1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:02,360 wow , 2 00:00:04,040 --> 00:00:07,680 my goodness . The sarcasm is just 3 00:00:07,680 --> 00:00:10,300 dripping in here . Do you think it was 4 00:00:10,300 --> 00:00:14,250 a friday ? Okay , a 5 00:00:14,250 --> 00:00:16,361 couple of things to get to at the top 6 00:00:16,361 --> 00:00:20,320 here . I think today uh 7 00:00:20,330 --> 00:00:22,330 you saw the department released the 8 00:00:22,330 --> 00:00:24,820 2021 on site installation evaluation 9 00:00:24,820 --> 00:00:27,510 report . I want to remind that on his 10 00:00:27,510 --> 00:00:30,240 very first full day in office , the 11 00:00:30,250 --> 00:00:32,250 secretary Austin made a very strong 12 00:00:32,250 --> 00:00:34,250 commitment about sexual assault and 13 00:00:34,250 --> 00:00:36,417 sexual harassment and how he was going 14 00:00:36,417 --> 00:00:38,639 to prioritize on it . And that set into 15 00:00:38,639 --> 00:00:40,861 motion an independent review commission 16 00:00:40,861 --> 00:00:42,750 which set into motion a series of 17 00:00:42,750 --> 00:00:44,694 findings and recommendations . And 18 00:00:44,694 --> 00:00:46,917 among those recommendations was that we 19 00:00:46,917 --> 00:00:49,139 take a look at sites around the country 20 00:00:49,139 --> 00:00:51,306 and around the world to make sure that 21 00:00:51,306 --> 00:00:53,500 we're um properly examining the kinds 22 00:00:53,500 --> 00:00:56,450 of conditions that exist to help 23 00:00:56,450 --> 00:00:59,150 prevent uh these harmful behaviors . 24 00:00:59,150 --> 00:01:01,206 And it's not just sexual assault and 25 00:01:01,206 --> 00:01:03,372 sexual harassment , but domestic abuse 26 00:01:03,372 --> 00:01:05,720 suicide . Uh and uh what kind of 27 00:01:05,720 --> 00:01:07,720 conditions rather to help prevent ? 28 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:10,530 What's the command climate like um what 29 00:01:10,530 --> 00:01:13,010 sort of resources are available uh to 30 00:01:13,010 --> 00:01:15,460 our to our folks and to their families . 31 00:01:15,470 --> 00:01:18,460 Uh Anyway , so all that led to this 32 00:01:18,460 --> 00:01:20,238 very first on site installation 33 00:01:20,238 --> 00:01:23,910 evaluation report . Um The secretary 34 00:01:23,910 --> 00:01:26,760 believes that the findings in this 35 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:29,680 report of those site visits is going to 36 00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:32,530 be critical to helping us better 37 00:01:32,530 --> 00:01:34,697 prevent a range of harmful behaviors . 38 00:01:34,697 --> 00:01:36,863 And I said that include sexual assault 39 00:01:36,863 --> 00:01:38,641 harassment , suicide , domestic 40 00:01:38,641 --> 00:01:41,780 violence and child abuse . Um uh how to 41 00:01:41,790 --> 00:01:43,846 better prevent it . And what is it , 42 00:01:43,846 --> 00:01:45,901 what's it take to to do prevention ? 43 00:01:45,901 --> 00:01:47,734 Well , so a key objective of the 44 00:01:47,734 --> 00:01:49,790 process here is to better understand 45 00:01:49,790 --> 00:01:51,790 where the gaps in the seams are and 46 00:01:51,790 --> 00:01:53,790 provide leaders at these institutes 47 00:01:53,790 --> 00:01:55,790 installations as well as across the 48 00:01:55,790 --> 00:01:58,160 force um with the necessary tools to uh 49 00:01:58,170 --> 00:02:01,620 to enhance prevention . So again , um 50 00:02:01,630 --> 00:02:03,860 this is a this was a first in what will 51 00:02:03,860 --> 00:02:06,027 be a series of additional installation 52 00:02:06,027 --> 00:02:08,138 visits and installation reports as it 53 00:02:08,138 --> 00:02:10,249 should be . We'll learn from each one 54 00:02:10,249 --> 00:02:12,304 will share those lessons broadly and 55 00:02:12,304 --> 00:02:14,471 we'll be as transparent with you as we 56 00:02:14,471 --> 00:02:16,471 can . And we have done that today . 57 00:02:16,471 --> 00:02:18,638 Also today , the department authorized 58 00:02:18,638 --> 00:02:20,693 for Public Larry's the rand Report , 59 00:02:20,693 --> 00:02:22,916 which was titled understanding civilian 60 00:02:22,916 --> 00:02:25,082 harm in Raqqa and its implications for 61 00:02:25,082 --> 00:02:27,304 future conflicts . I think you may have 62 00:02:27,304 --> 00:02:29,471 seen rand's already spoken to this and 63 00:02:29,471 --> 00:02:31,249 uh and posted their report . It 64 00:02:31,249 --> 00:02:33,304 provides insights into the causes of 65 00:02:33,304 --> 00:02:35,082 civilian harm during the US led 66 00:02:35,082 --> 00:02:37,082 campaign to liberate Raqqa from the 67 00:02:37,082 --> 00:02:40,790 Islamic state from june To October 68 00:02:40,790 --> 00:02:42,610 2017 . The report provides 69 00:02:42,610 --> 00:02:44,832 recommendations related to us strategic 70 00:02:44,832 --> 00:02:46,888 choices , operational approaches and 71 00:02:46,888 --> 00:02:48,999 capabilities , information collection 72 00:02:48,999 --> 00:02:51,110 approaches to adversary tactics and 73 00:02:51,110 --> 00:02:54,540 force development . It was sponsored by 74 00:02:54,550 --> 00:02:56,606 the Office of the Under Secretary of 75 00:02:56,606 --> 00:02:58,828 Defense for Policy . Um and this report 76 00:02:58,828 --> 00:03:00,661 will be one of the key resources 77 00:03:00,661 --> 00:03:02,750 considered in developing our own 78 00:03:02,760 --> 00:03:04,871 civilian harm mitigation and response 79 00:03:04,871 --> 00:03:06,960 action plan that the Secretary also 80 00:03:06,960 --> 00:03:08,960 recently directed the Department to 81 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:11,320 develop safeguarding civilian life is a 82 00:03:11,320 --> 00:03:13,542 strategic and moral imperative . You've 83 00:03:13,542 --> 00:03:15,709 heard . Secretary Austin say that many 84 00:03:15,709 --> 00:03:17,764 times the department appreciates the 85 00:03:17,764 --> 00:03:20,080 insights that that this report offers , 86 00:03:20,090 --> 00:03:22,201 appreciates all the work that ran put 87 00:03:22,201 --> 00:03:24,312 into it . Uh and we know it will help 88 00:03:24,312 --> 00:03:26,423 inform our own work as we continue to 89 00:03:26,423 --> 00:03:28,646 try to improve our approach to civilian 90 00:03:28,646 --> 00:03:30,701 harm , mitigation and response going 91 00:03:30,701 --> 00:03:34,430 forward . Let's see lastly , um 92 00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:36,662 earlier today I had the great privilege 93 00:03:36,662 --> 00:03:39,500 of launching a new community engagement 94 00:03:39,510 --> 00:03:41,454 strategic and community engagement 95 00:03:41,454 --> 00:03:43,510 initiative that we're calling beyond 96 00:03:43,510 --> 00:03:46,490 the battlefield . Um it's aimed at uh 97 00:03:46,500 --> 00:03:48,910 scholars and students at the collegiate 98 00:03:48,910 --> 00:03:52,590 level to try to help uh inform them . 99 00:03:52,600 --> 00:03:54,767 Obviously we want to encourage them to 100 00:03:54,767 --> 00:03:56,989 consider jobs and national security and 101 00:03:56,989 --> 00:03:59,156 here at the department of course , but 102 00:03:59,156 --> 00:04:01,267 it's really about helping inform them 103 00:04:01,267 --> 00:04:03,267 about how the policy making process 104 00:04:03,267 --> 00:04:05,267 works at the pentagon . I mean , so 105 00:04:05,267 --> 00:04:07,322 much of what the military does um is 106 00:04:07,322 --> 00:04:09,433 available for everybody to to see and 107 00:04:09,433 --> 00:04:11,267 to read about . I mean , we just 108 00:04:11,267 --> 00:04:13,378 released a budget on monday that lays 109 00:04:13,378 --> 00:04:15,433 out what we're gonna be spending and 110 00:04:15,433 --> 00:04:17,656 what we're spending it on and why . But 111 00:04:17,656 --> 00:04:19,767 I felt like we felt like we needed to 112 00:04:19,767 --> 00:04:21,989 do a better job explaining what working 113 00:04:21,989 --> 00:04:24,156 inside the Defense Department actually 114 00:04:24,156 --> 00:04:26,156 felt like . Um and uh and how those 115 00:04:26,156 --> 00:04:28,300 decisions got made . Uh and so we did 116 00:04:28,300 --> 00:04:31,070 our inaugural uh session today . I'm 117 00:04:31,070 --> 00:04:33,237 very proud of that and we'll keep it , 118 00:04:33,237 --> 00:04:35,403 we'll keep it going . It's gonna be an 119 00:04:35,403 --> 00:04:37,514 interactive , virtual dialogue to the 120 00:04:37,514 --> 00:04:39,626 degree that we need to right now with 121 00:04:39,626 --> 00:04:41,792 with Covid , but we hope to do more in 122 00:04:41,792 --> 00:04:43,848 person stuff . And so , um , I was I 123 00:04:43,848 --> 00:04:46,181 was very pleased to kick that off today . 124 00:04:46,181 --> 00:04:48,292 Finally , I know I'm kind of rattling 125 00:04:48,292 --> 00:04:50,459 on here , but an apology to uh all the 126 00:04:50,459 --> 00:04:52,459 press corps , we had some technical 127 00:04:52,459 --> 00:04:54,626 difficulties today so we won't be able 128 00:04:54,626 --> 00:04:56,681 to take calls through zoom . Uh , so 129 00:04:56,681 --> 00:04:58,940 basically you guys here with butts in 130 00:04:58,940 --> 00:05:01,051 seats , you're you're going to be the 131 00:05:01,051 --> 00:05:03,051 only ones asking question today and 132 00:05:03,051 --> 00:05:05,384 that's not , not not on purpose . We do , 133 00:05:05,384 --> 00:05:07,662 we do apologize . We try as , you know , 134 00:05:07,662 --> 00:05:09,829 very hard to make this as inclusive as 135 00:05:09,829 --> 00:05:11,996 we can because of covid restrictions . 136 00:05:11,996 --> 00:05:14,107 But unfortunately , uh technology got 137 00:05:14,107 --> 00:05:16,329 the better of us today . So we're gonna 138 00:05:16,329 --> 00:05:18,440 just stick to what's in the room . So 139 00:05:18,440 --> 00:05:20,551 bob , you're lucky you didn't call in 140 00:05:20,551 --> 00:05:22,773 today . You're here . So first question 141 00:05:22,773 --> 00:05:24,970 on Ukraine , can you give an update on 142 00:05:24,970 --> 00:05:28,010 the size and the scope of the movement 143 00:05:28,010 --> 00:05:31,040 of Russian forces north from Kiev ? Um , 144 00:05:31,050 --> 00:05:33,620 what you've called repositioning , does 145 00:05:33,620 --> 00:05:36,100 that include Chernobyl ? Or is that 146 00:05:36,100 --> 00:05:38,670 kind of a separate situation because of 147 00:05:38,890 --> 00:05:41,310 some health problems there that you 148 00:05:41,320 --> 00:05:43,480 could talk about . And lastly by 149 00:05:43,480 --> 00:05:45,480 popular demand . Can you give us an 150 00:05:45,480 --> 00:05:47,536 update on the convoy that you talked 151 00:05:47,536 --> 00:05:50,520 about ? I haven't gotten a convoy 152 00:05:50,520 --> 00:05:54,340 question in a long , long time . Uh , 153 00:05:54,350 --> 00:05:56,461 that did not merit rip laws . Whoever 154 00:05:56,461 --> 00:05:59,920 did that On the , on the , on the 155 00:05:59,930 --> 00:06:02,740 repositioning . Uh , we continue to see 156 00:06:02,740 --> 00:06:04,962 indications that that they are moving a 157 00:06:04,962 --> 00:06:07,073 small number . I don't have an update 158 00:06:07,073 --> 00:06:09,320 for you in terms of what that equates 159 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:11,431 to . I think yesterday we said it was 160 00:06:11,431 --> 00:06:13,653 about about 20% , maybe a little less . 161 00:06:13,653 --> 00:06:15,598 I don't think we would change that 162 00:06:15,598 --> 00:06:17,876 estimation Much over the last 24 hours . 163 00:06:17,876 --> 00:06:20,042 It has not been wholesale by any means 164 00:06:20,042 --> 00:06:23,740 or has it been rapid ? Um We we 165 00:06:23,740 --> 00:06:26,250 do believe that again that a small 166 00:06:26,250 --> 00:06:28,306 number are beginning to reposition . 167 00:06:28,306 --> 00:06:30,430 It's not exactly clear bob where 168 00:06:30,430 --> 00:06:33,140 they're gonna go for how long and for 169 00:06:33,140 --> 00:06:35,860 what purpose . Um , but we don't see 170 00:06:35,860 --> 00:06:38,120 any indication that they're going to be 171 00:06:38,120 --> 00:06:42,040 sent home . The best assessment we have 172 00:06:42,230 --> 00:06:44,286 and it's an assessment at this early 173 00:06:44,286 --> 00:06:46,174 stage is that they're going to be 174 00:06:46,174 --> 00:06:48,720 repositioned probably um into Belarus 175 00:06:48,730 --> 00:06:50,960 to be refit and resupplied and used 176 00:06:50,960 --> 00:06:53,071 elsewhere in Ukraine again . Where is 177 00:06:53,071 --> 00:06:55,349 that elsewhere ? We don't exactly know . 178 00:06:55,349 --> 00:06:57,349 All I can tell you is what , what , 179 00:06:57,349 --> 00:06:59,516 what we've said now for several days , 180 00:06:59,516 --> 00:07:01,460 it's clear the Russians want to re 181 00:07:01,460 --> 00:07:03,750 prioritize their operations in the 182 00:07:03,750 --> 00:07:05,980 Donbass area . That could be one 183 00:07:05,980 --> 00:07:08,091 destination , but again , too soon to 184 00:07:08,091 --> 00:07:10,430 know . We we don't really have a good 185 00:07:10,430 --> 00:07:12,430 sense of it . You were asking about 186 00:07:12,430 --> 00:07:14,486 Chernobyl , We have seen indications 187 00:07:14,486 --> 00:07:16,374 that uh , some Russian forces are 188 00:07:16,374 --> 00:07:19,740 departing the Chernobyl uh plant 189 00:07:19,740 --> 00:07:22,960 facility . Again , we we gather that 190 00:07:22,960 --> 00:07:26,330 they are leaving to the north um to go 191 00:07:26,330 --> 00:07:29,990 back again towards Belarus , but again , 192 00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:32,300 indications are , are not completely 193 00:07:32,300 --> 00:07:35,010 clear at this time . I think you're 194 00:07:35,010 --> 00:07:37,330 asking , is that of a piece or is it 195 00:07:37,330 --> 00:07:39,420 something separate ? Um , we would 196 00:07:39,420 --> 00:07:41,642 assess at this early stage that it's of 197 00:07:41,642 --> 00:07:44,740 a piece of this larger effort to , to 198 00:07:44,740 --> 00:07:47,260 refit and resupply and not necessarily 199 00:07:47,640 --> 00:07:51,140 done because of , of health hazards 200 00:07:51,140 --> 00:07:53,590 or some sort of emergency or a crisis 201 00:07:53,590 --> 00:07:55,646 at at Chernobyl , that that would be 202 00:07:55,646 --> 00:07:57,940 our assessment . And I honestly don't 203 00:07:57,940 --> 00:07:59,829 have an update for you on the the 204 00:07:59,829 --> 00:08:02,580 vaunted convoy . I don't I don't have 205 00:08:02,580 --> 00:08:05,460 anything for you on that . I don't even 206 00:08:05,460 --> 00:08:07,682 know if it still exists at this point . 207 00:08:07,682 --> 00:08:09,793 I mean , it's been now so long . They 208 00:08:09,793 --> 00:08:13,290 never , never really accomplished their 209 00:08:13,290 --> 00:08:16,360 mission . They never really provided 210 00:08:16,410 --> 00:08:19,540 resupply of any value to Russian forces 211 00:08:19,540 --> 00:08:22,930 that were assembling around 212 00:08:22,940 --> 00:08:26,360 Kiev um , never came to uh , never , 213 00:08:26,370 --> 00:08:28,426 never really came to their aid . The 214 00:08:28,426 --> 00:08:30,592 Ukrainians put a stop to the , to that 215 00:08:30,592 --> 00:08:33,500 convoy pretty quickly um by being very 216 00:08:33,500 --> 00:08:35,670 nimble , um , knocking out bridges , 217 00:08:35,680 --> 00:08:37,847 hitting lead vehicles , stopping their 218 00:08:37,847 --> 00:08:40,800 movement . But I I've we've not seen an 219 00:08:40,800 --> 00:08:43,020 update on , on what , where those 220 00:08:43,020 --> 00:08:45,076 vehicles are , what they're doing at 221 00:08:45,076 --> 00:08:47,409 this point . And at this point , I mean , 222 00:08:47,409 --> 00:08:50,180 you know , again , even if take our 223 00:08:50,180 --> 00:08:52,347 skepticism about the repositioning and 224 00:08:52,347 --> 00:08:54,513 just put that to the side for a minute 225 00:08:54,513 --> 00:08:56,680 over the last several days . We talked 226 00:08:56,680 --> 00:08:59,030 about that the Russians had um , pretty 227 00:08:59,030 --> 00:09:00,840 much even before this , this 228 00:09:00,850 --> 00:09:03,590 repositioning had basically established 229 00:09:03,590 --> 00:09:05,646 defensive positions and they weren't 230 00:09:05,646 --> 00:09:07,646 they were digging in ? They weren't 231 00:09:07,650 --> 00:09:09,817 making any effort to advance on Kiev , 232 00:09:09,817 --> 00:09:12,290 So it's questionable 233 00:09:12,300 --> 00:09:15,900 whether that resupply convoy would have 234 00:09:15,900 --> 00:09:17,956 been of much use anyway because they 235 00:09:17,956 --> 00:09:19,900 weren't , they weren't on the move 236 00:09:19,900 --> 00:09:22,011 anymore . Again , how much , how much 237 00:09:22,011 --> 00:09:24,122 of the material they were able to get 238 00:09:24,122 --> 00:09:26,289 from it ? I don't know what would that 239 00:09:26,289 --> 00:09:28,870 be an example of , of Russian , uh , 240 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:32,400 planning failures or shortcomings ? The 241 00:09:32,410 --> 00:09:34,632 convoy that didn't seem to connect with 242 00:09:34,632 --> 00:09:36,743 what they were doing ? I think it's a 243 00:09:36,743 --> 00:09:38,854 function of a lot of things . I think 244 00:09:38,854 --> 00:09:41,021 that's one of them . I mean , we don't 245 00:09:41,021 --> 00:09:43,077 think that they properly planned for 246 00:09:43,077 --> 00:09:45,132 logistics and sustainment of a force 247 00:09:45,132 --> 00:09:47,900 that size in the field under combat 248 00:09:47,900 --> 00:09:50,540 conditions . Clearly they didn't 249 00:09:50,550 --> 00:09:52,717 execute if they did plan for logistics 250 00:09:52,717 --> 00:09:54,828 and sustainment , they didn't execute 251 00:09:54,828 --> 00:09:57,750 very well . Um , because 252 00:09:58,540 --> 00:10:01,030 even before that , you know , before 253 00:10:01,030 --> 00:10:03,363 the convoy became a news story , I mean , 254 00:10:03,363 --> 00:10:05,252 we were talking about , they were 255 00:10:05,252 --> 00:10:07,474 running out of fuel , they were running 256 00:10:07,474 --> 00:10:06,720 out of food , they were running out of 257 00:10:06,720 --> 00:10:09,180 ammunition . So it's not clear to us 258 00:10:09,180 --> 00:10:11,291 whether this convoy was a reaction to 259 00:10:11,291 --> 00:10:13,513 problems they were experiencing or that 260 00:10:13,513 --> 00:10:15,736 was them trying to be proactive doesn't 261 00:10:15,736 --> 00:10:17,958 matter . Obviously didn't get there . I 262 00:10:17,958 --> 00:10:20,180 think it's also a function of Ukrainian 263 00:10:20,180 --> 00:10:22,347 resistance and agility and and frankly 264 00:10:22,347 --> 00:10:24,870 just battlefield smarts by knowing 265 00:10:24,870 --> 00:10:27,120 where these vehicles were coming from , 266 00:10:27,130 --> 00:10:29,241 knowing where they were trying to get 267 00:10:29,241 --> 00:10:31,510 to and getting between between where 268 00:10:31,510 --> 00:10:33,621 they were going and where they were , 269 00:10:33,621 --> 00:10:35,732 which is what they did , knocking out 270 00:10:35,732 --> 00:10:37,843 bridges for instance , making it hard 271 00:10:37,843 --> 00:10:40,066 for them to um , to move on paved roads 272 00:10:40,066 --> 00:10:42,177 and these were not vehicles that were 273 00:10:42,177 --> 00:10:44,399 built for off roading either . Um So um 274 00:10:44,399 --> 00:10:46,510 you know , I think you have to , when 275 00:10:46,510 --> 00:10:48,621 you when you talk about this resupply 276 00:10:48,621 --> 00:10:50,399 effort , you have to credit the 277 00:10:50,399 --> 00:10:52,677 Ukrainians for for some real dexterity . 278 00:10:52,840 --> 00:10:55,700 Okay , john can you rule out that the 279 00:10:55,700 --> 00:10:57,800 US is training Ukrainian military on 280 00:10:57,800 --> 00:11:01,730 polish soil ? We are we are not in a 281 00:11:01,740 --> 00:11:04,430 training environment in in Poland with 282 00:11:04,440 --> 00:11:06,496 with Ukrainians . What we've said in 283 00:11:06,496 --> 00:11:09,710 the past is that um that uh 284 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:12,610 obviously as there are trans shipments 285 00:11:12,610 --> 00:11:14,610 being coordinated in some countries 286 00:11:14,610 --> 00:11:17,090 around Ukraine , there's interactions 287 00:11:17,090 --> 00:11:19,800 with the Ukrainian armed forces . Some 288 00:11:19,800 --> 00:11:22,480 of those interactions are with with 289 00:11:22,480 --> 00:11:24,369 members of the U . S . Military , 290 00:11:24,369 --> 00:11:26,970 there's some liaison going on , but but 291 00:11:26,970 --> 00:11:29,137 we wouldn't call it classic training . 292 00:11:29,137 --> 00:11:31,140 And how do you explain that certain 293 00:11:31,140 --> 00:11:33,307 Ukrainian parliament members are still 294 00:11:33,307 --> 00:11:35,251 telling Congress that they are not 295 00:11:35,251 --> 00:11:37,529 getting not only the weapons they need , 296 00:11:37,529 --> 00:11:39,751 but the shipments have slowed . Can you 297 00:11:39,751 --> 00:11:41,720 give us a sense of the pace of the 298 00:11:41,720 --> 00:11:43,553 shipments ? And what is in those 299 00:11:43,553 --> 00:11:45,553 shipments ? Are you sending medical 300 00:11:45,553 --> 00:11:47,664 supplies for instance , or is it only 301 00:11:47,664 --> 00:11:49,776 lethal aid that you're sending ? No , 302 00:11:49,776 --> 00:11:51,831 it's it's a so so we would not agree 303 00:11:51,831 --> 00:11:53,664 that it's being slowed quite the 304 00:11:53,664 --> 00:11:57,080 contrary , we completed uh the 305 00:11:57,080 --> 00:12:00,390 $350 million that President biden 306 00:12:00,390 --> 00:12:02,890 authorized a month or so ago and that 307 00:12:02,890 --> 00:12:05,510 was that was completed in a record 308 00:12:05,520 --> 00:12:08,480 three weeks or so . Um which is unheard 309 00:12:08,480 --> 00:12:12,080 of um the 200 million that he 310 00:12:12,090 --> 00:12:15,850 approved . Uh Not long after . Um 311 00:12:15,860 --> 00:12:18,082 That's pretty much all in now . I think 312 00:12:18,082 --> 00:12:20,590 there may be maybe one shipment or so 313 00:12:20,590 --> 00:12:22,701 left , I don't know . Um And then the 314 00:12:22,701 --> 00:12:25,330 800 million that that the president 315 00:12:25,330 --> 00:12:27,441 approved . What more than just over a 316 00:12:27,441 --> 00:12:29,552 week or a week , 10 days ago . I mean 317 00:12:29,552 --> 00:12:31,386 that those shipments are already 318 00:12:31,386 --> 00:12:33,497 arriving . In fact , from the time he 319 00:12:33,497 --> 00:12:36,170 signed the order to the first shipment 320 00:12:36,170 --> 00:12:38,820 going on its way , was like four days , 321 00:12:38,830 --> 00:12:41,070 jen . Um And there's already been about 322 00:12:41,070 --> 00:12:43,014 a half a dozen shipments that have 323 00:12:43,014 --> 00:12:45,237 flowed into the region . Um And they're 324 00:12:45,237 --> 00:12:47,340 not I'm not going to talk about the 325 00:12:47,340 --> 00:12:49,173 ground routes and how things are 326 00:12:49,173 --> 00:12:50,951 getting into Ukraine as you can 327 00:12:50,951 --> 00:12:53,118 understand , but I would tell you that 328 00:12:53,118 --> 00:12:55,118 things aren't sitting long at these 329 00:12:55,118 --> 00:12:57,118 intermediate staging shipment sites 330 00:12:57,118 --> 00:12:59,118 before they're getting picked up by 331 00:12:59,118 --> 00:13:02,000 convoys and taken into Ukraine . So 332 00:13:02,000 --> 00:13:04,070 four days is pretty quick and like I 333 00:13:04,070 --> 00:13:06,126 said , there's already been a half a 334 00:13:06,126 --> 00:13:09,580 dozen or so on the way . And and we 335 00:13:09,580 --> 00:13:13,460 expect again without getting too 336 00:13:13,460 --> 00:13:15,516 predictive , we're gonna we're gonna 337 00:13:15,516 --> 00:13:17,571 get these materials in as fast as we 338 00:13:17,571 --> 00:13:19,793 can . Um It's it's happening as you and 339 00:13:19,793 --> 00:13:21,920 I are actually talking right now . Um 340 00:13:21,920 --> 00:13:24,130 and um we don't think it's going to 341 00:13:24,130 --> 00:13:27,600 take very long to complete The $800 342 00:13:27,610 --> 00:13:29,721 package , getting it all filled out . 343 00:13:29,721 --> 00:13:31,943 We really don't think that's gonna take 344 00:13:31,943 --> 00:13:33,721 long at all , a couple of weeks 345 00:13:33,721 --> 00:13:36,810 probably . Um , and the other question 346 00:13:36,810 --> 00:13:38,977 you had was on the , what's in there . 347 00:13:38,977 --> 00:13:42,800 So , uh , every shipment is 348 00:13:42,810 --> 00:13:46,550 a mixture of weapons systems and 349 00:13:46,550 --> 00:13:49,110 then support and sustainment items , 350 00:13:49,110 --> 00:13:52,970 whether that's food , body armor , 351 00:13:52,980 --> 00:13:55,650 helmets , small arms and ammunition , 352 00:13:55,890 --> 00:13:58,110 medical and first aid kits , all of 353 00:13:58,110 --> 00:13:59,980 that . They , there's a , every 354 00:13:59,980 --> 00:14:02,202 shipment is different . I couldn't tell 355 00:14:02,202 --> 00:14:04,230 you and I'm not going to , I'm not 356 00:14:04,230 --> 00:14:06,410 gonna , you know , tell you that that 357 00:14:06,420 --> 00:14:08,587 every single shipment has all of those 358 00:14:08,587 --> 00:14:10,753 things in . But in typically there's a 359 00:14:10,753 --> 00:14:12,698 mixture of what goes in with every 360 00:14:12,698 --> 00:14:14,698 shipment . It's not just all like , 361 00:14:14,698 --> 00:14:16,976 it's not all javelins and nothing else . 362 00:14:16,976 --> 00:14:19,087 But in these first half a dozen or so 363 00:14:19,087 --> 00:14:20,976 there have been , there have been 364 00:14:20,976 --> 00:14:22,864 weapons systems , There have been 365 00:14:22,864 --> 00:14:22,800 javelins , There have been stingers 366 00:14:23,040 --> 00:14:25,850 that have gone in as well as uh , 367 00:14:25,860 --> 00:14:28,080 medical supplies and body armor and 368 00:14:28,080 --> 00:14:30,191 small arms and ammunition . So look , 369 00:14:30,191 --> 00:14:33,650 jen um , we appreciate and respect 370 00:14:34,440 --> 00:14:36,662 that the Ukrainians want this stuff and 371 00:14:36,662 --> 00:14:38,607 they want it . Like yesterday , we 372 00:14:38,607 --> 00:14:40,773 understand that we know time is not on 373 00:14:40,773 --> 00:14:42,996 their side . We don't think it's on our 374 00:14:42,996 --> 00:14:44,829 side either , which is why we're 375 00:14:44,829 --> 00:14:46,884 working really , really hard . And I 376 00:14:46,884 --> 00:14:49,051 mean , I've been dealing with security 377 00:14:49,051 --> 00:14:51,273 assistance issues since when I had this 378 00:14:51,273 --> 00:14:53,551 podium under a previous administration . 379 00:14:53,551 --> 00:14:55,440 I've never seen the Department of 380 00:14:55,440 --> 00:14:57,662 Defense be able to move with this sense 381 00:14:57,662 --> 00:14:59,884 of alacrity and speed as I have in just 382 00:14:59,884 --> 00:15:01,940 the last few weeks . If you have any 383 00:15:01,940 --> 00:15:03,773 estimate of how many javelins or 384 00:15:03,773 --> 00:15:05,840 stingers have ended up in Russian or 385 00:15:05,840 --> 00:15:09,310 Chechen hands . I don't , I don't think 386 00:15:09,310 --> 00:15:11,421 we have any indication that that that 387 00:15:11,421 --> 00:15:14,740 that's happened on the on site 388 00:15:14,750 --> 00:15:17,450 evaluation report . There's a line in 389 00:15:17,450 --> 00:15:19,228 some of the materials that were 390 00:15:19,228 --> 00:15:21,450 distributed to reporters that says that 391 00:15:21,450 --> 00:15:23,617 the department basically considers its 392 00:15:23,617 --> 00:15:25,728 prevention program for sexual assault 393 00:15:25,728 --> 00:15:27,783 in the early development stage . Was 394 00:15:27,783 --> 00:15:31,040 that shocking to The secretary or 395 00:15:31,040 --> 00:15:33,900 anybody else to learn that 17 years 396 00:15:33,900 --> 00:15:35,844 since the support office was first 397 00:15:35,844 --> 00:15:38,350 stood up , that prevention prevention 398 00:15:38,380 --> 00:15:41,110 infrastructure and understanding in the 399 00:15:41,110 --> 00:15:43,221 military is still considered an early 400 00:15:43,221 --> 00:15:45,388 development . What I would tell you is 401 00:15:45,388 --> 00:15:47,760 this secretaries not 402 00:15:48,840 --> 00:15:52,210 comfortable that we haven't 403 00:15:52,530 --> 00:15:56,090 done as good a job on prevention as we 404 00:15:56,090 --> 00:15:58,201 should have done . And what he really 405 00:15:58,201 --> 00:16:00,550 appreciated about this report was how 406 00:16:00,560 --> 00:16:03,410 candid it was about how much more work 407 00:16:03,410 --> 00:16:06,770 we have to do . Um , So , um , 408 00:16:06,780 --> 00:16:09,300 I I think he would absolutely espouse 409 00:16:09,300 --> 00:16:11,600 that line , the fact that that we don't 410 00:16:11,610 --> 00:16:14,950 have prevention organized and resourced 411 00:16:14,950 --> 00:16:16,950 the way it needs to be . Clearly we 412 00:16:16,950 --> 00:16:18,783 don't Megan because you know for 413 00:16:18,783 --> 00:16:21,006 yourself how high the numbers now still 414 00:16:21,006 --> 00:16:24,950 are . Um , 20,000 incidents In 2020 I 415 00:16:24,950 --> 00:16:28,190 think was the number that's , that's 416 00:16:28,190 --> 00:16:31,890 just way too high . And so um , we're 417 00:16:31,900 --> 00:16:34,170 one of the reasons we wanted to to do 418 00:16:34,170 --> 00:16:36,570 this again . This was a recommendation 419 00:16:36,570 --> 00:16:39,050 by the IRC and a good one was to give 420 00:16:39,050 --> 00:16:41,130 us a more tactile feel of what it's 421 00:16:41,130 --> 00:16:43,297 like because you can have You can have 422 00:16:43,297 --> 00:16:45,241 the best prevention program at the 423 00:16:45,241 --> 00:16:46,797 corporate level here at the 424 00:16:46,797 --> 00:16:48,852 headquarters level . But unless it's 425 00:16:48,852 --> 00:16:51,074 being acted on and executed and locally 426 00:16:51,074 --> 00:16:54,960 adopted then it's it's much no 427 00:16:54,970 --> 00:16:57,081 no better than the paper it's written 428 00:16:57,081 --> 00:16:59,137 on . And so clearly we learned a lot 429 00:16:59,137 --> 00:17:01,359 from these 1st 20 sites . I think we're 430 00:17:01,359 --> 00:17:03,414 gonna learn a lot from the ones that 431 00:17:03,414 --> 00:17:05,470 that come . But the secretary is not 432 00:17:05,470 --> 00:17:07,692 resting on any laurels . He's not happy 433 00:17:07,692 --> 00:17:09,859 that that we haven't gotten prevention 434 00:17:09,859 --> 00:17:12,081 better organized and better resourced . 435 00:17:12,081 --> 00:17:11,960 And uh and he's committed to doing that 436 00:17:13,490 --> 00:17:15,268 captain . I'd like to follow up 437 00:17:15,268 --> 00:17:17,379 question and have a second question . 438 00:17:17,620 --> 00:17:19,787 My second question deals with the rand 439 00:17:19,787 --> 00:17:21,509 report specifically . But more 440 00:17:21,509 --> 00:17:23,731 generally , excuse me more generally is 441 00:17:23,731 --> 00:17:25,953 their essential lessons learned area of 442 00:17:25,953 --> 00:17:27,920 pentagon . We always hear you know 443 00:17:27,920 --> 00:17:30,960 after like the kabul incident and other 444 00:17:30,960 --> 00:17:32,920 incidents that there's a lessons 445 00:17:32,920 --> 00:17:35,590 learned done . Is there actually a 446 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:37,767 repository for these lessons learned ? 447 00:17:37,767 --> 00:17:39,933 So somebody can go and read the lesson 448 00:17:39,933 --> 00:17:43,620 for him . Well um what's 449 00:17:43,620 --> 00:17:46,280 typically done is by geographic region 450 00:17:46,280 --> 00:17:48,169 or combatant command or sometimes 451 00:17:48,169 --> 00:17:51,090 service specific . Um uh There are 452 00:17:51,100 --> 00:17:53,322 there have been lessons learned . There 453 00:17:53,322 --> 00:17:55,544 have been after action reports done now 454 00:17:55,544 --> 00:17:57,544 that you know we just wrapped up 20 455 00:17:57,544 --> 00:17:59,544 years of war so there are plenty of 456 00:17:59,544 --> 00:18:02,130 documents for us to consult and look at . 457 00:18:02,140 --> 00:18:04,370 Um And some of them reside here in D . 458 00:18:04,370 --> 00:18:06,592 C . Some of them were down in Tampa you 459 00:18:06,592 --> 00:18:08,703 know they're they're scattered around 460 00:18:08,703 --> 00:18:10,759 depending on depending on what level 461 00:18:10,759 --> 00:18:12,926 they were written but tom uh as I said 462 00:18:12,926 --> 00:18:15,680 at the opening uh he is now put into 463 00:18:15,690 --> 00:18:19,060 into place a civilian harm and 464 00:18:19,060 --> 00:18:21,790 mitigation response program here at the 465 00:18:21,790 --> 00:18:23,790 corporate level at the headquarters 466 00:18:23,790 --> 00:18:25,790 level uh to be led by the Assistant 467 00:18:25,790 --> 00:18:27,623 Secretary of Defense for Special 468 00:18:27,623 --> 00:18:29,679 special operations and low intensity 469 00:18:29,679 --> 00:18:31,846 conflict chris Mayer . So . No no no I 470 00:18:31,846 --> 00:18:33,957 know . So so Chris is going to take a 471 00:18:33,957 --> 00:18:35,957 hard look at , Obviously he's gonna 472 00:18:35,957 --> 00:18:38,068 learn from this rand report . Uh He's 473 00:18:38,068 --> 00:18:40,560 already gone through it . Um But but 474 00:18:40,570 --> 00:18:43,490 but he's leading up a team that that's 475 00:18:43,490 --> 00:18:45,712 going to come up with a more thoughtful 476 00:18:45,712 --> 00:18:47,379 approach to civilian harm and 477 00:18:47,379 --> 00:18:49,601 mitigation based on the lessons learned 478 00:18:49,601 --> 00:18:51,870 that from even just you know , this 479 00:18:51,870 --> 00:18:55,560 year's events and the successful 480 00:18:55,560 --> 00:18:57,990 mission in Syria that we talked about . 481 00:18:58,120 --> 00:19:00,250 He told us , you know how President 482 00:19:00,250 --> 00:19:02,417 biden wanted to make sure there was no 483 00:19:02,417 --> 00:19:04,639 civilians harmed etcetera . That's part 484 00:19:04,639 --> 00:19:06,417 of the lessons learned that you 485 00:19:06,417 --> 00:19:08,583 indicated from the podium . And that's 486 00:19:08,583 --> 00:19:10,806 so when chris and his team go to do the 487 00:19:10,806 --> 00:19:10,070 study , they know where to go to get 488 00:19:10,080 --> 00:19:13,020 these absolutely does . And if it's not 489 00:19:13,020 --> 00:19:15,020 something he can get his hands on , 490 00:19:15,020 --> 00:19:17,353 believe me , he can get his hands on it . 491 00:19:17,353 --> 00:19:19,409 Um We're gonna we're gonna be as the 492 00:19:19,409 --> 00:19:21,631 secretary has directed us to be as open 493 00:19:21,631 --> 00:19:23,853 minded . Um And as curious as we can be 494 00:19:23,853 --> 00:19:27,140 to try to get better at this , uh we 495 00:19:27,140 --> 00:19:29,196 still , you know , no other military 496 00:19:29,196 --> 00:19:31,470 works as hard as we do to mitigate 497 00:19:31,470 --> 00:19:33,692 civilian harm and yet we still cause it 498 00:19:34,410 --> 00:19:36,310 and we're going to be nothing but 499 00:19:36,310 --> 00:19:38,477 honest about that . And we're going to 500 00:19:38,477 --> 00:19:40,643 continue to try to learn from , from , 501 00:19:40,643 --> 00:19:43,210 from past issues on this question about 502 00:19:43,220 --> 00:19:45,160 the training , she asked you 503 00:19:45,170 --> 00:19:47,380 specifically ruled out and you said 504 00:19:47,380 --> 00:19:50,960 earlier this week , it's not training 505 00:19:51,440 --> 00:19:53,551 in the classic sense that what people 506 00:19:53,551 --> 00:19:55,662 would think this is , you're speaking 507 00:19:55,662 --> 00:19:57,607 from the podium when we were asked 508 00:19:57,607 --> 00:19:59,773 about the possible training of Ukraine 509 00:19:59,773 --> 00:20:01,884 Ukrainians by US forces . And he also 510 00:20:01,884 --> 00:20:03,940 referred this word liaison , which I 511 00:20:03,940 --> 00:20:06,051 found is an interesting word to use , 512 00:20:06,240 --> 00:20:08,351 you know , the classic definitions of 513 00:20:08,351 --> 00:20:10,407 liaison , our communications between 514 00:20:10,407 --> 00:20:12,190 people or in a culinary sense 515 00:20:12,300 --> 00:20:14,411 thickening of a product which I don't 516 00:20:14,411 --> 00:20:16,467 think you're referring to . So could 517 00:20:16,467 --> 00:20:19,370 you drill down a little bit on , is 518 00:20:19,370 --> 00:20:21,481 there no outright training ? And what 519 00:20:21,481 --> 00:20:23,592 do you mean training in the classical 520 00:20:23,592 --> 00:20:25,426 sense that people think is there 521 00:20:25,426 --> 00:20:27,259 something else going on ? People 522 00:20:27,259 --> 00:20:29,426 wouldn't think about ? No , I mean , I 523 00:20:29,426 --> 00:20:29,040 don't know that I can improve upon my 524 00:20:29,040 --> 00:20:32,720 answer to gen uh , we are 525 00:20:32,730 --> 00:20:36,620 having interactions on occasion with 526 00:20:36,630 --> 00:20:39,780 Ukrainian troops that that momentarily 527 00:20:39,780 --> 00:20:41,891 have to come temporarily have to come 528 00:20:41,891 --> 00:20:43,613 into Poland for the purpose of 529 00:20:43,613 --> 00:20:45,280 transshipment of the security 530 00:20:45,280 --> 00:20:47,391 assistance . And there's some liaison 531 00:20:47,391 --> 00:20:49,890 going on there , but it's it's not , as 532 00:20:49,890 --> 00:20:52,168 I said to her , it's not or and to you , 533 00:20:52,168 --> 00:20:54,334 it's not classic training in the sense 534 00:20:54,334 --> 00:20:56,557 that , you know , that that I think you 535 00:20:56,557 --> 00:20:58,560 and I think about it . Um , but but 536 00:20:58,560 --> 00:21:00,680 these liaisons are are are happening 537 00:21:00,680 --> 00:21:02,569 and they're happening at a fairly 538 00:21:02,569 --> 00:21:04,791 frequent level , I would remind , and I 539 00:21:04,791 --> 00:21:07,124 know I know why the questions coming up , 540 00:21:07,124 --> 00:21:09,013 but I mean , we did we did have a 541 00:21:09,013 --> 00:21:11,236 training mission in Ukraine that we had 542 00:21:11,236 --> 00:21:13,458 to suspend because of the invasion . We 543 00:21:13,458 --> 00:21:15,624 had florida National Guard troops that 544 00:21:15,624 --> 00:21:17,847 were there not far from levy that we're 545 00:21:17,847 --> 00:21:20,030 doing training and and um , you know , 546 00:21:20,030 --> 00:21:22,380 we we would love nothing better than to 547 00:21:22,390 --> 00:21:24,557 than to get back to that . But clearly 548 00:21:24,557 --> 00:21:26,557 that's that that's uh that's not an 549 00:21:26,557 --> 00:21:29,200 option right now , that you didn't ask 550 00:21:29,200 --> 00:21:31,033 this , but I'm going to take the 551 00:21:31,033 --> 00:21:33,200 opportunity anyway , that , you know , 552 00:21:33,200 --> 00:21:35,256 as we talk about security assistance 553 00:21:35,256 --> 00:21:37,256 and and we're doing a lot and we're 554 00:21:37,256 --> 00:21:39,600 doing a lot faster . And and I and I 555 00:21:39,600 --> 00:21:42,610 understand the focus and the interest 556 00:21:42,610 --> 00:21:45,840 in the actual items being sent and 557 00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:48,640 being used . I totally get that , but I 558 00:21:48,650 --> 00:21:51,360 just hope we don't forget that it's not 559 00:21:51,360 --> 00:21:53,304 just the stuff that matters , it's 560 00:21:53,304 --> 00:21:55,304 their ability to use this stuff and 561 00:21:55,304 --> 00:21:57,670 that didn't happen by accident . Eight 562 00:21:57,670 --> 00:22:00,550 years of training of Ukrainian armed 563 00:22:00,550 --> 00:22:02,790 forces has made an enormous difference 564 00:22:02,800 --> 00:22:04,744 in their battlefield competency in 565 00:22:04,744 --> 00:22:07,130 their capability . Uh and and that 566 00:22:07,130 --> 00:22:09,650 wasn't just the United States , UK , 567 00:22:09,660 --> 00:22:11,660 the Canadians and other allies were 568 00:22:11,660 --> 00:22:14,110 also involved in that , so that when 569 00:22:14,110 --> 00:22:16,600 these things are arriving , they're 570 00:22:16,600 --> 00:22:18,822 able to get into the hands of Ukrainian 571 00:22:18,822 --> 00:22:20,878 armed forces and they're able to use 572 00:22:20,878 --> 00:22:22,933 them in fairly short order . Again , 573 00:22:22,933 --> 00:22:25,044 that's not an accident that prowess , 574 00:22:25,044 --> 00:22:27,267 that , that , that agility that we were 575 00:22:27,267 --> 00:22:29,267 talking about earlier . Uh , that , 576 00:22:29,267 --> 00:22:31,489 that very much is was by design because 577 00:22:31,489 --> 00:22:33,711 of eight years of very quality training 578 00:22:33,711 --> 00:22:35,878 that they received statements that you 579 00:22:35,878 --> 00:22:37,822 just made . There is probably what 580 00:22:37,822 --> 00:22:39,656 fuels the idea that there's some 581 00:22:39,656 --> 00:22:41,767 training going on . Only because some 582 00:22:41,767 --> 00:22:43,656 of these weapons and supplies are 583 00:22:43,656 --> 00:22:45,822 relatively new to the Ukrainians . And 584 00:22:45,822 --> 00:22:45,720 your testimony up there , as you would 585 00:22:45,720 --> 00:22:47,776 say , eight years of training by the 586 00:22:47,776 --> 00:22:49,998 United States and other countries gives 587 00:22:49,998 --> 00:22:51,942 them this prowess , gives them the 588 00:22:51,942 --> 00:22:54,053 ability to stun the Russians . Yet on 589 00:22:54,053 --> 00:22:56,276 newer weapons they may not have been so 590 00:22:56,276 --> 00:22:58,442 familiar with . How could they achieve 591 00:22:58,442 --> 00:22:58,000 that thing ? I'm just saying that 592 00:22:58,010 --> 00:22:59,843 suggests the fact that someone , 593 00:22:59,843 --> 00:23:02,070 somewhere along the line , I can't 594 00:23:02,070 --> 00:23:04,014 improve upon my answer . There's , 595 00:23:04,014 --> 00:23:06,181 there's no , there's no training right 596 00:23:06,181 --> 00:23:08,237 now in the , in the , in the classic 597 00:23:08,237 --> 00:23:12,090 sense . Thank you , john , um , with , 598 00:23:12,100 --> 00:23:14,044 with everything that you mentioned 599 00:23:14,044 --> 00:23:15,933 about the Russian troops movement 600 00:23:15,933 --> 00:23:18,910 around here , The , the department 601 00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:22,600 detect any de escalation on the side of 602 00:23:22,600 --> 00:23:24,890 the Russian troops and around Kiev in 603 00:23:24,890 --> 00:23:28,530 Ukraine in general . And then what do 604 00:23:28,530 --> 00:23:30,641 you mean by de escalation , what they 605 00:23:30,641 --> 00:23:32,586 said , there's going to be some de 606 00:23:32,586 --> 00:23:35,110 escalation and the operations and what 607 00:23:35,110 --> 00:23:36,999 they call the escalation , I call 608 00:23:36,999 --> 00:23:39,090 repositioning that they had already 609 00:23:39,090 --> 00:23:42,100 been in a defensive posture before they 610 00:23:42,100 --> 00:23:46,010 began to reposition . Uh , and 611 00:23:46,010 --> 00:23:48,810 as far as we can tell , the forces that 612 00:23:48,810 --> 00:23:51,080 remain around Kiev are still largely in 613 00:23:51,080 --> 00:23:52,980 defensive positions . In terms of 614 00:23:52,990 --> 00:23:55,710 military operations targeting the city 615 00:23:55,710 --> 00:23:58,100 itself , they are from the air . I mean 616 00:23:58,100 --> 00:24:00,300 the key is still a central focus of 617 00:24:00,300 --> 00:24:03,180 their airstrikes . And you credited the 618 00:24:03,190 --> 00:24:06,150 Ukrainian forces with with their 619 00:24:06,150 --> 00:24:09,940 agility and stopping not only the uh , 620 00:24:09,950 --> 00:24:12,630 that convoy , but basically it seems 621 00:24:12,630 --> 00:24:14,574 like they were able to thwart this 622 00:24:14,574 --> 00:24:16,686 offensive . Russian offensive to take 623 00:24:16,686 --> 00:24:19,810 give should the pentagon as well be 624 00:24:19,810 --> 00:24:23,190 credited with any advisory role on the 625 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:25,311 operational level with the Ukrainians 626 00:24:25,311 --> 00:24:27,422 throughout this war . You said , like 627 00:24:27,422 --> 00:24:29,478 for eight years , of course , the US 628 00:24:29,478 --> 00:24:31,756 played a role in training these forces . 629 00:24:31,756 --> 00:24:34,190 The pentagon played any role not only 630 00:24:34,190 --> 00:24:36,460 in supplying the weapons , but play any 631 00:24:36,470 --> 00:24:39,850 um advisory role in the operational 632 00:24:39,850 --> 00:24:42,520 sense of how to basically deal with 633 00:24:42,530 --> 00:24:44,670 this . We don't , we don't have 634 00:24:44,670 --> 00:24:46,840 trainers on the ground in Ukraine were 635 00:24:46,840 --> 00:24:50,020 not doing tactical level , 636 00:24:50,030 --> 00:24:53,020 you know , advise and assist , which is 637 00:24:53,020 --> 00:24:56,170 what I think you're getting at . But we 638 00:24:56,170 --> 00:24:59,170 have said for a while now we , to the 639 00:24:59,170 --> 00:25:01,226 degree we can provide the Ukrainians 640 00:25:01,226 --> 00:25:03,281 information that's useful to them in 641 00:25:03,281 --> 00:25:05,430 the fight . We're providing that I 642 00:25:05,430 --> 00:25:07,319 think that's about the best I can 643 00:25:07,319 --> 00:25:09,870 answer your question , a question from 644 00:25:09,870 --> 00:25:12,092 one of our colleagues who was unable to 645 00:25:12,092 --> 00:25:15,360 dial in . So they found a 646 00:25:15,360 --> 00:25:18,770 workaround . Uh it's a very typical 647 00:25:18,770 --> 00:25:20,826 practice , The White House often did 648 00:25:20,826 --> 00:25:23,048 that during covid people would email to 649 00:25:23,048 --> 00:25:26,840 other colleagues . Um So this person 650 00:25:26,850 --> 00:25:29,660 who shall go unnamed , um I would like 651 00:25:29,660 --> 00:25:32,620 to know uh the Russian announcement and 652 00:25:32,620 --> 00:25:34,453 then I have a question about the 653 00:25:34,453 --> 00:25:37,080 134,000 conscripts , What do you make 654 00:25:37,080 --> 00:25:39,770 of that ? Do you believe the Russians 655 00:25:39,770 --> 00:25:42,100 when they say these conscripts won't go 656 00:25:42,100 --> 00:25:44,322 into Ukraine ? It's a routine call up . 657 00:25:44,322 --> 00:25:46,322 Do you believe they're going to get 658 00:25:46,322 --> 00:25:48,322 mobilized and that the Russians are 659 00:25:48,322 --> 00:25:50,990 going to have to rely on them in the 660 00:25:50,990 --> 00:25:52,879 coming weeks ? And the question I 661 00:25:52,879 --> 00:25:55,101 wanted to ask you , can you bring us up 662 00:25:55,101 --> 00:25:58,780 to date on any plan or thoughts you 663 00:25:58,780 --> 00:26:01,440 have , the department has about the 664 00:26:01,440 --> 00:26:04,860 need to establish either a rotational 665 00:26:04,860 --> 00:26:06,860 or extension program for the troops 666 00:26:06,860 --> 00:26:09,082 you've sent while some some of them are 667 00:26:09,082 --> 00:26:12,270 quite recently , there there's every 668 00:26:12,270 --> 00:26:14,492 reason to think you're going to have to 669 00:26:14,492 --> 00:26:16,659 eventually rotate or extend some units 670 00:26:17,740 --> 00:26:19,962 on the conscripts . I mean , we've seen 671 00:26:19,962 --> 00:26:22,129 noted that the Ministry of Defense has 672 00:26:22,129 --> 00:26:25,080 claimed Uh that these conscripts that 673 00:26:25,090 --> 00:26:27,020 the President Putin Putin has now 674 00:26:27,020 --> 00:26:30,270 called up 134,000 or so . 675 00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:32,850 Um they've claimed that they're not 676 00:26:32,850 --> 00:26:35,760 going to be sent into Ukraine to fight . 677 00:26:36,340 --> 00:26:39,720 We'll see um we've 678 00:26:39,720 --> 00:26:43,600 also seen Russia reject the deployment 679 00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:45,630 of conscripts in Ukraine totally 680 00:26:45,630 --> 00:26:48,320 outright saying , you know , it wasn't 681 00:26:48,320 --> 00:26:51,610 happening only to then have to 682 00:26:52,140 --> 00:26:55,150 publicly acknowledge that after it was 683 00:26:55,150 --> 00:26:58,010 revealed by journalists that they were 684 00:26:58,010 --> 00:27:00,730 in fact they're so I don't think you 685 00:27:00,730 --> 00:27:02,897 can take anything from the Ministry of 686 00:27:02,897 --> 00:27:06,480 Defense at face value . Uh So we'll 687 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:09,860 see , we know that and we've talked 688 00:27:09,860 --> 00:27:12,082 about this before . Barb , that that in 689 00:27:12,082 --> 00:27:15,560 those early days it was a 690 00:27:15,570 --> 00:27:17,792 significant amount of their forces were 691 00:27:17,792 --> 00:27:20,980 conscripts . Um and we have indications 692 00:27:20,980 --> 00:27:23,091 that many of them were simply lied to 693 00:27:23,091 --> 00:27:25,147 about what they were doing . Some of 694 00:27:25,147 --> 00:27:24,760 them thought they were going on a 695 00:27:24,760 --> 00:27:27,040 training exercise . We weren't told 696 00:27:27,040 --> 00:27:28,984 that they were actually going into 697 00:27:28,984 --> 00:27:31,380 combat into war . Um and of course 698 00:27:33,340 --> 00:27:37,260 that sense of disillusionment and their 699 00:27:37,260 --> 00:27:39,482 lack of proper training and preparation 700 00:27:39,482 --> 00:27:42,080 led to uh some disastrous consequences 701 00:27:42,080 --> 00:27:44,302 for some of these early Russian units . 702 00:27:44,302 --> 00:27:46,469 So again , we'll we'll see , We'll see 703 00:27:46,469 --> 00:27:48,680 where this goes , we'll watch , we'll 704 00:27:48,680 --> 00:27:50,847 try to do the best weekend to verify . 705 00:27:50,847 --> 00:27:53,013 We're not gonna take it face value and 706 00:27:53,013 --> 00:27:55,520 on the extension or extensions or 707 00:27:55,530 --> 00:27:58,180 rotations . I think the Secretary wants 708 00:27:58,180 --> 00:28:01,160 to keep his options open . Barb . Um uh 709 00:28:02,020 --> 00:28:04,500 the additional deployments that we've 710 00:28:04,500 --> 00:28:08,340 sent now somewhere on the order of just 711 00:28:08,340 --> 00:28:12,200 under 20,000 or so , uh troops 712 00:28:12,210 --> 00:28:14,510 to europe . Uh these are on temporary 713 00:28:14,510 --> 00:28:17,080 orders , uh you know , will will take 714 00:28:17,080 --> 00:28:20,760 each one as it comes and uh the 715 00:28:20,770 --> 00:28:22,990 Secretary will decide whether that 716 00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:25,390 capability needs to stay yes or no . 717 00:28:25,390 --> 00:28:27,501 And then if it does , does it need to 718 00:28:27,501 --> 00:28:29,557 be that unit or do we need to rotate 719 00:28:29,557 --> 00:28:32,770 that unit out thus far ? Nobody has 720 00:28:32,770 --> 00:28:34,770 been rotated out everybody that the 721 00:28:34,770 --> 00:28:36,992 secretary has ordered in uh is going to 722 00:28:36,992 --> 00:28:39,490 stay in . Um and we've talked about the 723 00:28:39,490 --> 00:28:41,601 82nd Airborne for instance , and some 724 00:28:41,601 --> 00:28:44,030 of their enablers , they are still uh 725 00:28:44,040 --> 00:28:46,151 there . Um and the Secretary has made 726 00:28:46,151 --> 00:28:48,207 no decisions about their departure . 727 00:28:48,460 --> 00:28:51,060 The carrier strike group Harry S Truman 728 00:28:51,440 --> 00:28:53,496 uh is still in the mediterranean and 729 00:28:53,496 --> 00:28:55,607 we'll stay in the mediterranean until 730 00:28:55,607 --> 00:28:57,829 the secretary decides that it's uh it's 731 00:28:57,829 --> 00:29:00,350 time for the ship to uh to rotate out 732 00:29:00,350 --> 00:29:02,239 now with a carrier strike group , 733 00:29:02,239 --> 00:29:04,350 obviously you've got refit and refuel 734 00:29:04,350 --> 00:29:06,461 and maintenance that has to go on the 735 00:29:06,461 --> 00:29:06,450 back end of the deployment , so so 736 00:29:06,450 --> 00:29:09,670 we'll factor that all in there . But 737 00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:13,060 I think what we're trying to be 738 00:29:13,440 --> 00:29:16,190 careful of , it's sort of hard ending 739 00:29:16,190 --> 00:29:18,246 dates on these temporary deployments 740 00:29:18,246 --> 00:29:20,357 because we want to be able to monitor 741 00:29:20,357 --> 00:29:22,412 the situation on the ground and make 742 00:29:22,412 --> 00:29:24,634 the best and most flexible decisions in 743 00:29:24,634 --> 00:29:24,190 real time . Okay , I'm sorry , I don't 744 00:29:24,200 --> 00:29:26,256 get it because I mean , are you just 745 00:29:26,256 --> 00:29:29,450 saying you're gonna I know you're not 746 00:29:29,460 --> 00:29:31,571 exactly saying you're just gonna bust 747 00:29:31,571 --> 00:29:34,280 deployment . Uh No , no , no , no , no , 748 00:29:34,280 --> 00:29:37,980 we're gonna we're gonna we're of 749 00:29:37,980 --> 00:29:40,250 course , of course , absolutely , the 750 00:29:40,250 --> 00:29:42,370 secretary is leaving his options open 751 00:29:42,380 --> 00:29:45,310 and look barb , I mean , nobody knows 752 00:29:45,310 --> 00:29:47,820 how long the need is gonna be there , 753 00:29:47,820 --> 00:29:51,650 The acute need for uh these deterrence 754 00:29:51,950 --> 00:29:53,950 and defense capabilities because we 755 00:29:53,950 --> 00:29:56,540 don't know how long uh this war in 756 00:29:56,540 --> 00:29:58,790 Ukraine is gonna last . So I think it 757 00:29:58,790 --> 00:30:01,290 follows just normal reason that at at 758 00:30:01,290 --> 00:30:03,630 some point if if the length of time 759 00:30:03,630 --> 00:30:05,930 gets to a point where commanders on the 760 00:30:05,930 --> 00:30:08,041 ground recommend that they swap these 761 00:30:08,041 --> 00:30:09,763 units out , the Secretary will 762 00:30:09,763 --> 00:30:12,030 certainly be open to that . Um and and 763 00:30:12,040 --> 00:30:15,680 it may be like you remove a capability 764 00:30:16,740 --> 00:30:18,962 because it's not only time to send that 765 00:30:18,962 --> 00:30:21,018 capability back , but maybe you just 766 00:30:21,018 --> 00:30:23,240 don't need it as much anymore and maybe 767 00:30:23,240 --> 00:30:24,962 what goes forward is something 768 00:30:24,962 --> 00:30:27,073 completely different or maybe nothing 769 00:30:27,073 --> 00:30:29,184 at all . I mean I think it's going to 770 00:30:29,184 --> 00:30:31,296 be very flexible and we'll be as open 771 00:30:31,296 --> 00:30:33,407 with you as we can about what's going 772 00:30:33,407 --> 00:30:35,573 in . But you you've noticed , I'm sure 773 00:30:35,573 --> 00:30:37,518 that we're not giving you hard end 774 00:30:37,518 --> 00:30:39,573 dates because because we're watching 775 00:30:39,573 --> 00:30:41,740 this in real time , it is about making 776 00:30:41,740 --> 00:30:43,851 sure that we are properly postured on 777 00:30:43,851 --> 00:30:46,073 the eastern flank of the alliance . And 778 00:30:46,073 --> 00:30:48,240 again , that's a that's a put and take 779 00:30:48,240 --> 00:30:50,184 that . The Secretary is looking at 780 00:30:50,184 --> 00:30:52,129 literally every day Carrier strike 781 00:30:52,129 --> 00:30:54,296 group you just mentioned , can you say 782 00:30:54,296 --> 00:30:56,490 who else is ? And I believe the army 783 00:30:56,490 --> 00:30:58,830 combat brigade , can you say who what 784 00:30:58,830 --> 00:31:00,774 other units are being extended ? I 785 00:31:00,774 --> 00:31:03,740 don't I don't have any other ones to 786 00:31:03,740 --> 00:31:05,851 speak to at this time . Those are the 787 00:31:05,851 --> 00:31:07,962 big muscle movements that we know are 788 00:31:07,962 --> 00:31:10,184 staying in place for right now . Um But 789 00:31:10,184 --> 00:31:12,351 I mean as you know , barb we have lots 790 00:31:12,351 --> 00:31:14,351 of small units enablers and I don't 791 00:31:14,351 --> 00:31:14,310 have , I don't have visibility on all 792 00:31:14,310 --> 00:31:17,980 of those there . They are not , 793 00:31:17,990 --> 00:31:20,580 they're not going anywhere anytime uh , 794 00:31:20,590 --> 00:31:22,812 in the immediate future . I just put it 795 00:31:22,812 --> 00:31:25,260 that way . Ah So , 796 00:31:26,340 --> 00:31:29,810 um Barbara's question , 797 00:31:30,130 --> 00:31:33,270 which one ? She asked a lot of 798 00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:37,270 about the length , there were no mine 799 00:31:38,140 --> 00:31:41,230 of the conflict . So I understand that 800 00:31:41,230 --> 00:31:44,020 the fact that the Russians refocus on 801 00:31:44,030 --> 00:31:47,730 uh columbus may extend the conflict 802 00:31:47,740 --> 00:31:51,160 because they will have to move and 803 00:31:51,170 --> 00:31:54,790 to uh to go into a very contested 804 00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:58,170 region . So how long do you think ? 805 00:31:58,240 --> 00:32:01,860 Think it could last month ? Years ? 806 00:32:02,540 --> 00:32:06,380 Hard to say it really is . Um the 807 00:32:06,380 --> 00:32:08,380 Ukrainians are fighting very , very 808 00:32:08,380 --> 00:32:11,750 well . Um and and the and the Russians 809 00:32:11,750 --> 00:32:15,300 are not , it's it would be 810 00:32:15,300 --> 00:32:17,640 foolish to try to predict exactly how 811 00:32:17,640 --> 00:32:21,210 long uh this could go clearly if in 812 00:32:21,210 --> 00:32:23,910 fact , they're gonna prioritize the 813 00:32:23,910 --> 00:32:26,710 Donbass region . If if what they say 814 00:32:26,710 --> 00:32:29,500 they're gonna do , they actually do um 815 00:32:29,500 --> 00:32:31,667 an area that they have now fought over 816 00:32:31,667 --> 00:32:33,778 for eight years , an area where there 817 00:32:33,778 --> 00:32:37,740 are many Ukrainian armed 818 00:32:37,740 --> 00:32:41,520 forces who are also very active . Um , 819 00:32:41,540 --> 00:32:45,350 this could drag on for a while . Uh it 820 00:32:45,350 --> 00:32:47,239 wouldn't , it might not just be a 821 00:32:47,239 --> 00:32:49,406 matter of days and weeks . It could be 822 00:32:49,406 --> 00:32:51,350 much longer than that , but Sylvia 823 00:32:51,350 --> 00:32:53,517 that's difficult to know . It's really 824 00:32:53,517 --> 00:32:55,683 difficult to know louis , he said that 825 00:32:55,683 --> 00:32:57,739 the secretary is keeping his options 826 00:32:57,739 --> 00:33:01,370 open about the presence , right ? Has 827 00:33:01,370 --> 00:33:05,220 he actually extended the carrier and 828 00:33:05,230 --> 00:33:07,560 the combat brigade and the 82nd because 829 00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:09,671 he said that they're not going home . 830 00:33:09,671 --> 00:33:12,200 And he has he has made , he reviews the 831 00:33:12,200 --> 00:33:15,110 posture Located every day and he has 832 00:33:15,110 --> 00:33:17,110 decided that he's going to keep the 833 00:33:17,110 --> 00:33:20,230 82nd there for a while longer . Uh And 834 00:33:20,230 --> 00:33:23,110 he has decided that uh that the the 835 00:33:23,110 --> 00:33:25,221 Harry S . Truman and her strike group 836 00:33:25,221 --> 00:33:27,554 will stay in the med for a while longer . 837 00:33:27,770 --> 00:33:31,490 The armored combat brigade there right 838 00:33:31,490 --> 00:33:33,601 now , those are the those are the two 839 00:33:33,601 --> 00:33:35,712 big muscle movements and the enablers 840 00:33:35,712 --> 00:33:37,601 that went with the 82nd also . Uh 841 00:33:37,601 --> 00:33:39,601 they're they're also staying as you 842 00:33:39,601 --> 00:33:41,379 might imagine . Um I don't have 843 00:33:41,379 --> 00:33:44,100 additional uh decisions to speak to 844 00:33:44,100 --> 00:33:47,110 today . Um uh But again , 845 00:33:49,240 --> 00:33:52,150 first of all , they have none of them 846 00:33:52,150 --> 00:33:55,340 have been there that long already . Uh 847 00:33:55,350 --> 00:33:57,628 It really hasn't been , it's been what , 848 00:33:57,628 --> 00:34:00,340 68 weeks in some cases . Um So it 849 00:34:00,340 --> 00:34:02,740 hasn't been that long . But again , 850 00:34:02,740 --> 00:34:04,962 he's gonna keep his options open , make 851 00:34:04,962 --> 00:34:07,610 decisions in consultations with the 852 00:34:07,620 --> 00:34:09,731 with the chairman and general Walters 853 00:34:09,731 --> 00:34:11,560 uh to make sure that that the 854 00:34:11,570 --> 00:34:13,570 deterrence and defense posture that 855 00:34:13,570 --> 00:34:15,810 we're we're trying to make sure it's in 856 00:34:15,810 --> 00:34:17,921 place on the eastern flank of NATO is 857 00:34:17,921 --> 00:34:20,490 preserved and that it's transparent and 858 00:34:20,490 --> 00:34:23,250 that that our allies and partners um 859 00:34:23,260 --> 00:34:26,780 also have a say in in what that posture 860 00:34:26,780 --> 00:34:29,002 looks like and that they're comfortable 861 00:34:29,002 --> 00:34:31,169 with the capabilities we have in their 862 00:34:31,169 --> 00:34:33,280 country or in their in their region . 863 00:34:33,280 --> 00:34:35,336 So again , well we'll do the best we 864 00:34:35,336 --> 00:34:37,510 can to to be as transparent with with 865 00:34:37,510 --> 00:34:39,566 you as well about that . But some of 866 00:34:39,566 --> 00:34:41,788 these units are fairly small and it's , 867 00:34:41,788 --> 00:34:43,732 you know , uh they may come and go 868 00:34:43,732 --> 00:34:46,050 based on whatever whatever the need is . 869 00:34:46,060 --> 00:34:48,700 Now , the more interesting question is , 870 00:34:48,700 --> 00:34:51,760 what does this look long term ? And so 871 00:34:51,940 --> 00:34:54,107 at the , at the right time , we'll sit 872 00:34:54,107 --> 00:34:56,051 down and we'll have those kinds of 873 00:34:56,051 --> 00:34:58,218 consultations with allies and partners 874 00:34:58,218 --> 00:34:57,940 to about what , what's the proper 875 00:34:57,950 --> 00:35:00,283 european posture here . Because clearly , 876 00:35:00,640 --> 00:35:02,862 no matter how this war ends , no matter 877 00:35:02,862 --> 00:35:05,084 when it ends , the security environment 878 00:35:05,084 --> 00:35:07,251 in europe is going to be different and 879 00:35:07,251 --> 00:35:09,362 we're gonna have to respond to that . 880 00:35:09,362 --> 00:35:11,696 So what that looks like , we don't know , 881 00:35:11,696 --> 00:35:10,720 but we're gonna stay open to having 882 00:35:10,720 --> 00:35:12,831 those kinds of conversations to about 883 00:35:12,831 --> 00:35:14,553 whether there needs to be more 884 00:35:14,553 --> 00:35:17,530 permanent , a larger permanent presence 885 00:35:17,540 --> 00:35:20,620 on the european continent . Tony one 886 00:35:20,630 --> 00:35:23,480 tactical 11 weapons question does the 887 00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:25,536 pentagon assess that at this point , 888 00:35:25,536 --> 00:35:27,810 the Russia's lack of air superiority , 889 00:35:27,820 --> 00:35:29,820 much less supremacy has been in the 890 00:35:29,820 --> 00:35:31,980 deciding factor in this conflict and 891 00:35:31,980 --> 00:35:33,813 that Ukrainian forces can attack 892 00:35:34,040 --> 00:35:37,440 Russian ground formations without any , 893 00:35:37,450 --> 00:35:39,617 without minimum , with minimal fear of 894 00:35:39,617 --> 00:35:42,430 being attacked by Russian aircraft . I 895 00:35:42,440 --> 00:35:44,329 don't think at this point , we're 896 00:35:44,329 --> 00:35:46,218 willing to say there's one factor 897 00:35:46,218 --> 00:35:48,218 that's been ultimately decisive . I 898 00:35:48,218 --> 00:35:51,400 think probably the most important 899 00:35:51,410 --> 00:35:55,010 decisive factor uh in Russia's failure 900 00:35:55,010 --> 00:35:57,290 thus far to achieve what they 901 00:35:57,300 --> 00:35:59,960 themselves said were their goals . And 902 00:35:59,970 --> 00:36:03,200 in terms of uh replacing the Zelinsky 903 00:36:03,200 --> 00:36:06,060 government occupying Ukraine removing 904 00:36:06,060 --> 00:36:08,116 their sovereignty , their failure to 905 00:36:08,116 --> 00:36:09,949 achieve that . The , the biggest 906 00:36:09,949 --> 00:36:11,838 decisive factor or the Ukrainians 907 00:36:11,838 --> 00:36:13,949 themselves and not just the Ukrainian 908 00:36:13,949 --> 00:36:13,850 armed forces , but the Ukrainian people , 909 00:36:14,230 --> 00:36:16,890 I would say that they get the lion's 910 00:36:16,890 --> 00:36:20,520 share of the credit here about about 911 00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:23,460 defeating the Russian strategic goals 912 00:36:23,470 --> 00:36:25,930 in the in the in the onset . I'm just 913 00:36:25,940 --> 00:36:28,273 giving them all the credit in the world . 914 00:36:28,273 --> 00:36:30,273 But the fact that they've contained 915 00:36:30,273 --> 00:36:32,329 this powerful Russian air force , it 916 00:36:32,329 --> 00:36:34,273 would seem to be a major factor in 917 00:36:34,273 --> 00:36:36,051 their success . I'm not I'm not 918 00:36:36,051 --> 00:36:38,107 suggesting it's not a major factor , 919 00:36:38,107 --> 00:36:40,329 but you asked me if it was the decisive 920 00:36:40,329 --> 00:36:42,440 factor and I think there's a lot that 921 00:36:42,440 --> 00:36:44,718 goes into that you rattle off stingers , 922 00:36:44,718 --> 00:36:46,940 javelins , you didn't mention those 100 923 00:36:46,940 --> 00:36:49,107 little drones that fixated the world's 924 00:36:49,107 --> 00:36:51,218 attention when they do arrive there , 925 00:36:51,218 --> 00:36:53,273 what will be their targets ? Because 926 00:36:53,273 --> 00:36:55,496 the version is going over there , don't 927 00:36:55,496 --> 00:36:57,440 have the Ukrainians to decide tank 928 00:36:57,440 --> 00:36:57,390 capability of those drones . I just 929 00:36:57,390 --> 00:36:59,446 want to get a sense from you , which 930 00:36:59,446 --> 00:37:01,557 I'm not going to get into targeting . 931 00:37:01,557 --> 00:37:05,350 Uh , we're providing the Ukrainians uh 932 00:37:05,930 --> 00:37:08,210 um systems and weapons that they can 933 00:37:08,210 --> 00:37:10,730 use to defend themselves and how they 934 00:37:10,740 --> 00:37:12,851 decide to use them where and when and 935 00:37:12,851 --> 00:37:15,018 against what targets that's really for 936 00:37:15,018 --> 00:37:16,907 them to speak to . And clearly it 937 00:37:16,907 --> 00:37:19,018 wouldn't be wise , even if I knew for 938 00:37:19,018 --> 00:37:20,962 me to talk about it here from this 939 00:37:20,962 --> 00:37:22,962 podium , they haven't arrived yet . 940 00:37:22,962 --> 00:37:25,240 Right . These switches , can I ask you , 941 00:37:25,240 --> 00:37:27,296 one of the civilian can minimize the 942 00:37:27,296 --> 00:37:28,962 civilian casualties . Part of 943 00:37:28,962 --> 00:37:31,129 minimizing it is fessing up and making 944 00:37:31,129 --> 00:37:33,351 good when you when you screw up like we 945 00:37:33,351 --> 00:37:35,518 did in Afghanistan killing that family 946 00:37:35,518 --> 00:37:37,629 in the air and drone attack . Can you 947 00:37:37,629 --> 00:37:39,684 take this for the record ? Have they 948 00:37:39,684 --> 00:37:41,907 been paying at the survivors then given 949 00:37:41,907 --> 00:37:43,962 any condolence payments ? But I know 950 00:37:43,962 --> 00:37:43,780 that was in the works . But you know , 951 00:37:43,780 --> 00:37:45,891 four months later , I haven't checked 952 00:37:45,891 --> 00:37:47,780 in a while . I will I'll take the 953 00:37:47,780 --> 00:37:50,002 question . I don't I don't believe that 954 00:37:50,002 --> 00:37:52,058 that's happened yet . I don't expect 955 00:37:52,058 --> 00:37:51,500 you to know off the top of your head . 956 00:37:51,500 --> 00:37:53,480 So thanks . Thank you . I have two 957 00:37:53,480 --> 00:37:55,536 questions . One for each side of the 958 00:37:55,536 --> 00:37:57,813 conflict . Now is the aim of the U . S . 959 00:37:57,813 --> 00:37:59,813 And the allied weapons transfers to 960 00:37:59,813 --> 00:38:02,230 help Ukraine win this war . And what a 961 00:38:02,230 --> 00:38:04,890 win entail pushing the Russians out of 962 00:38:04,890 --> 00:38:07,001 the Donbas region . Now for the other 963 00:38:07,001 --> 00:38:09,640 side is Belarus still providing help to 964 00:38:09,640 --> 00:38:11,760 the Russians or has lukashenko pulled 965 00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:14,200 back his support for Putin ? You mean , 966 00:38:14,200 --> 00:38:17,670 help us in providing a place from which 967 00:38:17,670 --> 00:38:19,781 the attack could have been launched ? 968 00:38:19,781 --> 00:38:23,410 Help us in providing refit and resupply . 969 00:38:23,420 --> 00:38:26,420 Should that be what the Russians do ? 970 00:38:26,430 --> 00:38:29,890 Help is in uh the the ability to have 971 00:38:29,900 --> 00:38:32,067 aircraft launch and take off from your 972 00:38:32,067 --> 00:38:34,220 territory . Help is in letting the 973 00:38:34,220 --> 00:38:36,100 Russians put surface air missile 974 00:38:36,100 --> 00:38:38,650 systems . Yeah , I think all of that's 975 00:38:38,650 --> 00:38:40,483 true . And that's for your first 976 00:38:40,483 --> 00:38:42,539 question , of course , look this war 977 00:38:42,539 --> 00:38:44,761 should have never happened in the first 978 00:38:44,761 --> 00:38:46,539 place . Um , but now that it is 979 00:38:46,539 --> 00:38:48,872 obviously we want the Ukrainians to win , 980 00:38:48,872 --> 00:38:51,039 why would we not be sending $2 billion 981 00:38:51,039 --> 00:38:52,983 worth of security assistance ? And 982 00:38:52,983 --> 00:38:55,094 that's just the United States ? If we 983 00:38:55,094 --> 00:38:55,040 didn't want them to win this war , if 984 00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:56,873 we didn't want them to get their 985 00:38:56,873 --> 00:38:58,818 country back to have every inch of 986 00:38:58,818 --> 00:39:00,810 their territory respected by their 987 00:39:00,810 --> 00:39:03,100 neighbors , including Russia . Yeah , 988 00:39:03,110 --> 00:39:06,010 absolutely . Real thank you 989 00:39:06,450 --> 00:39:10,150 china china and the Solomon Islands 990 00:39:10,160 --> 00:39:12,950 concluded the new security Solomon 991 00:39:12,960 --> 00:39:15,016 Islands , including the new security 992 00:39:15,016 --> 00:39:18,360 agreement earlier today . This argument 993 00:39:18,370 --> 00:39:21,310 is reportedly around chinese warships 994 00:39:21,320 --> 00:39:24,000 to visit the formal Ireland . So how 995 00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:26,130 much are you concerned about this new 996 00:39:26,130 --> 00:39:29,270 security deal ? And do you regard it as 997 00:39:29,270 --> 00:39:32,600 a chinese airport to undermine the free 998 00:39:32,600 --> 00:39:34,656 and open in the past week , I'll let 999 00:39:34,656 --> 00:39:36,822 the government of the supplement speak 1000 00:39:36,822 --> 00:39:39,660 to their relationship with with with 1001 00:39:39,660 --> 00:39:43,390 china . That's that's that's 1002 00:39:43,390 --> 00:39:46,710 really the appropriate place for for 1003 00:39:46,710 --> 00:39:50,300 comment about that . And I don't think 1004 00:39:50,310 --> 00:39:53,220 based on what little bit we know of of 1005 00:39:53,230 --> 00:39:56,810 of this , of this communication . Um , 1006 00:39:56,820 --> 00:40:00,130 it's too soon to know what China's long 1007 00:40:00,130 --> 00:40:02,410 term potential ambitions are here with 1008 00:40:02,410 --> 00:40:04,466 respect to that . So we'll let those 1009 00:40:04,466 --> 00:40:06,910 two nations speak to this Rio . But um 1010 00:40:06,920 --> 00:40:09,240 taking 10 steps back away from the 1011 00:40:09,240 --> 00:40:11,680 Solomon's . We have continued to see 1012 00:40:11,690 --> 00:40:15,660 China's outreach to be coercive 1013 00:40:15,670 --> 00:40:19,580 to be aggressive uh to uh . to 1014 00:40:19,580 --> 00:40:22,330 be clearly one sided towards china's 1015 00:40:22,340 --> 00:40:25,080 interests in the indo pacific region . 1016 00:40:25,090 --> 00:40:27,370 They're not only bully their neighbors 1017 00:40:27,380 --> 00:40:31,230 for ridiculous bogus territorial 1018 00:40:31,230 --> 00:40:33,286 claims , but they actually are , you 1019 00:40:33,286 --> 00:40:36,730 know , building basically uh 1020 00:40:38,510 --> 00:40:42,320 island aircraft carriers um in the in 1021 00:40:42,320 --> 00:40:45,670 the western pacific to uh to further 1022 00:40:45,670 --> 00:40:48,920 advance their own uh national security 1023 00:40:48,920 --> 00:40:51,560 goals which are inimical to so many 1024 00:40:51,560 --> 00:40:53,940 other nations there in the Asia pacific , 1025 00:40:54,800 --> 00:40:58,020 you have another beauty reach out to 1026 00:40:58,020 --> 00:41:01,520 the hormone island . There's a real do 1027 00:41:01,520 --> 00:41:03,353 the D . O . D . Reach out to the 1028 00:41:03,360 --> 00:41:06,190 Solomon Islands counterpart about this 1029 00:41:06,200 --> 00:41:08,550 new security ? I know I know of no 1030 00:41:08,550 --> 00:41:10,383 communication between us and the 1031 00:41:10,383 --> 00:41:12,383 Solomon islands . You might want to 1032 00:41:12,383 --> 00:41:12,330 check with the State Department though . 1033 00:41:12,710 --> 00:41:14,710 That's really a better question for 1034 00:41:14,710 --> 00:41:17,350 them . Chernobyl , can you say that 1035 00:41:17,360 --> 00:41:19,582 Chernobyl is still under the control of 1036 00:41:19,582 --> 00:41:21,710 Russians ? They have sent some forces 1037 00:41:21,710 --> 00:41:24,100 out . I all I can tell you is that 1038 00:41:24,100 --> 00:41:25,933 we've seen indications that some 1039 00:41:25,933 --> 00:41:29,120 Russian forces are leaving Chernobyl 1040 00:41:29,240 --> 00:41:31,860 who has custody of it right now ? I 1041 00:41:31,870 --> 00:41:33,537 don't think we're able to say 1042 00:41:33,537 --> 00:41:35,592 definitively and also on the nuclear 1043 00:41:35,592 --> 00:41:37,703 posture oppressions . Do you have any 1044 00:41:37,703 --> 00:41:39,759 indication that they changed nuclear 1045 00:41:39,759 --> 00:41:41,814 posture or have they conveyed to you 1046 00:41:41,814 --> 00:41:44,037 anything with respect to that ? They're 1047 00:41:44,037 --> 00:41:45,981 not conveying anything to us about 1048 00:41:45,981 --> 00:41:47,926 their nuclear posture . Kassem . I 1049 00:41:47,926 --> 00:41:51,390 would just say that um we 1050 00:41:52,010 --> 00:41:55,160 we haven't seen anything from a nuclear 1051 00:41:55,160 --> 00:41:58,460 posture perspective that that warrants 1052 00:41:58,460 --> 00:42:01,010 any change on our part . I just leave 1053 00:42:01,010 --> 00:42:04,150 it at that the back I have questions . 1054 00:42:04,150 --> 00:42:06,317 And my first question is about present 1055 00:42:06,317 --> 00:42:08,483 violence announcements to release more 1056 00:42:08,483 --> 00:42:11,670 oil reserves to reduce pressure on gas 1057 00:42:11,670 --> 00:42:14,080 prices . I would like to know the 1058 00:42:14,090 --> 00:42:16,550 strategic implication of this decision . 1059 00:42:17,190 --> 00:42:19,023 Does the U . S . Military have a 1060 00:42:19,023 --> 00:42:21,780 separate all reserved to make sure that 1061 00:42:21,780 --> 00:42:24,610 this decision doesn't have any negative 1062 00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:27,130 impact on the U . S . Military 1063 00:42:27,700 --> 00:42:31,560 readiness in case of large unexpected 1064 00:42:31,560 --> 00:42:35,490 contingencies we have . Uh as I think 1065 00:42:35,490 --> 00:42:37,950 everybody knows I mean we have fuel 1066 00:42:37,950 --> 00:42:40,090 reserves of our own to to fuel our 1067 00:42:40,090 --> 00:42:42,370 operations . Um we do the best we can 1068 00:42:42,370 --> 00:42:44,426 to distribute those and to make sure 1069 00:42:44,426 --> 00:42:48,290 that they are available um for 1070 00:42:48,300 --> 00:42:51,660 our use . Um And uh and obviously but 1071 00:42:51,670 --> 00:42:55,190 we we uh we 1072 00:42:55,190 --> 00:42:59,190 also purchase on the market oil 1073 00:42:59,190 --> 00:43:01,470 and gas too to so that we don't have to 1074 00:43:01,470 --> 00:43:03,526 dip into our reserves all the time . 1075 00:43:03,526 --> 00:43:05,637 What I would just tell you I'm not an 1076 00:43:05,637 --> 00:43:07,637 expert on exactly what that process 1077 00:43:07,637 --> 00:43:09,859 looks like . I would just tell you that 1078 00:43:09,859 --> 00:43:11,803 the more important thing is can we 1079 00:43:11,803 --> 00:43:13,748 continue to defend the country and 1080 00:43:13,748 --> 00:43:16,250 defend our national interests uh using 1081 00:43:16,260 --> 00:43:19,730 our reserves are resources 1082 00:43:19,740 --> 00:43:22,073 for fossil fuel . And the answer is yes . 1083 00:43:22,700 --> 00:43:24,922 And my second question is about nuclear 1084 00:43:24,922 --> 00:43:27,140 posture review . So so the U . S . 1085 00:43:27,140 --> 00:43:29,930 Allies have paid much attention to this 1086 00:43:29,930 --> 00:43:31,930 year's nuclear posture review . And 1087 00:43:31,930 --> 00:43:35,300 yesterday we have like half page fact 1088 00:43:35,300 --> 00:43:38,060 sheet . The summary of consisted of 1089 00:43:38,060 --> 00:43:40,190 seven sentences about nuclear posture 1090 00:43:40,190 --> 00:43:42,023 review and three sentences about 1091 00:43:42,023 --> 00:43:44,190 missile defense review . And I checked 1092 00:43:44,190 --> 00:43:46,070 how previous administrations 1093 00:43:46,070 --> 00:43:49,510 administrations released their results 1094 00:43:49,510 --> 00:43:51,630 of their review . So the Obama 1095 00:43:51,640 --> 00:43:55,490 administration had printed like 72 1096 00:43:55,500 --> 00:43:59,100 pages of a book and in 2010 and Trump 1097 00:43:59,100 --> 00:44:02,970 administration had released Like a 1098 00:44:02,980 --> 00:44:06,730 100 page of their like A 1099 00:44:06,730 --> 00:44:10,010 report in 2018 . So is there any reason 1100 00:44:10,010 --> 00:44:12,250 that the current administration should 1101 00:44:12,260 --> 00:44:15,790 keep most of information 1102 00:44:15,790 --> 00:44:17,957 classified this year ? And do you have 1103 00:44:17,957 --> 00:44:20,780 any plans to release more detailed and 1104 00:44:20,780 --> 00:44:22,780 comprehensive information ? We will 1105 00:44:22,780 --> 00:44:25,002 release an unclassified version of both 1106 00:44:25,002 --> 00:44:27,224 documents at the appropriate time right 1107 00:44:27,224 --> 00:44:29,169 now . They're classified will work 1108 00:44:29,169 --> 00:44:31,224 through the declassification process 1109 00:44:31,224 --> 00:44:33,336 but they'll get released eventually . 1110 00:44:33,336 --> 00:44:35,391 So do you do you have any estimation 1111 00:44:35,391 --> 00:44:37,391 about the release like when when in 1112 00:44:37,391 --> 00:44:39,336 coming months ? In coming months ? 1113 00:44:39,336 --> 00:44:42,920 Anything else ? Okay . Thanks everybody .