1 00:00:00,340 --> 00:00:03,180 today . Friends , colleagues , and we 2 00:00:03,180 --> 00:00:05,920 welcome those watching online as well . 3 00:00:06,840 --> 00:00:09,340 Now in every generation , in every 4 00:00:09,340 --> 00:00:11,260 administration , kind of , the 5 00:00:11,260 --> 00:00:13,680 Washington crowd here watches with 6 00:00:13,680 --> 00:00:16,460 great interest to see who's appointed 7 00:00:16,460 --> 00:00:18,182 to fill the positions of a new 8 00:00:18,182 --> 00:00:20,349 administration . It's kind of like our 9 00:00:20,349 --> 00:00:23,990 version of the NFL draft and 10 00:00:24,000 --> 00:00:26,222 sometimes you hear about an appointment 11 00:00:26,222 --> 00:00:28,444 and you say to yourself , okay , that's 12 00:00:28,444 --> 00:00:31,070 kind of an interesting choice . That's 13 00:00:31,070 --> 00:00:33,920 not entirely a compliment . Other times , 14 00:00:34,340 --> 00:00:36,230 it feels like the person has the 15 00:00:36,230 --> 00:00:39,340 background and expertise so well 16 00:00:39,340 --> 00:00:42,040 matched for the position that it's like 17 00:00:42,040 --> 00:00:45,400 an obvious choice . That's the reaction 18 00:00:45,410 --> 00:00:48,120 I had when I heard Dr Kathleen Hicks 19 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:50,860 would be Deputy Secretary of Defense . 20 00:00:51,710 --> 00:00:53,821 She's a leader for whom the role just 21 00:00:53,821 --> 00:00:57,160 made perfect sense . Now have I had the 22 00:00:57,160 --> 00:00:59,140 pleasure of knowing the Deputy 23 00:00:59,140 --> 00:01:02,260 Secretary for many years now . And I've 24 00:01:02,260 --> 00:01:04,920 learned from her that whole time . I 25 00:01:04,920 --> 00:01:07,087 had the good fortune to serve with her 26 00:01:07,087 --> 00:01:08,920 on the National Defense Strategy 27 00:01:08,920 --> 00:01:12,810 Commission in 2018 . And I 28 00:01:12,810 --> 00:01:16,130 gotta say I was appointed by the 29 00:01:16,130 --> 00:01:17,852 Republican side . Chairman Mac 30 00:01:17,852 --> 00:01:21,830 thornberry . Dr Hicks was not . Um 31 00:01:21,840 --> 00:01:23,618 and I just didn't know what the 32 00:01:23,618 --> 00:01:27,450 dynamics would be like . And I think my 33 00:01:28,240 --> 00:01:30,184 primary takeaway beyond just being 34 00:01:30,184 --> 00:01:32,129 impressed with her knowledge , her 35 00:01:32,129 --> 00:01:34,130 intelligence and her kindness and 36 00:01:34,130 --> 00:01:37,580 decency was kath 37 00:01:37,760 --> 00:01:40,980 listened , which is a quality that many 38 00:01:40,980 --> 00:01:43,520 in Washington , don't have they like to 39 00:01:43,520 --> 00:01:46,250 talk . Uh and I learned a lot that she 40 00:01:46,250 --> 00:01:48,417 was willing to listen even for someone 41 00:01:48,417 --> 00:01:50,540 like me . And I think that's probably 42 00:01:50,540 --> 00:01:54,230 why we had ah a commission report with 43 00:01:54,230 --> 00:01:56,660 consensus across all the commissioners 44 00:01:58,250 --> 00:02:01,540 and over the years . She's been a 45 00:02:01,540 --> 00:02:03,707 regular at the Reagan National Defense 46 00:02:03,707 --> 00:02:05,818 Forum where her voice really commands 47 00:02:05,818 --> 00:02:07,984 respect from both sides of the aisle . 48 00:02:07,984 --> 00:02:10,207 I think Kathy got bored with me calling 49 00:02:10,207 --> 00:02:12,320 her up every year around this time 50 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:14,431 actually . So it's no surprise you're 51 00:02:14,431 --> 00:02:17,040 here now . Ah Kath we need you on the 52 00:02:17,040 --> 00:02:20,270 panel again . Yes again 53 00:02:20,440 --> 00:02:24,200 and uh really always willing not only 54 00:02:24,200 --> 00:02:26,860 to participate but advise and and and 55 00:02:26,860 --> 00:02:29,190 give me and the Reagan Institute good 56 00:02:29,200 --> 00:02:32,110 uh advice in terms of who should be 57 00:02:32,110 --> 00:02:34,054 there . What issues we should talk 58 00:02:34,054 --> 00:02:36,221 about as we brought together and bring 59 00:02:36,221 --> 00:02:38,443 together the national defense community 60 00:02:38,443 --> 00:02:40,499 which is still very grateful for her 61 00:02:40,499 --> 00:02:42,832 pedigree is impeccable a PhD from M . I . 62 00:02:42,832 --> 00:02:44,888 T . Senior vice President as a Henry 63 00:02:44,888 --> 00:02:46,666 Kissinger chair and Director of 64 00:02:46,666 --> 00:02:48,777 International Security program at the 65 00:02:48,777 --> 00:02:50,721 Center for Strategic International 66 00:02:50,721 --> 00:02:52,499 Studies . She of course was the 67 00:02:52,499 --> 00:02:54,721 Principal Deputy Undersecretary Defense 68 00:02:54,721 --> 00:02:56,888 for Policy in the Obama administration 69 00:02:58,240 --> 00:03:01,680 Led many leading strategic reviews at 70 00:03:01,680 --> 00:03:04,000 the department defense the 2012 defense 71 00:03:04,000 --> 00:03:06,610 retreated guidance at 2010 quadrennial 72 00:03:06,610 --> 00:03:08,666 defense review , a relic of the past 73 00:03:08,666 --> 00:03:10,850 but certainly made a big impact then 74 00:03:11,440 --> 00:03:12,996 crafted guidance for future 75 00:03:12,996 --> 00:03:14,884 capabilities , military posture , 76 00:03:15,140 --> 00:03:17,950 contingency and theater plans . Kathy 77 00:03:17,950 --> 00:03:20,180 is clearly not no stranger to strategy 78 00:03:20,180 --> 00:03:22,402 and planning now in her current role as 79 00:03:22,402 --> 00:03:24,458 Deputy Secretary . She's tasked with 80 00:03:24,458 --> 00:03:26,569 overseeing internal management of the 81 00:03:26,569 --> 00:03:29,570 pentagon as all deputy secretaries 82 00:03:30,240 --> 00:03:33,170 deal . But her background is so stellar 83 00:03:33,170 --> 00:03:34,892 and known and and expertise in 84 00:03:34,892 --> 00:03:36,448 strategic thinking that her 85 00:03:36,448 --> 00:03:38,670 responsibilities are truly broader than 86 00:03:38,670 --> 00:03:40,781 that . That's why we're so honored to 87 00:03:40,781 --> 00:03:42,892 have you here today to talk about the 88 00:03:42,892 --> 00:03:44,670 administration's vision for the 89 00:03:44,670 --> 00:03:46,670 strategy we need to meet the global 90 00:03:46,670 --> 00:03:48,892 threats we face and how we can properly 91 00:03:48,892 --> 00:03:51,320 resource that strategy now , given how 92 00:03:51,320 --> 00:03:53,640 much the world has transformed and the 93 00:03:53,640 --> 00:03:56,480 just the past few months the National 94 00:03:56,480 --> 00:03:59,130 Defense Strategy is of course highly 95 00:03:59,130 --> 00:04:01,297 anticipated . This is the unclassified 96 00:04:01,297 --> 00:04:03,297 version for those who have seen the 97 00:04:03,297 --> 00:04:06,310 classified one uh since March . Uh They 98 00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:08,542 know what will come though , they can't 99 00:04:08,542 --> 00:04:10,598 speak about it . And what I think we 100 00:04:10,598 --> 00:04:12,542 all know is that it will be highly 101 00:04:12,542 --> 00:04:14,653 consequential . How does this sifting 102 00:04:14,653 --> 00:04:16,764 security environment in europe change 103 00:04:16,764 --> 00:04:18,764 things ? Given of course the war in 104 00:04:18,764 --> 00:04:22,180 Ukraine and Russian aggression even as 105 00:04:22,180 --> 00:04:24,320 the strategic conflict , the district 106 00:04:24,320 --> 00:04:26,950 conflict rages on , we have to focus on 107 00:04:26,950 --> 00:04:30,580 the indo pacific specifically china and 108 00:04:30,580 --> 00:04:32,747 how to respond to their investments in 109 00:04:32,747 --> 00:04:34,802 advanced technologies that of course 110 00:04:34,802 --> 00:04:36,413 are redefining the future of 111 00:04:36,413 --> 00:04:38,910 competition and conflict and of course 112 00:04:38,910 --> 00:04:41,132 how much do we need to spend to sustain 113 00:04:41,132 --> 00:04:43,354 all of these priorities . So we'll have 114 00:04:43,354 --> 00:04:45,521 a wide ranging conversation today from 115 00:04:45,521 --> 00:04:47,688 threats to strategy to budget and more 116 00:04:48,340 --> 00:04:50,229 so . I want to thank everyone for 117 00:04:50,229 --> 00:04:52,284 joining us and please welcome One of 118 00:04:52,284 --> 00:04:54,451 the sharpest minds in government . The 119 00:04:54,451 --> 00:04:56,730 35th Deputy Secretary Defense dr 120 00:04:56,730 --> 00:04:57,730 Kathleen Hicks . 121 00:05:08,140 --> 00:05:10,084 Alright , hopefully this mic is on 122 00:05:10,120 --> 00:05:12,231 you'd think after having run a lot of 123 00:05:12,231 --> 00:05:14,342 think tank events I would know better 124 00:05:14,342 --> 00:05:16,509 than to wear a dress on a day when I'm 125 00:05:16,509 --> 00:05:18,564 supposed to speak , but I think this 126 00:05:18,564 --> 00:05:18,420 will work . Um and also they've 127 00:05:18,420 --> 00:05:20,800 elevated me to my highest height ever . 128 00:05:20,810 --> 00:05:23,920 Um So first of all , great thanks to 129 00:05:23,920 --> 00:05:26,570 Roger and for the full team here to the 130 00:05:26,570 --> 00:05:28,626 Reagan Institute for hosting today's 131 00:05:28,626 --> 00:05:31,790 event . I have had the great pleasure 132 00:05:31,790 --> 00:05:34,600 of working with Roger for years in the 133 00:05:34,600 --> 00:05:37,380 past and attending of course the events 134 00:05:37,380 --> 00:05:40,370 out west . Um and you all do really 135 00:05:40,370 --> 00:05:42,610 important work and I will say , I think 136 00:05:42,610 --> 00:05:45,290 it's a testament um today's event , I 137 00:05:45,290 --> 00:05:47,250 hope to our ability to continue to 138 00:05:47,250 --> 00:05:49,083 bridge across really challenging 139 00:05:49,083 --> 00:05:51,050 political divides uh to have a 140 00:05:51,050 --> 00:05:53,330 conversation on serious topics and keep 141 00:05:53,330 --> 00:05:55,274 that going on across the political 142 00:05:55,274 --> 00:05:57,497 spectrum . So I think thank you all for 143 00:05:57,497 --> 00:05:59,663 hosting me . So I'm here today to talk 144 00:05:59,663 --> 00:06:01,886 a little bit about the National Defense 145 00:06:01,886 --> 00:06:03,886 strategy and the President's fiscal 146 00:06:03,886 --> 00:06:06,610 year 2023 defense budget request as 147 00:06:06,610 --> 00:06:08,730 Secretary Austin noted when he was 148 00:06:08,730 --> 00:06:10,897 addressing the Reagan National Defense 149 00:06:10,897 --> 00:06:13,000 forum back in december , Ronald . 150 00:06:13,000 --> 00:06:15,111 Reagan the 40th president was someone 151 00:06:15,111 --> 00:06:17,170 who loved democracy and had an 152 00:06:17,170 --> 00:06:19,580 implacable opposition to autocracy . 153 00:06:19,650 --> 00:06:21,650 Just walking through the halls here 154 00:06:21,650 --> 00:06:24,180 today really reinforces that from the 155 00:06:24,180 --> 00:06:26,960 many quotes um and artifacts that are 156 00:06:26,970 --> 00:06:28,803 that are here in this building . 157 00:06:29,340 --> 00:06:31,550 President biden shares those core 158 00:06:31,550 --> 00:06:33,550 convictions about the importance of 159 00:06:33,550 --> 00:06:35,717 protecting our democracy , which today 160 00:06:35,717 --> 00:06:38,640 faces a myriad of challenges the people 161 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:41,510 in Ukraine remain foremost on our minds . 162 00:06:41,540 --> 00:06:44,210 Russia poses an acute threat to the 163 00:06:44,210 --> 00:06:46,560 international system . As illustrated 164 00:06:46,560 --> 00:06:48,671 by its ongoing war of choice and it's 165 00:06:48,671 --> 00:06:51,290 brutal tactics . Our national defense 166 00:06:51,290 --> 00:06:53,346 strategy fully accounts for Russia's 167 00:06:53,346 --> 00:06:56,460 threats in europe and beyond . But even 168 00:06:56,460 --> 00:06:58,860 as we confront Russia's aggression and 169 00:06:58,860 --> 00:07:01,240 malign activities , the strategy is 170 00:07:01,240 --> 00:07:04,140 clear that china is our military's most 171 00:07:04,140 --> 00:07:06,650 consequential strategic competitor and 172 00:07:06,650 --> 00:07:09,910 pacing challenge . And our strategy 173 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:11,642 also acknowledges that we face 174 00:07:11,642 --> 00:07:14,340 additional persistent regional threats , 175 00:07:14,350 --> 00:07:16,460 including those emanating from Iran 176 00:07:16,470 --> 00:07:18,990 north Korea and violent extremist 177 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:21,840 organizations as well as transboundary 178 00:07:21,840 --> 00:07:23,840 challenges like climate change that 179 00:07:23,840 --> 00:07:27,030 affect our missions and operations . In 180 00:07:27,030 --> 00:07:29,197 an address to the American people . In 181 00:07:29,197 --> 00:07:31,700 1983 , President Reagan spoke about his 182 00:07:31,700 --> 00:07:33,867 defense budget request . In this way , 183 00:07:34,840 --> 00:07:37,690 budget is much more than a long list of 184 00:07:37,690 --> 00:07:40,510 numbers for behind all the numbers lies 185 00:07:40,520 --> 00:07:42,810 America's ability to prevent the 186 00:07:42,810 --> 00:07:45,000 greatest of human tragedies and 187 00:07:45,000 --> 00:07:47,170 preserve our free way of life in a 188 00:07:47,170 --> 00:07:49,060 sometimes dangerous world . 189 00:07:50,540 --> 00:07:52,970 Similarly , this administration built 190 00:07:52,980 --> 00:07:55,660 our budget request in direct response 191 00:07:55,660 --> 00:07:57,549 to the objectives of our national 192 00:07:57,549 --> 00:08:00,550 defense strategy . Our strategy has 193 00:08:00,550 --> 00:08:03,190 four priority objectives . First 194 00:08:03,200 --> 00:08:05,200 defending the homeland paste to the 195 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:08,130 multi domain threat that china poses 196 00:08:08,130 --> 00:08:11,410 today and can in the future . two 197 00:08:11,420 --> 00:08:14,810 Deterring strategic attacks . Third , 198 00:08:14,820 --> 00:08:16,870 deterring aggression , while being 199 00:08:16,870 --> 00:08:19,140 prepared to prevail in conflict . 200 00:08:19,180 --> 00:08:21,700 Prioritizing the PRC challenge in the 201 00:08:21,710 --> 00:08:24,060 indo pacific then the Russia challenge 202 00:08:24,060 --> 00:08:26,620 in europe and finally building a 203 00:08:26,630 --> 00:08:29,560 resilient joint force defense ecosystem . 204 00:08:30,540 --> 00:08:32,990 The President's fiscal year 23 request 205 00:08:33,000 --> 00:08:36,970 of $773 billion a roughly 206 00:08:36,980 --> 00:08:40,720 8.1% increase over the 22 request 207 00:08:40,730 --> 00:08:44,150 and 4% above the just inked fy 208 00:08:44,150 --> 00:08:47,890 2022 . Omnibus makes the investments . 209 00:08:47,890 --> 00:08:50,530 We need to implement the strategy by 210 00:08:50,530 --> 00:08:53,390 pursuing three approaches which connect 211 00:08:53,400 --> 00:08:56,790 our means to our ends . Our first 212 00:08:56,790 --> 00:08:59,390 approach is integrated deterrence . We 213 00:08:59,390 --> 00:09:01,850 seek to network our efforts across 214 00:09:01,850 --> 00:09:05,240 domains , theaters and the spectrum of 215 00:09:05,240 --> 00:09:08,510 conflict to ensure that the U . S . 216 00:09:08,510 --> 00:09:11,220 Military in close cooperation with the 217 00:09:11,220 --> 00:09:13,387 rest of the U . S . Government and our 218 00:09:13,387 --> 00:09:15,609 allies and partners makes the folly and 219 00:09:15,609 --> 00:09:18,860 costs of aggression very clear . The 220 00:09:18,860 --> 00:09:21,130 combat credibility of the U . S . 221 00:09:21,130 --> 00:09:23,930 Military to fight and win is the 222 00:09:23,930 --> 00:09:26,650 cornerstone of integrated deterrence . 223 00:09:27,220 --> 00:09:29,620 That is why our top line request for 224 00:09:29,630 --> 00:09:33,470 fiscal year 23 includes $276 billion 225 00:09:33,470 --> 00:09:35,760 dollars for procurement and for 226 00:09:35,760 --> 00:09:37,649 research , development , test and 227 00:09:37,649 --> 00:09:40,380 evaluation and that is across land , 228 00:09:40,390 --> 00:09:43,850 air , sea , cyber and space domains 229 00:09:43,850 --> 00:09:46,040 that must be netted together for 230 00:09:46,040 --> 00:09:49,580 integrated deterrence Of note across 231 00:09:49,580 --> 00:09:52,000 that spectrum of conflict . We also are 232 00:09:52,000 --> 00:09:55,060 investing $34.4 billion dollars in 233 00:09:55,060 --> 00:09:57,260 recapitalizing the nuclear triad . 234 00:09:58,640 --> 00:10:01,600 Campaigning is our second approach and 235 00:10:01,600 --> 00:10:04,370 its related campaigning strengthens 236 00:10:04,370 --> 00:10:06,259 deterrence and enables us to gain 237 00:10:06,259 --> 00:10:08,430 advantage against the full range of 238 00:10:08,430 --> 00:10:10,950 competitors . Coercive actions . 239 00:10:12,350 --> 00:10:14,950 The United States will operate forces 240 00:10:14,980 --> 00:10:17,400 synchronized broader department efforts 241 00:10:17,410 --> 00:10:19,610 and align department activities with 242 00:10:19,620 --> 00:10:21,920 other instruments of national power to 243 00:10:21,930 --> 00:10:24,510 undermine acute forms of competitor 244 00:10:24,510 --> 00:10:27,280 coercion complicate adversaries , 245 00:10:27,280 --> 00:10:29,820 military preparations and develop our 246 00:10:29,830 --> 00:10:31,997 own war fighting capabilities together 247 00:10:31,997 --> 00:10:35,380 with allies and partners Readiness for 248 00:10:35,380 --> 00:10:37,500 the threats of today is central to 249 00:10:37,500 --> 00:10:39,600 campaigning , which is why we invest 250 00:10:39,610 --> 00:10:43,110 almost $135 billion dollars in military 251 00:10:43,110 --> 00:10:46,030 readiness . And while we maintain the 252 00:10:46,030 --> 00:10:49,630 ability to respond across the globe are 253 00:10:49,630 --> 00:10:51,830 campaigning efforts will be focused on 254 00:10:51,830 --> 00:10:54,750 the indo pacific and europe . Through 255 00:10:54,750 --> 00:10:56,861 the pacific deterrence initiative and 256 00:10:56,861 --> 00:10:58,972 other regionally focused efforts . We 257 00:10:58,972 --> 00:11:00,861 make investments that support our 258 00:11:00,861 --> 00:11:02,990 comparative military advantage and 259 00:11:02,990 --> 00:11:05,130 bolster our posture and logistics in 260 00:11:05,130 --> 00:11:07,880 the indo pacific region regarding 261 00:11:07,880 --> 00:11:10,180 europe . Our request supports the 262 00:11:10,180 --> 00:11:12,458 european deterrence initiative . U . S . 263 00:11:12,458 --> 00:11:14,980 European command and our ironclad 264 00:11:14,980 --> 00:11:18,670 commitment to NATO . America's ongoing 265 00:11:18,670 --> 00:11:20,570 support to the people of Ukraine 266 00:11:20,580 --> 00:11:23,060 exemplifies these priorities in europe . 267 00:11:23,540 --> 00:11:25,600 As President biden has stated in the 268 00:11:25,600 --> 00:11:27,656 perennial struggle for democracy and 269 00:11:27,656 --> 00:11:30,510 freedom . Ukraine and its people are on 270 00:11:30,510 --> 00:11:33,470 the front lines . Thanks to the 271 00:11:33,470 --> 00:11:35,581 responsiveness of this administration 272 00:11:35,581 --> 00:11:37,748 and the United States Congress , we've 273 00:11:37,748 --> 00:11:40,120 already delivered over $4 billion 274 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:45,830 $3 275 00:11:45,830 --> 00:11:49,600 billion February 24 . That's 276 00:11:49,600 --> 00:11:52,580 remarkable To ensure the Ukrainians 277 00:11:52,580 --> 00:11:54,691 continue to get the capabilities they 278 00:11:54,691 --> 00:11:56,469 need to defend themselves . The 279 00:11:56,469 --> 00:11:58,580 president has recently made a request 280 00:11:58,580 --> 00:12:00,330 for an additional $33 billion 281 00:12:00,330 --> 00:12:04,280 16 billion of which will be for 282 00:12:04,280 --> 00:12:07,450 the Department of Defense . Earlier 283 00:12:07,450 --> 00:12:09,710 this week , I was in Troy Alabama with 284 00:12:09,710 --> 00:12:11,821 president biden visiting the Lockheed 285 00:12:11,821 --> 00:12:13,710 martin facility where our javelin 286 00:12:13,710 --> 00:12:15,710 missiles , which were an early game 287 00:12:15,710 --> 00:12:17,780 changer in Ukraine where they are 288 00:12:17,780 --> 00:12:20,470 produced . We were there to thank the 289 00:12:20,470 --> 00:12:22,303 women and men who worked at that 290 00:12:22,303 --> 00:12:25,630 facility for their tireless efforts in 291 00:12:25,630 --> 00:12:27,852 supplying the Department of Defense and 292 00:12:27,852 --> 00:12:30,110 our allies and partners . The work they 293 00:12:30,110 --> 00:12:32,970 do in Troy and across our entire 294 00:12:32,970 --> 00:12:35,730 defense industrial base is central to 295 00:12:35,730 --> 00:12:37,841 the execution of our national defense 296 00:12:37,841 --> 00:12:39,897 strategy . That's the third approach 297 00:12:39,897 --> 00:12:42,480 for connecting our ends to our means 298 00:12:42,490 --> 00:12:45,930 building enduring advantage . This 299 00:12:45,930 --> 00:12:47,930 requires us to invest in our people 300 00:12:48,040 --> 00:12:50,262 like providing the largest pay raise in 301 00:12:50,262 --> 00:12:52,318 20 years to our military personnel , 302 00:12:52,480 --> 00:12:54,760 investing in affordable childcare and 303 00:12:54,760 --> 00:12:56,649 ensuring their food and housing . 304 00:12:56,649 --> 00:12:59,710 Security . Building enduring advantage 305 00:12:59,720 --> 00:13:02,530 also means focusing intensely on 306 00:13:02,540 --> 00:13:05,170 innovation and modernization . And that 307 00:13:05,170 --> 00:13:07,990 is why we invest roughly 100 and $30 308 00:13:07,990 --> 00:13:10,560 billion in R . D . T . Nd our largest 309 00:13:10,560 --> 00:13:14,030 request ever Finally to combat the 310 00:13:14,030 --> 00:13:15,863 effects of climate change on our 311 00:13:15,863 --> 00:13:18,230 military . We invest $3 billion dollars 312 00:13:18,230 --> 00:13:20,240 to deploy new technologies , create 313 00:13:20,240 --> 00:13:21,970 efficiencies and prepare our 314 00:13:21,980 --> 00:13:24,920 infrastructure . As I've outlined , our 315 00:13:24,920 --> 00:13:26,809 budget request makes the critical 316 00:13:26,809 --> 00:13:28,698 investments we need to defend our 317 00:13:28,698 --> 00:13:31,500 nation . But our security depends on 318 00:13:31,500 --> 00:13:34,870 more than just dollars . We must 319 00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:37,380 outperform and out innovate would be 320 00:13:37,380 --> 00:13:40,130 threats . This means making sure that 321 00:13:40,140 --> 00:13:42,090 at the department we knocked down 322 00:13:42,090 --> 00:13:43,868 barriers that stymie innovative 323 00:13:43,868 --> 00:13:47,100 thinking simultaneously . Dut faces 324 00:13:47,110 --> 00:13:49,166 external barriers to innovation like 325 00:13:49,166 --> 00:13:52,510 delays and annual appropriations moving 326 00:13:52,510 --> 00:13:55,270 forward . Both inside and outside the 327 00:13:55,270 --> 00:13:57,326 five sides of the pentagon . We must 328 00:13:57,326 --> 00:13:59,548 work to find solutions to problems such 329 00:13:59,548 --> 00:14:01,603 as these to realize the concepts and 330 00:14:01,603 --> 00:14:04,060 capabilities that this century demands . 331 00:14:05,940 --> 00:14:08,162 I'm gonna conclude by just thanking you 332 00:14:08,162 --> 00:14:10,162 once again for inviting me to speak 333 00:14:10,162 --> 00:14:11,996 this morning . The Department of 334 00:14:11,996 --> 00:14:13,940 Defense today is ready to play its 335 00:14:13,940 --> 00:14:15,829 vital role in advancing President 336 00:14:15,829 --> 00:14:18,420 Biden's national security objectives As 337 00:14:18,420 --> 00:14:20,420 articulated in the National Defense 338 00:14:20,420 --> 00:14:22,630 Strategy , in connecting our ends ways 339 00:14:22,630 --> 00:14:25,470 and means we have proceeded with the 340 00:14:25,470 --> 00:14:28,010 object objectivity and rigor that our 341 00:14:28,010 --> 00:14:30,700 national security demands as Secretary 342 00:14:30,700 --> 00:14:33,100 Austin has said in doing so , we seek a 343 00:14:33,100 --> 00:14:35,570 21st century that is far more secure 344 00:14:35,750 --> 00:14:37,930 and far less bloody than the world of 345 00:14:37,940 --> 00:14:39,930 the 20th . I look forward to the 346 00:14:39,930 --> 00:14:40,930 discussion , 347 00:14:48,440 --> 00:14:52,260 mm . Mhm . Thank 348 00:14:52,260 --> 00:14:54,510 you dr hicks for those comments again . 349 00:14:54,510 --> 00:14:56,566 And for being here today we're we'll 350 00:14:56,566 --> 00:14:59,180 have a About 25 minutes or so of 351 00:14:59,190 --> 00:15:02,960 discussion and then we'll open up to 352 00:15:02,960 --> 00:15:04,738 the audience here for for their 353 00:15:04,738 --> 00:15:06,738 questions again . So appreciate you 354 00:15:06,738 --> 00:15:09,640 doing this . Um writing a defense 355 00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:11,807 strategy , coordinating with the White 356 00:15:11,807 --> 00:15:13,751 House . You want to make sure that 357 00:15:13,751 --> 00:15:15,807 follows a national security strategy 358 00:15:15,990 --> 00:15:18,046 and of course you probably think all 359 00:15:18,046 --> 00:15:20,323 right , please let the world cooperate . 360 00:15:20,323 --> 00:15:22,546 So all our assumptions in that strategy 361 00:15:22,546 --> 00:15:24,879 don't change . How's that going for you ? 362 00:15:24,879 --> 00:15:28,260 It's going well , which part of it 363 00:15:28,270 --> 00:15:30,437 would you like to tackle first . So we 364 00:15:30,437 --> 00:15:32,500 um let's take let's take the Russia 365 00:15:32,500 --> 00:15:35,090 piece . Um Russia has not been shy 366 00:15:35,090 --> 00:15:37,360 about its intentions . We've seen from 367 00:15:37,740 --> 00:15:41,050 uh Chechnya Georgia . Ukraine 368 00:15:41,050 --> 00:15:43,880 previously Syria . And certainly even 369 00:15:43,880 --> 00:15:46,210 last spring with the exercises the 370 00:15:46,210 --> 00:15:48,510 Russians were undertaking on their 371 00:15:48,510 --> 00:15:52,190 border with Ukraine a very clear um set 372 00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:54,450 of aggressive activities um that 373 00:15:54,450 --> 00:15:56,561 signaled well to us this way in which 374 00:15:56,561 --> 00:15:58,450 we've talked about it as an acute 375 00:15:58,450 --> 00:16:00,420 threat . You combine that with the 376 00:16:00,430 --> 00:16:03,660 election interference . Um uh you know , 377 00:16:03,670 --> 00:16:05,830 other other non military approaches . 378 00:16:05,830 --> 00:16:07,774 The Russians have undertaken cyber 379 00:16:07,774 --> 00:16:10,230 activities etcetera . Pretty clear 380 00:16:10,230 --> 00:16:13,170 pattern . So the fact that this time 381 00:16:13,170 --> 00:16:15,114 they actually went across which of 382 00:16:15,114 --> 00:16:17,080 course we had been signaling well 383 00:16:17,080 --> 00:16:19,940 before the next this most recent 384 00:16:19,940 --> 00:16:22,420 invasion that they were going to do was 385 00:16:22,420 --> 00:16:24,240 not a surprise in our strategy 386 00:16:24,240 --> 00:16:26,980 development . Um and the United States 387 00:16:26,980 --> 00:16:29,750 has invested very well since 2014 in 388 00:16:29,750 --> 00:16:31,861 particular in the European Deterrence 389 00:16:31,861 --> 00:16:33,583 Initiative . We built a lot of 390 00:16:33,583 --> 00:16:35,639 capability . There's over 100,000 US 391 00:16:35,639 --> 00:16:38,160 military forces today in and around the 392 00:16:38,160 --> 00:16:40,104 european theater . We're in a good 393 00:16:40,104 --> 00:16:42,970 position there . So that piece I think 394 00:16:42,980 --> 00:16:45,120 um fit very well with how we were 395 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:47,176 thinking about the challenges of the 396 00:16:47,176 --> 00:16:49,400 future . Our NATO allies . I think the 397 00:16:49,400 --> 00:16:52,260 biggest surprises around uh Ukraine are 398 00:16:52,260 --> 00:16:54,204 the fact that our NATO allies have 399 00:16:54,204 --> 00:16:57,880 really embrace the moment . Um partners 400 00:16:57,880 --> 00:17:00,120 have as well , both in the region and 401 00:17:00,120 --> 00:17:02,064 beyond and of course the Ukrainian 402 00:17:02,064 --> 00:17:04,240 people have really demonstrated that 403 00:17:04,250 --> 00:17:06,490 the will to to fight for your country 404 00:17:06,490 --> 00:17:09,490 to protect democracy um is probably the 405 00:17:09,490 --> 00:17:12,500 most powerful tools that any of us have 406 00:17:12,510 --> 00:17:14,770 in protecting the international order 407 00:17:14,940 --> 00:17:17,460 and our freedoms within it . We'll get 408 00:17:17,460 --> 00:17:19,571 to the White House piece coordinating 409 00:17:19,571 --> 00:17:21,793 the White House as well to get your Nds 410 00:17:21,793 --> 00:17:24,016 to follow the N . S . S . Of course the 411 00:17:24,016 --> 00:17:26,182 National Strategy has not come out and 412 00:17:26,182 --> 00:17:28,182 pretty creative way you guys handle 413 00:17:28,182 --> 00:17:30,016 that classified delivered to the 414 00:17:30,016 --> 00:17:32,238 Congress a two page fact sheet . So you 415 00:17:32,238 --> 00:17:34,182 try to nested within resources but 416 00:17:34,182 --> 00:17:36,182 certainly hasn't been the rollout . 417 00:17:36,182 --> 00:17:38,238 Probably you anticipated get to that 418 00:17:38,238 --> 00:17:40,700 innocent . We'll go there now , you 419 00:17:40,700 --> 00:17:43,290 know , that you pick a time when the 420 00:17:43,290 --> 00:17:45,512 National Security strategy has followed 421 00:17:45,512 --> 00:17:47,980 uh an easy course or pathway across any 422 00:17:47,980 --> 00:17:50,202 administration . I think it's right and 423 00:17:50,202 --> 00:17:52,313 appropriate to take your time on that 424 00:17:52,313 --> 00:17:54,424 strategy to get it right . A strategy 425 00:17:54,424 --> 00:17:56,202 is not a document . Strategy is 426 00:17:56,202 --> 00:17:58,424 something that you live and execute and 427 00:17:58,424 --> 00:18:00,480 it should be constantly reviewed and 428 00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:02,591 updated . That's true of our nds it's 429 00:18:02,591 --> 00:18:02,220 true of the National Security strategy 430 00:18:02,290 --> 00:18:04,457 and I do anticipate you'll see that in 431 00:18:04,457 --> 00:18:07,130 the coming months the the N . D . S . 432 00:18:07,140 --> 00:18:09,110 By statute from the United States 433 00:18:09,110 --> 00:18:11,332 Congress is required to be delivered in 434 00:18:11,332 --> 00:18:13,554 classified form . And we have done that 435 00:18:13,554 --> 00:18:15,554 with an unclassified summary and we 436 00:18:15,554 --> 00:18:17,610 have done that . We would like to be 437 00:18:17,610 --> 00:18:20,000 above and beyond the rule of law . Um 438 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:22,760 And in the spirit of how we try to 439 00:18:22,760 --> 00:18:24,927 operate in the department provide that 440 00:18:24,927 --> 00:18:26,760 unclassified fuller unclassified 441 00:18:26,760 --> 00:18:28,871 description . But it's appropriate to 442 00:18:28,871 --> 00:18:31,930 wait to see how the Nss is built out . 443 00:18:31,930 --> 00:18:34,130 So we make sure it's it's best nested 444 00:18:34,140 --> 00:18:36,450 there . Well let's let's stick on that 445 00:18:36,460 --> 00:18:40,440 thread for a minute um Back 446 00:18:40,450 --> 00:18:42,750 when the Bush 43 administration came 447 00:18:42,750 --> 00:18:44,750 into office . They rolled out their 448 00:18:44,820 --> 00:18:48,130 strategy and of course president George 449 00:18:48,130 --> 00:18:51,490 W Bush ran on a campaign of Not doing 450 00:18:51,490 --> 00:18:54,030 humanitarian intervention . 9 11 451 00:18:54,030 --> 00:18:57,330 happens . Freedom agenda comes in and 452 00:18:57,330 --> 00:19:00,160 it was a major market shift in strategy . 453 00:19:00,170 --> 00:19:02,226 I don't think that's a controversial 454 00:19:02,226 --> 00:19:05,940 thing to say . They change is this 455 00:19:05,940 --> 00:19:08,350 moment a similar moment . It would seem 456 00:19:08,350 --> 00:19:10,572 to be based on your answer that the NDS 457 00:19:10,572 --> 00:19:12,739 there's continuity and you anticipated 458 00:19:12,739 --> 00:19:14,517 of what I heard you say and the 459 00:19:14,517 --> 00:19:16,683 strategy anticipated that Russia might 460 00:19:16,683 --> 00:19:18,794 do something like this . On the other 461 00:19:18,794 --> 00:19:20,794 hand , one could interpret that the 462 00:19:20,794 --> 00:19:23,128 nationality strategy not coming out and , 463 00:19:23,128 --> 00:19:25,294 you know , the reporting suggest there 464 00:19:25,294 --> 00:19:27,183 could be more than just personnel 465 00:19:27,183 --> 00:19:26,930 changes . That there could be shifts in 466 00:19:26,930 --> 00:19:28,986 that strategy . Perhaps suggest that 467 00:19:29,640 --> 00:19:31,640 what's happening in europe , what's 468 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:33,473 happening with Russia means that 469 00:19:33,473 --> 00:19:35,529 there's an or a shift in orientation 470 00:19:35,529 --> 00:19:37,660 from from the White House as a result 471 00:19:37,660 --> 00:19:39,660 of the war in Ukraine . What's your 472 00:19:39,660 --> 00:19:41,827 take ? No , my take is I think there's 473 00:19:41,827 --> 00:19:44,830 a First of all focus of time and energy 474 00:19:44,840 --> 00:19:46,820 on Ukraine . As I just pointed out 475 00:19:46,820 --> 00:19:49,290 since February 24 , we've been just 476 00:19:49,300 --> 00:19:52,870 moving at light speed uh to support 477 00:19:52,870 --> 00:19:55,700 cross diplomatic economic means , You 478 00:19:55,700 --> 00:19:57,867 know , toughest sanctions in history . 479 00:19:57,867 --> 00:20:00,033 The diplomatic effort is immense . The 480 00:20:00,033 --> 00:20:02,144 security assistance effort is immense 481 00:20:02,144 --> 00:20:04,256 takes a lot of time and energy period 482 00:20:04,256 --> 00:20:06,510 full stop . Um I do think you'll see 483 00:20:06,520 --> 00:20:08,870 the themes essentially where the Nss 484 00:20:08,870 --> 00:20:11,092 will will end up , I think will be very 485 00:20:11,092 --> 00:20:13,203 consistent with where it was headed . 486 00:20:13,203 --> 00:20:15,370 It was not a finalized document that's 487 00:20:15,370 --> 00:20:17,314 held up . It was in process . So I 488 00:20:17,314 --> 00:20:19,537 think that process picks up and I think 489 00:20:19,537 --> 00:20:22,330 the president in his public remarks has 490 00:20:22,330 --> 00:20:24,630 been very clear as I repeated here 491 00:20:24,630 --> 00:20:27,420 today about how much this really 492 00:20:27,420 --> 00:20:30,580 continues this , this latest crisis in 493 00:20:30,580 --> 00:20:34,350 Ukraine continues to cast um the 494 00:20:34,350 --> 00:20:36,820 United States and its approach to 495 00:20:36,820 --> 00:20:39,110 democracy and market contrast to 496 00:20:39,110 --> 00:20:42,040 autocrats in the world . Um So I think 497 00:20:42,040 --> 00:20:44,096 that's a continued theme that you'll 498 00:20:44,096 --> 00:20:46,096 see play out . I want to go back to 499 00:20:46,096 --> 00:20:48,262 your response to my initial question . 500 00:20:48,262 --> 00:20:50,390 Mhm . And I agree with the response 501 00:20:50,390 --> 00:20:52,446 that the strategy , not just of this 502 00:20:52,446 --> 00:20:54,334 administration , but the previous 503 00:20:54,334 --> 00:20:56,501 administration where the congress went 504 00:20:56,501 --> 00:20:58,668 with the european defense initiative . 505 00:20:58,668 --> 00:21:00,723 We were concerned that Russia may do 506 00:21:00,723 --> 00:21:02,834 this again . It wasn't the first time 507 00:21:02,834 --> 00:21:06,060 Putin invaded a country in europe . 508 00:21:06,240 --> 00:21:09,170 Georgia obviously was was the first 509 00:21:09,940 --> 00:21:13,460 during Putin's reign at the same 510 00:21:13,460 --> 00:21:16,090 time . I think it's reasonable to say 511 00:21:16,090 --> 00:21:18,257 that deterrence doesn't work , meaning 512 00:21:18,420 --> 00:21:20,364 we have , we anticipated this . We 513 00:21:20,364 --> 00:21:22,531 thought it was a problem . We tried to 514 00:21:22,531 --> 00:21:24,809 put the tools of deterrents into place , 515 00:21:24,809 --> 00:21:26,976 whether you want to call it integrated 516 00:21:26,976 --> 00:21:29,087 deterrence or some other deterrents , 517 00:21:29,087 --> 00:21:31,309 wouldn't you agree that we didn't deter 518 00:21:31,309 --> 00:21:33,531 him from what we saw it out to the term 519 00:21:33,531 --> 00:21:35,587 from doing this is a war of Russia's 520 00:21:35,587 --> 00:21:37,980 choice . It's a war that can stop at 521 00:21:37,980 --> 00:21:40,091 any point that the Russians choose to 522 00:21:40,360 --> 00:21:43,000 and the Russians chose to go by all 523 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:45,580 accounts , Vladimir Putin chose to go 524 00:21:45,580 --> 00:21:48,170 forward into Ukraine and that's a fact . 525 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:51,150 Um our focus on integrated deterrence 526 00:21:51,150 --> 00:21:53,317 as I said at the Department of Defense 527 00:21:53,317 --> 00:21:55,039 is fundamentally around combat 528 00:21:55,039 --> 00:21:57,150 credibility of U . S . Forces and and 529 00:21:57,150 --> 00:21:59,317 we're confident that where we uh bring 530 00:21:59,317 --> 00:22:01,372 that to bear , that that will be the 531 00:22:01,372 --> 00:22:03,372 cornerstone of how we think through 532 00:22:03,372 --> 00:22:05,483 integrated deterrence , which I think 533 00:22:05,483 --> 00:22:07,594 is the question . Um Ukraine is not a 534 00:22:07,594 --> 00:22:09,860 place where the United States had the 535 00:22:09,870 --> 00:22:12,037 security commitment it has around NATO 536 00:22:12,140 --> 00:22:15,040 or that it has made even for example 537 00:22:15,040 --> 00:22:18,610 with regard to Taiwan um with regard to 538 00:22:18,620 --> 00:22:21,050 the military assistance side . So 539 00:22:21,060 --> 00:22:23,210 that's my answer , which is what we 540 00:22:23,210 --> 00:22:25,321 focus on in the Department of Defense 541 00:22:25,321 --> 00:22:27,321 is bringing that combat credibility 542 00:22:27,321 --> 00:22:29,154 forward . You note that that the 543 00:22:29,154 --> 00:22:30,932 Russians have not attacked NATO 544 00:22:30,932 --> 00:22:33,840 territory uh and we continue to stand 545 00:22:33,840 --> 00:22:36,007 by that deterrent as quite effective , 546 00:22:37,140 --> 00:22:39,490 very smart answer . Dr hicks . But but 547 00:22:39,500 --> 00:22:42,020 but but but I I just want to brazil 548 00:22:42,020 --> 00:22:45,880 aboard . No , but if if it 549 00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:48,940 was you did very well . Um but just 550 00:22:48,950 --> 00:22:50,617 pull the thread on this truly 551 00:22:50,617 --> 00:22:52,672 understand because you're right from 552 00:22:52,672 --> 00:22:54,783 your perch and the Department Defense 553 00:22:54,783 --> 00:22:56,894 deterrence begins to make sure that , 554 00:22:56,894 --> 00:22:58,561 you know , we have the combat 555 00:22:58,561 --> 00:22:58,260 credibility that no one's gonna 556 00:22:58,940 --> 00:23:01,340 challenge us and the next layers 557 00:23:01,350 --> 00:23:03,370 challenge our our alliance would be 558 00:23:03,370 --> 00:23:05,710 NATO , but wouldn't you agree that part 559 00:23:05,710 --> 00:23:07,654 of what we're seeking to achieve . 560 00:23:07,654 --> 00:23:09,877 Certainly the last defense strategy and 561 00:23:09,877 --> 00:23:11,821 and and this administration was to 562 00:23:11,821 --> 00:23:13,766 deter the Russians from going into 563 00:23:13,766 --> 00:23:15,766 Ukraine . I mean that certainly was 564 00:23:15,766 --> 00:23:17,932 part of the deterrence . I think we've 565 00:23:17,932 --> 00:23:19,932 all saw it since the occupation and 566 00:23:19,932 --> 00:23:22,270 annexation of Crimea . There is no 567 00:23:22,270 --> 00:23:24,381 doubt that the United States has been 568 00:23:24,381 --> 00:23:27,550 clear that , you know , yes , that 569 00:23:28,640 --> 00:23:31,280 violating the , you know , the 570 00:23:31,280 --> 00:23:33,169 sovereignty of another country is 571 00:23:33,169 --> 00:23:36,050 against the principles we stand for and 572 00:23:36,050 --> 00:23:39,250 that we would bring all um of our 573 00:23:39,250 --> 00:23:41,306 thoughts to bear on how to do that . 574 00:23:41,306 --> 00:23:43,528 The economic sanctions that we have put 575 00:23:43,528 --> 00:23:45,417 into place around this particular 576 00:23:45,417 --> 00:23:47,083 invasion of Ukraine alongside 577 00:23:47,083 --> 00:23:49,194 importantly not just NATO , but other 578 00:23:49,194 --> 00:23:51,250 countries of the world . We have not 579 00:23:51,250 --> 00:23:53,472 yet seen the full effects of that . And 580 00:23:53,472 --> 00:23:55,472 most importantly Russia has not yet 581 00:23:55,472 --> 00:23:57,639 seen the full effects of I think those 582 00:23:57,639 --> 00:23:59,472 are tremendously powerful . They 583 00:23:59,472 --> 00:24:01,583 clearly were not convincing to Russia 584 00:24:01,583 --> 00:24:03,694 in advance . Not clear anything would 585 00:24:03,694 --> 00:24:05,583 have been convincing to Russia in 586 00:24:05,583 --> 00:24:07,694 advance . I'm not going to try to get 587 00:24:07,694 --> 00:24:09,806 into the head of Vladimir Putin . But 588 00:24:09,806 --> 00:24:11,806 what I can tell you is they will be 589 00:24:11,806 --> 00:24:13,972 devastating . They will be devastating 590 00:24:13,972 --> 00:24:16,270 as will all of the diplomatic movement 591 00:24:16,540 --> 00:24:18,670 and the companies that have self 592 00:24:18,670 --> 00:24:21,070 selected out of Russia . International 593 00:24:21,070 --> 00:24:23,490 companies , the talent drain tens of 594 00:24:23,500 --> 00:24:25,940 thousands by all accounts of high end 595 00:24:25,940 --> 00:24:28,300 talent leaving Russia that I hope are 596 00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:30,467 coming to the United States and to the 597 00:24:30,467 --> 00:24:33,160 west to help us um to advance 598 00:24:33,160 --> 00:24:35,160 technology in line with appropriate 599 00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:38,260 democratic values . And I think that's 600 00:24:38,260 --> 00:24:41,670 the cost that he will bear . The fact 601 00:24:41,670 --> 00:24:43,990 that you have leaders who cannot 602 00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:46,060 understand rational deterrence 603 00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:48,790 frameworks is something we have always 604 00:24:48,790 --> 00:24:50,901 lived with . We have always had those 605 00:24:50,901 --> 00:24:54,110 who will violate international norms um 606 00:24:54,110 --> 00:24:56,890 and and you know , challenge us to 607 00:24:56,890 --> 00:24:59,650 deter them . That is why we must have 608 00:24:59,650 --> 00:25:01,650 the credibility to stand behind the 609 00:25:01,650 --> 00:25:03,872 commitments we have made and I think we 610 00:25:03,872 --> 00:25:06,094 have that . So let's stick with Ukraine 611 00:25:06,094 --> 00:25:08,039 a little bit more and then move to 612 00:25:08,039 --> 00:25:10,094 china was going to this later in the 613 00:25:10,094 --> 00:25:12,094 conversation . Let it be noted that 614 00:25:12,094 --> 00:25:11,750 Zakheim didn't focus on budget for the 615 00:25:11,760 --> 00:25:14,038 first five minutes of our conversation . 616 00:25:14,040 --> 00:25:17,760 Um but we're learning about 617 00:25:17,760 --> 00:25:20,320 deterrence . We obviously want to as a 618 00:25:20,320 --> 00:25:22,290 as a government , as a department 619 00:25:22,290 --> 00:25:24,330 defense to make sure that the 620 00:25:24,330 --> 00:25:26,274 sovereignty of a free nation isn't 621 00:25:26,274 --> 00:25:28,441 violent and the way we've seen and are 622 00:25:28,441 --> 00:25:30,608 witnessing it with every passing day . 623 00:25:30,608 --> 00:25:32,552 That's true for other countries in 624 00:25:32,552 --> 00:25:34,774 europe , it's obviously true for Taiwan 625 00:25:34,774 --> 00:25:36,830 as well , that that has got to be of 626 00:25:36,830 --> 00:25:39,052 prime importance . So kind of migrating 627 00:25:39,052 --> 00:25:41,163 from the european theater in europe , 628 00:25:41,163 --> 00:25:43,330 at the end of pacific and dealing with 629 00:25:43,330 --> 00:25:46,190 with china in part with this strategy 630 00:25:46,190 --> 00:25:48,412 and part of what you're doing every day 631 00:25:48,412 --> 00:25:50,412 in the department , what more do we 632 00:25:50,412 --> 00:25:52,468 need to do to restore the deterrence 633 00:25:52,468 --> 00:25:54,523 right to make sure that even if it's 634 00:25:54,523 --> 00:25:56,634 not a NATO ally or another country in 635 00:25:56,634 --> 00:25:58,690 the pacific that we have an alliance 636 00:25:58,690 --> 00:26:00,801 with Taiwan's interesting . It's kind 637 00:26:00,801 --> 00:26:02,968 of more complicated as you know . Well 638 00:26:02,968 --> 00:26:05,079 what else do we need to do to restore 639 00:26:05,079 --> 00:26:07,301 deterrence ? So whether it's a Putin or 640 00:26:07,301 --> 00:26:10,000 a xi , they don't come away from what's 641 00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:12,450 happening right now and think I can get 642 00:26:12,450 --> 00:26:15,880 away with this . So we are 643 00:26:15,880 --> 00:26:19,740 facing what I would call complex attack 644 00:26:19,740 --> 00:26:22,170 dynamics from both china and Russia . 645 00:26:22,540 --> 00:26:25,480 They span the spectrum of conflict from 646 00:26:25,480 --> 00:26:28,820 day to day activity through what often 647 00:26:28,820 --> 00:26:30,820 is called gray zone or hybrid . The 648 00:26:30,820 --> 00:26:33,390 Europeans prefer hybrid activity um and 649 00:26:33,400 --> 00:26:35,567 all the way up through advancing their 650 00:26:35,567 --> 00:26:38,470 nuclear capability . Um The United 651 00:26:38,470 --> 00:26:40,637 States has traditionally been far less 652 00:26:40,637 --> 00:26:42,803 agile across that spectrum of conflict 653 00:26:42,803 --> 00:26:45,820 and that and at pulling together um all 654 00:26:45,820 --> 00:26:49,090 the elements of the domains of conflict . 655 00:26:49,100 --> 00:26:51,500 Um We have talked about this obviously 656 00:26:51,500 --> 00:26:53,278 as you were referencing in this 657 00:26:53,278 --> 00:26:55,222 strategies , Integrated deterrence 658 00:26:55,222 --> 00:26:57,333 folks have talked about this as cross 659 00:26:57,333 --> 00:26:59,111 domain deterrence comprehensive 660 00:26:59,111 --> 00:27:01,333 approaches . There's been lots of terms 661 00:27:01,333 --> 00:27:03,389 used . Um there's a strong thread of 662 00:27:03,389 --> 00:27:05,556 continuity frankly in that . Um but we 663 00:27:05,556 --> 00:27:07,722 chose integrated deterrence because we 664 00:27:07,722 --> 00:27:09,833 think it it helps to communicate this 665 00:27:09,833 --> 00:27:11,889 idea that to deal with these complex 666 00:27:11,889 --> 00:27:14,650 attacks , vectors and to to have this 667 00:27:14,650 --> 00:27:17,440 deterrent fact , you have to be equally 668 00:27:17,440 --> 00:27:19,384 as we in the United States need to 669 00:27:19,384 --> 00:27:22,280 overcome a lot of cultural barriers 670 00:27:22,280 --> 00:27:24,790 internally to how we work across that 671 00:27:24,790 --> 00:27:27,110 spectrum first inside the military and 672 00:27:27,110 --> 00:27:29,277 then from our perspective first inside 673 00:27:29,277 --> 00:27:31,443 the military and then into how we work 674 00:27:31,443 --> 00:27:33,443 with allies partners and others . I 675 00:27:33,443 --> 00:27:36,500 think that's the core um and executing 676 00:27:36,500 --> 00:27:38,611 that through our campaigning approach 677 00:27:38,611 --> 00:27:40,990 in a day to day way , exemplifying that 678 00:27:40,990 --> 00:27:44,920 we can gain advantage in a day to day 679 00:27:44,920 --> 00:27:48,360 way through campaigning as we build 680 00:27:48,360 --> 00:27:50,471 that enduring advantage over the long 681 00:27:50,471 --> 00:27:52,527 term . Those three approaches really 682 00:27:52,527 --> 00:27:54,638 are our answer to your question about 683 00:27:54,638 --> 00:27:58,410 how we if you will ensure deterrence . 684 00:27:59,440 --> 00:28:01,850 And we actually dealt with this a bit 685 00:28:02,030 --> 00:28:04,086 during the National Defense Strategy 686 00:28:04,086 --> 00:28:06,086 commissions working , reviewing the 687 00:28:06,086 --> 00:28:05,890 Last administration's National Defense 688 00:28:05,890 --> 00:28:08,057 Strategy and you know , it was kind of 689 00:28:08,140 --> 00:28:10,251 how you deal with the steady state of 690 00:28:10,251 --> 00:28:12,473 competition , right ? Because it wasn't 691 00:28:12,473 --> 00:28:14,640 what we're witnessing in Ukraine , but 692 00:28:14,640 --> 00:28:16,751 it was all the other things that were 693 00:28:16,751 --> 00:28:16,480 happening , you know , from little 694 00:28:16,480 --> 00:28:18,591 Green men to the cyber realm to space 695 00:28:18,591 --> 00:28:22,450 realm , but I wonder um if we 696 00:28:22,450 --> 00:28:24,672 were not necessary successful at that , 697 00:28:24,672 --> 00:28:26,894 but the fact that Putin decided to take 698 00:28:26,894 --> 00:28:28,839 the form of aggression that was so 699 00:28:28,839 --> 00:28:31,380 conventional , right tanks , missiles 700 00:28:31,390 --> 00:28:35,380 and aircraft , um do we are we get 701 00:28:35,390 --> 00:28:37,334 is a kind of eye off the ball from 702 00:28:37,334 --> 00:28:39,334 deterring that type of conventional 703 00:28:39,334 --> 00:28:41,446 attack , both in europe . And we were 704 00:28:41,446 --> 00:28:43,334 missing something that determines 705 00:28:43,334 --> 00:28:45,223 framework the traditional type of 706 00:28:45,223 --> 00:28:47,223 deterrence , which you know , maybe 707 00:28:47,223 --> 00:28:49,223 just having the raw steel platforms 708 00:28:49,223 --> 00:28:51,446 that we had in the last century that we 709 00:28:51,446 --> 00:28:53,501 need today . And do you do you worry 710 00:28:53,501 --> 00:28:55,668 about that when it comes to Taiwan , I 711 00:28:55,668 --> 00:28:57,834 mean , you know , people talk about uh 712 00:28:57,834 --> 00:28:59,779 deterrence by denial , which is an 713 00:28:59,779 --> 00:29:01,860 approach that relies heavily on 714 00:29:01,860 --> 00:29:04,027 conventional capabilities . It doesn't 715 00:29:04,027 --> 00:29:06,193 have to be in conflict with integrated 716 00:29:06,193 --> 00:29:08,360 deterrence , but it certainly makes it 717 00:29:08,360 --> 00:29:10,527 primary . Mhm . Um in terms of how you 718 00:29:10,527 --> 00:29:12,860 might deter china vis a vis Taiwan . 719 00:29:14,140 --> 00:29:16,580 So um I think where I would differ a 720 00:29:16,580 --> 00:29:19,230 little bit is that you should always 721 00:29:19,230 --> 00:29:21,119 think about an adversary as being 722 00:29:21,119 --> 00:29:23,230 pretty smart . If they're not smart , 723 00:29:23,230 --> 00:29:26,510 that's great . Um but they are looking 724 00:29:26,510 --> 00:29:28,860 for your weaknesses . And the answer is 725 00:29:29,140 --> 00:29:31,560 to minimize your attack , surface area 726 00:29:31,570 --> 00:29:33,570 and maximize your advantage is your 727 00:29:33,570 --> 00:29:36,730 relative advantages . Um In the case of 728 00:29:36,730 --> 00:29:39,390 Russia , they have taken a conventional 729 00:29:39,390 --> 00:29:42,650 approach , it's not worked well . So we 730 00:29:42,650 --> 00:29:44,761 could talk about why that didn't work 731 00:29:44,761 --> 00:29:46,983 well . But I would also say back to the 732 00:29:46,983 --> 00:29:49,206 what the us has been doing since 2014 , 733 00:29:49,206 --> 00:29:51,372 we have built substantial conventional 734 00:29:51,372 --> 00:29:53,150 capability alongside allies and 735 00:29:53,150 --> 00:29:55,330 partners is not just the us but to 736 00:29:55,330 --> 00:29:57,800 include the U . S . In europe and 737 00:29:57,810 --> 00:29:59,921 inside the bounds of NATO territory . 738 00:29:59,921 --> 00:30:02,032 And that conventional deterrent and I 739 00:30:02,032 --> 00:30:05,110 will add our nuclear deterrent seem to 740 00:30:05,110 --> 00:30:08,580 be holding very well right now . Um we 741 00:30:08,580 --> 00:30:10,358 will continue to always look to 742 00:30:10,358 --> 00:30:13,250 strengthen those at the same time . If 743 00:30:13,250 --> 00:30:17,020 you relieve the deterrent elsewhere , 744 00:30:17,050 --> 00:30:19,272 smart adversary is going to go to those 745 00:30:19,272 --> 00:30:21,850 spaces . That's what we have seen . The 746 00:30:21,850 --> 00:30:24,560 Russians trying in different ways . 747 00:30:24,570 --> 00:30:26,530 Cyber is obviously one attacking 748 00:30:26,530 --> 00:30:28,697 democracy and information . Warfare is 749 00:30:28,697 --> 00:30:31,870 another . Um uh you know , the economic 750 00:30:31,870 --> 00:30:34,050 the corruption if you will is another 751 00:30:34,050 --> 00:30:37,070 chemical warfare in um in support of 752 00:30:37,070 --> 00:30:40,600 assad in Syria is another . Um , so it 753 00:30:40,600 --> 00:30:42,711 just requires the United States to be 754 00:30:42,711 --> 00:30:45,420 very thoughtful about how we ensure we 755 00:30:45,420 --> 00:30:47,920 can deter . Um , that's my Russia 756 00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:51,480 answer . Let's go to two budget . Sure . 757 00:30:51,490 --> 00:30:55,450 So The , the National Defense 758 00:30:55,450 --> 00:30:58,000 Strategy Fact Sheet and then in your 759 00:30:58,000 --> 00:31:01,390 March 28 gaggle with reporters , the 760 00:31:01,400 --> 00:31:03,289 release of the budget and and the 761 00:31:03,289 --> 00:31:05,400 defense strategy , you talk about the 762 00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:07,233 continuity actually in the force 763 00:31:07,233 --> 00:31:09,289 planning construct of the strategy , 764 00:31:09,289 --> 00:31:11,456 which kind of using imprecise language 765 00:31:11,540 --> 00:31:13,651 Is , you know , prevailing one and to 766 00:31:13,651 --> 00:31:15,707 turn a second . Um , that's what the 767 00:31:15,707 --> 00:31:17,929 trump administration's national defense 768 00:31:17,929 --> 00:31:19,820 strategy has . And based on your 769 00:31:19,820 --> 00:31:21,709 statement . That's what the biden 770 00:31:21,709 --> 00:31:23,931 administration force plan and construct 771 00:31:23,931 --> 00:31:26,209 will be as well . I think that's great . 772 00:31:26,209 --> 00:31:28,153 You know , to me it's it's an area 773 00:31:28,153 --> 00:31:28,140 where there should be continuity and 774 00:31:28,140 --> 00:31:30,720 recognition that we can't become so 775 00:31:30,720 --> 00:31:32,942 regionally focused that we take our eye 776 00:31:32,942 --> 00:31:34,887 off the ball elsewhere . Certainly 777 00:31:34,887 --> 00:31:37,130 events um , reflect the wisdom of that 778 00:31:37,130 --> 00:31:40,690 approach of course to do that . Um , 779 00:31:40,700 --> 00:31:43,670 you need a budget that could support 780 00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:47,410 that reach a budget that is 781 00:31:47,410 --> 00:31:49,466 truly trying to build a force that's 782 00:31:49,466 --> 00:31:53,080 global in nature . Many people who are 783 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:55,024 concerned about that kind of force 784 00:31:55,024 --> 00:31:57,247 planning construct . Look at the budget 785 00:31:57,247 --> 00:31:59,024 and say , you see you're not re 786 00:31:59,024 --> 00:32:01,247 sourcing this strategy seriously enough 787 00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:03,700 that can sustain that kind of force 788 00:32:03,700 --> 00:32:05,589 planning construct , that type of 789 00:32:05,589 --> 00:32:07,700 strategy , in which case we just have 790 00:32:07,700 --> 00:32:09,700 to realize we're gonna do less with 791 00:32:09,700 --> 00:32:11,589 less and make some hard choices . 792 00:32:11,589 --> 00:32:13,700 What's your answer to that critique ? 793 00:32:13,840 --> 00:32:16,150 Uh We have a quarter more than a 794 00:32:16,150 --> 00:32:18,580 quarter of a trillion dollars dedicated 795 00:32:18,580 --> 00:32:20,580 defense . As I said in my remarks , 796 00:32:20,580 --> 00:32:22,636 it's 8% above what we asked for last 797 00:32:22,636 --> 00:32:24,691 year . We matched it to the strategy 798 00:32:24,691 --> 00:32:26,802 sort of known as somebody who does my 799 00:32:26,802 --> 00:32:28,858 homework . I promise if anyone opens 800 00:32:28,858 --> 00:32:31,024 the books , I've done the homework and 801 00:32:31,024 --> 00:32:33,136 we have matched those . Um let's talk 802 00:32:33,136 --> 00:32:35,136 about inflation maybe as a separate 803 00:32:35,136 --> 00:32:37,247 answer because I want to come back to 804 00:32:37,247 --> 00:32:39,191 inflation . We have put together a 805 00:32:39,191 --> 00:32:41,860 program uh that I am very comfortable 806 00:32:41,870 --> 00:32:44,520 can execute that force planning 807 00:32:44,520 --> 00:32:46,742 construct . And I just want to add also 808 00:32:46,742 --> 00:32:49,080 the nuclear deterrent and also the 809 00:32:49,080 --> 00:32:51,520 homeland peace which is a little more 810 00:32:51,530 --> 00:32:53,752 aggressive on homeland if you will , or 811 00:32:53,752 --> 00:32:57,670 more focus than um in 2018 . 812 00:32:57,730 --> 00:33:01,390 So um that I'm very comfortable 813 00:33:01,390 --> 00:33:03,290 with , we have built out the 814 00:33:03,290 --> 00:33:05,560 capabilities that we need to do that . 815 00:33:06,100 --> 00:33:08,910 I think we get very focused in this 816 00:33:08,910 --> 00:33:12,130 town because it's simple um on sort of 817 00:33:12,140 --> 00:33:14,600 just the dollars , the dollars matter , 818 00:33:14,610 --> 00:33:18,180 we have to have the dollars . Um but we 819 00:33:18,180 --> 00:33:20,620 also get very focused on numbers , uh 820 00:33:20,630 --> 00:33:23,090 number of , you know , this type of 821 00:33:23,090 --> 00:33:25,146 system versus somebody else's , that 822 00:33:25,146 --> 00:33:27,146 kind of sort of missile gap kind of 823 00:33:27,146 --> 00:33:29,870 theory . Um we need to look at what the 824 00:33:29,870 --> 00:33:32,760 U . S . Needs to execute the concept of 825 00:33:32,760 --> 00:33:34,816 operations and campaign . That makes 826 00:33:34,816 --> 00:33:37,149 sense for us maximum what I said before , 827 00:33:37,149 --> 00:33:39,390 maximizing our a symmetries minimizing 828 00:33:39,390 --> 00:33:41,446 the attack surface vectors folks can 829 00:33:41,446 --> 00:33:43,790 comment us on . Um and I think we've 830 00:33:43,790 --> 00:33:46,270 done that with this program that we've 831 00:33:46,270 --> 00:33:49,030 put together in this budget . So you're 832 00:33:49,030 --> 00:33:51,840 kind of anticipating the the critique 833 00:33:51,840 --> 00:33:54,050 of divest to invest and certainly the 834 00:33:54,050 --> 00:33:57,620 budget um You know has cuts 24 ships , 835 00:33:57,620 --> 00:33:59,398 150 aircraft . We have aircraft 836 00:33:59,398 --> 00:34:01,287 carriers that don't actually have 837 00:34:01,287 --> 00:34:03,870 enough aircraft to to utilize the whole 838 00:34:03,870 --> 00:34:07,380 purpose of that uh platform . You know , 839 00:34:07,380 --> 00:34:09,047 we just kind of came out of a 840 00:34:09,047 --> 00:34:11,213 conversation . So I'm arguing with you 841 00:34:11,213 --> 00:34:13,380 right now , you know that the the that 842 00:34:13,380 --> 00:34:15,047 you know kind of conventional 843 00:34:15,047 --> 00:34:16,920 capability is something that is 844 00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:19,280 essential . Um you have a force 845 00:34:19,280 --> 00:34:21,502 planning construct that says we need to 846 00:34:21,502 --> 00:34:24,120 do this in two theaters At least you 847 00:34:24,120 --> 00:34:26,342 know near simultaneous top 10 minutes . 848 00:34:26,342 --> 00:34:28,564 I haven't seen the classified piece but 849 00:34:28,564 --> 00:34:27,850 I'm assuming you're dealing with 850 00:34:27,850 --> 00:34:29,961 simultaneity . And then of course the 851 00:34:29,961 --> 00:34:32,150 strategy talks about the Middle East 852 00:34:32,220 --> 00:34:34,331 and then other challenges and threats 853 00:34:34,331 --> 00:34:36,331 that are not necessarily regionally 854 00:34:36,331 --> 00:34:39,300 focused . Um I just kind of come out of 855 00:34:39,300 --> 00:34:42,050 this moment where it seems that those 856 00:34:42,050 --> 00:34:44,530 platforms and numbers matter more . You 857 00:34:44,530 --> 00:34:47,010 say it's simple but simplicity has an 858 00:34:47,010 --> 00:34:49,066 elegance all of its own because it's 859 00:34:49,066 --> 00:34:52,250 just right . So um you know , I 860 00:34:52,840 --> 00:34:55,490 we just are a smaller force with , it 861 00:34:55,490 --> 00:34:57,810 doesn't seem to be a mission set and a 862 00:34:57,810 --> 00:34:59,977 strategy that's asking us to do less . 863 00:34:59,977 --> 00:35:02,143 So give me a little more about why why 864 00:35:02,143 --> 00:35:04,199 I just don't have to worry about the 865 00:35:04,199 --> 00:35:04,130 numbers and the capabilities and the 866 00:35:04,130 --> 00:35:06,352 platforms ? We absolutely have to worry 867 00:35:06,352 --> 00:35:08,352 about the capability and capability 868 00:35:08,352 --> 00:35:11,350 includes your ability to disperse and 869 00:35:11,350 --> 00:35:13,406 the quantity of what you can deliver 870 00:35:13,406 --> 00:35:16,010 matters . So um that I'm not saying 871 00:35:16,020 --> 00:35:18,170 there isn't an issue around overall 872 00:35:18,170 --> 00:35:22,040 capacity , but we do have to elevate , 873 00:35:22,050 --> 00:35:24,217 we have to elevate this conversation . 874 00:35:24,217 --> 00:35:26,420 So capacity might mean for instance , 875 00:35:26,430 --> 00:35:28,940 um , what is my firepower , not ? How 876 00:35:28,940 --> 00:35:31,440 many platforms does that firepower move 877 00:35:31,440 --> 00:35:33,607 from ? What is my ability to shoot and 878 00:35:33,607 --> 00:35:35,790 scoot to use ? Uh , folks may be more 879 00:35:35,790 --> 00:35:38,012 familiar now with the artillery battles 880 00:35:38,012 --> 00:35:40,012 going on in Ukraine with that basic 881 00:35:40,012 --> 00:35:42,123 concept , but the new maneuverability 882 00:35:42,123 --> 00:35:44,510 of our force versus for instance , as 883 00:35:44,510 --> 00:35:46,980 the Russians are seeing lines of tanks , 884 00:35:46,980 --> 00:35:49,400 you know , so quantity , you know , is 885 00:35:49,400 --> 00:35:51,567 not going to be the way to think about 886 00:35:51,567 --> 00:35:53,678 the capabilities that we need for the 887 00:35:53,678 --> 00:35:55,844 future . While it still is an input to 888 00:35:55,844 --> 00:35:58,590 capable to overall capability . Um , so 889 00:35:58,590 --> 00:36:00,880 let's learn from the Russians uh , in 890 00:36:00,880 --> 00:36:02,991 what their experiences right now that 891 00:36:02,991 --> 00:36:05,600 we're seeing , um , you know , losing 892 00:36:05,610 --> 00:36:08,420 their lead cruiser because it doesn't 893 00:36:08,420 --> 00:36:10,753 have adequate air defense . How is that , 894 00:36:10,753 --> 00:36:12,642 how is that kind of approach that 895 00:36:12,642 --> 00:36:14,309 doesn't take into account the 896 00:36:14,309 --> 00:36:16,309 survivability and capability of our 897 00:36:16,309 --> 00:36:19,040 forces . If we lose that out of the 898 00:36:19,040 --> 00:36:20,840 conversation , we are not using 899 00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:23,640 taxpayer dollars wisely . So I think 900 00:36:23,640 --> 00:36:25,751 you do have to go to the specifics of 901 00:36:25,751 --> 00:36:28,029 how do we have a combat credible force ? 902 00:36:28,029 --> 00:36:30,580 How do we show that one year into this 903 00:36:30,580 --> 00:36:32,524 administration , how have we built 904 00:36:32,524 --> 00:36:35,940 effectively on what we inherited to 905 00:36:35,940 --> 00:36:38,380 develop out capacity and capability for 906 00:36:38,380 --> 00:36:40,436 the future ? Where is the industrial 907 00:36:40,436 --> 00:36:42,658 base ? Something that you all care very 908 00:36:42,658 --> 00:36:44,269 much about appropriately and 909 00:36:44,269 --> 00:36:46,324 wonderfully here . You know , one of 910 00:36:46,324 --> 00:36:48,324 the biggest challenges we face . We 911 00:36:48,324 --> 00:36:50,530 can't magic capability overnight . We 912 00:36:50,530 --> 00:36:53,160 need workforce , we need to have 913 00:36:53,160 --> 00:36:54,993 manufacturing capability in this 914 00:36:54,993 --> 00:36:56,716 country . We need steady clear 915 00:36:56,716 --> 00:36:59,390 investment strategies That demonstrate 916 00:36:59,390 --> 00:37:01,900 where the where that market is going so 917 00:37:01,910 --> 00:37:04,530 companies can plan and we need to bring 918 00:37:04,530 --> 00:37:06,940 in small business which we've lost 40 919 00:37:06,940 --> 00:37:08,884 some percent of our small business 920 00:37:08,884 --> 00:37:11,051 space um , out of the defense sector . 921 00:37:11,051 --> 00:37:13,329 That's where the innovation comes from . 922 00:37:13,329 --> 00:37:15,551 We can't just say we're gonna build all 923 00:37:15,551 --> 00:37:17,850 these new fill in the blank ships etc . 924 00:37:18,130 --> 00:37:20,160 You know , you got to look at the 925 00:37:20,160 --> 00:37:22,160 industrial capacity . You've got to 926 00:37:22,160 --> 00:37:24,327 build that out . I want to get to that 927 00:37:24,327 --> 00:37:26,660 in a second and then and then inflation , 928 00:37:26,660 --> 00:37:28,882 one more on this . This is a lot of fun 929 00:37:28,882 --> 00:37:31,216 for me . I'm enjoying this conversation . 930 00:37:31,216 --> 00:37:34,240 Thank you for being here . Um , so all 931 00:37:34,240 --> 00:37:36,570 your response to my pressing you on 932 00:37:36,570 --> 00:37:38,459 conventional capability . I think 933 00:37:38,459 --> 00:37:40,570 conventional capability means more at 934 00:37:40,570 --> 00:37:42,626 this moment and and our our programs 935 00:37:42,626 --> 00:37:44,848 should reflect that your responses , we 936 00:37:44,848 --> 00:37:46,959 gotta be smart . Look at how Russia's 937 00:37:46,959 --> 00:37:48,848 failed and failing . They did not 938 00:37:48,848 --> 00:37:51,014 succeed in Kiev . We'll see what we'll 939 00:37:51,014 --> 00:37:53,126 see what happens in terms of the rest 940 00:37:53,126 --> 00:37:55,292 of Ukraine . But one of things that we 941 00:37:55,292 --> 00:37:57,403 saw were on the commission together . 942 00:37:57,403 --> 00:37:59,626 I'm curious what your experiences since 943 00:37:59,626 --> 00:38:01,792 returning to department defenses , you 944 00:38:01,792 --> 00:38:03,792 know , the strategy wasn't actually 945 00:38:03,792 --> 00:38:06,610 operationalized the concepts of how we 946 00:38:06,610 --> 00:38:08,721 want to fight . You know , we weren't 947 00:38:08,721 --> 00:38:11,380 quite clear the new systems um , that 948 00:38:11,380 --> 00:38:13,491 we're gonna realize this new fight to 949 00:38:13,491 --> 00:38:15,602 make it less reliant on a tank or 1/5 950 00:38:15,602 --> 00:38:17,824 generation fighter , you know , the the 951 00:38:17,824 --> 00:38:19,880 replacement wasn't identified and we 952 00:38:19,880 --> 00:38:19,640 certainly were in procuring wasn't the 953 00:38:19,640 --> 00:38:21,696 program . And there was this concern 954 00:38:21,696 --> 00:38:25,050 about this gap . Right ? Sounds like 955 00:38:25,050 --> 00:38:27,161 you're confident that we were there , 956 00:38:27,161 --> 00:38:29,217 we can get there pretty soon tell me 957 00:38:29,217 --> 00:38:31,106 more about the transitioning from 958 00:38:31,106 --> 00:38:33,328 perhaps 25th century warfare and combat 959 00:38:33,328 --> 00:38:35,383 to , you know , where you're going , 960 00:38:35,383 --> 00:38:37,606 which is the 21st century smart fight . 961 00:38:37,606 --> 00:38:39,772 I mean , is there there there ? Yeah . 962 00:38:39,772 --> 00:38:41,994 So uh , now I'm having fun . So the way 963 00:38:41,994 --> 00:38:44,161 I , the way I talk about this often is 964 00:38:44,161 --> 00:38:46,383 3 to 25 minutes . Okay . Yeah . So , so 965 00:38:46,383 --> 00:38:48,106 um , you know , I am out there 966 00:38:48,106 --> 00:38:49,994 proselytizing about a three ft up 967 00:38:49,994 --> 00:38:51,994 approach and you are hitting on the 968 00:38:51,994 --> 00:38:54,161 core challenge that every , it doesn't 969 00:38:54,161 --> 00:38:56,050 matter the administration , every 970 00:38:56,050 --> 00:38:58,370 defense planner faces , which is What 971 00:38:58,370 --> 00:39:01,140 do I need now and then now for us , um , 972 00:39:01,150 --> 00:39:04,260 you know , is 23-27 , that's the future 973 00:39:04,260 --> 00:39:06,316 years defense program that that five 974 00:39:06,316 --> 00:39:08,260 year program that we're focused on 975 00:39:08,260 --> 00:39:10,427 right now . 2027 , obviously a notable 976 00:39:10,427 --> 00:39:13,840 year , um , in China with regard to the 977 00:39:13,840 --> 00:39:15,896 capabilities that they have publicly 978 00:39:15,896 --> 00:39:17,951 put forward . They want to have with 979 00:39:17,951 --> 00:39:20,800 regard to Taiwan . So what you're faced 980 00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:23,540 with in the immediate is what can I do , 981 00:39:24,020 --> 00:39:26,520 which is which is going to be less on 982 00:39:26,520 --> 00:39:28,790 new capital investment . That takes a 983 00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:30,957 long time to come to fruition in order 984 00:39:30,957 --> 00:39:33,068 to have maximized that deterrent that 985 00:39:33,068 --> 00:39:35,123 campaigning and deterrent capability 986 00:39:35,123 --> 00:39:37,810 today . Um there I would say there 987 00:39:37,810 --> 00:39:39,921 there are a number of focal areas . I 988 00:39:39,921 --> 00:39:42,143 won't do them justice but to the extent 989 00:39:42,143 --> 00:39:44,143 that you are survivable , your your 990 00:39:44,143 --> 00:39:46,254 cyber and space resilient . Those are 991 00:39:46,254 --> 00:39:48,366 significant investments that can come 992 00:39:48,366 --> 00:39:50,088 to fruition , your munitions , 993 00:39:50,088 --> 00:39:51,977 precision guided munitions , your 994 00:39:51,977 --> 00:39:54,120 continued steady pace on nuclear 995 00:39:54,120 --> 00:39:56,130 modernization which we were under 996 00:39:56,130 --> 00:39:58,297 invested in for so long that we're now 997 00:39:58,297 --> 00:40:00,463 having to pay that price . That's that 998 00:40:00,463 --> 00:40:03,830 first fit up . Let me jump ahead 3rd 999 00:40:03,830 --> 00:40:07,430 fit up force design , you know , the 1000 00:40:08,210 --> 00:40:10,432 robots , the you know , you name it all 1001 00:40:10,432 --> 00:40:12,480 the future stuff that we all really 1002 00:40:12,480 --> 00:40:14,560 want to make sure we can get to . Um 1003 00:40:14,570 --> 00:40:16,860 because that's the way to make those 1004 00:40:16,860 --> 00:40:20,740 concepts be enlivened and actualized 1005 00:40:21,310 --> 00:40:23,740 the challenge everyone faces is the 1006 00:40:23,740 --> 00:40:25,850 here to there and the trust and 1007 00:40:25,850 --> 00:40:27,628 confidence of the United States 1008 00:40:27,628 --> 00:40:29,572 Congress that the Department , any 1009 00:40:29,572 --> 00:40:31,880 Department of Defense actually has a 1010 00:40:31,890 --> 00:40:34,001 viable pathway through that . And the 1011 00:40:34,001 --> 00:40:36,057 lack of that trust and confidence is 1012 00:40:36,057 --> 00:40:38,830 what keeps sliding us back . So that 1013 00:40:38,830 --> 00:40:41,210 first fit up . It's just the reality we 1014 00:40:41,210 --> 00:40:44,580 live with forever . That is the task 1015 00:40:44,580 --> 00:40:47,380 that I think I face right now is the 1016 00:40:47,380 --> 00:40:49,700 deputy for this Department of Defense 1017 00:40:49,710 --> 00:40:52,290 almost more than anything is how do we 1018 00:40:52,290 --> 00:40:54,580 build out given the great authorities 1019 00:40:54,590 --> 00:40:57,760 that Ellen Lord developed alongside um 1020 00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:00,060 support from Congress in middle tier 1021 00:41:00,060 --> 00:41:03,030 acquisition , the concept work that's 1022 00:41:03,030 --> 00:41:05,140 underway under the joint warfighting 1023 00:41:05,140 --> 00:41:07,307 concept effort and what the individual 1024 00:41:07,307 --> 00:41:09,670 services are doing . Joint Force 2030 1025 00:41:09,670 --> 00:41:11,614 for the Marine Corps for example , 1026 00:41:11,620 --> 00:41:13,731 Excuse me Job Marine Corps Force 2030 1027 00:41:13,731 --> 00:41:17,030 sorry for the Marines . Um that's 1028 00:41:17,030 --> 00:41:19,141 really the challenge . How do we show 1029 00:41:19,141 --> 00:41:22,320 that we have a viable pathway through 1030 00:41:22,320 --> 00:41:26,160 that middle period to the force design . 1031 00:41:26,430 --> 00:41:28,597 So we have a number of initiatives , I 1032 00:41:28,597 --> 00:41:30,652 don't know how much time you want to 1033 00:41:30,652 --> 00:41:32,819 get into on this number of initiatives 1034 00:41:32,819 --> 00:41:34,930 underway to do exactly that pathway . 1035 00:41:34,930 --> 00:41:36,874 Finders , making sure that digital 1036 00:41:36,874 --> 00:41:39,041 backbone are ada initiative are raider 1037 00:41:39,041 --> 00:41:41,208 initiative which is tying the concepts 1038 00:41:41,208 --> 00:41:43,152 to actual capabilities that can be 1039 00:41:43,152 --> 00:41:45,319 fielded . I think that's where we have 1040 00:41:45,319 --> 00:41:47,541 to make a lot of progress and and again 1041 00:41:47,541 --> 00:41:49,430 I think that would be true in any 1042 00:41:49,430 --> 00:41:51,597 period of time that's a real challenge 1043 00:41:51,597 --> 00:41:53,819 not gonna pursue that . All those super 1044 00:41:53,819 --> 00:41:53,280 interesting , I want to get to 1045 00:41:53,290 --> 00:41:55,401 questions from the audience and I got 1046 00:41:55,401 --> 00:41:57,234 two more issues I want to hit on 1047 00:41:57,234 --> 00:41:59,512 inflation and then industrial capacity , 1048 00:41:59,610 --> 00:42:01,721 industrial capacity in some ways gets 1049 00:42:01,721 --> 00:42:03,332 back to our discussion about 1050 00:42:03,332 --> 00:42:05,388 investments and conventional type of 1051 00:42:05,388 --> 00:42:07,610 platforms . First on inflation You know 1052 00:42:07,610 --> 00:42:10,820 I'll give you that it's 4% growth from 1053 00:42:10,830 --> 00:42:14,500 an act enacted , But the inflator was 1054 00:42:14,510 --> 00:42:16,566 just so incredibly low . You and you 1055 00:42:16,566 --> 00:42:18,454 acknowledge this in your March 28 1056 00:42:18,454 --> 00:42:20,750 briefing 2.2% . It's just not accurate . 1057 00:42:20,750 --> 00:42:22,694 You have the chairman of the Joint 1058 00:42:22,694 --> 00:42:24,917 Chiefs testified before the House Armed 1059 00:42:24,917 --> 00:42:26,750 Services Committee saying it was 1060 00:42:26,750 --> 00:42:28,639 obviously inaccurate . And so the 1061 00:42:28,639 --> 00:42:30,528 reality is because of inflation , 1062 00:42:30,528 --> 00:42:32,694 you're not gonna have the buying power 1063 00:42:33,520 --> 00:42:36,770 that You so need to realize this 1064 00:42:36,770 --> 00:42:38,826 program you've just shared with us . 1065 00:42:38,826 --> 00:42:40,937 You probably had to wrestle with them 1066 00:42:40,937 --> 00:42:43,159 and even to get to that 4% . You know , 1067 00:42:43,159 --> 00:42:45,380 it's admirable , but the world is what 1068 00:42:45,380 --> 00:42:47,158 it is , you know , that the Fed 1069 00:42:47,158 --> 00:42:49,324 increased rates yesterday knowing that 1070 00:42:49,324 --> 00:42:51,380 it's gonna take a lot more to reduce 1071 00:42:51,380 --> 00:42:53,380 inflation . We're gonna be anywhere 1072 00:42:53,380 --> 00:42:55,436 between eight and 10% by the time we 1073 00:42:55,436 --> 00:42:57,547 get to appropriations for next fiscal 1074 00:42:57,547 --> 00:42:59,713 year . So that four is basically gonna 1075 00:42:59,713 --> 00:43:01,547 mean , you know , that cut , the 1076 00:43:01,547 --> 00:43:03,602 Department of Defense , feel free to 1077 00:43:03,602 --> 00:43:05,713 disagree with that characterization . 1078 00:43:05,713 --> 00:43:08,100 I'm interested in that more interested 1079 00:43:08,100 --> 00:43:10,322 in what are you gonna do about it ? And 1080 00:43:10,322 --> 00:43:12,378 I'll highlight something you said on 1081 00:43:12,378 --> 00:43:14,544 March 28th , if I can find in my notes 1082 00:43:14,544 --> 00:43:16,600 here , but you said something to the 1083 00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:18,544 effect of , I'm going to work with 1084 00:43:18,544 --> 00:43:20,600 Congress through this summer on , on 1085 00:43:20,600 --> 00:43:22,822 how to deal with this . So I'm assuming 1086 00:43:22,822 --> 00:43:22,710 that I'm right about inflation 8% . 1087 00:43:22,720 --> 00:43:24,831 What do you think's gonna happen with 1088 00:43:24,831 --> 00:43:26,831 Congress this summer . So the first 1089 00:43:26,831 --> 00:43:28,831 thing I would say is the best and I 1090 00:43:28,831 --> 00:43:30,942 have said this on the hill , the best 1091 00:43:30,942 --> 00:43:32,942 inflation buster we have is on time 1092 00:43:32,942 --> 00:43:35,109 appropriations that 4% is 4% more than 1093 00:43:35,109 --> 00:43:37,276 we would get if we stay on the C . R . 1094 00:43:37,276 --> 00:43:39,442 And I think we all know we're going to 1095 00:43:39,442 --> 00:43:41,664 be on a cr So , um , I think we need to 1096 00:43:41,664 --> 00:43:43,640 put our money where our political 1097 00:43:43,640 --> 00:43:45,807 mouths are if you will on capitol hill 1098 00:43:45,807 --> 00:43:47,751 and get the on time appropriations 1099 00:43:47,751 --> 00:43:49,862 regardless of whether it is that what 1100 00:43:49,862 --> 00:43:52,196 you meant by working through the summer ? 1101 00:43:52,196 --> 00:43:51,650 Just know I'm going to come back to 1102 00:43:51,650 --> 00:43:55,570 that . Um , Also for 23 , we don't know 1103 00:43:55,570 --> 00:43:57,737 what that inflation number will be the 1104 00:43:57,737 --> 00:43:59,681 inflator . We used the last fall , 1105 00:43:59,681 --> 00:44:01,626 which is how we do it every we the 1106 00:44:01,626 --> 00:44:03,570 collective we do it every year is 1107 00:44:03,570 --> 00:44:06,520 always just a forecast um where 1108 00:44:06,520 --> 00:44:09,140 inflation will be in September let 1109 00:44:09,140 --> 00:44:11,200 alone this time next year . We don't 1110 00:44:11,200 --> 00:44:12,978 know , But we want to work with 1111 00:44:12,978 --> 00:44:16,680 Congress on the 23 budget uh , to make 1112 00:44:16,680 --> 00:44:18,847 sure that we have the purchasing power 1113 00:44:18,847 --> 00:44:21,069 for this program . If at the end of the 1114 00:44:21,069 --> 00:44:23,120 day , it's this program with an 1115 00:44:23,120 --> 00:44:26,850 inflation factor that uh , is 1116 00:44:26,850 --> 00:44:29,280 again going to be a projection by the 1117 00:44:29,280 --> 00:44:31,700 United States Congress that we all feel 1118 00:44:31,700 --> 00:44:34,420 is closer to accurate and then we work 1119 00:44:34,420 --> 00:44:36,476 on through supplementals next year . 1120 00:44:36,476 --> 00:44:38,531 Anything where we're off if for some 1121 00:44:38,531 --> 00:44:40,531 reason that slow . I think that's a 1122 00:44:40,531 --> 00:44:42,753 really good outcome for us we want this 1123 00:44:42,753 --> 00:44:44,920 program ? Bottom line This summer ? My 1124 00:44:44,920 --> 00:44:47,850 point is we have trouble in 22 and 1125 00:44:47,850 --> 00:44:50,530 Congress had just passed . The Omnibus 1126 00:44:50,540 --> 00:44:53,880 gave a little bit of support For fuel . 1127 00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:56,200 But the actual inflation issue is a now 1128 00:44:56,200 --> 00:44:58,256 inflation issue because I don't know 1129 00:44:58,256 --> 00:45:00,367 what the inflator is going to be next 1130 00:45:00,367 --> 00:45:02,589 year . So I have to deal with how we're 1131 00:45:02,589 --> 00:45:04,756 thinking through this . So this summer 1132 00:45:04,756 --> 00:45:06,867 is about 22 . This is about with that 1133 00:45:06,867 --> 00:45:08,922 $25 billion dollars whatever edition 1134 00:45:08,922 --> 00:45:08,480 that the Congress gave in and to 1135 00:45:08,480 --> 00:45:10,647 realize as much as you can have that . 1136 00:45:10,890 --> 00:45:13,470 And then 23 you're still optimistic 1137 00:45:13,470 --> 00:45:16,270 that to the 2.2 will hold No , that's 1138 00:45:16,270 --> 00:45:18,437 not what I just said to you . I said , 1139 00:45:18,437 --> 00:45:20,270 I said as we kind of go into the 1140 00:45:20,270 --> 00:45:22,381 endgame for 23 appropriations , as we 1141 00:45:22,381 --> 00:45:24,437 would do in any year . We want to be 1142 00:45:24,437 --> 00:45:26,548 working with Congress on , you know , 1143 00:45:26,548 --> 00:45:28,492 the collective best estimates it's 1144 00:45:28,492 --> 00:45:30,437 still going to be an estimate . It 1145 00:45:30,437 --> 00:45:32,603 might be an estimate that's too high . 1146 00:45:32,603 --> 00:45:34,881 It might be an estimate that's too low . 1147 00:45:34,881 --> 00:45:36,881 If it's too low We would assume the 1148 00:45:36,881 --> 00:45:38,714 need to be able to come back for 1149 00:45:38,714 --> 00:45:40,937 supplemental for 23 if we need it . But 1150 00:45:40,937 --> 00:45:43,103 we're going to have to make you know , 1151 00:45:43,103 --> 00:45:45,214 we have a we have a former controller 1152 00:45:45,214 --> 00:45:44,850 sitting right here . We're going to 1153 00:45:44,850 --> 00:45:46,406 have to make our best guess 1154 00:45:46,406 --> 00:45:48,517 collectively , it's never going to be 1155 00:45:48,517 --> 00:45:50,683 quite right . The question is , how do 1156 00:45:50,683 --> 00:45:52,850 you know , how close to right are we ? 1157 00:45:52,850 --> 00:45:55,017 How much can we absorb that inside the 1158 00:45:55,017 --> 00:45:56,906 program ? If we don't feel we can 1159 00:45:56,906 --> 00:45:59,128 absorb it rest assured the Secretary of 1160 00:45:59,128 --> 00:46:01,350 Defense is going to go to the President 1161 00:46:01,350 --> 00:46:03,294 and seek assistance to get further 1162 00:46:03,294 --> 00:46:05,294 resources from Capitol Hill for the 1163 00:46:05,294 --> 00:46:07,517 buying power for this program . What we 1164 00:46:07,517 --> 00:46:10,050 don't want is added top line that's 1165 00:46:10,050 --> 00:46:12,600 filled with new program that we can't 1166 00:46:12,980 --> 00:46:15,091 support and afford in the out years . 1167 00:46:15,091 --> 00:46:17,313 And that doesn't cover inflation . That 1168 00:46:17,313 --> 00:46:19,424 is my number one concern . The deputy 1169 00:46:19,424 --> 00:46:21,702 secretary just give a message to the U . 1170 00:46:21,702 --> 00:46:23,758 S . Congress right there in terms of 1171 00:46:23,758 --> 00:46:25,758 what what what she does not want as 1172 00:46:25,758 --> 00:46:27,869 Congress may and probably will likely 1173 00:46:27,869 --> 00:46:30,036 try to add to uh to the budget in part 1174 00:46:30,036 --> 00:46:31,869 to deal with inflation . In part 1175 00:46:31,869 --> 00:46:33,813 because other priorities , this is 1176 00:46:33,813 --> 00:46:33,660 where I want to end . And then we'll go 1177 00:46:33,660 --> 00:46:35,604 to questions for the audience . It 1178 00:46:35,604 --> 00:46:37,660 strikes me that Ukraine has revealed 1179 00:46:38,380 --> 00:46:40,102 many things . But one thing in 1180 00:46:40,102 --> 00:46:42,158 particular is the limitations of our 1181 00:46:42,158 --> 00:46:44,380 industrial capacity . Um and you know , 1182 00:46:44,380 --> 00:46:46,602 whether you're talking about javelins , 1183 00:46:46,602 --> 00:46:48,769 you mentioned you were at the Lockheed 1184 00:46:48,769 --> 00:46:50,824 martin plant recently , uh Manpads , 1185 00:46:50,824 --> 00:46:52,769 other types of capabilities , were 1186 00:46:52,769 --> 00:46:52,580 there seems to be there's just 1187 00:46:52,730 --> 00:46:54,890 insufficient production , you know , 1188 00:46:54,890 --> 00:46:58,860 capacity there um in 1189 00:46:58,860 --> 00:47:01,082 your press conference and in the end of 1190 00:47:01,082 --> 00:47:03,082 March , you you focus on industrial 1191 00:47:03,082 --> 00:47:05,720 base and the need uh you know , for 1192 00:47:05,720 --> 00:47:07,942 development . But in five key areas , I 1193 00:47:07,942 --> 00:47:09,831 don't think anybody disagree with 1194 00:47:09,831 --> 00:47:11,720 microelectronic casting , forging 1195 00:47:11,720 --> 00:47:13,331 batteries , energy storage , 1196 00:47:13,331 --> 00:47:15,387 Connecticut capabilities , strategic 1197 00:47:15,387 --> 00:47:17,442 and critical minerals . But wouldn't 1198 00:47:17,442 --> 00:47:19,553 you say there's 1/6 or seventh that's 1199 00:47:19,553 --> 00:47:19,260 required ? I'll give you an example , 1200 00:47:19,360 --> 00:47:23,050 you know , conventional capability . 1201 00:47:23,060 --> 00:47:25,280 Even if you agree that we needed more 1202 00:47:25,290 --> 00:47:27,570 submarines , you know , more surface 1203 00:47:27,570 --> 00:47:30,910 ships , more fighter aircraft . Like we 1204 00:47:30,910 --> 00:47:32,910 thought that was the way we need to 1205 00:47:32,910 --> 00:47:35,021 fight for the next decade . Before we 1206 00:47:35,021 --> 00:47:34,640 did some of the future stuff , you 1207 00:47:34,640 --> 00:47:37,440 couldn't do it because there aren't 1208 00:47:37,440 --> 00:47:39,680 production lines to support it . We all 1209 00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:41,902 know the undersea is critical , but you 1210 00:47:41,902 --> 00:47:44,390 can only get to a year . Don't you 1211 00:47:44,390 --> 00:47:46,557 think that should be added to the list 1212 00:47:46,557 --> 00:47:48,501 as you talk about industrial based 1213 00:47:48,501 --> 00:47:50,390 capacity hasn't Ukraine . And the 1214 00:47:50,390 --> 00:47:52,390 conflict there reinforced that that 1215 00:47:52,390 --> 00:47:54,720 that view . So I just want to clarify 1216 00:47:54,720 --> 00:47:57,110 the five areas you just mentioned are 1217 00:47:57,120 --> 00:48:00,570 specific supply chain challenges . 1218 00:48:00,580 --> 00:48:02,790 You're raising a broader industrial 1219 00:48:02,790 --> 00:48:05,012 based set of priorities and they're not 1220 00:48:05,012 --> 00:48:07,346 quite the same thing on industrial base . 1221 00:48:07,346 --> 00:48:09,401 We we absolutely are concerned , for 1222 00:48:09,401 --> 00:48:11,970 example , on shipbuilding . Um , I've 1223 00:48:11,980 --> 00:48:15,460 visited a number of our facilities . Um 1224 00:48:15,470 --> 00:48:18,650 and as I mentioned before , a strong 1225 00:48:18,650 --> 00:48:21,180 theme coming back is workforce , same 1226 00:48:21,180 --> 00:48:23,069 ammunitions , which is one of our 1227 00:48:23,069 --> 00:48:25,640 supply chain issues um work , workforce 1228 00:48:25,640 --> 00:48:28,470 training , workforce availability . Um 1229 00:48:28,480 --> 00:48:30,647 making sure we can pay the wages , the 1230 00:48:30,647 --> 00:48:32,758 companies can pay the wages needed to 1231 00:48:32,758 --> 00:48:34,758 attract the workers . All these are 1232 00:48:34,758 --> 00:48:36,536 really important to getting the 1233 00:48:36,536 --> 00:48:38,647 workforce that we need . But facility 1234 00:48:38,647 --> 00:48:40,702 ization is also an issue when we put 1235 00:48:40,702 --> 00:48:42,536 significant investment in on the 1236 00:48:42,536 --> 00:48:44,424 shipbuilding side on in psyop for 1237 00:48:44,424 --> 00:48:47,420 instance , and other investments on on 1238 00:48:47,430 --> 00:48:49,652 the shipyards in particular . Because I 1239 00:48:49,652 --> 00:48:52,010 do think that that's a particular pain 1240 00:48:52,010 --> 00:48:55,640 point area . We are behind both on the 1241 00:48:55,640 --> 00:48:57,862 submarine side and on the surface ships 1242 00:48:57,862 --> 00:49:00,690 side um in the production that we 1243 00:49:00,690 --> 00:49:02,634 already have projected industry is 1244 00:49:02,634 --> 00:49:04,801 trying to play catch up . Part of that 1245 00:49:04,801 --> 00:49:07,360 of course is also um covid effects 1246 00:49:07,370 --> 00:49:09,700 going forward . Workers who weren't 1247 00:49:10,030 --> 00:49:12,610 able to come to work supply suppliers 1248 00:49:12,610 --> 00:49:14,950 in the chain falling out etcetera . So 1249 00:49:14,950 --> 00:49:17,061 we will have a lot of cleanup I think 1250 00:49:17,061 --> 00:49:19,283 to do there . I will repeat what I said 1251 00:49:19,283 --> 00:49:21,394 before . You can't have an industrial 1252 00:49:21,394 --> 00:49:23,506 base without a market signal . Um And 1253 00:49:23,506 --> 00:49:25,561 we need to continue to have a strong 1254 00:49:25,561 --> 00:49:27,728 market signal . The Ukrainian crisis I 1255 00:49:27,728 --> 00:49:30,140 think has uh will boost some of that 1256 00:49:30,150 --> 00:49:33,210 market signal , but that's for a subset 1257 00:49:33,220 --> 00:49:35,276 of types of capabilities that allies 1258 00:49:35,276 --> 00:49:37,276 and partners and the Ukrainians for 1259 00:49:37,276 --> 00:49:39,470 example . Um or that the U . S . May 1260 00:49:39,470 --> 00:49:42,290 need as backfill . Um Your your 1261 00:49:42,770 --> 00:49:44,714 reference to the Manpads is a good 1262 00:49:44,714 --> 00:49:47,140 example , the United States for 1263 00:49:47,140 --> 00:49:49,260 ourselves . We're focused on next 1264 00:49:49,260 --> 00:49:51,260 generation . I mean there there are 1265 00:49:51,260 --> 00:49:53,960 maybe Stinger desires for example , um 1266 00:49:53,970 --> 00:49:55,914 elsewhere in the world , but we're 1267 00:49:55,914 --> 00:49:58,026 looking ahead to what do we need next 1268 00:49:58,026 --> 00:50:00,192 And we need to be able to support both 1269 00:50:00,192 --> 00:50:02,248 of them . We want an industrial base 1270 00:50:02,248 --> 00:50:02,240 that both can support our highest 1271 00:50:02,240 --> 00:50:04,830 priority needs for our joint force at 1272 00:50:04,830 --> 00:50:06,941 the same time that it can support the 1273 00:50:06,941 --> 00:50:08,997 arsenal of democracy if you will for 1274 00:50:08,997 --> 00:50:10,719 what others need . So that's a 1275 00:50:10,719 --> 00:50:12,497 continuing priority . Alright . 1276 00:50:12,497 --> 00:50:14,460 Questions from the distinguished 1277 00:50:14,460 --> 00:50:16,700 audience here we have a few minutes 1278 00:50:16,710 --> 00:50:18,988 again . Thank dr thanks for being here . 1279 00:50:18,988 --> 00:50:21,770 We're gonna go glad to uh 1280 00:50:22,360 --> 00:50:25,290 Eleanor the former undersecretary for 1281 00:50:25,300 --> 00:50:28,330 acquisition sustainment roger and thank 1282 00:50:28,330 --> 00:50:30,663 you so much for being here this morning . 1283 00:50:30,663 --> 00:50:33,960 Secretary Hicks , I'm hoping that you 1284 00:50:33,960 --> 00:50:37,160 can comment on how we as a nation are 1285 00:50:37,160 --> 00:50:39,360 working with our close partners and 1286 00:50:39,370 --> 00:50:42,460 allies specifically with respect to 1287 00:50:42,470 --> 00:50:45,310 implementing Aucas perhaps using some 1288 00:50:45,310 --> 00:50:47,532 of the rather hollow authorities of the 1289 00:50:47,532 --> 00:50:49,730 interweb right now . And how we might 1290 00:50:49,740 --> 00:50:53,100 leverage the demand signal in Australia 1291 00:50:53,110 --> 00:50:54,999 to help with the lumpiness of the 1292 00:50:54,999 --> 00:50:57,880 demand signal for industry here and how 1293 00:50:57,880 --> 00:51:00,050 release ability and export ability 1294 00:51:00,070 --> 00:51:02,292 could be opened up a little bit to help 1295 00:51:02,292 --> 00:51:05,300 that . Sure , so um and tip continues 1296 00:51:05,300 --> 00:51:08,780 to be a key um uh 1297 00:51:09,460 --> 00:51:11,682 leverage point I guess an area where we 1298 00:51:11,682 --> 00:51:14,170 can really lean in with the UK Canada 1299 00:51:14,170 --> 00:51:18,170 Australia . Um And in the most recent 1300 00:51:18,170 --> 00:51:20,170 package in the supplemental , we've 1301 00:51:20,170 --> 00:51:23,330 actually tried to specify areas where 1302 00:51:23,330 --> 00:51:25,497 we think we want to kind of move to an 1303 00:51:25,497 --> 00:51:29,320 entity based approach um um to some of 1304 00:51:29,320 --> 00:51:31,376 the backfill requirements that we're 1305 00:51:31,376 --> 00:51:34,580 trying to meet some folks more broadly 1306 00:51:34,580 --> 00:51:36,580 referred to this as near shoring or 1307 00:51:36,580 --> 00:51:38,413 allied shoring . And it's really 1308 00:51:38,413 --> 00:51:40,413 important to how we think about the 1309 00:51:40,413 --> 00:51:42,636 capabilities that the critical minerals 1310 00:51:42,636 --> 00:51:44,747 is a good example . lithium is a good 1311 00:51:44,747 --> 00:51:46,858 example where the Australians have on 1312 00:51:46,858 --> 00:51:48,990 capability there to bring to bear on 1313 00:51:49,000 --> 00:51:51,900 august . We are working through of 1314 00:51:51,900 --> 00:51:54,650 course the submarine um approach but 1315 00:51:54,660 --> 00:51:56,530 also a series of other critical 1316 00:51:56,530 --> 00:51:59,290 technology areas and learning from both 1317 00:51:59,290 --> 00:52:02,460 the brits and Australians . Um where 1318 00:52:02,460 --> 00:52:04,670 there may be relative advantages each 1319 00:52:04,670 --> 00:52:07,610 can bring to bear um without getting 1320 00:52:07,610 --> 00:52:09,554 into any detail , I would just say 1321 00:52:09,554 --> 00:52:11,666 there are areas where the Australians 1322 00:52:11,666 --> 00:52:13,721 on the research and development side 1323 00:52:13,721 --> 00:52:15,943 and even into the procurement side have 1324 00:52:15,943 --> 00:52:18,054 um , I have some really good advances 1325 00:52:18,054 --> 00:52:20,166 that we in the United States can lean 1326 00:52:20,166 --> 00:52:22,166 on and I think august has created a 1327 00:52:22,166 --> 00:52:24,277 good opportunity to share that . Same 1328 00:52:24,277 --> 00:52:26,388 with the brits across three of us and 1329 00:52:26,388 --> 00:52:28,610 potentially beyond two other partners . 1330 00:52:28,610 --> 00:52:29,777 Question over here , 1331 00:52:32,750 --> 00:52:34,639 Hi Valerie and Cena with breaking 1332 00:52:34,639 --> 00:52:37,040 defense . Um , so earlier this week the 1333 00:52:37,040 --> 00:52:40,080 Pentagon sent a 1.5 billion 1334 00:52:40,100 --> 00:52:42,790 reprogramming request over to Congress 1335 00:52:42,800 --> 00:52:46,600 um asking to shift some funds around so 1336 00:52:46,610 --> 00:52:50,220 that the pentagon could ramp up 1337 00:52:50,220 --> 00:52:53,220 singer and javelin production . Um , 1338 00:52:53,230 --> 00:52:55,230 you know , obviously there are some 1339 00:52:55,230 --> 00:52:57,830 issues with with , with both lines . 1340 00:52:57,840 --> 00:53:00,062 Javelins and production . Lockheed says 1341 00:53:00,062 --> 00:53:02,173 it needs funds to expand that Singers 1342 00:53:02,173 --> 00:53:04,118 in production for an international 1343 00:53:04,118 --> 00:53:06,229 customer has obsolescence issues . So 1344 00:53:06,229 --> 00:53:08,340 this money that you guys are asking a 1345 00:53:08,340 --> 00:53:09,951 shift , what does that cover 1346 00:53:09,951 --> 00:53:12,118 specifically ? Does that help to cover 1347 00:53:12,118 --> 00:53:14,284 some of those issues or you know , how 1348 00:53:14,284 --> 00:53:16,340 many stingers and javelins does this 1349 00:53:16,340 --> 00:53:18,507 actually give you coming off the lines 1350 00:53:18,507 --> 00:53:21,330 again ? So the funds that were 1351 00:53:21,330 --> 00:53:24,020 requested are a result of some of the 1352 00:53:24,030 --> 00:53:26,252 supplemental funding we've already been 1353 00:53:26,252 --> 00:53:28,540 provided . Um , and it's at the end of 1354 00:53:28,540 --> 00:53:30,580 the 30 day notification period for 1355 00:53:30,580 --> 00:53:32,636 Congress . So that's why it's coming 1356 00:53:32,636 --> 00:53:34,858 out this week . So it's sort of then in 1357 00:53:34,858 --> 00:53:37,024 the plans we've had the notification , 1358 00:53:37,024 --> 00:53:38,969 we're now approved for the army to 1359 00:53:38,969 --> 00:53:41,136 start working on that . I just want to 1360 00:53:41,136 --> 00:53:43,230 clarify what that is . Um , the now 1361 00:53:43,230 --> 00:53:45,270 begins the process of getting into 1362 00:53:45,270 --> 00:53:47,381 exactly what you're asking , which is 1363 00:53:47,381 --> 00:53:49,640 with those funds working between the 1364 00:53:49,640 --> 00:53:52,090 army and contracting and the 1365 00:53:52,100 --> 00:53:54,860 manufacturers trying to understand what 1366 00:53:54,860 --> 00:53:58,000 is the smartest application of funds to 1367 00:53:58,000 --> 00:54:00,167 get the best output . So there isn't , 1368 00:54:00,170 --> 00:54:03,080 there isn't a set answer to your 1369 00:54:03,080 --> 00:54:05,247 question yet . But what I can tell you 1370 00:54:05,247 --> 00:54:08,300 is basically the approaches how to 1371 00:54:08,300 --> 00:54:10,480 apply the funds to ramp up the 1372 00:54:10,480 --> 00:54:13,670 production . So for javelin potentially 1373 00:54:13,670 --> 00:54:15,781 going up , you know , not , not quite 1374 00:54:15,781 --> 00:54:17,892 double , but significantly , you know 1375 00:54:17,892 --> 00:54:20,114 what , I'm terrible at math in public , 1376 00:54:20,114 --> 00:54:22,226 but , you know , 1.5 times where they 1377 00:54:22,226 --> 00:54:24,281 are now in monthly production . What 1378 00:54:24,281 --> 00:54:26,503 would that take ? So we're working with 1379 00:54:26,503 --> 00:54:29,530 them right now on that . Um , and on um , 1380 00:54:29,540 --> 00:54:32,520 uh , Stinger , a similar , similar set 1381 00:54:32,520 --> 00:54:35,170 of questions around obsolete parts . Um , 1382 00:54:35,180 --> 00:54:37,890 and planning efforts in addition to 1383 00:54:37,900 --> 00:54:40,067 production I mentioned the workforce , 1384 00:54:40,067 --> 00:54:42,178 piece of it . Some of the funds might 1385 00:54:42,178 --> 00:54:44,400 be going to the facilities , some of it 1386 00:54:44,400 --> 00:54:46,622 might be going to work force and that's 1387 00:54:46,622 --> 00:54:48,789 something that the army is going to be 1388 00:54:48,789 --> 00:54:50,844 working with the manufacturers right 1389 00:54:50,844 --> 00:54:52,844 now . I'll just say one more time . 1390 00:54:52,844 --> 00:54:54,956 It's important to remember that those 1391 00:54:54,956 --> 00:54:57,011 capabilities , we want to be able to 1392 00:54:57,011 --> 00:54:59,122 produce those capabilities for allies 1393 00:54:59,122 --> 00:55:01,344 and partners , but we are looking ahead 1394 00:55:01,344 --> 00:55:03,178 to to where we want to go on our 1395 00:55:03,178 --> 00:55:05,344 munitions . Um , and that was on track 1396 00:55:05,344 --> 00:55:07,400 if you will . So now it's also about 1397 00:55:07,400 --> 00:55:09,840 managing through both creating that , 1398 00:55:09,840 --> 00:55:12,330 generating that capability for others . 1399 00:55:12,540 --> 00:55:15,250 Um some amount of backfilled 1400 00:55:15,250 --> 00:55:17,472 potentially on the US side . But really 1401 00:55:17,472 --> 00:55:19,639 making sure we're staying on track for 1402 00:55:19,639 --> 00:55:21,694 the capabilities we need for the for 1403 00:55:21,694 --> 00:55:23,917 the joint voice in the future . We have 1404 00:55:23,917 --> 00:55:23,780 a few minutes left . So I apologize . 1405 00:55:23,780 --> 00:55:25,724 I'm not gonna get to everybody has 1406 00:55:25,724 --> 00:55:27,836 raised their hand . I saw tom Carrico 1407 00:55:27,836 --> 00:55:29,002 from C . S . I . S . 1408 00:55:34,460 --> 00:55:36,571 Great to see you . Good to see you in 1409 00:55:36,571 --> 00:55:38,627 your remarks , you talked about your 1410 00:55:38,627 --> 00:55:40,849 aggressive and focused attention to the 1411 00:55:40,849 --> 00:55:42,960 multi domain threat to the homeland . 1412 00:55:42,960 --> 00:55:45,260 We've seen hundreds and hundreds of 1413 00:55:45,260 --> 00:55:47,316 cruise missiles being used by Russia 1414 00:55:47,316 --> 00:55:49,538 and Ukraine . And over the past several 1415 00:55:49,538 --> 00:55:51,482 years . Joint staff documents have 1416 00:55:51,482 --> 00:55:53,649 talked about the threat of non nuclear 1417 00:55:53,649 --> 00:55:55,871 cruise missile attack to the homeland . 1418 00:55:55,871 --> 00:55:58,093 To change our political calculus . Some 1419 00:55:58,093 --> 00:56:00,316 of your PB 23 documents talk about this 1420 00:56:00,316 --> 00:56:02,482 as well including in some buffers . So 1421 00:56:02,482 --> 00:56:04,538 how do you think about that threat ? 1422 00:56:04,538 --> 00:56:06,538 What are some plans going forward ? 1423 00:56:06,538 --> 00:56:06,350 This is something that the North com 1424 00:56:06,350 --> 00:56:08,239 commander and other folks are are 1425 00:56:08,239 --> 00:56:10,183 pounding the table about of late . 1426 00:56:10,183 --> 00:56:12,294 Thank you . So I'm gonna broaden it a 1427 00:56:12,294 --> 00:56:14,610 little tom great to see you . Um I'm 1428 00:56:14,610 --> 00:56:16,277 gonna broaden it a little too 1429 00:56:16,277 --> 00:56:18,332 integrated air and missile defense . 1430 00:56:18,332 --> 00:56:20,332 Whether it's unmanned systems , low 1431 00:56:20,332 --> 00:56:22,499 slow flyers as as we used to just call 1432 00:56:22,499 --> 00:56:25,520 them um up through the cruise missile 1433 00:56:25,520 --> 00:56:27,940 challenge , which um you know , we have 1434 00:56:27,940 --> 00:56:30,810 long had that challenge from Russia to 1435 00:56:30,810 --> 00:56:34,590 think through um you know , all the way 1436 00:56:34,590 --> 00:56:36,760 up through the more advanced threats 1437 00:56:36,760 --> 00:56:38,871 we're seeing today . The way in which 1438 00:56:38,871 --> 00:56:41,149 we have to think about missile defense , 1439 00:56:41,149 --> 00:56:43,316 both regionally and here in the United 1440 00:56:43,316 --> 00:56:44,871 States really has to evolve 1441 00:56:44,871 --> 00:56:47,210 substantially . So there is still um a 1442 00:56:47,210 --> 00:56:51,140 key component for defeat um 1443 00:56:51,150 --> 00:56:54,900 and kinetic defeat . But increasingly 1444 00:56:54,910 --> 00:56:57,300 we have to be looking at opportunities 1445 00:56:57,300 --> 00:56:59,960 that are non kinetics of cyber jamming . 1446 00:57:00,330 --> 00:57:02,840 Um another capabilities as well as 1447 00:57:02,840 --> 00:57:04,896 detection and cruise missiles are in 1448 00:57:04,896 --> 00:57:07,118 one of these spaces where the detection 1449 00:57:07,118 --> 00:57:09,284 pieces so challenging . So there we've 1450 00:57:09,284 --> 00:57:12,770 put quite a bit of money into In the 23 1451 00:57:12,770 --> 00:57:16,400 request into our radars and are sensing 1452 00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:19,970 systems . Um you you I know are a big 1453 00:57:19,980 --> 00:57:22,091 advocate of and hopefully are pleased 1454 00:57:22,091 --> 00:57:23,980 with what we've done on the space 1455 00:57:23,980 --> 00:57:26,036 architecture in terms of sensing for 1456 00:57:26,036 --> 00:57:29,360 this very reason . Um but defeat is 1457 00:57:29,360 --> 00:57:31,360 very challenged . I'm not , I don't 1458 00:57:31,360 --> 00:57:34,730 want to sugarcoat that and we have long 1459 00:57:34,740 --> 00:57:37,470 uh emphasized and I will emphasize here 1460 00:57:37,470 --> 00:57:40,780 today . Um our strategic deterrent and 1461 00:57:40,780 --> 00:57:42,947 our conventional deterrent with regard 1462 00:57:42,947 --> 00:57:45,300 to how seriously we view any kind of 1463 00:57:45,300 --> 00:57:47,467 attack on the United States homeland , 1464 00:57:47,467 --> 00:57:50,150 whether that homeland is Guam Hawaii 1465 00:57:50,150 --> 00:57:53,020 Alaska or the continental United States 1466 00:57:53,030 --> 00:57:56,250 um a cruise missile attack or any kind 1467 00:57:56,250 --> 00:57:58,540 of attack like that on us here at home . 1468 00:57:58,730 --> 00:58:01,580 We have to be able to rely on that full 1469 00:58:01,580 --> 00:58:03,747 suite of capabilities and the time and 1470 00:58:03,747 --> 00:58:05,969 place of choosing for the United States 1471 00:58:05,969 --> 00:58:07,969 to respond . Alright , we'll do two 1472 00:58:07,969 --> 00:58:07,760 more here and then we'll wrap up 1473 00:58:07,760 --> 00:58:09,816 Michael Gordon ? Then we'll go to uh 1474 00:58:09,816 --> 00:58:13,340 Lawrence one strategic comparative 1475 00:58:13,720 --> 00:58:17,240 you identified refrain . It's stuck . 1476 00:58:17,720 --> 00:58:21,660 Yes . To prevent failed to 1477 00:58:21,660 --> 00:58:22,340 complete 1478 00:58:25,920 --> 00:58:28,450 specific terminology . Two page . 1479 00:58:30,270 --> 00:58:33,840 Sure . I'm sort of two related 1480 00:58:34,920 --> 00:58:38,570 two related questions . The pentagon's 1481 00:58:38,580 --> 00:58:41,400 objective to develop the U . S . 1482 00:58:41,400 --> 00:58:45,250 Military capability to deny china the 1483 00:58:45,250 --> 00:58:48,660 capability to conduct an invasion of 1484 00:58:48,670 --> 00:58:51,750 Taiwan or is the goal more general than 1485 00:58:51,750 --> 00:58:55,530 that ? That is to deter china by 1486 00:58:55,530 --> 00:58:58,670 imposing a range of military or other 1487 00:58:58,670 --> 00:59:02,010 costs under your integrated deterrence 1488 00:59:02,500 --> 00:59:04,611 concept ? If you see the difference . 1489 00:59:04,920 --> 00:59:07,250 Yes . To the first question on denying . 1490 00:59:07,620 --> 00:59:10,320 Mhm . And a second question is what do 1491 00:59:10,320 --> 00:59:13,340 you see as the lessons of the Ukraine 1492 00:59:13,820 --> 00:59:17,280 uh conflict for your ongoing efforts to 1493 00:59:17,280 --> 00:59:19,820 deter action ? And on Taiwan , are 1494 00:59:19,820 --> 00:59:22,042 there lessons there and what are they ? 1495 00:59:22,042 --> 00:59:24,098 Sure there's certainly lessons we're 1496 00:59:24,098 --> 00:59:26,098 not we're not done in Ukraine and I 1497 00:59:26,098 --> 00:59:27,820 think it's important for us to 1498 00:59:27,820 --> 00:59:30,340 acknowledge that lessons will build . 1499 00:59:30,720 --> 00:59:34,100 Um I think a major lesson 1500 00:59:34,110 --> 00:59:36,750 is the importance as I said before of 1501 00:59:36,750 --> 00:59:39,210 the demonstrated will to fight and 1502 00:59:39,210 --> 00:59:42,900 capability to fight of the um anyone 1503 00:59:42,900 --> 00:59:45,178 who's trying to defend their democracy . 1504 00:59:45,178 --> 00:59:47,344 And I think Taiwan has that as a clear 1505 00:59:47,344 --> 00:59:49,511 takeaway as well as you've seen in the 1506 00:59:49,511 --> 00:59:51,400 press , making sure that they are 1507 00:59:51,400 --> 00:59:53,233 investing themselves in the self 1508 00:59:53,233 --> 00:59:55,456 defense that they need to have . And of 1509 00:59:55,456 --> 00:59:57,678 course under the Taiwan relations Act , 1510 00:59:57,678 --> 00:59:59,789 we are here to support the um they're 1511 00:59:59,789 --> 01:00:01,678 self defense efforts , so working 1512 01:00:01,678 --> 01:00:04,011 closely with them on those capabilities , 1513 01:00:04,011 --> 01:00:06,011 but it's not just capabilities that 1514 01:00:06,011 --> 01:00:08,233 there are also some uh institutional or 1515 01:00:08,233 --> 01:00:11,970 um you know uh there's some more reform 1516 01:00:11,980 --> 01:00:14,550 efforts that they need to undertake 1517 01:00:14,560 --> 01:00:16,727 that they are focused on now and we're 1518 01:00:16,727 --> 01:00:18,870 there to support them on that more 1519 01:00:18,870 --> 01:00:21,092 broadly . I think the big takeaways are 1520 01:00:21,092 --> 01:00:22,870 that when you get um one of the 1521 01:00:22,870 --> 01:00:24,870 asymmetries as I mentioned that the 1522 01:00:24,870 --> 01:00:27,120 United States has , that that china and 1523 01:00:27,130 --> 01:00:30,730 Russia have lacked is that um uh 1524 01:00:30,740 --> 01:00:34,360 substantial throw weight of market 1525 01:00:34,360 --> 01:00:36,940 economies um that when they choose to 1526 01:00:36,940 --> 01:00:38,773 bring that to bear , it can have 1527 01:00:38,773 --> 01:00:40,718 devastating effect . As I said , I 1528 01:00:40,718 --> 01:00:42,773 think that will build over time here 1529 01:00:42,773 --> 01:00:45,520 and is a big lesson um not just for the 1530 01:00:45,520 --> 01:00:47,687 Europeans to sort of see what they can 1531 01:00:47,687 --> 01:00:50,310 bring to the table that they can also 1532 01:00:50,320 --> 01:00:54,320 bring their um citizens along uh to 1533 01:00:54,330 --> 01:00:56,640 increased investments in defense as 1534 01:00:56,640 --> 01:00:59,950 well , but also um what the chinese 1535 01:00:59,950 --> 01:01:02,540 will take away from the costs of 1536 01:01:02,540 --> 01:01:05,480 aggression , Lauren quit because they 1537 01:01:05,480 --> 01:01:07,930 were already over with secretaries time . 1538 01:01:09,540 --> 01:01:11,790 Um Quick question . So upon your 1539 01:01:11,790 --> 01:01:14,012 confirmation there was a Cape memo that 1540 01:01:14,012 --> 01:01:15,734 you had sent . There was press 1541 01:01:15,734 --> 01:01:17,846 reporting about including things like 1542 01:01:17,846 --> 01:01:20,068 looking at the fighter mix in the Fy 23 1543 01:01:20,068 --> 01:01:22,234 program as well as unmanned maritime . 1544 01:01:22,234 --> 01:01:24,179 How have your key investment areas 1545 01:01:24,179 --> 01:01:26,179 changed if at all ? Since that memo 1546 01:01:26,179 --> 01:01:28,346 about a year ago ? Um especially given 1547 01:01:28,346 --> 01:01:31,470 events in the world . So that was not a 1548 01:01:31,470 --> 01:01:33,900 key investment memo . That was a memo 1549 01:01:33,900 --> 01:01:36,390 on issues for the program review . And 1550 01:01:36,390 --> 01:01:38,723 we'll do we'll do another one this year . 1551 01:01:38,723 --> 01:01:41,950 Um So we always are shifting if you 1552 01:01:41,950 --> 01:01:44,061 will the areas that we think are most 1553 01:01:44,061 --> 01:01:45,894 important to investigate just to 1554 01:01:45,894 --> 01:01:47,894 clarify which is a little different 1555 01:01:47,894 --> 01:01:50,006 than most important to invest in . Um 1556 01:01:50,006 --> 01:01:52,339 And I would say coming out of the N . D . 1557 01:01:52,339 --> 01:01:54,228 S analytic work we have a we have 1558 01:01:54,228 --> 01:01:56,394 developed out some of those areas . We 1559 01:01:56,394 --> 01:01:58,006 have a few others we want to 1560 01:01:58,006 --> 01:02:00,061 investigate further this year . I'll 1561 01:02:00,061 --> 01:02:02,172 just highlight a few very broad areas 1562 01:02:02,172 --> 01:02:04,420 contested logistics um is one that 1563 01:02:04,420 --> 01:02:06,850 we're very interested in in exploring . 1564 01:02:06,860 --> 01:02:09,080 Um And that was before watching the 1565 01:02:09,080 --> 01:02:11,247 Russians be so challenged on their own 1566 01:02:11,247 --> 01:02:12,969 border . But we certainly know 1567 01:02:12,969 --> 01:02:15,240 logistics is a big challenge that we 1568 01:02:15,240 --> 01:02:17,407 want to make sure we can protect cyber 1569 01:02:17,407 --> 01:02:19,518 defense for example is a big piece of 1570 01:02:19,518 --> 01:02:22,230 that . Um And I would also um point to 1571 01:02:22,230 --> 01:02:24,174 homeland defense how we think more 1572 01:02:24,174 --> 01:02:27,050 broadly about the way in which our 1573 01:02:27,060 --> 01:02:29,890 homeland plays into challenge come 1574 01:02:29,900 --> 01:02:32,860 those complex threat dynamics that come 1575 01:02:32,860 --> 01:02:34,810 against , come against the United 1576 01:02:34,810 --> 01:02:37,330 States in any kind of major conflict . 1577 01:02:37,610 --> 01:02:39,610 But there will be several more than 1578 01:02:39,610 --> 01:02:41,610 that . That's just a few examples . 1579 01:02:41,910 --> 01:02:43,910 Join me in Thanking Dr . Hicks , 70 1580 01:02:43,910 --> 01:02:46,132 Secretary Defense is joining us today . 1581 01:02:46,132 --> 01:02:49,330 Stick around . We'll have a 1582 01:02:49,340 --> 01:02:50,970 distinguished panel coming up next .