1 00:00:01,340 --> 00:00:03,490 thank you Mr Chairman . Um you know , 2 00:00:03,490 --> 00:00:05,930 one of the areas that I've had some 3 00:00:05,930 --> 00:00:09,900 concerns about is um Iran's both 4 00:00:09,900 --> 00:00:13,080 direct and through proxies um influence 5 00:00:13,090 --> 00:00:15,350 in Syria and Lebanon . And in fact , I 6 00:00:15,360 --> 00:00:17,416 was able to secure provisions in the 7 00:00:17,416 --> 00:00:20,120 fiscal year 2020 intelligence 8 00:00:20,120 --> 00:00:22,950 authorization act to ask the DNA too . 9 00:00:23,340 --> 00:00:26,210 You know , report to us a bit about um 10 00:00:26,220 --> 00:00:29,700 those efforts by Iran and and what and 11 00:00:29,710 --> 00:00:32,980 how those efforts might impact us 12 00:00:32,980 --> 00:00:35,150 interests and our allies , including 13 00:00:35,150 --> 00:00:37,261 Israel . I was wondering if you could 14 00:00:37,261 --> 00:00:39,372 provide me with a bit of an update on 15 00:00:39,372 --> 00:00:41,539 Iran's efforts to expand its influence 16 00:00:41,539 --> 00:00:44,270 in Syria and Lebanon . Yes , ma'am , 17 00:00:44,270 --> 00:00:46,437 I'll begin and I'll begin with Lebanon 18 00:00:46,470 --> 00:00:49,540 as I spoke a little bit earlier , Iran 19 00:00:49,540 --> 00:00:52,320 sees Lebanon as the terminus of the of 20 00:00:52,320 --> 00:00:54,830 a land bridge to the Mediterranean that 21 00:00:54,830 --> 00:00:56,997 gives them a perch from which they can 22 00:00:56,997 --> 00:00:58,997 launch attacks on Israel . So their 23 00:00:58,997 --> 00:01:00,830 interest in Lebanon is holy holy 24 00:01:00,830 --> 00:01:02,997 transactional and is limited to that . 25 00:01:02,997 --> 00:01:05,170 Now they exercise influence in uh in 26 00:01:05,170 --> 00:01:07,170 Lebanon through Lebanese Lebanese , 27 00:01:07,170 --> 00:01:09,610 Hezbollah , LH a shadow organization 28 00:01:09,610 --> 00:01:11,990 that we recognize has penetrated many 29 00:01:11,990 --> 00:01:14,157 aspects of Lebanese society . But then 30 00:01:14,157 --> 00:01:16,212 again , doesn't actually do much for 31 00:01:16,212 --> 00:01:18,379 the Lebanese . Our response to that is 32 00:01:18,379 --> 00:01:20,657 at my level at the mill two mill level . 33 00:01:20,657 --> 00:01:22,657 Despite the many other things we're 34 00:01:22,657 --> 00:01:24,879 doing for the the government of Lebanon 35 00:01:24,879 --> 00:01:26,823 writ large is we work very hard to 36 00:01:26,823 --> 00:01:28,879 sustain the Lebanese armed forces as 37 00:01:28,879 --> 00:01:30,990 the single military representative of 38 00:01:30,990 --> 00:01:33,157 the properly constituted government of 39 00:01:33,157 --> 00:01:32,790 Lebanon . It is not a perfect 40 00:01:32,790 --> 00:01:34,790 relationship , but I believe in the 41 00:01:34,790 --> 00:01:36,901 long term , our best solution and and 42 00:01:36,901 --> 00:01:39,160 the the strategy that we follow is to 43 00:01:39,160 --> 00:01:41,160 assist that armed force . I have to 44 00:01:41,160 --> 00:01:42,993 speak to the Chief of Defense of 45 00:01:42,993 --> 00:01:45,216 Lebanon frequently . And I believe that 46 00:01:45,216 --> 00:01:47,216 they remain our best opportunity to 47 00:01:47,216 --> 00:01:49,438 balance the other nefarious actors that 48 00:01:49,438 --> 00:01:51,560 are in Lebanon . If we turn to Syria 49 00:01:51,840 --> 00:01:54,520 again , Iran's interests in Syria , 50 00:01:54,740 --> 00:01:57,040 holy transactional wholly negative , it 51 00:01:57,040 --> 00:01:59,207 is the sort of middle part of the land 52 00:01:59,207 --> 00:02:01,151 bridge that allows him to get into 53 00:02:01,151 --> 00:02:03,207 Israel . It also serves as a staging 54 00:02:03,207 --> 00:02:05,207 place for potential attacks against 55 00:02:05,207 --> 00:02:07,262 Israel and allows them also to uh to 56 00:02:07,262 --> 00:02:09,970 stage for operations inside inside Iraq , 57 00:02:09,980 --> 00:02:12,790 which is a long term focus of Syrian 58 00:02:12,790 --> 00:02:14,960 foreign policy and military strategy . 59 00:02:18,740 --> 00:02:21,230 Great thank you . Um and then just 60 00:02:21,240 --> 00:02:23,462 shifting a little bit um you know , the 61 00:02:23,462 --> 00:02:25,629 Wall Street Journal reported yesterday 62 00:02:25,629 --> 00:02:27,462 that Saudi Arabia is considering 63 00:02:27,462 --> 00:02:29,630 accepting the chinese Iran as payment 64 00:02:29,630 --> 00:02:32,690 for oil exports , which currently only 65 00:02:32,690 --> 00:02:35,560 accepts us dollars . You know , this is 66 00:02:35,840 --> 00:02:38,280 following up on news that Saudi Arabia 67 00:02:38,280 --> 00:02:40,780 had invited the chinese president to 68 00:02:40,780 --> 00:02:43,002 visit the kingdom on an official trip . 69 00:02:43,040 --> 00:02:45,151 You know , I think when I think about 70 00:02:45,151 --> 00:02:47,373 the prospect of a growing Saudi chinese 71 00:02:47,373 --> 00:02:50,350 relationship , um it's it's a little 72 00:02:50,350 --> 00:02:52,480 concerning , especially given the the 73 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:54,424 historical partnership between the 74 00:02:54,424 --> 00:02:56,591 United States and the Kingdom . What's 75 00:02:56,591 --> 00:02:58,424 your assessment of current Saudi 76 00:02:58,424 --> 00:03:00,900 chinese relations and the impact that 77 00:03:00,900 --> 00:03:03,830 it could have on the United States 78 00:03:03,830 --> 00:03:05,941 relationship as well as our influence 79 00:03:05,941 --> 00:03:08,163 in the region , ma'am . I can only talk 80 00:03:08,163 --> 00:03:10,330 really in my lane at the mill two mill 81 00:03:10,330 --> 00:03:12,386 level . But I will note that we we I 82 00:03:12,386 --> 00:03:14,608 have a good relationship with the Saudi 83 00:03:14,608 --> 00:03:16,830 Chief of Defense . We talk frequently . 84 00:03:16,830 --> 00:03:18,774 It is my belief that we remain the 85 00:03:18,774 --> 00:03:20,774 preferred partner of choice for the 86 00:03:20,774 --> 00:03:22,941 kingdom of Saudi Arabia . They won't , 87 00:03:22,941 --> 00:03:25,052 they want our equipment and they want 88 00:03:25,052 --> 00:03:24,440 more than our equipment , which is 89 00:03:24,440 --> 00:03:26,607 demonstrably the best available . They 90 00:03:26,607 --> 00:03:28,607 want the training , the education , 91 00:03:28,607 --> 00:03:30,662 then all the things that come with a 92 00:03:30,662 --> 00:03:32,440 partnership with America as for 93 00:03:32,440 --> 00:03:34,551 outreach to the chinese and what they 94 00:03:34,551 --> 00:03:36,440 might do with oil cells . They're 95 00:03:36,440 --> 00:03:38,496 probably not not my lane to answer . 96 00:03:38,496 --> 00:03:40,718 I'll defer to MS baker on that . Yeah , 97 00:03:40,718 --> 00:03:42,440 I mean I agree completely with 98 00:03:42,440 --> 00:03:44,551 everything that General Mackenzie has 99 00:03:44,551 --> 00:03:46,440 said . The only thing I would add 100 00:03:46,440 --> 00:03:48,551 perhaps by way of context , it's it's 101 00:03:48,551 --> 00:03:48,310 clear to us . I think that strategic 102 00:03:48,310 --> 00:03:50,532 competition has come to the Middle East 103 00:03:50,532 --> 00:03:52,588 and perhaps has been there for quite 104 00:03:52,588 --> 00:03:54,754 some time . And so we do see china and 105 00:03:54,754 --> 00:03:56,977 Russia , but particularly china looking 106 00:03:56,977 --> 00:03:59,320 for economic and other inroads with 107 00:03:59,320 --> 00:04:01,376 some of our partners and allies . As 108 00:04:01,376 --> 00:04:03,487 General Mackenzie said from a defense 109 00:04:03,487 --> 00:04:05,487 perspective , we believe that those 110 00:04:05,487 --> 00:04:07,431 relationships are strong , that we 111 00:04:07,431 --> 00:04:09,542 remain the partner of choice and that 112 00:04:09,542 --> 00:04:08,720 there are things that we bring to the 113 00:04:08,720 --> 00:04:10,553 table and that we're offering to 114 00:04:10,553 --> 00:04:12,730 partners and allies in the region that 115 00:04:12,730 --> 00:04:14,960 frankly china and others can't match . 116 00:04:18,640 --> 00:04:22,480 Thank you And I yield back Mr Waltz is 117 00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:25,640 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 118 00:04:25,640 --> 00:04:28,760 Mr Chairman , General McKenzie , 119 00:04:29,840 --> 00:04:33,100 Thank you again for your service is 120 00:04:33,100 --> 00:04:35,100 Great Nation and and and simplify . 121 00:04:37,040 --> 00:04:39,260 I just have a pretty straightforward 122 00:04:39,260 --> 00:04:41,880 question for you on Afghanistan . Just 123 00:04:41,890 --> 00:04:44,310 given how the withdrawal , not the 20 124 00:04:44,310 --> 00:04:46,470 years , not the mistakes that we've 125 00:04:46,470 --> 00:04:48,660 made , but given how this withdrawal 126 00:04:48,660 --> 00:04:51,990 was conducted , which most would say 127 00:04:51,990 --> 00:04:54,810 was was a bit of a debacle . Any 128 00:04:54,810 --> 00:04:58,760 regrets ? I think the endgame 129 00:04:58,760 --> 00:05:00,927 for Afghanistan that played out in the 130 00:05:00,927 --> 00:05:02,982 summer of 2021 , those events didn't 131 00:05:02,982 --> 00:05:04,927 begin in the spring of 2021 of the 132 00:05:04,927 --> 00:05:06,982 summer 2021 . You've got to look all 133 00:05:06,982 --> 00:05:08,982 the way back for that . Certainly I 134 00:05:08,982 --> 00:05:10,871 regret that we no longer have the 135 00:05:10,871 --> 00:05:13,038 ability to be as effective as we would 136 00:05:13,038 --> 00:05:12,990 like to be on the ground in Afghanistan 137 00:05:12,990 --> 00:05:15,101 and the CT mission . We're doing that 138 00:05:15,101 --> 00:05:17,268 over the horizon . As I've said , it's 139 00:05:17,268 --> 00:05:19,490 much harder to do that over the horizon 140 00:05:19,490 --> 00:05:19,020 and I'll talk in great detail about 141 00:05:19,020 --> 00:05:20,798 that in a closed session . So I 142 00:05:20,798 --> 00:05:23,020 certainly regret that we no longer have 143 00:05:23,020 --> 00:05:25,131 that opportunity . I've spoken with a 144 00:05:25,131 --> 00:05:27,360 number of the 13 Gold Star families who 145 00:05:27,840 --> 00:05:29,673 are now without their loved ones 146 00:05:29,673 --> 00:05:33,570 because of an ISIS fighter suicide 147 00:05:33,570 --> 00:05:35,626 bomber that was released from bagram 148 00:05:35,626 --> 00:05:38,290 prison just weeks before . I just 149 00:05:38,290 --> 00:05:41,020 received notes from Afghan women who 150 00:05:41,020 --> 00:05:43,020 served in the military alongside us 151 00:05:43,020 --> 00:05:45,076 that are being hunted down right now 152 00:05:45,540 --> 00:05:47,990 with the database that we left behind . 153 00:05:47,990 --> 00:05:51,170 With the payroll database , no regrets 154 00:05:51,170 --> 00:05:53,392 there . No , nothing we could have done 155 00:05:53,392 --> 00:05:55,760 differently in terms of how we exited . 156 00:05:56,440 --> 00:05:58,273 I think you go back to the basic 157 00:05:58,273 --> 00:06:00,496 strategic decision that we were leaving 158 00:06:00,496 --> 00:06:02,496 and everything else flows from that 159 00:06:02,496 --> 00:06:04,496 basic strategic decision that we're 160 00:06:04,496 --> 00:06:03,850 going to leave and we're gonna leave 161 00:06:03,850 --> 00:06:05,906 completely and everything flows from 162 00:06:05,906 --> 00:06:08,072 that . And was that the right decision 163 00:06:08,072 --> 00:06:10,128 in your view ? I have my opinion has 164 00:06:10,128 --> 00:06:12,239 been and I've stated publicly that we 165 00:06:12,239 --> 00:06:14,350 should have retained a small presence 166 00:06:14,350 --> 00:06:16,461 in Afghanistan . I argued for 4500 in 167 00:06:16,461 --> 00:06:18,683 the fall of 2020 . And , and as we went 168 00:06:18,683 --> 00:06:20,683 into the spring of 2021 , it was my 169 00:06:20,683 --> 00:06:22,850 opinion and remains my opinion today . 170 00:06:22,850 --> 00:06:24,850 That about 2500 would have given us 171 00:06:24,850 --> 00:06:27,072 adequate forces on the ground to retain 172 00:06:27,072 --> 00:06:29,183 an advising capability . I appreciate 173 00:06:29,183 --> 00:06:31,017 that . Ah , and I appreciate you 174 00:06:31,017 --> 00:06:32,850 reminding this committee of that 175 00:06:32,850 --> 00:06:35,072 because I think we are going to come to 176 00:06:35,072 --> 00:06:37,183 regret this decision and I think it's 177 00:06:37,183 --> 00:06:39,239 going to be felt on the homeland and 178 00:06:39,239 --> 00:06:41,017 it's going to be felt by future 179 00:06:41,017 --> 00:06:43,239 american soldiers that have to go fight 180 00:06:43,239 --> 00:06:45,406 their way back in to deal with it . MS 181 00:06:45,406 --> 00:06:47,572 baker along those lines , the Fy 22 nd 182 00:06:47,572 --> 00:06:51,230 a required And over the horizon 183 00:06:51,230 --> 00:06:53,397 strategy . Within 60 days of passage . 184 00:06:53,397 --> 00:06:55,508 That was about a month ago . You're a 185 00:06:55,508 --> 00:06:58,660 month late . Where's that strategy ? Uh , 186 00:06:58,670 --> 00:07:01,620 Congressman ? I don't know the exact 187 00:07:01,630 --> 00:07:04,470 uh , progress of that strategy . I'd be 188 00:07:04,470 --> 00:07:06,526 happy to look into it and get you an 189 00:07:06,526 --> 00:07:08,748 answer . You don't know the progress of 190 00:07:08,748 --> 00:07:10,859 an over the horizon strategy required 191 00:07:10,859 --> 00:07:12,914 by law , the President of the United 192 00:07:12,914 --> 00:07:14,914 States has cited over the horizon . 193 00:07:14,914 --> 00:07:17,137 Strategy . Secretary Austin , your boss 194 00:07:17,137 --> 00:07:19,720 here the last time he was here said we 195 00:07:19,720 --> 00:07:21,831 can do over the horizon , we can keep 196 00:07:21,831 --> 00:07:23,760 America safe . I'm in my district 197 00:07:23,870 --> 00:07:25,981 saying the administration says we can 198 00:07:25,981 --> 00:07:27,926 do this even though it's a special 199 00:07:27,926 --> 00:07:29,814 operator , I know better . What's 200 00:07:29,814 --> 00:07:31,926 what's the status General Mackenzie , 201 00:07:31,926 --> 00:07:34,037 have you chopped on it and send it up 202 00:07:34,037 --> 00:07:36,092 to usd that strategy ? Is is working 203 00:07:36,092 --> 00:07:38,037 right now ? I have we have had the 204 00:07:38,037 --> 00:07:40,092 opportunity to work on that strategy 205 00:07:40,092 --> 00:07:41,926 and we actually have a practical 206 00:07:41,926 --> 00:07:41,720 strategy that's in effect right now . 207 00:07:41,720 --> 00:07:43,887 Again , something I'd be happy to talk 208 00:07:43,887 --> 00:07:45,553 about in a closed session and 209 00:07:45,553 --> 00:07:47,776 congressman , if I could just clarify , 210 00:07:47,776 --> 00:07:47,620 we do have a strategy for over the 211 00:07:47,620 --> 00:07:49,676 horizon . What I was referring to is 212 00:07:49,676 --> 00:07:51,787 the specific report . I don't I don't 213 00:07:51,787 --> 00:07:54,064 know what the status of that report is , 214 00:07:54,064 --> 00:07:56,176 but I will get you an answer . Okay , 215 00:07:56,176 --> 00:07:59,770 do you what local out , let's take a 216 00:07:59,770 --> 00:08:01,826 step back . We just had a successful 217 00:08:01,826 --> 00:08:04,490 strike against the leader of um the 218 00:08:04,490 --> 00:08:06,823 leader of Isis , the successor in Syria . 219 00:08:07,140 --> 00:08:09,196 And as I've stayed in this committee 220 00:08:09,196 --> 00:08:10,973 before , but I think it's worth 221 00:08:10,973 --> 00:08:13,029 repeating . We had local allies that 222 00:08:13,029 --> 00:08:15,307 helped with that , correct . The kurds , 223 00:08:15,307 --> 00:08:17,529 we have bases in the region in Jordan , 224 00:08:17,529 --> 00:08:19,751 Turkey , Israel Northern Iraq . Right , 225 00:08:19,751 --> 00:08:21,696 so I would still characterize that 226 00:08:21,696 --> 00:08:23,862 strike and I'm now , as you know , I'm 227 00:08:23,862 --> 00:08:26,029 the officer who was characterized that 228 00:08:26,029 --> 00:08:28,362 is over the horizon is over the horizon . 229 00:08:28,362 --> 00:08:27,900 That is , I would characterize that . 230 00:08:27,900 --> 00:08:30,122 And let's let's look at the map again . 231 00:08:30,122 --> 00:08:32,344 Do we have any bases in any neighboring 232 00:08:32,344 --> 00:08:34,233 country in Afghanistan ? Know the 233 00:08:34,233 --> 00:08:36,289 differences as you as you know , the 234 00:08:36,289 --> 00:08:38,344 distances are far greater going into 235 00:08:38,344 --> 00:08:40,344 Afghanistan . Conceptually it's the 236 00:08:40,344 --> 00:08:42,622 same thing . The distances are greater . 237 00:08:42,622 --> 00:08:41,850 The risk will be higher and you're well 238 00:08:41,850 --> 00:08:43,720 aware of that sir . Are we still 239 00:08:43,720 --> 00:08:46,330 reliant on Pakistan for overflight of R . 240 00:08:46,340 --> 00:08:48,562 R . I . S are assets . There's no other 241 00:08:48,562 --> 00:08:50,740 way to get into Afghanistan for me . 242 00:08:50,740 --> 00:08:52,960 Right now , Pakistan has historically 243 00:08:52,960 --> 00:08:55,160 supported the taliban , correct ? They 244 00:08:55,160 --> 00:08:57,327 have also supported us . The airline a 245 00:08:57,327 --> 00:08:59,810 communication is is a direct reflect of 246 00:08:59,900 --> 00:09:02,420 Pakistan but it's a bit like asking the 247 00:09:02,420 --> 00:09:05,650 arsonist for access for the fire 248 00:09:05,650 --> 00:09:07,761 department to put out the fire should 249 00:09:07,761 --> 00:09:09,872 the homeland be threatened again . We 250 00:09:09,872 --> 00:09:11,928 are reliant just to be clear , we're 251 00:09:11,928 --> 00:09:14,261 relying on Pakistan for that overflight . 252 00:09:14,261 --> 00:09:16,428 Otherwise we got to fight our way in . 253 00:09:16,428 --> 00:09:16,340 We are relying on Pakistan but as you 254 00:09:16,340 --> 00:09:18,451 know , we always reserve the right to 255 00:09:18,451 --> 00:09:20,729 defend ourselves anywhere in the world . 256 00:09:20,940 --> 00:09:24,290 Thank you . Mr Chairman , Thank you . 257 00:09:24,300 --> 00:09:26,578 Mr Crow is recognized for five minutes . 258 00:09:26,740 --> 00:09:28,907 Thank you Mr Chairman and thank you to 259 00:09:28,907 --> 00:09:30,851 all of you for your service to the 260 00:09:30,851 --> 00:09:30,770 country and for coming in and 261 00:09:30,770 --> 00:09:32,659 particularly General Townsend and 262 00:09:32,659 --> 00:09:34,440 General Mackenzie in your last 263 00:09:34,440 --> 00:09:36,607 appearance here before the committee . 264 00:09:36,607 --> 00:09:38,718 I applaud you for your long uh and an 265 00:09:38,718 --> 00:09:40,662 honorable service to the country . 266 00:09:40,662 --> 00:09:42,773 General Mackenzie . I understand very 267 00:09:42,773 --> 00:09:44,940 deeply that decisions are made here in 268 00:09:44,940 --> 00:09:47,107 Washington and strategic decisions are 269 00:09:47,107 --> 00:09:49,218 made and the military has to carry it 270 00:09:49,218 --> 00:09:48,660 out . And I'm gonna thank you for your 271 00:09:48,840 --> 00:09:51,760 service and and candor before this 272 00:09:51,760 --> 00:09:53,816 committee and the american people on 273 00:09:53,816 --> 00:09:56,070 Afghanistan and related issues uh in in 274 00:09:56,070 --> 00:09:58,181 general towns . And as much as I want 275 00:09:58,181 --> 00:10:00,348 to start with you as a fellow ranger , 276 00:10:00,348 --> 00:10:02,292 actually gonna start and direct my 277 00:10:02,292 --> 00:10:04,459 comments to MS baker . MS baker , what 278 00:10:04,459 --> 00:10:06,292 is the timeline for the national 279 00:10:06,292 --> 00:10:08,403 Defense strategy ? When can we expect 280 00:10:08,403 --> 00:10:10,014 to have that released by the 281 00:10:10,014 --> 00:10:12,070 administration congressman ? I can't 282 00:10:12,070 --> 00:10:14,126 provide you with a specific data . I 283 00:10:14,126 --> 00:10:15,959 can tell you that it is in final 284 00:10:15,959 --> 00:10:18,126 coordination and we are hopeful to get 285 00:10:18,126 --> 00:10:20,237 it over to you all and and out to the 286 00:10:20,237 --> 00:10:22,570 public very soon . Okay . And is that 287 00:10:22,580 --> 00:10:24,580 is that been held up because of the 288 00:10:24,580 --> 00:10:26,820 recent events in Ukraine ? Uh , 289 00:10:26,830 --> 00:10:28,608 Congressman ? I think it's only 290 00:10:28,608 --> 00:10:30,663 appropriate for us to take a look at 291 00:10:30,663 --> 00:10:32,886 what's happened in Ukraine and and make 292 00:10:32,886 --> 00:10:35,052 sure that we're reflecting that in the 293 00:10:35,052 --> 00:10:37,219 strategy . I will say that the N . D . 294 00:10:37,219 --> 00:10:36,610 S as it's been developed over the 295 00:10:36,610 --> 00:10:38,832 course of the last year , we believe is 296 00:10:38,832 --> 00:10:40,888 very resilient to current events and 297 00:10:40,888 --> 00:10:44,660 and in fact uh , continues 298 00:10:44,660 --> 00:10:48,460 to to sort of the the bones of it are 299 00:10:48,460 --> 00:10:50,682 going to remain unchanged . I can I can 300 00:10:50,682 --> 00:10:52,349 certainly appreciate that and 301 00:10:52,349 --> 00:10:54,349 appreciate that you are taking into 302 00:10:54,349 --> 00:10:56,460 account some of the current events as 303 00:10:56,460 --> 00:10:58,627 well , that have changed the landscape 304 00:10:58,627 --> 00:11:01,200 a bit ? Um focusing in on africa ? You 305 00:11:01,200 --> 00:11:03,256 know , we have this uh , this notion 306 00:11:03,256 --> 00:11:05,540 that this um proclivity to kind of look 307 00:11:05,540 --> 00:11:07,750 at china is 10 ft tall sometimes and 308 00:11:07,750 --> 00:11:09,361 certainly they're making big 309 00:11:09,361 --> 00:11:11,472 investments and it would be a mistake 310 00:11:11,472 --> 00:11:13,417 for us to underestimate them , but 311 00:11:13,417 --> 00:11:15,639 they're also making a lot of mistakes . 312 00:11:15,639 --> 00:11:17,806 Right ? And the use of chinese labor , 313 00:11:17,806 --> 00:11:19,972 predatory economics , there's a lot of 314 00:11:19,972 --> 00:11:22,028 disenchantment that's growing within 315 00:11:22,028 --> 00:11:24,740 Africa in some places . Um , so they 316 00:11:24,740 --> 00:11:28,130 certainly have their weak points and we 317 00:11:28,130 --> 00:11:29,908 have our strengths . One of our 318 00:11:29,908 --> 00:11:31,963 strengths is the fact that we have a 319 00:11:31,963 --> 00:11:34,186 larger value proposition . We can bring 320 00:11:34,186 --> 00:11:36,408 to the table economic humanitarian , um 321 00:11:36,408 --> 00:11:38,660 uh you know , our moral authority , a 322 00:11:38,660 --> 00:11:42,030 lot of things . How would you classify 323 00:11:42,040 --> 00:11:44,040 very briefly , what is the elevator 324 00:11:44,040 --> 00:11:47,020 pitch for ? What is U . S . Strategy in 325 00:11:47,020 --> 00:11:49,190 africa ? Well , what what what how 326 00:11:49,190 --> 00:11:51,460 would you explain our our strategic 327 00:11:51,940 --> 00:11:53,760 posture in africa and our goals 328 00:11:55,140 --> 00:11:57,307 Congressman ? I and I'd invite General 329 00:11:57,307 --> 00:11:59,362 Townsend to add to this . I think we 330 00:11:59,362 --> 00:12:01,529 have three goals in africa right now . 331 00:12:01,529 --> 00:12:03,584 One is counter V . E . O . And we do 332 00:12:03,584 --> 00:12:05,418 that by with and through our our 333 00:12:05,418 --> 00:12:07,418 partners . The second is to that to 334 00:12:07,418 --> 00:12:09,418 that same point . We are working to 335 00:12:09,418 --> 00:12:11,307 strengthen those partnerships and 336 00:12:11,307 --> 00:12:13,473 strengthen those are , I don't mean to 337 00:12:13,473 --> 00:12:15,418 interrupt those are things to do , 338 00:12:15,418 --> 00:12:17,584 those are tasks enablers . What is our 339 00:12:17,584 --> 00:12:19,751 overarching goal goal ? What how do we 340 00:12:19,751 --> 00:12:21,807 want to be known in africa ? And how 341 00:12:21,807 --> 00:12:23,696 would you classify our engagement 342 00:12:23,696 --> 00:12:25,862 congressman ? I mean I certainly think 343 00:12:25,862 --> 00:12:27,918 that our goal in Africa is to be the 344 00:12:27,918 --> 00:12:30,251 continent's strategic partner of choice . 345 00:12:30,251 --> 00:12:33,580 Can so with that in mind . Um and from 346 00:12:33,580 --> 00:12:36,110 your purchase D . O . D . And and US 347 00:12:36,110 --> 00:12:38,750 government often has silos right . You 348 00:12:38,750 --> 00:12:40,917 know , State Department has their silo 349 00:12:40,917 --> 00:12:43,194 and they're laying D O D . U S A I . D . 350 00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:46,560 If our value proposition is to 351 00:12:46,560 --> 00:12:48,671 coordinate all of that and bring that 352 00:12:48,671 --> 00:12:51,130 all to bear in a way that our force 353 00:12:51,130 --> 00:12:53,720 multiplies each of those elements . How 354 00:12:53,720 --> 00:12:55,776 can we better do that ? And what are 355 00:12:55,776 --> 00:12:57,998 the impediments to achieving that right 356 00:12:57,998 --> 00:12:59,887 now , congressman ? I think we're 357 00:12:59,887 --> 00:13:01,831 always working to break down those 358 00:13:01,831 --> 00:13:03,942 silos as you well know from from your 359 00:13:03,942 --> 00:13:06,164 time in in in in uniform , I will say , 360 00:13:06,164 --> 00:13:08,276 I think in general Townsend again can 361 00:13:08,276 --> 00:13:10,520 can jump in here but it works better in 362 00:13:10,520 --> 00:13:13,690 the African Mayo are the integration of 363 00:13:13,690 --> 00:13:16,540 our defense , diplomacy and development 364 00:13:16,550 --> 00:13:18,810 efforts . Uh the fact that that general 365 00:13:18,810 --> 00:13:21,032 Townsend has folks from Usa I . D . And 366 00:13:21,032 --> 00:13:23,143 states sitting right beside him at at 367 00:13:23,143 --> 00:13:25,143 his headquarters . So I think we've 368 00:13:25,143 --> 00:13:27,199 made a lot of progress in africa and 369 00:13:27,199 --> 00:13:29,310 frankly there are things we can learn 370 00:13:29,310 --> 00:13:31,254 from africom and apply to other co 371 00:13:31,254 --> 00:13:33,960 comes . So I think she's got our 372 00:13:33,960 --> 00:13:36,127 strategic goal Exactly right . We want 373 00:13:36,127 --> 00:13:38,238 to be the strategic partner of choice 374 00:13:38,238 --> 00:13:41,250 that translates into us sustained us 375 00:13:41,250 --> 00:13:43,472 access and influence on the continent . 376 00:13:43,472 --> 00:13:45,306 And that will come in handy in a 377 00:13:45,306 --> 00:13:47,528 million ways that we can't even foresee 378 00:13:47,528 --> 00:13:50,210 today regarding the the the integration 379 00:13:50,220 --> 00:13:52,553 of you know the breaking down the silos . 380 00:13:52,553 --> 00:13:54,776 We try really hard to do that every day 381 00:13:54,776 --> 00:13:56,870 in africom . Uh dr baker bakers 382 00:13:56,870 --> 00:13:59,203 mentioned the fact that we have three D . 383 00:13:59,203 --> 00:14:01,370 Command built that way , purpose built 384 00:14:01,370 --> 00:14:03,510 that way from the start . One of my 385 00:14:03,520 --> 00:14:05,631 most senior leaders is a senior State 386 00:14:05,631 --> 00:14:07,576 Department ambassador . I've got a 387 00:14:07,576 --> 00:14:09,798 senior development advisor from USA I . 388 00:14:09,798 --> 00:14:11,964 D . We look at everything through that 389 00:14:11,964 --> 00:14:14,340 three D . Lens every day to to be the 390 00:14:14,340 --> 00:14:16,118 strategic partner of choice and 391 00:14:16,118 --> 00:14:18,062 maintain US access and influence . 392 00:14:18,140 --> 00:14:20,140 Thank you . I appreciate everyone's 393 00:14:20,140 --> 00:14:22,307 hard work . I yield back . Thank you . 394 00:14:22,307 --> 00:14:24,940 Uh Just programming note . Um as I 395 00:14:24,940 --> 00:14:26,940 mentioned at one o'clock we will we 396 00:14:26,940 --> 00:14:28,718 will have a classified briefing 397 00:14:28,718 --> 00:14:30,640 upstairs on Ukraine . So we'll be 398 00:14:30,640 --> 00:14:33,320 closed will be concluding this at 12 45 399 00:14:33,320 --> 00:14:35,542 to give the committee and we're in time 400 00:14:35,542 --> 00:14:37,764 to sort of move up and get settled . So 401 00:14:37,764 --> 00:14:39,987 we'll wrap this up , Open hearing up at 402 00:14:39,987 --> 00:14:42,153 12:45 . Then of course we'll be seeing 403 00:14:42,153 --> 00:14:44,209 all of these folks again at 2:30 for 404 00:14:44,209 --> 00:14:46,098 the classified portion of it . Mr 405 00:14:46,098 --> 00:14:48,376 Bergman is recognized for five minutes . 406 00:14:48,376 --> 00:14:50,153 Thank you . Mr Chairman General 407 00:14:50,153 --> 00:14:52,209 Mackenzie . General Townsend . Thank 408 00:14:52,209 --> 00:14:54,431 you for your decades of leadership . It 409 00:14:54,431 --> 00:14:56,598 takes leadership to do what we need to 410 00:14:56,598 --> 00:15:00,010 do . Um Mr baker . General Mackenzie . 411 00:15:00,020 --> 00:15:02,850 Um We lay out a scenario for you under 412 00:15:02,850 --> 00:15:05,690 the 2015 J . c . p . O . A . 413 00:15:06,340 --> 00:15:10,020 Russia removed all excess 414 00:15:10,170 --> 00:15:12,590 low enriched uranium and nuclear 415 00:15:12,590 --> 00:15:15,730 materials from Iran . If a similar 416 00:15:15,730 --> 00:15:19,060 requirement exists in a new deal 417 00:15:19,840 --> 00:15:23,690 and if Iran subsequently believes the 418 00:15:23,690 --> 00:15:27,590 agreement has been violated or that 419 00:15:27,590 --> 00:15:30,150 head is that it has not received the 420 00:15:30,150 --> 00:15:34,020 promised sanctions relief will Russia 421 00:15:34,030 --> 00:15:37,530 could Russia be in a position to 422 00:15:37,530 --> 00:15:40,960 return enriched uranium to Iran 423 00:15:41,540 --> 00:15:44,200 in essence . Would that potentially put 424 00:15:44,210 --> 00:15:47,910 Vladimir Putin in the position of being 425 00:15:47,910 --> 00:15:50,600 the de facto judge of compliance with 426 00:15:50,600 --> 00:15:51,600 the new agreement 427 00:15:54,540 --> 00:15:58,350 and congressman as you know there is no 428 00:15:58,350 --> 00:16:01,640 agreement yet . And there again it was 429 00:16:01,640 --> 00:16:05,510 a scenario understood . Um 430 00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:09,520 We don't know whether Russia will play 431 00:16:09,520 --> 00:16:11,670 that role in a future agreement . 432 00:16:11,740 --> 00:16:13,780 Certainly in whatever agreement is 433 00:16:13,780 --> 00:16:15,947 reached . If an agreement is reached , 434 00:16:15,947 --> 00:16:18,150 we would uh seek to pressure tested 435 00:16:18,150 --> 00:16:21,550 against any kind of interference of 436 00:16:21,550 --> 00:16:23,690 that kind from the Russians to this 437 00:16:23,690 --> 00:16:26,710 point . We have not seen any indication 438 00:16:26,710 --> 00:16:28,877 though that they intend to act in that 439 00:16:28,877 --> 00:16:32,060 way . Okay ah 440 00:16:32,940 --> 00:16:35,240 General Mackenzie in a in an 441 00:16:35,250 --> 00:16:38,270 unclassified way . Given the ongoing 442 00:16:38,270 --> 00:16:40,970 need to deploy U . S . Air defenses to 443 00:16:40,970 --> 00:16:44,300 europe , how do you assess our the 444 00:16:44,300 --> 00:16:48,120 United States ability to deploy and or 445 00:16:48,120 --> 00:16:50,520 sustained similar systems in the Middle 446 00:16:50,520 --> 00:16:54,080 East as a as a stopgap to help defend 447 00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:56,247 our gulf allies or at least until they 448 00:16:56,247 --> 00:16:58,260 are much better able to defend 449 00:16:58,260 --> 00:17:01,130 themselves . So over the last few years 450 00:17:01,130 --> 00:17:03,190 we have worked closely with our Gulf 451 00:17:03,190 --> 00:17:05,340 allies to expand their ability to 452 00:17:05,340 --> 00:17:07,562 defend themselves . And in fact some of 453 00:17:07,562 --> 00:17:09,284 those countries have very very 454 00:17:09,284 --> 00:17:11,396 significant air defense inventories . 455 00:17:11,396 --> 00:17:14,140 Saudi Arabia has over 20 patriot 456 00:17:14,140 --> 00:17:16,230 batteries . Um He has a number of 457 00:17:16,240 --> 00:17:18,670 patriot batteries as well . And and as 458 00:17:18,670 --> 00:17:21,260 you know you a actually possesses thad 459 00:17:21,270 --> 00:17:23,470 the antiballistic high altitude system 460 00:17:23,480 --> 00:17:25,147 which was demonstrated tested 461 00:17:25,147 --> 00:17:27,440 successfully just last month . So we 462 00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:29,490 work the way that we actually 463 00:17:29,490 --> 00:17:32,150 accommodate the basic fact of life that 464 00:17:32,150 --> 00:17:34,261 we don't have enough . Us patriots to 465 00:17:34,261 --> 00:17:36,317 service all of our needs globally is 466 00:17:36,317 --> 00:17:38,428 through and enhanced cooperation with 467 00:17:38,428 --> 00:17:40,594 our allies were still there . We still 468 00:17:40,594 --> 00:17:42,817 have patriots in the theater , we still 469 00:17:42,817 --> 00:17:45,039 work with them . But what you do is you 470 00:17:45,039 --> 00:17:47,206 try to think about the way nations can 471 00:17:47,206 --> 00:17:49,428 cooperate with each other and I'll talk 472 00:17:49,428 --> 00:17:48,450 a little bit more about that in the in 473 00:17:48,450 --> 00:17:50,617 the closed session but there is a path 474 00:17:50,617 --> 00:17:52,850 forward . Um and really you know the 475 00:17:52,860 --> 00:17:54,860 the countries in the region are the 476 00:17:54,860 --> 00:17:56,916 ones that are directly threatened by 477 00:17:56,916 --> 00:17:59,138 the Iranian threat . They are focused I 478 00:17:59,138 --> 00:18:01,249 believe in a way they have never been 479 00:18:01,249 --> 00:18:03,416 focused before by the imminence of the 480 00:18:03,416 --> 00:18:05,582 threat . The fact that the quality and 481 00:18:05,582 --> 00:18:07,527 number of the Iranian missiles and 482 00:18:07,527 --> 00:18:09,749 legumes and land attack cruise missiles 483 00:18:09,749 --> 00:18:11,916 and U . A . V . S . Is very concerning 484 00:18:11,916 --> 00:18:11,570 to them . So there's a there's a real 485 00:18:11,570 --> 00:18:13,737 convergence of interest on the part of 486 00:18:13,737 --> 00:18:15,930 our partners now . Okay and 487 00:18:16,640 --> 00:18:20,610 basically I think the my next question 488 00:18:20,610 --> 00:18:22,777 is going to be best answered in the in 489 00:18:22,777 --> 00:18:26,150 the closed classified session about uh 490 00:18:26,160 --> 00:18:28,780 the the engagement with our partners . 491 00:18:28,780 --> 00:18:30,990 You kind of alluded to that in the 492 00:18:30,990 --> 00:18:33,110 preparation and the training and the 493 00:18:33,110 --> 00:18:36,420 cooperation to um confront 494 00:18:36,420 --> 00:18:39,560 and deter a nuclear 495 00:18:40,140 --> 00:18:43,460 Iran . Should that possibility become 496 00:18:44,740 --> 00:18:48,000 a potential reality ? So with that MR 497 00:18:48,000 --> 00:18:50,167 Chairman , I'll yield back and save my 498 00:18:50,167 --> 00:18:52,333 questions for the classified session . 499 00:18:52,333 --> 00:18:54,000 Thank you . Mr Carter Hall is 500 00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:56,333 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 501 00:18:56,333 --> 00:18:58,480 Mr Chair and General Townsend and 502 00:18:58,480 --> 00:19:00,647 General Mackenzie , thank you for your 503 00:19:00,647 --> 00:19:02,813 many years of service to our country . 504 00:19:02,813 --> 00:19:04,869 Uh , I say that with great gratitude 505 00:19:04,869 --> 00:19:06,990 for the american people were lucky to 506 00:19:06,990 --> 00:19:09,810 have had you and your posts and thank 507 00:19:09,810 --> 00:19:12,460 you , Secretary baker for your service . 508 00:19:12,460 --> 00:19:15,140 Now , General Mackenzie , I applaud the 509 00:19:15,140 --> 00:19:17,310 department's commitment to improve its 510 00:19:17,310 --> 00:19:19,260 policy in order to better protect 511 00:19:19,260 --> 00:19:21,371 civilians . Especially with Secretary 512 00:19:21,371 --> 00:19:23,540 Austin's new memorandum entitled 513 00:19:23,540 --> 00:19:26,130 improving civilian harm mitigation and 514 00:19:26,130 --> 00:19:28,690 response , as we have seen several 515 00:19:28,690 --> 00:19:31,200 times just in this year alone , the US 516 00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:33,560 tragically can get it wrong sometimes 517 00:19:34,340 --> 00:19:36,229 with this new memorandum from the 518 00:19:36,229 --> 00:19:38,229 Secretary , including standing up a 519 00:19:38,229 --> 00:19:39,951 Civilian Protection Center for 520 00:19:39,951 --> 00:19:42,007 Excellence and issuing a forthcoming 521 00:19:42,007 --> 00:19:44,370 civilian harm mitigation Response 522 00:19:44,380 --> 00:19:46,750 Action Plan . How do you believe this 523 00:19:46,750 --> 00:19:48,861 directive will impact the A . R . S . 524 00:19:48,861 --> 00:19:52,530 Operations going forward . So , thank 525 00:19:52,530 --> 00:19:54,697 you for the question I'd like to begin 526 00:19:54,697 --> 00:19:56,808 by saying nobody wearing this uniform 527 00:19:56,808 --> 00:19:59,141 ever wants to kill an innocent civilian . 528 00:19:59,141 --> 00:20:01,308 Nobody ever wants to do that . There's 529 00:20:01,308 --> 00:20:01,100 nothing , there's nothing that is more 530 00:20:01,100 --> 00:20:03,322 completely antithetical from the way we 531 00:20:03,322 --> 00:20:05,489 operate . We have made mistakes and we 532 00:20:05,489 --> 00:20:07,600 have killed innocent civilians and we 533 00:20:07,600 --> 00:20:09,767 we acknowledge that and we're gonna do 534 00:20:09,767 --> 00:20:11,767 everything we can to get better and 535 00:20:11,767 --> 00:20:13,933 narrow and narrow that gap between our 536 00:20:13,933 --> 00:20:16,044 ideals and our actions . I would tell 537 00:20:16,044 --> 00:20:18,100 you , you know , with with Secretary 538 00:20:18,100 --> 00:20:20,267 Austin , it is much more than a than a 539 00:20:20,267 --> 00:20:22,322 memorandum . It is the energy he has 540 00:20:22,322 --> 00:20:24,322 brought to the problem . I have a I 541 00:20:24,322 --> 00:20:24,090 have several officers that are full 542 00:20:24,090 --> 00:20:26,257 time committed to a study that's going 543 00:20:26,257 --> 00:20:28,479 on right now , that will form the basis 544 00:20:28,479 --> 00:20:30,257 for future actions . But in the 545 00:20:30,257 --> 00:20:32,479 meantime , you know , we're not waiting 546 00:20:32,479 --> 00:20:34,590 on that study as a result of the rand 547 00:20:34,590 --> 00:20:36,757 study and other and other studies that 548 00:20:36,757 --> 00:20:36,390 have come out . We have undertaken a 549 00:20:36,390 --> 00:20:38,334 set of things in the short term to 550 00:20:38,334 --> 00:20:40,168 improve our own processes within 551 00:20:40,168 --> 00:20:42,279 Central Command , as General Townsend 552 00:20:42,279 --> 00:20:44,334 has within Africa Command . So we we 553 00:20:44,334 --> 00:20:46,446 don't want to minimize this problem . 554 00:20:46,446 --> 00:20:48,334 We recognize that it is in fact a 555 00:20:48,334 --> 00:20:50,557 significant and a critical problem that 556 00:20:50,557 --> 00:20:52,779 cuts right to the very heart of what we 557 00:20:52,779 --> 00:20:54,890 want to do . As as Representatives of 558 00:20:54,890 --> 00:20:57,112 the United States . Thank you . General 559 00:20:57,112 --> 00:20:58,890 Townsend African Nations are 560 00:20:58,890 --> 00:21:01,057 increasingly influential in the United 561 00:21:01,057 --> 00:21:03,334 Nations and other international forums . 562 00:21:03,334 --> 00:21:05,501 Currently , three of 15 United Nations 563 00:21:05,501 --> 00:21:07,446 Security Council seats are held by 564 00:21:07,446 --> 00:21:09,723 African Nations with the K . N . U . N . 565 00:21:09,723 --> 00:21:11,946 Ambassador giving an extremely powerful 566 00:21:11,946 --> 00:21:14,057 speech at the U . N . S . C . Meeting 567 00:21:14,057 --> 00:21:16,730 regarding Ukraine . Unfortunately there 568 00:21:16,730 --> 00:21:18,730 is a lot of public misunderstanding 569 00:21:18,730 --> 00:21:20,550 about the A . R . You have been 570 00:21:20,550 --> 00:21:23,520 Commander of Africom for over 2.5 years 571 00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:25,070 now . What are some of the 572 00:21:25,070 --> 00:21:27,050 misconceptions you hear from both 573 00:21:27,440 --> 00:21:29,440 american officials and the american 574 00:21:29,440 --> 00:21:32,820 public about the A . R . And how can we 575 00:21:32,820 --> 00:21:34,542 approach the A . R . In a more 576 00:21:34,542 --> 00:21:36,431 productive and effective manner ? 577 00:21:39,140 --> 00:21:41,560 Thanks congressman . I think some of 578 00:21:41,560 --> 00:21:43,820 the main misconceptions are probably 579 00:21:43,820 --> 00:21:46,740 that first of all , africa doesn't 580 00:21:46,740 --> 00:21:48,907 really matter to us that we don't have 581 00:21:48,907 --> 00:21:50,907 to worry about africa and and maybe 582 00:21:50,907 --> 00:21:53,390 America has been able to largely ignore 583 00:21:53,390 --> 00:21:55,501 africa in the past but that's not the 584 00:21:55,501 --> 00:21:57,557 future . And that's why I said in my 585 00:21:57,557 --> 00:21:59,501 opening statement , America cannot 586 00:21:59,501 --> 00:22:01,668 ignore africa . So that's probably the 587 00:22:01,668 --> 00:22:03,723 number one mistake perception then I 588 00:22:03,723 --> 00:22:05,723 think they don't understand that we 589 00:22:05,723 --> 00:22:07,723 have a lot of interest and a lot of 590 00:22:07,723 --> 00:22:10,200 partners there every day . We have a 591 00:22:10,200 --> 00:22:12,660 great relationship with much of africa 592 00:22:12,660 --> 00:22:14,880 and we are the partner of choice for 593 00:22:14,880 --> 00:22:17,010 much of africa and just educating the 594 00:22:17,010 --> 00:22:19,870 american public on that . You mentioned 595 00:22:19,870 --> 00:22:22,037 the vote in Ukraine and you're right , 596 00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:24,073 the Kenyan ambassador did give a 597 00:22:24,073 --> 00:22:26,640 powerful speech and he uh voted to 598 00:22:26,640 --> 00:22:28,910 condemn what the Russians were doing 599 00:22:28,910 --> 00:22:31,300 there but I'm a little dismayed about 600 00:22:31,310 --> 00:22:33,310 much of the rest of the continent , 601 00:22:33,310 --> 00:22:36,110 About half of the continent voted to 602 00:22:36,120 --> 00:22:39,240 condemn Russia . The other half either 603 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:41,950 abstained or did not vote . And that 604 00:22:41,950 --> 00:22:43,894 concerns me about only one country 605 00:22:43,894 --> 00:22:46,061 though did vote in support of Russia , 606 00:22:46,061 --> 00:22:48,283 Eritrea . But the other one half of the 607 00:22:48,283 --> 00:22:50,920 content didn't really cast a vote and 608 00:22:50,920 --> 00:22:53,840 that concerns me a bit . But many of 609 00:22:53,840 --> 00:22:56,062 the countries that we are the strongest 610 00:22:56,062 --> 00:22:58,229 partners with did join us in the world 611 00:22:58,230 --> 00:23:00,840 in condemning Russia . So I think the 612 00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:03,610 future the future for this country's 613 00:23:03,610 --> 00:23:05,860 security is in Africa and we have to 614 00:23:05,860 --> 00:23:08,160 lean into it . Thank you . General 615 00:23:08,160 --> 00:23:10,660 Townsend and Secretary baker around the 616 00:23:10,660 --> 00:23:12,716 world , violent extremism has been a 617 00:23:12,716 --> 00:23:14,771 very difficult problem to address in 618 00:23:14,771 --> 00:23:17,500 particular in the Africom A . R . From 619 00:23:17,500 --> 00:23:19,611 a report on recent trends in militant 620 00:23:19,611 --> 00:23:21,720 Islamic group activity in Africa the 621 00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:23,831 past few years , it appears there has 622 00:23:23,831 --> 00:23:25,887 been an alarming increase in violent 623 00:23:25,887 --> 00:23:27,998 events by these groups , including Al 624 00:23:27,998 --> 00:23:30,160 Shabaab and Al Qaida in the Islamic 625 00:23:30,540 --> 00:23:33,480 McGraw Mcrib area . What is the biggest 626 00:23:33,480 --> 00:23:35,424 impediment to being able to better 627 00:23:35,424 --> 00:23:37,480 address these threats ? Do you think 628 00:23:37,480 --> 00:23:39,702 the U . S . Needs to amend our strategy 629 00:23:39,702 --> 00:23:43,280 in the A . R . Congressman ? I'll start 630 00:23:43,280 --> 00:23:45,224 and then of course turn to General 631 00:23:45,224 --> 00:23:47,113 Townsend . You know , I think the 632 00:23:47,113 --> 00:23:49,169 challenge that we face in the Africa 633 00:23:49,169 --> 00:23:51,391 Mayo are and and part of what's driving 634 00:23:51,391 --> 00:23:53,280 the growth and B . E . O . S . Is 635 00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:55,502 challenges of underlying governance and 636 00:23:55,502 --> 00:23:57,613 underlying security . And so a lot of 637 00:23:57,613 --> 00:23:59,447 our effort in the A . O . R . Is 638 00:23:59,447 --> 00:24:01,224 dedicated towards institutional 639 00:24:01,224 --> 00:24:03,447 capacity building building , apologized 640 00:24:03,447 --> 00:24:05,669 gentleman's time has expired . I should 641 00:24:05,669 --> 00:24:07,836 I should point to that front , even if 642 00:24:07,836 --> 00:24:07,450 you're not answering the question . we 643 00:24:07,450 --> 00:24:09,617 try to wrap up as close as possible to 644 00:24:09,617 --> 00:24:11,839 respect other members . Time . Mr Banks 645 00:24:11,839 --> 00:24:14,006 is recognized for five minutes . Thank 646 00:24:14,006 --> 00:24:16,061 you . Mr Chairman General McKenzie , 647 00:24:16,061 --> 00:24:18,061 the original JCPOA was finalized in 648 00:24:18,061 --> 00:24:21,630 July of 2015 . Iran tested 649 00:24:21,630 --> 00:24:25,070 missiles in October 2015 before the 650 00:24:25,070 --> 00:24:27,560 deal was even implemented in January 651 00:24:28,140 --> 00:24:32,070 2016 , directly contradict all of 652 00:24:32,070 --> 00:24:34,237 this , directly contradicted the Obama 653 00:24:34,237 --> 00:24:36,292 administration's objective to change 654 00:24:36,292 --> 00:24:38,459 Iran's behavior for better through the 655 00:24:38,459 --> 00:24:40,681 deal . Then after the implementation of 656 00:24:40,681 --> 00:24:42,690 the J . CP . in January 2016 , Iran 657 00:24:42,690 --> 00:24:46,460 tested missiles again in March of 2016 . 658 00:24:47,340 --> 00:24:49,580 General Lloyd Austin , the then 659 00:24:49,580 --> 00:24:51,691 commander of Centcom said in a senate 660 00:24:51,691 --> 00:24:54,180 hearing at the time that despite the J . 661 00:24:54,180 --> 00:24:56,770 C . P . O . A quote , there are a 662 00:24:56,770 --> 00:24:58,603 number of things that lead me to 663 00:24:58,603 --> 00:25:00,548 personally believe that you know , 664 00:25:00,548 --> 00:25:02,603 their behavior is not , they haven't 665 00:25:02,603 --> 00:25:04,548 changed any course yet . End quote 666 00:25:05,540 --> 00:25:07,707 General Mackenzie six years later . Do 667 00:25:07,707 --> 00:25:09,873 you agree with then ? General Austin's 668 00:25:09,873 --> 00:25:12,096 assessment of Iran's behavior following 669 00:25:12,096 --> 00:25:14,429 the implementation of the J . C . P . O . 670 00:25:14,429 --> 00:25:16,651 A . With regard to ballistic missiles , 671 00:25:16,651 --> 00:25:18,540 cruise missiles . It is not their 672 00:25:18,540 --> 00:25:20,762 behavior has not changed . Do you think 673 00:25:20,762 --> 00:25:22,929 that the Islamic republic of Iran will 674 00:25:22,929 --> 00:25:25,310 ever give up its revisionist intentions 675 00:25:25,310 --> 00:25:27,720 in the region and if not what does a 676 00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:30,370 successful counter Iran policy look 677 00:25:30,370 --> 00:25:32,592 like . Well , I think you begin by Iran 678 00:25:32,592 --> 00:25:34,814 not possessing nuclear weapons and that 679 00:25:34,814 --> 00:25:37,037 needs to be an overarching . That's our 680 00:25:37,037 --> 00:25:37,000 overarching goal . I think it's better 681 00:25:37,000 --> 00:25:39,000 for everyone if Iran doesn't have a 682 00:25:39,000 --> 00:25:41,222 nuclear weapon , you should then try to 683 00:25:41,222 --> 00:25:43,167 find ways to bring their ballistic 684 00:25:43,167 --> 00:25:45,222 missiles the other elements of their 685 00:25:45,222 --> 00:25:47,222 national power that they value very 686 00:25:47,222 --> 00:25:49,444 highly under some form of control . And 687 00:25:49,444 --> 00:25:48,940 you're right . They have proven 688 00:25:48,940 --> 00:25:50,996 extremely resistant to that up until 689 00:25:50,996 --> 00:25:53,180 this time . I appreciate that 690 00:25:53,180 --> 00:25:55,360 Candidness , The Center for Strategic 691 00:25:55,360 --> 00:25:57,471 and International Studies reported on 692 00:25:57,471 --> 00:26:00,550 August 10 2021 that Iran possesses the 693 00:26:00,550 --> 00:26:02,383 largest and most diverse missile 694 00:26:02,383 --> 00:26:04,383 arsenal in the Middle East and is a 695 00:26:04,383 --> 00:26:06,494 major hub for weapons proliferation . 696 00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:08,951 If some form of the J . C . P . O . A 697 00:26:08,951 --> 00:26:11,173 is restored , how do you expect Iran to 698 00:26:11,173 --> 00:26:13,340 behave regarding missile proliferation 699 00:26:13,340 --> 00:26:17,050 amongst partner and proxy groups based 700 00:26:17,050 --> 00:26:19,260 on past behavior . I would expect not 701 00:26:19,260 --> 00:26:21,316 much modification in that behavior . 702 00:26:21,840 --> 00:26:23,896 And can you tell us specifically how 703 00:26:23,896 --> 00:26:26,118 centcom is prepared to deal with that ? 704 00:26:26,118 --> 00:26:28,720 So we work to prevent their success 705 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:30,664 that they're successful attacks by 706 00:26:30,664 --> 00:26:32,331 working with our partners for 707 00:26:32,331 --> 00:26:34,276 integrated air and missile defense 708 00:26:34,276 --> 00:26:36,276 across the theater by enhancing the 709 00:26:36,276 --> 00:26:38,331 capabilities of all our partners air 710 00:26:38,331 --> 00:26:38,290 defense air defenses in effect . And 711 00:26:38,290 --> 00:26:40,457 that's the best way to do it . I would 712 00:26:40,457 --> 00:26:42,679 also argue that Iran knows that if they 713 00:26:42,679 --> 00:26:44,679 strike us we're prepared to respond 714 00:26:44,679 --> 00:26:46,512 very powerfully if need be so we 715 00:26:46,512 --> 00:26:48,623 attempt to achieve deterrence and and 716 00:26:48,623 --> 00:26:50,734 that has largely worked over the past 717 00:26:50,734 --> 00:26:52,957 couple of years . You know , I note the 718 00:26:52,957 --> 00:26:54,790 attack last weekend . But let me 719 00:26:54,790 --> 00:26:54,530 emphasize again , that attack was 720 00:26:54,530 --> 00:26:57,460 actually not directed at us understood . 721 00:26:58,340 --> 00:27:00,690 General is one of his first foreign 722 00:27:00,690 --> 00:27:02,746 policy initiatives . President biden 723 00:27:02,746 --> 00:27:05,560 delisted the Iran backed Houthi rebels 724 00:27:05,940 --> 00:27:08,360 in Yemen as a foreign terrorist foreign 725 00:27:08,360 --> 00:27:11,090 terrorist organization . But instead of 726 00:27:11,090 --> 00:27:13,034 deescalating tension , the Houthis 727 00:27:13,034 --> 00:27:15,146 doubled their attacks on Saudi Arabia 728 00:27:15,146 --> 00:27:17,750 in 2021 and occupy the U . S . Embassy 729 00:27:17,750 --> 00:27:20,090 compound compound and sauna and took 730 00:27:20,090 --> 00:27:23,620 the local staff hostage in late 2021 in 731 00:27:23,620 --> 00:27:25,940 early 2022 . The houthis also attacked 732 00:27:25,940 --> 00:27:28,162 U . A . E . Three times , killing three 733 00:27:28,162 --> 00:27:30,290 people and the way the Houthis have 734 00:27:30,290 --> 00:27:32,512 conducted themselves . General , do you 735 00:27:32,512 --> 00:27:34,290 think that that the Houthis are 736 00:27:34,290 --> 00:27:36,512 terrorists ? I would defer to policy MS 737 00:27:36,512 --> 00:27:38,346 baker for a discussion about the 738 00:27:38,346 --> 00:27:40,568 delisting decision . But I can tell you 739 00:27:40,568 --> 00:27:42,179 from an operational military 740 00:27:42,179 --> 00:27:44,401 perspective , they continue to wage war 741 00:27:44,401 --> 00:27:46,568 on their neighbors , both Saudi Arabia 742 00:27:46,568 --> 00:27:48,901 and you . A and they wage irresponsible , 743 00:27:48,901 --> 00:27:50,901 reckless war without regard for for 744 00:27:50,901 --> 00:27:53,068 casualties . I understand as well that 745 00:27:53,068 --> 00:27:54,901 you would probably you you would 746 00:27:54,901 --> 00:27:54,780 probably differ as I asked . Why do you 747 00:27:54,780 --> 00:27:57,002 think the Iran backed houthis increased 748 00:27:57,002 --> 00:27:58,447 hostility since the biden 749 00:27:58,447 --> 00:28:00,336 administration delisted them as a 750 00:28:00,336 --> 00:28:02,980 foreign terrorist organization ? I'm 751 00:28:02,980 --> 00:28:05,147 sorry . Could you , would you say that 752 00:28:05,147 --> 00:28:07,202 again please ? Well , why why do you 753 00:28:07,202 --> 00:28:09,147 think that the Iran backed Houthis 754 00:28:09,147 --> 00:28:08,830 increased their hostility after the 755 00:28:08,830 --> 00:28:11,052 biden administration delisted them as a 756 00:28:11,052 --> 00:28:12,997 foreign terrorist organization . I 757 00:28:12,997 --> 00:28:15,163 think they still , I think the Houthis 758 00:28:15,163 --> 00:28:17,330 still believe there's a military means 759 00:28:17,330 --> 00:28:16,840 to achieve their end . I don't believe 760 00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:19,007 they're right in that . But it doesn't 761 00:28:19,007 --> 00:28:21,062 matter what , I think it's what they 762 00:28:21,062 --> 00:28:23,118 think . How how does centcom plan to 763 00:28:23,118 --> 00:28:25,118 address the Houthis behavior moving 764 00:28:25,118 --> 00:28:27,118 forward ? So we have worked closely 765 00:28:27,118 --> 00:28:26,810 with both . Are you a partners in there 766 00:28:26,810 --> 00:28:28,754 is in the wake of this most recent 767 00:28:28,754 --> 00:28:30,810 attack , we sent uh fifth generation 768 00:28:30,810 --> 00:28:32,700 fighters to you a we've moved a 769 00:28:32,700 --> 00:28:34,589 ballistic missile defense capable 770 00:28:34,589 --> 00:28:36,644 destroyer to the vicinity of you . A 771 00:28:36,644 --> 00:28:38,700 we've conducted refueling of U . A . 772 00:28:38,700 --> 00:28:40,700 Fighters that are flying combat air 773 00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:40,620 patrol and we've shared intelligence 774 00:28:40,620 --> 00:28:42,842 with you a on this . So we've done some 775 00:28:42,842 --> 00:28:45,064 very discreet Measurable things to help 776 00:28:45,064 --> 00:28:47,064 our partners in . Um I got I got 30 777 00:28:47,064 --> 00:28:49,287 seconds left , Miss baker . Why did the 778 00:28:49,287 --> 00:28:51,509 biden administration delist the Houthis 779 00:28:51,509 --> 00:28:53,676 as foreign terrorist organization ? Uh 780 00:28:53,676 --> 00:28:55,842 Congressman ? Uh you know , I think no 781 00:28:55,842 --> 00:28:57,953 one in the administration , certainly 782 00:28:57,953 --> 00:29:00,120 no one in the department takes lightly 783 00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:02,342 the threat that the houthis pose in the 784 00:29:02,342 --> 00:29:04,620 region . And as General Mackenzie said , 785 00:29:04,620 --> 00:29:06,620 we are attempting to get after that 786 00:29:06,620 --> 00:29:08,787 problem and we're providing any number 787 00:29:08,787 --> 00:29:11,120 of avenues of support both to the U . A . 788 00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:12,898 E . And to the Saudis . This is 789 00:29:12,898 --> 00:29:15,009 outrageous with that . I yield back . 790 00:29:15,040 --> 00:29:18,820 Thank you . MS Spears . I can ask for 791 00:29:18,820 --> 00:29:21,098 five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman . 792 00:29:21,098 --> 00:29:23,740 Uh General Mackenzie and Townsend . We 793 00:29:23,740 --> 00:29:25,740 can't begin to thank you enough for 794 00:29:25,740 --> 00:29:28,120 your extraordinary service . Um , but 795 00:29:28,120 --> 00:29:31,740 know that we are very grateful . Let me 796 00:29:31,740 --> 00:29:35,590 start with the report that was just 797 00:29:35,590 --> 00:29:39,490 released a few days ago detailing 798 00:29:39,500 --> 00:29:41,560 the significant failures in training 799 00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:45,070 and physical security at the U . S . 800 00:29:45,070 --> 00:29:47,770 Cooperative security location in kenya 801 00:29:48,140 --> 00:29:50,350 where we lost a service member and two 802 00:29:50,350 --> 00:29:53,800 D . O . D . Contractors . It was 803 00:29:53,810 --> 00:29:55,740 alarming to read that there was 804 00:29:55,750 --> 00:29:57,917 inadequate focus on force protection , 805 00:29:57,917 --> 00:30:00,028 inadequate , inadequate understanding 806 00:30:00,028 --> 00:30:02,028 of the threat , inadequate security 807 00:30:02,028 --> 00:30:04,028 force preparation and problems with 808 00:30:04,028 --> 00:30:07,460 mission command . What has that taught 809 00:30:07,460 --> 00:30:10,600 us in terms of looking at other 810 00:30:10,610 --> 00:30:13,700 cooperative facilities in Africa as to 811 00:30:13,710 --> 00:30:17,070 our responsibility to harden them in 812 00:30:17,070 --> 00:30:18,181 terms of security . 813 00:30:22,140 --> 00:30:24,950 Thanks man . Um , Well , first , let me 814 00:30:24,950 --> 00:30:27,500 say , uh , we certainly regret the loss 815 00:30:27,500 --> 00:30:29,500 of the lives of our three americans 816 00:30:29,500 --> 00:30:32,360 there at Manda Bay . We've studied 817 00:30:32,740 --> 00:30:36,280 this situation in 818 00:30:36,280 --> 00:30:38,880 great detail over the last two years 819 00:30:38,880 --> 00:30:40,936 and have applied the lessons learned 820 00:30:40,936 --> 00:30:43,102 across the African continent . All the 821 00:30:43,102 --> 00:30:45,213 things you mentioned that are in that 822 00:30:45,213 --> 00:30:47,670 report were all true regretfully . So I 823 00:30:47,670 --> 00:30:50,100 think they go back , they stem back to 824 00:30:50,110 --> 00:30:53,010 uh incorrect threat assessments . So 825 00:30:53,010 --> 00:30:55,010 when commanders and leaders look at 826 00:30:55,010 --> 00:30:57,232 threat assessments , that's their first 827 00:30:57,232 --> 00:30:59,399 understanding and that leads them down 828 00:30:59,399 --> 00:31:01,566 can lead them down the wrong path . So 829 00:31:01,566 --> 00:31:03,510 are you saying now that all of our 830 00:31:03,510 --> 00:31:05,732 facilities in Africa have been hardened 831 00:31:05,732 --> 00:31:08,340 and our have greater protection or do 832 00:31:08,350 --> 00:31:10,517 do we have some areas where we need to 833 00:31:10,517 --> 00:31:12,950 do more ? And should you alert us to 834 00:31:12,950 --> 00:31:16,700 those ah are all of our facilities have 835 00:31:16,700 --> 00:31:18,940 been improved since the attack at Manda 836 00:31:18,940 --> 00:31:21,350 bay . We apply those lessons across all 837 00:31:21,350 --> 00:31:23,240 of them . However , we do have to 838 00:31:23,240 --> 00:31:25,129 continue that work . We've got to 839 00:31:25,129 --> 00:31:27,351 improve our foxhole every day that work 840 00:31:27,351 --> 00:31:29,462 continues and we do have requirements 841 00:31:29,462 --> 00:31:31,629 in that area . All right , thank you . 842 00:31:31,629 --> 00:31:33,851 MS baker in the N . D . A . Last year . 843 00:31:33,851 --> 00:31:37,210 Um An amendment that I authored to 844 00:31:37,220 --> 00:31:39,460 request the status of African women ? 845 00:31:39,840 --> 00:31:41,784 Excuse me , Afghan women and girls 846 00:31:42,840 --> 00:31:44,784 Since the Taliban takeover was due 847 00:31:44,784 --> 00:31:47,150 March one . We haven't received it . 848 00:31:47,150 --> 00:31:50,390 When will we receive that congresswoman ? 849 00:31:50,390 --> 00:31:52,168 I don't know the status of that 850 00:31:52,168 --> 00:31:54,334 specific report but I would be glad to 851 00:31:54,334 --> 00:31:56,557 look into it and make sure we get it to 852 00:31:56,557 --> 00:31:58,668 you . All right . Um Would you report 853 00:31:58,668 --> 00:32:00,779 back to the committee then as to when 854 00:32:00,779 --> 00:32:02,668 we can expect that report ? Yes . 855 00:32:02,668 --> 00:32:04,834 Absolutely . Alright . Um MS baker and 856 00:32:04,834 --> 00:32:06,668 General Mackenzie as far back as 857 00:32:06,668 --> 00:32:09,880 october Dogg said it would be making 858 00:32:09,890 --> 00:32:12,001 payments to the families of those who 859 00:32:12,001 --> 00:32:14,960 were killed on on on the august 29th 860 00:32:15,540 --> 00:32:19,440 drone attack . Can you tell us the 861 00:32:19,440 --> 00:32:21,960 status of those payments ? 862 00:32:24,340 --> 00:32:26,760 Man that those um we're moving forward 863 00:32:26,760 --> 00:32:28,871 with those payments . Um In the inter 864 00:32:28,871 --> 00:32:30,982 agency , I can talk a little bit more 865 00:32:30,982 --> 00:32:33,149 about it in a closed session . Centcom 866 00:32:33,149 --> 00:32:35,316 stands ready to carry out instructions 867 00:32:35,316 --> 00:32:35,240 on how to conduct execute those 868 00:32:35,240 --> 00:32:38,130 payments once a decision is made ? Well , 869 00:32:38,140 --> 00:32:40,362 I thought we already made a decision to 870 00:32:40,362 --> 00:32:42,473 make payments to those families . The 871 00:32:42,473 --> 00:32:44,529 modality of the payment and how that 872 00:32:44,529 --> 00:32:46,807 how it's actually going to be executed ? 873 00:32:46,807 --> 00:32:48,807 So are you saying that there hasn't 874 00:32:48,807 --> 00:32:50,584 been any payments made to these 875 00:32:50,584 --> 00:32:54,080 families yet . Right , congressman . I 876 00:32:54,090 --> 00:32:56,257 just want to be a little careful about 877 00:32:56,257 --> 00:32:58,479 what we discussed in the public session 878 00:32:58,479 --> 00:33:00,423 because we don't want to put these 879 00:33:00,423 --> 00:33:02,590 families at further risk . But we'd be 880 00:33:02,590 --> 00:33:02,160 happy to get you that information and 881 00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:04,160 talk about it in the closed session 882 00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:06,382 this afternoon . Your husband that when 883 00:33:06,382 --> 00:33:08,604 we make a commitment , we deliver on it 884 00:33:08,604 --> 00:33:10,882 and we will delivery of not doing that . 885 00:33:10,882 --> 00:33:13,049 So , um , I have your word that we are 886 00:33:13,049 --> 00:33:15,104 going to deliver to those families . 887 00:33:15,104 --> 00:33:17,216 This has the attention of the highest 888 00:33:17,216 --> 00:33:20,500 of our leadership . Yes . Can any of 889 00:33:20,500 --> 00:33:23,860 you tell us um , the extent of our tea 890 00:33:23,860 --> 00:33:27,830 in africa , the extent of what 891 00:33:27,830 --> 00:33:30,108 ma'am , I didn't catch it Russia today . 892 00:33:30,340 --> 00:33:33,590 Right . Um , so 893 00:33:34,740 --> 00:33:36,796 I can't specifically talk about that 894 00:33:36,796 --> 00:33:39,820 particular media outlet , I can say 895 00:33:39,820 --> 00:33:42,420 this Russia has extensive media 896 00:33:42,420 --> 00:33:45,560 engagement on the continent uh , and 897 00:33:45,570 --> 00:33:49,320 that is greatly facilitated by um 898 00:33:49,330 --> 00:33:52,660 Yevgeny Precaution the oligarch and his 899 00:33:52,670 --> 00:33:55,420 media arm in addition to , you know , 900 00:33:55,420 --> 00:33:57,570 he has the Wagner mercenaries , but 901 00:33:57,570 --> 00:33:59,681 he's got a media arm that does that , 902 00:33:59,681 --> 00:34:01,903 you know , I do think our committee has 903 00:34:01,903 --> 00:34:03,959 to take very seriously the impact of 904 00:34:03,959 --> 00:34:06,970 our tea around the world . I just came 905 00:34:06,970 --> 00:34:09,880 back from latin America where not only 906 00:34:09,890 --> 00:34:12,780 is it pervasive and ubiquitous , it is 907 00:34:12,780 --> 00:34:15,800 perceived to be objective , it is 908 00:34:15,800 --> 00:34:19,160 perceived to be just a legitimate tv 909 00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:21,970 network and general Lady's time has 910 00:34:21,970 --> 00:34:23,914 expired ? She makes an outstanding 911 00:34:23,914 --> 00:34:26,400 point . However , um on the need to 912 00:34:26,400 --> 00:34:29,570 engage in the information warfare . Mr 913 00:34:29,570 --> 00:34:31,737 Gates is recognized for five minutes . 914 00:34:31,737 --> 00:34:33,903 Thank you . Mr Chairman . I completely 915 00:34:33,903 --> 00:34:36,070 concur with my colleague regarding the 916 00:34:36,070 --> 00:34:39,130 um risk that R . T poses and it seems 917 00:34:39,130 --> 00:34:41,860 to appear more legitimate and objective 918 00:34:42,240 --> 00:34:44,810 when members of Congress go on our T . 919 00:34:44,820 --> 00:34:47,020 And so I associate myself with the 920 00:34:47,020 --> 00:34:49,187 gentle lady's comments and perhaps you 921 00:34:49,187 --> 00:34:51,353 could share them with um the gentleman 922 00:34:51,353 --> 00:34:53,076 from California who chairs the 923 00:34:53,076 --> 00:34:55,298 Intelligence Committee who I've seen on 924 00:34:55,298 --> 00:34:57,464 our T talking about legislation giving 925 00:34:57,464 --> 00:35:00,510 them credibility . Um MS baker , I 926 00:35:00,520 --> 00:35:02,631 don't have a few moments but I'd love 927 00:35:02,631 --> 00:35:04,798 to chat with you about it further . MS 928 00:35:04,798 --> 00:35:06,576 baker , you said in response to 929 00:35:06,576 --> 00:35:08,631 congresswoman biases questions we've 930 00:35:08,631 --> 00:35:11,160 heard Israel's concerns about the J . C . 931 00:35:11,160 --> 00:35:12,760 P . O . A . What are they 932 00:35:16,140 --> 00:35:18,910 congressman ? I think Israel remains 933 00:35:18,910 --> 00:35:22,570 concerned as do we all about Iran's 934 00:35:22,580 --> 00:35:24,760 malign activity in the region beyond 935 00:35:24,760 --> 00:35:27,130 its nuclear program . And and that's 936 00:35:27,130 --> 00:35:29,241 something that we discussed with them 937 00:35:29,241 --> 00:35:31,280 regularly . So their concern is a 938 00:35:31,290 --> 00:35:33,480 better resourced Iran whether through 939 00:35:33,480 --> 00:35:36,140 sanctions , relief or cash payments 940 00:35:36,150 --> 00:35:38,690 would be more capable in taking action 941 00:35:38,690 --> 00:35:40,930 against Israel . Does that surmised 942 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:43,718 congressman . That is my understanding . 943 00:35:43,718 --> 00:35:46,700 Yes . And and can can we learn anything 944 00:35:46,700 --> 00:35:48,930 about whether or not cash payments are 945 00:35:48,930 --> 00:35:51,263 on the table as part of a renewed J . C . 946 00:35:51,263 --> 00:35:54,320 P . O . A . Congressman . I'm not able 947 00:35:54,320 --> 00:35:56,570 to discuss the details of the agreement 948 00:35:56,570 --> 00:35:58,792 only because there is no agreement that 949 00:35:58,792 --> 00:36:00,737 has been reached at this point . I 950 00:36:00,737 --> 00:36:02,681 think there has been progress made 951 00:36:02,681 --> 00:36:04,903 toward an agreement , But of course the 952 00:36:04,903 --> 00:36:07,014 issues that are remaining are some of 953 00:36:07,014 --> 00:36:09,070 the most complex . So , you know , I 954 00:36:09,070 --> 00:36:11,181 understand that in , in a negotiation 955 00:36:11,181 --> 00:36:13,237 that they're , you know , nothing is 956 00:36:13,237 --> 00:36:15,348 settled until everything is settled . 957 00:36:15,348 --> 00:36:17,514 But there are contours of an agreement 958 00:36:17,514 --> 00:36:19,681 as we get closer to it . And since the 959 00:36:19,681 --> 00:36:21,792 administration has been working on an 960 00:36:21,792 --> 00:36:23,959 Iran deal , I was wondering whether or 961 00:36:23,959 --> 00:36:25,737 not we could take off the table 962 00:36:25,737 --> 00:36:28,050 infusions of cash because when I asked 963 00:36:28,050 --> 00:36:29,883 General Mackenzie some years ago 964 00:36:30,030 --> 00:36:32,141 whether or not the cash payments that 965 00:36:32,141 --> 00:36:34,252 the Obama administration permitted to 966 00:36:34,252 --> 00:36:36,030 Iran increased that very malign 967 00:36:36,030 --> 00:36:38,252 activity that Israel is concerned about 968 00:36:38,252 --> 00:36:40,474 that . We're concerned about his answer 969 00:36:40,474 --> 00:36:42,380 was that that that there was more 970 00:36:42,380 --> 00:36:44,547 malign activity following the last J C 971 00:36:44,547 --> 00:36:46,850 p O again , congressman , I understand 972 00:36:46,850 --> 00:36:48,794 the concern , I'm just not able to 973 00:36:48,794 --> 00:36:50,720 discuss specifics of of of the 974 00:36:50,720 --> 00:36:52,776 agreement that's being negotiated by 975 00:36:52,776 --> 00:36:54,942 the State Department and so you're not 976 00:36:54,942 --> 00:36:54,600 in a position to be able to say the 977 00:36:54,600 --> 00:36:56,711 cash payments are off the table . I'm 978 00:36:56,711 --> 00:36:58,933 not in a position to be able to discuss 979 00:36:58,933 --> 00:37:01,044 the specifics of the agreement in any 980 00:37:01,044 --> 00:37:03,044 form . General Townsend is Vladimir 981 00:37:03,044 --> 00:37:05,156 Putin bringing African mercenaries to 982 00:37:05,156 --> 00:37:08,870 the fight in Ukraine . I've 983 00:37:08,870 --> 00:37:11,400 heard those reports , We haven't seen 984 00:37:11,410 --> 00:37:14,040 that yet . We're watching for that very 985 00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:16,360 closely . However , I do believe they 986 00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:18,840 are bringing Wagner fighters from 987 00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:21,810 Africa to Ukraine and in General 988 00:37:21,810 --> 00:37:23,754 Mackenzie , have you seen Vladimir 989 00:37:23,754 --> 00:37:25,532 Putin successfully bring Syrian 990 00:37:25,532 --> 00:37:27,643 mercenaries to the fight in Ukraine . 991 00:37:27,643 --> 00:37:29,643 Not yet . We watch that closely . I 992 00:37:29,643 --> 00:37:31,643 can't say one or two people haven't 993 00:37:31,643 --> 00:37:31,250 gone but we haven't seen any systemic 994 00:37:31,250 --> 00:37:33,139 movement . Great , I'll yield the 995 00:37:33,139 --> 00:37:35,083 remainder of my time to my florida 996 00:37:35,083 --> 00:37:34,960 colleague Mr frank . 997 00:37:39,530 --> 00:37:42,580 Thank you . Mr waltz general in your 998 00:37:42,580 --> 00:37:44,913 testimony and throughout your statement , 999 00:37:44,913 --> 00:37:46,802 sorry , General Mackenzie in your 1000 00:37:46,802 --> 00:37:49,210 written testimony here today and 1001 00:37:49,220 --> 00:37:51,442 throughout the question and you've made 1002 00:37:51,442 --> 00:37:53,553 it clear that you consider Iran to be 1003 00:37:53,553 --> 00:37:53,470 the biggest threat to stability in the 1004 00:37:53,470 --> 00:37:55,890 centcom kor during my travels 1005 00:37:55,890 --> 00:37:58,112 throughout the region and most recently 1006 00:37:58,112 --> 00:38:00,334 in Israel two weeks ago , the recurring 1007 00:38:00,334 --> 00:38:02,557 theme is the malign influence of Iran's 1008 00:38:02,557 --> 00:38:04,612 proxies . You also spoke of those in 1009 00:38:04,612 --> 00:38:06,501 your , in your testimony . Do you 1010 00:38:06,501 --> 00:38:08,446 consider the Irgc to be one of the 1011 00:38:08,446 --> 00:38:10,334 drivers and facilitators of these 1012 00:38:10,334 --> 00:38:12,168 proxies ? The Irgc and its elite 1013 00:38:12,168 --> 00:38:14,334 element that could force absolutely at 1014 00:38:14,334 --> 00:38:16,557 the very heart of these activities . Um 1015 00:38:16,557 --> 00:38:18,668 it's been reported and as recently as 1016 00:38:18,668 --> 00:38:20,779 yesterday in the press that the biden 1017 00:38:20,779 --> 00:38:23,001 administration is considering delisting 1018 00:38:23,001 --> 00:38:25,112 the Irgc is a terror organization . I 1019 00:38:25,112 --> 00:38:27,168 know that decision involves a lot of 1020 00:38:27,168 --> 00:38:29,390 factors that are beyond your lane , but 1021 00:38:29,390 --> 00:38:31,557 but strictly on your military advice . 1022 00:38:31,557 --> 00:38:33,834 Do you think that would be a good idea . 1023 00:38:33,834 --> 00:38:33,510 I'll have to I'll defer on that one . I 1024 00:38:33,510 --> 00:38:35,820 would not . I think they certainly are 1025 00:38:35,820 --> 00:38:37,876 very disruptive and dangerous in the 1026 00:38:37,876 --> 00:38:40,042 region , that remains my best military 1027 00:38:40,042 --> 00:38:42,098 advice and we should treat them like 1028 00:38:42,098 --> 00:38:41,720 that . And if they are emboldened or 1029 00:38:41,720 --> 00:38:43,887 strengthened , do you think that would 1030 00:38:43,887 --> 00:38:45,998 make them a more formidable ? I think 1031 00:38:45,998 --> 00:38:47,720 anything you do to embolden or 1032 00:38:47,720 --> 00:38:49,831 strengthen them would have a negative 1033 00:38:49,831 --> 00:38:51,720 effect across the region . Okay , 1034 00:38:51,720 --> 00:38:53,720 echoing some of my other colleagues 1035 00:38:53,720 --> 00:38:55,831 here with respect to Israel people we 1036 00:38:55,831 --> 00:38:57,831 met with , there were crystal clear 1037 00:38:57,831 --> 00:38:59,942 that historically , whether it's been 1038 00:38:59,942 --> 00:38:59,140 cash payments from the Obama 1039 00:38:59,140 --> 00:39:01,251 administration or any activities that 1040 00:39:01,251 --> 00:39:03,251 lead to put money in the coffers of 1041 00:39:03,251 --> 00:39:05,418 Iran , there's a direct correlation to 1042 00:39:05,418 --> 00:39:07,529 the pace of intensity of attacks when 1043 00:39:07,529 --> 00:39:09,696 that money flows in there . Is it your 1044 00:39:09,696 --> 00:39:11,696 opinion that buying Iranian oil and 1045 00:39:11,696 --> 00:39:13,862 lessening sanctions on Iran would lead 1046 00:39:13,862 --> 00:39:15,862 to an increase in irgc activity ? I 1047 00:39:15,862 --> 00:39:18,084 think any , I think the Iranian economy 1048 00:39:18,084 --> 00:39:20,251 as a whole is penetrated thoroughly by 1049 00:39:20,251 --> 00:39:22,418 the Irgc . So it's hard to , it's hard 1050 00:39:22,418 --> 00:39:24,418 to see where money flows inside the 1051 00:39:24,418 --> 00:39:26,640 Iranian Iranian economy and how much of 1052 00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:28,751 it is used for legitimate reasons and 1053 00:39:28,751 --> 00:39:30,973 how much of it is used for illegitimate 1054 00:39:30,973 --> 00:39:30,510 reasons . Roger that thank you , 1055 00:39:30,510 --> 00:39:32,621 general . I appreciate my colleague , 1056 00:39:32,621 --> 00:39:34,732 Guildenstern could just follow follow 1057 00:39:34,732 --> 00:39:36,732 up on that point . So we , I forget 1058 00:39:36,732 --> 00:39:38,899 exactly when but we left the J . C . P 1059 00:39:38,899 --> 00:39:41,066 O . A . And 2017 2018 , something like 1060 00:39:41,066 --> 00:39:43,010 that . Um So we went right back in 1061 00:39:43,010 --> 00:39:45,190 maximum sanctions , Would you say that 1062 00:39:45,190 --> 00:39:48,010 Iranian malign activity since we left 1063 00:39:48,010 --> 00:39:50,720 the J . C . P . O . A . Has increased ? 1064 00:39:51,040 --> 00:39:54,910 I would and and that's the point . Um 1065 00:39:54,910 --> 00:39:57,188 as as you've said , the point of the J . 1066 00:39:57,188 --> 00:39:59,243 C . P . O . A . Is to stop them from 1067 00:39:59,243 --> 00:40:01,243 getting a nuclear weapon . It would 1068 00:40:01,243 --> 00:40:03,243 appear that Iran's ability to to do 1069 00:40:03,243 --> 00:40:05,243 malign things in the region doesn't 1070 00:40:05,243 --> 00:40:07,410 seem to be tied to the J . C . P . O . 1071 00:40:07,410 --> 00:40:09,521 A . Because they are still incredibly 1072 00:40:09,521 --> 00:40:11,743 active even though we've been out of it 1073 00:40:11,743 --> 00:40:13,966 for three years , four years now . So I 1074 00:40:13,966 --> 00:40:16,077 just want to let members chew on that 1075 00:40:16,077 --> 00:40:18,299 one . Um Miss escobar is recognized for 1076 00:40:18,299 --> 00:40:21,760 five minutes . Thank you Mr 1077 00:40:21,760 --> 00:40:24,020 Chairman . And I just want to piggy 1078 00:40:24,020 --> 00:40:26,131 back a little bit on your the comment 1079 00:40:26,131 --> 00:40:28,409 that you just made about the J . C . P . 1080 00:40:28,409 --> 00:40:31,910 O . A . When you look at the evolution 1081 00:40:31,920 --> 00:40:35,800 of uh Iran's malign activity as you 1082 00:40:35,800 --> 00:40:38,470 mentioned , we really do have to look 1083 00:40:38,480 --> 00:40:41,240 at the withdrawal from the J . C . P . 1084 00:40:41,240 --> 00:40:44,490 O . A . Instead of looking at just a 1085 00:40:44,490 --> 00:40:46,712 narrow window . It's just like with our 1086 00:40:46,712 --> 00:40:49,000 conversations on Afghanistan , we need 1087 00:40:49,000 --> 00:40:51,690 to take a step back and look at the 1088 00:40:51,700 --> 00:40:55,430 broader historical movement . But 1089 00:40:55,440 --> 00:40:57,551 anyhow , so thank you for making that 1090 00:40:57,551 --> 00:41:00,330 point and I just wanted to um you know , 1091 00:41:00,340 --> 00:41:02,770 put an exclamation point on it . Um 1092 00:41:02,780 --> 00:41:04,780 thank you so much Chairman for this 1093 00:41:04,780 --> 00:41:07,420 hearing and um for making sure that 1094 00:41:07,420 --> 00:41:10,350 that we have the opportunity uh to 1095 00:41:10,360 --> 00:41:13,430 speak to to our panelists and and to 1096 00:41:13,430 --> 00:41:15,990 our panelists just want to express my 1097 00:41:15,990 --> 00:41:18,680 gratitude to all of you for your your 1098 00:41:18,680 --> 00:41:21,840 service to our nation and for being 1099 00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:24,490 here today to to share your wisdom and 1100 00:41:24,490 --> 00:41:26,750 I look forward to the conversations in 1101 00:41:26,750 --> 00:41:29,160 closed session as well . I have the 1102 00:41:29,160 --> 00:41:31,327 honor and privilege of representing el 1103 00:41:31,327 --> 00:41:33,271 paso texas , which is home to Fort 1104 00:41:33,271 --> 00:41:35,200 Bliss , America's second largest 1105 00:41:35,200 --> 00:41:37,730 military installation and largest joint 1106 00:41:37,730 --> 00:41:39,660 mobilization force generation 1107 00:41:39,660 --> 00:41:43,260 installation in the army and obviously 1108 00:41:43,260 --> 00:41:45,371 the regions of the world that you all 1109 00:41:45,371 --> 00:41:48,070 are postured in have long been plagued 1110 00:41:48,080 --> 00:41:50,660 by violence , instability and war in 1111 00:41:50,660 --> 00:41:53,180 some cases that has been furthered by 1112 00:41:53,190 --> 00:41:55,850 us . Um but as we look to the future 1113 00:41:55,850 --> 00:41:58,140 and be especially beyond our withdrawal 1114 00:41:58,140 --> 00:42:00,220 from Afghanistan . Ahead of the 1115 00:42:00,220 --> 00:42:02,442 challenges that we need to confront not 1116 00:42:02,442 --> 00:42:04,498 just today , but going forward . The 1117 00:42:04,498 --> 00:42:07,950 challenges posed by Iran china 1118 00:42:07,960 --> 00:42:10,180 Russia and the terrorist groups that 1119 00:42:10,180 --> 00:42:12,680 they empower in the centcom and africom 1120 00:42:12,680 --> 00:42:14,880 areas of operation . We've got to be 1121 00:42:14,880 --> 00:42:16,991 strategic with our engagement and our 1122 00:42:16,991 --> 00:42:19,270 posture in this ongoing battle , 1123 00:42:19,280 --> 00:42:21,500 especially that battle between 1124 00:42:21,500 --> 00:42:23,670 democracy and authoritarianism , 1125 00:42:23,680 --> 00:42:26,750 General Mackenzie , I was just in 1126 00:42:26,750 --> 00:42:28,972 Israel and I had the opportunity to see 1127 00:42:28,972 --> 00:42:32,360 for myself the warmer relations that 1128 00:42:32,360 --> 00:42:35,320 exist between Israel and Arab states , 1129 00:42:35,700 --> 00:42:39,690 it really is a source of great hope and 1130 00:42:39,700 --> 00:42:41,756 it's clear that the relationship has 1131 00:42:41,756 --> 00:42:44,060 created some stability in the region 1132 00:42:44,070 --> 00:42:46,292 and I'm pleased that that centcom under 1133 00:42:46,292 --> 00:42:48,420 your leadership has embraced this new 1134 00:42:48,420 --> 00:42:51,830 reality , but we know that the Israeli 1135 00:42:51,830 --> 00:42:54,590 Palestinian conflict remains a source 1136 00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:57,620 of tremendous friction . Um and it's 1137 00:42:57,630 --> 00:43:00,840 it's that that threat is always just 1138 00:43:00,850 --> 00:43:03,170 over the horizon . The fighting last 1139 00:43:03,170 --> 00:43:06,220 May is a prime example of how that how 1140 00:43:06,220 --> 00:43:08,276 the conflict in that region can very 1141 00:43:08,276 --> 00:43:10,800 quickly escalate and become violence 1142 00:43:10,810 --> 00:43:13,830 everyone there . Uh and here we are all 1143 00:43:13,830 --> 00:43:15,960 concerned that the cycles of violence 1144 00:43:15,960 --> 00:43:18,620 will only continue . But from an 1145 00:43:18,620 --> 00:43:21,070 american national security perspective , 1146 00:43:21,080 --> 00:43:23,470 do you believe that such rounds of 1147 00:43:23,470 --> 00:43:25,590 violence have adversely impacted 1148 00:43:25,600 --> 00:43:28,760 America's defense posture ? And if so , 1149 00:43:28,770 --> 00:43:31,020 is there a national security impetus 1150 00:43:31,030 --> 00:43:33,670 for the United States to take an active 1151 00:43:33,670 --> 00:43:35,726 role in improving the reality on the 1152 00:43:35,726 --> 00:43:38,130 ground in order to help create the 1153 00:43:38,130 --> 00:43:40,500 conditions needed to achieve A two 1154 00:43:40,500 --> 00:43:43,120 state solution ? And if so , how 1155 00:43:44,300 --> 00:43:46,467 man , the entry of Israel into the A . 1156 00:43:46,467 --> 00:43:48,522 O . R . Was a significant historical 1157 00:43:48,522 --> 00:43:50,744 event . And and so what it's done is it 1158 00:43:50,744 --> 00:43:52,856 is sort of the operational expression 1159 00:43:52,856 --> 00:43:55,022 of what began with the Abraham accords 1160 00:43:55,022 --> 00:43:57,244 and other normalization activities that 1161 00:43:57,244 --> 00:43:59,300 go forward . And so the relationship 1162 00:43:59,300 --> 00:44:01,522 that Israel is developing with its arab 1163 00:44:01,522 --> 00:44:03,522 neighbors is going to be profoundly 1164 00:44:03,522 --> 00:44:05,356 significant in the years ahead . 1165 00:44:05,356 --> 00:44:07,522 Something that is an irritant to those 1166 00:44:07,522 --> 00:44:09,522 good relationships is of course the 1167 00:44:09,522 --> 00:44:11,467 struggle with the Palestinians and 1168 00:44:11,467 --> 00:44:13,633 that's that's an irritant to the Arabs 1169 00:44:13,633 --> 00:44:15,744 and to all of that too many of them . 1170 00:44:15,744 --> 00:44:17,967 And I think it's a significant factor . 1171 00:44:17,967 --> 00:44:20,133 Anything we could do to reduce that to 1172 00:44:20,133 --> 00:44:19,610 reduce that as an irritant to those 1173 00:44:19,610 --> 00:44:21,840 relationships would contribute to not 1174 00:44:21,840 --> 00:44:24,062 only Israeli security not only security 1175 00:44:24,062 --> 00:44:26,229 across the region , but ultimately our 1176 00:44:26,229 --> 00:44:28,396 own security . Thank you so much . And 1177 00:44:28,396 --> 00:44:30,451 I have less than a minute left . But 1178 00:44:30,451 --> 00:44:32,618 generally speaking to what extent does 1179 00:44:32,618 --> 00:44:34,396 U . S . Security assistance and 1180 00:44:34,396 --> 00:44:36,173 coordination allow our regional 1181 00:44:36,173 --> 00:44:38,396 partners to better coordinate with each 1182 00:44:38,396 --> 00:44:40,507 other and remove some of the regional 1183 00:44:40,507 --> 00:44:42,618 security burdens that would otherwise 1184 00:44:42,618 --> 00:44:44,340 fall more directly on american 1185 00:44:44,340 --> 00:44:46,396 shoulders . So we have seen over the 1186 00:44:46,396 --> 00:44:48,173 past year , year and a half the 1187 00:44:48,173 --> 00:44:50,790 opportunity for nations to share us 1188 00:44:50,790 --> 00:44:52,901 resources that one nation purchased , 1189 00:44:52,901 --> 00:44:55,068 another nation had need of , there are 1190 00:44:55,068 --> 00:44:57,179 processes that we go through to allow 1191 00:44:57,179 --> 00:44:59,290 that third what we call a third party 1192 00:44:59,290 --> 00:45:01,820 transfer and and we have seen that work 1193 00:45:01,830 --> 00:45:04,052 successfully . The specifics I'd rather 1194 00:45:04,052 --> 00:45:06,052 put into the closed session but I'm 1195 00:45:06,052 --> 00:45:08,163 prepared to talk about that . But yes 1196 00:45:08,163 --> 00:45:10,274 it is , it is something we have found 1197 00:45:10,274 --> 00:45:10,050 valuable . I would simply tell you we 1198 00:45:10,050 --> 00:45:12,630 also struggle sometimes sometimes with 1199 00:45:12,630 --> 00:45:15,050 the United States bureaucracy . When we 1200 00:45:15,050 --> 00:45:17,161 attempt to do these moves , sometimes 1201 00:45:17,161 --> 00:45:19,272 we're our own most significant source 1202 00:45:19,272 --> 00:45:21,439 of friction when nations want to share 1203 00:45:21,439 --> 00:45:23,606 things like that . Thank you so much . 1204 00:45:23,606 --> 00:45:25,828 General McKenzie , I'm out of time . Mr 1205 00:45:25,828 --> 00:45:27,939 Chairman , I yield back . Thank you . 1206 00:45:27,939 --> 00:45:29,828 The chair recognizes Mr carl from 1207 00:45:29,828 --> 00:45:32,450 Alabama . Thank you Mr Chair . I 1208 00:45:32,460 --> 00:45:35,620 appreciate it . I apologize for popping 1209 00:45:35,620 --> 00:45:37,787 in and out . But as you will know it's 1210 00:45:37,787 --> 00:45:40,009 one of those days . Thank you to all of 1211 00:45:40,009 --> 00:45:42,064 our speakers . It's I know it's time 1212 00:45:42,064 --> 00:45:44,287 consuming for you to come here and take 1213 00:45:44,287 --> 00:45:46,231 time away and but I appreciate you 1214 00:45:46,231 --> 00:45:48,176 coming here . You're a general . I 1215 00:45:48,176 --> 00:45:50,231 raised a marine myself . So I'm very 1216 00:45:50,231 --> 00:45:52,398 proud of that . General Townsend . You 1217 00:45:52,398 --> 00:45:54,398 mentioned your statement . Uh , the 1218 00:45:54,398 --> 00:45:57,200 growing chinese influence in , in afcon 1219 00:45:57,210 --> 00:45:59,820 and their possible plans to establish a 1220 00:45:59,820 --> 00:46:01,931 naval base on the western side of the 1221 00:46:01,931 --> 00:46:04,660 continent allowing the chinese to do 1222 00:46:04,660 --> 00:46:07,100 this project . How can we expand our 1223 00:46:07,100 --> 00:46:09,340 naval capabilities to ensure that the 1224 00:46:09,340 --> 00:46:12,260 chinese do not have a dominant posture 1225 00:46:12,260 --> 00:46:13,100 in this area , 1226 00:46:17,980 --> 00:46:20,060 congressman , I would defer to the 1227 00:46:20,060 --> 00:46:22,282 department and the navy on how we might 1228 00:46:22,282 --> 00:46:24,393 expand our naval capabilities there . 1229 00:46:24,393 --> 00:46:26,820 Uh , the the naval capabilities that I 1230 00:46:26,820 --> 00:46:29,810 have today are sufficient to do what 1231 00:46:29,810 --> 00:46:32,750 africom must do . Uh , They are not 1232 00:46:32,760 --> 00:46:36,580 essential to precluding what china 1233 00:46:36,580 --> 00:46:39,210 does on the atlantic coast of Africa . 1234 00:46:39,780 --> 00:46:42,290 They will be essential If china is 1235 00:46:42,300 --> 00:46:44,522 successful in gaining a base there , we 1236 00:46:44,522 --> 00:46:46,689 would have to , in my view , we'd have 1237 00:46:46,689 --> 00:46:49,290 to invest more naval presence there and 1238 00:46:49,290 --> 00:46:52,480 activity to further protect America 1239 00:46:52,480 --> 00:46:54,313 from a chinese naval base on the 1240 00:46:54,313 --> 00:46:56,369 atlantic coast . Thank you sir . And 1241 00:46:56,369 --> 00:46:58,536 that's what I was after . I appreciate 1242 00:46:58,536 --> 00:47:00,758 that . And I give , give my time back . 1243 00:47:00,758 --> 00:47:02,924 The only question I have . Thank you . 1244 00:47:02,924 --> 00:47:04,702 Thank you . Mr Carl . The chair 1245 00:47:04,702 --> 00:47:06,758 recognizes mr scott from Georgia for 1246 00:47:06,758 --> 00:47:08,924 five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman 1247 00:47:08,924 --> 00:47:08,670 ma'am gentlemen . I appreciate your 1248 00:47:08,670 --> 00:47:10,892 service I slipped out for a few minutes 1249 00:47:10,892 --> 00:47:13,170 to meet with a man named David Beasley , 1250 00:47:13,170 --> 00:47:15,003 who's the head of the world Food 1251 00:47:15,003 --> 00:47:17,226 Program . And I want to read to you one 1252 00:47:17,226 --> 00:47:20,350 of his statements , We get 50% of our 1253 00:47:20,350 --> 00:47:22,572 grains out of the Ukraine Russia area . 1254 00:47:22,572 --> 00:47:24,794 It's going to have a dramatic impact on 1255 00:47:24,794 --> 00:47:26,906 food costs , shipping costs , oil and 1256 00:47:26,906 --> 00:47:29,017 fuel . This is a catastrophe . On top 1257 00:47:29,017 --> 00:47:31,570 of a catastrophe . He pointed out that 1258 00:47:31,570 --> 00:47:33,920 Sri Lanka right now and I'll just read 1259 00:47:33,920 --> 00:47:36,510 the headline from Bloomberg shock waves 1260 00:47:36,510 --> 00:47:38,732 from war in Ukraine threatened to swamp 1261 00:47:38,880 --> 00:47:42,370 Sri Lanka In 1262 00:47:42,370 --> 00:47:45,080 2021 . More than half of the grain for 1263 00:47:45,080 --> 00:47:47,247 the U.N . World Food Program came from 1264 00:47:47,247 --> 00:47:50,410 Ukraine . It's a tremendous exporter of 1265 00:47:50,410 --> 00:47:53,740 wheat , corn , sunflower oil , Russia 1266 00:47:53,740 --> 00:47:56,090 and Ukraine combined account for 30% of 1267 00:47:56,090 --> 00:47:59,660 the global wheat export as this 1268 00:47:59,660 --> 00:48:01,882 invasion continues . It's more and more 1269 00:48:01,882 --> 00:48:03,882 unlikely that the Ukrainian farmers 1270 00:48:03,882 --> 00:48:05,938 will be able to plant their crops or 1271 00:48:05,938 --> 00:48:08,104 fertilize their crops or harvest their 1272 00:48:08,104 --> 00:48:11,350 crops or export any of this food supply 1273 00:48:11,350 --> 00:48:13,790 into the world , 1274 00:48:17,170 --> 00:48:19,392 developing countries in the Middle East 1275 00:48:19,392 --> 00:48:22,720 and North Africa , we'll feel the 1276 00:48:22,720 --> 00:48:25,500 impact of this . And my question is , 1277 00:48:26,170 --> 00:48:28,392 have you considered the instability and 1278 00:48:28,392 --> 00:48:30,503 unrest that will soon be taking place 1279 00:48:31,970 --> 00:48:34,248 around the world and your respective A . 1280 00:48:34,248 --> 00:48:36,700 O . R . S . How can we help alleviate 1281 00:48:37,340 --> 00:48:40,370 the suffering and the instability that 1282 00:48:40,530 --> 00:48:42,620 we believe will come from this ? And 1283 00:48:42,620 --> 00:48:45,550 what funding resources do you need to 1284 00:48:45,550 --> 00:48:46,939 take on this challenge ? 1285 00:48:50,770 --> 00:48:53,930 Thanks congressman . So you're the 1286 00:48:53,930 --> 00:48:56,320 point is exactly right about the food 1287 00:48:56,320 --> 00:48:59,200 instability especially impacting Africa . 1288 00:49:00,170 --> 00:49:03,080 In fact , just in the last day or so , 1289 00:49:03,090 --> 00:49:06,150 the world Health Organization has 1290 00:49:06,150 --> 00:49:08,900 declared a humanitarian disaster in 1291 00:49:09,090 --> 00:49:12,700 Ethiopia as being the greatest one on 1292 00:49:12,700 --> 00:49:16,280 the planet . So food security 1293 00:49:16,720 --> 00:49:20,000 insecurity is a critical part of that 1294 00:49:20,370 --> 00:49:22,648 on the african continent , I would say . 1295 00:49:22,648 --> 00:49:25,250 As I said in my opening remarks I think 1296 00:49:25,250 --> 00:49:27,361 and in my written statement , I think 1297 00:49:27,361 --> 00:49:29,860 it's imperative that we continue to 1298 00:49:29,870 --> 00:49:33,860 fund the U . S . A . I . D . Because 1299 00:49:33,870 --> 00:49:35,960 they invest in a robust way in the 1300 00:49:35,960 --> 00:49:38,071 african continent . It's probably one 1301 00:49:38,071 --> 00:49:40,182 of the best investments America makes 1302 00:49:40,182 --> 00:49:42,404 there . And I think there's going to be 1303 00:49:42,404 --> 00:49:44,460 because of the point you just made , 1304 00:49:44,460 --> 00:49:44,200 there's gonna be more of that required . 1305 00:49:47,370 --> 00:49:49,481 So I would I would note two countries 1306 00:49:49,481 --> 00:49:51,481 in particular in my A . R . Will be 1307 00:49:51,481 --> 00:49:53,592 threatened . One is Egypt , the other 1308 00:49:53,592 --> 00:49:55,703 is Jordan's both depend significantly 1309 00:49:55,703 --> 00:49:57,814 on imports from from Ukraine and they 1310 00:49:57,814 --> 00:49:59,981 will face a growing food insufficiency 1311 00:49:59,981 --> 00:50:02,203 as we go forward . I think , you know , 1312 00:50:02,203 --> 00:50:02,000 the long term solution is you'd like to 1313 00:50:02,000 --> 00:50:03,778 find a regional way to actually 1314 00:50:03,778 --> 00:50:06,111 supplant exporting food into the region . 1315 00:50:06,111 --> 00:50:08,790 But that's a long term solution . We're 1316 00:50:08,790 --> 00:50:10,790 we are looking aggressively now for 1317 00:50:10,790 --> 00:50:12,846 short term solutions that will , you 1318 00:50:12,846 --> 00:50:14,957 know , that that will bring wheat and 1319 00:50:14,957 --> 00:50:17,234 other foodstuffs in for the short term . 1320 00:50:17,234 --> 00:50:16,930 And you're obviously you're gonna have 1321 00:50:16,930 --> 00:50:19,100 to find other sources , other global 1322 00:50:19,100 --> 00:50:21,378 sources rather than Ukraine and Russia . 1323 00:50:21,378 --> 00:50:23,489 And that's gonna be hard to do with a 1324 00:50:23,489 --> 00:50:25,600 third of the market coming from those 1325 00:50:25,600 --> 00:50:25,220 two areas . This is a very pressing 1326 00:50:25,220 --> 00:50:27,442 concern and I appreciate you calling it 1327 00:50:27,442 --> 00:50:31,250 out respect . Uh 1328 00:50:31,260 --> 00:50:33,260 Congressman . I couldn't agree more 1329 00:50:33,260 --> 00:50:35,371 with what what generals Mackenzie and 1330 00:50:35,371 --> 00:50:37,371 Townsend have said , I would add to 1331 00:50:37,371 --> 00:50:39,704 General McKenzie's list . Perhaps Yemen , 1332 00:50:39,704 --> 00:50:41,927 uh as being a country that will face an 1333 00:50:41,927 --> 00:50:44,093 impact here . Uh , you know what we're 1334 00:50:44,093 --> 00:50:46,149 seeing now are the 2nd and 3rd order 1335 00:50:46,149 --> 00:50:48,371 consequences of Russia's unprovoked and 1336 00:50:48,371 --> 00:50:51,010 illegal invasion of Ukraine . As 1337 00:50:51,010 --> 00:50:53,232 General Townsend said , U . S . A . I . 1338 00:50:53,232 --> 00:50:55,454 D . Has the lead on this issue . We are 1339 00:50:55,454 --> 00:50:57,621 strongly in support of U . S . A . I . 1340 00:50:57,621 --> 00:50:57,480 D . S . Efforts and will continue to 1341 00:50:57,480 --> 00:50:59,313 work with them in an interagency 1342 00:50:59,313 --> 00:51:01,258 fashion . I think what's happening 1343 00:51:01,258 --> 00:51:03,369 around the world right now is because 1344 00:51:03,369 --> 00:51:05,424 of the shortages and the anticipated 1345 00:51:05,424 --> 00:51:07,520 shortages is that people who were 1346 00:51:07,520 --> 00:51:09,990 receiving , some are now receiving none . 1347 00:51:10,070 --> 00:51:12,350 And a lot of people have had the 1348 00:51:12,350 --> 00:51:14,406 assistance that were getting through 1349 00:51:14,406 --> 00:51:17,070 the World Food Program cut in half . I 1350 00:51:17,070 --> 00:51:19,181 think as many as 13 million people in 1351 00:51:19,181 --> 00:51:21,450 Yemen actually received some type of 1352 00:51:21,460 --> 00:51:23,349 assistance through the World Food 1353 00:51:23,349 --> 00:51:25,780 Program . I just , I can't emphasize to 1354 00:51:25,780 --> 00:51:27,947 this committee and to the world enough 1355 00:51:27,947 --> 00:51:30,113 the devastation of what Vladimir Putin 1356 00:51:30,113 --> 00:51:33,330 has done in the disruption around the 1357 00:51:33,330 --> 00:51:35,441 world . And I think that the pain and 1358 00:51:35,441 --> 00:51:37,910 the suffering that that individual is 1359 00:51:37,910 --> 00:51:41,000 caused is only is only now beginning to 1360 00:51:41,000 --> 00:51:43,167 be felt and I think the world is going 1361 00:51:43,167 --> 00:51:46,590 to gonna be hurting for several years 1362 00:51:46,590 --> 00:51:48,757 because of what he's done . And I just 1363 00:51:48,757 --> 00:51:50,979 hope that we're paying attention to the 1364 00:51:50,979 --> 00:51:53,146 potential civil unrest and instability 1365 00:51:53,146 --> 00:51:55,090 that comes from the lack of global 1366 00:51:55,090 --> 00:51:57,090 foods play because of what Vladimir 1367 00:51:57,090 --> 00:51:59,368 Putin has done with that . Mr Chairman , 1368 00:51:59,368 --> 00:52:01,312 I yield . Thank you . MS Jacobs is 1369 00:52:01,312 --> 00:52:03,368 recognized for five minutes . Well , 1370 00:52:03,368 --> 00:52:05,534 thank you so much and thank you to our 1371 00:52:05,534 --> 00:52:07,646 witnesses . It's great to see you all 1372 00:52:07,646 --> 00:52:09,534 again . I first wanted to ask you 1373 00:52:09,534 --> 00:52:11,646 General Townsend , a recent reporting 1374 00:52:11,646 --> 00:52:13,590 brought to light us support to the 1375 00:52:13,590 --> 00:52:15,423 Rapid Intervention battalion and 1376 00:52:15,423 --> 00:52:17,757 Cameroon under uh the 1 27 Echo program . 1377 00:52:17,757 --> 00:52:19,812 The Rapid Intervention Battalion has 1378 00:52:19,812 --> 00:52:21,812 been repeatedly implicated in human 1379 00:52:21,812 --> 00:52:23,923 rights abuses . So why was us support 1380 00:52:23,923 --> 00:52:26,146 to the Rapid intervention Battalion not 1381 00:52:26,146 --> 00:52:28,312 blocked on human rights grounds ? What 1382 00:52:28,312 --> 00:52:30,479 steps is africom taking to ensure that 1383 00:52:30,479 --> 00:52:30,100 any partner forces supported under 1384 00:52:30,100 --> 00:52:32,156 Section 1 27 Echo have not committed 1385 00:52:32,156 --> 00:52:34,380 gross violations of human rights . And 1386 00:52:34,380 --> 00:52:36,602 wouldn't one way to prevent this in the 1387 00:52:36,602 --> 00:52:38,713 future be the subject 127 Echo to the 1388 00:52:38,713 --> 00:52:40,824 same kinds of leahy vetting standards 1389 00:52:40,824 --> 00:52:42,991 we use for nearly every other security 1390 00:52:42,991 --> 00:52:46,950 assistance program . Mhm . Um so , 1391 00:52:46,960 --> 00:52:50,040 uh there was a amnesty international I 1392 00:52:50,040 --> 00:52:52,850 think report in 2017 that brought this 1393 00:52:52,850 --> 00:52:55,270 to light that that caused the 1394 00:52:55,270 --> 00:52:57,381 department in africom to look closely 1395 00:52:57,381 --> 00:52:59,870 at our support , our engagement with 1396 00:53:00,250 --> 00:53:02,250 The rapid intervention battalion in 1397 00:53:02,250 --> 00:53:05,210 Cameroon in 2019 . Our relationship was 1398 00:53:05,220 --> 00:53:08,590 ended With that element . In fact , 1399 00:53:08,590 --> 00:53:10,980 we've drawn down pretty much in 2019 1400 00:53:10,980 --> 00:53:14,030 and by early 2020 , we ended all of our 1401 00:53:14,030 --> 00:53:17,820 engagement with Cameroon were starting 1402 00:53:17,830 --> 00:53:20,950 to reengage there on a very selected 1403 00:53:20,950 --> 00:53:24,090 basis with some Few programs , but not 1404 00:53:24,090 --> 00:53:26,920 with the rapid intervention battalion . 1405 00:53:26,950 --> 00:53:29,900 And we do go through extensive vetting 1406 00:53:30,080 --> 00:53:32,080 with all of our programs , training 1407 00:53:32,080 --> 00:53:34,247 programs on the content to include the 1408 00:53:34,247 --> 00:53:36,358 127 Echo program . Okay , thank you . 1409 00:53:36,358 --> 00:53:39,040 Um MS baker . Uh nice to see you . Um 1410 00:53:39,050 --> 00:53:40,939 recent years have seen us trained 1411 00:53:40,939 --> 00:53:42,960 officers in Burkina , faso mali , 1412 00:53:42,960 --> 00:53:44,904 guinea , Mauritania and the Gambia 1413 00:53:44,904 --> 00:53:46,849 overthrow national governments and 1414 00:53:46,849 --> 00:53:48,571 military coups . Many of these 1415 00:53:48,571 --> 00:53:50,682 countries had issues with gross human 1416 00:53:50,682 --> 00:53:52,460 rights violations in the past , 1417 00:53:52,460 --> 00:53:54,627 particularly Burkina Faso and mali and 1418 00:53:54,627 --> 00:53:56,293 lacked robust security sector 1419 00:53:56,293 --> 00:53:58,516 governance and democratic progress that 1420 00:53:58,516 --> 00:54:00,516 made this kind of challenge frankly 1421 00:54:00,516 --> 00:54:02,738 predictable . On february 4th , I along 1422 00:54:02,738 --> 00:54:04,738 with Chairman Meeks and a letter to 1423 00:54:04,738 --> 00:54:04,640 President biden Blinken and Secretary 1424 00:54:04,640 --> 00:54:06,750 Austin on our strategy in the saddle 1425 00:54:06,750 --> 00:54:08,861 and requested that the administration 1426 00:54:08,861 --> 00:54:11,083 evaluate its security sector assistance 1427 00:54:11,083 --> 00:54:13,028 and other efforts over the last 15 1428 00:54:13,028 --> 00:54:14,972 years to assess their efficacy and 1429 00:54:14,972 --> 00:54:16,917 areas for improvement . And I look 1430 00:54:16,917 --> 00:54:18,972 forward to this briefing and hope we 1431 00:54:18,972 --> 00:54:18,540 can work together on this going forward . 1432 00:54:18,540 --> 00:54:20,318 But how have these developments 1433 00:54:20,318 --> 00:54:22,096 impacted docs thinking on which 1434 00:54:22,096 --> 00:54:24,262 Sahelian and West African militaries , 1435 00:54:24,262 --> 00:54:27,450 we provide security assistance to thank 1436 00:54:27,450 --> 00:54:29,394 you Anderson and thank you for the 1437 00:54:29,394 --> 00:54:31,840 question . Um I should note just up 1438 00:54:31,840 --> 00:54:33,562 front that we do have security 1439 00:54:33,562 --> 00:54:35,673 assistance restrictions as a result , 1440 00:54:35,673 --> 00:54:37,840 as you said of the of the recent coups 1441 00:54:37,840 --> 00:54:40,007 in both Burkina faso mali and and also 1442 00:54:40,007 --> 00:54:42,240 Guinea . So uh for starters that that 1443 00:54:42,240 --> 00:54:44,760 is in place um as you know , we work 1444 00:54:44,940 --> 00:54:46,996 closely with the State department to 1445 00:54:46,996 --> 00:54:49,520 ensure that we are vetting all security 1446 00:54:49,520 --> 00:54:52,440 assistance partners uh in in compliance 1447 00:54:52,440 --> 00:54:55,160 with US law with local screening 1448 00:54:55,170 --> 00:54:57,281 biometrics as it's required . There's 1449 00:54:57,281 --> 00:54:59,226 always more that we can do in this 1450 00:54:59,226 --> 00:55:01,281 space . And so we'll look forward to 1451 00:55:01,281 --> 00:55:00,930 getting you a briefing on what we're 1452 00:55:00,940 --> 00:55:02,996 what we're working on . Okay . Thank 1453 00:55:02,996 --> 00:55:04,996 you frankly , I think some of these 1454 00:55:04,996 --> 00:55:07,051 challenges with the folks we trained 1455 00:55:07,051 --> 00:55:09,107 was a bit predictable . So I want to 1456 00:55:09,107 --> 00:55:08,560 make sure we're going beyond just the 1457 00:55:08,570 --> 00:55:10,950 immediate vetting to make sure we're 1458 00:55:10,960 --> 00:55:13,127 contributing to the broader democratic 1459 00:55:13,127 --> 00:55:15,238 governance of our partner countries . 1460 00:55:15,740 --> 00:55:18,018 Absolutely . And I just say , you know , 1461 00:55:18,018 --> 00:55:20,073 as as Gerald johnson has said one of 1462 00:55:20,073 --> 00:55:22,018 our focuses in the Africa Corps in 1463 00:55:22,018 --> 00:55:23,851 particular is that institutional 1464 00:55:23,851 --> 00:55:25,962 capacity building that will help us , 1465 00:55:25,962 --> 00:55:28,073 we hope to move beyond these kinds of 1466 00:55:28,073 --> 00:55:30,296 incidents . Great and General Mackenzie 1467 00:55:30,296 --> 00:55:32,351 um the D . O . D . Has significantly 1468 00:55:32,351 --> 00:55:34,184 undercounted civilian casualties 1469 00:55:34,184 --> 00:55:34,090 compared to numbers provided by 1470 00:55:34,090 --> 00:55:36,146 credible independent organizations . 1471 00:55:36,146 --> 00:55:37,701 Despite the fact that these 1472 00:55:37,701 --> 00:55:39,757 organizations undertake interviews , 1473 00:55:39,757 --> 00:55:41,979 site visits and other measures that D . 1474 00:55:41,979 --> 00:55:43,868 O . D . Does not generally have . 1475 00:55:43,868 --> 00:55:45,812 Additionally recent new york Times 1476 00:55:45,812 --> 00:55:47,868 reporting found that bot prematurely 1477 00:55:47,868 --> 00:55:47,730 dismissed many civilian casualty 1478 00:55:47,730 --> 00:55:49,952 reports at the assessment phase without 1479 00:55:49,952 --> 00:55:52,119 doing basic due diligence . Like basic 1480 00:55:52,119 --> 00:55:54,008 internet searches or searching in 1481 00:55:54,008 --> 00:55:56,174 Arabic instead of only in english . Um 1482 00:55:56,174 --> 00:55:58,286 And earlier this week I along with my 1483 00:55:58,286 --> 00:56:00,452 colleague sent a letter to D . O . D . 1484 00:56:00,452 --> 00:56:00,360 Urging it to take steps on preventing 1485 00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:02,416 and mitigating civilian casualties . 1486 00:56:02,416 --> 00:56:04,249 Moving moving forward as centcom 1487 00:56:04,249 --> 00:56:06,304 implements changes in procedures for 1488 00:56:06,304 --> 00:56:08,471 tracking , assessing and investigating 1489 00:56:08,471 --> 00:56:10,638 civilian harm will centcom revisit the 1490 00:56:10,638 --> 00:56:12,638 many past cases that appear to have 1491 00:56:12,638 --> 00:56:14,693 been prematurely dismissed and going 1492 00:56:14,693 --> 00:56:14,560 forward . What changes do you believe 1493 00:56:14,560 --> 00:56:18,120 need to be made ? So I'll begin by 1494 00:56:18,120 --> 00:56:20,176 saying nobody wearing the uniform of 1495 00:56:20,176 --> 00:56:22,120 the United States is interested in 1496 00:56:22,120 --> 00:56:24,287 killing an innocent person . We worked 1497 00:56:24,287 --> 00:56:26,231 very hard to minimize that but the 1498 00:56:26,231 --> 00:56:28,342 battlefield is a deadly and dangerous 1499 00:56:28,342 --> 00:56:30,564 place and we have made mistakes and yes 1500 00:56:30,564 --> 00:56:32,787 we have killed innocent people and when 1501 00:56:32,787 --> 00:56:32,380 we can and we have tried very hard to 1502 00:56:32,380 --> 00:56:34,269 mitigate that . As you know , the 1503 00:56:34,269 --> 00:56:36,102 secretary has undertaken a large 1504 00:56:36,102 --> 00:56:37,991 comprehensive exhaustive and high 1505 00:56:37,991 --> 00:56:40,020 energy project to further shape the 1506 00:56:40,020 --> 00:56:42,242 efforts of the department and were full 1507 00:56:42,242 --> 00:56:44,409 participants in that going forward . I 1508 00:56:44,409 --> 00:56:46,464 would tell you in the in the interim 1509 00:56:46,464 --> 00:56:48,576 based on uh various reports that have 1510 00:56:48,576 --> 00:56:50,576 been issued . We have undertaken 10 1511 00:56:50,576 --> 00:56:52,520 discrete actions within us central 1512 00:56:52,520 --> 00:56:54,576 command that will support the larger 1513 00:56:54,576 --> 00:56:54,550 effort but we're not waiting on that to 1514 00:56:54,550 --> 00:56:56,870 actually happen . Um and I will be 1515 00:56:56,870 --> 00:56:58,981 happy to send those 10 things over so 1516 00:56:58,981 --> 00:57:01,148 that you can examine them . Uh but but 1517 00:57:01,148 --> 00:57:03,370 but the secretary is seized with this . 1518 00:57:03,370 --> 00:57:05,426 His energy is palpable , visible and 1519 00:57:05,426 --> 00:57:07,703 we're moving forward on it . Thank you . 1520 00:57:07,703 --> 00:57:07,520 We appreciate the Secretary's efforts 1521 00:57:07,520 --> 00:57:09,687 and we look forward to that briefing . 1522 00:57:09,687 --> 00:57:11,853 Mr expired . Mr franklin is recognized 1523 00:57:11,853 --> 00:57:13,742 for five minutes . Thank you . Mr 1524 00:57:13,742 --> 00:57:15,576 Chairman and I had a couple more 1525 00:57:15,576 --> 00:57:17,853 questions I didn't quite get to before . 1526 00:57:17,853 --> 00:57:20,150 Um And again back to General Mackenzie 1527 00:57:20,530 --> 00:57:23,560 as chairman smith had had noted Iranian 1528 00:57:23,560 --> 00:57:25,616 terror activity has been significant 1529 00:57:25,616 --> 00:57:27,838 whether there's a J C P O A in place or 1530 00:57:27,838 --> 00:57:29,671 not understand that whether it's 1531 00:57:29,671 --> 00:57:31,782 Hezbollah in Lebanon Hamas and Gaza , 1532 00:57:31,782 --> 00:57:34,004 the houthis in Yemen , the codes forces 1533 00:57:34,004 --> 00:57:36,320 in Iraq , the common denominator is the 1534 00:57:36,320 --> 00:57:38,487 neighborhood bully . And I hate to use 1535 00:57:38,487 --> 00:57:40,653 that expression because it's obviously 1536 00:57:40,653 --> 00:57:40,630 a lot more significant than that . But 1537 00:57:40,630 --> 00:57:42,797 they're the bad guys , they're the bad 1538 00:57:42,797 --> 00:57:45,019 actor in the neighborhood , they're the 1539 00:57:45,019 --> 00:57:44,740 ones who want to destabilize everything . 1540 00:57:45,230 --> 00:57:49,220 Um I hate to ask this . I 1541 00:57:49,220 --> 00:57:51,442 wouldn't normally ask this question but 1542 00:57:51,442 --> 00:57:53,664 because I understand your your place to 1543 00:57:53,664 --> 00:57:56,400 provide um advice and counsel to the 1544 00:57:56,400 --> 00:57:58,622 administration but but based on the way 1545 00:57:58,622 --> 00:58:00,567 things unfolded in Afghanistan and 1546 00:58:00,567 --> 00:58:02,456 knowing now the questions we were 1547 00:58:02,456 --> 00:58:04,456 asking and we're getting answers to 1548 00:58:04,456 --> 00:58:06,678 before things are coming out that there 1549 00:58:06,678 --> 00:58:08,678 was a lot of advice provided by the 1550 00:58:08,678 --> 00:58:08,420 pentagon that was not heated by the 1551 00:58:08,420 --> 00:58:10,698 administration . So before we get this , 1552 00:58:10,920 --> 00:58:12,920 this treaty that the administration 1553 00:58:12,920 --> 00:58:15,087 seems really bent on getting back into 1554 00:58:15,087 --> 00:58:17,198 into place , I think it's it's really 1555 00:58:17,198 --> 00:58:16,700 essential that the details are 1556 00:58:16,700 --> 00:58:20,420 discussed . Has the White House engaged 1557 00:58:20,420 --> 00:58:22,390 you for your regional security 1558 00:58:22,390 --> 00:58:24,612 expertise in the negotiation process of 1559 00:58:24,612 --> 00:58:27,770 this Iran deal . So I might the person 1560 00:58:27,770 --> 00:58:29,659 I engage with is the Secretary of 1561 00:58:29,659 --> 00:58:31,492 Defense and Policy and we have a 1562 00:58:31,492 --> 00:58:33,548 constant dialogue with the Secretary 1563 00:58:33,548 --> 00:58:35,714 and all issues within the centcom . Er 1564 00:58:35,714 --> 00:58:37,881 and I understand the Secretary has got 1565 00:58:37,881 --> 00:58:37,490 a lot on his plate , but where he's 1566 00:58:37,490 --> 00:58:39,712 getting his primary source of the boots 1567 00:58:39,712 --> 00:58:41,934 on the ground feedback is gonna be from 1568 00:58:41,934 --> 00:58:43,990 you . I think he gets it from me , I 1569 00:58:43,990 --> 00:58:46,046 think he gets it from policy and you 1570 00:58:46,046 --> 00:58:46,030 know , a variety , a variety of sources . 1571 00:58:46,420 --> 00:58:48,840 Okay , so my concern is what we're 1572 00:58:48,840 --> 00:58:50,896 seeing on the press out there in the 1573 00:58:50,896 --> 00:58:52,784 press of what may be coming out , 1574 00:58:52,784 --> 00:58:56,330 delisting irgc buying Iranian oil those 1575 00:58:58,120 --> 00:59:00,342 from what you've told us here would not 1576 00:59:00,342 --> 00:59:02,342 be in alignment with your advice on 1577 00:59:02,342 --> 00:59:04,676 what's best from a military perspective . 1578 00:59:04,676 --> 00:59:06,564 And I don't I don't expect you to 1579 00:59:06,564 --> 00:59:06,250 comment on that , but it's either that 1580 00:59:06,260 --> 00:59:08,149 or or they're not asking for your 1581 00:59:08,149 --> 00:59:10,093 advice at all and I find either of 1582 00:59:10,093 --> 00:59:12,204 those to be very concerning and we're 1583 00:59:12,204 --> 00:59:14,260 gonna watch very closely on how this 1584 00:59:14,260 --> 00:59:16,371 treaty develops . But I thank you all 1585 00:59:16,371 --> 00:59:18,427 and I would , I'm assuming that this 1586 00:59:18,427 --> 00:59:20,482 will be the last time the two of you 1587 00:59:20,482 --> 00:59:22,482 testified before us . But I want to 1588 00:59:22,482 --> 00:59:24,593 thank you as a former military member 1589 00:59:24,593 --> 00:59:26,649 for your decades of service . It's a 1590 00:59:26,649 --> 00:59:26,530 lot of hard work and not very 1591 00:59:26,530 --> 00:59:28,586 gratifying a lot of times , but your 1592 00:59:28,586 --> 00:59:30,752 nation appreciates your work and I and 1593 00:59:30,752 --> 00:59:32,919 I yield back . Thank you very much . I 1594 00:59:32,919 --> 00:59:35,086 just want to clarify the last answer , 1595 00:59:35,086 --> 00:59:37,141 john McKenzie said he is speaking to 1596 00:59:37,141 --> 00:59:39,197 Secretary Austin and that that's the 1597 00:59:39,197 --> 00:59:39,100 chain of command here . Um The White 1598 00:59:39,100 --> 00:59:41,322 House is not ignoring the Department of 1599 00:59:41,322 --> 00:59:43,378 Defense's opinion on this . They are 1600 00:59:43,378 --> 00:59:45,544 speaking with Secretary Austin who was 1601 00:59:45,544 --> 00:59:47,767 speaking to his people and that's where 1602 00:59:47,767 --> 00:59:47,650 the information goes back and I will . 1603 00:59:47,660 --> 00:59:49,771 The larger point is it's , you know , 1604 00:59:49,771 --> 00:59:51,549 we have civilian control of the 1605 00:59:51,549 --> 00:59:53,716 military for a reason . You know , the 1606 00:59:53,716 --> 00:59:55,938 President is ultimately the one who has 1607 00:59:55,938 --> 00:59:57,993 to make decisions . Um if we want to 1608 00:59:57,993 --> 01:00:00,216 just do whatever the military told us , 1609 01:00:00,216 --> 01:00:00,150 we wouldn't have civilian control of 1610 01:00:00,150 --> 01:00:02,317 the military , you take the advice you 1611 01:00:02,317 --> 01:00:04,150 process it and you make the best 1612 01:00:04,150 --> 01:00:04,120 decision you can and that that's what 1613 01:00:04,120 --> 01:00:06,398 they're trying to do . And MR Chairman , 1614 01:00:06,398 --> 01:00:08,453 If I could I do just want to clarify 1615 01:00:08,453 --> 01:00:10,176 that both the chairman and the 1616 01:00:10,176 --> 01:00:12,398 Secretary , I have had opportunities to 1617 01:00:12,398 --> 01:00:14,453 provide that advice to the President 1618 01:00:14,453 --> 01:00:16,509 and to offer their recommendations . 1619 01:00:16,509 --> 01:00:16,330 Okay , thank you . I appreciate that 1620 01:00:16,330 --> 01:00:18,108 clarification . Mr Gallagher is 1621 01:00:18,108 --> 01:00:20,490 recognized profound minutes . Thank you . 1622 01:00:20,490 --> 01:00:24,470 Mr Chairman . Um MS baker , your 1623 01:00:24,470 --> 01:00:28,350 testimony references um the emerging 1624 01:00:28,350 --> 01:00:30,183 concept of integrated deterrence 1625 01:00:30,183 --> 01:00:31,850 multiple times . You said the 1626 01:00:31,850 --> 01:00:33,850 department , we'll continue to lean 1627 01:00:33,850 --> 01:00:35,961 forward in strengthening multilateral 1628 01:00:35,961 --> 01:00:35,720 security cooperation in order to 1629 01:00:35,720 --> 01:00:37,942 strengthen integrated deterrence and to 1630 01:00:37,942 --> 01:00:39,998 address threats , particularly those 1631 01:00:39,998 --> 01:00:42,053 emanating from Iran . Later on , you 1632 01:00:42,053 --> 01:00:44,053 say the integrated deterrence means 1633 01:00:44,053 --> 01:00:46,276 creating advantages for ourselves , our 1634 01:00:46,276 --> 01:00:48,570 partners and our allies while creating 1635 01:00:48,570 --> 01:00:50,792 dilemmas for our competitors . I'd like 1636 01:00:50,792 --> 01:00:53,014 to talk a little bit about the dilemmas 1637 01:00:53,014 --> 01:00:54,792 you envisioned under integrated 1638 01:00:54,792 --> 01:00:54,770 deterrence . I know this is a centcom 1639 01:00:54,770 --> 01:00:57,180 hearing , but I wanted to ask quickly 1640 01:00:57,190 --> 01:00:59,023 about Russia , Your portfolio is 1641 01:00:59,023 --> 01:01:01,023 obviously very vast . Would it be a 1642 01:01:01,023 --> 01:01:02,634 fair characterization of the 1643 01:01:02,634 --> 01:01:05,190 administration's policy that sanctions 1644 01:01:05,190 --> 01:01:07,170 are designed to deny the Russian 1645 01:01:07,170 --> 01:01:09,090 government resources they would 1646 01:01:09,100 --> 01:01:11,210 otherwise have available in order to 1647 01:01:11,210 --> 01:01:12,543 punish their behavior . 1648 01:01:14,910 --> 01:01:17,100 Uh Congressman , I would say that the 1649 01:01:17,100 --> 01:01:19,660 sanctions that the US led and that are 1650 01:01:19,670 --> 01:01:22,270 not only a US owned but but 1651 01:01:22,270 --> 01:01:24,048 multinational at this point are 1652 01:01:24,048 --> 01:01:25,992 designed to impose consequences on 1653 01:01:25,992 --> 01:01:27,937 Russia for its illegal invasion of 1654 01:01:27,937 --> 01:01:29,937 Ukraine . So that's a yes to punish 1655 01:01:29,937 --> 01:01:32,159 their behavior and by punishing Russian 1656 01:01:32,159 --> 01:01:34,440 behavior or we are creating dilemmas as 1657 01:01:34,440 --> 01:01:36,840 you put it , or at least costs for the 1658 01:01:36,840 --> 01:01:39,220 Russians right cost in position . Yes , 1659 01:01:39,220 --> 01:01:41,650 congressman . So , under the same logic , 1660 01:01:41,660 --> 01:01:45,550 if another actor say china provided the 1661 01:01:45,550 --> 01:01:47,772 Russian government with funding to help 1662 01:01:47,772 --> 01:01:49,939 them evade sanctions , that would , in 1663 01:01:49,939 --> 01:01:52,780 a sense , create an advantage for 1664 01:01:52,780 --> 01:01:55,002 Russia in the in the sense , that would 1665 01:01:55,002 --> 01:01:57,058 mitigate some of the costs we impose 1666 01:01:57,058 --> 01:01:59,380 via sanctions . Right ? Uh Congressman , 1667 01:01:59,380 --> 01:02:01,080 Yes . And and we are having a 1668 01:02:01,080 --> 01:02:03,030 conversation with china about our 1669 01:02:03,030 --> 01:02:05,197 concerns in that regard . I think this 1670 01:02:05,197 --> 01:02:07,252 is a very important point , not only 1671 01:02:07,252 --> 01:02:09,308 because as we evaluate whether China 1672 01:02:09,308 --> 01:02:11,419 increases its support to Russia , but 1673 01:02:11,419 --> 01:02:13,419 to be clear if our adversaries have 1674 01:02:13,419 --> 01:02:16,110 access to more resources , that creates 1675 01:02:16,120 --> 01:02:17,953 an advantage for them and if our 1676 01:02:17,953 --> 01:02:20,310 adversaries have more resources and are 1677 01:02:20,310 --> 01:02:23,130 more capable , that creates dilemmas 1678 01:02:23,130 --> 01:02:26,840 for ourselves and for our allies and I 1679 01:02:26,840 --> 01:02:29,007 bring this all up because I think it's 1680 01:02:29,007 --> 01:02:31,007 a self evident point that's getting 1681 01:02:31,007 --> 01:02:33,173 lost in the shuffle that policies that 1682 01:02:33,173 --> 01:02:35,830 give our enemies more resources give 1683 01:02:35,830 --> 01:02:37,441 them an advantage and by the 1684 01:02:37,441 --> 01:02:40,230 administration's own admission , 1685 01:02:40,800 --> 01:02:43,350 undermined its vision . Such as it 1686 01:02:43,350 --> 01:02:46,190 exists , of integrated deterrence and I 1687 01:02:46,190 --> 01:02:48,301 bring this up because as my colleague 1688 01:02:48,301 --> 01:02:50,470 Mr Loria brought up before , we may be 1689 01:02:50,470 --> 01:02:52,810 days before , according to some days 1690 01:02:52,820 --> 01:02:55,090 away . According to some reports uh 1691 01:02:55,100 --> 01:02:57,880 from signing a deal with Iran , which 1692 01:02:57,890 --> 01:03:01,790 will in any scenario provide a massive 1693 01:03:01,800 --> 01:03:03,830 windfall to the tune of billions of 1694 01:03:03,830 --> 01:03:06,510 dollars to the world's primary state 1695 01:03:06,510 --> 01:03:08,621 sponsor of terrorism . And everything 1696 01:03:08,621 --> 01:03:11,670 else aside , indications are that this 1697 01:03:11,670 --> 01:03:13,980 deal will provide unprecedented 1698 01:03:13,980 --> 01:03:16,202 sanctions relief well outside the scope 1699 01:03:16,202 --> 01:03:18,313 of its nuclear program to the Iranian 1700 01:03:18,313 --> 01:03:20,424 government , including from terrorism 1701 01:03:20,424 --> 01:03:22,780 related sanctions . And I don't think 1702 01:03:22,780 --> 01:03:25,480 you have to be an opponent of the 1703 01:03:25,490 --> 01:03:28,470 original J . C . P . O A uh to 1704 01:03:28,470 --> 01:03:30,581 understand that this makes no sense . 1705 01:03:30,581 --> 01:03:32,526 Just take the administration's own 1706 01:03:32,526 --> 01:03:34,581 words at face value . Their strategy 1707 01:03:34,581 --> 01:03:36,692 calls for creating advantages for our 1708 01:03:36,692 --> 01:03:39,026 allies and dilemmas for our adversaries . 1709 01:03:39,026 --> 01:03:41,081 But this deal , by providing massive 1710 01:03:41,081 --> 01:03:43,240 resources to our primary adversary in 1711 01:03:43,240 --> 01:03:45,720 the Middle East will create dilemmas 1712 01:03:45,720 --> 01:03:49,550 for us and provide advantages to 1713 01:03:49,550 --> 01:03:51,661 our foremost enemy . And just a quick 1714 01:03:51,661 --> 01:03:53,383 question on that point to your 1715 01:03:53,383 --> 01:03:55,606 knowledge , is the Central Bank of Iran 1716 01:03:55,606 --> 01:03:57,050 still financing terrorism 1717 01:03:59,300 --> 01:04:01,480 uh Congressman . That's a question I'd 1718 01:04:01,480 --> 01:04:03,369 have to defer to the Treasury and 1719 01:04:03,369 --> 01:04:05,147 others . Okay , I've asked this 1720 01:04:05,147 --> 01:04:07,369 question in other committees have asked 1721 01:04:07,369 --> 01:04:09,536 it to the CIA Director . It's a matter 1722 01:04:09,536 --> 01:04:11,313 of public record . The Treasury 1723 01:04:11,313 --> 01:04:13,369 Department has put it's not it's not 1724 01:04:13,369 --> 01:04:15,202 doesn't take arcane or exquisite 1725 01:04:15,202 --> 01:04:17,430 intelligence to to know the answer I 1726 01:04:17,430 --> 01:04:20,390 take , but we'll take it back . I guess , 1727 01:04:20,400 --> 01:04:22,289 since you responded to an earlier 1728 01:04:22,289 --> 01:04:24,456 question from my colleague Mr Crow , I 1729 01:04:24,456 --> 01:04:27,300 believe that the NDS is now being 1730 01:04:27,300 --> 01:04:29,133 delayed because of the crisis in 1731 01:04:29,133 --> 01:04:31,467 Ukraine . Is that correct , congressman ? 1732 01:04:31,467 --> 01:04:33,356 I wouldn't say it's being delayed 1733 01:04:33,356 --> 01:04:35,522 because of the crisis in Ukraine . And 1734 01:04:35,522 --> 01:04:37,578 it is it is uh in final coordination 1735 01:04:37,578 --> 01:04:39,633 and we hope to have it to you soon . 1736 01:04:39,633 --> 01:04:41,744 Okay . Um , are you rethinking any of 1737 01:04:41,744 --> 01:04:43,967 the assumptions underlying the NDS as a 1738 01:04:43,967 --> 01:04:46,189 result of Ukraine ? Or do you see it as 1739 01:04:46,189 --> 01:04:48,411 a validation of integrated deterrents ? 1740 01:04:48,411 --> 01:04:50,522 Carson ? We believe that the strategy 1741 01:04:50,522 --> 01:04:52,744 in fact took into consideration some of 1742 01:04:52,744 --> 01:04:54,967 the behavior that we've now seen Russia 1743 01:04:54,967 --> 01:04:57,189 exhibit and that it's resilient to what 1744 01:04:57,189 --> 01:04:59,356 we're seeing from the Russians at this 1745 01:04:59,356 --> 01:05:01,356 time . So do you believe integrated 1746 01:05:01,356 --> 01:05:03,356 deterrents succeeded in the case of 1747 01:05:03,356 --> 01:05:05,522 Russia , Ukraine ? I think what you're 1748 01:05:05,522 --> 01:05:07,244 seeing right now is integrated 1749 01:05:07,244 --> 01:05:09,022 deterrence in action , bringing 1750 01:05:09,022 --> 01:05:12,240 together the sanctions , the allies and 1751 01:05:12,240 --> 01:05:14,440 the partners have seven seconds . But 1752 01:05:14,440 --> 01:05:16,607 what you're effectively saying is your 1753 01:05:16,607 --> 01:05:18,829 entire theory of deterrence requires on 1754 01:05:18,829 --> 01:05:20,996 a country getting invaded and pillaged 1755 01:05:20,996 --> 01:05:22,996 in order to galvanize the West into 1756 01:05:22,996 --> 01:05:25,218 action and I just don't want to put our 1757 01:05:25,218 --> 01:05:27,440 eggs in that basket . I'm out of time . 1758 01:05:27,440 --> 01:05:29,496 Thank you , appreciate it will point 1759 01:05:29,496 --> 01:05:31,329 out , we we have sanctioned many 1760 01:05:31,329 --> 01:05:33,162 nations long before they invaded 1761 01:05:33,162 --> 01:05:35,162 another country . Certainly we have 1762 01:05:35,162 --> 01:05:36,940 sanctions against Russia , With 1763 01:05:36,940 --> 01:05:39,051 sanctions have sanctions against Iran 1764 01:05:39,051 --> 01:05:40,996 now . And I think that the central 1765 01:05:40,996 --> 01:05:42,996 dilemma that this administration is 1766 01:05:42,996 --> 01:05:45,218 trying to wrestle with is we also don't 1767 01:05:45,218 --> 01:05:47,384 want Iran to get a nuclear weapon . Um 1768 01:05:47,384 --> 01:05:49,384 and that's kind of the trade off on 1769 01:05:49,384 --> 01:05:51,551 that that we're trying to go through . 1770 01:05:51,551 --> 01:05:53,218 And I have not seen any other 1771 01:05:53,218 --> 01:05:55,384 reasonable plan other than negotiating 1772 01:05:55,384 --> 01:05:57,384 with Iran for how we stop them from 1773 01:05:57,384 --> 01:05:59,440 getting a nuclear weapon . Now , the 1774 01:05:59,440 --> 01:06:01,551 details of that negotiation obviously 1775 01:06:01,551 --> 01:06:01,210 matter what are we giving up , What are 1776 01:06:01,210 --> 01:06:03,530 we getting ? But we can't act like for 1777 01:06:03,530 --> 01:06:05,660 no apparent reason whatsoever . We're 1778 01:06:05,660 --> 01:06:07,716 just giving Iran sanctions relief so 1779 01:06:07,716 --> 01:06:09,938 they can engage in more mischief . No , 1780 01:06:09,938 --> 01:06:12,049 there's a very very , very big reason 1781 01:06:12,049 --> 01:06:14,271 why we're engaged in these negotiations 1782 01:06:14,271 --> 01:06:16,271 and as we don't want them to have a 1783 01:06:16,271 --> 01:06:18,216 nuclear weapon . Um now you debate 1784 01:06:18,216 --> 01:06:20,438 whether or not we're gonna get there on 1785 01:06:20,438 --> 01:06:19,980 that , but I think that's worth at 1786 01:06:19,980 --> 01:06:21,869 least throwing in there into that 1787 01:06:21,869 --> 01:06:23,869 conversation and discussion . Um We 1788 01:06:23,869 --> 01:06:26,570 have no further requests for time . I 1789 01:06:26,570 --> 01:06:28,292 want to thank you all for your 1790 01:06:28,292 --> 01:06:30,403 testimony . We'll see you in a couple 1791 01:06:30,403 --> 01:06:32,626 hours on the classified side . And with 1792 01:06:32,626 --> 01:06:32,810 that we are adjourned