1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,000 2 00:00:07,240 --> 00:00:09,670 Hey , good afternoon everyone . Today . 3 00:00:09,670 --> 00:00:11,614 We're going to discuss the defense 4 00:00:11,614 --> 00:00:13,670 intelligence agencies release of its 5 00:00:13,670 --> 00:00:16,040 latest Unclassified foundational report 6 00:00:16,350 --> 00:00:19,650 challenges to security and space 2022 . 7 00:00:20,090 --> 00:00:22,312 This is the second edition of D . I . A 8 00:00:22,312 --> 00:00:24,368 series of reports designed to inform 9 00:00:24,368 --> 00:00:26,201 the public on key challenges and 10 00:00:26,201 --> 00:00:28,620 foreign military threats in space . D . 11 00:00:28,620 --> 00:00:30,620 I . S . Foundational reports foster 12 00:00:30,620 --> 00:00:32,840 informed dialogues between America's 13 00:00:32,840 --> 00:00:34,770 leaders , the national security 14 00:00:34,770 --> 00:00:37,150 community , warfighters , academia , 15 00:00:37,180 --> 00:00:39,347 allies and partners about key national 16 00:00:39,347 --> 00:00:41,458 security challenges facing the United 17 00:00:41,458 --> 00:00:44,070 States . We're joined today by D . I . 18 00:00:44,070 --> 00:00:46,403 S , foremost experts in the space field . 19 00:00:46,403 --> 00:00:48,830 Dr John , who D . I . S . Defense 20 00:00:48,830 --> 00:00:50,774 Intelligence Officer for space and 21 00:00:50,774 --> 00:00:52,941 Counter space and Mr Kevin Rider , D . 22 00:00:52,941 --> 00:00:54,830 I . A senior defense intelligence 23 00:00:54,830 --> 00:00:56,941 analyst for space and counter space . 24 00:00:56,941 --> 00:00:59,108 Gentlemen , I'll hand it over to you . 25 00:01:00,240 --> 00:01:02,073 Thank you for the opportunity to 26 00:01:02,073 --> 00:01:04,073 discuss D . I . S report that we're 27 00:01:04,073 --> 00:01:06,240 releasing today challenges to security 28 00:01:06,240 --> 00:01:08,200 in space 2022 . Uh This is an 29 00:01:08,200 --> 00:01:10,311 unclassified report and it's a follow 30 00:01:10,311 --> 00:01:12,478 on to the first challenges to security 31 00:01:12,478 --> 00:01:14,756 and space D . I . A . Released in 2019 . 32 00:01:15,240 --> 00:01:17,260 Like its predecessor , this report 33 00:01:17,260 --> 00:01:19,316 examines the space and counter space 34 00:01:19,316 --> 00:01:21,538 programs that pose or potentially posed 35 00:01:21,538 --> 00:01:23,540 a significant challenge to us or 36 00:01:23,540 --> 00:01:26,180 partner interests by china Russia North , 37 00:01:26,180 --> 00:01:29,180 Korea and Iran . The second iteration 38 00:01:29,180 --> 00:01:31,180 addresses increases in the pace and 39 00:01:31,180 --> 00:01:33,470 scope of competitors space operations 40 00:01:33,470 --> 00:01:36,300 since early 2019 . Of what you're about 41 00:01:36,300 --> 00:01:38,740 to hear have been dramatic . D . I . A 42 00:01:38,740 --> 00:01:40,684 produces reports that provide both 43 00:01:40,684 --> 00:01:42,684 broad overviews of country military 44 00:01:42,684 --> 00:01:44,629 capabilities known as the military 45 00:01:44,629 --> 00:01:46,796 power series and more narrowly focused 46 00:01:46,796 --> 00:01:48,684 functional threat reports such as 47 00:01:48,684 --> 00:01:50,796 challenges the security and space and 48 00:01:50,796 --> 00:01:53,040 global nuclear landscapes . These are 49 00:01:53,050 --> 00:01:55,250 these are designed to help the public 50 00:01:55,250 --> 00:01:57,361 achieve a deeper understanding of key 51 00:01:57,361 --> 00:01:59,472 challenges and threats to us national 52 00:01:59,472 --> 00:02:01,740 security . This new edition of 53 00:02:01,740 --> 00:02:03,573 challenges to security and space 54 00:02:03,573 --> 00:02:05,407 provides an updated unclassified 55 00:02:05,407 --> 00:02:07,730 overview of current threats to us space 56 00:02:07,730 --> 00:02:10,050 based capabilities , particularly from 57 00:02:10,050 --> 00:02:12,272 china and Russia , but also to a lesser 58 00:02:12,272 --> 00:02:14,272 extent uh those emerging from North 59 00:02:14,272 --> 00:02:16,840 Korea and Iran this edition examines 60 00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:18,951 the expansion of space operations and 61 00:02:18,951 --> 00:02:21,062 details earth focus space services as 62 00:02:21,062 --> 00:02:23,229 well as growing efforts to explore the 63 00:02:23,229 --> 00:02:25,670 moon and beyond . And it also includes 64 00:02:25,670 --> 00:02:27,726 an expanded assessment of impacts of 65 00:02:27,726 --> 00:02:30,810 space debris . Space based 66 00:02:30,810 --> 00:02:32,940 capabilities impact many day to day 67 00:02:32,940 --> 00:02:35,051 aspects of the american way of life . 68 00:02:35,440 --> 00:02:37,910 The enable functions that affect our 69 00:02:37,910 --> 00:02:40,880 homes , transportation , electric power , 70 00:02:40,880 --> 00:02:44,140 bid electric power grids , banking and 71 00:02:44,140 --> 00:02:48,020 communications from watching television 72 00:02:48,040 --> 00:02:50,040 to predicting weather patterns , to 73 00:02:50,040 --> 00:02:52,207 avoiding traffic on our daily commutes 74 00:02:52,540 --> 00:02:54,373 satellites enable many real time 75 00:02:54,373 --> 00:02:56,540 conveniences that have become integral 76 00:02:56,540 --> 00:02:58,620 to our daily lives on the national 77 00:02:58,620 --> 00:03:00,690 security front . Space based 78 00:03:00,690 --> 00:03:02,801 capabilities afford the United States 79 00:03:02,801 --> 00:03:04,968 and our allies with crucial ability to 80 00:03:04,968 --> 00:03:07,320 project combat power to areas of 81 00:03:07,320 --> 00:03:11,110 conflict and instability . They enable 82 00:03:11,110 --> 00:03:13,060 our armed forces to collect vital 83 00:03:13,060 --> 00:03:14,949 intelligence on foreign threats , 84 00:03:15,740 --> 00:03:18,560 navigate and maneuver rapidly and 85 00:03:18,560 --> 00:03:20,782 communicate with one another to support 86 00:03:20,782 --> 00:03:23,260 global military and humanitarian crises . 87 00:03:24,440 --> 00:03:26,273 Meanwhile , Russia and china are 88 00:03:26,273 --> 00:03:28,260 primary strategic competitors are 89 00:03:28,260 --> 00:03:30,260 taking steps to undercut the United 90 00:03:30,260 --> 00:03:32,204 States and our allies in the space 91 00:03:32,204 --> 00:03:35,060 domain . Both nations view space as a 92 00:03:35,060 --> 00:03:37,171 requirement for winning modern wars , 93 00:03:37,340 --> 00:03:39,990 especially against Western nations and 94 00:03:39,990 --> 00:03:41,879 look to prove themselves as world 95 00:03:41,879 --> 00:03:44,750 leaders . Since early 2019 , 96 00:03:45,540 --> 00:03:48,630 competitor space operations have 97 00:03:48,630 --> 00:03:51,720 increased in pace and scope across 98 00:03:51,720 --> 00:03:53,550 nearly all major categories . 99 00:03:54,240 --> 00:03:56,460 Communications , remote sensing , 100 00:03:57,140 --> 00:03:59,680 navigation and science and technology 101 00:03:59,680 --> 00:04:02,920 demonstration china and Russia value 102 00:04:02,920 --> 00:04:05,950 superiority in space . And as a result , 103 00:04:05,960 --> 00:04:08,910 they will seek ways to strengthen their 104 00:04:08,910 --> 00:04:11,300 space and counter space programs and 105 00:04:11,300 --> 00:04:13,522 determine better ways to integrate them 106 00:04:13,522 --> 00:04:15,578 within their respective militaries . 107 00:04:16,240 --> 00:04:18,184 Both nations seek to broaden their 108 00:04:18,184 --> 00:04:20,840 space exploration initiatives together 109 00:04:20,840 --> 00:04:24,490 and individually With plans to explore 110 00:04:24,490 --> 00:04:27,000 the Moon and Mars during the next 30 111 00:04:27,000 --> 00:04:30,550 years . Uh and if successful , these 112 00:04:30,550 --> 00:04:33,580 efforts will likely lead to attempts by 113 00:04:33,580 --> 00:04:35,590 Beijing and Moscow to exploit the 114 00:04:35,590 --> 00:04:38,940 moon's natural resources . Beijing and 115 00:04:38,940 --> 00:04:40,940 Moscow have integrated space based 116 00:04:40,940 --> 00:04:43,300 capabilities into their individual 117 00:04:43,300 --> 00:04:46,090 national and warfighting strategies . 118 00:04:46,100 --> 00:04:48,570 With the intent of denying the United 119 00:04:48,570 --> 00:04:51,050 States a space enabled advantage . 120 00:04:52,140 --> 00:04:54,420 Evidence of both nations intent to 121 00:04:54,430 --> 00:04:56,650 undercut the United States and allied 122 00:04:56,890 --> 00:04:59,500 leadership in the space domain can be 123 00:04:59,500 --> 00:05:02,240 seen in the growth of combined in orbit 124 00:05:02,240 --> 00:05:04,930 assets of china and Russia , which grew 125 00:05:04,930 --> 00:05:08,410 approximately 70 in just two 126 00:05:08,410 --> 00:05:11,370 years . This recent and continuing 127 00:05:11,370 --> 00:05:14,600 expansion follows a more than 200% uh 128 00:05:14,610 --> 00:05:17,860 increase . Between 2015 and 2018 . 129 00:05:19,340 --> 00:05:21,750 China has launched a robotic lander and 130 00:05:21,750 --> 00:05:24,980 rover to the far side of the moon And 131 00:05:24,980 --> 00:05:27,060 an orbiter . Lander and Rover in one 132 00:05:27,060 --> 00:05:30,170 mission to Mars . It has also launched 133 00:05:30,170 --> 00:05:32,880 multiple missiles capable of destroying 134 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:35,540 satellites and deployed mobile jammers 135 00:05:35,540 --> 00:05:37,740 to deny satellite communications and 136 00:05:37,740 --> 00:05:41,620 GPS Moscow , on the other 137 00:05:41,620 --> 00:05:43,842 hand , has developed a suite of counter 138 00:05:43,842 --> 00:05:46,009 space weapons capabilities , including 139 00:05:46,009 --> 00:05:49,820 electronic warfare to deny degrade and 140 00:05:49,820 --> 00:05:52,560 disrupt communications and to not deny 141 00:05:52,560 --> 00:05:55,760 the use of space based imagery . Russia 142 00:05:55,760 --> 00:05:58,000 is also developing a mobile missile 143 00:05:58,010 --> 00:06:00,990 that is able to destroy satellites and 144 00:06:01,000 --> 00:06:03,790 crewed space vehicles . Now , as the 145 00:06:03,790 --> 00:06:06,720 number of spacefaring nations grow and 146 00:06:06,720 --> 00:06:08,887 counter space capabilities become more 147 00:06:08,887 --> 00:06:11,150 integrated into military operations , 148 00:06:12,240 --> 00:06:14,090 the US based posture will be 149 00:06:14,090 --> 00:06:16,380 increasingly challenged and or orbit 150 00:06:16,380 --> 00:06:20,190 assets will face new risks . A secure , 151 00:06:20,200 --> 00:06:23,650 stable and accessible space domain is 152 00:06:23,650 --> 00:06:25,890 crucial as challenges to the United 153 00:06:25,890 --> 00:06:27,930 States and our allies . Space 154 00:06:27,930 --> 00:06:30,150 capabilities continue to increase 155 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:34,540 Challenges to security in space . 2022 156 00:06:34,550 --> 00:06:36,480 offers the insights from top 157 00:06:36,480 --> 00:06:38,970 intelligence experts on current threats 158 00:06:38,970 --> 00:06:40,960 to the United States Space Posture 159 00:06:41,340 --> 00:06:44,240 Posed by our strategic competitors and 160 00:06:44,250 --> 00:06:46,890 key space issues through 2030 and 161 00:06:46,890 --> 00:06:49,170 beyond . Thank you for your time . We 162 00:06:49,170 --> 00:06:51,710 will now take questions . So if you 163 00:06:51,720 --> 00:06:53,831 have a question for these gentlemen , 164 00:06:53,831 --> 00:06:55,887 please just raise your hand and I'll 165 00:06:55,887 --> 00:06:57,942 call on you and you can please state 166 00:06:57,942 --> 00:06:59,831 your name and the outlet for what 167 00:06:59,831 --> 00:06:59,570 you're reporting and I saw your hand 168 00:06:59,570 --> 00:07:02,760 first . Yes , Ma'am . Defense one . 169 00:07:03,740 --> 00:07:05,907 I was wondering if you could both talk 170 00:07:05,907 --> 00:07:07,907 about the extent to which China has 171 00:07:07,907 --> 00:07:09,851 been watching Russia's invasion of 172 00:07:09,851 --> 00:07:11,740 Ukraine and how it's shaping what 173 00:07:11,740 --> 00:07:13,518 counter space capabilities it's 174 00:07:13,518 --> 00:07:15,740 pursuing , what sort of is it gathering 175 00:07:15,740 --> 00:07:18,110 lessons learned will it make it more 176 00:07:18,110 --> 00:07:20,277 difficult in future conflicts based on 177 00:07:20,277 --> 00:07:22,388 what we've seen happen over Ukraine . 178 00:07:22,840 --> 00:07:25,140 So as far as the scope of the document 179 00:07:25,140 --> 00:07:27,084 really doesn't cover that . That's 180 00:07:27,084 --> 00:07:28,918 fairly new and I'll say evolving 181 00:07:28,918 --> 00:07:31,110 information . So I really don't have a 182 00:07:31,110 --> 00:07:33,332 whole lot to to add on that right now . 183 00:07:34,940 --> 00:07:37,500 Yes sir . Hi brian Ever South Aviation 184 00:07:37,500 --> 00:07:39,722 week . This report obviously comes at a 185 00:07:39,722 --> 00:07:41,944 time when the U . S . Is ramping up its 186 00:07:41,944 --> 00:07:44,167 space based capabilities with many many 187 00:07:44,167 --> 00:07:46,056 launches planned . Can you talk a 188 00:07:46,056 --> 00:07:48,222 little bit about what the insights and 189 00:07:48,222 --> 00:07:50,389 the reports say for what resiliency is 190 00:07:50,389 --> 00:07:52,500 in need is maneuverability required , 191 00:07:52,500 --> 00:07:54,667 cyber hardening , what are some of the 192 00:07:54,667 --> 00:07:56,778 critical capabilities . So I will say 193 00:07:56,778 --> 00:07:58,778 that from A . D . I a perspective , 194 00:07:58,840 --> 00:08:01,500 what we do is we provide information on 195 00:08:01,500 --> 00:08:04,360 the threats and the challenges that are 196 00:08:04,370 --> 00:08:07,740 posed by our adversaries and we provide 197 00:08:07,740 --> 00:08:09,860 that to our policy makers and our 198 00:08:09,860 --> 00:08:12,180 warfighting planners to make those 199 00:08:12,190 --> 00:08:15,290 determinations on the type of systems 200 00:08:15,290 --> 00:08:17,512 that and mitigation strategies that are 201 00:08:17,512 --> 00:08:19,568 needed and certainly the acquisition 202 00:08:19,568 --> 00:08:22,430 community , the N . R . O . Uh S . D . 203 00:08:22,430 --> 00:08:24,550 A . Uh space development agency 204 00:08:24,550 --> 00:08:26,661 etcetera . But as kevin said , that's 205 00:08:26,661 --> 00:08:28,883 really for us to inform them , it's for 206 00:08:28,883 --> 00:08:31,106 them to figure out based on that threat 207 00:08:31,106 --> 00:08:33,340 information what they want to do . It's 208 00:08:33,340 --> 00:08:36,370 like a caller um Theresa Hitchens from 209 00:08:36,370 --> 00:08:39,240 breaking defense . Hi there , thanks 210 00:08:39,240 --> 00:08:41,880 for doing this . Um my question is on 211 00:08:41,880 --> 00:08:45,160 the news section or expanded section on 212 00:08:45,540 --> 00:08:47,770 moon and mars and sort of X geo 213 00:08:47,770 --> 00:08:50,550 activities . And I wondered if you 214 00:08:50,550 --> 00:08:53,900 could um tell us whether you actually 215 00:08:53,900 --> 00:08:56,680 have evidence that 216 00:08:56,690 --> 00:09:00,310 operators or there or have 217 00:09:00,310 --> 00:09:03,620 a the evidence that maybe Russia or 218 00:09:03,620 --> 00:09:06,550 china actually have ambitions to create 219 00:09:07,140 --> 00:09:10,410 military capabilities in that region of 220 00:09:10,410 --> 00:09:12,540 space . Because what we see in the 221 00:09:12,540 --> 00:09:15,540 public domain is primarily interest 222 00:09:15,540 --> 00:09:19,170 from many countries in exploitation um 223 00:09:19,180 --> 00:09:21,670 for economic reasons and exploration . 224 00:09:21,680 --> 00:09:23,791 Can you address that question ? Thank 225 00:09:23,791 --> 00:09:26,069 you . That's a very good question . Um , 226 00:09:26,069 --> 00:09:29,310 so what we've seen so far has been more 227 00:09:29,310 --> 00:09:32,860 civilian in nature . However , china 228 00:09:32,870 --> 00:09:36,710 emphasizes in their writings , uh civil 229 00:09:36,710 --> 00:09:38,630 military integration and dual use 230 00:09:38,630 --> 00:09:42,220 purpose space capabilities . Uh , so we 231 00:09:42,220 --> 00:09:44,420 while we do understand that right now 232 00:09:44,430 --> 00:09:46,830 it is civil in nature , we continue to 233 00:09:46,830 --> 00:09:49,700 monitor for any possibility of military 234 00:09:49,700 --> 00:09:52,700 activity . Do you think that the moon 235 00:09:52,700 --> 00:09:56,130 has strategic military value ? And if 236 00:09:56,130 --> 00:09:58,130 you are , what exactly do you think 237 00:09:58,130 --> 00:10:01,210 that would be ? So as far as the 238 00:10:01,220 --> 00:10:03,387 strategic military value that would be 239 00:10:03,387 --> 00:10:05,940 us for two to assess again , we would 240 00:10:05,940 --> 00:10:08,960 advise on what the adversary is doing 241 00:10:08,960 --> 00:10:11,180 or might be doing ? Certainly the moon 242 00:10:11,180 --> 00:10:13,840 has a lot of valuable minerals 243 00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:16,750 resources . It is the high ground . So 244 00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:19,310 those might all be considerations , but 245 00:10:19,310 --> 00:10:21,310 again , it wouldn't be us to assess 246 00:10:21,310 --> 00:10:23,254 that strategic value other than to 247 00:10:23,254 --> 00:10:25,810 inform on what our adversaries may or 248 00:10:25,810 --> 00:10:28,032 may not be doing . If I could follow up 249 00:10:28,032 --> 00:10:30,143 then , can I ask it a different way . 250 00:10:30,143 --> 00:10:33,710 Um what do you , what value strategic 251 00:10:33,710 --> 00:10:35,840 military value does china or Russia 252 00:10:35,840 --> 00:10:37,896 believe that the moon holds ? Do you 253 00:10:37,896 --> 00:10:40,790 have a read on that ? So I wouldn't 254 00:10:40,790 --> 00:10:44,390 want to speculate uh onto what their 255 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:47,620 thoughts are on what it might value 256 00:10:47,620 --> 00:10:50,200 right now . Um All we all we know right 257 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:53,600 now is that it is possible that because 258 00:10:53,600 --> 00:10:55,480 of their philosophy on dual use 259 00:10:55,490 --> 00:10:57,546 capabilities , that it may have some 260 00:10:57,546 --> 00:10:59,820 interest in the future . Technologies 261 00:10:59,820 --> 00:11:03,150 that are used for scientific purposes 262 00:11:03,150 --> 00:11:06,760 to get somebody to another body . I see 263 00:11:06,760 --> 00:11:09,270 the moon could also have that dual 264 00:11:09,270 --> 00:11:12,390 purpose or that military civil fusion 265 00:11:12,390 --> 00:11:16,120 aspect that could translate into 266 00:11:16,130 --> 00:11:18,241 military capabilities . But we're not 267 00:11:18,241 --> 00:11:20,408 seeing that right now . Thank you john 268 00:11:20,408 --> 00:11:22,297 harper with Fed scoop . Would you 269 00:11:22,297 --> 00:11:24,463 assess that china and Russia are ahead 270 00:11:24,463 --> 00:11:26,630 of the US now when it comes to counter 271 00:11:26,630 --> 00:11:28,852 space capabilities , how would you kind 272 00:11:28,852 --> 00:11:30,963 of compare each of those countries to 273 00:11:30,963 --> 00:11:33,130 the US in that regard ? So again , our 274 00:11:33,130 --> 00:11:35,230 job is really to inform on foreign 275 00:11:35,230 --> 00:11:37,341 military capabilities . Not really do 276 00:11:37,341 --> 00:11:39,690 what I would call a US comparative 277 00:11:39,690 --> 00:11:41,746 assessment , but within the building 278 00:11:41,746 --> 00:11:43,801 here office and that assessment , um 279 00:11:43,801 --> 00:11:47,370 the Space Force or or or Space Command 280 00:11:47,380 --> 00:11:49,491 would be better . They'd be better to 281 00:11:49,491 --> 00:11:52,530 answer that question than US . Like 282 00:11:52,530 --> 00:11:54,474 Tony capacity with Bloomberg had a 283 00:11:54,474 --> 00:11:56,308 couple of questions . One on the 284 00:11:56,308 --> 00:11:58,530 methodology of the report . So it's top 285 00:11:58,530 --> 00:11:58,350 heavy with footnotes to published 286 00:11:58,350 --> 00:12:00,920 articles into speeches ? Is it fair to 287 00:12:00,920 --> 00:12:03,620 assume that d a felt all those 288 00:12:03,630 --> 00:12:05,750 footnoted articles and articles were 289 00:12:05,750 --> 00:12:08,450 credible and thus part of the mosaic 290 00:12:08,840 --> 00:12:12,220 that you based your report on . So when 291 00:12:12,220 --> 00:12:15,770 D . I A does analysis um there are 292 00:12:15,770 --> 00:12:18,660 varying levels of confidence that we 293 00:12:18,660 --> 00:12:22,530 put into those particular sources . Um 294 00:12:22,540 --> 00:12:26,100 So um But usually when we do write a 295 00:12:26,100 --> 00:12:29,640 product , the bulk of the sources 296 00:12:29,650 --> 00:12:32,770 have some credibility and if not we 297 00:12:32,770 --> 00:12:35,380 identify the level of confidence in 298 00:12:35,380 --> 00:12:37,380 that source . Whether we think it's 299 00:12:37,380 --> 00:12:39,547 credible or not , that's a good that's 300 00:12:39,547 --> 00:12:41,769 a that's a useful answer . So assessing 301 00:12:41,769 --> 00:12:44,850 the China 20 July 21-21 302 00:12:45,140 --> 00:12:48,610 fractional orbital test you have it in 303 00:12:48,610 --> 00:12:51,000 there captured the world's attention . 304 00:12:51,010 --> 00:12:53,177 I need to ask you this , do you assess 305 00:12:53,177 --> 00:12:55,399 that ? That was a one off demonstration 306 00:12:55,399 --> 00:12:57,399 that will be tough to replicate for 307 00:12:57,399 --> 00:12:59,510 another a number of years or did that 308 00:12:59,510 --> 00:13:02,560 indicate an operational capability they 309 00:13:02,560 --> 00:13:05,000 have today that could be launched 310 00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:08,580 tomorrow if they felt necessary . So we 311 00:13:08,580 --> 00:13:10,640 see china both china and Russia 312 00:13:10,650 --> 00:13:12,872 expanding their space and counter space 313 00:13:12,872 --> 00:13:15,060 capabilities . As far as details on 314 00:13:15,060 --> 00:13:18,860 what we expect next . We can't we 315 00:13:18,860 --> 00:13:20,860 can't address any more details than 316 00:13:20,860 --> 00:13:23,290 what's in the report . I mean was it a 317 00:13:23,290 --> 00:13:25,290 one off test or do they have now an 318 00:13:25,290 --> 00:13:27,401 operational capability for fractional 319 00:13:27,401 --> 00:13:29,568 orbital launch ? I don't think I could 320 00:13:29,568 --> 00:13:31,790 address that in any more detail in this 321 00:13:31,790 --> 00:13:34,012 in this venue . Can't address it here . 322 00:13:34,012 --> 00:13:36,123 Is I just want to get a sense of that 323 00:13:36,123 --> 00:13:38,346 and anything we would assess for future 324 00:13:38,346 --> 00:13:40,457 capabilities or assessments on future 325 00:13:40,457 --> 00:13:43,620 tests etcetera would be classified when 326 00:13:43,620 --> 00:13:45,842 we go to the phones real quickly . Bill 327 00:13:45,842 --> 00:13:48,970 Gertz Washington times . Yeah . Hi um I 328 00:13:48,970 --> 00:13:51,192 want to follow up on Tony's question on 329 00:13:51,192 --> 00:13:54,220 the fractional orbital launch . Uh can 330 00:13:54,220 --> 00:13:57,200 you say whether this is a nuclear 331 00:13:57,200 --> 00:13:59,680 system or it's a conventional system 332 00:13:59,690 --> 00:14:02,640 and it is reported in the report as 333 00:14:02,640 --> 00:14:06,110 part of uh space weapons that are used 334 00:14:06,110 --> 00:14:09,320 to hit targets on the earth on the sea 335 00:14:09,320 --> 00:14:11,380 and in the air . Can you elaborate a 336 00:14:11,380 --> 00:14:14,950 little bit more on that ? Um 337 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:17,440 could you repeat the question ? I'm 338 00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:20,410 sorry . Yeah . The fractional orbital 339 00:14:20,410 --> 00:14:23,650 launch is described in the report as 340 00:14:24,040 --> 00:14:26,910 being part of space weapons that are 341 00:14:26,910 --> 00:14:29,820 going to be used to strike targets from 342 00:14:29,820 --> 00:14:33,280 space on the ground on the sea and in 343 00:14:33,280 --> 00:14:36,040 the air . Can you elaborate on whether 344 00:14:36,040 --> 00:14:39,420 this hypersonic glide vehicle will be 345 00:14:39,420 --> 00:14:41,950 used conventional or nuclear or both ? 346 00:14:42,840 --> 00:14:46,060 So I will say as the report states this 347 00:14:46,070 --> 00:14:49,080 is the first time we've seen this 348 00:14:49,080 --> 00:14:52,280 tested . So it's a little early right 349 00:14:52,280 --> 00:14:56,260 now to be able to determine um 350 00:14:56,640 --> 00:14:59,450 it's full set of capabilities and those 351 00:14:59,450 --> 00:15:01,950 that we have determined , I will 352 00:15:02,640 --> 00:15:05,610 reiterate my colleague's comments can't 353 00:15:05,620 --> 00:15:09,100 be discussed in this forum . No way . 354 00:15:09,100 --> 00:15:11,100 You know what , let me go back here 355 00:15:11,100 --> 00:15:14,610 real quick when you were talking about 356 00:15:14,620 --> 00:15:17,390 how Moscow had developed all of the 357 00:15:17,390 --> 00:15:20,530 additional counter space um Abilities . 358 00:15:20,540 --> 00:15:22,762 Uh the mobile missile that could strike 359 00:15:22,762 --> 00:15:24,929 satellites . I know that didn't Russia 360 00:15:24,929 --> 00:15:26,984 hit one of its own satellites just a 361 00:15:26,984 --> 00:15:29,450 few months ago in November one of its 362 00:15:29,460 --> 00:15:32,420 defunct Soviet satellites . So my 363 00:15:32,420 --> 00:15:34,980 question is have they used any of these 364 00:15:34,980 --> 00:15:37,036 new capabilities against the U . S . 365 00:15:37,036 --> 00:15:39,258 Have you seen any evidence that they've 366 00:15:39,258 --> 00:15:41,036 been trying to target these new 367 00:15:41,036 --> 00:15:43,550 capabilities towards U . S . Assets ? 368 00:15:45,610 --> 00:15:47,832 So I think again in the level of detail 369 00:15:47,832 --> 00:15:49,888 we have in the report about the race 370 00:15:49,888 --> 00:15:51,940 that weapons systems , the testing 371 00:15:51,940 --> 00:15:54,162 that's been reported in the press as of 372 00:15:54,162 --> 00:15:56,810 a couple of months ago is about what we 373 00:15:56,810 --> 00:16:00,030 can talk about here . It's the level of 374 00:16:00,030 --> 00:16:04,000 detail the report just to have the 375 00:16:04,010 --> 00:16:06,620 visual . Well I think in the report we 376 00:16:06,620 --> 00:16:10,440 talked about Russia developing ground 377 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:12,160 based ASAT capability 378 00:16:15,740 --> 00:16:17,740 just to follow up on the fractional 379 00:16:17,740 --> 00:16:19,684 orbital test isn't the D . I . S . 380 00:16:19,684 --> 00:16:22,360 Assessment that this vehicle was uh 381 00:16:22,370 --> 00:16:25,150 military in nature . Um There are 382 00:16:25,160 --> 00:16:26,993 there's some disagreement in the 383 00:16:26,993 --> 00:16:29,160 academic community that thought it was 384 00:16:29,160 --> 00:16:31,271 not military in nature , it was maybe 385 00:16:31,271 --> 00:16:33,160 space exploration in nature . 386 00:16:36,140 --> 00:16:38,251 So I don't I don't have an answer for 387 00:16:38,251 --> 00:16:40,473 you on that one . I'll have to get back 388 00:16:40,473 --> 00:16:43,090 to our public affairs secondly , in the 389 00:16:43,100 --> 00:16:46,470 in the report you also found that 390 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:50,800 china has is pursuing being able to 391 00:16:50,810 --> 00:16:53,520 capture satellites or other sensors um 392 00:16:53,530 --> 00:16:56,390 partly to be able to affect precision 393 00:16:56,390 --> 00:16:58,750 guided munitions . And I was just 394 00:16:58,750 --> 00:17:00,972 wondering to the extent to which that's 395 00:17:00,972 --> 00:17:03,610 occurring and I know Ukraine happened 396 00:17:03,610 --> 00:17:05,554 after this is published but to the 397 00:17:05,554 --> 00:17:07,610 extent that that is occurring on the 398 00:17:07,610 --> 00:17:09,554 current battlefield , what sort of 399 00:17:09,554 --> 00:17:11,666 guidance are you providing or helping 400 00:17:11,666 --> 00:17:15,050 shape future U . S . Defenses uh for 401 00:17:15,060 --> 00:17:16,616 future potential conflict ? 402 00:17:18,640 --> 00:17:21,410 So again I would say the report and the 403 00:17:21,410 --> 00:17:23,280 information from an intelligence 404 00:17:23,280 --> 00:17:26,820 perspective stands as it is . So those 405 00:17:26,820 --> 00:17:28,987 types of things are what we provide to 406 00:17:28,987 --> 00:17:31,300 our customers for them to consider as 407 00:17:31,300 --> 00:17:33,720 they are acquiring new capabilities 408 00:17:33,980 --> 00:17:36,670 with the understanding that both china 409 00:17:36,670 --> 00:17:38,726 and Russia are expanding their their 410 00:17:38,726 --> 00:17:40,559 kit if you will in counter space 411 00:17:40,559 --> 00:17:42,860 capabilities and those are all factored 412 00:17:42,860 --> 00:17:45,460 into the design of US systems . 413 00:17:47,140 --> 00:17:49,080 Um let's go to the phones again , 414 00:17:49,090 --> 00:17:52,960 Poonam Sharma from global Straight . My 415 00:17:52,960 --> 00:17:55,238 question has been answered . Thank you . 416 00:17:55,238 --> 00:17:57,071 You're welcome brian bender from 417 00:17:57,071 --> 00:17:59,800 politico right Hey there , thanks for 418 00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:02,200 doing this . Um I was hoping to draw 419 00:18:02,200 --> 00:18:04,311 you guys out a little bit more on how 420 00:18:04,311 --> 00:18:07,440 much in building this report , you 421 00:18:07,440 --> 00:18:09,810 looked at intent on the part of the 422 00:18:09,810 --> 00:18:12,030 chinese and the Russians , you threw 423 00:18:12,030 --> 00:18:15,420 out a bunch of percentages of growth in 424 00:18:15,420 --> 00:18:18,500 their space capabilities in recent 425 00:18:18,500 --> 00:18:21,840 years . Obviously the United States 426 00:18:21,840 --> 00:18:25,410 still has presumably an edge or at 427 00:18:25,410 --> 00:18:27,670 least in numbers more systems 428 00:18:29,330 --> 00:18:31,820 than they do . Give us some insight if 429 00:18:31,820 --> 00:18:33,931 you can about how you go about trying 430 00:18:33,931 --> 00:18:36,560 to understand why they're doing this . 431 00:18:36,940 --> 00:18:40,210 Why are they so aggressively trying to 432 00:18:40,210 --> 00:18:42,400 catch up if you will in these kinds of 433 00:18:42,400 --> 00:18:45,450 capabilities ? Well I'll start by 434 00:18:45,450 --> 00:18:48,550 saying there is a perception that the 435 00:18:48,550 --> 00:18:52,250 US is heavily reliant on uh space 436 00:18:52,250 --> 00:18:54,780 based capabilities for military 437 00:18:54,780 --> 00:18:58,740 operations and that they provide us a 438 00:18:58,750 --> 00:19:02,570 strategic advantage . Um countries 439 00:19:02,570 --> 00:19:05,030 like china and Russia are seeking to 440 00:19:05,040 --> 00:19:07,740 undercut that . So they are seeking to 441 00:19:07,940 --> 00:19:10,540 determine ways to counter that 442 00:19:10,540 --> 00:19:13,670 perceived advantage that we have in 443 00:19:13,670 --> 00:19:15,800 space . And certainly they have 444 00:19:15,820 --> 00:19:17,710 observed how we leverage space 445 00:19:17,710 --> 00:19:21,150 capabilities in the last few wars we've 446 00:19:21,150 --> 00:19:24,240 been in . They see how we advantage 447 00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:26,830 those . Uh that certainly is is a 448 00:19:26,830 --> 00:19:30,240 factor or driving factor but regard 449 00:19:30,240 --> 00:19:32,690 your intent question clearly they're 450 00:19:32,690 --> 00:19:34,801 not just creating capabilities . They 451 00:19:34,801 --> 00:19:38,460 have their own space forces . Uh So uh 452 00:19:38,470 --> 00:19:40,637 you can read into that or not what you 453 00:19:40,637 --> 00:19:42,930 want , but now you have a space force 454 00:19:42,930 --> 00:19:46,140 or space forces , you have capabilities 455 00:19:46,150 --> 00:19:49,380 and they are um including them into 456 00:19:49,380 --> 00:19:51,269 their combined arms fighter , the 457 00:19:51,269 --> 00:19:53,269 intent intent is to provide that or 458 00:19:53,269 --> 00:19:55,547 pull that into the combined arms fight . 459 00:19:55,547 --> 00:19:57,658 So I think that's about all I can say 460 00:19:57,658 --> 00:19:59,658 on intent , but I think it's pretty 461 00:19:59,658 --> 00:20:01,880 clear to us . Thank you , john harper , 462 00:20:01,880 --> 00:20:03,769 again , the various counter space 463 00:20:03,769 --> 00:20:05,824 capabilities that were documented in 464 00:20:05,824 --> 00:20:08,047 the report , Is there one in particular 465 00:20:08,047 --> 00:20:10,269 that most concerns you or that you feel 466 00:20:10,269 --> 00:20:12,436 like is the greatest threat to U . S . 467 00:20:12,436 --> 00:20:14,713 Space systems ? So from my perspective , 468 00:20:15,040 --> 00:20:19,000 all of the capabilities are equal 469 00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:22,430 in nature , um it depends on how and 470 00:20:22,430 --> 00:20:25,210 why and when the adversary would tend 471 00:20:25,210 --> 00:20:27,432 to use them or choose to use them . And 472 00:20:27,432 --> 00:20:29,490 if I could just reemphasize my last 473 00:20:29,490 --> 00:20:31,950 point and Thailand what kevin said . So 474 00:20:31,950 --> 00:20:34,250 it's not just a capability , it's the 475 00:20:34,250 --> 00:20:36,306 fact that they have a space force or 476 00:20:36,306 --> 00:20:38,528 each have space forces china and Russia 477 00:20:38,540 --> 00:20:41,140 and their intent is to make space part 478 00:20:41,140 --> 00:20:43,140 of that combined arms effort in any 479 00:20:43,140 --> 00:20:46,600 conflict Very almost . Yeah . The 480 00:20:46,600 --> 00:20:49,070 question which capability are they the 481 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:51,430 most advanced in ? That's the most 482 00:20:51,440 --> 00:20:52,440 alarming to you . 483 00:20:55,240 --> 00:20:57,296 Again , I'm I'm with Kevin . I don't 484 00:20:57,296 --> 00:20:59,830 think there's a particular capability 485 00:20:59,830 --> 00:21:01,719 that I would pull out and say I'm 486 00:21:01,719 --> 00:21:03,941 worried more about this or that because 487 00:21:03,941 --> 00:21:06,163 it's always context context dependent . 488 00:21:06,163 --> 00:21:08,470 It depends on the particular conflict 489 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:11,630 or stage a conflict . Uh So I wouldn't 490 00:21:11,630 --> 00:21:15,480 pick one of those out . I really want I 491 00:21:15,580 --> 00:21:17,247 want to go from space to more 492 00:21:17,247 --> 00:21:19,469 terrestrial . You talked about Russia's 493 00:21:19,469 --> 00:21:21,469 Russia , the Russian military views 494 00:21:21,469 --> 00:21:23,780 electronic warfare as an essential tool 495 00:21:23,780 --> 00:21:26,002 for gaining and maintaining information 496 00:21:26,002 --> 00:21:28,113 superiority over its adversaries just 497 00:21:28,113 --> 00:21:30,391 five weeks into an invasion of Ukraine . 498 00:21:30,391 --> 00:21:32,391 Does d I assess that even though on 499 00:21:32,391 --> 00:21:34,224 paper they have these incredible 500 00:21:34,224 --> 00:21:36,447 capabilities , they're not executing so 501 00:21:36,447 --> 00:21:40,170 well as a force . So 502 00:21:40,690 --> 00:21:42,912 as the report lays out , both china and 503 00:21:42,912 --> 00:21:46,860 Russia have a pretty good bag of 504 00:21:47,240 --> 00:21:49,080 kit capabilities with regard to 505 00:21:49,080 --> 00:21:51,910 electronic warfare . Russia emphasizes 506 00:21:51,910 --> 00:21:54,430 electronic warfare . We've seen some 507 00:21:54,430 --> 00:21:57,140 reporting in the press on how those are 508 00:21:57,150 --> 00:21:59,610 being used but beyond that can address 509 00:21:59,610 --> 00:22:01,780 any more details . Is this an example 510 00:22:01,780 --> 00:22:03,891 of one paper ? Can say one thing that 511 00:22:03,891 --> 00:22:05,724 operationally could be a totally 512 00:22:05,724 --> 00:22:08,270 different picture . Perhaps . 513 00:22:09,700 --> 00:22:13,090 What are you getting from this ? Let me 514 00:22:13,090 --> 00:22:15,257 go back to the phone Sandra Irwin with 515 00:22:15,257 --> 00:22:18,830 space news . Thank you so much . 516 00:22:18,840 --> 00:22:21,600 Just a couple of short questions . Uh 517 00:22:21,610 --> 00:22:25,030 just d a also produced a 518 00:22:25,040 --> 00:22:27,420 classified version of this report , or 519 00:22:27,420 --> 00:22:30,550 just the unclassified And the 2nd part 520 00:22:30,550 --> 00:22:33,320 of the question . Um and in the 521 00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:36,350 discussion on china's capabilities , do 522 00:22:36,350 --> 00:22:39,020 you consider all chinese space 523 00:22:39,020 --> 00:22:42,170 capabilities , military or do you make 524 00:22:42,170 --> 00:22:44,281 an exchange ? The distinction between 525 00:22:44,281 --> 00:22:46,560 civilian space and military space ? 526 00:22:47,140 --> 00:22:49,040 Thank you . So , for your first 527 00:22:49,040 --> 00:22:51,900 question , while D . I . A . Does 528 00:22:51,900 --> 00:22:54,370 publish a number of classified 529 00:22:54,370 --> 00:22:57,110 documents challenges to security and 530 00:22:57,110 --> 00:23:00,470 space uh is only produced in an 531 00:23:00,470 --> 00:23:04,220 unclassified format , I think with 532 00:23:04,220 --> 00:23:06,920 regard to your second question , kevin 533 00:23:06,930 --> 00:23:09,160 and I think I had already both talked 534 00:23:09,160 --> 00:23:11,470 about what the chinese refer to as 535 00:23:11,470 --> 00:23:14,510 civil military fusion . Uh so 536 00:23:14,510 --> 00:23:17,480 sometimes uh things can look very 537 00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:19,790 distinct as to whether they lay on one 538 00:23:19,790 --> 00:23:22,012 side or another , at least for the time 539 00:23:22,012 --> 00:23:24,068 being and that can change because of 540 00:23:24,068 --> 00:23:26,230 that . Um And there's a lot of gray 541 00:23:26,230 --> 00:23:28,370 area in there . They they they don't 542 00:23:28,370 --> 00:23:30,537 conduct business the way certainly the 543 00:23:30,537 --> 00:23:32,703 way us or other Western countries do . 544 00:23:34,140 --> 00:23:37,860 Yes , ma'am appreciate this and 545 00:23:37,860 --> 00:23:40,082 apologize if I missed this . But I hear 546 00:23:40,082 --> 00:23:41,971 you say a lot about how china and 547 00:23:41,971 --> 00:23:44,027 Russia are the premier competitors . 548 00:23:44,027 --> 00:23:46,620 Can you rank those who is the more 549 00:23:46,620 --> 00:23:48,900 dominant threat between china and 550 00:23:48,900 --> 00:23:49,900 Russia in space ? 551 00:23:51,630 --> 00:23:55,620 I'll put it this way china 552 00:23:55,630 --> 00:23:58,710 has due to economic , more economic 553 00:23:58,720 --> 00:24:01,320 advantages , has increased their 554 00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:04,600 capabilities and put more financial and 555 00:24:04,600 --> 00:24:06,570 military effort towards developing 556 00:24:06,580 --> 00:24:09,240 their capabilities . Russia on the 557 00:24:09,240 --> 00:24:12,210 other hand , is more streamlined um due 558 00:24:12,210 --> 00:24:14,580 to other modern uh military 559 00:24:14,580 --> 00:24:16,802 modernization efforts for the country , 560 00:24:17,630 --> 00:24:19,686 I won't take my eye off either one . 561 00:24:23,130 --> 00:24:26,110 Louis lulu Martinez with abc news . I 562 00:24:26,120 --> 00:24:29,570 have two questions . Um One how does in 563 00:24:29,570 --> 00:24:31,910 terms of the counter space activity 564 00:24:31,910 --> 00:24:34,243 that we're seeing from Russia and china ? 565 00:24:34,243 --> 00:24:36,466 How does this report compared with what 566 00:24:36,466 --> 00:24:38,521 the conclusions from the 2019 report 567 00:24:38,521 --> 00:24:40,632 and , you know , broad strokes , what 568 00:24:40,632 --> 00:24:42,966 what's the main difference in those two ? 569 00:24:42,966 --> 00:24:45,790 Well , the As you said , 570 00:24:45,790 --> 00:24:49,700 2022 bills on our 2019 report . Uh 571 00:24:49,710 --> 00:24:52,860 it expands a little bit more on some of 572 00:24:52,870 --> 00:24:55,420 the future developments . It also takes 573 00:24:55,430 --> 00:24:58,830 a harder look at uh space debris and 574 00:24:58,830 --> 00:25:01,490 that causes the potential impact of 575 00:25:01,490 --> 00:25:04,270 that in space . And it also looks at uh 576 00:25:04,740 --> 00:25:07,320 development to get out and exploration 577 00:25:07,330 --> 00:25:09,990 out beyond the moon . And I think we go 578 00:25:09,990 --> 00:25:11,990 a little bit deeper on space domain 579 00:25:11,990 --> 00:25:14,046 awareness and command and control as 580 00:25:14,046 --> 00:25:17,060 well in a new report because obviously 581 00:25:17,060 --> 00:25:19,282 we've had these tests that the Russians 582 00:25:19,282 --> 00:25:21,750 have undertaken , which the chinese are 583 00:25:21,830 --> 00:25:23,997 undertaken , which has led to . Well , 584 00:25:23,997 --> 00:25:26,163 there are a series of things , there's 585 00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:28,640 testing , there's battery explosions 586 00:25:28,640 --> 00:25:30,529 and then there's just inadvertent 587 00:25:30,529 --> 00:25:32,751 collisions that all contribute to space 588 00:25:32,751 --> 00:25:34,696 debris . And and my second line of 589 00:25:34,696 --> 00:25:37,200 questioning has to do with the US lead 590 00:25:37,200 --> 00:25:39,780 in space . We've seen this tremendous 591 00:25:39,780 --> 00:25:42,580 commercialization um , even in the last 592 00:25:42,580 --> 00:25:44,524 three years , I think there's been 593 00:25:44,524 --> 00:25:46,130 tremendous advances and the 594 00:25:46,130 --> 00:25:48,186 commercialization of space on the US 595 00:25:48,186 --> 00:25:50,900 side . Um is the US able to maintain , 596 00:25:50,910 --> 00:25:53,021 is that something that will allow the 597 00:25:53,021 --> 00:25:55,132 US to maintain the lead in the future 598 00:25:55,132 --> 00:25:57,280 or as these other countries ? Because 599 00:25:57,280 --> 00:25:59,360 they continue to do state sponsored 600 00:25:59,840 --> 00:26:02,510 space development ? What's the contrast 601 00:26:02,860 --> 00:26:06,370 to ? I think it'd be conjecture on our 602 00:26:06,370 --> 00:26:09,720 part , but we have a robust space 603 00:26:09,730 --> 00:26:12,880 economy commercial space economy . I 604 00:26:12,890 --> 00:26:14,890 attended the symposium last week in 605 00:26:14,890 --> 00:26:17,270 Colorado springs and you only needed to 606 00:26:17,270 --> 00:26:19,270 spend about 10 minutes there to see 607 00:26:19,270 --> 00:26:21,820 that we do have a robust space economy 608 00:26:21,820 --> 00:26:24,610 that supports both commercial and 609 00:26:24,740 --> 00:26:26,629 supports the government as well . 610 00:26:29,240 --> 00:26:32,360 That's right , yep . 611 00:26:33,040 --> 00:26:35,207 Um I'll tell you what , let's um let's 612 00:26:35,207 --> 00:26:36,984 go ahead and close this out . I 613 00:26:36,984 --> 00:26:39,207 appreciate everyone coming today , just 614 00:26:39,207 --> 00:26:41,373 as a reminder . Um or I guess probably 615 00:26:41,373 --> 00:26:43,540 letting you know for the first time we 616 00:26:43,540 --> 00:26:45,596 have handouts of the report that are 617 00:26:45,596 --> 00:26:47,929 available as you file out if you'd like . 618 00:26:47,929 --> 00:26:49,873 So , thanks for coming . Thank you 619 00:26:49,873 --> 00:26:49,670 gentlemen . Thank you