . Uh but 1619 00:58:00,040 --> 00:58:02,040 at the same time they're wanting to 1620 00:58:02,040 --> 00:58:04,096 pull their countries into the modern 1621 00:58:04,096 --> 00:58:07,870 world and so china is offering a very 1622 00:58:07,980 --> 00:58:10,760 lucrative technologies that they 1623 00:58:10,760 --> 00:58:12,760 probably wouldn't be able to access 1624 00:58:12,820 --> 00:58:14,764 otherwise . And so I think they're 1625 00:58:14,764 --> 00:58:16,930 going into it mostly with eyes open . 1626 00:58:17,220 --> 00:58:20,500 Do you think there's any effective 1627 00:58:20,500 --> 00:58:22,722 response that the U . S . Could have to 1628 00:58:22,722 --> 00:58:25,840 this type of coercion if you will . 1629 00:58:26,820 --> 00:58:29,920 Um I think probably and I'll defer to 1630 00:58:30,150 --> 00:58:33,170 MS baker but I think probably 1631 00:58:33,180 --> 00:58:35,570 having an economic alternative , 1632 00:58:35,580 --> 00:58:37,691 economical alternative . Right ? Some 1633 00:58:37,691 --> 00:58:39,650 competitive alternatives in on the 1634 00:58:39,650 --> 00:58:41,770 economic side and the free market is 1635 00:58:41,770 --> 00:58:43,937 probably the best alternative . I love 1636 00:58:43,937 --> 00:58:46,048 the word free market general . Are we 1637 00:58:46,048 --> 00:58:48,214 too far down the path though ? Um with 1638 00:58:48,214 --> 00:58:50,310 the amount of equipment that's been 1639 00:58:50,310 --> 00:58:53,600 installed in Africa to really uh 1640 00:58:53,610 --> 00:58:56,620 impact in a positive way the the 1641 00:58:56,620 --> 00:58:58,740 continent . No , I don't believe that 1642 00:58:58,740 --> 00:59:01,350 we are in the countries in the safe 1643 00:59:01,350 --> 00:59:03,017 cities that are already being 1644 00:59:03,017 --> 00:59:05,128 established . Yes , but elsewhere , I 1645 00:59:05,128 --> 00:59:07,017 don't believe that we are speaker 1646 00:59:07,017 --> 00:59:09,072 congressman . If I could just add to 1647 00:59:09,072 --> 00:59:11,239 that . You know , I think our strategy 1648 00:59:11,239 --> 00:59:11,150 as it relates to the telecommunications 1649 00:59:11,150 --> 00:59:12,983 infrastructure and and the china 1650 00:59:12,983 --> 00:59:15,320 challenge is twofold . The first as as 1651 00:59:15,320 --> 00:59:17,487 Jill Townsend said is we are trying to 1652 00:59:17,487 --> 00:59:19,598 make sure that partners and allies in 1653 00:59:19,598 --> 00:59:21,487 the , in the region , not only in 1654 00:59:21,487 --> 00:59:23,520 Africa , but globally have the 1655 00:59:23,520 --> 00:59:26,380 information that we see about the 1656 00:59:26,380 --> 00:59:28,158 threat that this poses to their 1657 00:59:28,158 --> 00:59:29,991 infrastructure and the potential 1658 00:59:29,991 --> 00:59:32,324 vulnerabilities that it will , you know , 1659 00:59:32,324 --> 00:59:34,547 introduce into their system . So that's 1660 00:59:34,547 --> 00:59:36,491 part one is sort of an educational 1661 00:59:36,491 --> 00:59:38,436 aspect were also and this is not a 1662 00:59:38,436 --> 00:59:40,602 Department of Defense lead , but as an 1663 00:59:40,602 --> 00:59:42,824 administration looking at technological 1664 00:59:42,824 --> 00:59:44,769 solutions that would allow some of 1665 00:59:44,769 --> 00:59:46,658 these countries to get after that 1666 00:59:46,658 --> 00:59:48,602 telecommunications capability that 1667 00:59:48,602 --> 00:59:50,769 they're so desperate to get . But it's 1668 00:59:50,769 --> 00:59:52,936 safer . Gentleman's time has expired . 1669 00:59:52,936 --> 00:59:54,769 MS Murphy is recognized for five 1670 00:59:54,769 --> 00:59:53,450 minutes .