1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:02,167 morning . Ladies and gentlemen , thank 2 00:00:02,167 --> 00:00:04,333 you for joining us today . A major rob 3 00:00:04,333 --> 00:00:06,056 Lodwick from the defense Press 4 00:00:06,056 --> 00:00:08,222 operations desk officer for the Middle 5 00:00:08,222 --> 00:00:10,167 East and I'll be facilitating this 6 00:00:10,167 --> 00:00:12,056 morning's briefing today . We are 7 00:00:12,056 --> 00:00:14,167 joined by the Commander of the United 8 00:00:14,167 --> 00:00:16,850 States Central Command General frank 9 00:00:16,850 --> 00:00:19,210 McKenzie . General Mackenzie is no 10 00:00:19,210 --> 00:00:21,377 stranger to this podium nor to most of 11 00:00:21,377 --> 00:00:23,520 you . But he is joining us today from 12 00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:25,631 his headquarters in Tampa florida for 13 00:00:25,631 --> 00:00:27,742 what will likely be his last pentagon 14 00:00:27,742 --> 00:00:29,853 press briefing as centcom commander . 15 00:00:29,940 --> 00:00:31,829 We're fortunate enough to have 45 16 00:00:31,829 --> 00:00:33,996 minutes with him this morning . So I'd 17 00:00:33,996 --> 00:00:36,107 ask you to please keep your follow up 18 00:00:36,107 --> 00:00:38,210 questions short and to of course 19 00:00:38,210 --> 00:00:40,200 identify yourself by name and 20 00:00:40,200 --> 00:00:42,850 affiliation . Also , please be aware 21 00:00:42,850 --> 00:00:45,030 that we are fighting about a 2-3 2nd 22 00:00:45,250 --> 00:00:48,570 communication delay with that General 23 00:00:48,570 --> 00:00:50,792 Mackenzie . Sir , thank you for joining 24 00:00:50,792 --> 00:00:53,360 us today . Do you hear us ? Okay ? I 25 00:00:53,360 --> 00:00:55,360 can hear and see you fine . And I'm 26 00:00:55,360 --> 00:00:56,360 ready to begin . 27 00:01:04,140 --> 00:01:06,307 It's a pleasure to be with you today . 28 00:01:06,440 --> 00:01:08,218 I spent a lot of time this week 29 00:01:08,218 --> 00:01:10,218 testifying to Congress for the last 30 00:01:10,218 --> 00:01:12,218 time as the Commander of US Central 31 00:01:12,218 --> 00:01:14,218 Command . It's an important duty to 32 00:01:14,218 --> 00:01:16,273 enable congressional oversight and I 33 00:01:16,273 --> 00:01:18,496 also wanted to make sure I had one last 34 00:01:18,496 --> 00:01:20,662 time to meet with all of you . I can't 35 00:01:20,662 --> 00:01:22,607 thank you enough for the important 36 00:01:22,607 --> 00:01:24,718 function . All of you provide to hold 37 00:01:24,718 --> 00:01:26,884 our leaders accountable , including me 38 00:01:26,884 --> 00:01:28,996 to preserve freedom and to ultimately 39 00:01:28,996 --> 00:01:31,162 make us a stronger nation . As Winston 40 00:01:31,162 --> 00:01:33,273 Churchill once said , a free press is 41 00:01:33,273 --> 00:01:35,329 the unsightly ping Guardian of every 42 00:01:35,329 --> 00:01:37,551 other right that free men prize . It is 43 00:01:37,551 --> 00:01:39,773 the most dangerous foe of tyranny . For 44 00:01:39,773 --> 00:01:41,718 many of the habit of liberty , the 45 00:01:41,718 --> 00:01:43,884 press will continue to be the vigilant 46 00:01:43,884 --> 00:01:43,510 guardian of the rights of the ordinary 47 00:01:43,510 --> 00:01:45,860 citizen . Well , I won't be commenting 48 00:01:45,860 --> 00:01:47,916 directly on the situation in Ukraine 49 00:01:47,916 --> 00:01:50,027 today . I will say that it's clear to 50 00:01:50,027 --> 00:01:52,193 me that the decline of a free and open 51 00:01:52,193 --> 00:01:54,138 press in Russia has contributed to 52 00:01:54,138 --> 00:01:55,916 Russia's unfortunate drift into 53 00:01:55,916 --> 00:01:58,138 authoritarianism , authoritarianism and 54 00:01:58,138 --> 00:02:00,360 the recent decision to invade Ukraine . 55 00:02:01,040 --> 00:02:03,096 It's clear that I don't always agree 56 00:02:03,096 --> 00:02:05,151 with every story you've ever written 57 00:02:05,151 --> 00:02:07,096 about us . Central Command and its 58 00:02:07,096 --> 00:02:09,262 operations over the past three years . 59 00:02:09,262 --> 00:02:11,151 I still very much appreciate your 60 00:02:11,151 --> 00:02:13,318 efforts to document and report out our 61 00:02:13,318 --> 00:02:15,484 activities to the american public . Is 62 00:02:15,484 --> 00:02:17,651 this is likely my last briefing here . 63 00:02:17,651 --> 00:02:19,818 I did want to take a moment to provide 64 00:02:19,818 --> 00:02:19,790 some perspective on my tenure as a 65 00:02:19,790 --> 00:02:22,650 centcom commander . I took command 66 00:02:22,650 --> 00:02:24,594 shortly after the defeat of the so 67 00:02:24,594 --> 00:02:26,650 called caliphate . In the end of its 68 00:02:26,650 --> 00:02:28,761 ability to hold territory in Iraq and 69 00:02:28,761 --> 00:02:30,817 Syria , I think we've had success in 70 00:02:30,817 --> 00:02:32,928 advancing the enduring defeat of ISIS 71 00:02:32,928 --> 00:02:35,520 as our partners with our support have 72 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:37,576 continued to get better at operating 73 00:02:37,576 --> 00:02:39,742 independently to root out and pressure 74 00:02:39,742 --> 00:02:42,470 the remaining holdouts of ISIS . The 75 00:02:42,470 --> 00:02:44,414 Iraqis in particular are doing the 76 00:02:44,414 --> 00:02:46,470 fighting themselves . Now as we have 77 00:02:46,470 --> 00:02:48,692 transitioned from a combat operation to 78 00:02:48,692 --> 00:02:50,803 a solely advice and assist mission in 79 00:02:50,803 --> 00:02:53,120 Iraq , their ability to operate 80 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:55,287 independently has continued to improve 81 00:02:55,287 --> 00:02:57,453 and we have a strong relationship with 82 00:02:57,453 --> 00:03:00,390 their security forces in Syria . The 83 00:03:00,390 --> 00:03:02,680 Sdf , with our support continues to 84 00:03:02,680 --> 00:03:04,790 root out pockets of ISIS hold ISIS 85 00:03:04,790 --> 00:03:07,068 prisoners and administer the I . D . P . 86 00:03:07,068 --> 00:03:09,012 Camps . As you saw with the recent 87 00:03:09,012 --> 00:03:11,123 attack on the Osaka prison , remnants 88 00:03:11,123 --> 00:03:13,710 of ISIS remained both in Iraq and Syria . 89 00:03:13,720 --> 00:03:15,664 But our partners in both countries 90 00:03:15,664 --> 00:03:17,890 continue to do the fighting . We have 91 00:03:17,890 --> 00:03:20,170 also successfully executed to arm range 92 00:03:20,170 --> 00:03:22,100 raids in Syria against successive 93 00:03:22,100 --> 00:03:24,430 leaders of ISIS which resulted in both 94 00:03:24,430 --> 00:03:26,541 of their deaths . These missions were 95 00:03:26,541 --> 00:03:28,374 important blows to the long term 96 00:03:28,374 --> 00:03:30,541 viability of ISIS and they demonstrate 97 00:03:30,541 --> 00:03:32,319 our continued commitment to the 98 00:03:32,319 --> 00:03:34,152 destruction of violent extremist 99 00:03:34,152 --> 00:03:35,930 organizations that threaten the 100 00:03:35,930 --> 00:03:37,930 homeland . One area in Syria that I 101 00:03:37,930 --> 00:03:40,097 wish we had been more successful in is 102 00:03:40,097 --> 00:03:42,319 in motivating international partners to 103 00:03:42,319 --> 00:03:44,374 repatriate ISIS prisoners from their 104 00:03:44,374 --> 00:03:46,541 countries . It's a burden that the Sdf 105 00:03:46,541 --> 00:03:48,819 have primarily dealt with on their own . 106 00:03:48,819 --> 00:03:50,597 And the only long term solution 107 00:03:50,597 --> 00:03:52,860 actually is repatriation . We also need 108 00:03:52,860 --> 00:03:55,790 to reintegrate thousands of IDps , many 109 00:03:55,790 --> 00:03:57,734 of whom are family members of ISIS 110 00:03:57,734 --> 00:03:59,734 fighters , we need to get them back 111 00:03:59,734 --> 00:04:01,679 into their communities in order to 112 00:04:01,679 --> 00:04:03,846 prevent vulnerable Children from being 113 00:04:03,846 --> 00:04:06,012 indoctrinated into the ISIS ideology . 114 00:04:06,012 --> 00:04:08,123 And if we don't do that , we're going 115 00:04:08,123 --> 00:04:10,012 to face ISIS 2.0 down the road of 116 00:04:10,012 --> 00:04:12,234 course , a long term political solution 117 00:04:12,234 --> 00:04:13,957 to the civil war in Syria that 118 00:04:13,957 --> 00:04:16,123 accommodates all stakeholders would be 119 00:04:16,123 --> 00:04:17,957 helpful and that would be key to 120 00:04:17,957 --> 00:04:20,123 preventing the return in the long term 121 00:04:20,123 --> 00:04:23,120 of ISIS . I continue to see Iran as the 122 00:04:23,120 --> 00:04:25,176 greatest threat to regional security 123 00:04:25,176 --> 00:04:27,231 and stability , they furnish weapons 124 00:04:27,231 --> 00:04:29,850 support and direction to proxies across 125 00:04:29,850 --> 00:04:32,390 the region who engage in acts of terror 126 00:04:32,400 --> 00:04:34,710 and undermine local governments . All 127 00:04:34,720 --> 00:04:37,450 advancing Iranian interests . Iran's 128 00:04:37,450 --> 00:04:39,617 ballistic missile threat has continued 129 00:04:39,617 --> 00:04:41,561 to advance and expand with greater 130 00:04:41,561 --> 00:04:43,730 ranges and accuracy . Centcom has 131 00:04:43,730 --> 00:04:45,952 continued to watch Iran and its proxies 132 00:04:45,952 --> 00:04:48,160 as we act as a deterrent to Iranian 133 00:04:48,160 --> 00:04:51,260 attacks on US interests . I will say 134 00:04:51,260 --> 00:04:53,260 that our partners across the region 135 00:04:53,260 --> 00:04:55,427 fully recognized the Iranian ballistic 136 00:04:55,427 --> 00:04:57,538 missile threat and that does actually 137 00:04:57,538 --> 00:04:59,482 provide some opportunities for the 138 00:04:59,482 --> 00:05:01,371 United States to advance regional 139 00:05:01,371 --> 00:05:03,649 cooperation in the area of air defense . 140 00:05:03,940 --> 00:05:06,110 Centcom has focused on operationalized 141 00:05:06,110 --> 00:05:08,166 in the Abraham accords as we brought 142 00:05:08,166 --> 00:05:10,570 Israel into our area of operations and 143 00:05:10,570 --> 00:05:12,292 missile defense is one area of 144 00:05:12,292 --> 00:05:14,181 cooperation that all our partners 145 00:05:14,181 --> 00:05:16,090 understand they all understand is 146 00:05:16,090 --> 00:05:17,868 particularly important when you 147 00:05:17,868 --> 00:05:19,701 consider the threat that Iranian 148 00:05:19,701 --> 00:05:21,923 missiles pose well , it continues to be 149 00:05:21,923 --> 00:05:24,034 nascent . At this time we have seen a 150 00:05:24,034 --> 00:05:26,034 willingness of traditional regional 151 00:05:26,034 --> 00:05:28,201 partners to work together in exercises 152 00:05:28,201 --> 00:05:30,257 with the Israeli Defense force . Air 153 00:05:30,257 --> 00:05:32,479 defense is an excellent opportunity for 154 00:05:32,479 --> 00:05:34,646 cooperation because improving regional 155 00:05:34,646 --> 00:05:36,590 missile defense can begin with the 156 00:05:36,590 --> 00:05:38,646 sharing of information which doesn't 157 00:05:38,646 --> 00:05:40,534 require any nation to approve the 158 00:05:40,534 --> 00:05:42,646 stationing of foreign forces on their 159 00:05:42,646 --> 00:05:44,479 territory . My hope is that this 160 00:05:44,479 --> 00:05:46,701 cooperation will continue to advance in 161 00:05:46,701 --> 00:05:48,868 the years to come in Afghanistan , the 162 00:05:48,868 --> 00:05:50,979 collapse of the Afghan government was 163 00:05:50,979 --> 00:05:53,034 not the result we desired . We began 164 00:05:53,034 --> 00:05:55,201 our withdrawal . That said the courage 165 00:05:55,201 --> 00:05:57,312 and hard work of several 1000 service 166 00:05:57,312 --> 00:05:59,423 members under difficult and dangerous 167 00:05:59,423 --> 00:06:01,646 conditions which allowed the evacuation 168 00:06:01,646 --> 00:06:03,757 of 124,000 U . S . Partner and Afghan 169 00:06:03,757 --> 00:06:05,868 nationals is something the nation can 170 00:06:05,868 --> 00:06:07,646 be very proud of . It came at a 171 00:06:07,646 --> 00:06:09,646 terrible cost of 13 U . S . Service 172 00:06:09,646 --> 00:06:11,757 members and over 100 afghan civilians 173 00:06:11,757 --> 00:06:11,700 killed . And that is a loss that I will 174 00:06:11,700 --> 00:06:13,867 deeply regret and I will regret it for 175 00:06:13,867 --> 00:06:15,811 the rest of my life . We owe these 176 00:06:15,811 --> 00:06:18,890 heroes our gratitude . My final thought 177 00:06:18,900 --> 00:06:21,011 is that the security and stability of 178 00:06:21,011 --> 00:06:22,956 the centcom region remains a vital 179 00:06:22,956 --> 00:06:25,289 national interest for the United States . 180 00:06:25,289 --> 00:06:27,456 It's a place with three of the world's 181 00:06:27,456 --> 00:06:29,456 most important maritime show points 182 00:06:29,456 --> 00:06:31,678 through which a large percentage of the 183 00:06:31,678 --> 00:06:33,844 Royals global commerce transits and of 184 00:06:33,844 --> 00:06:33,840 course an even larger percentage of the 185 00:06:33,840 --> 00:06:36,380 world's energy related commerce . We 186 00:06:36,380 --> 00:06:38,436 remain the partner of choice in this 187 00:06:38,436 --> 00:06:41,340 region . Even as we adjust our posture 188 00:06:41,340 --> 00:06:43,284 and deployments to account for new 189 00:06:43,284 --> 00:06:45,451 global challenges , we still have many 190 00:06:45,451 --> 00:06:47,562 friends in this region who look to us 191 00:06:47,562 --> 00:06:50,010 for assurance and security And with 192 00:06:50,010 --> 00:06:52,121 that I will now take your questions . 193 00:06:53,540 --> 00:06:55,890 Our first question will go to lida from 194 00:06:55,890 --> 00:06:57,834 Ap I believe you're on the phone . 195 00:06:59,340 --> 00:07:01,780 Thank you . Yes , Good morning general 196 00:07:01,790 --> 00:07:04,380 and thank you for doing this . And also 197 00:07:04,380 --> 00:07:07,120 I think from a lot of us thank you for 198 00:07:07,130 --> 00:07:09,880 um engaging with us and including son 199 00:07:09,880 --> 00:07:11,936 trips . So we greatly appreciate the 200 00:07:11,936 --> 00:07:15,900 access . We've had um two 201 00:07:15,900 --> 00:07:19,900 things . One on uh the latest 202 00:07:19,900 --> 00:07:22,660 exchange of strikes between Iran and 203 00:07:22,660 --> 00:07:26,100 Israel , can you tell us whether you 204 00:07:26,100 --> 00:07:28,650 think this signals more aggression by 205 00:07:28,650 --> 00:07:31,820 Iran ? And does it , do you worry that 206 00:07:31,820 --> 00:07:35,800 this might spill over into an impact 207 00:07:35,800 --> 00:07:38,010 on the U . S . And then my second 208 00:07:38,010 --> 00:07:40,920 question is on Afghanistan , can you 209 00:07:40,920 --> 00:07:42,531 give us a picture of ISIS in 210 00:07:42,531 --> 00:07:45,780 Afghanistan ? Their growth training 211 00:07:45,780 --> 00:07:47,836 camps , What are you seeing there as 212 00:07:47,836 --> 00:07:51,060 far as Islamic State's efforts to 213 00:07:51,060 --> 00:07:53,460 expand their numbers and their 214 00:07:53,460 --> 00:07:57,410 capability ? Sure 215 00:07:57,410 --> 00:07:59,660 later . And and uh I always I've always 216 00:07:59,660 --> 00:08:01,549 enjoyed working with you and I've 217 00:08:01,549 --> 00:08:03,716 enjoyed having you on travel with us . 218 00:08:03,716 --> 00:08:05,938 Uh let me actually take these questions 219 00:08:05,938 --> 00:08:05,090 in reverse order and begin with 220 00:08:05,090 --> 00:08:07,770 Afghanistan . And I'll begin with with 221 00:08:07,780 --> 00:08:11,130 with ISIS . So we assess uh probably a 222 00:08:11,130 --> 00:08:13,410 couple 1000 more or less ISIS fighters 223 00:08:13,410 --> 00:08:15,710 in Afghanistan , of course , when the 224 00:08:15,720 --> 00:08:17,970 Taliban opened polo sharky in parwan 225 00:08:17,970 --> 00:08:20,760 prisons and infused new talent and new 226 00:08:20,760 --> 00:08:23,650 energy into ISIS . And so they are now 227 00:08:23,650 --> 00:08:26,120 reaping uh the result of that very 228 00:08:26,120 --> 00:08:29,530 shortsighted decision . So ISIS is uh 229 00:08:29,540 --> 00:08:31,596 as you know , committed to attack in 230 00:08:31,596 --> 00:08:33,707 the United States . They aspire to do 231 00:08:33,707 --> 00:08:35,929 that . They're going to continue to try 232 00:08:35,929 --> 00:08:38,096 to do that . Uh the Taliban has in the 233 00:08:38,096 --> 00:08:40,262 past conducted operations against ISIS 234 00:08:40,262 --> 00:08:42,429 and we're now coming into the into the 235 00:08:42,429 --> 00:08:44,651 into the traditional fighting season uh 236 00:08:44,651 --> 00:08:46,651 some high profile attacks have been 237 00:08:46,651 --> 00:08:48,484 carried out by ISIS even include 238 00:08:48,484 --> 00:08:50,707 targets in the Kabul Bowl area , as you 239 00:08:50,707 --> 00:08:52,873 know , over the last few months . So I 240 00:08:52,873 --> 00:08:54,818 think the taliban will try to take 241 00:08:54,818 --> 00:08:56,818 operations to limit ISIS . It'll be 242 00:08:56,818 --> 00:08:56,450 interesting to see if they're able to 243 00:08:56,450 --> 00:08:58,617 do it because ISIS is gonna be a tough 244 00:08:58,617 --> 00:09:00,783 target . Uh , there are more of them . 245 00:09:00,783 --> 00:09:03,061 There have been in the past , you know , 246 00:09:03,061 --> 00:09:03,010 they are recruiting and so I think 247 00:09:03,010 --> 00:09:05,177 that's gonna be a challenge for uh for 248 00:09:05,177 --> 00:09:07,399 the taliban . Although my assessment is 249 00:09:07,399 --> 00:09:09,177 the taliban will attempt to act 250 00:09:09,177 --> 00:09:11,232 vigorously against ISIS . I think al 251 00:09:11,232 --> 00:09:13,454 Qaeda is another matter . Not nearly so 252 00:09:13,454 --> 00:09:16,650 many Al Al Qaeda fighters , several 100 253 00:09:16,740 --> 00:09:20,380 probably dispersed across Afghanistan . 254 00:09:20,390 --> 00:09:22,557 I think the challenge is a little more 255 00:09:22,557 --> 00:09:24,779 difficult for the taliban there because 256 00:09:24,779 --> 00:09:27,001 of the the cultural relationships , the 257 00:09:27,001 --> 00:09:29,057 intermarriages , the linkages of the 258 00:09:29,057 --> 00:09:31,279 taliban to al Qaeda . And we will watch 259 00:09:31,279 --> 00:09:33,168 with great interest to see if the 260 00:09:33,168 --> 00:09:35,279 taliban have done what they said they 261 00:09:35,279 --> 00:09:35,060 do , which is prevent , you know , 262 00:09:35,060 --> 00:09:37,630 prevent , prevent al Qaeda from 263 00:09:37,640 --> 00:09:39,584 conducting external operations and 264 00:09:39,584 --> 00:09:41,529 limiting and limiting what they're 265 00:09:41,529 --> 00:09:43,640 doing . We just were watching closely 266 00:09:43,640 --> 00:09:45,807 and we'll see if they actually do what 267 00:09:45,807 --> 00:09:48,029 they said , do what they said they were 268 00:09:48,029 --> 00:09:50,196 going to do in the past . I will watch 269 00:09:50,196 --> 00:09:49,880 that with great interest . You asked 270 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:52,370 about Iran and Israel . So I think it's 271 00:09:52,380 --> 00:09:54,436 it's obvious that Israel is going to 272 00:09:54,436 --> 00:09:56,547 take steps to defend itself when it's 273 00:09:56,547 --> 00:09:58,713 confronted with with Iranian actions . 274 00:09:58,713 --> 00:10:00,880 And of course Iran is dedicated to the 275 00:10:00,880 --> 00:10:00,690 destruction of Israel as a matter of 276 00:10:00,690 --> 00:10:02,857 public record . They've said that many 277 00:10:02,857 --> 00:10:04,579 times . I do worry about these 278 00:10:04,579 --> 00:10:06,468 exchanges between Iran and Israel 279 00:10:06,640 --> 00:10:09,270 because many times our forces are at 280 00:10:09,270 --> 00:10:12,070 risk , whether in Iraq or in Syria . So 281 00:10:12,070 --> 00:10:14,530 that that in fact does concern me as we 282 00:10:14,530 --> 00:10:16,697 watch this as we watch these series of 283 00:10:16,697 --> 00:10:20,660 exchanges . Thank you later . Okay , 284 00:10:20,660 --> 00:10:22,716 our next question here in the room , 285 00:10:22,716 --> 00:10:24,660 Mark from Fox . Hey general , good 286 00:10:24,660 --> 00:10:26,716 morning sir , Congratulations on the 287 00:10:26,716 --> 00:10:28,716 retirement . Mark MEREDITH with Fox 288 00:10:28,716 --> 00:10:30,716 news picking up with where you just 289 00:10:30,716 --> 00:10:32,771 left officer , Can you talk a little 290 00:10:32,771 --> 00:10:34,771 bit about how soon you believe that 291 00:10:34,771 --> 00:10:36,938 ISIS K would try to actually carry out 292 00:10:36,938 --> 00:10:36,300 these attacks . Is this something a 293 00:10:36,300 --> 00:10:38,522 period of months , is it , you know , a 294 00:10:38,522 --> 00:10:40,689 year away . And then you mentioned the 295 00:10:40,689 --> 00:10:42,689 possibility that they may try to go 296 00:10:42,689 --> 00:10:44,856 after us targets any idea of of what a 297 00:10:44,856 --> 00:10:46,911 potential target for them would look 298 00:10:46,911 --> 00:10:49,022 like . Are we talking about something 299 00:10:49,022 --> 00:10:51,300 small but noticeable , Something broad , 300 00:10:51,300 --> 00:10:53,633 bigger . Anything you can shed light on , 301 00:10:53,633 --> 00:10:55,689 sir ? Sure . Mark . So it's it's our 302 00:10:55,689 --> 00:10:57,856 assessment and I testified publicly to 303 00:10:57,856 --> 00:11:00,430 it this week . We assess that ISISK has 304 00:11:00,430 --> 00:11:02,690 about a 12-18 month window to 305 00:11:02,690 --> 00:11:04,370 regenerate an external attack 306 00:11:04,370 --> 00:11:06,700 capability , absent effective CT 307 00:11:06,700 --> 00:11:09,340 pressure . And so what do they do that 308 00:11:09,340 --> 00:11:11,562 by that ? I mean , the ability to carry 309 00:11:11,562 --> 00:11:13,896 out an attack in the United States , uh , 310 00:11:13,896 --> 00:11:16,173 difficult to do . They aspire to do it . 311 00:11:16,173 --> 00:11:18,340 And we believe that remains one of the 312 00:11:18,340 --> 00:11:20,340 very highest priorities at the same 313 00:11:20,340 --> 00:11:22,451 time . Of course they're carrying out 314 00:11:22,451 --> 00:11:22,120 that they , and they have been carrying 315 00:11:22,120 --> 00:11:24,430 out attacks across Afghanistan . High 316 00:11:24,430 --> 00:11:26,541 profile attacks against the Taliban . 317 00:11:26,541 --> 00:11:28,486 As I noted , we've seen several of 318 00:11:28,486 --> 00:11:30,652 those over the course of the fall into 319 00:11:30,652 --> 00:11:30,550 the winter and I think those are going 320 00:11:30,550 --> 00:11:32,530 to continue , but absent effective 321 00:11:32,530 --> 00:11:35,140 pressure is gonna be , we would expect 322 00:11:35,140 --> 00:11:36,918 that , that the , the ISIS will 323 00:11:36,918 --> 00:11:38,584 continue to regenerate in the 324 00:11:38,584 --> 00:11:40,529 ungoverned spaces , principally in 325 00:11:40,529 --> 00:11:42,196 Eastern Afghanistan , but not 326 00:11:42,196 --> 00:11:44,418 exclusively there . And we're gonna see 327 00:11:44,418 --> 00:11:44,360 them on down the road . Thank you . 328 00:11:46,640 --> 00:11:48,696 Next question . Barbara , from CNN , 329 00:11:48,696 --> 00:11:50,362 believe you're on the phone , 330 00:11:52,740 --> 00:11:55,530 General Mackenzie , um , you have had 331 00:11:55,530 --> 00:11:57,363 of course , quite a good deal of 332 00:11:57,363 --> 00:12:01,060 experience with understanding Russian 333 00:12:01,060 --> 00:12:04,550 forces in Syria , so are limited to 334 00:12:04,560 --> 00:12:06,740 that . Can you give us , as you 335 00:12:06,740 --> 00:12:08,629 conclude all of this , your sense 336 00:12:08,629 --> 00:12:11,970 recently , of those Russian forces in 337 00:12:11,970 --> 00:12:15,500 Syria , do they have frontline 338 00:12:15,500 --> 00:12:17,900 equipment ? Do they have food ? Do they 339 00:12:17,900 --> 00:12:21,640 have fuel , do there , uh , commanders ? 340 00:12:21,650 --> 00:12:25,050 Uh , look after them ? How do you know , 341 00:12:25,050 --> 00:12:27,660 are they , are they a top notch 342 00:12:28,040 --> 00:12:30,810 fighting force in Syria ? And I know 343 00:12:30,810 --> 00:12:32,921 you've also spoken a little bit , but 344 00:12:32,921 --> 00:12:35,330 could you regroup for us ? Your latest 345 00:12:35,330 --> 00:12:38,540 thoughts about uh , Russian mercenaries 346 00:12:38,550 --> 00:12:41,520 in Syria ? The extent to which the 347 00:12:41,520 --> 00:12:45,210 Russians maybe either using Wagner 348 00:12:45,220 --> 00:12:48,440 or recruiting in Syria to move into 349 00:12:48,440 --> 00:12:52,020 Ukraine . Thank you . Thanks Barbara . 350 00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,770 So , over the , over the three years of 351 00:12:54,770 --> 00:12:56,620 my command or centcom , we have 352 00:12:56,620 --> 00:12:59,450 generally had a brisk 353 00:13:00,240 --> 00:13:02,990 professional deconfliction relationship 354 00:13:02,990 --> 00:13:05,940 with the Russians in Syria , they we we 355 00:13:05,940 --> 00:13:07,996 can always contact them if we have a 356 00:13:07,996 --> 00:13:10,051 problem , they'll always pick up the 357 00:13:10,051 --> 00:13:12,107 phone and we feel that we respond in 358 00:13:12,107 --> 00:13:14,329 kind to them . So that relationship has 359 00:13:14,329 --> 00:13:16,551 been uh that relationship has been very 360 00:13:16,551 --> 00:13:18,551 very professional . I will tell you 361 00:13:18,551 --> 00:13:20,860 that uh they do have good equipment . I 362 00:13:20,860 --> 00:13:23,180 mean we've seen 1st 1st echelon fighter 363 00:13:23,180 --> 00:13:25,013 aircraft down there , we've seen 364 00:13:25,013 --> 00:13:27,236 bombers come in and out of out of their 365 00:13:27,236 --> 00:13:29,124 air base in Western Syria . Uh My 366 00:13:29,124 --> 00:13:31,180 observation is that writ large , the 367 00:13:31,180 --> 00:13:33,180 one thing the Russians don't have , 368 00:13:33,180 --> 00:13:35,124 which is sort of the key of the US 369 00:13:35,124 --> 00:13:37,500 Joint Force is the middle management 370 00:13:37,500 --> 00:13:39,389 level , the N . C . O . And staff 371 00:13:39,389 --> 00:13:41,333 noncommissioned officer level that 372 00:13:41,333 --> 00:13:43,590 really formed the backbone of our 373 00:13:43,590 --> 00:13:45,590 military . They are the people that 374 00:13:45,590 --> 00:13:47,646 actually ensure things get done that 375 00:13:47,646 --> 00:13:49,979 people are that people are fed properly , 376 00:13:49,979 --> 00:13:52,090 that people have a place a warm place 377 00:13:52,090 --> 00:13:54,423 to sleep at night , all of those things . 378 00:13:54,423 --> 00:13:53,980 I just don't believe there is good at 379 00:13:53,990 --> 00:13:56,157 that as we are . And you can draw your 380 00:13:56,157 --> 00:13:58,101 own larger conclusions , which I'm 381 00:13:58,101 --> 00:14:00,101 really not the person to talk about 382 00:14:00,101 --> 00:14:02,212 about their operations in Ukraine and 383 00:14:02,212 --> 00:14:04,379 what it means for their level of small 384 00:14:04,379 --> 00:14:04,060 unit training and small unit 385 00:14:04,060 --> 00:14:06,060 effectiveness , which I would again 386 00:14:06,060 --> 00:14:08,230 note is the pride really of the of the 387 00:14:08,240 --> 00:14:10,351 of the U . S . Military , our ability 388 00:14:10,351 --> 00:14:12,540 to have junior leaders execute 389 00:14:12,550 --> 00:14:14,770 independently . That is I think 390 00:14:14,770 --> 00:14:16,937 something that sets us apart from most 391 00:14:16,937 --> 00:14:19,048 militaries in the world and we're and 392 00:14:19,048 --> 00:14:20,992 we're very and we stress that as a 393 00:14:20,992 --> 00:14:23,159 point of emphasis and we're very proud 394 00:14:23,159 --> 00:14:25,326 of it . You asked about mercenaries in 395 00:14:25,326 --> 00:14:27,214 Syria and recruiting , we've seen 396 00:14:27,214 --> 00:14:30,040 little evidence of recruiting in Syria 397 00:14:30,050 --> 00:14:32,270 to bring people back to Ukraine . Not 398 00:14:32,270 --> 00:14:34,381 saying it couldn't happen and I'm not 399 00:14:34,381 --> 00:14:36,603 saying that one or two or three or four 400 00:14:36,603 --> 00:14:38,659 haven't gone but we haven't seen any 401 00:14:38,659 --> 00:14:40,770 large scale effort to do that . There 402 00:14:40,770 --> 00:14:42,770 is a wagon of something of a Vagner 403 00:14:42,770 --> 00:14:44,770 presence in Syria But it's actually 404 00:14:44,770 --> 00:14:46,937 relatively small and we don't we don't 405 00:14:46,937 --> 00:14:49,103 actually interact much with them . You 406 00:14:49,103 --> 00:14:51,159 may recall back in the first half of 407 00:14:51,159 --> 00:14:53,214 2018 , the Wagner group attempted to 408 00:14:53,214 --> 00:14:55,381 attack American forces down around the 409 00:14:55,381 --> 00:14:57,381 razor and resulted in a significant 410 00:14:57,381 --> 00:14:59,214 defeat for them with a number of 411 00:14:59,214 --> 00:15:01,381 casualties numbering in the hundreds . 412 00:15:01,381 --> 00:15:00,740 And that's an object lesson that they 413 00:15:00,740 --> 00:15:02,962 should probably ponder in Syria as they 414 00:15:02,962 --> 00:15:05,730 go forward . Thanks Barbara . We'll 415 00:15:05,730 --> 00:15:07,786 stay on the phones , dan loudmouth . 416 00:15:09,540 --> 00:15:11,596 Okay , sir , thank you for your time 417 00:15:11,596 --> 00:15:13,707 and thanks for all the context you've 418 00:15:13,707 --> 00:15:15,929 offered over the last couple of years . 419 00:15:15,929 --> 00:15:17,651 two questions If I could , you 420 00:15:17,651 --> 00:15:19,984 mentioned at the outset of the briefing , 421 00:15:19,984 --> 00:15:22,207 your regrets on the loss of the service 422 00:15:22,207 --> 00:15:24,429 members in in august , I've talked with 423 00:15:24,429 --> 00:15:24,270 a number of those families and I know 424 00:15:24,270 --> 00:15:26,437 they're they're still quite frustrated 425 00:15:26,437 --> 00:15:28,710 for understandable reasons as you look 426 00:15:28,710 --> 00:15:30,380 back on that month and and in 427 00:15:30,380 --> 00:15:33,790 particular on on that day . Uh , 428 00:15:33,800 --> 00:15:35,911 anything in particular that you would 429 00:15:35,911 --> 00:15:38,350 change more defense and depth . Uh , 430 00:15:38,360 --> 00:15:40,471 some other kinds of ways to have more 431 00:15:40,471 --> 00:15:42,638 standoff , anything like that ? Or was 432 00:15:42,638 --> 00:15:44,471 it simply not possible given the 433 00:15:44,471 --> 00:15:47,120 circumstances ? And then on Syria , uh , 434 00:15:47,130 --> 00:15:49,660 we continue to see sporadic 435 00:15:49,670 --> 00:15:51,940 interactions between Russian forces and 436 00:15:51,940 --> 00:15:54,273 americans over the last couple of years . 437 00:15:54,273 --> 00:15:56,650 It sometimes seems aimless in the eyes 438 00:15:56,650 --> 00:15:59,370 of , in the eyes of some veterans , In 439 00:15:59,370 --> 00:16:01,710 the eyes of some analysts . What the U . 440 00:16:01,710 --> 00:16:04,780 Says at this point makes sense for us 441 00:16:04,780 --> 00:16:07,040 posture in Syria , particularly as it 442 00:16:07,040 --> 00:16:09,460 relates to the Russian forces . Thanks 443 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:13,310 sure , dan . So , um , not a day goes 444 00:16:13,310 --> 00:16:15,532 by that . I don't think about august of 445 00:16:15,532 --> 00:16:17,588 last year . And uh , and the loss of 446 00:16:17,588 --> 00:16:20,200 our 13 , uh 11 marines , one soldier 447 00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:22,310 and , and , and one sailor there . I 448 00:16:22,310 --> 00:16:24,477 think about it a lot . You go back and 449 00:16:24,477 --> 00:16:26,699 you always try to find ways things that 450 00:16:26,699 --> 00:16:28,810 you could have done different . But I 451 00:16:28,810 --> 00:16:27,970 would just tell you this dan . The 452 00:16:27,970 --> 00:16:30,510 battlefield is a dynamic place . It is 453 00:16:30,510 --> 00:16:33,100 not a business plan . It is a contest 454 00:16:33,100 --> 00:16:35,270 of wills . It's a contest of plans 455 00:16:35,280 --> 00:16:37,920 where unpredictability , uh , friction 456 00:16:37,930 --> 00:16:40,540 dominate . We stopped a number of 457 00:16:40,540 --> 00:16:42,762 attacks . We were not able to stop this 458 00:16:42,762 --> 00:16:44,762 attack . I don't know what we could 459 00:16:44,762 --> 00:16:46,762 have done that would have presented 460 00:16:46,762 --> 00:16:48,818 prevented this particular attack . I 461 00:16:48,818 --> 00:16:50,929 know that we , again , as I said , we 462 00:16:50,929 --> 00:16:53,040 stopped other attacks for those , for 463 00:16:53,040 --> 00:16:55,096 those family members who have lost a 464 00:16:55,096 --> 00:16:57,207 child that loved one there , my heart 465 00:16:57,207 --> 00:16:59,540 breaks for them and I I feel their pain . 466 00:16:59,540 --> 00:17:01,596 I understand that my son went to war 467 00:17:01,596 --> 00:17:03,680 twice . He came back . But I can 468 00:17:03,680 --> 00:17:05,680 imagine the effect on me had he not 469 00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:08,390 come back . So I know exactly the 470 00:17:08,400 --> 00:17:10,400 tremendous pain these families must 471 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:12,456 feel . But is it is a tough , it's a 472 00:17:12,456 --> 00:17:14,400 tough situation and I know that we 473 00:17:14,400 --> 00:17:16,456 prevented some attacks . We were not 474 00:17:16,456 --> 00:17:16,370 able to prevent this attack . And I 475 00:17:16,370 --> 00:17:19,750 regret that . And yes , about Syria and 476 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:21,910 uh , we have no evidence that the 477 00:17:21,910 --> 00:17:24,720 Russians are intent on escalating 478 00:17:24,720 --> 00:17:27,370 anything in Syria . I think they 479 00:17:27,370 --> 00:17:29,490 probably have plans to do that . I'm 480 00:17:29,490 --> 00:17:31,546 just guessing they do . I don't know 481 00:17:31,546 --> 00:17:33,657 that , but they have not chosen to do 482 00:17:33,657 --> 00:17:35,546 so . And you're right . Sometimes 483 00:17:35,546 --> 00:17:37,860 Russian actions in Syria are puzzling . 484 00:17:38,040 --> 00:17:40,262 Uh , you know , we went through a phase 485 00:17:40,262 --> 00:17:42,040 last year where we had a lot of 486 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:44,180 friction with ground patrols and we 487 00:17:44,180 --> 00:17:46,402 took some measures that seem to seem to 488 00:17:46,402 --> 00:17:48,513 reduce the friction a little bit . We 489 00:17:48,513 --> 00:17:50,791 moved some armored vehicles into Syria . 490 00:17:50,791 --> 00:17:52,958 And uh , and as a signal of our intent 491 00:17:52,958 --> 00:17:55,069 to continue to conduct the operations 492 00:17:55,069 --> 00:17:54,860 that we needed to , to conduct and to 493 00:17:54,860 --> 00:17:57,180 not be dissuaded by their , by their 494 00:17:57,180 --> 00:17:59,402 bullying behavior . And I think we came 495 00:17:59,402 --> 00:18:01,569 to an understanding there , I think in 496 00:18:01,569 --> 00:18:03,736 the air , it's generally been the same 497 00:18:03,736 --> 00:18:05,791 thing . But I don't see any evidence 498 00:18:05,791 --> 00:18:05,640 that there , you know that the 499 00:18:05,640 --> 00:18:08,460 temperature is rising , particularly in 500 00:18:08,460 --> 00:18:10,682 Syria as a result of what's going on in 501 00:18:10,682 --> 00:18:12,904 Ukraine . But I do think it's it well I 502 00:18:12,904 --> 00:18:14,793 know it's something we watch very 503 00:18:14,793 --> 00:18:17,770 carefully . Thanks dan wafa al hurra , 504 00:18:18,340 --> 00:18:20,750 thank you general for doing this with 505 00:18:20,750 --> 00:18:24,170 al hurra in your assessment . 506 00:18:25,220 --> 00:18:28,730 And would an agreement with 507 00:18:28,740 --> 00:18:32,460 Iran help to address the security 508 00:18:32,460 --> 00:18:35,710 challenge . Just that you mentioned 509 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:40,030 would help to stop Iran's malign 510 00:18:40,040 --> 00:18:43,860 activities in the region . And another 511 00:18:43,860 --> 00:18:46,860 question on Syria . But you have 512 00:18:46,860 --> 00:18:50,390 concerns that U . S . Forces in Syria 513 00:18:50,390 --> 00:18:53,670 would be targeted by groups backed 514 00:18:54,140 --> 00:18:57,400 by Russia in response to the U . S . 515 00:18:57,410 --> 00:19:00,940 Military and security assistance to 516 00:19:00,940 --> 00:19:04,550 Ukraine . Thank you . 517 00:19:04,550 --> 00:19:07,860 So the number one objective of the 518 00:19:07,860 --> 00:19:10,070 United States with regard to Iran is 519 00:19:10,070 --> 00:19:12,930 Iran not possess a nuclear weapon . So 520 00:19:12,930 --> 00:19:15,041 I think any solution that closes that 521 00:19:15,041 --> 00:19:17,280 path to them contributes to regional 522 00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:19,280 security . Because we'd all like to 523 00:19:19,280 --> 00:19:21,502 work with an Iran that is not a nuclear 524 00:19:21,502 --> 00:19:23,502 armed Iran . The best way to get to 525 00:19:23,502 --> 00:19:25,669 there is probably through a negotiated 526 00:19:25,669 --> 00:19:27,836 agreement . Uh Now that does not solve 527 00:19:27,836 --> 00:19:30,002 Iranian proxies , it doesn't solve the 528 00:19:30,002 --> 00:19:32,224 compelling problem of Iranian ballistic 529 00:19:32,224 --> 00:19:34,002 missiles , land attack , cruise 530 00:19:34,002 --> 00:19:36,058 missiles , and small unmanned aerial 531 00:19:36,058 --> 00:19:38,058 vehicles . And we need to recognize 532 00:19:38,058 --> 00:19:40,224 that that's a separate problem . But I 533 00:19:40,224 --> 00:19:40,050 do think having the ability to take the 534 00:19:40,050 --> 00:19:42,740 nuclear uh the nuclear option off the 535 00:19:42,740 --> 00:19:44,830 table has to contribute to regional 536 00:19:44,830 --> 00:19:46,941 security . Now there are second order 537 00:19:46,941 --> 00:19:49,163 effects with that . And if an agreement 538 00:19:49,163 --> 00:19:51,386 is reached and I that would be with the 539 00:19:51,386 --> 00:19:50,900 Department of State , not the 540 00:19:50,900 --> 00:19:53,011 Department of Defense and not with me 541 00:19:53,011 --> 00:19:55,067 to comment on . So I will I'll leave 542 00:19:55,067 --> 00:19:57,233 that alone . But I think anything that 543 00:19:57,233 --> 00:19:59,067 uh that where Iran agrees not to 544 00:19:59,067 --> 00:19:58,780 possess a nuclear weapon that is 545 00:19:58,780 --> 00:20:01,030 verifiable through through through a 546 00:20:01,030 --> 00:20:02,919 process that would be jointly and 547 00:20:02,919 --> 00:20:05,141 mutually agreed upon . I think that's a 548 00:20:05,141 --> 00:20:06,752 good thing . There are other 549 00:20:06,752 --> 00:20:08,752 significant problems in the theater 550 00:20:08,752 --> 00:20:10,863 that agreement will not address . And 551 00:20:10,863 --> 00:20:13,086 we're gonna need to be we're gonna need 552 00:20:13,086 --> 00:20:12,690 to be able to address those preferably 553 00:20:12,690 --> 00:20:14,960 through negotiations but also through 554 00:20:14,960 --> 00:20:17,127 deterrence which is my contribution my 555 00:20:17,127 --> 00:20:19,182 share of the task , if you will , us 556 00:20:19,182 --> 00:20:21,127 Central Command is to provide that 557 00:20:21,127 --> 00:20:23,016 military component to our overall 558 00:20:23,016 --> 00:20:25,300 strategic approach to Iran . So you 559 00:20:25,300 --> 00:20:27,600 asked about you asked about Syria , 560 00:20:27,600 --> 00:20:29,767 Could you repeat the question on Syria 561 00:20:29,767 --> 00:20:32,820 for me please . That groups backed by 562 00:20:32,830 --> 00:20:36,410 Russia would target U . S . Forces 563 00:20:36,420 --> 00:20:38,930 there in response to the U . S . 564 00:20:38,930 --> 00:20:41,160 Military assistance to Ukraine . 565 00:20:42,740 --> 00:20:44,800 So we we examine our force posture 566 00:20:44,800 --> 00:20:46,911 every day . I talked to my commanders 567 00:20:46,911 --> 00:20:49,090 in in uh my overall commander in Iraq 568 00:20:49,090 --> 00:20:51,257 and Syria very frequently about this . 569 00:20:51,257 --> 00:20:53,034 I think we're well postured for 570 00:20:53,034 --> 00:20:55,201 anything that could happen . And uh we 571 00:20:55,201 --> 00:20:57,090 you know , we're prepared for any 572 00:20:57,090 --> 00:20:59,146 eventuality . We've seen no evidence 573 00:20:59,146 --> 00:21:01,257 that Russia intends to escalate in uh 574 00:21:01,257 --> 00:21:03,257 in Iraq or Syria . But of course we 575 00:21:03,257 --> 00:21:05,034 would be prepared . We would be 576 00:21:05,034 --> 00:21:06,812 prepared for that . Should that 577 00:21:06,812 --> 00:21:08,868 eventuality come about . Thank you , 578 00:21:09,340 --> 00:21:13,150 Sylvie . Hello sir . Um 579 00:21:13,250 --> 00:21:16,450 I would like also to thank you for all 580 00:21:16,450 --> 00:21:18,394 the access you gave us and all the 581 00:21:18,394 --> 00:21:21,770 press conferences you gave us um is 582 00:21:21,770 --> 00:21:25,680 there a possibility that some missile 583 00:21:25,680 --> 00:21:28,890 defense equipment um 584 00:21:28,900 --> 00:21:32,060 that could benefit Ukraine 585 00:21:32,540 --> 00:21:35,530 directly or indirectly 586 00:21:35,890 --> 00:21:38,170 could come from the Middle East ? 587 00:21:40,740 --> 00:21:42,907 So first of all , as you know , I live 588 00:21:42,907 --> 00:21:45,129 for these press conferences there . The 589 00:21:45,129 --> 00:21:47,351 highlight of my day . Uh just kidding . 590 00:21:47,351 --> 00:21:51,070 Um I would tell you , I can't obviously 591 00:21:51,070 --> 00:21:53,181 their capabilities that Ukraine could 592 00:21:53,181 --> 00:21:55,292 reach out from uh from nations in the 593 00:21:55,292 --> 00:21:57,237 Middle East . There's a lot of air 594 00:21:57,237 --> 00:21:59,459 defense assets in the Middle East but I 595 00:21:59,459 --> 00:21:59,380 really wouldn't be prepared to go 596 00:21:59,380 --> 00:22:01,580 beyond that . And uh you know I know 597 00:22:01,580 --> 00:22:03,747 that a number of people are looking at 598 00:22:03,747 --> 00:22:05,636 ways they can help Ukraine with a 599 00:22:05,636 --> 00:22:05,570 variety of air defense systems and I'll 600 00:22:05,570 --> 00:22:07,681 just have to leave it at that . Thank 601 00:22:07,681 --> 00:22:10,380 you . We'll go back to the phones . 602 00:22:10,390 --> 00:22:14,310 Tara Cop Defense one . Hi , thank 603 00:22:14,310 --> 00:22:16,310 you for doing this and just want to 604 00:22:16,310 --> 00:22:18,532 echo Sylvie and others comments . Thank 605 00:22:18,532 --> 00:22:20,754 you for talking to us general . Even on 606 00:22:20,754 --> 00:22:20,610 days when it was really hard , it's 607 00:22:20,620 --> 00:22:24,590 deeply appreciated . Um I wanted to 608 00:22:24,600 --> 00:22:28,150 follow up on Syria questions , Are you 609 00:22:28,150 --> 00:22:30,240 getting any sense that Russia is 610 00:22:30,250 --> 00:22:33,470 overstretched now because it has gone 611 00:22:33,480 --> 00:22:36,910 so far in on Ukraine um has it affected 612 00:22:36,910 --> 00:22:39,200 its ability to influence operations in 613 00:22:39,200 --> 00:22:42,570 Syria ? It seems like there is possibly 614 00:22:42,580 --> 00:22:44,802 the possibility of a ground movement in 615 00:22:44,802 --> 00:22:48,690 Syria by um uh huh any government 616 00:22:48,690 --> 00:22:50,801 protesters to try and regain somewhat 617 00:22:50,801 --> 00:22:53,850 of what has been lost . And then just 618 00:22:53,850 --> 00:22:56,240 to follow up on Barbara's question on 619 00:22:56,250 --> 00:22:58,361 the Russian professionalism . Besides 620 00:22:58,361 --> 00:23:01,170 the N . C . O . S , do you assess that 621 00:23:01,170 --> 00:23:04,300 their military in Syria is has all of 622 00:23:04,300 --> 00:23:06,540 the year , the food , the logistics 623 00:23:06,540 --> 00:23:08,930 support that you would expect given 624 00:23:08,930 --> 00:23:10,930 some of the surprises we've seen in 625 00:23:10,930 --> 00:23:14,820 Ukraine . Thank you . Sure . Let 626 00:23:14,820 --> 00:23:18,160 me uh talk about the tempo in in in in 627 00:23:18,160 --> 00:23:20,350 Syria , we haven't seen any any change 628 00:23:20,350 --> 00:23:23,200 really in the force levels in Syria . 629 00:23:23,210 --> 00:23:25,377 They go up and down a little bit . But 630 00:23:25,377 --> 00:23:27,488 I , you know , we look at it over the 631 00:23:27,488 --> 00:23:29,488 last several years so we look at it 632 00:23:29,488 --> 00:23:31,599 over longitudinal E . And we have not 633 00:23:31,599 --> 00:23:33,821 seen any significant drawdown of forces 634 00:23:33,821 --> 00:23:35,877 in Syria in order to go back back to 635 00:23:35,877 --> 00:23:37,877 Russia . You know , during over the 636 00:23:37,877 --> 00:23:39,877 last 30 days they've flown aircraft 637 00:23:39,877 --> 00:23:42,099 into Syria to do things mainly look out 638 00:23:42,099 --> 00:23:41,920 over the eastern med when the when the 639 00:23:41,920 --> 00:23:44,142 Truman and the Charles de Gaulle battle 640 00:23:44,142 --> 00:23:46,087 groups were in the Eastern Med and 641 00:23:46,087 --> 00:23:48,142 they've flown those aircraft back to 642 00:23:48,142 --> 00:23:47,300 Russia but they were never permanently 643 00:23:47,300 --> 00:23:50,090 based based in Syria to begin with . So , 644 00:23:50,090 --> 00:23:52,312 you know that is clearly something that 645 00:23:52,312 --> 00:23:54,201 I watched very carefully . I just 646 00:23:54,201 --> 00:23:56,201 haven't seen any indication I would 647 00:23:56,201 --> 00:23:58,257 expand that to not only uh Syria but 648 00:23:58,257 --> 00:24:00,090 also the stands Tajikistan where 649 00:24:00,090 --> 00:24:02,257 there's a significant Russian presence 650 00:24:02,257 --> 00:24:04,257 and some of the other Central Asian 651 00:24:04,257 --> 00:24:04,250 States , we just haven't seen anything 652 00:24:04,540 --> 00:24:06,707 yet that would lead us to believe that 653 00:24:06,707 --> 00:24:08,818 the Russians are going back . I would 654 00:24:08,818 --> 00:24:11,040 just tell you that um you know that the 655 00:24:11,040 --> 00:24:12,929 standard the standard of care for 656 00:24:12,929 --> 00:24:14,984 Russian soldiers is not the standard 657 00:24:14,984 --> 00:24:17,207 that we have for service members in the 658 00:24:17,207 --> 00:24:16,410 U . S . Central Command A . O . R . 659 00:24:16,420 --> 00:24:18,587 It's just very different . And I would 660 00:24:18,587 --> 00:24:20,753 just leave it at that when it comes to 661 00:24:20,753 --> 00:24:23,090 how how soldiers and sailors and airmen 662 00:24:23,100 --> 00:24:25,267 are taken care of by the Russians over 663 00:24:27,540 --> 00:24:31,390 louis , sir , Thank you again 664 00:24:31,400 --> 00:24:33,178 for these briefings . I echo my 665 00:24:33,178 --> 00:24:35,233 colleague's comments and I'm glad to 666 00:24:35,233 --> 00:24:37,011 hear that you to think it's the 667 00:24:37,011 --> 00:24:39,178 highlight of your day . Um I wanted to 668 00:24:39,178 --> 00:24:41,344 ask you two things . One about Syria , 669 00:24:41,370 --> 00:24:43,481 the United States military presence , 670 00:24:43,481 --> 00:24:45,648 there is about ISIS . Where do you see 671 00:24:45,648 --> 00:24:47,814 that mission going in the future ? And 672 00:24:47,814 --> 00:24:49,870 the Russians have been there now for 673 00:24:49,870 --> 00:24:52,037 many years ? Do you envision that they 674 00:24:52,037 --> 00:24:54,092 too will become an enduring presence 675 00:24:54,092 --> 00:24:56,203 inside Syria ? Um , And at what point 676 00:24:56,203 --> 00:24:58,426 does it not become feasible for them to 677 00:24:58,426 --> 00:25:00,481 continue on and following on waffles 678 00:25:00,481 --> 00:25:02,592 point ? Do you think that the US will 679 00:25:02,592 --> 00:25:04,814 be able to , if there is a deal be able 680 00:25:04,814 --> 00:25:06,814 to compartmentalize between Iranian 681 00:25:06,814 --> 00:25:08,926 malign activities ? Should there be a 682 00:25:08,926 --> 00:25:11,890 deal um with with them ? Uh , Keeping 683 00:25:11,890 --> 00:25:14,620 with the the deal of restrictions . If 684 00:25:14,620 --> 00:25:18,380 there is a deal uh Well , first of 685 00:25:18,380 --> 00:25:20,950 all , uh principal reason for being in 686 00:25:20,950 --> 00:25:23,117 Syria is to continue the fight against 687 00:25:23,117 --> 00:25:25,172 ISIS . And we're actually continuing 688 00:25:25,172 --> 00:25:27,394 that , you know , by supporting our sdf 689 00:25:27,394 --> 00:25:29,450 partners as they do the actual heavy 690 00:25:29,450 --> 00:25:29,180 lifting of the fighting and 691 00:25:29,180 --> 00:25:30,958 additionally supporting our sdf 692 00:25:30,958 --> 00:25:33,069 partners as they sit on top of a very 693 00:25:33,069 --> 00:25:35,180 large and concerning displaced person 694 00:25:35,180 --> 00:25:37,124 population and a equal , even more 695 00:25:37,124 --> 00:25:39,050 concerning Prison population , 696 00:25:39,060 --> 00:25:41,400 including over 2000 fighters . And 697 00:25:41,400 --> 00:25:43,622 we've seen the danger of that as recent 698 00:25:43,622 --> 00:25:45,733 as the Hasakah , uh , prison break of 699 00:25:45,733 --> 00:25:48,060 just just a few weeks ago . So , uh , 700 00:25:48,540 --> 00:25:50,740 so , so I , I , I think that that 701 00:25:50,740 --> 00:25:52,851 probably covers a serious question as 702 00:25:52,851 --> 00:25:55,184 for what the Russians are doing , their , 703 00:25:55,184 --> 00:25:57,351 uh , they came in after us and I think 704 00:25:57,351 --> 00:25:59,296 they came in for several reasons . 705 00:25:59,296 --> 00:26:00,962 First of all , I think it was 706 00:26:00,962 --> 00:26:02,796 opportunism , not grand strategy 707 00:26:02,796 --> 00:26:04,740 because I'm not sure that I , that 708 00:26:04,740 --> 00:26:07,018 they're practicing grand strategy . Um , 709 00:26:07,018 --> 00:26:09,073 but they came in because we had gone 710 00:26:09,073 --> 00:26:11,184 into Syria , it was an opportunity to 711 00:26:11,184 --> 00:26:11,000 throw sand in our gearbox . It was an 712 00:26:11,000 --> 00:26:12,944 active and an opportunity to prove 713 00:26:12,944 --> 00:26:15,167 their relevance on the world stage . It 714 00:26:15,167 --> 00:26:17,222 was their opportunity to really give 715 00:26:17,222 --> 00:26:19,333 aid and assistance to one of the very 716 00:26:19,333 --> 00:26:21,389 few countries in the world that is a 717 00:26:21,389 --> 00:26:23,611 client state for Russia external to the 718 00:26:23,611 --> 00:26:25,722 immediate boundary of the , of , of , 719 00:26:25,722 --> 00:26:25,650 of Russia . So , a lot of reasons 720 00:26:25,650 --> 00:26:27,890 brought them in a big one though , is 721 00:26:27,890 --> 00:26:30,860 the naval base in , in , in , in , in , 722 00:26:31,240 --> 00:26:33,351 on the coastline of Syria . I believe 723 00:26:33,351 --> 00:26:35,684 they're going to stay there as you know , 724 00:26:35,684 --> 00:26:37,962 they signed a long term lease for that . 725 00:26:37,962 --> 00:26:40,184 So I think that that's a long term goal 726 00:26:40,184 --> 00:26:39,890 of theirs , I think the Russians are 727 00:26:39,900 --> 00:26:42,370 probably intend to stay there as to 728 00:26:42,370 --> 00:26:44,426 their ability to sustain it over the 729 00:26:44,426 --> 00:26:46,370 long term . We just have to see if 730 00:26:46,370 --> 00:26:46,340 they're able to actually do that . I 731 00:26:46,340 --> 00:26:48,618 don't know the answer to that question , 732 00:26:48,618 --> 00:26:50,729 but we should remember that they held 733 00:26:50,729 --> 00:26:50,650 that naval base through much of the 734 00:26:50,650 --> 00:26:52,761 Cold War and never posed a particular 735 00:26:52,761 --> 00:26:54,872 problem for us . We watch it . I know 736 00:26:54,872 --> 00:26:56,872 my good friend Todd Walters over at 737 00:26:56,872 --> 00:26:59,039 UConn , he and his team look at it and 738 00:26:59,039 --> 00:27:01,010 what they can do their um but so I 739 00:27:01,010 --> 00:27:03,232 think the Russians will stay subject to 740 00:27:03,232 --> 00:27:04,899 their ability to , you know , 741 00:27:04,899 --> 00:27:06,954 economically fiscally and and with a 742 00:27:06,954 --> 00:27:08,843 force posture , sustain it in the 743 00:27:08,843 --> 00:27:11,066 future . And I just don't know what how 744 00:27:11,066 --> 00:27:11,060 that's going to shake out . Thank you . 745 00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:15,070 Go to the phones , Megan . Meier 746 00:27:15,400 --> 00:27:19,010 military times . Hi General 747 00:27:19,010 --> 00:27:21,177 Mackenzie , I just wanted to ask you a 748 00:27:21,177 --> 00:27:23,232 little along the lines of what louis 749 00:27:23,232 --> 00:27:25,288 asked um you know what the future is 750 00:27:25,288 --> 00:27:27,550 for troops on the ground in Syria and 751 00:27:27,550 --> 00:27:30,580 Iraq kind of what the endgame is . And 752 00:27:30,590 --> 00:27:32,590 you know , if you guys have thought 753 00:27:32,590 --> 00:27:34,646 about the picture of what that looks 754 00:27:34,646 --> 00:27:36,701 like when troops are able to leave . 755 00:27:36,701 --> 00:27:38,757 Sure . So let me actually begin with 756 00:27:38,757 --> 00:27:41,290 with Iraq . You know , Iraq . It's a 757 00:27:41,290 --> 00:27:43,457 good news story . Uh We're in Iraq and 758 00:27:43,457 --> 00:27:45,457 the express invitation of the Iraqi 759 00:27:45,457 --> 00:27:47,679 government , they want us to be there . 760 00:27:47,679 --> 00:27:49,901 Uh Not only do they want us , they want 761 00:27:49,901 --> 00:27:51,901 the NATO mission Iraq to be there . 762 00:27:51,901 --> 00:27:53,901 Which are our NATO NATO partners uh 763 00:27:53,901 --> 00:27:56,068 small but growing effort on the ground 764 00:27:56,068 --> 00:27:58,290 in Iraq . So so were there because they 765 00:27:58,290 --> 00:28:00,512 want us to be there . It's important to 766 00:28:00,512 --> 00:28:02,734 emphasize that point . Look as we as we 767 00:28:02,734 --> 00:28:04,901 look into the future , any force level 768 00:28:04,901 --> 00:28:07,068 adjustment in Iraq is going to be made 769 00:28:07,068 --> 00:28:09,179 as a result of consultations with the 770 00:28:09,179 --> 00:28:11,401 government of Iraq . Uh And and we just 771 00:28:11,401 --> 00:28:13,401 finished a strategic dialogue a few 772 00:28:13,401 --> 00:28:15,290 months ago . We believe that will 773 00:28:15,290 --> 00:28:17,401 continue as you know , Iraq is now in 774 00:28:17,401 --> 00:28:19,623 the process of government formation and 775 00:28:19,623 --> 00:28:21,790 I think , you know , so we're watching 776 00:28:21,790 --> 00:28:21,700 that with great interest and and wish 777 00:28:21,700 --> 00:28:23,922 them well . Despite the many roadblocks 778 00:28:23,922 --> 00:28:25,922 that are being thrown up by Iranian 779 00:28:25,922 --> 00:28:28,260 based proxy groups , they're proceeding . 780 00:28:28,270 --> 00:28:30,381 You know , maybe not the way we would 781 00:28:30,381 --> 00:28:32,492 do , it may be slower than the way we 782 00:28:32,492 --> 00:28:32,250 would do it , but nonetheless , they're 783 00:28:32,250 --> 00:28:34,830 moving forward . In the long term , we 784 00:28:34,830 --> 00:28:36,770 would like to have a normalized 785 00:28:36,780 --> 00:28:39,160 security cooperation agreement and 786 00:28:39,160 --> 00:28:41,104 posture with Iraq . And that would 787 00:28:41,104 --> 00:28:43,160 inevitably mean at some point in the 788 00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:45,327 future , you're gonna look at how many 789 00:28:45,327 --> 00:28:47,438 people you got there , you know , and 790 00:28:47,438 --> 00:28:47,380 and what we want to do in the long term 791 00:28:47,390 --> 00:28:49,612 in the fight against ISIS . And this is 792 00:28:49,612 --> 00:28:51,723 really an important point is you want 793 00:28:51,723 --> 00:28:53,834 to get to the state where nations and 794 00:28:53,834 --> 00:28:55,723 lo and security elements in those 795 00:28:55,723 --> 00:28:57,612 nations can deal with the violent 796 00:28:57,612 --> 00:28:59,946 extremist threat without our , you know , 797 00:28:59,946 --> 00:29:02,001 without direct support from us right 798 00:29:02,001 --> 00:29:04,168 now , we have the the Iraqis are doing 799 00:29:04,168 --> 00:29:06,390 the fighting . We're still helping them 800 00:29:06,390 --> 00:29:08,612 over time . You'd like for them to take 801 00:29:08,612 --> 00:29:10,834 a larger share of all the enabling that 802 00:29:10,834 --> 00:29:12,946 we're doing now . Because in the long 803 00:29:12,946 --> 00:29:15,168 run , you want local security forces to 804 00:29:15,168 --> 00:29:16,946 be able to achieve the security 805 00:29:16,946 --> 00:29:19,057 condition of suppressing ISIS , It is 806 00:29:19,057 --> 00:29:21,112 not going to be a bloodless future . 807 00:29:21,112 --> 00:29:21,090 There's going to be violence . They're 808 00:29:21,090 --> 00:29:23,368 going to be more Hasakah prison breaks . 809 00:29:23,368 --> 00:29:25,312 There's gonna be more explosions , 810 00:29:25,312 --> 00:29:27,257 there gonna be more I E . D . S uh 811 00:29:27,257 --> 00:29:29,479 directed against the Iraqis . They know 812 00:29:29,479 --> 00:29:31,479 that . But what you wanna do is you 813 00:29:31,479 --> 00:29:33,479 want it to be suppressed to a level 814 00:29:33,479 --> 00:29:35,701 where forces on the ground can actually 815 00:29:35,701 --> 00:29:37,868 deal with that problem . And we are on 816 00:29:37,868 --> 00:29:39,923 the path to do that in Iraq . It has 817 00:29:39,923 --> 00:29:42,090 been a slow path . It's been a painful 818 00:29:42,090 --> 00:29:44,201 path , but we're moving forward . And 819 00:29:44,201 --> 00:29:43,780 again , let me emphasize whatever we do 820 00:29:43,780 --> 00:29:46,002 in the future is something will jointly 821 00:29:46,002 --> 00:29:48,250 arrive at with our partner in the with 822 00:29:48,250 --> 00:29:50,306 the government of Iraq . And again , 823 00:29:50,306 --> 00:29:52,583 the North atlantic treaty organization , 824 00:29:52,583 --> 00:29:54,806 NATO very significant , important . And 825 00:29:54,806 --> 00:29:56,917 growing presence in Iraq again at the 826 00:29:56,917 --> 00:29:58,972 explicit request of the of the Iraqi 827 00:29:58,972 --> 00:30:01,250 government . So , in Syria . Again , 828 00:30:01,260 --> 00:30:03,440 our principal task is to complete the 829 00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:05,551 defeat of ISIS . You know , we are in 830 00:30:05,551 --> 00:30:07,551 support of our sdf partners as they 831 00:30:07,551 --> 00:30:09,690 continue that operation . And also as 832 00:30:09,690 --> 00:30:11,870 they sit on top of , you know , the 833 00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:14,800 many displaced persons camps and the 834 00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:16,660 prison camps that are there . So 835 00:30:16,930 --> 00:30:19,208 there's still work to be done in Syria . 836 00:30:19,208 --> 00:30:21,374 Uh , I don't know how long we're gonna 837 00:30:21,374 --> 00:30:23,430 we're gonna remain in Syria . That's 838 00:30:23,430 --> 00:30:23,240 just not known to me . That will be an 839 00:30:23,250 --> 00:30:25,194 ultimately , that will be a policy 840 00:30:25,194 --> 00:30:27,194 decision that will be made by , you 841 00:30:27,194 --> 00:30:29,083 know , national leadership of the 842 00:30:29,083 --> 00:30:31,306 United States as we go forward based on 843 00:30:31,306 --> 00:30:30,880 the situation on the ground . Thanks . 844 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:34,080 Megan staying on the phone , injuries . 845 00:30:35,940 --> 00:30:39,010 Um , thank thank you . Um let me caveat 846 00:30:39,010 --> 00:30:41,066 in my question by saying , I totally 847 00:30:41,066 --> 00:30:43,010 understand the differences between 848 00:30:43,010 --> 00:30:45,066 Ukraine and Afghanistan . But as you 849 00:30:45,066 --> 00:30:47,232 watch , Ukraine , Ukrainian forces put 850 00:30:47,232 --> 00:30:49,450 up stiff resistance . Do you look back 851 00:30:49,460 --> 00:30:52,710 and think if we did x , y z differently 852 00:30:52,710 --> 00:30:54,900 with the Afghan forces , maybe they 853 00:30:54,900 --> 00:30:57,122 would have put up more of a fight , you 854 00:30:57,122 --> 00:30:59,289 know , or do you think this would have 855 00:30:59,289 --> 00:31:01,567 happened inevitably ? I'm just curious , 856 00:31:01,567 --> 00:31:03,567 you know , do you see any potential 857 00:31:03,567 --> 00:31:05,456 comparisons between the Ukrainian 858 00:31:05,456 --> 00:31:07,622 resistance and what the afghans didn't 859 00:31:07,622 --> 00:31:09,789 do ? You're just you're you're cutting 860 00:31:09,789 --> 00:31:12,011 out a little bit . But let me just make 861 00:31:12,011 --> 00:31:11,780 sure I got your question just based on 862 00:31:11,780 --> 00:31:13,613 the , you know , the the the the 863 00:31:13,613 --> 00:31:15,613 fighting spirit that the Ukrainians 864 00:31:15,613 --> 00:31:17,724 have shown . Could we perhaps look at 865 00:31:17,724 --> 00:31:19,947 Afghanistan and postulate what we could 866 00:31:19,947 --> 00:31:22,058 have done different to inculcate than 867 00:31:22,058 --> 00:31:21,680 in the afghan army ? Is that , is that 868 00:31:21,680 --> 00:31:23,750 your question ? Yeah , just , just 869 00:31:23,750 --> 00:31:25,750 generally , what are your takeaways 870 00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:27,806 looking at ? So , you know , you can 871 00:31:27,806 --> 00:31:30,028 train an army , you can equip an army . 872 00:31:30,028 --> 00:31:31,972 What you can't give an army is the 873 00:31:31,972 --> 00:31:31,810 fighting spirit of the individual 874 00:31:31,810 --> 00:31:34,420 soldier . Clearly the Ukrainians have 875 00:31:34,420 --> 00:31:36,309 tremendous fighting spirit at the 876 00:31:36,309 --> 00:31:38,531 individual soldier level , At the small 877 00:31:38,531 --> 00:31:40,587 unit level , they're defending their 878 00:31:40,587 --> 00:31:42,920 homes , they're defending their country . 879 00:31:42,920 --> 00:31:44,864 Uh They feel that that right is on 880 00:31:44,864 --> 00:31:44,550 their sides . We can all make our 881 00:31:44,550 --> 00:31:46,439 judgments about how motivated the 882 00:31:46,439 --> 00:31:48,606 Russian soldiers appear and they don't 883 00:31:48,606 --> 00:31:50,772 appear from where I sit at least to be 884 00:31:50,772 --> 00:31:52,939 particularly motivated or particularly 885 00:31:52,939 --> 00:31:54,883 uh are particularly engaged in the 886 00:31:54,883 --> 00:31:57,050 campaign that they're undertaking . So 887 00:31:57,050 --> 00:31:56,500 what lessons do you draw from from 888 00:31:56,500 --> 00:31:59,080 Afghanistan ? Clearly , the D . N . A . 889 00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:01,413 Of a Taliban fighter was the same D . N . 890 00:32:01,413 --> 00:32:03,469 A . As the as that of an afghan army 891 00:32:03,469 --> 00:32:05,760 soldier . Um The Taliban ultimately 892 00:32:05,770 --> 00:32:08,730 chose to fight the Afghan army as part 893 00:32:08,730 --> 00:32:10,730 of what I would characterize is not 894 00:32:10,730 --> 00:32:12,952 just a military collapse , but really a 895 00:32:12,952 --> 00:32:15,063 national collapse ultimately couldn't 896 00:32:15,063 --> 00:32:17,230 find the will to stand and fight . And 897 00:32:17,230 --> 00:32:19,230 I think we're still , frankly , I'm 898 00:32:19,230 --> 00:32:21,286 still digesting that uh I don't know 899 00:32:21,286 --> 00:32:23,286 how you get to that . Um You know , 900 00:32:23,286 --> 00:32:25,341 we've we've , you know , many people 901 00:32:25,341 --> 00:32:27,508 have said , you know , we try to build 902 00:32:27,508 --> 00:32:26,760 an army that probably looked too much 903 00:32:26,760 --> 00:32:29,570 like our own army . Um but again , I 904 00:32:29,570 --> 00:32:31,630 don't know , um I don't know how you 905 00:32:31,630 --> 00:32:33,780 get how you inculcate fighting spirit 906 00:32:33,780 --> 00:32:36,002 into an organization ? There's gotta be 907 00:32:36,002 --> 00:32:38,002 a way to do it . And uh , and we've 908 00:32:38,002 --> 00:32:40,113 done it with other armies and our own 909 00:32:40,113 --> 00:32:42,002 forces have it in abundance , but 910 00:32:42,002 --> 00:32:44,790 clearly in the summer of 2021 . And 911 00:32:44,790 --> 00:32:46,846 really for the years prior , because 912 00:32:46,846 --> 00:32:48,957 the The events of August 2021 did not 913 00:32:48,957 --> 00:32:51,123 suddenly begin in the spring of 2021 . 914 00:32:51,123 --> 00:32:53,346 You gotta go back 10 , 15 , 20 years in 915 00:32:53,346 --> 00:32:55,290 order to gather all the facts that 916 00:32:55,290 --> 00:32:57,179 actually came to that culminating 917 00:32:57,179 --> 00:32:59,346 moment in the history of Afghanistan . 918 00:32:59,346 --> 00:32:59,200 So , a long answer to your question . 919 00:32:59,210 --> 00:33:01,880 Uh , it's a great question and uh , I'm 920 00:33:01,880 --> 00:33:04,102 going to continue to think about it and 921 00:33:04,102 --> 00:33:06,269 I know others will as well . Thank you 922 00:33:06,269 --> 00:33:10,030 Kourtney Mackenzie . I want to echo 923 00:33:10,030 --> 00:33:11,890 the thanks for talking to us , 924 00:33:11,890 --> 00:33:13,946 especially on the hard days and also 925 00:33:13,946 --> 00:33:16,130 add to it , thank you to your , your 926 00:33:16,130 --> 00:33:18,019 pho bill Urban has also been very 927 00:33:18,019 --> 00:33:20,019 accessible and helpful to us during 928 00:33:20,019 --> 00:33:22,074 your time . I know you guys are very 929 00:33:22,074 --> 00:33:24,241 busy but you both always made time for 930 00:33:24,241 --> 00:33:26,352 us to quick questions . One following 931 00:33:26,352 --> 00:33:28,352 on what Sylvia was asking about the 932 00:33:28,352 --> 00:33:30,463 missile defense systems . Because you 933 00:33:30,463 --> 00:33:32,686 talked about the importance of those in 934 00:33:32,686 --> 00:33:34,852 your opening statement , I'm wondering 935 00:33:34,852 --> 00:33:36,963 if you have any concerns about losing 936 00:33:36,963 --> 00:33:39,019 any of those systems given the , you 937 00:33:39,019 --> 00:33:41,019 know , the ongoing need for them in 938 00:33:41,019 --> 00:33:43,130 places like you come in Ukraine or if 939 00:33:43,130 --> 00:33:43,090 you think that you have enough . I know 940 00:33:43,090 --> 00:33:45,312 you , you , you frequently say that you 941 00:33:45,312 --> 00:33:47,479 never have enough of anything . But do 942 00:33:47,479 --> 00:33:49,534 you feel like you actually need more 943 00:33:49,534 --> 00:33:51,701 missile defense systems in centcom And 944 00:33:51,701 --> 00:33:51,350 then also there's been a lot of talk 945 00:33:51,350 --> 00:33:54,760 about delisting the Irgc as a foreign 946 00:33:54,760 --> 00:33:56,816 terror organization as part of these 947 00:33:56,816 --> 00:33:59,380 negotiations with the peace talks . And 948 00:33:59,380 --> 00:34:01,380 I'm wondering if you can talk about 949 00:34:01,380 --> 00:34:03,602 sort of the operational impact if there 950 00:34:03,602 --> 00:34:05,547 is one that that could have on the 951 00:34:05,547 --> 00:34:07,660 theater , if the Irgc is no longer an 952 00:34:07,670 --> 00:34:11,610 FTl . Thanks Courtney first on air 953 00:34:11,610 --> 00:34:13,666 defense systems , let me say we have 954 00:34:13,666 --> 00:34:15,832 enough for the mission that we've been 955 00:34:15,832 --> 00:34:18,166 given here in central command right now . 956 00:34:18,166 --> 00:34:20,166 So and the secretary and I are in a 957 00:34:20,166 --> 00:34:19,980 constant dialogue through the chairman 958 00:34:19,990 --> 00:34:22,101 about what the appropriate posture is 959 00:34:22,101 --> 00:34:24,212 here in central command ? I think the 960 00:34:24,212 --> 00:34:26,379 real the real story about air defenses 961 00:34:26,379 --> 00:34:28,657 in centcom is not us and not the U . S . 962 00:34:28,657 --> 00:34:30,601 Air defenses . It's really the air 963 00:34:30,601 --> 00:34:32,490 defenses and particularly the the 964 00:34:32,490 --> 00:34:34,434 patriot systems and other high end 965 00:34:34,434 --> 00:34:36,212 systems that are gulf and other 966 00:34:36,212 --> 00:34:38,046 partners possess and how that is 967 00:34:38,046 --> 00:34:40,350 knitted together . Because it's what 968 00:34:40,350 --> 00:34:42,461 you what you gotta do is Saudi Arabia 969 00:34:42,461 --> 00:34:44,683 has a number of patriot batteries . You 970 00:34:44,683 --> 00:34:46,850 a has a number of patriot batteries as 971 00:34:46,850 --> 00:34:48,961 does kuwait as does bahrain . So what 972 00:34:48,961 --> 00:34:51,072 the task in the theater is really how 973 00:34:51,072 --> 00:34:53,239 do you knit those together so that you 974 00:34:53,239 --> 00:34:55,406 create more than the simple sum of the 975 00:34:55,406 --> 00:34:57,461 component parts we call that tipping 976 00:34:57,461 --> 00:35:00,160 and queuing advanced early warning and 977 00:35:00,160 --> 00:35:02,327 you build what what we know and you've 978 00:35:02,327 --> 00:35:03,938 heard me say this the common 979 00:35:03,938 --> 00:35:06,160 operational picture . So everybody sees 980 00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:08,271 the same thing . Everybody gets early 981 00:35:08,271 --> 00:35:10,438 warning , everybody can be prepared to 982 00:35:10,438 --> 00:35:12,327 react very quickly to a potential 983 00:35:12,327 --> 00:35:14,820 Iranian attack . That's where uh that's 984 00:35:14,820 --> 00:35:16,931 where the future in this theater is . 985 00:35:16,931 --> 00:35:20,550 And so why is it important now And why 986 00:35:20,550 --> 00:35:23,000 are we suddenly at a state where it 987 00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:24,944 looks like people are increasingly 988 00:35:24,944 --> 00:35:27,167 interested in it ? I'll tell you , it's 989 00:35:27,167 --> 00:35:29,278 principally because of the Iranians , 990 00:35:29,278 --> 00:35:31,389 they have invested enormous resources 991 00:35:31,389 --> 00:35:33,210 into improving the number and 992 00:35:33,210 --> 00:35:35,420 capabilities of their ballistic 993 00:35:35,420 --> 00:35:38,130 missiles . And you know , it is in the 994 00:35:38,130 --> 00:35:40,170 al-Assad attack in January of 2020 995 00:35:40,420 --> 00:35:42,309 their missiles hit within tens of 996 00:35:42,309 --> 00:35:44,087 meters of the targets they were 997 00:35:44,087 --> 00:35:45,920 intended to hit . So you have to 998 00:35:45,920 --> 00:35:48,198 respect that capability and believe me , 999 00:35:48,198 --> 00:35:48,180 our partners in the gulf respect that 1000 00:35:48,180 --> 00:35:50,180 capability . So nothing focuses the 1001 00:35:50,180 --> 00:35:52,291 mind , you know , of a nation like an 1002 00:35:52,291 --> 00:35:54,402 imminent threat just over the horizon 1003 00:35:54,402 --> 00:35:56,513 with malign intent . So it's not only 1004 00:35:56,513 --> 00:35:58,513 ballistic missiles , it's also land 1005 00:35:58,513 --> 00:36:00,569 attack cruise missiles and it's also 1006 00:36:00,569 --> 00:36:02,736 unmanned aerial systems , all of those 1007 00:36:02,736 --> 00:36:04,970 things are now at a greater state of 1008 00:36:04,970 --> 00:36:07,026 danger than we have ever seen in the 1009 00:36:07,026 --> 00:36:09,410 central command aO are So you know , so 1010 00:36:09,410 --> 00:36:11,299 now there's there's pressure that 1011 00:36:11,299 --> 00:36:13,610 really is immediate that maybe hasn't 1012 00:36:13,610 --> 00:36:15,499 been there in the years prior for 1013 00:36:15,499 --> 00:36:17,554 nations to come together and develop 1014 00:36:17,554 --> 00:36:19,554 that defense architecture that will 1015 00:36:19,554 --> 00:36:21,554 allow them to share information and 1016 00:36:21,554 --> 00:36:23,870 again it is a it's a former defense 1017 00:36:23,870 --> 00:36:26,000 cooperation , it's it's easier to get 1018 00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:27,722 to than other forms of defense 1019 00:36:27,722 --> 00:36:29,722 cooperation because as I've noted , 1020 00:36:29,722 --> 00:36:31,944 you're really sharing information . And 1021 00:36:31,944 --> 00:36:34,056 so , so when we think about what's in 1022 00:36:34,056 --> 00:36:36,222 the theater , what do we need ? That's 1023 00:36:36,222 --> 00:36:38,389 really the heart of the matter . It is 1024 00:36:38,389 --> 00:36:40,167 not the U . S . Systems , it is 1025 00:36:40,167 --> 00:36:42,389 actually our allied and partner nations 1026 00:36:42,389 --> 00:36:42,350 nations systems and they have a bunch 1027 00:36:42,350 --> 00:36:44,406 more patriot batteries than we do in 1028 00:36:44,406 --> 00:36:46,406 the theater by a factor of three or 1029 00:36:46,406 --> 00:36:48,350 four or five . So there's a lot of 1030 00:36:48,350 --> 00:36:50,572 capability there , Courtney asked about 1031 00:36:50,572 --> 00:36:52,517 the , the Irgc and uh , you know , 1032 00:36:52,517 --> 00:36:55,870 first I would tell you the IrgC is , is 1033 00:36:55,870 --> 00:36:58,092 the centerpiece of Iranian bad behavior 1034 00:36:58,092 --> 00:37:00,259 in the , in the theater , the Irgc and 1035 00:37:00,259 --> 00:37:02,426 the elite sub element of the Irgc that 1036 00:37:02,426 --> 00:37:04,481 could force , you know , they're the 1037 00:37:04,481 --> 00:37:06,592 principal malign actor in the theater 1038 00:37:06,592 --> 00:37:08,759 so they're very concerning to me as to 1039 00:37:08,759 --> 00:37:10,981 whether what the effect de listing them 1040 00:37:10,981 --> 00:37:10,680 would have . You know , I really , I 1041 00:37:10,690 --> 00:37:13,160 don't know that I just , I would defer 1042 00:37:13,160 --> 00:37:15,216 to the Department of State . I don't 1043 00:37:15,216 --> 00:37:17,327 know that in terms of operationally , 1044 00:37:17,327 --> 00:37:19,549 in terms of the way we think about them 1045 00:37:19,549 --> 00:37:21,716 in the terms of the way we think about 1046 00:37:21,716 --> 00:37:23,882 the threat and what they do on a daily 1047 00:37:23,882 --> 00:37:23,820 basis across the theater . I don't 1048 00:37:23,820 --> 00:37:25,987 think much would change as a result of 1049 00:37:25,987 --> 00:37:28,153 that . But but again , I would wait to 1050 00:37:28,153 --> 00:37:30,153 see what , you know what the actual 1051 00:37:30,153 --> 00:37:31,987 agreement is , what actually the 1052 00:37:31,987 --> 00:37:31,730 party's contract to undertake as a 1053 00:37:31,730 --> 00:37:33,897 result of that . And thanks Courtney , 1054 00:37:35,230 --> 00:37:37,008 we have time for about two more 1055 00:37:37,008 --> 00:37:39,460 questions go to the phones for Jeff 1056 00:37:39,460 --> 00:37:42,210 struggle , task and purpose . Thank you 1057 00:37:42,210 --> 00:37:44,210 general . I just wanted to read you 1058 00:37:44,210 --> 00:37:46,950 something from an article in the 1059 00:37:46,950 --> 00:37:49,870 atlantic . It's said that when you met 1060 00:37:49,870 --> 00:37:53,640 with Abdul Ghani Bandar that you had 1061 00:37:53,650 --> 00:37:55,950 agreed to all that , you said you only 1062 00:37:55,950 --> 00:37:59,880 needed to control uh H Kaya and not the 1063 00:37:59,880 --> 00:38:03,730 rest of Kabul . And you said . 1064 00:38:03,750 --> 00:38:06,170 And in the article it says the exchange 1065 00:38:06,170 --> 00:38:07,892 between Baradar Mackenzie will 1066 00:38:07,892 --> 00:38:10,114 contribute to making the evacuation the 1067 00:38:10,114 --> 00:38:13,380 nightmare that it became in retrospect . 1068 00:38:13,390 --> 00:38:16,160 Should you have asked the Taliban to be 1069 00:38:16,160 --> 00:38:18,830 able to control all of Kabul instead of 1070 00:38:18,830 --> 00:38:22,180 just the airport . Thank you . Thanks 1071 00:38:22,180 --> 00:38:25,120 Jeff . Absolutely not . Um that's 1072 00:38:25,130 --> 00:38:27,400 categorically reject that , that idea 1073 00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:29,622 and I'll tell you why , first of all it 1074 00:38:29,622 --> 00:38:31,567 wasn't a serious offer . It was an 1075 00:38:31,567 --> 00:38:33,789 office , it was off the cuff offer from 1076 00:38:33,789 --> 00:38:35,900 from operator and I for and as we can 1077 00:38:35,900 --> 00:38:38,178 see now with the fullness of hindsight , 1078 00:38:38,178 --> 00:38:40,344 he does not actually tend to speak for 1079 00:38:40,344 --> 00:38:42,400 the hardliners in the taliban . We I 1080 00:38:42,400 --> 00:38:42,020 don't believe he would have been able 1081 00:38:42,020 --> 00:38:44,242 to deliver that even if he had intended 1082 00:38:44,242 --> 00:38:46,187 to be a serious offer number one , 1083 00:38:46,187 --> 00:38:48,242 Number two , if we had gone in to do 1084 00:38:48,242 --> 00:38:50,353 that mission , it would have required 1085 00:38:50,353 --> 00:38:50,210 the introduction of vastly more U . S . 1086 00:38:50,210 --> 00:38:52,910 Combat power at least a division with 1087 00:38:52,910 --> 00:38:55,077 enabling elements from a core in order 1088 00:38:55,077 --> 00:38:57,188 to conduct that mission . The Taliban 1089 00:38:57,188 --> 00:38:59,354 would never have stood for that . So I 1090 00:38:59,354 --> 00:39:01,577 reject the I reject that completely . I 1091 00:39:01,577 --> 00:39:01,480 think it's a completely is a complete 1092 00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:03,647 misreading and misunderstanding of the 1093 00:39:03,647 --> 00:39:06,780 situation . Thanks Jeff for our final 1094 00:39:06,780 --> 00:39:08,947 question . We'll go back to the phones 1095 00:39:08,947 --> 00:39:12,740 nick Schifrin . PBS thank you general 1096 00:39:12,740 --> 00:39:15,410 and thank you for your accessibility 1097 00:39:15,410 --> 00:39:17,466 and your team's accessibility . Over 1098 00:39:17,466 --> 00:39:19,680 the years . I wanted to end with Iran 1099 00:39:19,680 --> 00:39:21,900 and give you uh time for a kind of 1100 00:39:21,900 --> 00:39:23,844 classic question about what you're 1101 00:39:23,844 --> 00:39:25,956 telling your successor . Um So Iran , 1102 00:39:25,956 --> 00:39:28,011 are you seeing any change in Iranian 1103 00:39:28,011 --> 00:39:31,260 behavior across the theater in these 1104 00:39:31,260 --> 00:39:33,316 days ? That appeared to be the final 1105 00:39:33,316 --> 00:39:35,538 days before a possible deal is signed . 1106 00:39:35,538 --> 00:39:37,710 Uh And the big question is this the 1107 00:39:37,710 --> 00:39:39,488 obvious greatest challenge your 1108 00:39:39,488 --> 00:39:41,720 successor inherits . And what's been 1109 00:39:41,720 --> 00:39:43,942 your advice to him as he begins the job 1110 00:39:43,942 --> 00:39:46,760 when it comes to Iran . Thanks nick . 1111 00:39:46,760 --> 00:39:48,982 Thanks . First of all , my successor is 1112 00:39:48,982 --> 00:39:51,204 a magnificent army general officer eric 1113 00:39:51,204 --> 00:39:53,427 gorilla . I had the pleasure of working 1114 00:39:53,427 --> 00:39:55,649 with eric he was my Chief of staff here 1115 00:39:55,649 --> 00:39:57,871 at Central Command for part of my first 1116 00:39:57,871 --> 00:39:57,400 year in command here . He knows that 1117 00:39:57,400 --> 00:39:59,456 theater deeply . He knows the issues 1118 00:39:59,456 --> 00:40:01,622 deeply and he's gonna be he's gonna be 1119 00:40:01,622 --> 00:40:03,789 a remarkable leader and will take sent 1120 00:40:03,789 --> 00:40:05,678 common to do even better and more 1121 00:40:05,678 --> 00:40:07,789 important greater things in the years 1122 00:40:07,789 --> 00:40:07,660 ahead . So I I could not be more 1123 00:40:07,660 --> 00:40:09,840 pleased with the opportunity to pass 1124 00:40:09,840 --> 00:40:12,062 the pass the the guide onto him here in 1125 00:40:12,062 --> 00:40:14,173 just in just a couple of weeks . Um , 1126 00:40:14,173 --> 00:40:16,270 as for Iran , uh , the point I would 1127 00:40:16,270 --> 00:40:18,520 make is the Iranians want a couple of 1128 00:40:18,520 --> 00:40:21,610 things writ large . They won't uh they 1129 00:40:21,610 --> 00:40:24,280 want sanctions relief . And I think , 1130 00:40:24,290 --> 00:40:26,123 you know , and I believe they're 1131 00:40:26,123 --> 00:40:28,068 probably willing to talk about the 1132 00:40:28,068 --> 00:40:27,600 nuclear issue in order to get to 1133 00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:29,656 sanctions relief . So that's sort of 1134 00:40:29,656 --> 00:40:32,820 bucket one bucket to the Iranians want 1135 00:40:32,820 --> 00:40:35,650 us out of the theater . And for a while , 1136 00:40:35,660 --> 00:40:37,827 I believe they thought they had a pool 1137 00:40:37,827 --> 00:40:39,882 and they see the principle , but not 1138 00:40:39,882 --> 00:40:41,938 the only battleground for that being 1139 00:40:41,938 --> 00:40:44,271 Iraq . So over the past couple of years , 1140 00:40:44,271 --> 00:40:46,438 they have , they have worked political 1141 00:40:46,438 --> 00:40:46,420 solutions to try to eject us that have 1142 00:40:46,420 --> 00:40:48,476 not panned out for them . So they've 1143 00:40:48,476 --> 00:40:50,587 turned to kinetic solutions . And the 1144 00:40:50,587 --> 00:40:52,531 Iranians who believe that they can 1145 00:40:52,531 --> 00:40:54,587 undertake a certain level of kinetic 1146 00:40:54,587 --> 00:40:56,698 action against us and it won't affect 1147 00:40:56,698 --> 00:40:58,976 the larger negotiations state on state . 1148 00:40:58,976 --> 00:41:01,253 I'll tell you over the last six months , 1149 00:41:01,253 --> 00:41:00,670 as you know , we've been attacked a 1150 00:41:00,670 --> 00:41:02,880 number of times in Syria and Iraq and 1151 00:41:02,880 --> 00:41:05,340 through very good action on the part of 1152 00:41:05,340 --> 00:41:07,430 commanders on the ground , through a 1153 00:41:07,440 --> 00:41:10,110 good counter us action and a couple 1154 00:41:10,110 --> 00:41:12,332 other things . We've been able to avoid 1155 00:41:12,332 --> 00:41:14,499 us casualties . Um , had us casualties 1156 00:41:14,499 --> 00:41:16,499 occurred , I think we might be in a 1157 00:41:16,499 --> 00:41:18,554 very different place right now , but 1158 00:41:18,554 --> 00:41:18,140 we've been able to avoid that and we'll 1159 00:41:18,140 --> 00:41:20,362 continue to use those best practices as 1160 00:41:20,362 --> 00:41:22,520 we go ahead . But I think Iran , I 1161 00:41:22,520 --> 00:41:24,742 think Iran wants to deal . We'll see in 1162 00:41:24,742 --> 00:41:26,742 the next maybe today , maybe in the 1163 00:41:26,742 --> 00:41:26,450 next few days if we're if we're 1164 00:41:26,450 --> 00:41:28,561 actually gonna get a deal there . But 1165 00:41:28,561 --> 00:41:30,728 they still hold that long term view of 1166 00:41:30,728 --> 00:41:32,894 wanting to eject us from the theater . 1167 00:41:32,894 --> 00:41:35,390 So having said all of that , I as I as 1168 00:41:35,390 --> 00:41:37,390 I noted earlier today and are in my 1169 00:41:37,390 --> 00:41:39,501 comments , I think we don't want Iran 1170 00:41:39,501 --> 00:41:41,723 to have a nuclear weapon . And the best 1171 00:41:41,723 --> 00:41:43,890 way to get to that is probably through 1172 00:41:43,890 --> 00:41:45,890 a negotiated solution that will not 1173 00:41:45,890 --> 00:41:47,723 solve the other problems of Iran 1174 00:41:47,723 --> 00:41:49,946 Iranian behavior in the theater . And I 1175 00:41:49,946 --> 00:41:51,834 don't think anybody in the United 1176 00:41:51,834 --> 00:41:54,168 States government is blind to that fact . 1177 00:41:54,168 --> 00:41:54,150 I think everybody knows it . But I'll 1178 00:41:54,150 --> 00:41:56,317 tell you nick , if you can take if you 1179 00:41:56,317 --> 00:41:58,594 can take nuclear weapons off the table , 1180 00:41:58,594 --> 00:42:00,706 that's a powerful capability that you 1181 00:42:00,706 --> 00:42:02,872 don't have to worry about assuming you 1182 00:42:02,872 --> 00:42:02,680 can get all the verification that you 1183 00:42:02,680 --> 00:42:04,680 know , all the things that we would 1184 00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:06,569 want in place to ensure that that 1185 00:42:06,569 --> 00:42:08,680 doesn't happen , then you move on and 1186 00:42:08,680 --> 00:42:08,220 you deal with the other elements of the 1187 00:42:08,220 --> 00:42:10,276 reigning behavior again , what you'd 1188 00:42:10,276 --> 00:42:12,387 like to do is negotiate that . But if 1189 00:42:12,387 --> 00:42:14,720 you can't negotiate that that's where U . 1190 00:42:14,720 --> 00:42:16,942 S . Central command comes in . It's our 1191 00:42:16,942 --> 00:42:19,109 job to demonstrate to Iran the concept 1192 00:42:19,109 --> 00:42:18,820 of deterrence that the things they want 1193 00:42:18,820 --> 00:42:20,931 to pursue are too painful for them to 1194 00:42:20,931 --> 00:42:23,220 achieve . And so we work at that every 1195 00:42:23,220 --> 00:42:25,053 day . We work at that with force 1196 00:42:25,053 --> 00:42:27,164 posture . We work at that through our 1197 00:42:27,164 --> 00:42:29,109 other activities that we carry out 1198 00:42:29,109 --> 00:42:31,220 across the region . And , and we have 1199 00:42:31,220 --> 00:42:31,080 had some success in doing that . Not 1200 00:42:31,080 --> 00:42:33,302 perfect success . You know , the phrase 1201 00:42:33,302 --> 00:42:35,413 I use is contested deterrence when we 1202 00:42:35,413 --> 00:42:37,469 talk about the state of affairs that 1203 00:42:37,469 --> 00:42:39,302 exist between us and Iran in the 1204 00:42:39,302 --> 00:42:41,302 theater . Uh , and we will , but we 1205 00:42:41,302 --> 00:42:43,302 will be ready every day . So what I 1206 00:42:43,302 --> 00:42:45,524 leave , my successor with is my central 1207 00:42:45,524 --> 00:42:45,240 problem and my three years of command 1208 00:42:45,250 --> 00:42:47,417 was Iran . There were other problems , 1209 00:42:47,417 --> 00:42:49,083 other huge problems . But the 1210 00:42:49,083 --> 00:42:51,139 headquarters as a whole , as a joint 1211 00:42:51,139 --> 00:42:53,120 warfighting four star headquarters 1212 00:42:53,130 --> 00:42:55,074 focused on the Iranian problem and 1213 00:42:55,074 --> 00:42:57,130 everything attended to that . Thanks 1214 00:42:57,130 --> 00:42:59,860 nick Okay with that . We're just about 1215 00:42:59,860 --> 00:43:01,971 out of time . Thank you very much for 1216 00:43:01,971 --> 00:43:04,027 your time today sir . It has been an 1217 00:43:04,027 --> 00:43:06,193 honor working with you and your public 1218 00:43:06,193 --> 00:43:08,360 affairs team there at centcom . Do you 1219 00:43:08,360 --> 00:43:10,527 have any closing remarks for us here ? 1220 00:43:10,527 --> 00:43:12,471 Sure . I'd just like to say that I 1221 00:43:12,471 --> 00:43:14,471 actually , I think reaching out and 1222 00:43:14,471 --> 00:43:16,304 being available to the press and 1223 00:43:16,304 --> 00:43:16,100 talking to the press is a very 1224 00:43:16,100 --> 00:43:18,322 important responsibility for all senior 1225 00:43:18,322 --> 00:43:20,267 leaders . We've got to do it . And 1226 00:43:20,267 --> 00:43:22,433 there have been days , I'll tell you , 1227 00:43:22,433 --> 00:43:24,489 I would rather have my leg taken off 1228 00:43:24,489 --> 00:43:26,600 below the knee than come in there and 1229 00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:28,711 talk to you guys . And uh , but I but 1230 00:43:28,711 --> 00:43:30,878 it was an important thing to do and in 1231 00:43:30,878 --> 00:43:30,790 the long run it's better for the 1232 00:43:30,790 --> 00:43:33,010 country . It's better for everyone if 1233 00:43:33,010 --> 00:43:35,066 we're accessible to you and we share 1234 00:43:35,066 --> 00:43:37,288 what information we've got . And I have 1235 00:43:37,288 --> 00:43:39,343 enjoyed the very professional , uh , 1236 00:43:39,343 --> 00:43:41,566 professionally rewarding and personally 1237 00:43:41,566 --> 00:43:43,677 rewarding relationships that I've had 1238 00:43:43,677 --> 00:43:45,621 with members of the media . You're 1239 00:43:45,621 --> 00:43:45,410 you're trying to do your job and your 1240 00:43:45,410 --> 00:43:47,521 job is very important , and I and I , 1241 00:43:47,521 --> 00:43:49,577 and I support it . Thanks for thanks 1242 00:43:49,577 --> 00:43:51,188 very much . It's been a good 1243 00:43:51,188 --> 00:43:53,243 opportunity to talk to you today . I 1244 00:43:53,243 --> 00:43:55,466 wish you all the best , and thanks very 1245 00:43:55,466 --> 00:43:57,688 much out from Tampa . All right , Thank 1246 00:43:57,688 --> 00:43:59,910 you , sir . Ladies and gentlemen , this 1247 00:43:59,910 --> 00:43:59,670 concludes today's press briefing . 1248 00:43:59,680 --> 00:44:00,320 Thank you .