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Mr . Courtney is recognized for five 

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minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman and 

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thank you to the witnesses . Actually 

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I'm going to continue down this path . 

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Secretary in general and um Actually on 

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June four we are going to have the 

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killing for 

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US . 

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Uh the budget that came over and again 

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I share seapower . So we look at it 

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pretty closely . It's $6 billion 

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dollars for Colombia . Again , that's 

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the biggest number since this journey 

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started back in 2008 . So the you know , 

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the commitment by the administration in 

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your department in terms of really the 

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most critical leg of the triad which is 

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the sea based leg . I mean that's 70% 

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of our strategic deterrence is carried 

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on those platforms and the schedule is 

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knife edge . We there's no um really 

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margin for for delay in terms of moving 

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that forward . And this budget 

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certainly reflects that . I would also 

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note um on page seven general of your 

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testimony , you noted the fact that the 

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budget invests in the industrial base 

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to support fleet modernization and on 

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time delivery of the columbus columbus 

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class submarine and there's $538 

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million for supplier development , 

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submarine supplier development as well 

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as 227 for submarine workforce 

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development which means that the navy 

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now is in the position of trying to 

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boost welders , electricians ship 

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rights uh , pipe fitters . I mean when 

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we look at really the challenge that's 

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being faced for Colombia and frankly 

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ship ship building across it really is 

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a workforce issue . And I've been 

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around for a while , those numbers in 

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terms of D . O . D . Investment into 

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workforce . We've never seen anything 

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that robust and I was just wondering 

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maybe if you want to maybe enlarge on 

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your comment in the testimony general 

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in terms of that initiative , I I 

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just would underline that our submarine 

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force in the in the joint force As we 

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look to the future changing character 

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of war and then operating environment 

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uh in the 20s 30s 2040s and beyond the 

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submarine force is the most lethal . 

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The most capable and the most 

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survivable . Uh part of the joint force 

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that's out there . So continued 

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investment in the sub force is 

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fundamental to the nation's security 

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and reaching beyond really just the 

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navy's sort of box in terms of reaching 

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out into the industrial base in a way 

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that this budget does . Again , the 

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president back in december designated 

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the submarine workforce as essential in 

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a defense production act . Executive 

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order was at the end of december , 

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which again , I don't think I've ever 

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seen that any other sort of production 

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platform that we have . The 

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at one point . I just go back to the 

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question of the low yield missiles . I 

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would note that the nuclear posture 

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review does provide that low yield 

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missiles will be deployed on ballistic 

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submarines . Again , the question of 

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slick um is really whether they're 

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going to be extended to attack 

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submarines . And I would just tell you 

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representing a district with a lot of 

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submariners that issue of changing , 

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really , the mission of attack 

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submarines is something that is greatly , 

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um , in dispute . And I think the 

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administration made the right choice in 

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terms of keeping the attack subs 

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focused on their main mission , which 

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is to have an agile mobile . The queen 

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on the chessboard as Admiral Rough had 

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used to call them . And I think putting 

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tactical weapons on their really 

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changes it in a really clunky way in 

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terms of moving forward . I would note 

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also that the , the budget that came 

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over in terms of shipbuilding is about 

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$28 billion . That's the first time in 

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six years where we've had a president's 

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budget that's come over higher than the 

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prior year's enacted level . You know , 

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that may sound like sort of a green eye 

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shade sort of comment , but the fact is , 

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we're not beginning , you know , 

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underground or below zero with this 

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budget this year . In terms of the 

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committee . This is the first time 

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we've actually seen investment in ship 

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construction that's higher than the 

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prior year . And , and again , I think 

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that shows , you know , that you're 

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committed to , you know , really making 

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sure that we have the fleet of the 

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future . That's there . It's not 

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perfect . I think Gerald burgers made a 

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really good argument for , you know , 

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the LPD program to get looked at . And 

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I know that's on his unfunded um , 

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requirements list . And and again , I 

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think that's something we're , we're 

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certainly gonna take a very strong look 

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at . And um , and lastly , you know , 

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the sealift component , which is 

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mentioned in your testimony , it's only 

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two boats . We've got to do better than 

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that . I , you know , again from the 

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army , that sealift is not just a navy 

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program , it's really for the whole 

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service and 16 seconds left , maybe you 

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could sort of respond to that question ? 

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Well , certainly it is important and uh , 

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we we acknowledge that and you'll see 

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uh , if you look as you look at the 

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budget , you know , the investments 

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investments that we've made begin to 

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reflect that . And again , I apologize . 

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Mr Courtney said , yeah , horribly on 

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that one . So we'll have we'll have 

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we'll have to get that for the record . 

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Um , the gentleman's time has expired . 

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Um , Mr Whitman is recognized for five 

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minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman , 

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gentlemen , thanks for joining us today . 

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Thanks so much for your service to our 

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nation . Secretary Austin last March , 

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windowpane . Com Commander Phil 

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Davidson said that he saw that china is 

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making every preparation For a 

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confrontation over Taiwan by 2027 . 

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Current indo pay com Commander . 

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Admiral Aquilino said the same thing . 

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Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 

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agreed . In fact General Milley has 

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previously stated this , we're going to 

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have to have a much larger fleet than 

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we have today . If we're serious about 

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great power competition and deterring 

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great power war and if we're serious 

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about dominant capability over 

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something like china or some other 

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power that has significant capability . 

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Secretary Austin , do you agree that we 

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should be preparing for a showdown with 

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Taiwan in this decade ? 

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I agree that we should have the right 

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capabilities to be able to not only be 

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relevant in deterring future 

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adversaries but also dominant on the 

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future battlefield and we are investing 

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in in those capabilities in this budget . 

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Thank you . General Milley . The Navy 

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today has 297 ships and this budget 

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request will reduce our fleet to 280 by 

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2027 . If you look at where we are in 

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relation to the chinese , Our budget 

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and number of ships have shrunk 

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continually over the past two decades , 

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we have gone from 318 ships Down 2 - 

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97 today . During the same period of 

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time , China has gone from 210 ships to 

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360 ships . The odds Budget 

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will further shrink that to to 80 The 

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ODS owned china Power Report projects 

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that china will have 460 ships by 2030 . 

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In this latest budget request , the 

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Navy proposes to retire 24 ships and 

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build eight ships . I'm not a 

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mathematician , but it seems like to me 

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you can't do addition by subtraction . 

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This seems to be grossly irresponsible 

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and completely completely denies the 

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reality of what we are facing . General 

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Milley and your professional military 

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judgment does our shipbuilding plan 

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accurately reflect the investments that 

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we need to make in naval capacity and 

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capabilities that we need to deter the 

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chinese in the years and decades to 

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come . Well , let me make a couple of 

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comments . Congressman , thank you for 

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that First . I think it's important to 

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focus on capability . So capacity 

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matters . Numbers matter , mass matters . 

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And I'm on board with all that . But 

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capability matters and the ships that 

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were retiring the 20 some odd the two 

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dozen ships that are coming out of the 

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inventory in in this particular budget . 

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Uh the Navy has assessed us uh very 

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high maintenance costs high to sustain . 

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Uh and the cost is exceeding the 

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benefit of those ships staying on 

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active duty sort of thing . And the 

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nine ships that were procuring the 

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capability of those ships is the most 

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modern in the fleet . So uh you know , 

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the capability versus capacity 

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arguments there . I'm always in favor 

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of great numbers . I think that's great . 

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But I would bias towards capability 

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rather than just sheer numbers . It is 

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a fair argument about the number of 

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ships the chinese have and it even gets 

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worse if you think about our global 

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commitment versus say the U . S . Fleet . 

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That's in the western pacific or in the 

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pacific to the numbers are even the 

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ratios are even worse . But again it's 

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capability versus capacity And 

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cautioned folks to to go down into the 

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detail about what our ships can do , 

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what the training of our sailors can do , 

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what our tactics are , what our 

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technologies are on our ships . I think 

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there's a fundamental and significant 

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advantage to us relative to china on 

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that capability . But generally I don't 

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deny that our ships are great . Our 

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sailors are great . But you do have to 

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look at this in terms of magnitude , 

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quantity has a quality , all of all of 

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its own . And if we're going down to 

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280 and they're at 460 are great ships 

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can only be in one place at one time , 

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they can only engage so many targets . 

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Have a hard time figuring out how their 

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trajectory of China going in this 

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direction and the trajectory of the 

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United States going in the opposite 

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direction . It's almost impossible to 

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make an argument to say that we're 

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gonna build enough capability in nine 

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ships to displace the chinese and that 

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nine ships are going to be able to 

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replace the the Capacity and capability 

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in 24 ships . You know , like I said , 

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I'm not a I'm not a mathematician , but 

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it just seems like to me you can't do 

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addition by subtraction . I'm not gonna 

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get a big argument budget because I I'm 

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on the side of mass matters , quantity 

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has a quality all and so on , etcetera . 

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But you can't buy everything , you 

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can't be everything to everyone at all 

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times . Right . So there has to be a 

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balanced in the in the budget . And I 

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think this particular budget is 

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divesting uh in the Navy's . I think 

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some really quality analysis there that 

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they are divesting of ships that are of 

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marginal utility in the future . Combat 

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environment against china and investing 

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00:10:20,329 --> 00:10:22,530
in the nine ships that do have great 

272
00:10:22,530 --> 00:10:24,970
quality Germans time has has expired . 

273
00:10:24,980 --> 00:10:27,091
Um I will say we also on this issue , 

274
00:10:27,091 --> 00:10:29,370
shipbuilding capacity matters . I mean 

275
00:10:29,370 --> 00:10:31,370
basically do we have the industrial 

276
00:10:31,370 --> 00:10:33,370
base to support that even if we put 

277
00:10:33,370 --> 00:10:35,481
them in the budget , My understanding 

278
00:10:35,481 --> 00:10:37,537
is we we don't so that that that's a 

279
00:10:37,537 --> 00:10:39,759
different challenge as well in terms of 

280
00:10:39,759 --> 00:10:41,481
workforce . uh mr Garamendi is 

281
00:10:41,481 --> 00:10:43,814
recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 

282
00:10:43,814 --> 00:10:46,000
Let me start with a thank you for the 

283
00:10:46,000 --> 00:10:48,222
good work you've been doing with regard 

284
00:10:48,222 --> 00:10:51,100
to Ukraine pushing the necessary 

285
00:10:51,110 --> 00:10:53,380
equipment into Ukraine . It's an 

286
00:10:53,380 --> 00:10:55,547
extraordinary piece of work and you're 

287
00:10:55,547 --> 00:10:57,650
to be congratulated and thanked for 

288
00:10:57,650 --> 00:11:01,450
that work . Also , the work 

289
00:11:01,460 --> 00:11:04,750
Secretary Austin in General Millie 

290
00:11:05,340 --> 00:11:08,440
in rebuilding our relationships with 

291
00:11:08,440 --> 00:11:10,820
NATO . They were virtually destroyed in 

292
00:11:10,820 --> 00:11:13,050
the previous four years of the of the 

293
00:11:13,060 --> 00:11:15,460
previous administration very rapidly 

294
00:11:15,460 --> 00:11:17,880
rebuilt . And I think that may very 

295
00:11:17,880 --> 00:11:20,200
well be Secretary Austin , part of your 

296
00:11:20,210 --> 00:11:23,070
integrated deterrence strategy . Is 

297
00:11:23,070 --> 00:11:27,060
that correct ? Our allies ? It is part 

298
00:11:27,060 --> 00:11:29,350
of the significant part of the of our 

299
00:11:29,840 --> 00:11:32,290
our strategy . Integrated deterrence 

300
00:11:32,300 --> 00:11:35,580
means using all of the capability and 

301
00:11:35,580 --> 00:11:38,400
capacity that's resident in all of the 

302
00:11:38,400 --> 00:11:40,344
warfighting domains , air , land , 

303
00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:43,860
space , uh cyber 

304
00:11:44,240 --> 00:11:46,880
see and and networking those 

305
00:11:46,880 --> 00:11:49,047
capabilities in new and different ways 

306
00:11:49,047 --> 00:11:52,950
that really give us tremendous uh power 

307
00:11:52,950 --> 00:11:56,360
and also make sure that we remain a 

308
00:11:56,370 --> 00:11:59,890
dominant combat capable force . Uh and 

309
00:11:59,900 --> 00:12:01,678
a big part of that is using the 

310
00:12:01,678 --> 00:12:04,020
capability and capacity of our allies 

311
00:12:04,020 --> 00:12:06,131
as well . And uh and you're seeing us 

312
00:12:06,131 --> 00:12:09,670
do that in uh in NATO as we speak and 

313
00:12:09,670 --> 00:12:11,726
you'll see us continue to do that in 

314
00:12:11,726 --> 00:12:14,060
the end of pacific . But I think uh I 

315
00:12:14,060 --> 00:12:15,949
think we've done that in the past 

316
00:12:15,949 --> 00:12:18,171
certainly , but we want to increase our 

317
00:12:18,171 --> 00:12:20,393
our efforts going forward . And I think 

318
00:12:20,393 --> 00:12:22,560
I point to Aucas again , as one of the 

319
00:12:22,560 --> 00:12:24,671
one of the types of things that we're 

320
00:12:24,671 --> 00:12:26,838
doing to uh leverage the capability of 

321
00:12:26,838 --> 00:12:30,090
our of our alleys building on that 

322
00:12:30,520 --> 00:12:32,880
and on what Mr Courtney was raising 

323
00:12:32,880 --> 00:12:36,480
with regard to see lift . It's clear 

324
00:12:36,480 --> 00:12:39,550
that we are in a position now to not be 

325
00:12:39,550 --> 00:12:43,210
able to support our efforts in the 

326
00:12:43,250 --> 00:12:45,528
Western pacific should it be necessary . 

327
00:12:46,800 --> 00:12:49,180
And it doesn't appear to be based upon 

328
00:12:49,180 --> 00:12:51,810
the previous discussion money to build 

329
00:12:51,810 --> 00:12:53,860
the ships to provide the sealift 

330
00:12:53,870 --> 00:12:57,870
capacity . A quick comment if you would 

331
00:12:57,870 --> 00:13:00,960
on a strategy that would utilize the 

332
00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:05,580
current Jones act fleet in its 

333
00:13:05,580 --> 00:13:08,350
fullness , making it militarily useful , 

334
00:13:08,840 --> 00:13:12,800
subsidizing adding to the the 

335
00:13:12,810 --> 00:13:14,977
strength of the ships when necessary , 

336
00:13:14,977 --> 00:13:16,810
repurposing them and making them 

337
00:13:16,810 --> 00:13:18,977
available much as we currently do with 

338
00:13:18,977 --> 00:13:21,120
the craft program , the airline 

339
00:13:21,120 --> 00:13:23,176
industry If you'd care to comment on 

340
00:13:23,176 --> 00:13:25,287
that kind of a strategy that would be 

341
00:13:25,287 --> 00:13:29,140
using all of the assets of the United 

342
00:13:29,140 --> 00:13:31,710
States , including our maritime assets . 

343
00:13:31,720 --> 00:13:33,998
Absolutely . And that's what you would , 

344
00:13:33,998 --> 00:13:37,550
we would we would hope to do in , in 

345
00:13:37,550 --> 00:13:39,606
the case of need . You've seen us do 

346
00:13:39,606 --> 00:13:41,606
that as you pointed out with , with 

347
00:13:41,606 --> 00:13:43,828
aircraft . That's the thing that , that 

348
00:13:43,828 --> 00:13:46,960
gives us the ability to punch above our 

349
00:13:46,960 --> 00:13:49,960
weight class . And , uh , in our , our , 

350
00:13:51,440 --> 00:13:53,790
our country has always responded to our 

351
00:13:53,790 --> 00:13:55,734
request in times of needs . Well , 

352
00:13:55,734 --> 00:13:57,846
we'll be working on that , a national 

353
00:13:57,846 --> 00:14:00,068
maritime security program in the coming 

354
00:14:00,068 --> 00:14:02,580
months ahead of us . A final point has 

355
00:14:02,580 --> 00:14:05,800
to do with maintaining and repairing 

356
00:14:05,800 --> 00:14:08,760
all of the things that we have . We 

357
00:14:08,760 --> 00:14:11,940
don't do that so well are government 

358
00:14:11,950 --> 00:14:14,660
owned shipyards are antiquated . I'm 

359
00:14:14,660 --> 00:14:17,550
looking for the investment in that . 

360
00:14:17,560 --> 00:14:19,620
Also in the depots mentioned earlier 

361
00:14:19,620 --> 00:14:22,760
the issues of the arsenals . 

362
00:14:23,540 --> 00:14:26,180
If you'd care to comment on that 

363
00:14:26,190 --> 00:14:29,100
general Miley or Millie or Secretary 

364
00:14:29,100 --> 00:14:31,730
Austin . Thanks sir . That's a , that's 

365
00:14:31,730 --> 00:14:34,050
a great question . And I think you'll 

366
00:14:34,050 --> 00:14:36,060
see in this budget at $1.7 billion 

367
00:14:36,060 --> 00:14:38,120
dollar investment , uh , in our , in 

368
00:14:38,120 --> 00:14:40,570
our public shipyards . And , uh , and 

369
00:14:40,580 --> 00:14:43,420
that , uh , that begins to , uh , to 

370
00:14:43,420 --> 00:14:45,420
get after some of the things that , 

371
00:14:45,420 --> 00:14:47,587
that you've mentioned . This is really 

372
00:14:47,587 --> 00:14:49,809
important to make sure that we have the 

373
00:14:49,809 --> 00:14:52,087
capability , but they're not only , uh , 

374
00:14:52,087 --> 00:14:54,198
build the kinds of ships that we need 

375
00:14:54,198 --> 00:14:56,420
going forward , but also sustained them 

376
00:14:56,420 --> 00:14:59,950
as well . As you pointed out , the 

377
00:15:01,040 --> 00:15:03,990
but we're not there yet , that level of 

378
00:15:03,990 --> 00:15:06,110
investment in the government yards or 

379
00:15:06,110 --> 00:15:09,160
the public yards , I would probably not 

380
00:15:09,170 --> 00:15:11,580
be sufficient to maintain the ships 

381
00:15:12,310 --> 00:15:14,421
that we need to keep them at sea . We 

382
00:15:14,421 --> 00:15:16,588
can build more and more ships , but if 

383
00:15:16,588 --> 00:15:18,810
we cannot keep them at sea because they 

384
00:15:18,810 --> 00:15:20,921
cannot be maintained in a orderly and 

385
00:15:20,921 --> 00:15:24,090
quick way , it doesn't do much for us . 

386
00:15:24,290 --> 00:15:26,550
I absolutely agree with you , sir . And 

387
00:15:26,560 --> 00:15:28,727
you know , that's why I said , this is 

388
00:15:28,727 --> 00:15:32,460
this is this is a good , a good 

389
00:15:32,460 --> 00:15:34,900
start , a good uh , a couple of steps 

390
00:15:34,900 --> 00:15:37,011
forward , but we need more investment 

391
00:15:37,011 --> 00:15:39,178
going forward for the committee here . 

392
00:15:39,178 --> 00:15:41,344
We may want to consider this how we're 

393
00:15:41,344 --> 00:15:43,289
going to invest in maintaining our 

394
00:15:43,289 --> 00:15:45,289
ships at sea . Gentleman's time has 

395
00:15:45,289 --> 00:15:47,650
expired . Mr scott is recognized for 

396
00:15:47,650 --> 00:15:49,928
five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman , 

397
00:15:49,928 --> 00:15:52,094
Gentlemen , thank you for being here . 

398
00:15:52,094 --> 00:15:54,261
I want to speak briefly about indo bay 

399
00:15:54,261 --> 00:15:56,206
calm . It is over half the world's 

400
00:15:56,206 --> 00:15:58,550
population . Um , Ukraine puts 50 

401
00:15:58,550 --> 00:16:00,661
million metric tons of corn and wheat 

402
00:16:00,661 --> 00:16:02,661
into the export markets . Russia is 

403
00:16:02,661 --> 00:16:04,550
also responsible for a tremendous 

404
00:16:04,550 --> 00:16:06,494
amount of wheat going into the the 

405
00:16:06,494 --> 00:16:08,272
global food supply . Russia has 

406
00:16:08,272 --> 00:16:10,161
recently prohibited the export of 

407
00:16:10,161 --> 00:16:12,272
sunflower seed . It seems that Russia 

408
00:16:12,272 --> 00:16:16,190
is now using food um , literally 

409
00:16:16,190 --> 00:16:19,980
as a weapon of war . I 

410
00:16:19,980 --> 00:16:23,270
just wanted to make sure that at the D . 

411
00:16:23,270 --> 00:16:25,381
O . D . We're paying attention to the 

412
00:16:25,381 --> 00:16:29,090
potential for a significant reduction 

413
00:16:29,090 --> 00:16:32,160
in the global food supply and what that 

414
00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:34,800
means for the end up a com region where 

415
00:16:34,810 --> 00:16:36,977
Ukraine is the largest supplier of the 

416
00:16:36,977 --> 00:16:40,500
U . N . World Food Program . Are those 

417
00:16:40,500 --> 00:16:43,880
assessments being done by D . A . Or 

418
00:16:43,880 --> 00:16:46,280
any other type of analyzing agency with 

419
00:16:46,280 --> 00:16:48,224
regard to the potential unrest and 

420
00:16:48,224 --> 00:16:51,930
instability in um the 

421
00:16:51,930 --> 00:16:55,890
nDP calm region . Those 

422
00:16:55,890 --> 00:16:59,580
assessments continue to be uh done sir . 

423
00:16:59,580 --> 00:17:02,400
And and this has been a focus that is a 

424
00:17:02,400 --> 00:17:04,760
focus of our government uh and uh 

425
00:17:04,770 --> 00:17:07,110
across the inter agency , you know a 

426
00:17:07,110 --> 00:17:09,640
number of agencies are looking at this 

427
00:17:09,650 --> 00:17:12,150
but uh but we certainly share your 

428
00:17:12,150 --> 00:17:15,810
concern . I just I want to um 

429
00:17:15,820 --> 00:17:17,987
that that part of the world and really 

430
00:17:17,987 --> 00:17:19,931
the global economy , the Black Sea 

431
00:17:19,931 --> 00:17:21,931
region is something that the United 

432
00:17:21,931 --> 00:17:23,931
States tornado has seemed to have a 

433
00:17:23,931 --> 00:17:26,153
strategy for . And I do hope that as we 

434
00:17:26,153 --> 00:17:28,930
push forward we will develop a strategy 

435
00:17:28,930 --> 00:17:32,850
for the Black Sea region . The the 

436
00:17:32,850 --> 00:17:34,961
importance of that with regard to the 

437
00:17:34,961 --> 00:17:37,017
world food supply . I don't think it 

438
00:17:37,017 --> 00:17:38,970
can be um overestimated . There's 

439
00:17:38,970 --> 00:17:41,192
another country in that region that I'm 

440
00:17:41,192 --> 00:17:43,359
extremely concerned about . That's the 

441
00:17:43,359 --> 00:17:45,192
country of Georgia . They have a 

442
00:17:45,192 --> 00:17:44,810
partnership with the Georgia National 

443
00:17:44,810 --> 00:17:46,490
Guard , One of the many state 

444
00:17:46,490 --> 00:17:49,160
partnerships that we have . Um 

445
00:17:50,340 --> 00:17:52,507
what are we doing with regard to those 

446
00:17:52,507 --> 00:17:56,040
partnerships to make sure that over the 

447
00:17:56,040 --> 00:17:57,873
long term those partnerships are 

448
00:17:57,873 --> 00:18:01,730
strengthened and using uh 

449
00:18:01,740 --> 00:18:04,700
their ability to help fund putting the 

450
00:18:04,700 --> 00:18:06,867
weapons systems in the region where we 

451
00:18:06,867 --> 00:18:08,978
where we need them . In other words , 

452
00:18:08,978 --> 00:18:11,311
as we talk about , we're going to fight , 

453
00:18:11,311 --> 00:18:13,533
we fight by with and through partners . 

454
00:18:13,533 --> 00:18:15,533
And I want to make sure that we are 

455
00:18:15,533 --> 00:18:18,190
using those partnerships to get um the 

456
00:18:18,190 --> 00:18:21,770
weapons in the region in such a manner 

457
00:18:21,770 --> 00:18:23,826
that the U . S . Does not pay all of 

458
00:18:23,826 --> 00:18:25,050
the all of the cost . 

459
00:18:29,640 --> 00:18:32,100
You know , we can continue to do uh 

460
00:18:32,110 --> 00:18:34,550
great work in countries like Georgia 

461
00:18:34,550 --> 00:18:36,717
and I was there a couple of months ago 

462
00:18:36,717 --> 00:18:38,772
and I did get a chance to go out and 

463
00:18:38,772 --> 00:18:40,994
visit with our troops that are actually 

464
00:18:40,994 --> 00:18:43,106
doing some of that training that that 

465
00:18:43,106 --> 00:18:45,328
you mentioned , this is invaluable . It 

466
00:18:45,328 --> 00:18:48,430
it provides us great capabilities uh 

467
00:18:48,430 --> 00:18:50,860
and uh and so we we will continue to 

468
00:18:50,860 --> 00:18:52,930
invest in this in terms of specific 

469
00:18:52,930 --> 00:18:55,041
needs of countries will work those on 

470
00:18:55,041 --> 00:18:57,660
on a case by case individual basis . 

471
00:18:57,670 --> 00:19:01,350
But are the the value of our 

472
00:19:01,350 --> 00:19:05,090
troops engaging with with countries in 

473
00:19:05,090 --> 00:19:07,680
the region cannot be overstated . They 

474
00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,390
are doing a tremendous job . one of one 

475
00:19:10,390 --> 00:19:14,080
of my concerns Mr Secretary is is when 

476
00:19:14,080 --> 00:19:17,210
we divest um equipment in in the United 

477
00:19:17,210 --> 00:19:19,850
States , I think the a 10 is probably 

478
00:19:19,850 --> 00:19:23,380
the best example . This is a weapons 

479
00:19:23,380 --> 00:19:25,158
system that the D . O . D . Has 

480
00:19:25,158 --> 00:19:27,269
requested be that we divest from over 

481
00:19:27,269 --> 00:19:30,140
the last several years and at least as 

482
00:19:30,140 --> 00:19:32,251
long as I can remember being a member 

483
00:19:32,251 --> 00:19:34,440
of Congress . Yet when we look at the 

484
00:19:34,440 --> 00:19:36,329
european theater right now , it's 

485
00:19:36,329 --> 00:19:39,070
clearly a weapons system that if people 

486
00:19:39,070 --> 00:19:41,237
who share our interests and our values 

487
00:19:41,237 --> 00:19:43,950
had them , they would be doing even 

488
00:19:43,950 --> 00:19:46,260
better in the war against Russia . 

489
00:19:48,340 --> 00:19:50,062
The D . O . T . S position and 

490
00:19:50,062 --> 00:19:52,118
investment in the past has basically 

491
00:19:52,118 --> 00:19:54,007
been that you just get rid of the 

492
00:19:54,007 --> 00:19:56,460
weapons system . His deity changed 

493
00:19:56,460 --> 00:19:58,630
there thought process on that so that 

494
00:19:58,630 --> 00:20:01,080
when we divest from a weapons system or 

495
00:20:01,080 --> 00:20:03,080
we're going to now allow people who 

496
00:20:03,080 --> 00:20:05,136
share our interests and our values , 

497
00:20:05,136 --> 00:20:06,913
the opportunity to purchase and 

498
00:20:06,913 --> 00:20:10,670
maintain that system . We have 

499
00:20:10,670 --> 00:20:13,580
over time provided capabilities that we 

500
00:20:13,590 --> 00:20:16,600
no longer uh , used to to other 

501
00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:20,310
countries . Um , and in every case , 

502
00:20:20,320 --> 00:20:22,890
in terms of a high end capability , I 

503
00:20:22,890 --> 00:20:25,001
think you have to start with a with a 

504
00:20:25,001 --> 00:20:27,770
threat . And if you if they use this 

505
00:20:27,780 --> 00:20:30,080
piece of equipment or this , this 

506
00:20:30,080 --> 00:20:32,630
system or capability in that 

507
00:20:32,630 --> 00:20:35,160
environment is will it be relevant ? Uh , 

508
00:20:35,160 --> 00:20:37,216
and so as we look at the air defense 

509
00:20:37,216 --> 00:20:39,327
systems that we can expect Georgia to 

510
00:20:39,327 --> 00:20:41,530
to encounter , We look at the capable 

511
00:20:41,540 --> 00:20:43,960
training that's required . We look at 

512
00:20:43,960 --> 00:20:46,670
the , you know , the the maintenance 

513
00:20:46,670 --> 00:20:48,948
capabilities and those sorts of things . 

514
00:20:48,948 --> 00:20:50,614
All of that goes into into an 

515
00:20:50,614 --> 00:20:52,781
assessment to to see whether or not it 

516
00:20:52,781 --> 00:20:54,837
makes sense to to actually do that . 

517
00:20:54,837 --> 00:20:57,003
But certainly you make a great point . 

518
00:20:57,003 --> 00:20:59,003
This time has expired . MR spear is 

519
00:20:59,003 --> 00:21:00,837
recognized for five minutes . Mr 

520
00:21:00,837 --> 00:21:02,837
Chairman . Thank you . Thank you to 

521
00:21:02,837 --> 00:21:04,726
both Secretary Austin and General 

522
00:21:04,726 --> 00:21:06,670
Milley for extraordinary work . Um 

523
00:21:06,670 --> 00:21:09,410
First Secretary Austin last year , you 

524
00:21:09,410 --> 00:21:11,521
made a commitment that you would deal 

525
00:21:11,521 --> 00:21:13,688
with the issue of sexual assault . You 

526
00:21:13,688 --> 00:21:15,910
actually delivered on that commitment . 

527
00:21:15,910 --> 00:21:17,966
Thank you very much for the military 

528
00:21:17,966 --> 00:21:20,270
justice reform we've seen . But um as 

529
00:21:20,270 --> 00:21:22,810
you I believe agree sexual harassment 

530
00:21:22,810 --> 00:21:24,921
needs to be taken out of the chain of 

531
00:21:24,921 --> 00:21:26,643
command as well because sexual 

532
00:21:26,643 --> 00:21:28,810
harassment begets sexual assault . And 

533
00:21:28,810 --> 00:21:30,754
it appeared to be taken out on the 

534
00:21:30,754 --> 00:21:32,866
Senate side because they were getting 

535
00:21:32,866 --> 00:21:34,921
signals from the department , I hope 

536
00:21:34,921 --> 00:21:37,150
this year that we can count on you to 

537
00:21:37,150 --> 00:21:39,372
make that case to our Senate colleagues 

538
00:21:39,372 --> 00:21:41,483
about the importance of taking sexual 

539
00:21:41,483 --> 00:21:43,594
harassment out of the chain as well . 

540
00:21:45,740 --> 00:21:47,930
Well , as you said , I I think this uh 

541
00:21:47,940 --> 00:21:50,960
this the entire issue is is one that's 

542
00:21:50,970 --> 00:21:53,090
uh that's very important to us and 

543
00:21:53,090 --> 00:21:55,201
we'll continue to do the right things 

544
00:21:55,201 --> 00:21:57,423
in terms of making sure that we provide 

545
00:21:57,423 --> 00:21:59,646
the right environment for our troops to 

546
00:21:59,646 --> 00:22:01,757
operate in and we'll continue to work 

547
00:22:01,757 --> 00:22:04,260
to achieve the objectives that we've 

548
00:22:04,260 --> 00:22:08,080
outlined in terms of our reform of 

549
00:22:08,080 --> 00:22:11,410
our of our U . C . M . J . And I really 

550
00:22:11,410 --> 00:22:15,040
appreciate your support in in uh in in 

551
00:22:15,040 --> 00:22:17,390
the past year . To thank you , let me 

552
00:22:17,390 --> 00:22:20,720
move on . Um , I'm troubled by the 41% 

553
00:22:20,730 --> 00:22:23,430
increase in deaths by suicide by our 

554
00:22:23,430 --> 00:22:25,708
service members in the past five years . 

555
00:22:25,708 --> 00:22:27,930
I know you are as well . There are many 

556
00:22:27,930 --> 00:22:29,708
factors including uptempo toxic 

557
00:22:29,708 --> 00:22:31,930
climates and financial insecurity . But 

558
00:22:31,930 --> 00:22:34,041
having talked to the widows talked to 

559
00:22:34,041 --> 00:22:36,910
the parents of those soldiers and 

560
00:22:36,920 --> 00:22:38,920
airmen in particular who have taken 

561
00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:41,350
their lives . Um The biggest problem is 

562
00:22:41,350 --> 00:22:44,980
the lack of behavioral health expertise 

563
00:22:44,990 --> 00:22:47,370
in the system . We are woefully 

564
00:22:47,380 --> 00:22:50,510
underserved in that regard . And 

565
00:22:51,540 --> 00:22:53,720
I'm going with Senator Sullivan to 

566
00:22:53,730 --> 00:22:56,540
Alaska this month . I know we're going 

567
00:22:56,540 --> 00:22:58,429
to hear that . That's part of the 

568
00:22:58,429 --> 00:23:00,429
problem . You can't wait two months 

569
00:23:00,429 --> 00:23:03,140
when you are exhibiting Suicidal 

570
00:23:03,140 --> 00:23:06,280
ideation . Now , your department , your 

571
00:23:06,280 --> 00:23:08,280
defense health agency has said it's 

572
00:23:08,280 --> 00:23:10,391
going to take them to 2024 to come up 

573
00:23:10,740 --> 00:23:13,520
with the number that is necessary to 

574
00:23:13,520 --> 00:23:16,240
provide these services to our service 

575
00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:19,370
members . Imagine if Kaiser or 

576
00:23:19,380 --> 00:23:21,760
providence told their board that it was 

577
00:23:21,760 --> 00:23:24,120
going to take them two years to 

578
00:23:24,130 --> 00:23:27,210
determine um what the number of 

579
00:23:27,210 --> 00:23:29,321
providers that was necessary to serve 

580
00:23:29,321 --> 00:23:31,488
their patients , they would be fired . 

581
00:23:31,488 --> 00:23:33,654
Um what are you going to be able to do 

582
00:23:33,654 --> 00:23:35,599
to light a fire under the military 

583
00:23:35,599 --> 00:23:38,350
health system leadership to get a plan 

584
00:23:38,360 --> 00:23:40,471
in place . And the numbers identified 

585
00:23:40,780 --> 00:23:42,836
as well as you've heard me say in my 

586
00:23:42,836 --> 00:23:44,947
opening statement , this is something 

587
00:23:44,947 --> 00:23:47,058
that's uh that's very important to me 

588
00:23:47,058 --> 00:23:49,169
and our department remains focused on 

589
00:23:49,169 --> 00:23:51,502
it . As you know , we've with your help . 

590
00:23:51,502 --> 00:23:53,391
We stood up an independent review 

591
00:23:53,391 --> 00:23:55,502
commission to look at how we're doing 

592
00:23:55,502 --> 00:23:58,270
across across the department and to 

593
00:23:58,270 --> 00:24:00,860
look at the resources that we need and 

594
00:24:00,860 --> 00:24:03,680
how we can speed up resources uh to uh 

595
00:24:03,690 --> 00:24:05,760
to make them available to uh to our 

596
00:24:05,760 --> 00:24:07,950
troops and our families um In the 

597
00:24:07,950 --> 00:24:10,850
meantime we're we're going to use every 

598
00:24:10,860 --> 00:24:13,082
resource that's available to us . We're 

599
00:24:13,082 --> 00:24:15,450
going to increase our our use of 

600
00:24:15,450 --> 00:24:18,960
telehealth care . Uh And and and again 

601
00:24:18,970 --> 00:24:21,450
I think this is very important and 

602
00:24:21,450 --> 00:24:23,450
we're going to stay focused on it . 

603
00:24:23,450 --> 00:24:25,590
Thank you . General Milley , the 

604
00:24:25,590 --> 00:24:27,646
government accountability office has 

605
00:24:27,646 --> 00:24:29,812
repeatedly shown that the surface navy 

606
00:24:29,812 --> 00:24:33,480
is critically undermanned And some 

607
00:24:33,480 --> 00:24:37,150
6000 sailors undermanned . Yet the 

608
00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:38,827
budget requests . The Navy is 

609
00:24:38,827 --> 00:24:40,716
decreasing their end strength and 

610
00:24:40,716 --> 00:24:42,716
requesting more ships . The G . L . 

611
00:24:42,716 --> 00:24:44,950
reports that sailors are working 80-100 

612
00:24:44,950 --> 00:24:47,061
hours per week and sleeping less than 

613
00:24:47,061 --> 00:24:49,172
six hours at night and are struggling 

614
00:24:49,172 --> 00:24:51,339
with mental help . Um we saw it on the 

615
00:24:51,339 --> 00:24:54,790
Fitzgerald . Uh we've seen it in the 

616
00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:57,690
ship that was um destroyed , the $4 

617
00:24:57,690 --> 00:25:01,300
billion San Diego . What are we going 

618
00:25:01,300 --> 00:25:03,244
to do to get the navy to take this 

619
00:25:03,244 --> 00:25:07,040
seriously Congressman 

620
00:25:07,050 --> 00:25:09,050
1st ? I think the Navy does take it 

621
00:25:09,050 --> 00:25:12,070
seriously . The solution doesn't it's 

622
00:25:12,070 --> 00:25:14,126
not a simple solution has to do with 

623
00:25:14,126 --> 00:25:17,670
optempo . The navy is got , I don't 

624
00:25:17,670 --> 00:25:20,410
know , they're they're just under 1 to 

625
00:25:20,410 --> 00:25:22,577
2 op tempo for their ships . The fleet 

626
00:25:22,577 --> 00:25:24,688
at sea . Uh So they're running hard . 

627
00:25:24,688 --> 00:25:27,160
Uh And we ask an awful lot of our navy 

628
00:25:27,160 --> 00:25:29,000
as we do the army and Air Force 

629
00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:31,222
etcetera . But the navy is particularly 

630
00:25:31,222 --> 00:25:33,278
stressed because we extend ships and 

631
00:25:33,278 --> 00:25:35,444
they're out there for extended periods 

632
00:25:35,444 --> 00:25:37,389
of time etcetera . And as you note 

633
00:25:37,389 --> 00:25:39,389
there , the numbers are lower there 

634
00:25:39,389 --> 00:25:41,700
manning levels are lower per ship than 

635
00:25:41,700 --> 00:25:43,700
optimally manned . Uh , so that's a 

636
00:25:43,700 --> 00:25:45,867
problem . They are taking it serious . 

637
00:25:45,867 --> 00:25:47,978
But it's not something that the chain 

638
00:25:47,978 --> 00:25:50,089
of command of the Navy leadership has 

639
00:25:50,089 --> 00:25:52,200
not taken serious with respect to the 

640
00:25:52,200 --> 00:25:51,260
behavioral health piece . I couldn't 

641
00:25:51,260 --> 00:25:52,927
agree with you more . I think 

642
00:25:52,927 --> 00:25:54,816
behavioral health specialists are 

643
00:25:54,816 --> 00:25:56,927
critical to part of the problem or to 

644
00:25:56,927 --> 00:25:58,982
solve the problem . But I would also 

645
00:25:58,982 --> 00:26:01,149
emphasize the chain of command . There 

646
00:26:01,149 --> 00:26:03,204
is a behavioral health specialist in 

647
00:26:03,204 --> 00:26:05,371
every squad . In every team . In every 

648
00:26:05,371 --> 00:26:07,820
small group leader time has expired . 

649
00:26:07,820 --> 00:26:09,931
Thanks to hold the answer there . And 

650
00:26:09,931 --> 00:26:11,764
Mr brooks is recognized for five 

651
00:26:11,764 --> 00:26:13,931
minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman . This 

652
00:26:13,931 --> 00:26:15,931
past year we've seen in Afghanistan 

653
00:26:15,931 --> 00:26:18,320
withdrawal debacle Russia invade the 

654
00:26:18,320 --> 00:26:21,100
Ukraine china , threatening a nuclear 

655
00:26:21,100 --> 00:26:23,700
attack on Japan if Japan helps defend 

656
00:26:23,700 --> 00:26:25,756
Taiwan against the communist chinese 

657
00:26:25,756 --> 00:26:27,850
attack . And that brings me to my 

658
00:26:27,850 --> 00:26:29,628
question for General Milley and 

659
00:26:29,628 --> 00:26:32,090
Secretary Austin , in your professional 

660
00:26:32,090 --> 00:26:34,270
opinion over the past year , is the 

661
00:26:34,270 --> 00:26:37,260
world a more dangerous place , A less 

662
00:26:37,260 --> 00:26:39,371
dangerous place ? Or about the same . 

663
00:26:39,371 --> 00:26:42,510
General Milley . Thanks congressman . 

664
00:26:42,510 --> 00:26:45,130
As I said in my opening statement , it 

665
00:26:45,130 --> 00:26:48,650
is my observation , my analysis that 

666
00:26:48,650 --> 00:26:50,761
the world is becoming more unstable , 

667
00:26:50,761 --> 00:26:53,510
not less unstable . Secretary Austin 

668
00:26:53,510 --> 00:26:56,490
are unstable . And we're trending 

669
00:26:56,490 --> 00:26:58,546
towards greater instability . What's 

670
00:26:58,546 --> 00:27:01,770
that Now ? The consumer price index is 

671
00:27:01,780 --> 00:27:05,040
um increasing at a 7.9% rate , 

672
00:27:05,040 --> 00:27:06,929
according to the official federal 

673
00:27:06,929 --> 00:27:09,350
government statistics . Of course 

674
00:27:09,350 --> 00:27:11,572
that's an estimate . My personal belief 

675
00:27:11,572 --> 00:27:13,517
is it's probably worse than that . 

676
00:27:13,517 --> 00:27:15,572
Certainly talking anecdotally to the 

677
00:27:15,572 --> 00:27:17,628
people in my district . They believe 

678
00:27:17,628 --> 00:27:19,850
that it's worse than that . What is the 

679
00:27:19,850 --> 00:27:22,072
inflation rate for our national defense 

680
00:27:22,072 --> 00:27:25,240
cost , Manpower , bullets , fuel 

681
00:27:25,280 --> 00:27:27,380
everything that comprises national 

682
00:27:27,380 --> 00:27:29,436
offense ? What is the inflation rate 

683
00:27:29,436 --> 00:27:32,460
for those items ? General Milley . 

684
00:27:34,140 --> 00:27:36,250
Well , first I defer to mike McCord 

685
00:27:36,250 --> 00:27:38,400
down here as an expert , but the this 

686
00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:41,370
budget assumes an inflation rate Of 

687
00:27:41,370 --> 00:27:43,700
2.2% which is obviously incorrect 

688
00:27:43,710 --> 00:27:46,600
because it's almost 8% And uh it might 

689
00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:48,767
go up might go down but most forecasts 

690
00:27:48,767 --> 00:27:50,767
indicate it's going to go up and it 

691
00:27:50,767 --> 00:27:52,822
could level out at nine or 10% . Who 

692
00:27:52,822 --> 00:27:54,878
knows ? But it's clearly higher than 

693
00:27:54,878 --> 00:27:57,156
what the assumption was in this budget . 

694
00:27:57,156 --> 00:27:59,211
When you say it assumes a 2.2% . Are 

695
00:27:59,211 --> 00:28:01,433
you talking about a 2.2% consumer price 

696
00:28:01,433 --> 00:28:03,656
index inflation rate , which is what we 

697
00:28:03,656 --> 00:28:05,600
commonly look at . Are you talking 

698
00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:07,544
about a 2.2% increase for national 

699
00:28:07,544 --> 00:28:09,840
defense costs ? It's the c . p . I . 

700
00:28:09,850 --> 00:28:13,520
They the budget assumes 2.2% 

701
00:28:13,530 --> 00:28:16,810
inflation rate c . p . i . Uh inflation 

702
00:28:16,810 --> 00:28:19,360
rate . But when when the official rate 

703
00:28:19,360 --> 00:28:22,750
is 7.9% , why are we 

704
00:28:22,750 --> 00:28:25,770
assuming 2.2% ? Because the budget was 

705
00:28:25,770 --> 00:28:28,530
produced quite a while ago . Those 

706
00:28:28,530 --> 00:28:30,530
calculations were made prior to the 

707
00:28:30,530 --> 00:28:32,752
current inflation rate . That's correct 

708
00:28:32,752 --> 00:28:34,586
And I'd ask Mike McCord , Make a 

709
00:28:34,586 --> 00:28:36,641
comment on the specifics . You would 

710
00:28:36,641 --> 00:28:38,641
agree , would you not then that the 

711
00:28:38,641 --> 00:28:40,697
assumption at least according to the 

712
00:28:40,697 --> 00:28:42,808
official federal government inflation 

713
00:28:42,808 --> 00:28:44,919
rate is over 5% wrong , congressman , 

714
00:28:44,919 --> 00:28:46,752
congressman . We don't we in the 

715
00:28:46,752 --> 00:28:48,974
department offense don't use have never 

716
00:28:48,974 --> 00:28:50,919
used the C . P . I . As as what is 

717
00:28:50,919 --> 00:28:53,086
relevant for what . Mr McCord . Let me 

718
00:28:53,086 --> 00:28:55,197
ask you the question then what is the 

719
00:28:55,197 --> 00:28:57,363
inflation rate for the things that the 

720
00:28:57,363 --> 00:28:59,419
military has to purchase in order to 

721
00:28:59,419 --> 00:29:01,474
provide adequate national security ? 

722
00:29:01,474 --> 00:29:03,697
What we saw last year was 4% and that's 

723
00:29:03,697 --> 00:29:05,808
what we built into the West . What we 

724
00:29:05,808 --> 00:29:05,550
built into our pricing going forward 

725
00:29:05,550 --> 00:29:08,920
was to get that 2% up to 4% . So what 

726
00:29:08,920 --> 00:29:11,031
is your degree of confidence that the 

727
00:29:11,031 --> 00:29:13,198
4% rate is going to hold true ? That's 

728
00:29:13,198 --> 00:29:15,364
an unknown congressman . Obviously the 

729
00:29:15,364 --> 00:29:17,364
fiscal year calculation that you're 

730
00:29:17,364 --> 00:29:19,420
citing and the general million we're 

731
00:29:19,420 --> 00:29:21,364
discussing is of course starts six 

732
00:29:21,364 --> 00:29:23,587
months from now and ends 18 months from 

733
00:29:23,587 --> 00:29:25,809
now . So a lot can happen up or down uh 

734
00:29:25,809 --> 00:29:28,480
to affect that . Well , let me add some 

735
00:29:28,490 --> 00:29:32,230
uh comment and then some data . If we 

736
00:29:32,230 --> 00:29:34,360
don't know what the 

737
00:29:35,720 --> 00:29:38,680
inflation rate is for National Defense 

738
00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:41,340
procured products , then we can't 

739
00:29:41,340 --> 00:29:43,340
really know whether the president's 

740
00:29:43,340 --> 00:29:46,260
budget strengthens or weakens America's 

741
00:29:46,260 --> 00:29:48,680
national security in an environment 

742
00:29:48,680 --> 00:29:50,847
that both general Milley and Secretary 

743
00:29:50,847 --> 00:29:52,736
Austin I believe is becoming more 

744
00:29:52,736 --> 00:29:54,650
dangerous , not the same or less 

745
00:29:54,650 --> 00:29:57,060
dangerous . And I just looked up a 

746
00:29:57,060 --> 00:29:59,227
couple of items that I hope that y'all 

747
00:29:59,227 --> 00:30:00,949
would take into account as you 

748
00:30:00,949 --> 00:30:03,060
determine what ultimately will be the 

749
00:30:03,060 --> 00:30:05,310
budget that the president would support 

750
00:30:05,310 --> 00:30:08,070
for national security Over the past two 

751
00:30:08,070 --> 00:30:11,850
years , from January of 2022 , January 

752
00:30:11,850 --> 00:30:15,750
of 2022 , Crude oil has gone up 

753
00:30:15,750 --> 00:30:18,990
137% . Now , that's a big ticket item 

754
00:30:18,990 --> 00:30:22,350
in national defense , Wholesale gas . 

755
00:30:22,350 --> 00:30:24,350
Another big ticket item in national 

756
00:30:24,350 --> 00:30:27,740
offense has gone up 39% . Wholesale 

757
00:30:27,740 --> 00:30:30,950
diesel has gone up 37% . 

758
00:30:31,440 --> 00:30:33,830
There are probably other fuels like jet 

759
00:30:33,830 --> 00:30:36,052
fuels or what have you , uh , that have 

760
00:30:36,052 --> 00:30:38,530
gone up significantly . So I would hope 

761
00:30:38,530 --> 00:30:40,697
that y'all would take all these things 

762
00:30:40,697 --> 00:30:42,940
into account and increase our defense 

763
00:30:42,940 --> 00:30:45,200
spending in order to at least hold our 

764
00:30:45,200 --> 00:30:48,070
own in real purchasing power . And then 

765
00:30:48,070 --> 00:30:50,230
I'll add this final note . Uh , if I 

766
00:30:50,230 --> 00:30:52,286
recall correctly , you're looking at 

767
00:30:52,286 --> 00:30:54,700
about a 4.6% pay raise for our military 

768
00:30:54,700 --> 00:30:57,450
personnel . Is that what I heard ? Well , 

769
00:30:57,450 --> 00:31:01,020
if 4.6% is it , Given 

770
00:31:01,030 --> 00:31:03,980
that the consumer price index has gone 

771
00:31:03,990 --> 00:31:07,720
up 7.9 Do the math . That comes out to 

772
00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:10,670
a 3.3% pay cut for our military 

773
00:31:10,670 --> 00:31:12,892
personnel . Thank you . Mr . Chairman I 

774
00:31:12,892 --> 00:31:15,114
yield back . Thank you . Mr Norcross is 

775
00:31:15,114 --> 00:31:17,448
recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 

776
00:31:17,448 --> 00:31:19,670
Chairman . And I just want to follow up 

777
00:31:19,670 --> 00:31:21,781
on some of the previous conversations 

778
00:31:21,781 --> 00:31:23,892
when we start having the conversation 

779
00:31:23,892 --> 00:31:26,750
of what we have available to us in our 

780
00:31:26,750 --> 00:31:29,650
stockpiles . There is probably not a 

781
00:31:29,650 --> 00:31:31,810
day that goes by since the Russian 

782
00:31:31,810 --> 00:31:33,921
Ukrainian conflict started that we're 

783
00:31:33,921 --> 00:31:36,088
not talking about sending javelins and 

784
00:31:36,088 --> 00:31:38,620
stingers . Uh , but I want to back up a 

785
00:31:38,620 --> 00:31:41,000
little bit . We have a strategic 

786
00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:43,160
stockpile that has been formulated 

787
00:31:43,160 --> 00:31:45,950
based on risk over the years . Uh , 

788
00:31:46,440 --> 00:31:48,551
General Milley , your assessment with 

789
00:31:48,551 --> 00:31:50,773
respect to the weapons that we continue 

790
00:31:50,773 --> 00:31:54,320
to supply , Ukraine the level of 

791
00:31:54,320 --> 00:31:56,542
lethal aid that we can sustain . Are we 

792
00:31:56,542 --> 00:31:59,830
anywhere close right now to 

793
00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:03,460
depleting what we need as an assessment 

794
00:32:03,460 --> 00:32:05,620
of risk for our own protection or 

795
00:32:05,620 --> 00:32:09,180
potentially know what 

796
00:32:09,180 --> 00:32:12,050
we've supplied ? Uh , is a wide variety 

797
00:32:12,050 --> 00:32:15,380
of small arms munitions , machine guns , 

798
00:32:15,390 --> 00:32:17,334
um , grenades , grenade launcher , 

799
00:32:17,334 --> 00:32:19,980
etcetera and the two weapons systems 

800
00:32:19,980 --> 00:32:22,470
that uh , that are most in the news of 

801
00:32:22,470 --> 00:32:25,770
the javelin and the Stinger . 

802
00:32:26,140 --> 00:32:28,140
Uh , Stinger doesn't get produced . 

803
00:32:28,140 --> 00:32:30,084
There's no more production line on 

804
00:32:30,084 --> 00:32:32,307
Stinger . Uh , and uh , with respect to 

805
00:32:32,307 --> 00:32:34,529
javelin . No , we're not , we're not at 

806
00:32:34,529 --> 00:32:36,473
our uh , we were still meeting our 

807
00:32:36,473 --> 00:32:38,584
mission requirements for javelin . So 

808
00:32:38,584 --> 00:32:40,529
we're not breaking breaking any of 

809
00:32:40,529 --> 00:32:43,400
those red lines . So when we look at 

810
00:32:43,410 --> 00:32:47,330
our single point failures or critical 

811
00:32:47,330 --> 00:32:49,441
rare earth materials that go into the 

812
00:32:49,441 --> 00:32:52,180
explosive , the accelerants , uh , our 

813
00:32:52,180 --> 00:32:54,460
committee had a hearing earlier last 

814
00:32:54,460 --> 00:32:57,260
week that talked about the , uh , the 

815
00:32:57,260 --> 00:32:59,930
army's ongoing efforts to modernize the 

816
00:32:59,930 --> 00:33:01,874
ammunition production facilities , 

817
00:33:01,874 --> 00:33:04,280
which it would be kind of calm at World 

818
00:33:04,280 --> 00:33:06,720
War Two . And certainly over the next 

819
00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:08,553
five years , they have a billion 

820
00:33:08,553 --> 00:33:10,980
dollars that has been looked at is 

821
00:33:10,980 --> 00:33:14,240
something that we understand is minimum , 

822
00:33:14,250 --> 00:33:17,360
given that uh that critical supply 

823
00:33:17,360 --> 00:33:21,300
chain , one of the other issues in that 

824
00:33:21,300 --> 00:33:23,890
supply chain is the human efforts . And 

825
00:33:23,930 --> 00:33:26,152
Secretary Austin , this is where I like 

826
00:33:26,152 --> 00:33:28,080
to get your feedback . You know , 

827
00:33:28,090 --> 00:33:31,160
buying America has always been a motto 

828
00:33:31,160 --> 00:33:34,070
that most of us adhere to . Uh it has 

829
00:33:34,070 --> 00:33:35,848
shown us over the course of the 

830
00:33:35,848 --> 00:33:38,130
pandemic , how important that is for a 

831
00:33:38,130 --> 00:33:41,790
variety of reasons . Uh you heard about 

832
00:33:41,800 --> 00:33:44,840
the naval shipbuilding areas , but 

833
00:33:44,840 --> 00:33:48,520
across the board we Miss Larkin led a 

834
00:33:48,520 --> 00:33:50,687
task force about those critical supply 

835
00:33:50,687 --> 00:33:54,160
chain and bringing up the workforce as 

836
00:33:54,160 --> 00:33:57,200
you know , soldiers do not get born and 

837
00:33:57,200 --> 00:33:59,470
trained overnight . It takes time , as 

838
00:33:59,470 --> 00:34:02,350
does our industry for workforce . 

839
00:34:04,440 --> 00:34:06,850
What are we doing to try to on shore 

840
00:34:06,850 --> 00:34:09,760
some of those critical supply chain 

841
00:34:09,760 --> 00:34:12,910
issues and build up what's made here in 

842
00:34:12,910 --> 00:34:16,260
America versus across the globe . 

843
00:34:18,240 --> 00:34:20,296
Yeah , so this has been a thanks for 

844
00:34:20,296 --> 00:34:22,518
the question and it's it's been a point 

845
00:34:22,518 --> 00:34:26,350
of , of emphasis emphasis for us over 

846
00:34:26,350 --> 00:34:28,572
the last year , as you , you know , the 

847
00:34:28,572 --> 00:34:30,940
President has really worked , is really 

848
00:34:30,940 --> 00:34:34,730
working hard to onshore uh some of the 

849
00:34:34,740 --> 00:34:38,370
key capabilities that that have caused 

850
00:34:38,370 --> 00:34:40,370
us some concern with respect to our 

851
00:34:40,370 --> 00:34:42,660
supply chains here , microelectronic 

852
00:34:42,740 --> 00:34:45,050
and those kinds of things . So we're 

853
00:34:45,050 --> 00:34:47,830
working with uh with industry to help 

854
00:34:47,840 --> 00:34:50,062
try to see what we can do everything we 

855
00:34:50,062 --> 00:34:52,230
can do to help onshore those 

856
00:34:52,230 --> 00:34:54,452
capabilities and make sure that we have 

857
00:34:54,452 --> 00:34:58,260
the ability to create critical things 

858
00:34:58,270 --> 00:35:01,560
like microchips and that sort of stuff 

859
00:35:01,560 --> 00:35:03,550
here in the States were far too 

860
00:35:03,550 --> 00:35:06,910
dependent on foreign supplies there . 

861
00:35:07,610 --> 00:35:10,060
And we should be sure to point out that 

862
00:35:10,070 --> 00:35:12,200
our allies and partners are not the 

863
00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:15,800
problem . It's those in 2nd and 3rd 

864
00:35:15,810 --> 00:35:19,450
chain that creates the problem . Um And 

865
00:35:19,450 --> 00:35:21,450
again just as you know , we have to 

866
00:35:21,450 --> 00:35:23,617
build this industrial base in a way we 

867
00:35:23,617 --> 00:35:26,490
can do it is to signal the industry how 

868
00:35:26,490 --> 00:35:29,780
critically important it is that we give 

869
00:35:29,780 --> 00:35:32,110
them the assurances . It's just not a 

870
00:35:32,110 --> 00:35:34,350
one year . And without a yield back 

871
00:35:36,640 --> 00:35:38,362
Thank you . Dr . Desjarlais is 

872
00:35:38,362 --> 00:35:40,696
recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 

873
00:35:40,696 --> 00:35:42,751
Chairman . General Million . In your 

874
00:35:42,751 --> 00:35:44,918
opening statement , you began with the 

875
00:35:44,918 --> 00:35:47,140
fact that we have the greatest military 

876
00:35:47,140 --> 00:35:49,350
force on the planet and that we are 

877
00:35:49,740 --> 00:35:51,990
prepared to defend ourselves and our 

878
00:35:51,990 --> 00:35:54,510
allies and detour against aggression 

879
00:35:55,440 --> 00:35:58,470
that didn't work in in Ukraine . What 

880
00:35:58,470 --> 00:36:02,470
lessons have we learned in being 

881
00:36:02,470 --> 00:36:04,081
perhaps more concerned about 

882
00:36:04,081 --> 00:36:06,290
provocation of Vladimir Putin rather 

883
00:36:06,290 --> 00:36:08,290
than deterring him . And how can we 

884
00:36:08,290 --> 00:36:10,457
apply that when looking forward to the 

885
00:36:10,457 --> 00:36:11,957
chinese threat to Taiwan ? 

886
00:36:14,630 --> 00:36:17,510
Well , I think that with respect to um 

887
00:36:17,740 --> 00:36:19,907
the Russian invasion of Ukraine , it's 

888
00:36:19,907 --> 00:36:23,150
been longstanding objective of Putin 

889
00:36:23,870 --> 00:36:26,490
and candidly short of the commitment of 

890
00:36:26,490 --> 00:36:29,350
U . S . Military forces into Ukraine 

891
00:36:29,350 --> 00:36:32,420
proper . Um I'm not sure he was 

892
00:36:32,420 --> 00:36:34,670
deterrable . This has been a long term 

893
00:36:34,680 --> 00:36:38,060
um objective of his um that that goes 

894
00:36:38,060 --> 00:36:41,560
back years . So I think the idea of 

895
00:36:41,570 --> 00:36:44,840
deterring Putin from invading 

896
00:36:45,430 --> 00:36:48,500
Ukraine uh deterring them by the United 

897
00:36:48,500 --> 00:36:51,030
States would have required the 

898
00:36:51,030 --> 00:36:53,252
commitment of U . S . Military forces . 

899
00:36:53,252 --> 00:36:55,197
And I think that would have risked 

900
00:36:55,197 --> 00:36:57,252
armed conflict with Russia . Which I 

901
00:36:57,252 --> 00:36:59,600
certainly would have advised . Okay uh 

902
00:36:59,610 --> 00:37:02,060
you know the president's strategy at 

903
00:37:02,060 --> 00:37:04,280
least publicly and his administration 

904
00:37:04,280 --> 00:37:06,650
was to impose economic sanctions to 

905
00:37:06,650 --> 00:37:08,880
deter Russia . So did you advise him 

906
00:37:08,880 --> 00:37:10,880
that that was probably not going to 

907
00:37:10,880 --> 00:37:13,102
work and this invasion was inevitable . 

908
00:37:13,102 --> 00:37:16,690
Um The it's not my lane to comment on 

909
00:37:16,690 --> 00:37:19,150
sanctions per se but sanctions have a 

910
00:37:19,150 --> 00:37:21,500
very poor track record of deterring 

911
00:37:21,510 --> 00:37:23,640
aggression . But they are a means of 

912
00:37:23,640 --> 00:37:25,710
imposing significant cost . The 

913
00:37:25,710 --> 00:37:27,932
objective of the sanctions is to impose 

914
00:37:27,932 --> 00:37:30,240
significant costs if he invaded those 

915
00:37:30,250 --> 00:37:32,306
significant costs . The sanctions in 

916
00:37:32,306 --> 00:37:34,361
combination with the export controls 

917
00:37:34,361 --> 00:37:36,417
are breaking the back of the Russian 

918
00:37:36,417 --> 00:37:38,583
economy as we speak . Secretary Austin 

919
00:37:39,130 --> 00:37:40,920
several members have brought up 

920
00:37:40,930 --> 00:37:43,720
hypersonic weapons and you mentioned we 

921
00:37:43,720 --> 00:37:46,980
have other options . But of the three 

922
00:37:46,980 --> 00:37:49,202
countries currently fielding hypersonic 

923
00:37:49,202 --> 00:37:51,258
glide weapons , Russia china and the 

924
00:37:51,258 --> 00:37:53,258
United States who's leading in that 

925
00:37:53,258 --> 00:37:56,220
capability . I don't know what the 

926
00:37:56,230 --> 00:37:58,840
inventories over the chinese . 

927
00:38:06,720 --> 00:38:08,942
Okay you must not be attending the same 

928
00:38:08,942 --> 00:38:10,887
briefings . We are because clearly 

929
00:38:10,887 --> 00:38:12,887
china seems to be out front . Um We 

930
00:38:12,887 --> 00:38:14,950
don't have a current capability that 

931
00:38:14,950 --> 00:38:17,172
can defend against hypersonic threats . 

932
00:38:17,172 --> 00:38:18,172
Is that correct ? 

933
00:38:21,020 --> 00:38:24,820
And that gap or that's the gap that the 

934
00:38:24,820 --> 00:38:26,780
glide glide phase interceptor is 

935
00:38:26,780 --> 00:38:29,950
supposed to feel correct . Okay . I 

936
00:38:29,950 --> 00:38:32,172
heard some very concerning reports over 

937
00:38:32,172 --> 00:38:34,339
the past week that the White House and 

938
00:38:34,339 --> 00:38:34,250
the department may be slowing the 

939
00:38:34,250 --> 00:38:35,972
development of the glide phase 

940
00:38:35,972 --> 00:38:37,750
interceptor . Can you confirm ? 

941
00:38:43,510 --> 00:38:44,510
What's that ? 

942
00:38:52,920 --> 00:38:54,864
Yeah , we remain on track with our 

943
00:38:54,864 --> 00:38:56,864
program and as you can see from the 

944
00:38:56,864 --> 00:38:58,710
budget , we we're investing a 

945
00:38:58,720 --> 00:39:00,720
significant amount of money for the 

946
00:39:00,720 --> 00:39:04,460
defense of um um 

947
00:39:04,470 --> 00:39:06,692
for missile defense . Okay . We brought 

948
00:39:06,692 --> 00:39:08,692
up undersea capabilities and Russia 

949
00:39:08,692 --> 00:39:10,470
currently has a nuclear capable 

950
00:39:10,470 --> 00:39:12,470
submarine launched cruise missile , 

951
00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:16,270
correct . Russia has . I'm sorry to 

952
00:39:16,270 --> 00:39:18,270
interrupt . But they have a nuclear 

953
00:39:18,270 --> 00:39:20,159
capable submarine launched cruise 

954
00:39:20,159 --> 00:39:22,214
missile , correct ? That's correct . 

955
00:39:22,214 --> 00:39:24,437
Alright . Uh President biden's suggests 

956
00:39:24,437 --> 00:39:26,381
that we cut our own capability for 

957
00:39:26,381 --> 00:39:28,381
nuclear capable sea launched cruise 

958
00:39:28,381 --> 00:39:27,820
missiles . And that's correct as well . 

959
00:39:27,820 --> 00:39:30,860
Right . You can see what we're 

960
00:39:30,860 --> 00:39:33,120
investing in is $34 billion in our in 

961
00:39:33,120 --> 00:39:35,453
our nuclear triad here . General Milley , 

962
00:39:35,453 --> 00:39:37,287
you you commented that your best 

963
00:39:37,287 --> 00:39:39,398
medical advice is that we should keep 

964
00:39:39,398 --> 00:39:41,610
this capability . Uh Admiral Richards 

965
00:39:41,620 --> 00:39:44,220
general Walters . I think Van Herk has 

966
00:39:44,220 --> 00:39:46,276
mentioned that Secretary Austin , do 

967
00:39:46,276 --> 00:39:48,276
you agree with your colleagues that 

968
00:39:48,276 --> 00:39:50,276
this is a capability that we should 

969
00:39:50,276 --> 00:39:52,740
focus on to help ? Uh limit the 

970
00:39:52,740 --> 00:39:54,907
asymmetry we have when it comes to the 

971
00:39:54,907 --> 00:39:56,573
delivery of low yield nuclear 

972
00:39:56,573 --> 00:39:58,629
capability . Is this a slick them in 

973
00:39:58,629 --> 00:40:01,490
that you're referring to ? Yes . Um you 

974
00:40:01,490 --> 00:40:03,490
know , the marginal capability that 

975
00:40:03,490 --> 00:40:06,450
this uh this provides uh is far 

976
00:40:06,450 --> 00:40:09,050
outweighed by the cost . And so we have 

977
00:40:09,060 --> 00:40:11,116
the ability of colleagues to provide 

978
00:40:11,116 --> 00:40:13,282
options to the president with a number 

979
00:40:13,282 --> 00:40:15,504
of means . So Well , the one thing that 

980
00:40:15,504 --> 00:40:17,504
we hope is that regardless of which 

981
00:40:17,504 --> 00:40:19,560
party is in power in the White House 

982
00:40:19,560 --> 00:40:21,870
that our our military advisers like 

983
00:40:21,870 --> 00:40:23,814
yourselves look at this through an 

984
00:40:23,814 --> 00:40:26,037
objective lens and we had concern about 

985
00:40:26,037 --> 00:40:28,500
uh the department losing focus on our 

986
00:40:28,500 --> 00:40:30,830
lethal capability and focusing on more 

987
00:40:30,830 --> 00:40:32,886
of a woke military hope . That's not 

988
00:40:32,886 --> 00:40:35,052
the case . And and it seems like a lot 

989
00:40:35,052 --> 00:40:37,163
of us are agreement on capabilities , 

990
00:40:37,163 --> 00:40:39,219
but President biden is not listening 

991
00:40:39,219 --> 00:40:41,330
congressman . This is the most lethal 

992
00:40:41,330 --> 00:40:43,497
force on the planet and it will remain 

993
00:40:43,497 --> 00:40:45,719
that way and we will continue to invest 

994
00:40:45,719 --> 00:40:47,774
in the things that we need to remain 

995
00:40:47,774 --> 00:40:47,440
dominant on the battlefield . 

996
00:40:47,810 --> 00:40:50,730
Gentleman's time has expired . Mr Jago 

997
00:40:52,210 --> 00:40:54,377
Secretary Austin , can you explain the 

998
00:40:54,377 --> 00:40:56,488
concept of integrated deterrence in a 

999
00:40:56,488 --> 00:40:58,654
little more detail ? And are there any 

1000
00:40:58,654 --> 00:40:58,350
examples where we had , we would have 

1001
00:40:58,350 --> 00:41:00,600
seen it succeeds thus far , especially 

1002
00:41:00,600 --> 00:41:03,720
if there's any NATO examples , I think 

1003
00:41:03,720 --> 00:41:05,831
you heard me say a bit earlier , that 

1004
00:41:05,840 --> 00:41:08,510
integrated deterrence , it really means 

1005
00:41:08,520 --> 00:41:10,960
uh using all the capability and 

1006
00:41:10,960 --> 00:41:13,580
capacity in all of the warfighting 

1007
00:41:13,580 --> 00:41:16,420
domains , air land , sea cyber and 

1008
00:41:16,420 --> 00:41:19,280
space and and linking and networking 

1009
00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:21,750
those capabilities together in new ways 

1010
00:41:21,750 --> 00:41:24,350
to provide to create synergies and 

1011
00:41:24,350 --> 00:41:26,572
you're seeing us do that in a number of 

1012
00:41:26,572 --> 00:41:29,960
areas . It also involves leveraging the 

1013
00:41:29,960 --> 00:41:31,904
capability and the capacity of our 

1014
00:41:31,904 --> 00:41:33,738
allies . And again , I mentioned 

1015
00:41:33,738 --> 00:41:35,960
earlier that uh that we've done that in 

1016
00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:38,182
the past , but we need to do that a lot 

1017
00:41:38,182 --> 00:41:40,670
better . Not only air , land and sea , 

1018
00:41:40,680 --> 00:41:43,140
but also in space and cyber . And many 

1019
00:41:43,140 --> 00:41:44,862
of our allies have significant 

1020
00:41:44,862 --> 00:41:46,362
capability there as well . 

1021
00:41:49,170 --> 00:41:51,337
It was just to follow up on that . One 

1022
00:41:51,337 --> 00:41:54,190
of the things I was very happy and that 

1023
00:41:54,190 --> 00:41:56,246
you had in your written marks of the 

1024
00:41:56,246 --> 00:41:58,246
steps were taken with the allies to 

1025
00:41:58,246 --> 00:42:00,246
bolster NATO's eastern flicked . In 

1026
00:42:00,246 --> 00:42:02,301
fact , one of my proudest moments in 

1027
00:42:02,301 --> 00:42:01,960
Congress thus far as securing an 

1028
00:42:01,960 --> 00:42:03,960
authorization for the Baltic secure 

1029
00:42:03,960 --> 00:42:05,849
initiative , which revised target 

1030
00:42:05,849 --> 00:42:07,960
defense systems to Estonia Latvia and 

1031
00:42:07,960 --> 00:42:09,904
Lithuania including an air defense 

1032
00:42:09,904 --> 00:42:11,960
ammunition . And see for I . S . R . 

1033
00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:14,127
Across these abilities or others . Are 

1034
00:42:14,127 --> 00:42:13,850
there particular areas where you would 

1035
00:42:13,850 --> 00:42:16,017
like to deepen defense and military to 

1036
00:42:16,017 --> 00:42:18,239
military cooperation between the United 

1037
00:42:18,239 --> 00:42:20,239
States and the Baltic countries and 

1038
00:42:20,239 --> 00:42:22,239
which capabilities do you think are 

1039
00:42:22,239 --> 00:42:24,406
most important for ? The Baltic states 

1040
00:42:24,406 --> 00:42:26,406
prioritize well , some of them have 

1041
00:42:26,406 --> 00:42:28,870
some uh pretty uh significant 

1042
00:42:28,870 --> 00:42:31,037
capabilities in cyber and I think they 

1043
00:42:31,037 --> 00:42:34,820
can add to our already robust inventory 

1044
00:42:34,820 --> 00:42:37,610
here . But but I I think uh things like 

1045
00:42:37,610 --> 00:42:40,460
cyber uh , in air and missile defense , 

1046
00:42:40,460 --> 00:42:43,410
we'd like to see them to to to uh begin 

1047
00:42:43,410 --> 00:42:45,577
to develop more capabilities there and 

1048
00:42:45,577 --> 00:42:47,577
work together with their with their 

1049
00:42:47,577 --> 00:42:49,632
neighbors to link those capabilities 

1050
00:42:49,632 --> 00:42:52,870
together . Thank you . And then uh rub 

1051
00:42:52,880 --> 00:42:55,510
secretary also again , uh , you 

1052
00:42:55,510 --> 00:42:57,677
referenced Gray zone multiple times in 

1053
00:42:57,677 --> 00:42:59,677
your written testimony , noting our 

1054
00:42:59,677 --> 00:43:01,899
competitors , malign activities in it . 

1055
00:43:01,899 --> 00:43:04,121
One of my greatest concerns is Russia's 

1056
00:43:04,121 --> 00:43:06,343
ability to exploit the gray zone and to 

1057
00:43:06,343 --> 00:43:06,320
conduct targeted disinformation 

1058
00:43:06,320 --> 00:43:08,042
operations , spreading Putin's 

1059
00:43:08,042 --> 00:43:10,098
propaganda and blatant lies over the 

1060
00:43:10,098 --> 00:43:12,153
long term . I'm also concerned about 

1061
00:43:12,153 --> 00:43:14,320
the lessons that china is drawing from 

1062
00:43:14,320 --> 00:43:16,542
Russia and the space itself . Could you 

1063
00:43:16,542 --> 00:43:18,598
show your perspective how our forces 

1064
00:43:18,598 --> 00:43:20,820
can be more effective operating in this 

1065
00:43:20,820 --> 00:43:22,987
gray zone of conflict ? What short and 

1066
00:43:22,987 --> 00:43:25,153
long term steps should we be taking to 

1067
00:43:25,153 --> 00:43:24,690
counter this malign influence from 

1068
00:43:24,690 --> 00:43:27,050
Russia right now and from china to as 

1069
00:43:27,050 --> 00:43:28,994
it becomes more adept at spreading 

1070
00:43:28,994 --> 00:43:31,161
disinformation , operating in the gray 

1071
00:43:31,161 --> 00:43:34,410
zone , we we have been no 

1072
00:43:34,900 --> 00:43:38,090
very active and , you know , before the 

1073
00:43:38,090 --> 00:43:40,500
onset of hostilities here with with the 

1074
00:43:40,500 --> 00:43:42,667
Ukrainians and helping them with their 

1075
00:43:42,667 --> 00:43:44,667
cyber capabilities and helping them 

1076
00:43:44,667 --> 00:43:48,010
develop methods to to begin to counter 

1077
00:43:48,400 --> 00:43:50,622
some of the activity in the gray zone . 

1078
00:43:50,750 --> 00:43:52,690
And we can see this is a learning 

1079
00:43:52,690 --> 00:43:55,100
process . We continue to learn thus far . 

1080
00:43:55,100 --> 00:43:57,156
I think we've been very effective in 

1081
00:43:57,156 --> 00:43:59,267
helping them . And uh , and they have 

1082
00:43:59,267 --> 00:44:01,970
been able to uh , to push back on a 

1083
00:44:01,980 --> 00:44:04,430
number of unhelpful narratives and stay 

1084
00:44:04,430 --> 00:44:06,541
ahead of the power curve . Actually , 

1085
00:44:06,541 --> 00:44:08,708
so there are there will be a number of 

1086
00:44:08,708 --> 00:44:10,763
lessons learned coming out of this . 

1087
00:44:10,763 --> 00:44:12,930
But I think , uh , I think we've grown 

1088
00:44:12,930 --> 00:44:15,510
in our awareness uh , in terms of what 

1089
00:44:15,510 --> 00:44:18,010
it takes to be able to begin to be 

1090
00:44:18,010 --> 00:44:20,730
effective in countering unhelpful 

1091
00:44:20,730 --> 00:44:22,841
narratives in the information space . 

1092
00:44:23,290 --> 00:44:26,250
Thank you . And then , lastly , uh , 

1093
00:44:26,260 --> 00:44:28,371
what's a matter of time ? I'd like to 

1094
00:44:28,371 --> 00:44:30,371
talk to you about the civilian harm 

1095
00:44:30,371 --> 00:44:32,427
mitigation response action plan . As 

1096
00:44:32,427 --> 00:44:34,593
you all know , civilian harm caused by 

1097
00:44:34,593 --> 00:44:34,320
us military operations , risks are 

1098
00:44:34,320 --> 00:44:36,653
legitimate overseas legitimacy overseas , 

1099
00:44:36,653 --> 00:44:38,820
including what we've already seen with 

1100
00:44:38,820 --> 00:44:41,930
the reaction to Russia . Ah So it was 

1101
00:44:41,930 --> 00:44:43,819
probably a letter with a bunch of 

1102
00:44:43,819 --> 00:44:45,986
members . My understanding is that the 

1103
00:44:45,986 --> 00:44:48,041
review review is still ongoing under 

1104
00:44:48,041 --> 00:44:50,152
the 90 day window that you directed . 

1105
00:44:50,152 --> 00:44:52,152
But you share any insights you have 

1106
00:44:52,152 --> 00:44:54,319
learned so far from this process . I'm 

1107
00:44:54,319 --> 00:44:56,486
not prepared to share insights at this 

1108
00:44:56,486 --> 00:44:58,708
point . I would just the only insight I 

1109
00:44:58,708 --> 00:45:00,930
have is that the , you know , the folks 

1110
00:45:00,930 --> 00:45:04,700
that we've assemble 22 work on 

1111
00:45:04,700 --> 00:45:07,230
this are very detailed and very 

1112
00:45:07,230 --> 00:45:09,452
committed to doing this the right way . 

1113
00:45:10,160 --> 00:45:12,590
And these are people from a number of 

1114
00:45:12,590 --> 00:45:15,050
communities to include the the the 

1115
00:45:15,050 --> 00:45:18,620
active war fighters . Uh and and uh so 

1116
00:45:18,630 --> 00:45:20,963
we still have work to do . And you know , 

1117
00:45:20,963 --> 00:45:24,600
the the at the 

1118
00:45:25,190 --> 00:45:28,720
Review is about 30 days uh 

1119
00:45:29,290 --> 00:45:33,290
out in terms of the the 

1120
00:45:33,290 --> 00:45:35,720
brief out of the of the review . So 

1121
00:45:36,090 --> 00:45:38,090
once that's done , I'll be happy to 

1122
00:45:38,090 --> 00:45:40,110
share any any insights and lessons 

1123
00:45:40,110 --> 00:45:41,970
learned from this , but and also 

1124
00:45:41,980 --> 00:45:44,730
prescribed by way ahead . Right , thank 

1125
00:45:44,730 --> 00:45:47,030
you . Come back my time . Thank you . 

1126
00:45:47,040 --> 00:45:49,373
Mr Kelly is recognized for five minutes . 

1127
00:45:49,373 --> 00:45:51,429
Thank you . Mr Chairman . One of the 

1128
00:45:51,429 --> 00:45:53,707
things that I'm really concerned about . 

1129
00:45:53,707 --> 00:45:55,818
Secretary Austin and General Milley , 

1130
00:45:55,818 --> 00:45:57,651
is that across the D . O . D . I 

1131
00:45:57,651 --> 00:45:59,762
continually hear people talk about uh 

1132
00:45:59,762 --> 00:46:01,707
divesting of things for future for 

1133
00:46:01,707 --> 00:46:03,929
future things , future capabilities for 

1134
00:46:03,929 --> 00:46:06,151
current and General Milley , I've heard 

1135
00:46:06,151 --> 00:46:08,429
you say this , I learned this from you . 

1136
00:46:08,429 --> 00:46:10,596
We have to be able to fight today with 

1137
00:46:10,596 --> 00:46:12,484
the things fight tonight with the 

1138
00:46:12,484 --> 00:46:14,651
things that we have right now . And so 

1139
00:46:14,651 --> 00:46:16,596
I see that we're talking about the 

1140
00:46:16,596 --> 00:46:18,707
Marine Corps says they need 31 AM feb 

1141
00:46:18,707 --> 00:46:20,651
sips . Yet we're saying we're only 

1142
00:46:20,651 --> 00:46:22,429
going to give you 24 we're only 

1143
00:46:22,429 --> 00:46:24,651
building nine ships and we're divesting 

1144
00:46:24,651 --> 00:46:26,651
of 24 capabilities . It's a sliding 

1145
00:46:26,651 --> 00:46:29,730
scale of risk . K C 40 sixes are not 

1146
00:46:29,730 --> 00:46:31,841
coming online , not providing all the 

1147
00:46:31,841 --> 00:46:33,897
capabilities need in a timely enough 

1148
00:46:33,897 --> 00:46:35,952
manner . But yet we're talking about 

1149
00:46:35,952 --> 00:46:38,200
divesting of the KC 1 35 . So , so we 

1150
00:46:38,200 --> 00:46:40,730
continue to divest in thinking the same 

1151
00:46:40,730 --> 00:46:42,897
thing with the slick . Um , if we have 

1152
00:46:42,897 --> 00:46:45,008
another capability that provides that 

1153
00:46:45,008 --> 00:46:47,230
same thing in the same region , then we 

1154
00:46:47,230 --> 00:46:49,286
need to do that . So listen , I know 

1155
00:46:49,286 --> 00:46:51,563
everybody's heart's in the right place , 

1156
00:46:51,563 --> 00:46:53,563
but I just think we have to be very 

1157
00:46:53,563 --> 00:46:55,786
careful now . We have a war with Russia 

1158
00:46:55,786 --> 00:46:58,008
and Ukraine and re looking these things 

1159
00:46:58,008 --> 00:47:00,174
to see , do we have the capabilities ? 

1160
00:47:00,174 --> 00:47:02,286
Should , should the world ask that we 

1161
00:47:02,286 --> 00:47:04,341
fight two wars on two fronts whether 

1162
00:47:04,341 --> 00:47:06,508
that ships and current capabilities or 

1163
00:47:06,508 --> 00:47:08,563
refueling aircraft . The other thing 

1164
00:47:08,563 --> 00:47:10,786
I'm extremely concerned about Secretary 

1165
00:47:10,786 --> 00:47:09,980
Austin and I think this is something 

1166
00:47:09,980 --> 00:47:12,310
you can fix is our merchant marine 

1167
00:47:12,310 --> 00:47:14,800
fleet , our ability to move ships , 

1168
00:47:14,810 --> 00:47:18,560
troops , uh , equipment , uh , 

1169
00:47:18,570 --> 00:47:21,280
fuel all kind of logistics . We keep 

1170
00:47:21,280 --> 00:47:23,391
pushing that . That's not just a navy 

1171
00:47:23,391 --> 00:47:25,447
function . It's the army that has to 

1172
00:47:25,447 --> 00:47:27,391
have those goods , it's the Marine 

1173
00:47:27,391 --> 00:47:29,502
Corps . And so we really have to look 

1174
00:47:29,502 --> 00:47:29,490
at this and we have to invest in our 

1175
00:47:29,490 --> 00:47:31,712
merchant marine fleet to be able to get 

1176
00:47:31,712 --> 00:47:33,823
us what we need when we do , what are 

1177
00:47:33,823 --> 00:47:35,879
you doing to get our merchant marine 

1178
00:47:35,879 --> 00:47:38,046
fleet set at a D O . D level ? Because 

1179
00:47:38,046 --> 00:47:40,212
I can tell you the services are always 

1180
00:47:40,212 --> 00:47:40,090
going to say the other one needs to pay 

1181
00:47:40,090 --> 00:47:41,090
for it . 

1182
00:47:43,880 --> 00:47:47,800
Well , we have not invested any , 

1183
00:47:48,380 --> 00:47:51,020
any invested any money in this budget 

1184
00:47:51,030 --> 00:47:53,252
towards the merchant marine fleet . But 

1185
00:47:53,252 --> 00:47:55,474
you make some good points , but we need 

1186
00:47:55,474 --> 00:47:57,697
to , you would agree that that logistic 

1187
00:47:57,697 --> 00:47:59,863
chain . I mean the reason the Russians 

1188
00:47:59,863 --> 00:47:59,630
are getting their tail kicked in 

1189
00:47:59,630 --> 00:48:01,519
Ukraine right now is a logistical 

1190
00:48:01,519 --> 00:48:03,574
failure . And if we don't plan to do 

1191
00:48:03,574 --> 00:48:05,797
logistics , I promise you , it will not 

1192
00:48:05,797 --> 00:48:08,050
happen . I want to go back with KC 1 35 

1193
00:48:08,060 --> 00:48:10,180
or you will , are you willing General 

1194
00:48:10,180 --> 00:48:12,490
Milley , Secretary Austin to relook the 

1195
00:48:12,490 --> 00:48:15,110
divestiture of KC 1 35 until we have 

1196
00:48:15,120 --> 00:48:18,220
adequate capability to refuel to , to 

1197
00:48:18,230 --> 00:48:20,490
both . Windowpane , calm and also 

1198
00:48:20,490 --> 00:48:22,712
europe . Are you willing to relook that 

1199
00:48:22,712 --> 00:48:24,323
and not divest until we have 

1200
00:48:24,323 --> 00:48:25,657
capabilities replaced . 

1201
00:48:30,370 --> 00:48:32,537
I would be happy to relook anything in 

1202
00:48:32,537 --> 00:48:34,759
the budget that you want me to relook . 

1203
00:48:34,759 --> 00:48:34,490
And I'll take a look at that and get 

1204
00:48:34,490 --> 00:48:36,712
with the air force and make sure that I 

1205
00:48:36,712 --> 00:48:38,657
clearly understand the divestiture 

1206
00:48:38,657 --> 00:48:40,890
logic in the in the production rates of 

1207
00:48:40,890 --> 00:48:43,420
the KC- 46 . And then I just really 

1208
00:48:43,420 --> 00:48:45,710
hope you will relook the ship plan . I 

1209
00:48:45,710 --> 00:48:47,766
mean the marines say they need 31 AM 

1210
00:48:47,766 --> 00:48:49,988
Febreze yet . D . O . D says we're only 

1211
00:48:49,988 --> 00:48:52,043
going to give you 24 I disagree with 

1212
00:48:52,043 --> 00:48:54,210
the Chairman a little bit on this . We 

1213
00:48:54,210 --> 00:48:56,432
do have the capability to produce those 

1214
00:48:56,432 --> 00:48:56,400
ships , but it's about keeping the 

1215
00:48:56,400 --> 00:48:58,567
workforce engaged and making sure that 

1216
00:48:58,567 --> 00:49:00,733
we have a timeline and we don't change 

1217
00:49:00,733 --> 00:49:02,844
that every year so that they can plan 

1218
00:49:02,844 --> 00:49:05,067
out having the right industrial base at 

1219
00:49:05,067 --> 00:49:07,344
the right time . So I hope we will get , 

1220
00:49:07,344 --> 00:49:09,567
I haven't seen a ship plan in two years 

1221
00:49:09,567 --> 00:49:11,622
from the Navy and that is one of the 

1222
00:49:11,622 --> 00:49:13,733
requirements that they're supposed to 

1223
00:49:13,733 --> 00:49:13,630
do . We need that in order to do our 

1224
00:49:13,630 --> 00:49:16,260
job . Thanks for that . And that's 

1225
00:49:16,260 --> 00:49:19,780
forthcoming . Um and also they they've 

1226
00:49:19,780 --> 00:49:22,370
done an amphibian review uh and that's 

1227
00:49:22,370 --> 00:49:24,481
forthcoming as well . And once that's 

1228
00:49:24,481 --> 00:49:26,900
done , I think uh we'll have greater 

1229
00:49:26,900 --> 00:49:29,011
insights into what what the Secretary 

1230
00:49:29,011 --> 00:49:31,233
of the Navy really believes that credit 

1231
00:49:31,233 --> 00:49:33,560
the requirements are . I would just 

1232
00:49:33,560 --> 00:49:35,560
point to the fact that I know , you 

1233
00:49:35,560 --> 00:49:37,560
know this that we're investing $2.6 

1234
00:49:37,560 --> 00:49:40,160
billion in uh in AM Fibs uh in this , 

1235
00:49:40,170 --> 00:49:42,448
in this budget . Am fibs are important . 

1236
00:49:42,448 --> 00:49:44,503
There's no question about it . We're 

1237
00:49:44,503 --> 00:49:46,726
gonna make sure that mr secretary and I 

1238
00:49:46,726 --> 00:49:46,590
hate to interrupt , but I got one 

1239
00:49:46,590 --> 00:49:48,646
minute and I got one more question I 

1240
00:49:48,646 --> 00:49:50,701
really want to talk about . I really 

1241
00:49:50,701 --> 00:49:52,812
just hope you guys are the adviser to 

1242
00:49:52,812 --> 00:49:54,701
not just the president but to the 

1243
00:49:54,701 --> 00:49:56,923
nation and making sure that we have the 

1244
00:49:56,923 --> 00:49:58,923
right risk of fighting today versus 

1245
00:49:58,923 --> 00:50:00,923
future capabilities that we have to 

1246
00:50:00,923 --> 00:50:02,979
have to win future wars . And I just 

1247
00:50:02,979 --> 00:50:05,034
hope that we'll relook some of those 

1248
00:50:05,034 --> 00:50:07,146
things . Final point , I want to talk 

1249
00:50:07,146 --> 00:50:06,300
about , there's a little bit of 

1250
00:50:06,300 --> 00:50:08,467
movement right now and I just ask that 

1251
00:50:08,467 --> 00:50:10,940
both of y'all weigh in on this um to 

1252
00:50:10,940 --> 00:50:14,330
make gold star families uh to include a 

1253
00:50:14,330 --> 00:50:16,552
gold star to make them someone who dies 

1254
00:50:16,552 --> 00:50:18,774
in service . If I die of a heart attack 

1255
00:50:18,774 --> 00:50:20,886
while I'm doing guardrail , my family 

1256
00:50:20,886 --> 00:50:23,108
is not a Gold star family . I shouldn't 

1257
00:50:23,108 --> 00:50:25,386
get a purple heart for having an A . T . 

1258
00:50:25,386 --> 00:50:27,608
V . Wreck downrange . Uh that is not to 

1259
00:50:27,608 --> 00:50:30,010
denigrate anyone from not doing that . 

1260
00:50:30,010 --> 00:50:31,899
We love all our service members , 

1261
00:50:31,899 --> 00:50:33,954
however they die . But I really hope 

1262
00:50:33,954 --> 00:50:36,010
you'll look hard and making sure our 

1263
00:50:36,010 --> 00:50:37,954
Gold Star families , our Gold star 

1264
00:50:37,954 --> 00:50:40,066
families who are lost in combat and I 

1265
00:50:40,066 --> 00:50:42,177
am doing that personally doing that . 

1266
00:50:42,177 --> 00:50:44,232
Today is gold star spouses date gold 

1267
00:50:44,232 --> 00:50:46,890
Star family day by the way and there's 

1268
00:50:46,900 --> 00:50:48,844
nothing probably more important or 

1269
00:50:48,844 --> 00:50:51,011
sacred than to make sure that we honor 

1270
00:50:51,011 --> 00:50:53,122
those fallen in combat in the defense 

1271
00:50:53,122 --> 00:50:55,067
of this nation . So I'm looking at 

1272
00:50:55,067 --> 00:50:56,956
gentleman's time has expired . Mr 

1273
00:50:56,956 --> 00:50:59,289
Carvajal is recognized for five minutes . 

1274
00:50:59,289 --> 00:51:01,344
Thank you . Mr Chair . I apologize . 

1275
00:51:01,344 --> 00:51:03,511
Hold on . We'll start just saying um , 

1276
00:51:03,511 --> 00:51:05,678
the witnesses need a 15 minute break , 

1277
00:51:05,678 --> 00:51:07,900
which we're going to take at 11 30 . So 

1278
00:51:07,900 --> 00:51:10,067
we'll go to Mr Kirby Hall and the next 

1279
00:51:10,067 --> 00:51:09,330
Republican , then we'll take a 15 

1280
00:51:09,330 --> 00:51:11,140
minute break . After those two 

1281
00:51:11,150 --> 00:51:13,372
questioners . Mr Carvajal is recognized 

1282
00:51:13,372 --> 00:51:15,483
for five minutes . Thank you Mr Chair 

1283
00:51:15,483 --> 00:51:17,594
and thank you to both of you for your 

1284
00:51:17,594 --> 00:51:19,483
exceptional leadership throughout 

1285
00:51:19,483 --> 00:51:21,650
Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine . I 

1286
00:51:21,650 --> 00:51:23,817
want to take a moment to highlight the 

1287
00:51:23,817 --> 00:51:25,872
California's National Guard's unique 

1288
00:51:25,872 --> 00:51:28,039
and exceptional support to the Ukraine 

1289
00:51:28,039 --> 00:51:30,039
military through the National Guard 

1290
00:51:30,039 --> 00:51:32,450
State Partnership program , California 

1291
00:51:32,450 --> 00:51:34,750
has been partnered With Ukraine since 

1292
00:51:34,750 --> 00:51:38,220
1993 and since 2000 California , 

1293
00:51:38,220 --> 00:51:40,331
Ukraine soldiers have participated in 

1294
00:51:40,331 --> 00:51:44,170
over 330 military 330 military 

1295
00:51:44,180 --> 00:51:46,610
events , including training exercises 

1296
00:51:46,610 --> 00:51:49,400
at Camp Roberts located in my district 

1297
00:51:49,400 --> 00:51:52,040
in san luis Obispo County General 

1298
00:51:52,040 --> 00:51:53,929
Milley . How has California State 

1299
00:51:53,929 --> 00:51:56,230
Partnership program with Ukraine helped 

1300
00:51:56,230 --> 00:51:58,341
improve the capabilities of Ukrainian 

1301
00:51:58,341 --> 00:52:00,890
forces to fight against the Russian 

1302
00:52:00,890 --> 00:52:04,560
invasion . I mentioned it , I 

1303
00:52:04,560 --> 00:52:06,782
think upfront about the training effort 

1304
00:52:06,782 --> 00:52:08,893
that's been going on since 2014 ? The 

1305
00:52:08,893 --> 00:52:10,782
California guards been intimately 

1306
00:52:10,782 --> 00:52:13,004
involved in that , What , so what's the 

1307
00:52:13,004 --> 00:52:15,370
result of that . So over eight years . 

1308
00:52:15,850 --> 00:52:17,628
Uh , the Ukrainian military has 

1309
00:52:17,628 --> 00:52:19,294
reformed itself , developed a 

1310
00:52:19,294 --> 00:52:21,490
noncommissioned officer corps uh , and 

1311
00:52:21,490 --> 00:52:24,530
adopted the the US doctrinal concept of 

1312
00:52:24,530 --> 00:52:26,308
Mission command , decentralized 

1313
00:52:26,308 --> 00:52:28,308
decision making at the lowest level 

1314
00:52:28,308 --> 00:52:30,530
that's effective at making the decision 

1315
00:52:30,530 --> 00:52:32,580
and that's a direct result of the 

1316
00:52:32,580 --> 00:52:34,580
efforts of the California Guard and 

1317
00:52:34,580 --> 00:52:36,580
what they've done with Ukraine . Uh 

1318
00:52:36,580 --> 00:52:38,802
more recently I'll just use this as one 

1319
00:52:38,802 --> 00:52:40,969
vignette as an example of the value of 

1320
00:52:40,969 --> 00:52:42,858
the program . Um , the connective 

1321
00:52:42,858 --> 00:52:44,969
tissue , the the the human connection 

1322
00:52:44,969 --> 00:52:47,136
between the Ukrainian military and the 

1323
00:52:47,136 --> 00:52:49,390
California Guard has proven 

1324
00:52:49,400 --> 00:52:51,770
extraordinary to the point where the 

1325
00:52:51,770 --> 00:52:53,840
tag of California still maintains 

1326
00:52:53,850 --> 00:52:55,517
almost daily contact with his 

1327
00:52:55,517 --> 00:52:57,739
counterparts , even though they're half 

1328
00:52:57,739 --> 00:52:59,406
a world away , that's been an 

1329
00:52:59,406 --> 00:53:01,461
invaluable source of communication , 

1330
00:53:01,461 --> 00:53:03,239
intelligence development uh and 

1331
00:53:03,239 --> 00:53:05,294
transmission of information back and 

1332
00:53:05,294 --> 00:53:07,406
forth . So it's things like that that 

1333
00:53:07,406 --> 00:53:09,294
are intangibles in war , but they 

1334
00:53:09,294 --> 00:53:08,850
proved extraordinarily valuable in the 

1335
00:53:08,850 --> 00:53:11,940
actual conduct of war . Thank you . The 

1336
00:53:11,940 --> 00:53:13,996
men and women serving in uniform are 

1337
00:53:13,996 --> 00:53:16,218
the backbone of our national security . 

1338
00:53:16,330 --> 00:53:18,552
I appreciate the department's increased 

1339
00:53:18,552 --> 00:53:21,090
investment in personnel needs one issue , 

1340
00:53:21,090 --> 00:53:23,146
both of your statements touched upon 

1341
00:53:23,146 --> 00:53:25,312
that I have been working on to address 

1342
00:53:25,312 --> 00:53:27,479
is available and affordable child care 

1343
00:53:27,479 --> 00:53:29,368
for our military families . While 

1344
00:53:29,368 --> 00:53:31,257
construction of childcare . Child 

1345
00:53:31,257 --> 00:53:33,257
development centers is critical one 

1346
00:53:33,257 --> 00:53:35,312
deficiency that I hear when visiting 

1347
00:53:35,312 --> 00:53:37,479
installations is the lack of qualified 

1348
00:53:37,479 --> 00:53:39,870
childcare providers to meet the demand 

1349
00:53:40,450 --> 00:53:42,672
Secretary Austin , how's the department 

1350
00:53:42,672 --> 00:53:44,617
seeking to address the shortage of 

1351
00:53:44,617 --> 00:53:46,730
qualified childcare providers , you 

1352
00:53:46,730 --> 00:53:48,952
need additional authorities in order to 

1353
00:53:48,952 --> 00:53:50,897
hire the needed child care staff . 

1354
00:53:53,250 --> 00:53:55,100
Well , thanks sir . If we need 

1355
00:53:55,100 --> 00:53:56,989
additional authorities , we won't 

1356
00:53:56,989 --> 00:53:59,380
hesitate to ask for them . Uh This is 

1357
00:53:59,380 --> 00:54:02,250
something that I have my P . And R . 

1358
00:54:02,740 --> 00:54:05,290
Directorate , taking a hard look at and 

1359
00:54:05,290 --> 00:54:07,500
working with the the services and 

1360
00:54:07,500 --> 00:54:10,960
canvassing um installations . 

1361
00:54:10,970 --> 00:54:13,192
Uh This has been identified as an issue 

1362
00:54:13,192 --> 00:54:15,200
to us as well and we're trying to 

1363
00:54:15,210 --> 00:54:17,340
identify incentives that will help 

1364
00:54:17,340 --> 00:54:19,396
attract the right people and help us 

1365
00:54:19,396 --> 00:54:22,990
train and uh and equipped the right 

1366
00:54:22,990 --> 00:54:25,500
people to provide quality childcare . 

1367
00:54:26,140 --> 00:54:29,270
Okay . Another workforce . Uh Question 

1368
00:54:29,270 --> 00:54:31,440
Secretary Austin . Your testimony 

1369
00:54:31,440 --> 00:54:33,496
touches on the department's needs to 

1370
00:54:33,496 --> 00:54:35,440
improve its ability to attract and 

1371
00:54:35,440 --> 00:54:38,190
retain an innovation minded workforce 

1372
00:54:38,640 --> 00:54:40,710
for high skilled positions such as 

1373
00:54:40,710 --> 00:54:42,821
those that require specialized skills 

1374
00:54:42,821 --> 00:54:44,821
and credentials to meet digital and 

1375
00:54:44,821 --> 00:54:46,766
cyber security needs . How can the 

1376
00:54:46,766 --> 00:54:48,654
department better compete against 

1377
00:54:48,654 --> 00:54:52,070
private industry and the skill sets 

1378
00:54:52,070 --> 00:54:54,070
that you mentioned sir ? This is uh 

1379
00:54:54,070 --> 00:54:56,530
this is all this is tough because 

1380
00:54:56,540 --> 00:54:59,470
obviously uh you know , we can't 

1381
00:54:59,470 --> 00:55:01,414
compete with with the compensation 

1382
00:55:01,414 --> 00:55:03,580
packages that some of the big tech 

1383
00:55:03,580 --> 00:55:06,770
offers , but certainly that won't stop 

1384
00:55:06,770 --> 00:55:09,300
us from going after the right people 

1385
00:55:09,300 --> 00:55:12,640
with the right skill sets uh In in this 

1386
00:55:12,640 --> 00:55:15,810
is a this is a point of emphasis for us 

1387
00:55:15,820 --> 00:55:18,390
will continue to stay focused on it uh 

1388
00:55:18,400 --> 00:55:21,160
to include bringing on people who are 

1389
00:55:21,170 --> 00:55:23,680
currently employed by those agents of 

1390
00:55:23,680 --> 00:55:26,090
those companies to serve in our our 

1391
00:55:26,090 --> 00:55:28,360
garden and reserve forces as well . 

1392
00:55:29,440 --> 00:55:31,662
This committee has been very focused on 

1393
00:55:31,662 --> 00:55:33,829
the ongoing audit of the Department of 

1394
00:55:33,829 --> 00:55:35,662
Defense taxpayers . Department . 

1395
00:55:35,662 --> 00:55:37,829
Defense taxpayers deserve to know that 

1396
00:55:37,829 --> 00:55:39,884
while the top line funding level for 

1397
00:55:39,884 --> 00:55:41,996
our national security has increased , 

1398
00:55:41,996 --> 00:55:44,218
the department is effectively executing 

1399
00:55:44,218 --> 00:55:46,329
its funding . Secretary Austin , What 

1400
00:55:46,329 --> 00:55:48,218
material weaknesses has the audit 

1401
00:55:48,218 --> 00:55:50,329
identified that have been the hardest 

1402
00:55:50,329 --> 00:55:52,570
to address department wide . And how 

1403
00:55:52,570 --> 00:55:55,710
are you working to address those ? Well , 

1404
00:55:55,710 --> 00:55:57,890
you've you've seen me I think most 

1405
00:55:57,890 --> 00:56:00,160
recently put another letter out to the 

1406
00:56:00,160 --> 00:56:02,380
force emphasizing the importance of 

1407
00:56:02,390 --> 00:56:05,660
making sure that we have a clean audit 

1408
00:56:06,030 --> 00:56:08,700
going forward . And uh and this this is 

1409
00:56:08,700 --> 00:56:10,422
very important to me . This is 

1410
00:56:10,422 --> 00:56:13,140
something that Secretary McCord and I 

1411
00:56:13,140 --> 00:56:15,140
have worked on and will continue to 

1412
00:56:15,140 --> 00:56:17,196
work on . But I'm not satisfied that 

1413
00:56:17,196 --> 00:56:19,196
were there . But I apologize to the 

1414
00:56:19,196 --> 00:56:22,170
most time has expired . Mr Gallagher is 

1415
00:56:22,170 --> 00:56:24,503
recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 

1416
00:56:24,503 --> 00:56:26,614
Mr Chairman , Thank you , gentlemen . 

1417
00:56:26,614 --> 00:56:28,781
We have limited time . So I'm going to 

1418
00:56:28,781 --> 00:56:28,420
ask for a yes or no question probably 

1419
00:56:28,420 --> 00:56:30,587
unless otherwise indicated . Secretary 

1420
00:56:30,587 --> 00:56:32,809
Austin last week , General Walters told 

1421
00:56:32,809 --> 00:56:34,698
this committee that in the months 

1422
00:56:34,698 --> 00:56:36,531
leading up to february 24th , he 

1423
00:56:36,531 --> 00:56:38,531
considered himself part of an inter 

1424
00:56:38,531 --> 00:56:40,531
agency effort designed to deter and 

1425
00:56:40,531 --> 00:56:42,642
dissuade Vladimir Putin from invading 

1426
00:56:42,642 --> 00:56:45,410
Ukraine . Did you share general Walters 

1427
00:56:45,420 --> 00:56:48,010
goal ? Yes or no . Well , I hope 

1428
00:56:48,010 --> 00:56:50,232
general walter shared my goal since I'm 

1429
00:56:50,232 --> 00:56:52,660
the Secretary of Defense and uh and my 

1430
00:56:52,670 --> 00:56:54,860
my objectives were the number one 

1431
00:56:54,860 --> 00:56:57,660
defend this nation number to make sure 

1432
00:56:57,660 --> 00:56:59,604
that we did everything possible to 

1433
00:56:59,604 --> 00:57:02,560
unify uh and defend NATO if required . 

1434
00:57:02,570 --> 00:57:05,250
Number three flow security force 

1435
00:57:05,250 --> 00:57:07,990
assistance to to Ukraine . Uh and then 

1436
00:57:07,990 --> 00:57:10,730
number four manage escalation . So the 

1437
00:57:10,730 --> 00:57:12,930
goal was not to deter Putin from 

1438
00:57:12,930 --> 00:57:16,010
invading Ukraine . The I've just laid 

1439
00:57:16,010 --> 00:57:18,232
out what my goals were and certainly it 

1440
00:57:18,232 --> 00:57:20,288
did not include deterring Putin from 

1441
00:57:20,288 --> 00:57:22,399
invading Ukraine unless I missed it . 

1442
00:57:22,399 --> 00:57:24,510
It was an objective of the government 

1443
00:57:24,510 --> 00:57:26,677
to deter Putin . But as General Milley 

1444
00:57:26,677 --> 00:57:28,788
described it , it's very difficult to 

1445
00:57:28,788 --> 00:57:31,090
do unless you put forces on the ground . 

1446
00:57:31,100 --> 00:57:33,044
And that's a decision that we made 

1447
00:57:33,044 --> 00:57:35,480
earlier early in uh in the effort here , 

1448
00:57:35,480 --> 00:57:37,591
that we're not going to put forces in 

1449
00:57:37,591 --> 00:57:39,591
Ukraine to fight Russia . It was an 

1450
00:57:39,591 --> 00:57:41,758
objective of the government . You have 

1451
00:57:41,758 --> 00:57:41,620
just reminded us that you are an 

1452
00:57:41,620 --> 00:57:43,620
important person in that government 

1453
00:57:43,620 --> 00:57:45,731
apparatus . As Secretary of Defense . 

1454
00:57:45,731 --> 00:57:48,050
Was it the goal of your policy or the 

1455
00:57:48,050 --> 00:57:50,328
government's policy for which you work . 

1456
00:57:50,328 --> 00:57:52,439
The President of the United States to 

1457
00:57:52,439 --> 00:57:54,606
deter Putin from invading Ukraine . It 

1458
00:57:54,606 --> 00:57:56,439
was a goal to deter him from the 

1459
00:57:56,439 --> 00:57:58,661
invading Ukraine . And if and if he did 

1460
00:57:58,661 --> 00:58:00,772
invade , it was a goal and still is a 

1461
00:58:00,772 --> 00:58:03,250
goal to impose , impose significant 

1462
00:58:03,250 --> 00:58:05,750
costs on Putin . And you're seeing that 

1463
00:58:05,750 --> 00:58:08,260
play out in ways that that Putin never 

1464
00:58:08,260 --> 00:58:10,640
imagined . And you you're seeing the 

1465
00:58:10,650 --> 00:58:14,370
Ukrainians resist , Putin in in an in 

1466
00:58:14,370 --> 00:58:16,480
incredible ways because we provided 

1467
00:58:16,480 --> 00:58:18,710
them some capability to do that , but 

1468
00:58:18,710 --> 00:58:20,932
also because they have the grit and the 

1469
00:58:20,932 --> 00:58:23,240
determination to fight to defend their 

1470
00:58:23,240 --> 00:58:25,296
country totally agree with the great 

1471
00:58:25,296 --> 00:58:27,462
determination they've shown , which is 

1472
00:58:27,462 --> 00:58:29,573
remarkable . So the goal was to deter 

1473
00:58:29,573 --> 00:58:31,796
Putin . Uh we did not achieve that goal 

1474
00:58:31,796 --> 00:58:33,907
Putin invaded anyway on February 24 . 

1475
00:58:33,907 --> 00:58:36,580
Do you share the assessment ? General 

1476
00:58:36,580 --> 00:58:38,469
Milley gave a little bit ago that 

1477
00:58:38,469 --> 00:58:40,680
perhaps Putin was simply un deterrable 

1478
00:58:40,800 --> 00:58:42,689
and therefore our our campaign of 

1479
00:58:42,689 --> 00:58:45,340
deterrence was bound to fail . I do not 

1480
00:58:45,340 --> 00:58:47,507
believe that our campaign has failed . 

1481
00:58:47,507 --> 00:58:50,180
This is still this is still in progress 

1482
00:58:50,190 --> 00:58:53,640
and there is a price to be paid by by 

1483
00:58:53,640 --> 00:58:56,900
Putin for what he's done . Got it . But 

1484
00:58:56,910 --> 00:58:59,890
we failed to deter Putin from invading 

1485
00:58:59,890 --> 00:59:02,600
Ukraine . I'm interested in whether you 

1486
00:59:02,600 --> 00:59:04,656
think there's anything we could have 

1487
00:59:04,656 --> 00:59:07,050
done , looking back hindsight's 2020 in 

1488
00:59:07,050 --> 00:59:09,270
the months leading up to february 24th 

1489
00:59:09,280 --> 00:59:11,290
two successfully deter him from 

1490
00:59:11,290 --> 00:59:13,346
invading Ukraine . And perhaps there 

1491
00:59:13,346 --> 00:59:15,568
isn't , I don't know , I'm just curious 

1492
00:59:15,568 --> 00:59:17,679
to get your opinion as General Milley 

1493
00:59:17,679 --> 00:59:19,790
pointed out . If you if we put forces 

1494
00:59:19,790 --> 00:59:22,480
into Ukraine to fight Putin , this 

1495
00:59:22,480 --> 00:59:24,480
would be a different story , but we 

1496
00:59:24,480 --> 00:59:26,591
made a decision that we weren't gonna 

1497
00:59:26,591 --> 00:59:28,758
do that and we made a decision for the 

1498
00:59:28,758 --> 00:59:30,647
right reasons and I support those 

1499
00:59:30,647 --> 00:59:32,702
decisions . So I I uh I think that's 

1500
00:59:32,702 --> 00:59:34,869
that's actually a very important point 

1501
00:59:34,869 --> 00:59:36,980
that perhaps if we had put hard power 

1502
00:59:36,980 --> 00:59:36,750
and american hard power in the path of 

1503
00:59:36,750 --> 00:59:38,861
Putin . That would have been the only 

1504
00:59:38,861 --> 00:59:41,028
thing that could have deterred him . I 

1505
00:59:41,028 --> 00:59:40,180
guess what I mentioned , does the 

1506
00:59:40,180 --> 00:59:42,402
analysis , does that same analysis hold 

1507
00:59:42,402 --> 00:59:45,860
true with respect to Taiwan would 

1508
00:59:45,870 --> 00:59:48,160
putting american forces on Taiwan 

1509
00:59:48,170 --> 00:59:50,170
increase or decrease the likelihood 

1510
00:59:50,170 --> 00:59:52,059
that she Jinping would attempt an 

1511
00:59:52,059 --> 00:59:54,114
invasion hypothetical . I think that 

1512
00:59:54,114 --> 00:59:57,740
it's you know , it's you know not 

1513
00:59:57,740 --> 01:00:00,310
advisable to to make direct comparisons 

1514
01:00:00,320 --> 01:00:03,280
between Ukraine and Taiwan . These are 

1515
01:00:03,290 --> 01:00:05,430
two completely different scenarios to 

1516
01:00:05,440 --> 01:00:07,940
two different theaters . And so 

1517
01:00:08,810 --> 01:00:11,500
so do you do you do you think then that 

1518
01:00:11,500 --> 01:00:14,270
what has happened in Ukraine is not 

1519
01:00:14,280 --> 01:00:17,110
connected has not impacted she's 

1520
01:00:17,110 --> 01:00:20,170
calculus with respect to Taiwan . No , 

1521
01:00:20,170 --> 01:00:24,140
I have to I'm certain that you know , I 

1522
01:00:24,140 --> 01:00:26,196
don't want to speculate on what what 

1523
01:00:26,196 --> 01:00:28,450
what's in Mr xi's head . But certainly 

1524
01:00:28,460 --> 01:00:31,620
I think as the world looks at this uh 

1525
01:00:31,630 --> 01:00:34,250
they've uh they've been impressed by 

1526
01:00:34,250 --> 01:00:37,940
the um commitment the resolve 

1527
01:00:37,940 --> 01:00:41,360
of many countries in the world to 

1528
01:00:41,360 --> 01:00:44,130
resist uh that kind of behavior . So 

1529
01:00:44,510 --> 01:00:46,420
Would so would it be too far to 

1530
01:00:46,420 --> 01:00:48,087
characterize your view as the 

1531
01:00:48,087 --> 01:00:50,142
commitment and resolve on display by 

1532
01:00:50,142 --> 01:00:52,309
the Ukrainians and our NATO allies has 

1533
01:00:52,309 --> 01:00:54,476
made an invasion of Taiwan less likely 

1534
01:00:54,476 --> 01:00:56,587
than it was prior then likely than it 

1535
01:00:56,587 --> 01:00:59,810
was on February 23 . Is the commitment 

1536
01:00:59,820 --> 01:01:01,950
of the people of Taiwan . No , no 

1537
01:01:01,960 --> 01:01:04,182
that's just the gender , the commitment 

1538
01:01:04,182 --> 01:01:06,293
that you just referenced with respect 

1539
01:01:06,293 --> 01:01:09,120
to NATO and Ukraine had any impact on 

1540
01:01:09,130 --> 01:01:11,240
she's calculus in Taiwan and made an 

1541
01:01:11,240 --> 01:01:13,850
invasion more or less likely ? Well 

1542
01:01:13,860 --> 01:01:15,804
again I don't want to speculate on 

1543
01:01:15,804 --> 01:01:18,027
whether or not the invasion an invasion 

1544
01:01:18,027 --> 01:01:20,193
is likely or less likely . But again , 

1545
01:01:20,193 --> 01:01:22,193
I would say that we just need to be 

1546
01:01:22,193 --> 01:01:24,416
careful about making direct comparisons 

1547
01:01:24,416 --> 01:01:26,582
between what's going on in Ukraine and 

1548
01:01:26,582 --> 01:01:28,916
what could happen in Taiwan . Thank you . 

1549
01:01:28,916 --> 01:01:31,027
Jameson has expired . We are going to 

1550
01:01:31,027 --> 01:01:33,249
take a 15 minute break . We're going to 

1551
01:01:33,249 --> 01:01:35,304
be back at , well I guess that would 

1552
01:01:35,304 --> 01:01:38,130
make it 11 47 . Mr Connor is next . So 

1553
01:01:38,130 --> 01:01:40,130
at 11 47 we'll go to Mr Connor and 

1554
01:01:40,130 --> 01:01:42,130
we'll proceed from there . We'll be 

1555
01:01:42,130 --> 01:01:42,030
right back .