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please be seated . 

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Good morning . It's my great pleasure 

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to welcome you to the 2022 Admiral 

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Grace Hopper Award and Lecture Series 

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ceremony . Today we are celebrating the 

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achievements of jen Easterly Director 

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of the cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

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Security agency cisa . This event is 

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hosted by the National Defense 

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University's College of Information and 

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cyberspace . See I see , my name is 

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linda Jansson and I'll be your emcee . 

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I am a member of the C . I . C . 

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Faculty and like our awardee and many 

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of you here in the audience . A proud 

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army veteran Julia . 

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I was given the honor by our Chancellor 

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of leading the selection committee for 

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this award which consisted of a panel 

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of C . I . C . Faculty and students 

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tests with finding distinguished 

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thought leaders who are advancing the 

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field of information and or cyberspace 

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and who have a track record of 

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advancing the goals of diversity equity 

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and inclusion for a stronger workforce . 

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Jen Easterly fits that description to a 

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T Before we get to the good part , I 

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have three administrative remarks first , 

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please remember to turn off or silence 

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any electronic devices were watching . 

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Second , we'd like to thank our end Eu 

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Audiovisual professionals for streaming 

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the special event online . Please be 

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advised a recording of this event will 

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be made publicly available And third , 

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let me go over the sequence of events 

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First , a welcome from Lieutenant 

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General Michael plane , President of 

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the National Defense University , then 

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the Chancellor of the College of 

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Information in cyberspace . Dr 

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cassandra C . Lewis will tell us more 

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about the annual award and why it 

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matters . Chancellor Lewis will then 

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present the Admiral Grace Hopper Award 

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to Director Easterly and engage in a 

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fireside chat style talk followed by 

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audience question and answer . Please 

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note those participating remotely may 

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submit questions via the chat . We will 

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ask that you do respect everyone's time 

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and keep your questions brief and on 

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point We will conclude at 11:15 

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For those in the auditorium . You're 

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more than welcome to stay afterwards 

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mingle and take photos until about 1145 . 

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At this time I have the pleasure to 

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introduce the 17th president of the 

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National Defense University Lieutenant 

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General Michael plane sir , the floor 

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is yours . Okay 

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well thank you . Professor Jansen 

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welcome ladies and gentlemen to this 

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very special event as we honor Director 

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jen Easterly are 2022 recipients of 

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the Admiral Grace Hopper Award , a very 

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prestigious award now in its second 

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year . As you know the work we do here 

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at the National Defense University is 

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key to educating those who will ensure 

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the current and future security , not 

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only of our nation , but of many of our 

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partner nations as well as all eyes now 

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are focused on Ukraine . We hear daily 

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warnings to prepare the nation's 

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government agencies , utilities , banks , 

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businesses and schools for potential 

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cyber attacks ensuring we have 

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effective capabilities in the cyber and 

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information domain is vital not just on 

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the battlefield but throughout our 

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entire nation . This domain is unique 

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not only in the speed with which it has 

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manifested but also in the breathtaking 

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scope that touches every part of our 

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lives around the globe and even into 

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space . It is undeniable that the 

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elements of cyber and information are 

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now inextricably woven throughout the 

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fabric of our everyday lives and can be 

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affected through the cyber realm . It 

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is equally undeniable that the 

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targeting of american infrastructure by 

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a cyber attack is a real and constant 

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threat both from state and non state 

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actors . That is a key reason why the 

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Department of Homeland Security , 

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cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

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Security agency cisa is such an 

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important part of our national security . 

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That's also why it's appropriate that 

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the recipient of this year's award 

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currently serves as the director of 

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cisa And utilizing great cyber tools . 

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We are live streaming this out . I know 

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there's a large audience out there 

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who's participating , including 

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director Easter Lee's father who is 

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celebrating his 83rd birthday today . 

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Sir . So glad that you're able to watch 

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this uh and watch this wonderful award 

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being presented to your daughter . So I 

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mentioned the importance of the cyber 

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and information domain to national and 

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quite frankly global security . That's 

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why we have an entire college at N . D . 

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You dedicated to educating national 

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security professionals who are ready to 

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lead military and interagency programs 

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and operations in this critical domain . 

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That's also why are college of 

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information in cyberspace offers cyber 

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and information electives across the 

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entire National Defense University . 

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Some of our students will lead cyber 

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programs but all we'll need to 

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understand the domain and how best to 

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incorporate cyber and information 

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considerations into their broader 

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strategic appreciation of the global 

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strategic environment . Through such 

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understanding . They will be able 

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better to build the national security 

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team's strategies and plans that will 

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enable our nation as well as our allies 

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and partners to manage and mitigate 

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this evolving threat while also taking 

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full advantage of the strategic 

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opportunities the cyber domain offers 

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us . It is also appropriate that this 

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year's Hopper award winner leads at the 

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Department of Homeland Security . From 

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the inception of DHS there has been a 

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strong partnership and cooperation 

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between the Department of Defense and 

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the Department of Homeland Security . 

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In fact , DHS is one of N . D . U . S . 

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Strongest partners with students and 

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faculty members working across our 

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entire university . In recognition of 

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that fact , we just hosted a small 

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reception for our DHS uh students with 

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Director Easterly just a few minutes 

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ago . I would also note that the month 

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of March we celebrated the 

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contributions that women have made to 

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America . So it is fitting that the 

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Grace Hopper award is presented during 

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women's history month . Admiral Hopper 

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was an important pioneer in computing 

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and in National security education 

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having taught at this very institution . 

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She was also a role model for countless 

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women who followed her example of 

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military service to our nation . 

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Finally I want to thank publicly . 

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Chancellor Lewis and the C . I . C . 

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Team for creating and championing this 

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important award . Thank you all for 

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joining us here today as we present the 

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Admiral Grace Hopper Award to someone 

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who because of her own service to our 

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nation in uniform in policy circles . 

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And now as the leader of our nation's 

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cyber uh cybersecurity and 

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Infrastructure Security Agency is so 

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richly deserving of this award . 

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Congratulations Director Easterly , 

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thank you so much sir for those remarks . 

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It is now my pleasure to introduce the 

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Chancellor of the College of 

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Information in cyberspace dr cassandra . 

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See louis 

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thank you and good morning good morning 

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to you all . As Professor Jansen noted 

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my name is cassandra Lewis and I am 

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proud to be the Chancellor of the 

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College of Information in cyberspace . 

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It is my privilege to join Lieutenant 

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General plane to welcome each and every 

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one of you today , both of those who 

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are in the auditorium as well as those 

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who are watching online . This is a 

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really special occasion for C . I . C . 

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And it's always important as we gather 

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to recognize the legacy of Rear Admiral 

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Grace Hopper that we do so in the 

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spirit of jointness . And we also do so 

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in a recognition that diversity is an 

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important force Multiplier for our 

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nation . So thank you for all of our 

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students and and again I am just so 

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grateful that we have this opportunity 

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to honor both the legacy of Grace 

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Hopper as well as today's recipient to 

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our special guest of honor Director Jen 

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Easterly . We are honored that you can 

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join us . So thank you . I also want to 

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recognize the important work that 

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Professor linda Jansson did together 

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with the rest of the C . I . C 

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committee who pulled together uh this 

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year's nominees to in order for us to 

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bestow it on today's recipient . Two 

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years ago linda was the person that I 

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turned to to take the idea of this 

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award into reality and here we are 

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today with this really prestigious 

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opportunity . This gathering represents 

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a small subset of the dedicated faculty 

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staff and students of National Defense 

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University and the College of 

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Information and cyberspace , many of 

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whom are spread all across the national 

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Security enterprise and the world . See 

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I see fulfills an exceptionally unique 

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role to educate the Joint Warfighter 

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national Security leaders and disciple 

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workforce to lead advance national and 

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global security . Our unique focus on 

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the information environment and the 

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cyberspace domain necessitates that we 

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not only educate the forward thinkers 

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of today but create a positive 

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environment for the forward thinkers of 

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tomorrow . This was the idea that 

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propelled us forward when we first 

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envisioned the Grace Hopper Award . 

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Rear Admiral . Grace Hopper was a 

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faculty member in the early days of our 

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college , we've gone through a lot of 

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name changes but when we were called 

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the Department of Defense Computer 

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Institute , otherwise known as dot C of 

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course much has changed since those 

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days , but I am proud to say that the 

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legacy of excellence and innovation 

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found in Grace Hopper is still resident 

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today with each and every one of our 

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faculty and staff that are part of the 

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C . I . C . Team certainly also our 

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students , Admiral Hopper personified 

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everything that we hope to honor with 

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this award . She was monumental in her 

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field . She dedicated her life to 

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service and she continues to inspire 

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the national security and computing 

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fields through her legacy , recognizing 

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those that follow in her footsteps and 

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continue to forge their own paths is 

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essential is not to not only honoring 

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Admiral Hoppers impact but continuing 

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her work fundamentally . Our work 

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aims to secure the peace and prosperity 

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of our society to do so . We must 

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inspire future generations to pursue 

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education and careers in cyber 

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technology information and assume 

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mantles of leadership at all levels . 

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Enriching diverse talent pools within 

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our community is the bedrock of this 

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effort and that's what brings us here 

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to do today . We are here to promote 

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excellence and achievement . But we 

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also recognize that diversity and 

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inclusion are force multipliers for 

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creative ideas , alternative 

279
00:12:05,010 --> 00:12:07,960
perspectives and innovative ways for 

280
00:12:07,960 --> 00:12:10,580
responding to and solving intractable 

281
00:12:10,580 --> 00:12:13,940
problems . The threat imperatives of 

282
00:12:13,950 --> 00:12:17,510
our day are varied and unrelenting and 

283
00:12:17,510 --> 00:12:19,566
I don't have to list them to you but 

284
00:12:19,566 --> 00:12:21,510
let me just say malicious actors , 

285
00:12:21,510 --> 00:12:24,720
cyberattacks , disinformation campaigns , 

286
00:12:24,730 --> 00:12:27,640
All of these don't come one size fits 

287
00:12:27,650 --> 00:12:30,760
all to respond and to thwart these 

288
00:12:30,760 --> 00:12:32,427
threats . We are committed to 

289
00:12:32,427 --> 00:12:34,590
developing critical thinkers and 

290
00:12:34,590 --> 00:12:36,510
creating the strongest and most 

291
00:12:36,510 --> 00:12:39,360
resilient national security workforce 

292
00:12:39,370 --> 00:12:41,550
for the sake of global peace . 

293
00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:45,750
This year's recipients of the Rear 

294
00:12:45,760 --> 00:12:48,060
Admiral Grace Hopper Award is none 

295
00:12:48,070 --> 00:12:50,110
other as you've heard before than 

296
00:12:50,110 --> 00:12:52,940
Director Easterly , the director of the 

297
00:12:52,940 --> 00:12:54,820
cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

298
00:12:54,820 --> 00:12:57,650
Security Agency , also known as CISA . 

299
00:12:58,740 --> 00:13:02,110
As Director MS Easterly leads esa's 

300
00:13:02,120 --> 00:13:05,210
efforts to understand manage and reduce 

301
00:13:05,210 --> 00:13:07,910
the risk to their cyber and physical 

302
00:13:07,920 --> 00:13:10,520
infrastructure . Americans rely on 

303
00:13:10,530 --> 00:13:13,590
every day before serving in her current 

304
00:13:13,590 --> 00:13:16,220
role , MS Easterly was the head of firm 

305
00:13:16,220 --> 00:13:18,200
resilience at morgan Stanley 

306
00:13:18,210 --> 00:13:21,110
responsible for ensuring preparedness 

307
00:13:21,120 --> 00:13:23,450
and response to business disrupting 

308
00:13:23,460 --> 00:13:25,840
operational incidents and risk to the 

309
00:13:25,840 --> 00:13:29,820
firm . MS Easterly has a long tradition 

310
00:13:29,830 --> 00:13:32,650
of public service to include two tours 

311
00:13:32,650 --> 00:13:34,820
to the White House , most recently as 

312
00:13:34,820 --> 00:13:37,190
Special Assistant to President Obama 

313
00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:38,590
and Senior Director for 

314
00:13:38,590 --> 00:13:41,840
counterterrorism . She also served as 

315
00:13:41,840 --> 00:13:44,030
the Deputy for counterterrorism at the 

316
00:13:44,030 --> 00:13:47,060
National Security Security Agency . 

317
00:13:47,940 --> 00:13:50,860
A two time recipient of the Bronze Star . 

318
00:13:50,870 --> 00:13:53,037
Miss Easterly retired from the U . S . 

319
00:13:53,037 --> 00:13:55,700
Army after more than 20 years of 

320
00:13:55,700 --> 00:13:58,130
service in intelligence and cyber 

321
00:13:58,130 --> 00:14:01,570
operations , including tours of duty in 

322
00:14:01,570 --> 00:14:04,450
Haiti , the Balkans , Iraq and 

323
00:14:04,450 --> 00:14:08,400
Afghanistan responsible for standing up 

324
00:14:08,410 --> 00:14:11,210
the army's first cyber battalion . Miss 

325
00:14:11,210 --> 00:14:13,580
Easterly was also instrumental in the 

326
00:14:13,580 --> 00:14:16,090
design and creation of the United 

327
00:14:16,090 --> 00:14:19,460
States cyber command . A distinguished 

328
00:14:19,460 --> 00:14:21,630
graduate of the United States Military 

329
00:14:21,630 --> 00:14:24,280
Academy at West Point . MS Easterly 

330
00:14:24,280 --> 00:14:26,502
holds a Master's degree in Philosophy , 

331
00:14:26,502 --> 00:14:28,630
politics and Economics from the 

332
00:14:28,630 --> 00:14:31,020
University of Oxford where she studied 

333
00:14:31,030 --> 00:14:34,680
at a , as a Rhodes scholar , our 

334
00:14:34,680 --> 00:14:36,890
nation desperately depends on her 

335
00:14:36,890 --> 00:14:39,730
organization's success and she 

336
00:14:39,740 --> 00:14:41,410
understands the importance of 

337
00:14:41,410 --> 00:14:44,090
cultivating a diverse and inclusive 

338
00:14:44,090 --> 00:14:47,150
workforce to harness bold and creative 

339
00:14:47,150 --> 00:14:50,980
ideas to combat the tide of disruptive 

340
00:14:50,990 --> 00:14:53,350
and malicious cyber activity . 

341
00:14:54,040 --> 00:14:56,890
Recently , director Easterly announced 

342
00:14:56,900 --> 00:15:00,100
a bold gold to change the landscape of 

343
00:15:00,100 --> 00:15:02,740
cyber workforce , the cyber workforce 

344
00:15:02,740 --> 00:15:05,240
gender gap by doubling the number of 

345
00:15:05,240 --> 00:15:07,810
women in the cybersecurity field by the 

346
00:15:07,810 --> 00:15:11,520
year , Director Easterly 

347
00:15:11,530 --> 00:15:13,990
embodies the spirit of this award with 

348
00:15:13,990 --> 00:15:16,410
her vision and skill in leading an 

349
00:15:16,420 --> 00:15:18,680
organization committed to our 

350
00:15:18,680 --> 00:15:21,460
collective preparation and protection 

351
00:15:21,470 --> 00:15:24,970
all while focusing on people and 

352
00:15:24,970 --> 00:15:27,960
culture . Ladies and gentlemen , thank 

353
00:15:27,960 --> 00:15:30,120
you again for joining us on this very 

354
00:15:30,120 --> 00:15:32,840
special occasion , Director Easterly , 

355
00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:35,460
I invite you to join me center stage to 

356
00:15:35,460 --> 00:15:36,660
receive the award . 

357
00:15:51,830 --> 00:15:55,800
Me too . one 

358
00:15:55,800 --> 00:15:59,080
quick photo up . Amazing . 

359
00:16:02,540 --> 00:16:04,580
Right , thank you . 

360
00:16:07,150 --> 00:16:09,250
Mm hmm , mm hmm . 

361
00:16:12,040 --> 00:16:14,950
That okay . Yes . 

362
00:16:24,040 --> 00:16:26,151
Okay . So we are going to do a little 

363
00:16:26,151 --> 00:16:28,318
bit of a transition and we're going to 

364
00:16:28,318 --> 00:16:30,760
engage in a fireside chat . Um , as 

365
00:16:30,760 --> 00:16:32,982
Professor Jansen said , I'll open up by 

366
00:16:32,982 --> 00:16:35,204
asking you a couple of questions . Um , 

367
00:16:35,204 --> 00:16:37,204
and certainly I'm sure that much of 

368
00:16:37,204 --> 00:16:38,982
what you've heard already about 

369
00:16:38,982 --> 00:16:41,330
Director Easter lilies career as well 

370
00:16:41,330 --> 00:16:43,386
as her accomplishments and certainly 

371
00:16:43,386 --> 00:16:45,274
what she'll share as part of this 

372
00:16:45,274 --> 00:16:47,650
gathering will hopefully as well invoke 

373
00:16:47,650 --> 00:16:49,817
some excellent audience questions . So 

374
00:16:49,817 --> 00:16:52,039
I'll just kick kick us off . And then I 

375
00:16:52,039 --> 00:16:54,039
invite the audience um a little bit 

376
00:16:54,039 --> 00:16:56,094
later in the program to join us with 

377
00:16:56,094 --> 00:16:58,430
questions or comments of your own . So 

378
00:16:58,430 --> 00:17:01,830
I want to take us back . Um and I want 

379
00:17:01,830 --> 00:17:03,940
you to consider how you've actually 

380
00:17:03,940 --> 00:17:05,884
arrived at this moment . So can we 

381
00:17:05,884 --> 00:17:08,360
start by you sharing a little bit about 

382
00:17:08,370 --> 00:17:11,320
the experiences that led to a career in 

383
00:17:11,320 --> 00:17:13,320
national security and certainly one 

384
00:17:13,320 --> 00:17:16,020
that's focused on cybersecurity . I'd 

385
00:17:16,020 --> 00:17:18,470
love to . Um first I just have to say 

386
00:17:18,480 --> 00:17:21,480
thank you so much . It is such an 

387
00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:23,840
incredible honor to receive this 

388
00:17:23,850 --> 00:17:26,017
specific award . When you sent me that 

389
00:17:26,017 --> 00:17:28,800
email a couple months ago , I was just , 

390
00:17:28,800 --> 00:17:30,911
I think I got back to you within like 

391
00:17:30,911 --> 00:17:32,930
five seconds . I was so so thrilled 

392
00:17:32,930 --> 00:17:36,170
about it because uh Grace Hopper has 

393
00:17:36,170 --> 00:17:38,600
been a personal hero of mine for a very 

394
00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:41,620
long time . And so I cannot imagine a 

395
00:17:41,620 --> 00:17:43,840
greater honor . And so I am very 

396
00:17:43,840 --> 00:17:47,380
grateful to you two nd you uh to 

397
00:17:47,380 --> 00:17:51,110
linda my Iraq combat veteran buddy 

398
00:17:51,120 --> 00:17:53,940
um as well as you know , you for your 

399
00:17:53,940 --> 00:17:56,750
vision . Um just incredible leadership . 

400
00:17:56,760 --> 00:17:58,538
And and so I just think this is 

401
00:17:58,538 --> 00:18:00,760
fantastic and you know , my predecessor 

402
00:18:00,760 --> 00:18:02,927
getting this award , Laurie Reynolds , 

403
00:18:02,927 --> 00:18:04,927
I mean it's wonderful to be part of 

404
00:18:04,927 --> 00:18:07,038
that very special group of folks . So 

405
00:18:07,038 --> 00:18:09,204
thank you for your leadership and your 

406
00:18:09,204 --> 00:18:11,427
vision . It's pretty incredible and I'm 

407
00:18:11,427 --> 00:18:13,760
just so thrilled to be here . Thank you . 

408
00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:15,816
Um and I have to follow on to mike's 

409
00:18:15,816 --> 00:18:17,927
remarks and and say happy birthday to 

410
00:18:17,927 --> 00:18:20,750
my dad uh who turns 83 today , I think 

411
00:18:20,750 --> 00:18:22,750
he'd be okay with everybody knowing 

412
00:18:22,750 --> 00:18:25,390
that . Um but that really starts uh the 

413
00:18:25,390 --> 00:18:27,557
answer to your question , you know , I 

414
00:18:27,557 --> 00:18:29,890
think like most of us uh I was very , 

415
00:18:29,900 --> 00:18:32,410
very influenced by my , my parents and 

416
00:18:32,420 --> 00:18:35,230
my father has always been my hero and 

417
00:18:35,230 --> 00:18:37,610
my role model . He had a pretty tough 

418
00:18:37,610 --> 00:18:39,777
life growing up . He was a high school 

419
00:18:39,777 --> 00:18:42,860
dropout , Went off and joined the army 

420
00:18:43,290 --> 00:18:46,230
in the early 60's And ended up in 

421
00:18:46,230 --> 00:18:48,460
Vietnam . But it was the early days he 

422
00:18:48,460 --> 00:18:51,280
was there from 62 to 63 with the Army 

423
00:18:51,280 --> 00:18:53,502
Security Agency . So the predecessor of 

424
00:18:53,502 --> 00:18:57,190
the National Security Agency uh and you 

425
00:18:57,190 --> 00:18:59,530
know , it was a time before the 

426
00:18:59,530 --> 00:19:02,190
violence and the , you know , the 

427
00:19:02,190 --> 00:19:04,900
extreme amount of fighting there . And 

428
00:19:04,900 --> 00:19:07,011
he really enjoyed the experience that 

429
00:19:07,011 --> 00:19:10,350
opened up the eyes of uh they somewhat 

430
00:19:10,360 --> 00:19:13,090
disaffected but intellectually curious 

431
00:19:13,090 --> 00:19:15,930
kid and it really had an impact on him 

432
00:19:15,930 --> 00:19:18,480
and that impact really had an impact on 

433
00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:20,813
me . He actually came back from Vietnam . 

434
00:19:20,813 --> 00:19:23,320
He had got out of the army uh ended up 

435
00:19:23,330 --> 00:19:25,608
going to pennsylvania Military College , 

436
00:19:25,608 --> 00:19:27,580
which is now widener University uh 

437
00:19:27,590 --> 00:19:30,370
worked to set up a fund to build an 

438
00:19:30,380 --> 00:19:33,180
orphanage in the city of Canaan in 

439
00:19:33,180 --> 00:19:35,650
Vietnam . And when I was teaching at 

440
00:19:35,650 --> 00:19:37,730
West Point , He and I actually went 

441
00:19:37,730 --> 00:19:40,610
back to Vietnam um and visited for 

442
00:19:40,610 --> 00:19:42,721
about three weeks and saw some of the 

443
00:19:42,721 --> 00:19:44,888
places where he was uh and then I took 

444
00:19:44,888 --> 00:19:46,999
students and midshipman back there in 

445
00:19:46,999 --> 00:19:49,054
the summer of 2000 . And so you know 

446
00:19:49,054 --> 00:19:51,580
everything uh for national security in 

447
00:19:51,580 --> 00:19:53,720
the military where I spent 22 years 

448
00:19:53,730 --> 00:19:56,280
really starts with my dad . So it's 

449
00:19:56,280 --> 00:19:58,550
very fitting that it is his birthday 

450
00:19:58,550 --> 00:20:01,260
today . Um And I'm I'm very grateful 

451
00:20:01,260 --> 00:20:04,000
that he can listen in . So I knew from 

452
00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:06,790
a young age that I wanted to serve . Uh 

453
00:20:06,790 --> 00:20:09,860
and I wanted to be in the military . Uh 

454
00:20:09,870 --> 00:20:12,092
best place to be in the military was of 

455
00:20:12,092 --> 00:20:15,780
course the army um 

456
00:20:15,790 --> 00:20:18,290
and wanted to go to West Point . Uh So 

457
00:20:18,290 --> 00:20:20,500
I applied early to West Point . I got 

458
00:20:20,500 --> 00:20:23,270
accepted early uh And I made the 

459
00:20:23,270 --> 00:20:25,326
mistake of never visiting West Point 

460
00:20:25,326 --> 00:20:27,790
before uh before I arrived there on a 

461
00:20:27,800 --> 00:20:31,680
very very hot day july 1st of 1986 and 

462
00:20:31,680 --> 00:20:33,847
realized that I didn't know what I got 

463
00:20:33,847 --> 00:20:36,910
myself into . Um and it was pretty 

464
00:20:36,910 --> 00:20:39,077
tough . I mean this was 10 years after 

465
00:20:39,077 --> 00:20:41,560
the first um group of women were 

466
00:20:41,570 --> 00:20:43,737
admitted into the military academies . 

467
00:20:43,737 --> 00:20:45,760
And there were still a lot of men , 

468
00:20:45,760 --> 00:20:47,871
both cadets and professors who didn't 

469
00:20:47,871 --> 00:20:50,300
think women should be there . Uh And so 

470
00:20:50,300 --> 00:20:52,820
it was pretty tough and I thought a lot 

471
00:20:52,830 --> 00:20:55,730
about going home and going off to some 

472
00:20:55,730 --> 00:20:58,940
other nice little uh school . But it 

473
00:20:58,940 --> 00:21:02,260
was the first real test of um 

474
00:21:02,940 --> 00:21:05,390
understanding who I was in the world 

475
00:21:05,390 --> 00:21:07,920
and understanding and ability to deal 

476
00:21:07,920 --> 00:21:10,250
with a lot of difficulties that I don't 

477
00:21:10,250 --> 00:21:12,361
think I really had growing up in nice 

478
00:21:12,361 --> 00:21:14,790
suburbs of Washington D . C . Um And it 

479
00:21:14,790 --> 00:21:16,901
really at the end of the day while it 

480
00:21:16,901 --> 00:21:19,123
was not the most enjoyable experience , 

481
00:21:19,123 --> 00:21:21,290
of course , anybody who's ever been to 

482
00:21:21,290 --> 00:21:20,290
West Point can tell you the most 

483
00:21:20,290 --> 00:21:22,457
beautiful view is the one in your rear 

484
00:21:22,457 --> 00:21:25,810
view mirror . Um But it really made me 

485
00:21:25,820 --> 00:21:27,987
who I am because at the end of the day 

486
00:21:27,987 --> 00:21:31,030
it's about values , right ? The values 

487
00:21:31,030 --> 00:21:33,960
of duty , honor , country but loyalty 

488
00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:37,540
and uh respect and integrity and moral 

489
00:21:37,540 --> 00:21:41,450
courage and sacrifice . And that's how 

490
00:21:41,450 --> 00:21:43,450
I think about serving . And I think 

491
00:21:43,450 --> 00:21:45,561
that's how we all think about serving 

492
00:21:45,561 --> 00:21:47,880
is really it comes down to values and 

493
00:21:47,880 --> 00:21:49,713
are willing to sacrifice for the 

494
00:21:49,713 --> 00:21:52,090
american people um and for what this 

495
00:21:52,090 --> 00:21:55,880
nation stands for . And so that's um an 

496
00:21:55,890 --> 00:21:58,050
ethos that I've brought throughout my 

497
00:21:58,060 --> 00:22:00,580
career . And I'd like to think that it 

498
00:22:00,580 --> 00:22:03,530
brought me to this day because you know 

499
00:22:03,530 --> 00:22:05,419
if you think about Grace Hopper , 

500
00:22:05,419 --> 00:22:07,474
there's a lot of adjectives that can 

501
00:22:07,474 --> 00:22:09,530
can come to mind , but I think she's 

502
00:22:09,530 --> 00:22:11,419
somebody who truly understood the 

503
00:22:11,419 --> 00:22:13,940
importance of values . Um and that's 

504
00:22:13,940 --> 00:22:16,107
one of the reasons why I'm so proud to 

505
00:22:16,107 --> 00:22:18,273
be here with you . That's awesome . So 

506
00:22:18,273 --> 00:22:20,329
so if I can then shift this a little 

507
00:22:20,329 --> 00:22:22,600
bit to your professional journey that 

508
00:22:22,600 --> 00:22:25,310
led you to become the director of Cisa , 

509
00:22:25,310 --> 00:22:27,470
can you talk about your professional 

510
00:22:27,470 --> 00:22:29,637
trajectory ? Yeah it's like it's a bit 

511
00:22:29,637 --> 00:22:33,040
like this . So um uh so I started 

512
00:22:33,040 --> 00:22:35,810
out in the I guess what we call the 

513
00:22:35,810 --> 00:22:38,350
Tactical Army . My first eight years 

514
00:22:38,350 --> 00:22:40,640
was assignments that 25th Infantry 

515
00:22:40,640 --> 00:22:42,862
Division doing signals tactical signals 

516
00:22:42,862 --> 00:22:45,770
intelligence . During that time I was 

517
00:22:45,780 --> 00:22:48,300
deployed to Haiti . Uh and I would have 

518
00:22:48,300 --> 00:22:50,522
told you that I wasn't sure I was gonna 

519
00:22:50,522 --> 00:22:52,578
stay in the army passed my five year 

520
00:22:52,578 --> 00:22:54,578
obligation , but it was really that 

521
00:22:54,578 --> 00:22:56,467
first deployment that made a real 

522
00:22:56,467 --> 00:22:58,690
difference because I got a sense of um 

523
00:22:58,700 --> 00:23:01,020
how you could make a difference in 

524
00:23:01,020 --> 00:23:03,940
people's lives being on the ground in a 

525
00:23:03,950 --> 00:23:05,672
at that point in time it was a 

526
00:23:05,672 --> 00:23:08,530
peacekeeping mission . Um That was 1995 . 

527
00:23:08,540 --> 00:23:10,540
And then I went to Fort Bragg north 

528
00:23:10,540 --> 00:23:12,262
Carolina where I was a company 

529
00:23:12,262 --> 00:23:14,318
commander and a paratrooper . And uh 

530
00:23:14,318 --> 00:23:17,830
went off to Bosnia , where I was an s 

531
00:23:17,830 --> 00:23:20,052
to a senior intelligence officer for an 

532
00:23:20,052 --> 00:23:22,560
Apache brigade task force Tiger . Um 

533
00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:24,671
And that was a fantastic experience . 

534
00:23:24,671 --> 00:23:27,290
And then I went off to teach at West 

535
00:23:27,290 --> 00:23:30,040
Point for a couple of years , teach 

536
00:23:30,050 --> 00:23:32,760
economics and national security and all 

537
00:23:32,760 --> 00:23:36,240
of that . And so after I did that I 

538
00:23:36,240 --> 00:23:38,407
went to go work in the White House , I 

539
00:23:38,407 --> 00:23:40,129
was the executive assistant at 

540
00:23:40,129 --> 00:23:42,407
Condoleezza Rice for a couple of years . 

541
00:23:42,407 --> 00:23:44,629
It was a pretty intense time because it 

542
00:23:44,629 --> 00:23:46,629
was right after 9 11 , From 2000 to 

543
00:23:46,629 --> 00:23:50,390
2004 . And after that period of time I 

544
00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:53,390
got to um a chance to go to fort meat , 

545
00:23:53,400 --> 00:23:56,530
which was my first real exposure to the 

546
00:23:56,530 --> 00:24:00,010
world of uh cyber And was 

547
00:24:00,010 --> 00:24:02,930
there for a couple of years doing some 

548
00:24:02,930 --> 00:24:05,170
command and staff assignments and then 

549
00:24:05,180 --> 00:24:09,150
ended up being deployed to Iraq in 2006 , 

550
00:24:09,150 --> 00:24:11,840
where I was the head of what's called 

551
00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:13,951
the counter or the counterterrorism , 

552
00:24:13,951 --> 00:24:17,620
the cryptologic uh services group . So 

553
00:24:17,620 --> 00:24:19,731
we were basically in charge of all of 

554
00:24:19,731 --> 00:24:22,500
the military uh and forces that were 

555
00:24:22,500 --> 00:24:24,667
coming from N . S . A . To support the 

556
00:24:24,667 --> 00:24:27,300
brigade combat teams . And it was a 

557
00:24:27,300 --> 00:24:30,100
time where the insurgents were starting 

558
00:24:30,100 --> 00:24:33,500
to use communication to operationalize 

559
00:24:33,500 --> 00:24:35,667
attacks . And one of the things that I 

560
00:24:35,667 --> 00:24:37,556
was asked to do was to put was to 

561
00:24:37,556 --> 00:24:40,020
implement this high tech system . Uh It 

562
00:24:40,020 --> 00:24:42,131
was highly classified at the time and 

563
00:24:42,131 --> 00:24:44,298
since all been declassified but it was 

564
00:24:44,298 --> 00:24:46,520
called R . T . Started out being called 

565
00:24:46,520 --> 00:24:48,631
R . T 10 , but then our trg real time 

566
00:24:48,631 --> 00:24:50,742
regional gateway . And essentially uh 

567
00:24:50,742 --> 00:24:54,030
the idea was it took all sorts of data 

568
00:24:54,030 --> 00:24:56,141
that was being collected in theater . 

569
00:24:56,141 --> 00:24:58,252
So I think satellites , cell phones , 

570
00:24:58,252 --> 00:25:01,070
human reports from troops on the ground . 

571
00:25:01,080 --> 00:25:03,810
And it integrated it correlated it and 

572
00:25:03,810 --> 00:25:06,360
enriched it so that we could illuminate 

573
00:25:06,730 --> 00:25:09,370
information about insurgent networks 

574
00:25:09,370 --> 00:25:11,940
not in weeks or days , but in hours and 

575
00:25:11,940 --> 00:25:13,773
minutes . So we can provide that 

576
00:25:13,773 --> 00:25:15,940
capability to the troops on the ground 

577
00:25:15,940 --> 00:25:18,350
so that they were able to prosecute 

578
00:25:18,350 --> 00:25:20,830
these insurgent networks , specifically 

579
00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:23,330
the I . E . D . S , the improvised 

580
00:25:23,330 --> 00:25:25,552
explosive devices that were having such 

581
00:25:25,552 --> 00:25:27,663
catastrophic impacts on our troops on 

582
00:25:27,663 --> 00:25:29,886
the ground and on Iraqi civilians . And 

583
00:25:29,886 --> 00:25:32,052
so it was really the first time and it 

584
00:25:32,052 --> 00:25:34,219
was a pretty difficult thing , we were 

585
00:25:34,219 --> 00:25:36,386
able to get it up and running . Um but 

586
00:25:36,386 --> 00:25:36,330
it was the first time where again I 

587
00:25:36,330 --> 00:25:39,390
really saw the power of technology in 

588
00:25:39,390 --> 00:25:43,130
saving people's lives and I really it 

589
00:25:43,130 --> 00:25:46,250
had a huge impact on the path that 

590
00:25:46,260 --> 00:25:48,427
brought me to be director of . Since I 

591
00:25:48,427 --> 00:25:51,360
came back from Iraq , the director of 

592
00:25:51,360 --> 00:25:53,304
the National Security Agency keith 

593
00:25:53,304 --> 00:25:55,304
alexander at the time , asked me to 

594
00:25:55,304 --> 00:25:57,082
stand up the army's first cyber 

595
00:25:57,082 --> 00:25:59,230
battalion . We didn't have units like 

596
00:25:59,230 --> 00:26:01,560
we do now but stood up something called 

597
00:26:01,560 --> 00:26:04,430
the Army Network Warfare Battalion . Uh 

598
00:26:04,430 --> 00:26:07,030
And that was the first operational unit 

599
00:26:07,030 --> 00:26:09,450
in the army and then got involved in 

600
00:26:09,450 --> 00:26:13,110
working in uh en ESAs tailored access 

601
00:26:13,110 --> 00:26:15,277
operations which does computer network 

602
00:26:15,277 --> 00:26:17,960
operations . And then uh was then 

603
00:26:17,970 --> 00:26:20,650
dragged into a project to stand up a 

604
00:26:20,650 --> 00:26:22,650
little command called U . S . Cyber 

605
00:26:22,650 --> 00:26:25,500
command . Uh That was super fun . It 

606
00:26:25,500 --> 00:26:27,900
was a funny story actually . I was 

607
00:26:27,910 --> 00:26:29,743
sitting in my office over in the 

608
00:26:29,743 --> 00:26:31,966
research and engineering building in in 

609
00:26:31,966 --> 00:26:35,170
uh in N . S . A . Uh I was doing my job , 

610
00:26:35,170 --> 00:26:36,837
got this phone call , I was a 

611
00:26:36,837 --> 00:26:38,948
Lieutenant Colonel in the army at the 

612
00:26:38,948 --> 00:26:40,948
time , got this very exercise phone 

613
00:26:40,948 --> 00:26:42,837
call very aggressive uh from this 

614
00:26:42,837 --> 00:26:45,720
person called Captain White and 

615
00:26:45,730 --> 00:26:48,960
uh super aggressive by the way and I 

616
00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:51,016
was a Lieutenant Colonel . I thought 

617
00:26:51,016 --> 00:26:53,238
this guy was like an army captain , I'm 

618
00:26:53,238 --> 00:26:55,349
like what is going on with this guy , 

619
00:26:55,349 --> 00:26:57,404
but he said you need to come to this 

620
00:26:57,404 --> 00:26:59,571
meeting right away with the director , 

621
00:26:59,571 --> 00:27:01,571
it was like what the heck , I'll go 

622
00:27:01,571 --> 00:27:03,738
right , you know , as it turned out it 

623
00:27:03,738 --> 00:27:05,682
was Captain Navy , Captain T . J . 

624
00:27:05,682 --> 00:27:07,770
White , um uh and it was me , it was 

625
00:27:07,780 --> 00:27:10,940
Army Colonel paul Nakis , Sony Air 

626
00:27:10,940 --> 00:27:13,700
Force Colonel S . L . Davis , and we 

627
00:27:13,700 --> 00:27:15,644
were asked to be part of this very 

628
00:27:15,644 --> 00:27:17,700
small team called the implementation 

629
00:27:17,700 --> 00:27:19,811
team to help design and create United 

630
00:27:19,811 --> 00:27:21,867
States cyber command and we did that 

631
00:27:21,867 --> 00:27:23,867
for about a year and a half working 

632
00:27:23,867 --> 00:27:25,867
together and it was one of the real 

633
00:27:25,867 --> 00:27:27,700
highlights of my entire career , 

634
00:27:28,040 --> 00:27:30,040
working for general alexander chris 

635
00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:31,873
Inglis was the deputy director , 

636
00:27:31,873 --> 00:27:34,096
working as part of this very small team 

637
00:27:34,096 --> 00:27:36,040
where everybody wore uniform , but 

638
00:27:36,040 --> 00:27:38,151
there really was no rank , it was all 

639
00:27:38,151 --> 00:27:39,929
about how can we work as a team 

640
00:27:39,929 --> 00:27:41,984
collaboratively to figure out how to 

641
00:27:41,984 --> 00:27:44,580
design and create this brand new 

642
00:27:44,580 --> 00:27:46,940
combatant command . And so , you know , 

643
00:27:46,940 --> 00:27:49,107
that's where I got a little bit deeper 

644
00:27:49,107 --> 00:27:52,270
into cyber from a military perspective . 

645
00:27:52,640 --> 00:27:54,640
Uh And then a couple of years later 

646
00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:56,862
after I left the government , I went up 

647
00:27:56,862 --> 00:27:59,084
to morgan Stanley to stand up our cyber 

648
00:27:59,084 --> 00:28:01,307
security operations . They're built our 

649
00:28:01,307 --> 00:28:04,430
cyber fusion center and ended up being 

650
00:28:04,430 --> 00:28:07,860
head of resilience . Um so saw cyber 

651
00:28:07,860 --> 00:28:10,082
from an intelligence perspective , from 

652
00:28:10,082 --> 00:28:13,360
a combat um environment perspective , 

653
00:28:13,360 --> 00:28:16,370
saw it from uh the military perspective . 

654
00:28:16,370 --> 00:28:18,481
And then saw it from a private sector 

655
00:28:18,481 --> 00:28:20,537
perspective , which was probably the 

656
00:28:20,537 --> 00:28:22,537
most important experience to be the 

657
00:28:22,537 --> 00:28:24,592
director of cisa is really seeing it 

658
00:28:24,592 --> 00:28:26,481
from a private sector perspective 

659
00:28:26,481 --> 00:28:28,970
because we are so external facing and 

660
00:28:28,980 --> 00:28:31,147
everything that we do working with the 

661
00:28:31,147 --> 00:28:33,258
private sector , because we don't own 

662
00:28:33,258 --> 00:28:35,480
the vast majority of the infrastructure 

663
00:28:35,480 --> 00:28:37,591
the private sector does . And so that 

664
00:28:37,591 --> 00:28:39,813
was a really important experience . But 

665
00:28:39,813 --> 00:28:41,813
I ended up at the end of my time at 

666
00:28:41,813 --> 00:28:43,758
morgan Stanley , I was asked by my 

667
00:28:43,758 --> 00:28:46,800
friend um every L Haynes , uh I was 

668
00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:48,967
actually running the response to Covid 

669
00:28:48,967 --> 00:28:51,022
for the firm , working with my great 

670
00:28:51,022 --> 00:28:53,078
friend Dave Stark , who is our chief 

671
00:28:53,078 --> 00:28:54,967
medical Officer . And so it was a 

672
00:28:54,967 --> 00:28:57,022
pretty intense time Around August of 

673
00:28:57,022 --> 00:28:59,240
2020 , I get a call from avril and 

674
00:28:59,240 --> 00:29:01,296
she's like , we'd really like you to 

675
00:29:01,296 --> 00:29:03,462
come onto the transition team and lead 

676
00:29:03,462 --> 00:29:05,573
cyber policy . And I was like , oh my 

677
00:29:05,573 --> 00:29:07,573
gosh , I really don't have time for 

678
00:29:07,573 --> 00:29:06,910
this , really . I really can't do this . 

679
00:29:06,910 --> 00:29:09,021
But you know , if anybody knows Avril 

680
00:29:09,021 --> 00:29:10,910
Haines , our Director of National 

681
00:29:10,910 --> 00:29:12,854
Intelligence , you never say no to 

682
00:29:12,854 --> 00:29:14,966
Israel because she's , you know , one 

683
00:29:14,966 --> 00:29:14,760
of the most brilliant people , but also 

684
00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:16,930
like the nicest person in the world . 

685
00:29:16,940 --> 00:29:20,010
Um and so I agreed to come on , worked 

686
00:29:20,010 --> 00:29:22,540
on the transition . Very interesting 

687
00:29:22,540 --> 00:29:25,090
time to be on the transition because we 

688
00:29:25,090 --> 00:29:27,040
started in september and around 

689
00:29:27,050 --> 00:29:30,590
december after we knew that President 

690
00:29:30,590 --> 00:29:32,670
biden had one , We had solar winds , 

691
00:29:32,680 --> 00:29:35,870
which was the most significant cyber 

692
00:29:35,870 --> 00:29:38,250
espionage campaign that we had seen 

693
00:29:38,250 --> 00:29:40,083
with real impacts on our federal 

694
00:29:40,083 --> 00:29:41,972
civilian networks and on critical 

695
00:29:41,972 --> 00:29:44,660
infrastructure . Uh , and so it was 

696
00:29:44,660 --> 00:29:47,290
great to see that very early on this . 

697
00:29:47,290 --> 00:29:49,780
President was making cybersecurity a 

698
00:29:49,780 --> 00:29:52,390
real priority . And what happened with 

699
00:29:52,390 --> 00:29:55,150
solar winds helped to accelerate a lot 

700
00:29:55,150 --> 00:29:57,480
of the pieces that were put in place 

701
00:29:57,490 --> 00:30:00,380
after the inauguration . Uh , and so I 

702
00:30:00,380 --> 00:30:03,280
was asked to um come back and join 

703
00:30:03,280 --> 00:30:06,170
government again . And it was , it was , 

704
00:30:06,180 --> 00:30:10,070
it was not a super easy decision to be 

705
00:30:10,070 --> 00:30:12,880
honest . We loved my family up in new 

706
00:30:12,880 --> 00:30:15,047
york city . I I loved morgan Stanley . 

707
00:30:15,047 --> 00:30:17,570
It was a fantastic time . And I had a 

708
00:30:17,580 --> 00:30:19,691
boy who was going , you know , in his 

709
00:30:19,691 --> 00:30:21,747
10th grade year , you know what it's 

710
00:30:21,747 --> 00:30:23,802
like with your kids , right ? Moving 

711
00:30:23,802 --> 00:30:25,913
him around . But we made the decision 

712
00:30:25,913 --> 00:30:28,247
as a family because it was so important . 

713
00:30:28,247 --> 00:30:30,413
I mean , I've done so many cool things 

714
00:30:30,413 --> 00:30:32,302
in my career have been incredibly 

715
00:30:32,302 --> 00:30:34,191
blessed , but I have to say being 

716
00:30:34,191 --> 00:30:36,560
director of Cisa is the best job I've 

717
00:30:36,560 --> 00:30:40,090
ever had . It is so , um , it's such a 

718
00:30:40,090 --> 00:30:42,350
gift . It's such an absolute treasure 

719
00:30:42,360 --> 00:30:45,350
to , to be the director here . Um , so 

720
00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:47,582
that's what brought me , it was kind of 

721
00:30:47,582 --> 00:30:49,638
an around No , that's a that's those 

722
00:30:49,638 --> 00:30:51,804
are really important highlights . So , 

723
00:30:51,804 --> 00:30:53,860
so what can you tell us a little bit 

724
00:30:53,860 --> 00:30:55,860
about this gift ? I know that in um 

725
00:30:55,860 --> 00:30:58,260
you've been really public when in 

726
00:30:58,260 --> 00:31:00,316
discussion with the private sector , 

727
00:31:00,316 --> 00:31:02,482
that what you want them to focus on is 

728
00:31:02,482 --> 00:31:04,704
preparation and not panic . And there's 

729
00:31:04,704 --> 00:31:06,649
a lot to panic or a lot that could 

730
00:31:06,649 --> 00:31:08,649
cause us to panic . But you've been 

731
00:31:08,649 --> 00:31:10,760
really clear that your expectation is 

732
00:31:10,760 --> 00:31:14,460
that as a nation um as uh 

733
00:31:14,840 --> 00:31:17,810
private sectors companies really need 

734
00:31:17,810 --> 00:31:20,088
to focus on that aspect of preparation . 

735
00:31:20,088 --> 00:31:22,032
So can you talk to us a little bit 

736
00:31:22,032 --> 00:31:24,088
about how you lead CISA to make sure 

737
00:31:24,088 --> 00:31:26,088
that we're focused on preparation ? 

738
00:31:26,088 --> 00:31:27,921
Yeah , absolutely . It's a great 

739
00:31:27,921 --> 00:31:30,143
question . So just to step back because 

740
00:31:30,143 --> 00:31:32,199
I think it's , it's useful to look a 

741
00:31:32,199 --> 00:31:34,366
little bit at the evolution um because 

742
00:31:34,366 --> 00:31:36,421
there's always an origin story , you 

743
00:31:36,421 --> 00:31:38,643
know , see I see is dot see the NMC and 

744
00:31:38,643 --> 00:31:41,520
now now see I see . And so our origin 

745
00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:43,631
story was really as a staff element , 

746
00:31:43,631 --> 00:31:45,780
very small staff element called 

747
00:31:45,780 --> 00:31:47,670
National Programs and Protection 

748
00:31:47,670 --> 00:31:49,503
Directorate in the Department of 

749
00:31:49,503 --> 00:31:51,559
Homeland Security . And remember the 

750
00:31:51,559 --> 00:31:53,781
provenance of DHS was really Coming out 

751
00:31:53,781 --> 00:31:55,948
of 9 11 . So it's very much focused on 

752
00:31:55,948 --> 00:31:57,781
the counter terrorism threat and 

753
00:31:57,781 --> 00:31:59,948
physical security . Um , and then over 

754
00:31:59,948 --> 00:32:02,340
the years , as people realized that the 

755
00:32:02,340 --> 00:32:04,580
cyber threat could have significant 

756
00:32:04,590 --> 00:32:06,868
impacts on our critical infrastructure , 

757
00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:10,620
uh we began building a greater capacity 

758
00:32:10,620 --> 00:32:13,090
and capability . The Congress really 

759
00:32:13,090 --> 00:32:15,312
realized though that there was a gap in 

760
00:32:15,312 --> 00:32:17,970
terms of , there wasn't Um , other than 

761
00:32:17,970 --> 00:32:20,192
the staff element , there really wasn't 

762
00:32:20,192 --> 00:32:23,300
a component in operational agency 

763
00:32:23,310 --> 00:32:26,570
dedicated every day to the defense of 

764
00:32:26,570 --> 00:32:28,792
cyberspace of the nation and that's why 

765
00:32:28,792 --> 00:32:31,580
Congress passed the act in 2018 , 

766
00:32:31,580 --> 00:32:35,210
November of 2018 uh to build cisa as 

767
00:32:35,210 --> 00:32:38,490
America's cyber Defense Agency um to 

768
00:32:38,490 --> 00:32:41,830
really uh fill that gap of how do we 

769
00:32:41,840 --> 00:32:44,007
bring together the capabilities of the 

770
00:32:44,007 --> 00:32:46,640
nation to work with our partners across 

771
00:32:46,650 --> 00:32:49,040
America to help defend the nation in 

772
00:32:49,040 --> 00:32:52,780
cyberspace ? uh so we stood up in 2018 

773
00:32:52,790 --> 00:32:55,280
uh and it's been a little bit over 

774
00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:58,190
three years and our mission is to lead 

775
00:32:58,190 --> 00:33:00,220
the national effort to understand , 

776
00:33:00,220 --> 00:33:03,000
manage and reduce risk to the digital 

777
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:05,056
and the physical infrastructure that 

778
00:33:05,056 --> 00:33:07,167
Americans rely on every hour of every 

779
00:33:07,167 --> 00:33:09,333
day to get gas at the pump to get food 

780
00:33:09,333 --> 00:33:11,333
at the grocery store money from the 

781
00:33:11,333 --> 00:33:13,556
bank , power water , these the networks 

782
00:33:13,556 --> 00:33:15,556
and systems that underpin our daily 

783
00:33:15,556 --> 00:33:17,900
lives . And so we serve two main roles . 

784
00:33:17,900 --> 00:33:19,733
One is , we are in charge of the 

785
00:33:19,733 --> 00:33:21,844
protection of the dot gov . So all of 

786
00:33:21,844 --> 00:33:23,956
the federal civilian executive branch 

787
00:33:23,956 --> 00:33:26,233
networks , there's 100 and one of them . 

788
00:33:26,233 --> 00:33:28,470
Uh And then very importantly and 

789
00:33:28,470 --> 00:33:30,760
relevant to your question about the 

790
00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:32,800
private sector , we service the 

791
00:33:32,800 --> 00:33:34,689
national Coordinator for critical 

792
00:33:34,689 --> 00:33:36,356
infrastructure resilience and 

793
00:33:36,356 --> 00:33:38,467
cybersecurity . And so what does that 

794
00:33:38,467 --> 00:33:40,633
really mean ? Well , at the end of the 

795
00:33:40,633 --> 00:33:42,800
day , the private sector owns the vast 

796
00:33:42,800 --> 00:33:45,150
majority of critical infrastructure and 

797
00:33:45,150 --> 00:33:48,580
so we have to forge a very 

798
00:33:48,580 --> 00:33:51,530
collaborative partnership with them to 

799
00:33:51,530 --> 00:33:54,380
ensure that we are able to work 

800
00:33:54,380 --> 00:33:57,270
together to protect the infrastructure , 

801
00:33:57,270 --> 00:33:59,381
to ensure its security and resilience 

802
00:33:59,740 --> 00:34:03,050
And it has been um as I said , my my 

803
00:34:03,050 --> 00:34:05,272
experience in Morgan Stanley was really 

804
00:34:05,272 --> 00:34:07,383
interesting because I had been in the 

805
00:34:07,383 --> 00:34:10,410
government for 27 years before I went 

806
00:34:10,410 --> 00:34:12,680
to the private sector and I felt 

807
00:34:12,680 --> 00:34:15,460
looking back uh it was really confusing . 

808
00:34:16,240 --> 00:34:19,160
uh it was not clear how the private 

809
00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:21,630
sector was supposed to interact with 

810
00:34:21,630 --> 00:34:24,660
the government on matters of cyber uh 

811
00:34:24,670 --> 00:34:26,837
and frankly it sometimes felt like you 

812
00:34:26,837 --> 00:34:29,470
needed a PhD in government studies to 

813
00:34:29,470 --> 00:34:31,803
figure out how do I , how do I interact ? 

814
00:34:32,140 --> 00:34:35,110
And so I've been very deliberate 

815
00:34:35,120 --> 00:34:38,040
about talking about the transformation 

816
00:34:38,040 --> 00:34:40,040
of public private partnership , you 

817
00:34:40,040 --> 00:34:42,151
know , which we've been talking about 

818
00:34:42,151 --> 00:34:44,318
for decades now , it's become a bit of 

819
00:34:44,318 --> 00:34:46,429
a happening buzzword . What we really 

820
00:34:46,429 --> 00:34:45,890
want to do is not the type of 

821
00:34:45,890 --> 00:34:48,057
partnership where you know , we have a 

822
00:34:48,057 --> 00:34:50,279
meeting and I give you my business card 

823
00:34:50,279 --> 00:34:52,501
and you can call me if you need me , we 

824
00:34:52,501 --> 00:34:54,446
really need to have um what I call 

825
00:34:54,446 --> 00:34:56,390
operational collaboration which is 

826
00:34:56,390 --> 00:34:58,390
shoulder to shoulder professionally 

827
00:34:58,390 --> 00:35:00,590
intimate relationships where we are 

828
00:35:00,590 --> 00:35:03,830
exchanging relevant and actionable data 

829
00:35:03,830 --> 00:35:06,380
and insights in real time where the 

830
00:35:06,380 --> 00:35:08,980
government is seen as transparent and 

831
00:35:08,980 --> 00:35:10,980
responsive , not a black box of 

832
00:35:10,980 --> 00:35:13,202
information where you get something and 

833
00:35:13,202 --> 00:35:16,030
you never hear back where you don't 

834
00:35:16,030 --> 00:35:18,180
need higher education and government 

835
00:35:18,180 --> 00:35:20,402
studies to figure out who you go to and 

836
00:35:20,402 --> 00:35:22,820
that's why Congress created cisa to be 

837
00:35:22,820 --> 00:35:24,764
America's cyber defense agency and 

838
00:35:24,764 --> 00:35:26,940
really the front door for industry 

839
00:35:26,950 --> 00:35:30,630
before , during and after a cyber event 

840
00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:32,696
to help ensure the protection of the 

841
00:35:32,696 --> 00:35:35,050
nation . Uh , and that's why in those 

842
00:35:35,050 --> 00:35:37,730
relationships , I'm a big believer that 

843
00:35:37,740 --> 00:35:41,590
uh , fear does not properly motivate 

844
00:35:41,600 --> 00:35:44,200
a lot of action , right ? Maybe in a , 

845
00:35:44,210 --> 00:35:46,380
in a small amount of time , fear can 

846
00:35:46,380 --> 00:35:49,460
generate adrenaline and sort of the the 

847
00:35:49,470 --> 00:35:51,359
flight response . But when you're 

848
00:35:51,359 --> 00:35:53,400
talking about making important 

849
00:35:53,400 --> 00:35:54,956
investments and things like 

850
00:35:54,956 --> 00:35:57,690
cybersecurity , Fear is not in panic is 

851
00:35:57,690 --> 00:35:59,750
not the way to go . It really is 

852
00:35:59,760 --> 00:36:02,770
working very closely with our partners 

853
00:36:02,770 --> 00:36:04,500
to ensure that they have an 

854
00:36:04,500 --> 00:36:06,833
understanding of the threat environment , 

855
00:36:06,833 --> 00:36:08,833
the technical information that they 

856
00:36:08,833 --> 00:36:10,778
need to strengthen the security of 

857
00:36:10,778 --> 00:36:12,944
their networks and all of the guidance 

858
00:36:12,944 --> 00:36:14,980
uh , to help mitigate risk from any 

859
00:36:14,980 --> 00:36:17,160
sort of cyber threats . And what I'd 

860
00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:19,390
like to say preparation , not panic is 

861
00:36:19,390 --> 00:36:21,390
at the end of the day , the more we 

862
00:36:21,390 --> 00:36:23,557
work together to prepare , the more we 

863
00:36:23,557 --> 00:36:25,779
assume that bad things are gonna happen 

864
00:36:25,779 --> 00:36:27,446
because in today's world it's 

865
00:36:27,446 --> 00:36:29,557
incredibly difficult to prevent every 

866
00:36:29,557 --> 00:36:31,501
bad thing from happening , right ? 

867
00:36:31,501 --> 00:36:33,612
We're highly complex infrastructure , 

868
00:36:33,612 --> 00:36:35,834
highly connected . Uh , there are a lot 

869
00:36:35,834 --> 00:36:37,890
of vulnerabilities and so we need to 

870
00:36:37,890 --> 00:36:39,834
prepare , we need to ensure we can 

871
00:36:39,834 --> 00:36:41,930
respond , we can recover quickly to 

872
00:36:41,930 --> 00:36:44,370
mitigate risk . And that's the journey 

873
00:36:44,370 --> 00:36:46,910
we've been on since CAesar was stood up 

874
00:36:46,920 --> 00:36:49,460
and in particular since the end of last 

875
00:36:49,460 --> 00:36:51,238
year when we started seeing the 

876
00:36:51,238 --> 00:36:54,240
potential for Russia to invade Ukraine 

877
00:36:54,550 --> 00:36:56,328
and thought about the potential 

878
00:36:56,328 --> 00:36:58,217
implications of that from a cyber 

879
00:36:58,217 --> 00:37:00,272
security in the homeland perspective 

880
00:37:00,272 --> 00:37:02,494
and we've been working With the private 

881
00:37:02,494 --> 00:37:04,550
sector across all of the 16 critical 

882
00:37:04,550 --> 00:37:06,772
infrastructure sectors since the end of 

883
00:37:06,772 --> 00:37:09,090
November , uh providing both classified 

884
00:37:09,090 --> 00:37:11,312
and unclassified briefings to make sure 

885
00:37:11,312 --> 00:37:13,257
that they understood the potential 

886
00:37:13,257 --> 00:37:14,979
implications . And we're doing 

887
00:37:14,979 --> 00:37:16,812
everything they could to prepare 

888
00:37:16,812 --> 00:37:18,923
themselves . So we stood up something 

889
00:37:18,923 --> 00:37:21,146
called the shields up campaign . If you 

890
00:37:21,146 --> 00:37:23,034
go to system dot gov , you'll see 

891
00:37:23,034 --> 00:37:25,201
Shields up and it's really all all the 

892
00:37:25,201 --> 00:37:27,423
information that you could need . A one 

893
00:37:27,423 --> 00:37:29,534
stop shop of guidance to businesses , 

894
00:37:29,534 --> 00:37:31,534
large and small , guidance to ceo s 

895
00:37:31,534 --> 00:37:33,757
guidance to individuals because we play 

896
00:37:33,757 --> 00:37:35,701
a very important role in the cyber 

897
00:37:35,701 --> 00:37:37,757
security of the nation . Information 

898
00:37:37,757 --> 00:37:39,979
about ransomware , uh information about 

899
00:37:39,979 --> 00:37:42,090
technical advisories and how to occur 

900
00:37:42,090 --> 00:37:44,034
respond to certain specific threat 

901
00:37:44,034 --> 00:37:46,320
streams . So we've been really focused 

902
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:48,740
on that preparation piece uh and 

903
00:37:48,740 --> 00:37:50,740
certainly the announcement from the 

904
00:37:50,740 --> 00:37:54,530
president last week uh just um puts 

905
00:37:54,530 --> 00:37:57,470
a spotlight on what we've been saying 

906
00:37:57,470 --> 00:37:59,637
now for several months , is there is a 

907
00:37:59,637 --> 00:38:01,637
potential uh we are seeing evolving 

908
00:38:01,637 --> 00:38:04,180
intelligence that Russia is exploring 

909
00:38:04,180 --> 00:38:06,291
options for potential cyber attacks . 

910
00:38:06,291 --> 00:38:08,760
So incredibly important for everybody 

911
00:38:08,760 --> 00:38:10,820
to be prepared to withstand those 

912
00:38:10,820 --> 00:38:12,598
attacks and if they occurred to 

913
00:38:12,598 --> 00:38:15,670
mitigate risk from them so much there . 

914
00:38:15,680 --> 00:38:18,190
I do want to go further in some of the 

915
00:38:18,190 --> 00:38:20,357
stream of those questions , but I have 

916
00:38:20,357 --> 00:38:22,412
one more and then and then I'll make 

917
00:38:22,412 --> 00:38:24,523
sure to open it up for questions from 

918
00:38:24,523 --> 00:38:26,634
the audience . Um but you made , um I 

919
00:38:26,634 --> 00:38:28,857
referenced this in my opening remarks , 

920
00:38:28,857 --> 00:38:30,857
uh and my introduction of you , you 

921
00:38:30,857 --> 00:38:32,912
made a really bold statement um that 

922
00:38:32,912 --> 00:38:35,134
you want to change the landscape of the 

923
00:38:35,134 --> 00:38:38,010
uh national security cyber workforce . 

924
00:38:38,020 --> 00:38:40,910
Um What led you to that and how are you 

925
00:38:40,920 --> 00:38:43,590
um really getting after that goal , 

926
00:38:43,600 --> 00:38:47,000
making women 50% of the cybersecurity 

927
00:38:47,000 --> 00:38:50,770
workforce by 2030 , so we're about 

928
00:38:50,770 --> 00:38:53,780
25% you know , I didn't think it was 

929
00:38:53,780 --> 00:38:56,058
that bold , but everybody sort of said , 

930
00:38:56,058 --> 00:38:58,058
oh my gosh , that's a that's a bold 

931
00:38:58,058 --> 00:39:00,224
goal , Okay , maybe it's a bold goal . 

932
00:39:00,224 --> 00:39:02,950
Um I just think it's so incredibly 

933
00:39:02,950 --> 00:39:05,061
important and , you know , I think we 

934
00:39:05,061 --> 00:39:07,228
have to set highly ambitious goals for 

935
00:39:07,228 --> 00:39:09,450
ourselves , especially when it comes to 

936
00:39:09,450 --> 00:39:11,730
diversity . That is such a passion of 

937
00:39:11,730 --> 00:39:13,952
mine . I know it's a passion of yours . 

938
00:39:13,952 --> 00:39:16,800
I just believe to my core and some of 

939
00:39:16,800 --> 00:39:19,840
this is growing up an environment where 

940
00:39:20,020 --> 00:39:23,840
I was one of very few women in a highly 

941
00:39:23,840 --> 00:39:25,896
male dominated field . I just really 

942
00:39:25,896 --> 00:39:28,480
believe that all types of diversity , 

943
00:39:28,480 --> 00:39:30,430
whether that's neuro diversity , 

944
00:39:30,610 --> 00:39:32,380
diversity of gender identity , 

945
00:39:32,380 --> 00:39:34,730
diversity of sexual orientation , race , 

946
00:39:34,730 --> 00:39:37,630
national origin , age background , that 

947
00:39:37,640 --> 00:39:41,000
all equals diversity of thought . And 

948
00:39:41,000 --> 00:39:43,111
you have to have diversity of thought 

949
00:39:43,700 --> 00:39:45,860
to be able to come together and solve 

950
00:39:45,860 --> 00:39:47,582
the incredibly challenging the 

951
00:39:47,582 --> 00:39:49,804
challenging problems that we're dealing 

952
00:39:49,804 --> 00:39:51,527
with in cyberspace . And so my 

953
00:39:51,527 --> 00:39:54,030
experience is that the more diverse 

954
00:39:54,030 --> 00:39:56,141
teams that you have , people bringing 

955
00:39:56,141 --> 00:39:57,974
different types of approaches to 

956
00:39:57,974 --> 00:40:00,141
solving problems , you will be able to 

957
00:40:00,141 --> 00:40:02,810
solve problems better , faster , easier , 

958
00:40:02,810 --> 00:40:05,360
smarter . And so everywhere I've gone , 

959
00:40:05,360 --> 00:40:07,650
I've tried really hard to be able to 

960
00:40:07,650 --> 00:40:11,090
build diverse teams . And one of the 

961
00:40:11,100 --> 00:40:12,989
things that was terrific about my 

962
00:40:12,989 --> 00:40:15,100
experience at Morgan Stanley is there 

963
00:40:15,100 --> 00:40:17,267
was a real focus in spotlight , that's 

964
00:40:17,267 --> 00:40:19,300
when I was asked to go speak at the 

965
00:40:19,300 --> 00:40:21,133
Grace Hopper celebration down in 

966
00:40:21,133 --> 00:40:23,300
Orlando , that was one of the most fun 

967
00:40:23,300 --> 00:40:26,350
things . 25,000 women technologists . I 

968
00:40:26,350 --> 00:40:28,517
mean that was an amazing environment . 

969
00:40:28,710 --> 00:40:32,640
Um , and it really is um I 

970
00:40:32,650 --> 00:40:34,840
it goes back to values , it's really 

971
00:40:34,850 --> 00:40:37,680
the principles of how you build a great 

972
00:40:37,690 --> 00:40:40,510
organization and how you attract and 

973
00:40:40,510 --> 00:40:43,450
retain talent is that everybody feels 

974
00:40:43,450 --> 00:40:47,330
not just safe , not just welcome . 

975
00:40:47,910 --> 00:40:50,230
We just celebrated but truly cherished 

976
00:40:50,500 --> 00:40:53,130
for who they are . And I believe that 

977
00:40:53,140 --> 00:40:55,400
leaders have to create the magic of 

978
00:40:55,400 --> 00:40:57,344
that environment , which is really 

979
00:40:57,344 --> 00:40:59,880
about psychological safety , where you 

980
00:40:59,880 --> 00:41:02,500
can be yourself , your authentic self 

981
00:41:02,500 --> 00:41:04,630
or you feel respected by your 

982
00:41:04,630 --> 00:41:06,920
colleagues empowered by your leaders 

983
00:41:06,930 --> 00:41:09,152
and where you feel like you're making a 

984
00:41:09,152 --> 00:41:11,650
difference every day that you can ask 

985
00:41:11,650 --> 00:41:13,761
hard questions that you can give real 

986
00:41:13,761 --> 00:41:15,990
feedback because everybody is focused 

987
00:41:16,000 --> 00:41:17,833
on doing the right thing for the 

988
00:41:17,833 --> 00:41:19,950
mission . And I think if you get 

989
00:41:19,960 --> 00:41:22,182
different voices out there of different 

990
00:41:22,182 --> 00:41:24,990
backgrounds , I just think that fabric 

991
00:41:25,000 --> 00:41:27,333
when you weave that fabric of diversity , 

992
00:41:27,333 --> 00:41:29,790
it makes the entire organization 

993
00:41:29,800 --> 00:41:32,860
stronger . And so my hope is we'll get 

994
00:41:32,860 --> 00:41:36,370
to 50% by 2030 . I will do everything I 

995
00:41:36,370 --> 00:41:39,070
can to get there . But at the end of 

996
00:41:39,070 --> 00:41:41,950
the day I think we need to ensure that 

997
00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:44,127
there is diversity across the board in 

998
00:41:44,127 --> 00:41:46,440
so many different ways and um that's 

999
00:41:46,440 --> 00:41:48,662
how we're going to be able to get after 

1000
00:41:48,662 --> 00:41:52,310
this mission . Thank you . So Professor 

1001
00:41:52,310 --> 00:41:54,710
Jansen is going to help us facilitate 

1002
00:41:54,720 --> 00:41:57,630
this next phase where you all have an 

1003
00:41:57,630 --> 00:41:59,950
opportunity to ask questions . So for 

1004
00:41:59,950 --> 00:42:02,172
those of you in the auditorium who have 

1005
00:42:02,172 --> 00:42:04,339
a question , please indicate by making 

1006
00:42:04,339 --> 00:42:06,450
your way to one of the microphones on 

1007
00:42:06,460 --> 00:42:09,020
either side of the room and we'll take 

1008
00:42:09,020 --> 00:42:11,420
your questions in turn for those of you 

1009
00:42:11,420 --> 00:42:13,531
who are joining us online , please go 

1010
00:42:13,531 --> 00:42:15,587
ahead and post your questions in the 

1011
00:42:15,587 --> 00:42:17,430
chat at any time . And we will 

1012
00:42:17,440 --> 00:42:19,440
alternate between a question in the 

1013
00:42:19,440 --> 00:42:22,600
auditorium and a question online . So I 

1014
00:42:22,600 --> 00:42:24,822
see here in the room we have a question 

1015
00:42:24,822 --> 00:42:27,044
over here on the left . Please go ahead 

1016
00:42:27,044 --> 00:42:30,130
homer Hi , good morning ma'am , Omar 

1017
00:42:30,130 --> 00:42:32,700
Cruz we already met . I'm super proud 

1018
00:42:32,700 --> 00:42:36,590
that you're my boss Yay and 

1019
00:42:36,590 --> 00:42:38,860
thank you for being here today . Um as 

1020
00:42:38,860 --> 00:42:41,027
you heard from some of those earlier , 

1021
00:42:41,027 --> 00:42:42,916
um , there's a lot of interest in 

1022
00:42:42,916 --> 00:42:45,082
critical infrastructure and one of the 

1023
00:42:45,082 --> 00:42:47,193
challenges that as we've gone through 

1024
00:42:47,193 --> 00:42:49,304
our thesis and as we learn more about 

1025
00:42:49,304 --> 00:42:51,527
critic infrastructure is a lot of those 

1026
00:42:51,527 --> 00:42:53,638
private companies are still operating 

1027
00:42:53,638 --> 00:42:56,140
very , very old technology and so when 

1028
00:42:56,140 --> 00:42:58,307
trying to work with the private sector 

1029
00:42:58,307 --> 00:43:00,400
and and trying to defend critical 

1030
00:43:00,400 --> 00:43:03,810
infrastructure , it becomes a money . 

1031
00:43:04,200 --> 00:43:06,200
This challenge for them because now 

1032
00:43:06,200 --> 00:43:08,460
they need to make an investment on 

1033
00:43:08,470 --> 00:43:10,526
replacing the old technology and new 

1034
00:43:10,526 --> 00:43:12,637
one . And in some cases it's not even 

1035
00:43:12,637 --> 00:43:14,692
about the money because um , some of 

1036
00:43:14,692 --> 00:43:16,692
those technologies are obsolete and 

1037
00:43:16,692 --> 00:43:18,526
they're not able to make that um 

1038
00:43:18,526 --> 00:43:22,240
replacement . So my question to you is 

1039
00:43:22,250 --> 00:43:24,083
what are your thoughts on on how 

1040
00:43:24,083 --> 00:43:26,720
consists of support private companies 

1041
00:43:26,720 --> 00:43:28,887
who do want to play ball , so to speak 

1042
00:43:28,887 --> 00:43:30,942
with sister in terms of , you know , 

1043
00:43:30,942 --> 00:43:32,553
collaboration and so forth , 

1044
00:43:32,553 --> 00:43:34,498
information sharing information of 

1045
00:43:34,498 --> 00:43:36,609
threat information and so forth . But 

1046
00:43:36,609 --> 00:43:38,540
they're unable to perhaps protect 

1047
00:43:38,540 --> 00:43:40,707
themselves because they're not able to 

1048
00:43:40,707 --> 00:43:42,818
put security measures in place due to 

1049
00:43:42,818 --> 00:43:44,929
all technology . Yeah . Thanks . Omar 

1050
00:43:44,929 --> 00:43:46,651
and I'm super proud to be your 

1051
00:43:46,651 --> 00:43:48,484
teammates . So thank you for the 

1052
00:43:48,484 --> 00:43:51,390
question and great to see represented 

1053
00:43:51,390 --> 00:43:53,612
here at C I see you and you and Katie . 

1054
00:43:53,612 --> 00:43:56,020
It's wonderful . Um , so it's a really 

1055
00:43:56,020 --> 00:43:58,131
important question . Right ? When you 

1056
00:43:58,131 --> 00:44:00,250
think about big companies out there , 

1057
00:44:00,260 --> 00:44:02,570
uh like the one I came from morgan 

1058
00:44:02,570 --> 00:44:04,626
Stanley , like some of our other big 

1059
00:44:04,626 --> 00:44:07,300
banks , energy companies , they are now 

1060
00:44:07,300 --> 00:44:09,522
investing a significant amount and this 

1061
00:44:09,522 --> 00:44:11,578
isn't , this is an evolution right ? 

1062
00:44:11,578 --> 00:44:13,633
You wouldn't have seen this 10 years 

1063
00:44:13,633 --> 00:44:15,689
ago . But over the past 10 ish years 

1064
00:44:15,689 --> 00:44:17,522
there's been billions of dollars 

1065
00:44:17,522 --> 00:44:20,740
invested in people process technology 

1066
00:44:20,750 --> 00:44:24,250
to be able to ensure security and 

1067
00:44:24,250 --> 00:44:26,620
resilience from cyber threats . Um , 

1068
00:44:26,620 --> 00:44:28,509
that said there are many critical 

1069
00:44:28,509 --> 00:44:30,731
infrastructure owners and operators out 

1070
00:44:30,731 --> 00:44:34,300
there , small hospitals , schools , the 

1071
00:44:34,310 --> 00:44:37,120
water municipalities , uh , that don't 

1072
00:44:37,120 --> 00:44:40,710
have uh , that type of funding . 

1073
00:44:41,090 --> 00:44:43,090
Uh , and that frankly are suffering 

1074
00:44:43,090 --> 00:44:45,423
from , as you said , a lot of tech debt , 

1075
00:44:45,423 --> 00:44:47,930
a lot of old infrastructure . And so 

1076
00:44:47,930 --> 00:44:50,540
it's a really huge issue . I think the 

1077
00:44:50,540 --> 00:44:53,630
good news is there's a long term issue . 

1078
00:44:53,630 --> 00:44:55,908
And then there's a short term solution . 

1079
00:44:55,908 --> 00:44:58,074
We've been working . One of the things 

1080
00:44:58,074 --> 00:45:00,019
that we have been working with our 

1081
00:45:00,019 --> 00:44:59,960
private sector partners as part of our 

1082
00:44:59,960 --> 00:45:02,670
Shields Up campaign uh , is actually 

1083
00:45:02,670 --> 00:45:04,781
providing free cybersecurity services 

1084
00:45:04,781 --> 00:45:07,160
and tools to those elements we call a 

1085
00:45:07,170 --> 00:45:09,770
target rich resource poor . So think 

1086
00:45:09,770 --> 00:45:11,714
about all of these hospitals , for 

1087
00:45:11,714 --> 00:45:13,650
example , that have been hit with 

1088
00:45:13,650 --> 00:45:15,872
ransomware , you know , in a hospital . 

1089
00:45:15,872 --> 00:45:18,160
Oftentimes you're not very well funded 

1090
00:45:18,160 --> 00:45:20,382
and you're making that decision between 

1091
00:45:20,382 --> 00:45:22,950
hiring another surgeon or upgrading 

1092
00:45:22,950 --> 00:45:25,117
your computer infrastructure . Right ? 

1093
00:45:25,117 --> 00:45:27,900
It's a tough uh , it's a tough tradeoff . 

1094
00:45:27,910 --> 00:45:30,460
And so what we are doing is looking to 

1095
00:45:30,460 --> 00:45:32,830
provide options for some of these 

1096
00:45:32,830 --> 00:45:34,941
cybersecurity services and tools that 

1097
00:45:34,941 --> 00:45:37,163
are pro bono . And if you go to Shields 

1098
00:45:37,163 --> 00:45:39,330
up , you can actually see a whole list 

1099
00:45:39,330 --> 00:45:41,330
provided by cisa and by some of our 

1100
00:45:41,330 --> 00:45:43,441
private sector partners , but the the 

1101
00:45:43,441 --> 00:45:45,780
longer term piece of this , it has to 

1102
00:45:45,780 --> 00:45:47,836
do with some of the grants uh , that 

1103
00:45:47,836 --> 00:45:49,947
are coming out of Congress . So there 

1104
00:45:49,947 --> 00:45:51,780
was a billion dollars as part of 

1105
00:45:51,780 --> 00:45:53,724
infrastructure grants available to 

1106
00:45:53,724 --> 00:45:55,700
state and local , uh , colleagues 

1107
00:45:55,700 --> 00:45:57,710
specifically for cybersecurity . So 

1108
00:45:57,710 --> 00:46:00,190
there's a real recognition that we as a 

1109
00:46:00,190 --> 00:46:03,010
nation have to invest more in our 

1110
00:46:03,010 --> 00:46:05,620
cybersecurity . And I think we're going 

1111
00:46:05,620 --> 00:46:07,960
to see more and more of a recognition 

1112
00:46:07,960 --> 00:46:10,182
if you look at the president's budget , 

1113
00:46:10,182 --> 00:46:12,293
which was just revealed yesterday , a 

1114
00:46:12,293 --> 00:46:13,904
lot of investments , Uh , in 

1115
00:46:13,904 --> 00:46:15,904
cybersecurity , we got $500 million 

1116
00:46:15,904 --> 00:46:18,330
dollars over what was requested last 

1117
00:46:18,330 --> 00:46:21,690
year . And so I think we're moving in a 

1118
00:46:21,700 --> 00:46:23,700
good trend and , and I just want to 

1119
00:46:23,700 --> 00:46:25,860
address a little bit . Another one of 

1120
00:46:25,860 --> 00:46:27,916
your points somewhere . We've talked 

1121
00:46:27,916 --> 00:46:29,916
about sort of playing ball . I have 

1122
00:46:29,916 --> 00:46:32,320
sensed a real evolution in the private 

1123
00:46:32,320 --> 00:46:34,042
sector and our state and local 

1124
00:46:34,042 --> 00:46:36,910
colleagues seeing value in what we are 

1125
00:46:36,910 --> 00:46:39,243
providing from a government perspective . 

1126
00:46:39,243 --> 00:46:41,354
And I don't think that was always the 

1127
00:46:41,354 --> 00:46:43,632
case . As I was mentioning to dr Lewis , 

1128
00:46:43,632 --> 00:46:45,743
you know , what we're trying to do is 

1129
00:46:45,743 --> 00:46:47,966
make sure we're giving real meaning and 

1130
00:46:47,966 --> 00:46:50,188
depth to the word partnership , right ? 

1131
00:46:50,188 --> 00:46:52,077
We actually have an obligation to 

1132
00:46:52,077 --> 00:46:54,790
provide meaningful support to the 

1133
00:46:54,790 --> 00:46:56,901
private sector , not just expect that 

1134
00:46:56,901 --> 00:46:59,123
people are going to come to us and give 

1135
00:46:59,123 --> 00:47:01,346
us information or report things to us . 

1136
00:47:01,346 --> 00:47:03,401
And so that partnership I think will 

1137
00:47:03,401 --> 00:47:06,020
help to ensure that all of the 

1138
00:47:06,020 --> 00:47:08,020
infrastructure owners and operators 

1139
00:47:08,020 --> 00:47:10,131
realize that they have a real partner 

1140
00:47:10,131 --> 00:47:12,520
in us and we'll come to us for guidance 

1141
00:47:12,520 --> 00:47:15,000
for support uh , and in some cases for 

1142
00:47:15,000 --> 00:47:17,111
some of the funding grants that we're 

1143
00:47:17,111 --> 00:47:19,167
um we're gonna start giving out here 

1144
00:47:19,167 --> 00:47:21,389
later this year . Thank you very much , 

1145
00:47:21,389 --> 00:47:23,611
man , I appreciate it . Thank you . The 

1146
00:47:23,611 --> 00:47:27,600
next question from online . Good 

1147
00:47:27,600 --> 00:47:29,933
morning , thank you . Director Easterly , 

1148
00:47:29,933 --> 00:47:32,720
First off and congratulations . Um I 

1149
00:47:32,720 --> 00:47:34,664
currently don't have any questions 

1150
00:47:34,664 --> 00:47:36,776
online , but if I may I would like to 

1151
00:47:36,776 --> 00:47:38,942
provide a question . My question is um 

1152
00:47:38,942 --> 00:47:41,480
given the fact that cyber incidents 

1153
00:47:41,480 --> 00:47:44,500
have been prevalent since at least 2009 , 

1154
00:47:44,510 --> 00:47:47,970
um a former boss , keith alexander once 

1155
00:47:47,970 --> 00:47:50,240
stated , um you know , it's a constant 

1156
00:47:50,240 --> 00:47:52,351
threat and it is something that needs 

1157
00:47:52,351 --> 00:47:54,407
to be addressed in 2000 and nine and 

1158
00:47:54,407 --> 00:47:56,629
then shortly after with the Sony hack , 

1159
00:47:56,629 --> 00:47:58,796
You know , it was it was it was in the 

1160
00:47:58,796 --> 00:48:00,796
public sphere and people were quite 

1161
00:48:00,796 --> 00:48:02,851
aware . So my question is why did it 

1162
00:48:02,851 --> 00:48:05,840
take until 2018 for uh folks to 

1163
00:48:05,840 --> 00:48:09,360
recognize this gap ? Um so , you know , 

1164
00:48:09,360 --> 00:48:11,249
cyber attacks of it's decades and 

1165
00:48:11,249 --> 00:48:13,360
decades , frankly , you could go back 

1166
00:48:13,360 --> 00:48:15,550
to the Morris worm . Um but but 

1167
00:48:15,550 --> 00:48:18,000
certainly we have seen a recognition 

1168
00:48:18,470 --> 00:48:20,970
over the past two decades , I'd say , 

1169
00:48:20,980 --> 00:48:23,091
uh certainly after 9 11 , there was a 

1170
00:48:23,091 --> 00:48:25,750
real focus on terrorism and 

1171
00:48:25,760 --> 00:48:27,840
counterterrorism . I was the head of 

1172
00:48:27,840 --> 00:48:30,290
counterterrorism at the White House at 

1173
00:48:30,290 --> 00:48:31,790
the Nsc and the Deputy for 

1174
00:48:31,790 --> 00:48:33,846
counterterrorism . So there was this 

1175
00:48:33,846 --> 00:48:37,360
huge national focus there and there 

1176
00:48:37,360 --> 00:48:39,471
were cyber threats going on the whole 

1177
00:48:39,471 --> 00:48:41,540
time . Uh and I think there were 

1178
00:48:41,550 --> 00:48:43,606
evolutions . Right , I mean , sister 

1179
00:48:43,606 --> 00:48:45,717
was established in 2018 , but U . S . 

1180
00:48:45,717 --> 00:48:48,660
Cyber command was established in 2010 

1181
00:48:48,660 --> 00:48:50,430
and there were various other 

1182
00:48:50,430 --> 00:48:52,597
capabilities that were stood up across 

1183
00:48:52,597 --> 00:48:54,708
the U . S . Government Uh during that 

1184
00:48:54,708 --> 00:48:56,874
period of time . And so , you know , I 

1185
00:48:56,874 --> 00:48:58,986
I wouldn't say that we didn't wake up 

1186
00:48:58,986 --> 00:49:02,290
to it until 2018 . I would say that um 

1187
00:49:02,300 --> 00:49:05,790
happily uh there has been a very 

1188
00:49:05,790 --> 00:49:08,250
positive evolution in the recognition 

1189
00:49:08,260 --> 00:49:12,190
of cybersecurity as a very real threat 

1190
00:49:12,200 --> 00:49:14,780
to our homeland and a recognition from 

1191
00:49:14,780 --> 00:49:16,613
Congress who sees this as a very 

1192
00:49:16,613 --> 00:49:20,430
bipartisan issue uh and is ensuring 

1193
00:49:20,430 --> 00:49:23,720
that the America's cyber defense agency , 

1194
00:49:23,720 --> 00:49:26,090
that's why they created CISA has the 

1195
00:49:26,090 --> 00:49:28,460
authorities as well as the funding in 

1196
00:49:28,460 --> 00:49:31,680
the budget that we need to continue to 

1197
00:49:31,680 --> 00:49:34,870
help secure the nation . So um I look 

1198
00:49:34,870 --> 00:49:36,814
at it as a positive thing . It's a 

1199
00:49:36,814 --> 00:49:39,980
positive evolution . I do wanna just 

1200
00:49:39,980 --> 00:49:41,980
recognize a couple of people that I 

1201
00:49:41,980 --> 00:49:44,147
know are online because they send me a 

1202
00:49:44,147 --> 00:49:46,369
little note um whether they want to ask 

1203
00:49:46,369 --> 00:49:46,240
a question or not , but I think we've 

1204
00:49:46,250 --> 00:49:48,550
got my good friend chris Howard , who 

1205
00:49:48,550 --> 00:49:50,790
is president of RM you in Pittsburgh is 

1206
00:49:50,790 --> 00:49:53,190
now going out to Arizona State 

1207
00:49:53,190 --> 00:49:55,590
University . I think he's on the board 

1208
00:49:55,590 --> 00:49:58,900
of visitors here and then I am hoping 

1209
00:49:58,900 --> 00:50:02,890
my very good friend Kurt Beyer , uh the 

1210
00:50:02,900 --> 00:50:06,240
Annapolis grad and my classmates at 

1211
00:50:06,250 --> 00:50:08,760
Oxford . Uh and and I should tell this 

1212
00:50:08,760 --> 00:50:12,100
story because kurt is how I first found 

1213
00:50:12,100 --> 00:50:14,610
out about Grace Hopper . Uh He did his 

1214
00:50:14,610 --> 00:50:16,554
doctoral thesis at Berkeley in the 

1215
00:50:16,554 --> 00:50:19,320
history of science and technology on 

1216
00:50:19,330 --> 00:50:21,530
Grace Hopper . He wrote a book called 

1217
00:50:21,540 --> 00:50:23,590
Grace Hopper , The invention of the 

1218
00:50:23,600 --> 00:50:26,320
information age . Uh everybody should 

1219
00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:30,220
read . Uh but you know , he is 

1220
00:50:30,230 --> 00:50:32,397
uh he's really an inspiration . So I'm 

1221
00:50:32,397 --> 00:50:34,880
super psyched that he's able to uh uh 

1222
00:50:34,890 --> 00:50:37,112
to to watch because he was the person . 

1223
00:50:37,112 --> 00:50:39,223
I think when he gave me the book sort 

1224
00:50:39,223 --> 00:50:41,168
of said , you know this is I think 

1225
00:50:41,168 --> 00:50:43,279
about you and I think about this this 

1226
00:50:43,279 --> 00:50:44,946
person . And so it was a real 

1227
00:50:44,946 --> 00:50:47,460
inspiration . Next question is in the 

1228
00:50:47,460 --> 00:50:49,627
auditorium over here to the right , go 

1229
00:50:49,627 --> 00:50:52,360
ahead . Cory good morning . My name is 

1230
00:50:52,360 --> 00:50:54,200
Cory rob . I'm a Foreign Service 

1231
00:50:54,200 --> 00:50:56,367
officer with the U . S . Department of 

1232
00:50:56,367 --> 00:50:58,589
State . Congratulations . And thank you 

1233
00:50:58,589 --> 00:51:00,720
for your leadership . Um So much of 

1234
00:51:00,720 --> 00:51:02,750
what we see in cyberspace is often 

1235
00:51:02,750 --> 00:51:05,500
shrouded in an element of secrecy and I 

1236
00:51:05,500 --> 00:51:07,278
think that presents some really 

1237
00:51:07,278 --> 00:51:09,444
fundamental challenges in your opening 

1238
00:51:09,444 --> 00:51:11,770
remarks you touched on both 

1239
00:51:11,780 --> 00:51:13,724
unclassified as well as classified 

1240
00:51:13,724 --> 00:51:15,836
briefings . That system is working to 

1241
00:51:15,836 --> 00:51:17,947
deliver with the private sector . How 

1242
00:51:17,947 --> 00:51:20,058
going forward can we best address the 

1243
00:51:20,058 --> 00:51:22,002
secrecy component when it comes to 

1244
00:51:22,002 --> 00:51:23,836
attribution , real time response 

1245
00:51:23,836 --> 00:51:26,058
elements And these other aspects that I 

1246
00:51:26,058 --> 00:51:28,280
think are so crucial but often are very 

1247
00:51:28,280 --> 00:51:30,169
difficult to roll out in a timely 

1248
00:51:30,169 --> 00:51:32,169
manner . Yeah , it's a great it's a 

1249
00:51:32,169 --> 00:51:35,540
great great question . So um this is 

1250
00:51:35,540 --> 00:51:37,651
something that I actually think we're 

1251
00:51:37,651 --> 00:51:39,818
on a positive trajectory at the end of 

1252
00:51:39,818 --> 00:51:41,818
the day . So the type of classified 

1253
00:51:41,818 --> 00:51:43,873
briefings that we were doing , we're 

1254
00:51:43,873 --> 00:51:45,651
really talking about what's the 

1255
00:51:45,651 --> 00:51:47,860
strategic picture . Um and that's 

1256
00:51:47,870 --> 00:51:49,926
that's good to have right to kind of 

1257
00:51:49,926 --> 00:51:51,981
understand the context of the threat 

1258
00:51:51,981 --> 00:51:54,203
environment . The thing that we've been 

1259
00:51:54,203 --> 00:51:56,370
pushing very very hard to do it sister 

1260
00:51:56,370 --> 00:51:58,703
and I think we've had some good success . 

1261
00:51:58,703 --> 00:52:00,814
So you know our primary teammates are 

1262
00:52:00,814 --> 00:52:03,092
uh the FBI . So so we do cyber defense . 

1263
00:52:03,092 --> 00:52:05,670
The FBI does um pursuit investigation , 

1264
00:52:05,900 --> 00:52:08,370
N . S . A . Provides the context from a 

1265
00:52:08,370 --> 00:52:10,592
foreign intelligence perspective and we 

1266
00:52:10,592 --> 00:52:12,759
all worked very closely together . But 

1267
00:52:12,759 --> 00:52:14,981
I think what you've seen even just over 

1268
00:52:14,981 --> 00:52:17,030
the past few months um is a lot of 

1269
00:52:17,040 --> 00:52:19,630
effort to downgrade tactical level 

1270
00:52:19,630 --> 00:52:22,040
intelligence so that we can provide 

1271
00:52:22,040 --> 00:52:24,151
that to the network defenders so they 

1272
00:52:24,151 --> 00:52:26,151
can actually do something with it . 

1273
00:52:26,151 --> 00:52:28,207
Strategic level intelligence is good 

1274
00:52:28,207 --> 00:52:30,318
for context but you can't really give 

1275
00:52:30,318 --> 00:52:32,429
that to um a vulnerability management 

1276
00:52:32,429 --> 00:52:34,373
person or a threat hunter person . 

1277
00:52:34,373 --> 00:52:36,484
Right ? So what we're trying to do is 

1278
00:52:36,484 --> 00:52:38,707
make sure that we're pushing as hard as 

1279
00:52:38,707 --> 00:52:40,873
possible to get that uh tactical level 

1280
00:52:40,873 --> 00:52:43,096
intelligence and warning . And if there 

1281
00:52:43,096 --> 00:52:45,262
is any sort of warning of the threat , 

1282
00:52:45,262 --> 00:52:47,230
we immediately go and notify . You 

1283
00:52:47,240 --> 00:52:50,370
usually system and F FBI together , we 

1284
00:52:50,370 --> 00:52:52,210
will never sit on anything that 

1285
00:52:52,210 --> 00:52:53,988
presents a direct threat to our 

1286
00:52:53,988 --> 00:52:56,590
infrastructure . So so that problem is 

1287
00:52:56,600 --> 00:52:58,560
is very much solved but we're on a 

1288
00:52:58,560 --> 00:53:00,970
really good trajectory and I know um 

1289
00:53:00,980 --> 00:53:03,202
the Director of National Intelligence I 

1290
00:53:03,202 --> 00:53:05,258
mentioned Avril Haines , she is also 

1291
00:53:05,258 --> 00:53:07,369
looking to push the envelope here and 

1292
00:53:07,369 --> 00:53:09,091
make sure that we are not over 

1293
00:53:09,091 --> 00:53:11,970
classifying intelligence that can help 

1294
00:53:11,970 --> 00:53:13,748
the private sector defend their 

1295
00:53:13,748 --> 00:53:15,820
networks . And so I do think having 

1296
00:53:15,820 --> 00:53:17,764
been an intelligence officer for a 

1297
00:53:17,764 --> 00:53:19,876
really long time , both as a military 

1298
00:53:19,876 --> 00:53:22,098
person and as a civilian at N . S . A . 

1299
00:53:22,098 --> 00:53:24,264
I do think there is a tendency to over 

1300
00:53:24,264 --> 00:53:26,376
classify things and I think now we're 

1301
00:53:26,376 --> 00:53:28,376
starting to see a real change , you 

1302
00:53:28,376 --> 00:53:30,376
know , separate from cyber a lot of 

1303
00:53:30,376 --> 00:53:32,431
what the what the administration has 

1304
00:53:32,431 --> 00:53:34,653
been doing over the past several months 

1305
00:53:34,653 --> 00:53:38,210
with releasing information uh to give 

1306
00:53:38,220 --> 00:53:39,942
information about what Russian 

1307
00:53:39,942 --> 00:53:41,942
intentions are in Ukraine . I think 

1308
00:53:41,942 --> 00:53:44,109
that was a very successful uh strategy 

1309
00:53:44,109 --> 00:53:46,590
as well . And so I think I totally take 

1310
00:53:46,590 --> 00:53:48,534
your point Corey but I think we're 

1311
00:53:48,534 --> 00:53:50,701
moving in a positive direction . Thank 

1312
00:53:50,701 --> 00:53:53,660
you . Lots of questions here in the 

1313
00:53:53,660 --> 00:53:55,993
auditorium . Back over here on the left , 

1314
00:53:56,650 --> 00:53:59,040
Kati Marton Cisa at the College of 

1315
00:53:59,040 --> 00:54:01,151
Information in cyberspace , Thank you 

1316
00:54:01,151 --> 00:54:03,151
so much for coming today . Director 

1317
00:54:03,151 --> 00:54:05,318
Easterly , it's been really a pleasure 

1318
00:54:05,318 --> 00:54:07,373
to meet you in person . Um I had was 

1319
00:54:07,373 --> 00:54:07,180
preparing a really great question on 

1320
00:54:07,190 --> 00:54:08,746
interagency authorities and 

1321
00:54:08,746 --> 00:54:10,801
coordination , but I actually really 

1322
00:54:10,801 --> 00:54:12,468
interested given your amazing 

1323
00:54:12,468 --> 00:54:14,579
background on two questions . Um what 

1324
00:54:14,579 --> 00:54:16,357
would you say the best piece of 

1325
00:54:16,357 --> 00:54:18,523
professional advice is you've received 

1326
00:54:18,523 --> 00:54:20,690
throughout your career and on the flip 

1327
00:54:20,690 --> 00:54:20,180
side , what is the worst piece of 

1328
00:54:20,180 --> 00:54:22,347
advice or the piece of advice that you 

1329
00:54:22,347 --> 00:54:24,291
have found the most success in not 

1330
00:54:24,291 --> 00:54:26,850
following . Yeah , that's a great 

1331
00:54:26,850 --> 00:54:28,170
question . So , 

1332
00:54:30,640 --> 00:54:33,610
so I was thank you Katie . Um , so 

1333
00:54:33,610 --> 00:54:35,832
awesome to have you here as well . So I 

1334
00:54:35,832 --> 00:54:37,999
was telling general plane earlier . So 

1335
00:54:37,999 --> 00:54:40,166
I was uh , taught at West Point , went 

1336
00:54:40,166 --> 00:54:42,110
back , taught in the department of 

1337
00:54:42,110 --> 00:54:44,443
Social Sciences after I left Fort Bragg , 

1338
00:54:44,443 --> 00:54:47,350
this was 2000 and taught Economics and 

1339
00:54:47,360 --> 00:54:49,304
international economics , Advanced 

1340
00:54:49,304 --> 00:54:51,360
economics , National Security . Um , 

1341
00:54:51,360 --> 00:54:53,471
and then we got what's called an Olin 

1342
00:54:53,471 --> 00:54:55,800
professor . So visiting professor , a 

1343
00:54:55,810 --> 00:54:58,970
guy called Barry Mccaffrey . So retired 

1344
00:54:58,970 --> 00:55:01,590
four star general , uh , youngest and 

1345
00:55:01,590 --> 00:55:03,950
most highly decorated four star army 

1346
00:55:03,950 --> 00:55:06,117
general . When he retired , he was the 

1347
00:55:06,117 --> 00:55:08,061
commander of South com . President 

1348
00:55:08,061 --> 00:55:10,228
Clinton asked him to be his uh , drugs 

1349
00:55:10,228 --> 00:55:11,672
are and after he left the 

1350
00:55:11,672 --> 00:55:13,839
administration , he was , he was named 

1351
00:55:13,839 --> 00:55:16,061
as the only professor . So as this mike 

1352
00:55:16,061 --> 00:55:18,061
knows he also had the reputation of 

1353
00:55:18,061 --> 00:55:20,228
being the meanest and scariest general 

1354
00:55:20,228 --> 00:55:23,240
in the US army . Um , people , people , 

1355
00:55:23,240 --> 00:55:25,129
I was telling this to consent and 

1356
00:55:25,129 --> 00:55:27,240
people would , would brief him and he 

1357
00:55:27,240 --> 00:55:29,462
would just , they would fate . That was 

1358
00:55:29,462 --> 00:55:31,407
so scary . Um , like people know , 

1359
00:55:31,407 --> 00:55:31,400
right . Some people know about this 

1360
00:55:31,400 --> 00:55:33,980
anyway . So , um , anyway , so they 

1361
00:55:33,980 --> 00:55:35,758
asked me about people to be his 

1362
00:55:35,758 --> 00:55:37,869
executive assistant for some reason . 

1363
00:55:37,869 --> 00:55:41,790
Um , and who knows why , But so I said , 

1364
00:55:41,790 --> 00:55:43,901
okay , I'll do it . And it turned out 

1365
00:55:43,901 --> 00:55:46,390
that he was so fantastic . I mean I'm 

1366
00:55:46,390 --> 00:55:48,446
still very close to him and his wife 

1367
00:55:48,446 --> 00:55:50,446
Jill to this day turned out to be a 

1368
00:55:50,446 --> 00:55:52,720
wonderful mentor , wonderful teacher , 

1369
00:55:52,730 --> 00:55:54,841
amazing rapport with the cadets . And 

1370
00:55:54,841 --> 00:55:56,952
it was one of the best experiences of 

1371
00:55:56,952 --> 00:55:59,610
my life . But at some point in time he 

1372
00:55:59,610 --> 00:56:01,777
sat me down . I was an army captain at 

1373
00:56:01,777 --> 00:56:03,999
the time . He sat me down . He was like 

1374
00:56:03,999 --> 00:56:06,221
Jensen down . Okay . I want to give you 

1375
00:56:06,221 --> 00:56:08,332
and I'm not even going to anybody who 

1376
00:56:08,332 --> 00:56:10,388
knows anything about barry mccaffrey 

1377
00:56:10,388 --> 00:56:12,499
know that people like to sort of talk 

1378
00:56:12,499 --> 00:56:14,666
like him , but I can't do it . So just 

1379
00:56:14,666 --> 00:56:16,666
imagine his boston accent . Um , so 

1380
00:56:16,666 --> 00:56:18,832
he's like , I need to give you a piece 

1381
00:56:18,832 --> 00:56:20,943
of advice . It's like fantastic . I'm 

1382
00:56:20,943 --> 00:56:23,054
gonna get like the piece of advice to 

1383
00:56:23,054 --> 00:56:22,850
tell me what I can do to be a four star 

1384
00:56:22,850 --> 00:56:26,780
general . Okay . It's like gen , yes 

1385
00:56:26,780 --> 00:56:30,700
sir , gen you need to 

1386
00:56:30,710 --> 00:56:32,460
get married and have kids . 

1387
00:56:36,330 --> 00:56:40,330
Okay . I know that I have that 

1388
00:56:40,330 --> 00:56:43,320
look to , um , I was like , hmm , 

1389
00:56:43,330 --> 00:56:46,860
that's interesting . Uh , and you know , 

1390
00:56:46,870 --> 00:56:49,500
I did sort of say what , you know , but 

1391
00:56:49,510 --> 00:56:51,510
at the end of the day , what he was 

1392
00:56:51,510 --> 00:56:53,566
telling me is you can of course be a 

1393
00:56:53,566 --> 00:56:55,621
four star general . At this point at 

1394
00:56:55,621 --> 00:56:57,788
this point I was single , You can be a 

1395
00:56:57,788 --> 00:57:00,010
four star general . You can work really 

1396
00:57:00,010 --> 00:56:59,340
hard . You can achieve whatever you 

1397
00:56:59,340 --> 00:57:02,720
want to achieve . But you know , think 

1398
00:57:02,720 --> 00:57:05,550
about also the other side that you 

1399
00:57:05,550 --> 00:57:07,328
sometimes sacrifice when you're 

1400
00:57:07,328 --> 00:57:09,990
deployed , when you're working so hard , 

1401
00:57:09,990 --> 00:57:12,157
when you're when you're not taking any 

1402
00:57:12,157 --> 00:57:14,379
time for yourself . And he was saying , 

1403
00:57:14,379 --> 00:57:16,546
you know I think you're going to be an 

1404
00:57:16,546 --> 00:57:18,768
amazing wife and an amazing mom and you 

1405
00:57:18,768 --> 00:57:20,934
really should and he was a real family 

1406
00:57:20,934 --> 00:57:22,990
guy , three kids and all of that and 

1407
00:57:22,990 --> 00:57:25,212
and he was just sort of saying look you 

1408
00:57:25,212 --> 00:57:27,323
know , you can actually do it all and 

1409
00:57:27,323 --> 00:57:29,540
it was meant in the most sort of kind 

1410
00:57:29,550 --> 00:57:32,200
wonderful way and I've never sort of 

1411
00:57:32,200 --> 00:57:34,270
forgotten that whole that whole 

1412
00:57:34,270 --> 00:57:36,437
discussion . So I would say that was a 

1413
00:57:36,437 --> 00:57:38,326
fantastic piece of advice frankly 

1414
00:57:38,326 --> 00:57:40,270
because a couple years later I was 

1415
00:57:40,270 --> 00:57:43,010
married and expecting my first my first 

1416
00:57:43,010 --> 00:57:45,121
kid and you know , for all the things 

1417
00:57:45,121 --> 00:57:47,410
that I've accomplished in my life , you 

1418
00:57:47,410 --> 00:57:50,350
know my son Jett is the most important 

1419
00:57:50,360 --> 00:57:53,580
ever . So so that was a great piece of 

1420
00:57:53,580 --> 00:57:56,850
advice . Um The worst piece of 

1421
00:57:56,850 --> 00:58:00,340
advice was um 

1422
00:58:00,720 --> 00:58:03,190
You know I had a I had a real tragedy 

1423
00:58:03,190 --> 00:58:05,412
that happened in my life and that had a 

1424
00:58:05,412 --> 00:58:07,412
significant influence in sort of my 

1425
00:58:07,412 --> 00:58:09,634
path . That's why I ended up going down 

1426
00:58:09,634 --> 00:58:11,690
to D . C . But um you know I lost my 

1427
00:58:11,690 --> 00:58:13,801
little brother to suicide when he was 

1428
00:58:13,801 --> 00:58:17,410
25 And very very tough situation tough 

1429
00:58:17,410 --> 00:58:19,610
for my parents . Um you know it's one 

1430
00:58:19,610 --> 00:58:21,832
of the reasons why I'm such an advocate 

1431
00:58:21,832 --> 00:58:24,530
for mental health . Um and really try 

1432
00:58:24,530 --> 00:58:26,752
and work hard . We've declared Cisa the 

1433
00:58:26,752 --> 00:58:29,320
2022 is the year of mental health and 

1434
00:58:29,320 --> 00:58:31,320
well being because I really believe 

1435
00:58:31,320 --> 00:58:34,110
that we need to treat mental health as 

1436
00:58:34,120 --> 00:58:36,240
important as physical health is not 

1437
00:58:36,240 --> 00:58:39,020
more important in some ways . Um but I 

1438
00:58:39,020 --> 00:58:41,242
was going through a really tough period 

1439
00:58:41,242 --> 00:58:44,560
of time and I remember there was one of 

1440
00:58:44,560 --> 00:58:47,010
it was a more senior officer and also 

1441
00:58:47,010 --> 00:58:48,899
when I was teaching at the social 

1442
00:58:48,899 --> 00:58:51,750
department um who basically just sort 

1443
00:58:51,750 --> 00:58:55,570
of said to me , hey , um you 

1444
00:58:55,570 --> 00:58:58,070
know , you need to just get over it , 

1445
00:58:58,080 --> 00:59:00,247
you know , people are expecting you to 

1446
00:59:00,247 --> 00:59:02,780
be um to be tough to just you know , 

1447
00:59:02,780 --> 00:59:04,880
have these things happen and move on 

1448
00:59:04,890 --> 00:59:08,520
right . And um that was like the worst 

1449
00:59:08,520 --> 00:59:10,631
piece of advice at the end of the day 

1450
00:59:10,631 --> 00:59:13,030
and I think with that journey over the 

1451
00:59:13,030 --> 00:59:15,600
last 22 years and this is something 

1452
00:59:15,600 --> 00:59:18,590
where I have evolved as a leader is 

1453
00:59:18,590 --> 00:59:20,479
really the importance of allowing 

1454
00:59:20,479 --> 00:59:23,420
people to be vulnerable , allowing 

1455
00:59:23,420 --> 00:59:25,420
people to have problems , allowing 

1456
00:59:25,420 --> 00:59:29,350
people um to be who they are and 

1457
00:59:29,350 --> 00:59:31,461
share things about themselves because 

1458
00:59:31,461 --> 00:59:33,406
that at the end of the day is what 

1459
00:59:33,406 --> 00:59:35,739
creates trust and trust is so important , 

1460
00:59:35,739 --> 00:59:37,961
whether it's a marriage or whether it's 

1461
00:59:37,961 --> 00:59:40,072
a partnership with the private sector 

1462
00:59:40,072 --> 00:59:42,406
on a cyber defense mission and you know , 

1463
00:59:42,406 --> 00:59:44,490
allowing people to really go through 

1464
00:59:44,490 --> 00:59:47,790
tough times and making it okay . Um and 

1465
00:59:47,790 --> 00:59:49,901
I think , you know , the services not 

1466
00:59:49,901 --> 00:59:51,790
necessarily um um I think they're 

1467
00:59:51,790 --> 00:59:53,957
getting better , but when I felt , you 

1468
00:59:53,957 --> 00:59:56,290
know , it was coming up , you had to be , 

1469
00:59:56,420 --> 00:59:58,642
you know , tougher as a woman , right ? 

1470
00:59:58,642 --> 01:00:01,120
Tougher , stronger , faster , smarter . 

1471
01:00:01,130 --> 01:00:04,030
Um you know , all those things and you 

1472
01:00:04,040 --> 01:00:06,262
couldn't necessarily be who you who you 

1473
01:00:06,262 --> 01:00:09,590
were . And so um that's also been my 

1474
01:00:09,590 --> 01:00:11,590
sort of a journey of evolution as a 

1475
01:00:11,590 --> 01:00:13,570
leader and as a as a teammate . So 

1476
01:00:13,570 --> 01:00:17,500
thank you for asking . Wonderful . So 

1477
01:00:17,500 --> 01:00:19,667
we'll go back over here to the right . 

1478
01:00:19,667 --> 01:00:21,930
Yes sir . Good morning ma'am . I'm 

1479
01:00:21,930 --> 01:00:23,986
captain serum from the indian navy , 

1480
01:00:23,986 --> 01:00:26,208
firstly heartiest . Congratulations for 

1481
01:00:26,208 --> 01:00:27,986
your award . My question to use 

1482
01:00:27,986 --> 01:00:31,620
regarding allies and partners . Us 

1483
01:00:31,620 --> 01:00:33,890
interests lie in this white cyberspace 

1484
01:00:33,890 --> 01:00:37,510
lie beyond the mainland . So my 

1485
01:00:37,510 --> 01:00:39,420
question is , do you , does your 

1486
01:00:39,420 --> 01:00:42,580
organization interact with agencies 

1487
01:00:42,580 --> 01:00:44,636
like yours in other countries , your 

1488
01:00:44,636 --> 01:00:46,636
allies and partners to secure their 

1489
01:00:46,636 --> 01:00:48,858
cyber infrastructure because eventually 

1490
01:00:48,858 --> 01:00:51,120
it also protects your interest . Thank 

1491
01:00:51,120 --> 01:00:53,342
you . Yeah , it's a great question . Um 

1492
01:00:53,342 --> 01:00:56,150
and the answer is absolutely we 

1493
01:00:56,150 --> 01:00:58,400
recognize cyberspace as a borderless 

1494
01:00:58,400 --> 01:01:00,900
space . This is certainly not something 

1495
01:01:00,900 --> 01:01:02,511
within the boundaries of the 

1496
01:01:02,511 --> 01:01:04,567
continental us . And so we work very 

1497
01:01:04,567 --> 01:01:07,250
hard to have very robust relationships 

1498
01:01:07,250 --> 01:01:09,540
with our international partners . Um 

1499
01:01:09,540 --> 01:01:11,670
certainly in the crisis we've been 

1500
01:01:11,670 --> 01:01:13,892
working closely with the Ukraine cert . 

1501
01:01:13,892 --> 01:01:15,781
So where the US cert the computer 

1502
01:01:15,781 --> 01:01:17,948
emergency Response teams , it's one of 

1503
01:01:17,948 --> 01:01:20,530
the functions that we play and we work 

1504
01:01:20,540 --> 01:01:23,070
closely with . Again , the Ukraine sort 

1505
01:01:23,080 --> 01:01:25,191
we've been meeting even just over the 

1506
01:01:25,191 --> 01:01:27,413
past couple of weeks , bilaterally with 

1507
01:01:27,413 --> 01:01:29,580
the eastern european certs Lithuania , 

1508
01:01:29,580 --> 01:01:32,960
Latvia Estonia Poland Czechoslovakia to 

1509
01:01:32,960 --> 01:01:34,904
share information about the threat 

1510
01:01:34,904 --> 01:01:37,071
environment and also to make sure that 

1511
01:01:37,071 --> 01:01:39,238
we understand potential threats to the 

1512
01:01:39,238 --> 01:01:41,127
U . S . Homeland and our critical 

1513
01:01:41,127 --> 01:01:42,738
infrastructure . But We have 

1514
01:01:42,738 --> 01:01:44,904
relationships with over a 100 of these 

1515
01:01:44,904 --> 01:01:46,793
sorts around the world that we're 

1516
01:01:46,793 --> 01:01:48,849
constantly in a channel with sharing 

1517
01:01:48,849 --> 01:01:50,793
information . And then we have the 

1518
01:01:50,793 --> 01:01:52,904
closest partnerships with 16 of those 

1519
01:01:52,904 --> 01:01:55,071
nations that are part of what's called 

1520
01:01:55,071 --> 01:01:57,071
the International Watch and Warning 

1521
01:01:57,071 --> 01:01:59,293
Network where we're sharing information 

1522
01:01:59,293 --> 01:02:01,460
all the time . And interestingly , and 

1523
01:02:01,460 --> 01:02:03,516
there was just a meeting of the quad 

1524
01:02:03,516 --> 01:02:05,682
India Australia japan , the U . S . Uh 

1525
01:02:05,682 --> 01:02:07,793
and I know some things are gonna come 

1526
01:02:07,793 --> 01:02:09,738
out of that that will increase our 

1527
01:02:09,738 --> 01:02:11,904
partnership in particular with uh with 

1528
01:02:11,904 --> 01:02:13,960
your nation as well as the other big 

1529
01:02:13,960 --> 01:02:16,127
nations out in the pacific Thank you . 

1530
01:02:16,127 --> 01:02:18,238
Thank you . Okay , we'll go back here 

1531
01:02:18,238 --> 01:02:21,500
to the left . Good morning . My name is 

1532
01:02:21,500 --> 01:02:23,278
Ted Lange . I'm a . D . O . D . 

1533
01:02:23,278 --> 01:02:25,333
Civilian with the office of military 

1534
01:02:25,333 --> 01:02:27,556
commissions . Thank you again for being 

1535
01:02:27,556 --> 01:02:29,556
here today . Congratulations on the 

1536
01:02:29,556 --> 01:02:32,080
honor . Um Nicole Pearl , author of the 

1537
01:02:32,080 --> 01:02:33,969
new york Times , writes about the 

1538
01:02:33,969 --> 01:02:36,390
vulnerabilities equities process . I'm 

1539
01:02:36,400 --> 01:02:38,622
very sure you're familiar with it . But 

1540
01:02:38,622 --> 01:02:40,344
for the audience , this is the 

1541
01:02:40,344 --> 01:02:42,011
adjudicated process of when a 

1542
01:02:42,011 --> 01:02:45,070
vulnerability in a network or system is 

1543
01:02:45,070 --> 01:02:46,959
identified by the US government , 

1544
01:02:46,959 --> 01:02:49,590
whether it should be used for a tool 

1545
01:02:49,590 --> 01:02:52,130
set or it should be turned over for 

1546
01:02:52,140 --> 01:02:54,820
patching and plugging . Um 

1547
01:02:56,340 --> 01:02:58,730
the critique that MS Perloff offers is 

1548
01:02:58,730 --> 01:03:01,290
that because this process is housed 

1549
01:03:01,400 --> 01:03:04,520
within the NSA's cybersecurity that 

1550
01:03:04,520 --> 01:03:06,687
there's sort of a double dealing going 

1551
01:03:06,687 --> 01:03:08,353
on that the same organization 

1552
01:03:08,353 --> 01:03:10,520
responsible for offensive capabilities 

1553
01:03:10,520 --> 01:03:13,000
and operations is also responsible for 

1554
01:03:13,000 --> 01:03:16,610
keeping the systems unsafe and a 

1555
01:03:16,620 --> 01:03:18,740
critique that she offers is that this 

1556
01:03:18,740 --> 01:03:20,796
process should be turned over to the 

1557
01:03:20,796 --> 01:03:23,010
DHS , to an organization like Cisa and 

1558
01:03:23,010 --> 01:03:25,288
I wanted to know your thoughts on that . 

1559
01:03:25,288 --> 01:03:27,343
Yeah , it's a great question . So uh 

1560
01:03:27,343 --> 01:03:29,510
Nicole is terrific . She's actually on 

1561
01:03:29,510 --> 01:03:32,780
my board um and if folks are interested 

1562
01:03:32,780 --> 01:03:34,947
in this field , I highly recommend her 

1563
01:03:34,947 --> 01:03:36,947
book . This is how they tell me the 

1564
01:03:36,947 --> 01:03:40,440
world ends . It's fascinating um uh 

1565
01:03:40,450 --> 01:03:44,140
and you know , so I used to be on the N . 

1566
01:03:44,140 --> 01:03:46,110
S . A side , I am now on the cyber 

1567
01:03:46,110 --> 01:03:48,280
defense side and so I have very , I 

1568
01:03:48,280 --> 01:03:50,850
have an understanding of what it's like 

1569
01:03:50,850 --> 01:03:54,210
to be on that side . But now my very uh 

1570
01:03:54,220 --> 01:03:57,400
intense focus is all about cyber 

1571
01:03:57,400 --> 01:04:00,020
defense . And so if there are any 

1572
01:04:00,020 --> 01:04:03,150
vulnerabilities at all , we are focused 

1573
01:04:03,150 --> 01:04:05,170
on making sure we understand the 

1574
01:04:05,180 --> 01:04:07,236
implication of those vulnerabilities 

1575
01:04:07,236 --> 01:04:10,250
and then working with vendors through 

1576
01:04:10,250 --> 01:04:12,083
the what we call the coordinated 

1577
01:04:12,083 --> 01:04:14,230
vulnerability disclosure process to 

1578
01:04:14,230 --> 01:04:16,341
ensure that there can be a patch , if 

1579
01:04:16,341 --> 01:04:18,470
it's a zero day meaning that there is 

1580
01:04:18,470 --> 01:04:20,581
no patch yet , but if there's a patch 

1581
01:04:20,581 --> 01:04:22,637
that it can then be patched and that 

1582
01:04:22,637 --> 01:04:24,692
people can get that patch and ensure 

1583
01:04:24,692 --> 01:04:26,803
that they are implementing that patch 

1584
01:04:26,803 --> 01:04:29,320
before bad actors can exploit that 

1585
01:04:29,320 --> 01:04:31,440
vulnerability . And so I think it's 

1586
01:04:31,450 --> 01:04:34,880
incredibly important given the fact 

1587
01:04:34,880 --> 01:04:36,658
that , you know , everything is 

1588
01:04:36,658 --> 01:04:39,030
underpinned by technology now , it's 

1589
01:04:39,030 --> 01:04:41,050
not like the US uses some form of 

1590
01:04:41,050 --> 01:04:43,640
technology and uh you know , the rest 

1591
01:04:43,640 --> 01:04:45,696
of the world uses different forms of 

1592
01:04:45,696 --> 01:04:47,640
technology and that's what I think 

1593
01:04:47,640 --> 01:04:49,910
militates to ensuring that there is the 

1594
01:04:49,910 --> 01:04:51,966
right balance of how we are thinking 

1595
01:04:51,966 --> 01:04:54,400
about the equities process . Now , the 

1596
01:04:54,400 --> 01:04:56,233
equities process is actually not 

1597
01:04:56,233 --> 01:04:58,344
managed by en esa it's managed out of 

1598
01:04:58,344 --> 01:05:00,567
the National Security Council whose job 

1599
01:05:00,567 --> 01:05:03,810
it is to coordinate interagency policy 

1600
01:05:03,810 --> 01:05:06,330
and strategy . And of course I have a 

1601
01:05:06,330 --> 01:05:08,490
very strong view . The intel agencies 

1602
01:05:08,490 --> 01:05:10,670
may have a different view . And so uh 

1603
01:05:10,680 --> 01:05:13,410
the NsC is supposed to act as that 

1604
01:05:13,420 --> 01:05:16,250
honest broker and I think that's an 

1605
01:05:16,250 --> 01:05:18,306
appropriate role . I don't think you 

1606
01:05:18,306 --> 01:05:20,472
should have uh N . S . A . Running the 

1607
01:05:20,472 --> 01:05:22,639
process . And I think they would say , 

1608
01:05:22,639 --> 01:05:24,639
you know , sister has a very strong 

1609
01:05:24,639 --> 01:05:26,861
view about these things . They probably 

1610
01:05:26,861 --> 01:05:26,780
shouldn't be running that process . Um 

1611
01:05:26,790 --> 01:05:29,110
but I do think and I've seen this over 

1612
01:05:29,110 --> 01:05:30,840
the past nine months , this is 

1613
01:05:30,840 --> 01:05:33,062
something I was particularly interested 

1614
01:05:33,062 --> 01:05:36,760
in . I do think that um there 

1615
01:05:36,770 --> 01:05:39,840
are there is the right level of debate 

1616
01:05:39,850 --> 01:05:41,961
during that process to make sure that 

1617
01:05:41,961 --> 01:05:44,770
we are making sometimes some difficult 

1618
01:05:44,780 --> 01:05:47,370
decisions and choices . Um but I think 

1619
01:05:47,380 --> 01:05:50,430
ultimately uh everyone is taking those 

1620
01:05:50,430 --> 01:05:53,130
decisions , not in a parochial tribal 

1621
01:05:53,130 --> 01:05:55,940
way , but sort of really balancing what 

1622
01:05:55,940 --> 01:05:58,110
is the right thing for the security of 

1623
01:05:58,110 --> 01:06:00,221
the nation . And if there's something 

1624
01:06:00,221 --> 01:06:02,950
that we believe that presents critical 

1625
01:06:02,950 --> 01:06:05,130
risk to our critical infrastructure , 

1626
01:06:05,140 --> 01:06:07,710
um there is a recognition that that has 

1627
01:06:07,710 --> 01:06:10,600
to be uh disclosed in a proper way . 

1628
01:06:11,880 --> 01:06:14,470
Thank you . Thanks . Okay in the 

1629
01:06:14,470 --> 01:06:16,581
auditorium back to the right please . 

1630
01:06:16,581 --> 01:06:20,360
Hello . Hi , my name is Nathan Tassel 

1631
01:06:20,360 --> 01:06:22,970
from Israel's Defense force first of 

1632
01:06:22,970 --> 01:06:25,320
all , thank you also for for coming 

1633
01:06:25,320 --> 01:06:27,487
taking the time to talk with us . It's 

1634
01:06:27,487 --> 01:06:29,590
really an honor I would like to ask 

1635
01:06:29,590 --> 01:06:32,630
about the interagency , Katie skip that 

1636
01:06:32,630 --> 01:06:35,410
and asked much better question but I'll 

1637
01:06:35,420 --> 01:06:39,340
stick to interagency . So in Israel we 

1638
01:06:39,340 --> 01:06:42,950
have I was the chief 

1639
01:06:42,950 --> 01:06:45,117
cybersecurity Intelligence Officer for 

1640
01:06:45,117 --> 01:06:48,080
for Israel prior to me being here and 

1641
01:06:48,080 --> 01:06:51,600
I'm aware I know the way our 

1642
01:06:51,600 --> 01:06:54,010
apparatus works and I know I know the 

1643
01:06:54,010 --> 01:06:57,260
challenge in having uh to 

1644
01:06:57,270 --> 01:06:59,750
orchestrate the cybersecurity effort in 

1645
01:06:59,760 --> 01:07:02,240
in the nation's nation level . I mean 

1646
01:07:02,250 --> 01:07:04,700
you have defensive um agencies , 

1647
01:07:04,700 --> 01:07:06,700
offensive agencies , you have , the 

1648
01:07:06,700 --> 01:07:08,811
agency is the focus on private sector 

1649
01:07:08,811 --> 01:07:10,811
agencies that focus on the national 

1650
01:07:10,811 --> 01:07:12,811
level , you have to put all of them 

1651
01:07:12,811 --> 01:07:14,950
together in order to to to reach your 

1652
01:07:14,960 --> 01:07:16,940
your goal which is practically to 

1653
01:07:16,940 --> 01:07:19,790
reduce the damage . Right ? So reducing 

1654
01:07:19,790 --> 01:07:21,846
the damage is not only by defense is 

1655
01:07:21,846 --> 01:07:23,846
also by harming , you know imposing 

1656
01:07:23,846 --> 01:07:26,280
costs deterring etcetera etcetera . So 

1657
01:07:26,280 --> 01:07:28,502
you have these components and in in the 

1658
01:07:28,502 --> 01:07:30,669
U . S . You know if in Israel it seems 

1659
01:07:30,669 --> 01:07:32,724
complex in the US it seems much more 

1660
01:07:32,724 --> 01:07:35,002
complex and you have the federal level , 

1661
01:07:35,002 --> 01:07:37,440
the state level , it seems to me like 

1662
01:07:37,450 --> 01:07:40,230
um focusing not on critical 

1663
01:07:40,230 --> 01:07:43,600
infrastructure but on all other , you 

1664
01:07:43,600 --> 01:07:47,050
know , possible targets , It's almost 

1665
01:07:47,050 --> 01:07:50,990
like it's easy to to create , you know , 

1666
01:07:50,990 --> 01:07:54,320
death by 1000 cuts to the US . And my 

1667
01:07:54,320 --> 01:07:56,487
ask my question to you is , you know , 

1668
01:07:56,487 --> 01:07:59,560
um looking at the inter agency , that's 

1669
01:07:59,560 --> 01:08:02,620
your system . I know you're talking 

1670
01:08:02,620 --> 01:08:04,590
sometimes about the Rubik's cube . 

1671
01:08:04,600 --> 01:08:07,550
Right ? So is it like a Rubik's cube ? 

1672
01:08:07,560 --> 01:08:09,727
Like it seems complex , but there's an 

1673
01:08:09,727 --> 01:08:12,050
easy way to solve it , or is it more 

1674
01:08:12,050 --> 01:08:14,220
like a chess game which is complex but 

1675
01:08:14,220 --> 01:08:16,442
you have to be the best or is it like a 

1676
01:08:16,442 --> 01:08:18,498
holding problem that there is , it's 

1677
01:08:18,498 --> 01:08:20,720
undecipherable . What is the basic 

1678
01:08:20,720 --> 01:08:24,110
thing you think is is not uh , you know , 

1679
01:08:24,110 --> 01:08:26,054
in its best shape , what would you 

1680
01:08:26,054 --> 01:08:28,221
change ? And I'll give you one example 

1681
01:08:28,221 --> 01:08:30,830
before and um general Nakasone who was 

1682
01:08:30,840 --> 01:08:33,062
talking to Congress , right , uh , this 

1683
01:08:33,062 --> 01:08:36,240
month , addressing again the challenge 

1684
01:08:36,240 --> 01:08:39,630
in um , you know , adversaries , 

1685
01:08:39,640 --> 01:08:42,760
um using US infrastructure for example . 

1686
01:08:42,770 --> 01:08:45,240
So that's uh that's one example . I can 

1687
01:08:45,240 --> 01:08:48,380
think of that . I don't know , maybe 

1688
01:08:48,380 --> 01:08:50,790
something's not , there's not , you 

1689
01:08:50,790 --> 01:08:53,100
know , working . Yeah , no , it's a 

1690
01:08:53,100 --> 01:08:56,100
great it's a great question . Um so so 

1691
01:08:56,100 --> 01:08:58,267
let me just answer it two ways because 

1692
01:08:58,267 --> 01:09:00,322
I think there's been a little bit of 

1693
01:09:00,322 --> 01:09:02,433
this , what do you do and what do you 

1694
01:09:02,433 --> 01:09:04,544
do , what does she do ? So just um to 

1695
01:09:04,544 --> 01:09:06,600
break it down very simply um because 

1696
01:09:06,600 --> 01:09:08,656
there's some questions about my good 

1697
01:09:08,656 --> 01:09:10,600
friend chris Inglis national cyber 

1698
01:09:10,600 --> 01:09:12,711
director . So that was a new position 

1699
01:09:12,711 --> 01:09:15,780
that was created by Congress in 2021 to 

1700
01:09:15,780 --> 01:09:18,330
recognize the fact that this field does 

1701
01:09:18,330 --> 01:09:20,460
seem a little bit incoherent and so 

1702
01:09:20,460 --> 01:09:22,670
chris at the strategy level and he 

1703
01:09:22,680 --> 01:09:24,847
wrote a really good article in foreign 

1704
01:09:24,847 --> 01:09:27,069
affairs that I would commend to you the 

1705
01:09:27,069 --> 01:09:30,440
the new social contract for cyber . Um 

1706
01:09:30,440 --> 01:09:32,660
He is really responsible for the the 

1707
01:09:32,660 --> 01:09:35,180
strategy and the overall coherence of 

1708
01:09:35,190 --> 01:09:37,023
of what I call the federal cyber 

1709
01:09:37,023 --> 01:09:40,040
ecosystem . Um You have an Neuberger 

1710
01:09:40,040 --> 01:09:42,310
whose at the nsc who's really focused 

1711
01:09:42,310 --> 01:09:45,560
just on policy development . Um and 

1712
01:09:45,560 --> 01:09:49,540
then Cisa is operations . So 

1713
01:09:49,550 --> 01:09:52,540
um that's our mission where the only 

1714
01:09:52,540 --> 01:09:54,651
agency in the U . S . Government that 

1715
01:09:54,651 --> 01:09:57,000
wakes up every single morning worried 

1716
01:09:57,000 --> 01:09:59,080
about cyber defense of the nation . 

1717
01:09:59,090 --> 01:10:02,470
That's sort of our our North Star um In 

1718
01:10:02,470 --> 01:10:05,620
terms of how we work together with the 

1719
01:10:05,620 --> 01:10:07,842
other agencies I mentioned a little bit 

1720
01:10:07,842 --> 01:10:09,898
you know very close with the FBI who 

1721
01:10:09,898 --> 01:10:12,009
does pursuit investigation very close 

1722
01:10:12,009 --> 01:10:14,176
with the N . S . A . And uh as well as 

1723
01:10:14,176 --> 01:10:16,380
cyber command um who provides 

1724
01:10:16,380 --> 01:10:18,790
intelligence and then can take action 

1725
01:10:19,160 --> 01:10:22,720
offensively . Um But we are again just 

1726
01:10:22,720 --> 01:10:24,387
very focused on cyber defense 

1727
01:10:24,387 --> 01:10:28,110
operations to go to Paul's point about 

1728
01:10:28,120 --> 01:10:30,770
um attacks against infrastructure . 

1729
01:10:30,780 --> 01:10:34,120
Right ? Um So I don't know what I worry 

1730
01:10:34,120 --> 01:10:36,120
about is when people hear that they 

1731
01:10:36,120 --> 01:10:38,780
think oh well the intelligence 

1732
01:10:38,780 --> 01:10:40,947
community needs to have authorities to 

1733
01:10:40,947 --> 01:10:43,590
be able to operate on domestic 

1734
01:10:43,590 --> 01:10:45,757
infrastructure which I think is really 

1735
01:10:45,757 --> 01:10:47,757
the wrong lesson . And I think paul 

1736
01:10:47,757 --> 01:10:49,701
would say that's not what I mean . 

1737
01:10:49,701 --> 01:10:52,720
Right . So you don't want you know 

1738
01:10:52,730 --> 01:10:54,730
intelligence collection agencies on 

1739
01:10:54,730 --> 01:10:56,841
domestic infrastructure , what you do 

1740
01:10:56,841 --> 01:10:58,952
want is a recognition that at the end 

1741
01:10:58,952 --> 01:11:01,320
of the day it's not the USG or the 

1742
01:11:01,320 --> 01:11:03,487
intelligence community that's actually 

1743
01:11:03,487 --> 01:11:05,542
going to be able to detect malicious 

1744
01:11:05,542 --> 01:11:07,764
activity on US infrastructure . Right ? 

1745
01:11:07,764 --> 01:11:11,560
Who detected solar winds ? Yeah , my 

1746
01:11:11,560 --> 01:11:13,504
good friend . Also my board member 

1747
01:11:13,504 --> 01:11:15,393
kevin Mandia Fireeye . Right ? It 

1748
01:11:15,393 --> 01:11:17,393
wasn't it wasn't N . S . A . Or the 

1749
01:11:17,393 --> 01:11:19,393
intelligence community and it never 

1750
01:11:19,393 --> 01:11:22,810
will be . And with that recognition we 

1751
01:11:22,810 --> 01:11:24,977
have actually built a structure to try 

1752
01:11:24,977 --> 01:11:26,977
and get after this problem we built 

1753
01:11:26,977 --> 01:11:28,699
something Congress gave us new 

1754
01:11:28,699 --> 01:11:30,810
authorities . It was called the joint 

1755
01:11:30,810 --> 01:11:32,810
cyber planning office and I thought 

1756
01:11:32,810 --> 01:11:34,699
jake post sounded like a terrible 

1757
01:11:34,699 --> 01:11:37,040
acronym , which it does right , It 

1758
01:11:37,040 --> 01:11:39,870
sounds like a disease . Um and so and 

1759
01:11:39,870 --> 01:11:41,870
I'm a big eighties music fan . So I 

1760
01:11:41,870 --> 01:11:44,092
called it J . C . D . C . Aaron knows I 

1761
01:11:44,092 --> 01:11:46,259
was trying to call it , it's the joint 

1762
01:11:46,259 --> 01:11:48,259
cyber defense collaborative . I was 

1763
01:11:48,259 --> 01:11:50,314
trying to call it the advanced cyber 

1764
01:11:50,314 --> 01:11:52,537
defense collaborative but nobody nobody 

1765
01:11:52,537 --> 01:11:54,814
like that . Um So it's a J . C . D . C . 

1766
01:11:54,814 --> 01:11:57,037
And what the authorities allow us to do 

1767
01:11:57,037 --> 01:11:59,203
is to bring together the full power of 

1768
01:11:59,203 --> 01:12:01,259
the federal cyber ecosystem . So you 

1769
01:12:01,259 --> 01:12:03,370
have six A . U . N . S . A . You have 

1770
01:12:03,370 --> 01:12:05,592
FBI cyber com D O D . D O . J . O . D . 

1771
01:12:05,592 --> 01:12:07,703
N . I . Secret Service national cyber 

1772
01:12:07,703 --> 01:12:09,703
director , that's the federal cyber 

1773
01:12:09,703 --> 01:12:11,648
ecosystem and then departments and 

1774
01:12:11,648 --> 01:12:13,703
agencies that have a role in working 

1775
01:12:13,703 --> 01:12:15,814
with the private sector . So Treasury 

1776
01:12:15,814 --> 01:12:17,981
works with finance , energy works with 

1777
01:12:17,981 --> 01:12:20,203
energy , health and human services with 

1778
01:12:20,203 --> 01:12:22,426
the health community obviously . So you 

1779
01:12:22,426 --> 01:12:24,592
have that All together on one platform 

1780
01:12:24,592 --> 01:12:26,703
with the private sector . And what we 

1781
01:12:26,703 --> 01:12:28,926
did over the past several months is for 

1782
01:12:28,926 --> 01:12:30,814
what's called the J . C . D . C . 

1783
01:12:30,814 --> 01:12:32,870
Alliance which are 25 of the biggest 

1784
01:12:32,870 --> 01:12:34,814
technology partners in the world . 

1785
01:12:34,814 --> 01:12:36,680
Partners like Mandiant Palo Alto 

1786
01:12:36,690 --> 01:12:39,060
crowdstrike the I . S . P . S . The C . 

1787
01:12:39,060 --> 01:12:40,960
S . P . S . The infrastructure 

1788
01:12:40,960 --> 01:12:43,150
companies because they're the ones who 

1789
01:12:43,150 --> 01:12:45,980
are gonna see malicious activity first 

1790
01:12:45,990 --> 01:12:48,580
on our critical infrastructure . And so 

1791
01:12:48,580 --> 01:12:50,747
what we've done is we've taken a slack 

1792
01:12:50,747 --> 01:12:52,747
channel , you know , who would have 

1793
01:12:52,747 --> 01:12:54,913
thought a slack channel could actually 

1794
01:12:54,913 --> 01:12:54,770
make a difference in public private 

1795
01:12:54,780 --> 01:12:56,836
collaboration . But we've put all of 

1796
01:12:56,836 --> 01:12:59,058
these players together with the federal 

1797
01:12:59,058 --> 01:13:01,169
government exchanging information and 

1798
01:13:01,169 --> 01:13:03,870
insights , technical data in real time 

1799
01:13:04,250 --> 01:13:08,180
so we can get proactive about the 

1800
01:13:08,190 --> 01:13:10,301
threats that are out there because we 

1801
01:13:10,301 --> 01:13:12,301
recognize that it's very likely the 

1802
01:13:12,301 --> 01:13:14,357
private sector that are going to see 

1803
01:13:14,357 --> 01:13:16,523
these things first and that's allow us 

1804
01:13:16,523 --> 01:13:16,370
to have a better understanding of the 

1805
01:13:16,370 --> 01:13:18,950
threat environment and then to develop 

1806
01:13:18,950 --> 01:13:21,061
products that we can then send out to 

1807
01:13:21,061 --> 01:13:23,228
the rest of critical infrastructure to 

1808
01:13:23,228 --> 01:13:25,117
help them defend themselves . And 

1809
01:13:25,117 --> 01:13:27,006
you've seen over the past several 

1810
01:13:27,006 --> 01:13:29,061
months , things that we've done with 

1811
01:13:29,061 --> 01:13:31,006
log four j that vulnerability from 

1812
01:13:31,006 --> 01:13:33,117
december and even through the Ukraine 

1813
01:13:33,117 --> 01:13:35,172
war , a lot of work with the private 

1814
01:13:35,172 --> 01:13:37,228
sector to help us understand what we 

1815
01:13:37,228 --> 01:13:39,394
might be facing here in the homeland . 

1816
01:13:39,394 --> 01:13:41,940
And so I think getting after it in that 

1817
01:13:41,940 --> 01:13:43,718
way , having that collaborative 

1818
01:13:43,718 --> 01:13:46,020
partnership with the private sector is 

1819
01:13:46,020 --> 01:13:49,160
the way to solve the issue that general 

1820
01:13:49,160 --> 01:13:50,938
Knox Sony raised in the hearing 

1821
01:13:52,850 --> 01:13:55,010
and with just a moment left , we have 

1822
01:13:55,010 --> 01:13:56,954
two more questions on the left . I 

1823
01:13:56,954 --> 01:13:58,954
would ask , we'll take both of your 

1824
01:13:58,954 --> 01:14:01,121
questions one after the other and then 

1825
01:14:01,121 --> 01:14:03,288
we'll give Director Easterly the final 

1826
01:14:03,288 --> 01:14:05,343
word . Go ahead . Good morning . I'm 

1827
01:14:05,343 --> 01:14:07,566
brad Evans Foreign Service officer with 

1828
01:14:07,566 --> 01:14:09,788
the Department of State student here at 

1829
01:14:09,788 --> 01:14:11,820
C . I see very briefly what's the 

1830
01:14:11,820 --> 01:14:15,350
stickiest bad idea you hear about cyber 

1831
01:14:15,350 --> 01:14:17,406
security , whether you're talking to 

1832
01:14:17,406 --> 01:14:19,572
Congress , public sector or inside the 

1833
01:14:19,572 --> 01:14:21,794
U . S . Government , things that people 

1834
01:14:21,794 --> 01:14:24,017
think we ought to do but are really not 

1835
01:14:24,017 --> 01:14:26,360
1 1 will be very obvious and that's 

1836
01:14:26,370 --> 01:14:28,940
hacking back . Um that that's the 

1837
01:14:28,940 --> 01:14:30,996
answer to everything is , you know , 

1838
01:14:30,996 --> 01:14:33,107
changing the C . F . A . A to provide 

1839
01:14:33,107 --> 01:14:35,162
more authorities to have the private 

1840
01:14:35,162 --> 01:14:37,440
sector to hack back . I think that's um 

1841
01:14:37,450 --> 01:14:40,240
not a good idea at all . I think it can 

1842
01:14:40,240 --> 01:14:43,050
have perverse consequences . So that's 

1843
01:14:43,050 --> 01:14:45,217
sort of famously , but I think anybody 

1844
01:14:45,217 --> 01:14:47,520
in cyber would probably go to , I also 

1845
01:14:47,530 --> 01:14:49,586
would point to the fact that I think 

1846
01:14:49,586 --> 01:14:51,800
there's a lot of um there's a lot of 

1847
01:14:51,810 --> 01:14:54,130
sort of debate out there about whether 

1848
01:14:54,130 --> 01:14:56,074
regulation is going to solve every 

1849
01:14:56,074 --> 01:14:58,250
problem . Um and I think at the end of 

1850
01:14:58,250 --> 01:15:01,290
the day , um , you know , regulations 

1851
01:15:01,290 --> 01:15:03,290
certainly has its place , we're not 

1852
01:15:03,290 --> 01:15:05,068
really a regulatory agency . So 

1853
01:15:05,068 --> 01:15:07,290
everything that we do is about creating 

1854
01:15:07,290 --> 01:15:09,780
trusted partnerships , not using a 

1855
01:15:09,790 --> 01:15:12,280
compliance type hammer . Um , but what 

1856
01:15:12,280 --> 01:15:15,150
I do worry about is is if you end up 

1857
01:15:15,160 --> 01:15:17,820
with more and more regulations in the 

1858
01:15:17,820 --> 01:15:20,880
space , um you may get to an 

1859
01:15:20,880 --> 01:15:22,713
environment where it's not about 

1860
01:15:22,713 --> 01:15:24,936
operational risk management , it's more 

1861
01:15:24,936 --> 01:15:27,047
about compliance box checking because 

1862
01:15:27,047 --> 01:15:29,102
you've got so many different signals 

1863
01:15:29,102 --> 01:15:31,436
coming at you from different regulators . 

1864
01:15:31,436 --> 01:15:33,658
We experienced that in finance where we 

1865
01:15:33,658 --> 01:15:35,824
had so many different regulate it when 

1866
01:15:35,824 --> 01:15:37,991
it was not effectively harmonized . So 

1867
01:15:37,991 --> 01:15:40,158
I worry a little bit about that . So I 

1868
01:15:40,158 --> 01:15:39,950
just think we need to be really , 

1869
01:15:39,950 --> 01:15:43,480
really thoughtful as we look to ensure 

1870
01:15:43,480 --> 01:15:45,647
that the private sector is effectively 

1871
01:15:45,647 --> 01:15:48,280
incentivized um to be able to invest 

1872
01:15:48,280 --> 01:15:50,630
what they need to in their security and 

1873
01:15:50,630 --> 01:15:54,180
resilience . Thanks . Good morning 

1874
01:15:54,180 --> 01:15:56,236
ma'am ma'am . My name is Samir Major 

1875
01:15:56,236 --> 01:15:58,069
Sameer puri from Washington Army 

1876
01:15:58,069 --> 01:16:00,069
National Guard . Congratulations on 

1877
01:16:00,069 --> 01:16:01,958
your award and thank you for your 

1878
01:16:01,958 --> 01:16:04,620
leadership , ma'am , ma'am . Great CNN 

1879
01:16:04,630 --> 01:16:06,908
interview by the way about preparation , 

1880
01:16:06,908 --> 01:16:09,320
not panic . So my role Ma'am in my role 

1881
01:16:09,320 --> 01:16:11,376
as a D . C . O team chief . I worked 

1882
01:16:11,376 --> 01:16:13,376
with cities and counties and school 

1883
01:16:13,376 --> 01:16:15,670
district looking at the cyber security 

1884
01:16:15,670 --> 01:16:17,670
of the whole of government approach 

1885
01:16:17,670 --> 01:16:19,840
what message I can take it back to the 

1886
01:16:19,850 --> 01:16:22,470
state of Washington and cities to say 

1887
01:16:22,480 --> 01:16:24,790
what caesar is doing through strength 

1888
01:16:24,800 --> 01:16:26,740
strengthening the cybersecurity . 

1889
01:16:27,660 --> 01:16:29,716
That's a great question . Thanks for 

1890
01:16:29,716 --> 01:16:31,882
asking . You know , we've talked a lot 

1891
01:16:31,882 --> 01:16:31,760
about what we do with the private 

1892
01:16:31,760 --> 01:16:33,980
sector . Um but I like to say , you 

1893
01:16:33,980 --> 01:16:36,202
know , in in in places that I worked in 

1894
01:16:36,202 --> 01:16:37,869
government , counterterrorism 

1895
01:16:37,869 --> 01:16:39,758
intelligence , the army where the 

1896
01:16:39,758 --> 01:16:41,536
federal government arguably has 

1897
01:16:41,536 --> 01:16:43,647
monopoly power in cybersecurity . The 

1898
01:16:43,647 --> 01:16:45,647
federal government is really just a 

1899
01:16:45,647 --> 01:16:47,813
partner , both with the private sector 

1900
01:16:47,813 --> 01:16:49,702
but also with our state and local 

1901
01:16:49,702 --> 01:16:51,813
colleagues . And so one of the really 

1902
01:16:51,813 --> 01:16:53,480
cool things that people don't 

1903
01:16:53,480 --> 01:16:55,702
necessarily think about when they think 

1904
01:16:55,702 --> 01:16:57,813
about Cisa is that we have this great 

1905
01:16:57,813 --> 01:17:00,140
and growing field force . Uh so 600 

1906
01:17:00,140 --> 01:17:02,450
people out in the field in 10 regions 

1907
01:17:02,450 --> 01:17:04,617
aligned with our female colleagues and 

1908
01:17:04,617 --> 01:17:06,672
that includes cybersecurity advisors 

1909
01:17:06,672 --> 01:17:08,839
and cybersecurity . State coordinators 

1910
01:17:08,839 --> 01:17:11,550
that work with state and local C . I . 

1911
01:17:11,550 --> 01:17:13,770
Os . And sys owes to make sure because 

1912
01:17:13,770 --> 01:17:15,881
they are some of those areas that are 

1913
01:17:15,881 --> 01:17:18,890
target rich resource poor to make sure 

1914
01:17:18,900 --> 01:17:21,067
that not only do they have some of the 

1915
01:17:21,067 --> 01:17:23,870
free services that cisa offers fishing 

1916
01:17:23,870 --> 01:17:26,720
assessments , cyber hygiene assessments , 

1917
01:17:26,730 --> 01:17:29,260
vulnerability assessments , but they 

1918
01:17:29,260 --> 01:17:31,270
can come to us as a partner if they 

1919
01:17:31,280 --> 01:17:34,360
need assistance . So um During the 2020 

1920
01:17:34,360 --> 01:17:36,582
elections and I give a lot of credit to 

1921
01:17:36,582 --> 01:17:38,693
my great friend and predecessor Chris 

1922
01:17:38,693 --> 01:17:40,860
Krebs . Um a lot of headway was made , 

1923
01:17:40,860 --> 01:17:42,971
working with state and local election 

1924
01:17:42,971 --> 01:17:45,027
officials to make sure that they had 

1925
01:17:45,027 --> 01:17:47,249
the resources that they need to be able 

1926
01:17:47,249 --> 01:17:49,582
to secure their election infrastructure . 

1927
01:17:49,582 --> 01:17:51,360
And so we've got a really close 

1928
01:17:51,360 --> 01:17:54,120
partnership and so Um we've got a 

1929
01:17:54,130 --> 01:17:56,186
region that's based out of Seattle , 

1930
01:17:56,186 --> 01:17:58,130
it's our region 10 pat masses . My 

1931
01:17:58,130 --> 01:18:00,074
regional director is actually here 

1932
01:18:00,074 --> 01:18:03,090
visiting um and a great team that if if 

1933
01:18:03,100 --> 01:18:05,156
your folks don't already know them , 

1934
01:18:05,156 --> 01:18:07,044
then reach out and we'll get them 

1935
01:18:07,044 --> 01:18:10,760
connected . Thank you . Mhm . Okay , 

1936
01:18:10,760 --> 01:18:12,927
well , on behalf of the Chancellor , I 

1937
01:18:12,927 --> 01:18:14,704
want to thank everyone for your 

1938
01:18:14,704 --> 01:18:16,704
participation . Great questions and 

1939
01:18:16,704 --> 01:18:18,760
answers . Please join me in thanking 

1940
01:18:18,760 --> 01:18:20,927
our A V professionals . Once again our 

1941
01:18:20,927 --> 01:18:23,780
DHS chair Mr mike brody , jo Billingsly 

1942
01:18:23,780 --> 01:18:25,669
and the team for pulling all this 

1943
01:18:25,669 --> 01:18:27,669
together and of course our honorary 

1944
01:18:27,669 --> 01:18:29,836
director Easterly . Thank you a little 

1945
01:18:29,836 --> 01:18:29,720
bit . 

1946
01:18:34,010 --> 01:18:35,066
That was amazing . 

1947
01:18:38,120 --> 01:18:39,120
Yeah , 

1948
01:18:47,420 --> 01:18:49,600
and this concludes the formal part of 

1949
01:18:49,600 --> 01:18:51,767
the event , please stay safe and thank 

1950
01:18:51,767 --> 01:18:52,989
you all for attending 

1951
01:19:00,420 --> 01:19:02,250
photos , photos . 

1952
01:19:06,920 --> 01:19:07,920
Mhm . 

1953
01:19:13,820 --> 01:19:14,030
That's it .