1 00:00:02,040 --> 00:00:04,250 Good afternoon everyone . Let's go 2 00:00:04,250 --> 00:00:06,780 ahead and get started . Welcome to the 3 00:00:06,780 --> 00:00:08,950 briefing the PB 23 briefing for the 4 00:00:08,960 --> 00:00:12,200 Missile Defense Agency . To my left is 5 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:14,200 the director of the Missile Defense 6 00:00:14,200 --> 00:00:16,256 Agency . Vice Admiral john Hill . To 7 00:00:16,256 --> 00:00:18,422 his left is the Missile Defense Agency 8 00:00:18,422 --> 00:00:21,440 Controller . MS dee Dee Martinez . Once 9 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:24,320 the presentation is complete this 10 00:00:24,320 --> 00:00:26,209 afternoon , we will have time for 11 00:00:26,209 --> 00:00:28,670 questions . Of course . Please identify 12 00:00:28,670 --> 00:00:30,892 yourself and try to limit yourselves to 13 00:00:30,892 --> 00:00:32,980 one question with one follow up , do 14 00:00:32,980 --> 00:00:36,580 your best . I know that's hard 34 in a 15 00:00:36,580 --> 00:00:38,747 row . Please try and keep it to one if 16 00:00:38,747 --> 00:00:41,080 you can and then a follow up if you can , 17 00:00:41,080 --> 00:00:43,136 it'll just be easier on our , on our 18 00:00:43,136 --> 00:00:45,358 briefers today . And with that , I will 19 00:00:45,358 --> 00:00:47,469 turn it over to Vice Admiral Hill for 20 00:00:47,469 --> 00:00:49,358 his opening remarks and we'll get 21 00:00:49,358 --> 00:00:51,247 started . Okay , great . Thanks . 22 00:00:51,247 --> 00:00:53,358 Thanks Mark . Good afternoon . Thanks 23 00:00:53,358 --> 00:00:55,920 for the time today . I'm really here to 24 00:00:55,930 --> 00:00:58,980 represent our team . We call ourselves 25 00:00:58,980 --> 00:01:01,091 a stellar team with a noble mission . 26 00:01:01,091 --> 00:01:03,147 You know , you wake up every morning 27 00:01:03,147 --> 00:01:05,369 and if you work for the Missile Defense 28 00:01:05,369 --> 00:01:07,480 Agency , you know exactly what you're 29 00:01:07,480 --> 00:01:06,870 focused on and what we're focused on 30 00:01:06,870 --> 00:01:09,260 today is dealing with a very formidable 31 00:01:09,260 --> 00:01:11,550 and evolving threat . And so every 32 00:01:11,550 --> 00:01:13,550 penny that we're spending in the 23 33 00:01:13,550 --> 00:01:15,661 budget is focused on how we deal with 34 00:01:15,661 --> 00:01:17,828 those threats across a multiple , uh , 35 00:01:17,828 --> 00:01:20,161 you know , set of , of interesting , uh , 36 00:01:20,161 --> 00:01:22,383 scenarios . Um , so we're going to talk 37 00:01:22,383 --> 00:01:24,383 to you about where those investment 38 00:01:24,383 --> 00:01:26,606 areas are and I'm gonna turn it over to 39 00:01:26,606 --> 00:01:26,220 our Great Controller . MS Dee Dee 40 00:01:26,220 --> 00:01:29,240 Martinez . Thank you , Good afternoon 41 00:01:29,240 --> 00:01:31,462 everyone . I appreciate the opportunity 42 00:01:31,462 --> 00:01:33,351 to brief you today on the missile 43 00:01:33,351 --> 00:01:35,573 Defense Agency's Fy 23 budget request . 44 00:01:35,640 --> 00:01:39,110 Next chart please . In 2004 , the 45 00:01:39,110 --> 00:01:41,221 United States activated the ballistic 46 00:01:41,221 --> 00:01:43,277 missile defense system for the first 47 00:01:43,277 --> 00:01:45,443 time to defend the US Homeland against 48 00:01:45,443 --> 00:01:47,554 limited ballistic missile attack from 49 00:01:47,554 --> 00:01:49,721 nations such as North Korea and Iran . 50 00:01:49,721 --> 00:01:51,888 Since then , the threats posed by both 51 00:01:51,888 --> 00:01:53,888 ballistic and non ballistic missile 52 00:01:53,888 --> 00:01:56,054 systems have increased in both numbers 53 00:01:56,054 --> 00:01:58,110 and complexity . The missile defense 54 00:01:58,110 --> 00:02:00,110 system that the nation has deployed 55 00:02:00,110 --> 00:02:02,110 today addresses the current missile 56 00:02:02,110 --> 00:02:04,277 threat and consists of a robust sensor 57 00:02:04,277 --> 00:02:06,499 network , ground based interceptors for 58 00:02:06,499 --> 00:02:08,388 homeland defense and for regional 59 00:02:08,388 --> 00:02:10,610 defense . We have interceptors deployed 60 00:02:10,610 --> 00:02:12,499 on Aegis ships at Aegis ashore in 61 00:02:12,499 --> 00:02:14,277 Romania and in thad and patriot 62 00:02:14,277 --> 00:02:16,560 batteries deployed worldwide . These 63 00:02:16,560 --> 00:02:18,671 assets are all linked together by our 64 00:02:18,671 --> 00:02:20,893 command and control . Battle management 65 00:02:20,893 --> 00:02:23,004 and communications or C2 BMC system . 66 00:02:23,740 --> 00:02:25,851 However , the threat is changing at a 67 00:02:25,851 --> 00:02:27,796 rapid pace and we must continue to 68 00:02:27,796 --> 00:02:29,684 invest in system upgrades and new 69 00:02:29,684 --> 00:02:32,030 technology to keep pace . Ballistic 70 00:02:32,030 --> 00:02:34,252 missiles are now more sophisticated and 71 00:02:34,252 --> 00:02:36,141 numerous . They are becoming more 72 00:02:36,141 --> 00:02:38,440 mobile . Survivable , reliable and 73 00:02:38,440 --> 00:02:41,380 accurate and can achieve longer ranges . 74 00:02:41,840 --> 00:02:43,784 New ballistic missile systems also 75 00:02:43,784 --> 00:02:45,673 feature multiple and maneuverable 76 00:02:45,673 --> 00:02:48,220 reentry vehicles along with decoys and 77 00:02:48,220 --> 00:02:50,600 jamming devices . The homeland must 78 00:02:50,600 --> 00:02:52,730 also defend . Be defended from cruise 79 00:02:52,730 --> 00:02:54,786 missile attacks . The cruise missile 80 00:02:54,786 --> 00:02:56,397 threat is also increasing in 81 00:02:56,397 --> 00:02:59,130 sophistication and lethality . Cruise 82 00:02:59,130 --> 00:03:01,186 missiles follow unpredictable flight 83 00:03:01,186 --> 00:03:03,420 paths and are now capable of supersonic 84 00:03:03,430 --> 00:03:05,980 and hypersonic speeds . Russia and 85 00:03:05,980 --> 00:03:08,036 china are developing advanced cruise 86 00:03:08,036 --> 00:03:09,980 missiles that can be launched from 87 00:03:09,980 --> 00:03:12,091 aircraft , ground launchers and ships 88 00:03:12,091 --> 00:03:14,580 or submarines . Along with hypersonic 89 00:03:14,580 --> 00:03:17,250 missile capabilities , hypersonic 90 00:03:17,250 --> 00:03:19,306 missiles pose a new challenge to our 91 00:03:19,306 --> 00:03:21,528 missile defense systems . These threats 92 00:03:21,528 --> 00:03:23,583 can travel at exceptional speeds and 93 00:03:23,583 --> 00:03:26,970 unpredictable flight path . The 94 00:03:26,970 --> 00:03:29,081 development and deployment of missile 95 00:03:29,081 --> 00:03:30,914 defense systems to counter these 96 00:03:30,914 --> 00:03:32,970 advanced threats presents unique but 97 00:03:32,970 --> 00:03:35,081 surmountable challenges which require 98 00:03:35,081 --> 00:03:37,026 further development and technology 99 00:03:37,026 --> 00:03:39,137 investments . As I will highlight the 100 00:03:39,137 --> 00:03:41,248 Missile Defense Agency's FY 23 budget 101 00:03:41,248 --> 00:03:43,260 request includes key investments to 102 00:03:43,260 --> 00:03:45,530 address these challenges . Next chart 103 00:03:45,530 --> 00:03:48,830 please . The Missile Defense Agency 104 00:03:48,830 --> 00:03:50,774 mission is to develop and deploy a 105 00:03:50,774 --> 00:03:52,663 layered missile defense system to 106 00:03:52,663 --> 00:03:54,441 defend the United States . It's 107 00:03:54,441 --> 00:03:56,710 deployed forces , allies and friends 108 00:03:56,710 --> 00:03:58,821 from missile attacks in all phases of 109 00:03:58,821 --> 00:04:02,120 flight . As I've discussed , the need 110 00:04:02,120 --> 00:04:04,500 to invest in new capability development 111 00:04:04,500 --> 00:04:06,556 and advanced technologies to improve 112 00:04:06,556 --> 00:04:08,889 our missile defense systems is critical . 113 00:04:08,889 --> 00:04:10,944 We must also continue to operate and 114 00:04:10,944 --> 00:04:12,944 maintain our fielded systems to the 115 00:04:12,944 --> 00:04:15,056 highest level of system readiness and 116 00:04:15,056 --> 00:04:17,278 reliability and continue to produce and 117 00:04:17,278 --> 00:04:19,111 field missile defense capacity , 118 00:04:19,111 --> 00:04:20,944 including delivery of additional 119 00:04:20,944 --> 00:04:22,389 interceptors and radars . 120 00:04:25,440 --> 00:04:27,607 The balance between current and future 121 00:04:27,607 --> 00:04:29,607 capability is required to meet more 122 00:04:29,607 --> 00:04:31,607 fighter demand and our FY 23 budget 123 00:04:31,607 --> 00:04:33,829 request reflects this commitment . Next 124 00:04:33,829 --> 00:04:37,210 chart please . Our total request of 125 00:04:37,210 --> 00:04:40,770 9.6 billion in FY 23 strengthens and 126 00:04:40,770 --> 00:04:42,740 expands the deployment of defenses 127 00:04:42,740 --> 00:04:44,796 against increasingly capable missile 128 00:04:44,796 --> 00:04:48,040 threats . A request Of our request , 129 00:04:48,040 --> 00:04:50,780 7.9 billion or 82% of our budget is for 130 00:04:50,780 --> 00:04:53,002 research and development efforts . This 131 00:04:53,002 --> 00:04:55,002 budget reflects the best balance of 132 00:04:55,002 --> 00:04:57,002 resources to priorities and program 133 00:04:57,002 --> 00:05:00,910 risk . Next chart please . The 134 00:05:00,910 --> 00:05:03,050 next few charts will go over the 135 00:05:03,050 --> 00:05:05,200 details of our Fy 23 request . But 136 00:05:05,200 --> 00:05:07,478 first here are a few of the highlights . 137 00:05:08,440 --> 00:05:10,551 As with every budget request . Our Fy 138 00:05:10,551 --> 00:05:12,910 23 request maintains the operations and 139 00:05:12,910 --> 00:05:15,021 readiness of deployed missile defense 140 00:05:15,021 --> 00:05:17,132 systems to include our sensor network 141 00:05:17,132 --> 00:05:19,299 homeland and regional interceptors and 142 00:05:19,299 --> 00:05:22,990 see to BMC system . In Fy 23 we will 143 00:05:22,990 --> 00:05:25,040 launch two prototype hypersonic and 144 00:05:25,040 --> 00:05:27,620 ballistic tracking space sensors for on 145 00:05:27,620 --> 00:05:29,810 orbit experimentations in conjunction 146 00:05:29,810 --> 00:05:31,866 with the U . S . Space Force and the 147 00:05:31,866 --> 00:05:34,370 Space Development Agency . We continue 148 00:05:34,370 --> 00:05:36,537 to fund to next generation interceptor 149 00:05:36,537 --> 00:05:38,648 industry teams . Through the critical 150 00:05:38,648 --> 00:05:40,370 design review , we awarded two 151 00:05:40,370 --> 00:05:42,537 contracts last year for this important 152 00:05:42,537 --> 00:05:44,148 homeland defense program And 153 00:05:44,148 --> 00:05:47,820 development is ramping up in Fy 23 . We 154 00:05:47,820 --> 00:05:49,764 also continue the GMD Service life 155 00:05:49,764 --> 00:05:51,931 extension program for G . B . I . S to 156 00:05:51,931 --> 00:05:54,098 increase system reliability . Prior to 157 00:05:54,098 --> 00:05:56,280 N . G . I fielding I spoke earlier of 158 00:05:56,280 --> 00:05:58,391 the hypersonic threat and this budget 159 00:05:58,391 --> 00:06:00,391 continues development of a regional 160 00:06:00,391 --> 00:06:02,113 hypersonic defense glide phase 161 00:06:02,113 --> 00:06:04,280 intercept capability . To address that 162 00:06:04,280 --> 00:06:06,391 threat , we are continuing efforts to 163 00:06:06,391 --> 00:06:08,613 improve the defense of Guam against the 164 00:06:08,613 --> 00:06:10,558 full spectrum of advanced regional 165 00:06:10,558 --> 00:06:12,558 missile threats . This request also 166 00:06:12,558 --> 00:06:14,613 continues production and fielding of 167 00:06:14,613 --> 00:06:16,336 missile defense capability and 168 00:06:16,336 --> 00:06:18,558 production of additional SM three block 169 00:06:18,558 --> 00:06:20,669 one B and two A missiles for the Navy 170 00:06:20,669 --> 00:06:22,724 and thad interceptors for the army . 171 00:06:22,724 --> 00:06:24,724 The next set of charts will address 172 00:06:24,724 --> 00:06:26,891 some of the specific budget line items 173 00:06:26,891 --> 00:06:28,780 in our FY 23 budget request . The 174 00:06:28,780 --> 00:06:30,724 charts are in order of the missile 175 00:06:30,724 --> 00:06:32,947 defense system battle sequence , detect 176 00:06:32,947 --> 00:06:35,620 control and engage . Next chart please . 177 00:06:37,540 --> 00:06:39,596 M . D . A . Initiated the hypersonic 178 00:06:39,596 --> 00:06:41,762 and ballistic tracking space sensor or 179 00:06:41,762 --> 00:06:44,270 HP TSS program in 2018 to address the 180 00:06:44,270 --> 00:06:46,048 requirement to detect and track 181 00:06:46,048 --> 00:06:47,881 hypersonic threats and ballistic 182 00:06:47,881 --> 00:06:50,103 missiles . M . B . A . Is collaborating 183 00:06:50,103 --> 00:06:52,159 with the U . S . Space Force and the 184 00:06:52,159 --> 00:06:54,214 Space Development Agency to deploy a 185 00:06:54,214 --> 00:06:56,048 system that will provide a rapid 186 00:06:56,048 --> 00:06:58,214 capability using mature technology and 187 00:06:58,214 --> 00:07:00,437 operate as an element within the larger 188 00:07:00,437 --> 00:07:02,492 unified overhead persistent infrared 189 00:07:02,492 --> 00:07:04,800 enterprise architecture . The program 190 00:07:04,800 --> 00:07:06,800 will provide fire control , quality 191 00:07:06,800 --> 00:07:09,022 tracking data on hypersonic threats for 192 00:07:09,022 --> 00:07:11,244 handover to missile defense sensors and 193 00:07:11,244 --> 00:07:13,467 engagement by missile defense weapons . 194 00:07:13,730 --> 00:07:17,220 The Fy 23 request for H B T . S s is 89 195 00:07:17,220 --> 00:07:19,442 million and will support the deployment 196 00:07:19,442 --> 00:07:21,860 of two satellites in Fy 23 with on 197 00:07:21,860 --> 00:07:24,480 orbit experimentations to follow The 198 00:07:24,480 --> 00:07:26,536 space based kill assessment or Scott 199 00:07:26,536 --> 00:07:28,690 sensors were launched and an on orbit 200 00:07:28,690 --> 00:07:31,510 checkout was completed in 2019 . The 201 00:07:31,510 --> 00:07:33,121 Scots sensors have performed 202 00:07:33,121 --> 00:07:35,288 successfully during several recent NBA 203 00:07:35,288 --> 00:07:37,343 flight tests , further demonstrating 204 00:07:37,343 --> 00:07:39,399 the hit assessment capability to the 205 00:07:39,399 --> 00:07:41,490 Warfighter . The sky request is 27 206 00:07:41,490 --> 00:07:43,712 million to continue integration of this 207 00:07:43,712 --> 00:07:46,260 capability into the MSs . We are 208 00:07:46,260 --> 00:07:48,760 developing deploying and sustaining 209 00:07:48,760 --> 00:07:50,927 ground based radars to counter current 210 00:07:50,927 --> 00:07:52,871 and future missile threats , build 211 00:07:52,871 --> 00:07:54,871 warfighter confidence and increased 212 00:07:54,871 --> 00:07:57,460 force structure . Our Fy 23 request 213 00:07:57,460 --> 00:08:00,630 includes 504 million to upgrade and 214 00:08:00,630 --> 00:08:03,450 sustain the 12 tippy two radars . With 215 00:08:03,450 --> 00:08:05,561 the 13th radar being procured with Fy 216 00:08:05,561 --> 00:08:08,980 21 funds from Congress 75 million for 217 00:08:08,980 --> 00:08:11,147 the long range discrimination radar or 218 00:08:11,147 --> 00:08:13,810 L R . D . R . In Alaska . This advanced 219 00:08:13,810 --> 00:08:15,754 radar achieved initial fielding in 220 00:08:15,754 --> 00:08:18,220 December of 2021 and is a critical mid 221 00:08:18,220 --> 00:08:20,220 course sensor that improves missile 222 00:08:20,220 --> 00:08:22,276 defense system threat discrimination 223 00:08:22,276 --> 00:08:24,387 capability and also allows for a more 224 00:08:24,387 --> 00:08:26,498 efficient use of the ground-based mid 225 00:08:26,498 --> 00:08:29,560 course defense system . 165 million for 226 00:08:29,560 --> 00:08:32,710 the sea based X band radar or SBX to 227 00:08:32,710 --> 00:08:34,821 provide precision mid course tracking 228 00:08:34,821 --> 00:08:36,877 and threat discrimination to protect 229 00:08:36,877 --> 00:08:39,170 our homeland . Our FY 23 Request 230 00:08:39,320 --> 00:08:41,376 continues operations and support for 231 00:08:41,376 --> 00:08:44,060 this critical radar 20 million to 232 00:08:44,060 --> 00:08:46,020 sustain and provide updates to the 233 00:08:46,020 --> 00:08:48,242 upgraded early warning radars or you'II 234 00:08:48,242 --> 00:08:50,830 WRS and continue to sustain the Cobra 235 00:08:50,830 --> 00:08:52,941 dane radar in partnership with the US 236 00:08:52,941 --> 00:08:55,620 Air Force C two B M . C . Is the 237 00:08:55,620 --> 00:08:57,620 integrating elements of our missile 238 00:08:57,620 --> 00:09:00,220 defense system . Our FY 23 requests of 239 00:09:00,220 --> 00:09:02,800 569 million sustains the field at sea 240 00:09:02,800 --> 00:09:05,980 to BMC capability across 18 time zones 241 00:09:06,110 --> 00:09:08,710 with hardened networks supporting all 242 00:09:08,710 --> 00:09:11,150 of the combatant commands . A request 243 00:09:11,150 --> 00:09:13,261 also integrates new capabilities such 244 00:09:13,261 --> 00:09:15,483 as the recently fielded L . R . D . R . 245 00:09:15,483 --> 00:09:18,430 Into the sea to BMC system . Next chart 246 00:09:18,430 --> 00:09:22,120 please . The department is committed to 247 00:09:22,120 --> 00:09:24,398 improving US homeland missile defenses . 248 00:09:25,040 --> 00:09:27,040 The ground based mid course defense 249 00:09:27,040 --> 00:09:28,818 system or G M D . Serves as the 250 00:09:28,818 --> 00:09:31,040 continuously available homeland missile 251 00:09:31,040 --> 00:09:32,873 defense capability for defending 252 00:09:32,873 --> 00:09:34,984 against today's rogue state ballistic 253 00:09:34,984 --> 00:09:37,096 missile threats . The request for GMD 254 00:09:37,096 --> 00:09:40,460 is 2.8 billion . The request sustains 255 00:09:40,460 --> 00:09:42,182 and improves the performance , 256 00:09:42,182 --> 00:09:44,340 reliability , availability , and 257 00:09:44,340 --> 00:09:46,720 cybersecurity resiliency of the GMD 258 00:09:46,720 --> 00:09:48,887 weapons system throughout the fight of 259 00:09:49,340 --> 00:09:51,451 the request upgrades homeland defense 260 00:09:51,451 --> 00:09:53,507 system capabilities including ground 261 00:09:53,507 --> 00:09:56,030 based interceptors , ground systems and 262 00:09:56,030 --> 00:09:57,863 phased array G B I communication 263 00:09:57,863 --> 00:10:00,720 terminal kids and improves components 264 00:10:00,730 --> 00:10:03,990 of the agency's GMD system including G 265 00:10:03,990 --> 00:10:06,270 B I . S . Fire control nodes , 266 00:10:06,280 --> 00:10:09,580 communication systems , launch systems 267 00:10:09,610 --> 00:10:11,970 and infrastructure to pace rogue Nation 268 00:10:11,970 --> 00:10:14,570 threats to the homeland and initiates 269 00:10:14,580 --> 00:10:16,413 ground weapons system capability 270 00:10:16,413 --> 00:10:19,110 improvements to integrate N G I . The 271 00:10:19,110 --> 00:10:21,290 request continues funding for two N GI 272 00:10:21,290 --> 00:10:23,290 industry teams through the critical 273 00:10:23,290 --> 00:10:25,230 design review . This plan reduces 274 00:10:25,230 --> 00:10:27,063 technical risk in meeting common 275 00:10:27,063 --> 00:10:29,063 requirements and advanced threats , 276 00:10:29,340 --> 00:10:31,507 secures competitive production pricing 277 00:10:31,507 --> 00:10:33,340 and creates incentives for early 278 00:10:33,340 --> 00:10:35,507 delivery to the war fighter , which is 279 00:10:35,507 --> 00:10:37,729 one of their top priorities . The N G . 280 00:10:37,729 --> 00:10:39,618 I development will provide a more 281 00:10:39,618 --> 00:10:41,840 capable , robust all up around solution 282 00:10:41,840 --> 00:10:43,951 to meet the emerging threat , improve 283 00:10:43,951 --> 00:10:45,970 system survivability and increased 284 00:10:45,970 --> 00:10:48,081 performance against projected threats 285 00:10:48,081 --> 00:10:50,470 from rogue states . The Aegis missile 286 00:10:50,470 --> 00:10:53,020 defense request is 1.6 billion and 287 00:10:53,020 --> 00:10:55,131 continues to upgrade the AegIS weapon 288 00:10:55,131 --> 00:10:57,409 system and procure additional missiles , 289 00:10:57,409 --> 00:11:00,350 47 Aegis sM three block one B missiles 290 00:11:00,360 --> 00:11:02,580 and 10 sM three block two A missiles 291 00:11:02,580 --> 00:11:04,802 will be Procured for deployment on land 292 00:11:04,802 --> 00:11:07,024 at the two Aegis ashore sites in europe 293 00:11:07,024 --> 00:11:09,150 and at sea on multi mission capable 294 00:11:09,160 --> 00:11:12,000 Aegis ships . Our request continues the 295 00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:14,167 multiyear procurement for the SM three 296 00:11:14,167 --> 00:11:16,750 Block 1 B missile . We will continue to 297 00:11:16,750 --> 00:11:18,750 develop and implement Aegis weapons 298 00:11:18,750 --> 00:11:20,861 system upgrades to support the Navy's 299 00:11:20,861 --> 00:11:23,028 newest destroyers with the new spy six 300 00:11:23,028 --> 00:11:26,160 radar radar as well as upgrades sensors 301 00:11:26,540 --> 00:11:28,762 on the older ships in the Aegis fleet . 302 00:11:29,540 --> 00:11:31,651 The third weapon system is a globally 303 00:11:31,651 --> 00:11:33,596 transportable ground based missile 304 00:11:33,596 --> 00:11:35,318 defense system which is highly 305 00:11:35,318 --> 00:11:37,373 effective against short range medium 306 00:11:37,373 --> 00:11:39,540 range and intermediate range threats . 307 00:11:39,540 --> 00:11:41,429 As you know , the U . A . E . Has 308 00:11:41,429 --> 00:11:43,651 acquired thad batteries through foreign 309 00:11:43,651 --> 00:11:45,651 military sales and recently had the 310 00:11:45,651 --> 00:11:47,818 first successful combat engagements of 311 00:11:47,818 --> 00:11:49,929 the system . The Fy 23 3rd Request is 312 00:11:49,929 --> 00:11:53,760 422 million In Fy 23 . We will procure 313 00:11:53,760 --> 00:11:55,427 three thad interceptors while 314 00:11:55,427 --> 00:11:57,538 increasing obsolescence and stockpile 315 00:11:57,538 --> 00:11:59,371 reliability to extend in service 316 00:11:59,371 --> 00:12:01,300 interceptor life . We will also 317 00:12:01,300 --> 00:12:03,522 continue development and integration of 318 00:12:03,522 --> 00:12:05,689 multiple thoughts . Software builds to 319 00:12:05,689 --> 00:12:07,750 improve readiness , reliability and 320 00:12:07,750 --> 00:12:10,090 availability and enhance capability 321 00:12:10,090 --> 00:12:12,220 against global operational threats , 322 00:12:12,640 --> 00:12:15,020 address the evolving threat , improve 323 00:12:15,020 --> 00:12:17,076 the warfighters defense planning and 324 00:12:17,076 --> 00:12:20,310 improved system capability . Our Fy 23 325 00:12:20,320 --> 00:12:22,264 budget request includes funding to 326 00:12:22,264 --> 00:12:24,264 continue testing of fat and patriot 327 00:12:24,264 --> 00:12:26,487 interoperability to improve the overall 328 00:12:26,487 --> 00:12:28,750 missile defense capability and increase 329 00:12:28,750 --> 00:12:32,030 the defended area . F T T 25 is the key 330 00:12:32,030 --> 00:12:34,350 Fy 23 test of this capability . 331 00:12:35,840 --> 00:12:38,062 Current forces are capable of defending 332 00:12:38,062 --> 00:12:39,951 Guam against today's north korean 333 00:12:39,951 --> 00:12:42,062 ballistic missile threats . However , 334 00:12:42,062 --> 00:12:44,173 the regional threat to Guam including 335 00:12:44,173 --> 00:12:46,360 from china continues to rapidly evolve 336 00:12:47,140 --> 00:12:49,251 At the request of Indo pay calm . The 337 00:12:49,251 --> 00:12:51,560 FY 22 budget included funds to begin 338 00:12:51,560 --> 00:12:53,180 system architecture work and 339 00:12:53,180 --> 00:12:55,660 procurement for enhanced defensive blam . 340 00:12:56,290 --> 00:12:58,512 The architecture has now been finalized 341 00:12:58,512 --> 00:13:00,179 and includes a combination of 342 00:13:00,179 --> 00:13:01,957 integrated MD , a army and navy 343 00:13:01,957 --> 00:13:04,860 components . The Fy 23 MG . A request 344 00:13:04,860 --> 00:13:07,720 for defense of Guam is 539 million and 345 00:13:07,720 --> 00:13:09,720 continues the architecture work but 346 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:11,664 also provides funds for design and 347 00:13:11,664 --> 00:13:13,609 development of multiple land based 348 00:13:13,609 --> 00:13:15,776 radar systems . Procurement of weapons 349 00:13:15,776 --> 00:13:17,998 system components and initiates milk on 350 00:13:17,998 --> 00:13:20,400 planning and design activities . Next 351 00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:23,900 chart please . As always , we are 352 00:13:23,900 --> 00:13:26,067 looking to develop new technologies to 353 00:13:26,067 --> 00:13:28,200 keep pace with the threat . Our Fy 23 354 00:13:28,200 --> 00:13:30,311 budget request includes 39 million to 355 00:13:30,311 --> 00:13:32,311 continue our innovation science and 356 00:13:32,311 --> 00:13:34,660 technology program to explore leap 357 00:13:34,660 --> 00:13:37,040 ahead and disruptive technologies and 358 00:13:37,040 --> 00:13:39,151 also develop emerging capabilities to 359 00:13:39,151 --> 00:13:41,440 enhance our missile defenses . We are 360 00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:44,080 requesting 563 million for systems 361 00:13:44,080 --> 00:13:46,550 engineering to continue to provide 362 00:13:46,550 --> 00:13:48,717 critical products and processes needed 363 00:13:48,717 --> 00:13:50,661 to combine element missile defense 364 00:13:50,661 --> 00:13:53,100 capabilities into a single integrated 365 00:13:53,110 --> 00:13:55,700 and layered system testing is a 366 00:13:55,700 --> 00:13:57,867 critical aspect of the missile Defense 367 00:13:57,867 --> 00:13:59,811 Agency . Mission validating system 368 00:13:59,811 --> 00:14:01,922 performance through flight and ground 369 00:14:01,922 --> 00:14:03,922 tests is paramount to building more 370 00:14:03,922 --> 00:14:06,033 fighter confidence in our system . To 371 00:14:06,033 --> 00:14:08,144 that end , our FY 23 request includes 372 00:14:08,144 --> 00:14:10,840 361 million for flight , ground and 373 00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:14,260 cybersecurity testing 560 million for 374 00:14:14,260 --> 00:14:16,427 development of threat . Representative 375 00:14:16,427 --> 00:14:19,420 targets used during testing . Fy 23 376 00:14:19,420 --> 00:14:22,490 test highlights include F T G 12 A Gmd 377 00:14:22,490 --> 00:14:25,380 test of a G B I and two stage mode and 378 00:14:25,380 --> 00:14:27,750 a Tad Patriot . MSC interoperability 379 00:14:27,750 --> 00:14:31,330 test F T T 25 . We are continuing to 380 00:14:31,330 --> 00:14:33,052 develop and deliver a regional 381 00:14:33,052 --> 00:14:35,108 hypersonic defense capability to the 382 00:14:35,108 --> 00:14:37,274 warfighter . We are developing a glide 383 00:14:37,274 --> 00:14:39,386 phase intercept capability for future 384 00:14:39,386 --> 00:14:41,497 demonstration leveraging our existing 385 00:14:41,497 --> 00:14:43,730 missile defense systems . The request 386 00:14:43,730 --> 00:14:46,450 for hypersonic defense is 225 million . 387 00:14:47,240 --> 00:14:49,690 Our Fy 23 request includes 11 million 388 00:14:49,690 --> 00:14:51,634 to continue to develop the systems 389 00:14:51,634 --> 00:14:53,520 architecture and to conduct a 390 00:14:53,520 --> 00:14:55,353 demonstration for cruise missile 391 00:14:55,353 --> 00:14:57,409 defense capabilities using the joint 392 00:14:57,409 --> 00:14:59,330 tactical integrated fire control 393 00:14:59,330 --> 00:15:02,270 capability . This is in response to us 394 00:15:02,270 --> 00:15:04,270 North comms requirements for cruise 395 00:15:04,270 --> 00:15:06,492 missile defense of the homeland M . D . 396 00:15:06,492 --> 00:15:08,603 A . And is the Israel Missile Defense 397 00:15:08,603 --> 00:15:10,826 Organization . Continue to cooperate on 398 00:15:10,826 --> 00:15:13,130 engineering development , co production 399 00:15:13,150 --> 00:15:15,400 testing and fielding of the Israeli 400 00:15:15,400 --> 00:15:18,410 missile defense systems . The FY 23 401 00:15:18,410 --> 00:15:20,380 request of 500 million remains 402 00:15:20,380 --> 00:15:22,450 consistent with the memorandum of 403 00:15:22,450 --> 00:15:24,672 understanding between the United States 404 00:15:24,672 --> 00:15:28,550 and Israel . Next chart please In 405 00:15:28,550 --> 00:15:30,890 summary , we are requesting 9.6 billion 406 00:15:30,890 --> 00:15:33,730 in Fy 23 . Our request aligns with 407 00:15:33,730 --> 00:15:35,730 department priorities to defend the 408 00:15:35,730 --> 00:15:38,350 homeland and deter attacks . This 409 00:15:38,350 --> 00:15:40,406 budget will continue to increase the 410 00:15:40,406 --> 00:15:42,461 readiness capability and capacity of 411 00:15:42,461 --> 00:15:44,517 fielded homeland in regional missile 412 00:15:44,517 --> 00:15:46,740 defense systems . It also invests in 413 00:15:46,740 --> 00:15:48,907 advanced technology and development to 414 00:15:48,907 --> 00:15:51,990 counter the expanding threat . The Fy 415 00:15:51,990 --> 00:15:54,490 23 request launches prototype 416 00:15:54,490 --> 00:15:56,712 hypersonic and ballistic tracking space 417 00:15:56,712 --> 00:15:58,890 sensors for an on orbit experiment in 418 00:15:58,890 --> 00:16:00,834 conjunction with the U . S . Space 419 00:16:00,834 --> 00:16:02,612 Force and S . D . A . Continued 420 00:16:02,612 --> 00:16:04,557 development of the next generation 421 00:16:04,557 --> 00:16:06,779 interceptor . Procured SM three Block 1 422 00:16:06,779 --> 00:16:08,900 B and two a missiles and that 423 00:16:08,900 --> 00:16:10,789 interceptors for our war fighters 424 00:16:11,140 --> 00:16:13,320 continues to execute a robust and 425 00:16:13,320 --> 00:16:15,690 aggressive test program , continues 426 00:16:15,690 --> 00:16:17,634 development of hypersonic defenses 427 00:16:17,634 --> 00:16:19,357 including regional glide phase 428 00:16:19,357 --> 00:16:21,690 interceptor development and continues 429 00:16:21,690 --> 00:16:23,400 to enhance defensive Guam in 430 00:16:23,400 --> 00:16:25,567 coordination with the services and end 431 00:16:25,567 --> 00:16:28,390 up a com . Thank you the Admiral and I 432 00:16:28,390 --> 00:16:30,168 will now take a few questions . 433 00:16:33,740 --> 00:16:37,520 He said army and Navy elements he saved 434 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:39,960 that includes Aegis ashore or what 435 00:16:39,960 --> 00:16:42,290 elements there are But it does include 436 00:16:42,430 --> 00:16:44,486 just assured who would be manning in 437 00:16:44,486 --> 00:16:46,810 the Navy or the army . Great great 438 00:16:46,810 --> 00:16:48,977 question . Uh the architecture on Guam 439 00:16:48,977 --> 00:16:50,977 will be a mix of those systems . So 440 00:16:50,977 --> 00:16:53,970 think of that as NBA systems , our ME 441 00:16:53,980 --> 00:16:57,330 systems and uh navy systems . It will 442 00:16:57,330 --> 00:16:59,560 not be any just assure think of it as a 443 00:16:59,560 --> 00:17:02,080 distributed system because we do we're 444 00:17:02,080 --> 00:17:04,024 going to respond to the number one 445 00:17:04,024 --> 00:17:05,969 requirement of 362 degree coverage 446 00:17:05,969 --> 00:17:08,580 against ballistic cruise and hypersonic 447 00:17:08,580 --> 00:17:11,400 threats . Would be 448 00:17:15,220 --> 00:17:18,150 would be thad navy would be SM six or 449 00:17:18,160 --> 00:17:22,030 so . M . D . A . Would be the ballistic 450 00:17:22,030 --> 00:17:24,252 missile portion of Aegis . We work that 451 00:17:24,252 --> 00:17:26,419 in coordination with the Navy . So for 452 00:17:26,419 --> 00:17:28,586 procurement of some of those equipment 453 00:17:28,586 --> 00:17:30,808 sweets that you would need . That's our 454 00:17:30,808 --> 00:17:33,030 coordination with the Navy . Um It will 455 00:17:33,030 --> 00:17:34,974 include sm three missiles , sm six 456 00:17:34,974 --> 00:17:37,030 missiles and then the army will be 457 00:17:37,030 --> 00:17:39,086 connecting to them through their eye 458 00:17:39,086 --> 00:17:41,900 BCS system . So that will uh right now 459 00:17:41,900 --> 00:17:43,733 stay on the island . The current 460 00:17:43,733 --> 00:17:45,844 architecture right now is Aegis ships 461 00:17:45,844 --> 00:17:47,900 and that uh , we're gonna build upon 462 00:17:47,900 --> 00:17:49,844 that architecture leveraging Aegis 463 00:17:49,844 --> 00:17:51,733 command control , weapons , I BCS 464 00:17:51,733 --> 00:17:54,380 command control and weapons jen , 465 00:17:54,380 --> 00:17:58,080 please just pile on that would using a 466 00:17:58,090 --> 00:18:00,090 mid range capability missile as the 467 00:18:00,090 --> 00:18:02,260 launcher be something that you would 468 00:18:02,270 --> 00:18:05,550 consider um , down the road . Um , and 469 00:18:05,550 --> 00:18:07,661 also , what about certain things like 470 00:18:07,661 --> 00:18:09,828 army , army's radar , the l tams radar 471 00:18:09,828 --> 00:18:12,140 that to becoming a lot online . How are 472 00:18:12,140 --> 00:18:14,084 you looking at incorporating those 473 00:18:14,084 --> 00:18:16,084 future capable ? We assessed all of 474 00:18:16,084 --> 00:18:18,084 those areas , particularly the ones 475 00:18:18,084 --> 00:18:20,251 that were the most mature and the most 476 00:18:20,251 --> 00:18:22,584 capable today across those mission sets . 477 00:18:22,584 --> 00:18:24,880 So , so you will see heavy interest in 478 00:18:24,940 --> 00:18:26,996 mobile mobile launchers . So when we 479 00:18:26,996 --> 00:18:29,162 talk about distributed systems , it is 480 00:18:29,162 --> 00:18:31,329 about being as mobile as possible . So 481 00:18:31,329 --> 00:18:33,440 you're gonna see a distributed system 482 00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:36,060 that is mobile . Don't I'm going to 483 00:18:36,060 --> 00:18:38,060 span the global , global little bit 484 00:18:38,060 --> 00:18:40,227 span the globe a little bit the polish 485 00:18:40,227 --> 00:18:42,060 aegis ashore system . Given that 486 00:18:42,060 --> 00:18:44,630 europe's Topical . four years late , is 487 00:18:44,630 --> 00:18:46,630 it going to get , is it going to be 488 00:18:46,630 --> 00:18:49,560 operational this year ? Yeah , it's 489 00:18:49,570 --> 00:18:51,626 it's tracking along really well . Um 490 00:18:51,626 --> 00:18:53,848 you know , where we were , I think over 491 00:18:53,848 --> 00:18:55,848 the last 2 to 3 years the issue has 492 00:18:55,848 --> 00:18:58,070 been with the construction side of it , 493 00:18:58,070 --> 00:19:00,014 it's , it's like shipbuilding . If 494 00:19:00,014 --> 00:19:02,126 you're , if you're late on the ship , 495 00:19:02,126 --> 00:19:04,292 you're going to be late on getting the 496 00:19:04,292 --> 00:19:06,626 combat system installed and tested . Uh , 497 00:19:06,626 --> 00:19:06,600 we are in very close coordination with 498 00:19:06,600 --> 00:19:08,960 the Army Corps have have gotten to the 499 00:19:08,960 --> 00:19:10,571 point where we've got a very 500 00:19:10,571 --> 00:19:12,516 predictable schedule now . Um , so 501 00:19:12,516 --> 00:19:14,682 we've got the arrays in place , all of 502 00:19:14,682 --> 00:19:16,460 the Aegis equipment for the war 503 00:19:16,460 --> 00:19:18,293 fighting capability to shore now 504 00:19:18,293 --> 00:19:20,349 installed . It's all in place and we 505 00:19:20,349 --> 00:19:22,238 start our testing campaign on the 506 00:19:22,238 --> 00:19:24,571 combat system coming up this next month . 507 00:19:24,690 --> 00:19:26,360 That may be considered fully 508 00:19:26,360 --> 00:19:28,693 operational , your version of the F . U . 509 00:19:28,693 --> 00:19:31,520 E . So I typically like to do that when 510 00:19:31,520 --> 00:19:33,298 we don't have , you know , that 511 00:19:33,298 --> 00:19:35,464 confident schedule , you know , in the 512 00:19:35,464 --> 00:19:37,687 rear view mirror ? That's kind of a new 513 00:19:37,687 --> 00:19:39,798 thing . Plus we have a lot of wickets 514 00:19:39,798 --> 00:19:42,020 to go through . There's going to be the 515 00:19:42,020 --> 00:19:44,242 technical capability declaration on the 516 00:19:44,242 --> 00:19:43,540 NBA side . Then we have to do Navy 517 00:19:43,540 --> 00:19:45,373 acceptance . Then we do european 518 00:19:45,373 --> 00:19:47,151 command acceptance and the NATO 519 00:19:47,151 --> 00:19:49,373 acceptance . So all of those have their 520 00:19:49,373 --> 00:19:51,596 own schedules were working very closely 521 00:19:51,596 --> 00:19:53,651 across all those entities so that we 522 00:19:53,651 --> 00:19:55,762 can get there as soon as we can . I'm 523 00:19:55,762 --> 00:19:57,984 not going to ask you whether the launch 524 00:19:57,984 --> 00:20:00,207 last week was an indication of an I C . 525 00:20:00,207 --> 00:20:02,429 B . M . But I do want to ask you this , 526 00:20:02,429 --> 00:20:04,373 what is your assessment is the man 527 00:20:04,373 --> 00:20:06,207 whose agency is in charge of the 528 00:20:06,207 --> 00:20:08,373 missiles to defend the United States , 529 00:20:08,373 --> 00:20:10,596 what's your assessment of North Korea's 530 00:20:10,596 --> 00:20:12,540 countermeasures capability at this 531 00:20:12,540 --> 00:20:14,540 point ? It's always been a sticking 532 00:20:14,540 --> 00:20:14,160 point of the arms control community . 533 00:20:14,410 --> 00:20:16,780 So so I'm not in charge of that 534 00:20:16,780 --> 00:20:18,724 capability . Once it's deployed we 535 00:20:18,724 --> 00:20:20,891 certainly develop it and we provide it 536 00:20:20,891 --> 00:20:22,891 to the services to meet the command 537 00:20:22,891 --> 00:20:24,947 commands requirements . Um If you're 538 00:20:24,947 --> 00:20:26,780 really asking more of an intel a 539 00:20:26,780 --> 00:20:28,836 question , but I would say that they 540 00:20:28,836 --> 00:20:30,724 were advancing uh and that's what 541 00:20:30,724 --> 00:20:32,780 you're seeing around the globe . You 542 00:20:32,780 --> 00:20:31,730 know , you said you were gonna walk 543 00:20:31,730 --> 00:20:33,897 around the globe here . I tell you the 544 00:20:33,897 --> 00:20:36,119 the evolving threat is coming from many 545 00:20:36,119 --> 00:20:38,119 axes and it's coming in all forms . 546 00:20:38,119 --> 00:20:40,230 Whether it's air launched , submarine 547 00:20:40,230 --> 00:20:42,286 launched , ballistic launched cruise 548 00:20:42,286 --> 00:20:44,508 missile launched hypersonic . Uh that's 549 00:20:44,508 --> 00:20:46,730 what we're dealing with as a department 550 00:20:46,730 --> 00:20:46,090 along with our allies and partners . 551 00:20:46,090 --> 00:20:48,360 It's it's it's a tough place to be but 552 00:20:48,360 --> 00:20:50,138 I would say that enough of that 553 00:20:50,138 --> 00:20:53,150 technology is proliferating to where we 554 00:20:53,150 --> 00:20:55,200 have to address it . North Korea is 555 00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:56,978 that they're advancing in their 556 00:20:56,978 --> 00:20:58,978 countermeasures capability over the 557 00:20:58,978 --> 00:21:00,978 last two or three years or that's a 558 00:21:00,978 --> 00:21:00,740 better question for the intel community . 559 00:21:00,740 --> 00:21:02,962 I can give you a qualitative answer but 560 00:21:02,962 --> 00:21:05,184 I'm not gonna talk about details here . 561 00:21:05,184 --> 00:21:07,184 Okay I want to ask you to be on the 562 00:21:07,184 --> 00:21:09,407 General Selva The vice chief of staff a 563 00:21:09,407 --> 00:21:11,629 few years ago in 2019 as he was leaving 564 00:21:11,629 --> 00:21:13,860 said , North Korea has not perfected 565 00:21:14,950 --> 00:21:17,350 reentry vehicle ? The army and guidance 566 00:21:17,350 --> 00:21:19,517 and timing that a nuclear weapon would 567 00:21:19,517 --> 00:21:22,280 have to have on I . C . B . M . Nor 568 00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:24,610 that could lead the RV that would be 569 00:21:24,610 --> 00:21:27,560 able to carry the warhead Fast forward 570 00:21:27,560 --> 00:21:29,616 three years . Is that still the case 571 00:21:29,616 --> 00:21:31,616 because the world is fixated on the 572 00:21:31,616 --> 00:21:33,838 range of the missile but not the tip of 573 00:21:33,838 --> 00:21:35,671 the spear so to speak . The vice 574 00:21:35,671 --> 00:21:37,671 chairman at the time I think gave a 575 00:21:37,671 --> 00:21:39,893 very fair assessment that was based and 576 00:21:39,893 --> 00:21:42,060 rooted in the intelligence that we had 577 00:21:42,060 --> 00:21:44,227 at the time . And I remember there was 578 00:21:44,227 --> 00:21:46,393 a pause and uh testing right so so now 579 00:21:46,393 --> 00:21:48,560 now they're testing again . Um so they 580 00:21:48,560 --> 00:21:50,560 are making progress but in terms of 581 00:21:50,560 --> 00:21:52,782 details of reentry and survivability um 582 00:21:52,782 --> 00:21:54,838 I can't really speak to that today . 583 00:21:54,838 --> 00:21:56,949 More of an intel question thank you . 584 00:21:56,949 --> 00:21:59,800 Let's come to right after let's go to 585 00:21:59,810 --> 00:22:02,720 the bottom line and ask Jason Sherman 586 00:22:02,720 --> 00:22:04,970 to go ahead and uh field his question . 587 00:22:04,970 --> 00:22:07,220 Jason , are you there ? Yes thank you . 588 00:22:07,220 --> 00:22:09,387 Have a question about the Guam defense 589 00:22:09,387 --> 00:22:11,387 system and also the missile defense 590 00:22:11,387 --> 00:22:14,480 review . Um Admiral uh your budget is 591 00:22:14,480 --> 00:22:17,940 seeking $539 million . Dut says the 592 00:22:17,940 --> 00:22:21,640 total amount is 892 . Can you tell us 593 00:22:21,650 --> 00:22:24,710 uh where the balance of those funds 594 00:22:24,710 --> 00:22:27,280 would be ? And also the indo pay calm 595 00:22:27,280 --> 00:22:29,447 had been very vocal about needing that 596 00:22:29,447 --> 00:22:32,660 capability by 2026 . Does this budget 597 00:22:32,670 --> 00:22:34,770 uh you know keep the department on 598 00:22:34,770 --> 00:22:38,600 track to deliver a um 599 00:22:38,610 --> 00:22:42,590 in Egypt well a new air missile defense 600 00:22:42,590 --> 00:22:46,170 system um To the island by 2026 . 601 00:22:46,940 --> 00:22:49,320 Jason . Thanks . Great . Great question . 602 00:22:49,330 --> 00:22:51,441 Um I would say that the work that the 603 00:22:51,441 --> 00:22:53,330 department has done over the last 604 00:22:53,330 --> 00:22:55,497 couple of years , working very closely 605 00:22:55,497 --> 00:22:57,663 with NdP calm . You know , in terms of 606 00:22:57,663 --> 00:22:59,886 leaning forward , even in the 22 budget 607 00:22:59,886 --> 00:23:02,052 We laid down where we would prioritize 608 00:23:02,052 --> 00:23:04,274 not knowing what the final architecture 609 00:23:04,274 --> 00:23:06,330 would be , which is really in the 23 610 00:23:06,330 --> 00:23:05,870 budget . It's it's it's what we 611 00:23:05,880 --> 00:23:08,047 discussed a little bit earlier today . 612 00:23:08,047 --> 00:23:10,213 Um , so we're gonna do everything that 613 00:23:10,213 --> 00:23:12,720 we can to meet that timeline . Um you 614 00:23:12,720 --> 00:23:14,498 know , the requirement from the 615 00:23:14,498 --> 00:23:16,553 combatant command is clear timelines 616 00:23:16,553 --> 00:23:18,553 clear which is why we went with the 617 00:23:18,553 --> 00:23:20,720 more mature technologies . And I'm not 618 00:23:20,720 --> 00:23:22,942 talking a lot about new things out here 619 00:23:22,942 --> 00:23:22,780 today . We're going to leverage what we 620 00:23:22,780 --> 00:23:24,891 have with each is fire control , what 621 00:23:24,891 --> 00:23:27,113 we have with iBc s where we are with sm 622 00:23:27,113 --> 00:23:29,002 three missiles , Sm six C . Based 623 00:23:29,002 --> 00:23:31,169 terminal . Uh , and that and Patriot . 624 00:23:31,169 --> 00:23:33,336 So I think we're on a good path . It's 625 00:23:33,336 --> 00:23:35,447 going to be hard though . If you were 626 00:23:35,447 --> 00:23:34,800 to ask me what the hardest things are 627 00:23:34,800 --> 00:23:37,022 in the missile defense agency . I would 628 00:23:37,022 --> 00:23:38,967 say we've got to keep N . G . I on 629 00:23:38,967 --> 00:23:41,133 track . We're doing very well with the 630 00:23:41,133 --> 00:23:43,300 G . B . I . S in the ground today . We 631 00:23:43,300 --> 00:23:45,522 have the service life extension program 632 00:23:45,522 --> 00:23:47,633 which will keep those missiles around 633 00:23:47,633 --> 00:23:47,470 for a long time . We just in placed one 634 00:23:47,470 --> 00:23:49,803 of the refurb missiles , which is great . 635 00:23:49,803 --> 00:23:51,914 We're getting ready to in place . The 636 00:23:51,914 --> 00:23:53,970 2nd 1 . I would have told you it was 637 00:23:53,970 --> 00:23:53,530 done today but we had some wind issues 638 00:23:53,530 --> 00:23:55,530 up there now . So we're we're we're 639 00:23:55,530 --> 00:23:57,752 rock solid there . That is the focus of 640 00:23:57,752 --> 00:23:59,586 this agency , Homeland ballistic 641 00:23:59,586 --> 00:24:01,530 missile defense . And when I think 642 00:24:01,530 --> 00:24:03,586 about level of difficulty it will be 643 00:24:03,586 --> 00:24:05,770 Guam . We just had a team return . You 644 00:24:05,770 --> 00:24:07,770 probably know that there is a small 645 00:24:07,770 --> 00:24:09,492 percentage of the land that is 646 00:24:09,492 --> 00:24:11,437 available for us to land this this 647 00:24:11,437 --> 00:24:13,548 capability . So we're gonna stay very 648 00:24:13,548 --> 00:24:15,548 close to the joint regional command 649 00:24:15,548 --> 00:24:17,770 there for land allocations and citing . 650 00:24:17,770 --> 00:24:19,937 And when you think about mobility , uh 651 00:24:19,937 --> 00:24:22,159 that means a lot of gear going onto the 652 00:24:22,159 --> 00:24:24,048 land . And so right now it's just 653 00:24:24,048 --> 00:24:26,214 moving as fast as we can with the most 654 00:24:26,214 --> 00:24:28,270 mature technology , prioritize those 655 00:24:28,270 --> 00:24:28,060 things that we need to buy now 656 00:24:28,060 --> 00:24:30,450 prioritize those engineering studies to 657 00:24:30,460 --> 00:24:32,571 integrate and pull them together . Uh 658 00:24:32,571 --> 00:24:34,738 and we're gonna we're gonna get pretty 659 00:24:34,738 --> 00:24:36,904 doggone close to that timeline . But I 660 00:24:36,904 --> 00:24:39,071 will know more once we finish the work 661 00:24:39,071 --> 00:24:41,238 that we have to do in the architecture 662 00:24:41,238 --> 00:24:43,182 and the actual footprint and where 663 00:24:43,182 --> 00:24:43,080 things are going to go . So that that 664 00:24:43,080 --> 00:24:45,260 is work that's in front of us . And so 665 00:24:45,260 --> 00:24:47,316 I can't say date certain we're gonna 666 00:24:47,316 --> 00:24:49,316 hit that timeline . But I can't say 667 00:24:49,316 --> 00:24:51,260 we're pointing to it and we've got 668 00:24:51,260 --> 00:24:54,000 everything aligned to get there . Thank 669 00:24:54,000 --> 00:24:56,056 you , Jason . Yes , ma'am . Go ahead 670 00:24:56,690 --> 00:24:58,801 with breaking Defense . Thank you for 671 00:24:58,801 --> 00:25:00,968 doing this sir . My question is on H . 672 00:25:00,968 --> 00:25:04,090 B . T . S . S and um you're you're 673 00:25:04,090 --> 00:25:06,257 showing that you're going to launch in 674 00:25:06,257 --> 00:25:08,257 the second quarter of fy 23 the two 675 00:25:08,257 --> 00:25:10,423 prototypes . Can you talk a little bit 676 00:25:10,423 --> 00:25:12,534 about what happens then , like when a 677 00:25:12,534 --> 00:25:14,540 decision is made and who who is the 678 00:25:14,540 --> 00:25:16,596 Space force going to operate these ? 679 00:25:16,596 --> 00:25:18,510 And um so what's the timeline for 680 00:25:18,510 --> 00:25:20,677 making a decision about whether you go 681 00:25:20,677 --> 00:25:22,732 forward with the natural program and 682 00:25:22,732 --> 00:25:24,970 Teresa . Thank you . Um So I'll spell 683 00:25:24,970 --> 00:25:27,026 out the acronym first though , so we 684 00:25:27,026 --> 00:25:29,026 understand what we're talking about 685 00:25:29,026 --> 00:25:31,081 here . Hypersonic ballistic tracking 686 00:25:31,081 --> 00:25:33,192 space sensor . So it is a sensor that 687 00:25:33,192 --> 00:25:35,303 were in close coordination with Space 688 00:25:35,303 --> 00:25:37,470 Development Agency and the Space Force 689 00:25:37,470 --> 00:25:39,359 to work it into their overall opr 690 00:25:39,359 --> 00:25:41,414 enterprise . So that will be the big 691 00:25:41,414 --> 00:25:43,359 decision for us . After 23 , we're 692 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:45,670 gonna have data available in 23 , just 693 00:25:45,670 --> 00:25:47,670 like many of the other systems that 694 00:25:47,670 --> 00:25:49,559 were discussed today and then the 695 00:25:49,559 --> 00:25:51,726 decision will be made to to go forward 696 00:25:51,726 --> 00:25:53,892 to proliferate . Um right now going to 697 00:25:53,892 --> 00:25:55,892 23 is taking what we've done on the 698 00:25:55,892 --> 00:25:57,948 ground . We really worked hard to de 699 00:25:57,948 --> 00:25:59,726 risk the program . Um So you've 700 00:25:59,726 --> 00:26:01,781 probably heard me talk about some of 701 00:26:01,781 --> 00:26:04,003 the ground testing , we have done where 702 00:26:04,003 --> 00:26:06,114 we have pulled the hot targets off of 703 00:26:06,114 --> 00:26:08,226 the Warm Earth and that is not easy . 704 00:26:08,226 --> 00:26:10,337 But the companies have performed very 705 00:26:10,337 --> 00:26:12,337 well and we're gonna take them into 706 00:26:12,337 --> 00:26:14,448 space into that environment and we're 707 00:26:14,448 --> 00:26:14,260 gonna pull that data down , we're gonna 708 00:26:14,270 --> 00:26:16,470 put it in the fire control loop and uh 709 00:26:16,480 --> 00:26:18,702 and if we proved to ourselves that this 710 00:26:18,702 --> 00:26:20,758 is worth doing then will proliferate 711 00:26:20,758 --> 00:26:22,813 but that will be done as part of the 712 00:26:22,813 --> 00:26:24,924 larger opr enterprise and then at the 713 00:26:24,924 --> 00:26:27,202 end of 23 Uh that timelines are pretty , 714 00:26:27,202 --> 00:26:29,369 pretty decent for what we can assume . 715 00:26:29,369 --> 00:26:31,470 Um it's but yeah we we should have a 716 00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:33,536 data coming down , you know , in the 717 00:26:33,536 --> 00:26:35,758 summer of 23 or so and we'll be able to 718 00:26:35,758 --> 00:26:37,980 help the space force make decisions and 719 00:26:37,980 --> 00:26:37,480 answer your your first question . The 720 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:39,591 space force will operate the system . 721 00:26:39,860 --> 00:26:42,360 Yes ma'am , thank you . Yes ma'am 722 00:26:45,630 --> 00:26:48,250 Korea . Currently 723 00:26:48,260 --> 00:26:52,090 28000s U . S . Troops in South 724 00:26:52,090 --> 00:26:55,880 Korea . If with 725 00:26:55,890 --> 00:26:59,170 withdraw increase of U . S . Troops in 726 00:26:59,170 --> 00:27:03,060 South Korea Has any defense body 727 00:27:03,360 --> 00:27:05,760 changed for 23 ? 728 00:27:07,590 --> 00:27:09,820 Great question . And I wish I could 729 00:27:09,820 --> 00:27:13,410 answer it . I don't I don't really know 730 00:27:13,410 --> 00:27:15,890 about troop withdrawal and any offsets 731 00:27:15,890 --> 00:27:19,080 in the budget . It's has no impact on 732 00:27:19,080 --> 00:27:20,969 what we're doing as a development 733 00:27:20,969 --> 00:27:24,280 agency of capability . Thank you . Yes 734 00:27:24,280 --> 00:27:27,510 sir . Obviously with Britain thank you 735 00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:30,860 very much . Thank you . 23 mil con 736 00:27:30,870 --> 00:27:33,700 budget request is 47 million . And then 737 00:27:33,700 --> 00:27:37,650 your fy 24 is 501 um what 738 00:27:37,660 --> 00:27:39,827 what investment are you making there ? 739 00:27:39,827 --> 00:27:42,760 That accounts for that $450 million 740 00:27:42,760 --> 00:27:44,980 increase . That that would be the mill 741 00:27:44,980 --> 00:27:47,630 conference is already actually I 742 00:27:47,630 --> 00:27:49,741 believe it's the ground test facility 743 00:27:49,741 --> 00:27:51,630 infrastructure project as well as 744 00:27:52,940 --> 00:27:55,107 Thanks . Alright . So 11 of the things 745 00:27:55,107 --> 00:27:57,273 we're doing to ensure we can do in the 746 00:27:57,273 --> 00:27:59,384 end testing and this is hard . I grew 747 00:27:59,384 --> 00:28:01,551 up in the world where we all wanted to 748 00:28:01,551 --> 00:28:03,384 do high speed end to end testing 749 00:28:03,384 --> 00:28:05,107 meaning that you've got a good 750 00:28:05,107 --> 00:28:07,218 characterization of the environment , 751 00:28:07,218 --> 00:28:07,210 good digital characterization of the 752 00:28:07,210 --> 00:28:09,377 radar , characterization of the combat 753 00:28:09,377 --> 00:28:11,488 control characterization of women and 754 00:28:11,488 --> 00:28:13,710 have it all as a string to where we can 755 00:28:13,710 --> 00:28:16,060 do thousands of runs and test the full 756 00:28:16,060 --> 00:28:18,440 requirements space in the world that we 757 00:28:18,440 --> 00:28:20,329 live in today where we're sneaker 758 00:28:20,329 --> 00:28:22,720 netting um , you know , um , data 759 00:28:22,730 --> 00:28:24,674 between different systems that are 760 00:28:24,674 --> 00:28:26,674 located around . We're trying to co 761 00:28:26,674 --> 00:28:26,620 locate everything and that's that's 762 00:28:26,620 --> 00:28:28,676 what that's about . Thank you . Dede 763 00:28:29,040 --> 00:28:32,250 please . Just on the Guam architecture 764 00:28:32,250 --> 00:28:34,840 again , um how does the architecture 765 00:28:34,850 --> 00:28:37,128 deal with the issue of cruise missiles ? 766 00:28:37,128 --> 00:28:39,740 Say like a swarm attack by CJ . Great , 767 00:28:39,740 --> 00:28:41,684 great question . That's one of the 768 00:28:41,684 --> 00:28:43,907 reasons why we have a heavy leverage on 769 00:28:43,907 --> 00:28:46,073 iBC . S . They bring in cruise missile 770 00:28:46,073 --> 00:28:48,270 capability . Um , and then we have the 771 00:28:48,270 --> 00:28:50,270 way we're going to disperse for our 772 00:28:50,270 --> 00:28:52,492 detection capability and our networking 773 00:28:52,492 --> 00:28:54,714 is how we're going to deal with that on 774 00:28:54,714 --> 00:28:56,881 the interceptor side though . Is there 775 00:28:56,881 --> 00:28:56,660 any particular ones that's that's 776 00:28:57,540 --> 00:29:00,200 useful for that ? So Patriots got a 777 00:29:00,210 --> 00:29:02,560 fabulous capability for that . And 778 00:29:02,570 --> 00:29:04,737 that's that's our first focus area and 779 00:29:04,737 --> 00:29:06,737 we have the ability within aegis to 780 00:29:06,737 --> 00:29:08,681 enable that . But right now we are 781 00:29:08,681 --> 00:29:10,848 doing ballistic missiles hypersonic on 782 00:29:10,848 --> 00:29:12,570 the Aegis part of that overall 783 00:29:12,570 --> 00:29:14,737 integrated architecture . And then the 784 00:29:14,737 --> 00:29:16,848 cruise missile peace will be with the 785 00:29:16,848 --> 00:29:19,014 army systems . Could you talk a little 786 00:29:19,014 --> 00:29:21,237 bit about the operational impact if you 787 00:29:21,237 --> 00:29:23,070 successfully can demonstrate fed 788 00:29:23,070 --> 00:29:25,292 Patriot MSC integration ? You've done a 789 00:29:25,292 --> 00:29:27,403 couple of tests . You had one going , 790 00:29:27,403 --> 00:29:29,514 what's the operational impact to like 791 00:29:29,514 --> 00:29:31,514 the U . S . Forces in Korea ? South 792 00:29:31,514 --> 00:29:34,170 korean forces if this plays out ? Yeah , 793 00:29:34,170 --> 00:29:36,281 I'm really excited about this one . I 794 00:29:36,281 --> 00:29:38,337 would say it's more interoperability 795 00:29:38,337 --> 00:29:40,392 but it does require you to integrate 796 00:29:40,392 --> 00:29:42,503 those systems . So for instance , the 797 00:29:42,503 --> 00:29:44,726 current test campaign that we're in now 798 00:29:44,726 --> 00:29:46,837 allows that that battery to control a 799 00:29:46,837 --> 00:29:48,948 Patriot launcher . What that provides 800 00:29:48,948 --> 00:29:51,114 the combatant command is flexibility . 801 00:29:51,114 --> 00:29:53,337 Right ? So the first test we did was to 802 00:29:53,337 --> 00:29:53,140 separate the launchers . Right so we 803 00:29:53,140 --> 00:29:55,473 want to do is to give flexibility again , 804 00:29:55,473 --> 00:29:57,584 right , where you place your launches 805 00:29:57,584 --> 00:29:59,807 really matters . Right ? So if you need 806 00:29:59,807 --> 00:30:01,973 to worry about ports to the south then 807 00:30:01,973 --> 00:30:04,196 you have the ability to to do that . If 808 00:30:04,196 --> 00:30:06,362 you want to move the thad battery back 809 00:30:06,362 --> 00:30:05,970 and and uh you know , I'll be careful 810 00:30:05,970 --> 00:30:07,914 on getting in front of the command 811 00:30:07,914 --> 00:30:10,026 command . What they will do . It just 812 00:30:10,026 --> 00:30:11,914 gives them that flexibility . The 813 00:30:11,914 --> 00:30:11,830 ability to control the Patriot missile 814 00:30:11,830 --> 00:30:14,300 using a tad radar , more flexibility . 815 00:30:14,630 --> 00:30:16,574 So that's that's really what we're 816 00:30:16,574 --> 00:30:18,797 doing . And it's based on very discreet 817 00:30:18,797 --> 00:30:20,519 requirements coming from India 818 00:30:24,170 --> 00:30:26,360 discrimination . Absolutely . And you 819 00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:28,471 can take advantage of the mathematics 820 00:30:28,471 --> 00:30:30,693 of the Patriot Embassy missile . That's 821 00:30:30,693 --> 00:30:34,020 what can you preview ? Ft G 12 this two 822 00:30:34,020 --> 00:30:36,590 stage selectable G B I test . Yeah , 823 00:30:36,600 --> 00:30:38,544 that'll be all interesting when it 824 00:30:38,544 --> 00:30:40,711 happens but translated what it is . So 825 00:30:40,711 --> 00:30:43,044 so we did a boost vehicle test recently . 826 00:30:43,044 --> 00:30:45,267 What that was is really let's just make 827 00:30:45,267 --> 00:30:47,211 sure we can do that to three stage 828 00:30:47,211 --> 00:30:49,433 capability . And what that means is you 829 00:30:49,433 --> 00:30:51,600 don't burn the third stage that allows 830 00:30:51,600 --> 00:30:53,711 you to handle targets that are coming 831 00:30:53,711 --> 00:30:53,700 over to you . Alright , so it closes 832 00:30:53,700 --> 00:30:55,589 battlespace up . Right , So we're 833 00:30:55,589 --> 00:30:57,811 shooting out far normally and just like 834 00:30:57,811 --> 00:30:59,644 we do with Aegis and other stage 835 00:30:59,644 --> 00:31:01,756 missiles . If you don't fire the last 836 00:31:01,756 --> 00:31:03,811 stage that allows you to really take 837 00:31:03,811 --> 00:31:05,867 care of the fuller battlespace . The 838 00:31:05,867 --> 00:31:08,089 ones coming closer to the United States 839 00:31:08,089 --> 00:31:07,940 or the world , you can get farther out . 840 00:31:07,950 --> 00:31:10,061 It gives you a really more of a shoot 841 00:31:10,061 --> 00:31:12,283 look shoot capability as they come in . 842 00:31:12,283 --> 00:31:14,450 So you shoot them far . Then you shoot 843 00:31:14,450 --> 00:31:16,339 them in closer by controlling the 844 00:31:16,339 --> 00:31:18,394 staging and the burn . You can shoot 845 00:31:18,394 --> 00:31:22,280 those ones that are closer jim 846 00:31:22,290 --> 00:31:24,970 please just to follow up on the shore 847 00:31:24,970 --> 00:31:28,160 system in Poland , I know that It was 848 00:31:28,160 --> 00:31:30,050 somewhat over budget and previous 849 00:31:30,060 --> 00:31:33,200 budget briefings . How over budget has 850 00:31:33,210 --> 00:31:35,890 the Aegis Ashore system gotten in this 851 00:31:35,900 --> 00:31:38,300 process ? In Poland . Can you , what 852 00:31:38,300 --> 00:31:41,320 was the number of 23 ? So in 23 we have 853 00:31:41,330 --> 00:31:43,441 30 million in procurement for this is 854 00:31:43,441 --> 00:31:45,386 all of you just a short to include 855 00:31:45,386 --> 00:31:47,663 Romania and the test site at P . M . R . 856 00:31:47,663 --> 00:31:49,886 F 30 million procurement and 28 million 857 00:31:49,886 --> 00:31:51,997 for rd teeny so 58 million in total . 858 00:31:52,340 --> 00:31:54,930 Yeah , so so that's and and so um some 859 00:31:54,930 --> 00:31:56,930 portion of that is pulling , we can 860 00:31:56,930 --> 00:31:59,097 break that out for you another venue . 861 00:32:00,100 --> 00:32:02,740 What was predicted before ? All of this ? 862 00:32:03,410 --> 00:32:06,450 It is very frustrating . But I tell you 863 00:32:06,460 --> 00:32:08,571 the partnership of the Army Corps has 864 00:32:08,571 --> 00:32:11,100 been great . And with the uh the team 865 00:32:11,100 --> 00:32:12,656 that's out there doing that 866 00:32:12,656 --> 00:32:14,433 construction again , we're on a 867 00:32:14,433 --> 00:32:16,378 predictable schedule now , all the 868 00:32:16,378 --> 00:32:18,544 equipment's in place . We start robust 869 00:32:18,544 --> 00:32:20,711 testing here in april and we're really 870 00:32:20,711 --> 00:32:20,390 excited about that . I was pretty 871 00:32:20,390 --> 00:32:22,557 stoked when we got the arrays in place 872 00:32:22,557 --> 00:32:24,557 because I was a forcing function on 873 00:32:24,557 --> 00:32:26,668 construction but now that we have the 874 00:32:26,668 --> 00:32:28,890 equipment in place , the sailors are on 875 00:32:28,890 --> 00:32:31,112 board now because we , we completed the 876 00:32:31,112 --> 00:32:30,980 water supply buildings . So you've got 877 00:32:30,980 --> 00:32:32,924 the , the operational team there , 878 00:32:32,924 --> 00:32:34,980 you've got the security team there . 879 00:32:34,980 --> 00:32:37,036 It's about going to testing now with 880 00:32:37,036 --> 00:32:37,000 operators on console . So that's a 881 00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:39,250 great place to be . And just just to 882 00:32:39,250 --> 00:32:41,139 follow up because I can follow up 883 00:32:41,139 --> 00:32:43,361 question uh , what's the timing for the 884 00:32:43,361 --> 00:32:46,090 glide phase interceptor for hypersonic 885 00:32:46,090 --> 00:32:48,190 defense ? Um , I know that you said 886 00:32:48,190 --> 00:32:50,468 that it was a little bit in limbo . Um , 887 00:32:50,468 --> 00:32:52,246 you know , as we head into this 888 00:32:52,246 --> 00:32:54,500 budgeting process but can you provide 889 00:32:54,500 --> 00:32:56,667 any more fidelity on that ? Yeah . You 890 00:32:56,667 --> 00:32:58,722 know , I thought long and hard about 891 00:32:58,722 --> 00:33:01,056 how you give a range of time , you know , 892 00:33:01,056 --> 00:33:00,670 that's , that's in the future , 893 00:33:00,840 --> 00:33:03,062 particularly when you're , where we are 894 00:33:03,062 --> 00:33:05,173 in G . P . I , which is we have three 895 00:33:05,173 --> 00:33:07,700 and we've taken a other transaction 896 00:33:07,700 --> 00:33:09,922 authority approach so that we can bring 897 00:33:09,922 --> 00:33:11,922 in the best of what industry has to 898 00:33:11,922 --> 00:33:13,811 offer . So we're evaluating those 899 00:33:13,811 --> 00:33:16,930 proposals now . So it , I'm not ready 900 00:33:16,930 --> 00:33:19,290 to say , you know what , what the end 901 00:33:19,290 --> 00:33:21,179 state will look like or what that 902 00:33:21,179 --> 00:33:23,401 endgame will look like . We know we can 903 00:33:23,401 --> 00:33:25,512 move quickly . We know the propulsion 904 00:33:25,512 --> 00:33:27,290 capability to get there is just 905 00:33:27,290 --> 00:33:27,270 operating in a different environment . 906 00:33:27,270 --> 00:33:29,437 So it's all about the front end and so 907 00:33:29,437 --> 00:33:31,492 we , we have to do more work . We're 908 00:33:31,492 --> 00:33:33,381 not even at a system requirements 909 00:33:33,381 --> 00:33:35,437 review yet . So you know , stating a 910 00:33:35,437 --> 00:33:37,437 date certain is really hard at this 911 00:33:37,437 --> 00:33:39,659 point , but we can move quickly once we 912 00:33:39,659 --> 00:33:42,190 finish our evaluation and get into the 913 00:33:42,190 --> 00:33:45,740 formal development Tony you have to 914 00:33:45,740 --> 00:33:48,710 follow up in the polish site , the john 915 00:33:48,710 --> 00:33:50,980 wood company , the United Kingdom Group 916 00:33:50,980 --> 00:33:53,202 that was , they hadn't been paid , they 917 00:33:53,202 --> 00:33:55,091 weren't as of like last year they 918 00:33:55,091 --> 00:33:57,036 hadn't been paid for quite a while 919 00:33:57,036 --> 00:33:59,036 because of their work was less than 920 00:33:59,036 --> 00:34:01,036 optimal . Can you check and I don't 921 00:34:01,036 --> 00:34:03,258 expect you to know that something . Can 922 00:34:03,258 --> 00:34:02,530 you check to see whether you've resumed 923 00:34:02,530 --> 00:34:05,310 payments company ? We have started to 924 00:34:05,310 --> 00:34:07,750 that that was part of when I say this 925 00:34:07,750 --> 00:34:09,917 great coordination with the Army Corps 926 00:34:09,917 --> 00:34:12,083 is that we've been able to use some of 927 00:34:12,083 --> 00:34:14,139 those funds to to stimulate and keep 928 00:34:14,139 --> 00:34:16,250 keep the company moving ? Um So we're 929 00:34:16,250 --> 00:34:18,194 so by the way there their work has 930 00:34:18,194 --> 00:34:20,306 always been high quality . Alright so 931 00:34:20,306 --> 00:34:22,417 so we're very satisfied with that and 932 00:34:22,417 --> 00:34:24,583 that that's a good thing . It was just 933 00:34:24,583 --> 00:34:26,806 running slow because there's just a lot 934 00:34:26,806 --> 00:34:28,861 of complexity with a fully automated 935 00:34:28,861 --> 00:34:28,200 system like that and that's what we're 936 00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:30,570 coming through now . So again when we 937 00:34:30,570 --> 00:34:32,737 go into testing here in april that's a 938 00:34:32,737 --> 00:34:34,860 very positive sign because typically 939 00:34:34,860 --> 00:34:37,082 when you get to any just light off on a 940 00:34:37,082 --> 00:34:39,304 ship you you were in the end game . And 941 00:34:39,304 --> 00:34:41,527 so we were there the Russians are going 942 00:34:41,527 --> 00:34:43,749 to misinterpret this . Remember this is 943 00:34:43,749 --> 00:34:43,720 for Iran Iranian missiles but it's 944 00:34:43,720 --> 00:34:46,880 always given the environment not is 945 00:34:46,880 --> 00:34:49,102 your messaging going to have to ratchet 946 00:34:49,102 --> 00:34:51,060 up to reinforce what this thing is 947 00:34:51,060 --> 00:34:53,220 supposed to stop ? So it's going to 948 00:34:53,230 --> 00:34:55,452 it's really policy in Yukon messaging . 949 00:34:55,640 --> 00:34:57,751 Um you know , I know exactly what the 950 00:34:57,751 --> 00:34:59,862 technical capability is and I think a 951 00:34:59,862 --> 00:35:02,084 lot of the statements that are made are 952 00:35:02,084 --> 00:35:04,307 are just there to get folks spun up . I 953 00:35:04,307 --> 00:35:06,473 mean , you know what the capability of 954 00:35:06,473 --> 00:35:08,696 sm three block two A is it is not meant 955 00:35:08,696 --> 00:35:10,918 to go after strategic capabilities like 956 00:35:10,918 --> 00:35:13,084 Russia would bring . Yes sir thank you 957 00:35:13,084 --> 00:35:15,570 louis please um Secretary Austin 958 00:35:15,570 --> 00:35:18,820 recently postponed an I . C . B . M . 959 00:35:19,440 --> 00:35:21,662 Minimum three tests because they didn't 960 00:35:21,662 --> 00:35:23,884 want any miscalculations on the part of 961 00:35:23,884 --> 00:35:26,260 the Russian ? I mean have you been 962 00:35:26,270 --> 00:35:28,381 received any guidance that any future 963 00:35:28,381 --> 00:35:30,492 testing that you may do this year ? I 964 00:35:30,492 --> 00:35:32,270 don't know if you have anything 965 00:35:32,270 --> 00:35:34,381 scheduled flights Would would that if 966 00:35:34,381 --> 00:35:36,600 this drags on could it impact your 967 00:35:36,600 --> 00:35:40,580 testing given ? Yeah . So 968 00:35:40,580 --> 00:35:42,636 it's a broad question . Um It has in 969 00:35:42,636 --> 00:35:44,858 the past . All right . So so what we do 970 00:35:44,858 --> 00:35:47,080 is we make sure we're coordinating very 971 00:35:47,080 --> 00:35:46,900 closely with the combatant command in 972 00:35:46,900 --> 00:35:49,067 that region where we happen to be , do 973 00:35:49,067 --> 00:35:51,122 you happen to be doing our testing , 974 00:35:51,122 --> 00:35:53,289 make sure I I run that right up to the 975 00:35:53,289 --> 00:35:55,490 National Military command . Um and 976 00:35:55,500 --> 00:35:57,500 we're doing the same thing with the 977 00:35:57,500 --> 00:35:59,500 current test campaign that we're in 978 00:35:59,500 --> 00:36:01,722 right now uh particularly the political 979 00:36:01,722 --> 00:36:03,556 military side it is fair for the 980 00:36:03,556 --> 00:36:05,500 Secretary of Defense to make those 981 00:36:05,500 --> 00:36:07,722 sorts of decisions because of the world 982 00:36:07,722 --> 00:36:09,889 that we live in . And so we're open to 983 00:36:09,889 --> 00:36:12,111 that . And so part of our test planning 984 00:36:12,111 --> 00:36:14,278 includes uh over communicating on what 985 00:36:14,278 --> 00:36:16,333 we're doing and you know I'm not the 986 00:36:16,333 --> 00:36:18,444 expert on saying if it's gonna have a 987 00:36:18,444 --> 00:36:18,230 policy impact or if it's gonna have 988 00:36:18,230 --> 00:36:20,890 some concern around the globe . Um So 989 00:36:20,900 --> 00:36:23,210 if I'm told to back off or delay or 990 00:36:23,210 --> 00:36:25,430 change we will do that . It's just a 991 00:36:25,430 --> 00:36:27,270 normal normal part of doing this 992 00:36:27,270 --> 00:36:29,270 business . I've been doing it for a 993 00:36:29,270 --> 00:36:31,381 long time . And uh sometimes you have 994 00:36:31,381 --> 00:36:33,326 to be you have to be we have to be 995 00:36:33,326 --> 00:36:35,270 concerned about political military 996 00:36:35,270 --> 00:36:34,870 concerns all the time . And so if we 997 00:36:34,870 --> 00:36:38,870 have to just we'll adjust . Yes , 998 00:36:39,450 --> 00:36:41,450 we've done that before . Right . So 999 00:36:41,450 --> 00:36:44,950 it's not new . Okay . 1000 00:36:45,360 --> 00:36:47,720 Um , on the cruise missile test 1001 00:36:47,730 --> 00:36:50,200 architecture that you spoke to . Uh , 1002 00:36:50,210 --> 00:36:52,510 can you provide some more details on 1003 00:36:52,510 --> 00:36:54,550 that ? Um , It sounds like there's 1004 00:36:54,550 --> 00:36:56,772 gonna be a fire control demonstration . 1005 00:36:56,772 --> 00:36:59,850 But um , what what is this , where is 1006 00:36:59,850 --> 00:37:02,230 this architecture headed ? Um , in 1007 00:37:02,230 --> 00:37:04,452 terms of developing this , where you're 1008 00:37:04,452 --> 00:37:06,740 going with this ? Um , it's it's it's a 1009 00:37:06,740 --> 00:37:09,490 hard one . We stay very close to NORAD 1010 00:37:09,490 --> 00:37:11,601 and North com on what their needs are 1011 00:37:11,601 --> 00:37:13,657 and the driving requirements for the 1012 00:37:13,657 --> 00:37:15,879 capability . I would say that the trade 1013 00:37:15,879 --> 00:37:17,990 spaces still within the department on 1014 00:37:17,990 --> 00:37:20,130 how fast we're going to move against 1015 00:37:20,130 --> 00:37:22,297 what defended assets and what critical 1016 00:37:22,297 --> 00:37:24,408 assets . So there's a lot of homework 1017 00:37:24,408 --> 00:37:26,630 to be done . Our job is to lay down the 1018 00:37:26,630 --> 00:37:28,741 technical architecture options uh and 1019 00:37:28,741 --> 00:37:30,908 work that within the department to see 1020 00:37:30,908 --> 00:37:32,852 what we can do . Uh , it is a real 1021 00:37:32,852 --> 00:37:34,852 threat . If you talk to General Van 1022 00:37:34,852 --> 00:37:36,908 Herk , he is concerned about it . We 1023 00:37:36,908 --> 00:37:39,130 stay very close to him . And uh and and 1024 00:37:39,130 --> 00:37:40,852 of course we're working at the 1025 00:37:40,852 --> 00:37:43,019 department , you'll you'll see dollars 1026 00:37:43,019 --> 00:37:45,130 in our budget to continue to work the 1027 00:37:45,130 --> 00:37:44,550 architecture and those options . That 1028 00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:46,671 that's why the dollars in 23 budget . 1029 00:37:48,630 --> 00:37:50,980 Uh it's it's a it's a broader threat 1030 00:37:50,980 --> 00:37:53,091 problem for the United States were at 1031 00:37:53,091 --> 00:37:55,313 large . And so that's that's what we're 1032 00:37:55,313 --> 00:37:57,202 looking at . We're looking at the 1033 00:37:57,202 --> 00:37:56,650 bigger problem , then you have to kind 1034 00:37:56,650 --> 00:37:58,761 of narrow that down to what the sites 1035 00:37:58,761 --> 00:38:01,039 would be and and then we go from there , 1036 00:38:01,039 --> 00:38:03,094 but we're gonna do a demonstration , 1037 00:38:03,094 --> 00:38:05,317 you know , for some small area . Um and 1038 00:38:05,317 --> 00:38:07,428 so that's that's where we go . We are 1039 00:38:07,428 --> 00:38:09,594 defended today in the national capital 1040 00:38:09,594 --> 00:38:08,860 region with the capabilities that we 1041 00:38:08,860 --> 00:38:10,971 have . It's about the evolving threat 1042 00:38:10,971 --> 00:38:13,082 as it always is . And we want to make 1043 00:38:13,082 --> 00:38:15,304 sure that we're ready for that mr . And 1044 00:38:15,304 --> 00:38:17,527 we're gonna go to the back to zoom line 1045 00:38:17,527 --> 00:38:19,693 and Jason Sherman , you have the honor 1046 00:38:19,693 --> 00:38:21,638 of having the last question of the 1047 00:38:21,638 --> 00:38:24,150 evening , Please go ahead . Uh Admiral . 1048 00:38:24,150 --> 00:38:26,317 Wonder if you could say if you see the 1049 00:38:26,317 --> 00:38:28,539 Guam system as a one off whether it's , 1050 00:38:28,539 --> 00:38:30,706 you know , or there's potential around 1051 00:38:30,706 --> 00:38:32,928 the corner for that to be used in other 1052 00:38:32,928 --> 00:38:34,761 parts of the world . And I had a 1053 00:38:34,761 --> 00:38:36,983 question also earlier about the missile 1054 00:38:36,983 --> 00:38:38,983 defense review , can you say um how 1055 00:38:38,983 --> 00:38:41,206 this budget you're proposing um changes 1056 00:38:41,206 --> 00:38:43,261 course in any way from what you have 1057 00:38:43,261 --> 00:38:45,372 been doing . The department have been 1058 00:38:45,372 --> 00:38:47,483 doing up until now as a result of the 1059 00:38:47,483 --> 00:38:49,539 missile defense review , I don't see 1060 00:38:49,539 --> 00:38:51,761 anything about layered homeland defense 1061 00:38:51,761 --> 00:38:53,372 seems to be gone . Any other 1062 00:38:53,372 --> 00:38:56,150 initiatives um taken on or jettisoned 1063 00:38:56,720 --> 00:38:58,609 in this budget as a result of the 1064 00:38:58,609 --> 00:39:00,609 defense review . Thank you . Well , 1065 00:39:00,610 --> 00:39:02,777 Jason , thanks . Well , you know , the 1066 00:39:02,777 --> 00:39:04,721 missile Defense review hasn't been 1067 00:39:04,721 --> 00:39:06,888 released yet . So I can't really speak 1068 00:39:06,888 --> 00:39:08,666 to . It's it's more of a policy 1069 00:39:08,666 --> 00:39:10,777 document anyways . It's it's not uh I 1070 00:39:10,777 --> 00:39:12,721 mean I I participate in the in the 1071 00:39:12,721 --> 00:39:14,832 crafting of it but in the end it will 1072 00:39:14,832 --> 00:39:14,130 be policy in the department that 1073 00:39:14,130 --> 00:39:16,297 releases that review . I don't see any 1074 00:39:16,297 --> 00:39:18,352 big swings . It's still always about 1075 00:39:18,352 --> 00:39:20,340 integrated deterrence and having a 1076 00:39:20,340 --> 00:39:22,562 credible defense as a part of that . Uh 1077 00:39:22,562 --> 00:39:24,618 So I'm not seeing any any big swings 1078 00:39:24,618 --> 00:39:27,280 there now to answer your Guam question 1079 00:39:27,280 --> 00:39:29,530 about it being a one off . Absolutely 1080 00:39:29,530 --> 00:39:31,550 not . Um I think that what we do on 1081 00:39:31,550 --> 00:39:34,360 Guam will inform what we do for cruise 1082 00:39:34,360 --> 00:39:36,360 missile defense of the homeland for 1083 00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:38,870 example , we are using existing sensor 1084 00:39:38,870 --> 00:39:40,814 technology . We're going to tie in 1085 00:39:40,814 --> 00:39:42,759 through command and control battle 1086 00:39:42,759 --> 00:39:44,926 management into space assets and other 1087 00:39:44,926 --> 00:39:47,130 sensing capability to have our fuse 1088 00:39:47,130 --> 00:39:49,880 track there so that we're gonna be 1089 00:39:49,880 --> 00:39:52,047 using , you know , different launching 1090 00:39:52,047 --> 00:39:53,713 systems and different missile 1091 00:39:53,713 --> 00:39:55,936 capability that exist today that are in 1092 00:39:55,936 --> 00:39:57,991 a constant state of evolution . So I 1093 00:39:57,991 --> 00:40:00,102 think we're going to deliver a really 1094 00:40:00,102 --> 00:40:02,324 great capability on Guam and absolutely 1095 00:40:02,324 --> 00:40:02,180 it will be extensible . It's not a one 1096 00:40:02,180 --> 00:40:04,540 off . What makes it may feel like that 1097 00:40:04,550 --> 00:40:06,494 is if you've ever been on Guam the 1098 00:40:06,494 --> 00:40:08,717 topology of the island . And Mark loves 1099 00:40:08,717 --> 00:40:11,050 it when you use big words like topology . 1100 00:40:11,050 --> 00:40:13,161 It is a tough place . So , you know , 1101 00:40:13,161 --> 00:40:15,328 and it's just a short sight is limited 1102 00:40:15,328 --> 00:40:17,439 in what it can do because of the rise 1103 00:40:17,439 --> 00:40:17,430 and the fall of the hills and you know , 1104 00:40:17,430 --> 00:40:19,790 you've got radar , you know , it's not 1105 00:40:19,790 --> 00:40:21,790 a flat earth and it's certainly not 1106 00:40:21,790 --> 00:40:23,679 flat on Guam . So we've done some 1107 00:40:23,679 --> 00:40:25,679 really incredible work and analysis 1108 00:40:25,679 --> 00:40:27,734 over the last couple of years and by 1109 00:40:27,734 --> 00:40:29,846 dispersing the systems and you know , 1110 00:40:29,846 --> 00:40:31,901 making sure everything's networked , 1111 00:40:31,901 --> 00:40:34,123 We're going to do something great there 1112 00:40:34,123 --> 00:40:33,920 and it will be extensible to other 1113 00:40:33,920 --> 00:40:36,198 areas as the department needs it to be . 1114 00:40:37,020 --> 00:40:39,076 And that brings us to the end of our 1115 00:40:39,076 --> 00:40:41,242 time for today guys . Thank you all so 1116 00:40:41,242 --> 00:40:43,298 much for sticking around so late and 1117 00:40:43,298 --> 00:40:45,464 for your interest in missile defense . 1118 00:40:45,464 --> 00:40:47,576 Thanks again and have a great night , 1119 00:40:47,576 --> 00:40:48,620 Admiral . Thanks .