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hearing for the fiscal year 2023 

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Defense budget request and the 

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committee has honored this morning to 

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have the Secretary of Defense Secretary 

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of Defense , Lloyd Austin with us as 

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well as the Chairman of the Joint 

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Chiefs of Staff , Mark Milley um and 

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the controller at the pentagon mike 

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McCord guys job . It is to keep track 

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of the money . So important to have all 

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three of you here . Obviously this is 

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an incredibly important time for the 

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national defense of this country and 

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for peace and stability in the globe . 

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We all watch on a on a daily basis what 

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is happening in Ukraine . Um the the 

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horror and devastation from the violent 

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attack that Vladimir Putin and Russia 

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have brought down upon Ukraine and we 

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see the world that we do not want 

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unquestionably . Um and this committee 

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and the Department of Defense have a 

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huge role in trying to figure out how 

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we create the better world that we do 

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want . And as a starting point , our 

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ability and our allies ability to get 

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aid and weapons to Ukraine has been 

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crucial in the early days of this fight . 

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Um Russia has struggled far greater 

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than just about anybody expected . 

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There are a lot of reasons for that . 

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Certainly the biggest is the will and 

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the courage of the Ukrainian people . 

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But it has also been crucial that our 

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alliance , the NATO alliance and others 

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have come together to offer that 

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support to Ukraine . And one of the 

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biggest questions that we're gonna have 

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in this committee uh for you three 

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gentlemen is how can we do more . How 

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can we make sure we're getting 

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absolutely everything we can to Ukraine 

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to help them defend their country and 

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defend themselves . And we will be very 

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focused on the effort and stand ready 

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to do anything we can to help make that 

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happen . And then the larger question 

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is , we look at this is we have to make 

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sure that Russia does not succeed 

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because the implications it has . Um 

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certainly for Ukraine , but for the 

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larger world as well , we do not want 

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Russia or other aggressive countries in 

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the world to think that by force they 

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can simply expand their territory and 

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attack their neighbors . We need to 

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build a robust deterrence across the 

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globe to make sure that this kind of 

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thing does not happen again . Um We've 

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been working on that for a long time , 

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obviously on our national security 

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policy , but it comes in an incredibly 

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sharp focus now as we see the war in 

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Ukraine deterrence is many things . 

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Certainly it is incredibly important 

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that we build those alliances , you 

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know , where would we be if we were 

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trying to do this on our own or if we 

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were deeply divided in the West . Um 

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there would be in a terrible place . So 

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making sure that we continue to build 

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those alliances across europe and 

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across the world is enormously 

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important . We also need to understand 

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That Russia and China are are the 

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principal threats here , as we now have 

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the national security strategy . We 

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have the 2023 budget . We see that 

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President Biden and his team recognized 

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that uh , and and prioritize those 

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threats is what we need to deter going 

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forward . We face a very stark choice 

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in the world . The President has 

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outlined this clearly , um , we can 

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push for greater freedom , greater 

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economic and political freedom , um , 

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or we can face the , the , the 

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autocracy that Russia and china are 

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trying to bring down upon us . And it 

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is crucial that we build a defense 

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budget that reflects that . And I 

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believe that the budget that has been 

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submitted gets us headed in the right 

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direction . Now there will be a lot of 

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really robust increase in the budget 

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last year as it was enacted . We have a 

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robust increase in the budget this year . 

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We will have that debate about what 

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that top line number should be and that 

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that is fine . But what I hope we also 

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really focus on is where do we spend 

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the money spending that money 

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efficiently and effectively in a 

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rapidly changing environment . To me is 

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the most important thing that this 

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committee and the pentagon can do . And 

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it starts with recognizing the changing 

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nature of warfare . I've I've come to 

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sum it up as , as information and 

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survivability , which I guess have 

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always been central to warfare . It's 

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just that they're changing so much now 

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and you can look and learn from how the 

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Russians are struggling in Ukraine 

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there , they can't communicate with 

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each other , they're large tank columns 

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are victims to relatively cheap and 

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expensive missiles . We need to figure 

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out how do we build the force that can 

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survive in today's world ? We have to 

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make sure that we can protect our 

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information and distribute it . We have 

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to make sure that our systems are not 

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just single points of failure . Um you 

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know , large , exquisite systems that 

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can be shut down either by a cyber 

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attack or a missile . We need to 

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fundamentally rethink how we approach 

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the military and our biggest focus on 

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this committee has been that innovation 

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and and sadly , you know , the pentagon 

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is not the most innovative institution 

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in the world . Um it is slow to adopt 

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new technology is certainly slow to 

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adopt software . A number of reforms 

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and changes have been made in recent 

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years to try to address that issue . 

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But it is crucially important that we 

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figure out how to develop new 

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technologies first and even more 

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crucially we figure out how to use them 

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um ai missile technology , drones , 

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these are all critically important . 

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How do you employ those ? How do we put 

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the right people in place to make sure 

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that we are making the best use of the 

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technology and innovation that we are 

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doing and I would recommend all of you 

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an article in Foreign Affairs magazine 

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that former Secretary Spencer sent me 

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that's entitled The Pentagon's Office 

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Culture is stuck in 1968 . That may be 

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a slight overstatement . But when you 

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read the analysis of how you structure 

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a company today to adopt to the 

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innovative , the innovative economy , 

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the faith that we face , the technology 

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changes that we face versus how you 

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would build a company in the more 

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assembly line industrial age of the 

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1960s . You can see a stark contrast 

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really want to see that change that we 

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have a more innovative pentagon that 

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can take advantage of of the the 

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changes that are happening out there 

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and make sure that we get there first . 

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Because without question , when you 

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look at the world , um you have the U . 

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S . And the west and our involvement 

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and then you have china Russia , Iran 

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north Korea and transnational terrorist 

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groups . Our job is simple . We want to 

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deter those adversaries , all of them . 

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We get into a ranking issue 

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occasionally and certainly china is the 

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biggest um economy , The biggest , you 

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know , alternative out there . Russia 

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clearly is committing violent acts as 

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we speak , but they all matter . We 

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need to build an alliance that promotes 

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economic and political freedom and we 

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need to do it with a very , very strong 

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military and a robust involvement in 

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the world in diplomacy and development 

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and alliances . We have to build that . 

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Pentagon is a huge part of that . Uh 

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mornings , the discussion is the 

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kickoff point for our committee to 

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looking at how the FY 23 budget affects 

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that fight . I look forward to the 

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testimony on the questions and answers . 

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And with that , I will yield to the 

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ranking member . Mr Rogers for his 

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opening statement . Thank you Mr 

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Chairman and I want to thank the 

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witnesses for their attendance and 

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their service to our country . Um the 

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threats that we face now are more 

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formidable than at any point in the 20 

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years . I've had the privilege of 

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serving on this committee . 

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Unprecedented chinese military 

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modernization has enabled them to leap 

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progress in key capabilities . The 

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Chinese Communist Party now controls 

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the largest army and navy in the world . 

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It has more troops , more ships and 

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more hypersonic missiles than the 

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United States with each passing day . 

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More and more clear , more and more 

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clear . Their interests are , it's more 

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and more clear that they diametrically 

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opposed our interest . And to make 

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matters worse , President Z has entered 

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into a no limits partisan partnership 

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with Putin providing him with strategic 

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cover and international legitimacy . 

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But Putin's catastrophic invasion of 

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Ukraine has proven to the rest of the 

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world that he's nothing more than an 

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unhinged crackpot . The problem is this 

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crackpot has his finger on the world's 

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largest nuclear arsenal and illegal 

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stockpile of chemical and biological 

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weapons , which he hasn't hesitated to 

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use against his perceived enemies . 

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Emulating . Putin's desire to undermine 

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democracy or the despotic leaders of 

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North Korea and Iran both continue to 

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aggressively pursue nuclear weapons and 

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conduct destabilizing activities in 

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their region . Finally , President , 

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the president's decision to 

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unilaterally and unconditionally 

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withdraw US forces from Afghanistan has 

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offered terrorists the opportunity to 

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regain their footing and our capability 

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to keep an eye on them and strike them 

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before they strike us has diminished . 

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These are just a few of the growing 

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threats confronting our nation , how we 

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respond to them as the biggest test we 

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will face as americans . Many of us 

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here , regardless of party , believe we 

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should respond with increased 

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investment and the men and women of our 

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armed forces and the modernization of 

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our conventional and strategic 

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deterrence . Unfortunately , the 

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president doesn't see things the same 

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way for the second year in a row . The 

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president has sent us a budget that 

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fails to keep pace with china and 

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Russia and yet again it fails to keep 

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pace with inflation . Despite 

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predictions from leading economists , 

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the record high inflation will endure . 

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The White House directed the pentagon 

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to assume a rate of only 2.2% for fy 23 . 

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Regardless of this inflation , We are 

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now at 8% inflation to to to get an 

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average of 2.2% next year would require 

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months of unprecedented low inflation 

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inflation . Everyone here knows that's 

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not gonna happen . That means every 

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dollar of increase in this budget will 

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be eaten by inflation very little if 

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anything , will be left over to 

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modernize or grow capability . The 

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president may claim this budget 

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bolsters our national security , but 

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that's far from the truth . The budget 

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cuts . The number of soldiers , sailors , 

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airmen , marines , well below 

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00:09:36,570 --> 00:09:38,740
authorized levels . It slashes the 

276
00:09:38,740 --> 00:09:40,760
number of ships and aircraft in our 

277
00:09:40,760 --> 00:09:42,990
arsenal . In fact , at no point over 

278
00:09:42,990 --> 00:09:45,046
the next five years does the size of 

279
00:09:45,046 --> 00:09:47,830
the navy grow Instead of moving toward 

280
00:09:47,830 --> 00:09:50,370
a 500 ship , Navy needed to counter 

281
00:09:50,370 --> 00:09:53,770
China , it shrinks to 280 ships . The 

282
00:09:53,770 --> 00:09:55,937
budget cuts , procurement for the army 

283
00:09:55,937 --> 00:09:57,992
and Marine Corps , delaying critical 

284
00:09:57,992 --> 00:09:59,937
modernization efforts . It slashes 

285
00:09:59,937 --> 00:10:02,103
funding for next generation aircraft , 

286
00:10:02,103 --> 00:10:04,159
new nuclear deterrent capability and 

287
00:10:04,159 --> 00:10:06,159
modernized ground combat vehicles . 

288
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Finally , according to the president's 

289
00:10:08,326 --> 00:10:10,492
comptroller , the budget was completed 

290
00:10:10,492 --> 00:10:13,070
before Putin's invasion of Ukraine . No 

291
00:10:13,070 --> 00:10:15,237
funds have been added to the account . 

292
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You know , for the increased cost of 

293
00:10:17,292 --> 00:10:20,190
reinforcing NATO allies are to continue 

294
00:10:20,190 --> 00:10:22,412
to provide lethal aid to Ukraine in the 

295
00:10:22,412 --> 00:10:24,468
next fiscal year . This is extremely 

296
00:10:24,468 --> 00:10:27,170
shortsighted . The problem again this 

297
00:10:27,170 --> 00:10:29,337
year is not that the president refuses 

298
00:10:29,337 --> 00:10:31,392
to spend money is that he refuses to 

299
00:10:31,392 --> 00:10:33,550
spend it on defense . Yet again , the 

300
00:10:33,550 --> 00:10:36,190
budget proposes massive increases in 

301
00:10:36,190 --> 00:10:38,190
funding for the E . P . A . And the 

302
00:10:38,190 --> 00:10:41,130
Department of Education and HHS In all , 

303
00:10:41,170 --> 00:10:43,140
non defense discretionary spending 

304
00:10:43,140 --> 00:10:46,730
grows by an astonishing 12% . 3 times 

305
00:10:46,730 --> 00:10:49,890
more than defense Using GDP as a metric 

306
00:10:49,890 --> 00:10:52,980
defense spending will total 3.1% of GDP 

307
00:10:53,340 --> 00:10:57,060
nondefense spending will total 18% of 

308
00:10:57,060 --> 00:10:59,338
GDP nearly six times more than defense . 

309
00:10:59,840 --> 00:11:01,951
I know these numbers are inconvenient 

310
00:11:01,951 --> 00:11:04,173
to too many people in the White House . 

311
00:11:04,173 --> 00:11:06,118
Some on the far left want to slash 

312
00:11:06,118 --> 00:11:08,340
defending defense spending by 10 to his 

313
00:11:08,340 --> 00:11:10,284
credit . The president hadn't gone 

314
00:11:10,284 --> 00:11:13,020
there . But what he is proposing is far 

315
00:11:13,020 --> 00:11:14,853
from what's needed to maintain a 

316
00:11:14,853 --> 00:11:16,798
credible deterrent . Under the old 

317
00:11:16,798 --> 00:11:18,909
National Defense Strategy , we needed 

318
00:11:18,909 --> 00:11:20,690
an annual increase of 3-5% over 

319
00:11:20,690 --> 00:11:23,010
inflation to stay ahead of China . The 

320
00:11:23,010 --> 00:11:25,280
new national defense strategy departs 

321
00:11:25,280 --> 00:11:27,430
little from the last one . I suspect 

322
00:11:27,430 --> 00:11:29,486
the new commission were appointed to 

323
00:11:29,486 --> 00:11:31,541
review the National Defense strategy 

324
00:11:31,541 --> 00:11:33,652
will again recommending at least that 

325
00:11:33,652 --> 00:11:35,652
level of funding If this budget was 

326
00:11:35,652 --> 00:11:39,090
truly driven by risk 5% above inflation 

327
00:11:39,090 --> 00:11:41,201
is the level of growth we would see . 

328
00:11:41,201 --> 00:11:43,201
Unfortunately that's not the case . 

329
00:11:43,201 --> 00:11:45,257
This budget fails to account for the 

330
00:11:45,257 --> 00:11:47,201
record inflation the department is 

331
00:11:47,201 --> 00:11:48,868
currently facing and severely 

332
00:11:48,868 --> 00:11:51,090
underestimates its impact over the next 

333
00:11:51,090 --> 00:11:53,312
year . It robs our warfighters of vital 

334
00:11:53,312 --> 00:11:55,423
capabilities . They need to carry out 

335
00:11:55,423 --> 00:11:57,534
their missions . But most regrettably 

336
00:11:57,534 --> 00:11:59,534
it gives china more time to enhance 

337
00:11:59,534 --> 00:12:01,701
their military advantage and undermine 

338
00:12:01,701 --> 00:12:03,812
our deterrence . I urge my colleagues 

339
00:12:03,812 --> 00:12:05,812
to reject this budget and work on a 

340
00:12:05,812 --> 00:12:08,034
bipartisan manner to address the urgent 

341
00:12:08,034 --> 00:12:10,201
needs of our national defense and with 

342
00:12:10,201 --> 00:12:12,201
that Mr Chairman , I yield back . Q 

343
00:12:12,201 --> 00:12:14,900
Secretary Austin . Good morning . 

344
00:12:14,910 --> 00:12:16,799
Chairman smith . Ranking member , 

345
00:12:16,799 --> 00:12:18,910
Rogers . Distinguished members of the 

346
00:12:18,910 --> 00:12:21,132
committee . Thank you for the chance to 

347
00:12:21,132 --> 00:12:22,910
testify today in support of the 

348
00:12:22,910 --> 00:12:25,040
president's budget request for fiscal 

349
00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:27,970
year 2023 . It's great to be here with 

350
00:12:27,970 --> 00:12:29,692
general Milley who has been an 

351
00:12:29,692 --> 00:12:31,914
outstanding partner . And I'm also glad 

352
00:12:31,914 --> 00:12:33,748
to be joined by our today by our 

353
00:12:33,748 --> 00:12:36,026
controller and chief financial officer . 

354
00:12:36,026 --> 00:12:38,260
Mike Mchugh Rd . Mr . Chairman . We're 

355
00:12:38,260 --> 00:12:41,270
still focused on three key priorities 

356
00:12:41,270 --> 00:12:42,992
at the Department of Defense , 

357
00:12:43,040 --> 00:12:45,151
defending our nation , taking care of 

358
00:12:45,151 --> 00:12:47,040
our people and succeeding through 

359
00:12:47,040 --> 00:12:49,450
teamwork and the budget requests that 

360
00:12:49,450 --> 00:12:51,617
we have submitted to you helps us meet 

361
00:12:51,617 --> 00:12:54,880
each of those priorities . Our budget 

362
00:12:54,880 --> 00:12:57,370
seeks more than $56 billion dollars for 

363
00:12:57,370 --> 00:13:00,070
air power platforms and systems And 

364
00:13:00,070 --> 00:13:01,903
more than $40 billion dollars to 

365
00:13:01,903 --> 00:13:04,650
maintain our dominance at sea Including 

366
00:13:04,650 --> 00:13:07,860
buying nine more battle force ships And 

367
00:13:07,860 --> 00:13:10,150
almost $13 billion dollars to support 

368
00:13:10,160 --> 00:13:12,110
and modernize our combat credible 

369
00:13:12,110 --> 00:13:15,380
forces on land . A budget request also 

370
00:13:15,380 --> 00:13:18,140
funds the modernization of all three 

371
00:13:18,140 --> 00:13:21,310
legs of the nuclear triad to ensure 

372
00:13:21,310 --> 00:13:24,320
that we maintain a safe , secure and 

373
00:13:24,320 --> 00:13:27,100
effective strategic deterrent . Of 

374
00:13:27,100 --> 00:13:29,100
course these capabilities , none of 

375
00:13:29,100 --> 00:13:31,267
these capabilities matter much without 

376
00:13:31,267 --> 00:13:33,560
our people and their families . So 

377
00:13:33,560 --> 00:13:37,430
we're seeking your support for a 4.6% 

378
00:13:37,440 --> 00:13:40,470
pay raise for our military and civilian 

379
00:13:40,470 --> 00:13:43,260
personnel and special pay and benefits . 

380
00:13:43,940 --> 00:13:46,920
We also plan to invest in outstanding 

381
00:13:46,920 --> 00:13:49,360
and affordable child care in in the 

382
00:13:49,360 --> 00:13:51,590
construction of on base child 

383
00:13:51,590 --> 00:13:53,750
development centers and in ensuring 

384
00:13:53,750 --> 00:13:56,140
that all our families can put good and 

385
00:13:56,140 --> 00:13:58,690
healthy food on the table . We're also 

386
00:13:58,690 --> 00:14:01,030
deeply focused on a terrible problem of 

387
00:14:01,030 --> 00:14:03,410
suicide in the U . S . Military and 

388
00:14:03,410 --> 00:14:05,780
I'll keep on saying it , mental health 

389
00:14:05,790 --> 00:14:08,910
is health period . So we're increasing 

390
00:14:08,910 --> 00:14:10,632
access to mental health care , 

391
00:14:10,840 --> 00:14:13,380
expanding telehealth care telehealth 

392
00:14:13,390 --> 00:14:15,980
capabilities and fighting the tired old 

393
00:14:15,980 --> 00:14:18,660
stigmas that's against seeking help 

394
00:14:19,440 --> 00:14:21,496
with your support . I vote I've just 

395
00:14:21,496 --> 00:14:23,273
ordered the establishment of an 

396
00:14:23,273 --> 00:14:25,496
independent review committee to help us 

397
00:14:25,496 --> 00:14:27,470
grapple with suicide to better 

398
00:14:27,470 --> 00:14:30,180
understand it , prevent it and treat 

399
00:14:30,180 --> 00:14:33,120
the unseen wounds that lead to it . At 

400
00:14:33,120 --> 00:14:35,300
the same time , we're working hard to 

401
00:14:35,310 --> 00:14:37,366
implement the recommendations of the 

402
00:14:37,366 --> 00:14:39,630
Independent Review Commission on Sexual 

403
00:14:39,630 --> 00:14:41,797
Assault because we know that we have a 

404
00:14:41,797 --> 00:14:44,019
long way to go to rid ourselves of this 

405
00:14:44,019 --> 00:14:46,770
scourge . Our budget seeks nearly $480 

406
00:14:46,770 --> 00:14:49,130
million dollars for that enterprise and 

407
00:14:49,130 --> 00:14:51,186
sexual assault as we know , it's not 

408
00:14:51,186 --> 00:14:53,810
just a crime , it's an assault or an 

409
00:14:53,810 --> 00:14:56,370
affront to our values and to everything 

410
00:14:56,370 --> 00:14:58,370
that we're supposed to represent to 

411
00:14:58,370 --> 00:15:00,481
each other and to this country . This 

412
00:15:00,481 --> 00:15:02,703
is a leadership issue . And you have my 

413
00:15:02,703 --> 00:15:04,814
personal commitment to keep leading . 

414
00:15:05,140 --> 00:15:06,918
Now , while I'm on the topic of 

415
00:15:06,918 --> 00:15:10,520
leadership , let me briefly address our 

416
00:15:10,520 --> 00:15:13,440
military's role in the world because as 

417
00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:15,662
I've said , we succeed through teamwork 

418
00:15:16,340 --> 00:15:18,350
and as I've witnessed myself in the 

419
00:15:18,350 --> 00:15:20,680
last several weeks , countries around 

420
00:15:20,680 --> 00:15:22,624
the world continue to look for the 

421
00:15:22,624 --> 00:15:24,736
United States to provide that sort of 

422
00:15:24,736 --> 00:15:26,791
leadership with help from Congress , 

423
00:15:26,791 --> 00:15:28,624
we've been able to rush security 

424
00:15:28,624 --> 00:15:30,513
assistance to Ukraine to help the 

425
00:15:30,513 --> 00:15:32,736
Ukrainian Ukrainian people defend their 

426
00:15:32,736 --> 00:15:34,569
lives in their country and their 

427
00:15:34,569 --> 00:15:37,060
freedom and last october I visited Kiev 

428
00:15:37,440 --> 00:15:39,660
to meet both my Ukrainian counterpart 

429
00:15:40,040 --> 00:15:42,660
and President Zelensky and we discussed 

430
00:15:42,660 --> 00:15:45,390
our deepening defense partnership in 

431
00:15:45,390 --> 00:15:47,580
our unwavering support for Ukraine's 

432
00:15:47,580 --> 00:15:49,710
sovereignty in the face of Russian 

433
00:15:49,710 --> 00:15:52,400
aggression . And even before Russia's 

434
00:15:52,400 --> 00:15:54,650
unprovoked and illegal invasion , we 

435
00:15:54,650 --> 00:15:56,872
provided Ukraine with a billion dollars 

436
00:15:56,872 --> 00:15:58,761
worth of weapons and gear through 

437
00:15:58,761 --> 00:16:01,270
presidential drawdown authority . And 

438
00:16:01,270 --> 00:16:03,492
now we're delivering on another billion 

439
00:16:03,492 --> 00:16:05,660
dollars pledged by President Biden . 

440
00:16:06,240 --> 00:16:08,640
And our budget includes $650 million 

441
00:16:08,640 --> 00:16:12,480
Europe , Including 

442
00:16:12,480 --> 00:16:15,280
$300 million Security Assistance 

443
00:16:15,290 --> 00:16:17,870
Initiative . We're also helping to 

444
00:16:17,870 --> 00:16:19,870
coordinate the delivery of material 

445
00:16:19,870 --> 00:16:21,990
provided by other nations which 

446
00:16:21,990 --> 00:16:24,660
continues to flow in every single day . 

447
00:16:25,240 --> 00:16:27,296
And let me thank all of you for your 

448
00:16:27,296 --> 00:16:29,296
strong leadership toward our shared 

449
00:16:29,296 --> 00:16:31,518
goal of helping Ukraine defend itself . 

450
00:16:31,740 --> 00:16:34,010
And since the invasion , I've spoken 

451
00:16:34,010 --> 00:16:35,843
and met frequently with Minister 

452
00:16:35,843 --> 00:16:38,970
Reznikoff including just yesterday and 

453
00:16:38,970 --> 00:16:40,748
I have assured him that we will 

454
00:16:40,748 --> 00:16:42,803
continue this effort . We'll get him 

455
00:16:42,803 --> 00:16:44,637
and his troops the tools and the 

456
00:16:44,637 --> 00:16:46,690
weapons that they need most and are 

457
00:16:46,690 --> 00:16:48,930
using most effectively against Russian 

458
00:16:48,930 --> 00:16:52,540
forces . We've also reinforced our NATO 

459
00:16:52,540 --> 00:16:55,090
allies . We spend additional combat 

460
00:16:55,090 --> 00:16:57,201
power to the alliance's eastern flank 

461
00:16:57,740 --> 00:16:59,851
Raising our posture in Europe to more 

462
00:16:59,851 --> 00:17:02,570
than 100,000 troops . And these 

463
00:17:02,570 --> 00:17:04,920
reinforcements includes include dozens 

464
00:17:04,920 --> 00:17:07,120
of aircraft , an aircraft carrier 

465
00:17:07,120 --> 00:17:09,380
strike group And two Brigade Combat 

466
00:17:09,380 --> 00:17:11,600
Teams . And as President biden made 

467
00:17:11,600 --> 00:17:14,040
clear we will defend every inch of NATO 

468
00:17:14,040 --> 00:17:16,630
territory if required . And we're 

469
00:17:16,630 --> 00:17:18,630
making good on that promise on that 

470
00:17:18,630 --> 00:17:20,852
promise . Mr Chairman , you've heard me 

471
00:17:20,852 --> 00:17:23,420
say many times . We need resources 

472
00:17:23,420 --> 00:17:25,642
match the strategy and strategy matched 

473
00:17:25,642 --> 00:17:27,900
the policy and policy matched to the 

474
00:17:27,900 --> 00:17:30,280
will of the american people . This 

475
00:17:30,280 --> 00:17:32,391
budget gives us the resources that we 

476
00:17:32,391 --> 00:17:34,724
need to deliver on that promise as well . 

477
00:17:35,220 --> 00:17:37,164
It reflects our recently submitted 

478
00:17:37,164 --> 00:17:38,942
national Defense strategy which 

479
00:17:38,942 --> 00:17:40,887
highlights the pacing challenge of 

480
00:17:40,887 --> 00:17:42,609
china . That's why we've we're 

481
00:17:42,609 --> 00:17:44,664
investing some $6 billion dollars in 

482
00:17:44,664 --> 00:17:48,090
this budget in the pacific deterrence 

483
00:17:48,090 --> 00:17:49,990
initiative . And it's why we're 

484
00:17:49,990 --> 00:17:51,934
realigning our posture in the indo 

485
00:17:51,934 --> 00:17:53,823
pacific toward a more distributed 

486
00:17:53,823 --> 00:17:56,620
footprint . We're going to enhance our 

487
00:17:56,620 --> 00:17:59,990
forward posture infrastructure presence 

488
00:17:59,990 --> 00:18:01,879
and readiness in the indo pacific 

489
00:18:01,879 --> 00:18:03,990
including the missile defense of Guam 

490
00:18:04,540 --> 00:18:06,429
and that's why we're making broad 

491
00:18:06,429 --> 00:18:08,262
investments in such key areas as 

492
00:18:08,262 --> 00:18:10,373
undersea dominance , fighter aircraft 

493
00:18:10,373 --> 00:18:12,690
modernization and advanced weaponry 

494
00:18:12,690 --> 00:18:15,560
including hypersonic strike . And many 

495
00:18:15,560 --> 00:18:17,782
of these investments will pay dividends 

496
00:18:17,782 --> 00:18:20,004
encountering the acute threat of Russia 

497
00:18:20,004 --> 00:18:22,560
as well which are strategy underscores 

498
00:18:23,340 --> 00:18:25,396
at the same time we must be prepared 

499
00:18:25,396 --> 00:18:27,562
for threats that don't observe borders 

500
00:18:27,562 --> 00:18:30,170
from pandemics to climate change . And 

501
00:18:30,170 --> 00:18:32,281
we must tackle the persistent threats 

502
00:18:32,281 --> 00:18:34,450
posed by north Korea Iran and global 

503
00:18:34,450 --> 00:18:36,830
terrorist groups . Now the national 

504
00:18:36,830 --> 00:18:39,270
defense strategy advances our goals in 

505
00:18:39,270 --> 00:18:42,460
three main ways forging integrated 

506
00:18:42,460 --> 00:18:45,680
deterrence campaigning and building 

507
00:18:45,910 --> 00:18:49,140
enduring advantages . An integrated 

508
00:18:49,140 --> 00:18:50,940
deterrence means combining our 

509
00:18:50,940 --> 00:18:53,670
strengths across all the warfighting 

510
00:18:53,670 --> 00:18:56,430
domains to maximum effect to ward off 

511
00:18:56,430 --> 00:18:59,250
potential conflict campaigning means 

512
00:18:59,250 --> 00:19:01,194
our day to day efforts to gain and 

513
00:19:01,194 --> 00:19:03,750
sustain military advantage , counter 

514
00:19:03,750 --> 00:19:05,500
acute forms of coercion by our 

515
00:19:05,500 --> 00:19:07,680
competitors and complicate their 

516
00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,450
preparations for aggression and to 

517
00:19:10,450 --> 00:19:13,020
build enduring advantages . We need to 

518
00:19:13,020 --> 00:19:14,760
accelerate force development , 

519
00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:17,329
acquiring the technology that our 

520
00:19:17,329 --> 00:19:20,740
warfighters need . So our budget seeks 

521
00:19:20,740 --> 00:19:23,390
more than $130 billion dollars for 

522
00:19:23,390 --> 00:19:25,446
research , development , testing and 

523
00:19:25,446 --> 00:19:27,740
evaluation . And that's the largest R . 

524
00:19:27,740 --> 00:19:29,573
And D . Request that this depart 

525
00:19:29,573 --> 00:19:32,140
department has ever made . It's nearly 

526
00:19:32,140 --> 00:19:34,960
a 10% increase over last year , which 

527
00:19:34,960 --> 00:19:36,904
was the department's previous high 

528
00:19:36,904 --> 00:19:38,904
previous high water mark . And this 

529
00:19:38,904 --> 00:19:40,682
includes $2 billion dollars for 

530
00:19:40,682 --> 00:19:43,210
artificial intelligence . $250 million 

531
00:19:43,210 --> 00:19:46,300
for five G . Nearly $28 billion for 

532
00:19:46,300 --> 00:19:49,060
space capabilities and another $11 

533
00:19:49,060 --> 00:19:51,120
billion to protect our networks and 

534
00:19:51,120 --> 00:19:54,090
develop a cyber mission force . This 

535
00:19:54,090 --> 00:19:56,830
budget maintains our edge but it does 

536
00:19:56,830 --> 00:19:58,970
not take that edge for granted . And 

537
00:19:58,970 --> 00:20:01,026
quite frankly , Mr . Chairman in the 

538
00:20:01,026 --> 00:20:03,690
21st century , you either innovate or 

539
00:20:03,690 --> 00:20:05,820
you get left behind and through the 

540
00:20:05,830 --> 00:20:07,997
president's budget . And with the help 

541
00:20:07,997 --> 00:20:10,108
of this committee we will continue to 

542
00:20:10,108 --> 00:20:12,108
innovate and with your help we will 

543
00:20:12,108 --> 00:20:14,219
continue to defend this nation . Take 

544
00:20:14,219 --> 00:20:16,163
care of our people and support our 

545
00:20:16,163 --> 00:20:19,050
allies and partners and with your help 

546
00:20:19,060 --> 00:20:21,227
I know that we will continue to lead . 

547
00:20:21,840 --> 00:20:23,896
Thank you and I look forward to your 

548
00:20:23,896 --> 00:20:26,229
questions . Thank you . Chairman Milley . 

549
00:20:27,650 --> 00:20:29,872
Karen smith , ranking member , Rogers . 

550
00:20:29,872 --> 00:20:32,150
Distinguished members of the committee . 

551
00:20:32,150 --> 00:20:33,928
I'm privileged to represent the 

552
00:20:33,928 --> 00:20:36,039
soldiers , sailors , airmen , marines 

553
00:20:36,039 --> 00:20:37,983
and guardians of the United States 

554
00:20:37,983 --> 00:20:40,094
Joint Force . Our troops are the best 

555
00:20:40,094 --> 00:20:42,150
led , best equipped , best trained , 

556
00:20:42,150 --> 00:20:44,261
most lethal and most capable military 

557
00:20:44,261 --> 00:20:47,470
force in the world alongside our allies 

558
00:20:47,470 --> 00:20:49,303
and partners at any given time . 

559
00:20:49,640 --> 00:20:53,050
Approximately 400,000 american troops 

560
00:20:53,050 --> 00:20:56,350
are currently standing watch 155 

561
00:20:56,350 --> 00:20:58,350
countries and conducting operations 

562
00:20:58,440 --> 00:21:00,960
every day . They keep americans safe . 

563
00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:03,618
Currently we are supporting our 

564
00:21:03,618 --> 00:21:05,890
european allies and guarding NATO's 

565
00:21:05,890 --> 00:21:09,050
eastern flank in the face of the 

566
00:21:09,050 --> 00:21:12,320
unnecessary war of aggression by Russia 

567
00:21:12,490 --> 00:21:14,601
against the people of Ukraine and the 

568
00:21:14,601 --> 00:21:17,020
assault on the democratic institutions 

569
00:21:17,020 --> 00:21:19,242
and the rules based international order 

570
00:21:19,300 --> 00:21:21,770
That have prevented Great Power War for 

571
00:21:21,770 --> 00:21:24,400
the last 78 years since the end of 

572
00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:28,190
World War two . We are now facing two 

573
00:21:28,200 --> 00:21:30,950
global powers china and Russia , 

574
00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:33,650
each with significant military 

575
00:21:33,650 --> 00:21:36,590
capabilities , both who intend to 

576
00:21:36,590 --> 00:21:39,270
fundamentally change the rules based 

577
00:21:39,280 --> 00:21:41,860
current global order . We are entering 

578
00:21:41,860 --> 00:21:45,060
a world that is becoming more unstable 

579
00:21:45,940 --> 00:21:47,829
and the potential for significant 

580
00:21:47,829 --> 00:21:49,884
international conflict between great 

581
00:21:49,884 --> 00:21:52,960
powers is increasing . Not decreasing 

582
00:21:54,190 --> 00:21:56,246
the United States military comprises 

583
00:21:56,246 --> 00:21:58,640
one of the four key components of 

584
00:21:58,640 --> 00:22:01,110
national power , diplomatic , economic , 

585
00:22:01,120 --> 00:22:03,950
informational and military to protect 

586
00:22:03,950 --> 00:22:07,110
the homeland and sustain a stable and 

587
00:22:07,110 --> 00:22:09,470
open international system . In 

588
00:22:09,470 --> 00:22:11,692
coordination with the other elements of 

589
00:22:11,692 --> 00:22:13,748
power . We constantly develop a wide 

590
00:22:13,748 --> 00:22:15,637
range of military options for the 

591
00:22:15,637 --> 00:22:17,859
president as commander in chief and for 

592
00:22:17,859 --> 00:22:20,137
this Congress to consider as the U . S . 

593
00:22:20,137 --> 00:22:22,359
Military . We are prepared to deter and 

594
00:22:22,359 --> 00:22:24,470
if necessary fight and win anyone who 

595
00:22:24,470 --> 00:22:26,526
seeks to attack the United States or 

596
00:22:26,526 --> 00:22:28,692
our allies or a significant core vital 

597
00:22:28,692 --> 00:22:31,180
national security interests . The joint 

598
00:22:31,180 --> 00:22:33,320
force appreciates the work that our 

599
00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:35,376
elected representatives do to ensure 

600
00:22:35,376 --> 00:22:37,376
that we have the resources needed , 

601
00:22:37,376 --> 00:22:39,720
train equipped and manage the force in 

602
00:22:39,720 --> 00:22:41,600
order to be ready . We thank the 

603
00:22:41,600 --> 00:22:43,600
Congress for increasing last year's 

604
00:22:43,800 --> 00:22:45,856
last fiscal year's level of military 

605
00:22:45,856 --> 00:22:47,856
funding and we look forward to your 

606
00:22:47,856 --> 00:22:49,950
support for this year's budget . The 

607
00:22:49,950 --> 00:22:52,800
Joint force will deliver modernization 

608
00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:54,800
and readiness for armed forces And 

609
00:22:54,800 --> 00:22:56,967
secure the people of the United States 

610
00:22:57,100 --> 00:22:59,800
at the fiscal year 23 budget request of 

611
00:22:59,800 --> 00:23:03,640
773 billion . This budget will 

612
00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:05,830
enable the appropriate decisions for 

613
00:23:05,830 --> 00:23:08,280
modernization And transformation of the 

614
00:23:08,280 --> 00:23:10,480
joint force in order to set and meet 

615
00:23:10,480 --> 00:23:12,258
the conditions of the operating 

616
00:23:12,258 --> 00:23:14,369
environment that we will face in 2030 

617
00:23:14,369 --> 00:23:16,300
and beyond the so called changing 

618
00:23:16,300 --> 00:23:18,411
character of war that we've discussed 

619
00:23:18,411 --> 00:23:20,960
many times in the past . We will work 

620
00:23:20,960 --> 00:23:23,071
diligently to ensure the resources of 

621
00:23:23,071 --> 00:23:25,980
american people entrust to us are spent 

622
00:23:25,980 --> 00:23:28,147
prudently and in the best interests of 

623
00:23:28,147 --> 00:23:29,980
the nation in alignment with the 

624
00:23:29,980 --> 00:23:32,091
forthcoming national defense strategy 

625
00:23:32,091 --> 00:23:34,147
and the national military strategy . 

626
00:23:34,147 --> 00:23:36,380
This budget delivers already agile and 

627
00:23:36,380 --> 00:23:38,436
capable joint force that will defend 

628
00:23:38,436 --> 00:23:40,436
the nation while taking care of our 

629
00:23:40,436 --> 00:23:42,491
people and working with our partners 

630
00:23:42,491 --> 00:23:45,230
and allies . We are witness to the 

631
00:23:45,230 --> 00:23:47,670
greatest threat to peace and security 

632
00:23:48,040 --> 00:23:51,990
of europe and perhaps the world In my 

633
00:23:51,990 --> 00:23:55,050
42 years of service in uniform , the 

634
00:23:55,050 --> 00:23:56,772
Russian invasion of Ukraine is 

635
00:23:56,772 --> 00:23:58,700
threatening to undermine not only 

636
00:23:58,700 --> 00:24:02,040
european peace and stability but global 

637
00:24:02,050 --> 00:24:04,460
peace and stability that my parents and 

638
00:24:04,460 --> 00:24:06,750
a generation of americans fought so 

639
00:24:06,750 --> 00:24:09,440
hard to defend the islands of the 

640
00:24:09,440 --> 00:24:11,440
pacific and the beaches of Normandy 

641
00:24:11,740 --> 00:24:13,907
bore witness to the incredible tragedy 

642
00:24:13,907 --> 00:24:16,430
that befalls humanity when nations seek 

643
00:24:16,430 --> 00:24:18,319
power through military aggression 

644
00:24:18,340 --> 00:24:21,400
across sovereign borders . Despite the 

645
00:24:21,400 --> 00:24:23,622
horrific assault on the institutions of 

646
00:24:23,622 --> 00:24:25,733
freedom , it is heartening to see the 

647
00:24:25,733 --> 00:24:27,900
world rally and say never again to the 

648
00:24:27,900 --> 00:24:29,900
specter of war in europe . Your 

649
00:24:29,900 --> 00:24:32,640
military stands ready to do whatever is 

650
00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:35,000
directed in order to maintain peace and 

651
00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:37,970
stability on the european continent . A 

652
00:24:37,970 --> 00:24:40,210
piece that ensures global stability and 

653
00:24:40,210 --> 00:24:42,321
international order where all nations 

654
00:24:42,321 --> 00:24:45,050
can prosper in peace . We are also 

655
00:24:45,050 --> 00:24:47,260
prepared and need to sustain our 

656
00:24:47,260 --> 00:24:49,482
capabilities anywhere else in the globe 

657
00:24:49,600 --> 00:24:51,544
as well . With our priority effort 

658
00:24:51,740 --> 00:24:53,573
being in the Asia pacific region 

659
00:24:53,590 --> 00:24:55,701
measured against our pacing challenge 

660
00:24:55,701 --> 00:24:58,060
of arising people's republic of china 

661
00:24:58,940 --> 00:25:01,162
and the defense of our nation . We must 

662
00:25:01,162 --> 00:25:03,329
also maintain competitive overmatch in 

663
00:25:03,329 --> 00:25:06,300
all the domains of war , cyber , space , 

664
00:25:06,490 --> 00:25:10,420
land , sea and air . To conclude the 

665
00:25:10,420 --> 00:25:12,700
United States is at a very critical and 

666
00:25:12,700 --> 00:25:15,350
historic geo strategic inflection point . 

667
00:25:16,340 --> 00:25:18,562
We need to pursue a clear ride strategy 

668
00:25:19,040 --> 00:25:21,200
of maintaining the peace to the 

669
00:25:21,200 --> 00:25:23,760
unambiguous capability of strength 

670
00:25:24,340 --> 00:25:28,140
relative to china or Russia . This 

671
00:25:28,140 --> 00:25:30,140
requires we simultaneously maintain 

672
00:25:30,140 --> 00:25:32,430
readiness and modernize the force for 

673
00:25:32,430 --> 00:25:34,770
the future . If we do not do that , 

674
00:25:35,320 --> 00:25:37,542
then we will be risking the security of 

675
00:25:37,542 --> 00:25:39,764
future generations . And I believe this 

676
00:25:39,764 --> 00:25:41,764
budget is a major step in the right 

677
00:25:41,764 --> 00:25:43,709
direction . I look forward to your 

678
00:25:43,709 --> 00:25:47,290
questions . Thank you very much for the 

679
00:25:47,290 --> 00:25:49,568
question and answer is all of you know , 

680
00:25:49,568 --> 00:25:51,623
but want to reiterate , we have five 

681
00:25:51,623 --> 00:25:53,790
minutes . Um and when we're done we're 

682
00:25:53,790 --> 00:25:55,957
done . So even if the witnesses are in 

683
00:25:55,957 --> 00:25:58,123
the middle of answering the question , 

684
00:25:58,123 --> 00:25:57,630
I will cut them off to move on to other 

685
00:25:57,630 --> 00:25:59,463
members of the secretary and the 

686
00:25:59,463 --> 00:26:01,686
chairman have generously said they will 

687
00:26:01,686 --> 00:26:03,630
be here to get through all members 

688
00:26:03,630 --> 00:26:05,852
questions so we will get through them . 

689
00:26:05,852 --> 00:26:07,963
Um , one other thing , it's perfectly 

690
00:26:07,963 --> 00:26:10,186
okay to if you it's your five minutes , 

691
00:26:10,186 --> 00:26:12,130
you want to make a speech for five 

692
00:26:12,130 --> 00:26:14,352
minutes . That's cool . You want to ask 

693
00:26:14,352 --> 00:26:13,840
questions ? I am going to try to make 

694
00:26:13,840 --> 00:26:16,007
sure no one badgers the witnesses . If 

695
00:26:16,007 --> 00:26:18,007
you ask a question , you have to at 

696
00:26:18,007 --> 00:26:20,173
least give them the tiniest little bit 

697
00:26:20,173 --> 00:26:22,340
of a chance to answer uh , for cutting 

698
00:26:22,340 --> 00:26:24,340
off a filibuster is fine , but make 

699
00:26:24,340 --> 00:26:26,396
sure they have a chance to speak . I 

700
00:26:26,396 --> 00:26:28,173
don't want this to turn in to a 

701
00:26:28,173 --> 00:26:30,007
badgering session um , with that 

702
00:26:30,007 --> 00:26:32,290
focusing on Ukraine . Um it's important 

703
00:26:32,290 --> 00:26:34,457
to remember we passed the supplemental 

704
00:26:34,457 --> 00:26:36,623
budget just a couple of weeks ago . So 

705
00:26:36,623 --> 00:26:38,790
in addition to the number um , that we 

706
00:26:38,790 --> 00:26:41,090
have , we have roughly $14 billion 

707
00:26:41,090 --> 00:26:50,670
$14 

708
00:26:50,670 --> 00:26:52,503
billion dollars is a significant 

709
00:26:52,503 --> 00:26:54,726
investment . My question is What's most 

710
00:26:54,726 --> 00:26:56,781
important in that $14 billion ? What 

711
00:26:56,781 --> 00:26:59,003
what what are you using it for ? How is 

712
00:26:59,003 --> 00:27:01,226
that helping the fight in Ukraine ? The 

713
00:27:01,226 --> 00:27:04,310
sector ? Thank you , chairman . And and 

714
00:27:04,310 --> 00:27:07,080
thanks for the support that uh that you 

715
00:27:07,080 --> 00:27:09,170
continue to provide to uh to our 

716
00:27:09,170 --> 00:27:11,059
efforts to provide security force 

717
00:27:11,059 --> 00:27:14,980
assistance to Ukraine . I speak with my 

718
00:27:14,980 --> 00:27:17,680
counterpart , Minister Resnick aww 

719
00:27:17,690 --> 00:27:19,857
frequently . And as I said earlier , I 

720
00:27:19,857 --> 00:27:22,023
just spoke with them yesterday because 

721
00:27:22,023 --> 00:27:24,079
we do want to make sure that uh that 

722
00:27:24,079 --> 00:27:26,079
we're meeting their needs and we're 

723
00:27:26,079 --> 00:27:28,246
providing them to things that are most 

724
00:27:28,246 --> 00:27:30,600
useful uh to their to their fight . Ah 

725
00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:32,378
and and the things that we have 

726
00:27:32,378 --> 00:27:34,660
provided them , as you've seen have 

727
00:27:34,660 --> 00:27:37,540
been very very instrumental in their 

728
00:27:37,540 --> 00:27:41,450
efforts to blunt um the the advance of 

729
00:27:41,460 --> 00:27:45,100
an overwhelming Russia Russian force . 

730
00:27:45,640 --> 00:27:49,160
Uh , so what has been very helpful has 

731
00:27:49,160 --> 00:27:52,110
been the anti armor and anti aircraft 

732
00:27:52,110 --> 00:27:54,110
capability that we've provided them 

733
00:27:54,240 --> 00:27:58,190
also , the U . A . V . Capability 

734
00:27:58,190 --> 00:28:01,660
that that's been pushed in as well as , 

735
00:28:01,670 --> 00:28:03,892
you know , we have over a year over the 

736
00:28:03,892 --> 00:28:05,860
years provided them the ability to 

737
00:28:05,870 --> 00:28:08,220
communicate through tactical radios , 

738
00:28:08,230 --> 00:28:11,800
secure tactical radios that that , you 

739
00:28:11,800 --> 00:28:13,856
know , we pushed in over a number of 

740
00:28:13,856 --> 00:28:16,590
years . And they have been able to uh 

741
00:28:16,600 --> 00:28:18,656
to maintain command and control over 

742
00:28:18,656 --> 00:28:20,822
their forces throughout that's enabled 

743
00:28:20,822 --> 00:28:22,878
them to do things that have provided 

744
00:28:22,878 --> 00:28:25,210
them an advantage in certain cases . So 

745
00:28:25,220 --> 00:28:27,164
we will continue to focus on those 

746
00:28:27,164 --> 00:28:29,331
types of things that have been uh been 

747
00:28:29,331 --> 00:28:32,460
most useful to them as well as emerging 

748
00:28:32,460 --> 00:28:35,300
needs that the Minister of Defense 

749
00:28:35,310 --> 00:28:38,960
identifies . Thank you and for both of 

750
00:28:38,960 --> 00:28:41,720
you . What lessons have we learned as 

751
00:28:41,720 --> 00:28:43,850
we've watched the last month plus now 

752
00:28:43,850 --> 00:28:45,739
of the fight in Ukraine , because 

753
00:28:45,739 --> 00:28:47,739
you've got Russia as a global power 

754
00:28:47,739 --> 00:28:50,250
going up against a much much smaller , 

755
00:28:50,260 --> 00:28:53,410
less armed , less resourced foe and 

756
00:28:53,410 --> 00:28:56,730
struggling mightily in doing that . As 

757
00:28:56,730 --> 00:28:59,090
we look at what we need to build and 

758
00:28:59,090 --> 00:29:01,420
how we need to think about deterrence . 

759
00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:03,384
You know , we we all we want to be 

760
00:29:03,384 --> 00:29:05,496
ready for the fight if it comes . But 

761
00:29:05,496 --> 00:29:07,607
the main goal of what we're trying to 

762
00:29:07,607 --> 00:29:09,718
do here is to build a force that will 

763
00:29:09,718 --> 00:29:11,718
deter adversaries . Um , Iran china 

764
00:29:11,718 --> 00:29:13,940
Russia , you know , being at the top of 

765
00:29:13,940 --> 00:29:16,107
that list , North Korea , what have we 

766
00:29:16,107 --> 00:29:18,218
learned about what we would need . As 

767
00:29:18,218 --> 00:29:20,440
you see , I mean , obviously one of the 

768
00:29:20,440 --> 00:29:22,607
lessons is the tank isn't what it used 

769
00:29:22,607 --> 00:29:24,773
to be . How is that informing for both 

770
00:29:24,773 --> 00:29:26,551
of you ? What you think is most 

771
00:29:26,551 --> 00:29:28,718
important to fund to make sure that we 

772
00:29:28,718 --> 00:29:28,400
have that deterrence for for , for the 

773
00:29:28,400 --> 00:29:30,890
battlefield that we face today with the 

774
00:29:30,890 --> 00:29:32,612
technology that is available . 

775
00:29:35,730 --> 00:29:37,786
Well , we've learned that armed with 

776
00:29:37,786 --> 00:29:39,786
the with the right capabilities , a 

777
00:29:39,786 --> 00:29:43,690
determined force can do tremendous work 

778
00:29:43,690 --> 00:29:45,746
in terms of defending itself and the 

779
00:29:45,746 --> 00:29:48,230
Ukrainians demonstrate that each and 

780
00:29:48,230 --> 00:29:51,640
every day we we've seen them again 

781
00:29:51,640 --> 00:29:55,190
blunt the the advance of a far superior 

782
00:29:55,190 --> 00:29:58,060
force with respect to the Russians in 

783
00:29:58,060 --> 00:30:00,650
terms of numbers and capability by 

784
00:30:00,650 --> 00:30:03,790
using the right types of techniques and 

785
00:30:03,790 --> 00:30:06,090
the right uh , weapons systems , The 

786
00:30:06,090 --> 00:30:09,460
javelin , the Stingers have proven to 

787
00:30:09,460 --> 00:30:12,550
be very , very effective in this fight . 

788
00:30:13,040 --> 00:30:15,960
Um , we've also learned that 

789
00:30:16,740 --> 00:30:18,750
that just because you have the 

790
00:30:18,750 --> 00:30:20,639
capability , it doesn't mean that 

791
00:30:20,639 --> 00:30:23,350
you're gonna overwhelm another force 

792
00:30:23,360 --> 00:30:26,120
easily . The Russians had to have 

793
00:30:26,130 --> 00:30:29,250
significant mechanized capability . But 

794
00:30:29,250 --> 00:30:31,139
as you look at the techniques and 

795
00:30:31,139 --> 00:30:33,630
tactics procedures that they used , 

796
00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:35,751
they were not very effective . And so 

797
00:30:35,751 --> 00:30:37,807
you question the training , uh , the 

798
00:30:37,807 --> 00:30:40,170
leadership at the , at the , at the 

799
00:30:40,180 --> 00:30:42,402
noncommissioned level , noncommissioned 

800
00:30:42,402 --> 00:30:44,710
officer level and their ability to 

801
00:30:44,710 --> 00:30:47,510
provide basic logistics to a force that 

802
00:30:47,510 --> 00:30:49,621
size . Those are the things that have 

803
00:30:49,621 --> 00:30:51,677
given them significant problems over 

804
00:30:51,677 --> 00:30:54,040
the over the last several weeks , in 

805
00:30:54,040 --> 00:30:56,810
addition to their inability to link , 

806
00:30:56,820 --> 00:30:59,490
uh , you know , air power to , to the 

807
00:30:59,490 --> 00:31:01,720
ground effort . But there are a number 

808
00:31:01,720 --> 00:31:03,831
of lessons that have been learned , I 

809
00:31:03,831 --> 00:31:07,250
think , um , because the Russians have 

810
00:31:07,250 --> 00:31:09,194
not been effective and using their 

811
00:31:09,194 --> 00:31:11,610
their armor , uh , it does not mean 

812
00:31:11,620 --> 00:31:13,453
that armor is ineffective on the 

813
00:31:13,453 --> 00:31:15,509
battlefield going forward . It means 

814
00:31:15,509 --> 00:31:17,620
that they were ineffective because of 

815
00:31:17,620 --> 00:31:19,830
the things that they failed to do uh , 

816
00:31:19,840 --> 00:31:22,007
in this fight . Thank you , chairman . 

817
00:31:22,007 --> 00:31:24,760
Really just a couple of comments 

818
00:31:24,760 --> 00:31:26,704
briefly , one is the importance of 

819
00:31:26,704 --> 00:31:28,871
intelligence . We've had extraordinary 

820
00:31:28,871 --> 00:31:30,871
intelligence all throughout and the 

821
00:31:30,871 --> 00:31:33,093
intelligence sharing that we've enabled 

822
00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:36,580
Ukraine to see . So I wouldn't 

823
00:31:36,870 --> 00:31:38,981
suggest that it's at the level of the 

824
00:31:38,981 --> 00:31:41,092
ultra secret sort of thing from World 

825
00:31:41,092 --> 00:31:43,037
War Two . But the ability of us to 

826
00:31:43,037 --> 00:31:45,610
transmit information that is useful to 

827
00:31:45,610 --> 00:31:47,721
Ukraine has been enormously helpful I 

828
00:31:47,721 --> 00:31:49,832
believe to them . And and I talked to 

829
00:31:49,832 --> 00:31:51,999
my Ukrainian counterpart several times 

830
00:31:51,999 --> 00:31:53,943
a week . So he has reiterated that 

831
00:31:53,943 --> 00:31:55,666
multiple times secondly is the 

832
00:31:55,666 --> 00:31:55,390
importance of leadership . That's at 

833
00:31:55,390 --> 00:31:57,390
the national level . I think that's 

834
00:31:57,390 --> 00:31:59,501
been pretty clear with Zelensky , but 

835
00:31:59,501 --> 00:32:01,557
also at the tactical level . Ukraine 

836
00:32:01,557 --> 00:32:03,668
has been trained by the United States 

837
00:32:03,668 --> 00:32:05,834
since 2014 . Uh And they have given me 

838
00:32:05,834 --> 00:32:07,890
feedback personally saying that that 

839
00:32:07,890 --> 00:32:10,112
train has been quite effective in terms 

840
00:32:10,112 --> 00:32:12,001
of the concept of Mission command 

841
00:32:12,001 --> 00:32:14,279
distributed uh junior level leadership . 

842
00:32:14,279 --> 00:32:14,080
The development of an N . C . O . Corps , 

843
00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:16,380
junior officers that have initiative uh 

844
00:32:16,390 --> 00:32:18,612
That is not present in the Russian army 

845
00:32:18,612 --> 00:32:20,446
that is present right now in the 

846
00:32:20,446 --> 00:32:20,140
Ukrainian Army . And you see the 

847
00:32:20,140 --> 00:32:21,640
effects of Mission command 

848
00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:24,410
decentralized operation uh and and that 

849
00:32:24,410 --> 00:32:26,577
is working out extraordinarily well on 

850
00:32:26,577 --> 00:32:28,577
the battlefield . The third piece I 

851
00:32:28,577 --> 00:32:30,688
would say is focusing on that , which 

852
00:32:30,688 --> 00:32:32,410
gives you the best effect on a 

853
00:32:32,410 --> 00:32:34,632
battlefield which in this case has been 

854
00:32:34,632 --> 00:32:36,466
antitank weapons and air defense 

855
00:32:36,466 --> 00:32:38,410
weapons . To deny the Russians the 

856
00:32:38,410 --> 00:32:40,466
ability to maintain air supremacy or 

857
00:32:40,466 --> 00:32:42,632
even achieve air superiority . And the 

858
00:32:42,632 --> 00:32:42,430
last thing that you mentioned character 

859
00:32:42,430 --> 00:32:44,541
for one of the things we know is that 

860
00:32:44,541 --> 00:32:47,330
by mid century roughly speaking , 90% 

861
00:32:47,330 --> 00:32:49,330
of the eight or nine billion people 

862
00:32:49,330 --> 00:32:51,441
that are going to inhabit the earth , 

863
00:32:51,441 --> 00:32:53,663
they're gonna be living in highly dense 

864
00:32:53,663 --> 00:32:55,386
urban areas . Uh , so that the 

865
00:32:55,386 --> 00:32:57,163
character of war is gonna shift 

866
00:32:57,163 --> 00:32:59,386
character . We're being , how you fight 

867
00:32:59,386 --> 00:32:58,540
with what weapons you fight , the 

868
00:32:58,540 --> 00:33:00,540
organization's tactics , etcetera . 

869
00:33:00,540 --> 00:33:02,540
That is going to shift . We've seen 

870
00:33:02,540 --> 00:33:04,596
precursors of that in the battles of 

871
00:33:04,596 --> 00:33:06,707
Mosul and rocket , we're seeing again 

872
00:33:06,707 --> 00:33:08,651
Kiev , Kharkiv and all these urban 

873
00:33:08,651 --> 00:33:10,596
battles . So what you're seeing is 

874
00:33:10,596 --> 00:33:12,707
forces that are optimized to fight in 

875
00:33:12,707 --> 00:33:14,651
rural , wooded , rolling hill type 

876
00:33:14,651 --> 00:33:16,762
terrain are going to have very , very 

877
00:33:16,762 --> 00:33:18,929
difficult times in urban terrain . And 

878
00:33:18,929 --> 00:33:20,984
that proved true . And that's one of 

879
00:33:20,984 --> 00:33:20,670
the reasons why the Russians are 

880
00:33:20,670 --> 00:33:22,614
withdrawing from Kiev because they 

881
00:33:22,614 --> 00:33:24,837
couldn't mask the combat power to seize 

882
00:33:24,837 --> 00:33:26,892
Kiev . So , urban battle is going to 

883
00:33:26,892 --> 00:33:29,059
dominate land combat in the future and 

884
00:33:29,059 --> 00:33:31,600
that will then also drive . Our use of 

885
00:33:31,600 --> 00:33:33,822
helicopters are use of radios , are use 

886
00:33:33,822 --> 00:33:35,822
of tanks , armored vehicles , light 

887
00:33:35,822 --> 00:33:37,989
infantry , dismounted , light infantry 

888
00:33:37,989 --> 00:33:40,211
and so on , so forth . So there's a lot 

889
00:33:40,211 --> 00:33:39,810
of lessons to be learned and I've got a 

890
00:33:39,810 --> 00:33:41,921
whole laundry list we've been working 

891
00:33:41,921 --> 00:33:43,921
with the Ukrainians on , but that's 

892
00:33:43,921 --> 00:33:46,143
just the tip of the iceberg . Thank you 

893
00:33:46,143 --> 00:33:47,977
very much . Mr Rogers . Hey , Mr 

894
00:33:47,977 --> 00:33:50,088
Chairman , General Milley , last week 

895
00:33:50,088 --> 00:33:52,254
we had general Walters EUCOM commander 

896
00:33:52,254 --> 00:33:55,300
testified before us and and he stated 

897
00:33:55,300 --> 00:33:57,810
that it was his best military judgment 

898
00:33:57,810 --> 00:33:59,921
that we should reallocate some of our 

899
00:33:59,921 --> 00:34:01,930
european troops um , for permanent 

900
00:34:01,930 --> 00:34:04,620
basing and Poland Romania and in the 

901
00:34:04,620 --> 00:34:07,290
Baltics and your best military judgment 

902
00:34:07,300 --> 00:34:10,540
uh is that a good deterrent for us to 

903
00:34:10,550 --> 00:34:14,410
pursue ? I think 

904
00:34:14,410 --> 00:34:16,480
actual presence is always a good 

905
00:34:16,480 --> 00:34:18,990
deterrent relative to a given threat . 

906
00:34:19,000 --> 00:34:20,930
As a general rule of thumb . With 

907
00:34:20,930 --> 00:34:23,152
respect to what general walter said , I 

908
00:34:23,152 --> 00:34:25,810
have a slight modification to my view . 

909
00:34:25,810 --> 00:34:28,070
Anyway . My advice would be uh to 

910
00:34:28,070 --> 00:34:29,903
create permanent bases but don't 

911
00:34:29,903 --> 00:34:31,970
permanently station . So you get the 

912
00:34:31,970 --> 00:34:34,330
effect of permanence by rotational 

913
00:34:34,330 --> 00:34:36,860
forces cycling through permanent bases 

914
00:34:37,340 --> 00:34:39,396
and and what you don't have to do is 

915
00:34:39,396 --> 00:34:42,380
incur the cost of family moves , PX 

916
00:34:42,380 --> 00:34:44,324
schools , housing and that sort of 

917
00:34:44,324 --> 00:34:45,936
thing . So you cycle through 

918
00:34:45,936 --> 00:34:47,991
expeditionary forces through forward 

919
00:34:47,991 --> 00:34:49,824
deployed permanent bases . And I 

920
00:34:49,824 --> 00:34:51,769
believe that a lot of our european 

921
00:34:51,769 --> 00:34:53,824
allies , especially those such as in 

922
00:34:53,824 --> 00:34:55,824
the Baltics or Poland or Romania or 

923
00:34:55,824 --> 00:34:57,658
elsewhere , they are very , very 

924
00:34:57,658 --> 00:34:59,824
willing to establish permanent bases , 

925
00:34:59,824 --> 00:35:01,880
They'll build them , they'll pay for 

926
00:35:01,880 --> 00:35:03,880
them etcetera . And for us to cycle 

927
00:35:03,880 --> 00:35:06,047
through on a rotational basis . So you 

928
00:35:06,047 --> 00:35:08,269
get the effect of permanent presence of 

929
00:35:08,269 --> 00:35:08,250
forces but the actual individual 

930
00:35:08,260 --> 00:35:10,316
soldier , sailor , airman Marine are 

931
00:35:10,316 --> 00:35:12,538
not permanently stationed there for two 

932
00:35:12,538 --> 00:35:14,593
or three years . Great , thank you . 

933
00:35:14,593 --> 00:35:16,482
Secretary Austin . We had celeste 

934
00:35:16,482 --> 00:35:18,482
Wallander in here and ask her about 

935
00:35:18,482 --> 00:35:20,704
this basing issue . And if the decision 

936
00:35:20,704 --> 00:35:22,593
is close to being made , she said 

937
00:35:22,593 --> 00:35:24,816
they're working on it . Can you tell me 

938
00:35:24,816 --> 00:35:24,450
something with more clarity about when 

939
00:35:24,450 --> 00:35:26,617
we can expect a decision on this basic 

940
00:35:26,617 --> 00:35:30,550
issue as you would expect ranking 

941
00:35:30,550 --> 00:35:34,280
member Rogers Member Rogers NATO is 

942
00:35:34,280 --> 00:35:36,336
going through a process right now to 

943
00:35:36,336 --> 00:35:39,530
really kind of assess how the we expect 

944
00:35:39,530 --> 00:35:41,810
that the , the security architecture in 

945
00:35:41,810 --> 00:35:44,160
the region is going to change for the 

946
00:35:44,160 --> 00:35:46,271
foreseeable future or has changed for 

947
00:35:46,271 --> 00:35:48,750
the foreseeable future . Ah , with that 

948
00:35:48,750 --> 00:35:50,990
in mind then , you know , we'll look to 

949
00:35:50,990 --> 00:35:54,410
work with with NATO to if NATO deems 

950
00:35:54,410 --> 00:35:56,730
that it's appropriate to uh , to change 

951
00:35:56,730 --> 00:35:59,350
its footprint , then certainly we'll be 

952
00:35:59,350 --> 00:36:01,406
a part of that . Our goal is to make 

953
00:36:01,406 --> 00:36:04,680
sure that we continue to reassure our 

954
00:36:04,690 --> 00:36:06,857
allies and partners , especially those 

955
00:36:06,857 --> 00:36:08,870
that are on the eastern flank and 

956
00:36:08,870 --> 00:36:12,860
especially our allies 

957
00:36:12,860 --> 00:36:14,749
that are in the Baltic area , the 

958
00:36:14,749 --> 00:36:17,320
Baltic region . So this is a work in 

959
00:36:17,320 --> 00:36:20,160
progress as secretary Wallander said . 

960
00:36:20,630 --> 00:36:23,840
Um , and I suspect that . Well , I 

961
00:36:23,850 --> 00:36:27,240
expect that we'll discuss this as we go 

962
00:36:27,240 --> 00:36:29,150
into the june summit . 

963
00:36:31,190 --> 00:36:33,412
Well , I can't think of a better signal 

964
00:36:33,412 --> 00:36:35,523
that we can send to our allies and to 

965
00:36:35,523 --> 00:36:37,523
Putin that we are committed to NATO 

966
00:36:37,523 --> 00:36:40,050
than this basing issue . Um , I am 

967
00:36:40,050 --> 00:36:42,217
concerned that with the budget that it 

968
00:36:42,217 --> 00:36:44,272
only had one patriot battery in it . 

969
00:36:44,272 --> 00:36:46,540
And in my position , in my view , we 

970
00:36:46,550 --> 00:36:49,580
need at least three . I know we have a 

971
00:36:49,580 --> 00:36:53,320
manning issue with that , but General 

972
00:36:53,320 --> 00:36:55,690
Milley in your opinion , could we use , 

973
00:36:55,700 --> 00:36:57,533
do we need more than one patriot 

974
00:36:57,533 --> 00:36:59,256
battery In addition to what we 

975
00:36:59,256 --> 00:37:02,750
currently have an inventory . Um , 

976
00:37:04,030 --> 00:37:06,430
thanks congressman . The patriot is one 

977
00:37:06,430 --> 00:37:08,597
of those systems that's in huge demand 

978
00:37:08,830 --> 00:37:12,790
worldwide . We've got 15 battalions . I 

979
00:37:12,790 --> 00:37:15,110
think it is in the army and one of 

980
00:37:15,110 --> 00:37:17,332
those is really an experimental type or 

981
00:37:17,332 --> 00:37:19,770
training units . So Call it 14 for 

982
00:37:19,770 --> 00:37:21,881
deployment . We've got several spread 

983
00:37:21,881 --> 00:37:24,550
out in the Middle East , Asia and in 

984
00:37:24,560 --> 00:37:27,380
europe . And they are in a very , very 

985
00:37:27,380 --> 00:37:29,269
high op tempo , high , one of the 

986
00:37:29,269 --> 00:37:31,500
highest in the force . So additional 

987
00:37:31,500 --> 00:37:33,556
patriot is always a good thing . Now 

988
00:37:33,556 --> 00:37:35,111
having said that patriot is 

989
00:37:35,111 --> 00:37:37,111
extraordinarily expensive , takes a 

990
00:37:37,111 --> 00:37:39,190
long time to train on it . So one 

991
00:37:39,270 --> 00:37:42,530
method could be to produce Patriot sell 

992
00:37:42,530 --> 00:37:44,474
them to allies and partners . That 

993
00:37:44,474 --> 00:37:46,641
would be a technique that could work . 

994
00:37:46,641 --> 00:37:48,697
We've done that in the Middle East . 

995
00:37:48,697 --> 00:37:51,030
Another one is to produce patriots , uh , 

996
00:37:51,030 --> 00:37:53,086
and loan them to allied partners and 

997
00:37:53,086 --> 00:37:54,974
train the soldiers from the other 

998
00:37:54,974 --> 00:37:57,141
countries because our soldiers in that 

999
00:37:57,141 --> 00:37:59,363
particular M . O . S . We would have to 

1000
00:37:59,363 --> 00:38:01,363
expand the numbers significantly of 

1001
00:38:01,363 --> 00:38:03,363
those troops that man Patriot . But 

1002
00:38:03,363 --> 00:38:05,474
there's a couple of different ways to 

1003
00:38:05,474 --> 00:38:04,720
go about it . But I think patriot is 

1004
00:38:04,720 --> 00:38:06,831
one of the systems that is definitely 

1005
00:38:06,831 --> 00:38:09,053
worth investing in . Well , that's what 

1006
00:38:09,053 --> 00:38:11,109
I would like to see us do . I'd like 

1007
00:38:11,109 --> 00:38:12,887
for us to instead of buying one 

1008
00:38:12,887 --> 00:38:15,109
additional like versus the two by three 

1009
00:38:15,109 --> 00:38:17,220
and then use at least two of those in 

1010
00:38:17,220 --> 00:38:19,680
along the the european eastern european 

1011
00:38:19,680 --> 00:38:23,220
flank on a loan basis and and let them 

1012
00:38:23,230 --> 00:38:26,840
man them . But for our 

1013
00:38:26,850 --> 00:38:29,760
needs alone , we need at least one more 

1014
00:38:29,770 --> 00:38:32,150
outside of eastern europe . And uh , so 

1015
00:38:32,160 --> 00:38:34,327
I hope the budget that we come up with 

1016
00:38:34,327 --> 00:38:36,327
does reflect that last question I'd 

1017
00:38:36,327 --> 00:38:38,550
have and I know it's hard to answer , 

1018
00:38:38,550 --> 00:38:42,130
but this would be for Secretary Austin . 

1019
00:38:42,140 --> 00:38:45,480
Uh , we've just given in in this 

1020
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:48,130
current year , fiscal year a 6% 

1021
00:38:48,130 --> 00:38:50,540
increase . I know you just got the 

1022
00:38:50,540 --> 00:38:52,484
omnibus bill in the last couple of 

1023
00:38:52,484 --> 00:38:55,090
weeks to fund it . Uh , but do you have 

1024
00:38:55,090 --> 00:38:57,146
any idea how you're going to keep up 

1025
00:38:57,146 --> 00:38:59,146
with inflation ? Given that we just 

1026
00:38:59,146 --> 00:39:01,368
plus you up by 6% ? But we're living in 

1027
00:39:01,368 --> 00:39:03,680
an 8% inflation world . I would say 

1028
00:39:03,680 --> 00:39:06,890
that this is uh , this is a very robust 

1029
00:39:06,890 --> 00:39:10,040
budget that we've we've asked for . Uh 

1030
00:39:10,050 --> 00:39:13,860
and uh , and I think uh , ranking 

1031
00:39:13,860 --> 00:39:15,790
member Rogers that we can we can 

1032
00:39:15,790 --> 00:39:17,901
address our needs with what's in this 

1033
00:39:17,901 --> 00:39:20,200
budget . And clearly , you know , when 

1034
00:39:20,210 --> 00:39:22,210
we snapped the chalk line , when we 

1035
00:39:22,210 --> 00:39:24,321
built the budget , inflation was at a 

1036
00:39:24,321 --> 00:39:26,488
different point . But but I think this 

1037
00:39:26,488 --> 00:39:28,654
budget gives us the capability uh , to 

1038
00:39:28,654 --> 00:39:30,710
go after the types of things that we 

1039
00:39:30,710 --> 00:39:32,860
believe that we need to support our 

1040
00:39:32,860 --> 00:39:35,440
strategy and uh , and give us uh , the 

1041
00:39:35,440 --> 00:39:37,551
warfighting capabilities that we need 

1042
00:39:37,620 --> 00:39:39,840
on the patriot battery issue . I I 

1043
00:39:39,840 --> 00:39:42,210
absolutely agree with you . Uh , you 

1044
00:39:42,210 --> 00:39:44,990
know , we we do need more if you take a 

1045
00:39:44,990 --> 00:39:47,110
look at what we're doing across the 

1046
00:39:47,110 --> 00:39:49,700
fight up , we are going to invest in in 

1047
00:39:49,710 --> 00:39:52,320
additional patriot batteries going 

1048
00:39:52,320 --> 00:39:54,420
forward . We expect to have three 

1049
00:39:54,420 --> 00:39:57,900
batteries by the end of 26 . Thank you . 

1050
00:39:57,900 --> 00:40:00,090
Mr Chairman . Mr Landman is recognized 

1051
00:40:00,090 --> 00:40:01,979
for five minutes . Thank you . Mr 

1052
00:40:01,979 --> 00:40:03,701
Chairman , I want to thank our 

1053
00:40:03,701 --> 00:40:05,868
witnesses for your testimony today and 

1054
00:40:05,868 --> 00:40:07,923
thank you for your service to our to 

1055
00:40:07,923 --> 00:40:10,146
our country . Um , I applaud everything 

1056
00:40:10,146 --> 00:40:12,600
that we're doing to put weapons in the 

1057
00:40:12,600 --> 00:40:14,750
hands of the Ukrainian people . Thank 

1058
00:40:14,750 --> 00:40:16,583
you for making that happen under 

1059
00:40:16,583 --> 00:40:18,583
President Biden's leadership . Um , 

1060
00:40:18,910 --> 00:40:20,970
obviously they've shown incredible 

1061
00:40:20,970 --> 00:40:23,060
resilience and effectiveness of the 

1062
00:40:23,060 --> 00:40:25,282
weapons that we have given them to push 

1063
00:40:25,282 --> 00:40:27,171
back against the Russians and the 

1064
00:40:27,171 --> 00:40:29,504
javelins and the stingers in particular . 

1065
00:40:29,504 --> 00:40:31,671
And but because we all want to do more 

1066
00:40:31,671 --> 00:40:33,616
and Mr Secretary , you and I had a 

1067
00:40:33,616 --> 00:40:35,782
conversation the pentagon not long ago 

1068
00:40:35,782 --> 00:40:37,949
about uh , more lethal weapons systems 

1069
00:40:37,949 --> 00:40:40,560
and you did respond saying that uh , it 

1070
00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:42,560
doesn't do us any good to give them 

1071
00:40:42,560 --> 00:40:44,504
weapons that the Ukrainians aren't 

1072
00:40:44,504 --> 00:40:46,504
trained to use , which I agree with 

1073
00:40:46,504 --> 00:40:46,170
that . But now that we have the luxury 

1074
00:40:46,170 --> 00:40:48,920
of time , are we identifying those more 

1075
00:40:48,920 --> 00:40:51,087
lethal weapons systems that would help 

1076
00:40:51,087 --> 00:40:52,976
them to be even more effective at 

1077
00:40:52,976 --> 00:40:55,142
fighting against the Russians with the 

1078
00:40:55,142 --> 00:40:57,087
minimal amount of training that we 

1079
00:40:57,087 --> 00:40:59,198
could give some of the Ukrainians and 

1080
00:40:59,198 --> 00:40:58,910
get those more sophisticated weapons 

1081
00:40:58,910 --> 00:41:02,900
systems into their hands . Yes , 

1082
00:41:02,900 --> 00:41:05,930
we we are doing that . And um , 

1083
00:41:06,810 --> 00:41:10,250
I think if you look at the latest the 

1084
00:41:10,250 --> 00:41:12,083
inventory of the latest round of 

1085
00:41:12,083 --> 00:41:14,028
assistance that we provided them . 

1086
00:41:14,028 --> 00:41:16,290
There . There are U . A . V . S . Like 

1087
00:41:16,290 --> 00:41:18,290
the switchblade . U A . V . That we 

1088
00:41:18,290 --> 00:41:20,940
discussed earlier that is uh that is , 

1089
00:41:21,310 --> 00:41:23,660
you know , a higher level of technology 

1090
00:41:23,670 --> 00:41:26,490
but provides some additional capability 

1091
00:41:26,490 --> 00:41:29,180
to go after armored formations and that 

1092
00:41:29,180 --> 00:41:31,402
sort of thing . And we continue to work 

1093
00:41:31,402 --> 00:41:35,110
with our allies two to see what they 

1094
00:41:35,110 --> 00:41:37,770
may have in their inventory to be able 

1095
00:41:37,770 --> 00:41:39,881
to kind of up the game there in terms 

1096
00:41:39,881 --> 00:41:42,870
of additional capability . So again we 

1097
00:41:42,870 --> 00:41:44,870
continue to interact with them on a 

1098
00:41:44,870 --> 00:41:47,640
daily basis uh and uh endeavor to meet 

1099
00:41:47,640 --> 00:41:49,820
their needs as a situation of balls . 

1100
00:41:50,810 --> 00:41:52,921
Thank you . Let me try to cyber for a 

1101
00:41:52,921 --> 00:41:54,810
minute . Secretary , Last in last 

1102
00:41:54,810 --> 00:41:56,643
year's testimony , I asked you a 

1103
00:41:56,643 --> 00:41:59,030
question that I like to revisit . The 

1104
00:41:59,030 --> 00:42:01,650
Department of Defense recognizes five 

1105
00:42:01,710 --> 00:42:04,070
warfighter domains , air , land , sea , 

1106
00:42:04,070 --> 00:42:06,950
space and cyberspace . In the case of 

1107
00:42:06,960 --> 00:42:08,960
four of these , the senior civilian 

1108
00:42:08,960 --> 00:42:12,670
responsible for this uh domain is uh is 

1109
00:42:12,670 --> 00:42:14,781
a service Secretary . However , uh in 

1110
00:42:14,781 --> 00:42:16,960
the cyber domain , uh the senior most 

1111
00:42:16,960 --> 00:42:19,960
civilian official is four rungs below 

1112
00:42:19,960 --> 00:42:22,440
in that hierarchy . Obviously this 

1113
00:42:22,440 --> 00:42:24,329
seems like an imbalance . Can you 

1114
00:42:24,329 --> 00:42:27,780
explain to us why this does or does not 

1115
00:42:27,950 --> 00:42:31,510
make sense ? Well , thank you , sir . 

1116
00:42:31,510 --> 00:42:34,840
Well , cyber is a warfighting domain . 

1117
00:42:34,850 --> 00:42:38,600
There is not a cyber force like there 

1118
00:42:38,600 --> 00:42:41,510
is with special operations forces with 

1119
00:42:41,520 --> 00:42:44,230
with the army forces . Space Forces . 

1120
00:42:44,600 --> 00:42:47,600
So there is not a secretary . Uh 

1121
00:42:47,610 --> 00:42:49,730
Service Secretary uh you know , 

1122
00:42:49,730 --> 00:42:53,250
designated the head of the cyber 

1123
00:42:53,250 --> 00:42:57,050
command obviously reports to uh to 

1124
00:42:57,050 --> 00:43:00,850
me and uh and he also is uh is 

1125
00:43:00,850 --> 00:43:04,480
supervised by the by my undersecretary 

1126
00:43:04,480 --> 00:43:06,960
for policy . And , and so we have a 

1127
00:43:06,960 --> 00:43:09,060
number of checks and balances that 

1128
00:43:09,060 --> 00:43:10,949
provides civilian oversight . But 

1129
00:43:10,949 --> 00:43:13,290
because he's not , there is not a 

1130
00:43:13,290 --> 00:43:15,390
separate service , there's not a 

1131
00:43:15,390 --> 00:43:18,280
service secretary designate . Well , 

1132
00:43:18,280 --> 00:43:20,920
I'm I'm I I remain concerned about this , 

1133
00:43:20,930 --> 00:43:23,097
this this structure and I think that's 

1134
00:43:23,097 --> 00:43:25,263
something we're gonna have to continue 

1135
00:43:25,263 --> 00:43:27,263
to to to look at . Especially since 

1136
00:43:27,263 --> 00:43:29,486
cyber the the U . S . Cyber Command and 

1137
00:43:29,486 --> 00:43:31,708
cyber mission force , which can be , it 

1138
00:43:31,708 --> 00:43:33,870
is highly effective . I still think 

1139
00:43:33,870 --> 00:43:36,620
that we need to elevate the civilian 

1140
00:43:36,800 --> 00:43:39,730
oversight on this and involvement . Um , 

1141
00:43:40,300 --> 00:43:42,990
let me turn to something else . The so 

1142
00:43:42,990 --> 00:43:45,101
called Valley of Death often makes it 

1143
00:43:45,101 --> 00:43:47,323
impossible for technology to transition 

1144
00:43:47,323 --> 00:43:49,434
from non traditional organizations to 

1145
00:43:49,434 --> 00:43:51,323
programs of record to support the 

1146
00:43:51,323 --> 00:43:53,323
warfighter . What is the department 

1147
00:43:53,323 --> 00:43:55,434
doing to solve this problem ? And how 

1148
00:43:55,434 --> 00:43:57,546
does this budget request reflect that 

1149
00:43:57,546 --> 00:44:00,020
effort ? Well , we've 

1150
00:44:00,590 --> 00:44:04,220
we've established an initiative , 

1151
00:44:04,230 --> 00:44:07,940
uh it's a it's a reserve , it's called 

1152
00:44:07,940 --> 00:44:11,100
raider . That uh that encourages joint 

1153
00:44:11,110 --> 00:44:13,580
uh experiment , uh joint 

1154
00:44:13,580 --> 00:44:15,420
experimentation and encourages 

1155
00:44:15,790 --> 00:44:18,680
entrepreneurs to come in and and bring 

1156
00:44:18,680 --> 00:44:22,190
their their capabilities forward . And 

1157
00:44:22,190 --> 00:44:24,246
and hopefully using initiatives like 

1158
00:44:24,246 --> 00:44:27,140
that . We can help bridge this Valley 

1159
00:44:27,140 --> 00:44:29,473
of Death . That that you mentioned here . 

1160
00:44:29,473 --> 00:44:31,640
This is very important to us . We want 

1161
00:44:31,640 --> 00:44:33,862
to make sure that uh that we're getting 

1162
00:44:33,862 --> 00:44:36,029
the best that's available out there in 

1163
00:44:36,029 --> 00:44:38,084
terms of technology and capability . 

1164
00:44:38,084 --> 00:44:41,010
And so we'll continue to focus on that 

1165
00:44:41,010 --> 00:44:43,230
particular issue . But I I think it's 

1166
00:44:43,230 --> 00:44:45,630
really important to make sure that the 

1167
00:44:45,640 --> 00:44:48,730
the the small entrepreneurs have a 

1168
00:44:48,730 --> 00:44:51,280
chance to get their products uh you 

1169
00:44:51,280 --> 00:44:53,670
know , in the inventory , I couldn't 

1170
00:44:53,670 --> 00:44:55,448
agree more . We have incredible 

1171
00:44:55,448 --> 00:44:57,559
entrepreneurs out there that can help 

1172
00:44:57,559 --> 00:44:59,892
meet the warfighter even more effective . 

1173
00:44:59,892 --> 00:44:59,780
We want to make sure they have that 

1174
00:44:59,780 --> 00:45:01,947
opportunity to do so how you back ? Mr 

1175
00:45:01,947 --> 00:45:03,947
Chairman , thank you . Mr Turner is 

1176
00:45:03,947 --> 00:45:06,280
recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 

1177
00:45:06,280 --> 00:45:08,502
Mr Chairman , gentlemen , thank you for 

1178
00:45:08,502 --> 00:45:08,200
your service and your leadership . Um 

1179
00:45:08,210 --> 00:45:10,760
we we were all very concerned as the 

1180
00:45:10,760 --> 00:45:13,890
war broke out in Ukraine as 

1181
00:45:13,900 --> 00:45:17,580
to the concern about weapons 

1182
00:45:17,580 --> 00:45:20,200
getting into Ukraine , we had advocated 

1183
00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:22,311
for the administration to give lethal 

1184
00:45:22,311 --> 00:45:24,144
assistance to Ukraine before the 

1185
00:45:24,144 --> 00:45:26,610
conflict occurred after the conflict 

1186
00:45:26,610 --> 00:45:29,010
occurred . Um we were very concerned 

1187
00:45:29,010 --> 00:45:31,066
about how quickly things would would 

1188
00:45:31,066 --> 00:45:32,954
get in . Both of you had given us 

1189
00:45:32,954 --> 00:45:35,010
assurances that you were doing so in 

1190
00:45:35,010 --> 00:45:37,121
doing so quickly . I think we've seen 

1191
00:45:37,121 --> 00:45:39,454
the evidence of that on the battlefield . 

1192
00:45:39,454 --> 00:45:39,250
So I want to thank you for your , your 

1193
00:45:39,250 --> 00:45:41,306
efforts . I think the whole world is 

1194
00:45:41,306 --> 00:45:44,990
seeing um the the effectiveness of us 

1195
00:45:44,990 --> 00:45:47,046
lethal aid that is being provided to 

1196
00:45:47,046 --> 00:45:49,268
Ukraine . And that brings me to my area 

1197
00:45:49,268 --> 00:45:51,490
of question . Um you know , the ranking 

1198
00:45:51,490 --> 00:45:53,434
member had raised the issue of the 

1199
00:45:53,434 --> 00:45:55,379
budget and the top line and that's 

1200
00:45:55,379 --> 00:45:57,601
certainly important to other components 

1201
00:45:57,601 --> 00:45:59,823
under your responsibility are also cost 

1202
00:45:59,823 --> 00:46:01,990
cost structures . How do we manage the 

1203
00:46:01,990 --> 00:46:03,934
overall cost ? If we give you more 

1204
00:46:03,934 --> 00:46:03,650
money , but we don't manage it 

1205
00:46:03,650 --> 00:46:05,928
effectively , we don't really buy more . 

1206
00:46:05,980 --> 00:46:08,313
Another issue is the rate of production , 

1207
00:46:08,313 --> 00:46:10,369
how quickly things get where they're 

1208
00:46:10,369 --> 00:46:12,202
going . Now , I think one of the 

1209
00:46:12,202 --> 00:46:14,313
lessons from Ukraine to our allies is 

1210
00:46:14,313 --> 00:46:16,147
going to be the need for them to 

1211
00:46:16,147 --> 00:46:18,369
stockpile weapons . We have a number of 

1212
00:46:18,369 --> 00:46:20,480
weapons that have been used by the US 

1213
00:46:20,480 --> 00:46:22,591
and our allies that are going to have 

1214
00:46:22,591 --> 00:46:24,702
to be backfilled . And then our whole 

1215
00:46:24,702 --> 00:46:24,590
inventory concept is going to have to 

1216
00:46:24,590 --> 00:46:26,701
change as we look to the fact that we 

1217
00:46:26,701 --> 00:46:29,300
now have an aggressive Russia , Mr 

1218
00:46:29,300 --> 00:46:31,467
Secretary , How do you view this issue 

1219
00:46:31,467 --> 00:46:33,022
of what we need to be doing 

1220
00:46:33,022 --> 00:46:35,133
specifically in the areas of missiles 

1221
00:46:35,133 --> 00:46:37,244
and ammunition so that we can get the 

1222
00:46:37,244 --> 00:46:39,189
defense industrial base to ramp up 

1223
00:46:39,189 --> 00:46:41,300
production and also lower overall our 

1224
00:46:41,300 --> 00:46:43,300
costs . Well , thanks sir , this is 

1225
00:46:43,430 --> 00:46:45,900
obviously a very important issue for us 

1226
00:46:45,910 --> 00:46:49,710
for us and and my staff is working hard 

1227
00:46:49,710 --> 00:46:52,160
to ensure that uh , you know , we have 

1228
00:46:52,170 --> 00:46:54,920
uh , we even , we have engaged industry 

1229
00:46:54,920 --> 00:46:56,753
and we have highlighted what our 

1230
00:46:56,753 --> 00:46:58,976
requirements are and we're working with 

1231
00:46:58,976 --> 00:47:01,530
them to , to speed up the process uh , 

1232
00:47:01,540 --> 00:47:04,250
to to replenish those stocks that that 

1233
00:47:04,250 --> 00:47:06,810
you mentioned . Uh and uh , I'm 

1234
00:47:06,810 --> 00:47:08,643
optimistic that we'll be able to 

1235
00:47:08,643 --> 00:47:10,810
truncate the , you know , the forecast 

1236
00:47:10,810 --> 00:47:12,977
of timelines that we got to early on , 

1237
00:47:12,977 --> 00:47:15,310
But this is very , very important to us . 

1238
00:47:15,310 --> 00:47:17,532
We not only have to replenish our stock 

1239
00:47:17,532 --> 00:47:19,754
images , we have to also make sure that 

1240
00:47:19,754 --> 00:47:22,130
those allies who who volunteer to 

1241
00:47:22,130 --> 00:47:25,460
provide capability to the effort . And 

1242
00:47:25,460 --> 00:47:27,880
it was if it's US capability , we were 

1243
00:47:27,880 --> 00:47:31,050
able to replenish those stocks as well . 

1244
00:47:31,060 --> 00:47:33,910
So we're working very hard . Industry 

1245
00:47:33,910 --> 00:47:36,132
has been responsive . Uh , and uh , and 

1246
00:47:36,132 --> 00:47:37,799
if we need additional help or 

1247
00:47:37,799 --> 00:47:39,854
authorities from Congress , we won't 

1248
00:47:39,854 --> 00:47:42,021
hesitate to ask , actually , because I 

1249
00:47:42,021 --> 00:47:44,243
appreciate you mentioning , because the 

1250
00:47:44,243 --> 00:47:46,354
the timelines that we're hearing from 

1251
00:47:46,354 --> 00:47:48,632
you are certainly very concerning . Um , 

1252
00:47:48,880 --> 00:47:50,880
and I hope that that you're able to 

1253
00:47:50,880 --> 00:47:53,047
move this to some extent . I think the 

1254
00:47:53,047 --> 00:47:55,158
defense industrial base looks at some 

1255
00:47:55,158 --> 00:47:57,324
of these weapons production systems as 

1256
00:47:57,324 --> 00:47:57,270
annuities rather than actual 

1257
00:47:57,420 --> 00:47:59,364
contributions to national security 

1258
00:47:59,364 --> 00:48:01,642
because when we need to turn that dial , 

1259
00:48:01,642 --> 00:48:03,809
they need to be able to respond . That 

1260
00:48:03,809 --> 00:48:03,780
takes me to the next topic you recently 

1261
00:48:03,780 --> 00:48:05,613
called in the defense industrial 

1262
00:48:05,613 --> 00:48:08,280
community that were involved in the 

1263
00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:12,050
hyper sonics um development to have a 

1264
00:48:12,060 --> 00:48:14,227
discussion as to how we can speed that 

1265
00:48:14,227 --> 00:48:16,227
up . We're behind our adversaries . 

1266
00:48:16,227 --> 00:48:18,449
Could you tell us how that's how that's 

1267
00:48:18,449 --> 00:48:20,616
turning out ? Yeah . When we say we're 

1268
00:48:20,616 --> 00:48:23,400
behind our adversaries , I think . Mhm . 

1269
00:48:25,170 --> 00:48:27,500
I think we have to be careful now , 

1270
00:48:27,870 --> 00:48:30,380
Hypersonic is a capability , sir , but 

1271
00:48:30,380 --> 00:48:33,880
it's not the only capability I 

1272
00:48:33,890 --> 00:48:36,001
seriously just we have a short period 

1273
00:48:36,001 --> 00:48:38,001
of time . I really want to hear how 

1274
00:48:38,001 --> 00:48:40,168
your meeting and they need to speed it 

1275
00:48:40,168 --> 00:48:42,112
up . I mean , you can tell me that 

1276
00:48:42,112 --> 00:48:41,420
there are other systems , but we're 

1277
00:48:41,420 --> 00:48:43,740
talking hypersonic and there are other 

1278
00:48:43,740 --> 00:48:45,796
systems and we look for a balance of 

1279
00:48:45,796 --> 00:48:47,573
capabilities that match our our 

1280
00:48:47,573 --> 00:48:51,190
warfighting um concepts here and and so 

1281
00:48:51,190 --> 00:48:53,246
yeah I have engaged industry and and 

1282
00:48:53,246 --> 00:48:55,500
asked them to uh to make sure that 

1283
00:48:55,500 --> 00:48:57,700
they're leaning into the this issue of 

1284
00:48:57,700 --> 00:48:59,450
hypersonic development . Most 

1285
00:48:59,450 --> 00:49:01,520
importantly I've asked them to make 

1286
00:49:01,520 --> 00:49:03,576
sure that they're working with us on 

1287
00:49:03,576 --> 00:49:05,687
how we're gonna defend ourselves with 

1288
00:49:05,687 --> 00:49:08,040
respect to hypersonic six . Uh and uh 

1289
00:49:08,050 --> 00:49:10,450
and you know my my staff my R . And D . 

1290
00:49:10,450 --> 00:49:14,430
Staff is is working with them to ensure 

1291
00:49:14,430 --> 00:49:17,630
that that they have good visibility if 

1292
00:49:17,630 --> 00:49:19,630
we did what we appreciate that . Mr 

1293
00:49:19,630 --> 00:49:21,852
Secretary General I have a question for 

1294
00:49:21,852 --> 00:49:24,019
you uh the sea launched cruise missile 

1295
00:49:24,019 --> 00:49:26,130
slick um was zeroed out . Um You have 

1296
00:49:26,130 --> 00:49:28,352
previously stated the importance of the 

1297
00:49:28,352 --> 00:49:30,463
low yield nuclear weapon and that and 

1298
00:49:30,463 --> 00:49:32,519
that you supported it . I'm assuming 

1299
00:49:32,519 --> 00:49:35,020
you have not changed your position . I 

1300
00:49:35,020 --> 00:49:37,242
have not . That's correct . Thank you . 

1301
00:49:37,242 --> 00:49:40,710
You're back . Thank you Mr Larson thank 

1302
00:49:40,710 --> 00:49:42,710
you . I just said thanks for coming 

1303
00:49:42,710 --> 00:49:45,580
today . Just maybe a turning to some 

1304
00:49:45,580 --> 00:49:47,636
other issues in the defense budget . 

1305
00:49:47,636 --> 00:49:51,490
Perhaps for the secretary on the 

1306
00:49:51,500 --> 00:49:53,167
generally on the research and 

1307
00:49:53,167 --> 00:49:55,333
development and science and technology 

1308
00:49:55,333 --> 00:49:57,520
across the enterprise . How would you 

1309
00:49:57,530 --> 00:50:00,990
characterize that ? The budget proposal ? 

1310
00:50:02,520 --> 00:50:06,420
It's the largest Amount that 

1311
00:50:06,430 --> 00:50:08,840
we've ever asked for uh in our budget 

1312
00:50:08,850 --> 00:50:10,820
it's $130 billion . So that's a 

1313
00:50:10,820 --> 00:50:14,480
substantial amount And is it um 

1314
00:50:14,960 --> 00:50:18,950
uh how how would you characterize how 

1315
00:50:18,950 --> 00:50:22,540
it's allocated not by service but by um 

1316
00:50:22,550 --> 00:50:24,661
the timing of the investment to get a 

1317
00:50:24,661 --> 00:50:26,950
result if you will to meet this speed 

1318
00:50:26,950 --> 00:50:29,170
of relevance and and and catching up 

1319
00:50:29,170 --> 00:50:32,380
with with peer competitors in certain 

1320
00:50:32,380 --> 00:50:36,160
areas ? Well I think of 

1321
00:50:36,160 --> 00:50:38,382
course as you know if you recall in the 

1322
00:50:38,382 --> 00:50:40,930
22 budget we invested heavily in R . D . 

1323
00:50:40,930 --> 00:50:43,430
T . And E . As well . And so there are 

1324
00:50:43,430 --> 00:50:45,374
a number of capabilities that that 

1325
00:50:45,374 --> 00:50:47,541
we're going after that I think some of 

1326
00:50:47,541 --> 00:50:50,420
them will take time to uh to come come 

1327
00:50:50,420 --> 00:50:53,280
to reality but investing in things like 

1328
00:50:53,290 --> 00:50:55,890
Ai and and those kinds of things and 

1329
00:50:55,890 --> 00:50:58,700
space based capabilities again long 

1330
00:50:58,700 --> 00:51:00,820
term in some cases long term 

1331
00:51:00,830 --> 00:51:03,020
investments but investments that we 

1332
00:51:03,020 --> 00:51:04,964
need to make now . Yeah I know you 

1333
00:51:04,964 --> 00:51:06,798
probably came here to talk about 

1334
00:51:06,798 --> 00:51:08,687
today's headlines and such . So I 

1335
00:51:08,687 --> 00:51:10,464
appreciate your answering those 

1336
00:51:10,464 --> 00:51:13,080
questions . Um there's a one particular 

1337
00:51:13,090 --> 00:51:15,201
program of interest in mind that that 

1338
00:51:15,201 --> 00:51:17,257
NATO and the NATO alliance developed 

1339
00:51:17,257 --> 00:51:20,060
the shorthand is Diana but it's the uh 

1340
00:51:20,070 --> 00:51:22,237
defense innovation accelerator for the 

1341
00:51:22,237 --> 00:51:24,459
north atlantic . And I don't think that 

1342
00:51:24,459 --> 00:51:27,560
we've committed yet to participating in 

1343
00:51:27,560 --> 00:51:29,960
the alliance's efforts for investment 

1344
00:51:29,960 --> 00:51:32,680
into these developing and sharing 

1345
00:51:33,260 --> 00:51:35,260
emerging what they call E . D . T . 

1346
00:51:35,260 --> 00:51:37,427
Emerging disruptive technologies . Can 

1347
00:51:37,427 --> 00:51:39,590
you give an update on that ? I would 

1348
00:51:39,590 --> 00:51:42,700
just point to some of the things that 

1349
00:51:42,700 --> 00:51:46,310
we are doing and like do you recall 

1350
00:51:46,320 --> 00:51:49,280
Aucas that we announced here this last 

1351
00:51:49,280 --> 00:51:51,920
year that only not only includes the 

1352
00:51:51,920 --> 00:51:54,900
development of a submarine capability , 

1353
00:51:54,910 --> 00:51:58,200
it also includes working uh with uh 

1354
00:51:58,210 --> 00:52:01,130
with our partners in other areas like 

1355
00:52:01,140 --> 00:52:04,090
hyper sonics , like , you know , long 

1356
00:52:04,090 --> 00:52:06,560
range strike and those kinds of things 

1357
00:52:06,560 --> 00:52:09,380
and ai uh and and that is coming along 

1358
00:52:09,390 --> 00:52:11,557
really , really well . So I agree with 

1359
00:52:11,557 --> 00:52:13,612
you , those types of investments are 

1360
00:52:13,612 --> 00:52:17,220
really important . General Milley , the 

1361
00:52:17,230 --> 00:52:18,952
secretary mentioned artificial 

1362
00:52:18,952 --> 00:52:21,286
intelligence machine learning and so on . 

1363
00:52:21,286 --> 00:52:23,174
To what extent are we starting to 

1364
00:52:23,174 --> 00:52:25,690
incorporate uh just you know , a 

1365
00:52:25,690 --> 00:52:27,680
knowledge base and professional 

1366
00:52:27,690 --> 00:52:31,320
military education on how to use 

1367
00:52:31,320 --> 00:52:33,209
ai what to expect from artificial 

1368
00:52:33,209 --> 00:52:35,431
intelligence , not to create a bunch of 

1369
00:52:35,431 --> 00:52:38,570
coders , but to ensure that the folks 

1370
00:52:38,570 --> 00:52:40,737
going through pm me sort of understand 

1371
00:52:40,737 --> 00:52:42,959
these concepts and how they can be used 

1372
00:52:42,959 --> 00:52:46,070
as well as the ethics around them . Um , 

1373
00:52:46,080 --> 00:52:48,380
artificial intelligence in my view is , 

1374
00:52:48,390 --> 00:52:50,501
would I for lack of better term , I'd 

1375
00:52:50,501 --> 00:52:52,723
say it's the mother of all technologies 

1376
00:52:52,723 --> 00:52:52,700
here when it comes to military 

1377
00:52:52,700 --> 00:52:54,960
operations . Because what that will 

1378
00:52:54,970 --> 00:52:58,780
enable you to do uh is to go through 

1379
00:52:58,780 --> 00:53:00,669
the UDA loop , the observe orient 

1380
00:53:00,669 --> 00:53:02,613
direct and act loop . The decision 

1381
00:53:02,613 --> 00:53:04,669
making process at rates of speed far 

1382
00:53:04,669 --> 00:53:07,130
greater than your opponent . So that 

1383
00:53:07,130 --> 00:53:08,760
side that masters artificial 

1384
00:53:08,760 --> 00:53:11,390
intelligence and applies it to military 

1385
00:53:11,390 --> 00:53:13,501
operations is going to have a perhaps 

1386
00:53:13,501 --> 00:53:15,612
not decisive , but it's going to be a 

1387
00:53:15,612 --> 00:53:17,779
very , very significant advantage over 

1388
00:53:17,779 --> 00:53:20,150
your opponent . We are teaching those 

1389
00:53:20,150 --> 00:53:23,060
techniques and and given essentially 

1390
00:53:23,070 --> 00:53:24,920
essentially introductory level 

1391
00:53:24,920 --> 00:53:26,531
information about artificial 

1392
00:53:26,531 --> 00:53:28,364
intelligence in our professional 

1393
00:53:28,364 --> 00:53:30,476
military education at the war college 

1394
00:53:30,476 --> 00:53:32,587
is not so much at the lower schools , 

1395
00:53:32,587 --> 00:53:34,587
but the war colleges for sure . And 

1396
00:53:34,587 --> 00:53:34,080
there's a significant amount of 

1397
00:53:34,080 --> 00:53:36,770
investment and I thought my head um I 

1398
00:53:36,780 --> 00:53:38,836
don't have it in front of me , but I 

1399
00:53:38,836 --> 00:53:40,780
think it's uh $15 or $20 billion , 

1400
00:53:40,780 --> 00:53:42,558
something that in in artificial 

1401
00:53:42,558 --> 00:53:42,440
intelligence in this budget . So that's 

1402
00:53:42,440 --> 00:53:44,273
a that's a real critical area of 

1403
00:53:44,273 --> 00:53:46,930
investment now , years ago , Department 

1404
00:53:46,930 --> 00:53:49,350
of Defense was the innovative leader in 

1405
00:53:49,350 --> 00:53:51,820
technology many , many decades ago now , 

1406
00:53:51,820 --> 00:53:54,042
it's the commercial industry , so we've 

1407
00:53:54,042 --> 00:53:57,110
got to leverage commercial efforts in 

1408
00:53:57,110 --> 00:54:00,100
artificial intelligence uh for military 

1409
00:54:00,100 --> 00:54:01,878
application and that will be an 

1410
00:54:01,878 --> 00:54:03,656
enormously advantage , enormous 

1411
00:54:03,656 --> 00:54:05,878
advantage in future combat . Great , do 

1412
00:54:05,878 --> 00:54:09,510
you anticipate um um , in injecting 

1413
00:54:09,520 --> 00:54:11,742
this type of education into the service 

1414
00:54:11,742 --> 00:54:14,076
academies in the near future . Actually , 

1415
00:54:14,076 --> 00:54:16,242
the service academies right now are on 

1416
00:54:16,242 --> 00:54:18,298
the cutting edge of that the younger 

1417
00:54:18,298 --> 00:54:20,520
they're digital natives . Uh they do an 

1418
00:54:20,520 --> 00:54:22,742
awful lot of technical or technological 

1419
00:54:22,742 --> 00:54:24,853
courses at the service academies . So 

1420
00:54:24,853 --> 00:54:26,964
they are actually at the cutting edge 

1421
00:54:26,964 --> 00:54:29,187
of the artificial intelligence programs 

1422
00:54:29,187 --> 00:54:29,050
that Department Defense is doing 

1423
00:54:29,410 --> 00:54:31,632
appreciate that . Thank you very much . 

1424
00:54:31,640 --> 00:54:33,696
Thank you . Mr Lambert is recognized 

1425
00:54:33,696 --> 00:54:37,630
for five minutes and you're either 

1426
00:54:37,630 --> 00:54:39,797
muted or we can't hear . Well we can't 

1427
00:54:39,797 --> 00:54:41,908
hear you , it could be insurmountable 

1428
00:54:41,908 --> 00:54:44,019
or it could be because you're muted . 

1429
00:54:44,240 --> 00:54:46,351
Can you hear me now ? Mr We got you . 

1430
00:54:46,351 --> 00:54:48,351
Doug go ahead . Okay , thank you so 

1431
00:54:48,351 --> 00:54:50,240
much . I have a concern I want to 

1432
00:54:50,240 --> 00:54:52,129
express . And then I have several 

1433
00:54:52,129 --> 00:54:54,570
questions . Many of President biden's 

1434
00:54:54,570 --> 00:54:57,300
national security failures feature an 

1435
00:54:57,300 --> 00:54:59,522
unwillingness to listen to military and 

1436
00:54:59,522 --> 00:55:02,130
subject matter experts . The atrocious 

1437
00:55:02,130 --> 00:55:04,430
withdrawal from Afghanistan and its 

1438
00:55:04,430 --> 00:55:07,050
tragic consequences was the first alarm 

1439
00:55:07,050 --> 00:55:09,630
bell at that time . Military advisers 

1440
00:55:09,790 --> 00:55:11,790
testified to Congress that in their 

1441
00:55:11,790 --> 00:55:14,012
opinion , the United States should have 

1442
00:55:14,012 --> 00:55:16,068
kept a troop presence in Afghanistan 

1443
00:55:16,068 --> 00:55:18,290
past the withdrawal date . But this was 

1444
00:55:18,290 --> 00:55:20,512
not listened to The second alarm . Bell 

1445
00:55:20,512 --> 00:55:23,000
went off on February 24 when Russia 

1446
00:55:23,000 --> 00:55:25,500
invaded Ukraine here . The failure was 

1447
00:55:25,500 --> 00:55:28,470
the inability to deter Vladimir Putin 

1448
00:55:28,660 --> 00:55:30,882
and a misunderstanding of what it meant 

1449
00:55:30,882 --> 00:55:33,010
to deter throughout President biden's 

1450
00:55:33,010 --> 00:55:35,232
response . The only constants have been 

1451
00:55:35,232 --> 00:55:38,300
reaction and assistance provided later 

1452
00:55:38,310 --> 00:55:40,850
than needed . And I'm concerned about 

1453
00:55:40,850 --> 00:55:43,700
what might be a third alarm bill . Uh 

1454
00:55:43,710 --> 00:55:45,654
the flaws in the nuclear posture . 

1455
00:55:45,654 --> 00:55:48,440
Review a possible decision to reenter 

1456
00:55:48,440 --> 00:55:51,290
the Iran nuclear deal or others . So , 

1457
00:55:51,290 --> 00:55:53,457
with those concerns in mind . Chairman 

1458
00:55:53,457 --> 00:55:55,623
Milley , I have some questions for you 

1459
00:55:55,740 --> 00:55:58,290
of last week . And Representative 

1460
00:55:58,290 --> 00:56:00,123
Turner's started on this line of 

1461
00:56:00,123 --> 00:56:02,234
questions , but we heard from general 

1462
00:56:02,234 --> 00:56:04,401
Walters that His recommendation was to 

1463
00:56:04,401 --> 00:56:06,512
proceed with the nuclear sea launched 

1464
00:56:06,512 --> 00:56:09,070
cruise missile or slick them in and its 

1465
00:56:09,070 --> 00:56:11,330
associated warhead . General Heighten 

1466
00:56:11,330 --> 00:56:14,170
was a big proponent of ensuring full 

1467
00:56:14,170 --> 00:56:17,520
funding for the slick . Um in just 

1468
00:56:17,520 --> 00:56:19,576
yesterday , the committee received a 

1469
00:56:19,576 --> 00:56:21,631
letter from Admiral Richard where he 

1470
00:56:21,631 --> 00:56:23,520
stated that , quote , the current 

1471
00:56:23,520 --> 00:56:25,353
situation in Ukraine and china's 

1472
00:56:25,353 --> 00:56:27,242
nuclear trajectory convinces me a 

1473
00:56:27,242 --> 00:56:29,353
deterrence and assurance gap exists . 

1474
00:56:29,353 --> 00:56:31,464
Unquote . He goes on to state that to 

1475
00:56:31,464 --> 00:56:33,820
address this gap . He needs a low yield 

1476
00:56:33,820 --> 00:56:36,650
weapon with a non ballistic trajectory . 

1477
00:56:37,130 --> 00:56:39,530
In other words , a sea launched cruise 

1478
00:56:39,530 --> 00:56:41,641
missile . However , it seems that the 

1479
00:56:41,641 --> 00:56:43,586
biden administration has chosen to 

1480
00:56:43,586 --> 00:56:45,610
cancel slick them in in its nuclear 

1481
00:56:45,610 --> 00:56:47,970
posture . Review . What was your best 

1482
00:56:47,980 --> 00:56:50,660
military advice ? General General 

1483
00:56:50,660 --> 00:56:52,980
Milley on the slick amend during the 

1484
00:56:52,990 --> 00:56:56,590
NPR process ? And did it mirror that of 

1485
00:56:56,600 --> 00:56:58,711
Admiral Richard ? General Walters and 

1486
00:56:58,711 --> 00:57:02,440
general heighten thanks . 

1487
00:57:02,440 --> 00:57:06,270
And as I have stated many , many times 

1488
00:57:06,270 --> 00:57:08,480
before , my best military advice to 

1489
00:57:08,480 --> 00:57:12,250
this president or any president um , is 

1490
00:57:12,250 --> 00:57:14,528
a matter between me and that president . 

1491
00:57:14,528 --> 00:57:16,361
I will say that to you though as 

1492
00:57:16,361 --> 00:57:18,528
members of Congress who have oversight 

1493
00:57:18,528 --> 00:57:20,750
responsibilities , my position on slick 

1494
00:57:20,750 --> 00:57:23,083
Herman has not changed . As I mentioned , 

1495
00:57:23,083 --> 00:57:25,380
uh , to Representative Turner . Uh , my 

1496
00:57:25,380 --> 00:57:28,230
general view is that this president or 

1497
00:57:28,230 --> 00:57:30,452
any president deserves to have multiple 

1498
00:57:30,452 --> 00:57:32,920
options to deal with national security 

1499
00:57:32,920 --> 00:57:36,520
situations . Uh , and my advice 

1500
00:57:36,810 --> 00:57:39,300
is listened to . Um , and I have an 

1501
00:57:39,300 --> 00:57:41,356
opportunity to express my voice on a 

1502
00:57:41,356 --> 00:57:44,050
continuous basis . Many , many times . 

1503
00:57:46,430 --> 00:57:48,770
General Milley Milley was any of this 

1504
00:57:48,770 --> 00:57:50,992
put in writing that we would be able to 

1505
00:57:50,992 --> 00:57:54,730
get a copy of . Um , my best 

1506
00:57:54,730 --> 00:57:56,952
military advice is almost always put in 

1507
00:57:56,952 --> 00:57:59,140
writing whether or not , uh , the 

1508
00:57:59,140 --> 00:58:01,473
committee requests that there are rules , 

1509
00:58:01,473 --> 00:58:03,640
obviously and how we do that . So it's 

1510
00:58:03,640 --> 00:58:06,160
all classified . But um , I'll defer to 

1511
00:58:06,160 --> 00:58:08,382
the chairman , Chairman smith on that . 

1512
00:58:08,382 --> 00:58:10,438
We we give up stuff to the committee 

1513
00:58:10,438 --> 00:58:12,660
all the time or individual members upon 

1514
00:58:12,660 --> 00:58:14,716
request but there's procedures to do 

1515
00:58:14,716 --> 00:58:16,660
that and it isn't writing . Okay . 

1516
00:58:16,660 --> 00:58:18,900
Thank you . Now for both of you . I see 

1517
00:58:18,900 --> 00:58:20,789
that there is full funding in the 

1518
00:58:20,789 --> 00:58:22,900
budget for the ground based strategic 

1519
00:58:22,900 --> 00:58:26,600
deterrent W 87 1 warhead and the two 

1520
00:58:26,600 --> 00:58:28,910
sites solution for producing plutonium 

1521
00:58:28,910 --> 00:58:30,743
pits . That is excellent . And I 

1522
00:58:30,743 --> 00:58:33,190
applaud that Now . I am curious as to 

1523
00:58:33,190 --> 00:58:35,357
why the Department of Defense canceled 

1524
00:58:35,357 --> 00:58:38,050
a minimum three flight test last week . 

1525
00:58:38,050 --> 00:58:40,140
These are regularly scheduled tests 

1526
00:58:40,520 --> 00:58:42,687
that are scheduled months in advance . 

1527
00:58:43,120 --> 00:58:45,287
Secretary Austin . How could this have 

1528
00:58:45,287 --> 00:58:47,453
been perceived as escalatory when it's 

1529
00:58:47,453 --> 00:58:50,380
a routine tests that scheduled months 

1530
00:58:50,390 --> 00:58:52,446
in advance . And did the White House 

1531
00:58:52,620 --> 00:58:56,390
exercise ? It's and provide input over 

1532
00:58:56,390 --> 00:58:59,780
this cancelation to answer your 

1533
00:58:59,780 --> 00:59:02,740
question on a second Part of your 

1534
00:59:02,740 --> 00:59:06,130
question 1st . No . We did not get a 

1535
00:59:06,130 --> 00:59:09,560
directive to to cancel that from the 

1536
00:59:09,560 --> 00:59:12,170
White House . Uh it's my assessment 

1537
00:59:12,170 --> 00:59:15,420
based upon the current state of the 

1538
00:59:15,430 --> 00:59:17,340
state of play with respect to 

1539
00:59:17,340 --> 00:59:19,920
escalation management that it was the 

1540
00:59:19,920 --> 00:59:23,910
best thing to do in in in terms 

1541
00:59:23,910 --> 00:59:25,799
of postponing and then eventually 

1542
00:59:25,799 --> 00:59:28,470
canceling that test . We will certainly 

1543
00:59:28,480 --> 00:59:31,930
be able to continue to make progress in 

1544
00:59:31,930 --> 00:59:34,780
the program . And so that that is not 

1545
00:59:34,790 --> 00:59:38,270
an issue . And and and by the way , 

1546
00:59:38,270 --> 00:59:40,440
thanks for your concern on our on our 

1547
00:59:40,440 --> 00:59:43,880
investment in our nuclear try it . I 

1548
00:59:43,890 --> 00:59:45,890
would just point that there's We've 

1549
00:59:45,890 --> 00:59:49,380
invested $34.4 billion dollars in the 

1550
00:59:49,380 --> 00:59:51,560
modernization of the triad in his 

1551
00:59:51,560 --> 00:59:53,393
budget . And I think that's very 

1552
00:59:53,393 --> 00:59:55,560
sincerely apologize to the gentleman's 

1553
00:59:55,560 --> 00:59:55,590
time has expired .