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thank you very much . Mr . Chairman , 

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thank you to both of you for being here 

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today . Uh Secretary Austin , I want to 

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commend you want to commend the work 

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that you have done so far to get 

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Ukraine the equipment and support , 

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they need to fight back against 

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Russia's unforgivable attack on their 

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country . And at the same time , I'm 

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glad we're starting to provide more 

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capable systems . And I really urge you 

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to increase those deliveries and 

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provide all the necessary training . So , 

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Ukrainian forces do have everything 

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they need . Now , I have heard 

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repeatedly from people on the front 

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lines and those involved in the 

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logistics system in Ukraine about 

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equipment um , that we deliver not 

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reaching frontline units that most need , 

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the weapons , weapons and ammunition 

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and body armor . There there seems to 

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be a number of logistical and 

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institutional issues , including some 

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diversion and hoarding which are 

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standing in the way . So I wanted to 

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ask you today , what is your assessment 

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of those issues and how are you working 

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with the Ukraine to make distribution 

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of international assistance more 

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transparent and effective . So the 

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units on the front lines actually get 

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the equipment that they need . Well , 

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thank you , Senator , This is something 

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that's very important to us at at the 

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Department and to me and General Milley 

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specifically , and we we talked to our 

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counterparts on a weekly basis and 

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without fail . This is a question that 

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I ask about . We don't have people on 

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the ground to be able to provide 

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accurate feedback on how this equipment 

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is moving and whether or not it's 

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getting to where it's needed most . But 

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the report that we get back from the 

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senior leadership routinely is that 

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it's getting to where it needs to go . 

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But you know , I won't stop , I'll 

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continue to engage and make sure that 

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we emphasize that uh that it's 

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important that all the stuff we're 

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giving them gets to the right place so 

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that they can be successful . And in 

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addition to that , you know , when I 

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engaged the Senior leadership in Kiev 

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last week , I emphasized the importance 

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of accountability as well . And and uh 

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and they acknowledge that this is 

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something that's important and 

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something that they're focused on again 

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without without people on the ground to 

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be able to confirm or deny . Its very 

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very difficult to do at this point . 

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Okay , I appreciate that . Um Turning 

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to Home Secretary Austin in january , I 

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and many of my colleagues sent you a 

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letter regarding D . O . D . Oversight 

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of privatized housing after belle for 

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beauty communities pled guilty to 

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defrauding the government . The 

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department's response provided few 

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meaningful answers on how oversight is 

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actually going to improve and that 

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really needs to change . And on top of 

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that , as you probably know , just a 

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few days ago , the Senate permanent 

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subcommittee on investigations released 

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a report showing that after the period 

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covered by the doj investigation 

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Balfour . Beatty continued to fail to 

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remediate mold failed to make critical 

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repairs and falsified information in 

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the database . D . O . D . Uses to 

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calculate their incentive fee . That is 

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really outrageous and really completely 

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unacceptable . In my home state of 

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Washington Balfour . Beatty continues 

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to obstruct building sufficient housing 

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at Fairchild and along with the 

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shortage of housing in the community 

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where BH fails to keep up with rent 

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prices . That means that military 

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families are left without housing . 

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Some have been stuck living in out out 

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of RVs for months now . Um , and at 

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joint base lewiS mcchord dozens of 

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families have sued Lincoln military 

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housing over really deplorable living 

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conditions . Our service members should 

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have access to the best or at least 

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decent housing , not the worst . Now . 

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We all want to fix this as soon as 

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possible . This budget requests almost 

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$168 million 

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$45 

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million dollars more than last year . 

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Can you tell me first what our military 

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families getting out of this funding 

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increase ? And secondly , what is your 

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assessment of the private housing 

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companies compliance since the plea 

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agreement ? And will you hold them 

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accountable for such horrendous abusive 

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conduct uh , to your last question 

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first , Yes , I will hold them 

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accountable and uh , I expect the 

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service secretaries to hold them 

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accountable as well and , you know , 

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they , the health and welfare of our 

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troops . Our families is very , very 

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important to us . Um , and , you know , 

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we put a great deal of emphasis on this , 

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but , you know , obviously , this is 

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something that we can never take our 

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eyes off of and we're not there yet . 

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We put more more resources into into 

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the budget so we can provide more and 

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higher quality housing . But we're 

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gonna have to hold the contractors 

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accountable and we we intend to do that . 

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I intend to do that . So what what are 

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the military families getting out of 

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the funding increase that's being 

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requested ? It will be of course it's 

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spread out over a number of different 

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projects but it will be more in better 

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housing . So our quality has okay well 

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we've been told this for a long time 

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and we're still seeing these deplorable 

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conditions in the ongoing um really 

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substandard housing and the challenges 

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that our families are having . So this 

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needs a lot of work and oversight and 

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we have got to stay up on top of it . I 

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want to know that you're gonna be doing 

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that . I will thank you . Mr . Chairman 

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Senator Moran . Thank you . Mr . 

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Chairman thank you both for your 

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service to our nation . In your recent 

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written testimony you both mentioned 

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that our adversaries are rapidly 

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developing hypersonic missiles as 

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hypersonic become more commonplace . It 

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seems we can't rely upon nuclear 

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deterrence alone to prevent hypersonic 

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attacks . Once and once hypersonic 

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interceptors are developed how do we 

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plan on deploying these defensive 

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capabilities around the globe to make 

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certain that our deployed troops are 

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sufficiently protected from attack and 

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what shifts do you expect to see in 

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missile and interceptor investment in 

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future years . The US company , as the 

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US as US competes with china , 

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Hypersonic is important to us . And in 

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this budget , I think you've seen 

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senator that we're investing some $7.2 

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billion dollars in long range fires . 

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$4.7 billion dollars of that is focused 

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on hypersonic . And so we're , we 

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continue to develop capability for 

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ourselves . But what's important is 

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that we need to consider the mix the 

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range of capabilities , the mix of 

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capabilities that we're gonna , we're 

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gonna bring on board to support our 

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warfighting concepts . So hypersonic is 

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an important capability . But there are 

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other things that add to this equation 

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as well in terms of defending ourselves , 

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this is a , a priority for me . And as 

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soon as uh , we came on board , I 

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tasked my staff to make sure that we 

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pulled uh , the right elements together 

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to make sure that we were pressing 

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forward rapidly to increase our , our 

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efforts in developing a , our defenses 

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against the hypersonic threat . You've 

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seen us engage industry on this issue 

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and will continue to press . But you 

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know , we've made some progress , but 

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we have a ways to go yet . What what 

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concerns do you have about the 

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hypersonic weapons workforce ? What do 

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we need to do to be training and 

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preparing ourselves ? What kind of 

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investment in our work force is 

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necessary in our , in 

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our private sector workforce . Well , 

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certainly , you know , we've , 

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engaged the , um , engaged 

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industry and asked them to pick up the 

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pace . Uh , and in terms of what they 

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need specifically in their workforce 

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elements . Uh , that's something that 

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we haven't discussed . But uh , but 

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again , I I think the issue to to this 

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point has been , you know , 

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we've we've not pushed to the degree 

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that we we can push and we've not 

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invested to the degree that we can 

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invest . And so we invested in this 

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last year . We invested in it this year . 

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And we're going to continue to press . 

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Thank you . Let me let me shift . Uh , 

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natures of my question , I had the 

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opportunity to review and sit down with 

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staff from the Inspector General's 

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office To discuss their November 21 

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report evaluating the department's 

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implementation of suicide prevention 

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resources for transitioning members . 

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We know from our work on the Veterans 

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Committee that the most vulnerable time 

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for many members of our military as are 

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their leaving active duty and becoming 

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veterans . That Inspector general's 

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report demonstrates a lack of 

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compliance with executive order 138-2 

231
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regarding mental health screenings and 

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the warm handoff to mental health care 

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for transitioning service members . It 

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continues to be troubling to me , uh , 

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that this does not seem to receive the 

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attention that it deserves within our 

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military community . Can you share with 

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me either one of you what progress the 

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department is making in implementing 

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the inspector general's recommendations 

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from that 21 November 21 report . 

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What I can tell you senator is that and 

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you've heard me say this a number of 

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times that this is important to me . 

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This is important to our department and 

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this is why we've invested in in 

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suicide prevention in mental health in 

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in a major way . This year . We've 

249
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invested invested in it last year as 

250
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well . But this year uh we're investing 

251
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$1.4 billion in uh in mental health 

252
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efforts . Uh We continue to uh to 

253
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liaise and engage with our counterparts 

254
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in the V . A . To ensure that we can 

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close as much as possible . Close the 

256
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gap as as troops transition from uh 

257
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from active duty to to leaving the 

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service or going or going in any 

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direction . So , um I've also stood up 

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an independent independent review 

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committee uh to uh to address this 

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issue and give us further insights and 

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mental health issues and also uh 

264
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prevention of suicide . Uh and uh and 

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so we're investing in this in in a 

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major way I intended to pursue this 

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further in in India . And I look 

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forward to your cooperation as we 

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figure out what language instructions 

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might be valuable to the department to 

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see that that gap that you just 

272
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described is closed . Thank you . 

273
00:11:05,070 --> 00:11:07,292
Before I get to Senator Durbin , I just 

274
00:11:07,292 --> 00:11:10,110
want to add to Senator Moran's question 

275
00:11:10,110 --> 00:11:12,680
on on the transition , we have work to 

276
00:11:12,680 --> 00:11:14,458
do . And I know you guys aren't 

277
00:11:14,458 --> 00:11:17,170
necessarily in the position to deal 

278
00:11:17,180 --> 00:11:19,550
with pushing people out . You want to 

279
00:11:19,560 --> 00:11:22,220
keep them in . But it is apparent that 

280
00:11:22,230 --> 00:11:24,690
this is a pretty massive problem and 

281
00:11:24,700 --> 00:11:27,380
it's both active military . And so I 

282
00:11:27,380 --> 00:11:29,436
want to thank Senator Moran for that 

283
00:11:29,436 --> 00:11:31,602
line of questioning . Senator Durbin , 

284
00:11:31,602 --> 00:11:33,769
thank you Mr Chairman , thank you both 

285
00:11:33,769 --> 00:11:35,936
for being here . General Milley and as 

286
00:11:35,936 --> 00:11:35,480
well as Secretary Austin , thank you 

287
00:11:35,480 --> 00:11:37,536
for what you're doing today and your 

288
00:11:37,536 --> 00:11:40,100
years of service to our country . And 

289
00:11:40,100 --> 00:11:42,630
so those of us who have been in the 

290
00:11:42,630 --> 00:11:45,490
business of military politics over a 

291
00:11:45,490 --> 00:11:47,490
period of time are considered to be 

292
00:11:47,490 --> 00:11:49,520
wise forecasters of what's going to 

293
00:11:49,520 --> 00:11:51,750
happen . And sometimes we are and 

294
00:11:51,750 --> 00:11:54,410
sometimes we aren't . I can recall the 

295
00:11:54,410 --> 00:11:56,990
early briefing on what we might expect 

296
00:11:56,990 --> 00:11:59,212
in Ukraine when the Russian troops were 

297
00:11:59,212 --> 00:12:01,350
all poised at the border . And if I 

298
00:12:01,350 --> 00:12:03,710
remember it correctly , the prediction 

299
00:12:03,710 --> 00:12:06,690
was that the city of Kiev would fall in 

300
00:12:06,690 --> 00:12:09,190
a matter of days and that major parts 

301
00:12:09,190 --> 00:12:11,301
of Ukraine would fall to the Russians 

302
00:12:11,301 --> 00:12:13,370
as well . Then they would find find 

303
00:12:13,370 --> 00:12:15,203
that the maintenance of order in 

304
00:12:15,410 --> 00:12:17,577
conquered territory would be extremely 

305
00:12:17,577 --> 00:12:19,354
difficult and they would face a 

306
00:12:19,354 --> 00:12:21,521
resistance for a long period of time . 

307
00:12:21,840 --> 00:12:24,160
I remember that prediction as we all 

308
00:12:24,160 --> 00:12:27,620
watched reality unfold Kiev today , 

309
00:12:27,630 --> 00:12:29,930
thank goodness is still not in the 

310
00:12:29,930 --> 00:12:31,930
hands of the Russians . Those under 

311
00:12:31,930 --> 00:12:34,990
attack , I'm sure , and most of 

312
00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:38,040
Ukraine has not been conquered by 

313
00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:40,560
Russia , thank goodness . Uh and they 

314
00:12:40,560 --> 00:12:42,727
are apparently having a difficult time 

315
00:12:42,727 --> 00:12:44,893
hanging on to what they currently have 

316
00:12:44,893 --> 00:12:47,810
and are fighting to extend their reach 

317
00:12:47,810 --> 00:12:51,040
every day . And I just wonder we can 

318
00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:53,207
assess it in many different ways , but 

319
00:12:53,207 --> 00:12:55,429
certainly the courage and resilience of 

320
00:12:55,429 --> 00:12:57,651
the Ukrainian people first and foremost 

321
00:12:57,651 --> 00:12:59,596
is the reason for what we see , at 

322
00:12:59,596 --> 00:13:01,710
least . I think so . Uh and I wonder 

323
00:13:01,710 --> 00:13:03,599
what we've learned about Russia's 

324
00:13:03,599 --> 00:13:06,010
military strength and what we 

325
00:13:06,010 --> 00:13:08,121
anticipated they would deliver in the 

326
00:13:08,121 --> 00:13:10,399
field and what they actually delivered . 

327
00:13:10,399 --> 00:13:12,510
And I know it's been asked earlier by 

328
00:13:12,510 --> 00:13:14,677
Senator baldwin , but a declaration of 

329
00:13:14,677 --> 00:13:16,843
war , what would that mean in terms of 

330
00:13:16,843 --> 00:13:19,700
Putin's capabilities in extending his 

331
00:13:19,700 --> 00:13:23,120
military reach in Ukraine Secretary , 

332
00:13:23,510 --> 00:13:26,830
with your permission , I'll take a I'll 

333
00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:28,784
answer first . And if you want the 

334
00:13:28,784 --> 00:13:30,673
chairman to respond as well sir , 

335
00:13:30,673 --> 00:13:32,118
certainly we offer that . 

336
00:13:33,540 --> 00:13:37,260
We , I have learned a lot about 

337
00:13:38,440 --> 00:13:42,400
Russia's leadership at the lower levels , 

338
00:13:42,420 --> 00:13:45,280
which I think has been very , very 

339
00:13:46,040 --> 00:13:48,590
key in this in their efforts here . 

340
00:13:49,040 --> 00:13:51,610
They have modern equipment , they have 

341
00:13:51,610 --> 00:13:53,930
lots of it , they have , they have a 

342
00:13:53,930 --> 00:13:56,530
doctrine that that really wasn't 

343
00:13:56,530 --> 00:13:59,730
followed . Uh And uh and so as we 

344
00:13:59,730 --> 00:14:02,450
saw things unfold on the ground , we 

345
00:14:02,450 --> 00:14:06,380
saw them , um , not 

346
00:14:06,390 --> 00:14:09,220
uh , not able to support themselves , 

347
00:14:09,220 --> 00:14:11,276
logistically , we saw them make some 

348
00:14:11,276 --> 00:14:13,510
bad assumptions at the very beginning 

349
00:14:13,510 --> 00:14:16,370
of this . Uh , we saw them fail to 

350
00:14:16,370 --> 00:14:18,580
integrate aerial fires with their 

351
00:14:18,580 --> 00:14:21,320
ground maneuver uh in just a number of 

352
00:14:21,320 --> 00:14:24,630
missteps and and I attribute a lot of 

353
00:14:24,630 --> 00:14:28,090
that too , lack of leadership at the 

354
00:14:28,090 --> 00:14:30,800
lower level . Uh , and then we saw 

355
00:14:30,810 --> 00:14:33,270
Russia pushed its senior officers 

356
00:14:33,270 --> 00:14:35,460
forward as a result of that , and many 

357
00:14:35,460 --> 00:14:38,900
of those were killed from being forward 

358
00:14:38,900 --> 00:14:41,067
on the battlefield . We'll see some of 

359
00:14:41,067 --> 00:14:43,122
the same mistakes , some of the same 

360
00:14:43,122 --> 00:14:45,990
weaknesses as a , as a prosecute the 

361
00:14:45,990 --> 00:14:48,101
fight in the don boss and , and , and 

362
00:14:48,101 --> 00:14:50,157
uh , and in the southern part of the 

363
00:14:50,157 --> 00:14:52,379
country . Uh , but they will learn from 

364
00:14:52,379 --> 00:14:54,601
the lessons uh , that , uh , learn from 

365
00:14:54,601 --> 00:14:57,400
the what they did in the early stages 

366
00:14:57,400 --> 00:14:59,710
of this fight . Uh , and uh , we'll see 

367
00:14:59,710 --> 00:15:02,050
them improve their logistical efforts , 

368
00:15:02,340 --> 00:15:04,451
uh , and we'll see them improve their 

369
00:15:04,451 --> 00:15:06,340
massing of fires and that sort of 

370
00:15:06,340 --> 00:15:08,451
business , but some things they won't 

371
00:15:08,451 --> 00:15:10,396
be able to correct . So we , we've 

372
00:15:10,396 --> 00:15:12,618
learned a lot about their leadership at 

373
00:15:12,618 --> 00:15:14,618
the , at the lower levels and their 

374
00:15:14,618 --> 00:15:16,673
level of training . I'd like General 

375
00:15:16,673 --> 00:15:18,673
Miller to respond . But there was a 

376
00:15:18,673 --> 00:15:20,784
suggestion that if declaration of war 

377
00:15:20,784 --> 00:15:22,673
took place , that something would 

378
00:15:22,673 --> 00:15:24,840
happen automatically under Russian law 

379
00:15:24,840 --> 00:15:27,320
of the conscription . And that suggests 

380
00:15:27,320 --> 00:15:30,530
to me as a civilian that a lot of 

381
00:15:30,540 --> 00:15:33,670
untrained men in this circumstance 

382
00:15:33,710 --> 00:15:36,010
might be called into training and 

383
00:15:36,010 --> 00:15:38,440
exercises that they aren't prepared for . 

384
00:15:38,450 --> 00:15:41,250
They haven't been conditioned for . 

385
00:15:41,340 --> 00:15:43,451
That doesn't seem like it would be an 

386
00:15:43,451 --> 00:15:45,340
immediate boost to their effort . 

387
00:15:45,340 --> 00:15:48,290
That's exactly right senator . He would , 

388
00:15:48,300 --> 00:15:50,390
he would be able to mobilize more 

389
00:15:50,390 --> 00:15:52,680
people , but to adequately train those 

390
00:15:52,680 --> 00:15:54,791
people to be more effective than what 

391
00:15:54,791 --> 00:15:57,069
we've seen on the battlefield thus far , 

392
00:15:57,069 --> 00:15:59,124
that's questionable . Gentlemen . If 

393
00:15:59,124 --> 00:16:01,124
you'd respond to that question I've 

394
00:16:01,124 --> 00:16:03,180
asked earlier , if you'd also add to 

395
00:16:03,180 --> 00:16:05,236
your comments and I'm running out of 

396
00:16:05,236 --> 00:16:07,180
time . I have a particular concern 

397
00:16:07,180 --> 00:16:09,291
about Poland and the Baltics and they 

398
00:16:09,291 --> 00:16:11,013
worry every step of the way of 

399
00:16:11,013 --> 00:16:13,700
extension of Russian aggression into 

400
00:16:13,700 --> 00:16:15,867
their region . I hope you will address 

401
00:16:15,867 --> 00:16:18,033
that in your comments just very , very 

402
00:16:18,033 --> 00:16:20,540
briefly , center uh Declaration of War 

403
00:16:20,540 --> 00:16:22,490
does have some implications inside 

404
00:16:22,490 --> 00:16:25,160
Russian society legally would , as the 

405
00:16:25,160 --> 00:16:27,382
secretary said , it would allow them to 

406
00:16:27,382 --> 00:16:29,660
mobilize additional forces , but again , 

407
00:16:29,660 --> 00:16:31,771
training etcetera , how long it would 

408
00:16:31,771 --> 00:16:33,827
take for them to get to the front in 

409
00:16:33,827 --> 00:16:36,049
terms of the lessons learned leadership 

410
00:16:36,049 --> 00:16:35,490
is clearly the key from Zelensky on 

411
00:16:35,490 --> 00:16:37,720
down to the lowest private and as 

412
00:16:37,730 --> 00:16:39,786
napoleon taught us a long time ago , 

413
00:16:39,786 --> 00:16:41,786
you know , moral is the physical as 

414
00:16:41,786 --> 00:16:44,008
three is to one . So they are capable . 

415
00:16:44,008 --> 00:16:46,008
That is probably the most important 

416
00:16:46,008 --> 00:16:47,841
difference right now between the 

417
00:16:47,841 --> 00:16:49,786
Russians and the Ukrainians is the 

418
00:16:49,786 --> 00:16:51,897
leadership throughout the levels . In 

419
00:16:51,897 --> 00:16:51,740
addition to that is what the Western 

420
00:16:51,740 --> 00:16:53,796
nations NATO and particularly United 

421
00:16:53,796 --> 00:16:55,962
States taught their leaders Since 2014 

422
00:16:55,962 --> 00:16:58,129
about Mission Command . The Ukrainians 

423
00:16:58,129 --> 00:17:00,240
are practicing a decentralized intent 

424
00:17:00,240 --> 00:17:02,462
based set of tactics , the Russians are 

425
00:17:02,462 --> 00:17:04,800
practicing a top down very , very top 

426
00:17:04,800 --> 00:17:07,480
heavy directive in nature , a sort of 

427
00:17:07,490 --> 00:17:09,490
set of orders coming from the top , 

428
00:17:09,490 --> 00:17:11,712
which is not necessarily the best thing 

429
00:17:11,712 --> 00:17:13,768
to do in a dynamic battlefield . The 

430
00:17:13,768 --> 00:17:15,823
second thing is the effective use of 

431
00:17:15,823 --> 00:17:15,490
antitank weapons is being phenomenal on 

432
00:17:15,490 --> 00:17:17,601
the part of the Ukrainians . Third is 

433
00:17:17,601 --> 00:17:19,323
the denial of the airspace air 

434
00:17:19,323 --> 00:17:21,700
supremacy . There's superiority to the 

435
00:17:21,700 --> 00:17:23,644
Russians by the Ukrainians and the 

436
00:17:23,644 --> 00:17:25,644
effective use of , of air defense , 

437
00:17:25,644 --> 00:17:27,630
ground air defense systems . Uh , 

438
00:17:27,640 --> 00:17:29,696
terrain has played to the terrain to 

439
00:17:29,696 --> 00:17:32,970
the Ukrainian favor uh , intelligence 

440
00:17:32,970 --> 00:17:35,026
is really important . The Ukrainians 

441
00:17:35,026 --> 00:17:37,026
have a built in intelligence system 

442
00:17:37,026 --> 00:17:38,859
being the people . So , uh , the 

443
00:17:38,859 --> 00:17:41,026
Russians have walked into an area that 

444
00:17:41,026 --> 00:17:43,081
is clearly unwelcome to them and the 

445
00:17:43,081 --> 00:17:45,303
people who provided a massive amount of 

446
00:17:45,303 --> 00:17:44,930
intelligence . Plus we have opened up 

447
00:17:44,930 --> 00:17:47,152
the pipes , which I'm not gonna go into 

448
00:17:47,152 --> 00:17:49,208
detail here at an open hearing . But 

449
00:17:49,208 --> 00:17:50,986
there's a significant amount of 

450
00:17:50,986 --> 00:17:53,041
intelligence flowing to Ukraine from 

451
00:17:53,041 --> 00:17:54,986
the United States , all of that in 

452
00:17:54,986 --> 00:17:57,041
combination and many , many more are 

453
00:17:57,041 --> 00:17:56,650
some of the early lessons learned that 

454
00:17:56,650 --> 00:17:58,872
have made the difference as what you've 

455
00:17:58,872 --> 00:18:00,928
seen in terms of predictions . Those 

456
00:18:00,928 --> 00:18:03,039
were early assessments . Uh , and war 

457
00:18:03,039 --> 00:18:04,872
is a dynamic interaction between 

458
00:18:04,872 --> 00:18:06,817
competing wills . So between those 

459
00:18:06,817 --> 00:18:08,817
predictions that you heard in early 

460
00:18:08,817 --> 00:18:10,850
february and in january , a lot of 

461
00:18:10,850 --> 00:18:13,260
things happened on that battlefield In 

462
00:18:13,260 --> 00:18:15,320
preparation prior to the invasion on 

463
00:18:15,320 --> 00:18:17,542
the 24th , not the least of which is an 

464
00:18:17,542 --> 00:18:19,431
intelligence flow from the United 

465
00:18:19,431 --> 00:18:21,376
States and that made a significant 

466
00:18:21,376 --> 00:18:23,264
difference in outcomes . And then 

467
00:18:23,264 --> 00:18:26,540
Poland and Balk . It's so Poland is 

468
00:18:26,550 --> 00:18:29,080
Baltics . Yeah , Poland , Poland is 

469
00:18:29,090 --> 00:18:31,423
clearly , you know , these are all NATO , 

470
00:18:31,423 --> 00:18:33,670
Article five allies . As you know the 

471
00:18:33,670 --> 00:18:35,726
United States Under the direction of 

472
00:18:35,726 --> 00:18:37,837
President Secretary Defense . We went 

473
00:18:37,837 --> 00:18:40,190
ahead and directed us troops . So right 

474
00:18:40,190 --> 00:18:42,468
now you have U . S . Troops in Estonia , 

475
00:18:42,468 --> 00:18:44,720
Latvia , Lithuania Poland Romania , 

476
00:18:44,730 --> 00:18:46,940
Hungary . The whole the whole all the 

477
00:18:46,940 --> 00:18:49,560
entire belt has US troops in there . 

478
00:18:50,040 --> 00:18:52,207
And that was done immediately in order 

479
00:18:52,207 --> 00:18:55,440
to reinforce the NATO Article five 

480
00:18:55,450 --> 00:18:57,672
deterrence posture of the United States 

481
00:18:57,672 --> 00:18:59,783
and to assure our allies That they're 

482
00:18:59,783 --> 00:19:02,006
not going to be left alone . So that is 

483
00:19:02,006 --> 00:19:04,228
a critical component . As the president 

484
00:19:04,228 --> 00:19:06,394
has said many many times as members of 

485
00:19:06,394 --> 00:19:05,970
Congress has said many many times . 

486
00:19:05,980 --> 00:19:08,036
Article five matters . It's a Senate 

487
00:19:08,036 --> 00:19:10,258
ratified treaty uh in the United States 

488
00:19:10,258 --> 00:19:12,424
will not give up we will protect every 

489
00:19:12,424 --> 00:19:14,758
inch of NATO territory . Senator Graham . 

490
00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:17,850
Thank you . Mr Chairman thank you both 

491
00:19:17,850 --> 00:19:21,240
for coming . General Austin uh this 

492
00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:24,550
budget request . Is it a 4% increase ? 

493
00:19:28,140 --> 00:19:31,060
Yes . From last year's . Okay . What's 

494
00:19:31,060 --> 00:19:34,740
the inflation rate Current current 

495
00:19:34,740 --> 00:19:37,210
inflation rate is uh well above that . 

496
00:19:37,220 --> 00:19:39,630
Okay , so this budget doesn't keep up 

497
00:19:39,630 --> 00:19:43,400
with inflation number one uh percentage 

498
00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:46,960
of GDP spent on defense . What 

499
00:19:46,970 --> 00:19:49,360
percentage does this budget represent ? 

500
00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:54,590
I think it's 3.1 . Okay . How many 

501
00:19:54,590 --> 00:19:57,840
times have we been below 3% 

502
00:19:58,000 --> 00:20:01,910
since World War II ? Mhm . I 

503
00:20:01,920 --> 00:20:05,360
don't know senator . Well you need to 

504
00:20:05,360 --> 00:20:07,520
look it up in 1940 , 

505
00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:12,030
2000 2001 ? And the 10 year 

506
00:20:12,030 --> 00:20:15,530
window the fiscal year defense plan In 

507
00:20:15,530 --> 00:20:19,430
year 10 2032 what percentage 

508
00:20:19,440 --> 00:20:22,170
of GDP will be spent on defense 

509
00:20:24,420 --> 00:20:28,060
In the 10 year window FY 32 . 

510
00:20:28,440 --> 00:20:30,660
The trajectory on where will we be in 

511
00:20:30,660 --> 00:20:34,640
Fy 32 ? We should be 

512
00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:36,696
a bit above where we are right now . 

513
00:20:36,696 --> 00:20:38,862
What ? 2.4% . If the numbers I've been 

514
00:20:38,862 --> 00:20:41,470
given ? All right . So over time we 

515
00:20:41,470 --> 00:20:44,240
spend less historically than we've ever 

516
00:20:44,240 --> 00:20:47,230
spent And given the 10 years that I'm 

517
00:20:47,230 --> 00:20:49,174
looking at . I don't see it . Real 

518
00:20:49,174 --> 00:20:51,174
peace dividend out there . How many 

519
00:20:51,174 --> 00:20:53,341
current battle for ships do we have in 

520
00:20:53,341 --> 00:20:56,720
the Navy ? So 

521
00:20:58,540 --> 00:21:02,130
We have 296 . We have 11 aircraft 

522
00:21:02,130 --> 00:21:05,290
carriers . How many ships does china 

523
00:21:05,290 --> 00:21:08,400
have ? I think the latest number was 

524
00:21:08,400 --> 00:21:11,650
around 400 . Yeah . 355 . They're going 

525
00:21:11,650 --> 00:21:15,630
to 422 by the end of Well for 60 by 

526
00:21:15,630 --> 00:21:18,920
2030 . Where will we be in terms of 

527
00:21:18,920 --> 00:21:22,170
ships by the end of 2032 . 

528
00:21:24,140 --> 00:21:27,450
Us ships It's 280 . 

529
00:21:28,040 --> 00:21:29,984
So the bottom line is we're on the 

530
00:21:29,984 --> 00:21:31,818
wrong path here . From my humble 

531
00:21:31,818 --> 00:21:34,096
opinion we're spending below inflation . 

532
00:21:34,620 --> 00:21:36,731
The chinese are increasing their navy 

533
00:21:37,140 --> 00:21:40,250
By 2032 . We'll have these numbers . 

534
00:21:40,250 --> 00:21:42,417
All right . We'll have 280 ships below 

535
00:21:42,417 --> 00:21:45,670
what we have today . Uh GDP spent on 

536
00:21:45,670 --> 00:21:48,920
defense will be at 2.4% . I don't know 

537
00:21:48,920 --> 00:21:51,142
what kind of world we're looking at out 

538
00:21:51,142 --> 00:21:53,253
there . But you're seeing a different 

539
00:21:53,253 --> 00:21:55,309
world than I am . And I hope we in a 

540
00:21:55,309 --> 00:21:57,420
bipartisan way , you can correct this 

541
00:21:57,420 --> 00:21:59,420
because I think in really many ways 

542
00:21:59,420 --> 00:22:01,309
this is dangerous . Afghanistan , 

543
00:22:01,309 --> 00:22:04,210
General Milley . Um , I think you and 

544
00:22:04,300 --> 00:22:07,490
uh Secretary Austin said last year That 

545
00:22:07,490 --> 00:22:10,860
we could expect in the next 2-3 years 

546
00:22:11,540 --> 00:22:13,373
threats to the american homeland 

547
00:22:13,373 --> 00:22:15,750
emerged from Afghanistan . Is that 

548
00:22:15,750 --> 00:22:19,250
still accurate ? I still believe that 

549
00:22:19,250 --> 00:22:21,417
to be a correct assessment as it moved 

550
00:22:21,417 --> 00:22:23,417
one way or the other . We're saying 

551
00:22:23,417 --> 00:22:25,639
initial indications as you have seen in 

552
00:22:25,639 --> 00:22:27,750
the media as well and you're privy to 

553
00:22:27,750 --> 00:22:29,917
some of the intelligence which I won't 

554
00:22:29,917 --> 00:22:31,806
go over here . But ISIS and other 

555
00:22:31,806 --> 00:22:33,806
groups are trying to put themselves 

556
00:22:33,806 --> 00:22:36,028
back together . They have not succeeded 

557
00:22:36,028 --> 00:22:38,139
yet and they have not yet presented a 

558
00:22:38,139 --> 00:22:40,194
threat to the U . S . Homeland . But 

559
00:22:40,194 --> 00:22:40,060
we're watching that very , very closely 

560
00:22:40,440 --> 00:22:42,440
and if they raise their head and do 

561
00:22:42,440 --> 00:22:44,384
present a threat , then we'll take 

562
00:22:44,384 --> 00:22:46,218
appropriate actions are over the 

563
00:22:46,218 --> 00:22:47,996
horizon , capability to monitor 

564
00:22:47,996 --> 00:22:50,020
Afghanistan sufficient . I think we 

565
00:22:50,020 --> 00:22:52,242
have room to improve to be sure we do . 

566
00:22:52,242 --> 00:22:55,560
I don't want to do anything classified 

567
00:22:55,560 --> 00:22:58,440
here , but r I . S our presence in 

568
00:22:58,440 --> 00:23:00,662
Afghanistan , I think you'll be shocked 

569
00:23:00,662 --> 00:23:02,551
to know what it is and where it's 

570
00:23:02,551 --> 00:23:04,662
headed to both of you . You advocated 

571
00:23:04,662 --> 00:23:07,310
for a troop troops to remain in 

572
00:23:07,310 --> 00:23:10,160
Afghanistan , Is that correct ? It's 

573
00:23:10,160 --> 00:23:12,382
the President's decision , but that was 

574
00:23:12,382 --> 00:23:14,493
the position of both of you . Is that 

575
00:23:14,493 --> 00:23:16,771
correct ? That's correct ? To be clear . 

576
00:23:16,771 --> 00:23:18,882
Senator . I support the President . I 

577
00:23:18,882 --> 00:23:18,680
know , but the recommendation you gave 

578
00:23:18,680 --> 00:23:20,902
want to be clear was it would be better 

579
00:23:20,902 --> 00:23:23,069
off to have a residual force . Is that 

580
00:23:23,069 --> 00:23:25,236
accurate ? And and so , you know , I I 

581
00:23:25,236 --> 00:23:28,480
will never . Well , the records replete 

582
00:23:28,490 --> 00:23:30,546
with the fact that it was and I just 

583
00:23:30,546 --> 00:23:32,657
want to compliment you both trying to 

584
00:23:32,657 --> 00:23:34,823
compliment you . Hear that ? I thought 

585
00:23:34,823 --> 00:23:36,934
that was the right decision that that 

586
00:23:36,934 --> 00:23:39,900
pulling everybody out of Afghanistan uh 

587
00:23:39,910 --> 00:23:42,350
was a mistake . Do you believe that our 

588
00:23:42,350 --> 00:23:45,540
withdrawal from Afghanistan made it 

589
00:23:45,540 --> 00:23:47,540
more likely that Putin would invade 

590
00:23:47,540 --> 00:23:51,260
Ukraine ? I think that President Putin 

591
00:23:51,260 --> 00:23:53,290
made his decision to invade Ukraine 

592
00:23:53,290 --> 00:23:54,901
long before we pulled out of 

593
00:23:54,901 --> 00:23:57,179
Afghanistan . To be very , very candid . 

594
00:23:57,179 --> 00:23:59,401
Why didn't he do it before ? Why didn't 

595
00:23:59,401 --> 00:24:01,401
he do it before ? Um I think he was 

596
00:24:01,401 --> 00:24:03,568
preparing the force last year . He ran 

597
00:24:03,568 --> 00:24:05,670
a very , very large exercise and 

598
00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:07,847
getting the force ready . Why did they 

599
00:24:07,847 --> 00:24:11,640
invade Crimea when they did in 2014 ? 

600
00:24:13,840 --> 00:24:16,118
I can't answer that question right now . 

601
00:24:16,118 --> 00:24:18,284
I think it's because I've got a theory 

602
00:24:18,284 --> 00:24:20,284
here that that with all due respect 

603
00:24:20,284 --> 00:24:22,450
that Afghanistan sent the worst 

604
00:24:22,450 --> 00:24:25,420
possible signal to our adversaries and 

605
00:24:25,420 --> 00:24:28,680
our allies , President biden and 

606
00:24:28,690 --> 00:24:30,801
Secretary Blinken have said they have 

607
00:24:30,801 --> 00:24:32,801
no regrets regarding our withdrawal 

608
00:24:32,801 --> 00:24:35,240
from Afghanistan . Secretary Austin . 

609
00:24:35,240 --> 00:24:38,080
Do you have any regrets ? Senator ? As 

610
00:24:38,080 --> 00:24:40,024
I said , I support the President's 

611
00:24:40,024 --> 00:24:42,760
decision . And uh and again , um 

612
00:24:43,580 --> 00:24:46,070
What about you ? General Milley , I 

613
00:24:46,070 --> 00:24:48,980
deeply regret the loss of 13 11 marines , 

614
00:24:48,990 --> 00:24:51,220
one sailor . And yeah , I do too . I 

615
00:24:51,220 --> 00:24:53,387
really regret the loss of everybody we 

616
00:24:53,387 --> 00:24:55,276
we've lost over there and all the 

617
00:24:55,276 --> 00:24:57,387
wounded . But do you have any regrets 

618
00:24:57,387 --> 00:24:59,553
in terms of our national security that 

619
00:24:59,553 --> 00:25:02,660
maybe we made the wrong decision ? 

620
00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:05,810
Senator ? I'm a soldier and I execute 

621
00:25:05,810 --> 00:25:07,921
the decisions that I'm told to make . 

622
00:25:07,921 --> 00:25:10,143
Um and I don't think at this point it's 

623
00:25:10,143 --> 00:25:12,366
helpful for me to express regret or not 

624
00:25:12,366 --> 00:25:14,366
enough . So I want to work with you 

625
00:25:14,366 --> 00:25:17,730
both . Um Chairman Durbin has been 

626
00:25:17,730 --> 00:25:19,952
great on Ukraine . We want to do more , 

627
00:25:19,952 --> 00:25:22,119
not less . We're gonna send a signal , 

628
00:25:22,119 --> 00:25:24,030
we're in it to win it . And uh I 

629
00:25:24,030 --> 00:25:26,870
appreciate the robust response is 

630
00:25:26,870 --> 00:25:29,092
getting better every day . So thank you 

631
00:25:29,092 --> 00:25:31,092
both . In terms of the budget , the 

632
00:25:31,092 --> 00:25:33,203
budget before us is inadequate to the 

633
00:25:33,203 --> 00:25:35,259
threats we face and over time it's a 

634
00:25:35,259 --> 00:25:37,481
disaster and I'd like to fix it . Thank 

635
00:25:37,481 --> 00:25:41,430
you . Senator Hovan , Thanks Mr . 

636
00:25:41,430 --> 00:25:43,541
Chairman , question for both of you . 

637
00:25:43,541 --> 00:25:46,560
Uh what weapons systems uh does Ukraine 

638
00:25:46,570 --> 00:25:49,820
need uh and 

639
00:25:49,830 --> 00:25:53,030
most need the most and need the soonest 

640
00:25:53,030 --> 00:25:56,180
that they don't have . What what 

641
00:25:56,180 --> 00:25:58,700
they've asked for , Senator is uh long 

642
00:25:58,700 --> 00:26:01,250
range fire capability . And uh we're 

643
00:26:01,250 --> 00:26:03,360
providing that as you've seen with 

644
00:26:05,010 --> 00:26:08,360
Most recently 9155 

645
00:26:09,480 --> 00:26:12,090
systems and they're able to capable of 

646
00:26:12,090 --> 00:26:13,923
using them or do they need to be 

647
00:26:13,923 --> 00:26:15,979
trained and they're using them now . 

648
00:26:15,979 --> 00:26:18,201
They're using them as we speak , As you 

649
00:26:18,201 --> 00:26:20,090
may know . We we took a number of 

650
00:26:20,090 --> 00:26:22,201
troops out and uh and trained them up 

651
00:26:22,201 --> 00:26:25,660
very quickly on 155 put them back into 

652
00:26:26,230 --> 00:26:28,590
into action and they are employing 

653
00:26:28,590 --> 00:26:30,812
those weapons systems now they have the 

654
00:26:30,812 --> 00:26:33,160
ammunition That we're providing them 

655
00:26:33,160 --> 00:26:35,216
and other countries are providing on 

656
00:26:35,216 --> 00:26:37,410
155 capability as well . They've also 

657
00:26:37,410 --> 00:26:40,110
asked for armored capability , tanks 

658
00:26:40,110 --> 00:26:43,340
and armored vehicles , uh and countries 

659
00:26:43,340 --> 00:26:46,450
in the region are providing that . And 

660
00:26:46,740 --> 00:26:50,670
as we witnessed in our meeting 

661
00:26:50,670 --> 00:26:54,260
that we held in Ramstein a week ago , 

662
00:26:54,740 --> 00:26:57,350
countries like Canada and Germany are 

663
00:26:57,350 --> 00:26:59,461
stepping up providing armored vehicle 

664
00:26:59,461 --> 00:27:02,340
capability and so their their 

665
00:27:02,340 --> 00:27:04,507
capability overall is increasing . And 

666
00:27:04,507 --> 00:27:06,618
then again they put the put the stuff 

667
00:27:06,618 --> 00:27:08,784
that we provided them to very good use 

668
00:27:08,784 --> 00:27:10,896
in addition to the U . A . V . S that 

669
00:27:10,896 --> 00:27:12,673
were also provided general same 

670
00:27:12,673 --> 00:27:14,729
question , same thing . Uh Senator I 

671
00:27:14,729 --> 00:27:16,673
talked to my counterpart literally 

672
00:27:16,673 --> 00:27:18,896
every other day um and we worked very , 

673
00:27:18,896 --> 00:27:21,062
very hard to get him what he thinks he 

674
00:27:21,062 --> 00:27:23,173
needs long range fires , specifically 

675
00:27:23,173 --> 00:27:25,760
cannon artillery And rocket artillery . 

676
00:27:25,760 --> 00:27:28,010
They were used to using the old Soviet 

677
00:27:28,010 --> 00:27:30,350
Model 152 artillery ammunition became a 

678
00:27:30,350 --> 00:27:33,000
problem . So we're moving to a NATO 

679
00:27:33,000 --> 00:27:35,180
standard . So the United States and 

680
00:27:35,180 --> 00:27:37,180
many of our allies and partners are 

681
00:27:37,180 --> 00:27:39,347
providing him with multiple battalions 

682
00:27:39,347 --> 00:27:41,970
worth of 155 cannon and the ammunition 

683
00:27:41,970 --> 00:27:44,026
to go with it . Plus the radars plus 

684
00:27:44,026 --> 00:27:46,081
the fire direction center the entire 

685
00:27:46,081 --> 00:27:48,081
package for effective use of fire . 

686
00:27:48,081 --> 00:27:50,192
That's the most important thing right 

687
00:27:50,192 --> 00:27:52,359
now in the current fight secondly , is 

688
00:27:52,359 --> 00:27:54,581
to continue to sustain him on anti tank 

689
00:27:54,581 --> 00:27:56,748
weapons , very effective anti aircraft 

690
00:27:56,748 --> 00:27:58,970
weapons , ground based either SAm's and 

691
00:27:58,970 --> 00:28:01,192
or manpads . Those are probably the top 

692
00:28:01,192 --> 00:28:03,248
three . And the number four would be 

693
00:28:03,248 --> 00:28:05,470
his ground maneuver capability of tanks 

694
00:28:05,470 --> 00:28:07,692
and mech infantry vehicles , which many 

695
00:28:07,692 --> 00:28:09,914
countries are now helping to contribute 

696
00:28:09,914 --> 00:28:11,914
as well . So those would be the top 

697
00:28:11,914 --> 00:28:11,540
four , There's a whole laundry list 

698
00:28:11,550 --> 00:28:13,883
below that , but those are the top four . 

699
00:28:13,940 --> 00:28:15,940
Looking at what the Ukrainians have 

700
00:28:15,940 --> 00:28:17,884
done to the Russian tanks with our 

701
00:28:17,884 --> 00:28:20,740
javelins . Do we have something that is 

702
00:28:20,740 --> 00:28:22,629
going to ensure that the tanks we 

703
00:28:22,629 --> 00:28:25,150
provide are able to defeat that same 

704
00:28:25,150 --> 00:28:27,550
type of shoulder mounted threat and 

705
00:28:27,550 --> 00:28:31,350
truly be effective ? The tanks that 

706
00:28:31,350 --> 00:28:34,000
we that we that have been provided to 

707
00:28:34,000 --> 00:28:36,420
them . Senator have been uh , tanks 

708
00:28:36,420 --> 00:28:38,531
that they are accustomed to using and 

709
00:28:38,531 --> 00:28:41,770
that they have the the the maintenance 

710
00:28:41,770 --> 00:28:44,630
capabilities to maintain . So , um , 

711
00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:47,360
we've seen tanks , uh , a number of 

712
00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:50,150
tanks being provided by countries like 

713
00:28:50,150 --> 00:28:52,039
Poland and others that are in the 

714
00:28:52,039 --> 00:28:55,460
neighborhood . And and again , 

715
00:28:57,320 --> 00:28:59,264
Russians don't have something that 

716
00:28:59,264 --> 00:29:01,560
approaches the javelin . So that's a 

717
00:29:02,940 --> 00:29:05,020
All right . So then , uh , next 

718
00:29:05,020 --> 00:29:07,690
question , have we fully utilized the 

719
00:29:07,700 --> 00:29:10,070
funds that we've already provided such 

720
00:29:10,070 --> 00:29:12,126
that you need this ? And when do you 

721
00:29:12,126 --> 00:29:14,181
need this supplemental ? And have we 

722
00:29:14,181 --> 00:29:16,403
really focused on the lethal aid versus 

723
00:29:16,403 --> 00:29:18,292
getting other things in this ? 33 

724
00:29:18,292 --> 00:29:20,126
billion supplemental ? Yeah , we 

725
00:29:20,126 --> 00:29:22,237
absolutely have focused on the lethal 

726
00:29:22,237 --> 00:29:24,348
aid Senator and we're at the very end 

727
00:29:24,348 --> 00:29:27,890
of our drawdown capability here . Uh so 

728
00:29:27,900 --> 00:29:29,844
um , you know , we're very quickly 

729
00:29:29,844 --> 00:29:31,678
going to run out of out of fun . 

730
00:29:32,340 --> 00:29:34,507
General . Did you have anything to add 

731
00:29:34,507 --> 00:29:36,729
to that ? No , I think it's clear to me 

732
00:29:36,729 --> 00:29:38,618
that the monies that congress has 

733
00:29:38,618 --> 00:29:40,790
provided is overwhelmingly in support 

734
00:29:40,790 --> 00:29:42,790
of lethal aid . There's no question 

735
00:29:42,790 --> 00:29:45,012
about it . It's almost all lethal aid . 

736
00:29:45,012 --> 00:29:47,012
Actually , I'm switching gears here 

737
00:29:47,012 --> 00:29:49,290
more along the lines of Senator Graham . 

738
00:29:49,540 --> 00:29:51,960
Um are you both this question for both ? 

739
00:29:51,970 --> 00:29:54,040
Are you both fully committed to 

740
00:29:54,050 --> 00:29:57,130
upgrading , updating and modernizing 

741
00:29:57,140 --> 00:30:00,280
our nuclear triad ? And is the funding 

742
00:30:00,280 --> 00:30:02,760
in this budget adequate to do that ? 

743
00:30:03,240 --> 00:30:07,000
$34 billion allocated to 

744
00:30:07,000 --> 00:30:09,650
that ? Uh that effort in this budget . 

745
00:30:09,660 --> 00:30:12,330
Uh and yes , Senator , I am absolutely 

746
00:30:12,330 --> 00:30:14,274
fully committed to modernizing the 

747
00:30:14,274 --> 00:30:16,860
triad . 100% . It's the number one 

748
00:30:16,860 --> 00:30:18,990
priority to in this budget and it'll 

749
00:30:18,990 --> 00:30:20,934
have to be sustained over time and 

750
00:30:20,934 --> 00:30:23,046
future budgets . But that will ensure 

751
00:30:23,046 --> 00:30:25,268
the protection of the United States for 

752
00:30:25,268 --> 00:30:24,720
many , many years and we need to 

753
00:30:24,730 --> 00:30:27,060
reinvest and recapitalize it . No one . 

754
00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:29,440
Thank you . I appreciate that . And 

755
00:30:29,440 --> 00:30:31,830
agree 100% . Final question , are you 

756
00:30:31,830 --> 00:30:34,810
familiar with um sky range for 

757
00:30:34,820 --> 00:30:37,070
developing the sky range system to test 

758
00:30:37,070 --> 00:30:39,310
hyper sonics as a way to actually do it 

759
00:30:39,310 --> 00:30:41,421
rather than lining up naval ships and 

760
00:30:41,421 --> 00:30:43,754
trying to do it . And do you support it , 

761
00:30:43,754 --> 00:30:45,810
including using the global hawks for 

762
00:30:45,810 --> 00:30:48,200
that purpose . I am familiar with it , 

763
00:30:48,210 --> 00:30:50,450
Senator . And yes , I do support it . 

764
00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:52,680
And uh and again the Air Force will 

765
00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:54,850
continue to work to make sure that the 

766
00:30:54,850 --> 00:30:56,961
right capabilities are in place to to 

767
00:30:56,961 --> 00:30:59,070
support that effort . Thank you . I 

768
00:30:59,080 --> 00:31:01,980
appreciate Senator murkowski . Thank 

769
00:31:01,980 --> 00:31:05,270
you . Mr Chairman , gentlemen , thank 

770
00:31:05,270 --> 00:31:07,159
you both for your leadership . We 

771
00:31:07,159 --> 00:31:09,330
appreciate it at all times . But 

772
00:31:09,340 --> 00:31:11,062
certainly at these very , very 

773
00:31:11,062 --> 00:31:13,062
difficult and challenging times . I 

774
00:31:13,062 --> 00:31:15,229
want to just follow on Senator Hogan's 

775
00:31:15,229 --> 00:31:18,760
comments about hyper sonics . Um we are 

776
00:31:18,770 --> 00:31:20,840
in a unique position as you know in 

777
00:31:20,840 --> 00:31:23,420
Alaska and providing the only location 

778
00:31:23,420 --> 00:31:26,270
of supporting both short and long range 

779
00:31:26,280 --> 00:31:29,080
hypersonic weapons testing within the 

780
00:31:29,080 --> 00:31:31,790
country just because of of where we are 

781
00:31:31,790 --> 00:31:34,560
with the unique geographic location . 

782
00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:38,660
Um nobody in the way down there for the 

783
00:31:38,660 --> 00:31:42,570
most part and I know that this is 

784
00:31:42,570 --> 00:31:44,580
something that General Milley , you 

785
00:31:44,580 --> 00:31:47,180
have you have spoken a lot about with 

786
00:31:47,180 --> 00:31:50,640
regards to china china's hypersonic 

787
00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:54,490
weapons testing ability just 

788
00:31:54,490 --> 00:31:56,434
very briefly whether or not you're 

789
00:31:56,434 --> 00:31:59,380
looking at the illusions for for this 

790
00:31:59,380 --> 00:32:03,080
in terms of opportunity for testing Yes . 

791
00:32:03,110 --> 00:32:05,332
In conjunction with our spaceport there 

792
00:32:05,332 --> 00:32:07,499
in kodiak as as the short short answer 

793
00:32:07,499 --> 00:32:09,221
is yes . And hypersonic are an 

794
00:32:09,221 --> 00:32:11,332
important weapon in in a in an entire 

795
00:32:11,332 --> 00:32:13,610
array of weapons systems . As you know , 

796
00:32:13,610 --> 00:32:15,388
the Russians have already fired 

797
00:32:15,388 --> 00:32:17,610
hypersonic weapons in in Ukraine . I do 

798
00:32:17,610 --> 00:32:19,832
want to caveat that though . But but it 

799
00:32:19,832 --> 00:32:22,070
is the key to it is in its name . It is 

800
00:32:22,070 --> 00:32:24,040
very , very fast and there is no 

801
00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:26,860
effective defensive weapon against it 

802
00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:29,630
per se to shoot it down . So the key is 

803
00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:32,530
sent him ran and asked earlier the key 

804
00:32:32,530 --> 00:32:34,752
is to shoot the archer , not the arrows 

805
00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:37,080
and to get at the system at its launch 

806
00:32:37,080 --> 00:32:39,191
sites . The other key from protection 

807
00:32:39,191 --> 00:32:41,302
standpoint is not only the integrated 

808
00:32:41,302 --> 00:32:43,358
air missile ballistic defense system 

809
00:32:43,358 --> 00:32:45,636
but it's also the tactics of the units . 

810
00:32:45,636 --> 00:32:47,802
So units are going to have to be as we 

811
00:32:47,802 --> 00:32:50,024
move into the changing character of war 

812
00:32:50,024 --> 00:32:52,247
in the future , units and organizations 

813
00:32:52,247 --> 00:32:51,960
and equipment are gonna have to be 

814
00:32:51,960 --> 00:32:54,870
smaller , faster . Uh much more hidden 

815
00:32:54,870 --> 00:32:56,759
in the sense of not quite totally 

816
00:32:56,759 --> 00:32:58,926
invisible , probably never get there . 

817
00:32:58,926 --> 00:33:00,814
But uh we we need to be very very 

818
00:33:00,814 --> 00:33:03,037
difficult to find on a battlefield . So 

819
00:33:03,037 --> 00:33:05,092
a constant state of moving in motion 

820
00:33:05,320 --> 00:33:07,542
invisible to the extent that's possible 

821
00:33:07,640 --> 00:33:11,180
smaller in general and speed will 

822
00:33:11,180 --> 00:33:13,291
matter on future battlefields because 

823
00:33:13,810 --> 00:33:15,977
so far what we've seen with hypersonic 

824
00:33:15,977 --> 00:33:17,977
says they're very effective against 

825
00:33:17,977 --> 00:33:19,977
fixed targets , much more difficult 

826
00:33:19,977 --> 00:33:22,650
against moving targets . Let me let me 

827
00:33:22,650 --> 00:33:25,790
ask about the javelins . He was just 

828
00:33:25,790 --> 00:33:27,623
speaking about that with Senator 

829
00:33:27,623 --> 00:33:30,640
Senator Hovan Mr . Secretary and we've 

830
00:33:30,640 --> 00:33:33,200
been working with a constituent of mine . 

831
00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:36,220
He's an army special forces that he's 

832
00:33:36,230 --> 00:33:38,870
been in Ukraine training ground forces 

833
00:33:38,870 --> 00:33:41,037
for the past couple of months . He has 

834
00:33:41,037 --> 00:33:42,950
facilitated several requirements 

835
00:33:42,950 --> 00:33:45,117
letters from the Ukrainian Ministry of 

836
00:33:45,117 --> 00:33:47,320
Defense verifying the need for javelin 

837
00:33:47,330 --> 00:33:50,310
training kits including the head of 

838
00:33:50,310 --> 00:33:53,170
Ukrainian defense Intelligence . I 

839
00:33:53,170 --> 00:33:55,360
understand these documents have been 

840
00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:58,090
pushed to your office . Obviously the 

841
00:33:58,090 --> 00:33:59,900
javelins have the ability to 

842
00:33:59,900 --> 00:34:02,350
significantly help Ukrainian forces . 

843
00:34:02,740 --> 00:34:05,510
But what we're hearing is that the new 

844
00:34:05,510 --> 00:34:08,060
Ukrainian troops are not provided 

845
00:34:08,070 --> 00:34:11,530
adequate training to operate these 

846
00:34:11,540 --> 00:34:14,640
$200,000 weapons 

847
00:34:14,650 --> 00:34:17,630
systems . And they're looking at an 

848
00:34:17,640 --> 00:34:20,030
article that came out um just just a 

849
00:34:20,030 --> 00:34:23,860
few uh a week ago now with regards to 

850
00:34:23,860 --> 00:34:26,150
to the training aspect of it . So the 

851
00:34:26,150 --> 00:34:28,660
question to you is is whether or not 

852
00:34:29,740 --> 00:34:31,851
they they have enough of the javelins 

853
00:34:31,851 --> 00:34:34,250
that they need . But what we're doing 

854
00:34:34,250 --> 00:34:38,060
to help facilitate then the training 

855
00:34:38,070 --> 00:34:39,959
so that they can most effectively 

856
00:34:39,959 --> 00:34:43,180
deploy these weapons . And and what is 

857
00:34:43,180 --> 00:34:45,810
d . O . D telling the Ukrainian 

858
00:34:45,820 --> 00:34:48,380
Ministry of Defense in response to 

859
00:34:48,380 --> 00:34:50,491
their ask for more trainers , how are 

860
00:34:50,491 --> 00:34:53,140
we doing on that side ? First of all , 

861
00:34:53,150 --> 00:34:55,261
thank you Senator . I would highlight 

862
00:34:55,261 --> 00:34:58,120
that we have taken at this point , 

863
00:34:58,150 --> 00:35:00,890
several 100 troops out of out of 

864
00:35:00,890 --> 00:35:03,030
Ukraine train them in other countries 

865
00:35:03,030 --> 00:35:06,240
on artillery , operation of U . A . V . 

866
00:35:06,240 --> 00:35:09,380
S . Uh and other things and and they've 

867
00:35:09,380 --> 00:35:12,280
been reintroduced into the fight . So 

868
00:35:12,290 --> 00:35:14,401
training is something that that we're 

869
00:35:14,401 --> 00:35:18,070
doing . Uh But the issue is that in my 

870
00:35:18,070 --> 00:35:19,903
engagements with the Minister of 

871
00:35:19,903 --> 00:35:22,126
Defense and I think also with the Chief 

872
00:35:22,126 --> 00:35:24,348
of Defense and the Chairman , the issue 

873
00:35:24,348 --> 00:35:26,430
of uh specific issue of training on 

874
00:35:26,430 --> 00:35:29,960
javelins has never come up . But if if 

875
00:35:30,340 --> 00:35:32,562
if they raise that issue , certainly we 

876
00:35:32,562 --> 00:35:34,840
stand ready to to train them if it is a 

877
00:35:34,840 --> 00:35:37,007
requirement . And since you brought it 

878
00:35:37,007 --> 00:35:39,229
up , no doubt it is , we'll go back and 

879
00:35:39,229 --> 00:35:41,284
check with them again and the people 

880
00:35:41,284 --> 00:35:43,229
that they need to train , we stand 

881
00:35:43,229 --> 00:35:45,340
ready to train them and we're pushing 

882
00:35:45,340 --> 00:35:47,507
training kits into into the country as 

883
00:35:47,507 --> 00:35:49,750
well . I will be happy to follow up and 

884
00:35:49,760 --> 00:35:51,816
and provide you with the information 

885
00:35:51,816 --> 00:35:53,871
that we have on this and I thank you 

886
00:35:53,871 --> 00:35:55,982
for that . Um then just very lastly , 

887
00:35:55,982 --> 00:35:58,093
and this doesn't require a response . 

888
00:35:58,093 --> 00:35:58,020
But this is with regards to arctic 

889
00:35:58,030 --> 00:36:00,252
operations . You'd be disappointed if I 

890
00:36:00,252 --> 00:36:03,760
didn't raise it with you . But I am 

891
00:36:03,770 --> 00:36:05,770
thankful that you have stressed the 

892
00:36:05,770 --> 00:36:08,180
importance of supporting arctic 

893
00:36:08,180 --> 00:36:09,958
operations , the training , the 

894
00:36:09,958 --> 00:36:12,150
equipment of our joint forces in this 

895
00:36:12,150 --> 00:36:15,690
important region . I know you've got uh 

896
00:36:15,700 --> 00:36:17,756
good progress that we have made with 

897
00:36:17,756 --> 00:36:19,867
regards to the Ted stevens Securities 

898
00:36:19,867 --> 00:36:22,190
Arctic Security Studies Center in in 

899
00:36:22,190 --> 00:36:25,230
Alaska , the first Deputy Assistant 

900
00:36:25,240 --> 00:36:27,620
Secretary of Defense for Arctic Affairs . 

901
00:36:27,630 --> 00:36:30,380
You've got North com tasked with an 

902
00:36:30,390 --> 00:36:32,612
arctic security assessment . So there's 

903
00:36:32,612 --> 00:36:34,830
a lot coming on in in this way . I 

904
00:36:34,830 --> 00:36:37,052
understand there's a report coming up . 

905
00:36:37,052 --> 00:36:39,163
We'll look forward uh to to reviewing 

906
00:36:39,163 --> 00:36:41,386
that and and being there to support you 

907
00:36:41,386 --> 00:36:43,219
in all those efforts , but truly 

908
00:36:43,219 --> 00:36:45,163
appreciate the heightened level of 

909
00:36:45,163 --> 00:36:47,330
engagement in this very important part 

910
00:36:47,330 --> 00:36:49,710
of of our responsibility . Thank you Mr 

911
00:36:49,710 --> 00:36:51,988
Chairman , thank you Senator murkowski . 

912
00:36:51,988 --> 00:36:54,890
Um I'm gonna take my question time now , 

913
00:36:54,900 --> 00:36:57,011
fellas , we've been at this for about 

914
00:36:57,011 --> 00:36:59,011
an hour and 37 minutes , which is a 

915
00:36:59,011 --> 00:37:01,178
little longer than I had anticipated , 

916
00:37:01,178 --> 00:37:03,233
but it's a big budget and it's worth 

917
00:37:03,233 --> 00:37:05,456
every question to be asked . And I just 

918
00:37:05,456 --> 00:37:07,622
want to start by thanking you guys for 

919
00:37:07,622 --> 00:37:09,789
what you're doing . I mean , the truth 

920
00:37:09,789 --> 00:37:13,060
is , is $773 billion . Um You're gonna 

921
00:37:13,060 --> 00:37:15,060
have people come in saying it's too 

922
00:37:15,060 --> 00:37:17,227
much , you're gonna have people coming 

923
00:37:17,227 --> 00:37:19,338
in saying it's too little , as you've 

924
00:37:19,338 --> 00:37:18,760
already pointed out , secretary , you 

925
00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:20,982
have to snap the shock line somewhere . 

926
00:37:20,982 --> 00:37:23,360
That's a good analogy , And and I just 

927
00:37:23,360 --> 00:37:25,416
appreciate the work that you've done 

928
00:37:25,416 --> 00:37:27,582
because anybody can pick holes in it , 

929
00:37:27,582 --> 00:37:30,620
anybody can pick holes in it and to 

930
00:37:30,620 --> 00:37:32,787
talk about where we're gonna be in the 

931
00:37:32,787 --> 00:37:35,710
next decade , 10 years from now is 

932
00:37:35,710 --> 00:37:38,050
pretty interesting because you have to 

933
00:37:38,050 --> 00:37:40,272
have people around you nimble enough to 

934
00:37:40,272 --> 00:37:42,217
know whether we're even gonna need 

935
00:37:42,217 --> 00:37:44,161
ships or tanks or if it's gonna be 

936
00:37:44,161 --> 00:37:46,106
fought in outer space , or if it's 

937
00:37:46,106 --> 00:37:48,050
gonna be fought in the cyber realm 

938
00:37:48,050 --> 00:37:50,217
wherever it's going to be fought . And 

939
00:37:50,217 --> 00:37:52,383
the truth is , if you screw up , we're 

940
00:37:52,383 --> 00:37:52,170
all gonna have opinions and we're gonna 

941
00:37:52,170 --> 00:37:55,050
beat the out of you . And so you've got 

942
00:37:55,050 --> 00:37:57,217
to do what's best for this country and 

943
00:37:57,217 --> 00:37:59,383
best for the people who are super into 

944
00:37:59,383 --> 00:38:01,550
you . And I just want to thank you for 

945
00:38:01,550 --> 00:38:04,740
that . Talking about the area of um 

946
00:38:04,750 --> 00:38:08,640
Decommissioning divesting . Um 

947
00:38:08,650 --> 00:38:11,000
It's always a challenge . You've always 

948
00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:13,000
got people in the Senate that don't 

949
00:38:13,000 --> 00:38:15,520
want to see certain things go away . Um , 

950
00:38:15,530 --> 00:38:17,990
but , but I want to talk about a 

951
00:38:17,990 --> 00:38:20,340
proposal to get rid of ships that quite 

952
00:38:20,340 --> 00:38:22,920
frankly , we just put into service . In 

953
00:38:22,920 --> 00:38:25,142
fact , some of them aren't even totally 

954
00:38:25,142 --> 00:38:27,142
put into service yet . The littoral 

955
00:38:27,142 --> 00:38:29,710
combat ships . Um , how much confidence 

956
00:38:29,710 --> 00:38:31,821
do you have in the analysis that that 

957
00:38:31,821 --> 00:38:33,877
these things just aren't fit for the 

958
00:38:33,877 --> 00:38:37,530
fight ? I'm very , very confident 

959
00:38:37,540 --> 00:38:40,540
Chairman . I again , I think you hit 

960
00:38:40,540 --> 00:38:42,760
the nail on the head . There were 

961
00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:45,090
looking to acquire capabilities that 

962
00:38:45,090 --> 00:38:47,220
are relevant in the future fight and 

963
00:38:47,220 --> 00:38:50,820
survivable . The earlier variants of 

964
00:38:50,820 --> 00:38:53,070
this , of the ship that you mentioned , 

965
00:38:53,520 --> 00:38:56,240
uh , did not live up to expectations . 

966
00:38:56,240 --> 00:38:59,650
It's very expensive to maintain . And 

967
00:38:59,650 --> 00:39:01,970
so we've made the decision that could 

968
00:39:01,970 --> 00:39:05,340
be uh better to 

969
00:39:05,350 --> 00:39:07,420
decommission those ships and invest 

970
00:39:07,430 --> 00:39:10,370
those resources and in acquiring 

971
00:39:10,370 --> 00:39:13,160
capabilities that are more agile and 

972
00:39:13,160 --> 00:39:15,160
more relevant to the future . Fight 

973
00:39:15,160 --> 00:39:17,650
more survivable . Um , 

974
00:39:19,120 --> 00:39:23,100
and those those ships have been 

975
00:39:23,100 --> 00:39:25,540
on the books for , um , like I said , 

976
00:39:25,540 --> 00:39:27,540
they're not , I think there's still 

977
00:39:27,540 --> 00:39:29,880
some in process , But they were 

978
00:39:29,880 --> 00:39:32,102
designed what , 20 years ago , 15 years 

979
00:39:32,102 --> 00:39:34,158
ago do you do , you know offhand ? I 

980
00:39:34,158 --> 00:39:36,380
think it was about 20 years ago , about 

981
00:39:36,380 --> 00:39:38,491
20 years ago and it's already changed 

982
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:40,520
In 20 years . Uh , and pretty 

983
00:39:40,520 --> 00:39:42,687
dramatically , I might add , I want to 

984
00:39:42,687 --> 00:39:44,853
talk a little bit about something it's 

985
00:39:44,853 --> 00:39:46,853
already been visited . And that's , 

986
00:39:46,853 --> 00:39:46,340
that's accountability . There's been 

987
00:39:46,340 --> 00:39:47,520
$3.7 billion 

988
00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:53,840
16.4 

989
00:39:53,850 --> 00:39:56,170
uh projected to go out . You had said 

990
00:39:56,170 --> 00:39:58,840
with earlier questions that um , 

991
00:39:59,720 --> 00:40:02,050
you're reasonably confident that the 

992
00:40:02,060 --> 00:40:04,171
that the that the weaponry is getting 

993
00:40:04,171 --> 00:40:06,670
to the to the Ukrainians and I get it , 

994
00:40:06,680 --> 00:40:08,680
you don't have people on the ground 

995
00:40:08,680 --> 00:40:10,958
there to be able to monitor everything . 

996
00:40:10,958 --> 00:40:13,490
But but the the question is , and is is 

997
00:40:13,490 --> 00:40:16,520
that are we making sure that 

998
00:40:17,210 --> 00:40:20,300
number one , none of these weapons are 

999
00:40:20,300 --> 00:40:22,522
falling into the wrong hands . Is there 

1000
00:40:22,522 --> 00:40:24,590
any way to even do that ? And then 

1001
00:40:24,590 --> 00:40:26,646
number two , are we making sure that 

1002
00:40:27,080 --> 00:40:29,080
the taxpayer dollars that are being 

1003
00:40:29,080 --> 00:40:32,690
spent um are are actually 

1004
00:40:32,700 --> 00:40:35,960
um , making a difference . And I'm 

1005
00:40:35,960 --> 00:40:38,960
talking a significant difference . Well , 

1006
00:40:38,960 --> 00:40:40,849
first of all , I I think they are 

1007
00:40:40,849 --> 00:40:43,016
making a difference , chairman . And , 

1008
00:40:43,016 --> 00:40:45,300
you know , just look at the battlefield 

1009
00:40:45,300 --> 00:40:48,250
today versus what we're looking at a 

1010
00:40:48,260 --> 00:40:51,000
couple of weeks ago , we see that the 

1011
00:40:51,000 --> 00:40:53,880
Russians , uh , the Ukrainians have 

1012
00:40:53,880 --> 00:40:57,230
defeated the Russians around Kiev and 

1013
00:40:57,240 --> 00:40:59,430
they've they've moved back . They're 

1014
00:40:59,430 --> 00:41:02,030
focused on the south and east now . Uh 

1015
00:41:02,030 --> 00:41:04,310
And uh we expect that to be a bit of a 

1016
00:41:04,310 --> 00:41:06,800
different flavor of fight that employs 

1017
00:41:06,800 --> 00:41:09,580
more long range fires , a bit more 

1018
00:41:09,580 --> 00:41:12,500
maneuver , uh and the Ukrainians have 

1019
00:41:12,500 --> 00:41:15,170
asked for what they believe is relevant 

1020
00:41:15,180 --> 00:41:18,910
in that fight . And uh the department 

1021
00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:21,770
and the joint staff under Chairman , uh 

1022
00:41:21,780 --> 00:41:23,947
Chairman's leadership . They're really 

1023
00:41:23,947 --> 00:41:26,500
hustled to get the capabilities that to 

1024
00:41:26,500 --> 00:41:28,722
them as quickly as possible . And we've 

1025
00:41:28,722 --> 00:41:30,944
engaged other other countries to do the 

1026
00:41:30,944 --> 00:41:33,380
same to provide additional capability . 

1027
00:41:33,390 --> 00:41:35,830
But in terms of accountability , uh we 

1028
00:41:35,830 --> 00:41:37,997
we have to depend on the Ukrainians at 

1029
00:41:37,997 --> 00:41:41,220
this point to uh to do the right thing 

1030
00:41:41,220 --> 00:41:44,830
and and and make sure that they are 

1031
00:41:45,610 --> 00:41:48,170
prudent and careful about how they 

1032
00:41:48,180 --> 00:41:50,402
issue these weapons out and account for 

1033
00:41:50,402 --> 00:41:52,620
these weapons . Again , I I engaged a 

1034
00:41:52,620 --> 00:41:54,731
very senior leadership in the country 

1035
00:41:54,731 --> 00:41:56,898
on this issue and they assured me that 

1036
00:41:56,898 --> 00:41:59,064
this is something that's important and 

1037
00:41:59,064 --> 00:42:01,120
they'll they'll continue to focus on 

1038
00:42:01,120 --> 00:42:04,990
for for resupplying . Um There's a 

1039
00:42:04,990 --> 00:42:07,046
lot of stories about coal production 

1040
00:42:07,046 --> 00:42:09,046
lines , about the fact that we have 

1041
00:42:09,046 --> 00:42:11,101
supply chain issues when it comes to 

1042
00:42:11,101 --> 00:42:12,879
replacing everything that we're 

1043
00:42:12,879 --> 00:42:14,879
shipping in the Ukraine and and our 

1044
00:42:14,879 --> 00:42:17,430
allies are shipping into Ukraine to you 

1045
00:42:17,430 --> 00:42:19,652
said you thought , and don't let me put 

1046
00:42:19,652 --> 00:42:22,510
words in your mouth that the weaponry 

1047
00:42:22,510 --> 00:42:24,677
could be replaced within the next year 

1048
00:42:24,677 --> 00:42:27,950
with this budget . It's all of it won't 

1049
00:42:27,950 --> 00:42:30,240
be replaced within a within a year . I 

1050
00:42:30,250 --> 00:42:33,860
it will see production lines operate 

1051
00:42:33,860 --> 00:42:36,510
at at different speeds just based upon 

1052
00:42:36,510 --> 00:42:38,760
what they are . We were optimistic 

1053
00:42:38,760 --> 00:42:41,680
about the javelin being 

1054
00:42:42,100 --> 00:42:45,670
the industry being able to increase uh 

1055
00:42:45,680 --> 00:42:47,830
the production rate in a very 

1056
00:42:47,830 --> 00:42:50,410
meaningful way and uh and their 

1057
00:42:50,410 --> 00:42:52,990
decisions to be made about the on the 

1058
00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:55,111
on the Stinger going forward . But in 

1059
00:42:55,111 --> 00:42:57,370
every case , uh the , you know , the 

1060
00:42:57,380 --> 00:42:59,860
industry has leaned into this and is 

1061
00:42:59,860 --> 00:43:01,890
willing to work with us to increase 

1062
00:43:01,890 --> 00:43:04,057
production as much as possible and the 

1063
00:43:04,057 --> 00:43:06,020
dollars in this budget accomplish 

1064
00:43:06,500 --> 00:43:08,667
accomplish getting those production up 

1065
00:43:08,667 --> 00:43:11,160
lines up and it and it accomplishes 

1066
00:43:11,160 --> 00:43:13,730
getting what we need to replace what's 

1067
00:43:13,730 --> 00:43:15,730
being utilized and the supplemental 

1068
00:43:15,730 --> 00:43:18,250
that we've asked you for right senator 

1069
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:23,300
um in the opening statement um 

1070
00:43:23,310 --> 00:43:25,477
and this is for you , General Milley I 

1071
00:43:25,477 --> 00:43:28,790
believe asking for 100 and 30 

1072
00:43:28,800 --> 00:43:30,990
billion in R . And D spending . That's 

1073
00:43:30,990 --> 00:43:33,500
10 billion over 2020 to 12 billion over 

1074
00:43:33,500 --> 00:43:36,240
the previous year . Procurement 

1075
00:43:36,250 --> 00:43:39,620
conversely is flat at about 144 billion 

1076
00:43:40,500 --> 00:43:42,800
for years . R . And D . Has been used 

1077
00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:46,020
in mature and prototype technologies 

1078
00:43:46,400 --> 00:43:50,360
like a I like hyper sonics um which 

1079
00:43:50,360 --> 00:43:52,620
are important . Um 

1080
00:43:54,300 --> 00:43:56,411
if we're gonna if we're gonna compete 

1081
00:43:56,411 --> 00:43:59,520
particularly with china . So 

1082
00:44:00,000 --> 00:44:02,260
when when will they become real 

1083
00:44:02,260 --> 00:44:05,850
programs and and and wildly feeling my 

1084
00:44:05,850 --> 00:44:08,830
concern is is that we're prototype and 

1085
00:44:08,830 --> 00:44:10,941
everything to death and it never gets 

1086
00:44:10,941 --> 00:44:12,997
to the field . Is this a concern you 

1087
00:44:12,997 --> 00:44:15,630
have number one General and number two , 

1088
00:44:15,640 --> 00:44:17,196
can you give me any sort of 

1089
00:44:17,196 --> 00:44:19,362
expectations when we might see some of 

1090
00:44:19,362 --> 00:44:21,480
this stuff come to reality . And I 

1091
00:44:21,480 --> 00:44:23,880
think the time window and again , I 

1092
00:44:23,880 --> 00:44:25,547
agree with your comment about 

1093
00:44:25,547 --> 00:44:28,380
predicting 10 , 15 years out but we do 

1094
00:44:28,380 --> 00:44:30,547
know the broad outlines or at least we 

1095
00:44:30,547 --> 00:44:32,658
think we know the broad outlines well 

1096
00:44:32,658 --> 00:44:34,658
the future operating environment in 

1097
00:44:34,658 --> 00:44:36,602
this changing character of war and 

1098
00:44:36,602 --> 00:44:38,950
these programs will need to be online 

1099
00:44:38,960 --> 00:44:42,030
fielded in the hands of The force in 

1100
00:44:42,030 --> 00:44:44,030
the in the hands of the joint force 

1101
00:44:44,030 --> 00:44:47,750
inside of 10 years . If we are going to 

1102
00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:51,560
have an opportunity to be superior 

1103
00:44:51,580 --> 00:44:53,802
to our adversaries specifically China . 

1104
00:44:53,802 --> 00:44:56,024
The programs . I'm specifically talking 

1105
00:44:56,024 --> 00:44:58,024
about our artificial intelligence , 

1106
00:44:58,024 --> 00:45:00,191
robotics , hypersonic . There's a wide 

1107
00:45:00,191 --> 00:45:02,358
variety of these technologies that are 

1108
00:45:02,358 --> 00:45:04,580
coming online . But in addition to that 

1109
00:45:04,580 --> 00:45:04,510
it's more than just the technologies , 

1110
00:45:04,700 --> 00:45:06,867
the Joint warfighter concept . We have 

1111
00:45:06,867 --> 00:45:08,978
to get that on the street . We've got 

1112
00:45:08,978 --> 00:45:11,200
to make sure that our organizations are 

1113
00:45:11,200 --> 00:45:13,422
doctrines and our talent management are 

1114
00:45:13,422 --> 00:45:15,589
all adjusted . We've got to shift this 

1115
00:45:15,589 --> 00:45:17,644
military from its current state That 

1116
00:45:17,644 --> 00:45:19,978
we're in and we have to bias the future . 

1117
00:45:19,978 --> 00:45:22,144
We have to make some predictions as as 

1118
00:45:22,144 --> 00:45:24,089
as risky as that can be as to what 

1119
00:45:24,089 --> 00:45:26,200
warfare will look like in the 20s 30s 

1120
00:45:26,200 --> 00:45:28,367
and 2040s . And we've got to move this 

1121
00:45:28,367 --> 00:45:30,533
organization in that direction . If we 

1122
00:45:30,533 --> 00:45:32,644
fail to do that , we'll be condemning 

1123
00:45:32,644 --> 00:45:34,867
generations to come to be on the losing 

1124
00:45:34,867 --> 00:45:36,867
side of the war . We can do it . We 

1125
00:45:36,867 --> 00:45:39,033
were capable of doing it . This budget 

1126
00:45:39,033 --> 00:45:41,256
puts us on that path . Okay . And so is 

1127
00:45:41,256 --> 00:45:44,000
that's good to know that's that's good 

1128
00:45:44,000 --> 00:45:46,950
enough . Um One last question then I'll 

1129
00:45:46,950 --> 00:45:50,200
let you guys go Mr Secretary of the 

1130
00:45:50,210 --> 00:45:53,080
2022 National Defense Strategy . It 

1131
00:45:53,080 --> 00:45:55,380
does continue to highlight china's are 

1132
00:45:55,380 --> 00:45:58,300
most consequential strategic competitor 

1133
00:45:58,300 --> 00:46:01,400
and pacing challenge is the Russian 

1134
00:46:01,400 --> 00:46:03,289
invasion of Ukraine caused you to 

1135
00:46:03,289 --> 00:46:05,289
rethink the department's priorities 

1136
00:46:05,289 --> 00:46:08,270
laid out in the N . D . S . And uh and 

1137
00:46:08,270 --> 00:46:10,480
we will that have budget implications 

1138
00:46:10,480 --> 00:46:14,170
if if the answer is yes . Mhm . It is 

1139
00:46:14,170 --> 00:46:16,059
not chairman . As you look at the 

1140
00:46:16,059 --> 00:46:18,440
strategy you see , we we characterize 

1141
00:46:18,450 --> 00:46:20,710
the Russian Russia as an acute threat 

1142
00:46:21,290 --> 00:46:23,890
in the capabilities that we're going 

1143
00:46:23,890 --> 00:46:26,810
after and to support our our 

1144
00:46:26,820 --> 00:46:30,400
competition with with china uh are 

1145
00:46:30,410 --> 00:46:33,320
very , very relevant to what we're 

1146
00:46:33,330 --> 00:46:35,497
seeing . And potentially we'll have to 

1147
00:46:35,497 --> 00:46:38,820
do uh in an extreme case with with 

1148
00:46:38,820 --> 00:46:41,340
respect to Russia . Uh and and we , you 

1149
00:46:41,340 --> 00:46:43,396
know , we're part of a the strongest 

1150
00:46:43,396 --> 00:46:46,440
alliance in the world with with NATO . 

1151
00:46:46,450 --> 00:46:48,540
It's not only our capability that's 

1152
00:46:48,540 --> 00:46:50,373
relevant there but it's also the 

1153
00:46:50,373 --> 00:46:52,484
capability of our all of our allies . 

1154
00:46:52,484 --> 00:46:54,596
So what we're going after is relevant 

1155
00:46:54,596 --> 00:46:57,000
to both both areas of competition . 

1156
00:46:57,980 --> 00:46:59,970
Thank you both . I just want to 

1157
00:46:59,970 --> 00:47:01,940
acknowledge that Senator Shelby's 

1158
00:47:01,940 --> 00:47:04,480
statement will be a part of the record 

1159
00:47:04,490 --> 00:47:08,350
and uh and let him know that we 

1160
00:47:08,350 --> 00:47:11,340
missed him here today and and we look 

1161
00:47:11,340 --> 00:47:14,040
forward for him to return very very 

1162
00:47:14,040 --> 00:47:15,800
soon . Um 

1163
00:47:17,080 --> 00:47:20,310
Everybody has theories . Everybody has 

1164
00:47:20,320 --> 00:47:24,010
2020 hindsight . And I can tell you 

1165
00:47:24,020 --> 00:47:27,800
um just as a statement for the record , 

1166
00:47:28,480 --> 00:47:32,120
the some can say that the pullout of 

1167
00:47:32,120 --> 00:47:34,990
Afghanistan was a mistake . I think it 

1168
00:47:34,990 --> 00:47:38,070
was a decision that had to be made that 

1169
00:47:38,080 --> 00:47:40,860
quite frankly it could be questioned 

1170
00:47:40,860 --> 00:47:42,804
either way if we left troops there 

1171
00:47:42,804 --> 00:47:44,860
would have been questioned if we had 

1172
00:47:44,860 --> 00:47:46,638
pulled out troops , we could be 

1173
00:47:46,638 --> 00:47:48,582
questioned . But to say that Putin 

1174
00:47:48,582 --> 00:47:50,804
invaded Ukraine because of the pull out 

1175
00:47:50,804 --> 00:47:52,916
Afghanistan is the most bizarre thing 

1176
00:47:52,916 --> 00:47:52,750
I've ever heard . It was just his 

1177
00:47:52,750 --> 00:47:55,490
theory . So I got mine . I think the 

1178
00:47:55,490 --> 00:47:57,712
reason Putin invaded Ukraine is because 

1179
00:47:57,712 --> 00:47:59,712
president trump empowered him to do 

1180
00:47:59,712 --> 00:48:01,860
such . I don't expect a response from 

1181
00:48:01,860 --> 00:48:03,582
you guys on that , but this is 

1182
00:48:03,582 --> 00:48:06,990
absolutely ridiculous . Um I want to 

1183
00:48:07,000 --> 00:48:09,450
once again appreciate your guys 

1184
00:48:09,450 --> 00:48:11,710
testimony here today . Senators may 

1185
00:48:11,710 --> 00:48:13,880
submit , submit additional written 

1186
00:48:13,880 --> 00:48:16,560
questions and we ask that you respond 

1187
00:48:16,560 --> 00:48:18,838
to them in a reasonable period of time . 

1188
00:48:18,838 --> 00:48:21,004
In other words , as quick as you can . 

1189
00:48:21,510 --> 00:48:23,490
This defense subcommittee were 

1190
00:48:23,500 --> 00:48:27,090
reconvene on Tuesday May 10th At 10 a.m . 

1191
00:48:27,090 --> 00:48:29,257
to hear from the Secretary of the Army 

1192
00:48:29,257 --> 00:48:31,201
and the Army Chief of Staff . This 

1193
00:48:31,201 --> 00:48:32,410
committee stands in recess .