1
00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:02,296
the committee meets today to receive 

2
00:00:02,296 --> 00:00:04,240
testimony on the worldwide threats 

3
00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:06,073
facing the United States and our 

4
00:00:06,073 --> 00:00:08,129
international partners . I'd like to 

5
00:00:08,129 --> 00:00:09,740
welcome Director of National 

6
00:00:09,740 --> 00:00:11,518
Intelligence , April Haynes and 

7
00:00:11,518 --> 00:00:13,573
director of the Defense Intelligence 

8
00:00:13,573 --> 00:00:15,740
Agency . Lieutenant General scott deve 

9
00:00:15,800 --> 00:00:18,910
barrier . Thank you both for joining us . 

10
00:00:18,910 --> 00:00:20,799
And please convey the committee's 

11
00:00:20,799 --> 00:00:22,910
gratitude to the men and women of the 

12
00:00:22,910 --> 00:00:24,743
intelligence community for their 

13
00:00:24,743 --> 00:00:26,577
critical work . We must start by 

14
00:00:26,577 --> 00:00:28,688
addressing the illegal war . Vladimir 

15
00:00:28,688 --> 00:00:30,688
Putin is waging in Ukraine over the 

16
00:00:30,688 --> 00:00:32,799
past 2.5 months . Russia's unprovoked 

17
00:00:32,799 --> 00:00:34,700
aggression has inflicted horrific 

18
00:00:34,700 --> 00:00:36,756
suffering upon innocent civilians in 

19
00:00:36,756 --> 00:00:38,770
Ukraine threatened the european 

20
00:00:38,770 --> 00:00:41,360
security and cause serious consequences 

21
00:00:41,360 --> 00:00:43,730
for the global economy . In the face of 

22
00:00:43,730 --> 00:00:45,952
this senseless violence , the Ukrainian 

23
00:00:45,952 --> 00:00:47,952
military has performed tremendously 

24
00:00:47,952 --> 00:00:50,119
supported by the United States and the 

25
00:00:50,119 --> 00:00:52,330
international community . A formidable 

26
00:00:52,340 --> 00:00:54,780
array of our global allies and partners 

27
00:00:54,780 --> 00:00:57,490
have joined in solidarity to impose 

28
00:00:57,490 --> 00:00:59,920
severe sanctions on Russia and provide 

29
00:00:59,920 --> 00:01:02,100
support to Ukraine . We cannot 

30
00:01:02,100 --> 00:01:04,380
overstate the scale and importance of 

31
00:01:04,380 --> 00:01:06,630
this unity . I want to commend the 

32
00:01:06,630 --> 00:01:08,852
biden administration and the leaders of 

33
00:01:08,852 --> 00:01:10,797
the intelligence community for the 

34
00:01:10,797 --> 00:01:12,908
unprecedented and skillful release of 

35
00:01:12,908 --> 00:01:14,852
intelligence over the last several 

36
00:01:14,852 --> 00:01:17,074
months that exposed Russia's aggressive 

37
00:01:17,074 --> 00:01:19,560
intentions and deceitful activities 

38
00:01:19,570 --> 00:01:21,514
ahead of its invasion of Ukraine . 

39
00:01:21,940 --> 00:01:23,610
Intelligence officials are 

40
00:01:23,620 --> 00:01:25,842
understandably cautious about revealing 

41
00:01:25,842 --> 00:01:28,310
hard won insights on adversaries , but 

42
00:01:28,310 --> 00:01:30,088
this strategy has proven highly 

43
00:01:30,088 --> 00:01:32,000
effective in strengthening the 

44
00:01:32,000 --> 00:01:34,580
international community's response and 

45
00:01:34,580 --> 00:01:36,747
creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin . 

46
00:01:37,240 --> 00:01:39,296
This is a great example of competing 

47
00:01:39,296 --> 00:01:41,407
effectively in the information to the 

48
00:01:41,407 --> 00:01:43,629
domain . And I hope we will continue to 

49
00:01:43,629 --> 00:01:45,518
make use of this kind of Creative 

50
00:01:45,518 --> 00:01:47,400
Tradecraft . With that in mind . 

51
00:01:47,710 --> 00:01:50,050
Russia's strategy in Ukraine seems to 

52
00:01:50,050 --> 00:01:52,840
be evolving Director Hanes general 

53
00:01:52,840 --> 00:01:54,570
barrier . I would ask for your 

54
00:01:54,570 --> 00:01:56,681
assessment of the Ukraine conflict in 

55
00:01:56,681 --> 00:01:58,850
the logic context of the evolving 

56
00:01:58,850 --> 00:02:01,280
international order as well as the 

57
00:02:01,280 --> 00:02:03,224
implications for the United States 

58
00:02:03,224 --> 00:02:05,447
approached the security in the european 

59
00:02:05,447 --> 00:02:07,570
theater going forward . We must also 

60
00:02:07,570 --> 00:02:09,960
stay focused on our long term strategic 

61
00:02:09,960 --> 00:02:12,660
competition with china . In addition to 

62
00:02:12,660 --> 00:02:15,310
its economic and sociopolitical growth , 

63
00:02:15,360 --> 00:02:17,582
China has studied the United States way 

64
00:02:17,582 --> 00:02:19,760
of war and focused on offsetting our 

65
00:02:19,760 --> 00:02:21,920
advantages . Beijing has made 

66
00:02:21,920 --> 00:02:24,330
concerning progress in this regard and 

67
00:02:24,330 --> 00:02:27,430
holds its own expansive geostrategic 

68
00:02:27,430 --> 00:02:30,040
ambitions . As we speak , China is 

69
00:02:30,040 --> 00:02:32,151
watching how the nations of the world 

70
00:02:32,151 --> 00:02:34,190
respond to Russia in considering a 

71
00:02:34,190 --> 00:02:36,210
potential invasion of Taiwan . 

72
00:02:36,220 --> 00:02:38,730
President xi is scrutinizing Putin's 

73
00:02:38,730 --> 00:02:41,250
playbook and the international response . 

74
00:02:41,840 --> 00:02:44,140
However , there is a broad consensus 

75
00:02:44,140 --> 00:02:46,140
that our comparative advantage over 

76
00:02:46,140 --> 00:02:48,196
china is our network of partners and 

77
00:02:48,196 --> 00:02:50,250
allies in the region and globally 

78
00:02:50,740 --> 00:02:52,962
strengthening that network should be at 

79
00:02:52,962 --> 00:02:55,184
the center of any strategy for the indo 

80
00:02:55,184 --> 00:02:57,240
pacific region and the maturation of 

81
00:02:57,240 --> 00:02:59,407
the quadrilateral security dialogue or 

82
00:02:59,407 --> 00:03:01,351
quad involving the United States . 

83
00:03:01,351 --> 00:03:04,300
Japan India and Australia presents a 

84
00:03:04,300 --> 00:03:06,580
strategic opportunity to establish a 

85
00:03:06,580 --> 00:03:08,680
durable framework . I would ask the 

86
00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:10,847
eyewitnesses is to share what military 

87
00:03:10,847 --> 00:03:13,070
and non military factors are most 

88
00:03:13,070 --> 00:03:14,970
likely to impact chinese decision 

89
00:03:14,970 --> 00:03:17,660
making with response to potential 

90
00:03:17,660 --> 00:03:21,100
action against Taiwan . Turning to Iran 

91
00:03:21,840 --> 00:03:23,562
in the four years since then , 

92
00:03:23,562 --> 00:03:25,784
President trump pulled out of the joint 

93
00:03:25,784 --> 00:03:28,007
comprehensive plan of action or jcPOa . 

94
00:03:28,340 --> 00:03:31,020
Iran has made key nuclear advances . It 

95
00:03:31,020 --> 00:03:33,187
has decreased breakout time to several 

96
00:03:33,187 --> 00:03:35,540
weeks from a year under the previous 

97
00:03:35,540 --> 00:03:37,510
agreement has increased uranium 

98
00:03:37,510 --> 00:03:40,260
enrichment to 60% instead of just under 

99
00:03:40,260 --> 00:03:43,350
4% allowed under the agreement , Iran 

100
00:03:43,350 --> 00:03:45,350
has hardened its infrastructure and 

101
00:03:45,350 --> 00:03:47,520
replace damaged equipment with more 

102
00:03:47,530 --> 00:03:49,730
advanced models . And while 

103
00:03:49,730 --> 00:03:52,220
negotiations to return Iran to the J . 

104
00:03:52,220 --> 00:03:54,760
C . P . O . R in the final stages , the 

105
00:03:54,760 --> 00:03:56,540
final outcome has not yet been 

106
00:03:56,540 --> 00:03:59,320
determined beyond its nuclear advances . 

107
00:03:59,320 --> 00:04:01,700
Iran and Iranian proxies continue to 

108
00:04:01,700 --> 00:04:03,811
mount grown and rocket attacks in the 

109
00:04:03,811 --> 00:04:06,240
region including against bases in Iraq 

110
00:04:06,240 --> 00:04:08,240
and Syria with the U . S . Military 

111
00:04:08,240 --> 00:04:12,030
presence Saudi Arabia and also now 

112
00:04:12,030 --> 00:04:14,700
the United Arab Emirates have also come 

113
00:04:14,700 --> 00:04:16,820
under attack director Hanes . Given 

114
00:04:16,820 --> 00:04:18,931
these current dynamics , I would like 

115
00:04:18,931 --> 00:04:20,987
your thoughts and how best due to de 

116
00:04:20,987 --> 00:04:22,876
escalate tensions with Iran while 

117
00:04:22,876 --> 00:04:25,209
preserving space to return to the J . C . 

118
00:04:25,209 --> 00:04:27,580
P . O . A . Finally this year's threat 

119
00:04:27,580 --> 00:04:29,358
assessment again highlights the 

120
00:04:29,358 --> 00:04:31,247
challenges posed by environmental 

121
00:04:31,247 --> 00:04:33,740
degradation from climate change . I 

122
00:04:33,740 --> 00:04:36,310
understand it is the kidneys view that 

123
00:04:36,310 --> 00:04:39,040
climate change will increasingly exit 

124
00:04:39,150 --> 00:04:42,850
exit exacerbate risk to us national 

125
00:04:42,850 --> 00:04:45,620
security interest as issues like rising 

126
00:04:45,620 --> 00:04:47,950
temperatures , pour water , governance , 

127
00:04:47,960 --> 00:04:50,490
pollution , changing , participate 

128
00:04:50,500 --> 00:04:52,720
participation patterns and other 

129
00:04:52,720 --> 00:04:54,831
climate effects are likely to lead to 

130
00:04:54,831 --> 00:04:57,350
an array of human challenges such as 

131
00:04:57,350 --> 00:05:00,150
food and water insecurity and threats 

132
00:05:00,150 --> 00:05:03,240
to human health . We live in a complex 

133
00:05:03,240 --> 00:05:04,907
and dangerous global security 

134
00:05:04,907 --> 00:05:07,129
environment from Russia's aggression in 

135
00:05:07,129 --> 00:05:09,351
europe to china's influence in the indo 

136
00:05:09,351 --> 00:05:11,590
pacific to counsel to list other malign 

137
00:05:11,590 --> 00:05:14,100
actors around the world prevailing in 

138
00:05:14,100 --> 00:05:16,267
this environment will require resolute 

139
00:05:16,267 --> 00:05:18,580
affordable strategies . I look forward 

140
00:05:18,580 --> 00:05:20,636
to our witnesses insights into these 

141
00:05:20,636 --> 00:05:22,858
issues and I thank them again for their 

142
00:05:22,858 --> 00:05:25,024
participation . Now let me turn to the 

143
00:05:25,024 --> 00:05:27,247
ranking member , Senator Inhofe . Thank 

144
00:05:27,247 --> 00:05:29,136
you . Mr Chairman . I join you in 

145
00:05:29,136 --> 00:05:31,960
welcoming our witnesses when our 

146
00:05:31,960 --> 00:05:33,738
witnesses testified before this 

147
00:05:33,738 --> 00:05:37,260
committee last year or we had witnesses . 

148
00:05:38,040 --> 00:05:40,540
They provided a dire assessment of the 

149
00:05:40,540 --> 00:05:42,707
threats to our national security . And 

150
00:05:42,707 --> 00:05:44,830
it's clear and I I really can't 

151
00:05:44,830 --> 00:05:47,880
overstate this . The security situation 

152
00:05:47,880 --> 00:05:50,380
we face today is significantly more 

153
00:05:50,380 --> 00:05:53,230
dangerous and complex than it has has 

154
00:05:53,240 --> 00:05:55,700
ever been . There certainly was a year 

155
00:05:55,700 --> 00:05:58,390
ago . The Chinese threat is beyond 

156
00:05:58,390 --> 00:06:00,446
anything we ever dealt with before . 

157
00:06:00,446 --> 00:06:02,650
This year . Beijing announced its 7.1% 

158
00:06:02,660 --> 00:06:05,780
defense budget increase . They've had 

159
00:06:05,790 --> 00:06:08,350
two decades of real growth with no 

160
00:06:08,350 --> 00:06:10,572
signs of slowing down . As the chairman 

161
00:06:10,572 --> 00:06:13,150
alluded to Putin's unprovoked 

162
00:06:13,150 --> 00:06:17,070
aggression against Ukraine shows 

163
00:06:17,070 --> 00:06:20,690
the danger posed by the nuclear 

164
00:06:20,690 --> 00:06:24,630
armed Russia to our security and those 

165
00:06:24,630 --> 00:06:27,350
of our allies and international order . 

166
00:06:28,240 --> 00:06:31,510
Iran's behind behavior continues 

167
00:06:31,510 --> 00:06:33,420
throughout the Middle East and 

168
00:06:33,430 --> 00:06:36,070
terrorist groups like IsIS and Al Qaeda 

169
00:06:36,080 --> 00:06:38,650
are growing in strength across africa . 

170
00:06:39,040 --> 00:06:41,570
Despite this reality President biden's 

171
00:06:41,580 --> 00:06:44,770
budget request is inadequate . It 

172
00:06:44,770 --> 00:06:46,770
doesn't deliver the real growth our 

173
00:06:46,770 --> 00:06:50,180
military needs and that is the 3-5% 

174
00:06:50,180 --> 00:06:52,850
increase that we established some five 

175
00:06:52,850 --> 00:06:56,120
years ago and as I've said it before , 

176
00:06:56,120 --> 00:06:58,840
inflation is now is the new 

177
00:06:58,850 --> 00:07:01,890
sequestration that we consider today 

178
00:07:01,890 --> 00:07:03,557
and it's making everywhere in 

179
00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:06,070
everything we do more difficult . So I 

180
00:07:06,070 --> 00:07:08,126
look forward to hearing from both of 

181
00:07:08,126 --> 00:07:10,710
you about how are threats have evolved 

182
00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:14,030
since ever since last year and how the 

183
00:07:14,030 --> 00:07:16,760
intelligence community is changing to 

184
00:07:16,770 --> 00:07:19,370
respond to the national security 

185
00:07:19,370 --> 00:07:21,760
strategy . Thank you . Mr . Chairman , 

186
00:07:22,940 --> 00:07:25,107
Thank you very much . Senator Inhofe . 

187
00:07:25,107 --> 00:07:27,218
Now let me recognize Director Han's . 

188
00:07:29,440 --> 00:07:31,551
Thank you very much . Chairman . Reed 

189
00:07:31,551 --> 00:07:33,718
ranking member Inhofe . Members of the 

190
00:07:33,718 --> 00:07:33,610
committee . Thank you for the 

191
00:07:33,610 --> 00:07:35,832
opportunity to speak with you today and 

192
00:07:35,832 --> 00:07:37,999
to provide testimony alongside general 

193
00:07:37,999 --> 00:07:40,221
barrier on the intelligence community's 

194
00:07:40,221 --> 00:07:42,388
annual assessment of worldwide threats 

195
00:07:42,388 --> 00:07:44,950
to us national security . Before I 

196
00:07:44,950 --> 00:07:47,172
start , I just want to take a moment to 

197
00:07:47,172 --> 00:07:49,394
publicly thank the men and women of the 

198
00:07:49,394 --> 00:07:51,228
intelligence community for their 

199
00:07:51,228 --> 00:07:53,394
extraordinary work to keep us safe . I 

200
00:07:53,394 --> 00:07:55,561
know how privileged I am to be part of 

201
00:07:55,561 --> 00:07:57,839
this community , truly talented people . 

202
00:07:57,839 --> 00:07:59,894
To be given a chance to do something 

203
00:07:59,894 --> 00:07:59,820
useful in service of my country and I 

204
00:07:59,820 --> 00:08:02,150
thank you for support for their work . 

205
00:08:02,940 --> 00:08:04,662
Broadly speaking . This year's 

206
00:08:04,662 --> 00:08:06,551
assessment focuses much like last 

207
00:08:06,551 --> 00:08:08,607
year's assessment on adversaries and 

208
00:08:08,607 --> 00:08:10,662
competitors , critical transnational 

209
00:08:10,662 --> 00:08:12,900
threats and conflicts and instability 

210
00:08:13,140 --> 00:08:15,860
and these categories of often overlap 

211
00:08:15,870 --> 00:08:17,648
cybercrime , for example , is a 

212
00:08:17,648 --> 00:08:19,870
transnational threat while also being a 

213
00:08:19,870 --> 00:08:22,148
threat that emanates from state actors . 

214
00:08:22,148 --> 00:08:24,259
one of the key challenges of this era 

215
00:08:24,259 --> 00:08:26,314
is assessing how various threats and 

216
00:08:26,314 --> 00:08:28,537
trends are likely to intersect so as to 

217
00:08:28,537 --> 00:08:30,648
identify where their interactions may 

218
00:08:30,648 --> 00:08:32,870
result in fundamentally greater risk to 

219
00:08:32,870 --> 00:08:35,037
our interests than one might otherwise 

220
00:08:35,037 --> 00:08:36,981
expect or where they introduce new 

221
00:08:36,981 --> 00:08:39,148
opportunities . And this year's annual 

222
00:08:39,148 --> 00:08:41,203
threat assessment highlights some of 

223
00:08:41,203 --> 00:08:43,259
these connections as it provides the 

224
00:08:43,259 --> 00:08:45,203
ISIS baseline of the most pressing 

225
00:08:45,203 --> 00:08:47,314
threats to US national security . The 

226
00:08:47,314 --> 00:08:49,481
assessment starts with threats from qi 

227
00:08:49,481 --> 00:08:49,290
state actors beginning with the 

228
00:08:49,290 --> 00:08:51,234
People's Republic of China , which 

229
00:08:51,234 --> 00:08:53,290
remains an unparalleled priority for 

230
00:08:53,290 --> 00:08:55,290
the intelligence community and then 

231
00:08:55,290 --> 00:08:57,568
turns to Russia , Iran and north Korea . 

232
00:08:57,568 --> 00:08:59,734
All four governments have demonstrated 

233
00:08:59,734 --> 00:09:01,810
the capability and intent to promote 

234
00:09:01,810 --> 00:09:03,643
their interests in ways that cut 

235
00:09:03,643 --> 00:09:06,020
against US and allied interests . The 

236
00:09:06,020 --> 00:09:08,100
PRC is coming ever closer to being a 

237
00:09:08,100 --> 00:09:10,211
pure competitor in areas of relevance 

238
00:09:10,211 --> 00:09:12,267
to national security . Is pushing to 

239
00:09:12,267 --> 00:09:14,489
revise global norms and institutions to 

240
00:09:14,489 --> 00:09:16,544
its advantage and is challenging the 

241
00:09:16,544 --> 00:09:18,378
United States in multiple arenas 

242
00:09:18,378 --> 00:09:20,180
economically , militarily and 

243
00:09:20,180 --> 00:09:22,740
technologically . China is especially 

244
00:09:22,740 --> 00:09:24,573
effective at bringing together a 

245
00:09:24,573 --> 00:09:26,351
coordinated whole of government 

246
00:09:26,351 --> 00:09:28,407
approach to demonstrate its strength 

247
00:09:28,407 --> 00:09:30,629
and to compel neighbors to acquiesce to 

248
00:09:30,629 --> 00:09:32,407
its preferences , including its 

249
00:09:32,407 --> 00:09:34,407
territorial and maritime claims and 

250
00:09:34,407 --> 00:09:36,560
assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan 

251
00:09:37,240 --> 00:09:39,462
and a key area of focus for the I . C . 

252
00:09:39,462 --> 00:09:42,030
Is President Xi Jinping's determination 

253
00:09:42,030 --> 00:09:44,290
to force unification with Taiwan on 

254
00:09:44,290 --> 00:09:46,710
Beijing's terms . China would prefer 

255
00:09:46,710 --> 00:09:48,870
coerced unification that avoids armed 

256
00:09:48,870 --> 00:09:51,570
conflict and it has been stepping up 

257
00:09:51,570 --> 00:09:53,620
diplomatic economic and military 

258
00:09:53,620 --> 00:09:56,690
pressure on the island for years to 

259
00:09:56,700 --> 00:09:58,940
isolated and weakened confidence in its 

260
00:09:58,940 --> 00:10:01,170
democratically elected leaders and at 

261
00:10:01,170 --> 00:10:03,337
the same time , Beijing is prepared to 

262
00:10:03,337 --> 00:10:05,448
use military force if it decides this 

263
00:10:05,448 --> 00:10:08,420
is necessary . The PRC is also engaged 

264
00:10:08,430 --> 00:10:10,319
in the largest ever nuclear force 

265
00:10:10,319 --> 00:10:13,020
expansion and arsenal diversification 

266
00:10:13,030 --> 00:10:15,340
in its history . Is working to match or 

267
00:10:15,340 --> 00:10:18,010
exceed US capabilities in space and 

268
00:10:18,010 --> 00:10:20,232
presents the broadest , most active and 

269
00:10:20,232 --> 00:10:22,510
persistent cyber espionage threat to U . 

270
00:10:22,510 --> 00:10:24,399
S . Government and private sector 

271
00:10:24,399 --> 00:10:26,900
networks . And Russia of course , also 

272
00:10:26,900 --> 00:10:29,740
remains a critical priority . And 

273
00:10:29,740 --> 00:10:31,851
there's a significant focus right now 

274
00:10:31,851 --> 00:10:33,907
in light of President Putin's tragic 

275
00:10:33,907 --> 00:10:36,129
invasion of Ukraine in february , which 

276
00:10:36,129 --> 00:10:37,684
has produced a shock to the 

277
00:10:37,684 --> 00:10:39,740
geopolitical order with implications 

278
00:10:39,740 --> 00:10:41,518
for the future that we are only 

279
00:10:41,518 --> 00:10:43,740
beginning to understand but are sure to 

280
00:10:43,740 --> 00:10:45,962
be consequential and the I . C . As you 

281
00:10:45,962 --> 00:10:48,018
know , provided warning of President 

282
00:10:48,018 --> 00:10:47,660
Putin's plans . But this is a case 

283
00:10:47,660 --> 00:10:49,660
where I think all of us wish we had 

284
00:10:49,660 --> 00:10:51,900
been wrong . Russia's failure to 

285
00:10:51,900 --> 00:10:53,733
rapidly seize Kiev and overwhelm 

286
00:10:53,733 --> 00:10:55,956
Ukrainian forces has deprived Moscow of 

287
00:10:55,956 --> 00:10:58,122
the quick military victory that it had 

288
00:10:58,122 --> 00:11:00,233
originally expected would prevent the 

289
00:11:00,233 --> 00:11:02,400
United States and NATO from being able 

290
00:11:02,400 --> 00:11:04,511
to provide meaningful military aid to 

291
00:11:04,511 --> 00:11:06,511
Ukraine . And the Russians met with 

292
00:11:06,511 --> 00:11:08,678
more resistance from Ukraine than they 

293
00:11:08,678 --> 00:11:10,567
expected and their own militaries 

294
00:11:10,567 --> 00:11:12,400
performance revealed a number of 

295
00:11:12,400 --> 00:11:14,289
significant internal challenges , 

296
00:11:14,289 --> 00:11:16,344
forcing them to adjust their initial 

297
00:11:16,344 --> 00:11:18,567
military objectives fall back from Kiev 

298
00:11:18,567 --> 00:11:20,780
and focus on the Donbas the next month 

299
00:11:20,780 --> 00:11:23,070
or two of fighting will be significant . 

300
00:11:23,080 --> 00:11:25,302
As the Russians attempt to reinvigorate 

301
00:11:25,302 --> 00:11:27,358
their efforts . But even if they are 

302
00:11:27,358 --> 00:11:29,524
successful , we are not confident that 

303
00:11:29,524 --> 00:11:31,136
the fight in the Donbas will 

304
00:11:31,136 --> 00:11:33,247
effectively end the war . We assess , 

305
00:11:33,247 --> 00:11:35,191
President Putin is preparing for a 

306
00:11:35,191 --> 00:11:37,358
prolonged conflict in Ukraine , during 

307
00:11:37,358 --> 00:11:39,580
which he still intends to achieve goals 

308
00:11:39,580 --> 00:11:41,524
beyond the Donbas . We assess that 

309
00:11:41,524 --> 00:11:43,580
Putin strategic ALS has probably not 

310
00:11:43,580 --> 00:11:45,580
changed . Suggesting he regards the 

311
00:11:45,580 --> 00:11:47,469
decision in late March to refocus 

312
00:11:47,469 --> 00:11:49,636
Russian forces on the Donbas is only a 

313
00:11:49,636 --> 00:11:51,390
temporary shift to regain the 

314
00:11:51,390 --> 00:11:53,112
initiative . After the Russian 

315
00:11:53,112 --> 00:11:56,130
military's failure to capture Kiev and 

316
00:11:56,130 --> 00:11:57,852
his current near term military 

317
00:11:57,852 --> 00:11:59,963
objectives are to capture the two all 

318
00:11:59,963 --> 00:12:02,220
blasts in Donetsk and Luhansk with a 

319
00:12:02,220 --> 00:12:04,640
buffer zone encircle Ukrainian forces 

320
00:12:04,640 --> 00:12:06,640
from the north and the south to the 

321
00:12:06,640 --> 00:12:09,000
west of the Donbas in order to crush 

322
00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:10,944
the most capable and well equipped 

323
00:12:10,944 --> 00:12:13,000
Ukrainian forces who are fighting to 

324
00:12:13,000 --> 00:12:15,300
hold the line in the east , consolidate 

325
00:12:15,300 --> 00:12:17,411
control of the land bridge Russia has 

326
00:12:17,411 --> 00:12:19,522
established from Crimea to the Donbas 

327
00:12:19,522 --> 00:12:21,744
occupied kerosene and control the water 

328
00:12:21,744 --> 00:12:24,022
source for Crimea that is to the north . 

329
00:12:24,022 --> 00:12:26,078
And we also see indications that the 

330
00:12:26,078 --> 00:12:28,133
Russian military wants to extend the 

331
00:12:28,133 --> 00:12:30,356
land bridge to Transnistria . And while 

332
00:12:30,356 --> 00:12:32,411
the Russian forces may be capable of 

333
00:12:32,411 --> 00:12:34,633
achieving most of these near term goals 

334
00:12:34,633 --> 00:12:36,800
in the coming months , we believe that 

335
00:12:36,800 --> 00:12:39,022
they will not be able to extend control 

336
00:12:39,022 --> 00:12:41,078
over a land bridge that stretches to 

337
00:12:41,078 --> 00:12:42,911
Transnistria and includes Odessa 

338
00:12:42,911 --> 00:12:44,633
without launching some form of 

339
00:12:44,633 --> 00:12:46,790
mobilization and it is increasingly 

340
00:12:46,790 --> 00:12:48,734
unlikely that they will be able to 

341
00:12:48,734 --> 00:12:50,790
establish control over both Obelisks 

342
00:12:50,790 --> 00:12:52,957
and the buffer zone they desire in the 

343
00:12:52,957 --> 00:12:55,012
coming weeks , but Putin most likely 

344
00:12:55,012 --> 00:12:57,123
also judges that Russia has a greater 

345
00:12:57,123 --> 00:12:59,012
ability and willingness to endure 

346
00:12:59,012 --> 00:13:01,123
challenges than his adversaries , and 

347
00:13:01,123 --> 00:13:03,179
he is probably counting on us and Eu 

348
00:13:03,179 --> 00:13:05,346
resolved to weaken as food shortages , 

349
00:13:05,346 --> 00:13:07,690
inflation , energy prices get worse . 

350
00:13:08,240 --> 00:13:10,351
Moreover , as both Russia and Ukraine 

351
00:13:10,351 --> 00:13:12,240
believe they can continue to make 

352
00:13:12,240 --> 00:13:14,351
progress militarily , we do not see a 

353
00:13:14,351 --> 00:13:16,407
viable negotiating path forward , at 

354
00:13:16,407 --> 00:13:18,629
least in the short term , the uncertain 

355
00:13:18,629 --> 00:13:20,296
nature of the battle which is 

356
00:13:20,296 --> 00:13:22,351
developing into a war of attrition , 

357
00:13:22,351 --> 00:13:24,407
combined with the reality that Putin 

358
00:13:24,407 --> 00:13:26,573
faces a mismatch between his ambitions 

359
00:13:26,573 --> 00:13:28,462
and Russia's current conventional 

360
00:13:28,462 --> 00:13:30,518
military capabilities , likely means 

361
00:13:30,518 --> 00:13:32,740
the next few months could see us moving 

362
00:13:32,740 --> 00:13:34,462
along a more unpredictable and 

363
00:13:34,462 --> 00:13:36,629
potentially escalatory trajectory . At 

364
00:13:36,629 --> 00:13:38,851
the very least , we believe the economy 

365
00:13:38,851 --> 00:13:40,962
will usher in a period of more ad hoc 

366
00:13:40,962 --> 00:13:43,160
decision making in Russia , both with 

367
00:13:43,160 --> 00:13:45,160
respect to the domestic adjustments 

368
00:13:45,160 --> 00:13:47,382
required to sustain this push , as well 

369
00:13:47,382 --> 00:13:49,493
as the military conflict with Ukraine 

370
00:13:49,493 --> 00:13:51,820
and the West , and the current trend 

371
00:13:51,830 --> 00:13:54,052
increases the likelihood that President 

372
00:13:54,052 --> 00:13:56,274
Putin will turn to more drastic means , 

373
00:13:56,274 --> 00:13:58,300
including imposing martial law , 

374
00:13:58,310 --> 00:14:00,690
reorienting industrial production or 

375
00:14:00,690 --> 00:14:03,020
potentially escalatory military actions 

376
00:14:03,020 --> 00:14:04,964
to free up the resources needed to 

377
00:14:04,964 --> 00:14:07,131
achieve his objectives as the conflict 

378
00:14:07,131 --> 00:14:09,480
drags on . Or if he perceives Russia is 

379
00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:12,120
losing in Ukraine and the most likely 

380
00:14:12,120 --> 00:14:14,009
flashpoints for escalation in the 

381
00:14:14,009 --> 00:14:15,953
coming weeks are around increasing 

382
00:14:15,953 --> 00:14:18,064
Russian attempts to interdict Western 

383
00:14:18,064 --> 00:14:20,176
security assistance , retaliation for 

384
00:14:20,176 --> 00:14:22,287
Western economic sanctions or threats 

385
00:14:22,287 --> 00:14:24,750
to the regime at home . We believe that 

386
00:14:24,750 --> 00:14:26,720
Moscow continues to use nuclear 

387
00:14:26,720 --> 00:14:28,942
rhetoric to deter the United States and 

388
00:14:28,942 --> 00:14:31,140
the West from increasing lethal aid to 

389
00:14:31,140 --> 00:14:33,360
Ukraine and to respond to public 

390
00:14:33,360 --> 00:14:35,304
comments that the U . S . And NATO 

391
00:14:35,304 --> 00:14:37,210
allies and that suggests expanded 

392
00:14:37,210 --> 00:14:39,480
Western goals in the conflict . And if 

393
00:14:39,480 --> 00:14:41,647
Putin perceives that the United States 

394
00:14:41,647 --> 00:14:43,869
is ignoring his threats , he may try to 

395
00:14:43,869 --> 00:14:45,869
signal to Washington the heightened 

396
00:14:45,869 --> 00:14:47,869
danger of its support to Ukraine by 

397
00:14:47,869 --> 00:14:47,810
authorizing another large nuclear 

398
00:14:47,810 --> 00:14:50,450
exercise involving a major dispersal of 

399
00:14:50,450 --> 00:14:52,394
mobile intercontinental missiles , 

400
00:14:52,394 --> 00:14:54,561
heavy bombers , strategic submarines . 

401
00:14:54,940 --> 00:14:57,080
We otherwise continue to believe that 

402
00:14:57,080 --> 00:14:59,080
President Putin would probably only 

403
00:14:59,080 --> 00:15:01,191
authorized the use of nuclear weapons 

404
00:15:01,191 --> 00:15:03,302
if he perceived an existential threat 

405
00:15:03,302 --> 00:15:05,524
to the Russian state or regime , but we 

406
00:15:05,524 --> 00:15:07,469
will remain vigilant in monitoring 

407
00:15:07,469 --> 00:15:09,413
every aspect of Russia's strategic 

408
00:15:09,413 --> 00:15:11,413
nuclear forces . With tensions this 

409
00:15:11,413 --> 00:15:13,358
high , there is always an enhanced 

410
00:15:13,358 --> 00:15:15,080
potential for miscalculation , 

411
00:15:15,080 --> 00:15:17,302
unintended escalation which we hope our 

412
00:15:17,302 --> 00:15:19,191
intelligence can help to mitigate 

413
00:15:19,191 --> 00:15:21,413
beyond its invasion of Ukraine , Moscow 

414
00:15:21,413 --> 00:15:23,580
presents a serious cyber threat . Aqui 

415
00:15:23,580 --> 00:15:25,636
space competitor and one of the most 

416
00:15:25,636 --> 00:15:27,691
serious foreign influence threats to 

417
00:15:27,691 --> 00:15:27,680
the United States using its 

418
00:15:27,680 --> 00:15:29,736
intelligence services , Proxies wide 

419
00:15:29,736 --> 00:15:31,847
ranging influence tools . The Russian 

420
00:15:31,847 --> 00:15:34,069
government seeks to not only pursue its 

421
00:15:34,069 --> 00:15:36,013
own interests , but also to divide 

422
00:15:36,013 --> 00:15:38,236
Western alliances , undermine US global 

423
00:15:38,236 --> 00:15:40,347
standing , amplified , discord inside 

424
00:15:40,347 --> 00:15:42,291
the United States and influence US 

425
00:15:42,291 --> 00:15:44,770
voters and decision making and to 

426
00:15:44,770 --> 00:15:46,881
finish with our state actor threats . 

427
00:15:46,881 --> 00:15:48,659
The Iranian regime continues to 

428
00:15:48,659 --> 00:15:50,714
threaten us interests as it tries to 

429
00:15:50,714 --> 00:15:52,826
erode US influence in the Middle East 

430
00:15:52,826 --> 00:15:54,881
and trends its influence and project 

431
00:15:54,881 --> 00:15:56,659
power in neighboring states and 

432
00:15:56,659 --> 00:15:58,826
minimize threats to regime stability . 

433
00:15:58,826 --> 00:16:00,881
Meanwhile , kim jong un continues to 

434
00:16:00,881 --> 00:16:03,103
steadily expand and enhance Pyongyang's 

435
00:16:03,103 --> 00:16:05,214
nuclear and conventional capabilities 

436
00:16:05,214 --> 00:16:07,214
targeting the United States and its 

437
00:16:07,214 --> 00:16:09,492
allies , periodically using aggressive , 

438
00:16:09,492 --> 00:16:11,548
potentially destabilizing actions to 

439
00:16:11,548 --> 00:16:13,214
reshape the regional security 

440
00:16:13,214 --> 00:16:14,992
environment in his favor and to 

441
00:16:14,992 --> 00:16:17,159
reinforce its status quo as a de facto 

442
00:16:17,159 --> 00:16:18,881
nuclear power . The assessment 

443
00:16:18,881 --> 00:16:21,250
continues to focus on a number of key 

444
00:16:21,250 --> 00:16:23,194
global and transnational threats , 

445
00:16:23,194 --> 00:16:25,139
including global health security , 

446
00:16:25,139 --> 00:16:27,139
transnational organized crime , the 

447
00:16:27,139 --> 00:16:29,083
rapid development of destabilizing 

448
00:16:29,083 --> 00:16:31,139
technologies , climate migration and 

449
00:16:31,139 --> 00:16:33,250
terrorism . I raise this because they 

450
00:16:33,250 --> 00:16:35,194
pose challenges of a fundamentally 

451
00:16:35,194 --> 00:16:37,028
different nature to our national 

452
00:16:37,028 --> 00:16:38,861
security than those posed by the 

453
00:16:38,861 --> 00:16:38,850
actions of nation states , Even 

454
00:16:38,850 --> 00:16:41,490
powerful ones like china and Russia . 

455
00:16:41,680 --> 00:16:43,791
And we look at the Russia Ukraine war 

456
00:16:43,791 --> 00:16:46,013
and can imagine outcomes to resolve the 

457
00:16:46,013 --> 00:16:47,958
crisis and the steps needed to get 

458
00:16:47,958 --> 00:16:49,847
there even though unpalatable and 

459
00:16:49,847 --> 00:16:52,069
difficult . And similarly , we view the 

460
00:16:52,069 --> 00:16:54,069
array of challenges chinese actions 

461
00:16:54,069 --> 00:16:53,970
pose and can discuss what is required , 

462
00:16:53,970 --> 00:16:56,440
how we think about trade offs . But 

463
00:16:56,440 --> 00:16:58,662
transnational issues are more complex , 

464
00:16:58,662 --> 00:17:00,551
require significant and sustained 

465
00:17:00,551 --> 00:17:02,662
multilateral effort . And then we can 

466
00:17:02,662 --> 00:17:04,829
discuss ways of managing them . All of 

467
00:17:04,829 --> 00:17:07,051
them pose a set of choices that will be 

468
00:17:07,051 --> 00:17:09,051
more difficult to untangle and will 

469
00:17:09,051 --> 00:17:11,273
perhaps require more sacrifice to bring 

470
00:17:11,273 --> 00:17:13,496
about meaningful change . This reflects 

471
00:17:13,496 --> 00:17:15,607
not just the interconnected nature of 

472
00:17:15,607 --> 00:17:17,718
the problems but also the significant 

473
00:17:17,718 --> 00:17:19,718
impact , increasingly empowered non 

474
00:17:19,718 --> 00:17:21,829
state actors have on the outcomes and 

475
00:17:21,829 --> 00:17:23,662
the reality And that some of the 

476
00:17:23,662 --> 00:17:25,662
countries who are key to mitigating 

477
00:17:25,662 --> 00:17:27,884
threats posed by nation states are also 

478
00:17:27,884 --> 00:17:29,996
the ones we will be asking to do more 

479
00:17:29,996 --> 00:17:32,051
in the transnational space . And for 

480
00:17:32,051 --> 00:17:34,218
example , the lingering effects of the 

481
00:17:34,218 --> 00:17:36,329
COVID-19 pandemic is putting a strain 

482
00:17:36,329 --> 00:17:36,220
on governments and societies fueling 

483
00:17:36,220 --> 00:17:38,640
humanitarian and economic crises , 

484
00:17:38,640 --> 00:17:40,529
political unrest and geopolitical 

485
00:17:40,529 --> 00:17:42,810
competition . Low income countries with 

486
00:17:42,810 --> 00:17:44,421
high debts face particularly 

487
00:17:44,421 --> 00:17:46,920
challenging recoveries now exacerbated 

488
00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:48,753
in some cases by increasing food 

489
00:17:48,753 --> 00:17:50,698
security resulting from the Russia 

490
00:17:50,698 --> 00:17:52,864
Ukraine crisis . And these shifts will 

491
00:17:52,864 --> 00:17:54,753
spur migration around the world , 

492
00:17:54,753 --> 00:17:56,920
including on our southern border . The 

493
00:17:56,920 --> 00:17:59,031
economic impact has set many poor and 

494
00:17:59,031 --> 00:18:01,142
middle income countries back years in 

495
00:18:01,142 --> 00:18:02,976
terms of economic development is 

496
00:18:02,976 --> 00:18:04,864
encouraging some in latin America 

497
00:18:04,864 --> 00:18:06,920
africa and Asia to look to china and 

498
00:18:06,920 --> 00:18:09,087
Russia for quick economic and security 

499
00:18:09,087 --> 00:18:11,364
assistance to manage their new reality . 

500
00:18:11,364 --> 00:18:13,309
And we see the same complex mix of 

501
00:18:13,309 --> 00:18:15,420
interlocking challenges stemming from 

502
00:18:15,420 --> 00:18:17,642
the threat of climate change , which is 

503
00:18:17,642 --> 00:18:19,809
exacerbating risks in U . S . National 

504
00:18:19,809 --> 00:18:21,920
security interests across the board , 

505
00:18:21,920 --> 00:18:24,087
but particularly as it intersects with 

506
00:18:24,087 --> 00:18:23,920
environmental degradation and global 

507
00:18:23,920 --> 00:18:26,040
health challenges and terrorism , of 

508
00:18:26,040 --> 00:18:28,373
course remains a persistent threat to U . 

509
00:18:28,373 --> 00:18:30,484
S . Persons and interests at home and 

510
00:18:30,484 --> 00:18:32,484
abroad . But the implication of the 

511
00:18:32,484 --> 00:18:34,540
problem are evolving in africa , for 

512
00:18:34,540 --> 00:18:36,596
example , where terrorist groups are 

513
00:18:36,596 --> 00:18:38,762
clearly gaining strength . The growing 

514
00:18:38,762 --> 00:18:38,740
overlap between terrorism , criminal 

515
00:18:38,740 --> 00:18:40,740
activity and smuggling networks has 

516
00:18:40,740 --> 00:18:42,740
undermined stability contributed to 

517
00:18:42,740 --> 00:18:45,190
COOS and an erosion of democracy and 

518
00:18:45,190 --> 00:18:47,023
resulted in countries turning to 

519
00:18:47,023 --> 00:18:49,134
Russian entities to help manage these 

520
00:18:49,134 --> 00:18:50,912
problems . Global transnational 

521
00:18:50,912 --> 00:18:53,134
criminal organizations continue to pose 

522
00:18:53,134 --> 00:18:55,190
a direct threat to the United States 

523
00:18:55,190 --> 00:18:57,357
through the production and trafficking 

524
00:18:57,357 --> 00:18:59,690
of lethal illicit drugs , massive theft , 

525
00:18:59,690 --> 00:19:01,301
including cybercrime , human 

526
00:19:01,301 --> 00:19:03,357
trafficking and financial crimes and 

527
00:19:03,357 --> 00:19:05,246
money laundering schemes . And in 

528
00:19:05,246 --> 00:19:07,301
particular , the threat from illicit 

529
00:19:07,301 --> 00:19:09,412
drugs is at historic levels with more 

530
00:19:09,412 --> 00:19:11,468
than 100,000 Americans drug overdose 

531
00:19:11,468 --> 00:19:13,523
deaths for the first time annually , 

532
00:19:13,523 --> 00:19:15,523
driven mainly by a robust supply of 

533
00:19:15,523 --> 00:19:17,246
synthetic opioids from mexican 

534
00:19:17,246 --> 00:19:19,412
transnational criminal organizations . 

535
00:19:19,412 --> 00:19:21,468
In short , the interconnected global 

536
00:19:21,468 --> 00:19:23,579
security environment is marked by the 

537
00:19:23,579 --> 00:19:25,412
growing specter of great power , 

538
00:19:25,412 --> 00:19:25,410
competition and conflict , while 

539
00:19:25,410 --> 00:19:27,466
transnational threats to all nations 

540
00:19:27,466 --> 00:19:29,610
and actors compete not only for our 

541
00:19:29,610 --> 00:19:31,388
attention , but also for finite 

542
00:19:31,388 --> 00:19:33,054
resources . And finally , the 

543
00:19:33,054 --> 00:19:34,943
assessment turns to conflicts and 

544
00:19:34,943 --> 00:19:37,110
instability , highlighting a series of 

545
00:19:37,110 --> 00:19:39,166
regional challenges of importance to 

546
00:19:39,166 --> 00:19:41,332
the United States . Iterative violence 

547
00:19:41,332 --> 00:19:43,443
between Israel and Iran and conflicts 

548
00:19:43,443 --> 00:19:45,610
in other areas including Africa , Asia 

549
00:19:45,610 --> 00:19:45,530
and the Middle East have the potential 

550
00:19:45,530 --> 00:19:47,197
to escalate or spread fueling 

551
00:19:47,197 --> 00:19:49,363
humanitarian crises and threatening us 

552
00:19:49,363 --> 00:19:51,419
persons . Africa , for example , has 

553
00:19:51,419 --> 00:19:53,530
seen six irregular transfers of power 

554
00:19:53,530 --> 00:19:56,200
since 2020 and probably will see new 

555
00:19:56,200 --> 00:19:58,550
bouts of conflict in the coming year as 

556
00:19:58,550 --> 00:20:00,328
the region becomes increasingly 

557
00:20:00,328 --> 00:20:02,390
strained by a volatile mixture of 

558
00:20:02,390 --> 00:20:04,660
democratic backsliding intercommunal 

559
00:20:04,660 --> 00:20:06,716
violence and the continued threat of 

560
00:20:06,716 --> 00:20:09,100
cross border terrorism and finally , 

561
00:20:09,100 --> 00:20:11,267
most important of all , we are focused 

562
00:20:11,267 --> 00:20:13,489
on our work forces and their families . 

563
00:20:13,489 --> 00:20:15,656
The I . C . Continues to contribute to 

564
00:20:15,656 --> 00:20:17,711
the government wide effort to better 

565
00:20:17,711 --> 00:20:19,878
understand potential causal mechanisms 

566
00:20:19,878 --> 00:20:19,650
of anomalous health incidents and 

567
00:20:19,650 --> 00:20:21,872
remains committed to ensuring afflicted 

568
00:20:21,872 --> 00:20:23,928
individuals receive the quality care 

569
00:20:23,928 --> 00:20:26,039
they need . The safety and well being 

570
00:20:26,039 --> 00:20:27,817
of our workforce is our highest 

571
00:20:27,817 --> 00:20:29,706
priority . And we are grateful to 

572
00:20:29,706 --> 00:20:29,520
members of this committee for your 

573
00:20:29,520 --> 00:20:31,520
continued support on these issues . 

574
00:20:31,520 --> 00:20:33,353
Thank you for the opportunity to 

575
00:20:33,353 --> 00:20:35,298
present our assessments and I look 

576
00:20:35,298 --> 00:20:37,409
forward to your questions . Thank you 

577
00:20:37,409 --> 00:20:39,464
very much , madam . Director General 

578
00:20:39,464 --> 00:20:43,150
barrier please . Chairman Reed ranking 

579
00:20:43,150 --> 00:20:44,983
member in half and distinguished 

580
00:20:44,983 --> 00:20:46,928
members of the committee . It is a 

581
00:20:46,928 --> 00:20:49,039
privilege to testify today as part of 

582
00:20:49,039 --> 00:20:50,928
the intelligence community's 2022 

583
00:20:50,928 --> 00:20:53,039
Assessment of worldwide threats to us 

584
00:20:53,039 --> 00:20:55,300
national security on behalf of the 

585
00:20:55,300 --> 00:20:57,522
Defense Intelligence Agency . I want to 

586
00:20:57,522 --> 00:20:59,522
express how much we appreciate your 

587
00:20:59,522 --> 00:21:01,856
support and partnership . Thank you . D . 

588
00:21:01,856 --> 00:21:03,967
I fills a unique intelligence role by 

589
00:21:03,967 --> 00:21:05,967
providing strategic operational and 

590
00:21:05,967 --> 00:21:05,720
tactical intelligence to our 

591
00:21:05,720 --> 00:21:07,553
warfighters , defense planners , 

592
00:21:07,840 --> 00:21:09,673
policymakers and the acquisition 

593
00:21:09,673 --> 00:21:11,920
community . We examine conflict across 

594
00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:13,809
all warfighting domains to assess 

595
00:21:13,809 --> 00:21:16,031
foreign capabilities and understand our 

596
00:21:16,031 --> 00:21:18,460
adversaries intent . Dia is dedicated 

597
00:21:18,460 --> 00:21:20,571
professionals in partnership with our 

598
00:21:20,571 --> 00:21:22,682
intelligence community , colleagues , 

599
00:21:22,682 --> 00:21:24,682
allies and foreign partners deliver 

600
00:21:24,682 --> 00:21:26,682
timely and relevant intelligence on 

601
00:21:26,682 --> 00:21:28,571
threats and challenges facing our 

602
00:21:28,571 --> 00:21:30,460
nation . D . I . A . Has a highly 

603
00:21:30,460 --> 00:21:32,571
resilient workforce that has overcome 

604
00:21:32,571 --> 00:21:32,340
difficult challenges posed by the 

605
00:21:32,340 --> 00:21:35,180
pandemic Today . My goal is to convey 

606
00:21:35,190 --> 00:21:37,470
ideas insights to you and the american 

607
00:21:37,470 --> 00:21:39,310
public on the evolving threat 

608
00:21:39,310 --> 00:21:42,360
environment as we understand it as I 

609
00:21:42,360 --> 00:21:44,527
look at the global landscape today . I 

610
00:21:44,527 --> 00:21:46,416
want to begin with Russia and its 

611
00:21:46,416 --> 00:21:48,527
invasion of Ukraine , which is now in 

612
00:21:48,527 --> 00:21:50,360
its third month Russian military 

613
00:21:50,360 --> 00:21:52,527
capabilities have been used to violate 

614
00:21:52,527 --> 00:21:54,527
the sovereignty and independence of 

615
00:21:54,527 --> 00:21:56,582
Ukraine and they pose an existential 

616
00:21:56,582 --> 00:21:58,804
threat to US national security and that 

617
00:21:58,804 --> 00:22:00,638
of our allies . The invasion has 

618
00:22:00,638 --> 00:22:02,416
demonstrated Russia's intent to 

619
00:22:02,416 --> 00:22:04,471
overturn the US led rules based post 

620
00:22:04,471 --> 00:22:06,582
Cold War international order , expand 

621
00:22:06,582 --> 00:22:08,527
its control over the former soviet 

622
00:22:08,527 --> 00:22:10,582
union and reclaim what it regards as 

623
00:22:10,582 --> 00:22:12,527
its rightful position on the world 

624
00:22:12,527 --> 00:22:14,527
stage . Moscow's underestimation of 

625
00:22:14,527 --> 00:22:16,360
Ukraine's effective resistance , 

626
00:22:16,440 --> 00:22:18,750
Russia's substantial battlefield losses 

627
00:22:18,800 --> 00:22:20,967
and Western resolve to support Ukraine 

628
00:22:21,050 --> 00:22:23,360
has undermined Moscow's assault on Kiev 

629
00:22:24,040 --> 00:22:26,207
and improve prospects that Ukraine can 

630
00:22:26,207 --> 00:22:28,318
successfully defend its sovereignty . 

631
00:22:29,040 --> 00:22:31,040
Moscow has now shifted its focus to 

632
00:22:31,040 --> 00:22:33,151
eastern Ukraine , where it appears to 

633
00:22:33,151 --> 00:22:35,318
be prioritizing prioritizing defeating 

634
00:22:35,318 --> 00:22:37,380
Ukrainian forces in the Donbas in 

635
00:22:37,380 --> 00:22:39,580
response to stiff resistance , Russia 

636
00:22:39,580 --> 00:22:41,802
has resorted to more indiscriminate and 

637
00:22:41,802 --> 00:22:43,747
brutal methods that are destroying 

638
00:22:43,747 --> 00:22:45,802
cities infrastructure and increasing 

639
00:22:45,802 --> 00:22:47,913
civilian deaths , negotiations remain 

640
00:22:47,913 --> 00:22:49,969
stalled as both sides focused on the 

641
00:22:49,969 --> 00:22:52,080
outcome of the battle in the Donbas . 

642
00:22:52,080 --> 00:22:54,024
While partnership with Ukraine and 

643
00:22:54,024 --> 00:22:56,191
warning of potential escalation remain 

644
00:22:56,191 --> 00:22:58,740
key priorities for D . I . A turning to 

645
00:22:58,740 --> 00:23:01,520
china , it remains a pacing threat and 

646
00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:04,300
major security challenge . Beijing has 

647
00:23:04,300 --> 00:23:06,244
long viewed the United States as a 

648
00:23:06,244 --> 00:23:08,467
strategic competitor . China is capable 

649
00:23:08,467 --> 00:23:10,744
of combining its economic , diplomatic , 

650
00:23:10,744 --> 00:23:12,920
military and technological power to 

651
00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:15,200
mount a sustained challenge to a stable 

652
00:23:15,210 --> 00:23:18,040
and open international system . The P . 

653
00:23:18,040 --> 00:23:19,929
L . A , which has already fielded 

654
00:23:19,929 --> 00:23:21,984
sophisticated weapons and instituted 

655
00:23:21,984 --> 00:23:24,207
major organizational reforms to enhance 

656
00:23:24,207 --> 00:23:26,096
joint operations , is nearing the 

657
00:23:26,096 --> 00:23:28,040
status of global competitor to the 

658
00:23:28,040 --> 00:23:30,262
United States , its allies and partners 

659
00:23:30,262 --> 00:23:32,318
and is a credible peer competitor in 

660
00:23:32,318 --> 00:23:34,484
the region . China's currently current 

661
00:23:34,484 --> 00:23:36,596
nuclear force expansion is historic . 

662
00:23:37,330 --> 00:23:39,386
The United States faces military and 

663
00:23:39,386 --> 00:23:41,497
intelligence threats from competitors 

664
00:23:41,497 --> 00:23:43,663
particularly Russia and china who have 

665
00:23:43,663 --> 00:23:45,663
and are developing new capabilities 

666
00:23:45,663 --> 00:23:47,830
intended to contest limit or exceed US 

667
00:23:47,830 --> 00:23:50,180
military advantage . State and non 

668
00:23:50,180 --> 00:23:52,236
state actors are selectively putting 

669
00:23:52,236 --> 00:23:54,347
these capabilities into play globally 

670
00:23:54,347 --> 00:23:56,347
and regionally . These capabilities 

671
00:23:56,347 --> 00:23:58,480
also span all warfighting domains 

672
00:23:58,630 --> 00:24:00,640
maritime , land , air , electronic 

673
00:24:00,640 --> 00:24:02,710
warfare , cyberspace information and 

674
00:24:02,710 --> 00:24:05,220
space . They include more lethal 

675
00:24:05,220 --> 00:24:07,442
ballistic and cruise missiles . Growing 

676
00:24:07,442 --> 00:24:09,330
nuclear stockpiles , modernized 

677
00:24:09,340 --> 00:24:11,562
conventional forces and a range of gray 

678
00:24:11,562 --> 00:24:13,570
zone measures such as the use of 

679
00:24:13,570 --> 00:24:15,459
ambiguous unconventional forces , 

680
00:24:15,459 --> 00:24:17,550
foreign proxies , information 

681
00:24:17,550 --> 00:24:19,690
manipulation , cyberattacks and 

682
00:24:19,690 --> 00:24:22,180
economic coercion , strategic 

683
00:24:22,180 --> 00:24:24,236
competitors and other challenges are 

684
00:24:24,236 --> 00:24:26,347
exerting increasing military pressure 

685
00:24:26,347 --> 00:24:28,291
on neighboring states . Russia has 

686
00:24:28,291 --> 00:24:30,458
invaded Ukraine , China is threatening 

687
00:24:30,458 --> 00:24:33,060
Taiwan in Iran through its proxies 

688
00:24:33,070 --> 00:24:35,237
threatens neighbors in the Middle East 

689
00:24:35,237 --> 00:24:37,680
and U . S . Forces while also enriching 

690
00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:40,040
uranium to new levels . North Korea 

691
00:24:40,040 --> 00:24:42,040
continues to threaten South Korea . 

692
00:24:42,040 --> 00:24:43,873
Japan and the United States with 

693
00:24:43,873 --> 00:24:46,096
nuclear capable ballistic missiles have 

694
00:24:46,096 --> 00:24:48,096
increased range and lethality trans 

695
00:24:48,096 --> 00:24:50,262
nationally . The terrorist threat will 

696
00:24:50,262 --> 00:24:52,429
also persist and we need to understand 

697
00:24:52,429 --> 00:24:54,651
more about the lessons learned from our 

698
00:24:54,651 --> 00:24:54,350
experience supporting military and 

699
00:24:54,350 --> 00:24:56,517
intelligence operations in Afghanistan 

700
00:24:56,517 --> 00:24:59,130
and the Middle East . Turning back to 

701
00:24:59,130 --> 00:25:01,352
my own organization . I take the health 

702
00:25:01,352 --> 00:25:03,463
safety and well being of my workforce 

703
00:25:03,463 --> 00:25:05,490
very , very seriously . D I remains 

704
00:25:05,490 --> 00:25:07,379
actively engaged in investigating 

705
00:25:07,379 --> 00:25:09,657
anomalous health incidents . H . I . S . 

706
00:25:09,940 --> 00:25:11,890
My agency has the process and 

707
00:25:11,890 --> 00:25:14,057
procedures in place to quickly respond 

708
00:25:14,057 --> 00:25:16,001
to reports from employees or their 

709
00:25:16,001 --> 00:25:18,001
families who believe that they have 

710
00:25:18,001 --> 00:25:20,001
been impacted by H . I . We're also 

711
00:25:20,001 --> 00:25:22,279
partnering with other members of the I . 

712
00:25:22,279 --> 00:25:24,390
C . Determine the origin and cause of 

713
00:25:24,390 --> 00:25:26,501
the reported events . I am honored to 

714
00:25:26,501 --> 00:25:28,446
lead D . I . A . My intent in this 

715
00:25:28,446 --> 00:25:30,668
hearing is that this helps Congress and 

716
00:25:30,668 --> 00:25:32,390
our nation better understand , 

717
00:25:32,390 --> 00:25:34,501
understand the threats and challenges 

718
00:25:34,501 --> 00:25:36,557
we face from foreign adversaries and 

719
00:25:36,557 --> 00:25:38,612
competitors . I look forward to your 

720
00:25:38,612 --> 00:25:40,446
questions and thank you for your 

721
00:25:40,446 --> 00:25:42,779
continued support . Thank you . General . 

722
00:25:42,779 --> 00:25:44,834
Let me remind my colleagues that the 

723
00:25:44,834 --> 00:25:47,057
conclusion of this open session , there 

724
00:25:47,057 --> 00:25:49,223
will be a classified session at sbc to 

725
00:25:49,223 --> 00:25:51,446
17 and the witnesses may differ some uh 

726
00:25:51,446 --> 00:25:53,660
responses to that classified session 

727
00:25:54,140 --> 00:25:57,780
Director Hanes your description of 

728
00:25:57,780 --> 00:26:00,410
the unfolding battle in the Ukraine 

729
00:26:00,410 --> 00:26:02,577
suggests that is moving to a battle of 

730
00:26:02,577 --> 00:26:06,540
attrition over a long term . And 

731
00:26:06,540 --> 00:26:08,762
that the objectives of the Russians are 

732
00:26:08,762 --> 00:26:12,480
too destroy the Ukrainian forces 

733
00:26:12,490 --> 00:26:14,800
and also disrupt the international 

734
00:26:14,800 --> 00:26:17,940
coalition through economic pressures , 

735
00:26:17,950 --> 00:26:21,200
uh gasoline prices and other factors 

736
00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:24,400
we're witnessing uh that leads us to at 

737
00:26:24,400 --> 00:26:26,344
least to me to the question of how 

738
00:26:26,344 --> 00:26:28,670
effective our our economic sanctions 

739
00:26:29,140 --> 00:26:31,100
and what more can we do to bring 

740
00:26:31,100 --> 00:26:34,670
pressure to the people of Russia so 

741
00:26:34,670 --> 00:26:38,260
that they are less supportive of this 

742
00:26:38,260 --> 00:26:39,260
effort . 

743
00:26:42,140 --> 00:26:44,810
Thank you , chairman , I think um from 

744
00:26:44,810 --> 00:26:46,532
our perspective , the economic 

745
00:26:46,532 --> 00:26:48,699
sanctions and the export controls have 

746
00:26:48,699 --> 00:26:50,643
had a pretty significant impact on 

747
00:26:50,643 --> 00:26:52,810
Russia . And among the indicators that 

748
00:26:52,810 --> 00:26:55,200
one might look at our , for example , 

749
00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:57,200
the fact that we're seeing close to 

750
00:26:57,200 --> 00:26:59,256
about , we predict Approximately 20% 

751
00:26:59,256 --> 00:27:02,850
inflation , Um you know , in Russia , 

752
00:27:02,860 --> 00:27:05,480
that we expect that their GDP will fall 

753
00:27:05,480 --> 00:27:08,340
about 10% , possibly even more over the 

754
00:27:08,340 --> 00:27:10,600
course of the year , we've seen not 

755
00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:13,920
only the sanctions enacted by the 

756
00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:15,970
United States and europe and other 

757
00:27:15,970 --> 00:27:18,860
partners around the world having these 

758
00:27:18,860 --> 00:27:21,870
impacts , um but also the private 

759
00:27:21,870 --> 00:27:23,930
sector taking action on its own to 

760
00:27:23,930 --> 00:27:26,152
remove itself . So things like the fact 

761
00:27:26,152 --> 00:27:28,690
that while production services and and 

762
00:27:28,690 --> 00:27:30,930
companies pulled themselves out will 

763
00:27:30,930 --> 00:27:34,090
have an impact on Russia's capacity to 

764
00:27:34,090 --> 00:27:36,740
produce and um that's a major revenue 

765
00:27:36,740 --> 00:27:38,851
source , obviously for Russia , we've 

766
00:27:38,851 --> 00:27:42,500
seen uh you know , other indicators of 

767
00:27:42,510 --> 00:27:44,621
essentially the private sector impact 

768
00:27:44,621 --> 00:27:46,454
in these areas and on the export 

769
00:27:46,454 --> 00:27:48,677
controls . We're seeing how things like 

770
00:27:48,677 --> 00:27:50,788
export controls on semiconductors and 

771
00:27:50,788 --> 00:27:52,677
so on are affecting their defense 

772
00:27:52,677 --> 00:27:54,788
industry ? So , I think that's a very 

773
00:27:54,788 --> 00:27:56,621
significant impact essentially . 

774
00:27:56,621 --> 00:27:58,843
Although obviously time will tell as we 

775
00:27:58,843 --> 00:28:01,066
move forward . Are you sensing that any 

776
00:28:01,066 --> 00:28:02,670
popular uh 

777
00:28:03,930 --> 00:28:06,990
unease perhaps in terms of these these 

778
00:28:06,990 --> 00:28:09,101
economic factors that could translate 

779
00:28:09,101 --> 00:28:10,960
into a political 

780
00:28:11,740 --> 00:28:14,670
resistance to the regime ? 

781
00:28:17,040 --> 00:28:19,050
Well , I know many of us saw the 

782
00:28:19,050 --> 00:28:22,170
protests that erupted after the 

783
00:28:22,180 --> 00:28:24,590
invasion . And um and then the 

784
00:28:24,590 --> 00:28:27,590
crackdown that occurred essentially in 

785
00:28:27,590 --> 00:28:29,820
Russia including passing laws that 

786
00:28:29,820 --> 00:28:32,030
would provide for very significant 

787
00:28:32,030 --> 00:28:34,740
punishments uh in the event that when 

788
00:28:34,740 --> 00:28:37,610
protested on these issues . And so 

789
00:28:37,610 --> 00:28:40,860
we've seen those reduce actually and 

790
00:28:40,870 --> 00:28:44,120
when we've looked at uh effectively you 

791
00:28:44,120 --> 00:28:46,342
know polling and so on , that indicates 

792
00:28:46,342 --> 00:28:48,676
where it is that the Russian people are . 

793
00:28:48,676 --> 00:28:50,898
What we see is that the majority of the 

794
00:28:50,898 --> 00:28:53,064
Russian people continue to support the 

795
00:28:53,064 --> 00:28:55,009
special military operation . And I 

796
00:28:55,009 --> 00:28:57,250
think it's just very hard frankly for 

797
00:28:57,260 --> 00:28:59,450
information to get into Russia to the 

798
00:28:59,450 --> 00:29:01,339
Russian people . They have a very 

799
00:29:01,339 --> 00:29:03,339
particular perspective that they're 

800
00:29:03,339 --> 00:29:05,561
being fed by the government during this 

801
00:29:05,561 --> 00:29:07,617
period . Thank you . General barry . 

802
00:29:07,617 --> 00:29:09,617
What do you believe the chinese are 

803
00:29:09,617 --> 00:29:12,910
taking away from their clothes scrutiny 

804
00:29:12,910 --> 00:29:16,080
of the Russian activities in Crimea and 

805
00:29:16,090 --> 00:29:18,146
not Crimea but Ukraine . Excuse me , 

806
00:29:19,840 --> 00:29:22,300
Senator , I think the chinese are going 

807
00:29:22,300 --> 00:29:24,700
to um watch this very , very carefully . 

808
00:29:24,700 --> 00:29:26,811
It's going to take some time for them 

809
00:29:26,811 --> 00:29:29,790
to sort out all elements of diplomatic 

810
00:29:29,790 --> 00:29:31,957
information , military , economic that 

811
00:29:31,957 --> 00:29:34,179
has occurred with this crisis . I think 

812
00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:36,751
they're they're thinking about future 

813
00:29:36,751 --> 00:29:38,918
operations probably against Taiwan and 

814
00:29:38,918 --> 00:29:41,029
how difficult that might be . They're 

815
00:29:41,029 --> 00:29:43,230
probably also thinking about the 

816
00:29:43,240 --> 00:29:45,351
scrutiny that they would come under . 

817
00:29:45,351 --> 00:29:47,240
Should they entertain thoughts or 

818
00:29:47,240 --> 00:29:49,820
operations like that ? Thank you . And 

819
00:29:49,830 --> 00:29:52,910
the final question , Director Hanes 

820
00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:56,920
uh do you uh I think you 

821
00:29:56,920 --> 00:29:59,800
indicated in your testimony that cyber 

822
00:29:59,810 --> 00:30:01,930
interference in our elections as a 

823
00:30:01,940 --> 00:30:04,470
distinct possibility . Is that 

824
00:30:04,470 --> 00:30:06,359
something that your agency or the 

825
00:30:06,359 --> 00:30:08,260
agencies are following and taking 

826
00:30:08,260 --> 00:30:09,316
preemptive steps ? 

827
00:30:12,440 --> 00:30:16,050
Yes , absolutely , sara , we we are 

828
00:30:16,060 --> 00:30:18,900
well positioned to essentially monitor 

829
00:30:18,900 --> 00:30:21,530
for the potential of election influence 

830
00:30:21,530 --> 00:30:25,160
and including efforts through cyber . 

831
00:30:26,740 --> 00:30:30,250
Now , one other final final question is 

832
00:30:30,250 --> 00:30:33,410
that are you surprised that the the 

833
00:30:33,420 --> 00:30:36,270
Russians have not used cyber 

834
00:30:36,640 --> 00:30:40,060
Attention against 3rd parties or 

835
00:30:40,060 --> 00:30:43,150
against the United States directly up 

836
00:30:43,150 --> 00:30:45,094
to this point ? I think that was a 

837
00:30:45,094 --> 00:30:47,206
concern we all had from the beginning 

838
00:30:47,206 --> 00:30:50,880
of this operation . Yeah , I think 

839
00:30:50,890 --> 00:30:53,730
what we've seen is the Russians have 

840
00:30:53,730 --> 00:30:56,370
advice obviously attacked Ukraine and 

841
00:30:56,380 --> 00:30:59,060
and we've attributed a variety of tax 

842
00:30:59,060 --> 00:31:01,610
to them in that context , including for 

843
00:31:01,610 --> 00:31:03,800
example , destructive wiper attacks 

844
00:31:03,800 --> 00:31:05,633
against the Ukrainian government 

845
00:31:05,633 --> 00:31:08,240
websites , um DDOS attacks against 

846
00:31:08,240 --> 00:31:10,540
their financial industry . They also 

847
00:31:10,550 --> 00:31:13,510
were engaged in attacks intended to get 

848
00:31:13,510 --> 00:31:15,660
at command and control communications 

849
00:31:15,670 --> 00:31:19,520
in Ukraine during the invasion . That 

850
00:31:19,530 --> 00:31:22,010
attack had an outsized impact . In 

851
00:31:22,010 --> 00:31:24,010
other words , we assessed that they 

852
00:31:24,010 --> 00:31:25,899
intended to focus in on Ukrainian 

853
00:31:25,899 --> 00:31:27,954
command and control , but ultimately 

854
00:31:27,954 --> 00:31:30,121
they ended up affecting a much broader 

855
00:31:30,121 --> 00:31:33,450
um set of V SATS essentially 

856
00:31:33,450 --> 00:31:36,830
of , you know , um very 

857
00:31:36,830 --> 00:31:40,550
small terminals um outside 

858
00:31:40,550 --> 00:31:44,230
of Ukraine including in europe . And uh 

859
00:31:44,240 --> 00:31:46,351
and yet we have not seen the level of 

860
00:31:46,351 --> 00:31:48,680
attacks to your point that we expected 

861
00:31:48,690 --> 00:31:51,530
and we have a variety of different um 

862
00:31:51,540 --> 00:31:53,707
sort of theories for why that might be 

863
00:31:53,707 --> 00:31:55,818
the case , including the fact that we 

864
00:31:55,818 --> 00:31:57,818
think that they may have determined 

865
00:31:57,818 --> 00:31:59,762
that the collateral impact of such 

866
00:31:59,762 --> 00:32:01,873
attacks would be challenging for them 

867
00:32:01,873 --> 00:32:03,984
in the context of Ukraine . Also that 

868
00:32:03,984 --> 00:32:06,280
they may not have wished to essentially 

869
00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:08,130
sacrifice potential access and 

870
00:32:08,130 --> 00:32:10,330
collection opportunities in those 

871
00:32:10,330 --> 00:32:13,080
scenarios . Um And then in terms of 

872
00:32:13,090 --> 00:32:15,280
attacks against the United States , I 

873
00:32:15,280 --> 00:32:17,224
think they have had a longstanding 

874
00:32:17,224 --> 00:32:19,002
concern about the potential for 

875
00:32:19,002 --> 00:32:22,300
escalation uh in cyber vis a vis the 

876
00:32:22,300 --> 00:32:24,467
United States , that doesn't mean that 

877
00:32:24,467 --> 00:32:26,578
they won't attack at some point . But 

878
00:32:26,578 --> 00:32:28,720
um but it has been interesting to see 

879
00:32:28,730 --> 00:32:30,897
that they haven't during this period . 

880
00:32:30,897 --> 00:32:32,910
Thank you very much , Senator . And 

881
00:32:32,910 --> 00:32:35,050
well , please , thank you Mr Chairman 

882
00:32:35,060 --> 00:32:38,050
for both of you . The lack of an 

883
00:32:38,050 --> 00:32:39,994
independent intelligence community 

884
00:32:40,440 --> 00:32:43,670
significantly worsened Putin's decision 

885
00:32:43,670 --> 00:32:47,440
making in Ukraine . What do you think ? 

886
00:32:47,450 --> 00:32:51,370
President she President 

887
00:32:51,370 --> 00:32:54,310
xI in china is learning about his 

888
00:32:54,310 --> 00:32:57,060
intelligence communities , both of you . 

889
00:33:01,140 --> 00:33:04,970
Thank you . Um you know , I think it's 

890
00:33:04,970 --> 00:33:06,970
a really interesting question . I I 

891
00:33:06,970 --> 00:33:09,081
prefer to answer it perhaps in closed 

892
00:33:09,081 --> 00:33:11,192
session . Would that be alright sir ? 

893
00:33:11,192 --> 00:33:12,970
That's fine . How about you any 

894
00:33:12,970 --> 00:33:14,914
comments making this open Senate , 

895
00:33:14,914 --> 00:33:17,192
Senator , I will take the lead on that . 

896
00:33:17,192 --> 00:33:19,970
I suspected that thank you . The Biden 

897
00:33:19,970 --> 00:33:21,980
administration has offered Iran 

898
00:33:21,980 --> 00:33:24,360
significant sanctions relief in return 

899
00:33:24,370 --> 00:33:28,200
to the 2015 Iran nuclear 

900
00:33:28,200 --> 00:33:30,422
agreement . General Barrier . Would you 

901
00:33:30,422 --> 00:33:33,690
expect Iran to spend at least some of 

902
00:33:33,690 --> 00:33:36,940
this sanctions relief on its terrorist 

903
00:33:36,940 --> 00:33:39,850
proxies and missile programs , do you ? 

904
00:33:40,440 --> 00:33:44,180
I agree that if the Irgc 

905
00:33:44,190 --> 00:33:46,760
has additional money that they would 

906
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:49,360
increase their targeting of americans 

907
00:33:49,370 --> 00:33:52,280
and our allies or let's just say could 

908
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:55,770
they increase that targeting 

909
00:33:56,340 --> 00:33:58,340
Yes , Senator , they could increase 

910
00:33:58,340 --> 00:34:00,451
targeting against our partners in the 

911
00:34:00,451 --> 00:34:00,430
region as well as U . S . Forces if 

912
00:34:00,430 --> 00:34:02,652
they had increased funding , appreciate 

913
00:34:02,652 --> 00:34:04,541
that very much . Thank you . Mr . 

914
00:34:04,541 --> 00:34:06,374
Chairman , thank you very much . 

915
00:34:06,374 --> 00:34:08,597
Senator Hoff , let me recognize Senator 

916
00:34:08,597 --> 00:34:10,708
Hin , please thank you . Good morning 

917
00:34:10,708 --> 00:34:12,819
and thank you both for your testimony 

918
00:34:12,819 --> 00:34:14,930
this morning . Um I returned a couple 

919
00:34:14,930 --> 00:34:17,120
of weeks ago from the western Balkans 

920
00:34:17,120 --> 00:34:19,453
with Senator Tillerson . Senator Murphy . 

921
00:34:19,453 --> 00:34:21,880
We visited Serbia , Bosnia , 

922
00:34:21,880 --> 00:34:24,960
Herzegovina and Kosovo . 

923
00:34:25,540 --> 00:34:27,850
And one of the things we heard in that 

924
00:34:27,850 --> 00:34:30,010
region was a great deal of concern 

925
00:34:30,020 --> 00:34:32,670
about Russian meddling and the 

926
00:34:32,670 --> 00:34:36,280
potential , particularly in Bosnia Um 

927
00:34:36,290 --> 00:34:39,730
for that two DST further destabilize 

928
00:34:39,740 --> 00:34:43,040
the country . Are you are following 

929
00:34:43,050 --> 00:34:46,250
what's going on in that part of europe ? 

930
00:34:46,260 --> 00:34:48,660
And are you equally concerned ? 

931
00:34:53,540 --> 00:34:55,540
Thank you , Senator Shane . So I'll 

932
00:34:55,540 --> 00:34:57,651
just start and obviously hand over to 

933
00:34:57,651 --> 00:34:59,873
my colleague as well . But yes , we are 

934
00:34:59,873 --> 00:35:01,596
concerned about this , this is 

935
00:35:01,596 --> 00:35:03,762
something we've been working with NATO 

936
00:35:03,762 --> 00:35:05,984
on in particular to try to help them be 

937
00:35:05,984 --> 00:35:08,151
more resilient in this context and you 

938
00:35:08,151 --> 00:35:10,040
know , both information and cyber 

939
00:35:10,040 --> 00:35:12,040
issues are obviously at stake but I 

940
00:35:12,040 --> 00:35:15,240
think um managing how it is that Russia 

941
00:35:15,240 --> 00:35:17,420
develops and what kind of activities 

942
00:35:17,420 --> 00:35:19,476
they engage in worldwide during this 

943
00:35:19,476 --> 00:35:21,570
crisis and beyond will be a critical 

944
00:35:21,580 --> 00:35:24,220
aspect of our work moving forward . Can 

945
00:35:24,220 --> 00:35:26,830
I just before , Before you begin 

946
00:35:26,830 --> 00:35:28,941
general , can I just ask you to speak 

947
00:35:28,941 --> 00:35:32,400
to NATO and U . Four in Bosnia because 

948
00:35:32,400 --> 00:35:35,670
as you know , the um authorization for 

949
00:35:35,680 --> 00:35:38,970
you four is going to end this fall in 

950
00:35:38,980 --> 00:35:40,980
Bosnia ? And there's a real concern 

951
00:35:40,980 --> 00:35:43,420
about Russia's willingness to allow 

952
00:35:43,420 --> 00:35:46,240
that to continue . So what are we doing 

953
00:35:46,250 --> 00:35:49,880
to ensure that the troops are not um 

954
00:35:49,890 --> 00:35:53,520
taken out of Bosnia and avoid left ? 

955
00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:56,140
That provides a real vacuum for 

956
00:35:56,140 --> 00:35:56,960
instability ? 

957
00:36:01,130 --> 00:36:03,130
Senator ? I think that's a that's a 

958
00:36:03,130 --> 00:36:05,310
policy question . I would refer to the 

959
00:36:05,310 --> 00:36:06,532
Department of Defense 

960
00:36:10,930 --> 00:36:13,320
and senator to to your to the earlier 

961
00:36:13,330 --> 00:36:15,820
portion of your question . Um I I 

962
00:36:15,820 --> 00:36:17,764
believe this is a key component of 

963
00:36:17,764 --> 00:36:19,931
strategic competition and this is this 

964
00:36:19,931 --> 00:36:22,098
is where I think with our partners and 

965
00:36:22,098 --> 00:36:24,209
allies and and certainly NATO , we we 

966
00:36:24,209 --> 00:36:26,320
have to be able to identify that kind 

967
00:36:26,320 --> 00:36:28,376
of malign activity and expose it and 

968
00:36:28,376 --> 00:36:30,431
and help our our partners and future 

969
00:36:30,431 --> 00:36:32,653
partners be aware of it and and do more 

970
00:36:32,653 --> 00:36:34,876
to encountering . Yes , we are aware of 

971
00:36:34,876 --> 00:36:36,876
it . Thank you . Well , I would say 

972
00:36:36,876 --> 00:36:38,987
that that policy decision needs to be 

973
00:36:38,987 --> 00:36:41,480
viewed very closely by everybody so 

974
00:36:41,480 --> 00:36:43,480
that we don't wind up with a vacuum 

975
00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:46,520
there , then we're not able to address . 

976
00:36:46,930 --> 00:36:50,890
Um I want to go to what's 

977
00:36:50,890 --> 00:36:53,600
still happening with ISIS because as 

978
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:57,570
you both know , um we have thousands 

979
00:36:57,570 --> 00:36:59,626
of ISIS family members who are still 

980
00:36:59,626 --> 00:37:01,848
being held in camps in Northern Syria . 

981
00:37:02,030 --> 00:37:04,960
Um they're posing a persistent 

982
00:37:05,430 --> 00:37:07,652
challenge . Not only humanitarian , but 

983
00:37:07,652 --> 00:37:09,763
the potential is breeding grounds for 

984
00:37:09,763 --> 00:37:13,160
terrorists . So are we 

985
00:37:13,530 --> 00:37:15,720
watching closely ? What's going on 

986
00:37:15,720 --> 00:37:17,930
there and what are we doing to try and 

987
00:37:17,930 --> 00:37:21,100
address um what's happening in those 

988
00:37:21,100 --> 00:37:23,870
camps from the perspective of the 

989
00:37:23,880 --> 00:37:25,936
Department of Defense and d I we are 

990
00:37:25,936 --> 00:37:27,936
watching very , very closely what's 

991
00:37:27,936 --> 00:37:29,991
what's happening in those camps , um 

992
00:37:29,991 --> 00:37:31,936
what's happened since uh since the 

993
00:37:31,936 --> 00:37:33,936
break in uh and and really with our 

994
00:37:33,936 --> 00:37:36,158
centcom partners trying to monitor ISIS 

995
00:37:36,158 --> 00:37:38,324
capability as it evolves over time and 

996
00:37:38,324 --> 00:37:40,380
what's happening with those families 

997
00:37:40,380 --> 00:37:42,491
and where they're moving this is this 

998
00:37:42,491 --> 00:37:42,470
is a problem that we partner with 

999
00:37:42,470 --> 00:37:43,880
Centcom and the Defense 

1000
00:37:43,880 --> 00:37:45,936
Counterterrorism Center and really , 

1001
00:37:45,936 --> 00:37:48,102
the National Counterterrorism Center , 

1002
00:37:48,102 --> 00:37:50,380
it's a it's a huge focus for everybody . 

1003
00:37:50,380 --> 00:37:52,436
Yeah . And and do we have a strategy 

1004
00:37:52,436 --> 00:37:54,491
for how to deal with it ? We have an 

1005
00:37:54,491 --> 00:37:56,491
intelligence collection strategy to 

1006
00:37:56,491 --> 00:37:59,550
monitor it if and 

1007
00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:04,150
we're seeing the Taliban in Afghanistan ? 

1008
00:38:04,620 --> 00:38:07,610
Um Renege on everything they said they 

1009
00:38:07,610 --> 00:38:10,660
would do post um troop withdrawal . 

1010
00:38:10,670 --> 00:38:13,290
Obviously , one of those is continuing 

1011
00:38:13,290 --> 00:38:15,620
their relationship with Al Qaeda and 

1012
00:38:15,620 --> 00:38:18,430
other terrorist groups in Afghanistan . 

1013
00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:21,920
How concerned are you that we might see 

1014
00:38:21,930 --> 00:38:24,900
terrorist activity spread out of 

1015
00:38:24,900 --> 00:38:27,950
Afghanistan to the rest of the world ? 

1016
00:38:28,620 --> 00:38:31,140
Uh Senator . I'm more concerned about 

1017
00:38:31,150 --> 00:38:34,140
ISIS K um in Afghanistan . And the fact 

1018
00:38:34,140 --> 00:38:36,307
that they have had some successful and 

1019
00:38:36,307 --> 00:38:38,710
catastrophic attacks within Afghanistan , 

1020
00:38:38,710 --> 00:38:40,932
which which does not portend well , for 

1021
00:38:40,932 --> 00:38:43,154
the future . Al Qaeda has had some some 

1022
00:38:43,154 --> 00:38:45,450
problems with reconstitution leadership 

1023
00:38:45,460 --> 00:38:47,404
and to a to a degree , I think the 

1024
00:38:47,404 --> 00:38:50,050
Taliban have held um to their word 

1025
00:38:50,050 --> 00:38:52,050
about not allowing Al Qaeda to to 

1026
00:38:52,050 --> 00:38:53,828
rejuvenate it so far , but it's 

1027
00:38:53,828 --> 00:38:55,994
something that we we watch very , very 

1028
00:38:55,994 --> 00:38:58,106
carefully . And there was an election 

1029
00:38:58,106 --> 00:39:01,030
in the Philippines yesterday and the 

1030
00:39:03,020 --> 00:39:05,330
the winner of that election , Mr marcos 

1031
00:39:05,820 --> 00:39:09,650
um was is 

1032
00:39:10,020 --> 00:39:12,990
not likely to have as positive a view 

1033
00:39:13,000 --> 00:39:15,370
to the United States . Are you 

1034
00:39:15,370 --> 00:39:17,592
concerned that that is going to have an 

1035
00:39:17,592 --> 00:39:21,450
impact on um how china is going to view 

1036
00:39:21,460 --> 00:39:25,250
activity in the Philippines ? And um do 

1037
00:39:25,250 --> 00:39:28,950
we expect there might be any spillover 

1038
00:39:28,960 --> 00:39:32,090
in terms of illegal 

1039
00:39:32,090 --> 00:39:34,550
substances from the Philippines . Now 

1040
00:39:34,550 --> 00:39:37,440
that heart is no longer doing his extra 

1041
00:39:38,660 --> 00:39:41,790
legal killing of people 

1042
00:39:42,060 --> 00:39:45,150
suspected of being drug kingpins . 

1043
00:39:45,620 --> 00:39:47,620
Senator . I think it's I think it's 

1044
00:39:47,620 --> 00:39:50,300
early in the process with with the 

1045
00:39:50,300 --> 00:39:52,467
elected marcos to determine whether or 

1046
00:39:52,467 --> 00:39:54,930
not he will be anti us or pro us . I 

1047
00:39:54,930 --> 00:39:56,930
know that we would like to have the 

1048
00:39:56,930 --> 00:39:59,097
Philippines is a is a key intelligence 

1049
00:39:59,097 --> 00:40:01,319
partner in the region . I think there's 

1050
00:40:01,319 --> 00:40:03,597
a lot of effort going on to to do that . 

1051
00:40:03,597 --> 00:40:05,597
So , so we'll wait to see what what 

1052
00:40:05,597 --> 00:40:07,652
percolates of all this in our in our 

1053
00:40:07,652 --> 00:40:09,986
relationship and I'll just end it there . 

1054
00:40:09,986 --> 00:40:09,910
Thank you . Thank you . Mr Chairman , 

1055
00:40:09,910 --> 00:40:11,743
Thank you Senator soon . Senator 

1056
00:40:11,743 --> 00:40:13,910
Fischer , please thank you Mr Chairman 

1057
00:40:13,910 --> 00:40:17,220
and welcome to our panel today last 

1058
00:40:17,220 --> 00:40:19,070
week in the Strategic Forces 

1059
00:40:19,070 --> 00:40:21,670
subcommittee undersecretary of research 

1060
00:40:21,670 --> 00:40:23,930
and engineering . Heidi shoes stated , 

1061
00:40:23,930 --> 00:40:26,670
quote , strategic competitors of the 

1062
00:40:26,670 --> 00:40:29,040
United States are rapidly developing 

1063
00:40:29,040 --> 00:40:31,670
their nuclear arsenal in new and novel 

1064
00:40:31,670 --> 00:40:34,100
ways with the clear intent of 

1065
00:40:34,110 --> 00:40:36,470
increasing their reliance on these 

1066
00:40:36,470 --> 00:40:39,200
weapons in their security strategies . 

1067
00:40:39,210 --> 00:40:41,550
End , quote Director Hanes , Do you 

1068
00:40:41,550 --> 00:40:43,106
agree with that statement ? 

1069
00:40:45,910 --> 00:40:48,940
Yes , general do you ? Yes . 

1070
00:40:50,610 --> 00:40:52,930
Throughout the war in Ukraine Putin and 

1071
00:40:52,930 --> 00:40:55,070
other Russian leaders have overtly 

1072
00:40:55,070 --> 00:40:58,250
threatened nuclear use . Including 

1073
00:40:58,250 --> 00:41:01,150
Russian state tv airing an animated 

1074
00:41:01,150 --> 00:41:04,190
video showing the british isles being 

1075
00:41:04,190 --> 00:41:06,310
completely destroyed by a nuclear 

1076
00:41:06,310 --> 00:41:09,140
attack general in the United States . 

1077
00:41:09,140 --> 00:41:11,700
We view nuclear weapons primarily as 

1078
00:41:11,700 --> 00:41:14,570
tools of deterrence . But do you think 

1079
00:41:14,570 --> 00:41:16,650
that what we're seeing indicates 

1080
00:41:16,660 --> 00:41:19,470
Russian leadership views nuclear 

1081
00:41:19,470 --> 00:41:23,320
weapons as tools of coercion 

1082
00:41:23,320 --> 00:41:26,450
and intimidation ? Yes I believe they 

1083
00:41:26,450 --> 00:41:28,660
view those as tools of coercion and 

1084
00:41:28,670 --> 00:41:31,810
intimidation . Thank you . General . 

1085
00:41:31,810 --> 00:41:34,790
Also the defense intelligence agencies 

1086
00:41:34,790 --> 00:41:38,770
2020 1 2021 report on china's 

1087
00:41:38,770 --> 00:41:40,659
military power states quote , the 

1088
00:41:40,659 --> 00:41:43,700
accelerating pace of the PRC's nuclear 

1089
00:41:43,700 --> 00:41:47,290
expansion may enable the PRC to have up 

1090
00:41:47,300 --> 00:41:51,140
to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 

1091
00:41:51,140 --> 00:41:54,600
2027 . The PRC likely intends to have 

1092
00:41:54,600 --> 00:41:58,130
at least 1000 warheads By 2030 

1093
00:41:58,320 --> 00:42:00,950
exceeding the pace and size the d . o . 

1094
00:42:00,950 --> 00:42:04,710
d . projected in 2020 end quote . I 

1095
00:42:04,710 --> 00:42:06,766
know what you say is limited in this 

1096
00:42:06,766 --> 00:42:10,190
setting But is it your assessment that 

1097
00:42:10,200 --> 00:42:12,930
China's nuclear forces will stop 

1098
00:42:12,940 --> 00:42:15,930
expanding when it reaches that point of 

1099
00:42:15,930 --> 00:42:19,930
1000 . It is my assessment that 

1100
00:42:19,930 --> 00:42:21,874
they would continue to develop the 

1101
00:42:21,874 --> 00:42:25,390
weapons they have . Director Hanes . Is 

1102
00:42:25,390 --> 00:42:27,501
that view shared by the rest of the I 

1103
00:42:27,501 --> 00:42:31,110
see that china's 

1104
00:42:31,120 --> 00:42:33,176
arsenal is going to continue to grow 

1105
00:42:33,500 --> 00:42:37,400
past that point in time . I mean , our 

1106
00:42:37,400 --> 00:42:40,390
assessment basically says that China 

1107
00:42:40,400 --> 00:42:43,730
will continue to essentially expand 

1108
00:42:43,730 --> 00:42:45,174
their nuclear arsenal and 

1109
00:42:45,174 --> 00:42:47,650
diversification for a period of time . 

1110
00:42:47,660 --> 00:42:49,716
It's unclear how long that will be . 

1111
00:42:51,100 --> 00:42:53,460
But you anticipated it will continue 

1112
00:42:53,460 --> 00:42:57,360
past the 1000 warheads that um we we 

1113
00:42:57,360 --> 00:43:00,410
have looked at in the past , I think 

1114
00:43:00,410 --> 00:43:02,577
for us to get into numbers , we should 

1115
00:43:02,577 --> 00:43:04,799
do that in closed session . Thank you . 

1116
00:43:05,000 --> 00:43:07,090
General . As the statement notes , 

1117
00:43:07,090 --> 00:43:09,780
china's nuclear expansion is larger and 

1118
00:43:09,780 --> 00:43:12,020
more rapid than previous assessments 

1119
00:43:12,500 --> 00:43:15,080
projected . Admiral Richard has made a 

1120
00:43:15,080 --> 00:43:17,470
similar point noting quote , when I 

1121
00:43:17,470 --> 00:43:19,192
first testified here , we were 

1122
00:43:19,192 --> 00:43:21,630
questioning whether or not china would 

1123
00:43:21,630 --> 00:43:23,852
be able to double that stockpile by the 

1124
00:43:23,852 --> 00:43:26,260
end of the decade , decade and they are 

1125
00:43:26,260 --> 00:43:28,590
actually very close to doing it on my 

1126
00:43:28,590 --> 00:43:30,820
watch end quote . What are the 

1127
00:43:30,820 --> 00:43:33,270
implications of the fact that this 

1128
00:43:33,270 --> 00:43:35,530
threat is evolving faster than we've 

1129
00:43:35,530 --> 00:43:38,840
anticipated ? And how should we factor 

1130
00:43:38,840 --> 00:43:41,870
that in our assessments ? Uh Senator , 

1131
00:43:41,870 --> 00:43:43,981
we can get into much more detail in a 

1132
00:43:43,981 --> 00:43:46,092
closed session . But I would just say 

1133
00:43:46,092 --> 00:43:48,092
from a from a strategic competition 

1134
00:43:48,092 --> 00:43:50,370
perspective and and nuclear deterrence . 

1135
00:43:50,370 --> 00:43:52,148
Um this this makes it much more 

1136
00:43:52,148 --> 00:43:54,370
challenging for us to defend . And when 

1137
00:43:54,370 --> 00:43:56,560
you factor in Russian nuclear 

1138
00:43:56,560 --> 00:43:59,020
capability with with chinese capability 

1139
00:43:59,030 --> 00:44:02,510
um I I think it's a it's a problem for 

1140
00:44:02,520 --> 00:44:04,720
strategic command and the department . 

1141
00:44:05,390 --> 00:44:08,820
Thank you also general if we can move 

1142
00:44:08,820 --> 00:44:11,560
to a different theater now . If if ISIS 

1143
00:44:11,560 --> 00:44:13,810
and Al Qaeda are able to operate in 

1144
00:44:13,810 --> 00:44:16,800
Afghanistan without consistent or 

1145
00:44:16,800 --> 00:44:19,170
effective ct pressure ? How long does 

1146
00:44:19,170 --> 00:44:21,580
the intelligence community assess it 

1147
00:44:21,580 --> 00:44:23,770
will take for either organization to 

1148
00:44:23,770 --> 00:44:26,470
reconstitute their external attack 

1149
00:44:26,480 --> 00:44:29,570
capabilities ? We we assess ISIS 

1150
00:44:29,570 --> 00:44:32,440
probably a year , slightly longer and 

1151
00:44:32,450 --> 00:44:35,750
longer for Al Qaeda . You know , last 

1152
00:44:35,750 --> 00:44:38,180
october we heard from secretary call , 

1153
00:44:38,190 --> 00:44:40,412
he told the committee that we could see 

1154
00:44:40,412 --> 00:44:43,210
ISIS K generate the capability in 6 to 

1155
00:44:43,210 --> 00:44:45,590
12 months . And then in March we heard 

1156
00:44:45,590 --> 00:44:49,280
from uh General McKenzie that the 

1157
00:44:49,280 --> 00:44:52,710
capability might be 12 to 18 months . 

1158
00:44:53,490 --> 00:44:55,870
So I look forward to hearing more about 

1159
00:44:55,870 --> 00:44:57,800
how and why these intelligence 

1160
00:44:57,800 --> 00:45:01,270
estimates have have shifted 

1161
00:45:01,270 --> 00:45:03,530
forward . I think that's important for 

1162
00:45:03,530 --> 00:45:05,419
this committee to know . And it's 

1163
00:45:05,419 --> 00:45:08,300
important to understand when we look at 

1164
00:45:08,690 --> 00:45:11,550
the dramatic reduction we've seen in 

1165
00:45:11,550 --> 00:45:13,870
our intelligence collection in the 

1166
00:45:13,880 --> 00:45:16,220
region since our withdrawal . Thank you . 

1167
00:45:16,790 --> 00:45:18,901
Thank you . Mr Chairman , Thank you . 

1168
00:45:18,901 --> 00:45:21,234
Senator for Senator Gillibrand , please . 

1169
00:45:21,234 --> 00:45:23,401
Director Hanes . Thank you so much for 

1170
00:45:23,401 --> 00:45:25,290
your testimony . I want to talk a 

1171
00:45:25,290 --> 00:45:27,512
little bit about um advanced persistent 

1172
00:45:27,512 --> 00:45:30,220
threats and I want to know what type of 

1173
00:45:30,230 --> 00:45:32,210
support are you providing critical 

1174
00:45:32,210 --> 00:45:34,432
infrastructure providers to deal with A 

1175
00:45:34,432 --> 00:45:37,480
PTS ? Um specifically , I'm concerned 

1176
00:45:37,490 --> 00:45:39,760
if this war in Ukraine does escalate 

1177
00:45:39,770 --> 00:45:42,170
that attacks from Russia will come to 

1178
00:45:42,170 --> 00:45:44,226
american businesses and our critical 

1179
00:45:44,226 --> 00:45:46,003
infrastructure . I know this is 

1180
00:45:46,003 --> 00:45:48,310
generally the job of Cisa but um in 

1181
00:45:48,310 --> 00:45:49,977
your engagement with critical 

1182
00:45:49,977 --> 00:45:52,199
infrastructure providers , what are the 

1183
00:45:52,199 --> 00:45:54,254
biggest areas of need that they have 

1184
00:45:54,254 --> 00:45:56,254
shared with you ? And are there any 

1185
00:45:56,254 --> 00:45:58,310
additional authorities that would be 

1186
00:45:58,310 --> 00:46:00,254
helpful to you and enabling you to 

1187
00:46:00,254 --> 00:46:02,032
support critical infrastructure 

1188
00:46:02,032 --> 00:46:04,254
providers and securing their networks ? 

1189
00:46:04,980 --> 00:46:07,202
Thank you senator . And I know this has 

1190
00:46:07,202 --> 00:46:09,258
been a major issue focus for you and 

1191
00:46:09,258 --> 00:46:11,424
and in fact that you've supported some 

1192
00:46:11,424 --> 00:46:13,480
of the things that have been done in 

1193
00:46:13,480 --> 00:46:15,647
new york with reserves , for example , 

1194
00:46:15,647 --> 00:46:15,350
in this area , which has been really 

1195
00:46:15,350 --> 00:46:17,350
effective . And I know that general 

1196
00:46:17,350 --> 00:46:19,517
Nakasone has been looking at expanding 

1197
00:46:19,517 --> 00:46:21,890
that and as um around the United States 

1198
00:46:21,890 --> 00:46:24,510
in different ways . I think for us uh 

1199
00:46:24,520 --> 00:46:27,280
look , we have quite obviously 

1200
00:46:27,280 --> 00:46:29,940
heightened awareness of cyber threats 

1201
00:46:29,940 --> 00:46:31,980
to critical infrastructure and it's 

1202
00:46:31,980 --> 00:46:34,202
been a driving force behind a number of 

1203
00:46:34,202 --> 00:46:36,202
sort of cyber defense measures that 

1204
00:46:36,202 --> 00:46:37,980
we've taken in the intelligence 

1205
00:46:37,980 --> 00:46:40,202
community to support in effect , as you 

1206
00:46:40,202 --> 00:46:42,313
say , CIA and FBI and others in doing 

1207
00:46:42,313 --> 00:46:45,080
their work . One is lowering thresholds 

1208
00:46:45,080 --> 00:46:47,302
for reporting . We've asked for network 

1209
00:46:47,302 --> 00:46:49,469
owners to really lower their threshold 

1210
00:46:49,469 --> 00:46:51,358
for reporting suspected malicious 

1211
00:46:51,358 --> 00:46:53,358
activity . That's critical from our 

1212
00:46:53,358 --> 00:46:55,524
perspective in order for us to be able 

1213
00:46:55,524 --> 00:46:57,358
to identify what the threat is . 

1214
00:46:57,358 --> 00:46:59,580
Another is just making more information 

1215
00:46:59,580 --> 00:47:01,691
publicly available . We're increasing 

1216
00:47:01,691 --> 00:47:03,580
the amount of information that we 

1217
00:47:03,580 --> 00:47:05,691
released to the private sector , both 

1218
00:47:05,691 --> 00:47:07,802
to help combat the rise in cybercrime 

1219
00:47:07,802 --> 00:47:09,969
and recently in our efforts to posture 

1220
00:47:09,969 --> 00:47:09,860
industry for potential Russian 

1221
00:47:09,860 --> 00:47:12,110
cyberattacks , for example , something 

1222
00:47:12,110 --> 00:47:14,332
that we've been trying to get out to do 

1223
00:47:14,332 --> 00:47:16,332
significantly more briefings on and 

1224
00:47:16,332 --> 00:47:18,670
help industry in effect get ready for 

1225
00:47:18,670 --> 00:47:20,670
things so they can take action that 

1226
00:47:20,670 --> 00:47:22,892
would make them more resilient in these 

1227
00:47:22,892 --> 00:47:25,059
circumstances . And this includes some 

1228
00:47:25,059 --> 00:47:27,226
close hold releases , you know , so as 

1229
00:47:27,226 --> 00:47:29,059
to dampen malicious cyber actors 

1230
00:47:29,059 --> 00:47:31,170
warning before mitigations can be put 

1231
00:47:31,170 --> 00:47:34,070
into place . Another has been our 

1232
00:47:34,070 --> 00:47:36,070
significant outreach to the private 

1233
00:47:36,070 --> 00:47:38,014
sector . DHS partners held over 90 

1234
00:47:38,014 --> 00:47:39,903
engagements with more than 10,000 

1235
00:47:39,903 --> 00:47:43,010
partners . Um , just even on the Russia 

1236
00:47:43,020 --> 00:47:44,780
peace and it includes sharing 

1237
00:47:44,780 --> 00:47:46,780
preventative measures to help these 

1238
00:47:46,780 --> 00:47:48,780
partners mitigate vulnerabilities . 

1239
00:47:48,780 --> 00:47:50,724
Another has been facilitating hunt 

1240
00:47:50,724 --> 00:47:53,360
teams on networks . And we've also 

1241
00:47:53,360 --> 00:47:55,471
asked company owners to actively hunt 

1242
00:47:55,471 --> 00:47:58,530
for Russian techniques essentially on 

1243
00:47:58,530 --> 00:48:00,641
their networks and to facilitate this 

1244
00:48:00,641 --> 00:48:02,808
and provided list of vulnerabilities , 

1245
00:48:02,808 --> 00:48:05,030
indicators of compromise to look for on 

1246
00:48:05,030 --> 00:48:07,086
a company's networks . But those are 

1247
00:48:07,086 --> 00:48:07,080
just some of the things that are 

1248
00:48:07,080 --> 00:48:08,524
focused on helping on the 

1249
00:48:08,524 --> 00:48:10,469
infrastructure piece . Thank you . 

1250
00:48:10,469 --> 00:48:12,636
Thank you . Director . Do you need any 

1251
00:48:12,636 --> 00:48:14,802
additional authorities or resources to 

1252
00:48:14,802 --> 00:48:17,024
amplify this effort ? So we we've asked 

1253
00:48:17,024 --> 00:48:20,250
for resources in our FY 23 budget that 

1254
00:48:20,260 --> 00:48:22,482
are designed to help with this effort . 

1255
00:48:22,482 --> 00:48:24,760
And uh and so absolutely in that sense , 

1256
00:48:24,970 --> 00:48:26,860
we haven't identified particular 

1257
00:48:26,860 --> 00:48:28,860
authorities that we need but I will 

1258
00:48:28,860 --> 00:48:31,082
tell you that we will come to you if we 

1259
00:48:31,082 --> 00:48:33,249
do thank you . Thank you . Um Director 

1260
00:48:33,249 --> 00:48:35,530
Hanes and general barrier . I saw that 

1261
00:48:35,530 --> 00:48:37,752
the annual threat assessment notes that 

1262
00:48:37,752 --> 00:48:40,230
advances in dual use technology could 

1263
00:48:40,230 --> 00:48:42,230
quote , enable development of novel 

1264
00:48:42,230 --> 00:48:44,174
biological weapons that complicate 

1265
00:48:44,174 --> 00:48:46,397
detection attribution and treatment and 

1266
00:48:46,397 --> 00:48:49,240
of quote , I've advocated for a one 

1267
00:48:49,240 --> 00:48:51,129
health security approach where we 

1268
00:48:51,129 --> 00:48:53,073
incorporate people across multiple 

1269
00:48:53,073 --> 00:48:54,629
disciplines , including the 

1270
00:48:54,629 --> 00:48:56,796
intelligence community to increase our 

1271
00:48:56,796 --> 00:48:58,650
bio defense and prevent the next 

1272
00:48:58,650 --> 00:49:01,390
pandemic in the context of ongoing 

1273
00:49:01,390 --> 00:49:03,334
biological threats . How would you 

1274
00:49:03,334 --> 00:49:05,510
suggest we develop a multidisciplinary 

1275
00:49:05,520 --> 00:49:07,840
approach like this ? Where can we 

1276
00:49:07,880 --> 00:49:10,040
prepare and prevent both naturally 

1277
00:49:10,050 --> 00:49:11,717
occurring diseases , but also 

1278
00:49:11,717 --> 00:49:15,280
deliberate threats ? I can 

1279
00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:17,880
start on this . I'm very passionate 

1280
00:49:17,880 --> 00:49:19,991
about this issue . I completely agree 

1281
00:49:19,991 --> 00:49:22,102
with you . I think we have not in the 

1282
00:49:22,102 --> 00:49:24,640
intelligence community um it's sort of 

1283
00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:27,020
been able to work with other parts of , 

1284
00:49:27,020 --> 00:49:29,187
for example , the federal government , 

1285
00:49:29,187 --> 00:49:31,409
even in the scientific community within 

1286
00:49:31,409 --> 00:49:33,520
the federal government as effectively 

1287
00:49:33,520 --> 00:49:35,353
as we need to . And we have been 

1288
00:49:35,353 --> 00:49:36,964
developing mechanisms in the 

1289
00:49:36,964 --> 00:49:39,131
intelligence community to do so more . 

1290
00:49:39,131 --> 00:49:41,187
We're working more with the national 

1291
00:49:41,187 --> 00:49:43,298
labs than we ever have before . We're 

1292
00:49:43,298 --> 00:49:45,242
working more with HHS with CC with 

1293
00:49:45,242 --> 00:49:47,353
others to try to make sure that we're 

1294
00:49:47,353 --> 00:49:49,520
also supporting their work and that we 

1295
00:49:49,520 --> 00:49:51,687
can understand some of the issues that 

1296
00:49:51,687 --> 00:49:53,853
they see as critical to our work . And 

1297
00:49:53,853 --> 00:49:55,742
so that's been a big piece of our 

1298
00:49:55,742 --> 00:49:57,798
effort in the intelligence community 

1299
00:49:57,798 --> 00:49:59,190
within the National 

1300
00:49:59,200 --> 00:50:02,650
Counterproliferation and um center . We 

1301
00:50:02,650 --> 00:50:04,930
have been doing a major effort on 

1302
00:50:04,940 --> 00:50:07,107
essentially working with global health 

1303
00:50:07,107 --> 00:50:09,329
and we actually now have a new national 

1304
00:50:09,329 --> 00:50:11,400
Intelligence Manager that works on 

1305
00:50:11,400 --> 00:50:14,020
these issues specifically and is hoping 

1306
00:50:14,020 --> 00:50:16,530
to support that kind of outreach um on 

1307
00:50:16,530 --> 00:50:18,641
this and be happy to give you a brief 

1308
00:50:18,641 --> 00:50:20,808
at some point in more detail if that's 

1309
00:50:20,808 --> 00:50:23,620
useful Senator for for D . I . I think 

1310
00:50:23,620 --> 00:50:25,564
it's about partnership . So it's a 

1311
00:50:25,564 --> 00:50:27,787
partnership between the National Center 

1312
00:50:27,787 --> 00:50:29,953
for Medical Intelligence , the Defense 

1313
00:50:29,953 --> 00:50:32,120
Counterproliferation Center as well as 

1314
00:50:32,120 --> 00:50:34,176
en CPC . The role really for D . I . 

1315
00:50:34,176 --> 00:50:36,120
And N . C . M . I is is to provide 

1316
00:50:36,120 --> 00:50:35,880
warning on these pandemics . So I'm 

1317
00:50:35,880 --> 00:50:37,880
passionate about it as well . And I 

1318
00:50:37,880 --> 00:50:40,102
think it's it's an area that's going to 

1319
00:50:40,102 --> 00:50:42,269
expand in the in the coming months and 

1320
00:50:42,269 --> 00:50:42,260
years as we look forward to this . And 

1321
00:50:42,260 --> 00:50:44,427
I look forward to engaging you perhaps 

1322
00:50:44,427 --> 00:50:46,538
A D . I . On this topic . Thank you . 

1323
00:50:46,538 --> 00:50:48,649
Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank you . 

1324
00:50:48,649 --> 00:50:48,410
Senator Gillibrand , Senator Cotton , 

1325
00:50:48,410 --> 00:50:50,770
please . General . What's your 

1326
00:50:50,910 --> 00:50:53,132
assessment on the state of the fighting 

1327
00:50:53,132 --> 00:50:55,299
between Russia and Ukraine and Eastern 

1328
00:50:55,299 --> 00:50:58,120
and Southern Ukraine today , Senator , 

1329
00:50:58,120 --> 00:51:00,640
I think I think I would characterize it 

1330
00:51:00,640 --> 00:51:04,390
as the Russians aren't winning 

1331
00:51:04,760 --> 00:51:06,982
and the Ukrainians aren't winning . And 

1332
00:51:06,982 --> 00:51:09,038
we're at a bit of a stalemate here . 

1333
00:51:09,038 --> 00:51:10,816
And what what has been the most 

1334
00:51:10,816 --> 00:51:12,740
interesting evolution for me and 

1335
00:51:12,740 --> 00:51:14,840
watching how the Russian forces have 

1336
00:51:14,850 --> 00:51:17,072
have misstepped is really the lack of a 

1337
00:51:17,072 --> 00:51:19,128
noncommissioned Officer Corps . When 

1338
00:51:19,128 --> 00:51:21,183
when I when I think about small unit 

1339
00:51:21,183 --> 00:51:23,072
tactics and how this has unfolded 

1340
00:51:23,072 --> 00:51:25,239
between Ukraine and Russia . I think I 

1341
00:51:25,239 --> 00:51:27,406
think the N . C . O . Corps is a big , 

1342
00:51:27,406 --> 00:51:29,294
big piece of this and I think the 

1343
00:51:29,294 --> 00:51:31,461
Ukrainians have that about right , who 

1344
00:51:32,160 --> 00:51:33,938
who faces a greater risk from a 

1345
00:51:33,938 --> 00:51:36,080
stalemate Russia or Ukraine . 

1346
00:51:38,170 --> 00:51:40,170
I think , I think we have to take a 

1347
00:51:40,170 --> 00:51:42,059
wait and see approach on how this 

1348
00:51:42,059 --> 00:51:44,360
evolves . And what is in the decision 

1349
00:51:44,360 --> 00:51:47,260
calculus for Putin and his generals as 

1350
00:51:47,260 --> 00:51:50,690
this unfolds . And it still made to be 

1351
00:51:50,690 --> 00:51:52,650
clear , does not mean an armistice 

1352
00:51:53,060 --> 00:51:54,970
peace , It means continued but 

1353
00:51:54,980 --> 00:51:57,380
indecisive fighting in which both sides 

1354
00:51:57,380 --> 00:52:00,600
are losing personnel equipment , 

1355
00:52:00,610 --> 00:52:02,777
weapons and vehicles , right . I think 

1356
00:52:02,777 --> 00:52:04,666
it's attrition warfare and and it 

1357
00:52:04,666 --> 00:52:07,290
depends it depends how well how well 

1358
00:52:07,300 --> 00:52:09,356
the Ukrainians can can maintain what 

1359
00:52:09,356 --> 00:52:11,630
they have going on with weapons and 

1360
00:52:11,630 --> 00:52:14,380
ammunition and and how the Russians 

1361
00:52:14,380 --> 00:52:16,213
decided to deal with that either 

1362
00:52:16,213 --> 00:52:18,670
through mobilization or not and decide 

1363
00:52:18,670 --> 00:52:20,900
to go with what they have in the 

1364
00:52:20,900 --> 00:52:23,011
theater right now . Which side do you 

1365
00:52:23,011 --> 00:52:25,178
think at this point is more capable of 

1366
00:52:25,178 --> 00:52:27,289
generating additional combat power in 

1367
00:52:27,289 --> 00:52:29,178
the form of trained and motivated 

1368
00:52:29,178 --> 00:52:31,680
troops ? Russia or Ukraine Ukraine , 

1369
00:52:32,350 --> 00:52:34,683
Even though it's 1/3 the size of Russia ? 

1370
00:52:35,150 --> 00:52:37,710
Yes . Why do you say that ? Because I 

1371
00:52:37,710 --> 00:52:39,960
think the the Ukrainians have it right 

1372
00:52:39,970 --> 00:52:42,960
in terms of of grit and how they face 

1373
00:52:42,960 --> 00:52:45,071
the defense of their nation . I'm not 

1374
00:52:45,071 --> 00:52:47,650
sure that Russian soldiers from the far 

1375
00:52:47,650 --> 00:52:49,428
flung military districts really 

1376
00:52:49,428 --> 00:52:51,480
understand that finding defend , to 

1377
00:52:51,480 --> 00:52:54,250
defend one's own home from war of 

1378
00:52:54,250 --> 00:52:56,139
aggression is a highly motivating 

1379
00:52:56,850 --> 00:52:59,500
factor , isn't it ? Yes , it is . 

1380
00:53:02,050 --> 00:53:04,370
And Russians probably are not terribly 

1381
00:53:04,370 --> 00:53:06,510
motivated to be the next wave of 

1382
00:53:06,510 --> 00:53:08,621
recruits into Vladimir Putin's war of 

1383
00:53:08,621 --> 00:53:11,190
aggression ? I would say , not based on 

1384
00:53:11,190 --> 00:53:14,950
what we've seen , if that's the 

1385
00:53:14,950 --> 00:53:17,510
case And this stalemate as you call it 

1386
00:53:17,510 --> 00:53:19,750
continues not just for weeks but for 

1387
00:53:19,750 --> 00:53:23,560
months . Um Which side do you 

1388
00:53:23,560 --> 00:53:25,940
think faces the greater possibility of 

1389
00:53:25,940 --> 00:53:29,680
a decisive breakout ? The Russians 

1390
00:53:29,690 --> 00:53:32,820
with their bill train and unmotivated 

1391
00:53:32,820 --> 00:53:34,820
troops of the Ukrainians with their 

1392
00:53:34,820 --> 00:53:37,530
supremely motivated troops ? 

1393
00:53:39,750 --> 00:53:41,917
Senator , I think right right now with 

1394
00:53:41,917 --> 00:53:43,972
the stalemate of that stands , if if 

1395
00:53:43,972 --> 00:53:46,139
Russia , if Russia doesn't declare war 

1396
00:53:46,139 --> 00:53:48,250
and mobilize , the stalemate is gonna 

1397
00:53:48,250 --> 00:53:50,417
gonna last for a while and I don't see 

1398
00:53:50,417 --> 00:53:50,190
a breakout on either side . If they do 

1399
00:53:50,190 --> 00:53:52,710
mobilize and they do declare war that 

1400
00:53:52,710 --> 00:53:55,510
will bring thousands of more soldiers 

1401
00:53:55,510 --> 00:53:57,732
to the fight . And even though they may 

1402
00:53:57,732 --> 00:53:59,899
not be as well trained and competent , 

1403
00:53:59,899 --> 00:54:01,954
they will still bring mass and a lot 

1404
00:54:01,954 --> 00:54:04,720
more ammunition . What are the 

1405
00:54:04,720 --> 00:54:07,490
prospects of a catastrophic collapse , 

1406
00:54:07,500 --> 00:54:10,210
collapse of morale and will among 

1407
00:54:10,210 --> 00:54:14,130
Russian forces remains to be seen ? 

1408
00:54:14,140 --> 00:54:16,307
I think I think the Russians still are 

1409
00:54:16,307 --> 00:54:18,460
a learning organization . If 

1410
00:54:18,470 --> 00:54:20,526
appropriate lessons could be applied 

1411
00:54:20,526 --> 00:54:22,581
with leadership , you might see that 

1412
00:54:22,581 --> 00:54:25,560
turnaround . You know , the current 

1413
00:54:25,560 --> 00:54:28,380
count on how many generals have been 

1414
00:54:28,380 --> 00:54:32,340
killed in Ukraine on Russia's side . I 

1415
00:54:32,340 --> 00:54:34,451
think the number is between eight and 

1416
00:54:34,451 --> 00:54:36,673
10 , You know how many generals we lost 

1417
00:54:36,673 --> 00:54:38,396
in 20 years of war in Iraq and 

1418
00:54:38,396 --> 00:54:41,950
Afghanistan ? Not many and those we 

1419
00:54:41,950 --> 00:54:45,090
lost were happenstance . Right ? The 

1420
00:54:45,090 --> 00:54:47,257
bad guy's got a lucky shot at a convoy 

1421
00:54:47,257 --> 00:54:50,200
or helicopter . Yes , does the fact 

1422
00:54:50,200 --> 00:54:51,978
that Russia is losing all these 

1423
00:54:51,978 --> 00:54:54,144
generals and as you pointed out , they 

1424
00:54:54,144 --> 00:54:56,033
have no trained N . C . O . Corps 

1425
00:54:56,033 --> 00:54:58,200
suggest to you that these generals are 

1426
00:54:58,200 --> 00:55:00,256
having to go forward to ensure their 

1427
00:55:00,256 --> 00:55:02,144
orders are executed in a way that 

1428
00:55:02,640 --> 00:55:04,807
general barrier never would have to go 

1429
00:55:04,807 --> 00:55:06,918
forward if he was in a combat command 

1430
00:55:06,918 --> 00:55:09,084
because he could count on the captains 

1431
00:55:09,084 --> 00:55:11,140
and the lieutenants and the sergeant 

1432
00:55:11,140 --> 00:55:13,307
barriers to execute his orders . Yes . 

1433
00:55:17,440 --> 00:55:21,320
Sounds to me like the balance of 

1434
00:55:21,320 --> 00:55:24,260
forces here are moving more decisively 

1435
00:55:24,640 --> 00:55:26,807
and Ukraine's factor and will continue 

1436
00:55:26,807 --> 00:55:30,130
to overtime as long as we continue to 

1437
00:55:30,130 --> 00:55:32,110
support them with the arms and the 

1438
00:55:32,110 --> 00:55:35,310
intelligence that they need . Well , 

1439
00:55:35,310 --> 00:55:38,020
well led forces that are motivated and 

1440
00:55:38,020 --> 00:55:40,131
have have what they need can can do a 

1441
00:55:40,131 --> 00:55:41,131
lot . Thank you . 

1442
00:55:44,540 --> 00:55:46,484
Thank you Senator Cotton . Senator 

1443
00:55:46,484 --> 00:55:48,762
Blumenthal please . Thanks . Thank you . 

1444
00:55:48,762 --> 00:55:50,818
Mr Chairman I want to pursue Senator 

1445
00:55:50,818 --> 00:55:52,929
Cotton's line of questioning if I may 

1446
00:55:53,140 --> 00:55:57,060
ah In my 

1447
00:55:58,240 --> 00:56:01,630
exchange with the Secretary of Defense 

1448
00:56:01,640 --> 00:56:03,862
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

1449
00:56:03,862 --> 00:56:06,110
Staff several weeks ago , I commented 

1450
00:56:06,110 --> 00:56:09,290
that are approached Ukraine seems 

1451
00:56:09,290 --> 00:56:13,210
somewhat schizophrenic . We say we want 

1452
00:56:13,210 --> 00:56:16,460
Ukraine to win but we're afraid of what 

1453
00:56:17,030 --> 00:56:20,450
Putin may do if he loses . 

1454
00:56:23,330 --> 00:56:26,760
Have urged since 2014 that we provide 

1455
00:56:26,760 --> 00:56:30,420
more lethal weapons to Ukraine . When I 

1456
00:56:30,420 --> 00:56:32,870
visited Ukraine recently with some of 

1457
00:56:32,870 --> 00:56:34,926
my colleagues have bipartisan trip . 

1458
00:56:34,926 --> 00:56:37,660
One of them asked President Zelensky , 

1459
00:56:38,230 --> 00:56:40,840
are you fearful about the Russian 

1460
00:56:41,430 --> 00:56:43,760
prospect of invasion ? It was a number 

1461
00:56:43,760 --> 00:56:45,927
of weeks before the invasion . He said 

1462
00:56:47,130 --> 00:56:50,080
The Russians invaded us in 2014 . We 

1463
00:56:50,080 --> 00:56:52,450
have been fighting them since then . 

1464
00:56:53,730 --> 00:56:56,280
And in my view , the implication is 

1465
00:56:56,290 --> 00:57:00,220
that we have failed over a period 

1466
00:57:00,230 --> 00:57:02,060
of years under different 

1467
00:57:02,060 --> 00:57:05,750
administrations to provide Ukraine with 

1468
00:57:05,750 --> 00:57:08,460
the arms that it needs to counter and 

1469
00:57:08,460 --> 00:57:11,680
deter increased 

1470
00:57:11,960 --> 00:57:14,720
Russian aggression there . So , my 

1471
00:57:14,720 --> 00:57:17,850
question to you is do you agree that we 

1472
00:57:17,850 --> 00:57:21,500
should increase the kind of military 

1473
00:57:21,500 --> 00:57:23,760
aid as well as humanitarian assistance 

1474
00:57:23,760 --> 00:57:26,420
and economic sanctions that we been 

1475
00:57:26,420 --> 00:57:30,230
providing by orders of magnitude that 

1476
00:57:30,230 --> 00:57:33,790
will enable Ukraine to 

1477
00:57:33,790 --> 00:57:37,740
win . And would you also 

1478
00:57:37,740 --> 00:57:40,960
agree that if we simply provide more 

1479
00:57:42,430 --> 00:57:46,120
of that kind of aid , tanks , 

1480
00:57:46,130 --> 00:57:49,310
artillery , armed personnel carriers , 

1481
00:57:49,510 --> 00:57:51,980
even planes , Singer and javelin 

1482
00:57:51,980 --> 00:57:54,160
missiles , all of the arms that 

1483
00:57:55,630 --> 00:57:58,760
Ukraine needs to fight . Letha lee and 

1484
00:57:58,760 --> 00:58:02,240
defensively , that Putin may 

1485
00:58:02,380 --> 00:58:05,660
engage in sword 

1486
00:58:05,660 --> 00:58:08,720
rattling and threats and implications 

1487
00:58:08,720 --> 00:58:11,440
of what he might do . But 

1488
00:58:12,320 --> 00:58:14,950
enabling Ukraine to win ought to be our 

1489
00:58:14,960 --> 00:58:17,120
objective . Let me ask you first , 

1490
00:58:17,120 --> 00:58:18,120
General 

1491
00:58:21,420 --> 00:58:23,800
Senator in in your statement there . It 

1492
00:58:23,800 --> 00:58:25,911
really it really gets at the national 

1493
00:58:25,911 --> 00:58:28,022
level decision making on what are our 

1494
00:58:28,022 --> 00:58:30,680
policy should be with regard to arming 

1495
00:58:30,680 --> 00:58:32,902
Ukraine . My my role as the director of 

1496
00:58:32,902 --> 00:58:34,902
D A is to is to keep an eye on this 

1497
00:58:34,902 --> 00:58:36,902
conflict and provide information to 

1498
00:58:36,902 --> 00:58:39,013
decision makers so that they can make 

1499
00:58:39,013 --> 00:58:41,236
those those kinds of decisions in terms 

1500
00:58:41,236 --> 00:58:43,458
of of what Putin might do to escalate . 

1501
00:58:43,458 --> 00:58:45,980
I think the best that we can do rather 

1502
00:58:45,980 --> 00:58:48,100
than describing what those escalatory 

1503
00:58:48,100 --> 00:58:49,767
measures would be would be to 

1504
00:58:49,767 --> 00:58:51,822
understand what they might do and be 

1505
00:58:51,822 --> 00:58:53,711
ready in terms of indications and 

1506
00:58:53,711 --> 00:58:55,822
warning to be able to notify decision 

1507
00:58:55,822 --> 00:58:58,044
makers that that was actually occurring 

1508
00:58:58,044 --> 00:59:00,156
or or about to occur . So I I take an 

1509
00:59:00,156 --> 00:59:02,100
intelligence perspective of of the 

1510
00:59:02,100 --> 00:59:04,322
conflict itself and and leave the leave 

1511
00:59:04,322 --> 00:59:06,690
the policy to decision makers . Do you ? 

1512
00:59:08,620 --> 00:59:11,750
And alas , Miss Haines the same . I 

1513
00:59:11,760 --> 00:59:13,980
think there is a serious immediate 

1514
00:59:13,980 --> 00:59:17,010
prospect that Putin would engage in the 

1515
00:59:17,010 --> 00:59:19,640
use of tactical tactical nuclear weapon 

1516
00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:23,400
right right now we do not see that . 

1517
00:59:23,410 --> 00:59:25,750
And I think that's that's a huge 

1518
00:59:25,750 --> 00:59:27,972
warning issue for us and something that 

1519
00:59:27,972 --> 00:59:29,583
we're very very focused on . 

1520
00:59:32,120 --> 00:59:35,810
Thank you senator . I think on the 

1521
00:59:35,810 --> 00:59:39,360
first part of your question uh you know , 

1522
00:59:39,360 --> 00:59:41,416
as General Barry said , obviously we 

1523
00:59:41,416 --> 00:59:43,730
try to provide the intelligence to help 

1524
00:59:43,740 --> 00:59:45,573
policymakers like you make these 

1525
00:59:45,573 --> 00:59:49,170
decisions . And among the questions 

1526
00:59:49,170 --> 00:59:52,530
that come up in that discussion are 

1527
00:59:52,540 --> 00:59:55,380
whether or not frankly , Ukraine can 

1528
00:59:55,380 --> 00:59:59,290
absorb additional assistance and 

1529
00:59:59,290 --> 01:00:01,810
how much of it . And that's very hard 

1530
01:00:01,810 --> 01:00:03,970
for us to tell . We have in fact more 

1531
01:00:03,970 --> 01:00:06,026
insight probably on the Russian side 

1532
01:00:06,026 --> 01:00:08,192
than we do on the Ukrainian side . But 

1533
01:00:08,192 --> 01:00:10,137
that's something obviously for the 

1534
01:00:10,137 --> 01:00:12,081
Defense Department to work through 

1535
01:00:12,081 --> 01:00:14,192
essentially as they go through this . 

1536
01:00:14,192 --> 01:00:16,248
But we also obviously get asked this 

1537
01:00:16,248 --> 01:00:18,192
question of whether or not certain 

1538
01:00:18,192 --> 01:00:20,081
actions will escalate things with 

1539
01:00:20,310 --> 01:00:23,340
Russia as you indicate and if so how 

1540
01:00:23,340 --> 01:00:25,562
and that really gets to the second part 

1541
01:00:25,562 --> 01:00:27,507
of your question , because I think 

1542
01:00:27,507 --> 01:00:29,729
obviously we're in a position as you've 

1543
01:00:29,729 --> 01:00:31,618
identified where we're supporting 

1544
01:00:31,618 --> 01:00:33,618
Ukraine , but we also don't want to 

1545
01:00:33,810 --> 01:00:36,120
ultimately end up in World War Three , 

1546
01:00:36,130 --> 01:00:38,630
and we don't want to have a situation 

1547
01:00:38,630 --> 01:00:40,910
in which um actors are using nuclear 

1548
01:00:40,910 --> 01:00:43,310
weapons . Our view is as general 

1549
01:00:43,310 --> 01:00:46,260
barrier indicated that there is not a 

1550
01:00:46,260 --> 01:00:49,740
sort of imminent potential for Putin to 

1551
01:00:49,780 --> 01:00:52,860
use nuclear weapons . We perceive that , 

1552
01:00:52,870 --> 01:00:54,950
as I indicated in my statement , is 

1553
01:00:54,950 --> 01:00:56,950
something that he is unlikely to do 

1554
01:00:56,950 --> 01:00:59,600
unless there is effectively uh an 

1555
01:00:59,600 --> 01:01:02,480
existential threat to his regime and to 

1556
01:01:02,490 --> 01:01:04,601
Russia . From his perspective , we do 

1557
01:01:04,601 --> 01:01:07,500
think that um that could be the case in 

1558
01:01:07,500 --> 01:01:09,667
the event that he perceives that he is 

1559
01:01:09,667 --> 01:01:13,070
losing the war in Ukraine . And that 

1560
01:01:13,080 --> 01:01:15,260
NATO , in effect is sort of either 

1561
01:01:15,260 --> 01:01:17,316
intervening or about to intervene in 

1562
01:01:17,316 --> 01:01:19,371
that context , which would obviously 

1563
01:01:19,371 --> 01:01:21,482
contribute to a perception that he is 

1564
01:01:21,482 --> 01:01:23,649
about to lose the war in Ukraine . But 

1565
01:01:23,649 --> 01:01:25,871
there are a lot of things that he would 

1566
01:01:25,871 --> 01:01:28,960
do in uh the context of escalation 

1567
01:01:28,960 --> 01:01:31,900
before he would get to a nuclear weapon . 

1568
01:01:31,900 --> 01:01:34,110
And also that he would be likely to 

1569
01:01:34,110 --> 01:01:37,430
engage in some signaling beyond what 

1570
01:01:37,430 --> 01:01:39,640
he's done thus far before doing . So , 

1571
01:01:40,810 --> 01:01:44,140
thank you . My my time is expired on 

1572
01:01:44,140 --> 01:01:45,862
behalf of the Chairman Senator 

1573
01:01:45,862 --> 01:01:46,140
Blackburn