1 00:00:00,340 --> 00:00:02,396 Thank you . Cheryl is recognized for 2 00:00:02,396 --> 00:00:04,562 five minutes . Thank you . Mr Chairman 3 00:00:04,562 --> 00:00:06,562 General Milley . Secretary Austin . 4 00:00:06,562 --> 00:00:08,618 Thank you for your commitment to our 5 00:00:08,618 --> 00:00:10,673 armed forces and your service to our 6 00:00:10,673 --> 00:00:12,562 country . Gentlemen , both of you 7 00:00:12,562 --> 00:00:14,784 briefly touched on long range precision 8 00:00:14,784 --> 00:00:16,951 and hypersonic fires in your testimony 9 00:00:16,951 --> 00:00:18,618 and the important role such a 10 00:00:18,618 --> 00:00:20,507 capability would play not only an 11 00:00:20,507 --> 00:00:22,396 integrated deterrence but also an 12 00:00:22,396 --> 00:00:24,229 enabling success in multi domain 13 00:00:24,229 --> 00:00:26,740 operations as we worked swiftly to 14 00:00:26,740 --> 00:00:28,730 modernize the joint force more 15 00:00:28,730 --> 00:00:30,860 specifically our long range fires , 16 00:00:30,860 --> 00:00:33,540 platforms . What ground based platforms 17 00:00:33,540 --> 00:00:35,550 can commanders depend on to provide 18 00:00:35,550 --> 00:00:38,230 that capability ? And how if at all has 19 00:00:38,230 --> 00:00:39,952 the range displayed by Russian 20 00:00:39,952 --> 00:00:42,063 artillery and their war of aggression 21 00:00:42,063 --> 00:00:44,300 in Ukraine changed that thinking how's 22 00:00:44,300 --> 00:00:46,522 the department planning to increase our 23 00:00:46,522 --> 00:00:48,133 range without increasing our 24 00:00:48,133 --> 00:00:50,244 vulnerability to ground based missile 25 00:00:50,244 --> 00:00:53,910 defense systems ? Thanks congresswoman . 26 00:00:53,910 --> 00:00:57,000 The we've got a number of long range 27 00:00:57,070 --> 00:01:00,210 systems in the inventory today . Um but 28 00:01:00,210 --> 00:01:02,580 what the army in particular but also 29 00:01:02,580 --> 00:01:04,630 the Marine Corps working on our 30 00:01:04,630 --> 00:01:07,450 experimental long range fire systems . 31 00:01:07,700 --> 00:01:10,080 Those are rocket , uh some of hyper 32 00:01:10,090 --> 00:01:12,520 hyper sonic uh and some are tube 33 00:01:12,520 --> 00:01:15,840 artillery and these go very very long 34 00:01:15,840 --> 00:01:18,007 range . I won't get into . We can have 35 00:01:18,007 --> 00:01:19,673 a team come over and give you 36 00:01:19,673 --> 00:01:21,618 classified briefing on some of the 37 00:01:21,618 --> 00:01:21,560 experimental things that are going on . 38 00:01:21,570 --> 00:01:23,910 But we recognize that long range and 39 00:01:23,910 --> 00:01:26,132 long range precision fires and even put 40 00:01:26,132 --> 00:01:28,243 that caveat on it are critical to the 41 00:01:28,243 --> 00:01:30,354 future operational environment that's 42 00:01:30,354 --> 00:01:32,299 proven true over and over and over 43 00:01:32,299 --> 00:01:34,521 again and the ability to maneuver based 44 00:01:34,521 --> 00:01:36,743 military uh and for maneuver . You have 45 00:01:36,743 --> 00:01:38,770 to have fires plus the movement the 46 00:01:38,780 --> 00:01:41,400 mobility of the force uh combined gives 47 00:01:41,400 --> 00:01:43,622 you maneuver at the lower levels of the 48 00:01:43,622 --> 00:01:46,070 tactical level . Uh So we want to make 49 00:01:46,070 --> 00:01:48,780 sure that we have dominance in fires . 50 00:01:48,790 --> 00:01:51,180 We are that's that's one of the 51 00:01:51,190 --> 00:01:53,900 critical areas of development in each 52 00:01:53,900 --> 00:01:55,956 of the services but particularly the 53 00:01:55,956 --> 00:01:59,200 ground services and General Milley . 54 00:01:59,200 --> 00:02:01,311 Would you consider the strategic long 55 00:02:01,311 --> 00:02:03,533 range cannon an asset that would enable 56 00:02:03,533 --> 00:02:05,478 combatant commanders to succeed in 57 00:02:05,478 --> 00:02:07,700 multi domain operations ? Yes . In fact 58 00:02:07,700 --> 00:02:09,867 that yes , it's it's the basis of what 59 00:02:09,867 --> 00:02:12,089 the army is calling . Multi domain task 60 00:02:12,089 --> 00:02:14,256 force and what the marines are calling 61 00:02:14,256 --> 00:02:16,311 the littoral regiments are those are 62 00:02:16,311 --> 00:02:18,422 those is that cannon system ? So that 63 00:02:18,422 --> 00:02:21,650 is a um if you let's use the scenario 64 00:02:21,650 --> 00:02:23,820 of the south china seas with those 65 00:02:23,820 --> 00:02:26,510 capabilities based off shore based long 66 00:02:26,510 --> 00:02:28,600 range precision munitions , uh they 67 00:02:28,600 --> 00:02:30,544 should be able to do a significant 68 00:02:30,544 --> 00:02:32,767 amount of damage to any surface fleet , 69 00:02:32,767 --> 00:02:35,510 perhaps chinese surface fleet . So the 70 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:37,640 point is , is that that system , that 71 00:02:37,640 --> 00:02:39,807 particular system you mentioned is one 72 00:02:39,807 --> 00:02:41,862 of those in experimental development 73 00:02:41,862 --> 00:02:43,918 and it will be a key to a future war 74 00:02:43,918 --> 00:02:46,084 fight . And as the army modernizes its 75 00:02:46,084 --> 00:02:48,196 indirect fire capabilities . Will the 76 00:02:48,196 --> 00:02:50,084 slur contribute to the integrated 77 00:02:50,084 --> 00:02:52,307 deterrence model ? And can you speak on 78 00:02:52,307 --> 00:02:54,473 the importance that further developing 79 00:02:54,473 --> 00:02:56,307 a capability like that will have 80 00:02:56,307 --> 00:02:58,418 towards establishing a modern force , 81 00:02:58,418 --> 00:03:00,418 you spoke a little bit about um for 82 00:03:00,418 --> 00:03:02,529 example in china , how important that 83 00:03:02,529 --> 00:03:04,751 is . Yes , I think um this this will be 84 00:03:04,751 --> 00:03:06,862 a lengthy conversation but we have to 85 00:03:06,862 --> 00:03:08,918 start with the operating environment 86 00:03:08,918 --> 00:03:11,140 we're gonna operate in and the changing 87 00:03:11,140 --> 00:03:13,196 character of war that chairman smith 88 00:03:13,196 --> 00:03:15,029 mentioned up front once we fully 89 00:03:15,029 --> 00:03:17,140 analyze that and understand that what 90 00:03:17,140 --> 00:03:19,140 we derived a set of attributes that 91 00:03:19,140 --> 00:03:20,973 come for each of the services in 92 00:03:20,973 --> 00:03:23,084 particular the joint force combined . 93 00:03:23,084 --> 00:03:25,084 Uh Speaking of that , would that be 94 00:03:25,084 --> 00:03:25,020 appropriate for the Marine corps as 95 00:03:25,020 --> 00:03:27,530 well ? And they're absolutely yes . So 96 00:03:27,660 --> 00:03:29,960 and what the marines are doing is 97 00:03:29,960 --> 00:03:32,127 upgrading therefore . And I'm aware of 98 00:03:32,127 --> 00:03:34,071 the debate that's ongoing with the 99 00:03:34,071 --> 00:03:36,182 marines but what they're trying to do 100 00:03:36,182 --> 00:03:38,404 is tailor the marines to optimize their 101 00:03:38,404 --> 00:03:40,516 capability as part of the joint force 102 00:03:40,516 --> 00:03:42,738 in a future operating environment under 103 00:03:42,738 --> 00:03:44,627 changed character of war . Uh And 104 00:03:44,627 --> 00:03:46,849 there's a lot of nuance to that , which 105 00:03:46,849 --> 00:03:49,071 would be much beyond the time available 106 00:03:49,071 --> 00:03:51,182 here . But the key is the development 107 00:03:51,182 --> 00:03:53,404 of the doctrine , the organization that 108 00:03:53,404 --> 00:03:55,516 the personnel , the training , all of 109 00:03:55,516 --> 00:03:57,627 those things in combination to set us 110 00:03:57,627 --> 00:04:00,230 up For operations in the 20s 30s . And 111 00:04:00,230 --> 00:04:02,286 that's what this budget is all about 112 00:04:02,286 --> 00:04:04,063 actually . Well , thank you , I 113 00:04:04,063 --> 00:04:06,830 appreciate that . And um with the 114 00:04:06,830 --> 00:04:09,030 army's extended range cannon artillery 115 00:04:09,030 --> 00:04:11,250 system that was designed to close the 116 00:04:11,250 --> 00:04:13,472 capabilities gap between the US and our 117 00:04:13,472 --> 00:04:15,639 adversaries . Is there a plan to field 118 00:04:15,639 --> 00:04:18,000 a toad extended range version of the 119 00:04:18,020 --> 00:04:21,880 mic triple seven um the M triple seven . 120 00:04:21,880 --> 00:04:24,270 I'm well there is a , there is already 121 00:04:24,270 --> 00:04:27,370 a 155 extended range toad version . So 122 00:04:27,370 --> 00:04:29,370 I think the short answer is yes but 123 00:04:29,370 --> 00:04:31,370 that's not the system we're talking 124 00:04:31,370 --> 00:04:33,426 about . We're talking about the long 125 00:04:33,426 --> 00:04:35,648 range precision fires that the that the 126 00:04:35,648 --> 00:04:35,630 army is developing . That that's not 127 00:04:35,630 --> 00:04:37,880 fielded yet in in at scale there's some 128 00:04:37,880 --> 00:04:39,936 experimental units that are using it 129 00:04:39,936 --> 00:04:42,102 right now . They did some recent tests 130 00:04:42,102 --> 00:04:44,269 at white sands which have proven quite 131 00:04:44,269 --> 00:04:46,380 successful . Um But that's not yet in 132 00:04:46,380 --> 00:04:48,940 the in the field and then as we work to 133 00:04:48,940 --> 00:04:50,829 build the capabilities within our 134 00:04:50,829 --> 00:04:52,884 within our hypersonic suite is there 135 00:04:52,884 --> 00:04:55,051 not a need for a land based long range 136 00:04:55,051 --> 00:04:57,273 surface to surface artillery asset that 137 00:04:57,273 --> 00:04:59,630 is more cost effective than the common 138 00:04:59,630 --> 00:05:02,070 hypersonic glide body and is readily 139 00:05:02,070 --> 00:05:03,959 available to combatant commanders 140 00:05:03,959 --> 00:05:06,181 seeking to strike critical targets such 141 00:05:06,181 --> 00:05:08,348 as headquarters maintenance apologized 142 00:05:08,348 --> 00:05:10,530 general Ladies time how the army is 143 00:05:10,530 --> 00:05:12,940 developing that . Thank you . Mr Green 144 00:05:12,940 --> 00:05:14,996 is right now . Thank you mr Chairman 145 00:05:14,996 --> 00:05:17,162 and thank the ranking member and thank 146 00:05:17,162 --> 00:05:19,218 our witnesses for being here today . 147 00:05:19,218 --> 00:05:21,218 And I want to again echo my amazing 148 00:05:21,218 --> 00:05:23,384 opportunity to bump into H minus there 149 00:05:23,384 --> 00:05:25,384 in Poland and and see your previous 150 00:05:25,384 --> 00:05:27,440 unit that you commanded in in a in a 151 00:05:27,440 --> 00:05:29,551 unit that I commanded . I'll tell you 152 00:05:29,551 --> 00:05:31,662 they're doing fantastic work . And so 153 00:05:31,662 --> 00:05:33,773 is Kevin Sharp the brigade from 101st 154 00:05:33,773 --> 00:05:35,940 they're just doing outstanding stuff . 155 00:05:35,940 --> 00:05:39,650 Um brief comment . You know 4% 156 00:05:40,140 --> 00:05:42,660 Raise for troops and an 8% inflation 157 00:05:42,660 --> 00:05:45,430 environment isn't a raise . Um I wish 158 00:05:45,430 --> 00:05:47,652 we could rethink that and certainly I'm 159 00:05:47,652 --> 00:05:49,597 sure there will be amendments that 160 00:05:49,597 --> 00:05:51,763 address it also on the top line number 161 00:05:51,763 --> 00:05:53,874 4% and an 8% inflation is is really a 162 00:05:53,874 --> 00:05:55,763 cut . Um I just want to make that 163 00:05:55,763 --> 00:05:59,230 comment . Mr McCord a quick comment for 164 00:05:59,230 --> 00:06:02,120 you . I I saw a statement that you had 165 00:06:02,120 --> 00:06:04,287 made . The budget was written prior to 166 00:06:04,287 --> 00:06:06,509 the Ukrainian invasion and could not be 167 00:06:06,509 --> 00:06:09,520 adjusted to include that . I want to 168 00:06:09,520 --> 00:06:11,490 tell you that I am and I'm talking 169 00:06:11,490 --> 00:06:13,601 specifically about making adjustments 170 00:06:13,601 --> 00:06:15,601 due to what's going on in Ukraine . 171 00:06:16,020 --> 00:06:18,187 There's not a company in America where 172 00:06:18,540 --> 00:06:20,707 the board of directors would allow the 173 00:06:20,707 --> 00:06:23,030 Ceo to say that the speed of business 174 00:06:23,030 --> 00:06:25,920 is the speed of now and the pentagon 175 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:27,698 has got to move at the speed of 176 00:06:27,698 --> 00:06:29,940 business the speed of now and so you 177 00:06:29,940 --> 00:06:32,162 know in a few weeks that this thing has 178 00:06:32,162 --> 00:06:34,329 been going on . I would think that the 179 00:06:34,329 --> 00:06:36,440 adjustments could be made . Secretary 180 00:06:36,440 --> 00:06:38,496 Austin quick question for you who is 181 00:06:38,496 --> 00:06:40,718 advising the president that it's a good 182 00:06:40,718 --> 00:06:42,662 idea to allow the war criminals in 183 00:06:42,662 --> 00:06:44,773 Russia to build a nuclear reactor for 184 00:06:44,773 --> 00:06:48,370 Iran in the J . C . P . O . A . 185 00:06:48,370 --> 00:06:51,730 The uh current negotiations would allow 186 00:06:51,730 --> 00:06:54,240 Russia to build a nuclear reactor to 187 00:06:54,240 --> 00:06:56,462 the tune of $10 billion . These are the 188 00:06:56,462 --> 00:06:58,980 guys that you know have done these 189 00:06:58,980 --> 00:07:01,036 horrible things in Ukraine and we're 190 00:07:01,036 --> 00:07:03,180 here letting them at least right now 191 00:07:03,180 --> 00:07:05,013 considering letting them build a 192 00:07:05,013 --> 00:07:08,720 nuclear reactor there . I mean there 193 00:07:08,720 --> 00:07:11,600 are a number of people that are leading 194 00:07:11,600 --> 00:07:13,822 that process of course , you know , our 195 00:07:13,822 --> 00:07:16,760 national Security Advisor plus um as 196 00:07:16,760 --> 00:07:18,760 you know the State Department is is 197 00:07:18,760 --> 00:07:20,980 leading the , let me ask you is I mean 198 00:07:20,980 --> 00:07:22,869 is there somebody at D O D saying 199 00:07:22,869 --> 00:07:25,490 that's a good idea ? Do you think it's 200 00:07:25,490 --> 00:07:28,150 a good idea ? No , that's no , we we we 201 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:30,216 have not provided any counsel to the 202 00:07:30,216 --> 00:07:32,327 president on building and I would ask 203 00:07:32,327 --> 00:07:34,493 you to do that . I think it's a really 204 00:07:34,493 --> 00:07:36,493 bad idea . Uh I want to talk legacy 205 00:07:36,493 --> 00:07:38,716 Systems general Milley with you if it's 206 00:07:38,716 --> 00:07:40,771 if it's okay , we've had discussions 207 00:07:40,771 --> 00:07:43,104 before about phasing out legacy systems , 208 00:07:43,104 --> 00:07:44,938 bringing in new systems with the 209 00:07:44,938 --> 00:07:46,771 capability to overcome those and 210 00:07:46,771 --> 00:07:48,493 amplify on them . I'm a little 211 00:07:48,493 --> 00:07:50,493 concerned about about J STARS . You 212 00:07:50,493 --> 00:07:52,438 know , we army guys , we love that 213 00:07:52,438 --> 00:07:56,360 program , it helps us . Um and there's 214 00:07:56,370 --> 00:07:59,240 I guess talking this budget of uh the 215 00:07:59,240 --> 00:08:01,573 Air Force wanting to get rid of J STARS , 216 00:08:01,573 --> 00:08:04,090 I'd love to hear your thoughts on and 217 00:08:04,090 --> 00:08:06,201 maybe we have to go into a classified 218 00:08:06,201 --> 00:08:08,034 setting . Is there going to be a 219 00:08:08,034 --> 00:08:10,750 capability gap if that thing goes away ? 220 00:08:12,740 --> 00:08:15,440 Well , first chase like you just saw is 221 00:08:15,440 --> 00:08:18,670 a great system but this budget and the 222 00:08:18,670 --> 00:08:21,130 National Defense strategy is optimizing 223 00:08:21,130 --> 00:08:22,963 for the pacing threat , the most 224 00:08:22,963 --> 00:08:25,074 significant strategic challenge , the 225 00:08:25,074 --> 00:08:27,241 United States china and then the acute 226 00:08:27,241 --> 00:08:29,297 challenge of acute threat , which is 227 00:08:29,297 --> 00:08:31,352 Russia , J Stars is not a Survivable 228 00:08:31,352 --> 00:08:33,510 aircraft in that type of environment 229 00:08:33,510 --> 00:08:36,580 against that high end threat . Uh , so 230 00:08:36,580 --> 00:08:39,000 that's 0.1 point two in terms of the 231 00:08:39,000 --> 00:08:41,056 capability that J Stars does bring , 232 00:08:41,056 --> 00:08:43,111 which is the ability to battle track 233 00:08:43,111 --> 00:08:45,167 movements , etcetera on the ground . 234 00:08:45,167 --> 00:08:48,050 That so I'm sorry , That's right . And 235 00:08:48,240 --> 00:08:50,780 uh that capability will exist in a 236 00:08:50,780 --> 00:08:52,780 different form and from a different 237 00:08:52,780 --> 00:08:54,947 platform , but for that I have to take 238 00:08:54,947 --> 00:08:57,113 it to a different session . So there's 239 00:08:57,113 --> 00:08:59,113 no capability loss with that with J 240 00:08:59,113 --> 00:09:01,169 stars going away , I don't know , no 241 00:09:01,169 --> 00:09:03,391 significant capability lost relative to 242 00:09:03,391 --> 00:09:05,613 china and Russia . If you wanted to use 243 00:09:05,613 --> 00:09:05,190 J stars in a lower intensity 244 00:09:05,190 --> 00:09:07,079 environment , then there would be 245 00:09:07,079 --> 00:09:09,412 because the J stars would be going away . 246 00:09:09,412 --> 00:09:11,634 But our we're optimizing for china than 247 00:09:11,634 --> 00:09:13,746 Russia , I may um then asked for that 248 00:09:13,746 --> 00:09:15,912 classified discussion . So we can kind 249 00:09:15,912 --> 00:09:18,580 of go into that one quick thought about 250 00:09:18,580 --> 00:09:21,850 this legacy Fall off and the 251 00:09:21,860 --> 00:09:24,027 implementation of the new systems that 252 00:09:24,027 --> 00:09:25,638 are 5 , 6 years out . I know 253 00:09:25,638 --> 00:09:27,693 Congressman Whitman has talked about 254 00:09:27,693 --> 00:09:29,920 this challenge . I'm aware that there's 255 00:09:29,920 --> 00:09:32,460 this strategic deterrence fund that 256 00:09:32,460 --> 00:09:34,800 hasn't been used for years . I'd love 257 00:09:34,810 --> 00:09:36,866 to get some details on that . If you 258 00:09:36,866 --> 00:09:38,930 all have it because we could protect 259 00:09:38,930 --> 00:09:40,930 the guys across the aisle who don't 260 00:09:40,930 --> 00:09:42,708 necessarily want to see massive 261 00:09:42,708 --> 00:09:44,930 increases in the budget . We could fund 262 00:09:44,930 --> 00:09:46,819 some of the R and D for these new 263 00:09:46,819 --> 00:09:46,510 projects through that and it would be 264 00:09:46,510 --> 00:09:48,800 similar to the way we did the Yoko uh 265 00:09:48,800 --> 00:09:51,022 and and sort of put money over there to 266 00:09:51,022 --> 00:09:54,560 to I would ask that be considered . 267 00:09:55,140 --> 00:09:56,918 And even speaking to some of my 268 00:09:56,918 --> 00:09:59,140 democrat colleagues , they think that'd 269 00:09:59,140 --> 00:10:01,362 be a great idea about future systems so 270 00:10:01,362 --> 00:10:03,029 that that we can maintain the 271 00:10:03,029 --> 00:10:05,196 capabilities in that gap period . Keep 272 00:10:05,196 --> 00:10:07,084 legacy systems around long enough 273 00:10:07,084 --> 00:10:09,196 afford them in the current budget and 274 00:10:09,196 --> 00:10:11,362 pay for the new systems in a different 275 00:10:11,362 --> 00:10:13,529 strategic fund . And if you could look 276 00:10:13,529 --> 00:10:15,640 into that and get back with my office 277 00:10:15,640 --> 00:10:15,460 would be great . Thank you . Thank you . 278 00:10:15,640 --> 00:10:17,751 Gentleman has expired . MR escobar is 279 00:10:17,751 --> 00:10:19,973 recognized for five minutes . Thank you 280 00:10:19,973 --> 00:10:22,140 Mr Chairman for this important hearing 281 00:10:22,140 --> 00:10:24,029 and thank you Secretary Austin in 282 00:10:24,029 --> 00:10:26,251 General Milley for your service and for 283 00:10:26,251 --> 00:10:28,560 your time before us today I have the 284 00:10:28,560 --> 00:10:30,880 honor and privilege of serving 285 00:10:30,890 --> 00:10:33,110 representing el paso texas , home to 286 00:10:33,110 --> 00:10:35,590 Fort Bliss , America's second largest 287 00:10:35,590 --> 00:10:37,830 military installation and the largest 288 00:10:37,830 --> 00:10:40,010 joint mobilization force generation 289 00:10:40,010 --> 00:10:43,050 installations in the army , home to the 290 00:10:43,050 --> 00:10:45,060 first armored division and joint 291 00:10:45,060 --> 00:10:47,610 modernization command . I'm so pleased 292 00:10:47,610 --> 00:10:50,630 to see $15 million in the budget for a 293 00:10:50,630 --> 00:10:53,040 new fire station at Fort Bliss and will 294 00:10:53,040 --> 00:10:55,040 work to ensure that that funding is 295 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:57,690 included in this year's N . D . A Fort 296 00:10:57,690 --> 00:10:59,857 Bliss . It's people and infrastructure 297 00:10:59,857 --> 00:11:01,579 are critical to our military's 298 00:11:01,579 --> 00:11:04,080 readiness . From my first day as the 299 00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:06,270 congresswoman for this great military 300 00:11:06,270 --> 00:11:08,381 installation . I've advocated for the 301 00:11:08,381 --> 00:11:10,530 investments needed for our assets and 302 00:11:10,530 --> 00:11:12,570 missions . I'm going to do it again 303 00:11:12,570 --> 00:11:14,670 here today . There are two 304 00:11:14,670 --> 00:11:16,837 infrastructure priorities that we need 305 00:11:16,837 --> 00:11:19,270 to fund critical to our readiness . The 306 00:11:19,270 --> 00:11:21,500 first is a modest investment in a 307 00:11:21,500 --> 00:11:23,280 railhead . The current rail 308 00:11:23,280 --> 00:11:25,502 infrastructure and design is a limiting 309 00:11:25,502 --> 00:11:27,280 factor in efficient movement of 310 00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:29,113 military equipment in support of 311 00:11:29,113 --> 00:11:31,360 deployments , punting on providing 312 00:11:31,360 --> 00:11:33,193 funding for the railhead further 313 00:11:33,193 --> 00:11:35,082 degrades Fort Bliss is ability to 314 00:11:35,082 --> 00:11:37,700 mobilize and demobilize troops that 315 00:11:37,700 --> 00:11:39,930 come from every corner of the country 316 00:11:39,940 --> 00:11:42,162 because of the installations mission as 317 00:11:42,162 --> 00:11:44,510 a joint mobilization force generation 318 00:11:44,510 --> 00:11:47,510 installation . Fort Hood has a similar 319 00:11:47,510 --> 00:11:49,680 number of assets and missions , but a 320 00:11:49,680 --> 00:11:52,230 larger railhead Bliss is doing the best 321 00:11:52,230 --> 00:11:54,341 they can , but a larger railhead will 322 00:11:54,341 --> 00:11:56,674 allow them to better meet the D . O . D . 323 00:11:56,674 --> 00:11:58,786 Shift to meet the challenges of today 324 00:11:58,786 --> 00:12:01,300 and tomorrow . Namely china . The 325 00:12:01,300 --> 00:12:03,670 second is the need for new barracks . 326 00:12:03,680 --> 00:12:05,902 I've been in the barracks at Fort Bliss 327 00:12:05,902 --> 00:12:08,124 and can tell you they are in poor shape 328 00:12:08,124 --> 00:12:11,200 and inadequately cooled in a desert 329 00:12:11,210 --> 00:12:13,266 environment like el paso where we've 330 00:12:13,266 --> 00:12:16,110 had more record breaking triple digit 331 00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:19,020 temperatures each year . As a result of 332 00:12:19,020 --> 00:12:21,210 the climate crisis , the barracks can 333 00:12:21,210 --> 00:12:23,120 become so hot . I can easily see 334 00:12:23,120 --> 00:12:25,990 someone passing out as a result , I 335 00:12:25,990 --> 00:12:27,657 know there's some 3D printing 336 00:12:27,657 --> 00:12:29,657 innovation going on , but I want to 337 00:12:29,657 --> 00:12:31,870 emphasize that degraded living spaces 338 00:12:31,870 --> 00:12:33,870 and substandard facilities that are 339 00:12:33,870 --> 00:12:36,740 installations lowers morale , increases 340 00:12:36,740 --> 00:12:39,140 health and safety risks and negatively 341 00:12:39,150 --> 00:12:41,360 impacts retention , which in turn 342 00:12:41,370 --> 00:12:44,680 affects our readiness . I provide these 343 00:12:44,680 --> 00:12:46,902 two examples in order to make sure that 344 00:12:46,902 --> 00:12:49,124 Fort Bliss remains top of mind to you . 345 00:12:49,124 --> 00:12:51,000 And also to point out that our 346 00:12:51,000 --> 00:12:53,110 readiness is directly tied to the 347 00:12:53,110 --> 00:12:55,520 infrastructure we have here at home at 348 00:12:55,520 --> 00:12:57,520 key installations like Fort Bliss , 349 00:12:57,740 --> 00:13:00,140 Secretary Austin and General Milley . 350 00:13:00,150 --> 00:13:02,372 Could you talk about where you see Fort 351 00:13:02,372 --> 00:13:04,372 Bliss fitting into the department's 352 00:13:04,372 --> 00:13:06,150 plans for addressing the pacing 353 00:13:06,150 --> 00:13:08,300 challenge with china and modernizing 354 00:13:08,300 --> 00:13:12,250 our military ? Well as 355 00:13:12,250 --> 00:13:14,940 you if you as you've said , Fort Bliss 356 00:13:15,740 --> 00:13:16,580 has 357 00:13:19,040 --> 00:13:22,560 houses some of our most capable 358 00:13:22,560 --> 00:13:24,880 forces there with their armored forces 359 00:13:24,880 --> 00:13:27,520 and also some air defense capability . 360 00:13:27,520 --> 00:13:30,510 So it is an important installation to 361 00:13:30,510 --> 00:13:34,250 us in . I I 362 00:13:34,250 --> 00:13:36,306 share your concerns with making sure 363 00:13:36,306 --> 00:13:37,780 that we have the right 364 00:13:40,340 --> 00:13:42,900 facilities for our troops and and make 365 00:13:42,900 --> 00:13:45,178 sure that our troops are taken care of . 366 00:13:45,178 --> 00:13:47,233 That's very , very important to me . 367 00:13:47,233 --> 00:13:49,400 We'll make sure that we go back and uh 368 00:13:49,400 --> 00:13:51,590 and work with the army to see where 369 00:13:51,590 --> 00:13:53,757 things stand in the priority and get a 370 00:13:53,757 --> 00:13:55,812 better understanding of when and how 371 00:13:55,812 --> 00:13:58,470 these things are funded . And I would 372 00:13:58,470 --> 00:14:00,637 just echo what the secretary said four 373 00:14:00,637 --> 00:14:02,692 plus is a strategic platform for the 374 00:14:02,692 --> 00:14:04,640 deployment of uh some really 375 00:14:04,640 --> 00:14:06,473 significant combat power and the 376 00:14:06,473 --> 00:14:08,696 armored division that's their uh and as 377 00:14:08,696 --> 00:14:10,862 mentioned through many previous member 378 00:14:10,862 --> 00:14:12,918 comments about the importance of air 379 00:14:12,918 --> 00:14:15,029 defense systems , Patriot and so on . 380 00:14:15,029 --> 00:14:17,140 That's all done at Fort Bliss then of 381 00:14:17,140 --> 00:14:19,140 course , you know , as well as I do 382 00:14:19,140 --> 00:14:21,307 that for publicity , Jason white sands 383 00:14:21,307 --> 00:14:23,362 missile range , a lot of testing for 384 00:14:23,362 --> 00:14:25,584 modernization has done there . Uh So we 385 00:14:25,584 --> 00:14:25,000 want to make sure that the railheads 386 00:14:25,000 --> 00:14:27,111 are good so they can deploy the force 387 00:14:27,111 --> 00:14:29,167 we want to make sure the barracks is 388 00:14:29,167 --> 00:14:31,278 squared away to ensure that the force 389 00:14:31,278 --> 00:14:33,500 itself is being taken care of so we can 390 00:14:33,500 --> 00:14:35,556 achieve those strategic objectives . 391 00:14:35,556 --> 00:14:35,330 I'll get with the Chief of Staff of the 392 00:14:35,330 --> 00:14:38,380 Army . I wasn't as you know , former 393 00:14:38,380 --> 00:14:40,491 chief of staff of the army , I wasn't 394 00:14:40,491 --> 00:14:42,491 tracking the barracks at Bliss have 395 00:14:42,491 --> 00:14:44,658 deteriorated that bad . But let me let 396 00:14:44,658 --> 00:14:44,260 me get back to you on an answer for 397 00:14:44,260 --> 00:14:46,093 that , appreciate it . And in my 398 00:14:46,093 --> 00:14:48,204 remaining 30 seconds , I just want to 399 00:14:48,204 --> 00:14:50,204 emphasize as we've heard some of my 400 00:14:50,204 --> 00:14:52,371 colleagues talk about legacy systems . 401 00:14:52,371 --> 00:14:54,371 Um , it's really on Congress . It's 402 00:14:54,371 --> 00:14:56,593 important to us that we heed the advice 403 00:14:56,593 --> 00:14:59,100 that you've given us um in classified 404 00:14:59,100 --> 00:15:02,870 and unclassified settings about the 405 00:15:02,870 --> 00:15:06,190 need to invest in the right way . My 406 00:15:06,190 --> 00:15:08,301 time is up . I yield back . Thank you 407 00:15:08,301 --> 00:15:10,523 both . And by the way , invite you both 408 00:15:10,523 --> 00:15:12,579 would be honored to host you at Fort 409 00:15:12,579 --> 00:15:14,634 Bliss . Mr Chairman . I yield back . 410 00:15:14,634 --> 00:15:16,746 Thank you . Mr Carl is recognized for 411 00:15:16,746 --> 00:15:18,801 five minutes . Thank you Mr Chairman 412 00:15:18,801 --> 00:15:21,023 and thank you gentlemen for willingness 413 00:15:21,023 --> 00:15:20,380 to come in here and speak to us . I've 414 00:15:20,380 --> 00:15:22,713 got three quick points and one question . 415 00:15:22,713 --> 00:15:24,658 So you know , when you get to me , 416 00:15:24,658 --> 00:15:26,769 you're at the end of the line so that 417 00:15:26,769 --> 00:15:28,936 that's the good news . Uh , you know , 418 00:15:28,936 --> 00:15:31,047 on this defense budget . I personally 419 00:15:31,047 --> 00:15:33,213 am tired of the defense budget process 420 00:15:33,213 --> 00:15:35,436 that does not supply our troops or meet 421 00:15:35,436 --> 00:15:38,290 our global , global defensive needs . 422 00:15:38,300 --> 00:15:41,280 For example , reducing our naval fleet 423 00:15:41,290 --> 00:15:43,123 in order to stretch insufficient 424 00:15:43,123 --> 00:15:45,870 personnel across fewer ships indicates 425 00:15:45,870 --> 00:15:47,814 how backwards our defense spending 426 00:15:47,814 --> 00:15:50,740 approach has become . Second point . 427 00:15:50,920 --> 00:15:53,390 Our withdrawal of Afghanistan indicates 428 00:15:53,390 --> 00:15:56,970 a completely avoidable , avoidable uh 429 00:15:56,980 --> 00:15:59,147 failure of leadership and has made the 430 00:15:59,147 --> 00:16:02,220 world and our homeland less safe rather 431 00:16:02,220 --> 00:16:04,750 than more safe . And the 3rd point , 432 00:16:05,340 --> 00:16:07,860 our refueling capability is essential , 433 00:16:08,540 --> 00:16:10,318 especially given the challenges 434 00:16:10,318 --> 00:16:12,400 presented by the in tow the indo 435 00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:15,540 pacific last year . In the same setting , 436 00:16:15,650 --> 00:16:18,860 we had this conversation asked you both , 437 00:16:19,340 --> 00:16:22,360 General Milley , I asked you both 438 00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:26,130 Where we are essentially on , on the 439 00:16:26,130 --> 00:16:29,440 circumstances with the KC 46 , we were 440 00:16:29,440 --> 00:16:33,030 briefed last week That the KC 46 441 00:16:33,070 --> 00:16:36,450 is capable of refueling 86% of our 442 00:16:36,450 --> 00:16:39,350 aircraft . would anyone in this room by 443 00:16:39,350 --> 00:16:42,870 a car with the idea of it working 86% 444 00:16:42,870 --> 00:16:45,970 of the time And not 100% of the time . 445 00:16:46,340 --> 00:16:49,210 So my frustration is really with this K . 446 00:16:49,210 --> 00:16:51,960 C . And my question , General Milley 447 00:16:51,960 --> 00:16:55,720 and and and General Austin . I asked 448 00:16:55,720 --> 00:16:57,800 both of you , why are we not moving 449 00:16:57,800 --> 00:17:00,220 forward with the next generation tanker ? 450 00:17:00,220 --> 00:17:02,890 The L . M . X . T , which I understand 451 00:17:02,890 --> 00:17:04,946 is serving us quite well in europe . 452 00:17:09,540 --> 00:17:11,970 Yeah , thanks for that . I , well , 453 00:17:11,970 --> 00:17:15,680 first on your comments about 454 00:17:15,690 --> 00:17:18,010 refueling in general . Uh that is a 455 00:17:18,010 --> 00:17:20,610 strategic capability that we've got to 456 00:17:20,610 --> 00:17:24,160 sustain improve because the the legs of 457 00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:26,360 aircraft especially over the pacific 458 00:17:26,740 --> 00:17:29,170 are too short on a single tank of gas 459 00:17:29,180 --> 00:17:31,560 to be involved in the chinese war fight , 460 00:17:31,940 --> 00:17:35,060 given that the chinese do have anti 461 00:17:35,060 --> 00:17:38,680 access capabilities . uh 462 00:17:38,680 --> 00:17:41,060 .1.2 is the survivability of those 463 00:17:41,060 --> 00:17:43,650 aircraft is every bit as important as 464 00:17:43,650 --> 00:17:45,761 their ability to refuel an aircraft . 465 00:17:45,761 --> 00:17:47,817 So those are particularly vulnerable 466 00:17:47,817 --> 00:17:49,983 aircraft . So those two things have to 467 00:17:49,983 --> 00:17:52,261 be worked on in this particular budget . 468 00:17:52,261 --> 00:17:52,150 Uh If memory serves me right , I think 469 00:17:52,150 --> 00:17:55,160 there's a 15 K C 46 is uh 470 00:17:55,540 --> 00:17:58,470 as part of this we are phasing out some 471 00:17:58,470 --> 00:18:01,220 KC 1 35 and I agree with you on the on 472 00:18:01,220 --> 00:18:03,442 the L . M . X . Piece . I think that is 473 00:18:03,442 --> 00:18:06,380 the next generation . Uh we need to uh 474 00:18:06,390 --> 00:18:08,630 get going with that because that is 475 00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:11,070 more survivable and it handles a 476 00:18:11,080 --> 00:18:13,191 greater ability to refuel the fleet . 477 00:18:13,191 --> 00:18:15,358 So I'm not in disagreement with any of 478 00:18:15,358 --> 00:18:17,302 that , but refueling is a critical 479 00:18:17,302 --> 00:18:19,469 strategic capability that we have . Uh 480 00:18:19,469 --> 00:18:21,691 And if you take it back to our american 481 00:18:21,691 --> 00:18:24,710 way of war , um what what makes us so 482 00:18:24,710 --> 00:18:26,432 much different than many other 483 00:18:26,432 --> 00:18:28,432 countries is our ability to project 484 00:18:28,432 --> 00:18:31,570 combat power very rapidly at great 485 00:18:31,570 --> 00:18:33,700 distances from continental United 486 00:18:33,700 --> 00:18:36,340 States and refueling along with the 487 00:18:36,340 --> 00:18:38,396 maritime fleet along with many other 488 00:18:38,396 --> 00:18:40,507 capabilities are what enable us to do 489 00:18:40,507 --> 00:18:42,229 that . So that's a key area of 490 00:18:42,229 --> 00:18:44,396 investment that we need to continue to 491 00:18:44,396 --> 00:18:47,610 do . Thank you sir . I agree with what 492 00:18:47,610 --> 00:18:50,210 the chairman has said , uh , refueling 493 00:18:50,210 --> 00:18:52,920 capability is a significant part of our 494 00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:55,240 strategic advantage . Uh , and we have 495 00:18:55,240 --> 00:18:57,407 to make sure that we , we maintain the 496 00:18:57,407 --> 00:19:00,180 capability to fuel refuel all of our 497 00:19:00,180 --> 00:19:02,920 aircraft . And so for a period of time 498 00:19:02,930 --> 00:19:05,097 we'll need to make sure we have a kind 499 00:19:05,097 --> 00:19:07,450 of a blend of , of capability . So 500 00:19:07,460 --> 00:19:09,682 until we get some of the problems fixed 501 00:19:09,682 --> 00:19:13,060 on the , on the , On the 46 but 502 00:19:13,070 --> 00:19:15,126 investing in the next generation , I 503 00:19:15,126 --> 00:19:17,348 think it's the right thing to do . So I 504 00:19:17,348 --> 00:19:19,330 agree with with what you've , what 505 00:19:19,330 --> 00:19:21,663 you've raised her . Thank you gentlemen . 506 00:19:21,663 --> 00:19:24,590 Now you're my time . Mr Golden is 507 00:19:24,590 --> 00:19:28,530 recognized . Thank you . Secretary 508 00:19:28,530 --> 00:19:30,641 Austin and General Miller , thank you 509 00:19:30,641 --> 00:19:32,808 for being here today and thank you for 510 00:19:32,808 --> 00:19:34,586 your lifetime of service to the 511 00:19:34,586 --> 00:19:36,920 country's defense . Um , you know , 512 00:19:36,930 --> 00:19:38,874 sitting here for now , three hours 513 00:19:38,874 --> 00:19:41,760 similar to the way that you to have , 514 00:19:41,770 --> 00:19:44,050 It occurs to me that these hearings 515 00:19:44,050 --> 00:19:46,161 obviously are very important . That's 516 00:19:46,161 --> 00:19:49,010 why we do them . That the oversight is 517 00:19:49,010 --> 00:19:51,480 critical . The debate , I think can be 518 00:19:51,480 --> 00:19:54,000 a real source of strength in the policy 519 00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:56,360 making process when done correctly and 520 00:19:56,370 --> 00:20:00,360 done . I think in general act of 521 00:20:00,370 --> 00:20:02,300 good faith , we've also seen some 522 00:20:02,300 --> 00:20:04,633 examples where perhaps it's not helpful , 523 00:20:04,633 --> 00:20:06,800 uh , in regards to the message you can 524 00:20:06,800 --> 00:20:09,180 send to the world to our , our friends 525 00:20:09,180 --> 00:20:11,440 and our foes , uh , and most 526 00:20:11,440 --> 00:20:14,550 importantly to the american people in 527 00:20:14,550 --> 00:20:16,717 regards to that . I want to talk about 528 00:20:16,717 --> 00:20:18,661 something we really haven't talked 529 00:20:18,661 --> 00:20:20,883 about today and that's a recent opinion 530 00:20:20,883 --> 00:20:23,050 piece in the Wall Street Journal . You 531 00:20:23,050 --> 00:20:24,939 may have seen written by a former 532 00:20:24,939 --> 00:20:27,410 member of Congress as well as a former 533 00:20:27,420 --> 00:20:30,610 secretary of a cabinet of a different 534 00:20:30,610 --> 00:20:32,770 presidential administration passed . 535 00:20:33,940 --> 00:20:36,107 And what's concerning about it I think 536 00:20:36,107 --> 00:20:38,200 is the message that it sends to the 537 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:40,640 american people uh and two others who 538 00:20:40,640 --> 00:20:42,807 are paying attention . And this has to 539 00:20:42,807 --> 00:20:44,862 do with the commandant of the Marine 540 00:20:44,862 --> 00:20:48,810 Corps Current Force Redesign . I wanted 541 00:20:48,810 --> 00:20:51,460 to ask a couple of questions about this 542 00:20:51,790 --> 00:20:54,123 and I'm gonna start with General Milley . 543 00:20:54,420 --> 00:20:56,850 It says here that there are people out 544 00:20:56,850 --> 00:20:58,710 there who are feeling that it is 545 00:20:58,710 --> 00:21:01,890 unclear particularly for people with 546 00:21:01,890 --> 00:21:04,057 experience in military planning . What 547 00:21:04,057 --> 00:21:05,946 formal review in coordination was 548 00:21:05,946 --> 00:21:07,834 required of the common commandant 549 00:21:07,834 --> 00:21:10,800 before his words . The author of this 550 00:21:10,800 --> 00:21:12,800 opinion piece before the commandant 551 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:15,600 unilaterally announced a policy that 552 00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:18,220 would alter the Marine Corps . It goes 553 00:21:18,220 --> 00:21:21,180 on to say that the law doesn't give the 554 00:21:21,180 --> 00:21:23,510 commandant carte blanc to make 555 00:21:23,510 --> 00:21:25,566 significant changes in for structure 556 00:21:25,566 --> 00:21:27,677 but rather Title 10 provides that the 557 00:21:27,677 --> 00:21:29,899 commandant performs its duty subject to 558 00:21:29,899 --> 00:21:32,066 the authority direction and control of 559 00:21:32,066 --> 00:21:34,288 the Secretary of the Navy , who also by 560 00:21:34,288 --> 00:21:36,454 the way uh is subject to the authority 561 00:21:36,454 --> 00:21:36,300 direction and control of the Secretary 562 00:21:36,300 --> 00:21:38,189 of Defense and then finally , the 563 00:21:38,189 --> 00:21:40,411 president retains ultimate authority as 564 00:21:40,411 --> 00:21:43,430 commander in chief . Ah The next 565 00:21:43,430 --> 00:21:45,580 paragraph here says that there's a 566 00:21:45,590 --> 00:21:48,080 problem in a restructuring of this 567 00:21:48,080 --> 00:21:51,030 scale having moved through without full 568 00:21:51,030 --> 00:21:53,130 consideration and debate in front of 569 00:21:53,130 --> 00:21:55,450 the proper offices within the pentagon 570 00:21:55,460 --> 00:21:57,950 such as the Defense Resource Board or 571 00:21:57,950 --> 00:22:00,530 others and that a formal approval by 572 00:22:00,530 --> 00:22:02,920 the sec def should have been conducted 573 00:22:02,920 --> 00:22:05,031 before it was sent to the White House 574 00:22:05,031 --> 00:22:07,031 for further review and then sent to 575 00:22:07,031 --> 00:22:09,142 Congress for oversight hearings . The 576 00:22:09,142 --> 00:22:11,253 last thing I would point out that the 577 00:22:11,253 --> 00:22:13,930 opinion piece asserts that This 578 00:22:13,930 --> 00:22:15,874 announcement was made during COVID 579 00:22:15,874 --> 00:22:17,986 making it difficult for congressional 580 00:22:17,986 --> 00:22:20,097 oversight to take place . And I think 581 00:22:20,097 --> 00:22:22,208 perhaps for you , General Milley most 582 00:22:22,208 --> 00:22:24,430 concerning . It asserts that due to the 583 00:22:24,430 --> 00:22:26,374 chaos that existed in the Pentagon 584 00:22:26,374 --> 00:22:28,560 during the 2020 campaign year And post 585 00:22:28,560 --> 00:22:31,390 election turbulence that perhaps this 586 00:22:31,390 --> 00:22:35,230 proposal has just floated through uh 587 00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:37,296 through improper channels . And so I 588 00:22:37,296 --> 00:22:39,462 wanted to ask you , you've been around 589 00:22:39,462 --> 00:22:41,740 in this position since October of 2019 . 590 00:22:41,740 --> 00:22:43,962 Do you have any concern along the way , 591 00:22:43,962 --> 00:22:45,690 having had this re force this 592 00:22:45,690 --> 00:22:49,080 restructure announced In March of 2020 593 00:22:49,080 --> 00:22:51,710 that the proper process has not been 594 00:22:51,710 --> 00:22:54,970 followed ? No . And I read the piece by 595 00:22:54,970 --> 00:22:56,803 Senator Webb and I have enormous 596 00:22:56,803 --> 00:22:58,914 respect for Senator Webb by the way , 597 00:22:58,914 --> 00:23:00,859 it has to have a Navy cross Winter 598 00:23:00,859 --> 00:23:02,803 Marine veteran , a tremendous Navy 599 00:23:02,803 --> 00:23:05,140 Secretary et cetera . I read the piece 600 00:23:05,150 --> 00:23:07,260 uh and Dave Berger the commandant 601 00:23:07,260 --> 00:23:10,500 Marine Corps General burger . Uh he 602 00:23:10,510 --> 00:23:12,677 pretty rigorously thought this through 603 00:23:12,677 --> 00:23:15,320 with the the Marine Corps staff and the 604 00:23:15,320 --> 00:23:17,740 Navy staff And he he did brief it up 605 00:23:17,740 --> 00:23:19,740 through various elements within the 606 00:23:19,740 --> 00:23:21,740 Department of Defense . I can't say 607 00:23:21,740 --> 00:23:23,629 about the White House piece . I I 608 00:23:23,629 --> 00:23:25,740 assume he does hearings as well . I'm 609 00:23:25,740 --> 00:23:27,907 assuming that the oversight committees 610 00:23:27,907 --> 00:23:29,851 have heard it many times about the 611 00:23:29,851 --> 00:23:31,907 restructuring of marine and marine , 612 00:23:31,907 --> 00:23:34,129 you know , 2030 plan . But let's take a 613 00:23:34,129 --> 00:23:36,351 look just for a second . What what is , 614 00:23:36,351 --> 00:23:38,684 what are they actually doing materially , 615 00:23:38,684 --> 00:23:38,180 What are they physically doing ? You 616 00:23:38,180 --> 00:23:40,300 know , reducing by three infantry 617 00:23:40,300 --> 00:23:42,740 battalions . That certainly there's 618 00:23:42,740 --> 00:23:44,907 only 31 infantry battalions and Marine 619 00:23:44,907 --> 00:23:46,962 Corps . So it's not a large force to 620 00:23:46,962 --> 00:23:49,129 begin with . Let me , we're almost out 621 00:23:49,129 --> 00:23:49,060 of time . Let me just say , I think 622 00:23:49,060 --> 00:23:51,360 it's important you were aware of course 623 00:23:51,360 --> 00:23:53,416 that the Marine Corps was absolutely 624 00:23:53,416 --> 00:23:55,416 aware that they've been in front of 625 00:23:55,416 --> 00:23:57,582 Congress for oversight . We were aware 626 00:23:57,582 --> 00:23:59,416 and I'm also aware of the alumni 627 00:23:59,416 --> 00:24:01,582 community of the Marine Corps is quite 628 00:24:01,582 --> 00:24:01,390 upset about it . The Secretary of the 629 00:24:01,390 --> 00:24:03,557 Navy under multiple administrations is 630 00:24:03,557 --> 00:24:05,334 aware of this and approved it . 631 00:24:05,334 --> 00:24:07,612 Obviously it was green lighted to come . 632 00:24:07,612 --> 00:24:09,723 I believe the answer is just all that 633 00:24:09,723 --> 00:24:09,510 and you're committed to ensuring that 634 00:24:09,510 --> 00:24:11,710 that proper processes followed going 635 00:24:11,710 --> 00:24:13,543 forward because my understanding 636 00:24:13,543 --> 00:24:15,877 Marines is as they're implementing this , 637 00:24:15,877 --> 00:24:17,766 they're also flexible and they're 638 00:24:17,766 --> 00:24:19,766 they're learning lessons and making 639 00:24:19,766 --> 00:24:21,988 adjustments correct . So totally I have 640 00:24:21,988 --> 00:24:21,500 no problem with the process that was 641 00:24:21,500 --> 00:24:23,500 followed and that may not have come 642 00:24:23,500 --> 00:24:25,611 clear to the senator or others out in 643 00:24:25,611 --> 00:24:27,722 the alumni community , but inside the 644 00:24:27,722 --> 00:24:29,889 pentagon it's my belief anyway because 645 00:24:29,889 --> 00:24:32,111 I saw it and so did many members of the 646 00:24:32,111 --> 00:24:31,930 Department of Defense . And I know the 647 00:24:31,930 --> 00:24:34,160 committees of oversights are so I think 648 00:24:34,160 --> 00:24:36,720 that part of the process is important . 649 00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:38,960 Point . Thank you . Thank you Mr Rogers 650 00:24:39,540 --> 00:24:41,651 Madam Chair . I ask unanimous consent 651 00:24:41,651 --> 00:24:43,762 that all committee members have three 652 00:24:43,762 --> 00:24:45,873 legislative days to revise and extend 653 00:24:45,873 --> 00:24:47,929 my remarks and to include extraneous 654 00:24:47,929 --> 00:24:49,929 materials into the record . Without 655 00:24:49,929 --> 00:24:52,380 objection . So ordered Mr moore Mr 656 00:24:52,380 --> 00:24:54,602 moore is recognized . Thank you Chair . 657 00:24:54,602 --> 00:24:57,170 Thank you . And remember The F- 35 658 00:24:57,170 --> 00:24:59,340 Joint Strike Fighter Strengthens 659 00:24:59,340 --> 00:25:01,410 National Security , enhances global 660 00:25:01,410 --> 00:25:03,632 partnerships and powers economic growth 661 00:25:03,632 --> 00:25:05,688 across our nation . I agree with Air 662 00:25:05,688 --> 00:25:08,650 Force Chiefs Chief of Staff Brown , The 663 00:25:08,650 --> 00:25:10,817 F- 35 is indeed the cornerstone of Air 664 00:25:10,817 --> 00:25:13,039 Force modernization remains remains the 665 00:25:13,039 --> 00:25:15,206 most lethal . Survivable and connected 666 00:25:15,206 --> 00:25:17,428 fighter in the world , giving pilots an 667 00:25:17,428 --> 00:25:19,428 advantage against any adversary and 668 00:25:19,428 --> 00:25:21,594 then most importantly enabling them to 669 00:25:21,594 --> 00:25:21,050 execute their mission to come home 670 00:25:21,050 --> 00:25:23,850 safely . At Hill Air Force Base in Utah 671 00:25:23,860 --> 00:25:26,027 are three 88th Fighter wing is the Air 672 00:25:26,027 --> 00:25:28,193 Force First active duty combat capable 673 00:25:28,193 --> 00:25:30,360 F 35 a lightning unit Right now , F 30 674 00:25:30,360 --> 00:25:32,800 five's from the base is 34 squadron 675 00:25:32,810 --> 00:25:34,643 have been deployed to Germany in 676 00:25:34,643 --> 00:25:36,588 response to Russia's aggression in 677 00:25:36,588 --> 00:25:38,810 Ukraine . However , I am concerned that 678 00:25:38,810 --> 00:25:38,740 these fifth generation aircraft have 679 00:25:38,740 --> 00:25:40,930 not consistently been accompanied with 680 00:25:40,940 --> 00:25:43,107 equally modern and advanced weaponry . 681 00:25:43,240 --> 00:25:45,018 The weaponry to accompany fifth 682 00:25:45,018 --> 00:25:47,184 generation aircraft must include cyber 683 00:25:47,184 --> 00:25:49,296 and electronic warfare capabilities , 684 00:25:49,296 --> 00:25:51,462 superior radars and sensors , unmanned 685 00:25:51,462 --> 00:25:53,629 capabilities and the ability to defeat 686 00:25:53,629 --> 00:25:55,740 rapidly relocate herbal targets in an 687 00:25:55,740 --> 00:25:57,518 anti access environment from my 688 00:25:57,518 --> 00:25:59,573 understanding Jazz um and Laura's um 689 00:25:59,573 --> 00:26:01,796 and the standard attack weapon can help 690 00:26:01,796 --> 00:26:03,907 they have 35 reach its full potential 691 00:26:03,907 --> 00:26:05,907 As 5th Generation Fighter Secretary 692 00:26:05,907 --> 00:26:08,073 Austin again , thank you all for being 693 00:26:08,073 --> 00:26:10,073 here and for your service . Can you 694 00:26:10,073 --> 00:26:12,296 provide an update on the implementation 695 00:26:12,296 --> 00:26:14,518 of advanced weaponry for the F- 35 with 696 00:26:14,518 --> 00:26:16,629 battle management capabilities needed 697 00:26:16,629 --> 00:26:18,296 to to address an increasingly 698 00:26:18,296 --> 00:26:20,573 adversarial adversarial threats ? Yeah , 699 00:26:20,573 --> 00:26:22,573 so we're we're working hard to make 700 00:26:22,573 --> 00:26:25,650 sure that that , you know , we do in 701 00:26:25,650 --> 00:26:28,920 fact achieve the upgrades going forward 702 00:26:28,920 --> 00:26:31,031 that you mentioned and we are able to 703 00:26:31,630 --> 00:26:33,760 to integrate the capabilities from 704 00:26:33,770 --> 00:26:37,330 cyber in uh and information 705 00:26:37,330 --> 00:26:40,040 that that you mentioned ? That's that's 706 00:26:40,040 --> 00:26:42,151 a work in progress . We will continue 707 00:26:42,151 --> 00:26:44,373 to invest in precision guided munitions 708 00:26:44,373 --> 00:26:46,096 because that's really , really 709 00:26:46,096 --> 00:26:48,151 important to us . And you've seen us 710 00:26:48,151 --> 00:26:50,040 invest in in the upgrade of those 711 00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:52,262 precision guided munitions to make sure 712 00:26:52,262 --> 00:26:54,800 that they're survivable . And I like to 713 00:26:54,800 --> 00:26:57,022 look at it , and you know as I dig into 714 00:26:57,022 --> 00:26:59,078 this with my team and and some of my 715 00:26:59,078 --> 00:27:01,244 stakeholders back home , I like to you 716 00:27:01,244 --> 00:27:03,356 make a comparison with an $80 million 717 00:27:03,356 --> 00:27:05,390 dollar plane That we are putting 50 718 00:27:05,390 --> 00:27:07,820 year old weapons weapons technology 719 00:27:07,820 --> 00:27:10,450 into um important piece , especially as 720 00:27:10,450 --> 00:27:12,980 we talk about the budget today . Do you 721 00:27:12,980 --> 00:27:15,091 think there has been enough attention 722 00:27:15,091 --> 00:27:17,258 given to the weaponry available to the 723 00:27:17,258 --> 00:27:20,990 F- 35 . One of my priorities uh , is to 724 00:27:20,990 --> 00:27:23,460 ensure that we continue to invest in 725 00:27:23,460 --> 00:27:25,900 the , the upgrade of our , of our P G . 726 00:27:25,900 --> 00:27:27,678 M s and that we have sufficient 727 00:27:27,678 --> 00:27:30,230 quantities of PGM s on hand , so we're 728 00:27:30,230 --> 00:27:32,341 going to continue to invest in this . 729 00:27:32,940 --> 00:27:35,780 Um , my , my last question is related 730 00:27:35,780 --> 00:27:37,450 to um , 731 00:27:39,140 --> 00:27:42,560 the number , the number of F 30 732 00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:44,671 five's , the D . O . D is insistent . 733 00:27:44,671 --> 00:27:48,550 It still plans to seek a total of 1763 . 734 00:27:48,550 --> 00:27:51,680 F 30 five's . However , at a rate of 33 735 00:27:51,680 --> 00:27:53,569 per year , that would take half a 736 00:27:53,569 --> 00:27:57,560 century , How is it decreased F 35 x 737 00:27:57,560 --> 00:27:59,880 35 by justified to meet the needs of 738 00:27:59,890 --> 00:28:03,410 peer competition . And , you know , the 739 00:28:03,420 --> 00:28:07,010 very apparent and obvious adversarial A . 740 00:28:07,010 --> 00:28:09,066 O . R . S that are increasing across 741 00:28:09,066 --> 00:28:11,177 our globe . Just kind of comment on , 742 00:28:11,177 --> 00:28:13,343 are we , are we doing enough on this S 743 00:28:13,343 --> 00:28:15,454 F 35 by and by decreasing it , are we 744 00:28:15,454 --> 00:28:17,788 ready , are we ready for the next fight ? 745 00:28:17,788 --> 00:28:19,899 So , pure competition is exactly what 746 00:28:19,899 --> 00:28:21,899 we have in mind and we want to make 747 00:28:21,899 --> 00:28:23,843 sure that we have the right mix of 748 00:28:23,843 --> 00:28:26,010 capabilities in in the inventory as we 749 00:28:26,010 --> 00:28:28,232 go forward . And as you look across the 750 00:28:28,232 --> 00:28:30,454 fit up , You'll see that we , we invest 751 00:28:30,454 --> 00:28:34,280 in F- 35s in a significant way . But 752 00:28:34,290 --> 00:28:37,990 uh , the F- 35 and the uh , the F- 22 753 00:28:37,990 --> 00:28:41,230 have uh , specific roles in the , in 754 00:28:41,230 --> 00:28:43,286 the fight , uh , and they are very , 755 00:28:43,286 --> 00:28:45,174 very capable aircraft , but other 756 00:28:45,174 --> 00:28:47,286 aircraft are also relevant and uh and 757 00:28:47,286 --> 00:28:49,286 so we want to make sure we have the 758 00:28:49,286 --> 00:28:51,452 right mix . I've been impressed with , 759 00:28:51,740 --> 00:28:53,684 you know , one of the , one of the 760 00:28:53,684 --> 00:28:55,907 highlights of this role I'm in my first 761 00:28:55,907 --> 00:28:57,684 term of Congress and one of the 762 00:28:57,684 --> 00:28:59,740 highlights is getting be interacting 763 00:28:59,740 --> 00:29:01,796 individually with the pilots back on 764 00:29:01,796 --> 00:29:03,907 our Air Force base . I think a lot of 765 00:29:03,907 --> 00:29:06,129 us have that that that chance to go and 766 00:29:06,129 --> 00:29:08,129 and hear their perspective and they 767 00:29:08,129 --> 00:29:10,129 have such incredible ideas and such 768 00:29:10,129 --> 00:29:12,073 closeness to these , these weapons 769 00:29:12,073 --> 00:29:14,240 systems . Um , and uh I I know there's 770 00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:16,800 a real strong desire for , for their 771 00:29:16,800 --> 00:29:18,920 voice to be heard and the airmen as 772 00:29:18,920 --> 00:29:21,031 they work on these every day and just 773 00:29:21,031 --> 00:29:23,198 will constantly encourage , there's no 774 00:29:23,198 --> 00:29:23,150 question here , I just want to 775 00:29:23,150 --> 00:29:25,372 constantly encourage our leadership and 776 00:29:25,372 --> 00:29:27,594 our committee to be thinking about what 777 00:29:27,594 --> 00:29:30,280 that direct base level input is and how 778 00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:32,280 important that that is because they 779 00:29:32,280 --> 00:29:34,447 have amazing ideas and I've and I just 780 00:29:34,447 --> 00:29:36,391 wanted to to take this opportunity 781 00:29:36,391 --> 00:29:36,020 amidst the terminal going on in the 782 00:29:36,020 --> 00:29:38,131 world to thank them for their service 783 00:29:38,131 --> 00:29:40,242 and and really appreciate from , from 784 00:29:40,242 --> 00:29:42,409 every base , but particularly um where 785 00:29:42,409 --> 00:29:44,630 we have , you know , assets deployed 786 00:29:44,630 --> 00:29:46,741 from from , from ogden Utah right now 787 00:29:46,741 --> 00:29:50,140 and Layton , thank you deal back Mrs 788 00:29:50,140 --> 00:29:53,530 Loria is recognized . Well , thank you 789 00:29:53,530 --> 00:29:55,752 General Milley , I noticed earlier in a 790 00:29:55,752 --> 00:29:59,240 comment to Mr Bacon um you said 791 00:29:59,250 --> 00:30:01,250 that I don't think we're taking too 792 00:30:01,250 --> 00:30:03,390 much risk with regards to china and 793 00:30:03,390 --> 00:30:05,830 Russia . Um So one of the things that 794 00:30:05,830 --> 00:30:08,052 when we look at the budget , we look at 795 00:30:08,052 --> 00:30:10,163 what's in it , what's not in it , The 796 00:30:10,163 --> 00:30:12,274 things that are unfunded requirements 797 00:30:12,274 --> 00:30:14,274 list , there's risk associated with 798 00:30:14,274 --> 00:30:13,740 each of those choices that were made 799 00:30:13,750 --> 00:30:16,670 based off of the top line . Um And what 800 00:30:16,670 --> 00:30:18,726 you've included in the budget coming 801 00:30:18,726 --> 00:30:20,670 over to us and I know that entitle 802 00:30:20,670 --> 00:30:22,670 tenant requires the Chairman's Risk 803 00:30:22,670 --> 00:30:24,726 assessment , which would normally be 804 00:30:24,726 --> 00:30:26,837 submitted annually by february 15th . 805 00:30:26,837 --> 00:30:28,559 Um Have you submitted the risk 806 00:30:28,559 --> 00:30:30,890 assessment this year ? Have not 807 00:30:30,890 --> 00:30:32,779 typically in sequence that goes ? 808 00:30:32,779 --> 00:30:34,612 National Security strategy , the 809 00:30:34,612 --> 00:30:36,501 National Defense Strategy and the 810 00:30:36,501 --> 00:30:38,501 National Military strategy than the 811 00:30:38,501 --> 00:30:38,020 budget then the Chairman's risk 812 00:30:38,020 --> 00:30:41,880 assessment . So um but anyway , um I 813 00:30:41,890 --> 00:30:44,001 have it um it's in draft and it would 814 00:30:44,001 --> 00:30:46,840 be submitted shortly . Uh So talk risk 815 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:48,896 for just a second . So the way we do 816 00:30:48,896 --> 00:30:51,007 that , the way I do it and the way we 817 00:30:51,007 --> 00:30:53,340 have as the department has done it well , 818 00:30:53,340 --> 00:30:55,507 the joint staff has done it um is take 819 00:30:55,507 --> 00:30:57,396 a look at the probability and the 820 00:30:57,396 --> 00:30:59,396 consequence of a specific event and 821 00:30:59,396 --> 00:31:01,618 then measured against the risk to force 822 00:31:01,618 --> 00:31:03,784 risk admission , Evaluate against time 823 00:31:03,784 --> 00:31:05,896 and the cost of troops . How much are 824 00:31:05,896 --> 00:31:05,540 you gonna lose in terms of audience ? 825 00:31:05,540 --> 00:31:07,596 So can I jump in really quickly . So 826 00:31:07,596 --> 00:31:09,373 when was the last time the risk 827 00:31:09,373 --> 00:31:11,540 assessment was done ? It was two years 828 00:31:11,540 --> 00:31:13,707 ago . Okay . Right , so August of 2020 829 00:31:13,707 --> 00:31:15,970 asking also perhaps why it wasn't done 830 00:31:15,970 --> 00:31:17,859 last year , but I've reviewed the 831 00:31:17,859 --> 00:31:19,803 previous risk assessments and they 832 00:31:19,803 --> 00:31:21,803 don't really follow the format that 833 00:31:21,803 --> 00:31:23,859 you're stating . And also They don't 834 00:31:23,859 --> 00:31:26,137 really follow . The format is required , 835 00:31:26,137 --> 00:31:25,910 entitled 10 and include all of the 836 00:31:25,910 --> 00:31:29,020 elements in them that are necessary , 837 00:31:29,020 --> 00:31:30,964 which I think was written that way 838 00:31:30,964 --> 00:31:32,853 because that allows us to to make 839 00:31:32,853 --> 00:31:35,230 decisions um perhaps adding additional 840 00:31:35,230 --> 00:31:38,250 resources to the defense budget . Um So 841 00:31:38,260 --> 00:31:40,427 go ahead , please . I'm sorry . Okay , 842 00:31:40,427 --> 00:31:42,316 I'll do better on rewriting it in 843 00:31:42,316 --> 00:31:44,427 accordance with the formats . But but 844 00:31:44,427 --> 00:31:46,810 my point being is the substance of any 845 00:31:46,810 --> 00:31:49,760 risk assessment that we do is relative 846 00:31:49,760 --> 00:31:51,780 to that . So the probability we're 847 00:31:51,780 --> 00:31:54,480 evaluating risk in this for this budget 848 00:31:54,490 --> 00:31:58,310 in this . Nds relative to china uh and 849 00:31:58,320 --> 00:32:01,550 Russia uh and specific to china . 850 00:32:01,940 --> 00:32:05,390 I when I said in my comment to uh mr 851 00:32:05,390 --> 00:32:09,100 Bacon earlier about uh the I don't 852 00:32:09,100 --> 00:32:11,570 think it's too much risk . I think that 853 00:32:11,570 --> 00:32:13,848 we've mitigated risk relative to china . 854 00:32:13,848 --> 00:32:16,020 And I think that the probability of 855 00:32:16,020 --> 00:32:18,780 armed conflict with china , the 856 00:32:18,790 --> 00:32:20,790 consequence would be high , but the 857 00:32:20,790 --> 00:32:22,790 probability is not high in the near 858 00:32:22,790 --> 00:32:25,123 term in terms of this particular budget . 859 00:32:25,123 --> 00:32:27,290 Uh Now , as you get in the out years , 860 00:32:27,290 --> 00:32:29,401 as you get in the out years , what do 861 00:32:29,401 --> 00:32:31,568 you think that the out years is beyond 862 00:32:31,568 --> 00:32:33,623 five years . So beyond that does not 863 00:32:33,623 --> 00:32:33,580 concur what we've heard from Adam 864 00:32:33,590 --> 00:32:35,923 Davidson and what Admiral Davidson said , 865 00:32:35,923 --> 00:32:38,146 and Admiral Aquilino said was they said 866 00:32:38,146 --> 00:32:41,620 that the probability Or the capability 867 00:32:41,630 --> 00:32:43,990 of China to attack Taiwan is going to 868 00:32:43,990 --> 00:32:46,480 be 2027 capability not probability . 869 00:32:46,740 --> 00:32:48,907 And and that is exactly what president 870 00:32:48,907 --> 00:32:51,129 she charged his military to do . Well I 871 00:32:51,129 --> 00:32:53,240 would say that myself and many others 872 00:32:53,240 --> 00:32:55,351 on this committee interpreted Admiral 873 00:32:55,351 --> 00:32:54,650 Aquilino and Davidson statements 874 00:32:54,650 --> 00:32:56,706 differently . But as we're limited , 875 00:32:56,706 --> 00:32:58,928 they were interpreted differently . But 876 00:32:58,928 --> 00:33:00,983 what they said was The capability to 877 00:33:00,983 --> 00:33:03,039 attack Taiwan was to be developed by 878 00:33:03,039 --> 00:33:04,817 2027 . That's not the same as a 879 00:33:04,817 --> 00:33:06,983 decision to attack . I think that they 880 00:33:06,983 --> 00:33:06,630 said that there was a high probability 881 00:33:06,630 --> 00:33:08,686 within the next six years now , five 882 00:33:08,686 --> 00:33:10,852 years . And I've had that conversation 883 00:33:11,140 --> 00:33:13,362 but just so that we can get through the 884 00:33:13,362 --> 00:33:15,196 question about so You know , the 885 00:33:15,196 --> 00:33:17,307 purpose is to see how the current and 886 00:33:17,307 --> 00:33:19,529 future risk changes with regards to the 887 00:33:19,529 --> 00:33:21,751 budget that's submitted and so with the 888 00:33:21,751 --> 00:33:23,807 budget priorities , the trade offs , 889 00:33:23,807 --> 00:33:23,540 the physical constraints . And so 890 00:33:23,540 --> 00:33:25,596 there's some things in here . I mean 891 00:33:25,596 --> 00:33:27,484 we're d coming 24 ships were only 892 00:33:27,484 --> 00:33:29,596 building eight , you say nine . We're 893 00:33:29,596 --> 00:33:29,460 delaying the laws for the Marine Corps 894 00:33:29,460 --> 00:33:31,571 to come to the fight in the pacific , 895 00:33:31,571 --> 00:33:33,682 we're not maximizing our shipbuilding 896 00:33:33,682 --> 00:33:35,682 capacity . We could build 15 Ddgs . 897 00:33:35,682 --> 00:33:35,360 We're only building 10 . We're stopping 898 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:37,582 the LPD production line . We're pushing 899 00:33:37,582 --> 00:33:39,416 out the L . H . A . The unfunded 900 00:33:39,416 --> 00:33:41,582 requirements list . Risk like what are 901 00:33:41,582 --> 00:33:43,804 the things that can prevent an invasion 902 00:33:43,804 --> 00:33:46,027 of Taiwan ? You know it's the bottom of 903 00:33:46,027 --> 00:33:47,971 the unfunded requirements list for 904 00:33:47,971 --> 00:33:49,860 offensive mining is the Air force 905 00:33:49,860 --> 00:33:49,540 investing in long range anti surface 906 00:33:49,540 --> 00:33:51,651 missiles are as um , you know , these 907 00:33:51,651 --> 00:33:53,762 things that in my mind our priorities 908 00:33:53,762 --> 00:33:55,984 to accomplish our goals or some of them 909 00:33:55,984 --> 00:33:57,651 not even funded or not funded 910 00:33:57,651 --> 00:33:59,873 sufficiently . So you've made decisions 911 00:33:59,873 --> 00:34:01,929 there to fund this , but put this on 912 00:34:01,929 --> 00:34:03,929 the unfunded requirements list . So 913 00:34:03,929 --> 00:34:06,151 there's a risk . So that is what I feel 914 00:34:06,151 --> 00:34:07,984 is not being communicated to the 915 00:34:07,984 --> 00:34:10,040 committee And you're here requesting 916 00:34:10,040 --> 00:34:11,984 $773 billion . And I feel like you 917 00:34:11,984 --> 00:34:14,151 haven't provided , you know , the most 918 00:34:14,151 --> 00:34:16,040 basic information necessary to to 919 00:34:16,040 --> 00:34:18,040 understand what this budget will or 920 00:34:18,040 --> 00:34:20,830 will not do for the defense . Well , 921 00:34:20,840 --> 00:34:23,062 there's 30 seconds left . So as quickly 922 00:34:23,062 --> 00:34:24,729 as I can , I don't think that 923 00:34:24,729 --> 00:34:26,951 Decommissioning ships that are 30 years 924 00:34:26,951 --> 00:34:29,062 old that have no relevance to a fight 925 00:34:29,062 --> 00:34:31,007 against China or limited relevance 926 00:34:31,007 --> 00:34:33,173 don't have time in 30 seconds to cover 927 00:34:33,173 --> 00:34:36,150 this topic . But I do think that I'm 928 00:34:36,150 --> 00:34:38,261 looking forward to reading about that 929 00:34:38,261 --> 00:34:40,094 in the risk assessment when it's 930 00:34:40,094 --> 00:34:42,317 submitted soon . So thank you . I don't 931 00:34:42,317 --> 00:34:44,539 think it's excessive risk . MRS Vice is 932 00:34:44,539 --> 00:34:46,483 recognized . Thank you want to say 933 00:34:46,483 --> 00:34:48,594 thank you to Secretary Austin General 934 00:34:48,594 --> 00:34:50,150 Milley for spending it . An 935 00:34:50,150 --> 00:34:52,206 extraordinary amount of time with us 936 00:34:52,206 --> 00:34:54,428 today , Secretary Austin , I understand 937 00:34:54,428 --> 00:34:56,317 that the Air Force plans to begin 938 00:34:56,317 --> 00:34:58,320 phasing out a number of the E three 939 00:34:58,320 --> 00:35:01,690 century aircraft in 2023 . As you know , 940 00:35:01,690 --> 00:35:03,579 this is an important platform for 941 00:35:03,579 --> 00:35:05,746 command and control , target detection 942 00:35:05,746 --> 00:35:07,920 and battle management . I am concerned 943 00:35:07,920 --> 00:35:09,864 that if we phase out this aircraft 944 00:35:09,864 --> 00:35:12,031 without the replacement of the E seven 945 00:35:12,031 --> 00:35:14,260 online , then we will lose critically 946 00:35:14,260 --> 00:35:16,340 needed combat capability . I'm also 947 00:35:16,340 --> 00:35:18,396 concerned that bases like Tinker Air 948 00:35:18,396 --> 00:35:20,507 Force Base would experience a decline 949 00:35:20,507 --> 00:35:22,618 in associated institutional knowledge 950 00:35:22,618 --> 00:35:24,970 readiness and workforce proficiency if 951 00:35:24,970 --> 00:35:27,760 we can't transition this workforce To 952 00:35:27,760 --> 00:35:30,470 the E seven concurrently secretary , 953 00:35:30,470 --> 00:35:32,414 can you tell me how the department 954 00:35:32,414 --> 00:35:34,770 plans to fill the gap capability gap of 955 00:35:34,770 --> 00:35:36,603 the E three aircraft if they are 956 00:35:36,603 --> 00:35:38,826 retired without a replacement in hand ? 957 00:35:39,140 --> 00:35:41,370 Yeah . So we'll need to manage the 958 00:35:41,370 --> 00:35:43,426 transition to make sure that we have 959 00:35:43,426 --> 00:35:45,648 adequate capability on hand as we bring 960 00:35:45,648 --> 00:35:47,870 on new capabilities . But at the at the 961 00:35:47,870 --> 00:35:50,092 current time we're talking about taking 962 00:35:50,092 --> 00:35:52,740 out E 3s before those E seven or even 963 00:35:52,750 --> 00:35:56,530 being built . Yeah , so uh , and there 964 00:35:56,530 --> 00:36:00,370 are other platforms and ways to 965 00:36:00,380 --> 00:36:02,158 uh , to give us the situational 966 00:36:02,158 --> 00:36:04,269 awareness that that we need and we'll 967 00:36:04,269 --> 00:36:06,420 leverage those platforms but we'll 968 00:36:06,420 --> 00:36:08,640 continue to manage uh , you know , the 969 00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:10,807 transition to ensure that we have what 970 00:36:10,807 --> 00:36:12,960 we need to be relevant in the fight 971 00:36:12,970 --> 00:36:15,320 going forward . Are you suggesting that 972 00:36:15,320 --> 00:36:17,640 there is some other platform that's 973 00:36:17,640 --> 00:36:19,650 being considered to replace the 974 00:36:19,650 --> 00:36:21,872 capability of the E three ? There are a 975 00:36:21,872 --> 00:36:23,928 number of platforms that will use to 976 00:36:23,928 --> 00:36:25,928 create the situational awareness or 977 00:36:25,928 --> 00:36:28,150 provide situational awareness that that 978 00:36:28,150 --> 00:36:30,372 you've alluded to , but an aircraft may 979 00:36:30,372 --> 00:36:32,550 not be it a number of capabilities . 980 00:36:33,530 --> 00:36:35,808 Thank you . Like many of my colleagues , 981 00:36:35,808 --> 00:36:38,320 I feel that the defense budget um in 982 00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:41,640 some cases inadequately um addresses 983 00:36:41,640 --> 00:36:43,862 the threats that we're facing today . I 984 00:36:43,862 --> 00:36:45,973 very much appreciate , appreciate the 985 00:36:45,973 --> 00:36:48,084 pay increases for our service members 986 00:36:48,084 --> 00:36:49,862 in the budget , but as has been 987 00:36:49,862 --> 00:36:51,751 mentioned many times over the pay 988 00:36:51,751 --> 00:36:53,807 increase does not actually cover the 989 00:36:53,807 --> 00:36:55,751 current cost of inflation . That's 990 00:36:55,751 --> 00:36:57,862 essentially a pay cut for our service 991 00:36:57,862 --> 00:36:59,862 members and their families with the 992 00:36:59,862 --> 00:37:02,084 recent technological breakthroughs made 993 00:37:02,084 --> 00:37:01,700 by china and the growing military 994 00:37:01,700 --> 00:37:04,170 budget of our foreign adversaries . Um 995 00:37:04,180 --> 00:37:06,291 Do you think the president's budget , 996 00:37:06,291 --> 00:37:08,624 which fails to keep pace with inflation , 997 00:37:08,624 --> 00:37:10,791 is appropriate and adequate to counter 998 00:37:10,791 --> 00:37:12,624 these rising threats ? This is a 999 00:37:12,624 --> 00:37:15,540 significant budget uh and it provides 1000 00:37:15,540 --> 00:37:17,750 us the capability , the ability to go 1001 00:37:17,750 --> 00:37:19,639 after the capabilities we need to 1002 00:37:19,680 --> 00:37:21,790 support our warfighting concepts and 1003 00:37:21,790 --> 00:37:24,250 our strategy overall a significant 1004 00:37:24,250 --> 00:37:28,020 budget . I want to piggyback 1005 00:37:28,030 --> 00:37:30,160 off of representative laureate 1006 00:37:30,170 --> 00:37:33,130 mentioned with the risk assessment um 1007 00:37:33,140 --> 00:37:35,251 and General Milley , if you'd like to 1008 00:37:35,251 --> 00:37:37,251 comment on this piece of this , the 1009 00:37:37,251 --> 00:37:39,196 conversation has really focused on 1010 00:37:39,196 --> 00:37:41,750 military readiness and or um , you know , 1011 00:37:41,750 --> 00:37:44,290 military equipment , how much emphasis 1012 00:37:44,300 --> 00:37:46,810 are we putting on cyber and space ? I 1013 00:37:46,810 --> 00:37:49,032 think that's a piece that in some cases 1014 00:37:49,032 --> 00:37:51,450 maybe being put on the back burner . I 1015 00:37:51,530 --> 00:37:53,730 Remember in the opening testimony , I 1016 00:37:53,730 --> 00:37:55,952 think there's $2 billion dollars that's 1017 00:37:55,952 --> 00:37:58,180 being invested . Um , but but how much 1018 00:37:58,180 --> 00:38:01,020 are we really um focused on ensuring 1019 00:38:01,020 --> 00:38:03,076 that we have the proper capabilities 1020 00:38:03,076 --> 00:38:05,298 from a cyber and space perspective this 1021 00:38:05,298 --> 00:38:08,580 budget is putting in 27 billion , I 1022 00:38:08,580 --> 00:38:12,540 think it is uh into space . Uh that's 1023 00:38:13,330 --> 00:38:15,330 the space specific and then there's 1024 00:38:15,330 --> 00:38:17,441 probably additional monies throughout 1025 00:38:17,441 --> 00:38:19,441 the Air force and Space Command and 1026 00:38:19,441 --> 00:38:21,663 Space Force Beyond that , 27 and then I 1027 00:38:21,663 --> 00:38:23,941 think it's 11 or 12 billion into cyber . 1028 00:38:23,941 --> 00:38:25,997 So I think that's pretty significant 1029 00:38:25,997 --> 00:38:28,163 investments in both of those domains . 1030 00:38:28,720 --> 00:38:30,640 Any any comments ? Uh Secretary 1031 00:38:30,910 --> 00:38:34,470 Chairman's got it exactly right . 27.6 1032 00:38:34,480 --> 00:38:37,990 billion in space In over $11 billion 1033 00:38:37,990 --> 00:38:41,730 two billion for Ai is 1034 00:38:41,740 --> 00:38:45,140 adequate ? I do , I do 1035 00:38:45,620 --> 00:38:49,430 okay , thank you . I yield back Mr 1036 00:38:49,430 --> 00:38:52,980 Panetta is recognized . Thank you madam . 1037 00:38:52,980 --> 00:38:55,147 Chair gentlemen , Good morning , thank 1038 00:38:55,147 --> 00:38:57,369 you for your service . And of course of 1039 00:38:57,369 --> 00:38:59,424 course thank you for being here . Um 1040 00:38:59,424 --> 00:39:01,313 Obviously I think the invasion of 1041 00:39:01,313 --> 00:39:03,424 Ukraine is pretty much I believe it's 1042 00:39:03,424 --> 00:39:05,369 revitalized democracies and as the 1043 00:39:05,369 --> 00:39:07,424 administration and president said it 1044 00:39:07,424 --> 00:39:09,536 strengthened our NATO's resolve . And 1045 00:39:09,536 --> 00:39:11,536 we've seen that basically , and the 1046 00:39:11,536 --> 00:39:13,480 fact that you're seeing other NATO 1047 00:39:13,480 --> 00:39:15,424 countries beefing up their force , 1048 00:39:15,424 --> 00:39:17,424 their forces and that includes what 1049 00:39:17,424 --> 00:39:19,536 we're doing in regards to the defense 1050 00:39:19,536 --> 00:39:22,710 budget that you submitted . Uh the 813 1051 00:39:22,710 --> 00:39:25,410 billion very very large on its face . 1052 00:39:25,420 --> 00:39:27,587 However , when you look at it compared 1053 00:39:27,587 --> 00:39:29,642 to this year's budget , it's just 2% 1054 00:39:29,642 --> 00:39:33,500 more . Uh Also you take 1055 00:39:33,500 --> 00:39:36,390 into account inflation and the 2.5% of 1056 00:39:36,390 --> 00:39:38,223 our budget , which is sort of an 1057 00:39:38,223 --> 00:39:40,334 optimistic number . Some are actually 1058 00:39:40,334 --> 00:39:42,570 saying that it's going to be a real 1059 00:39:42,570 --> 00:39:45,330 terms cut in regards to defense 1060 00:39:45,330 --> 00:39:48,240 spending And that Congress is going to 1061 00:39:48,240 --> 00:39:50,296 have to do what it did this year and 1062 00:39:50,296 --> 00:39:52,940 add probably close to $30 billion . 1063 00:39:53,420 --> 00:39:55,980 Moreover , the budget does not take 1064 00:39:55,980 --> 00:39:58,450 into account what's spent on nukes , 1065 00:39:58,450 --> 00:40:00,570 what's spent on resettling of afghans 1066 00:40:00,570 --> 00:40:04,520 and our help with Ukraine at this point . 1067 00:40:05,410 --> 00:40:07,354 Additionally , the release of this 1068 00:40:07,354 --> 00:40:09,354 budget is before the release of the 1069 00:40:09,354 --> 00:40:11,470 National Security strategy . So just 1070 00:40:11,470 --> 00:40:14,040 quickly um combined with the inflation 1071 00:40:14,040 --> 00:40:16,262 rate one , do you think this is a cut ? 1072 00:40:16,262 --> 00:40:18,318 This is going to be a cut in defense 1073 00:40:18,318 --> 00:40:20,540 spending and to because it doesn't take 1074 00:40:20,540 --> 00:40:22,484 into account the National security 1075 00:40:22,484 --> 00:40:24,651 strategy , will we need to review this 1076 00:40:24,651 --> 00:40:27,270 budget at a later time . Thanks 1077 00:40:27,320 --> 00:40:30,190 Congressman . We we actually built this 1078 00:40:30,190 --> 00:40:32,357 budget based upon our National Defense 1079 00:40:32,357 --> 00:40:34,820 strategy uh in a national defense 1080 00:40:34,820 --> 00:40:36,598 strategy as you know , has been 1081 00:40:36,598 --> 00:40:40,150 released . Uh And uh and again we made 1082 00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:42,850 a significant effort to ensure that 1083 00:40:42,860 --> 00:40:44,916 this budget gave us the capabilities 1084 00:40:44,916 --> 00:40:47,249 that we needed to execute that strategy . 1085 00:40:47,249 --> 00:40:50,440 So um so to answer your question , Yes . 1086 00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:52,190 And I do think again this is a 1087 00:40:52,190 --> 00:40:54,990 substantial budget uh and it gives us 1088 00:40:54,990 --> 00:40:56,657 the ability to go after those 1089 00:40:56,657 --> 00:40:58,823 capabilities understood in regards and 1090 00:40:58,823 --> 00:41:01,250 thank you for that . Uh Mr Secretary , 1091 00:41:01,260 --> 00:41:04,310 in regards to um NATO looking at the 1092 00:41:04,310 --> 00:41:06,970 Diana project , which I'm sure you're 1093 00:41:06,970 --> 00:41:08,914 very aware of which , you know , I 1094 00:41:08,914 --> 00:41:10,692 believe will will reinforce the 1095 00:41:10,692 --> 00:41:13,040 transatlantic cooperation and important 1096 00:41:13,040 --> 00:41:15,096 areas like hypersonic weapons and of 1097 00:41:15,096 --> 00:41:17,570 course space technology . Uh Secretary 1098 00:41:17,570 --> 00:41:19,737 Austin , do you believe that the Diana 1099 00:41:19,737 --> 00:41:21,792 project offers the type of framework 1100 00:41:21,792 --> 00:41:24,790 that we need to improve and refine 1101 00:41:24,800 --> 00:41:26,911 NATO's capabilities to design , build 1102 00:41:26,911 --> 00:41:28,744 and validate our missile defense 1103 00:41:28,744 --> 00:41:31,300 programs . I do . It's one of a number 1104 00:41:31,300 --> 00:41:35,030 of things that that will provide NATO 1105 00:41:35,030 --> 00:41:37,140 the ability to to be forward looking 1106 00:41:37,140 --> 00:41:39,307 and of course , you know , we'll go in 1107 00:41:39,307 --> 00:41:42,420 and NATO will go in and review its 1108 00:41:42,420 --> 00:41:44,420 requirements and and concepts going 1109 00:41:44,420 --> 00:41:47,450 forward . So . But in terms of us the 1110 00:41:47,450 --> 00:41:50,420 United States of America , we routinely 1111 00:41:50,420 --> 00:41:54,240 work with allies and partners to and as 1112 00:41:54,240 --> 00:41:56,910 we develop additional capabilities and 1113 00:41:56,910 --> 00:41:59,970 I appointed to Aucas earlier on uh that 1114 00:41:59,970 --> 00:42:02,192 not only is focused on development of a 1115 00:42:02,192 --> 00:42:04,770 submarine but also working with our 1116 00:42:04,780 --> 00:42:08,610 partner in developing um technologies 1117 00:42:08,610 --> 00:42:11,430 and Ai and and uh and hypersonic and 1118 00:42:11,430 --> 00:42:14,410 other things . Great . And in regards 1119 00:42:14,420 --> 00:42:16,870 obviously you've heard um a number of 1120 00:42:16,870 --> 00:42:18,981 questions in this hearing and another 1121 00:42:18,981 --> 00:42:21,037 hearings or at least I have heard uh 1122 00:42:21,037 --> 00:42:23,092 many of my colleagues talk about the 1123 00:42:23,092 --> 00:42:25,259 deterrence . Do you believe that Diana 1124 00:42:25,259 --> 00:42:27,290 will help our NATO allies as we 1125 00:42:27,300 --> 00:42:29,320 continue to face ? Obviously the 1126 00:42:29,320 --> 00:42:31,320 challenges but fortify a collective 1127 00:42:31,320 --> 00:42:34,600 deterrent . Well what will help us most 1128 00:42:34,610 --> 00:42:36,670 going forward is is our ability to 1129 00:42:36,670 --> 00:42:40,040 remain united uh and uh and committed 1130 00:42:40,040 --> 00:42:43,620 to uh defending excuse me , NATO 1131 00:42:43,620 --> 00:42:45,930 territory . Again , there are a number 1132 00:42:45,930 --> 00:42:47,986 of things that go into this equation 1133 00:42:48,300 --> 00:42:50,467 sharing of information , for example , 1134 00:42:50,467 --> 00:42:52,411 is one of those things which which 1135 00:42:52,411 --> 00:42:55,880 enabled us to create transparency and 1136 00:42:55,880 --> 00:42:59,270 and and and bolster confidence uh , and 1137 00:42:59,280 --> 00:43:01,290 and led to what we're seeing , uh , 1138 00:43:01,300 --> 00:43:04,680 excuse me and NATO right now . And 1139 00:43:04,680 --> 00:43:06,513 that's largely apart . Uh , it's 1140 00:43:06,513 --> 00:43:08,736 largely a measure of what the President 1141 00:43:08,736 --> 00:43:12,280 is . Decision early on to do things to 1142 00:43:12,290 --> 00:43:15,550 help us be able to share insights and 1143 00:43:15,550 --> 00:43:17,550 information with our partners . And 1144 00:43:17,550 --> 00:43:19,760 that transparency has uh , has really 1145 00:43:19,770 --> 00:43:21,992 has really been helpful to us . Great , 1146 00:43:21,992 --> 00:43:24,159 thank you . Mr Secretary . Thank you . 1147 00:43:24,159 --> 00:43:26,381 Gentlemen . Mr Chairman . Mr Chairman , 1148 00:43:26,381 --> 00:43:28,603 are you back ? Thank you . Mr Mclean is 1149 00:43:28,603 --> 00:43:30,937 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 1150 00:43:30,937 --> 00:43:33,159 Mr Chairman and thank you all for being 1151 00:43:33,159 --> 00:43:35,326 here . I really appreciate it . Um , I 1152 00:43:35,326 --> 00:43:37,214 want to follow up on MS . Loria's 1153 00:43:37,214 --> 00:43:40,360 question . Um , when as it pertains to 1154 00:43:40,360 --> 00:43:43,170 risk . When do you think will have the 1155 00:43:43,170 --> 00:43:45,430 risk assessment piece done ? 1156 00:43:47,400 --> 00:43:49,567 Yeah , that's my responsibility to get 1157 00:43:49,567 --> 00:43:51,567 that done . Get it submitted to the 1158 00:43:51,567 --> 00:43:53,733 Secretary and the President . Probably 1159 00:43:53,733 --> 00:43:56,067 my guess is in the next couple of weeks . 1160 00:43:56,067 --> 00:43:58,178 And then okay , if you go through the 1161 00:43:58,178 --> 00:43:57,770 risk that gets submitted to you as well , 1162 00:43:57,770 --> 00:43:59,881 it's not just to the Secretary of the 1163 00:43:59,881 --> 00:44:02,103 President . Thank you . If in that risk 1164 00:44:02,103 --> 00:44:04,700 assessment , we find some glaring risks 1165 00:44:04,700 --> 00:44:07,170 that maybe we didn't foresee at that 1166 00:44:07,170 --> 00:44:09,281 time . I'm assuming we will make some 1167 00:44:09,281 --> 00:44:12,990 changes to the budget . That's part of 1168 00:44:12,990 --> 00:44:16,300 the idea is for to submit it to the 1169 00:44:16,310 --> 00:44:18,477 Secretary and the President and to the 1170 00:44:18,477 --> 00:44:21,590 Congress that if there are errors or 1171 00:44:21,590 --> 00:44:23,701 glare , glaring errors but not errors 1172 00:44:23,701 --> 00:44:25,923 but significant risk because it's , I'm 1173 00:44:25,923 --> 00:44:28,210 trying to wrap my head has to be 1174 00:44:28,210 --> 00:44:30,470 covered by the mitigating factors of 1175 00:44:30,470 --> 00:44:32,692 the budget . I'm trying to wrap my head 1176 00:44:32,692 --> 00:44:34,803 around how we put together a budget , 1177 00:44:34,803 --> 00:44:36,859 but we don't really have a good risk 1178 00:44:36,859 --> 00:44:38,470 assessment . Am I , am I not 1179 00:44:38,470 --> 00:44:40,803 understanding that correctly ? So we do . 1180 00:44:40,990 --> 00:44:43,980 I participate in in in the budget and 1181 00:44:43,990 --> 00:44:46,690 my staff does as well . So there is a 1182 00:44:46,700 --> 00:44:48,756 iterative process of risk assessment 1183 00:44:48,756 --> 00:44:50,922 throughout so we have a general idea . 1184 00:44:50,922 --> 00:44:53,144 Okay , thank you sir . Then I need some 1185 00:44:53,144 --> 00:44:55,256 clarification from both of you on the 1186 00:44:55,256 --> 00:44:57,422 President's budget requests for combat 1187 00:44:57,422 --> 00:44:59,960 vehicles . Can you explain the army's 1188 00:44:59,960 --> 00:45:02,580 rationale for the precipitous drop in 1189 00:45:02,580 --> 00:45:05,690 vehicle procurement , specifically the 1190 00:45:05,700 --> 00:45:09,170 Abrams tank . And what risks are we 1191 00:45:09,170 --> 00:45:12,600 incurring with that drop in 1192 00:45:12,600 --> 00:45:15,540 procurement of the Abrams tanks ? Well , 1193 00:45:15,540 --> 00:45:17,484 first we've got about four or 5000 1194 00:45:17,484 --> 00:45:19,750 tanks in the inventory . So again , 1195 00:45:19,750 --> 00:45:23,010 it's relative to uh , the national 1196 00:45:23,010 --> 00:45:25,110 Defense strategy and and we are 1197 00:45:25,110 --> 00:45:27,900 optimizing the military for a fight 1198 00:45:27,900 --> 00:45:30,011 that will occur sometime if it occurs 1199 00:45:30,011 --> 00:45:32,067 at all . Hopefully never does in the 1200 00:45:32,067 --> 00:45:35,660 twenties thirties . Uh and uh tanks may 1201 00:45:35,660 --> 00:45:38,150 or may not probably not play a very 1202 00:45:38,150 --> 00:45:40,150 significant role in the war against 1203 00:45:40,150 --> 00:45:42,270 china in the twenties thirties . What 1204 00:45:42,270 --> 00:45:44,437 will play a really significant role be 1205 00:45:44,437 --> 00:45:47,230 space and cyber but also air defense 1206 00:45:47,230 --> 00:45:49,610 systems , long range precision fires , 1207 00:45:49,890 --> 00:45:52,001 naval capabilities and air capability 1208 00:45:52,001 --> 00:45:55,550 and a ground war with china . 1209 00:45:57,090 --> 00:45:59,310 The ground will have uh the ground 1210 00:45:59,310 --> 00:46:02,290 forces , Marine and Army will play an 1211 00:46:02,290 --> 00:46:04,780 important role but the dominant role we 1212 00:46:04,780 --> 00:46:07,830 played by the air and maritime forces 1213 00:46:07,840 --> 00:46:09,840 with that then the air force is the 1214 00:46:09,840 --> 00:46:12,340 oldest smallest and least ready in its 1215 00:46:12,340 --> 00:46:14,210 entire history . The Air Force 1216 00:46:14,210 --> 00:46:16,210 leadership has repeatedly explained 1217 00:46:16,210 --> 00:46:18,620 that they need to procure at least 72 1218 00:46:18,620 --> 00:46:22,540 fighter aircraft . Um However in 23 1219 00:46:22,540 --> 00:46:24,651 D . O . D . Budget cuts the Air Force 1220 00:46:24,651 --> 00:46:26,930 new tactical combat aircraft only to 1221 00:46:26,930 --> 00:46:30,780 buy 57 . So with the future being in 1222 00:46:30,780 --> 00:46:32,836 air and space where we really need , 1223 00:46:32,836 --> 00:46:36,630 why are we Not fulfilling the 72 ? Why 1224 00:46:36,630 --> 00:46:40,040 are we only procuring 57 ? If that's 1225 00:46:40,050 --> 00:46:42,890 the future ? I thought it was a minor 1226 00:46:42,890 --> 00:46:45,510 point . That was 61 . But well let's 1227 00:46:45,510 --> 00:46:47,680 even say it's 61 it's still less than 1228 00:46:47,680 --> 00:46:50,060 one unrequested . Right ? Yeah . The 1229 00:46:50,070 --> 00:46:53,680 Air Force opted to want to buy and 1230 00:46:53,680 --> 00:46:55,980 purchase and return that money for to 1231 00:46:55,980 --> 00:46:58,340 build a block for F 35 which is the 1232 00:46:58,340 --> 00:47:00,562 most advanced of the versions . Right ? 1233 00:47:00,562 --> 00:47:03,250 So the ones that are being chosen not 1234 00:47:03,250 --> 00:47:06,720 to buy uh Those are blocked threes . So 1235 00:47:07,020 --> 00:47:09,800 we we want to get the most advanced 1236 00:47:10,180 --> 00:47:12,560 versions of these aircraft . The F 35 1237 00:47:12,560 --> 00:47:14,504 is gonna be the quarterback of the 1238 00:47:14,504 --> 00:47:16,338 joint force in a fight uh In the 1239 00:47:16,338 --> 00:47:18,171 Western pacific that aircraft is 1240 00:47:18,171 --> 00:47:20,116 critical . We want the most modern 1241 00:47:20,116 --> 00:47:22,116 capabilities and that's what that's 1242 00:47:22,116 --> 00:47:24,227 what we're purchasing . So we're just 1243 00:47:24,227 --> 00:47:23,810 we're taking the same money . Were just 1244 00:47:23,810 --> 00:47:25,754 referring it to a different that's 1245 00:47:25,900 --> 00:47:27,956 that's the idea behind what CQ Brown 1246 00:47:27,956 --> 00:47:30,580 and Secretary of the Air Force has 1247 00:47:30,580 --> 00:47:33,100 decided to . And just an overall 1248 00:47:33,100 --> 00:47:36,210 question last minute is 1249 00:47:37,180 --> 00:47:39,930 It appears with inflation being , you 1250 00:47:39,930 --> 00:47:42,152 know , 8% in our budget being less than 1251 00:47:42,152 --> 00:47:44,152 inflation . You know , we we've all 1252 00:47:44,152 --> 00:47:46,263 talked about it and we're not keeping 1253 00:47:46,263 --> 00:47:48,319 up with inflation . One of the risks 1254 00:47:48,319 --> 00:47:50,486 that I'm assuming that we're assessing 1255 00:47:50,486 --> 00:47:53,290 is the risks on how we look to our 1256 00:47:53,300 --> 00:47:57,030 adversaries and our allies in terms 1257 00:47:57,040 --> 00:48:00,290 of our our budget 1258 00:48:01,070 --> 00:48:04,020 weakness . And I say that is if I look 1259 00:48:04,030 --> 00:48:06,197 at china for example , which is one of 1260 00:48:06,197 --> 00:48:08,520 our major adversaries , right ? They 1261 00:48:08,520 --> 00:48:11,040 are spending maybe even overspending . 1262 00:48:11,050 --> 00:48:14,550 Some could argue we are cutting back . 1263 00:48:14,560 --> 00:48:16,782 What message do you think that sends to 1264 00:48:16,782 --> 00:48:20,220 our allies and adversaries , sir ? Yeah . 1265 00:48:20,230 --> 00:48:22,250 So I don't I don't think we are . I 1266 00:48:22,260 --> 00:48:24,204 don't think we're cutting back . I 1267 00:48:24,204 --> 00:48:26,260 think this is a substantial budget . 1268 00:48:26,260 --> 00:48:26,170 703 quarters of a trillion dollars . A 1269 00:48:26,170 --> 00:48:28,392 lot of money . The chinese are spending 1270 00:48:28,392 --> 00:48:32,280 about 500,000,000,560 billion or so on 1271 00:48:32,280 --> 00:48:34,447 their announced budget . If you factor 1272 00:48:34,447 --> 00:48:36,890 in things like the ladies time has 1273 00:48:36,890 --> 00:48:39,700 expired . Mr horse fruit is recognized 1274 00:48:39,700 --> 00:48:41,867 for five minutes . Thank you so much . 1275 00:48:41,867 --> 00:48:43,700 Mr Chairman and thank you to our 1276 00:48:43,700 --> 00:48:45,867 witnesses . Uh Secretary Austin . It's 1277 00:48:45,867 --> 00:48:47,867 my understanding that the Air force 1278 00:48:47,867 --> 00:48:49,644 intends to submit a legislative 1279 00:48:49,644 --> 00:48:51,811 proposal this year requesting expanded 1280 00:48:51,811 --> 00:48:53,990 usage of the Nevada test and training 1281 00:48:53,990 --> 00:48:56,390 range located in my district . This new 1282 00:48:56,390 --> 00:48:58,446 proposal would come amid the ongoing 1283 00:48:58,446 --> 00:49:00,470 effort by the navy to reach an 1284 00:49:00,470 --> 00:49:02,303 accessible compromise with local 1285 00:49:02,303 --> 00:49:04,750 stakeholders regarding modernization of 1286 00:49:04,750 --> 00:49:08,390 the falun range training complex . I 1287 00:49:08,390 --> 00:49:10,612 am deeply concerned and I want to bring 1288 00:49:10,612 --> 00:49:12,501 to your attention that the Nevada 1289 00:49:12,501 --> 00:49:15,290 delegation has still not been consulted 1290 00:49:15,290 --> 00:49:17,401 on the Nevada test and training range 1291 00:49:17,401 --> 00:49:19,530 proposal or been given details 1292 00:49:19,530 --> 00:49:22,030 regarding the Air Force's plan . So my 1293 00:49:22,030 --> 00:49:24,420 question is , when will the Air Force 1294 00:49:24,430 --> 00:49:26,486 share their proposal with the Nevada 1295 00:49:26,486 --> 00:49:28,630 delegation in our constituents ? And 1296 00:49:28,630 --> 00:49:30,630 can you commit to ensuring that the 1297 00:49:30,630 --> 00:49:32,960 department works collaboratively with 1298 00:49:32,960 --> 00:49:35,090 our delegation as well as our local 1299 00:49:35,090 --> 00:49:38,190 state and tribal leaders to develop an 1300 00:49:38,190 --> 00:49:41,760 accessible proposal for joint use in 1301 00:49:41,760 --> 00:49:44,870 the Nevada test and training range on 1302 00:49:44,870 --> 00:49:47,250 the the first part of the question in 1303 00:49:47,250 --> 00:49:50,500 terms of when they intend to share , um 1304 00:49:50,870 --> 00:49:52,981 I'll take that for the record and get 1305 00:49:52,981 --> 00:49:55,259 back to you on what what their plan is . 1306 00:49:55,259 --> 00:49:58,950 And yes , we you know , you have my 1307 00:49:58,950 --> 00:50:00,894 commitment to make sure that we're 1308 00:50:00,894 --> 00:50:03,061 transparent and and what we're doing . 1309 00:50:03,061 --> 00:50:04,950 Thank you sir , I look forward to 1310 00:50:04,950 --> 00:50:07,006 working with you . I'd like to shift 1311 00:50:07,006 --> 00:50:09,172 now to the small community of remotely 1312 00:50:09,172 --> 00:50:11,339 piloted aircraft crews shouldering the 1313 00:50:11,339 --> 00:50:13,450 burden of over the horizon operations 1314 00:50:13,450 --> 00:50:15,672 in the Middle East and around the world 1315 00:50:15,672 --> 00:50:17,894 as the Air Force works to identify ways 1316 00:50:17,894 --> 00:50:20,061 to improve quality of life for our P a 1317 00:50:20,061 --> 00:50:22,006 cruise . I want to ensure that the 1318 00:50:22,006 --> 00:50:24,172 department is leveraging all available 1319 00:50:24,172 --> 00:50:26,280 tools already at at its disposal . 1320 00:50:26,560 --> 00:50:28,560 Secretary Austin has the department 1321 00:50:28,560 --> 00:50:31,030 considered expanding the combat zone 1322 00:50:31,040 --> 00:50:34,210 tax exclusion to RP A cruise flying in 1323 00:50:34,210 --> 00:50:36,780 support of named combat operations , 1324 00:50:37,160 --> 00:50:39,330 giving their direct participation in 1325 00:50:39,330 --> 00:50:41,490 these operations . Would you support 1326 00:50:41,500 --> 00:50:45,170 this expansion ? Well , in terms of 1327 00:50:45,170 --> 00:50:47,370 expanding the combat zone , that's a 1328 00:50:47,380 --> 00:50:49,720 that's a thing that's , you know , it's 1329 00:50:49,720 --> 00:50:51,498 relevant to the area that we're 1330 00:50:51,498 --> 00:50:53,664 actually fighting in and that's that's 1331 00:50:53,664 --> 00:50:55,720 physical space on the ground . As to 1332 00:50:55,720 --> 00:50:59,600 whether or not we we provide credit 1333 00:50:59,610 --> 00:51:02,210 to the troops that are engaged in 1334 00:51:02,210 --> 00:51:04,543 activities . There is a different issue . 1335 00:51:04,543 --> 00:51:06,710 I know it's one that the Air Force has 1336 00:51:06,710 --> 00:51:09,580 taken up before . I certainly support 1337 00:51:11,060 --> 00:51:13,680 rewarding and awarding those those uh 1338 00:51:13,690 --> 00:51:16,730 airmen soldiers , sailors that had that 1339 00:51:16,740 --> 00:51:20,210 have participated in meaningful ways . 1340 00:51:20,220 --> 00:51:23,020 Appropriately . Thank you . General 1341 00:51:23,020 --> 00:51:25,131 Milley , given the unique burdens and 1342 00:51:25,131 --> 00:51:27,242 stressors faced by our P . A cruise , 1343 00:51:27,242 --> 00:51:29,131 would you commit to exploring the 1344 00:51:29,131 --> 00:51:31,380 expansion of this program ? The Special 1345 00:51:31,380 --> 00:51:33,650 Operations Command's preservation of 1346 00:51:33,650 --> 00:51:36,210 the force and family program to include 1347 00:51:36,210 --> 00:51:38,560 ArpA crews , flying and support of 1348 00:51:38,560 --> 00:51:41,250 combat operations ? I'll absolutely 1349 00:51:41,250 --> 00:51:43,083 take a look at that . Along with 1350 00:51:43,083 --> 00:51:45,028 Secretary Absolutely . Thank you . 1351 00:51:45,460 --> 00:51:47,600 Changing subjects In recent months . 1352 00:51:47,600 --> 00:51:50,260 We've seen a concerning rise in attacks 1353 00:51:50,270 --> 00:51:53,330 on LGBT rights and statehouses across 1354 00:51:53,330 --> 00:51:55,720 the country . These include efforts to 1355 00:51:55,720 --> 00:51:58,130 deny life saving medical care to our 1356 00:51:58,130 --> 00:52:00,186 most vulnerable youth and a range of 1357 00:52:00,186 --> 00:52:02,880 other potentially deadly policies ? 1358 00:52:03,150 --> 00:52:05,206 Secretary Austin . What steps is the 1359 00:52:05,206 --> 00:52:07,640 department taking to shield active duty 1360 00:52:07,640 --> 00:52:09,696 service members and their dependants 1361 00:52:09,800 --> 00:52:12,090 from these hateful attacks and our 1362 00:52:12,090 --> 00:52:14,490 state laws denying or restricting 1363 00:52:14,500 --> 00:52:17,060 gender . Affirming care considered 1364 00:52:17,060 --> 00:52:19,180 during the PCS process for service 1365 00:52:19,180 --> 00:52:21,750 members with impacted dependence . 1366 00:52:23,250 --> 00:52:25,417 Yeah , they're so there there are some 1367 00:52:25,417 --> 00:52:29,100 there is some litigation ongoing with 1368 00:52:29,100 --> 00:52:31,770 respect to a couple of states here and 1369 00:52:31,770 --> 00:52:35,040 and and and this particular issue and 1370 00:52:35,040 --> 00:52:37,040 so I won't comment on that . What I 1371 00:52:37,040 --> 00:52:39,096 will say is that and you've heard me 1372 00:52:39,096 --> 00:52:41,580 say this and demonstrate this before 1373 00:52:41,590 --> 00:52:45,360 that all of our troops are important to 1374 00:52:45,360 --> 00:52:47,670 us there at the top of my priority in 1375 00:52:47,670 --> 00:52:49,726 terms of their health and well being 1376 00:52:49,726 --> 00:52:51,892 and and we want to provide opportunity 1377 00:52:51,892 --> 00:52:54,620 for everybody who's qualified to serve 1378 00:52:54,630 --> 00:52:57,180 in our military and and everything that 1379 00:52:57,180 --> 00:52:59,600 we've done . Uh you know up to this 1380 00:52:59,600 --> 00:53:01,990 point reflects that we'll continue to 1381 00:53:01,990 --> 00:53:04,480 do everything within our power to take 1382 00:53:04,480 --> 00:53:07,430 care of our of our population . So just 1383 00:53:07,430 --> 00:53:09,541 related to that in my final moments , 1384 00:53:09,541 --> 00:53:12,190 it's my understanding that in 2021 D . 1385 00:53:12,190 --> 00:53:14,680 O . D . Issued only about 4000 1386 00:53:14,680 --> 00:53:17,470 prescriptions for prep . Uh despite the 1387 00:53:17,470 --> 00:53:20,580 fact that HIV HIV infection rate among 1388 00:53:20,590 --> 00:53:23,000 active duty service members has nearly 1389 00:53:23,000 --> 00:53:25,222 doubled . So what steps has the D . O . 1390 00:53:25,222 --> 00:53:28,060 D . Taken to improve access to prep 1391 00:53:28,790 --> 00:53:32,720 two ? Our service members . Yeah , 1392 00:53:32,720 --> 00:53:36,640 I can't answer that question . Uh but 1393 00:53:36,640 --> 00:53:38,640 but I will take it for the record . 1394 00:53:38,640 --> 00:53:40,751 I'll get back to you on on what we're 1395 00:53:40,751 --> 00:53:42,862 doing or not doing in N . D . O . D . 1396 00:53:42,862 --> 00:53:44,918 Thank you . Thank you so much . Time 1397 00:53:44,918 --> 00:53:47,029 has expired . Mr Wilson is recognized 1398 00:53:47,029 --> 00:53:48,807 for five minutes . Thank you Mr 1399 00:53:48,807 --> 00:53:48,790 Chairman and thank you for being here 1400 00:53:48,790 --> 00:53:52,690 today as a 31 year army veteran myself . 1401 00:53:52,700 --> 00:53:54,890 As a grateful father of four service 1402 00:53:54,890 --> 00:53:57,112 members who have served in Iraq , Egypt 1403 00:53:57,112 --> 00:53:59,334 and Afghanistan . I want you to succeed 1404 00:53:59,750 --> 00:54:02,780 And that's why I'm concerned . Uh , as 1405 00:54:02,780 --> 00:54:04,947 Sean Hannity has pointed out that uh , 1406 00:54:04,947 --> 00:54:07,280 correctly identified that we're in day 1407 00:54:07,290 --> 00:54:10,940 234 since the murder of 13 1408 00:54:10,950 --> 00:54:13,230 Americans service members in 1409 00:54:13,230 --> 00:54:16,110 Afghanistan as we left American 1410 00:54:16,120 --> 00:54:19,920 personnel uh , Americans behind . I 1411 00:54:19,920 --> 00:54:23,500 hope that you both can by 1412 00:54:23,500 --> 00:54:26,710 immediately providing help to Ukraine 1413 00:54:26,720 --> 00:54:29,920 now the most advanced military 1414 00:54:29,920 --> 00:54:32,087 equipment for a victory for the people 1415 00:54:32,087 --> 00:54:34,170 of Ukraine . We need to show our 1416 00:54:34,170 --> 00:54:37,190 resolve and show our success uh for the 1417 00:54:37,190 --> 00:54:39,246 very brave people of Ukraine who are 1418 00:54:39,246 --> 00:54:42,640 just uh remarkably pushing back against 1419 00:54:42,650 --> 00:54:45,470 Putin with that in mind . General 1420 00:54:45,470 --> 00:54:47,192 Austin . The front page of the 1421 00:54:47,192 --> 00:54:50,350 Washington post Provided on February 28 . 1422 00:54:50,360 --> 00:54:53,780 It's uh , speaks for itself that uh 1423 00:54:53,790 --> 00:54:56,830 Putin is threatening uh , he's a war 1424 00:54:56,830 --> 00:54:58,886 criminal . I believe the families of 1425 00:54:58,886 --> 00:55:00,886 America and our allies with nuclear 1426 00:55:00,886 --> 00:55:03,430 weapons modernization of our strategic 1427 00:55:03,430 --> 00:55:05,380 nuclear stockpiles should be a top 1428 00:55:05,380 --> 00:55:07,610 priority moving forward . We cannot 1429 00:55:07,610 --> 00:55:10,130 expect to deter Putin when the nuclear 1430 00:55:10,130 --> 00:55:12,019 capabilities are lagging behind . 1431 00:55:12,019 --> 00:55:14,360 There's Putin's recent invasion of 1432 00:55:14,360 --> 00:55:16,360 Ukraine , which included threats of 1433 00:55:16,360 --> 00:55:18,470 first strike nuclear attack toward 1434 00:55:18,470 --> 00:55:20,359 America and our allies , elevated 1435 00:55:20,359 --> 00:55:21,970 nuclear modernization on the 1436 00:55:21,970 --> 00:55:24,026 department's priority list . Can you 1437 00:55:24,026 --> 00:55:26,248 explain the importance of modernization 1438 00:55:26,248 --> 00:55:28,970 for deterrence ? Thanks . Uh sorry , 1439 00:55:28,970 --> 00:55:31,260 it's it's absolutely critical , as 1440 00:55:31,260 --> 00:55:33,427 you've heard me say before , the triad 1441 00:55:33,427 --> 00:55:35,690 has served us well over the years . And 1442 00:55:35,690 --> 00:55:37,468 my goal is to make sure that it 1443 00:55:37,468 --> 00:55:39,468 continues to do so . And that's why 1444 00:55:39,468 --> 00:55:41,740 we've invested 30 for over $34 billion 1445 00:55:41,740 --> 00:55:43,640 in this budget uh towards the 1446 00:55:43,640 --> 00:55:45,529 modernization of our triumphs and 1447 00:55:45,529 --> 00:55:47,751 indeed what you're saying peace through 1448 00:55:47,751 --> 00:55:50,550 strength works uh and uh and also 1449 00:55:50,550 --> 00:55:54,060 general in May 2018 N . N . S . A . 1450 00:55:54,340 --> 00:55:56,450 Announced that it would pursue a new 1451 00:55:56,450 --> 00:55:58,720 approach . The plutonium pit production 1452 00:55:58,720 --> 00:56:00,720 split between the facilities at Los 1453 00:56:00,720 --> 00:56:02,776 Alamos and the Savannah River site . 1454 00:56:03,630 --> 00:56:06,410 The war criminal Putin has the ability 1455 00:56:06,410 --> 00:56:08,540 to produce plutonium pits . Yet the 1456 00:56:08,540 --> 00:56:10,207 United States currently lacks 1457 00:56:10,207 --> 00:56:12,207 disability . Does the Department of 1458 00:56:12,207 --> 00:56:14,207 Defense continue to support the two 1459 00:56:14,207 --> 00:56:16,262 sides solution for the plutonium pit 1460 00:56:16,262 --> 00:56:18,484 production ? How can we recently expect 1461 00:56:18,484 --> 00:56:20,262 that this vital program will be 1462 00:56:20,262 --> 00:56:21,929 adequately supported when the 1463 00:56:21,929 --> 00:56:23,984 department's budget request does not 1464 00:56:23,984 --> 00:56:25,984 even exceed the rate of inflation ? 1465 00:56:26,730 --> 00:56:28,674 Well , I can assure you that we're 1466 00:56:28,674 --> 00:56:30,970 gonna we're gonna make sure that that 1467 00:56:30,970 --> 00:56:33,380 we have the capability that we require 1468 00:56:33,380 --> 00:56:36,560 to make sure that our our triad remains 1469 00:56:36,560 --> 00:56:38,940 functional and safe . And so this is a 1470 00:56:38,940 --> 00:56:41,051 thing that will continue to invest in 1471 00:56:41,051 --> 00:56:45,050 but will maintain the capability to to 1472 00:56:45,050 --> 00:56:47,106 do what needs to be done and the two 1473 00:56:47,106 --> 00:56:49,440 sites solution to with the capabilities 1474 00:56:49,440 --> 00:56:51,770 of Los Alamos in Savannah River that 1475 00:56:51,780 --> 00:56:53,947 that's critical that it be two sites . 1476 00:56:54,130 --> 00:56:56,550 Well , it's what's critical is that we 1477 00:56:56,550 --> 00:56:58,717 maintain the capability that that that 1478 00:56:58,717 --> 00:57:00,717 we need . And again , as we look at 1479 00:57:00,717 --> 00:57:02,939 things going forward , You know , we'll 1480 00:57:02,939 --> 00:57:05,161 make , we'll make the right decisions . 1481 00:57:05,161 --> 00:57:07,328 But my my commitment to you is that we 1482 00:57:07,328 --> 00:57:09,439 will , we will make sure that we have 1483 00:57:09,439 --> 00:57:11,217 the right capability , adequate 1484 00:57:11,217 --> 00:57:13,328 capability to be successful . And the 1485 00:57:13,328 --> 00:57:15,383 American people need to know many of 1486 00:57:15,383 --> 00:57:17,661 the pits that we have are 60 years old . 1487 00:57:17,661 --> 00:57:19,717 And so this is something that's just 1488 00:57:19,717 --> 00:57:21,606 got to be done in the two sides . 1489 00:57:21,606 --> 00:57:21,210 Solution wouldn't really work to the 1490 00:57:21,210 --> 00:57:23,450 benefit of the American people . Uh and 1491 00:57:23,450 --> 00:57:25,561 the final question general gruesomely 1492 00:57:25,561 --> 00:57:27,728 are treasured ally India , the world's 1493 00:57:27,728 --> 00:57:30,690 largest democracy is choosing to align 1494 00:57:30,690 --> 00:57:33,650 itself with the Kremlin by choosing 1495 00:57:33,650 --> 00:57:35,761 Russian weapons systems over american 1496 00:57:35,761 --> 00:57:38,130 and allied options . What weapons 1497 00:57:38,130 --> 00:57:40,500 platforms could we offer through the 1498 00:57:40,500 --> 00:57:42,740 foreign military sales program that 1499 00:57:42,740 --> 00:57:44,573 would incentivize Russian indian 1500 00:57:44,573 --> 00:57:47,500 leaders to eject Putin in a line with 1501 00:57:47,510 --> 00:57:51,380 its natural allies of democracy . Well , 1502 00:57:51,380 --> 00:57:53,436 as you know , we we have the finance 1503 00:57:53,436 --> 00:57:55,491 weapons systems in the world and the 1504 00:57:55,491 --> 00:57:57,547 most advanced weapons systems in the 1505 00:57:57,547 --> 00:57:57,460 world . And so we have a range of 1506 00:57:57,460 --> 00:58:01,030 capabilities that that we can provide 1507 00:58:01,420 --> 00:58:05,090 uh , offer . We continue to work with 1508 00:58:05,100 --> 00:58:07,990 with them to ensure that they 1509 00:58:07,990 --> 00:58:10,190 understand that uh , you know , it's 1510 00:58:10,190 --> 00:58:12,357 not in their best we believe that it's 1511 00:58:12,357 --> 00:58:14,523 not in their best interest to continue 1512 00:58:14,523 --> 00:58:16,579 to invest in Russian equipment . And 1513 00:58:16,579 --> 00:58:18,960 and our requirement going forward is 1514 00:58:18,960 --> 00:58:22,740 that , you know , they they downscale 1515 00:58:22,750 --> 00:58:25,180 um the types of equipment that they're 1516 00:58:25,180 --> 00:58:28,250 investing in uh and uh and look to 1517 00:58:28,250 --> 00:58:30,870 invest more in the types of things that 1518 00:58:30,870 --> 00:58:33,240 will make us continue to be compatible . 1519 00:58:33,620 --> 00:58:35,787 Well , I look forward to continuing to 1520 00:58:35,787 --> 00:58:38,009 work with the great people of India and 1521 00:58:38,009 --> 00:58:40,009 what a great ally they can be if we 1522 00:58:40,009 --> 00:58:42,120 eliminate some of the restrictions on 1523 00:58:42,120 --> 00:58:44,064 sales . Thank you . I yield back . 1524 00:58:44,220 --> 00:58:46,442 Thank you . MS Jacobs is recognized for 1525 00:58:46,442 --> 00:58:48,550 five minutes . Well , thank you . Mr 1526 00:58:48,550 --> 00:58:50,606 Chair and thank you secretary Austin 1527 00:58:50,606 --> 00:58:52,661 and General Milley for coming to the 1528 00:58:52,661 --> 00:58:54,550 committee to talk about the FY 23 1529 00:58:54,550 --> 00:58:56,661 budget request . Uh You know , I know 1530 00:58:56,661 --> 00:58:58,606 there's been a lot of conversation 1531 00:58:58,606 --> 00:59:00,772 about the budget and whether it's what 1532 00:59:00,772 --> 00:59:02,828 we need in my initial assessment , I 1533 00:59:02,828 --> 00:59:04,661 believe this budget is more than 1534 00:59:04,661 --> 00:59:06,828 adequate and I look forward to working 1535 00:59:06,828 --> 00:59:08,828 with you on what an adequate budget 1536 00:59:08,828 --> 00:59:10,883 looks like moving forward . So , you 1537 00:59:10,883 --> 00:59:13,050 know , we've talked a lot about what , 1538 00:59:13,050 --> 00:59:15,272 how much money we're spending and , you 1539 00:59:15,272 --> 00:59:14,260 know , I want to talk a little bit 1540 00:59:14,260 --> 00:59:16,427 about what we're spending money on . I 1541 00:59:16,427 --> 00:59:18,482 think it's clear that so many of our 1542 00:59:18,482 --> 00:59:20,427 doctrines and our policies and our 1543 00:59:20,427 --> 00:59:22,316 weapons systems were designed for 1544 00:59:22,316 --> 00:59:24,538 threats and challenges that happened in 1545 00:59:24,538 --> 00:59:26,760 the past , but not necessarily the ones 1546 00:59:26,760 --> 00:59:28,704 that we're facing now and into the 1547 00:59:28,704 --> 00:59:30,927 future . And so , you know , I actually 1548 00:59:30,927 --> 00:59:32,982 think the current war in Ukraine has 1549 00:59:32,982 --> 00:59:35,093 shown the utility of low cost weapons 1550 00:59:35,093 --> 00:59:37,204 over large expensive legacy systems . 1551 00:59:37,204 --> 00:59:39,316 And so Secretary Austin , what do you 1552 00:59:39,316 --> 00:59:41,482 think the main lessons are for the U . 1553 00:59:41,482 --> 00:59:43,704 S . And how successful Ukraine has been 1554 00:59:43,704 --> 00:59:45,871 in fighting back a Russian force . And 1555 00:59:45,871 --> 00:59:45,730 how do you think that should impact the 1556 00:59:45,730 --> 00:59:47,897 way D . O . D . Does business ? I know 1557 00:59:47,897 --> 00:59:50,008 Chairman smith touched on this in its 1558 00:59:50,008 --> 00:59:52,063 opening , but I really want to drill 1559 00:59:52,063 --> 00:59:54,119 down on if in light of Ukraine , you 1560 00:59:54,119 --> 00:59:56,286 think the department should focus more 1561 00:59:56,286 --> 00:59:56,160 on low cost weapons and less on new 1562 00:59:56,160 --> 00:59:58,104 expensive and often overly complex 1563 00:59:58,104 --> 00:59:59,993 platforms that are often not even 1564 00:59:59,993 --> 01:00:02,104 survivable in high end environments . 1565 01:00:03,810 --> 01:00:05,810 You know , many of the weapons that 1566 01:00:05,810 --> 01:00:08,180 have been effective , you know , are 1567 01:00:08,180 --> 01:00:11,100 not necessarily low cost , but but we 1568 01:00:11,100 --> 01:00:12,989 have been able to provide them in 1569 01:00:12,989 --> 01:00:14,767 sufficient quantities to make a 1570 01:00:14,767 --> 01:00:16,933 significant significant difference . A 1571 01:00:16,933 --> 01:00:18,933 lot of credit goes to the Ukrainian 1572 01:00:18,933 --> 01:00:21,400 people for you know , their their will 1573 01:00:21,400 --> 01:00:24,220 to fight , their determination and 1574 01:00:24,240 --> 01:00:26,880 their willingness to sacrifice . But 1575 01:00:26,880 --> 01:00:29,650 given all of that , you know , they had 1576 01:00:29,650 --> 01:00:32,030 when the time came , uh you know , the 1577 01:00:32,030 --> 01:00:34,252 elements , the right kinds of equipment 1578 01:00:34,252 --> 01:00:36,474 to be able to make a difference on that 1579 01:00:36,474 --> 01:00:38,920 battlefield . Uh , and and we've been 1580 01:00:38,920 --> 01:00:42,030 pouring it in on a daily basis and 1581 01:00:42,030 --> 01:00:44,660 increasing the not only the quantity 1582 01:00:44,660 --> 01:00:47,030 but the quality of capability that 1583 01:00:47,030 --> 01:00:49,690 we've been providing . So there are 1584 01:00:49,690 --> 01:00:51,857 some lessons to be learned in terms of 1585 01:00:51,857 --> 01:00:54,420 commitment leadership , uh tactics , 1586 01:00:54,420 --> 01:00:56,642 techniques and procedures , logistics , 1587 01:00:56,642 --> 01:00:58,698 uh integration of different types of 1588 01:00:58,698 --> 01:01:00,642 platforms , you know , a number of 1589 01:01:00,642 --> 01:01:02,698 lessons across the board , but a key 1590 01:01:02,698 --> 01:01:05,320 lesson is that , you know , if you pay 1591 01:01:05,320 --> 01:01:07,376 attention to the right things and do 1592 01:01:07,376 --> 01:01:09,487 the right things armed with the right 1593 01:01:09,487 --> 01:01:11,653 equipment , you know , a smaller force 1594 01:01:11,653 --> 01:01:13,876 can be very , very effective and that's 1595 01:01:13,876 --> 01:01:16,030 what we're seeing today . So . 1596 01:01:17,710 --> 01:01:20,490 Well , thank you . And um I do think 1597 01:01:20,490 --> 01:01:22,546 they're low cost relative to some of 1598 01:01:22,546 --> 01:01:24,601 the high end alternatives that we're 1599 01:01:24,601 --> 01:01:26,601 talking about here today . Uh and I 1600 01:01:26,601 --> 01:01:28,768 think it shows some of the real limits 1601 01:01:28,768 --> 01:01:30,601 of the high end systems that for 1602 01:01:30,601 --> 01:01:32,768 instance Russia had . So I'm moving on 1603 01:01:32,768 --> 01:01:34,934 to the next topic . Secretary Austin , 1604 01:01:34,934 --> 01:01:36,990 I and many other members of Congress 1605 01:01:36,990 --> 01:01:39,046 are looking forward to reviewing the 1606 01:01:39,046 --> 01:01:41,268 report on civilian casualties . And I'm 1607 01:01:41,268 --> 01:01:43,323 very appreciative That you've called 1608 01:01:43,323 --> 01:01:45,379 for a thorough review and have taken 1609 01:01:45,379 --> 01:01:47,434 this very seriously . Um so just two 1610 01:01:47,434 --> 01:01:49,657 quick requests related to that review . 1611 01:01:49,657 --> 01:01:51,879 First , a few of my colleagues sent you 1612 01:01:51,879 --> 01:01:53,712 a letter specifically focused on 1613 01:01:53,712 --> 01:01:55,823 questions related to the strike first 1614 01:01:55,823 --> 01:01:55,140 reported by the New York Times , which 1615 01:01:55,140 --> 01:01:58,630 took place in Baku Syria in 2019 . Can 1616 01:01:58,630 --> 01:02:00,574 you commit to us today that we can 1617 01:02:00,574 --> 01:02:02,908 expect a prompt response to that letter ? 1618 01:02:02,908 --> 01:02:05,074 Given the seriousness of the questions 1619 01:02:05,074 --> 01:02:07,019 raised by public reporting ? Yes , 1620 01:02:07,019 --> 01:02:09,640 thank you very much . And Secondly , 1621 01:02:09,650 --> 01:02:12,330 General Mackenzie a few weeks ago um 1622 01:02:12,340 --> 01:02:15,560 mentioned a list of 10 concrete steps 1623 01:02:15,560 --> 01:02:17,670 centcom has taken to reduce civilian 1624 01:02:17,670 --> 01:02:19,670 casualties . General Mackenzie 1625 01:02:19,670 --> 01:02:21,781 personally promised me at the hearing 1626 01:02:21,781 --> 01:02:23,892 that he'd be transmitting that report 1627 01:02:23,892 --> 01:02:25,837 to my team shortly but we have not 1628 01:02:25,837 --> 01:02:25,830 received it . So can you please assist 1629 01:02:25,830 --> 01:02:28,100 in urging centcom to promptly provide 1630 01:02:28,100 --> 01:02:30,980 that list to the committee ? Okay . I 1631 01:02:30,980 --> 01:02:33,147 certainly would like to see it as well 1632 01:02:33,147 --> 01:02:35,590 but I I certainly will do that well . 1633 01:02:35,590 --> 01:02:37,534 Thank you . And finally , based on 1634 01:02:37,534 --> 01:02:39,534 information from Ngos and the media 1635 01:02:39,534 --> 01:02:41,534 such as the new york Times civilian 1636 01:02:41,534 --> 01:02:43,701 casualty files is D . O . D . Planning 1637 01:02:43,701 --> 01:02:45,590 to revisit cases that were likely 1638 01:02:45,590 --> 01:02:47,646 prematurely dismissed as a result of 1639 01:02:47,646 --> 01:02:50,800 faulty initial assessments . At this 1640 01:02:50,800 --> 01:02:53,460 point , we don't have an intent to to 1641 01:02:53,460 --> 01:02:57,240 re litigate cases or that from before 1642 01:02:57,250 --> 01:03:00,910 over . Okay . Well I I think that it's 1643 01:03:00,910 --> 01:03:03,077 important that you do so since we know 1644 01:03:03,077 --> 01:03:05,021 in so many of these instances that 1645 01:03:05,021 --> 01:03:07,450 we've seen some really horrific cases 1646 01:03:07,450 --> 01:03:09,490 that the initial assessment was 1647 01:03:09,500 --> 01:03:11,750 declined . Uh and so we were never able 1648 01:03:11,750 --> 01:03:14,580 to get more information on that . Um 1649 01:03:14,590 --> 01:03:16,590 and with that Mr Chairman , I yield 1650 01:03:16,590 --> 01:03:18,368 back . Thank you . Mr Fallon is 1651 01:03:18,368 --> 01:03:20,850 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 1652 01:03:20,850 --> 01:03:22,961 Mr Chair . Thank you . General Milley 1653 01:03:22,961 --> 01:03:25,183 Secretary Austin Mr . Record , you know 1654 01:03:25,183 --> 01:03:28,200 inflation is at 8% . And The 1655 01:03:28,200 --> 01:03:30,830 president's proposed budget , $18,813 1656 01:03:30,830 --> 01:03:33,320 billion 4% increase year over years . 1657 01:03:33,320 --> 01:03:35,042 Which means in real dollars in 1658 01:03:35,042 --> 01:03:36,931 purchasing power of course it's a 1659 01:03:36,931 --> 01:03:39,264 reduction may be as much as $30 billion . 1660 01:03:39,264 --> 01:03:41,376 And then a world ruled you know where 1661 01:03:41,376 --> 01:03:43,431 the Taliban is ruling in Afghanistan 1662 01:03:43,431 --> 01:03:45,376 after humility and withdrawal were 1663 01:03:45,376 --> 01:03:47,431 witness to the largest land invasion 1664 01:03:47,431 --> 01:03:47,430 we've seen in europe since World War 1665 01:03:47,430 --> 01:03:49,319 two and the saber rattling of the 1666 01:03:49,319 --> 01:03:51,650 communist chinese over the last 1667 01:03:51,650 --> 01:03:53,872 particularly the last year , Where they 1668 01:03:53,872 --> 01:03:55,983 increase their defense spending by 7% 1669 01:03:55,983 --> 01:03:58,420 and are also using ever more increasing 1670 01:03:58,420 --> 01:04:00,531 and aggressive rhetoric when it comes 1671 01:04:00,531 --> 01:04:02,587 to as they see it . They're renegade 1672 01:04:02,587 --> 01:04:04,642 province of Taiwan . And given these 1673 01:04:04,642 --> 01:04:06,830 and a host of other threats that we're 1674 01:04:06,830 --> 01:04:09,280 facing in this real world , Uh to 1675 01:04:09,280 --> 01:04:11,391 embark on a path to reduce the number 1676 01:04:11,391 --> 01:04:13,558 of operational ships in our Navy by 24 1677 01:04:13,558 --> 01:04:15,669 vessels over the next five years . To 1678 01:04:15,669 --> 01:04:17,613 reduce our active duty army to the 1679 01:04:17,613 --> 01:04:19,669 smallest size since World War II and 1680 01:04:19,669 --> 01:04:21,891 overall to reduce our active duty force 1681 01:04:21,891 --> 01:04:24,169 by about a point percentage and a half . 1682 01:04:24,169 --> 01:04:23,940 I just don't think that's the right 1683 01:04:23,940 --> 01:04:25,884 path . And it's concerning to me . 1684 01:04:26,090 --> 01:04:28,340 Secretary Austin at the beginning of 1685 01:04:28,340 --> 01:04:30,396 November last year , ranking members 1686 01:04:30,396 --> 01:04:32,600 Rogers and Turner lead a letter that 1687 01:04:32,600 --> 01:04:34,680 myself and a total of 15 members of 1688 01:04:34,680 --> 01:04:36,569 this committee . Sign , it's this 1689 01:04:36,569 --> 01:04:38,791 letter right here . We signed on urging 1690 01:04:38,791 --> 01:04:40,902 the president and your administration 1691 01:04:40,902 --> 01:04:42,870 to do two things considering the 1692 01:04:42,870 --> 01:04:44,926 massing that we saw of troops in the 1693 01:04:44,926 --> 01:04:47,320 open source reporting of the sizeable 1694 01:04:47,540 --> 01:04:49,429 Russian presence on the Ukrainian 1695 01:04:49,429 --> 01:04:51,596 border and their equipment and I think 1696 01:04:51,596 --> 01:04:53,540 every any level headed fair minded 1697 01:04:53,540 --> 01:04:55,373 observer would have seen that if 1698 01:04:55,373 --> 01:04:57,373 innovation wasn't imminent , it was 1699 01:04:57,373 --> 01:04:59,707 highly likely . We asked for two things . 1700 01:04:59,707 --> 01:05:01,707 One to send a significant amount of 1701 01:05:01,707 --> 01:05:03,818 lethal aid to the Ukraine immediately 1702 01:05:04,190 --> 01:05:07,100 and to to deploy a military presence in 1703 01:05:07,100 --> 01:05:09,100 the Black Sea . So take Secretary 1704 01:05:09,100 --> 01:05:11,850 Austin . Um What was the total dollar 1705 01:05:11,850 --> 01:05:14,550 amount of new lethal aid ? That was 1706 01:05:14,560 --> 01:05:16,060 because I know we sent the 1707 01:05:16,060 --> 01:05:18,116 administration sent 60 , I think $60 1708 01:05:18,116 --> 01:05:20,860 million September of last year . What 1709 01:05:20,860 --> 01:05:23,120 was the total of new lethal aid that 1710 01:05:23,120 --> 01:05:25,287 was sent to the Ukraine in november of 1711 01:05:25,287 --> 01:05:27,287 last year ? Well I'll just tell you 1712 01:05:27,287 --> 01:05:29,287 that over , you know , prior to the 1713 01:05:29,287 --> 01:05:31,398 invasion , the total amount over time 1714 01:05:31,398 --> 01:05:33,287 that we provided to Ukraine was a 1715 01:05:33,287 --> 01:05:35,176 billion dollars . And what is the 1716 01:05:35,176 --> 01:05:37,342 invasion ? We've also provided another 1717 01:05:37,342 --> 01:05:39,509 billion dollars . Do you don't know in 1718 01:05:39,509 --> 01:05:41,564 november of what that number was ? I 1719 01:05:41,564 --> 01:05:43,676 don't know how it , how it breaks out 1720 01:05:43,676 --> 01:05:45,676 in in november versus any other any 1721 01:05:45,676 --> 01:05:47,676 other month . Because my concern is 1722 01:05:47,676 --> 01:05:49,898 that uh , that letter wasn't heated and 1723 01:05:49,898 --> 01:05:49,800 we dragged our feet and exclusively for 1724 01:05:49,800 --> 01:05:53,070 no reason . Uh Secretary , what is 1725 01:05:53,070 --> 01:05:55,380 the total number of ships we currently 1726 01:05:55,380 --> 01:05:59,340 have in the Black Sea current 1727 01:05:59,340 --> 01:06:01,562 U . S . Ships in the Black Sea . Okay . 1728 01:06:01,562 --> 01:06:03,562 Because we historically have kept a 1729 01:06:03,562 --> 01:06:05,562 presence in the Black Sea , is that 1730 01:06:05,562 --> 01:06:07,590 correct ? Fair to say ? We have , I 1731 01:06:07,590 --> 01:06:09,757 mean the presence has ebbed and flowed 1732 01:06:09,757 --> 01:06:11,701 over time but there has not been a 1733 01:06:11,701 --> 01:06:13,812 permanent presence in the Black Sea , 1734 01:06:13,812 --> 01:06:15,950 but in 2021 is it true that we had 12 1735 01:06:15,950 --> 01:06:18,117 ships in the Black Sea for a total and 1736 01:06:18,117 --> 01:06:20,283 aggregate of 100 and 82 days . We were 1737 01:06:20,283 --> 01:06:22,006 rotating in and out on various 1738 01:06:22,006 --> 01:06:24,283 exercises working with partner nations . 1739 01:06:24,283 --> 01:06:26,506 Yes . So my , my concern is simply that 1740 01:06:26,506 --> 01:06:28,672 we see this mass build up , you know , 1741 01:06:28,672 --> 01:06:31,020 the Russians and we had a presence in 1742 01:06:31,020 --> 01:06:32,964 the Black Sea . And now we have no 1743 01:06:32,964 --> 01:06:35,187 presence at all . And it's almost as if 1744 01:06:35,187 --> 01:06:37,298 we're cutting tail and running rather 1745 01:06:37,298 --> 01:06:37,240 than trying to deter a very evil man 1746 01:06:37,250 --> 01:06:39,370 and the actions that he's taken and , 1747 01:06:39,370 --> 01:06:41,426 you know , our worst nightmares from 1748 01:06:41,426 --> 01:06:43,648 last november have , you know , come to 1749 01:06:43,648 --> 01:06:47,200 come to pass , please cocktail and 1750 01:06:47,200 --> 01:06:50,260 running things as you would expect . I 1751 01:06:50,260 --> 01:06:52,371 don't think your microphone , I don't 1752 01:06:52,371 --> 01:06:54,093 think your microphone is on Mr 1753 01:06:54,093 --> 01:06:56,093 Secretary , you know , it's hard to 1754 01:06:56,093 --> 01:06:58,149 Yeah , if I could just Well , that's 1755 01:06:58,149 --> 01:07:00,482 what critics would say . I'm not saying , 1756 01:07:00,482 --> 01:07:02,538 you know , because we , I think in a 1757 01:07:02,538 --> 01:07:04,760 large measure , we're allowing Putin to 1758 01:07:04,760 --> 01:07:06,816 deter us and not deter him . So , so 1759 01:07:06,816 --> 01:07:06,620 what , what you've seen , you know , I 1760 01:07:06,620 --> 01:07:09,690 want in , you know , the day after he 1761 01:07:09,690 --> 01:07:12,020 invaded , you know , we had forces 1762 01:07:12,020 --> 01:07:15,010 flowing to the Baltics states to the 1763 01:07:15,010 --> 01:07:17,360 eastern flank , you know , within 24 1764 01:07:17,360 --> 01:07:20,680 hours to reassure and deter . We had 1765 01:07:20,680 --> 01:07:23,380 aircraft , flying police in policing 1766 01:07:23,390 --> 01:07:25,840 missions in , uh , in Romania and 1767 01:07:25,840 --> 01:07:29,540 Poland Right away within 24 hours . And 1768 01:07:29,540 --> 01:07:33,210 so Putin In his , his best 1769 01:07:33,210 --> 01:07:35,432 estimate was , was that it was going to 1770 01:07:35,432 --> 01:07:37,543 take months for NATO to uh , to react 1771 01:07:37,543 --> 01:07:39,377 or respond to move forces to the 1772 01:07:39,377 --> 01:07:41,266 Eastern Flank , but we were there 1773 01:07:41,266 --> 01:07:44,160 within within you know , 24 hours . So 1774 01:07:44,170 --> 01:07:46,003 that's far from cutting tail and 1775 01:07:46,003 --> 01:07:48,050 running . And not to mention the 1776 01:07:48,050 --> 01:07:50,106 incredible capabilities that we have 1777 01:07:50,106 --> 01:07:52,700 been providing to the Ukrainians who 1778 01:07:53,380 --> 01:07:56,540 have taken it that that assistance that 1779 01:07:56,540 --> 01:07:58,651 we provided along with our allies and 1780 01:07:58,651 --> 01:08:00,707 partners and used it to get effect . 1781 01:08:00,707 --> 01:08:02,818 And and and Secretary I just with the 1782 01:08:02,818 --> 01:08:05,040 little time I have remaining so we have 1783 01:08:05,040 --> 01:08:07,318 no presence right now in the Black Sea . 1784 01:08:07,318 --> 01:08:09,373 That's the bottom line though . Um I 1785 01:08:09,373 --> 01:08:11,540 went on a code l just recently and one 1786 01:08:11,540 --> 01:08:13,707 of the I found it interesting that the 1787 01:08:13,707 --> 01:08:15,873 Romanian Prime Minister said that when 1788 01:08:15,873 --> 01:08:18,040 I asked him should we keep a our bases 1789 01:08:18,040 --> 01:08:20,151 in eastern europe permanent , he said 1790 01:08:20,151 --> 01:08:22,262 he didn't think we had any choice . I 1791 01:08:22,262 --> 01:08:21,730 wanted you to comment on that if you 1792 01:08:21,730 --> 01:08:23,900 could , Gentleman's time has expired . 1793 01:08:23,910 --> 01:08:27,700 So we've got one more question . I I 1794 01:08:27,700 --> 01:08:29,700 have some questions . I want to get 1795 01:08:29,700 --> 01:08:31,867 before we get done here and then we're 1796 01:08:31,867 --> 01:08:31,570 done . Mr moulton is gonna be the last 1797 01:08:31,570 --> 01:08:33,459 question . So we'll be done short 1798 01:08:33,459 --> 01:08:35,459 shortly after two . So if anybody's 1799 01:08:35,459 --> 01:08:37,459 looking around out there , um We're 1800 01:08:37,459 --> 01:08:39,348 done after Mr moulton . I want to 1801 01:08:39,348 --> 01:08:41,403 follow up on the sub launched cruise 1802 01:08:41,403 --> 01:08:43,459 missile because we're probably gonna 1803 01:08:43,459 --> 01:08:45,292 have an argument over this and I 1804 01:08:45,292 --> 01:08:47,459 understand that you know , the general 1805 01:08:47,459 --> 01:08:50,230 position is more is better . But I 1806 01:08:50,230 --> 01:08:52,480 don't Mr Courtney needs some I think 1807 01:08:52,490 --> 01:08:54,657 pretty well thought out comments about 1808 01:08:54,657 --> 01:08:56,980 the impact of turning our attack 1809 01:08:56,980 --> 01:08:59,280 submarines into nuclear launch 1810 01:08:59,290 --> 01:09:01,512 submarines and how that would undermine 1811 01:09:01,512 --> 01:09:03,623 other other missions would complicate 1812 01:09:03,623 --> 01:09:06,220 the ability to get in there um for them 1813 01:09:06,220 --> 01:09:08,387 to do what they're they're designed to 1814 01:09:08,387 --> 01:09:10,553 do . It also potentially has an impact 1815 01:09:10,553 --> 01:09:12,442 on the Aucas deal because the the 1816 01:09:12,442 --> 01:09:14,442 Australians are pretty clear on the 1817 01:09:14,442 --> 01:09:16,498 fact they don't want to be launching 1818 01:09:16,498 --> 01:09:18,664 nuclear weapons off of the submarine . 1819 01:09:18,664 --> 01:09:20,887 So , and we are building the long range 1820 01:09:20,887 --> 01:09:23,300 standoff weapon um granted that's up in 1821 01:09:23,300 --> 01:09:25,633 the air , not underground under the sea , 1822 01:09:25,633 --> 01:09:27,356 um , but it has a very similar 1823 01:09:27,356 --> 01:09:30,180 capability . So other than just , well , 1824 01:09:30,180 --> 01:09:32,180 what the hell ? We may as well have 1825 01:09:32,180 --> 01:09:34,520 more um , how do we overcome those 1826 01:09:34,520 --> 01:09:36,742 concerns about the impact it would have 1827 01:09:36,742 --> 01:09:38,576 and what the attacks submissions 1828 01:09:38,576 --> 01:09:40,687 already are in the wisdom of building 1829 01:09:40,687 --> 01:09:42,798 this missile And general miller , you 1830 01:09:42,798 --> 01:09:44,853 sort of state your position that you 1831 01:09:44,853 --> 01:09:47,980 want the missile . So how do those 1832 01:09:47,980 --> 01:09:51,810 arguments not undermine that ? There's 1833 01:09:51,820 --> 01:09:55,040 uh , Was there a 1834 01:09:55,040 --> 01:09:58,100 5050 some odd attack subs in the system 1835 01:09:58,110 --> 01:10:00,054 that's what we're talking about is 1836 01:10:00,054 --> 01:10:02,000 building or developing a piece of 1837 01:10:02,000 --> 01:10:05,480 munition and and uh , ammo granted its 1838 01:10:05,480 --> 01:10:08,860 nuclear . But uh so the the weapon 1839 01:10:08,860 --> 01:10:11,980 itself wouldn't be necessarily on each 1840 01:10:11,990 --> 01:10:14,430 of those subs . So some of those subs a 1841 01:10:14,430 --> 01:10:16,440 small percentage may have a mission 1842 01:10:16,440 --> 01:10:18,950 change ? Uh , the others would not . So 1843 01:10:18,950 --> 01:10:20,783 I think it's a fair comment from 1844 01:10:20,783 --> 01:10:23,410 Congressman Court about it . But I I 1845 01:10:23,410 --> 01:10:26,290 don't I don't buy that is in terms of 1846 01:10:26,660 --> 01:10:28,327 uh the overall , I think that 1847 01:10:28,327 --> 01:10:30,549 presenting the president this President 1848 01:10:30,549 --> 01:10:32,716 of future President with options , But 1849 01:10:32,716 --> 01:10:34,771 it's also a moot point . I'm here to 1850 01:10:34,771 --> 01:10:36,771 defend the President's budget . The 1851 01:10:36,771 --> 01:10:36,500 President's already made a decision . I 1852 01:10:36,500 --> 01:10:39,150 mean , this is not actually a moot 1853 01:10:39,150 --> 01:10:41,390 point . Well , I mean , we're still 1854 01:10:41,390 --> 01:10:43,557 going to fight about it up here . So , 1855 01:10:43,557 --> 01:10:45,779 Okay , so that's why I'm trying to make 1856 01:10:45,779 --> 01:10:45,620 sure we have the argument . But but 1857 01:10:45,620 --> 01:10:47,787 look at , I support the NPR , which is 1858 01:10:47,787 --> 01:10:50,710 part of the NDS and um , and we have a 1859 01:10:50,710 --> 01:10:54,570 lot of nuclear capability . So no foe 1860 01:10:54,580 --> 01:10:56,136 of the United States should 1861 01:10:56,136 --> 01:10:58,810 underestimate our capability because of 1862 01:10:58,810 --> 01:11:01,960 a slick amend a decision to to produce 1863 01:11:01,960 --> 01:11:04,170 or not produce a slick amend Our 1864 01:11:04,170 --> 01:11:06,059 nuclear capability is much , much 1865 01:11:06,059 --> 01:11:08,337 bigger than that . It is . As you know , 1866 01:11:08,337 --> 01:11:10,630 a triad and the amount of throw weight 1867 01:11:10,630 --> 01:11:12,810 we have the money yield we have in all 1868 01:11:12,810 --> 01:11:14,977 kinds of different weapons systems and 1869 01:11:14,977 --> 01:11:17,088 nuclear weapons systems is enormous . 1870 01:11:17,088 --> 01:11:18,977 And so no adversary of the United 1871 01:11:18,977 --> 01:11:20,754 States should underestimate our 1872 01:11:20,754 --> 01:11:22,977 capability . Will is a different matter 1873 01:11:22,977 --> 01:11:24,699 whether you use it or not is a 1874 01:11:24,699 --> 01:11:24,650 different matter , those political 1875 01:11:24,650 --> 01:11:26,820 decisions . But our capability , our 1876 01:11:26,820 --> 01:11:28,820 nuclear capability is significant . 1877 01:11:28,820 --> 01:11:31,160 It's assured , it's capable and in this 1878 01:11:31,160 --> 01:11:33,104 budget and a future budget or past 1879 01:11:33,104 --> 01:11:34,827 budgets . We are continuing to 1880 01:11:34,827 --> 01:11:36,750 recapitalize that system . So I 1881 01:11:36,750 --> 01:11:38,694 wouldn't get overly hung up on the 1882 01:11:38,694 --> 01:11:40,528 slick of men because our nuclear 1883 01:11:40,528 --> 01:11:42,583 capability writ large . The triad is 1884 01:11:42,583 --> 01:11:44,750 very capable uh , to defend the United 1885 01:11:44,750 --> 01:11:46,972 States . And that's good . I will point 1886 01:11:46,972 --> 01:11:49,194 out that you can tell there are members 1887 01:11:49,194 --> 01:11:49,170 of this committee who will get overly 1888 01:11:49,170 --> 01:11:51,392 hung up on it . Um , so we're trying to 1889 01:11:51,392 --> 01:11:53,614 work through that and make sure we have 1890 01:11:53,614 --> 01:11:55,892 the arguments clear and in front of us . 1891 01:11:55,892 --> 01:11:58,130 And I , you know , I'm not a submarine 1892 01:11:58,140 --> 01:11:59,751 person by any stretch of the 1893 01:11:59,751 --> 01:12:01,418 imagination . But from what I 1894 01:12:01,418 --> 01:12:03,473 understand , if you're talking about 1895 01:12:03,473 --> 01:12:05,807 handling nuclear weapons on a submarine , 1896 01:12:05,807 --> 01:12:08,000 that is an entirely different thing in 1897 01:12:08,000 --> 01:12:10,333 terms of how you have to train the crew , 1898 01:12:10,333 --> 01:12:12,278 prepare the crew . And even if the 1899 01:12:12,278 --> 01:12:14,000 nuclear weapons aren't on that 1900 01:12:14,000 --> 01:12:16,167 particular submarine , that would have 1901 01:12:16,167 --> 01:12:18,222 to be certified moment . And my only 1902 01:12:18,222 --> 01:12:20,222 point is I'd like all presidents to 1903 01:12:20,222 --> 01:12:22,167 have as many options as possible . 1904 01:12:22,167 --> 01:12:24,333 That's all fair enough . Mr moulton is 1905 01:12:24,333 --> 01:12:26,667 recognized for five minutes . Thank you . 1906 01:12:26,667 --> 01:12:25,460 Mr Chairman , Gentlemen . Thank you 1907 01:12:25,460 --> 01:12:27,682 very much for your continued service of 1908 01:12:27,682 --> 01:12:29,904 the country and your stamina . You have 1909 01:12:29,904 --> 01:12:32,260 the weight on your shoulders of 1910 01:12:32,750 --> 01:12:34,750 protecting freedom around the globe 1911 01:12:34,750 --> 01:12:36,694 while avoiding a nuclear war every 1912 01:12:36,694 --> 01:12:38,750 single day . And that's not a weight 1913 01:12:38,750 --> 01:12:40,972 that many would be able to bear . I was 1914 01:12:40,972 --> 01:12:43,139 quite critical of the administration's 1915 01:12:43,139 --> 01:12:44,917 handling of the withdrawal from 1916 01:12:44,917 --> 01:12:47,083 Afghanistan . But I have to tell you , 1917 01:12:47,083 --> 01:12:49,083 I think that the last two months of 1918 01:12:49,083 --> 01:12:48,880 Putin's war in Ukraine , you've handled 1919 01:12:48,880 --> 01:12:51,047 brilliantly and so I want to sincerely 1920 01:12:51,047 --> 01:12:53,213 thank you for your leadership . That's 1921 01:12:53,213 --> 01:12:55,380 been so critical to our priorities and 1922 01:12:55,380 --> 01:12:57,658 to the success of the Ukrainian people . 1923 01:12:57,658 --> 01:12:59,602 So thank you . The only consistent 1924 01:12:59,602 --> 01:13:01,324 criticism that I've heard in a 1925 01:13:01,324 --> 01:13:03,491 bipartisan way on the on the effort in 1926 01:13:03,491 --> 01:13:05,491 Ukraine is just simply the speed at 1927 01:13:05,491 --> 01:13:07,491 which things are moving . Um you've 1928 01:13:07,491 --> 01:13:09,491 done all the right things . Um some 1929 01:13:09,491 --> 01:13:11,491 people have said it could move more 1930 01:13:11,491 --> 01:13:13,658 quickly and I think that reflects just 1931 01:13:13,658 --> 01:13:15,880 a broader concern I have with with this 1932 01:13:15,880 --> 01:13:15,350 budget that we're transforming the 1933 01:13:15,350 --> 01:13:17,183 force we're modernizing , you're 1934 01:13:17,183 --> 01:13:18,961 investing a lot in research and 1935 01:13:18,961 --> 01:13:21,072 development . My question is , are we 1936 01:13:21,072 --> 01:13:23,239 moving quickly enough . So I just have 1937 01:13:23,239 --> 01:13:25,183 a couple of questions on that . Mr 1938 01:13:25,183 --> 01:13:27,350 Secretary , you you've testified about 1939 01:13:27,350 --> 01:13:29,517 the various innovation efforts and the 1940 01:13:29,517 --> 01:13:31,850 and the duties investment in technology , 1941 01:13:31,850 --> 01:13:33,961 but Defense Innovation University , D 1942 01:13:33,961 --> 01:13:36,017 IU which has leveraged 25 billion in 1943 01:13:36,017 --> 01:13:37,961 private r and d introduced 100 new 1944 01:13:37,961 --> 01:13:40,017 suppliers to D O D from 37 states um 1945 01:13:40,017 --> 01:13:43,030 has been cut in its budget for fy 22 2 . 1946 01:13:43,040 --> 01:13:46,590 Why is that ? And is that a wise move 1947 01:13:46,590 --> 01:13:48,701 for the future ? I think they've been 1948 01:13:48,701 --> 01:13:51,950 incredibly successful . Well , we as we 1949 01:13:51,950 --> 01:13:54,240 look across the landscape , we want to 1950 01:13:54,240 --> 01:13:56,129 make sure that , you know , we're 1951 01:13:56,129 --> 01:13:58,240 putting out dollars where we're going 1952 01:13:58,240 --> 01:14:00,240 to get a good return . And d IU has 1953 01:14:00,240 --> 01:14:02,407 done amazing work for us over time and 1954 01:14:02,407 --> 01:14:04,573 and uh we want to make sure that we're 1955 01:14:04,573 --> 01:14:07,510 also using other means to encourage 1956 01:14:07,520 --> 01:14:10,170 initiative and bring new new 1957 01:14:10,170 --> 01:14:13,250 capabilities on board and and and get 1958 01:14:13,250 --> 01:14:15,810 the input of of entrepreneurs and small 1959 01:14:15,810 --> 01:14:17,921 companies and that sort of business . 1960 01:14:17,921 --> 01:14:20,650 But uh d Iu is important to us . It 1961 01:14:20,650 --> 01:14:22,539 will remain important to us . And 1962 01:14:22,539 --> 01:14:24,706 that's not a signal that we're phasing 1963 01:14:24,706 --> 01:14:26,820 D IU out if that's what you know , Mr 1964 01:14:26,820 --> 01:14:28,910 Secretary , I it's hard for me , 1965 01:14:28,920 --> 01:14:30,809 especially as the co chair of the 1966 01:14:30,809 --> 01:14:33,031 Future Defense Task Force from a couple 1967 01:14:33,031 --> 01:14:34,976 of years ago to imagine you're not 1968 01:14:34,976 --> 01:14:37,031 increasing the budget for D IU given 1969 01:14:37,031 --> 01:14:39,142 their returns . Uh So I'd really like 1970 01:14:39,142 --> 01:14:41,309 to I'd like to have a more detailed uh 1971 01:14:41,309 --> 01:14:43,642 uh answer for the record please on that . 1972 01:14:43,642 --> 01:14:45,864 And if there's an opportunity for us to 1973 01:14:45,864 --> 01:14:45,700 increase the budget , that's something 1974 01:14:45,700 --> 01:14:48,420 we'd like to do . Um In china gentlemen 1975 01:14:48,420 --> 01:14:51,210 we've seen heavy divestment from the 1976 01:14:51,220 --> 01:14:53,331 traditional land army . It was a good 1977 01:14:53,331 --> 01:14:55,650 thing for us that China wasted a lot of 1978 01:14:55,650 --> 01:14:57,706 time and effort on their million man 1979 01:14:57,706 --> 01:14:59,983 army because it was not very effective . 1980 01:14:59,983 --> 01:15:02,150 They've been pretty dramatic in taking 1981 01:15:02,150 --> 01:15:04,206 money out of that , downsizing their 1982 01:15:04,206 --> 01:15:05,983 force and putting it into other 1983 01:15:05,983 --> 01:15:08,050 capabilities as you think about the 1984 01:15:08,060 --> 01:15:10,116 overall structure of D . O . D . And 1985 01:15:10,116 --> 01:15:14,030 the balance among the services . Are 1986 01:15:14,030 --> 01:15:16,500 you adapting that balance to meet the 1987 01:15:16,500 --> 01:15:19,120 threats from china and Russia or does 1988 01:15:19,120 --> 01:15:21,310 each service within your budget 1989 01:15:21,310 --> 01:15:23,421 essentially still get the same amount 1990 01:15:23,421 --> 01:15:27,240 of money . I I can assure 1991 01:15:27,240 --> 01:15:29,530 you that each service does not and 1992 01:15:29,540 --> 01:15:33,320 that's always a an issue of the great 1993 01:15:33,320 --> 01:15:35,740 debate but we're really going after the 1994 01:15:35,740 --> 01:15:37,720 capabilities that we need that are 1995 01:15:37,720 --> 01:15:40,350 relevant to this fight , that we could 1996 01:15:40,350 --> 01:15:42,780 have in the future . And so you've seen 1997 01:15:42,780 --> 01:15:45,002 significant investment and naval forces 1998 01:15:45,002 --> 01:15:46,891 and also air forces , if you look 1999 01:15:46,891 --> 01:15:48,891 across the fit up , that that trend 2000 01:15:48,891 --> 01:15:52,610 continues . But it's not a , excuse me , 2001 01:15:52,610 --> 01:15:54,666 it's not a cookie cutter approach by 2002 01:15:54,666 --> 01:15:56,721 any stretch of the imagination . The 2003 01:15:56,721 --> 01:15:58,888 secretary on the , on the same theme . 2004 01:15:58,888 --> 01:16:00,888 Can you just , um , I know that the 2005 01:16:00,888 --> 01:16:00,600 chairman asked this question at the 2006 01:16:00,600 --> 01:16:02,767 beginning of the hearing , but can you 2007 01:16:02,767 --> 01:16:05,120 give me two specific lessons that we 2008 01:16:05,120 --> 01:16:07,530 have learned from Ukraine and explain 2009 01:16:07,530 --> 01:16:09,560 how those lessons are reflected in 2010 01:16:09,560 --> 01:16:12,910 changes in this budget ? So , you know , 2011 01:16:12,920 --> 01:16:14,976 are you changing the amount of money 2012 01:16:14,976 --> 01:16:17,031 that we're investing in artillery or 2013 01:16:17,031 --> 01:16:19,087 armor or in drones or something like 2014 01:16:19,087 --> 01:16:21,253 that , given the lessons we've seen on 2015 01:16:21,253 --> 01:16:23,420 the ground in the last several weeks , 2016 01:16:23,420 --> 01:16:25,587 uh , the lesson and again , it's still 2017 01:16:25,587 --> 01:16:27,531 early and this is a month into the 2018 01:16:27,531 --> 01:16:29,698 fight . And there will be lessons that 2019 01:16:29,698 --> 01:16:32,030 that we take away from this . Um , but 2020 01:16:32,030 --> 01:16:33,860 in terms of how it impacts our 2021 01:16:33,860 --> 01:16:36,260 structure in our war fighting 2022 01:16:36,270 --> 01:16:40,050 capabilities , we we don't 2023 01:16:40,730 --> 01:16:42,674 there are no changes that we would 2024 01:16:42,674 --> 01:16:44,730 desire to make at this point again ? 2025 01:16:44,730 --> 01:16:46,730 Well , we'll see how this plays out 2026 01:16:46,730 --> 01:16:48,897 over time . Mr . Chairman mask you the 2027 01:16:48,897 --> 01:16:50,952 same question . Do you think that we 2028 01:16:50,952 --> 01:16:50,790 should be making changes in our budget 2029 01:16:50,790 --> 01:16:53,510 based on what we're seeing in Ukraine ? 2030 01:16:53,520 --> 01:16:55,550 I might add the conflict Azerbaijan 2031 01:16:55,550 --> 01:16:57,772 gave us a lot of lessons along the same 2032 01:16:57,772 --> 01:17:01,250 lines . I'd say two things not 2033 01:17:01,250 --> 01:17:03,361 necessary changes to the budget , but 2034 01:17:03,361 --> 01:17:05,528 one is the fundamental significance of 2035 01:17:05,528 --> 01:17:07,750 air defense systems in order to uh deny 2036 01:17:07,750 --> 01:17:09,950 an opponent the ability to achieve air 2037 01:17:09,950 --> 01:17:12,117 superiority of supremacy . That's been 2038 01:17:12,117 --> 01:17:14,283 done by the Ukrainians . And it's been 2039 01:17:14,283 --> 01:17:16,339 done with a huge amount of help from 2040 01:17:16,339 --> 01:17:16,170 the United States , with Stingers 2041 01:17:16,170 --> 01:17:18,410 etcetera , but also because of our 2042 01:17:18,410 --> 01:17:20,577 intelligence feeds . So the second big 2043 01:17:20,577 --> 01:17:23,300 lesson there is intelligence . Uh we 2044 01:17:23,300 --> 01:17:25,530 have and I'm not going to go in an open 2045 01:17:25,530 --> 01:17:27,586 hearing about the intelligence we've 2046 01:17:27,586 --> 01:17:29,863 collected , how we did it and all that . 2047 01:17:29,863 --> 01:17:33,460 But this war has arguably been 2048 01:17:33,930 --> 01:17:37,130 uh the the most successful intelligence 2049 01:17:37,130 --> 01:17:39,770 operation in military history . Uh and 2050 01:17:39,770 --> 01:17:41,826 it's really tremendous . And someday 2051 01:17:41,826 --> 01:17:43,937 that story will be told , I guess the 2052 01:17:43,937 --> 01:17:46,590 third thing is the is to reinforce uh 2053 01:17:46,600 --> 01:17:48,767 the United States doctoral methodology 2054 01:17:48,767 --> 01:17:50,840 of mission command power down 2055 01:17:50,850 --> 01:17:52,906 decentralized decision making to the 2056 01:17:52,906 --> 01:17:55,310 lowest level possible . The Ukrainians 2057 01:17:55,310 --> 01:17:57,532 have been trained on that over the last 2058 01:17:57,532 --> 01:17:59,850 uh six years , actually longer than 2059 01:17:59,850 --> 01:18:03,640 that has expired . Good 2060 01:18:03,640 --> 01:18:05,751 answer . And this good place place to 2061 01:18:05,751 --> 01:18:08,120 close , I think because in the 2062 01:18:08,120 --> 01:18:10,398 President's budget as president budget , 2063 01:18:10,398 --> 01:18:12,398 the President's budget , but it's a 2064 01:18:12,398 --> 01:18:14,564 starting point . Not an ending point . 2065 01:18:14,564 --> 01:18:16,620 Um So a lot of the things that we've 2066 01:18:16,620 --> 01:18:18,564 talked about here and as we try to 2067 01:18:18,564 --> 01:18:20,453 react to the lessons learned from 2068 01:18:20,453 --> 01:18:22,620 Ukraine um conflict . You know , we we 2069 01:18:22,620 --> 01:18:24,842 have a number of months here to to work 2070 01:18:24,842 --> 01:18:26,509 our will legislatively and in 2071 01:18:26,509 --> 01:18:28,453 cooperation with the Department of 2072 01:18:28,453 --> 01:18:30,676 Defense and the president did to get to 2073 01:18:30,676 --> 01:18:32,842 the right answer on this , but I think 2074 01:18:32,842 --> 01:18:34,953 what mr moulton and a number of other 2075 01:18:34,953 --> 01:18:37,064 people are talking about is is really 2076 01:18:37,064 --> 01:18:36,820 important . Modernizing the force . 2077 01:18:36,830 --> 01:18:39,052 We've talked about it for a long time . 2078 01:18:39,052 --> 01:18:41,060 How do we , you know , B . G . Put 2079 01:18:41,060 --> 01:18:42,838 ourselves in a position to take 2080 01:18:42,838 --> 01:18:45,004 advantage of innovation more quickly ? 2081 01:18:45,004 --> 01:18:47,060 Um and recognize how the battlefield 2082 01:18:47,060 --> 01:18:49,338 has changed within the pentagon budget . 2083 01:18:49,338 --> 01:18:51,338 As you know , it's a big process um 2084 01:18:51,338 --> 01:18:50,740 sort of like painting the golden gate 2085 01:18:50,740 --> 01:18:52,740 bridge , it's constant , you know , 2086 01:18:52,740 --> 01:18:54,684 budget introduced requirements get 2087 01:18:54,684 --> 01:18:56,907 locked in , you know , and Pentagon has 2088 01:18:56,907 --> 01:18:58,970 built a system around the five year 2089 01:18:58,970 --> 01:19:00,581 plan . You know , one of our 2090 01:19:00,581 --> 01:19:02,637 frustrations on D . I . U . S . D IU 2091 01:19:02,637 --> 01:19:05,420 does great research on ideas um and if 2092 01:19:05,420 --> 01:19:07,500 they find something that works then 2093 01:19:07,500 --> 01:19:09,611 they gotta wait two years before they 2094 01:19:09,611 --> 01:19:11,722 can buy it in many instances . I know 2095 01:19:11,722 --> 01:19:14,056 there is some fungible money to do that . 2096 01:19:14,056 --> 01:19:15,944 Um but the length and the process 2097 01:19:15,944 --> 01:19:18,110 involved undermines our ability to 2098 01:19:18,120 --> 01:19:20,810 rapidly react . Um in terms of 2099 01:19:20,810 --> 01:19:23,032 procurement acquisition , in terms of , 2100 01:19:23,032 --> 01:19:24,699 you know , how we're going to 2101 01:19:24,699 --> 01:19:26,810 prioritize things . We are working to 2102 01:19:26,810 --> 01:19:28,977 try to help you speed that up . Um and 2103 01:19:28,977 --> 01:19:31,199 that will be a lot of what we do in the 2104 01:19:31,199 --> 01:19:30,750 next process . Of course , single most 2105 01:19:30,750 --> 01:19:32,861 important things that we can get this 2106 01:19:32,861 --> 01:19:34,861 done by October one . Um that would 2107 01:19:34,861 --> 01:19:37,070 help you as well . Um gentlemen , you 2108 01:19:37,070 --> 01:19:39,126 have anything to say for the for the 2109 01:19:39,126 --> 01:19:41,348 good of the order . Um I will allow you 2110 01:19:41,920 --> 01:19:43,920 closing comments if you have them . 2111 01:19:45,520 --> 01:19:48,050 My only closing comment , Chairman is I 2112 01:19:48,050 --> 01:19:51,120 want to thank the committee and uh and 2113 01:19:51,120 --> 01:19:53,880 all of your colleagues at large for the 2114 01:19:53,880 --> 01:19:56,102 tremendous support that you've given us 2115 01:19:56,102 --> 01:19:58,213 the speed at which you've moved to uh 2116 01:19:58,213 --> 01:20:01,430 to uh support our efforts especially 2117 01:20:01,440 --> 01:20:04,690 here in with Ukraine here in the recent 2118 01:20:04,690 --> 01:20:07,150 past and uh we'll continue this work . 2119 01:20:07,160 --> 01:20:09,380 Uh This is not this is something that 2120 01:20:09,390 --> 01:20:11,501 the chairman and I talked about every 2121 01:20:11,501 --> 01:20:14,510 day and uh so this is not something 2122 01:20:14,510 --> 01:20:16,399 that's been passed off to a staff 2123 01:20:16,399 --> 01:20:19,900 officer at a lower level . This has our 2124 01:20:19,910 --> 01:20:22,520 continued focus and we remain in 2125 01:20:22,520 --> 01:20:25,010 contact with our with our counterparts 2126 01:20:25,010 --> 01:20:26,843 in Ukraine here . They've done , 2127 01:20:26,843 --> 01:20:29,720 they've performed . Mhm and 2128 01:20:29,730 --> 01:20:31,680 magnificently and I think they'll 2129 01:20:31,680 --> 01:20:34,770 continue that work . I would also point 2130 01:20:34,780 --> 01:20:36,880 to the fact that the you know what 2131 01:20:36,880 --> 01:20:39,102 you're seeing with NATO right now is no 2132 01:20:39,102 --> 01:20:42,390 accident . The President uh and all the 2133 01:20:42,390 --> 01:20:44,612 cabinet members have really leaned into 2134 01:20:44,612 --> 01:20:46,680 the two , uh making sure that we are 2135 01:20:46,680 --> 01:20:48,470 transparent with NATO . We do 2136 01:20:48,470 --> 01:20:50,880 everything we can to keep NATO unified . 2137 01:20:50,890 --> 01:20:53,670 And uh and I think well I don't think I 2138 01:20:53,670 --> 01:20:57,060 know that our our colleagues in in 2139 01:20:57,060 --> 01:20:59,120 europe , really appreciate our 2140 01:20:59,120 --> 01:21:01,287 leadership and what we've done to help 2141 01:21:01,287 --> 01:21:03,398 them . Thank you sir . Thank you . We 2142 01:21:03,398 --> 01:21:05,509 were very much . I'm sorry , Chairman 2143 01:21:05,509 --> 01:21:07,564 Malik . And you know . Ditto I would 2144 01:21:07,564 --> 01:21:09,620 like to thank the committee for your 2145 01:21:09,620 --> 01:21:12,270 continued support as well . Um and and 2146 01:21:12,270 --> 01:21:14,381 I want to re emphasize what I said in 2147 01:21:14,381 --> 01:21:16,437 the opening statement . We we are at 2148 01:21:16,437 --> 01:21:18,740 literally in my view a pivot point and 2149 01:21:18,740 --> 01:21:21,470 the geo strategic history of europe for 2150 01:21:21,470 --> 01:21:23,637 sure . And perhaps the globe with this 2151 01:21:23,637 --> 01:21:25,803 invasion of Ukraine . Uh and we've got 2152 01:21:25,803 --> 01:21:28,026 to do everything we can that's possible 2153 01:21:28,026 --> 01:21:30,026 without going to war with Russia to 2154 01:21:30,026 --> 01:21:32,248 ensure that the Ukrainian people remain 2155 01:21:32,248 --> 01:21:34,192 free and sovereign . That's really 2156 01:21:34,192 --> 01:21:36,414 critically important to uh to to global 2157 01:21:36,414 --> 01:21:38,637 security . And the third and last point 2158 01:21:38,637 --> 01:21:40,692 is I'm enormously proud of what this 2159 01:21:40,692 --> 01:21:43,026 joint forces all about every single day . 2160 01:21:43,026 --> 01:21:45,192 These guys come to work . Uh they work 2161 01:21:45,192 --> 01:21:44,980 hard to defend their country and 2162 01:21:44,980 --> 01:21:46,813 they're they're doing a selfless 2163 01:21:46,813 --> 01:21:48,758 service uh for the defense of this 2164 01:21:48,758 --> 01:21:50,924 nation and support of the constitution 2165 01:21:50,924 --> 01:21:50,920 and nothing could make me prouder than 2166 01:21:50,950 --> 01:21:53,117 what our soldiers , sailors , airmen , 2167 01:21:53,117 --> 01:21:55,228 marines and guardians do every single 2168 01:21:55,228 --> 01:21:57,450 day day in and day out . Yeah , we will 2169 01:21:57,450 --> 01:21:59,450 emphasize those last few points the 2170 01:21:59,450 --> 01:22:01,672 Secretary and Chairman billy made , you 2171 01:22:01,672 --> 01:22:03,839 know , one that the hard work that has 2172 01:22:03,839 --> 01:22:05,950 gone in from Secretary Austin and the 2173 01:22:05,950 --> 01:22:08,061 entire body administration to to pull 2174 01:22:08,061 --> 01:22:10,061 this coalition together to have the 2175 01:22:10,061 --> 01:22:12,117 response and then second what you're 2176 01:22:12,117 --> 01:22:13,950 seeing in Ukraine , we have been 2177 01:22:13,950 --> 01:22:16,061 working to train the Ukrainians for a 2178 01:22:16,061 --> 01:22:18,006 very long time . Um It shows so we 2179 01:22:18,006 --> 01:22:20,228 should be very proud of that . Um and I 2180 01:22:20,228 --> 01:22:22,450 do also want to thank the committee , I 2181 01:22:22,450 --> 01:22:24,672 think with with one notable exception . 2182 01:22:24,672 --> 01:22:24,410 Um This was a very , very good 2183 01:22:24,420 --> 01:22:26,642 discussion of the issues and what we're 2184 01:22:26,642 --> 01:22:28,476 looking for , and as far as that 2185 01:22:28,476 --> 01:22:30,698 notable exception goes , um I looked it 2186 01:22:30,698 --> 01:22:32,753 up sadly , I don't have the power to 2187 01:22:32,753 --> 01:22:34,864 simply take a member's time away . Uh 2188 01:22:34,864 --> 01:22:36,976 So if they're going , they're going . 2189 01:22:36,976 --> 01:22:39,031 But other than that , I I think this 2190 01:22:39,031 --> 01:22:38,610 committee did a really good job of 2191 01:22:38,610 --> 01:22:40,721 analyzing the issues . Um As I said , 2192 01:22:40,721 --> 01:22:42,832 this is the start of the process . Um 2193 01:22:42,832 --> 01:22:44,999 We got a lot of work to do between now 2194 01:22:44,999 --> 01:22:47,110 and when we produce the final product 2195 01:22:47,110 --> 01:22:49,332 and look forward to working with all of 2196 01:22:49,332 --> 01:22:48,360 you to get that done to the best of our 2197 01:22:48,360 --> 01:22:50,082 ability . And with that we are 2198 01:22:50,082 --> 01:22:50,620 adjourned .