WEBVTT

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thank you Mr Chairman . Um you know ,

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one of the areas that I've had some

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concerns about is um Iran's both

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direct and through proxies um influence

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in Syria and Lebanon . And in fact , I

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was able to secure provisions in the

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fiscal year 2020 intelligence

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authorization act to ask the DNA too .

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You know , report to us a bit about um

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those efforts by Iran and and what and

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how those efforts might impact us

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interests and our allies , including

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Israel . I was wondering if you could

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provide me with a bit of an update on

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Iran's efforts to expand its influence

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in Syria and Lebanon . Yes , ma'am ,

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I'll begin and I'll begin with Lebanon

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as I spoke a little bit earlier , Iran

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sees Lebanon as the terminus of the of

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a land bridge to the Mediterranean that

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gives them a perch from which they can

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launch attacks on Israel . So their

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interest in Lebanon is holy holy

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transactional and is limited to that .

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Now they exercise influence in uh in

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Lebanon through Lebanese Lebanese ,

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Hezbollah , LH a shadow organization

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that we recognize has penetrated many

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aspects of Lebanese society . But then

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again , doesn't actually do much for

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the Lebanese . Our response to that is

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at my level at the mill two mill level .

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Despite the many other things we're

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doing for the the government of Lebanon

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writ large is we work very hard to

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sustain the Lebanese armed forces as

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the single military representative of

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the properly constituted government of

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Lebanon . It is not a perfect

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relationship , but I believe in the

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long term , our best solution and and

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the the strategy that we follow is to

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assist that armed force . I have to

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speak to the Chief of Defense of

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Lebanon frequently . And I believe that

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they remain our best opportunity to

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balance the other nefarious actors that

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are in Lebanon . If we turn to Syria

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again , Iran's interests in Syria ,

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holy transactional wholly negative , it

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is the sort of middle part of the land

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bridge that allows him to get into

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Israel . It also serves as a staging

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place for potential attacks against

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Israel and allows them also to uh to

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stage for operations inside inside Iraq ,

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which is a long term focus of Syrian

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foreign policy and military strategy .

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Great thank you . Um and then just

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shifting a little bit um you know , the

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Wall Street Journal reported yesterday

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that Saudi Arabia is considering

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accepting the chinese Iran as payment

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for oil exports , which currently only

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accepts us dollars . You know , this is

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following up on news that Saudi Arabia

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had invited the chinese president to

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visit the kingdom on an official trip .

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You know , I think when I think about

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the prospect of a growing Saudi chinese

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relationship , um it's it's a little

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concerning , especially given the the

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historical partnership between the

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United States and the Kingdom . What's

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your assessment of current Saudi

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chinese relations and the impact that

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it could have on the United States

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relationship as well as our influence

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in the region , ma'am . I can only talk

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really in my lane at the mill two mill

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level . But I will note that we we I

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have a good relationship with the Saudi

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Chief of Defense . We talk frequently .

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It is my belief that we remain the

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preferred partner of choice for the

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kingdom of Saudi Arabia . They won't ,

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they want our equipment and they want

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more than our equipment , which is

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demonstrably the best available . They

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want the training , the education ,

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then all the things that come with a

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partnership with America as for

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outreach to the chinese and what they

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might do with oil cells . They're

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probably not not my lane to answer .

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I'll defer to MS baker on that . Yeah ,

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I mean I agree completely with

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everything that General Mackenzie has

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said . The only thing I would add

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perhaps by way of context , it's it's

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clear to us . I think that strategic

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competition has come to the Middle East

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and perhaps has been there for quite

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some time . And so we do see china and

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Russia , but particularly china looking

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for economic and other inroads with

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some of our partners and allies . As

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General Mackenzie said from a defense

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perspective , we believe that those

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relationships are strong , that we

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remain the partner of choice and that

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there are things that we bring to the

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table and that we're offering to

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partners and allies in the region that

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frankly china and others can't match .

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Thank you And I yield back Mr Waltz is

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recognized for five minutes . Thank you .

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Mr Chairman , General McKenzie ,

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Thank you again for your service is

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Great Nation and and and simplify .

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I just have a pretty straightforward

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question for you on Afghanistan . Just

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given how the withdrawal , not the 20

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years , not the mistakes that we've

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made , but given how this withdrawal

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was conducted , which most would say

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was was a bit of a debacle . Any

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regrets ? I think the endgame

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for Afghanistan that played out in the

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summer of 2021 , those events didn't

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begin in the spring of 2021 of the

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summer 2021 . You've got to look all

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the way back for that . Certainly I

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regret that we no longer have the

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ability to be as effective as we would

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like to be on the ground in Afghanistan

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and the CT mission . We're doing that

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over the horizon . As I've said , it's

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much harder to do that over the horizon

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and I'll talk in great detail about

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that in a closed session . So I

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certainly regret that we no longer have

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that opportunity . I've spoken with a

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number of the 13 Gold Star families who

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are now without their loved ones

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because of an ISIS fighter suicide

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bomber that was released from bagram

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prison just weeks before . I just

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received notes from Afghan women who

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served in the military alongside us

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that are being hunted down right now

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with the database that we left behind .

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With the payroll database , no regrets

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there . No , nothing we could have done

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differently in terms of how we exited .

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I think you go back to the basic

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strategic decision that we were leaving

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and everything else flows from that

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basic strategic decision that we're

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going to leave and we're gonna leave

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completely and everything flows from

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that . And was that the right decision

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in your view ? I have my opinion has

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been and I've stated publicly that we

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should have retained a small presence

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in Afghanistan . I argued for 4500 in

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the fall of 2020 . And , and as we went

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into the spring of 2021 , it was my

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opinion and remains my opinion today .

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That about 2500 would have given us

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adequate forces on the ground to retain

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an advising capability . I appreciate

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that . Ah , and I appreciate you

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reminding this committee of that

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because I think we are going to come to

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regret this decision and I think it's

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going to be felt on the homeland and

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it's going to be felt by future

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american soldiers that have to go fight

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their way back in to deal with it . MS

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baker along those lines , the Fy 22 nd

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a required And over the horizon

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strategy . Within 60 days of passage .

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That was about a month ago . You're a

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month late . Where's that strategy ? Uh ,

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Congressman ? I don't know the exact

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uh , progress of that strategy . I'd be

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happy to look into it and get you an

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answer . You don't know the progress of

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an over the horizon strategy required

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by law , the President of the United

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States has cited over the horizon .

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Strategy . Secretary Austin , your boss

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here the last time he was here said we

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can do over the horizon , we can keep

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America safe . I'm in my district

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saying the administration says we can

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do this even though it's a special

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operator , I know better . What's

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what's the status General Mackenzie ,

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have you chopped on it and send it up

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to usd that strategy ? Is is working

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right now ? I have we have had the

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opportunity to work on that strategy

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and we actually have a practical

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strategy that's in effect right now .

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Again , something I'd be happy to talk

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about in a closed session and

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congressman , if I could just clarify ,

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we do have a strategy for over the

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horizon . What I was referring to is

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the specific report . I don't I don't

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know what the status of that report is ,

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but I will get you an answer . Okay ,

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do you what local out , let's take a

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step back . We just had a successful

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strike against the leader of um the

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leader of Isis , the successor in Syria .

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And as I've stayed in this committee

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before , but I think it's worth

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repeating . We had local allies that

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helped with that , correct . The kurds ,

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we have bases in the region in Jordan ,

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Turkey , Israel Northern Iraq . Right ,

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so I would still characterize that

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strike and I'm now , as you know , I'm

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the officer who was characterized that

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is over the horizon is over the horizon .

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That is , I would characterize that .

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And let's let's look at the map again .

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Do we have any bases in any neighboring

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country in Afghanistan ? Know the

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differences as you as you know , the

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distances are far greater going into

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Afghanistan . Conceptually it's the

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same thing . The distances are greater .

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The risk will be higher and you're well

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aware of that sir . Are we still

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reliant on Pakistan for overflight of R .

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R . I . S are assets . There's no other

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way to get into Afghanistan for me .

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Right now , Pakistan has historically

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supported the taliban , correct ? They

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have also supported us . The airline a

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communication is is a direct reflect of

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Pakistan but it's a bit like asking the

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arsonist for access for the fire

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department to put out the fire should

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the homeland be threatened again . We

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are reliant just to be clear , we're

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relying on Pakistan for that overflight .

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Otherwise we got to fight our way in .

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We are relying on Pakistan but as you

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know , we always reserve the right to

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defend ourselves anywhere in the world .

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Thank you . Mr Chairman , Thank you .

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Mr Crow is recognized for five minutes .

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Thank you Mr Chairman and thank you to

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all of you for your service to the

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country and for coming in and

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particularly General Townsend and

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General Mackenzie in your last

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appearance here before the committee .

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I applaud you for your long uh and an

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honorable service to the country .

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General Mackenzie . I understand very

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deeply that decisions are made here in

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Washington and strategic decisions are

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made and the military has to carry it

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out . And I'm gonna thank you for your

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service and and candor before this

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committee and the american people on

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Afghanistan and related issues uh in in

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general towns . And as much as I want

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to start with you as a fellow ranger ,

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actually gonna start and direct my

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comments to MS baker . MS baker , what

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is the timeline for the national

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Defense strategy ? When can we expect

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to have that released by the

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administration congressman ? I can't

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provide you with a specific data . I

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can tell you that it is in final

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coordination and we are hopeful to get

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it over to you all and and out to the

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public very soon . Okay . And is that

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is that been held up because of the

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recent events in Ukraine ? Uh ,

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Congressman ? I think it's only

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appropriate for us to take a look at

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what's happened in Ukraine and and make

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sure that we're reflecting that in the

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strategy . I will say that the N . D .

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S as it's been developed over the

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course of the last year , we believe is

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very resilient to current events and

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and in fact uh , continues

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to to sort of the the bones of it are

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going to remain unchanged . I can I can

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certainly appreciate that and

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appreciate that you are taking into

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account some of the current events as

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well , that have changed the landscape

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a bit ? Um focusing in on africa ? You

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know , we have this uh , this notion

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that this um proclivity to kind of look

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at china is 10 ft tall sometimes and

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certainly they're making big

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investments and it would be a mistake

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for us to underestimate them , but

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they're also making a lot of mistakes .

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Right ? And the use of chinese labor ,

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predatory economics , there's a lot of

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disenchantment that's growing within

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Africa in some places . Um , so they

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certainly have their weak points and we

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have our strengths . One of our

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strengths is the fact that we have a

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larger value proposition . We can bring

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to the table economic humanitarian , um

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uh you know , our moral authority , a

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lot of things . How would you classify

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very briefly , what is the elevator

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pitch for ? What is U . S . Strategy in

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africa ? Well , what what what how

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would you explain our our strategic

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posture in africa and our goals

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Congressman ? I and I'd invite General

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Townsend to add to this . I think we

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have three goals in africa right now .

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One is counter V . E . O . And we do

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that by with and through our our

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partners . The second is to that to

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that same point . We are working to

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strengthen those partnerships and

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strengthen those are , I don't mean to

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interrupt those are things to do ,

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those are tasks enablers . What is our

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overarching goal goal ? What how do we

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want to be known in africa ? And how

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would you classify our engagement

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congressman ? I mean I certainly think

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that our goal in Africa is to be the

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continent's strategic partner of choice .

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Can so with that in mind . Um and from

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your purchase D . O . D . And and US

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government often has silos right . You

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know , State Department has their silo

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and they're laying D O D . U S A I . D .

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If our value proposition is to

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coordinate all of that and bring that

12:48.671 --> 12:51.130
all to bear in a way that our force

12:51.130 --> 12:53.720
multiplies each of those elements . How

12:53.720 --> 12:55.776
can we better do that ? And what are

12:55.776 --> 12:57.998
the impediments to achieving that right

12:57.998 --> 12:59.887
now , congressman ? I think we're

12:59.887 --> 13:01.831
always working to break down those

13:01.831 --> 13:03.942
silos as you well know from from your

13:03.942 --> 13:06.164
time in in in in uniform , I will say ,

13:06.164 --> 13:08.276
I think in general Townsend again can

13:08.276 --> 13:10.520
can jump in here but it works better in

13:10.520 --> 13:13.690
the African Mayo are the integration of

13:13.690 --> 13:16.540
our defense , diplomacy and development

13:16.550 --> 13:18.810
efforts . Uh the fact that that general

13:18.810 --> 13:21.032
Townsend has folks from Usa I . D . And

13:21.032 --> 13:23.143
states sitting right beside him at at

13:23.143 --> 13:25.143
his headquarters . So I think we've

13:25.143 --> 13:27.199
made a lot of progress in africa and

13:27.199 --> 13:29.310
frankly there are things we can learn

13:29.310 --> 13:31.254
from africom and apply to other co

13:31.254 --> 13:33.960
comes . So I think she's got our

13:33.960 --> 13:36.127
strategic goal Exactly right . We want

13:36.127 --> 13:38.238
to be the strategic partner of choice

13:38.238 --> 13:41.250
that translates into us sustained us

13:41.250 --> 13:43.472
access and influence on the continent .

13:43.472 --> 13:45.306
And that will come in handy in a

13:45.306 --> 13:47.528
million ways that we can't even foresee

13:47.528 --> 13:50.210
today regarding the the the integration

13:50.220 --> 13:52.553
of you know the breaking down the silos .

13:52.553 --> 13:54.776
We try really hard to do that every day

13:54.776 --> 13:56.870
in africom . Uh dr baker bakers

13:56.870 --> 13:59.203
mentioned the fact that we have three D .

13:59.203 --> 14:01.370
Command built that way , purpose built

14:01.370 --> 14:03.510
that way from the start . One of my

14:03.520 --> 14:05.631
most senior leaders is a senior State

14:05.631 --> 14:07.576
Department ambassador . I've got a

14:07.576 --> 14:09.798
senior development advisor from USA I .

14:09.798 --> 14:11.964
D . We look at everything through that

14:11.964 --> 14:14.340
three D . Lens every day to to be the

14:14.340 --> 14:16.118
strategic partner of choice and

14:16.118 --> 14:18.062
maintain US access and influence .

14:18.140 --> 14:20.140
Thank you . I appreciate everyone's

14:20.140 --> 14:22.307
hard work . I yield back . Thank you .

14:22.307 --> 14:24.940
Uh Just programming note . Um as I

14:24.940 --> 14:26.940
mentioned at one o'clock we will we

14:26.940 --> 14:28.718
will have a classified briefing

14:28.718 --> 14:30.640
upstairs on Ukraine . So we'll be

14:30.640 --> 14:33.320
closed will be concluding this at 12 45

14:33.320 --> 14:35.542
to give the committee and we're in time

14:35.542 --> 14:37.764
to sort of move up and get settled . So

14:37.764 --> 14:39.987
we'll wrap this up , Open hearing up at

14:39.987 --> 14:42.153
12:45 . Then of course we'll be seeing

14:42.153 --> 14:44.209
all of these folks again at 2:30 for

14:44.209 --> 14:46.098
the classified portion of it . Mr

14:46.098 --> 14:48.376
Bergman is recognized for five minutes .

14:48.376 --> 14:50.153
Thank you . Mr Chairman General

14:50.153 --> 14:52.209
Mackenzie . General Townsend . Thank

14:52.209 --> 14:54.431
you for your decades of leadership . It

14:54.431 --> 14:56.598
takes leadership to do what we need to

14:56.598 --> 15:00.010
do . Um Mr baker . General Mackenzie .

15:00.020 --> 15:02.850
Um We lay out a scenario for you under

15:02.850 --> 15:05.690
the 2015 J . c . p . O . A .

15:06.340 --> 15:10.020
Russia removed all excess

15:10.170 --> 15:12.590
low enriched uranium and nuclear

15:12.590 --> 15:15.730
materials from Iran . If a similar

15:15.730 --> 15:19.060
requirement exists in a new deal

15:19.840 --> 15:23.690
and if Iran subsequently believes the

15:23.690 --> 15:27.590
agreement has been violated or that

15:27.590 --> 15:30.150
head is that it has not received the

15:30.150 --> 15:34.020
promised sanctions relief will Russia

15:34.030 --> 15:37.530
could Russia be in a position to

15:37.530 --> 15:40.960
return enriched uranium to Iran

15:41.540 --> 15:44.200
in essence . Would that potentially put

15:44.210 --> 15:47.910
Vladimir Putin in the position of being

15:47.910 --> 15:50.600
the de facto judge of compliance with

15:50.600 --> 15:51.600
the new agreement

15:54.540 --> 15:58.350
and congressman as you know there is no

15:58.350 --> 16:01.640
agreement yet . And there again it was

16:01.640 --> 16:05.510
a scenario understood . Um

16:06.240 --> 16:09.520
We don't know whether Russia will play

16:09.520 --> 16:11.670
that role in a future agreement .

16:11.740 --> 16:13.780
Certainly in whatever agreement is

16:13.780 --> 16:15.947
reached . If an agreement is reached ,

16:15.947 --> 16:18.150
we would uh seek to pressure tested

16:18.150 --> 16:21.550
against any kind of interference of

16:21.550 --> 16:23.690
that kind from the Russians to this

16:23.690 --> 16:26.710
point . We have not seen any indication

16:26.710 --> 16:28.877
though that they intend to act in that

16:28.877 --> 16:32.060
way . Okay ah

16:32.940 --> 16:35.240
General Mackenzie in a in an

16:35.250 --> 16:38.270
unclassified way . Given the ongoing

16:38.270 --> 16:40.970
need to deploy U . S . Air defenses to

16:40.970 --> 16:44.300
europe , how do you assess our the

16:44.300 --> 16:48.120
United States ability to deploy and or

16:48.120 --> 16:50.520
sustained similar systems in the Middle

16:50.520 --> 16:54.080
East as a as a stopgap to help defend

16:54.080 --> 16:56.247
our gulf allies or at least until they

16:56.247 --> 16:58.260
are much better able to defend

16:58.260 --> 17:01.130
themselves . So over the last few years

17:01.130 --> 17:03.190
we have worked closely with our Gulf

17:03.190 --> 17:05.340
allies to expand their ability to

17:05.340 --> 17:07.562
defend themselves . And in fact some of

17:07.562 --> 17:09.284
those countries have very very

17:09.284 --> 17:11.396
significant air defense inventories .

17:11.396 --> 17:14.140
Saudi Arabia has over 20 patriot

17:14.140 --> 17:16.230
batteries . Um He has a number of

17:16.240 --> 17:18.670
patriot batteries as well . And and as

17:18.670 --> 17:21.260
you know you a actually possesses thad

17:21.270 --> 17:23.470
the antiballistic high altitude system

17:23.480 --> 17:25.147
which was demonstrated tested

17:25.147 --> 17:27.440
successfully just last month . So we

17:27.440 --> 17:29.490
work the way that we actually

17:29.490 --> 17:32.150
accommodate the basic fact of life that

17:32.150 --> 17:34.261
we don't have enough . Us patriots to

17:34.261 --> 17:36.317
service all of our needs globally is

17:36.317 --> 17:38.428
through and enhanced cooperation with

17:38.428 --> 17:40.594
our allies were still there . We still

17:40.594 --> 17:42.817
have patriots in the theater , we still

17:42.817 --> 17:45.039
work with them . But what you do is you

17:45.039 --> 17:47.206
try to think about the way nations can

17:47.206 --> 17:49.428
cooperate with each other and I'll talk

17:49.428 --> 17:48.450
a little bit more about that in the in

17:48.450 --> 17:50.617
the closed session but there is a path

17:50.617 --> 17:52.850
forward . Um and really you know the

17:52.860 --> 17:54.860
the countries in the region are the

17:54.860 --> 17:56.916
ones that are directly threatened by

17:56.916 --> 17:59.138
the Iranian threat . They are focused I

17:59.138 --> 18:01.249
believe in a way they have never been

18:01.249 --> 18:03.416
focused before by the imminence of the

18:03.416 --> 18:05.582
threat . The fact that the quality and

18:05.582 --> 18:07.527
number of the Iranian missiles and

18:07.527 --> 18:09.749
legumes and land attack cruise missiles

18:09.749 --> 18:11.916
and U . A . V . S . Is very concerning

18:11.916 --> 18:11.570
to them . So there's a there's a real

18:11.570 --> 18:13.737
convergence of interest on the part of

18:13.737 --> 18:15.930
our partners now . Okay and

18:16.640 --> 18:20.610
basically I think the my next question

18:20.610 --> 18:22.777
is going to be best answered in the in

18:22.777 --> 18:26.150
the closed classified session about uh

18:26.160 --> 18:28.780
the the engagement with our partners .

18:28.780 --> 18:30.990
You kind of alluded to that in the

18:30.990 --> 18:33.110
preparation and the training and the

18:33.110 --> 18:36.420
cooperation to um confront

18:36.420 --> 18:39.560
and deter a nuclear

18:40.140 --> 18:43.460
Iran . Should that possibility become

18:44.740 --> 18:48.000
a potential reality ? So with that MR

18:48.000 --> 18:50.167
Chairman , I'll yield back and save my

18:50.167 --> 18:52.333
questions for the classified session .

18:52.333 --> 18:54.000
Thank you . Mr Carter Hall is

18:54.000 --> 18:56.333
recognized for five minutes . Thank you .

18:56.333 --> 18:58.480
Mr Chair and General Townsend and

18:58.480 --> 19:00.647
General Mackenzie , thank you for your

19:00.647 --> 19:02.813
many years of service to our country .

19:02.813 --> 19:04.869
Uh , I say that with great gratitude

19:04.869 --> 19:06.990
for the american people were lucky to

19:06.990 --> 19:09.810
have had you and your posts and thank

19:09.810 --> 19:12.460
you , Secretary baker for your service .

19:12.460 --> 19:15.140
Now , General Mackenzie , I applaud the

19:15.140 --> 19:17.310
department's commitment to improve its

19:17.310 --> 19:19.260
policy in order to better protect

19:19.260 --> 19:21.371
civilians . Especially with Secretary

19:21.371 --> 19:23.540
Austin's new memorandum entitled

19:23.540 --> 19:26.130
improving civilian harm mitigation and

19:26.130 --> 19:28.690
response , as we have seen several

19:28.690 --> 19:31.200
times just in this year alone , the US

19:31.200 --> 19:33.560
tragically can get it wrong sometimes

19:34.340 --> 19:36.229
with this new memorandum from the

19:36.229 --> 19:38.229
Secretary , including standing up a

19:38.229 --> 19:39.951
Civilian Protection Center for

19:39.951 --> 19:42.007
Excellence and issuing a forthcoming

19:42.007 --> 19:44.370
civilian harm mitigation Response

19:44.380 --> 19:46.750
Action Plan . How do you believe this

19:46.750 --> 19:48.861
directive will impact the A . R . S .

19:48.861 --> 19:52.530
Operations going forward . So , thank

19:52.530 --> 19:54.697
you for the question I'd like to begin

19:54.697 --> 19:56.808
by saying nobody wearing this uniform

19:56.808 --> 19:59.141
ever wants to kill an innocent civilian .

19:59.141 --> 20:01.308
Nobody ever wants to do that . There's

20:01.308 --> 20:01.100
nothing , there's nothing that is more

20:01.100 --> 20:03.322
completely antithetical from the way we

20:03.322 --> 20:05.489
operate . We have made mistakes and we

20:05.489 --> 20:07.600
have killed innocent civilians and we

20:07.600 --> 20:09.767
we acknowledge that and we're gonna do

20:09.767 --> 20:11.767
everything we can to get better and

20:11.767 --> 20:13.933
narrow and narrow that gap between our

20:13.933 --> 20:16.044
ideals and our actions . I would tell

20:16.044 --> 20:18.100
you , you know , with with Secretary

20:18.100 --> 20:20.267
Austin , it is much more than a than a

20:20.267 --> 20:22.322
memorandum . It is the energy he has

20:22.322 --> 20:24.322
brought to the problem . I have a I

20:24.322 --> 20:24.090
have several officers that are full

20:24.090 --> 20:26.257
time committed to a study that's going

20:26.257 --> 20:28.479
on right now , that will form the basis

20:28.479 --> 20:30.257
for future actions . But in the

20:30.257 --> 20:32.479
meantime , you know , we're not waiting

20:32.479 --> 20:34.590
on that study as a result of the rand

20:34.590 --> 20:36.757
study and other and other studies that

20:36.757 --> 20:36.390
have come out . We have undertaken a

20:36.390 --> 20:38.334
set of things in the short term to

20:38.334 --> 20:40.168
improve our own processes within

20:40.168 --> 20:42.279
Central Command , as General Townsend

20:42.279 --> 20:44.334
has within Africa Command . So we we

20:44.334 --> 20:46.446
don't want to minimize this problem .

20:46.446 --> 20:48.334
We recognize that it is in fact a

20:48.334 --> 20:50.557
significant and a critical problem that

20:50.557 --> 20:52.779
cuts right to the very heart of what we

20:52.779 --> 20:54.890
want to do . As as Representatives of

20:54.890 --> 20:57.112
the United States . Thank you . General

20:57.112 --> 20:58.890
Townsend African Nations are

20:58.890 --> 21:01.057
increasingly influential in the United

21:01.057 --> 21:03.334
Nations and other international forums .

21:03.334 --> 21:05.501
Currently , three of 15 United Nations

21:05.501 --> 21:07.446
Security Council seats are held by

21:07.446 --> 21:09.723
African Nations with the K . N . U . N .

21:09.723 --> 21:11.946
Ambassador giving an extremely powerful

21:11.946 --> 21:14.057
speech at the U . N . S . C . Meeting

21:14.057 --> 21:16.730
regarding Ukraine . Unfortunately there

21:16.730 --> 21:18.730
is a lot of public misunderstanding

21:18.730 --> 21:20.550
about the A . R . You have been

21:20.550 --> 21:23.520
Commander of Africom for over 2.5 years

21:23.520 --> 21:25.070
now . What are some of the

21:25.070 --> 21:27.050
misconceptions you hear from both

21:27.440 --> 21:29.440
american officials and the american

21:29.440 --> 21:32.820
public about the A . R . And how can we

21:32.820 --> 21:34.542
approach the A . R . In a more

21:34.542 --> 21:36.431
productive and effective manner ?

21:39.140 --> 21:41.560
Thanks congressman . I think some of

21:41.560 --> 21:43.820
the main misconceptions are probably

21:43.820 --> 21:46.740
that first of all , africa doesn't

21:46.740 --> 21:48.907
really matter to us that we don't have

21:48.907 --> 21:50.907
to worry about africa and and maybe

21:50.907 --> 21:53.390
America has been able to largely ignore

21:53.390 --> 21:55.501
africa in the past but that's not the

21:55.501 --> 21:57.557
future . And that's why I said in my

21:57.557 --> 21:59.501
opening statement , America cannot

21:59.501 --> 22:01.668
ignore africa . So that's probably the

22:01.668 --> 22:03.723
number one mistake perception then I

22:03.723 --> 22:05.723
think they don't understand that we

22:05.723 --> 22:07.723
have a lot of interest and a lot of

22:07.723 --> 22:10.200
partners there every day . We have a

22:10.200 --> 22:12.660
great relationship with much of africa

22:12.660 --> 22:14.880
and we are the partner of choice for

22:14.880 --> 22:17.010
much of africa and just educating the

22:17.010 --> 22:19.870
american public on that . You mentioned

22:19.870 --> 22:22.037
the vote in Ukraine and you're right ,

22:22.240 --> 22:24.073
the Kenyan ambassador did give a

22:24.073 --> 22:26.640
powerful speech and he uh voted to

22:26.640 --> 22:28.910
condemn what the Russians were doing

22:28.910 --> 22:31.300
there but I'm a little dismayed about

22:31.310 --> 22:33.310
much of the rest of the continent ,

22:33.310 --> 22:36.110
About half of the continent voted to

22:36.120 --> 22:39.240
condemn Russia . The other half either

22:39.240 --> 22:41.950
abstained or did not vote . And that

22:41.950 --> 22:43.894
concerns me about only one country

22:43.894 --> 22:46.061
though did vote in support of Russia ,

22:46.061 --> 22:48.283
Eritrea . But the other one half of the

22:48.283 --> 22:50.920
content didn't really cast a vote and

22:50.920 --> 22:53.840
that concerns me a bit . But many of

22:53.840 --> 22:56.062
the countries that we are the strongest

22:56.062 --> 22:58.229
partners with did join us in the world

22:58.230 --> 23:00.840
in condemning Russia . So I think the

23:00.840 --> 23:03.610
future the future for this country's

23:03.610 --> 23:05.860
security is in Africa and we have to

23:05.860 --> 23:08.160
lean into it . Thank you . General

23:08.160 --> 23:10.660
Townsend and Secretary baker around the

23:10.660 --> 23:12.716
world , violent extremism has been a

23:12.716 --> 23:14.771
very difficult problem to address in

23:14.771 --> 23:17.500
particular in the Africom A . R . From

23:17.500 --> 23:19.611
a report on recent trends in militant

23:19.611 --> 23:21.720
Islamic group activity in Africa the

23:21.720 --> 23:23.831
past few years , it appears there has

23:23.831 --> 23:25.887
been an alarming increase in violent

23:25.887 --> 23:27.998
events by these groups , including Al

23:27.998 --> 23:30.160
Shabaab and Al Qaida in the Islamic

23:30.540 --> 23:33.480
McGraw Mcrib area . What is the biggest

23:33.480 --> 23:35.424
impediment to being able to better

23:35.424 --> 23:37.480
address these threats ? Do you think

23:37.480 --> 23:39.702
the U . S . Needs to amend our strategy

23:39.702 --> 23:43.280
in the A . R . Congressman ? I'll start

23:43.280 --> 23:45.224
and then of course turn to General

23:45.224 --> 23:47.113
Townsend . You know , I think the

23:47.113 --> 23:49.169
challenge that we face in the Africa

23:49.169 --> 23:51.391
Mayo are and and part of what's driving

23:51.391 --> 23:53.280
the growth and B . E . O . S . Is

23:53.280 --> 23:55.502
challenges of underlying governance and

23:55.502 --> 23:57.613
underlying security . And so a lot of

23:57.613 --> 23:59.447
our effort in the A . O . R . Is

23:59.447 --> 24:01.224
dedicated towards institutional

24:01.224 --> 24:03.447
capacity building building , apologized

24:03.447 --> 24:05.669
gentleman's time has expired . I should

24:05.669 --> 24:07.836
I should point to that front , even if

24:07.836 --> 24:07.450
you're not answering the question . we

24:07.450 --> 24:09.617
try to wrap up as close as possible to

24:09.617 --> 24:11.839
respect other members . Time . Mr Banks

24:11.839 --> 24:14.006
is recognized for five minutes . Thank

24:14.006 --> 24:16.061
you . Mr Chairman General McKenzie ,

24:16.061 --> 24:18.061
the original JCPOA was finalized in

24:18.061 --> 24:21.630
July of 2015 . Iran tested

24:21.630 --> 24:25.070
missiles in October 2015 before the

24:25.070 --> 24:27.560
deal was even implemented in January

24:28.140 --> 24:32.070
2016 , directly contradict all of

24:32.070 --> 24:34.237
this , directly contradicted the Obama

24:34.237 --> 24:36.292
administration's objective to change

24:36.292 --> 24:38.459
Iran's behavior for better through the

24:38.459 --> 24:40.681
deal . Then after the implementation of

24:40.681 --> 24:42.690
the J . CP . in January 2016 , Iran

24:42.690 --> 24:46.460
tested missiles again in March of 2016 .

24:47.340 --> 24:49.580
General Lloyd Austin , the then

24:49.580 --> 24:51.691
commander of Centcom said in a senate

24:51.691 --> 24:54.180
hearing at the time that despite the J .

24:54.180 --> 24:56.770
C . P . O . A quote , there are a

24:56.770 --> 24:58.603
number of things that lead me to

24:58.603 --> 25:00.548
personally believe that you know ,

25:00.548 --> 25:02.603
their behavior is not , they haven't

25:02.603 --> 25:04.548
changed any course yet . End quote

25:05.540 --> 25:07.707
General Mackenzie six years later . Do

25:07.707 --> 25:09.873
you agree with then ? General Austin's

25:09.873 --> 25:12.096
assessment of Iran's behavior following

25:12.096 --> 25:14.429
the implementation of the J . C . P . O .

25:14.429 --> 25:16.651
A . With regard to ballistic missiles ,

25:16.651 --> 25:18.540
cruise missiles . It is not their

25:18.540 --> 25:20.762
behavior has not changed . Do you think

25:20.762 --> 25:22.929
that the Islamic republic of Iran will

25:22.929 --> 25:25.310
ever give up its revisionist intentions

25:25.310 --> 25:27.720
in the region and if not what does a

25:27.720 --> 25:30.370
successful counter Iran policy look

25:30.370 --> 25:32.592
like . Well , I think you begin by Iran

25:32.592 --> 25:34.814
not possessing nuclear weapons and that

25:34.814 --> 25:37.037
needs to be an overarching . That's our

25:37.037 --> 25:37.000
overarching goal . I think it's better

25:37.000 --> 25:39.000
for everyone if Iran doesn't have a

25:39.000 --> 25:41.222
nuclear weapon , you should then try to

25:41.222 --> 25:43.167
find ways to bring their ballistic

25:43.167 --> 25:45.222
missiles the other elements of their

25:45.222 --> 25:47.222
national power that they value very

25:47.222 --> 25:49.444
highly under some form of control . And

25:49.444 --> 25:48.940
you're right . They have proven

25:48.940 --> 25:50.996
extremely resistant to that up until

25:50.996 --> 25:53.180
this time . I appreciate that

25:53.180 --> 25:55.360
Candidness , The Center for Strategic

25:55.360 --> 25:57.471
and International Studies reported on

25:57.471 --> 26:00.550
August 10 2021 that Iran possesses the

26:00.550 --> 26:02.383
largest and most diverse missile

26:02.383 --> 26:04.383
arsenal in the Middle East and is a

26:04.383 --> 26:06.494
major hub for weapons proliferation .

26:06.840 --> 26:08.951
If some form of the J . C . P . O . A

26:08.951 --> 26:11.173
is restored , how do you expect Iran to

26:11.173 --> 26:13.340
behave regarding missile proliferation

26:13.340 --> 26:17.050
amongst partner and proxy groups based

26:17.050 --> 26:19.260
on past behavior . I would expect not

26:19.260 --> 26:21.316
much modification in that behavior .

26:21.840 --> 26:23.896
And can you tell us specifically how

26:23.896 --> 26:26.118
centcom is prepared to deal with that ?

26:26.118 --> 26:28.720
So we work to prevent their success

26:28.720 --> 26:30.664
that they're successful attacks by

26:30.664 --> 26:32.331
working with our partners for

26:32.331 --> 26:34.276
integrated air and missile defense

26:34.276 --> 26:36.276
across the theater by enhancing the

26:36.276 --> 26:38.331
capabilities of all our partners air

26:38.331 --> 26:38.290
defense air defenses in effect . And

26:38.290 --> 26:40.457
that's the best way to do it . I would

26:40.457 --> 26:42.679
also argue that Iran knows that if they

26:42.679 --> 26:44.679
strike us we're prepared to respond

26:44.679 --> 26:46.512
very powerfully if need be so we

26:46.512 --> 26:48.623
attempt to achieve deterrence and and

26:48.623 --> 26:50.734
that has largely worked over the past

26:50.734 --> 26:52.957
couple of years . You know , I note the

26:52.957 --> 26:54.790
attack last weekend . But let me

26:54.790 --> 26:54.530
emphasize again , that attack was

26:54.530 --> 26:57.460
actually not directed at us understood .

26:58.340 --> 27:00.690
General is one of his first foreign

27:00.690 --> 27:02.746
policy initiatives . President biden

27:02.746 --> 27:05.560
delisted the Iran backed Houthi rebels

27:05.940 --> 27:08.360
in Yemen as a foreign terrorist foreign

27:08.360 --> 27:11.090
terrorist organization . But instead of

27:11.090 --> 27:13.034
deescalating tension , the Houthis

27:13.034 --> 27:15.146
doubled their attacks on Saudi Arabia

27:15.146 --> 27:17.750
in 2021 and occupy the U . S . Embassy

27:17.750 --> 27:20.090
compound compound and sauna and took

27:20.090 --> 27:23.620
the local staff hostage in late 2021 in

27:23.620 --> 27:25.940
early 2022 . The houthis also attacked

27:25.940 --> 27:28.162
U . A . E . Three times , killing three

27:28.162 --> 27:30.290
people and the way the Houthis have

27:30.290 --> 27:32.512
conducted themselves . General , do you

27:32.512 --> 27:34.290
think that that the Houthis are

27:34.290 --> 27:36.512
terrorists ? I would defer to policy MS

27:36.512 --> 27:38.346
baker for a discussion about the

27:38.346 --> 27:40.568
delisting decision . But I can tell you

27:40.568 --> 27:42.179
from an operational military

27:42.179 --> 27:44.401
perspective , they continue to wage war

27:44.401 --> 27:46.568
on their neighbors , both Saudi Arabia

27:46.568 --> 27:48.901
and you . A and they wage irresponsible ,

27:48.901 --> 27:50.901
reckless war without regard for for

27:50.901 --> 27:53.068
casualties . I understand as well that

27:53.068 --> 27:54.901
you would probably you you would

27:54.901 --> 27:54.780
probably differ as I asked . Why do you

27:54.780 --> 27:57.002
think the Iran backed houthis increased

27:57.002 --> 27:58.447
hostility since the biden

27:58.447 --> 28:00.336
administration delisted them as a

28:00.336 --> 28:02.980
foreign terrorist organization ? I'm

28:02.980 --> 28:05.147
sorry . Could you , would you say that

28:05.147 --> 28:07.202
again please ? Well , why why do you

28:07.202 --> 28:09.147
think that the Iran backed Houthis

28:09.147 --> 28:08.830
increased their hostility after the

28:08.830 --> 28:11.052
biden administration delisted them as a

28:11.052 --> 28:12.997
foreign terrorist organization . I

28:12.997 --> 28:15.163
think they still , I think the Houthis

28:15.163 --> 28:17.330
still believe there's a military means

28:17.330 --> 28:16.840
to achieve their end . I don't believe

28:16.840 --> 28:19.007
they're right in that . But it doesn't

28:19.007 --> 28:21.062
matter what , I think it's what they

28:21.062 --> 28:23.118
think . How how does centcom plan to

28:23.118 --> 28:25.118
address the Houthis behavior moving

28:25.118 --> 28:27.118
forward ? So we have worked closely

28:27.118 --> 28:26.810
with both . Are you a partners in there

28:26.810 --> 28:28.754
is in the wake of this most recent

28:28.754 --> 28:30.810
attack , we sent uh fifth generation

28:30.810 --> 28:32.700
fighters to you a we've moved a

28:32.700 --> 28:34.589
ballistic missile defense capable

28:34.589 --> 28:36.644
destroyer to the vicinity of you . A

28:36.644 --> 28:38.700
we've conducted refueling of U . A .

28:38.700 --> 28:40.700
Fighters that are flying combat air

28:40.700 --> 28:40.620
patrol and we've shared intelligence

28:40.620 --> 28:42.842
with you a on this . So we've done some

28:42.842 --> 28:45.064
very discreet Measurable things to help

28:45.064 --> 28:47.064
our partners in . Um I got I got 30

28:47.064 --> 28:49.287
seconds left , Miss baker . Why did the

28:49.287 --> 28:51.509
biden administration delist the Houthis

28:51.509 --> 28:53.676
as foreign terrorist organization ? Uh

28:53.676 --> 28:55.842
Congressman ? Uh you know , I think no

28:55.842 --> 28:57.953
one in the administration , certainly

28:57.953 --> 29:00.120
no one in the department takes lightly

29:00.120 --> 29:02.342
the threat that the houthis pose in the

29:02.342 --> 29:04.620
region . And as General Mackenzie said ,

29:04.620 --> 29:06.620
we are attempting to get after that

29:06.620 --> 29:08.787
problem and we're providing any number

29:08.787 --> 29:11.120
of avenues of support both to the U . A .

29:11.120 --> 29:12.898
E . And to the Saudis . This is

29:12.898 --> 29:15.009
outrageous with that . I yield back .

29:15.040 --> 29:18.820
Thank you . MS Spears . I can ask for

29:18.820 --> 29:21.098
five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman .

29:21.098 --> 29:23.740
Uh General Mackenzie and Townsend . We

29:23.740 --> 29:25.740
can't begin to thank you enough for

29:25.740 --> 29:28.120
your extraordinary service . Um , but

29:28.120 --> 29:31.740
know that we are very grateful . Let me

29:31.740 --> 29:35.590
start with the report that was just

29:35.590 --> 29:39.490
released a few days ago detailing

29:39.500 --> 29:41.560
the significant failures in training

29:41.560 --> 29:45.070
and physical security at the U . S .

29:45.070 --> 29:47.770
Cooperative security location in kenya

29:48.140 --> 29:50.350
where we lost a service member and two

29:50.350 --> 29:53.800
D . O . D . Contractors . It was

29:53.810 --> 29:55.740
alarming to read that there was

29:55.750 --> 29:57.917
inadequate focus on force protection ,

29:57.917 --> 30:00.028
inadequate , inadequate understanding

30:00.028 --> 30:02.028
of the threat , inadequate security

30:02.028 --> 30:04.028
force preparation and problems with

30:04.028 --> 30:07.460
mission command . What has that taught

30:07.460 --> 30:10.600
us in terms of looking at other

30:10.610 --> 30:13.700
cooperative facilities in Africa as to

30:13.710 --> 30:17.070
our responsibility to harden them in

30:17.070 --> 30:18.181
terms of security .

30:22.140 --> 30:24.950
Thanks man . Um , Well , first , let me

30:24.950 --> 30:27.500
say , uh , we certainly regret the loss

30:27.500 --> 30:29.500
of the lives of our three americans

30:29.500 --> 30:32.360
there at Manda Bay . We've studied

30:32.740 --> 30:36.280
this situation in

30:36.280 --> 30:38.880
great detail over the last two years

30:38.880 --> 30:40.936
and have applied the lessons learned

30:40.936 --> 30:43.102
across the African continent . All the

30:43.102 --> 30:45.213
things you mentioned that are in that

30:45.213 --> 30:47.670
report were all true regretfully . So I

30:47.670 --> 30:50.100
think they go back , they stem back to

30:50.110 --> 30:53.010
uh incorrect threat assessments . So

30:53.010 --> 30:55.010
when commanders and leaders look at

30:55.010 --> 30:57.232
threat assessments , that's their first

30:57.232 --> 30:59.399
understanding and that leads them down

30:59.399 --> 31:01.566
can lead them down the wrong path . So

31:01.566 --> 31:03.510
are you saying now that all of our

31:03.510 --> 31:05.732
facilities in Africa have been hardened

31:05.732 --> 31:08.340
and our have greater protection or do

31:08.350 --> 31:10.517
do we have some areas where we need to

31:10.517 --> 31:12.950
do more ? And should you alert us to

31:12.950 --> 31:16.700
those ah are all of our facilities have

31:16.700 --> 31:18.940
been improved since the attack at Manda

31:18.940 --> 31:21.350
bay . We apply those lessons across all

31:21.350 --> 31:23.240
of them . However , we do have to

31:23.240 --> 31:25.129
continue that work . We've got to

31:25.129 --> 31:27.351
improve our foxhole every day that work

31:27.351 --> 31:29.462
continues and we do have requirements

31:29.462 --> 31:31.629
in that area . All right , thank you .

31:31.629 --> 31:33.851
MS baker in the N . D . A . Last year .

31:33.851 --> 31:37.210
Um An amendment that I authored to

31:37.220 --> 31:39.460
request the status of African women ?

31:39.840 --> 31:41.784
Excuse me , Afghan women and girls

31:42.840 --> 31:44.784
Since the Taliban takeover was due

31:44.784 --> 31:47.150
March one . We haven't received it .

31:47.150 --> 31:50.390
When will we receive that congresswoman ?

31:50.390 --> 31:52.168
I don't know the status of that

31:52.168 --> 31:54.334
specific report but I would be glad to

31:54.334 --> 31:56.557
look into it and make sure we get it to

31:56.557 --> 31:58.668
you . All right . Um Would you report

31:58.668 --> 32:00.779
back to the committee then as to when

32:00.779 --> 32:02.668
we can expect that report ? Yes .

32:02.668 --> 32:04.834
Absolutely . Alright . Um MS baker and

32:04.834 --> 32:06.668
General Mackenzie as far back as

32:06.668 --> 32:09.880
october Dogg said it would be making

32:09.890 --> 32:12.001
payments to the families of those who

32:12.001 --> 32:14.960
were killed on on on the august 29th

32:15.540 --> 32:19.440
drone attack . Can you tell us the

32:19.440 --> 32:21.960
status of those payments ?

32:24.340 --> 32:26.760
Man that those um we're moving forward

32:26.760 --> 32:28.871
with those payments . Um In the inter

32:28.871 --> 32:30.982
agency , I can talk a little bit more

32:30.982 --> 32:33.149
about it in a closed session . Centcom

32:33.149 --> 32:35.316
stands ready to carry out instructions

32:35.316 --> 32:35.240
on how to conduct execute those

32:35.240 --> 32:38.130
payments once a decision is made ? Well ,

32:38.140 --> 32:40.362
I thought we already made a decision to

32:40.362 --> 32:42.473
make payments to those families . The

32:42.473 --> 32:44.529
modality of the payment and how that

32:44.529 --> 32:46.807
how it's actually going to be executed ?

32:46.807 --> 32:48.807
So are you saying that there hasn't

32:48.807 --> 32:50.584
been any payments made to these

32:50.584 --> 32:54.080
families yet . Right , congressman . I

32:54.090 --> 32:56.257
just want to be a little careful about

32:56.257 --> 32:58.479
what we discussed in the public session

32:58.479 --> 33:00.423
because we don't want to put these

33:00.423 --> 33:02.590
families at further risk . But we'd be

33:02.590 --> 33:02.160
happy to get you that information and

33:02.160 --> 33:04.160
talk about it in the closed session

33:04.160 --> 33:06.382
this afternoon . Your husband that when

33:06.382 --> 33:08.604
we make a commitment , we deliver on it

33:08.604 --> 33:10.882
and we will delivery of not doing that .

33:10.882 --> 33:13.049
So , um , I have your word that we are

33:13.049 --> 33:15.104
going to deliver to those families .

33:15.104 --> 33:17.216
This has the attention of the highest

33:17.216 --> 33:20.500
of our leadership . Yes . Can any of

33:20.500 --> 33:23.860
you tell us um , the extent of our tea

33:23.860 --> 33:27.830
in africa , the extent of what

33:27.830 --> 33:30.108
ma'am , I didn't catch it Russia today .

33:30.340 --> 33:33.590
Right . Um , so

33:34.740 --> 33:36.796
I can't specifically talk about that

33:36.796 --> 33:39.820
particular media outlet , I can say

33:39.820 --> 33:42.420
this Russia has extensive media

33:42.420 --> 33:45.560
engagement on the continent uh , and

33:45.570 --> 33:49.320
that is greatly facilitated by um

33:49.330 --> 33:52.660
Yevgeny Precaution the oligarch and his

33:52.670 --> 33:55.420
media arm in addition to , you know ,

33:55.420 --> 33:57.570
he has the Wagner mercenaries , but

33:57.570 --> 33:59.681
he's got a media arm that does that ,

33:59.681 --> 34:01.903
you know , I do think our committee has

34:01.903 --> 34:03.959
to take very seriously the impact of

34:03.959 --> 34:06.970
our tea around the world . I just came

34:06.970 --> 34:09.880
back from latin America where not only

34:09.890 --> 34:12.780
is it pervasive and ubiquitous , it is

34:12.780 --> 34:15.800
perceived to be objective , it is

34:15.800 --> 34:19.160
perceived to be just a legitimate tv

34:19.160 --> 34:21.970
network and general Lady's time has

34:21.970 --> 34:23.914
expired ? She makes an outstanding

34:23.914 --> 34:26.400
point . However , um on the need to

34:26.400 --> 34:29.570
engage in the information warfare . Mr

34:29.570 --> 34:31.737
Gates is recognized for five minutes .

34:31.737 --> 34:33.903
Thank you . Mr Chairman . I completely

34:33.903 --> 34:36.070
concur with my colleague regarding the

34:36.070 --> 34:39.130
um risk that R . T poses and it seems

34:39.130 --> 34:41.860
to appear more legitimate and objective

34:42.240 --> 34:44.810
when members of Congress go on our T .

34:44.820 --> 34:47.020
And so I associate myself with the

34:47.020 --> 34:49.187
gentle lady's comments and perhaps you

34:49.187 --> 34:51.353
could share them with um the gentleman

34:51.353 --> 34:53.076
from California who chairs the

34:53.076 --> 34:55.298
Intelligence Committee who I've seen on

34:55.298 --> 34:57.464
our T talking about legislation giving

34:57.464 --> 35:00.510
them credibility . Um MS baker , I

35:00.520 --> 35:02.631
don't have a few moments but I'd love

35:02.631 --> 35:04.798
to chat with you about it further . MS

35:04.798 --> 35:06.576
baker , you said in response to

35:06.576 --> 35:08.631
congresswoman biases questions we've

35:08.631 --> 35:11.160
heard Israel's concerns about the J . C .

35:11.160 --> 35:12.760
P . O . A . What are they

35:16.140 --> 35:18.910
congressman ? I think Israel remains

35:18.910 --> 35:22.570
concerned as do we all about Iran's

35:22.580 --> 35:24.760
malign activity in the region beyond

35:24.760 --> 35:27.130
its nuclear program . And and that's

35:27.130 --> 35:29.241
something that we discussed with them

35:29.241 --> 35:31.280
regularly . So their concern is a

35:31.290 --> 35:33.480
better resourced Iran whether through

35:33.480 --> 35:36.140
sanctions , relief or cash payments

35:36.150 --> 35:38.690
would be more capable in taking action

35:38.690 --> 35:40.930
against Israel . Does that surmised

35:41.440 --> 35:43.718
congressman . That is my understanding .

35:43.718 --> 35:46.700
Yes . And and can can we learn anything

35:46.700 --> 35:48.930
about whether or not cash payments are

35:48.930 --> 35:51.263
on the table as part of a renewed J . C .

35:51.263 --> 35:54.320
P . O . A . Congressman . I'm not able

35:54.320 --> 35:56.570
to discuss the details of the agreement

35:56.570 --> 35:58.792
only because there is no agreement that

35:58.792 --> 36:00.737
has been reached at this point . I

36:00.737 --> 36:02.681
think there has been progress made

36:02.681 --> 36:04.903
toward an agreement , But of course the

36:04.903 --> 36:07.014
issues that are remaining are some of

36:07.014 --> 36:09.070
the most complex . So , you know , I

36:09.070 --> 36:11.181
understand that in , in a negotiation

36:11.181 --> 36:13.237
that they're , you know , nothing is

36:13.237 --> 36:15.348
settled until everything is settled .

36:15.348 --> 36:17.514
But there are contours of an agreement

36:17.514 --> 36:19.681
as we get closer to it . And since the

36:19.681 --> 36:21.792
administration has been working on an

36:21.792 --> 36:23.959
Iran deal , I was wondering whether or

36:23.959 --> 36:25.737
not we could take off the table

36:25.737 --> 36:28.050
infusions of cash because when I asked

36:28.050 --> 36:29.883
General Mackenzie some years ago

36:30.030 --> 36:32.141
whether or not the cash payments that

36:32.141 --> 36:34.252
the Obama administration permitted to

36:34.252 --> 36:36.030
Iran increased that very malign

36:36.030 --> 36:38.252
activity that Israel is concerned about

36:38.252 --> 36:40.474
that . We're concerned about his answer

36:40.474 --> 36:42.380
was that that that there was more

36:42.380 --> 36:44.547
malign activity following the last J C

36:44.547 --> 36:46.850
p O again , congressman , I understand

36:46.850 --> 36:48.794
the concern , I'm just not able to

36:48.794 --> 36:50.720
discuss specifics of of of the

36:50.720 --> 36:52.776
agreement that's being negotiated by

36:52.776 --> 36:54.942
the State Department and so you're not

36:54.942 --> 36:54.600
in a position to be able to say the

36:54.600 --> 36:56.711
cash payments are off the table . I'm

36:56.711 --> 36:58.933
not in a position to be able to discuss

36:58.933 --> 37:01.044
the specifics of the agreement in any

37:01.044 --> 37:03.044
form . General Townsend is Vladimir

37:03.044 --> 37:05.156
Putin bringing African mercenaries to

37:05.156 --> 37:08.870
the fight in Ukraine . I've

37:08.870 --> 37:11.400
heard those reports , We haven't seen

37:11.410 --> 37:14.040
that yet . We're watching for that very

37:14.040 --> 37:16.360
closely . However , I do believe they

37:16.360 --> 37:18.840
are bringing Wagner fighters from

37:18.840 --> 37:21.810
Africa to Ukraine and in General

37:21.810 --> 37:23.754
Mackenzie , have you seen Vladimir

37:23.754 --> 37:25.532
Putin successfully bring Syrian

37:25.532 --> 37:27.643
mercenaries to the fight in Ukraine .

37:27.643 --> 37:29.643
Not yet . We watch that closely . I

37:29.643 --> 37:31.643
can't say one or two people haven't

37:31.643 --> 37:31.250
gone but we haven't seen any systemic

37:31.250 --> 37:33.139
movement . Great , I'll yield the

37:33.139 --> 37:35.083
remainder of my time to my florida

37:35.083 --> 37:34.960
colleague Mr frank .

37:39.530 --> 37:42.580
Thank you . Mr waltz general in your

37:42.580 --> 37:44.913
testimony and throughout your statement ,

37:44.913 --> 37:46.802
sorry , General Mackenzie in your

37:46.802 --> 37:49.210
written testimony here today and

37:49.220 --> 37:51.442
throughout the question and you've made

37:51.442 --> 37:53.553
it clear that you consider Iran to be

37:53.553 --> 37:53.470
the biggest threat to stability in the

37:53.470 --> 37:55.890
centcom kor during my travels

37:55.890 --> 37:58.112
throughout the region and most recently

37:58.112 --> 38:00.334
in Israel two weeks ago , the recurring

38:00.334 --> 38:02.557
theme is the malign influence of Iran's

38:02.557 --> 38:04.612
proxies . You also spoke of those in

38:04.612 --> 38:06.501
your , in your testimony . Do you

38:06.501 --> 38:08.446
consider the Irgc to be one of the

38:08.446 --> 38:10.334
drivers and facilitators of these

38:10.334 --> 38:12.168
proxies ? The Irgc and its elite

38:12.168 --> 38:14.334
element that could force absolutely at

38:14.334 --> 38:16.557
the very heart of these activities . Um

38:16.557 --> 38:18.668
it's been reported and as recently as

38:18.668 --> 38:20.779
yesterday in the press that the biden

38:20.779 --> 38:23.001
administration is considering delisting

38:23.001 --> 38:25.112
the Irgc is a terror organization . I

38:25.112 --> 38:27.168
know that decision involves a lot of

38:27.168 --> 38:29.390
factors that are beyond your lane , but

38:29.390 --> 38:31.557
but strictly on your military advice .

38:31.557 --> 38:33.834
Do you think that would be a good idea .

38:33.834 --> 38:33.510
I'll have to I'll defer on that one . I

38:33.510 --> 38:35.820
would not . I think they certainly are

38:35.820 --> 38:37.876
very disruptive and dangerous in the

38:37.876 --> 38:40.042
region , that remains my best military

38:40.042 --> 38:42.098
advice and we should treat them like

38:42.098 --> 38:41.720
that . And if they are emboldened or

38:41.720 --> 38:43.887
strengthened , do you think that would

38:43.887 --> 38:45.998
make them a more formidable ? I think

38:45.998 --> 38:47.720
anything you do to embolden or

38:47.720 --> 38:49.831
strengthen them would have a negative

38:49.831 --> 38:51.720
effect across the region . Okay ,

38:51.720 --> 38:53.720
echoing some of my other colleagues

38:53.720 --> 38:55.831
here with respect to Israel people we

38:55.831 --> 38:57.831
met with , there were crystal clear

38:57.831 --> 38:59.942
that historically , whether it's been

38:59.942 --> 38:59.140
cash payments from the Obama

38:59.140 --> 39:01.251
administration or any activities that

39:01.251 --> 39:03.251
lead to put money in the coffers of

39:03.251 --> 39:05.418
Iran , there's a direct correlation to

39:05.418 --> 39:07.529
the pace of intensity of attacks when

39:07.529 --> 39:09.696
that money flows in there . Is it your

39:09.696 --> 39:11.696
opinion that buying Iranian oil and

39:11.696 --> 39:13.862
lessening sanctions on Iran would lead

39:13.862 --> 39:15.862
to an increase in irgc activity ? I

39:15.862 --> 39:18.084
think any , I think the Iranian economy

39:18.084 --> 39:20.251
as a whole is penetrated thoroughly by

39:20.251 --> 39:22.418
the Irgc . So it's hard to , it's hard

39:22.418 --> 39:24.418
to see where money flows inside the

39:24.418 --> 39:26.640
Iranian Iranian economy and how much of

39:26.640 --> 39:28.751
it is used for legitimate reasons and

39:28.751 --> 39:30.973
how much of it is used for illegitimate

39:30.973 --> 39:30.510
reasons . Roger that thank you ,

39:30.510 --> 39:32.621
general . I appreciate my colleague ,

39:32.621 --> 39:34.732
Guildenstern could just follow follow

39:34.732 --> 39:36.732
up on that point . So we , I forget

39:36.732 --> 39:38.899
exactly when but we left the J . C . P

39:38.899 --> 39:41.066
O . A . And 2017 2018 , something like

39:41.066 --> 39:43.010
that . Um So we went right back in

39:43.010 --> 39:45.190
maximum sanctions , Would you say that

39:45.190 --> 39:48.010
Iranian malign activity since we left

39:48.010 --> 39:50.720
the J . C . P . O . A . Has increased ?

39:51.040 --> 39:54.910
I would and and that's the point . Um

39:54.910 --> 39:57.188
as as you've said , the point of the J .

39:57.188 --> 39:59.243
C . P . O . A . Is to stop them from

39:59.243 --> 40:01.243
getting a nuclear weapon . It would

40:01.243 --> 40:03.243
appear that Iran's ability to to do

40:03.243 --> 40:05.243
malign things in the region doesn't

40:05.243 --> 40:07.410
seem to be tied to the J . C . P . O .

40:07.410 --> 40:09.521
A . Because they are still incredibly

40:09.521 --> 40:11.743
active even though we've been out of it

40:11.743 --> 40:13.966
for three years , four years now . So I

40:13.966 --> 40:16.077
just want to let members chew on that

40:16.077 --> 40:18.299
one . Um Miss escobar is recognized for

40:18.299 --> 40:21.760
five minutes . Thank you Mr

40:21.760 --> 40:24.020
Chairman . And I just want to piggy

40:24.020 --> 40:26.131
back a little bit on your the comment

40:26.131 --> 40:28.409
that you just made about the J . C . P .

40:28.409 --> 40:31.910
O . A . When you look at the evolution

40:31.920 --> 40:35.800
of uh Iran's malign activity as you

40:35.800 --> 40:38.470
mentioned , we really do have to look

40:38.480 --> 40:41.240
at the withdrawal from the J . C . P .

40:41.240 --> 40:44.490
O . A . Instead of looking at just a

40:44.490 --> 40:46.712
narrow window . It's just like with our

40:46.712 --> 40:49.000
conversations on Afghanistan , we need

40:49.000 --> 40:51.690
to take a step back and look at the

40:51.700 --> 40:55.430
broader historical movement . But

40:55.440 --> 40:57.551
anyhow , so thank you for making that

40:57.551 --> 41:00.330
point and I just wanted to um you know ,

41:00.340 --> 41:02.770
put an exclamation point on it . Um

41:02.780 --> 41:04.780
thank you so much Chairman for this

41:04.780 --> 41:07.420
hearing and um for making sure that

41:07.420 --> 41:10.350
that we have the opportunity uh to

41:10.360 --> 41:13.430
speak to to our panelists and and to

41:13.430 --> 41:15.990
our panelists just want to express my

41:15.990 --> 41:18.680
gratitude to all of you for your your

41:18.680 --> 41:21.840
service to our nation and for being

41:21.840 --> 41:24.490
here today to to share your wisdom and

41:24.490 --> 41:26.750
I look forward to the conversations in

41:26.750 --> 41:29.160
closed session as well . I have the

41:29.160 --> 41:31.327
honor and privilege of representing el

41:31.327 --> 41:33.271
paso texas , which is home to Fort

41:33.271 --> 41:35.200
Bliss , America's second largest

41:35.200 --> 41:37.730
military installation and largest joint

41:37.730 --> 41:39.660
mobilization force generation

41:39.660 --> 41:43.260
installation in the army and obviously

41:43.260 --> 41:45.371
the regions of the world that you all

41:45.371 --> 41:48.070
are postured in have long been plagued

41:48.080 --> 41:50.660
by violence , instability and war in

41:50.660 --> 41:53.180
some cases that has been furthered by

41:53.190 --> 41:55.850
us . Um but as we look to the future

41:55.850 --> 41:58.140
and be especially beyond our withdrawal

41:58.140 --> 42:00.220
from Afghanistan . Ahead of the

42:00.220 --> 42:02.442
challenges that we need to confront not

42:02.442 --> 42:04.498
just today , but going forward . The

42:04.498 --> 42:07.950
challenges posed by Iran china

42:07.960 --> 42:10.180
Russia and the terrorist groups that

42:10.180 --> 42:12.680
they empower in the centcom and africom

42:12.680 --> 42:14.880
areas of operation . We've got to be

42:14.880 --> 42:16.991
strategic with our engagement and our

42:16.991 --> 42:19.270
posture in this ongoing battle ,

42:19.280 --> 42:21.500
especially that battle between

42:21.500 --> 42:23.670
democracy and authoritarianism ,

42:23.680 --> 42:26.750
General Mackenzie , I was just in

42:26.750 --> 42:28.972
Israel and I had the opportunity to see

42:28.972 --> 42:32.360
for myself the warmer relations that

42:32.360 --> 42:35.320
exist between Israel and Arab states ,

42:35.700 --> 42:39.690
it really is a source of great hope and

42:39.700 --> 42:41.756
it's clear that the relationship has

42:41.756 --> 42:44.060
created some stability in the region

42:44.070 --> 42:46.292
and I'm pleased that that centcom under

42:46.292 --> 42:48.420
your leadership has embraced this new

42:48.420 --> 42:51.830
reality , but we know that the Israeli

42:51.830 --> 42:54.590
Palestinian conflict remains a source

42:54.600 --> 42:57.620
of tremendous friction . Um and it's

42:57.630 --> 43:00.840
it's that that threat is always just

43:00.850 --> 43:03.170
over the horizon . The fighting last

43:03.170 --> 43:06.220
May is a prime example of how that how

43:06.220 --> 43:08.276
the conflict in that region can very

43:08.276 --> 43:10.800
quickly escalate and become violence

43:10.810 --> 43:13.830
everyone there . Uh and here we are all

43:13.830 --> 43:15.960
concerned that the cycles of violence

43:15.960 --> 43:18.620
will only continue . But from an

43:18.620 --> 43:21.070
american national security perspective ,

43:21.080 --> 43:23.470
do you believe that such rounds of

43:23.470 --> 43:25.590
violence have adversely impacted

43:25.600 --> 43:28.760
America's defense posture ? And if so ,

43:28.770 --> 43:31.020
is there a national security impetus

43:31.030 --> 43:33.670
for the United States to take an active

43:33.670 --> 43:35.726
role in improving the reality on the

43:35.726 --> 43:38.130
ground in order to help create the

43:38.130 --> 43:40.500
conditions needed to achieve A two

43:40.500 --> 43:43.120
state solution ? And if so , how

43:44.300 --> 43:46.467
man , the entry of Israel into the A .

43:46.467 --> 43:48.522
O . R . Was a significant historical

43:48.522 --> 43:50.744
event . And and so what it's done is it

43:50.744 --> 43:52.856
is sort of the operational expression

43:52.856 --> 43:55.022
of what began with the Abraham accords

43:55.022 --> 43:57.244
and other normalization activities that

43:57.244 --> 43:59.300
go forward . And so the relationship

43:59.300 --> 44:01.522
that Israel is developing with its arab

44:01.522 --> 44:03.522
neighbors is going to be profoundly

44:03.522 --> 44:05.356
significant in the years ahead .

44:05.356 --> 44:07.522
Something that is an irritant to those

44:07.522 --> 44:09.522
good relationships is of course the

44:09.522 --> 44:11.467
struggle with the Palestinians and

44:11.467 --> 44:13.633
that's that's an irritant to the Arabs

44:13.633 --> 44:15.744
and to all of that too many of them .

44:15.744 --> 44:17.967
And I think it's a significant factor .

44:17.967 --> 44:20.133
Anything we could do to reduce that to

44:20.133 --> 44:19.610
reduce that as an irritant to those

44:19.610 --> 44:21.840
relationships would contribute to not

44:21.840 --> 44:24.062
only Israeli security not only security

44:24.062 --> 44:26.229
across the region , but ultimately our

44:26.229 --> 44:28.396
own security . Thank you so much . And

44:28.396 --> 44:30.451
I have less than a minute left . But

44:30.451 --> 44:32.618
generally speaking to what extent does

44:32.618 --> 44:34.396
U . S . Security assistance and

44:34.396 --> 44:36.173
coordination allow our regional

44:36.173 --> 44:38.396
partners to better coordinate with each

44:38.396 --> 44:40.507
other and remove some of the regional

44:40.507 --> 44:42.618
security burdens that would otherwise

44:42.618 --> 44:44.340
fall more directly on american

44:44.340 --> 44:46.396
shoulders . So we have seen over the

44:46.396 --> 44:48.173
past year , year and a half the

44:48.173 --> 44:50.790
opportunity for nations to share us

44:50.790 --> 44:52.901
resources that one nation purchased ,

44:52.901 --> 44:55.068
another nation had need of , there are

44:55.068 --> 44:57.179
processes that we go through to allow

44:57.179 --> 44:59.290
that third what we call a third party

44:59.290 --> 45:01.820
transfer and and we have seen that work

45:01.830 --> 45:04.052
successfully . The specifics I'd rather

45:04.052 --> 45:06.052
put into the closed session but I'm

45:06.052 --> 45:08.163
prepared to talk about that . But yes

45:08.163 --> 45:10.274
it is , it is something we have found

45:10.274 --> 45:10.050
valuable . I would simply tell you we

45:10.050 --> 45:12.630
also struggle sometimes sometimes with

45:12.630 --> 45:15.050
the United States bureaucracy . When we

45:15.050 --> 45:17.161
attempt to do these moves , sometimes

45:17.161 --> 45:19.272
we're our own most significant source

45:19.272 --> 45:21.439
of friction when nations want to share

45:21.439 --> 45:23.606
things like that . Thank you so much .

45:23.606 --> 45:25.828
General McKenzie , I'm out of time . Mr

45:25.828 --> 45:27.939
Chairman , I yield back . Thank you .

45:27.939 --> 45:29.828
The chair recognizes Mr carl from

45:29.828 --> 45:32.450
Alabama . Thank you Mr Chair . I

45:32.460 --> 45:35.620
appreciate it . I apologize for popping

45:35.620 --> 45:37.787
in and out . But as you will know it's

45:37.787 --> 45:40.009
one of those days . Thank you to all of

45:40.009 --> 45:42.064
our speakers . It's I know it's time

45:42.064 --> 45:44.287
consuming for you to come here and take

45:44.287 --> 45:46.231
time away and but I appreciate you

45:46.231 --> 45:48.176
coming here . You're a general . I

45:48.176 --> 45:50.231
raised a marine myself . So I'm very

45:50.231 --> 45:52.398
proud of that . General Townsend . You

45:52.398 --> 45:54.398
mentioned your statement . Uh , the

45:54.398 --> 45:57.200
growing chinese influence in , in afcon

45:57.210 --> 45:59.820
and their possible plans to establish a

45:59.820 --> 46:01.931
naval base on the western side of the

46:01.931 --> 46:04.660
continent allowing the chinese to do

46:04.660 --> 46:07.100
this project . How can we expand our

46:07.100 --> 46:09.340
naval capabilities to ensure that the

46:09.340 --> 46:12.260
chinese do not have a dominant posture

46:12.260 --> 46:13.100
in this area ,

46:17.980 --> 46:20.060
congressman , I would defer to the

46:20.060 --> 46:22.282
department and the navy on how we might

46:22.282 --> 46:24.393
expand our naval capabilities there .

46:24.393 --> 46:26.820
Uh , the the naval capabilities that I

46:26.820 --> 46:29.810
have today are sufficient to do what

46:29.810 --> 46:32.750
africom must do . Uh , They are not

46:32.760 --> 46:36.580
essential to precluding what china

46:36.580 --> 46:39.210
does on the atlantic coast of Africa .

46:39.780 --> 46:42.290
They will be essential If china is

46:42.300 --> 46:44.522
successful in gaining a base there , we

46:44.522 --> 46:46.689
would have to , in my view , we'd have

46:46.689 --> 46:49.290
to invest more naval presence there and

46:49.290 --> 46:52.480
activity to further protect America

46:52.480 --> 46:54.313
from a chinese naval base on the

46:54.313 --> 46:56.369
atlantic coast . Thank you sir . And

46:56.369 --> 46:58.536
that's what I was after . I appreciate

46:58.536 --> 47:00.758
that . And I give , give my time back .

47:00.758 --> 47:02.924
The only question I have . Thank you .

47:02.924 --> 47:04.702
Thank you . Mr Carl . The chair

47:04.702 --> 47:06.758
recognizes mr scott from Georgia for

47:06.758 --> 47:08.924
five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman

47:08.924 --> 47:08.670
ma'am gentlemen . I appreciate your

47:08.670 --> 47:10.892
service I slipped out for a few minutes

47:10.892 --> 47:13.170
to meet with a man named David Beasley ,

47:13.170 --> 47:15.003
who's the head of the world Food

47:15.003 --> 47:17.226
Program . And I want to read to you one

47:17.226 --> 47:20.350
of his statements , We get 50% of our

47:20.350 --> 47:22.572
grains out of the Ukraine Russia area .

47:22.572 --> 47:24.794
It's going to have a dramatic impact on

47:24.794 --> 47:26.906
food costs , shipping costs , oil and

47:26.906 --> 47:29.017
fuel . This is a catastrophe . On top

47:29.017 --> 47:31.570
of a catastrophe . He pointed out that

47:31.570 --> 47:33.920
Sri Lanka right now and I'll just read

47:33.920 --> 47:36.510
the headline from Bloomberg shock waves

47:36.510 --> 47:38.732
from war in Ukraine threatened to swamp

47:38.880 --> 47:42.370
Sri Lanka In

47:42.370 --> 47:45.080
2021 . More than half of the grain for

47:45.080 --> 47:47.247
the U.N . World Food Program came from

47:47.247 --> 47:50.410
Ukraine . It's a tremendous exporter of

47:50.410 --> 47:53.740
wheat , corn , sunflower oil , Russia

47:53.740 --> 47:56.090
and Ukraine combined account for 30% of

47:56.090 --> 47:59.660
the global wheat export as this

47:59.660 --> 48:01.882
invasion continues . It's more and more

48:01.882 --> 48:03.882
unlikely that the Ukrainian farmers

48:03.882 --> 48:05.938
will be able to plant their crops or

48:05.938 --> 48:08.104
fertilize their crops or harvest their

48:08.104 --> 48:11.350
crops or export any of this food supply

48:11.350 --> 48:13.790
into the world ,

48:17.170 --> 48:19.392
developing countries in the Middle East

48:19.392 --> 48:22.720
and North Africa , we'll feel the

48:22.720 --> 48:25.500
impact of this . And my question is ,

48:26.170 --> 48:28.392
have you considered the instability and

48:28.392 --> 48:30.503
unrest that will soon be taking place

48:31.970 --> 48:34.248
around the world and your respective A .

48:34.248 --> 48:36.700
O . R . S . How can we help alleviate

48:37.340 --> 48:40.370
the suffering and the instability that

48:40.530 --> 48:42.620
we believe will come from this ? And

48:42.620 --> 48:45.550
what funding resources do you need to

48:45.550 --> 48:46.939
take on this challenge ?

48:50.770 --> 48:53.930
Thanks congressman . So you're the

48:53.930 --> 48:56.320
point is exactly right about the food

48:56.320 --> 48:59.200
instability especially impacting Africa .

49:00.170 --> 49:03.080
In fact , just in the last day or so ,

49:03.090 --> 49:06.150
the world Health Organization has

49:06.150 --> 49:08.900
declared a humanitarian disaster in

49:09.090 --> 49:12.700
Ethiopia as being the greatest one on

49:12.700 --> 49:16.280
the planet . So food security

49:16.720 --> 49:20.000
insecurity is a critical part of that

49:20.370 --> 49:22.648
on the african continent , I would say .

49:22.648 --> 49:25.250
As I said in my opening remarks I think

49:25.250 --> 49:27.361
and in my written statement , I think

49:27.361 --> 49:29.860
it's imperative that we continue to

49:29.870 --> 49:33.860
fund the U . S . A . I . D . Because

49:33.870 --> 49:35.960
they invest in a robust way in the

49:35.960 --> 49:38.071
african continent . It's probably one

49:38.071 --> 49:40.182
of the best investments America makes

49:40.182 --> 49:42.404
there . And I think there's going to be

49:42.404 --> 49:44.460
because of the point you just made ,

49:44.460 --> 49:44.200
there's gonna be more of that required .

49:47.370 --> 49:49.481
So I would I would note two countries

49:49.481 --> 49:51.481
in particular in my A . R . Will be

49:51.481 --> 49:53.592
threatened . One is Egypt , the other

49:53.592 --> 49:55.703
is Jordan's both depend significantly

49:55.703 --> 49:57.814
on imports from from Ukraine and they

49:57.814 --> 49:59.981
will face a growing food insufficiency

49:59.981 --> 50:02.203
as we go forward . I think , you know ,

50:02.203 --> 50:02.000
the long term solution is you'd like to

50:02.000 --> 50:03.778
find a regional way to actually

50:03.778 --> 50:06.111
supplant exporting food into the region .

50:06.111 --> 50:08.790
But that's a long term solution . We're

50:08.790 --> 50:10.790
we are looking aggressively now for

50:10.790 --> 50:12.846
short term solutions that will , you

50:12.846 --> 50:14.957
know , that that will bring wheat and

50:14.957 --> 50:17.234
other foodstuffs in for the short term .

50:17.234 --> 50:16.930
And you're obviously you're gonna have

50:16.930 --> 50:19.100
to find other sources , other global

50:19.100 --> 50:21.378
sources rather than Ukraine and Russia .

50:21.378 --> 50:23.489
And that's gonna be hard to do with a

50:23.489 --> 50:25.600
third of the market coming from those

50:25.600 --> 50:25.220
two areas . This is a very pressing

50:25.220 --> 50:27.442
concern and I appreciate you calling it

50:27.442 --> 50:31.250
out respect . Uh

50:31.260 --> 50:33.260
Congressman . I couldn't agree more

50:33.260 --> 50:35.371
with what what generals Mackenzie and

50:35.371 --> 50:37.371
Townsend have said , I would add to

50:37.371 --> 50:39.704
General McKenzie's list . Perhaps Yemen ,

50:39.704 --> 50:41.927
uh as being a country that will face an

50:41.927 --> 50:44.093
impact here . Uh , you know what we're

50:44.093 --> 50:46.149
seeing now are the 2nd and 3rd order

50:46.149 --> 50:48.371
consequences of Russia's unprovoked and

50:48.371 --> 50:51.010
illegal invasion of Ukraine . As

50:51.010 --> 50:53.232
General Townsend said , U . S . A . I .

50:53.232 --> 50:55.454
D . Has the lead on this issue . We are

50:55.454 --> 50:57.621
strongly in support of U . S . A . I .

50:57.621 --> 50:57.480
D . S . Efforts and will continue to

50:57.480 --> 50:59.313
work with them in an interagency

50:59.313 --> 51:01.258
fashion . I think what's happening

51:01.258 --> 51:03.369
around the world right now is because

51:03.369 --> 51:05.424
of the shortages and the anticipated

51:05.424 --> 51:07.520
shortages is that people who were

51:07.520 --> 51:09.990
receiving , some are now receiving none .

51:10.070 --> 51:12.350
And a lot of people have had the

51:12.350 --> 51:14.406
assistance that were getting through

51:14.406 --> 51:17.070
the World Food Program cut in half . I

51:17.070 --> 51:19.181
think as many as 13 million people in

51:19.181 --> 51:21.450
Yemen actually received some type of

51:21.460 --> 51:23.349
assistance through the World Food

51:23.349 --> 51:25.780
Program . I just , I can't emphasize to

51:25.780 --> 51:27.947
this committee and to the world enough

51:27.947 --> 51:30.113
the devastation of what Vladimir Putin

51:30.113 --> 51:33.330
has done in the disruption around the

51:33.330 --> 51:35.441
world . And I think that the pain and

51:35.441 --> 51:37.910
the suffering that that individual is

51:37.910 --> 51:41.000
caused is only is only now beginning to

51:41.000 --> 51:43.167
be felt and I think the world is going

51:43.167 --> 51:46.590
to gonna be hurting for several years

51:46.590 --> 51:48.757
because of what he's done . And I just

51:48.757 --> 51:50.979
hope that we're paying attention to the

51:50.979 --> 51:53.146
potential civil unrest and instability

51:53.146 --> 51:55.090
that comes from the lack of global

51:55.090 --> 51:57.090
foods play because of what Vladimir

51:57.090 --> 51:59.368
Putin has done with that . Mr Chairman ,

51:59.368 --> 52:01.312
I yield . Thank you . MS Jacobs is

52:01.312 --> 52:03.368
recognized for five minutes . Well ,

52:03.368 --> 52:05.534
thank you so much and thank you to our

52:05.534 --> 52:07.646
witnesses . It's great to see you all

52:07.646 --> 52:09.534
again . I first wanted to ask you

52:09.534 --> 52:11.646
General Townsend , a recent reporting

52:11.646 --> 52:13.590
brought to light us support to the

52:13.590 --> 52:15.423
Rapid Intervention battalion and

52:15.423 --> 52:17.757
Cameroon under uh the 1 27 Echo program .

52:17.757 --> 52:19.812
The Rapid Intervention Battalion has

52:19.812 --> 52:21.812
been repeatedly implicated in human

52:21.812 --> 52:23.923
rights abuses . So why was us support

52:23.923 --> 52:26.146
to the Rapid intervention Battalion not

52:26.146 --> 52:28.312
blocked on human rights grounds ? What

52:28.312 --> 52:30.479
steps is africom taking to ensure that

52:30.479 --> 52:30.100
any partner forces supported under

52:30.100 --> 52:32.156
Section 1 27 Echo have not committed

52:32.156 --> 52:34.380
gross violations of human rights . And

52:34.380 --> 52:36.602
wouldn't one way to prevent this in the

52:36.602 --> 52:38.713
future be the subject 127 Echo to the

52:38.713 --> 52:40.824
same kinds of leahy vetting standards

52:40.824 --> 52:42.991
we use for nearly every other security

52:42.991 --> 52:46.950
assistance program . Mhm . Um so ,

52:46.960 --> 52:50.040
uh there was a amnesty international I

52:50.040 --> 52:52.850
think report in 2017 that brought this

52:52.850 --> 52:55.270
to light that that caused the

52:55.270 --> 52:57.381
department in africom to look closely

52:57.381 --> 52:59.870
at our support , our engagement with

53:00.250 --> 53:02.250
The rapid intervention battalion in

53:02.250 --> 53:05.210
Cameroon in 2019 . Our relationship was

53:05.220 --> 53:08.590
ended With that element . In fact ,

53:08.590 --> 53:10.980
we've drawn down pretty much in 2019

53:10.980 --> 53:14.030
and by early 2020 , we ended all of our

53:14.030 --> 53:17.820
engagement with Cameroon were starting

53:17.830 --> 53:20.950
to reengage there on a very selected

53:20.950 --> 53:24.090
basis with some Few programs , but not

53:24.090 --> 53:26.920
with the rapid intervention battalion .

53:26.950 --> 53:29.900
And we do go through extensive vetting

53:30.080 --> 53:32.080
with all of our programs , training

53:32.080 --> 53:34.247
programs on the content to include the

53:34.247 --> 53:36.358
127 Echo program . Okay , thank you .

53:36.358 --> 53:39.040
Um MS baker . Uh nice to see you . Um

53:39.050 --> 53:40.939
recent years have seen us trained

53:40.939 --> 53:42.960
officers in Burkina , faso mali ,

53:42.960 --> 53:44.904
guinea , Mauritania and the Gambia

53:44.904 --> 53:46.849
overthrow national governments and

53:46.849 --> 53:48.571
military coups . Many of these

53:48.571 --> 53:50.682
countries had issues with gross human

53:50.682 --> 53:52.460
rights violations in the past ,

53:52.460 --> 53:54.627
particularly Burkina Faso and mali and

53:54.627 --> 53:56.293
lacked robust security sector

53:56.293 --> 53:58.516
governance and democratic progress that

53:58.516 --> 54:00.516
made this kind of challenge frankly

54:00.516 --> 54:02.738
predictable . On february 4th , I along

54:02.738 --> 54:04.738
with Chairman Meeks and a letter to

54:04.738 --> 54:04.640
President biden Blinken and Secretary

54:04.640 --> 54:06.750
Austin on our strategy in the saddle

54:06.750 --> 54:08.861
and requested that the administration

54:08.861 --> 54:11.083
evaluate its security sector assistance

54:11.083 --> 54:13.028
and other efforts over the last 15

54:13.028 --> 54:14.972
years to assess their efficacy and

54:14.972 --> 54:16.917
areas for improvement . And I look

54:16.917 --> 54:18.972
forward to this briefing and hope we

54:18.972 --> 54:18.540
can work together on this going forward .

54:18.540 --> 54:20.318
But how have these developments

54:20.318 --> 54:22.096
impacted docs thinking on which

54:22.096 --> 54:24.262
Sahelian and West African militaries ,

54:24.262 --> 54:27.450
we provide security assistance to thank

54:27.450 --> 54:29.394
you Anderson and thank you for the

54:29.394 --> 54:31.840
question . Um I should note just up

54:31.840 --> 54:33.562
front that we do have security

54:33.562 --> 54:35.673
assistance restrictions as a result ,

54:35.673 --> 54:37.840
as you said of the of the recent coups

54:37.840 --> 54:40.007
in both Burkina faso mali and and also

54:40.007 --> 54:42.240
Guinea . So uh for starters that that

54:42.240 --> 54:44.760
is in place um as you know , we work

54:44.940 --> 54:46.996
closely with the State department to

54:46.996 --> 54:49.520
ensure that we are vetting all security

54:49.520 --> 54:52.440
assistance partners uh in in compliance

54:52.440 --> 54:55.160
with US law with local screening

54:55.170 --> 54:57.281
biometrics as it's required . There's

54:57.281 --> 54:59.226
always more that we can do in this

54:59.226 --> 55:01.281
space . And so we'll look forward to

55:01.281 --> 55:00.930
getting you a briefing on what we're

55:00.940 --> 55:02.996
what we're working on . Okay . Thank

55:02.996 --> 55:04.996
you frankly , I think some of these

55:04.996 --> 55:07.051
challenges with the folks we trained

55:07.051 --> 55:09.107
was a bit predictable . So I want to

55:09.107 --> 55:08.560
make sure we're going beyond just the

55:08.570 --> 55:10.950
immediate vetting to make sure we're

55:10.960 --> 55:13.127
contributing to the broader democratic

55:13.127 --> 55:15.238
governance of our partner countries .

55:15.740 --> 55:18.018
Absolutely . And I just say , you know ,

55:18.018 --> 55:20.073
as as Gerald johnson has said one of

55:20.073 --> 55:22.018
our focuses in the Africa Corps in

55:22.018 --> 55:23.851
particular is that institutional

55:23.851 --> 55:25.962
capacity building that will help us ,

55:25.962 --> 55:28.073
we hope to move beyond these kinds of

55:28.073 --> 55:30.296
incidents . Great and General Mackenzie

55:30.296 --> 55:32.351
um the D . O . D . Has significantly

55:32.351 --> 55:34.184
undercounted civilian casualties

55:34.184 --> 55:34.090
compared to numbers provided by

55:34.090 --> 55:36.146
credible independent organizations .

55:36.146 --> 55:37.701
Despite the fact that these

55:37.701 --> 55:39.757
organizations undertake interviews ,

55:39.757 --> 55:41.979
site visits and other measures that D .

55:41.979 --> 55:43.868
O . D . Does not generally have .

55:43.868 --> 55:45.812
Additionally recent new york Times

55:45.812 --> 55:47.868
reporting found that bot prematurely

55:47.868 --> 55:47.730
dismissed many civilian casualty

55:47.730 --> 55:49.952
reports at the assessment phase without

55:49.952 --> 55:52.119
doing basic due diligence . Like basic

55:52.119 --> 55:54.008
internet searches or searching in

55:54.008 --> 55:56.174
Arabic instead of only in english . Um

55:56.174 --> 55:58.286
And earlier this week I along with my

55:58.286 --> 56:00.452
colleague sent a letter to D . O . D .

56:00.452 --> 56:00.360
Urging it to take steps on preventing

56:00.360 --> 56:02.416
and mitigating civilian casualties .

56:02.416 --> 56:04.249
Moving moving forward as centcom

56:04.249 --> 56:06.304
implements changes in procedures for

56:06.304 --> 56:08.471
tracking , assessing and investigating

56:08.471 --> 56:10.638
civilian harm will centcom revisit the

56:10.638 --> 56:12.638
many past cases that appear to have

56:12.638 --> 56:14.693
been prematurely dismissed and going

56:14.693 --> 56:14.560
forward . What changes do you believe

56:14.560 --> 56:18.120
need to be made ? So I'll begin by

56:18.120 --> 56:20.176
saying nobody wearing the uniform of

56:20.176 --> 56:22.120
the United States is interested in

56:22.120 --> 56:24.287
killing an innocent person . We worked

56:24.287 --> 56:26.231
very hard to minimize that but the

56:26.231 --> 56:28.342
battlefield is a deadly and dangerous

56:28.342 --> 56:30.564
place and we have made mistakes and yes

56:30.564 --> 56:32.787
we have killed innocent people and when

56:32.787 --> 56:32.380
we can and we have tried very hard to

56:32.380 --> 56:34.269
mitigate that . As you know , the

56:34.269 --> 56:36.102
secretary has undertaken a large

56:36.102 --> 56:37.991
comprehensive exhaustive and high

56:37.991 --> 56:40.020
energy project to further shape the

56:40.020 --> 56:42.242
efforts of the department and were full

56:42.242 --> 56:44.409
participants in that going forward . I

56:44.409 --> 56:46.464
would tell you in the in the interim

56:46.464 --> 56:48.576
based on uh various reports that have

56:48.576 --> 56:50.576
been issued . We have undertaken 10

56:50.576 --> 56:52.520
discrete actions within us central

56:52.520 --> 56:54.576
command that will support the larger

56:54.576 --> 56:54.550
effort but we're not waiting on that to

56:54.550 --> 56:56.870
actually happen . Um and I will be

56:56.870 --> 56:58.981
happy to send those 10 things over so

56:58.981 --> 57:01.148
that you can examine them . Uh but but

57:01.148 --> 57:03.370
but the secretary is seized with this .

57:03.370 --> 57:05.426
His energy is palpable , visible and

57:05.426 --> 57:07.703
we're moving forward on it . Thank you .

57:07.703 --> 57:07.520
We appreciate the Secretary's efforts

57:07.520 --> 57:09.687
and we look forward to that briefing .

57:09.687 --> 57:11.853
Mr expired . Mr franklin is recognized

57:11.853 --> 57:13.742
for five minutes . Thank you . Mr

57:13.742 --> 57:15.576
Chairman and I had a couple more

57:15.576 --> 57:17.853
questions I didn't quite get to before .

57:17.853 --> 57:20.150
Um And again back to General Mackenzie

57:20.530 --> 57:23.560
as chairman smith had had noted Iranian

57:23.560 --> 57:25.616
terror activity has been significant

57:25.616 --> 57:27.838
whether there's a J C P O A in place or

57:27.838 --> 57:29.671
not understand that whether it's

57:29.671 --> 57:31.782
Hezbollah in Lebanon Hamas and Gaza ,

57:31.782 --> 57:34.004
the houthis in Yemen , the codes forces

57:34.004 --> 57:36.320
in Iraq , the common denominator is the

57:36.320 --> 57:38.487
neighborhood bully . And I hate to use

57:38.487 --> 57:40.653
that expression because it's obviously

57:40.653 --> 57:40.630
a lot more significant than that . But

57:40.630 --> 57:42.797
they're the bad guys , they're the bad

57:42.797 --> 57:45.019
actor in the neighborhood , they're the

57:45.019 --> 57:44.740
ones who want to destabilize everything .

57:45.230 --> 57:49.220
Um I hate to ask this . I

57:49.220 --> 57:51.442
wouldn't normally ask this question but

57:51.442 --> 57:53.664
because I understand your your place to

57:53.664 --> 57:56.400
provide um advice and counsel to the

57:56.400 --> 57:58.622
administration but but based on the way

57:58.622 --> 58:00.567
things unfolded in Afghanistan and

58:00.567 --> 58:02.456
knowing now the questions we were

58:02.456 --> 58:04.456
asking and we're getting answers to

58:04.456 --> 58:06.678
before things are coming out that there

58:06.678 --> 58:08.678
was a lot of advice provided by the

58:08.678 --> 58:08.420
pentagon that was not heated by the

58:08.420 --> 58:10.698
administration . So before we get this ,

58:10.920 --> 58:12.920
this treaty that the administration

58:12.920 --> 58:15.087
seems really bent on getting back into

58:15.087 --> 58:17.198
into place , I think it's it's really

58:17.198 --> 58:16.700
essential that the details are

58:16.700 --> 58:20.420
discussed . Has the White House engaged

58:20.420 --> 58:22.390
you for your regional security

58:22.390 --> 58:24.612
expertise in the negotiation process of

58:24.612 --> 58:27.770
this Iran deal . So I might the person

58:27.770 --> 58:29.659
I engage with is the Secretary of

58:29.659 --> 58:31.492
Defense and Policy and we have a

58:31.492 --> 58:33.548
constant dialogue with the Secretary

58:33.548 --> 58:35.714
and all issues within the centcom . Er

58:35.714 --> 58:37.881
and I understand the Secretary has got

58:37.881 --> 58:37.490
a lot on his plate , but where he's

58:37.490 --> 58:39.712
getting his primary source of the boots

58:39.712 --> 58:41.934
on the ground feedback is gonna be from

58:41.934 --> 58:43.990
you . I think he gets it from me , I

58:43.990 --> 58:46.046
think he gets it from policy and you

58:46.046 --> 58:46.030
know , a variety , a variety of sources .

58:46.420 --> 58:48.840
Okay , so my concern is what we're

58:48.840 --> 58:50.896
seeing on the press out there in the

58:50.896 --> 58:52.784
press of what may be coming out ,

58:52.784 --> 58:56.330
delisting irgc buying Iranian oil those

58:58.120 --> 59:00.342
from what you've told us here would not

59:00.342 --> 59:02.342
be in alignment with your advice on

59:02.342 --> 59:04.676
what's best from a military perspective .

59:04.676 --> 59:06.564
And I don't I don't expect you to

59:06.564 --> 59:06.250
comment on that , but it's either that

59:06.260 --> 59:08.149
or or they're not asking for your

59:08.149 --> 59:10.093
advice at all and I find either of

59:10.093 --> 59:12.204
those to be very concerning and we're

59:12.204 --> 59:14.260
gonna watch very closely on how this

59:14.260 --> 59:16.371
treaty develops . But I thank you all

59:16.371 --> 59:18.427
and I would , I'm assuming that this

59:18.427 --> 59:20.482
will be the last time the two of you

59:20.482 --> 59:22.482
testified before us . But I want to

59:22.482 --> 59:24.593
thank you as a former military member

59:24.593 --> 59:26.649
for your decades of service . It's a

59:26.649 --> 59:26.530
lot of hard work and not very

59:26.530 --> 59:28.586
gratifying a lot of times , but your

59:28.586 --> 59:30.752
nation appreciates your work and I and

59:30.752 --> 59:32.919
I yield back . Thank you very much . I

59:32.919 --> 59:35.086
just want to clarify the last answer ,

59:35.086 --> 59:37.141
john McKenzie said he is speaking to

59:37.141 --> 59:39.197
Secretary Austin and that that's the

59:39.197 --> 59:39.100
chain of command here . Um The White

59:39.100 --> 59:41.322
House is not ignoring the Department of

59:41.322 --> 59:43.378
Defense's opinion on this . They are

59:43.378 --> 59:45.544
speaking with Secretary Austin who was

59:45.544 --> 59:47.767
speaking to his people and that's where

59:47.767 --> 59:47.650
the information goes back and I will .

59:47.660 --> 59:49.771
The larger point is it's , you know ,

59:49.771 --> 59:51.549
we have civilian control of the

59:51.549 --> 59:53.716
military for a reason . You know , the

59:53.716 --> 59:55.938
President is ultimately the one who has

59:55.938 --> 59:57.993
to make decisions . Um if we want to

59:57.993 --> 01:00:00.216
just do whatever the military told us ,

01:00:00.216 --> 01:00:00.150
we wouldn't have civilian control of

01:00:00.150 --> 01:00:02.317
the military , you take the advice you

01:00:02.317 --> 01:00:04.150
process it and you make the best

01:00:04.150 --> 01:00:04.120
decision you can and that that's what

01:00:04.120 --> 01:00:06.398
they're trying to do . And MR Chairman ,

01:00:06.398 --> 01:00:08.453
If I could I do just want to clarify

01:00:08.453 --> 01:00:10.176
that both the chairman and the

01:00:10.176 --> 01:00:12.398
Secretary , I have had opportunities to

01:00:12.398 --> 01:00:14.453
provide that advice to the President

01:00:14.453 --> 01:00:16.509
and to offer their recommendations .

01:00:16.509 --> 01:00:16.330
Okay , thank you . I appreciate that

01:00:16.330 --> 01:00:18.108
clarification . Mr Gallagher is

01:00:18.108 --> 01:00:20.490
recognized profound minutes . Thank you .

01:00:20.490 --> 01:00:24.470
Mr Chairman . Um MS baker , your

01:00:24.470 --> 01:00:28.350
testimony references um the emerging

01:00:28.350 --> 01:00:30.183
concept of integrated deterrence

01:00:30.183 --> 01:00:31.850
multiple times . You said the

01:00:31.850 --> 01:00:33.850
department , we'll continue to lean

01:00:33.850 --> 01:00:35.961
forward in strengthening multilateral

01:00:35.961 --> 01:00:35.720
security cooperation in order to

01:00:35.720 --> 01:00:37.942
strengthen integrated deterrence and to

01:00:37.942 --> 01:00:39.998
address threats , particularly those

01:00:39.998 --> 01:00:42.053
emanating from Iran . Later on , you

01:00:42.053 --> 01:00:44.053
say the integrated deterrence means

01:00:44.053 --> 01:00:46.276
creating advantages for ourselves , our

01:00:46.276 --> 01:00:48.570
partners and our allies while creating

01:00:48.570 --> 01:00:50.792
dilemmas for our competitors . I'd like

01:00:50.792 --> 01:00:53.014
to talk a little bit about the dilemmas

01:00:53.014 --> 01:00:54.792
you envisioned under integrated

01:00:54.792 --> 01:00:54.770
deterrence . I know this is a centcom

01:00:54.770 --> 01:00:57.180
hearing , but I wanted to ask quickly

01:00:57.190 --> 01:00:59.023
about Russia , Your portfolio is

01:00:59.023 --> 01:01:01.023
obviously very vast . Would it be a

01:01:01.023 --> 01:01:02.634
fair characterization of the

01:01:02.634 --> 01:01:05.190
administration's policy that sanctions

01:01:05.190 --> 01:01:07.170
are designed to deny the Russian

01:01:07.170 --> 01:01:09.090
government resources they would

01:01:09.100 --> 01:01:11.210
otherwise have available in order to

01:01:11.210 --> 01:01:12.543
punish their behavior .

01:01:14.910 --> 01:01:17.100
Uh Congressman , I would say that the

01:01:17.100 --> 01:01:19.660
sanctions that the US led and that are

01:01:19.670 --> 01:01:22.270
not only a US owned but but

01:01:22.270 --> 01:01:24.048
multinational at this point are

01:01:24.048 --> 01:01:25.992
designed to impose consequences on

01:01:25.992 --> 01:01:27.937
Russia for its illegal invasion of

01:01:27.937 --> 01:01:29.937
Ukraine . So that's a yes to punish

01:01:29.937 --> 01:01:32.159
their behavior and by punishing Russian

01:01:32.159 --> 01:01:34.440
behavior or we are creating dilemmas as

01:01:34.440 --> 01:01:36.840
you put it , or at least costs for the

01:01:36.840 --> 01:01:39.220
Russians right cost in position . Yes ,

01:01:39.220 --> 01:01:41.650
congressman . So , under the same logic ,

01:01:41.660 --> 01:01:45.550
if another actor say china provided the

01:01:45.550 --> 01:01:47.772
Russian government with funding to help

01:01:47.772 --> 01:01:49.939
them evade sanctions , that would , in

01:01:49.939 --> 01:01:52.780
a sense , create an advantage for

01:01:52.780 --> 01:01:55.002
Russia in the in the sense , that would

01:01:55.002 --> 01:01:57.058
mitigate some of the costs we impose

01:01:57.058 --> 01:01:59.380
via sanctions . Right ? Uh Congressman ,

01:01:59.380 --> 01:02:01.080
Yes . And and we are having a

01:02:01.080 --> 01:02:03.030
conversation with china about our

01:02:03.030 --> 01:02:05.197
concerns in that regard . I think this

01:02:05.197 --> 01:02:07.252
is a very important point , not only

01:02:07.252 --> 01:02:09.308
because as we evaluate whether China

01:02:09.308 --> 01:02:11.419
increases its support to Russia , but

01:02:11.419 --> 01:02:13.419
to be clear if our adversaries have

01:02:13.419 --> 01:02:16.110
access to more resources , that creates

01:02:16.120 --> 01:02:17.953
an advantage for them and if our

01:02:17.953 --> 01:02:20.310
adversaries have more resources and are

01:02:20.310 --> 01:02:23.130
more capable , that creates dilemmas

01:02:23.130 --> 01:02:26.840
for ourselves and for our allies and I

01:02:26.840 --> 01:02:29.007
bring this all up because I think it's

01:02:29.007 --> 01:02:31.007
a self evident point that's getting

01:02:31.007 --> 01:02:33.173
lost in the shuffle that policies that

01:02:33.173 --> 01:02:35.830
give our enemies more resources give

01:02:35.830 --> 01:02:37.441
them an advantage and by the

01:02:37.441 --> 01:02:40.230
administration's own admission ,

01:02:40.800 --> 01:02:43.350
undermined its vision . Such as it

01:02:43.350 --> 01:02:46.190
exists , of integrated deterrence and I

01:02:46.190 --> 01:02:48.301
bring this up because as my colleague

01:02:48.301 --> 01:02:50.470
Mr Loria brought up before , we may be

01:02:50.470 --> 01:02:52.810
days before , according to some days

01:02:52.820 --> 01:02:55.090
away . According to some reports uh

01:02:55.100 --> 01:02:57.880
from signing a deal with Iran , which

01:02:57.890 --> 01:03:01.790
will in any scenario provide a massive

01:03:01.800 --> 01:03:03.830
windfall to the tune of billions of

01:03:03.830 --> 01:03:06.510
dollars to the world's primary state

01:03:06.510 --> 01:03:08.621
sponsor of terrorism . And everything

01:03:08.621 --> 01:03:11.670
else aside , indications are that this

01:03:11.670 --> 01:03:13.980
deal will provide unprecedented

01:03:13.980 --> 01:03:16.202
sanctions relief well outside the scope

01:03:16.202 --> 01:03:18.313
of its nuclear program to the Iranian

01:03:18.313 --> 01:03:20.424
government , including from terrorism

01:03:20.424 --> 01:03:22.780
related sanctions . And I don't think

01:03:22.780 --> 01:03:25.480
you have to be an opponent of the

01:03:25.490 --> 01:03:28.470
original J . C . P . O A uh to

01:03:28.470 --> 01:03:30.581
understand that this makes no sense .

01:03:30.581 --> 01:03:32.526
Just take the administration's own

01:03:32.526 --> 01:03:34.581
words at face value . Their strategy

01:03:34.581 --> 01:03:36.692
calls for creating advantages for our

01:03:36.692 --> 01:03:39.026
allies and dilemmas for our adversaries .

01:03:39.026 --> 01:03:41.081
But this deal , by providing massive

01:03:41.081 --> 01:03:43.240
resources to our primary adversary in

01:03:43.240 --> 01:03:45.720
the Middle East will create dilemmas

01:03:45.720 --> 01:03:49.550
for us and provide advantages to

01:03:49.550 --> 01:03:51.661
our foremost enemy . And just a quick

01:03:51.661 --> 01:03:53.383
question on that point to your

01:03:53.383 --> 01:03:55.606
knowledge , is the Central Bank of Iran

01:03:55.606 --> 01:03:57.050
still financing terrorism

01:03:59.300 --> 01:04:01.480
uh Congressman . That's a question I'd

01:04:01.480 --> 01:04:03.369
have to defer to the Treasury and

01:04:03.369 --> 01:04:05.147
others . Okay , I've asked this

01:04:05.147 --> 01:04:07.369
question in other committees have asked

01:04:07.369 --> 01:04:09.536
it to the CIA Director . It's a matter

01:04:09.536 --> 01:04:11.313
of public record . The Treasury

01:04:11.313 --> 01:04:13.369
Department has put it's not it's not

01:04:13.369 --> 01:04:15.202
doesn't take arcane or exquisite

01:04:15.202 --> 01:04:17.430
intelligence to to know the answer I

01:04:17.430 --> 01:04:20.390
take , but we'll take it back . I guess ,

01:04:20.400 --> 01:04:22.289
since you responded to an earlier

01:04:22.289 --> 01:04:24.456
question from my colleague Mr Crow , I

01:04:24.456 --> 01:04:27.300
believe that the NDS is now being

01:04:27.300 --> 01:04:29.133
delayed because of the crisis in

01:04:29.133 --> 01:04:31.467
Ukraine . Is that correct , congressman ?

01:04:31.467 --> 01:04:33.356
I wouldn't say it's being delayed

01:04:33.356 --> 01:04:35.522
because of the crisis in Ukraine . And

01:04:35.522 --> 01:04:37.578
it is it is uh in final coordination

01:04:37.578 --> 01:04:39.633
and we hope to have it to you soon .

01:04:39.633 --> 01:04:41.744
Okay . Um , are you rethinking any of

01:04:41.744 --> 01:04:43.967
the assumptions underlying the NDS as a

01:04:43.967 --> 01:04:46.189
result of Ukraine ? Or do you see it as

01:04:46.189 --> 01:04:48.411
a validation of integrated deterrents ?

01:04:48.411 --> 01:04:50.522
Carson ? We believe that the strategy

01:04:50.522 --> 01:04:52.744
in fact took into consideration some of

01:04:52.744 --> 01:04:54.967
the behavior that we've now seen Russia

01:04:54.967 --> 01:04:57.189
exhibit and that it's resilient to what

01:04:57.189 --> 01:04:59.356
we're seeing from the Russians at this

01:04:59.356 --> 01:05:01.356
time . So do you believe integrated

01:05:01.356 --> 01:05:03.356
deterrents succeeded in the case of

01:05:03.356 --> 01:05:05.522
Russia , Ukraine ? I think what you're

01:05:05.522 --> 01:05:07.244
seeing right now is integrated

01:05:07.244 --> 01:05:09.022
deterrence in action , bringing

01:05:09.022 --> 01:05:12.240
together the sanctions , the allies and

01:05:12.240 --> 01:05:14.440
the partners have seven seconds . But

01:05:14.440 --> 01:05:16.607
what you're effectively saying is your

01:05:16.607 --> 01:05:18.829
entire theory of deterrence requires on

01:05:18.829 --> 01:05:20.996
a country getting invaded and pillaged

01:05:20.996 --> 01:05:22.996
in order to galvanize the West into

01:05:22.996 --> 01:05:25.218
action and I just don't want to put our

01:05:25.218 --> 01:05:27.440
eggs in that basket . I'm out of time .

01:05:27.440 --> 01:05:29.496
Thank you , appreciate it will point

01:05:29.496 --> 01:05:31.329
out , we we have sanctioned many

01:05:31.329 --> 01:05:33.162
nations long before they invaded

01:05:33.162 --> 01:05:35.162
another country . Certainly we have

01:05:35.162 --> 01:05:36.940
sanctions against Russia , With

01:05:36.940 --> 01:05:39.051
sanctions have sanctions against Iran

01:05:39.051 --> 01:05:40.996
now . And I think that the central

01:05:40.996 --> 01:05:42.996
dilemma that this administration is

01:05:42.996 --> 01:05:45.218
trying to wrestle with is we also don't

01:05:45.218 --> 01:05:47.384
want Iran to get a nuclear weapon . Um

01:05:47.384 --> 01:05:49.384
and that's kind of the trade off on

01:05:49.384 --> 01:05:51.551
that that we're trying to go through .

01:05:51.551 --> 01:05:53.218
And I have not seen any other

01:05:53.218 --> 01:05:55.384
reasonable plan other than negotiating

01:05:55.384 --> 01:05:57.384
with Iran for how we stop them from

01:05:57.384 --> 01:05:59.440
getting a nuclear weapon . Now , the

01:05:59.440 --> 01:06:01.551
details of that negotiation obviously

01:06:01.551 --> 01:06:01.210
matter what are we giving up , What are

01:06:01.210 --> 01:06:03.530
we getting ? But we can't act like for

01:06:03.530 --> 01:06:05.660
no apparent reason whatsoever . We're

01:06:05.660 --> 01:06:07.716
just giving Iran sanctions relief so

01:06:07.716 --> 01:06:09.938
they can engage in more mischief . No ,

01:06:09.938 --> 01:06:12.049
there's a very very , very big reason

01:06:12.049 --> 01:06:14.271
why we're engaged in these negotiations

01:06:14.271 --> 01:06:16.271
and as we don't want them to have a

01:06:16.271 --> 01:06:18.216
nuclear weapon . Um now you debate

01:06:18.216 --> 01:06:20.438
whether or not we're gonna get there on

01:06:20.438 --> 01:06:19.980
that , but I think that's worth at

01:06:19.980 --> 01:06:21.869
least throwing in there into that

01:06:21.869 --> 01:06:23.869
conversation and discussion . Um We

01:06:23.869 --> 01:06:26.570
have no further requests for time . I

01:06:26.570 --> 01:06:28.292
want to thank you all for your

01:06:28.292 --> 01:06:30.403
testimony . We'll see you in a couple

01:06:30.403 --> 01:06:32.626
hours on the classified side . And with

01:06:32.626 --> 01:06:32.810
that we are adjourned