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Thank you Mr Chairman and thank you 

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very much to each of you for being here 

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today . Uh Miss Haines , I want to come 

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to you . Um we've talked a lot about 

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Ukraine and Russia this morning and 

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appreciate your frankness and this . 

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But let me ask you about Wagner and the 

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proxies and what you're seeing , not 

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only in Ukraine but also what you're 

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seeing when it comes to Libya into 

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other areas in the aggressiveness of 

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the use of the proxies . 

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Thank you . Senator . I we can probably 

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go into more detail in closed session 

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but um , but I could just say more 

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generally that uh we do see Wagner 

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being used in effect in Ukraine . We 

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see that that's uh something in africa . 

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Yes , absolutely . Vanya has been 

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historically present in Africa and it's 

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a more recent event obviously in the 

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current crisis that Russia deployed 

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them effectively in Ukraine . Okay . 

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All right . General barrier . Do you 

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have anything you want to add on that ? 

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We uh senator , we track ISIS in africa . 

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Syria other places . I think we'll get 

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into a richer discussion on the , on 

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the closed session about um ISIS or 

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excuse me , um Wagner operations in in 

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in Ukraine . Sorry . Okay . Uh that is 

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helpful . Let me ask you also and by 

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the way , thank you for the china map . 

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I will say this . I think we could have 

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a picture of the globe and say that is 

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where China is seeking to be aggressive . 

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Uh it is something that is not lost 

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on me that they are anxious right 

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now to expand their reach . 

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But um let's talk about D . I . A . And 

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how is the D . I . A . 

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Collaborating with our allies and our 

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partners to counter Beijing's um 

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cyber espionage operations . 

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Senator . We are we're closely 

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collaborating with with our Five Eyes 

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partners in this case are Australian 

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and new Zealand partners on this very 

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issue along with our partners over at 

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the national security agency with 

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general Nakasone . There is a concerted 

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effort by by the Five Eyes to 

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understand these these activities in 

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cyberspace from emanating from from 

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china . So we're working on that very 

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very closely . We can provide more 

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details and close and can you provide 

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us with some of the lessons learned 

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from the Russia Ukraine conflict that 

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helped to inform some of this work 

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cyber activity . So I think I think the 

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key there would be um information 

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operations and disinformation 

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operations and their level of 

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effectiveness on the Russian side or 

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ineffectiveness on the Russian side and 

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then looking at the level of 

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effectiveness on the Ukrainian side . 

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When I when I compare and contrast 

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information operations , I think I 

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think the Ukrainians have been much 

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more successful . Uh And the 

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information's operations in in space 

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Russians have had some success with 

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cyber activities in the Ukraine . Uh 

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And I think the PRC and she are looking 

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at all of that as they as they sort of 

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unwind this conflict and and learn the 

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lessons from that and Miss Haines ? How 

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is the intel community utilizing 

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Ai and uh machine learning 

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as they look at applications . 

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Um , look at how Beijing is continuing 

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to move forward . So how are you 

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preferences ? Some of the new 

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technologies that can help us in this 

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effort ? Thank you senator . So we 

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are using artificial 

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intelligence and in particular machine 

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learning across the board for our 

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mission set . And just to give you an 

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example um , of the kind of things that 

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we're able to do with it , I think it 

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has been extraordinary in terms of 

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helping us with analysis , being able 

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to focus in on uh certain 

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datasets that were able to effectively 

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manipulate more um , easily and 

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without as many human resources 

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effectively to identify patterns were 

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able to use that then uh , you know , 

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have analysts that are educated experts , 

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um , take that information and , and uh , 

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you know , and use it in their analysis 

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in different ways . We have something 

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called an artificial intelligence unity 

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project that is really looking across 

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the intelligence community at different 

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applications of artificial intelligence 

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and machine learning and then trying to 

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leverage those so that we can actually 

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allow other elements to build off of 

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the work that's being done by , you 

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know , another element that they might 

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not have thought of before and also 

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doing it at sort of a cheaper cost and 

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so on . So there's a variety of ways in 

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which we're doing it . It's hard to 

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talk about it in an unclassified way , 

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but um , but we're certainly this is a 

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major area of effort and investment and 

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we can provide you with further details 

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if that's useful . My time has expired . 

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I will come to you for a written 

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response on the recent article that 

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quoted a senior intel source saying 

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there about referencing the uptick in 

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al Shabaab activity . So , thank you 

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very much on behalf of the chair , 

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Senator Warren , thank you Senator King . 

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So it's paramount to our national 

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security that we keep our most 

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sensitive secrets properly protected 

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and classified , particularly when 

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protecting sources and methods . But I 

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am very concerned about the levels of 

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over classification and pseudo 

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classification that we're seeing across 

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the federal government . Everyone 

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understands the need to protect 

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information about our most sensitive 

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capabilities from our enemies . But our 

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classification system has spiraled out 

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of control when it means for example 

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that our own four star generals can't 

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share information with their fellow 

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three stars . It is hard to see how 

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that level of classification is making 

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America safer . So , over 

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classification also reduces public 

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scrutiny of important issues and it can 

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hamper accountability . Director Hanes 

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you lead the intelligence community . 

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You have years of experience in these 

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matters . Do you think that over 

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classification is a national security 

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problem ? I do senator . I'm I've 

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stated this explicitly . I do think 

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it's a challenge as long as I've been 

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in government , frankly , there've been 

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blue ribbon commissions that have 

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looked at this have said there's 

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significant overclassification . This 

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is a challenge , as you indicate from a 

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Democratic perspective , but it's also 

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a challenge from a national security 

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perspective because if we can't share 

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information as easily as we might 

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otherwise be , if it were appropriately 

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classified , then that obviously 

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affects our capacity to work on these 

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issues . It's a very challenging issue 

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as I know , you know . Well , in other 

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words , it is , you know , there are 

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technical aspects to it . There are 

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cultural and let's talk about that just 

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a little bit . Uh and I want to say , I 

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agree with you that over classification 

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has been a problem across 

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administrations . The Obama 

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administration put out two different 

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executive orders aimed at improving 

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classification and information sharing . 

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But that was more than a decade ago . 

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And obviously the problem persists . So 

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let me ask this a different way , 

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Director Hanes would you support the 

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administration releasing a new 

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executive order on classification 

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practices to ensure that we are 

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protecting national security 

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information while keeping our 

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commitments to open government 

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without knowing exactly what it would 

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say . It's sort of hard for me to to 

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say I would support an executive order 

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on that subject . I mean , I think I am 

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constantly looking for additional ways 

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in which we might try to help address 

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this issue and we have a number of ways 

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that we're investing in the 

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intelligence community these issues . 

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But I yeah , I mean , I appreciate that . 

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And I'm not asking you to sign a fair 

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enough , but you're the president's 

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principal adviser on intelligence 

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matters . And I'm just asking if you 

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would be supportive if the president 

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wanted to take that step ? Well , I am 

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supportive of what the president wants 

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to take as steps within his authority 

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and appropriate policy to do so . Yes , 

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in that sense , I would be okay . So 

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let me ask this then from one more 

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perspective and that is during the 

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Ukraine crisis , we have seen that a 

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well functioning de classification 

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system can be incredibly powerful . The 

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work by the biden administration to 

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expose what the intelligence committee 

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knew about Putin's plans . Seriously 

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hurt Russia's credibility and it 

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strengthened our response to an illegal 

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and immoral war . My understanding is 

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that it took reshuffling of resources 

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to make that happen . And I applaud 

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that . But we need more of it . The 

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most recent numbers that I've seen is 

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that we spend $18 billion 

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5% 

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of that number on declassification 

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efforts . And that ratio feels off in a 

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democracy . So with that in mind , 

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Director Hanes , are there any lessons 

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learned from Ukraine about how we can 

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expedite declassification when there's 

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a compelling reason to do so I think 

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there are lessons to be learned from 

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Ukraine and um and there's it will be 

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easier to talk about this in closed 

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session . But I think there's uh 

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there's some value that we could 

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discuss in closed session on those 

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issues . And I do think it has helped 

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to help other people understand the 

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value of ensuring that we are 

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classifying things at the appropriate 

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level and how declassification can 

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support foreign policy in different 

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ways . So I think that's all to the 

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good good . You know , in a democracy 

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we have a duty to be accountable to the 

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public . And when we keep secrets from 

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americans , there needs to be a 

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compelling public interest in doing so . 

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And in too many cases it seems that 

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public officials air on the side of 

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secrecy because the information could 

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be embarrassing or even worse just 

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because it's easier not to be 

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accountable to the american people . So 

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I urge all of our agencies to address 

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this problem and I look forward to 

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working with you on it . Thank you on 

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behalf of the chairman . Senator 

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Tuberville , thank you . Thank you . 

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Senator uh Good morning . Director 

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Hanes in your best assessment . Does 

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Russia intelligence closely monitor our 

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Secretary of Defense ? I think Russian 

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intelligence tries very closely to 

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monitor all of our senior leaders . 

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Thank you . So you believe that noted 

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that when he or uh when he 

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or said that Russia weakened 

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and that the US will move heaven and 

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earth to arm Ukraine . Do you believe 

278
00:11:51,430 --> 00:11:55,270
that's right ? He should say that . Yes . 

279
00:11:55,270 --> 00:11:57,381
I think Secretary of Defense , do you 

280
00:11:57,381 --> 00:11:58,992
believe Russia blames the US 

281
00:11:58,992 --> 00:12:00,937
intelligence community for helping 

282
00:12:00,937 --> 00:12:02,881
Ukraine shoot down a Russian plane 

283
00:12:02,881 --> 00:12:05,360
carrying hundreds of people . I'm sorry 

284
00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:07,527
sir . Can you repeat the question ? Do 

285
00:12:07,527 --> 00:12:09,360
you believe Russia blames us our 

286
00:12:09,360 --> 00:12:11,560
intelligence agency for Ukraine 

287
00:12:11,560 --> 00:12:13,727
shooting down a plane with hundreds of 

288
00:12:13,727 --> 00:12:16,280
troops on board ? Do you do you think 

289
00:12:16,290 --> 00:12:19,020
Russia blames us for that ? Which plane 

290
00:12:19,020 --> 00:12:21,242
are you thinking of ? There was a plane 

291
00:12:21,242 --> 00:12:23,353
recently that was shot down a Russian 

292
00:12:23,353 --> 00:12:25,940
plane that 100 troops you believe that 

293
00:12:25,940 --> 00:12:28,107
they blame our intelligence agency for 

294
00:12:28,107 --> 00:12:31,150
that ? I don't know , sir . Okay . Uh , 

295
00:12:31,160 --> 00:12:33,990
do you believe that Russia blames R US 

296
00:12:33,990 --> 00:12:37,530
intelligence for sinking uh , uh , 

297
00:12:37,540 --> 00:12:41,020
their flagship Moscow ova . Do you 

298
00:12:41,020 --> 00:12:43,187
think they blame us for that ? I don't 

299
00:12:43,187 --> 00:12:45,020
know , sir . We haven't seen any 

300
00:12:45,020 --> 00:12:47,242
director . To what extent do you access 

301
00:12:47,242 --> 00:12:50,200
that Russia believes it is at war with 

302
00:12:50,200 --> 00:12:52,200
the West in the United States . You 

303
00:12:52,200 --> 00:12:54,422
think that they believe they're they're 

304
00:12:54,422 --> 00:12:57,620
at war with us . Russia has 

305
00:12:57,620 --> 00:12:59,787
historically believed that they are in 

306
00:12:59,787 --> 00:13:01,953
a conflict in effect with NATO and the 

307
00:13:01,953 --> 00:13:04,120
United States on a variety of issues , 

308
00:13:04,120 --> 00:13:06,231
including in cyber and so on . So you 

309
00:13:06,231 --> 00:13:08,509
believe that they're fighting us there , 

310
00:13:08,509 --> 00:13:08,470
that they're fighting us as well as 

311
00:13:08,470 --> 00:13:11,060
their fighting Ukraine , correct in a 

312
00:13:11,060 --> 00:13:13,540
sense , their perception . Yeah , 

313
00:13:13,550 --> 00:13:15,550
because we're arming them and we're 

314
00:13:15,550 --> 00:13:17,772
talking . Okay . General barrier , does 

315
00:13:17,772 --> 00:13:19,661
United States or Ukraine have air 

316
00:13:19,661 --> 00:13:21,772
superiority over the war zone . Which 

317
00:13:21,772 --> 00:13:23,994
one has air superiority superiority ? I 

318
00:13:23,994 --> 00:13:26,217
would I would call it Senator . I would 

319
00:13:26,217 --> 00:13:28,190
call that an air an error standoff 

320
00:13:28,190 --> 00:13:30,412
right now ? I mean the Russians can can 

321
00:13:30,412 --> 00:13:32,600
fly tactical aircraft over the line of 

322
00:13:32,610 --> 00:13:34,790
troops in the local area , but they 

323
00:13:34,790 --> 00:13:37,800
cannot um expand into Western parts of 

324
00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:39,800
Ukraine without coming under an air 

325
00:13:39,800 --> 00:13:41,856
threat . Ukraine is more than we are 

326
00:13:41,856 --> 00:13:43,856
the United States obviously because 

327
00:13:43,856 --> 00:13:43,660
we're not we're not involved in there . 

328
00:13:44,890 --> 00:13:46,890
Would you say that Russia possesses 

329
00:13:46,890 --> 00:13:48,810
strong air defenses ? I think the 

330
00:13:48,810 --> 00:13:51,130
Russians have very credible air defense 

331
00:13:51,130 --> 00:13:54,170
systems . Does Ukraine have any counter 

332
00:13:54,170 --> 00:13:56,370
measures to thwart Russia artillery 

333
00:13:56,370 --> 00:13:58,650
rockets and long range . Does Ukraine 

334
00:13:58,650 --> 00:14:01,550
have any air defenses ? Ukraine has air 

335
00:14:01,550 --> 00:14:03,439
defenses ? They also have counter 

336
00:14:03,439 --> 00:14:05,328
battery radars that allow them to 

337
00:14:05,328 --> 00:14:07,106
defend themselves from incoming 

338
00:14:07,106 --> 00:14:09,272
artillery or really see it . Would you 

339
00:14:09,272 --> 00:14:11,439
agree that anyone in Ukraine right now 

340
00:14:11,439 --> 00:14:13,439
is under serious threat ? Obviously 

341
00:14:13,439 --> 00:14:15,730
they are correct . In the past two 

342
00:14:15,730 --> 00:14:17,841
weeks we've seen several high profile 

343
00:14:17,841 --> 00:14:20,119
visitors take trips to active war zone . 

344
00:14:20,119 --> 00:14:22,119
Our Secretary of State Secretary of 

345
00:14:22,119 --> 00:14:25,770
Defense um uh huh Speaker of the House , 

346
00:14:25,780 --> 00:14:28,420
the first lady . And this is for both 

347
00:14:28,420 --> 00:14:31,860
of you . What is our 

348
00:14:31,860 --> 00:14:34,040
intelligence community doing to lessen 

349
00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:36,151
the risk of a high ranking official ? 

350
00:14:39,040 --> 00:14:40,984
How are we protecting these people 

351
00:14:40,984 --> 00:14:43,580
going to Ukraine ? Are people going to 

352
00:14:43,580 --> 00:14:45,970
Ukraine ? I mean senator , I think that 

353
00:14:45,970 --> 00:14:48,026
would be a discussion for the closed 

354
00:14:48,026 --> 00:14:51,670
session . So We could 

355
00:14:51,670 --> 00:14:53,837
guarantee that the first lady was safe 

356
00:14:53,837 --> 00:14:55,837
when she went to Ukraine . We could 

357
00:14:55,837 --> 00:14:58,170
guarantee that 100% correct both of you . 

358
00:14:59,550 --> 00:15:03,140
I'm just asking ? I would not say that . 

359
00:15:03,150 --> 00:15:06,250
No , I would not say that . Uh , is it 

360
00:15:06,250 --> 00:15:08,490
your best advice that we don't go to 

361
00:15:08,490 --> 00:15:11,130
Ukraine right now ? Any of us , any of 

362
00:15:11,130 --> 00:15:15,060
us in here , senator . I wouldn't say 

363
00:15:15,060 --> 00:15:17,393
that . I would say with proper planning . 

364
00:15:17,393 --> 00:15:19,630
Um , and and and coordination that it 

365
00:15:19,630 --> 00:15:22,480
it's possible . General 100% 100% . Can 

366
00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:25,070
we guarantee going into a war zone that 

367
00:15:25,070 --> 00:15:27,237
there are secretary of defense and the 

368
00:15:27,237 --> 00:15:29,292
Secretary of State went on a train . 

369
00:15:29,292 --> 00:15:31,070
Sen . I don't think we can ever 

370
00:15:31,070 --> 00:15:33,260
guarantee anything . 100% . Well , 

371
00:15:33,270 --> 00:15:35,381
that's kind of the point I'm making . 

372
00:15:35,381 --> 00:15:37,437
Uh , you know , we're kind of poking 

373
00:15:37,437 --> 00:15:40,370
the bear here , uh , saying , you know , 

374
00:15:40,380 --> 00:15:42,436
we're sending all that were bragging 

375
00:15:42,436 --> 00:15:44,547
about . And even President biden said 

376
00:15:44,547 --> 00:15:46,658
today , wait a minute . You know , we 

377
00:15:46,658 --> 00:15:48,880
got to cut back on this point in that , 

378
00:15:48,880 --> 00:15:48,150
you know , how many generals had been 

379
00:15:48,150 --> 00:15:50,520
killed and we're part of it . Uh , I 

380
00:15:50,520 --> 00:15:52,520
totally agree with that . I totally 

381
00:15:52,520 --> 00:15:54,353
agree that hey , we want to help 

382
00:15:54,353 --> 00:15:57,250
Ukraine . Obviously we all do , but we 

383
00:15:57,250 --> 00:15:59,810
do not want to take that step forward 

384
00:15:59,810 --> 00:16:02,200
to where we get a lot of our men and 

385
00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:04,330
women involved in this . And it looks 

386
00:16:04,330 --> 00:16:06,386
like to me that we're taking way too 

387
00:16:06,386 --> 00:16:08,386
many chances of sending people over 

388
00:16:08,386 --> 00:16:11,610
there for uh , a photo op other than 

389
00:16:11,610 --> 00:16:13,610
doing the right things which we are 

390
00:16:13,610 --> 00:16:15,777
doing , but we just don't need to step 

391
00:16:15,777 --> 00:16:17,888
over that path and thank you for what 

392
00:16:17,888 --> 00:16:19,943
you're doing . But I think all of us 

393
00:16:19,943 --> 00:16:22,054
need to look at that point of , hey , 

394
00:16:22,054 --> 00:16:24,221
there's a point of no return here . If 

395
00:16:24,221 --> 00:16:26,760
we cross that line and if we were on 

396
00:16:26,760 --> 00:16:29,760
the other side the same way and we , we 

397
00:16:29,760 --> 00:16:31,871
had somebody helping . We had a plane 

398
00:16:31,871 --> 00:16:34,170
shot down a ship snake and then 

399
00:16:34,170 --> 00:16:36,392
bragging about killing generals . As as 

400
00:16:36,392 --> 00:16:38,970
Senator Cotton said , uh you know , we 

401
00:16:38,970 --> 00:16:41,081
were walking a tightrope here and and 

402
00:16:41,081 --> 00:16:43,081
that's that's just the only point I 

403
00:16:43,081 --> 00:16:45,248
want to bring up . Thank you very much 

404
00:16:45,248 --> 00:16:47,526
on behalf of the chair . Senator kelly , 

405
00:16:49,340 --> 00:16:53,190
thank you Mr Chairman um Director 

406
00:16:53,190 --> 00:16:57,070
Hanes . Uh again , looking at 

407
00:16:57,080 --> 00:16:59,630
your office is 2022 annual threat 

408
00:16:59,630 --> 00:17:02,110
assessment . It's clear there's a lot 

409
00:17:02,120 --> 00:17:04,342
going on in the world right now . And I 

410
00:17:04,342 --> 00:17:06,450
understand that resources are finite 

411
00:17:07,240 --> 00:17:09,850
and trade offs often have to be made . 

412
00:17:10,410 --> 00:17:13,080
That is in uh , I think a large part 

413
00:17:13,080 --> 00:17:15,358
what makes your job a very challenging . 

414
00:17:15,360 --> 00:17:17,082
You know , clearly clearly the 

415
00:17:17,082 --> 00:17:19,304
situation in Ukraine is taking up a lot 

416
00:17:19,304 --> 00:17:21,249
of bandwidth right now and I would 

417
00:17:21,249 --> 00:17:23,960
pursue presume that indo pay calm um 

418
00:17:24,940 --> 00:17:26,930
requires a significant amount of 

419
00:17:26,930 --> 00:17:29,690
resources as well to fully understand 

420
00:17:29,690 --> 00:17:32,040
the threat environment and you know , 

421
00:17:32,040 --> 00:17:34,318
these two things are obviously related . 

422
00:17:34,318 --> 00:17:36,373
But what about some other regions in 

423
00:17:36,373 --> 00:17:38,484
the world , in light of the worldwide 

424
00:17:38,484 --> 00:17:40,484
threats , you have articulated here 

425
00:17:40,484 --> 00:17:42,540
today . Do you feel the intelligence 

426
00:17:42,540 --> 00:17:44,651
community has the necessary resources 

427
00:17:44,651 --> 00:17:47,660
in place to confidently understand the 

428
00:17:47,660 --> 00:17:50,250
threat environment in other places such 

429
00:17:50,250 --> 00:17:52,590
as Afghanistan , Northern Syria , 

430
00:17:52,850 --> 00:17:54,360
Pakistan and Iran . 

431
00:17:56,740 --> 00:17:59,018
Thank you , Senator . I mean , I think , 

432
00:17:59,018 --> 00:18:01,440
you know , like all good bureaucrats 

433
00:18:01,450 --> 00:18:03,672
that we could spend more money on these 

434
00:18:03,672 --> 00:18:05,894
issues . There's no question . I mean , 

435
00:18:05,894 --> 00:18:08,790
I think um certainly that's true , but 

436
00:18:08,790 --> 00:18:11,290
we are doing our very best as ewing 

437
00:18:11,290 --> 00:18:13,360
indicate to ensure that we're not 

438
00:18:13,540 --> 00:18:15,810
taking our eye off the ball essentially 

439
00:18:15,810 --> 00:18:17,810
across the globe on issues that are 

440
00:18:17,810 --> 00:18:19,921
also of critical importance among the 

441
00:18:19,921 --> 00:18:23,040
ones that you've identified . Thank you . 

442
00:18:23,050 --> 00:18:26,360
Um What a asked a specific question 

443
00:18:26,360 --> 00:18:29,460
about the MQ nine reaper drones . So 

444
00:18:30,040 --> 00:18:32,890
um , the Air Force has been reluctant 

445
00:18:32,900 --> 00:18:36,600
to uh invest in upgrading the 

446
00:18:36,610 --> 00:18:39,960
platform And proposes to retire it 

447
00:18:40,080 --> 00:18:43,300
potentially like in 2035 . Even as the 

448
00:18:43,300 --> 00:18:46,400
demand from combat commanders for the 

449
00:18:46,400 --> 00:18:48,830
system remains high . You know , their 

450
00:18:48,830 --> 00:18:51,052
argument , you know , has been that the 

451
00:18:51,052 --> 00:18:53,670
platform is not survivable in a china 

452
00:18:53,670 --> 00:18:56,690
Russia scenario . Um , I think it's 

453
00:18:56,690 --> 00:18:58,640
pretty clear that it would be 

454
00:18:58,640 --> 00:19:02,310
survivable in a Russian scenario . 

455
00:19:02,310 --> 00:19:05,310
Now , Do you have an opinion on the 

456
00:19:05,310 --> 00:19:07,920
continued utility of reconnaissance 

457
00:19:07,920 --> 00:19:10,050
platforms such as the MQ nine , 

458
00:19:10,060 --> 00:19:12,530
particularly as we face increased 

459
00:19:12,530 --> 00:19:15,210
activity in the so called gray zone 

460
00:19:15,460 --> 00:19:17,571
below the threshold of armed combat ? 

461
00:19:18,540 --> 00:19:22,080
Yeah , No , no , senator . 

462
00:19:22,090 --> 00:19:24,980
I have been the beneficiary of MQ nine 

463
00:19:24,990 --> 00:19:27,270
operations for the last 20 years . It's 

464
00:19:27,270 --> 00:19:29,270
an outstanding platform . It's done 

465
00:19:29,270 --> 00:19:31,500
great things um with increasing threats 

466
00:19:31,500 --> 00:19:33,500
emanating from from China and their 

467
00:19:33,500 --> 00:19:35,556
ability to reach out and touch those 

468
00:19:35,556 --> 00:19:37,840
kinds of things ? I totally understand 

469
00:19:37,840 --> 00:19:39,896
why the Air Force wants to divest of 

470
00:19:39,896 --> 00:19:42,250
that platform . Uh the efficacy of that 

471
00:19:42,260 --> 00:19:43,982
um in the coming years and low 

472
00:19:43,982 --> 00:19:45,982
intensity conflict counterterrorism 

473
00:19:45,982 --> 00:19:48,093
operations that will always be useful 

474
00:19:48,093 --> 00:19:47,880
in a in a low air defense kind of 

475
00:19:47,880 --> 00:19:49,769
environment . But in the high end 

476
00:19:49,769 --> 00:19:51,769
environment I don't think it's very 

477
00:19:51,769 --> 00:19:55,450
survivable . But we have looked at the 

478
00:19:56,040 --> 00:19:59,100
Russian surface to air missile threat 

479
00:19:59,270 --> 00:20:02,960
environment as you know , high end um 

480
00:20:03,470 --> 00:20:06,470
turns out Like a lot of things , you 

481
00:20:06,470 --> 00:20:08,359
know , day one of the war is much 

482
00:20:08,359 --> 00:20:11,060
different than day 60 or 90 or 180 of 

483
00:20:11,060 --> 00:20:14,650
any conflict . So I'm concerned that 

484
00:20:14,790 --> 00:20:16,957
not only this platform , but sometimes 

485
00:20:16,957 --> 00:20:19,068
we look at the divesting , you know , 

486
00:20:19,068 --> 00:20:20,957
from platforms that could provide 

487
00:20:20,957 --> 00:20:23,220
incredible utility , you know , further 

488
00:20:23,560 --> 00:20:26,260
along in the timeline . Um General I 

489
00:20:26,260 --> 00:20:29,310
got another question for you here um in 

490
00:20:29,310 --> 00:20:32,740
my last minute um any 

491
00:20:32,740 --> 00:20:36,260
satellite , you know , a ban on testing , 

492
00:20:36,740 --> 00:20:38,851
the administration recently announced 

493
00:20:38,851 --> 00:20:41,270
this . It's a policy , I I agree with 

494
00:20:41,640 --> 00:20:44,430
Russia china . They do not you know , 

495
00:20:44,430 --> 00:20:48,000
share this goal nor do they abide by 

496
00:20:48,000 --> 00:20:50,170
any kind of similar policy . The 

497
00:20:50,180 --> 00:20:52,236
Russians and the chinese , both both 

498
00:20:52,236 --> 00:20:54,950
over the last about a decade and a half 

499
00:20:54,950 --> 00:20:58,480
of performed asset tests . The Russians 

500
00:20:58,490 --> 00:21:01,450
more recently , The D . A . is 2022 

501
00:21:01,450 --> 00:21:03,506
report on challenges to security and 

502
00:21:03,506 --> 00:21:05,670
space lists orbital debris as a 

503
00:21:05,670 --> 00:21:07,650
significant challenge to space 

504
00:21:07,650 --> 00:21:10,130
operations and concluded that the 

505
00:21:10,130 --> 00:21:12,230
debris endangers spacecraft of all 

506
00:21:12,230 --> 00:21:14,570
nations in low earth orbit , including 

507
00:21:14,570 --> 00:21:16,848
astronauts and cosmonauts aboard the I . 

508
00:21:16,848 --> 00:21:18,880
S . S . But also china has a space 

509
00:21:18,880 --> 00:21:21,060
station as well . Given the fact that 

510
00:21:21,060 --> 00:21:23,360
both the Russians and chinese conduct 

511
00:21:23,360 --> 00:21:25,582
manned space operations . What would be 

512
00:21:25,582 --> 00:21:28,530
your assessment as to why they continue 

513
00:21:28,760 --> 00:21:31,020
to put their people in harm's way by 

514
00:21:31,020 --> 00:21:33,160
conducting these dangerous tests ? 

515
00:21:33,940 --> 00:21:35,829
Senator , I think they value that 

516
00:21:35,829 --> 00:21:37,884
capability of space is an asymmetric 

517
00:21:37,884 --> 00:21:40,051
advantage over our superior technology 

518
00:21:40,051 --> 00:21:42,162
and continue to uh to pursue uh those 

519
00:21:42,162 --> 00:21:44,218
kinds of capabilities whether or not 

520
00:21:44,218 --> 00:21:46,329
they would actually use it is another 

521
00:21:46,329 --> 00:21:48,440
discussion . Do you expect them to do 

522
00:21:48,440 --> 00:21:51,220
more anti satellite tests ? We we have 

523
00:21:51,220 --> 00:21:54,350
not seen evidence that they plan in the 

524
00:21:54,350 --> 00:21:56,572
near future of doing more , but I would 

525
00:21:56,572 --> 00:21:58,794
expect as they as they go through their 

526
00:21:58,794 --> 00:21:58,360
development processes , they will do 

527
00:21:58,360 --> 00:22:00,304
more tests . All right , thank you 

528
00:22:00,304 --> 00:22:02,638
General and thank you . Director Haines , 

529
00:22:02,740 --> 00:22:04,962
thank you . Senator kelly center around 

530
00:22:04,962 --> 00:22:08,440
please . Thank you . Mr Chairman , let 

531
00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:10,496
me begin by thanking both of you for 

532
00:22:10,496 --> 00:22:12,551
your continued service to our to our 

533
00:22:12,551 --> 00:22:16,270
country . Director Hanes in april , 

534
00:22:16,280 --> 00:22:18,470
Secretary Blinken told Congress that 

535
00:22:18,480 --> 00:22:21,370
Iran's attempts to assassinate former 

536
00:22:21,370 --> 00:22:23,370
Secretary of State mike Pompeo were 

537
00:22:23,370 --> 00:22:26,640
real and ongoing . And this month is 

538
00:22:26,650 --> 00:22:29,400
Israel Israeli press reported that an 

539
00:22:29,410 --> 00:22:31,410
agent for the Iranian revolutionary 

540
00:22:31,410 --> 00:22:33,632
Guards codes force was thwarted from an 

541
00:22:33,632 --> 00:22:35,577
assassination attempt on a U . S . 

542
00:22:35,577 --> 00:22:38,870
General in Germany ? Why is Iran 

543
00:22:39,230 --> 00:22:41,360
apparently so emboldened right now ? 

544
00:22:41,360 --> 00:22:43,660
And how can the intelligence community 

545
00:22:43,660 --> 00:22:45,900
and national security communities at 

546
00:22:45,900 --> 00:22:49,400
large change this dangerous trend and 

547
00:22:49,400 --> 00:22:51,850
deter Iran from these malicious actions ? 

548
00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:57,670
Thank you senator . So I think um 

549
00:22:58,640 --> 00:23:00,890
we should probably pick this up in 

550
00:23:00,900 --> 00:23:03,122
closed session . What I think I can say 

551
00:23:03,122 --> 00:23:06,820
just in open session is a fair amount 

552
00:23:06,820 --> 00:23:09,220
of their motivation in this scenario . 

553
00:23:09,220 --> 00:23:11,610
We assessed to be in relation to 

554
00:23:11,620 --> 00:23:13,840
Soleimani as part of their sort of 

555
00:23:13,850 --> 00:23:17,340
efforts for revenge . And uh and is a 

556
00:23:17,340 --> 00:23:19,562
particularly challenging area I think , 

557
00:23:19,562 --> 00:23:22,450
to deter them from action in this space . 

558
00:23:22,450 --> 00:23:25,460
But we can discuss what more specifics 

559
00:23:25,460 --> 00:23:27,571
I think in closed session . Thank you 

560
00:23:27,571 --> 00:23:30,570
sir . Very well . Uh Director Hanes 

561
00:23:30,570 --> 00:23:32,792
once again , the crisis that the United 

562
00:23:32,792 --> 00:23:34,848
States southern border has literally 

563
00:23:34,848 --> 00:23:37,210
exploded under this administration and 

564
00:23:37,220 --> 00:23:40,420
continues to deteriorate . Reuters 

565
00:23:40,420 --> 00:23:42,531
reported that the US officials at the 

566
00:23:42,531 --> 00:23:44,531
Department of Homeland Security are 

567
00:23:44,531 --> 00:23:47,170
preparing for as high as 9000 arrests 

568
00:23:47,180 --> 00:23:50,110
per day as the economic and political 

569
00:23:50,110 --> 00:23:52,332
conditions in latin America continue to 

570
00:23:52,332 --> 00:23:54,221
spark waves of migration that put 

571
00:23:54,221 --> 00:23:56,332
pressure on our southern border . How 

572
00:23:56,332 --> 00:23:58,554
serious does the intelligence community 

573
00:23:58,554 --> 00:24:00,666
see this as a threat to our country ? 

574
00:24:00,666 --> 00:24:02,832
And also how and to what degree is the 

575
00:24:02,832 --> 00:24:04,610
intelligence community shifting 

576
00:24:04,610 --> 00:24:06,721
resources to address the surge at our 

577
00:24:06,721 --> 00:24:09,590
southern border . Thank you , senator . 

578
00:24:09,590 --> 00:24:12,220
So we have stood up a migrant crisis 

579
00:24:12,220 --> 00:24:14,880
cell which is essentially a cell that 

580
00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:16,936
helps to bring together intelligence 

581
00:24:16,936 --> 00:24:19,080
from across the community to support 

582
00:24:19,090 --> 00:24:21,390
DHS's efforts . And it's really looking 

583
00:24:21,390 --> 00:24:24,070
south of the border at effectively 

584
00:24:24,080 --> 00:24:27,020
migrant movements that may be coming 

585
00:24:27,020 --> 00:24:29,187
towards the southern border so that we 

586
00:24:29,187 --> 00:24:31,770
can help them to prepare in effect for 

587
00:24:32,040 --> 00:24:35,740
encounters on the border . Are you 

588
00:24:35,750 --> 00:24:37,861
in agreement with the assessment that 

589
00:24:37,861 --> 00:24:39,917
there could be as many as 9000 of us 

590
00:24:39,917 --> 00:24:42,083
today ? Is that an assessment that you 

591
00:24:42,083 --> 00:24:44,500
would concur with sir ? I don't look at 

592
00:24:44,510 --> 00:24:46,890
those particular questions that is 

593
00:24:46,890 --> 00:24:48,779
within the Department of Homeland 

594
00:24:48,779 --> 00:24:51,050
Security . I'm just curious because 

595
00:24:51,060 --> 00:24:53,004
when you're doing your planning to 

596
00:24:53,004 --> 00:24:56,010
determine what your needs are clearly 

597
00:24:56,020 --> 00:24:58,131
in order for you to do the planning , 

598
00:24:58,131 --> 00:25:00,131
you've got to have an assessment of 

599
00:25:00,131 --> 00:25:02,242
what the expected flow would be . I'm 

600
00:25:02,242 --> 00:25:04,242
just curious if it's not meant as a 

601
00:25:04,242 --> 00:25:06,242
gotcha question . No , no , no , of 

602
00:25:06,242 --> 00:25:08,187
course it's so we don't , we don't 

603
00:25:08,187 --> 00:25:10,076
assess our needs along the border 

604
00:25:10,076 --> 00:25:12,131
because we don't actually have needs 

605
00:25:12,131 --> 00:25:11,880
along the border . In other words , 

606
00:25:11,880 --> 00:25:13,769
that's sort of the DHS role is to 

607
00:25:13,769 --> 00:25:15,713
figure out how can we plan for the 

608
00:25:15,713 --> 00:25:18,140
number of incidents or encounters that 

609
00:25:18,140 --> 00:25:20,410
they'll have on the border . Um , and 

610
00:25:20,410 --> 00:25:22,410
for us , what we're trying to do is 

611
00:25:22,410 --> 00:25:24,730
understand , what are the drivers , 

612
00:25:24,740 --> 00:25:26,900
what are the ultimate flows that are 

613
00:25:26,900 --> 00:25:29,090
likely to occur ? And we try to set up 

614
00:25:29,100 --> 00:25:31,156
intelligence so that we can actually 

615
00:25:31,156 --> 00:25:33,520
provide some indicating warning of here 

616
00:25:33,520 --> 00:25:35,353
is where you're likely to see an 

617
00:25:35,353 --> 00:25:37,520
increase in the flow , either south or 

618
00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:39,640
north or how it is , you know , and 

619
00:25:39,640 --> 00:25:41,640
where it's coming from ultimately . 

620
00:25:41,640 --> 00:25:43,807
Does that make sense ? I don't know if 

621
00:25:43,807 --> 00:25:45,918
it does . It just catches me a little 

622
00:25:45,918 --> 00:25:48,750
bit by surprise that that in in in your 

623
00:25:48,750 --> 00:25:51,410
planning that most certainly you have 

624
00:25:51,410 --> 00:25:53,730
to have a good communication with 

625
00:25:53,730 --> 00:25:55,563
Homeland Security . I'm assuming 

626
00:25:55,563 --> 00:25:57,730
there's a good communication there and 

627
00:25:57,730 --> 00:25:59,897
that based upon what their needs are , 

628
00:25:59,897 --> 00:26:01,910
is really what you're doing is 

629
00:26:01,910 --> 00:26:03,632
providing them with additional 

630
00:26:03,632 --> 00:26:06,270
resources . And you're also at the same 

631
00:26:06,270 --> 00:26:09,190
time gathering intel based on the 

632
00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:11,540
possibility the strong possibility that 

633
00:26:11,540 --> 00:26:13,373
individuals would try to come in 

634
00:26:13,410 --> 00:26:15,760
through the southern border and based 

635
00:26:15,760 --> 00:26:17,982
on that . I was just curious and I know 

636
00:26:17,982 --> 00:26:19,649
that we're in a , in a public 

637
00:26:19,649 --> 00:26:21,816
discussion , but nonetheless , I think 

638
00:26:21,816 --> 00:26:21,160
it's it's something that's been talked 

639
00:26:21,160 --> 00:26:23,327
about publicly and the fact that we've 

640
00:26:23,327 --> 00:26:25,493
got folks from all over the world that 

641
00:26:25,493 --> 00:26:27,660
are using that as an entryway into the 

642
00:26:27,660 --> 00:26:29,604
United States . And most certainly 

643
00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:32,200
you're aware of that ? Absolutely , no , 

644
00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:34,850
I'm not trying to sort of duck the 

645
00:26:34,850 --> 00:26:37,183
question or anything . I think the , um , 

646
00:26:37,183 --> 00:26:39,480
you know , we see a very high flow , 

647
00:26:39,480 --> 00:26:41,770
there's no question what happens is the 

648
00:26:41,780 --> 00:26:43,836
Department of Homeland Security . We 

649
00:26:43,836 --> 00:26:45,891
have , um , somebody who's a liaison 

650
00:26:45,891 --> 00:26:48,900
that sits within their sort of spaces 

651
00:26:48,910 --> 00:26:51,243
that tells us here are the requirements . 

652
00:26:51,243 --> 00:26:53,380
And they basically are looking for 

653
00:26:53,460 --> 00:26:56,000
indications and warning of , you know , 

654
00:26:56,010 --> 00:26:58,950
you're likely to see a flow along this 

655
00:26:58,950 --> 00:27:01,283
part of the border , that sort of thing , 

656
00:27:01,283 --> 00:27:03,283
as opposed to us being able to help 

657
00:27:03,283 --> 00:27:05,450
them determine . Okay , today , you're 

658
00:27:05,450 --> 00:27:07,617
going to see x number of people coming 

659
00:27:07,617 --> 00:27:09,894
through the southern border as a whole . 

660
00:27:10,840 --> 00:27:13,940
Thank you . Just one other quick 

661
00:27:13,940 --> 00:27:15,773
question here . The intelligence 

662
00:27:15,773 --> 00:27:17,884
community and congress are working to 

663
00:27:17,884 --> 00:27:20,051
flesh out the foreign malign influence 

664
00:27:20,051 --> 00:27:22,410
center's mission , The budget and size 

665
00:27:22,410 --> 00:27:24,620
among other issues . But with the 2022 

666
00:27:24,620 --> 00:27:26,700
midterms almost here we're probably 

667
00:27:26,700 --> 00:27:28,756
behind the curve a little bit . What 

668
00:27:28,756 --> 00:27:30,978
are the major roadblocks stopping the I 

669
00:27:30,978 --> 00:27:33,144
see from standing up this intelligence 

670
00:27:33,144 --> 00:27:34,811
center ? So we've just gotten 

671
00:27:34,811 --> 00:27:37,033
appropriations basically through the Fy 

672
00:27:37,033 --> 00:27:39,840
22 budget , which has been great and 

673
00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:41,896
we're currently building up the farm 

674
00:27:41,896 --> 00:27:44,062
line influence center . We already had 

675
00:27:44,062 --> 00:27:46,007
the election threat executive , so 

676
00:27:46,007 --> 00:27:47,896
we've been doing work on what the 

677
00:27:47,896 --> 00:27:50,490
threats might be to our elections . Uh 

678
00:27:50,500 --> 00:27:53,230
that is now pulled into the farm malign 

679
00:27:53,230 --> 00:27:55,210
influence center and um and we 

680
00:27:55,210 --> 00:27:58,830
effectively have the budget for up to 

681
00:27:58,830 --> 00:28:02,630
12 people um in the far malign 

682
00:28:02,630 --> 00:28:04,741
influence center under this context . 

683
00:28:04,741 --> 00:28:06,860
And we've asked for funding for Fy 23 

684
00:28:06,940 --> 00:28:09,107
essentially to be able to expand it by 

685
00:28:09,107 --> 00:28:11,490
about three people but also to allow us 

686
00:28:11,490 --> 00:28:15,220
to to um access expertise and 

687
00:28:15,220 --> 00:28:17,442
knowledge that we think is critical and 

688
00:28:17,442 --> 00:28:19,664
and really just to help facilitate what 

689
00:28:19,664 --> 00:28:21,887
the community is doing across the board 

690
00:28:21,887 --> 00:28:24,220
on these issues . Thank you . Thank you . 

691
00:28:24,220 --> 00:28:26,164
Mr Chairman . My time is expired . 

692
00:28:26,164 --> 00:28:28,442
Thank you Senator around Senator Kaine , 

693
00:28:28,442 --> 00:28:30,664
please thank you Mr Chair and thanks to 

694
00:28:30,664 --> 00:28:30,360
our witnesses . Um I want to ask about 

695
00:28:30,370 --> 00:28:32,610
two items of the first is undersea 

696
00:28:32,610 --> 00:28:36,560
cables , 95% of global communication 

697
00:28:36,940 --> 00:28:39,630
Rely on a robust undersea cable network , 

698
00:28:39,640 --> 00:28:41,750
500,000 miles across the sea floor 

699
00:28:41,750 --> 00:28:44,530
globally . Internet global banking 

700
00:28:44,530 --> 00:28:46,680
transactions , the swift system , 

701
00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:48,760
diplomatic cables encrypted military 

702
00:28:48,760 --> 00:28:51,400
communications are a few of the myriad 

703
00:28:51,400 --> 00:28:53,567
applications that rely on this network 

704
00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:56,062
to NATO commands . The joint support in 

705
00:28:56,062 --> 00:28:58,118
enabling commanding home Germany and 

706
00:28:58,118 --> 00:29:00,550
Joint force command in Norfolk are 

707
00:29:01,140 --> 00:29:03,840
monitoring threats against undersea 

708
00:29:03,850 --> 00:29:05,930
cables in the atlantic but the vast 

709
00:29:05,930 --> 00:29:08,152
majority of these cables are controlled 

710
00:29:08,152 --> 00:29:10,590
by private sector companies in the US 

711
00:29:10,590 --> 00:29:13,640
France spain , japan china . These 

712
00:29:13,650 --> 00:29:16,250
contractors , companies and contractors 

713
00:29:16,250 --> 00:29:18,361
who work with them such as google and 

714
00:29:18,361 --> 00:29:20,139
amazon , oversee the planning , 

715
00:29:20,139 --> 00:29:22,194
production , design , deployment and 

716
00:29:22,194 --> 00:29:24,194
maintenance of the cables . To what 

717
00:29:24,194 --> 00:29:26,194
extent is the D . O . D . And I see 

718
00:29:26,340 --> 00:29:28,920
looking at integrating and 

719
00:29:28,920 --> 00:29:31,142
communicating with these private actors 

720
00:29:31,142 --> 00:29:33,253
so that we can monitor threats to the 

721
00:29:33,253 --> 00:29:36,090
cables . Senator , I'm going to take 

722
00:29:36,090 --> 00:29:38,410
that one for action . Do a little 

723
00:29:38,410 --> 00:29:40,577
homework to get you a fulsome answer . 

724
00:29:41,140 --> 00:29:43,260
Um , and I would I would like 

725
00:29:43,270 --> 00:29:45,214
additionally to know whether china 

726
00:29:45,214 --> 00:29:47,326
Russia or other malign actors have an 

727
00:29:47,326 --> 00:29:50,050
organic capability to map our networks 

728
00:29:50,540 --> 00:29:52,720
um to cut into our tap into them to 

729
00:29:52,720 --> 00:29:55,460
listen to military or other government 

730
00:29:55,470 --> 00:29:57,510
communications . So I would like a 

731
00:29:57,520 --> 00:29:59,720
response back to that . Here's my 

732
00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:03,040
second question . Unless director Hanes , 

733
00:30:03,040 --> 00:30:05,151
unless you have something to offer on 

734
00:30:05,151 --> 00:30:07,318
the undersea cable . Thank you sir . I 

735
00:30:07,318 --> 00:30:09,373
actually I'd love to do it in closed 

736
00:30:09,373 --> 00:30:11,429
session , if that's all right , I'll 

737
00:30:11,429 --> 00:30:12,873
look forward to that . Um 

738
00:30:15,940 --> 00:30:18,051
now a question about our intelligence 

739
00:30:18,051 --> 00:30:19,996
estimates of the strength of other 

740
00:30:19,996 --> 00:30:22,100
militaries , I think there were a 

741
00:30:22,100 --> 00:30:24,100
number of estimates that the Afghan 

742
00:30:24,100 --> 00:30:26,322
military would perform much better than 

743
00:30:26,322 --> 00:30:28,433
they did . And there were a number of 

744
00:30:28,433 --> 00:30:30,730
estimates that the Russian military was 

745
00:30:30,730 --> 00:30:33,008
much stronger than it has proven to be . 

746
00:30:33,340 --> 00:30:36,390
So what are we doing to assess why we 

747
00:30:36,400 --> 00:30:38,511
overestimated the strength of both of 

748
00:30:38,511 --> 00:30:40,678
those militaries and recalibrating the 

749
00:30:40,678 --> 00:30:42,880
way we assess military strength of 

750
00:30:42,890 --> 00:30:45,660
other nations . Senator , I'll start 

751
00:30:45,660 --> 00:30:48,250
we're taking a holistic view of how we 

752
00:30:48,260 --> 00:30:51,340
um do analysis and evaluate foreign 

753
00:30:51,340 --> 00:30:53,396
militaries . You know , it starts it 

754
00:30:53,396 --> 00:30:55,507
starts with the relationships that we 

755
00:30:55,507 --> 00:30:55,450
have with our foreign partners , 

756
00:30:55,460 --> 00:30:57,293
understanding their militaries , 

757
00:30:57,293 --> 00:30:59,516
understanding their understanding of of 

758
00:30:59,516 --> 00:31:01,850
adversary militaries and working uh an 

759
00:31:01,850 --> 00:31:03,830
all source assessment to have 

760
00:31:03,830 --> 00:31:06,820
granularity inside inside the the 

761
00:31:06,820 --> 00:31:08,542
capabilities of these of these 

762
00:31:08,542 --> 00:31:10,598
militaries . Certainly certainly the 

763
00:31:10,598 --> 00:31:12,598
the A N . D S . F was an issue . Uh 

764
00:31:12,598 --> 00:31:15,760
certainly the Russian overestimation of 

765
00:31:15,760 --> 00:31:17,940
Russian capability was an issue . But 

766
00:31:17,940 --> 00:31:20,107
if you if you back up , if you look at 

767
00:31:20,107 --> 00:31:22,350
Russia's growth since uh since the 

768
00:31:22,360 --> 00:31:24,249
early two thousand's there war in 

769
00:31:24,249 --> 00:31:26,416
Chechnya , their war in Georgia , what 

770
00:31:26,416 --> 00:31:28,582
they did in Ukraine , their operations 

771
00:31:28,582 --> 00:31:31,170
in Syria and you understand the reforms 

772
00:31:31,170 --> 00:31:33,260
that they went through . We saw that 

773
00:31:33,270 --> 00:31:35,326
from the outside what we did not see 

774
00:31:35,326 --> 00:31:37,437
from the inside was sort of this this 

775
00:31:37,437 --> 00:31:39,603
Hollow Force lack of N . C . O . Corps 

776
00:31:39,603 --> 00:31:41,714
lack of leadership training , lack of 

777
00:31:41,714 --> 00:31:43,826
effective doctrine . So those are the 

778
00:31:43,826 --> 00:31:45,937
intangibles that we've got to be able 

779
00:31:45,937 --> 00:31:45,840
to get our arms around as as an 

780
00:31:45,840 --> 00:31:47,673
intelligence community to really 

781
00:31:47,673 --> 00:31:48,673
understand . 

782
00:31:51,840 --> 00:31:55,440
Thank you I yield back . Thank you . 

783
00:31:55,440 --> 00:31:57,770
Senator Kaine , uh Senator worker 

784
00:31:57,770 --> 00:32:00,080
please . Thank you . Mr Chairman 

785
00:32:00,090 --> 00:32:02,257
General Barry . Let me quote from your 

786
00:32:02,257 --> 00:32:04,540
prepared statement , Beijing appears 

787
00:32:04,540 --> 00:32:07,020
willing to defer the use of military 

788
00:32:07,020 --> 00:32:09,600
force as long as it considers that 

789
00:32:09,600 --> 00:32:11,810
unification with Taiwan can be 

790
00:32:11,810 --> 00:32:14,430
negotiated and that the cost of 

791
00:32:14,430 --> 00:32:17,550
conflict outweigh the benefits . 

792
00:32:18,740 --> 00:32:20,907
General barrier . I believe the United 

793
00:32:20,907 --> 00:32:23,650
States should prepare Taiwan and send a 

794
00:32:23,650 --> 00:32:26,320
clear message to Beijing that a 

795
00:32:26,320 --> 00:32:28,542
military invasion would be too costly . 

796
00:32:28,542 --> 00:32:31,560
I also believe the primary objective of 

797
00:32:31,560 --> 00:32:34,460
the United States and its allies with 

798
00:32:34,460 --> 00:32:38,160
regard to Taiwan should not be so much 

799
00:32:38,160 --> 00:32:41,120
to repel a chinese attack but to 

800
00:32:41,120 --> 00:32:44,770
prevent it from ever occurring . So 

801
00:32:44,780 --> 00:32:47,160
general from your assessment of china's 

802
00:32:47,540 --> 00:32:49,596
capabilities and timeline as well as 

803
00:32:49,710 --> 00:32:52,460
Taiwan's current defensive posture , 

804
00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:54,896
what needs to be done ? What can the 

805
00:32:54,896 --> 00:32:57,710
United States be doing for or supplying 

806
00:32:57,710 --> 00:33:00,660
to Taiwan in order to prevent a chinese 

807
00:33:00,660 --> 00:33:04,140
attack from ever occurring . Senator , 

808
00:33:04,140 --> 00:33:06,196
thanks for that question . First , I 

809
00:33:06,196 --> 00:33:08,362
would say that I believe the PRC would 

810
00:33:08,362 --> 00:33:10,362
rather not do it by force . I think 

811
00:33:10,362 --> 00:33:12,418
they would rather do this peacefully 

812
00:33:12,418 --> 00:33:14,584
over time . There are some things that 

813
00:33:14,584 --> 00:33:16,584
that we can do with with Taiwan . I 

814
00:33:16,584 --> 00:33:18,418
think they're learning some very 

815
00:33:18,418 --> 00:33:20,584
interesting lessons from the Ukrainian 

816
00:33:20,584 --> 00:33:20,200
conflict . Like how important 

817
00:33:20,200 --> 00:33:22,367
leadership is how important small unit 

818
00:33:22,367 --> 00:33:24,533
tactics are . How important an N . C . 

819
00:33:24,533 --> 00:33:26,644
O . Corps is and and really effective 

820
00:33:26,644 --> 00:33:28,867
training with the right weapons systems 

821
00:33:28,867 --> 00:33:30,978
and what those systems with the right 

822
00:33:30,978 --> 00:33:33,033
people would be able to do to thwart 

823
00:33:33,033 --> 00:33:35,089
that . So I think I think we have to 

824
00:33:35,089 --> 00:33:37,200
engage with our indo pay com partners 

825
00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:39,311
within the Department of Defense , uh 

826
00:33:39,311 --> 00:33:41,422
the Taiwan military and leadership to 

827
00:33:41,422 --> 00:33:43,644
help them understand what this conflict 

828
00:33:43,644 --> 00:33:43,380
has been about , what lessons they can 

829
00:33:43,380 --> 00:33:45,324
learn and and where they should be 

830
00:33:45,324 --> 00:33:47,380
focusing their dollars on defense in 

831
00:33:47,380 --> 00:33:49,491
their training . Is there any C . O . 

832
00:33:49,491 --> 00:33:51,769
Corps where it should be at this point ? 

833
00:33:51,769 --> 00:33:53,547
They have a they have a largely 

834
00:33:53,547 --> 00:33:55,769
conscript force . I don't believe it is 

835
00:33:55,769 --> 00:33:59,120
where it should be . And and and 

836
00:33:59,120 --> 00:34:01,970
so the the 

837
00:34:01,970 --> 00:34:05,470
volunteer part of of their 

838
00:34:05,480 --> 00:34:08,610
armed forces . Is that where it should 

839
00:34:08,610 --> 00:34:12,390
be the non conscript ? They have a very 

840
00:34:12,400 --> 00:34:15,100
very short enlistment period . I can 

841
00:34:15,100 --> 00:34:16,989
provide you additional additional 

842
00:34:16,989 --> 00:34:19,044
details in a in a written response . 

843
00:34:19,044 --> 00:34:21,380
Okay . You also have written that the P . 

844
00:34:21,380 --> 00:34:23,910
L . A . Navy is the largest navy in the 

845
00:34:23,910 --> 00:34:26,580
world and has the capability to conduct 

846
00:34:26,580 --> 00:34:28,770
long range precision strikes against 

847
00:34:28,770 --> 00:34:30,990
land targets from its submarine and 

848
00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,500
surface combatants . You later have 

849
00:34:34,500 --> 00:34:37,160
written that Russia is fielding , It's 

850
00:34:37,160 --> 00:34:40,170
new quote ultra quiet 

851
00:34:41,140 --> 00:34:43,460
submarine capable of threatening north 

852
00:34:43,460 --> 00:34:45,810
America from the pacific ocean General , 

853
00:34:45,810 --> 00:34:47,880
Do you assess that china and Russia 

854
00:34:47,890 --> 00:34:51,090
will continue to grow both of their 

855
00:34:51,090 --> 00:34:52,850
naval fleets and invest in new 

856
00:34:52,850 --> 00:34:55,740
capabilities ? Yes , I do believe they 

857
00:34:55,740 --> 00:34:57,796
will both invest in new capabilities 

858
00:34:57,796 --> 00:34:59,740
and grow their fleets . And is the 

859
00:34:59,740 --> 00:35:01,684
United States on pace to build and 

860
00:35:01,684 --> 00:35:03,740
commission as many ships as china is 

861
00:35:03,740 --> 00:35:06,150
building ? I would refer that question 

862
00:35:06,150 --> 00:35:08,261
to the Secretary of Navy and Chief of 

863
00:35:08,261 --> 00:35:11,770
Naval Operations . But but surely the 

864
00:35:11,770 --> 00:35:13,437
intelligence community has an 

865
00:35:13,437 --> 00:35:16,930
assessment of that . Dia has an 

866
00:35:16,930 --> 00:35:18,486
assessment of Russian naval 

867
00:35:18,486 --> 00:35:21,810
capabilities and chinese pln 

868
00:35:21,810 --> 00:35:24,690
capabilities . D . And D . I . A . Is 

869
00:35:24,700 --> 00:35:27,410
familiar with what the plans of the 

870
00:35:27,420 --> 00:35:29,520
public plans of the Navy are at this 

871
00:35:29,520 --> 00:35:32,120
point broadly . But I think that the 

872
00:35:32,120 --> 00:35:33,898
Navy will make those investment 

873
00:35:33,898 --> 00:35:35,953
decisions based on how they perceive 

874
00:35:35,953 --> 00:35:38,064
the threat as well and well certainly 

875
00:35:38,064 --> 00:35:40,120
collaborate with our partners in the 

876
00:35:40,120 --> 00:35:39,740
Navy on any of that . Let me switch to 

877
00:35:39,740 --> 00:35:42,420
Afghanistan . Director Hanes . You 

878
00:35:42,420 --> 00:35:45,570
submitted The 2022 Office of Director 

879
00:35:45,570 --> 00:35:49,260
of National Intelligence and your 

880
00:35:49,260 --> 00:35:52,010
threat assessment on Afghanistan . The 

881
00:35:52,010 --> 00:35:54,121
report says that the Taliban takeover 

882
00:35:54,840 --> 00:35:58,170
threatens us interest 

883
00:35:58,540 --> 00:36:02,230
That 500,000 Afghan refugees could 

884
00:36:02,230 --> 00:36:04,119
attempt to cross into surrounding 

885
00:36:04,119 --> 00:36:05,952
countries . And almost certainly 

886
00:36:05,952 --> 00:36:08,080
terrorist groups will establish and 

887
00:36:08,080 --> 00:36:11,440
expand safe havens from which to plot 

888
00:36:11,450 --> 00:36:14,440
attacks . So , Madam Director , given 

889
00:36:14,440 --> 00:36:16,950
these assessments in your office's 

890
00:36:16,950 --> 00:36:19,920
annual threat assessment , would you 

891
00:36:19,920 --> 00:36:23,010
assess that the chaotic US withdrawal 

892
00:36:23,010 --> 00:36:25,590
from Afghanistan has left the homeland 

893
00:36:25,590 --> 00:36:29,150
more susceptible to terrorist attacks ? 

894
00:36:33,230 --> 00:36:36,420
Thank you , Senator . I am agreed with 

895
00:36:36,420 --> 00:36:38,587
what general barrier indicated earlier 

896
00:36:38,587 --> 00:36:40,642
on about the threat essentially that 

897
00:36:40,642 --> 00:36:42,642
we're seeing from al Qaeda and from 

898
00:36:42,642 --> 00:36:44,910
ISIS K . Which is to say that we see 

899
00:36:44,910 --> 00:36:47,240
ISIS K as the more concerning threat . 

900
00:36:47,630 --> 00:36:50,640
This p at this point we do not assess 

901
00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:52,862
that they currently have the capability 

902
00:36:52,862 --> 00:36:56,820
to sexually affect external attacks 

903
00:36:56,820 --> 00:37:00,290
directed from Afghanistan to the United 

904
00:37:00,290 --> 00:37:02,660
States um at this stage . But they 

905
00:37:02,660 --> 00:37:04,771
could build that capability over time 

906
00:37:04,771 --> 00:37:06,882
and they certainly have the intent to 

907
00:37:06,882 --> 00:37:09,160
do so with Al Qaeda . We are not seeing 

908
00:37:09,430 --> 00:37:12,320
um as much of a threat and that doesn't 

909
00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:14,487
mean that it couldn't grow over time . 

910
00:37:14,487 --> 00:37:16,487
And that's obviously something that 

911
00:37:16,487 --> 00:37:18,598
we're monitoring during this period . 

912
00:37:18,598 --> 00:37:20,709
General barrier has has the exit from 

913
00:37:20,709 --> 00:37:22,653
Afghanistan left our homeland more 

914
00:37:22,653 --> 00:37:25,930
vulnerable . Senator , I would say not 

915
00:37:25,930 --> 00:37:27,708
more vulnerable but but this is 

916
00:37:27,708 --> 00:37:29,263
certainly an issue that the 

917
00:37:29,263 --> 00:37:31,374
intelligence community has to keep on 

918
00:37:31,374 --> 00:37:33,486
on the warm plate if you will to make 

919
00:37:33,486 --> 00:37:33,250
sure that we can monitor those networks 

920
00:37:33,250 --> 00:37:35,472
what they're doing um and where they're 

921
00:37:35,472 --> 00:37:39,330
migrating to . Thank you both . Thank 

922
00:37:39,330 --> 00:37:41,163
you very much , Senator Wicker . 

923
00:37:41,163 --> 00:37:43,830
Senator King , please . Thank you . Mr 

924
00:37:43,830 --> 00:37:47,130
Chairman um Madam Director . I'm 

925
00:37:47,130 --> 00:37:49,400
concerned about the leaks last week of 

926
00:37:49,400 --> 00:37:53,310
the in the fact that the details 

927
00:37:53,310 --> 00:37:55,366
of intelligence is being shared with 

928
00:37:55,366 --> 00:37:57,430
the Ukrainians , both in terms of 

929
00:37:57,430 --> 00:37:59,263
sources and methods alerting the 

930
00:37:59,263 --> 00:38:01,930
Russians . But we know perhaps how we 

931
00:38:01,930 --> 00:38:04,490
know it and also feeding Vladimir 

932
00:38:04,490 --> 00:38:06,720
Putin's paranoia about conflict with 

933
00:38:06,720 --> 00:38:08,970
the west . Are you actively pursuing 

934
00:38:08,970 --> 00:38:11,360
the source of the of those leaks from 

935
00:38:11,370 --> 00:38:15,280
from last week . Thank you Senator . 

936
00:38:15,290 --> 00:38:19,220
We obviously always actively pursue any 

937
00:38:19,220 --> 00:38:20,998
information that we have . That 

938
00:38:20,998 --> 00:38:22,776
indicates that anybody maybe um 

939
00:38:22,776 --> 00:38:25,500
disclosing classified information . Um , 

940
00:38:25,510 --> 00:38:29,090
you know without authorization . I hope 

941
00:38:29,090 --> 00:38:31,146
you will pursue that because the , I 

942
00:38:31,146 --> 00:38:33,423
think sometimes leaks are embarrassing . 

943
00:38:33,423 --> 00:38:35,479
We don't worry too much about them , 

944
00:38:35,479 --> 00:38:37,423
but I think in this case they were 

945
00:38:37,423 --> 00:38:39,590
harmful and I hope that this will be a 

946
00:38:39,590 --> 00:38:43,270
an active investigation . A question to 

947
00:38:43,270 --> 00:38:45,630
both of you , both of you . Uh we all 

948
00:38:45,640 --> 00:38:47,862
believe that the intelligence community 

949
00:38:47,862 --> 00:38:50,084
is a really excellent job of predicting 

950
00:38:50,084 --> 00:38:52,307
the invasion , alerting the world as to 

951
00:38:52,307 --> 00:38:53,918
what was going on , what the 

952
00:38:53,918 --> 00:38:56,140
disposition of of Russian troops were . 

953
00:38:56,140 --> 00:38:58,140
The involvement of Belarus . All of 

954
00:38:58,140 --> 00:39:00,370
that . What we missed was the will to 

955
00:39:00,370 --> 00:39:02,350
fight of the Ukrainians and the 

956
00:39:02,350 --> 00:39:05,700
leadership of Vladimir Zelensky . 

957
00:39:06,320 --> 00:39:08,340
Um and we also missed that in 

958
00:39:08,340 --> 00:39:10,610
Afghanistan within 12 months . We 

959
00:39:10,610 --> 00:39:12,277
missed the will to fight . We 

960
00:39:12,277 --> 00:39:14,610
overestimated the Afghans will to fight . 

961
00:39:14,610 --> 00:39:17,660
Underestimated the the Ukrainians will 

962
00:39:17,660 --> 00:39:19,827
to fight . I realized will to fight is 

963
00:39:19,827 --> 00:39:21,882
a lot harder to assess the number of 

964
00:39:21,882 --> 00:39:25,750
tanks or the volume of ammunition or 

965
00:39:25,750 --> 00:39:27,620
something . But I hope that the 

966
00:39:27,620 --> 00:39:29,676
intelligence community is doing some 

967
00:39:29,676 --> 00:39:31,842
soul searching about how to better get 

968
00:39:31,842 --> 00:39:33,898
a handle on that question because we 

969
00:39:33,898 --> 00:39:36,120
had testimony and in this committee and 

970
00:39:36,120 --> 00:39:38,342
in the intelligence committee that Kiev 

971
00:39:38,342 --> 00:39:40,564
was gonna fall in three or four days in 

972
00:39:40,564 --> 00:39:42,787
the war would last two weeks . Uh , and 

973
00:39:42,787 --> 00:39:44,898
that turned out to be grossly wrong . 

974
00:39:44,898 --> 00:39:46,787
Is this , are you looking at this 

975
00:39:46,787 --> 00:39:49,009
question of how to assess will to fight 

976
00:39:49,009 --> 00:39:51,640
and domestic leadership . Yes , Senator , 

977
00:39:51,650 --> 00:39:53,483
You heard from general barrier . 

978
00:39:53,483 --> 00:39:55,594
Obviously a number of things that DEA 

979
00:39:55,594 --> 00:39:57,817
is doing for the intelligence community 

980
00:39:57,817 --> 00:39:59,817
at large . We have a process at the 

981
00:39:59,817 --> 00:40:01,983
National Intelligence Council taking a 

982
00:40:01,983 --> 00:40:03,983
look at these issues . It is um , I 

983
00:40:03,983 --> 00:40:06,039
would say that it's a combination of 

984
00:40:06,039 --> 00:40:08,206
will to fight and capacity in effect . 

985
00:40:08,206 --> 00:40:11,220
And uh and the two of them are issues 

986
00:40:11,230 --> 00:40:13,270
that are , as you indicated , quite 

987
00:40:13,270 --> 00:40:16,320
challenging to , you know , provide 

988
00:40:16,510 --> 00:40:18,399
effective analysis on . And we're 

989
00:40:18,399 --> 00:40:20,566
looking at different methodologies for 

990
00:40:20,566 --> 00:40:23,290
doing so . And this is your this is 

991
00:40:23,290 --> 00:40:26,540
your lane assessing military capability . 

992
00:40:26,540 --> 00:40:28,873
And a big part as you testified earlier . 

993
00:40:28,873 --> 00:40:30,984
The reason the Ukrainian war is going 

994
00:40:30,984 --> 00:40:33,151
the way it is is that the Ukrainians , 

995
00:40:33,151 --> 00:40:35,318
Ukrainians are fighting for their land 

996
00:40:35,318 --> 00:40:37,373
and the Russians don't have the same 

997
00:40:37,373 --> 00:40:39,373
will to fight . I hope that this is 

998
00:40:39,373 --> 00:40:41,484
something you're focused upon because 

999
00:40:41,484 --> 00:40:43,373
again , I think we failed on this 

1000
00:40:43,373 --> 00:40:45,096
question in Afghanistan and in 

1001
00:40:45,096 --> 00:40:47,207
Afghanistan we had testimony over and 

1002
00:40:47,207 --> 00:40:49,429
over that the government would last six 

1003
00:40:49,429 --> 00:40:51,540
months or a year beyond the departure 

1004
00:40:51,540 --> 00:40:54,440
of US troops . It lasted -2 weeks . Is 

1005
00:40:54,440 --> 00:40:56,773
this something that you're focused upon , 

1006
00:40:56,773 --> 00:40:58,940
Senator ? I am focused on and I really 

1007
00:40:58,940 --> 00:41:00,884
appreciate this dialogue because I 

1008
00:41:00,884 --> 00:41:03,051
think there's an important nuance that 

1009
00:41:03,051 --> 00:41:05,218
we have to discuss . One is one is the 

1010
00:41:05,218 --> 00:41:04,330
will to fight and the other is the 

1011
00:41:04,330 --> 00:41:06,470
capacity to fight so and in closed 

1012
00:41:06,470 --> 00:41:08,303
briefings , we talked about this 

1013
00:41:08,303 --> 00:41:10,710
capacity this capacity to fight . And 

1014
00:41:10,710 --> 00:41:12,766
given the correlation of forces that 

1015
00:41:12,766 --> 00:41:14,432
the Russians had and what the 

1016
00:41:14,432 --> 00:41:16,377
Ukrainians had . It was it was the 

1017
00:41:16,377 --> 00:41:18,321
thought of senior analysts that it 

1018
00:41:18,321 --> 00:41:20,543
wasn't gonna go very well for a variety 

1019
00:41:20,543 --> 00:41:22,543
of factors . But there was never an 

1020
00:41:22,543 --> 00:41:24,710
intelligence community assessment that 

1021
00:41:24,710 --> 00:41:26,877
said , the Ukrainians lack the will to 

1022
00:41:26,877 --> 00:41:26,670
fight . Those assessments . Talked 

1023
00:41:26,670 --> 00:41:28,781
about there wasn't an assessment that 

1024
00:41:28,781 --> 00:41:30,948
they did either . The assessment was , 

1025
00:41:30,948 --> 00:41:33,170
Ukraine would be overrun in a matter of 

1026
00:41:33,170 --> 00:41:35,003
weeks . That was grossly wrong . 

1027
00:41:35,003 --> 00:41:36,892
Grossly wrong . But not not not a 

1028
00:41:36,892 --> 00:41:39,003
question of will to fight . It was it 

1029
00:41:39,003 --> 00:41:41,170
was capacity at that time as the D and 

1030
00:41:41,170 --> 00:41:43,281
I just said , so we are taking a look 

1031
00:41:43,281 --> 00:41:45,448
at them saying that Ukrainians will to 

1032
00:41:45,448 --> 00:41:45,210
fight hasn't been an important part of 

1033
00:41:45,210 --> 00:41:47,210
this struggle ? No , I'm not saying 

1034
00:41:47,210 --> 00:41:48,877
that . I think it's it's been 

1035
00:41:48,877 --> 00:41:50,932
everything and that's what we didn't 

1036
00:41:50,932 --> 00:41:52,988
know correct . Well , we we assessed 

1037
00:41:52,988 --> 00:41:55,099
their capacity to , to face the , the 

1038
00:41:55,099 --> 00:41:57,154
size of the Russian forces that were 

1039
00:41:57,154 --> 00:41:59,321
massed on the border was gonna be very 

1040
00:41:59,321 --> 00:42:01,321
difficult for them . Well , all I'm 

1041
00:42:01,321 --> 00:42:03,377
saying is the intelligence community 

1042
00:42:03,377 --> 00:42:03,320
needs to be able to do a better job on 

1043
00:42:03,320 --> 00:42:05,264
this issue . I think , I think the 

1044
00:42:05,264 --> 00:42:07,431
intelligence community did a great job 

1045
00:42:07,431 --> 00:42:09,598
on this issue , senator and we we will 

1046
00:42:09,598 --> 00:42:11,820
general , how can you possibly say that 

1047
00:42:11,820 --> 00:42:13,820
when we were told explicitly , Kiev 

1048
00:42:13,820 --> 00:42:15,653
would fall in three days and the 

1049
00:42:15,653 --> 00:42:17,709
Ukraine would would fall fall in two 

1050
00:42:17,709 --> 00:42:19,653
weeks . You're telling me that was 

1051
00:42:19,653 --> 00:42:21,598
accurate intelligence . So we were 

1052
00:42:21,598 --> 00:42:23,820
really focused on on the Russian forces 

1053
00:42:23,820 --> 00:42:25,876
at the time . And so when we when we 

1054
00:42:25,876 --> 00:42:27,876
back we were wrong about that too , 

1055
00:42:27,876 --> 00:42:27,470
weren't we ? We overestimated the 

1056
00:42:27,470 --> 00:42:29,637
Russians in the intelligence community 

1057
00:42:29,637 --> 00:42:31,803
did a great job and and predicting and 

1058
00:42:31,803 --> 00:42:33,914
talking to and I acknowledged that at 

1059
00:42:33,914 --> 00:42:35,748
the beginning of my question , I 

1060
00:42:35,748 --> 00:42:38,026
understand that the yes , yes they did . 

1061
00:42:38,026 --> 00:42:40,248
What they failed at was predicting what 

1062
00:42:40,248 --> 00:42:42,081
was going to happen after Russia 

1063
00:42:42,081 --> 00:42:44,248
invaded . So as I look at the totality 

1064
00:42:44,248 --> 00:42:46,359
of the of the entire operation , um I 

1065
00:42:46,359 --> 00:42:49,250
think the the enormity rests on the 

1066
00:42:49,250 --> 00:42:51,361
predictions of what the Russians were 

1067
00:42:51,361 --> 00:42:53,417
going to do versus versus whether or 

1068
00:42:53,417 --> 00:42:53,290
not the Ukrainian we're gonna be 

1069
00:42:53,290 --> 00:42:56,590
successful . Well if if you don't 

1070
00:42:56,590 --> 00:42:58,701
concede there was a problem on this , 

1071
00:42:58,701 --> 00:43:00,868
then we've got a problem . Senator . I 

1072
00:43:00,868 --> 00:43:03,034
didn't say that we are going to take a 

1073
00:43:03,034 --> 00:43:02,720
hard look at this but but I think in 

1074
00:43:02,720 --> 00:43:04,887
the totality of the entire operation , 

1075
00:43:04,887 --> 00:43:06,887
there are a lot more successes than 

1076
00:43:06,887 --> 00:43:09,580
failures . I won't argue that point . 

1077
00:43:09,590 --> 00:43:11,757
I'm just trying to make a point that I 

1078
00:43:11,757 --> 00:43:13,868
think there was a major issue that we 

1079
00:43:13,868 --> 00:43:16,090
missed that had a significant influence 

1080
00:43:16,090 --> 00:43:19,020
on how this , how this has unfolded . 

1081
00:43:19,150 --> 00:43:21,630
And had we had a better a better handle 

1082
00:43:21,630 --> 00:43:24,040
on the prediction , we could have done 

1083
00:43:24,040 --> 00:43:26,262
more to assist the Ukrainians earlier . 

1084
00:43:26,262 --> 00:43:28,373
Thank you . Mr Chairman , Thank you . 

1085
00:43:28,373 --> 00:43:30,540
Senator . King Senator Hawley , please 

1086
00:43:30,540 --> 00:43:32,484
Thank you . Mr Chairman , Director 

1087
00:43:32,484 --> 00:43:34,596
Hanes General , is it your sense that 

1088
00:43:34,596 --> 00:43:36,762
Beijing thinks that it has a window of 

1089
00:43:36,762 --> 00:43:38,762
opportunity to invade Taiwan before 

1090
00:43:38,762 --> 00:43:41,920
Taiwan and the United States modernize 

1091
00:43:41,930 --> 00:43:45,200
and get into better position to deter 

1092
00:43:45,210 --> 00:43:47,266
any such invasion . Let's start with 

1093
00:43:47,266 --> 00:43:50,880
you , director . So thank you Senator . 

1094
00:43:51,700 --> 00:43:54,690
It's our view that they are working 

1095
00:43:54,690 --> 00:43:58,470
hard to effectively put themselves into 

1096
00:43:58,470 --> 00:44:00,581
a position in which their military is 

1097
00:44:00,581 --> 00:44:03,910
capable of taking Taiwan over our 

1098
00:44:03,910 --> 00:44:07,140
intervention . Right ? Um we can talk 

1099
00:44:07,140 --> 00:44:09,580
in closed sessions about timelines and 

1100
00:44:09,580 --> 00:44:12,350
so on for for how quickly they think 

1101
00:44:12,350 --> 00:44:14,517
they may be able to achieve that . But 

1102
00:44:14,517 --> 00:44:16,739
I think that is something that they are 

1103
00:44:16,739 --> 00:44:18,906
trying to achieve even as what general 

1104
00:44:18,906 --> 00:44:21,017
barriers said earlier is true . Which 

1105
00:44:21,017 --> 00:44:23,239
is to say that they would prefer not to 

1106
00:44:23,239 --> 00:44:25,183
have to use military force to take 

1107
00:44:25,183 --> 00:44:27,517
Taiwan . They prefer to use other means . 

1108
00:44:27,517 --> 00:44:27,350
General . Do you want to comment on 

1109
00:44:27,350 --> 00:44:29,406
this ? Well , I know there are there 

1110
00:44:29,406 --> 00:44:31,572
are a lot of dates out there . Senator 

1111
00:44:31,572 --> 00:44:33,350
2027 2030 2020 49 . Certainly . 

1112
00:44:33,350 --> 00:44:35,406
Certainly it's on their mind . We're 

1113
00:44:35,406 --> 00:44:37,628
not really sure what lessons Xi xinping 

1114
00:44:37,628 --> 00:44:39,850
is taking away from this conflict right 

1115
00:44:39,850 --> 00:44:41,906
now we would hope that they would be 

1116
00:44:41,906 --> 00:44:44,072
they would be the right ones . But but 

1117
00:44:44,072 --> 00:44:43,630
I think it's going to take some time to 

1118
00:44:43,630 --> 00:44:45,630
sort out whether or not he believes 

1119
00:44:45,630 --> 00:44:47,408
this is a window or or that his 

1120
00:44:47,408 --> 00:44:49,574
timeline would extend . Let me ask you 

1121
00:44:49,574 --> 00:44:51,686
about something that Admiral Davidson 

1122
00:44:51,686 --> 00:44:53,930
said when he was the commander of a 

1123
00:44:53,930 --> 00:44:56,152
calm , he told the committee last March 

1124
00:44:56,290 --> 00:44:58,179
That he worried about the Chinese 

1125
00:44:58,179 --> 00:45:00,123
invasion of Taiwan in the next six 

1126
00:45:00,123 --> 00:45:02,068
years . That's his testimony . His 

1127
00:45:02,068 --> 00:45:03,901
successor , Admiral Aquilino has 

1128
00:45:03,901 --> 00:45:05,734
similarly said that he views the 

1129
00:45:05,734 --> 00:45:07,846
timeline to be shrinking based on the 

1130
00:45:07,846 --> 00:45:10,068
indicators director , let me start with 

1131
00:45:10,068 --> 00:45:12,068
you on this based on the indicators 

1132
00:45:12,068 --> 00:45:14,401
available to the intelligence community . 

1133
00:45:14,401 --> 00:45:14,070
Do you agree that the threat to Taiwan 

1134
00:45:14,070 --> 00:45:16,420
is acute between now and 2030 ? 

1135
00:45:19,790 --> 00:45:21,930
Yes , I think it's fair to say that 

1136
00:45:21,930 --> 00:45:25,510
it's critical between or acute between 

1137
00:45:25,510 --> 00:45:27,177
now and 2030 . I think that's 

1138
00:45:27,177 --> 00:45:29,630
absolutely fair . What is hard to tell 

1139
00:45:29,630 --> 00:45:32,580
is how for example , whatever lessons 

1140
00:45:32,580 --> 00:45:34,691
china learns coming out of the Russia 

1141
00:45:34,691 --> 00:45:36,524
Ukraine crisis might affect that 

1142
00:45:36,524 --> 00:45:38,802
timeline as well . As as you indicated , 

1143
00:45:38,802 --> 00:45:40,469
you know , whether or not our 

1144
00:45:40,469 --> 00:45:42,636
capabilities , Taiwan's capabilities , 

1145
00:45:42,636 --> 00:45:44,691
other decisions that will have to be 

1146
00:45:44,691 --> 00:45:46,691
made between now and then that will 

1147
00:45:46,691 --> 00:45:48,858
affect the timeline general . What did 

1148
00:45:48,858 --> 00:45:50,913
that you said just a second ago that 

1149
00:45:50,913 --> 00:45:50,530
you hoped china would learn some 

1150
00:45:50,530 --> 00:45:52,530
lessons from the Ukraine conflict . 

1151
00:45:52,530 --> 00:45:54,752
What is it you're hoping that they take 

1152
00:45:54,752 --> 00:45:56,970
away just how difficult , like a cross 

1153
00:45:56,970 --> 00:45:59,000
strait invasion might be and how 

1154
00:45:59,000 --> 00:46:01,222
dangerous and high risk that might be ? 

1155
00:46:01,222 --> 00:46:03,444
We we saw ? Well , don't you think that 

1156
00:46:03,444 --> 00:46:05,667
the rush that the chinese , sorry , the 

1157
00:46:05,667 --> 00:46:07,833
chinese military is significantly more 

1158
00:46:07,833 --> 00:46:07,580
capable than the right as it turns out , 

1159
00:46:07,590 --> 00:46:09,701
just to pick up what Senator King was 

1160
00:46:09,701 --> 00:46:11,590
pressing you on . We pretty 

1161
00:46:11,590 --> 00:46:13,812
dramatically overestimated the strength 

1162
00:46:13,812 --> 00:46:15,810
of the Russian military , I'd be 

1163
00:46:15,810 --> 00:46:18,000
surprised for one of if china's 

1164
00:46:18,000 --> 00:46:20,110
military strength proves to be so 

1165
00:46:20,110 --> 00:46:22,277
attenuated . So I mean don't you think 

1166
00:46:22,277 --> 00:46:24,499
that we're dealing with a significantly 

1167
00:46:24,499 --> 00:46:26,666
more formidable adversary in china ? I 

1168
00:46:26,666 --> 00:46:28,666
think I think china is a formidable 

1169
00:46:28,666 --> 00:46:31,270
adversary . So I mean back to lessons 

1170
00:46:31,270 --> 00:46:33,700
learned . I would unfortunately . I 

1171
00:46:33,700 --> 00:46:35,811
mean I think one lesson they can draw 

1172
00:46:35,811 --> 00:46:37,644
from the Ukraine conflict is the 

1173
00:46:37,644 --> 00:46:39,756
deterrence didn't work in Ukraine . I 

1174
00:46:39,756 --> 00:46:41,978
mean Russia invaded Ukraine . I for one 

1175
00:46:41,978 --> 00:46:41,710
don't want to be having this 

1176
00:46:41,710 --> 00:46:43,932
conversation about Taiwan in any period 

1177
00:46:43,932 --> 00:46:46,099
of years , not next year , not in five 

1178
00:46:46,099 --> 00:46:48,210
years or 10 years . So my my sense of 

1179
00:46:48,210 --> 00:46:50,432
urgency on this is we better figure out 

1180
00:46:50,432 --> 00:46:52,599
how deterrence is gonna work in Taiwan 

1181
00:46:52,599 --> 00:46:54,710
because if if china is successful and 

1182
00:46:54,710 --> 00:46:56,821
the fate accompli that's gonna look a 

1183
00:46:56,821 --> 00:46:58,932
lot different than a Russian scenario 

1184
00:46:58,932 --> 00:47:01,210
in Ukraine , would you agree with that ? 

1185
00:47:01,210 --> 00:47:03,377
I do agree with that . So just to that 

1186
00:47:03,377 --> 00:47:05,654
end director , let me come back to you . 

1187
00:47:05,654 --> 00:47:07,877
One of the things that the that the I c 

1188
00:47:07,877 --> 00:47:10,099
uh was able to give us lead time on was 

1189
00:47:10,099 --> 00:47:12,432
a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine . 

1190
00:47:12,432 --> 00:47:14,488
I mean we're very clear on that that 

1191
00:47:14,488 --> 00:47:16,710
that that there was a strong likelihood 

1192
00:47:16,710 --> 00:47:16,620
of that and you had that months in 

1193
00:47:16,620 --> 00:47:18,720
advance actually I'm curious if you 

1194
00:47:18,720 --> 00:47:20,498
think that we would get similar 

1195
00:47:20,498 --> 00:47:22,498
strategic warning about a potential 

1196
00:47:22,498 --> 00:47:26,030
chinese invasion of Taiwan . I mean 

1197
00:47:26,040 --> 00:47:28,340
it's too early to tell honestly , you 

1198
00:47:28,340 --> 00:47:30,451
know whether or not that would be the 

1199
00:47:30,451 --> 00:47:32,562
case and obviously you know in a kind 

1200
00:47:32,562 --> 00:47:34,618
of classic intelligence way we would 

1201
00:47:34,618 --> 00:47:36,700
sure as hell not you know promise 

1202
00:47:36,700 --> 00:47:40,020
anything at this stage . So general let 

1203
00:47:40,020 --> 00:47:42,076
me ask you about something that that 

1204
00:47:42,076 --> 00:47:44,076
has long been a concern of mine and 

1205
00:47:44,076 --> 00:47:46,020
even more so now and that's what I 

1206
00:47:46,020 --> 00:47:48,242
think of as the simultaneity problems , 

1207
00:47:48,242 --> 00:47:50,131
simultaneous conflicts in Western 

1208
00:47:50,131 --> 00:47:52,298
europe with Russia and with china . So 

1209
00:47:52,298 --> 00:47:54,353
do you worry that that Beijing might 

1210
00:47:54,353 --> 00:47:56,520
see an opportunity to invade Taiwan in 

1211
00:47:56,520 --> 00:47:58,409
the very near future ? Should the 

1212
00:47:58,409 --> 00:48:00,760
United States get drawn into an actual 

1213
00:48:00,760 --> 00:48:02,649
conflict of kinetic conflict with 

1214
00:48:02,649 --> 00:48:06,310
Russia ? I think that's ah a remote 

1215
00:48:06,310 --> 00:48:08,650
possibility but which parts remote ? 

1216
00:48:08,660 --> 00:48:12,020
The part that china would see that as a 

1217
00:48:12,020 --> 00:48:14,020
window to open to take advantage of 

1218
00:48:14,020 --> 00:48:16,330
that based on the fact that they 

1219
00:48:16,340 --> 00:48:18,507
probably aren't ready to do that right 

1220
00:48:18,507 --> 00:48:20,600
now . Mhm . So you don't think they 

1221
00:48:20,600 --> 00:48:22,711
have the capacity right now to invade 

1222
00:48:22,711 --> 00:48:24,933
Taiwan ? I didn't I didn't say that . I 

1223
00:48:24,933 --> 00:48:27,100
think I'm trying to drill down on what 

1224
00:48:27,100 --> 00:48:29,100
you mean when you say they probably 

1225
00:48:29,100 --> 00:48:31,156
have actually actually can we can we 

1226
00:48:31,156 --> 00:48:33,433
take this into a into a closed session ? 

1227
00:48:33,433 --> 00:48:32,930
Sure . Absolutely . And my time is 

1228
00:48:32,930 --> 00:48:35,041
expired . So I'll take it up with you 

1229
00:48:35,041 --> 00:48:37,208
then . Thank you . Mr Chairman . Thank 

1230
00:48:37,208 --> 00:48:37,050
you . Senator Hawley ? Senator Manchin 

1231
00:48:37,050 --> 00:48:40,660
please thank you . Mr 

1232
00:48:40,660 --> 00:48:43,350
Chairman . Um Sir just real quickly 

1233
00:48:43,350 --> 00:48:45,461
back on Taiwan again . Do you believe 

1234
00:48:45,461 --> 00:48:47,572
Taiwan is prepared to defend itself . 

1235
00:48:49,130 --> 00:48:51,352
Your evaluation of what Taiwan has been 

1236
00:48:51,352 --> 00:48:53,463
doing anything I keep seeing you will 

1237
00:48:53,463 --> 00:48:55,408
keep they want more of F16s and we 

1238
00:48:55,408 --> 00:48:57,630
think they're going to be able to go to 

1239
00:48:57,630 --> 00:48:59,797
air war with china and defend Taiwan ? 

1240
00:48:59,797 --> 00:49:01,741
I don't think so . I think I think 

1241
00:49:01,741 --> 00:49:03,797
Taiwan could do more . Sir . Are you 

1242
00:49:03,797 --> 00:49:05,686
are you are you all strategically 

1243
00:49:05,686 --> 00:49:05,340
giving them different things that they 

1244
00:49:05,340 --> 00:49:07,650
can use , whether it be in the sea or 

1245
00:49:07,650 --> 00:49:09,650
on land to protect their island ? I 

1246
00:49:09,650 --> 00:49:11,372
think I think they're in close 

1247
00:49:11,372 --> 00:49:13,594
consultation with our with our partners 

1248
00:49:13,594 --> 00:49:15,761
in a calm and within the Department of 

1249
00:49:15,761 --> 00:49:17,770
Defense . How about Ukraine ? Can 

1250
00:49:17,770 --> 00:49:21,300
Ukraine win now that we've as Senator 

1251
00:49:21,310 --> 00:49:23,500
King so rightfully pointed out and 

1252
00:49:23,500 --> 00:49:25,410
Senator holly followed up on , we 

1253
00:49:25,410 --> 00:49:27,630
misread that one . Are we reading it 

1254
00:49:27,630 --> 00:49:29,741
now ? They have the ability to win if 

1255
00:49:29,741 --> 00:49:31,963
we continue to support without us being 

1256
00:49:31,963 --> 00:49:33,963
pulled into a land war with them on 

1257
00:49:33,963 --> 00:49:36,186
their own . Can they win ? I think that 

1258
00:49:36,186 --> 00:49:38,560
is a that is a difficult prediction to 

1259
00:49:38,560 --> 00:49:41,260
make right now . I think where where 

1260
00:49:41,270 --> 00:49:43,420
the agency is at as a as a as a 

1261
00:49:43,420 --> 00:49:45,587
prolonged stalemate should should know 

1262
00:49:45,587 --> 00:49:48,300
factor change on either side . In other 

1263
00:49:48,300 --> 00:49:50,467
words the Russians continue to do what 

1264
00:49:50,467 --> 00:49:52,633
they're doing and we we continue to do 

1265
00:49:52,633 --> 00:49:54,856
what we're doing for the Ukrainians ? I 

1266
00:49:54,856 --> 00:49:54,840
see that as a stalemate not dr Haynes , 

1267
00:49:54,840 --> 00:49:56,951
how do you how do you evaluate this ? 

1268
00:49:56,951 --> 00:49:59,062
I'm sure you've been kept up to speed 

1269
00:49:59,062 --> 00:50:01,229
on this and evaluating them . My other 

1270
00:50:01,229 --> 00:50:03,284
concerns you might want to answer is 

1271
00:50:03,284 --> 00:50:05,507
our ability to maintain and manufacture 

1272
00:50:05,507 --> 00:50:07,729
the weapons that are needed to not only 

1273
00:50:07,729 --> 00:50:10,340
help Ukraine , not only to backfill our 

1274
00:50:10,340 --> 00:50:13,000
allies , but also keep our own supply 

1275
00:50:13,000 --> 00:50:15,500
chains up . Are we running critically 

1276
00:50:15,500 --> 00:50:17,500
low ? Could it be that we could put 

1277
00:50:17,500 --> 00:50:19,556
ourselves in a dangerous situation ? 

1278
00:50:21,260 --> 00:50:23,540
Thank you senator . So I think a few 

1279
00:50:23,540 --> 00:50:26,000
things . One is um , just taking your 

1280
00:50:26,000 --> 00:50:29,250
last question first , uh , something we 

1281
00:50:29,250 --> 00:50:31,250
can do maybe a little bit in closed 

1282
00:50:31,250 --> 00:50:33,361
session is talking about not just our 

1283
00:50:33,370 --> 00:50:35,426
military assistance to Ukraine , but 

1284
00:50:35,426 --> 00:50:37,537
also a number of other countries that 

1285
00:50:37,537 --> 00:50:39,592
have provided military assistance to 

1286
00:50:39,592 --> 00:50:41,810
Ukraine . And ask the questions are we 

1287
00:50:41,820 --> 00:50:45,060
are you concerned about the ability to 

1288
00:50:45,060 --> 00:50:47,600
have the supplies that are needed for 

1289
00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:51,200
us for our allies and what 

1290
00:50:51,210 --> 00:50:53,432
Ukraine is going to need to sustain and 

1291
00:50:53,432 --> 00:50:56,080
hopefully win this war . So that's why 

1292
00:50:56,080 --> 00:50:58,247
I was talking about the allies peace . 

1293
00:50:58,247 --> 00:51:00,413
No , I'm not concerned because I think 

1294
00:51:00,413 --> 00:51:02,469
frankly between all of us , there is 

1295
00:51:02,469 --> 00:51:04,469
the capacity to provide the kind of 

1296
00:51:04,469 --> 00:51:06,524
assistance that they're asking for . 

1297
00:51:06,524 --> 00:51:08,580
Okay , and as you identify , can you 

1298
00:51:08,580 --> 00:51:08,470
identify other hotspots were very much 

1299
00:51:08,470 --> 00:51:10,470
concerned about ? And I'll give you 

1300
00:51:10,470 --> 00:51:12,303
other than china because we know 

1301
00:51:12,303 --> 00:51:14,248
china's challenges , we have other 

1302
00:51:14,248 --> 00:51:16,414
hotspots that we're worried about stem 

1303
00:51:16,414 --> 00:51:18,526
up rise up during this very difficult 

1304
00:51:18,526 --> 00:51:20,748
time in the geopolitical unrest that we 

1305
00:51:20,748 --> 00:51:22,803
have in the world . What would you I 

1306
00:51:22,803 --> 00:51:24,970
mean in Iran North Korea . Some of the 

1307
00:51:24,970 --> 00:51:27,192
ones you're more watching and concern ? 

1308
00:51:27,192 --> 00:51:29,192
Worry i the agency is worried about 

1309
00:51:29,192 --> 00:51:31,026
North Korea for sure . And their 

1310
00:51:31,026 --> 00:51:33,192
ballistic missile development timeline 

1311
00:51:33,192 --> 00:51:35,026
and as well as potential nuclear 

1312
00:51:35,026 --> 00:51:37,026
testing , we're always we're always 

1313
00:51:37,026 --> 00:51:39,026
thinking about Iran and the actions 

1314
00:51:39,026 --> 00:51:41,060
that they have to to pull malign 

1315
00:51:41,060 --> 00:51:43,282
influence within the region against our 

1316
00:51:43,282 --> 00:51:45,282
our neighbors and certainly U . S . 

1317
00:51:45,282 --> 00:51:47,282
Forces there always always thinking 

1318
00:51:47,282 --> 00:51:49,449
through how to sustain partnerships to 

1319
00:51:49,449 --> 00:51:51,480
be able to keep a beat on these on 

1320
00:51:51,480 --> 00:51:53,590
these threats . Director Hanes , are 

1321
00:51:53,590 --> 00:51:56,480
you concerned about basically the 

1322
00:51:56,960 --> 00:51:59,620
tensions that we have with us today and 

1323
00:51:59,620 --> 00:52:03,570
with Saudis ? And also there are more 

1324
00:52:04,150 --> 00:52:06,510
visual movements , intentional 

1325
00:52:06,510 --> 00:52:09,370
movements towards china for support or 

1326
00:52:09,370 --> 00:52:12,670
basically the one being used now 

1327
00:52:12,670 --> 00:52:15,350
as the currency that they're accepting 

1328
00:52:15,440 --> 00:52:18,020
for payment of energy . Things of this 

1329
00:52:18,020 --> 00:52:20,290
sort . It could also put us in a more 

1330
00:52:20,290 --> 00:52:23,510
precarious situation with y and 

1331
00:52:23,510 --> 00:52:26,410
salaries . Thank you senator . I mean I 

1332
00:52:26,410 --> 00:52:29,420
think obviously as you indicate we are 

1333
00:52:29,420 --> 00:52:32,850
always looking at um efforts that both 

1334
00:52:32,860 --> 00:52:34,916
china and Russia make to try to make 

1335
00:52:34,916 --> 00:52:37,750
inroads with partners of ours across 

1336
00:52:37,750 --> 00:52:40,020
the world and you . E and Saudi Arabia 

1337
00:52:40,020 --> 00:52:42,580
are examples of that in both respects , 

1338
00:52:42,650 --> 00:52:44,940
cybersecurity is my final one for you 

1339
00:52:44,940 --> 00:52:47,210
All cyber right now . Somebody can be 

1340
00:52:47,210 --> 00:52:49,710
just a convoluted area where people 

1341
00:52:49,710 --> 00:52:51,821
would report where there whether it's 

1342
00:52:51,821 --> 00:52:53,932
private companies in America that are 

1343
00:52:53,932 --> 00:52:56,099
getting hacked and what's going on but 

1344
00:52:56,099 --> 00:52:58,210
also who is in charge ? Where do they 

1345
00:52:58,210 --> 00:53:00,432
go ? What is the chain right now within 

1346
00:53:00,432 --> 00:53:02,488
the federal government in military , 

1347
00:53:02,488 --> 00:53:04,500
especially on cyber that you would 

1348
00:53:04,500 --> 00:53:07,010
consider the premier spot that we 

1349
00:53:07,010 --> 00:53:09,170
should be working with or are we 

1350
00:53:09,170 --> 00:53:11,281
putting things together ? We still so 

1351
00:53:11,281 --> 00:53:14,940
fragmented throughout our agencies . I 

1352
00:53:14,940 --> 00:53:16,829
mean in my experience it's gotten 

1353
00:53:16,829 --> 00:53:18,996
better over the years . I mean I would 

1354
00:53:18,996 --> 00:53:21,430
never say it's perfect . It is one of 

1355
00:53:21,430 --> 00:53:23,319
those things that continues to be 

1356
00:53:23,319 --> 00:53:25,319
worked through , but there's a very 

1357
00:53:25,319 --> 00:53:27,486
clear chain of command with respect to 

1358
00:53:27,486 --> 00:53:30,230
taking action that takes the lead . So 

1359
00:53:30,230 --> 00:53:32,300
when it comes to offensive cyber 

1360
00:53:32,300 --> 00:53:34,270
operations to defend the country , 

1361
00:53:34,270 --> 00:53:36,270
obviously the Department of Defense 

1362
00:53:36,270 --> 00:53:39,210
does so when it comes to defending uh 

1363
00:53:39,220 --> 00:53:40,831
you know , helping to defend 

1364
00:53:40,831 --> 00:53:42,831
infrastructure and critical . Right 

1365
00:53:42,831 --> 00:53:44,942
exactly , resiliency , its Department 

1366
00:53:44,942 --> 00:53:47,109
of Homeland Security and the FBI . And 

1367
00:53:47,109 --> 00:53:49,109
it's um and everybody has a role to 

1368
00:53:49,109 --> 00:53:51,300
play and we obviously support in the 

1369
00:53:51,300 --> 00:53:53,522
intelligence community , all of them in 

1370
00:53:53,522 --> 00:53:55,578
the work that they're doing national 

1371
00:53:55,578 --> 00:53:59,290
cybersecurity . How about the center , 

1372
00:53:59,300 --> 00:54:01,467
how do you evaluate the National cyber 

1373
00:54:01,467 --> 00:54:05,200
Security center ? You mean the 

1374
00:54:05,210 --> 00:54:07,330
National cybersecurity Director , the 

1375
00:54:07,330 --> 00:54:08,941
new position ? We'll all the 

1376
00:54:08,941 --> 00:54:10,941
stakeholders are involved in that . 

1377
00:54:10,941 --> 00:54:13,163
That's what I'm saying . The convoluted 

1378
00:54:13,163 --> 00:54:15,386
who's taking the lead , Who is the lead 

1379
00:54:15,386 --> 00:54:18,870
person ? Who is the lead agency ? Yeah . 

1380
00:54:18,940 --> 00:54:21,760
This is the main how do you evaluate 

1381
00:54:21,760 --> 00:54:24,038
that ? I think they're doing very well . 

1382
00:54:24,240 --> 00:54:27,830
Yeah , no further questions . Thank you 

1383
00:54:27,830 --> 00:54:29,970
very much Senator Manchin . Senator 

1384
00:54:29,970 --> 00:54:32,360
Sullivan please . Thank you . Mr 

1385
00:54:32,360 --> 00:54:34,193
Chairman and I want to thank the 

1386
00:54:34,193 --> 00:54:36,840
witnesses for their their hard work 

1387
00:54:36,840 --> 00:54:39,800
during a challenging time ? I want to 

1388
00:54:39,970 --> 00:54:42,160
focus a lot on the issue of energy . 

1389
00:54:43,140 --> 00:54:46,390
And I'll relay a story I had with 

1390
00:54:46,390 --> 00:54:49,140
Senator McCain and a Russian dissident 

1391
00:54:49,140 --> 00:54:51,720
who has now been arrested , Vladimir 

1392
00:54:51,720 --> 00:54:54,740
Kara Murza . Um , he's in jail right 

1393
00:54:54,740 --> 00:54:58,620
now . Um in Russia , About four years 

1394
00:54:58,620 --> 00:55:01,500
ago I asked him , what was the number 

1395
00:55:01,500 --> 00:55:03,850
one thing we could do to undermine the 

1396
00:55:05,040 --> 00:55:08,250
corrupt Russian regime to undermine 

1397
00:55:08,250 --> 00:55:10,472
Vladimir Putin ? And he said the number 

1398
00:55:10,472 --> 00:55:12,880
one thing is easy . Senator produce 

1399
00:55:12,880 --> 00:55:16,280
more american energy produce more 

1400
00:55:16,280 --> 00:55:19,050
american energy . So I want to talk a 

1401
00:55:19,050 --> 00:55:20,717
little bit about that in your 

1402
00:55:20,717 --> 00:55:23,330
assessment is energy independence . So 

1403
00:55:23,340 --> 00:55:25,229
a couple of years ago we were the 

1404
00:55:25,229 --> 00:55:27,396
largest producer of natural gas in the 

1405
00:55:27,396 --> 00:55:29,562
world's largest producer of oil in the 

1406
00:55:29,562 --> 00:55:29,340
world's largest producer of renewables 

1407
00:55:29,340 --> 00:55:31,118
in the world . Is that good for 

1408
00:55:31,118 --> 00:55:33,229
America's National Security ? General 

1409
00:55:34,890 --> 00:55:37,190
Senator thanks for the question as we 

1410
00:55:37,190 --> 00:55:39,650
have , we have watched this conflict 

1411
00:55:39,650 --> 00:55:41,761
unfold . What were , were just just a 

1412
00:55:41,761 --> 00:55:43,706
lot of questions that I gave you a 

1413
00:55:43,706 --> 00:55:45,872
softball . Can you answer the question 

1414
00:55:45,872 --> 00:55:47,872
is that good for America's national 

1415
00:55:47,872 --> 00:55:49,928
security to be energy independent in 

1416
00:55:49,928 --> 00:55:51,706
the world's energy superpower , 

1417
00:55:51,706 --> 00:55:53,706
certainly , certainly . Ener energy 

1418
00:55:53,706 --> 00:55:55,928
independence is a is a good thing . How 

1419
00:55:55,928 --> 00:55:57,872
about you ? Um , Director . Okay , 

1420
00:55:57,872 --> 00:55:59,761
thank you for the straightforward 

1421
00:55:59,761 --> 00:56:03,560
question . Um , or answer now in 

1422
00:56:03,560 --> 00:56:07,250
this , in this conflict with Ukraine . 

1423
00:56:07,930 --> 00:56:11,260
Uh , what does our ability to produce 

1424
00:56:11,270 --> 00:56:14,150
energy do ? How do the Russians view 

1425
00:56:14,150 --> 00:56:17,150
that and how do our allies view that ? 

1426
00:56:17,160 --> 00:56:19,280
And we all know Vladimir Putin uses 

1427
00:56:19,290 --> 00:56:22,450
energy as a weapon ? How are you 

1428
00:56:22,450 --> 00:56:24,550
assessing the ability of the United 

1429
00:56:24,550 --> 00:56:27,570
States to fill the void that the 

1430
00:56:27,570 --> 00:56:29,737
Germans and others have with regard to 

1431
00:56:29,737 --> 00:56:32,490
getting energy from Russia to now get 

1432
00:56:32,490 --> 00:56:34,740
it from the United States . Are is 

1433
00:56:34,740 --> 00:56:36,851
there a lot of interest in that ? And 

1434
00:56:36,851 --> 00:56:38,962
is that a good thing for our national 

1435
00:56:38,962 --> 00:56:41,129
security general ? I certainly believe 

1436
00:56:41,129 --> 00:56:44,220
that our european allies see um , this 

1437
00:56:44,220 --> 00:56:46,442
is a national security issue for sure . 

1438
00:56:46,442 --> 00:56:48,498
And and they're thinking through new 

1439
00:56:48,498 --> 00:56:51,010
ways of of developing uh , and getting 

1440
00:56:51,010 --> 00:56:53,066
after their their energy needs . For 

1441
00:56:53,066 --> 00:56:55,232
sure . How about getting some from the 

1442
00:56:55,232 --> 00:56:57,232
United States ? If if if the United 

1443
00:56:57,232 --> 00:56:59,343
States had excess capacity , I'm sure 

1444
00:56:59,343 --> 00:57:01,566
that would be something that they would 

1445
00:57:01,566 --> 00:57:03,510
welcome . Do you see that Director 

1446
00:57:03,510 --> 00:57:06,340
similarly . Yes , sir . Yes . Let me 

1447
00:57:06,340 --> 00:57:07,460
ask . Um , 

1448
00:57:10,630 --> 00:57:14,000
with regard to china , almost 70% of 

1449
00:57:14,000 --> 00:57:16,490
China's crude oil supply came in the 

1450
00:57:16,490 --> 00:57:20,160
form of imports . Um , 

1451
00:57:21,330 --> 00:57:23,497
what is your assessment of how china's 

1452
00:57:23,497 --> 00:57:27,070
energy dependence could or would 

1453
00:57:27,080 --> 00:57:29,770
impact its military operations during a 

1454
00:57:29,770 --> 00:57:33,210
potential cross strait conflict in your 

1455
00:57:33,210 --> 00:57:35,377
assessment when you read up on china's 

1456
00:57:35,377 --> 00:57:37,620
weaknesses , are they concerned about 

1457
00:57:37,620 --> 00:57:40,500
their energy dependence with regard to 

1458
00:57:40,500 --> 00:57:43,180
natural gas and oil being a major major 

1459
00:57:43,180 --> 00:57:45,550
importer ? If there if there is a way 

1460
00:57:45,550 --> 00:57:47,494
we could take this into the closed 

1461
00:57:47,494 --> 00:57:49,550
session to discuss that , I would be 

1462
00:57:49,550 --> 00:57:51,900
better senator ? Yes , I I do . I do 

1463
00:57:51,900 --> 00:57:54,011
believe they're concerned about their 

1464
00:57:54,011 --> 00:57:56,460
their dependence on energy Director ? 

1465
00:57:57,730 --> 00:57:59,952
Yes , absolutely . Do you see that as a 

1466
00:57:59,952 --> 00:58:02,190
strategic advantage we have in our 

1467
00:58:02,190 --> 00:58:04,370
great power competition with china and 

1468
00:58:04,370 --> 00:58:06,537
Russia , The fact that we can not only 

1469
00:58:06,537 --> 00:58:08,592
produce energy for our own country . 

1470
00:58:08,592 --> 00:58:10,259
And I'm talking all the above 

1471
00:58:10,259 --> 00:58:12,790
renewables , oil , gas . Um , do you 

1472
00:58:12,790 --> 00:58:14,901
see that as a strategic advantage for 

1473
00:58:14,901 --> 00:58:18,100
our nation ? Relative advantage . Yeah . 

1474
00:58:18,110 --> 00:58:20,221
I mean , I think frankly our capacity 

1475
00:58:20,221 --> 00:58:22,760
to work with our allies on this issue 

1476
00:58:22,760 --> 00:58:24,927
has been a strategic advantage and our 

1477
00:58:24,927 --> 00:58:27,240
ability to , to work with them in order 

1478
00:58:27,240 --> 00:58:30,750
to actually um , help to mitigate 

1479
00:58:30,750 --> 00:58:33,230
against Russia . Using energy as a 

1480
00:58:33,230 --> 00:58:36,700
weapon has been a major issue in 

1481
00:58:36,700 --> 00:58:38,811
china's dependence on energy . Should 

1482
00:58:38,811 --> 00:58:40,978
there be some kind of conflict between 

1483
00:58:40,978 --> 00:58:44,880
us and china ? Yes , I think 

1484
00:58:44,880 --> 00:58:47,400
it will be , uh , their relationship 

1485
00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:49,344
with Russia will be relevant under 

1486
00:58:49,344 --> 00:58:51,511
those circumstances . Obviously let me 

1487
00:58:51,511 --> 00:58:53,400
ask one final question . It's not 

1488
00:58:53,400 --> 00:58:55,456
really a question on intel , but You 

1489
00:58:55,456 --> 00:58:57,678
know , we're getting ready to vote here 

1490
00:58:57,678 --> 00:58:59,733
on a $40 billion dollar package . My 

1491
00:58:59,733 --> 00:59:01,733
team and I are looking through it . 

1492
00:59:01,733 --> 00:59:05,380
It's a lot . Um , how do you assess our 

1493
00:59:05,380 --> 00:59:08,820
NATO partners commitment 

1494
00:59:08,830 --> 00:59:12,240
finally To hitting two 

1495
00:59:12,920 --> 00:59:15,740
GDP 2% of their GDP for , 

1496
00:59:16,320 --> 00:59:19,260
for Their annual military budget . I 

1497
00:59:19,260 --> 00:59:21,780
mean , we have now 100,000 troops over 

1498
00:59:21,780 --> 00:59:24,010
in Europe . I fully support what the 

1499
00:59:24,010 --> 00:59:26,343
president has been doing in that regard . 

1500
00:59:26,343 --> 00:59:28,232
But if there was ever a time that 

1501
00:59:28,232 --> 00:59:30,288
countries had to kind of wake up and 

1502
00:59:30,288 --> 00:59:32,232
say , you know , what for 40 years 

1503
00:59:32,232 --> 00:59:34,399
we've promised to hit 2% the Wolf's at 

1504
00:59:34,399 --> 00:59:36,621
the door or maybe the bears at the door 

1505
00:59:36,621 --> 00:59:38,732
or the dragons at the door , whatever 

1506
00:59:38,732 --> 00:59:40,788
metaphor you want . Are you seeing a 

1507
00:59:40,788 --> 00:59:42,954
shift ? Because the Germans made a big 

1508
00:59:42,954 --> 00:59:44,899
announcement , My understanding is 

1509
00:59:44,899 --> 00:59:47,040
Canada still won't even hit 1% of GDP 

1510
00:59:47,420 --> 00:59:49,364
for their defense budget . Are you 

1511
00:59:49,364 --> 00:59:51,560
seeing a shift in our NATO allies to 

1512
00:59:51,560 --> 00:59:55,370
say you know what , it's time for us to 

1513
00:59:55,920 --> 00:59:57,642
pull our own weight here ? The 

1514
00:59:57,642 --> 00:59:59,753
americans are doing it once again and 

1515
00:59:59,753 --> 01:00:02,087
look , I support everything we're doing . 

1516
01:00:02,087 --> 01:00:04,142
But You know , 40 billion . That's a 

1517
01:00:04,142 --> 01:00:06,198
lot of money . My constituents got a 

1518
01:00:06,198 --> 01:00:08,420
lot of needs to write and we still have 

1519
01:00:08,420 --> 01:00:10,630
NATO allies . Canada one who just 

1520
01:00:11,210 --> 01:00:14,630
freeload and getting a little tiring . 

1521
01:00:14,630 --> 01:00:16,580
What's your assessment of our NATO 

1522
01:00:16,580 --> 01:00:19,590
partners commitment to finally hitting 

1523
01:00:19,590 --> 01:00:22,480
2% now that it's very clear that there 

1524
01:00:22,480 --> 01:00:24,758
is a brutal dictator on their doorstep ? 

1525
01:00:26,410 --> 01:00:29,000
I think we've seen obviously , as you 

1526
01:00:29,010 --> 01:00:30,843
indicated in the opening to your 

1527
01:00:30,843 --> 01:00:32,566
question that just a number of 

1528
01:00:32,566 --> 01:00:34,788
countries and now announced an increase 

1529
01:00:34,788 --> 01:00:36,899
in their defense budget . And I think 

1530
01:00:36,899 --> 01:00:39,010
that is something that we're going to 

1531
01:00:39,010 --> 01:00:41,177
see them follow through on at least in 

1532
01:00:41,177 --> 01:00:43,232
part general and I think it's had to 

1533
01:00:43,232 --> 01:00:45,343
get this has had a galvanizing effect 

1534
01:00:45,343 --> 01:00:44,810
on our , on our NATO partners and I 

1535
01:00:44,810 --> 01:00:46,699
think most of them will will come 

1536
01:00:46,699 --> 01:00:48,921
around thank you . And again , I didn't 

1537
01:00:48,921 --> 01:00:51,088
start by saying the the intel that you 

1538
01:00:51,088 --> 01:00:53,143
were providing us and everybody else 

1539
01:00:53,143 --> 01:00:55,410
prior to the war was exceptional in the 

1540
01:00:55,410 --> 01:00:58,720
intel ops that you did . We're also 

1541
01:00:59,030 --> 01:01:01,420
really impressive . So I appreciate 

1542
01:01:01,420 --> 01:01:03,420
that . Thank you . Senator Sullivan 

1543
01:01:03,420 --> 01:01:07,270
Senator Peters please . Thank you . Mr 

1544
01:01:07,270 --> 01:01:10,910
Chairman Stricter Haines . The the 

1545
01:01:10,920 --> 01:01:14,180
2022 annual thrust assessment states 

1546
01:01:14,190 --> 01:01:16,520
quote , that china presents the 

1547
01:01:16,520 --> 01:01:19,080
broadest , most active and persistent 

1548
01:01:19,080 --> 01:01:21,191
cyber espionage threat to the U . S . 

1549
01:01:21,191 --> 01:01:23,540
Government and private sector networks . 

1550
01:01:23,540 --> 01:01:25,750
End of quote , the the assessment 

1551
01:01:25,750 --> 01:01:27,972
specifically discusses the capacity for 

1552
01:01:27,972 --> 01:01:30,280
china to conduct surveillance as well 

1553
01:01:30,280 --> 01:01:33,200
as disrupt critical infrastructure . My 

1554
01:01:33,210 --> 01:01:35,840
my question for you , ma'am is does the 

1555
01:01:35,850 --> 01:01:38,017
O . D . N . I believe that china would 

1556
01:01:38,017 --> 01:01:40,870
use their cyber capacity to shape other 

1557
01:01:40,870 --> 01:01:43,390
countries . Decisions such as the 

1558
01:01:43,390 --> 01:01:45,690
Russians are known to do . Do you 

1559
01:01:45,690 --> 01:01:47,690
believe that that's in the cards as 

1560
01:01:47,690 --> 01:01:51,080
well ? Thank you sir . Yes . I mean , I 

1561
01:01:51,080 --> 01:01:52,960
think in the sense that um in 

1562
01:01:52,960 --> 01:01:55,240
particular our assessment is that China 

1563
01:01:55,240 --> 01:01:57,070
is pursuing significant cyber 

1564
01:01:57,070 --> 01:01:59,292
capabilities in this area in particular 

1565
01:01:59,292 --> 01:02:01,490
to deter the United States from taking 

1566
01:02:01,490 --> 01:02:04,480
action in the event of a conflict , for 

1567
01:02:04,480 --> 01:02:06,110
example , in their region . 

1568
01:02:08,700 --> 01:02:10,900
Hey , you media media coverage during 

1569
01:02:10,900 --> 01:02:12,790
the weeks leading up to Russia's 

1570
01:02:12,790 --> 01:02:14,960
invasion often used open source 

1571
01:02:14,960 --> 01:02:16,293
evidence to support the 

1572
01:02:16,293 --> 01:02:18,850
administration's intelligence estimates , 

1573
01:02:19,170 --> 01:02:21,010
examples here range from images 

1574
01:02:21,010 --> 01:02:23,210
provided by max ours commercial 

1575
01:02:23,210 --> 01:02:26,280
satellite network to Russian military 

1576
01:02:26,280 --> 01:02:28,640
communications that were intercepted by 

1577
01:02:28,640 --> 01:02:31,720
tech savvy civilians . My question for 

1578
01:02:31,720 --> 01:02:33,720
you . General barrier is how is the 

1579
01:02:33,720 --> 01:02:35,498
proliferation of technology and 

1580
01:02:35,498 --> 01:02:37,970
information accessibility for average 

1581
01:02:37,970 --> 01:02:39,870
citizens ? Impacting the realm of 

1582
01:02:39,870 --> 01:02:41,981
professional intelligence work within 

1583
01:02:41,981 --> 01:02:45,750
your agency . From the perspective of 

1584
01:02:45,750 --> 01:02:47,850
this uh this war between Russia and 

1585
01:02:47,850 --> 01:02:50,240
Ukraine , the plethora of open source 

1586
01:02:50,240 --> 01:02:52,730
data that's available to enrich our 

1587
01:02:52,730 --> 01:02:54,930
assessments has been amazing . Um , 

1588
01:02:54,940 --> 01:02:57,360
just think of the third party damage 

1589
01:02:57,360 --> 01:02:59,527
assessment work that's happening right 

1590
01:02:59,527 --> 01:03:01,780
now using using images because most 

1591
01:03:01,780 --> 01:03:03,891
Ukrainian citizens have a have a cell 

1592
01:03:03,891 --> 01:03:06,169
phone . It's been really , really rich . 

1593
01:03:06,169 --> 01:03:08,336
And then you combine it with the other 

1594
01:03:08,336 --> 01:03:10,447
open source data that's available and 

1595
01:03:10,447 --> 01:03:12,669
publicly available and can be purchased 

1596
01:03:12,669 --> 01:03:12,490
um , for us , it's it's it's been 

1597
01:03:12,490 --> 01:03:14,546
enlightening and will probably shape 

1598
01:03:14,546 --> 01:03:16,657
how we do intelligence operations and 

1599
01:03:16,657 --> 01:03:18,823
analysis going forward in the future . 

1600
01:03:18,823 --> 01:03:20,934
We we just have to be careful that we 

1601
01:03:20,934 --> 01:03:23,046
use the right rules at the right time 

1602
01:03:23,046 --> 01:03:22,360
to make sure that we're safeguarding 

1603
01:03:22,360 --> 01:03:24,304
the information and that we're not 

1604
01:03:24,304 --> 01:03:27,310
violating any laws or policies . Yes , 

1605
01:03:27,310 --> 01:03:29,366
that that that actually leads to the 

1606
01:03:29,366 --> 01:03:31,254
next question . And you mentioned 

1607
01:03:31,254 --> 01:03:33,088
you're you're looking at how you 

1608
01:03:33,088 --> 01:03:33,070
integrate that into how you collect 

1609
01:03:33,070 --> 01:03:35,126
information . Is there anything that 

1610
01:03:35,126 --> 01:03:37,181
congress should be doing to help you 

1611
01:03:37,181 --> 01:03:39,820
better enable uh , your abilities to to 

1612
01:03:39,820 --> 01:03:41,931
harness the potential for open source 

1613
01:03:41,931 --> 01:03:43,931
information ? I think I think we're 

1614
01:03:43,931 --> 01:03:46,153
budgeted forward center and we're we're 

1615
01:03:46,153 --> 01:03:48,098
looking forward to the to the work 

1616
01:03:48,098 --> 01:03:50,264
ahead as we go forward on this issue . 

1617
01:03:50,264 --> 01:03:52,098
Good Director Haines , the biden 

1618
01:03:52,098 --> 01:03:53,931
administration has done um uh an 

1619
01:03:53,931 --> 01:03:56,153
admirable job , certainly of crafting a 

1620
01:03:56,153 --> 01:03:57,876
coalition of nations to impose 

1621
01:03:57,876 --> 01:03:59,931
sanctions , enforced export controls 

1622
01:03:59,931 --> 01:04:01,910
against Russia for their illegal 

1623
01:04:01,920 --> 01:04:04,230
invasion . This includes our 

1624
01:04:04,230 --> 01:04:06,341
transatlantic partners , many of them 

1625
01:04:06,341 --> 01:04:08,174
who are now giving up on Russian 

1626
01:04:08,174 --> 01:04:10,490
hydrocarbons . Something that I think 

1627
01:04:10,500 --> 01:04:12,167
we all would have thought was 

1628
01:04:12,167 --> 01:04:14,278
absolutely unthinkable . Just a short 

1629
01:04:14,278 --> 01:04:16,500
while ago as well as our global 

1630
01:04:16,500 --> 01:04:19,570
partners , Japan and Taiwan actively 

1631
01:04:19,570 --> 01:04:22,010
engaged . What has been noticeable 

1632
01:04:22,010 --> 01:04:24,232
though is to see that much of the world 

1633
01:04:24,232 --> 01:04:26,910
is still not with us . They may not be 

1634
01:04:26,910 --> 01:04:29,132
with Russia . I'm not saying there with 

1635
01:04:29,132 --> 01:04:31,243
Russia but they're not subscribing to 

1636
01:04:31,243 --> 01:04:33,354
our call for a global coalition of of 

1637
01:04:33,354 --> 01:04:35,521
democracies to stand against Ukraine . 

1638
01:04:35,521 --> 01:04:38,620
This includes India Indonesia Nigeria 

1639
01:04:38,620 --> 01:04:40,620
South Africa and particularly other 

1640
01:04:40,620 --> 01:04:42,960
nations in the global South in which 

1641
01:04:42,970 --> 01:04:45,380
the US certainly has very friendly 

1642
01:04:45,390 --> 01:04:48,110
relations with . But we have not yet 

1643
01:04:48,110 --> 01:04:50,990
been able to get them to join the 

1644
01:04:51,000 --> 01:04:53,530
Ukrainian cause . Um as the U . S . 

1645
01:04:53,530 --> 01:04:55,697
Will will need to certainly build even 

1646
01:04:55,697 --> 01:04:57,919
more robust coalition of nations in the 

1647
01:04:57,919 --> 01:05:00,090
future to to counter potential chinese 

1648
01:05:00,100 --> 01:05:02,460
aggression . I believe it's imperative 

1649
01:05:02,460 --> 01:05:04,571
that the US understand how how to win 

1650
01:05:04,571 --> 01:05:07,130
over these non aligned nations living 

1651
01:05:07,230 --> 01:05:09,610
certainly in a multipolar world . So my 

1652
01:05:09,610 --> 01:05:12,040
question to you in your view what what 

1653
01:05:12,040 --> 01:05:14,520
steps should the U . S . Take to build 

1654
01:05:14,520 --> 01:05:17,330
a broader coalition for potential 

1655
01:05:17,330 --> 01:05:19,730
future conflicts similar to what we're 

1656
01:05:19,730 --> 01:05:22,730
seeing right now . Thank you senator . 

1657
01:05:22,740 --> 01:05:24,684
So from the intelligence community 

1658
01:05:24,684 --> 01:05:26,462
perspective we've done a lot of 

1659
01:05:26,462 --> 01:05:28,351
thinking about how we can help to 

1660
01:05:28,351 --> 01:05:30,573
facilitate frankly the policy community 

1661
01:05:30,573 --> 01:05:32,684
in this area to your point and one of 

1662
01:05:32,684 --> 01:05:34,796
the things that we did in the context 

1663
01:05:34,796 --> 01:05:37,018
of Ukraine that I think is possible for 

1664
01:05:37,018 --> 01:05:38,962
us to do in other areas . And that 

1665
01:05:38,962 --> 01:05:40,740
we've discussed with the policy 

1666
01:05:40,740 --> 01:05:42,796
community about is basically working 

1667
01:05:42,796 --> 01:05:45,040
with key allies and partners who are 

1668
01:05:45,050 --> 01:05:47,340
influencers in effect within specific 

1669
01:05:47,340 --> 01:05:50,740
regions to try to get out to them as 

1670
01:05:50,740 --> 01:05:52,962
much intelligence as we can . Obviously 

1671
01:05:52,962 --> 01:05:55,129
being mindful of sources and methods , 

1672
01:05:55,129 --> 01:05:57,296
but just to lay the groundwork so that 

1673
01:05:57,296 --> 01:05:59,518
then the policy community can work with 

1674
01:05:59,518 --> 01:06:01,684
those countries to effectively provide 

1675
01:06:01,684 --> 01:06:03,629
for the kind of coalition that you 

1676
01:06:03,629 --> 01:06:05,518
describe . And I do think it's an 

1677
01:06:05,518 --> 01:06:07,629
absolutely fundamental piece . I mean 

1678
01:06:07,629 --> 01:06:09,407
the fact that The U.N . General 

1679
01:06:09,407 --> 01:06:11,573
Assembly managed to Garner 141 votes . 

1680
01:06:11,573 --> 01:06:13,629
I think it was against Russia on the 

1681
01:06:13,629 --> 01:06:15,518
Russia . Ukraine piece was pretty 

1682
01:06:15,518 --> 01:06:17,740
extraordinary . And I do think that our 

1683
01:06:17,740 --> 01:06:19,629
capacity to share intelligence in 

1684
01:06:19,629 --> 01:06:21,796
advance of that moment was critical to 

1685
01:06:21,796 --> 01:06:24,018
getting that kind of coalition together 

1686
01:06:24,018 --> 01:06:23,790
and I hope we can do that in the future . 

1687
01:06:24,180 --> 01:06:26,124
Right . Thank you . Thank you Mr . 

1688
01:06:26,124 --> 01:06:28,291
Chairman , thank you . Senator Peter . 

1689
01:06:28,291 --> 01:06:30,580
Senator Rosen , please thank you . 

1690
01:06:30,580 --> 01:06:34,050
Chairman Read and I really appreciate 

1691
01:06:34,170 --> 01:06:36,281
the witnesses . I appreciate you both 

1692
01:06:36,281 --> 01:06:38,448
for being here today . And uh for your 

1693
01:06:38,448 --> 01:06:41,020
service Director Hanes and general 

1694
01:06:41,020 --> 01:06:43,187
barrier . Given that the annual threat 

1695
01:06:43,187 --> 01:06:45,353
assessment was written before Russia's 

1696
01:06:45,353 --> 01:06:48,450
invasion of Ukraine has Russia's loss 

1697
01:06:48,460 --> 01:06:50,682
and expenditure of military equipment , 

1698
01:06:50,682 --> 01:06:52,990
personnel and resources in Ukraine 

1699
01:06:53,170 --> 01:06:55,340
coupled with their frankly poor 

1700
01:06:55,340 --> 01:06:58,300
performance changed our overall threat 

1701
01:06:58,780 --> 01:07:00,391
of Russia and their military 

1702
01:07:00,391 --> 01:07:02,710
capabilities . And like I said , this 

1703
01:07:02,710 --> 01:07:04,877
was written before . Before that , how 

1704
01:07:04,877 --> 01:07:06,988
do you assess ? We may need to adjust 

1705
01:07:06,988 --> 01:07:09,154
our planning going forward , seeing as 

1706
01:07:09,154 --> 01:07:11,570
what we're learning . I'll start with 

1707
01:07:11,570 --> 01:07:13,681
that one senator I think , you know , 

1708
01:07:13,681 --> 01:07:16,160
as we've watched the Russians falter 

1709
01:07:16,160 --> 01:07:18,216
here and and the losses that they've 

1710
01:07:18,216 --> 01:07:20,360
sustained . Um we we believe that 

1711
01:07:20,360 --> 01:07:21,971
they're going to be set back 

1712
01:07:21,971 --> 01:07:24,193
conventionally for a number of years as 

1713
01:07:24,193 --> 01:07:26,193
they try to recoup these losses and 

1714
01:07:26,193 --> 01:07:28,027
replace all of the equipment and 

1715
01:07:28,027 --> 01:07:30,193
soldiers that that they have lost . So 

1716
01:07:30,193 --> 01:07:32,416
I think we should we should back up our 

1717
01:07:32,416 --> 01:07:34,416
assessment really for NATO and what 

1718
01:07:34,416 --> 01:07:36,360
that threat really looks like also 

1719
01:07:36,360 --> 01:07:38,193
factoring in their their nuclear 

1720
01:07:38,193 --> 01:07:40,249
capabilities and what that means for 

1721
01:07:40,249 --> 01:07:42,600
NATO going forward . So I'll just add 

1722
01:07:42,600 --> 01:07:44,656
to this , I think , you know , as we 

1723
01:07:44,656 --> 01:07:46,767
talked to the analysts about this and 

1724
01:07:46,767 --> 01:07:48,767
obviously before each of the threat 

1725
01:07:48,767 --> 01:07:50,822
hearings , we discussed this because 

1726
01:07:50,822 --> 01:07:52,767
the threat hearings came after the 

1727
01:07:52,767 --> 01:07:55,130
Russia's invasion of Ukraine . And as 

1728
01:07:55,130 --> 01:07:57,297
you indicate , the assessment was done 

1729
01:07:57,297 --> 01:07:59,241
beforehand and I think the overall 

1730
01:07:59,241 --> 01:08:01,408
threat level is not so much changed as 

1731
01:08:01,408 --> 01:08:03,574
it is . You know , the question of how 

1732
01:08:03,574 --> 01:08:05,930
it's evolving to general barriers point . 

1733
01:08:05,930 --> 01:08:08,041
I mean , I think our view is that the 

1734
01:08:08,041 --> 01:08:10,263
ground combat forces have been degraded 

1735
01:08:10,263 --> 01:08:12,430
considerably . It's going to take them 

1736
01:08:12,430 --> 01:08:14,530
years to basically managed to , you 

1737
01:08:14,530 --> 01:08:16,752
know , to the extent that they are able 

1738
01:08:16,752 --> 01:08:18,808
to rebuild that in effect . And that 

1739
01:08:18,808 --> 01:08:20,697
may end up meaning that they have 

1740
01:08:20,697 --> 01:08:22,363
greater reliance in effect on 

1741
01:08:22,363 --> 01:08:24,474
asymmetric tools during this period , 

1742
01:08:24,474 --> 01:08:26,530
so they may rely more on things like 

1743
01:08:26,530 --> 01:08:28,697
cyber nuclear precision etcetera . And 

1744
01:08:28,697 --> 01:08:30,863
that's obviously a shift in the way in 

1745
01:08:30,863 --> 01:08:33,220
which they are exercising their efforts 

1746
01:08:33,220 --> 01:08:35,590
for influence and so on well and 

1747
01:08:35,590 --> 01:08:37,740
knowing that we also know to everyone 

1748
01:08:37,740 --> 01:08:39,907
else's point here too , that the world 

1749
01:08:39,907 --> 01:08:42,120
is watching . So director Hanes , how 

1750
01:08:42,120 --> 01:08:44,009
do you assess the threat level to 

1751
01:08:44,009 --> 01:08:46,120
Taiwan ? Is it increased ? Does china 

1752
01:08:46,120 --> 01:08:48,200
feel more emboldened now that Russia 

1753
01:08:48,200 --> 01:08:50,530
has invaded Ukraine ? And then I will 

1754
01:08:50,540 --> 01:08:52,707
uh give the second part of that to you 

1755
01:08:52,707 --> 01:08:55,110
general . Um does china see this as an 

1756
01:08:55,110 --> 01:08:58,900
opportunity maybe this period to um 

1757
01:08:58,910 --> 01:09:00,790
invade Ukraine as we might be 

1758
01:09:00,790 --> 01:09:02,568
distracted , The world might be 

1759
01:09:02,568 --> 01:09:05,100
distracted with the Ukraine crisis . 

1760
01:09:05,970 --> 01:09:09,470
Thank you . So um it's hard to tell 

1761
01:09:09,480 --> 01:09:11,980
honestly at this stage , what we see is 

1762
01:09:11,980 --> 01:09:13,990
that China is evaluating what's 

1763
01:09:13,990 --> 01:09:16,268
happening in the Russia Ukraine crisis . 

1764
01:09:16,268 --> 01:09:18,323
They are still evaluating the crisis 

1765
01:09:18,323 --> 01:09:20,434
obviously continues . So what lessons 

1766
01:09:20,434 --> 01:09:22,601
they learned during this period is not 

1767
01:09:22,601 --> 01:09:24,768
really , you know , concluded yet . Um 

1768
01:09:24,768 --> 01:09:26,768
and so it's a little harder to tell 

1769
01:09:26,768 --> 01:09:29,060
whether or not it's an increase threat 

1770
01:09:29,070 --> 01:09:31,014
of their , you know , accelerating 

1771
01:09:31,014 --> 01:09:34,350
their uh efforts towards Taiwan or or 

1772
01:09:34,350 --> 01:09:37,540
less . So I would say that thus far we 

1773
01:09:37,540 --> 01:09:40,140
have not the I c has not assessed that 

1774
01:09:40,150 --> 01:09:43,100
the Russia Ukraine crisis is likely to 

1775
01:09:43,100 --> 01:09:45,130
accelerate their plan , vis a vis 

1776
01:09:45,130 --> 01:09:48,760
Taiwan . Um and the kinds of lessons 

1777
01:09:48,770 --> 01:09:51,950
that that we think are possible that 

1778
01:09:51,950 --> 01:09:54,640
are relevant just to give you maybe 2 . 

1779
01:09:54,650 --> 01:09:57,490
1 is they were surprised by the degree 

1780
01:09:57,500 --> 01:09:59,870
to which the United States and Europe 

1781
01:09:59,880 --> 01:10:02,047
came together to enact sanctions . And 

1782
01:10:02,047 --> 01:10:03,880
that is something obviously that 

1783
01:10:03,880 --> 01:10:05,991
they're going to be looking at in the 

1784
01:10:05,991 --> 01:10:07,936
context of Taiwan . And um and the 

1785
01:10:07,936 --> 01:10:10,047
second one I think is this point that 

1786
01:10:10,047 --> 01:10:12,158
really general barrier made earlier a 

1787
01:10:12,158 --> 01:10:14,213
little bit , which is to say that um 

1788
01:10:14,213 --> 01:10:16,102
one of the issues for them is the 

1789
01:10:16,102 --> 01:10:18,324
confidence they have that they are able 

1790
01:10:18,324 --> 01:10:20,750
militarily to take action in Taiwan 

1791
01:10:20,760 --> 01:10:23,120
over our intervention that will play 

1792
01:10:23,120 --> 01:10:25,287
into their decision making over time . 

1793
01:10:25,460 --> 01:10:28,400
We think at seeing what happened in 

1794
01:10:28,400 --> 01:10:30,122
Russia that may give them less 

1795
01:10:30,122 --> 01:10:32,233
confidence in some respects over what 

1796
01:10:32,233 --> 01:10:34,567
it is that's likely to happen , Senator , 

1797
01:10:34,567 --> 01:10:36,789
the only thing that I would add is on a 

1798
01:10:36,789 --> 01:10:38,733
on a day to day basis with chinese 

1799
01:10:38,733 --> 01:10:40,678
military activity . I'm not seeing 

1800
01:10:40,678 --> 01:10:40,380
anything that would tell me that 

1801
01:10:40,380 --> 01:10:42,491
they're they're thinking about trying 

1802
01:10:42,491 --> 01:10:44,602
to take advantage of this time . That 

1803
01:10:44,602 --> 01:10:46,769
that they think that they might have . 

1804
01:10:46,769 --> 01:10:48,991
But let me ask one additional follow up 

1805
01:10:48,991 --> 01:10:50,991
on that , what's your assessment of 

1806
01:10:50,991 --> 01:10:52,880
their , of our ability to conduct 

1807
01:10:52,880 --> 01:10:55,047
military operations in both theaters ? 

1808
01:10:55,047 --> 01:10:58,640
Should something occur ? We have we 

1809
01:10:58,640 --> 01:11:01,290
have significant capabilities in both 

1810
01:11:01,300 --> 01:11:03,750
theaters . It would depend what the 

1811
01:11:03,750 --> 01:11:06,040
variables were with with each situation 

1812
01:11:06,040 --> 01:11:08,262
and what that meant . But that's why we 

1813
01:11:08,262 --> 01:11:10,429
have four star combatant commanders in 

1814
01:11:10,429 --> 01:11:13,070
US EUCOM and end up a . Com . Thank you . 

1815
01:11:13,560 --> 01:11:15,671
Thank you . Mr . Chairman . Thank you 

1816
01:11:15,671 --> 01:11:18,330
very much , Senator Rosen . Uh and 

1817
01:11:18,330 --> 01:11:21,190
thank you uh Madam Director in General . 

1818
01:11:21,200 --> 01:11:24,370
Uh We have a vote at 11 

1819
01:11:24,370 --> 01:11:28,150
45 . Uh We will reconvene in S . V . 

1820
01:11:28,150 --> 01:11:30,790
C . To 17 for the classified session 

1821
01:11:31,160 --> 01:11:34,990
At 12:00 . Uh And at this 

1822
01:11:34,990 --> 01:11:38,840
point I will uh recess or adjourn 

1823
01:11:38,840 --> 01:11:41,290
the open session . Thank you very much .