1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:02,462 thank you so much everybody for joining 2 00:00:02,462 --> 00:00:04,684 us . I know we're sort of post lunch so 3 00:00:04,684 --> 00:00:06,907 hopefully everybody's feeling energized 4 00:00:06,907 --> 00:00:09,830 and not asleep . Uh this panel doesn't 5 00:00:09,830 --> 00:00:11,997 really need introduction but I will do 6 00:00:11,997 --> 00:00:14,150 brief ones for them . Um I'm Jenna 7 00:00:14,150 --> 00:00:16,094 Mclaughlin , I'm NPR cybersecurity 8 00:00:16,094 --> 00:00:18,317 correspondent and first up on the video 9 00:00:18,317 --> 00:00:20,428 screen I can see him here and perhaps 10 00:00:20,428 --> 00:00:22,483 he's behind me somewhere but Senator 11 00:00:22,483 --> 00:00:24,820 King of maine who certainly needs no 12 00:00:24,830 --> 00:00:26,990 introduction but he is a known and 13 00:00:26,990 --> 00:00:29,101 recognized cyber champion , he was co 14 00:00:29,101 --> 00:00:30,934 chair of the cyberspace Solarium 15 00:00:30,934 --> 00:00:32,990 Commission , which I'm sure everyone 16 00:00:32,990 --> 00:00:35,101 here is really familiar with . Um and 17 00:00:35,101 --> 00:00:36,879 that was a big piece of putting 18 00:00:36,879 --> 00:00:38,768 together a lot of different cyber 19 00:00:38,768 --> 00:00:40,934 recommendations including the one that 20 00:00:40,934 --> 00:00:43,046 created uh rob Kentucky's office . Um 21 00:00:43,046 --> 00:00:45,390 we've also got steffi Hill to my right , 22 00:00:45,400 --> 00:00:47,620 she is the executive Vice president of 23 00:00:47,620 --> 00:00:49,787 rotary and Mission systems at Lockheed 24 00:00:49,787 --> 00:00:52,050 martin . Her portfolio includes 25 00:00:52,060 --> 00:00:54,380 everything from helicopters and cyber 26 00:00:54,380 --> 00:00:56,547 solutions to underseas warfare , which 27 00:00:56,547 --> 00:01:00,440 sounds pretty interesting . Huh ? Yeah , 28 00:01:00,840 --> 00:01:02,673 yeah and and I also noticed your 29 00:01:02,673 --> 00:01:04,784 twitter handle is accidental engineer 30 00:01:04,784 --> 00:01:06,618 and you write about being a stem 31 00:01:06,618 --> 00:01:08,840 champion . So it sounds like you've got 32 00:01:08,840 --> 00:01:11,062 quite a lot of things going on . Um and 33 00:01:11,062 --> 00:01:14,070 then next is issue is the Deputy 34 00:01:14,070 --> 00:01:16,014 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 35 00:01:16,014 --> 00:01:18,126 cyber policy . She was previously the 36 00:01:18,126 --> 00:01:20,126 vice President of national Security 37 00:01:20,126 --> 00:01:22,181 programs at the think tank third way 38 00:01:22,181 --> 00:01:24,070 Where she did all kinds of things 39 00:01:24,070 --> 00:01:27,020 including writing about Cybercrime 40 00:01:27,020 --> 00:01:29,350 Section 702 A Fisa and she even started 41 00:01:29,350 --> 00:01:31,461 a podcast trying to give me a run for 42 00:01:31,461 --> 00:01:33,572 my money , maybe she'll go back to it 43 00:01:33,572 --> 00:01:35,739 one day . Um and then of course at the 44 00:01:35,739 --> 00:01:37,739 end we have rob Kentucky who is the 45 00:01:37,739 --> 00:01:39,850 Deputy Deputy national cyber Director 46 00:01:39,850 --> 00:01:42,017 for Strategy and budget , which sounds 47 00:01:42,017 --> 00:01:44,350 very important . You have all the money . 48 00:01:44,350 --> 00:01:46,406 Uh previously a senior fellow at the 49 00:01:46,406 --> 00:01:48,572 Council of Foreign Relations fellow at 50 00:01:48,572 --> 00:01:50,794 Harvard's Belfer Center cyber project , 51 00:01:50,794 --> 00:01:52,961 um all kinds of different cyber things 52 00:01:52,961 --> 00:01:56,740 clearly . And you also served 53 00:01:56,750 --> 00:01:59,060 on what the White House described as 54 00:01:59,070 --> 00:02:01,350 the predecessor to cISA at DHS , which 55 00:02:01,360 --> 00:02:03,471 I thought was really interesting . Um 56 00:02:03,471 --> 00:02:05,760 so obviously leads on everything from 57 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:07,927 election security to engaging with the 58 00:02:07,927 --> 00:02:10,038 private sector , on engaging on cyber 59 00:02:10,038 --> 00:02:11,816 threats . So we've got a really 60 00:02:11,816 --> 00:02:13,649 esteemed panel here . Um so this 61 00:02:13,649 --> 00:02:16,840 panel's title is the 21st century 62 00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:18,507 security innovation and cyber 63 00:02:18,507 --> 00:02:20,580 resilience in times of crisis . So 64 00:02:20,580 --> 00:02:22,636 there's a lot going on there and I'm 65 00:02:22,636 --> 00:02:24,636 sure we could spend like four hours 66 00:02:24,636 --> 00:02:26,802 unpacking that . But I'd love to start 67 00:02:26,802 --> 00:02:29,080 sort of with that mention of of crisis . 68 00:02:29,080 --> 00:02:31,191 Since I'm a journalist . Um of course 69 00:02:31,191 --> 00:02:33,302 I'm covering the war in Ukraine right 70 00:02:33,302 --> 00:02:35,358 now . The conflict that's dragged on 71 00:02:35,358 --> 00:02:37,358 for the last three months . Um it's 72 00:02:37,358 --> 00:02:39,524 involved a volunteer hacker army . The 73 00:02:39,524 --> 00:02:41,580 resurgence of hacktivism the dump of 74 00:02:41,580 --> 00:02:44,000 reams of documents on Russian companies , 75 00:02:44,010 --> 00:02:45,899 Russian hacking Ukrainian hacking 76 00:02:45,899 --> 00:02:48,010 targeting of satellite communications 77 00:02:48,010 --> 00:02:50,121 across europe . We've seen a lot each 78 00:02:50,121 --> 00:02:52,288 of you obviously has a different piece 79 00:02:52,288 --> 00:02:54,343 of the pie here . Um but I'd love to 80 00:02:54,343 --> 00:02:56,566 get a sense of how from your seat , the 81 00:02:56,566 --> 00:02:56,340 war in Ukraine has sort of impacted 82 00:02:56,340 --> 00:02:58,451 your job . And I'd love to start with 83 00:02:58,451 --> 00:03:00,820 Mick , uh how has this conflict 84 00:03:00,830 --> 00:03:03,052 influenced the pentagon's understanding 85 00:03:03,052 --> 00:03:05,219 of , of cyber and war ? Yeah , I think 86 00:03:05,219 --> 00:03:07,163 we've spent a lot of time thinking 87 00:03:07,163 --> 00:03:09,386 about what cyberwar would look like and 88 00:03:09,386 --> 00:03:11,330 this is the first time where we're 89 00:03:11,330 --> 00:03:13,330 really seeing a very highly capable 90 00:03:13,330 --> 00:03:15,441 cyber country going to war and seeing 91 00:03:15,441 --> 00:03:17,608 how they integrate the use of cyber in 92 00:03:17,608 --> 00:03:21,160 alongside their kinetic activities . We 93 00:03:21,160 --> 00:03:23,500 had some indications of what the , what 94 00:03:23,500 --> 00:03:25,830 Russia was capable of in in previous 95 00:03:26,040 --> 00:03:28,480 attempts to try and disrupt cyber 96 00:03:28,480 --> 00:03:30,480 activity in Ukraine . Um , and so I 97 00:03:30,480 --> 00:03:32,536 think we had some expectations about 98 00:03:32,536 --> 00:03:34,536 what might happen . Um , you know , 99 00:03:34,536 --> 00:03:36,702 people keep asking me what's the after 100 00:03:36,702 --> 00:03:36,680 action report on this and I keep saying 101 00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:38,847 the action is not done yet . So it's a 102 00:03:38,847 --> 00:03:40,791 little tough for us to say exactly 103 00:03:40,791 --> 00:03:43,013 what's going on . I don't think we want 104 00:03:43,013 --> 00:03:44,958 to draw too many conclusions while 105 00:03:44,958 --> 00:03:44,850 while this conflict is still going on . 106 00:03:45,040 --> 00:03:47,096 But I think this is really important 107 00:03:47,096 --> 00:03:49,310 for us to understand , what is the 108 00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:52,150 limit of Russian capability ? What are , 109 00:03:52,160 --> 00:03:54,330 what is their use in doctrine in 110 00:03:54,330 --> 00:03:56,441 wartime ? What does this mean for how 111 00:03:56,441 --> 00:03:58,608 quickly they can regenerate ? Um , and 112 00:03:58,608 --> 00:04:01,320 what does this mean about sort of what 113 00:04:01,320 --> 00:04:03,653 capabilities they bring to bear in this ? 114 00:04:03,653 --> 00:04:05,820 What might they be reserving for other 115 00:04:05,820 --> 00:04:07,987 things . Um , but I think that this is 116 00:04:07,987 --> 00:04:10,153 a very important example of what cyber 117 00:04:10,153 --> 00:04:12,320 conflict looks like . Um , and I think 118 00:04:12,320 --> 00:04:14,431 that a lot of people thought that the 119 00:04:14,431 --> 00:04:16,660 cyber conflict would be massive and 120 00:04:16,660 --> 00:04:18,716 that the cyber portion of that would 121 00:04:18,716 --> 00:04:20,882 have a strategic impact and what we're 122 00:04:20,882 --> 00:04:22,938 seeing is the Russians are unable to 123 00:04:22,938 --> 00:04:25,570 bring cyber capability to bear in a way 124 00:04:25,570 --> 00:04:27,650 that fundamentally changes the 125 00:04:27,650 --> 00:04:29,950 Ukrainian strategic will to defend 126 00:04:29,950 --> 00:04:32,172 their territory frankly , their kinetic 127 00:04:32,172 --> 00:04:34,339 capabilities are insufficient for that 128 00:04:34,339 --> 00:04:36,672 as well . Um that's a whole other story , 129 00:04:36,672 --> 00:04:38,672 but I think that then that helps us 130 00:04:38,672 --> 00:04:40,617 have a better understanding of the 131 00:04:40,617 --> 00:04:43,210 limits of cyber when it comes to its 132 00:04:43,210 --> 00:04:45,370 use in armed conflict . Absolutely , 133 00:04:45,370 --> 00:04:47,700 and you mentioned limits obviously , 134 00:04:47,700 --> 00:04:49,811 and I think a lot of people have been 135 00:04:49,811 --> 00:04:51,811 kind of surprised about the limited 136 00:04:51,811 --> 00:04:53,922 impact . Do you have any sense of why 137 00:04:53,922 --> 00:04:57,200 that is this is a fundamental question 138 00:04:57,200 --> 00:04:59,230 that I think we won't necessarily 139 00:04:59,230 --> 00:05:01,174 understand for quite some time . I 140 00:05:01,174 --> 00:05:03,119 think there are a lot of different 141 00:05:03,119 --> 00:05:05,286 hypotheses about why that might be are 142 00:05:05,286 --> 00:05:07,508 they holding back its cyber harder than 143 00:05:07,508 --> 00:05:09,619 we think um are the Ukrainians better 144 00:05:09,619 --> 00:05:11,563 at defense than we think ? I think 145 00:05:11,563 --> 00:05:11,310 there's a lot of different things 146 00:05:11,310 --> 00:05:13,143 happening here , but then as you 147 00:05:13,143 --> 00:05:15,310 mentioned in the opener , I think it's 148 00:05:15,310 --> 00:05:17,143 really important that we try and 149 00:05:17,143 --> 00:05:19,254 understand also what other actors are 150 00:05:19,254 --> 00:05:21,650 coming into this conflict globally and 151 00:05:21,650 --> 00:05:23,817 this is the first time we've seen sort 152 00:05:23,817 --> 00:05:27,590 of a global surge of uh 153 00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:30,310 non state actor hackers coming to the 154 00:05:30,310 --> 00:05:32,860 assistance of countries , um and how we 155 00:05:32,860 --> 00:05:35,260 understand what they have been up to 156 00:05:35,340 --> 00:05:37,562 and what that impact has been , I think 157 00:05:37,562 --> 00:05:39,784 is something we will be unpacking for a 158 00:05:39,784 --> 00:05:42,007 very long time . Absolutely , hopefully 159 00:05:42,007 --> 00:05:44,229 I'll be covering those stories . Uh , I 160 00:05:44,229 --> 00:05:46,284 want to get back to you make it in a 161 00:05:46,284 --> 00:05:48,507 minute , but pivoting over to Stephanie 162 00:05:48,507 --> 00:05:48,100 from the private sector . I'm curious 163 00:05:48,110 --> 00:05:50,350 how this conflict has sort of got you 164 00:05:50,350 --> 00:05:52,239 thinking about how to help defend 165 00:05:52,239 --> 00:05:54,406 against the cyber threat from Russia . 166 00:05:54,406 --> 00:05:56,183 We obviously are hearing pretty 167 00:05:56,183 --> 00:05:58,183 frequently that the threat level is 168 00:05:58,183 --> 00:05:58,060 increased . There's a possibility of 169 00:05:58,070 --> 00:06:00,403 Russia retaliating against us companies . 170 00:06:00,403 --> 00:06:02,626 How have you been thinking about that ? 171 00:06:02,626 --> 00:06:04,570 Yeah , so it's it's something that 172 00:06:04,570 --> 00:06:04,150 we've thought about and have actually 173 00:06:04,150 --> 00:06:06,820 put measures in place for quite a long 174 00:06:06,820 --> 00:06:08,931 time . When you think about near peer 175 00:06:08,931 --> 00:06:10,987 adversaries , Nation state actors as 176 00:06:10,987 --> 00:06:13,042 you talked about and what we know we 177 00:06:13,042 --> 00:06:15,042 have to do now more than ever is to 178 00:06:15,042 --> 00:06:16,764 operate at speed in delivering 179 00:06:16,764 --> 00:06:19,490 offensive and defensive capability to 180 00:06:19,500 --> 00:06:21,722 our customers into the war fighter . So 181 00:06:21,722 --> 00:06:23,944 we think about it in a couple of ways . 182 00:06:23,944 --> 00:06:25,944 First , in our systems products and 183 00:06:25,944 --> 00:06:25,790 platforms that we developed for the war 184 00:06:25,790 --> 00:06:28,012 fighter , we should make sure that they 185 00:06:28,012 --> 00:06:30,179 are resilient as they are deployed and 186 00:06:30,179 --> 00:06:32,401 their views from kinetic perspective or 187 00:06:32,401 --> 00:06:34,401 from a sensing perspective . And we 188 00:06:34,401 --> 00:06:36,234 have to look at our own internal 189 00:06:36,234 --> 00:06:38,290 networks . So interestingly Lockheed 190 00:06:38,290 --> 00:06:40,401 martin for many , many years has been 191 00:06:40,401 --> 00:06:42,640 one of the most attack surfaces on the 192 00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:44,862 planet because of who our customer is . 193 00:06:44,862 --> 00:06:47,580 People want to get into our systems And 194 00:06:47,580 --> 00:06:49,302 so many years ago we developed 195 00:06:49,302 --> 00:06:51,358 something and I'm pretty sure you're 196 00:06:51,358 --> 00:06:53,469 familiar with it the cyber kill chain 197 00:06:53,469 --> 00:06:53,110 we call it . And it's basically a 198 00:06:53,110 --> 00:06:55,590 layered defense that we used to protect 199 00:06:55,590 --> 00:06:57,970 our network to protect all the amazing 200 00:06:57,970 --> 00:07:00,137 information data that we have from our 201 00:07:00,137 --> 00:07:02,359 customers and from our own technology . 202 00:07:02,359 --> 00:07:05,700 And we believe it's very good . And we 203 00:07:05,700 --> 00:07:08,320 have stepped back to say with this 204 00:07:08,320 --> 00:07:10,264 intelligence that we all have that 205 00:07:10,264 --> 00:07:12,264 Russia is exploring options . Maybe 206 00:07:12,264 --> 00:07:14,487 they won't be successful but we have to 207 00:07:14,487 --> 00:07:16,098 be ready anyway . So we have 208 00:07:16,098 --> 00:07:17,931 established something called the 209 00:07:17,931 --> 00:07:19,987 shields up task force that really is 210 00:07:19,987 --> 00:07:21,987 stepping back to take a look at how 211 00:07:21,987 --> 00:07:24,098 ready are we , how how penetrable are 212 00:07:24,098 --> 00:07:26,320 we ? And it starts with our workforce , 213 00:07:26,320 --> 00:07:26,020 you know the workforce and the people 214 00:07:26,030 --> 00:07:28,197 who are in the seats every day are our 215 00:07:28,197 --> 00:07:30,197 biggest avenue for protection . And 216 00:07:30,197 --> 00:07:32,197 then it looks at the technology and 217 00:07:32,197 --> 00:07:34,419 here's something that we've always done 218 00:07:34,419 --> 00:07:36,586 and we're doing it even more now . You 219 00:07:36,586 --> 00:07:38,474 might not realize that in private 220 00:07:38,474 --> 00:07:40,641 industry we don't we don't share a lot 221 00:07:40,641 --> 00:07:42,641 of our secret information with each 222 00:07:42,641 --> 00:07:44,808 other because it's not , you know , we 223 00:07:44,808 --> 00:07:44,560 lose our competitive advantage . One 224 00:07:44,560 --> 00:07:47,410 thing that we do share very broadly is 225 00:07:47,420 --> 00:07:49,753 information we have about cyber threats . 226 00:07:49,753 --> 00:07:51,864 There are there are groups , official 227 00:07:51,864 --> 00:07:53,920 groups of companies of government 228 00:07:53,930 --> 00:07:55,874 agencies where we share what those 229 00:07:55,874 --> 00:07:57,986 threats are so we can all be prepared 230 00:07:57,986 --> 00:08:00,097 because it's not about preserving our 231 00:08:00,097 --> 00:08:02,041 competitive advantage . It's about 232 00:08:02,041 --> 00:08:04,097 preserving our national security and 233 00:08:04,097 --> 00:08:06,319 then what we do . So think about it , I 234 00:08:06,319 --> 00:08:06,040 think I was sharing this with you 235 00:08:06,040 --> 00:08:09,520 earlier . Our biggest vulnerability in 236 00:08:09,530 --> 00:08:11,641 the cyber kill chain is in our supply 237 00:08:11,641 --> 00:08:14,380 chain . So companies like Lockheed 238 00:08:14,380 --> 00:08:16,547 martin , large companies can invest to 239 00:08:16,547 --> 00:08:19,600 protect against cyber intrusions and 240 00:08:19,610 --> 00:08:22,580 attacks . Many small businesses can't 241 00:08:22,580 --> 00:08:24,802 afford to do that . So we actually hold 242 00:08:24,802 --> 00:08:27,280 workshops to educate , we provide all 243 00:08:27,280 --> 00:08:29,640 kinds of uh , we're piloting some 244 00:08:29,640 --> 00:08:31,473 technology that we would give to 245 00:08:31,473 --> 00:08:33,640 smaller business to help them to shore 246 00:08:33,640 --> 00:08:35,800 up their cyber posture . And so we're 247 00:08:35,800 --> 00:08:38,970 doing a lot because maybe Russia is not 248 00:08:38,970 --> 00:08:41,081 being as successful , but you get all 249 00:08:41,081 --> 00:08:44,240 kinds of opportunities for cyber attack 250 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:47,370 and we are obligated to protect the 251 00:08:47,370 --> 00:08:49,259 amazing information we have as we 252 00:08:49,259 --> 00:08:51,314 partner with our customers . I think 253 00:08:51,314 --> 00:08:53,259 that jen easterly is cheering from 254 00:08:53,259 --> 00:08:55,203 wherever she is when you mentioned 255 00:08:55,203 --> 00:08:57,750 she'll die . I think we're gonna get a 256 00:08:57,760 --> 00:09:00,340 tweet about that . I just want to 257 00:09:00,350 --> 00:09:02,461 really quickly follow up on something 258 00:09:02,461 --> 00:09:04,406 you said there , you mentioned the 259 00:09:04,406 --> 00:09:04,350 supply chain obviously , which has been 260 00:09:04,350 --> 00:09:06,340 a huge issue for several years . I 261 00:09:06,340 --> 00:09:08,770 think I was at a defense industry event 262 00:09:08,770 --> 00:09:10,937 where they were talking about just how 263 00:09:10,937 --> 00:09:12,937 large that supply chain is that ? I 264 00:09:12,937 --> 00:09:14,937 think it was something like several 265 00:09:14,937 --> 00:09:14,470 thousands of different companies that 266 00:09:14,470 --> 00:09:16,748 supply different pieces of it , do you ? 267 00:09:18,240 --> 00:09:20,580 Of suppliers and in the pandemic , one 268 00:09:20,580 --> 00:09:22,580 of the things that We have done and 269 00:09:22,580 --> 00:09:24,191 we're continuing to do is in 270 00:09:24,191 --> 00:09:26,524 particularly for the smaller businesses , 271 00:09:26,524 --> 00:09:28,358 we have accelerated more than $2 272 00:09:28,358 --> 00:09:30,358 billion dollars of payments to keep 273 00:09:30,358 --> 00:09:32,469 those businesses going and solvent to 274 00:09:32,469 --> 00:09:34,358 be able to deliver the capability 275 00:09:34,358 --> 00:09:36,524 because what we hear about it in every 276 00:09:36,524 --> 00:09:38,358 industry of all the supply chain 277 00:09:38,358 --> 00:09:40,358 problems , the defense industry has 278 00:09:40,358 --> 00:09:42,580 experienced that as well . And the good 279 00:09:42,580 --> 00:09:44,358 news is in partnership with the 280 00:09:44,358 --> 00:09:46,580 government . We've been able to help to 281 00:09:46,580 --> 00:09:48,469 stabilize the supply chain and to 282 00:09:48,469 --> 00:09:50,691 figure out what it is , I mean , and to 283 00:09:50,691 --> 00:09:52,858 figure out even that just seems like a 284 00:09:52,858 --> 00:09:54,969 massive challenge . Um Senator King , 285 00:09:54,969 --> 00:09:57,024 I'd love to move to you from there . 286 00:09:57,024 --> 00:09:59,191 Obviously a big part of what you do is 287 00:09:59,191 --> 00:10:01,136 looking at sort of defending these 288 00:10:01,136 --> 00:10:03,358 industries . One of the major dangerous 289 00:10:03,358 --> 00:10:05,080 here is that Russia's going to 290 00:10:05,080 --> 00:10:07,302 retaliate that it could hit us critical 291 00:10:07,302 --> 00:10:09,636 infrastructure with a cyber attack . Uh , 292 00:10:09,636 --> 00:10:08,810 Congress has been proactive about 293 00:10:08,810 --> 00:10:10,477 trying to give the government 294 00:10:10,477 --> 00:10:12,699 additional authorities to work with the 295 00:10:12,699 --> 00:10:14,810 private sector to mandate reporting . 296 00:10:14,810 --> 00:10:16,754 Um , I was just moderating a panel 297 00:10:16,754 --> 00:10:18,754 earlier this week with the National 298 00:10:18,754 --> 00:10:18,450 Association of Water Companies and the 299 00:10:18,450 --> 00:10:20,810 threat there just seems so clear and 300 00:10:20,810 --> 00:10:22,860 and so apparent to them . Um , I'm 301 00:10:22,860 --> 00:10:25,082 curious what else do you think needs to 302 00:10:25,082 --> 00:10:27,304 be done to make sure that these sectors 303 00:10:27,304 --> 00:10:29,540 are protected ? Well , before , Before 304 00:10:29,540 --> 00:10:32,180 I answer the question , I want to also 305 00:10:32,180 --> 00:10:34,402 and you mentioned at the very beginning 306 00:10:34,402 --> 00:10:36,569 of the presentation , the presentation 307 00:10:36,569 --> 00:10:38,791 that was online just before we got here 308 00:10:38,791 --> 00:10:40,736 with the two authors talking about 309 00:10:40,736 --> 00:10:42,569 their Children's books is really 310 00:10:42,569 --> 00:10:44,791 important and raises a really important 311 00:10:44,791 --> 00:10:46,958 issue . One of the biggest problems in 312 00:10:46,958 --> 00:10:49,124 cyber occurs at the individual desktop 313 00:10:49,124 --> 00:10:51,180 or laptop , where people just aren't 314 00:10:51,180 --> 00:10:53,236 familiar with the risks . They we've 315 00:10:53,236 --> 00:10:55,430 we've jumped into this digital age 316 00:10:55,430 --> 00:10:58,420 without developing the kind of uh 317 00:10:58,430 --> 00:11:02,360 ancillary culture and and and ethics 318 00:11:02,360 --> 00:11:04,471 and all of the other things that have 319 00:11:04,471 --> 00:11:06,638 accompanied , you know , 1000 years of 320 00:11:06,638 --> 00:11:08,880 printed books . And so I believe that 321 00:11:08,890 --> 00:11:11,280 education and particularly what I call 322 00:11:11,280 --> 00:11:13,700 digital literacy is really critical and 323 00:11:13,700 --> 00:11:15,950 it ought to be taught in every school 324 00:11:15,950 --> 00:11:18,200 starting at the youngest age . And so I 325 00:11:18,200 --> 00:11:20,422 I just I just want to touch on that . I 326 00:11:20,422 --> 00:11:22,478 thought that presentation by the two 327 00:11:22,478 --> 00:11:24,890 authors was great and I love what 328 00:11:24,890 --> 00:11:27,112 they're doing and I think we ought to , 329 00:11:27,112 --> 00:11:29,279 but we ought to be thinking about this 330 00:11:29,279 --> 00:11:32,330 in a larger , more systemic way . Um , 331 00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:36,210 okay , um , back to the 332 00:11:36,210 --> 00:11:39,070 issue of Ukraine and and the risk to 333 00:11:39,070 --> 00:11:42,860 the critical infrastructure . One thing 334 00:11:42,860 --> 00:11:45,027 that hasn't been mentioned thus far is 335 00:11:45,027 --> 00:11:48,310 deterrence and I don't have , I'm not 336 00:11:48,310 --> 00:11:50,254 speaking from the perspective of a 337 00:11:50,254 --> 00:11:52,421 member of the Intelligence Committee , 338 00:11:52,421 --> 00:11:54,643 often I have to try to remember where I 339 00:11:54,643 --> 00:11:56,643 learned things and be careful about 340 00:11:56,643 --> 00:11:59,120 what I what I say , but uh I don't 341 00:11:59,130 --> 00:12:01,019 think there's much doubt that the 342 00:12:01,019 --> 00:12:04,660 Russians have uh have held back to some 343 00:12:04,660 --> 00:12:07,410 extent because they know that we hold 344 00:12:07,410 --> 00:12:09,650 them at risk . Uh it's sort of a 345 00:12:09,650 --> 00:12:11,817 classic deterrence theory and this was 346 00:12:11,817 --> 00:12:14,210 one of the major recommendations of the , 347 00:12:14,220 --> 00:12:18,020 of the solarium was to establish an 348 00:12:18,020 --> 00:12:21,760 ability to impose costs . We have to be 349 00:12:21,760 --> 00:12:23,760 resilient . We have to protect , we 350 00:12:23,760 --> 00:12:25,982 have to patch , we have to do all those 351 00:12:25,982 --> 00:12:28,204 kinds of things , educate people at the 352 00:12:28,204 --> 00:12:30,316 desktop , but we also have to be sure 353 00:12:30,316 --> 00:12:33,320 that the adversary knows that they that 354 00:12:33,330 --> 00:12:35,441 they'll pay a price . President biden 355 00:12:35,441 --> 00:12:37,608 had a very important meeting with with 356 00:12:37,608 --> 00:12:39,820 or I can't remember I was in person or 357 00:12:39,820 --> 00:12:42,380 online or what it was but with Vladimir 358 00:12:42,380 --> 00:12:45,350 Putin almost a year ago last summer 359 00:12:45,740 --> 00:12:47,796 where basically President biden said 360 00:12:47,796 --> 00:12:49,962 these are the areas , you know , we're 361 00:12:49,962 --> 00:12:52,170 not going to tolerate and particularly 362 00:12:52,180 --> 00:12:55,580 in in critical infrastructure . So I 363 00:12:55,580 --> 00:12:57,524 have I , you know , and again this 364 00:12:57,524 --> 00:12:59,636 isn't based on intelligence , this is 365 00:12:59,636 --> 00:13:01,830 just based on my awareness over the 366 00:13:01,830 --> 00:13:05,380 years of of how the Russian think , 367 00:13:05,550 --> 00:13:07,550 I think they know that we have some 368 00:13:07,550 --> 00:13:10,230 pretty potent capabilities ourselves uh 369 00:13:10,230 --> 00:13:13,250 and that they better be careful and I 370 00:13:13,260 --> 00:13:15,371 have to believe that that's been part 371 00:13:15,371 --> 00:13:18,160 of why we haven't seen the widespread 372 00:13:18,540 --> 00:13:20,870 uh cyber attacks in the in the in 373 00:13:20,870 --> 00:13:22,870 europe or in the United States that 374 00:13:22,940 --> 00:13:25,760 everyone including me was expecting . 375 00:13:25,770 --> 00:13:27,881 But and I think that's a good thing . 376 00:13:28,140 --> 00:13:30,880 So that those are some thoughts I think 377 00:13:30,890 --> 00:13:33,120 I think it's it's resilience , but it's 378 00:13:33,120 --> 00:13:36,280 also deterrence . Um and I think that I 379 00:13:36,280 --> 00:13:37,836 think the President and the 380 00:13:37,836 --> 00:13:40,058 administration has , has done that well 381 00:13:40,058 --> 00:13:43,670 by communicating the cost in position 382 00:13:43,680 --> 00:13:45,680 and I think it's working thus far . 383 00:13:46,240 --> 00:13:48,184 Absolutely , yeah , I was actually 384 00:13:48,184 --> 00:13:50,296 speaking with Merlyn migrate over and 385 00:13:50,296 --> 00:13:52,462 Estonia who was the former head of the 386 00:13:52,462 --> 00:13:54,462 NATO cyber center there and she was 387 00:13:54,462 --> 00:13:56,684 talking a little bit about sort of that 388 00:13:56,684 --> 00:13:58,907 collective ability of Western allies as 389 00:13:58,907 --> 00:14:00,907 well including someone like Estonia 390 00:14:00,907 --> 00:14:02,629 tiny little country but highly 391 00:14:02,629 --> 00:14:04,796 sophisticated . Um of course it's it's 392 00:14:04,796 --> 00:14:06,851 difficult to always kind of like you 393 00:14:06,851 --> 00:14:08,796 mentioned previously apply kind of 394 00:14:08,796 --> 00:14:10,950 these digital lessons uh to these 395 00:14:10,950 --> 00:14:13,117 physical conflicts , something that we 396 00:14:13,117 --> 00:14:14,950 think about with deterrents that 397 00:14:14,950 --> 00:14:17,172 previously applies to nuclear weapons . 398 00:14:17,172 --> 00:14:19,283 It's we're still figuring out exactly 399 00:14:19,283 --> 00:14:21,450 what that means . Um I'd love to shift 400 00:14:21,450 --> 00:14:23,450 over to to rob a little bit to talk 401 00:14:23,450 --> 00:14:25,672 just a little bit about the white house 402 00:14:25,672 --> 00:14:27,617 cyber office and what it is you're 403 00:14:27,617 --> 00:14:29,672 doing over there , I think we're all 404 00:14:29,672 --> 00:14:29,260 still getting acquainted with that 405 00:14:29,270 --> 00:14:31,580 office , we want to hear more . Um and 406 00:14:31,580 --> 00:14:33,636 how have your first day's been since 407 00:14:33,636 --> 00:14:35,413 it's been in the middle of this 408 00:14:35,413 --> 00:14:37,469 conflict . Yeah , so my my first day 409 00:14:37,469 --> 00:14:40,440 was february 28th , so came in in the 410 00:14:40,440 --> 00:14:43,640 middle of this conflict four days after . 411 00:14:43,640 --> 00:14:47,200 Right , got down here , my family's up 412 00:14:47,200 --> 00:14:50,060 in Portland Maine uh and 413 00:14:50,640 --> 00:14:54,010 slowdown bought food bought water prep , 414 00:14:54,010 --> 00:14:56,010 my apartment expecting that we were 415 00:14:56,010 --> 00:14:58,570 going to be in a very ugly cyberwar , I 416 00:14:58,580 --> 00:15:00,691 started getting the briefings started 417 00:15:00,691 --> 00:15:02,802 to understand what the intel flow was 418 00:15:02,802 --> 00:15:05,190 like and from there we really started 419 00:15:05,190 --> 00:15:07,650 pushing on what are we going to do to 420 00:15:07,650 --> 00:15:09,761 make sure we're as prepared as we can 421 00:15:09,761 --> 00:15:13,530 possibly be for a Russian attack on U . 422 00:15:13,530 --> 00:15:16,310 S soil through cyberspace . That was 423 00:15:16,310 --> 00:15:18,540 the overwhelming emphasis of my first 424 00:15:18,540 --> 00:15:21,960 few weeks in office and that continues 425 00:15:21,960 --> 00:15:24,910 to be an overwhelming emphasis of what 426 00:15:24,920 --> 00:15:28,460 our office is doing when and 427 00:15:28,460 --> 00:15:30,300 Neuberger the NsC's lead on 428 00:15:30,300 --> 00:15:33,620 cybersecurity , did a White house press 429 00:15:33,620 --> 00:15:36,430 briefing on this issue and said we have 430 00:15:36,430 --> 00:15:38,830 intelligence , there is a threat . 431 00:15:38,840 --> 00:15:40,896 People need to take this seriously . 432 00:15:41,140 --> 00:15:43,029 They need to patch , they need to 433 00:15:43,029 --> 00:15:44,980 improve their cyber hygiene . Were 434 00:15:44,980 --> 00:15:47,091 pushing whatever intelligence we have 435 00:15:47,100 --> 00:15:49,350 after the private sector that was 436 00:15:49,350 --> 00:15:51,390 because there was that intelligence 437 00:15:51,510 --> 00:15:53,730 that threat still exists . That's the 438 00:15:53,730 --> 00:15:56,210 reason that we have shields up and why 439 00:15:56,210 --> 00:15:58,377 Shields up is still continuing today . 440 00:15:58,377 --> 00:16:00,543 Right . This is why jen has not said , 441 00:16:00,543 --> 00:16:02,710 okay , bring your shields down so that 442 00:16:02,710 --> 00:16:05,060 threat continues while that is ongoing . 443 00:16:05,340 --> 00:16:07,890 We're rapidly learning lessons about 444 00:16:07,890 --> 00:16:11,570 how we implement the strategy that the 445 00:16:11,570 --> 00:16:13,760 NsC has set to try and drive 446 00:16:13,760 --> 00:16:15,816 collaboration with the Department of 447 00:16:15,816 --> 00:16:17,982 Defense to try and drive collaboration 448 00:16:17,982 --> 00:16:19,940 with Cisa with the sector risk 449 00:16:19,940 --> 00:16:22,051 management agencies like Treasury and 450 00:16:22,051 --> 00:16:24,273 Energy and right now we're in kind of a 451 00:16:24,273 --> 00:16:26,329 feedback loop as we're seeing what's 452 00:16:26,329 --> 00:16:28,551 working as we're seeing where there are 453 00:16:28,551 --> 00:16:30,773 seams in our communications processes . 454 00:16:30,773 --> 00:16:32,773 That's an ongoing effort that we're 455 00:16:32,773 --> 00:16:34,990 obligated to carry out at all times . 456 00:16:34,990 --> 00:16:37,450 It is the overwhelming thing that this 457 00:16:37,450 --> 00:16:39,880 office does is simply to focus on 458 00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:42,260 implementation not to write new 459 00:16:42,260 --> 00:16:44,427 executive orders , not to push out new 460 00:16:44,427 --> 00:16:46,710 policy . That's the nsc's job , our job 461 00:16:46,720 --> 00:16:48,730 is to make sure that that policy is 462 00:16:48,730 --> 00:16:51,470 getting implemented easy enough . 463 00:16:51,840 --> 00:16:55,460 I'm sure that's a fun job . I think I 464 00:16:55,460 --> 00:16:57,460 want to ask a brief follow up to to 465 00:16:57,460 --> 00:16:59,516 each of you because I think you will 466 00:16:59,516 --> 00:17:01,738 each sit in different parts of this and 467 00:17:01,738 --> 00:17:03,904 it's interesting um we've seen sort of 468 00:17:03,904 --> 00:17:05,682 historically Finland and Sweden 469 00:17:05,682 --> 00:17:07,627 officially apply to to join NATO . 470 00:17:07,627 --> 00:17:09,516 We've talked obviously about this 471 00:17:09,516 --> 00:17:11,682 threat level being rather persistent . 472 00:17:11,682 --> 00:17:11,470 That Russia is continuing to threaten 473 00:17:11,470 --> 00:17:13,630 to launch a cyber attack . Has that 474 00:17:13,640 --> 00:17:16,100 increased since this talk of NATO has 475 00:17:16,100 --> 00:17:18,211 been happening ? Do you maybe want to 476 00:17:18,211 --> 00:17:21,180 start ? Um Look , I think as a senator 477 00:17:21,180 --> 00:17:23,180 king said the president's made very 478 00:17:23,180 --> 00:17:25,347 clear to the Russians that there would 479 00:17:25,347 --> 00:17:27,458 be consequences if there was a direct 480 00:17:27,458 --> 00:17:29,402 Russian attack on U . S . Critical 481 00:17:29,402 --> 00:17:31,402 infrastructure . Um and as we think 482 00:17:31,402 --> 00:17:33,513 about deterrence in the Department of 483 00:17:33,513 --> 00:17:33,440 Defense , we have a new national 484 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:35,440 Defense strategy and we think about 485 00:17:35,440 --> 00:17:37,384 integrated deterrents and we think 486 00:17:37,384 --> 00:17:39,496 about how it doesn't necessarily have 487 00:17:39,496 --> 00:17:41,496 to be cyber for cyber but there are 488 00:17:41,496 --> 00:17:43,496 many other tools that we can use to 489 00:17:43,496 --> 00:17:45,496 bring to bear to impose costs on an 490 00:17:45,496 --> 00:17:47,162 adversary for taking steps in 491 00:17:47,162 --> 00:17:49,162 cyberspace or taking steps in other 492 00:17:49,162 --> 00:17:51,384 places , it's we have many , many tools 493 00:17:51,384 --> 00:17:54,100 in the toolbox and while their 494 00:17:54,100 --> 00:17:56,156 disruption of our cyber may matter , 495 00:17:56,156 --> 00:17:58,267 you know , may hit a certain point of 496 00:17:58,267 --> 00:18:00,100 mattering to us , the reciprocal 497 00:18:00,100 --> 00:18:02,211 activity might not matter the same to 498 00:18:02,211 --> 00:18:04,267 them . And so we need to think about 499 00:18:04,267 --> 00:18:06,320 what is reciprocal in value when we 500 00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:08,480 talk about trying to impose costs and 501 00:18:08,480 --> 00:18:12,180 integrated deterrence . I think that we 502 00:18:12,180 --> 00:18:15,770 are always concerned that if 503 00:18:15,780 --> 00:18:18,060 Russia begins to think that this is in 504 00:18:18,060 --> 00:18:21,150 fact a direct conflict between them and 505 00:18:21,150 --> 00:18:23,820 NATO , that they could change their 506 00:18:23,830 --> 00:18:25,941 posture and we are very worried about 507 00:18:25,941 --> 00:18:27,774 the potentiality of threat . The 508 00:18:27,774 --> 00:18:29,886 challenge in the cyber domain is that 509 00:18:29,886 --> 00:18:31,997 people need to be prepared to execute 510 00:18:31,997 --> 00:18:34,780 quickly and so what may look , you know 511 00:18:34,780 --> 00:18:37,140 the difference between uh intelligence 512 00:18:37,140 --> 00:18:39,360 and pre positioning and an attack may 513 00:18:39,360 --> 00:18:41,027 look the same from a victim's 514 00:18:41,027 --> 00:18:43,249 perspective . Um it is really just when 515 00:18:43,249 --> 00:18:45,138 did they , when did they flip the 516 00:18:45,138 --> 00:18:47,304 switch and impose , you know , and and 517 00:18:47,304 --> 00:18:49,527 change something about the architecture 518 00:18:49,527 --> 00:18:51,693 that has an effect in the world . Um I 519 00:18:51,693 --> 00:18:54,220 think that we've seen sort of 520 00:18:54,230 --> 00:18:56,430 conflicting messages from the Russians 521 00:18:56,440 --> 00:18:58,910 about what this means and I think um 522 00:18:58,920 --> 00:19:01,110 well I think we remain very concerned 523 00:19:01,120 --> 00:19:04,880 about the prospect of um Russian cyber 524 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:07,047 attack ? I don't know that our posture 525 00:19:07,047 --> 00:19:10,420 has changed about . So what the 526 00:19:10,420 --> 00:19:13,560 calculus is for for president . Right . 527 00:19:13,570 --> 00:19:15,792 And have you been in touch with Finnish 528 00:19:15,792 --> 00:19:18,014 and Swedish counterparts about this ? I 529 00:19:18,014 --> 00:19:21,480 have not on the cyber front but other 530 00:19:21,480 --> 00:19:23,313 colleagues of mine , my regional 531 00:19:23,313 --> 00:19:25,202 colleagues are in touch with them 532 00:19:25,202 --> 00:19:27,258 regularly on this . Um I think there 533 00:19:27,258 --> 00:19:29,202 will be a question for Finland and 534 00:19:29,202 --> 00:19:31,202 Sweden um about whether or not they 535 00:19:31,202 --> 00:19:33,369 start to experience the kind of hybrid 536 00:19:33,369 --> 00:19:35,424 attacks um that we have seen against 537 00:19:35,424 --> 00:19:37,147 other countries when they have 538 00:19:37,147 --> 00:19:39,550 announced an interest in joining NATO . 539 00:19:39,550 --> 00:19:41,661 And we're obviously very wary of that 540 00:19:41,661 --> 00:19:43,272 and prepared to help provide 541 00:19:43,272 --> 00:19:45,106 cybersecurity support to them as 542 00:19:45,106 --> 00:19:47,960 necessary as they need from us . 543 00:19:48,440 --> 00:19:50,440 Absolutely . I'm curious if anybody 544 00:19:50,440 --> 00:19:52,607 else wants to weigh in on whether they 545 00:19:52,607 --> 00:19:54,980 feel as if this NATO moment is is an 546 00:19:54,980 --> 00:19:56,980 increase in in the threat . If it's 547 00:19:56,980 --> 00:19:58,813 kind of part of the course we're 548 00:19:58,813 --> 00:20:01,147 staying studying the ship . Anyone else ? 549 00:20:01,940 --> 00:20:04,060 I think Putin is trying to figure out 550 00:20:04,440 --> 00:20:06,551 how to respond because at first there 551 00:20:06,551 --> 00:20:08,607 was a lot of saber rattling and then 552 00:20:08,607 --> 00:20:10,773 two days ago there was this weird sort 553 00:20:10,773 --> 00:20:13,520 of , we don't care message out of the 554 00:20:13,520 --> 00:20:15,990 Kremlin . And now we're hearing more 555 00:20:15,990 --> 00:20:18,740 about just this morning , there were 556 00:20:18,740 --> 00:20:21,900 reports of of the Russians developing 557 00:20:21,900 --> 00:20:23,960 new battle groups on that , on the 558 00:20:23,960 --> 00:20:26,210 Finnish border . Finnish Swedish border 559 00:20:26,540 --> 00:20:29,690 of Russia . So I think they really 560 00:20:29,700 --> 00:20:32,400 haven't quite figured out what what the 561 00:20:32,400 --> 00:20:34,640 reaction is . I think I think they've 562 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:36,473 come to realize it's it's now an 563 00:20:36,473 --> 00:20:39,540 inevitability and so whether they're 564 00:20:39,540 --> 00:20:41,540 going to try to react and of course 565 00:20:41,540 --> 00:20:44,750 there there resource constrained to 566 00:20:44,750 --> 00:20:46,861 some extent because they have so much 567 00:20:46,861 --> 00:20:48,972 of their uh forces concentrated in in 568 00:20:48,972 --> 00:20:51,170 Ukraine . So uh , you know , 569 00:20:51,180 --> 00:20:53,402 everybody's sort of waiting to see what 570 00:20:53,402 --> 00:20:55,402 the reaction is , but right now , I 571 00:20:55,402 --> 00:20:58,540 think , I think they don't know frankly , 572 00:20:58,540 --> 00:21:00,484 and , and that's why we're getting 573 00:21:00,484 --> 00:21:02,540 conflicting signals . Yeah , I think 574 00:21:02,540 --> 00:21:04,651 that's been the case for the a lot of 575 00:21:04,651 --> 00:21:06,707 the conflict . We don't know what we 576 00:21:06,707 --> 00:21:08,818 don't know . And and these things can 577 00:21:08,818 --> 00:21:10,929 change over time . Obviously one last 578 00:21:10,929 --> 00:21:13,096 follow up on that for me , just before 579 00:21:13,096 --> 00:21:14,984 we kind of shift areas , I'm just 580 00:21:14,984 --> 00:21:17,207 curious if amongst that sort of overall 581 00:21:17,207 --> 00:21:19,207 strategy of mixed deterrence is the 582 00:21:19,207 --> 00:21:21,262 pentagon still considering launching 583 00:21:21,262 --> 00:21:23,151 offensive cyber attacks ? Is in a 584 00:21:23,151 --> 00:21:25,207 response , I think in this forum I'm 585 00:21:25,207 --> 00:21:27,207 not going to discuss the pentagon's 586 00:21:27,207 --> 00:21:29,151 offensive cyber activity , but I'm 587 00:21:29,151 --> 00:21:31,151 happy to talk to Senator . That was 588 00:21:31,151 --> 00:21:33,770 your answer that I had to ask . I look 589 00:21:33,770 --> 00:21:35,714 forward to talking to Senator King 590 00:21:35,714 --> 00:21:38,048 about it . Our quarterly updates though . 591 00:21:38,048 --> 00:21:39,937 Alright , that's called strategic 592 00:21:39,937 --> 00:21:42,320 ambiguity . I love it . Maybe I'll hear 593 00:21:42,320 --> 00:21:44,320 more about that in the future . Who 594 00:21:44,320 --> 00:21:46,480 knows ? Um , I'd like to turn to 595 00:21:46,480 --> 00:21:48,480 another word that's featured on the 596 00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:50,647 description of this panel innovation . 597 00:21:50,647 --> 00:21:52,591 Uh , the Advancement of Technology 598 00:21:52,591 --> 00:21:54,369 offers so many opportunities to 599 00:21:54,369 --> 00:21:56,536 warfighters to intelligence officers , 600 00:21:56,536 --> 00:21:58,647 humanitarians , even farmers . But it 601 00:21:58,647 --> 00:22:00,702 also creates a lot of challenges and 602 00:22:00,702 --> 00:22:02,924 built in competition with our peers and 603 00:22:02,924 --> 00:22:04,813 our adversaries . Um , I recently 604 00:22:04,813 --> 00:22:06,924 interviewed former estonian president 605 00:22:06,924 --> 00:22:06,850 Toomas , Hendrik Ilves , and he talked 606 00:22:06,850 --> 00:22:09,072 a lot about how technology is the great 607 00:22:09,072 --> 00:22:11,128 equalizer . Um , for small countries 608 00:22:11,128 --> 00:22:13,017 like Estonia to punch above their 609 00:22:13,017 --> 00:22:15,294 weight , but also for cybercrime gangs , 610 00:22:15,294 --> 00:22:17,406 they can get access to a lot of these 611 00:22:17,406 --> 00:22:19,572 tools that previously they didn't um , 612 00:22:19,572 --> 00:22:21,628 there's a lot of ways to take this . 613 00:22:21,628 --> 00:22:23,794 But I'd love to start with Stephanie . 614 00:22:23,794 --> 00:22:23,290 Uh it's clear that there's a bit of a 615 00:22:23,290 --> 00:22:26,040 race maybe with china uh , to innovate 616 00:22:26,040 --> 00:22:28,500 these days , whether it's in five G ai 617 00:22:28,500 --> 00:22:30,611 quantum technology , we've seen a lot 618 00:22:30,611 --> 00:22:32,833 of indictments demonstrating that china 619 00:22:32,833 --> 00:22:34,778 isn't necessarily fighting fair or 620 00:22:34,778 --> 00:22:36,611 necessarily sparing any national 621 00:22:36,611 --> 00:22:38,333 resources towards winning that 622 00:22:38,333 --> 00:22:40,278 competition . How are you thinking 623 00:22:40,278 --> 00:22:39,930 about that challenge from the 624 00:22:39,930 --> 00:22:42,041 perspective of the private sector and 625 00:22:42,041 --> 00:22:44,097 what do you think it'll take to keep 626 00:22:44,097 --> 00:22:46,097 the US ahead ? So what we look , we 627 00:22:46,097 --> 00:22:47,930 look at china and it's been very 628 00:22:47,930 --> 00:22:50,097 interesting to see how they have fused 629 00:22:50,097 --> 00:22:52,319 their commercial and defense sectors to 630 00:22:52,319 --> 00:22:54,097 be able to overtake some of the 631 00:22:54,097 --> 00:22:56,290 military dominance that is enjoyed by 632 00:22:56,290 --> 00:22:58,457 the U . S . And our allies . And so we 633 00:22:58,457 --> 00:23:00,234 were watching that and as we're 634 00:23:00,234 --> 00:23:02,123 watching that again from Lockheed 635 00:23:02,123 --> 00:23:04,234 martin perspective , what we're doing 636 00:23:04,234 --> 00:23:06,346 is we're looking to make sure that we 637 00:23:06,346 --> 00:23:08,512 can deliver capability faster and what 638 00:23:08,512 --> 00:23:10,623 that requires is that technology that 639 00:23:10,623 --> 00:23:12,623 you talked about Jonah , it's using 640 00:23:12,623 --> 00:23:14,623 digital transformation . We like to 641 00:23:14,623 --> 00:23:16,623 call it the digital thread where we 642 00:23:16,623 --> 00:23:18,568 start from our design process with 643 00:23:18,568 --> 00:23:20,401 creating the digital thread that 644 00:23:20,401 --> 00:23:22,290 actually flows all the way to the 645 00:23:22,290 --> 00:23:24,068 factory floor and also onto the 646 00:23:24,068 --> 00:23:26,068 battlefield for sustainment , to be 647 00:23:26,068 --> 00:23:28,179 able to help us to deliver capability 648 00:23:28,179 --> 00:23:30,401 much more quickly to be able to deliver 649 00:23:30,401 --> 00:23:32,457 capability much more affordably . So 650 00:23:32,457 --> 00:23:34,512 we're thinking about For some of our 651 00:23:34,512 --> 00:23:36,950 large systems it can take years to five , 652 00:23:36,950 --> 00:23:38,617 sometimes 10 years to deliver 653 00:23:38,617 --> 00:23:40,783 capability . Well , we're changing how 654 00:23:40,783 --> 00:23:44,180 we uh design produce 655 00:23:44,180 --> 00:23:46,069 capabilities so that we can start 656 00:23:46,069 --> 00:23:48,069 delivering capability in six months 657 00:23:48,069 --> 00:23:50,180 centers incremental capability to the 658 00:23:50,180 --> 00:23:52,402 warfighter . We have some programs that 659 00:23:52,402 --> 00:23:52,010 are doing that today , some programs 660 00:23:52,010 --> 00:23:53,677 that are able to deliver that 661 00:23:53,677 --> 00:23:55,677 capability that quickly today . Our 662 00:23:55,677 --> 00:23:57,732 vision for that we call 21st century 663 00:23:57,732 --> 00:23:59,750 security . And so we're using 664 00:23:59,750 --> 00:24:01,990 technology and partnerships to deliver 665 00:24:02,000 --> 00:24:04,220 faster . We're also when you think 666 00:24:04,220 --> 00:24:06,920 about the threat of china and what 667 00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:09,830 they're doing , we are focused on 668 00:24:09,840 --> 00:24:13,020 connecting things and that's part of 669 00:24:13,020 --> 00:24:16,340 the 21st century security um , vision . 670 00:24:16,350 --> 00:24:18,572 So we want to connect things across all 671 00:24:18,572 --> 00:24:21,510 domains to really increase speed , 672 00:24:21,510 --> 00:24:24,030 agility and did and I'll say decision 673 00:24:24,030 --> 00:24:27,550 dominance because the person or the 674 00:24:27,560 --> 00:24:30,340 country that has the best information 675 00:24:30,340 --> 00:24:32,500 to make the decision fastest will 676 00:24:32,510 --> 00:24:34,177 ultimately prevail . So we're 677 00:24:34,177 --> 00:24:36,066 partnering with , we're investing 678 00:24:36,066 --> 00:24:38,288 ourselves and artificial intelligence . 679 00:24:38,288 --> 00:24:40,510 We're partnering with companies um , to 680 00:24:40,510 --> 00:24:42,566 be able to bring that more delight . 681 00:24:42,566 --> 00:24:42,260 I'll give you one example that is not a 682 00:24:42,440 --> 00:24:44,551 a military example , but it's I think 683 00:24:44,551 --> 00:24:46,880 it's a good one to show of the 684 00:24:47,060 --> 00:24:48,893 importance of technology and the 685 00:24:48,893 --> 00:24:51,116 results that can have . So since 2021 , 686 00:24:51,540 --> 00:24:54,300 we have been partnering with NVIDIA 687 00:24:54,310 --> 00:24:56,630 artificial intelligence company and 688 00:24:56,630 --> 00:24:58,630 we're actually focused on something 689 00:24:58,630 --> 00:25:00,797 that is a national threat . And that's 690 00:25:00,797 --> 00:25:03,019 firefighting . And so we are working on 691 00:25:03,019 --> 00:25:05,074 a model that would have firefighting 692 00:25:05,074 --> 00:25:07,074 intelligence as a service . So what 693 00:25:07,074 --> 00:25:09,074 we're able to do through artificial 694 00:25:09,074 --> 00:25:11,241 intelligence and technology is to have 695 00:25:11,241 --> 00:25:13,690 camera to interpret and analyze camera 696 00:25:13,690 --> 00:25:15,820 imagery Very quickly to provide 697 00:25:15,830 --> 00:25:17,886 information to the firefighters . So 698 00:25:17,886 --> 00:25:20,108 typically firefighters are inundated by 699 00:25:20,108 --> 00:25:22,890 a whole lot of data that is old , often 700 00:25:22,890 --> 00:25:25,600 24 hours or more old and is therefore 701 00:25:25,600 --> 00:25:27,489 in actionable . A lot of it is an 702 00:25:27,489 --> 00:25:30,720 actionable . We're able to take all of 703 00:25:30,720 --> 00:25:33,820 the information available to us , apply 704 00:25:33,830 --> 00:25:37,030 algorithms to it and get data to the 705 00:25:37,040 --> 00:25:39,380 firefighters around the perimeter of 706 00:25:39,380 --> 00:25:41,547 the fire . The prediction of where the 707 00:25:41,547 --> 00:25:44,700 fire is going , the epicenter In what 708 00:25:44,700 --> 00:25:46,811 would have normally taken a couple of 709 00:25:46,811 --> 00:25:48,756 days in hours , sometimes and even 710 00:25:48,756 --> 00:25:50,478 minutes . So this is what this 711 00:25:50,478 --> 00:25:52,367 technology can do in , you know , 712 00:25:52,367 --> 00:25:54,533 something that we've all we all see uh 713 00:25:54,533 --> 00:25:56,589 firefighting and we're applying that 714 00:25:56,589 --> 00:25:58,811 there were prying that applying that in 715 00:25:58,811 --> 00:26:00,644 our 21st century security to our 716 00:26:00,644 --> 00:26:02,978 military customers all around the world . 717 00:26:02,978 --> 00:26:04,867 Yeah , I'm glad you mentioned the 718 00:26:04,867 --> 00:26:04,810 firefighting application because I 719 00:26:04,820 --> 00:26:06,987 wanted to ask , you know , how much of 720 00:26:06,987 --> 00:26:09,153 this is new technology versus thinking 721 00:26:09,153 --> 00:26:11,376 about capabilities that perhaps already 722 00:26:11,376 --> 00:26:13,460 exist or are being too to apply them 723 00:26:13,460 --> 00:26:15,460 together . It's a combination of of 724 00:26:15,460 --> 00:26:17,516 using technology that exists because 725 00:26:17,516 --> 00:26:19,682 you've got a lot of the data coming in 726 00:26:19,682 --> 00:26:21,738 anyway . And then it's using some of 727 00:26:21,738 --> 00:26:23,682 the tech technical skills and also 728 00:26:23,682 --> 00:26:25,627 tactics and algorithms and ai that 729 00:26:25,627 --> 00:26:27,627 allow you to really have that force 730 00:26:27,627 --> 00:26:29,182 multiplier and it's through 731 00:26:29,182 --> 00:26:31,127 partnerships , you know , Lockheed 732 00:26:31,127 --> 00:26:31,040 martin invested a whole lot of money in 733 00:26:31,040 --> 00:26:33,096 these things for a military customer 734 00:26:33,096 --> 00:26:35,318 and then you bring in a partner like in 735 00:26:35,318 --> 00:26:37,484 video and then it becomes a real force 736 00:26:37,484 --> 00:26:39,484 multiplier for for this problem and 737 00:26:39,484 --> 00:26:41,540 other problem sets . Absolutely . Um 738 00:26:41,540 --> 00:26:44,030 rob your boss chris Inglis has talked a 739 00:26:44,030 --> 00:26:46,290 lot about making us a harder target and 740 00:26:46,290 --> 00:26:48,290 I think there's a lot of ways to to 741 00:26:48,290 --> 00:26:50,123 take that . Um he said that that 742 00:26:50,123 --> 00:26:52,068 doesn't just involve enhancing the 743 00:26:52,068 --> 00:26:54,346 security of our technology necessarily . 744 00:26:54,346 --> 00:26:56,512 It's also about teaching people . It's 745 00:26:56,512 --> 00:26:58,679 it's about the humans at the center of 746 00:26:58,679 --> 00:26:58,500 this as well . Can you speak a little 747 00:26:58,500 --> 00:27:00,667 bit about that strategy to kind of get 748 00:27:00,667 --> 00:27:02,722 everyone on the same page to be more 749 00:27:02,722 --> 00:27:04,889 resilient and what kinds of things has 750 00:27:04,889 --> 00:27:04,830 the office done to move in that 751 00:27:04,830 --> 00:27:06,920 direction so far ? Sure . Again , so 752 00:27:06,920 --> 00:27:09,031 you're gonna you're gonna hear me hit 753 00:27:09,031 --> 00:27:10,642 this theme of us focusing on 754 00:27:10,642 --> 00:27:13,450 implementation . Right ? So last spring , 755 00:27:13,460 --> 00:27:16,190 uh in response to solar winds , the 756 00:27:16,190 --> 00:27:18,390 administration surged a lot of money 757 00:27:18,390 --> 00:27:20,557 towards agencies that were impacted by 758 00:27:20,557 --> 00:27:22,501 that and then put out an executive 759 00:27:22,501 --> 00:27:25,360 order 14028 that really was pushing 760 00:27:25,360 --> 00:27:27,471 towards a Zero Trust architecture for 761 00:27:27,471 --> 00:27:29,582 the federal government trying to move 762 00:27:29,582 --> 00:27:31,638 away from legacy security and legacy 763 00:27:31,638 --> 00:27:33,690 systems towards a modern defensible 764 00:27:33,690 --> 00:27:36,320 architecture . And so we've taken up 765 00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:38,542 the responsibility for making sure that 766 00:27:38,542 --> 00:27:41,030 that actually gets implemented . Now 767 00:27:41,040 --> 00:27:43,970 that's really hard to do in the federal 768 00:27:43,970 --> 00:27:46,270 I . T . Context because you're dealing 769 00:27:46,270 --> 00:27:48,437 with legacy systems . I used to advise 770 00:27:48,437 --> 00:27:50,560 startups in the cybersecurity space 771 00:27:50,740 --> 00:27:53,210 before the term Zero Trust was invented . 772 00:27:53,210 --> 00:27:55,377 They were already doing all the things 773 00:27:55,377 --> 00:27:57,321 in that strategy . It came kind of 774 00:27:57,321 --> 00:27:59,321 naturally if you were a cloud based 775 00:27:59,321 --> 00:28:03,170 organization , if you took that 776 00:28:03,170 --> 00:28:05,170 strategy and you're trying to apply 777 00:28:05,170 --> 00:28:07,392 that to the federal government requires 778 00:28:07,392 --> 00:28:10,110 a huge surge not just on cybersecurity 779 00:28:10,120 --> 00:28:13,490 but also on modernizing the underlying 780 00:28:13,490 --> 00:28:16,340 I . T . Systems . This is also a very 781 00:28:16,340 --> 00:28:18,562 similar problem that we see in a lot of 782 00:28:18,562 --> 00:28:21,350 private sector companies but also 783 00:28:21,360 --> 00:28:23,471 really in our critical infrastructure 784 00:28:23,471 --> 00:28:25,693 in our operational technology systems . 785 00:28:25,693 --> 00:28:28,010 These are legacy systems Some of which 786 00:28:28,010 --> 00:28:30,177 have been around for 30 and 40 years , 787 00:28:30,177 --> 00:28:33,250 30 and 40 year old IT systems . And so 788 00:28:33,260 --> 00:28:35,270 how do you secure that ? How do you 789 00:28:35,270 --> 00:28:36,992 modernize that ? So you have a 790 00:28:36,992 --> 00:28:39,159 defensible architecture ? Well we have 791 00:28:39,159 --> 00:28:41,381 some good news here . One of the things 792 00:28:41,381 --> 00:28:43,270 our office is very focused on and 793 00:28:43,270 --> 00:28:45,381 indeed I would say the entire federal 794 00:28:45,381 --> 00:28:47,326 government is really focused on is 795 00:28:47,326 --> 00:28:49,381 implementation of the infrastructure 796 00:28:49,381 --> 00:28:51,492 investment and jobs act . Right . And 797 00:28:51,492 --> 00:28:53,659 this is a once in a generation for our 798 00:28:53,659 --> 00:28:55,770 generation opportunity to rebuild the 799 00:28:55,770 --> 00:28:57,937 infrastructure in the United States to 800 00:28:57,937 --> 00:29:00,103 modernize a lot of the I . T . And O . 801 00:29:00,103 --> 00:29:02,159 T . Systems that that infrastructure 802 00:29:02,159 --> 00:29:04,840 relies on and to do it securely and to 803 00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:07,007 make sure that the investments are not 804 00:29:07,007 --> 00:29:09,062 only getting mail made into building 805 00:29:09,062 --> 00:29:12,000 new bridges and new roadways but also 806 00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:13,944 that those smart bridges and smart 807 00:29:13,944 --> 00:29:16,100 roadways and water systems are gonna 808 00:29:16,100 --> 00:29:18,322 have the I . T . Systems that will make 809 00:29:18,322 --> 00:29:20,322 them more efficient . And also that 810 00:29:20,322 --> 00:29:22,340 those investments will be secure 811 00:29:22,340 --> 00:29:24,451 against cyber threats . So that's the 812 00:29:24,451 --> 00:29:26,507 big focus of our office right now is 813 00:29:26,507 --> 00:29:30,120 just to make sure that things like uh 814 00:29:30,130 --> 00:29:33,830 wireless charging and uh car charging 815 00:29:33,830 --> 00:29:35,663 and things like that . These new 816 00:29:35,663 --> 00:29:37,800 technologies are going to be secure 817 00:29:37,810 --> 00:29:41,270 from the start again easy enough . 818 00:29:41,280 --> 00:29:43,440 I wouldn't ask you to name any names 819 00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:45,496 but I can imagine that some agencies 820 00:29:45,496 --> 00:29:47,718 you call up and they're like , what the 821 00:29:47,718 --> 00:29:49,829 heck are you ? What are you doing ? I 822 00:29:49,829 --> 00:29:52,170 can picture that . Um Senator King back 823 00:29:52,170 --> 00:29:54,392 in March you were celebrating the House 824 00:29:54,392 --> 00:29:56,281 and Senate decision to include 52 825 00:29:56,281 --> 00:29:58,337 billion in funding for the chips act 826 00:29:58,337 --> 00:30:00,226 supporting domestic semiconductor 827 00:30:00,226 --> 00:30:02,281 production . Can you speak about why 828 00:30:02,281 --> 00:30:04,448 that legislation is important in light 829 00:30:04,448 --> 00:30:06,392 of this emphasis on innovation and 830 00:30:06,392 --> 00:30:08,559 anything else you can preview that you 831 00:30:08,559 --> 00:30:11,190 think would be ? Well let me I'll do 832 00:30:11,190 --> 00:30:13,301 three things first . I want to answer 833 00:30:13,301 --> 00:30:15,523 the prior question a little bit because 834 00:30:15,523 --> 00:30:17,634 I think there's some important points 835 00:30:17,634 --> 00:30:19,801 on on the the changing and altering of 836 00:30:19,801 --> 00:30:21,746 the technology which we have to be 837 00:30:21,746 --> 00:30:23,968 responsive to . Here's an example . Our 838 00:30:23,968 --> 00:30:25,801 intelligence community is set up 839 00:30:25,801 --> 00:30:27,912 basically on foreign intelligence and 840 00:30:27,912 --> 00:30:30,160 domestic intelligence . The FBI has 841 00:30:30,160 --> 00:30:32,382 jurisdiction in the United States , the 842 00:30:32,382 --> 00:30:33,938 C . I . A . N . S . A . Has 843 00:30:33,938 --> 00:30:35,882 jurisdiction abroad . What about a 844 00:30:35,882 --> 00:30:37,993 cyber attack that may originate in ST 845 00:30:37,993 --> 00:30:40,340 Petersburg Russia but goes through a 846 00:30:40,340 --> 00:30:43,070 server in ST Petersburg florida or 847 00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:46,780 Toledo Ohio where's that fit ? And and 848 00:30:46,780 --> 00:30:48,947 frankly we haven't really figured that 849 00:30:48,947 --> 00:30:51,030 out . And and some of these uh 850 00:30:51,040 --> 00:30:53,130 infrastructure hacks that we've seen 851 00:30:53,140 --> 00:30:56,040 appear to be using that kind of skip 852 00:30:56,050 --> 00:30:58,217 technology . So that's number one that 853 00:30:58,217 --> 00:30:59,883 we have to figure out who has 854 00:30:59,883 --> 00:31:02,050 jurisdiction . How do they how do they 855 00:31:02,050 --> 00:31:04,050 work ? We don't want uh you know we 856 00:31:04,050 --> 00:31:05,883 don't want the CIA investigating 857 00:31:05,883 --> 00:31:08,010 americans and poking around in our 858 00:31:08,020 --> 00:31:10,131 systems . That's a that's been a role 859 00:31:10,131 --> 00:31:12,298 in this country for ever since the C . 860 00:31:12,298 --> 00:31:14,620 I . A . Was invented second issue and 861 00:31:14,620 --> 00:31:16,460 you touched on this is that new 862 00:31:16,460 --> 00:31:18,230 technology we're more and more 863 00:31:18,230 --> 00:31:20,950 connected . I mean your microwave car 864 00:31:20,950 --> 00:31:24,620 chargers rob Benson uh you know 865 00:31:24,630 --> 00:31:27,070 all of those you know , Alexa all of 866 00:31:27,070 --> 00:31:28,737 those things . And one of the 867 00:31:28,737 --> 00:31:30,737 recommendations that we made in the 868 00:31:30,737 --> 00:31:32,792 solarium that I don't think has been 869 00:31:32,792 --> 00:31:34,681 implemented yet is to develop a a 870 00:31:34,681 --> 00:31:37,830 voluntary ul kind of label for 871 00:31:37,830 --> 00:31:39,770 cybersecurity . So when a when a 872 00:31:39,780 --> 00:31:42,870 private citizen buys a server or I'm 873 00:31:42,870 --> 00:31:46,300 sorry a router or or some kind of 874 00:31:46,300 --> 00:31:48,720 other internet connected device 875 00:31:48,730 --> 00:31:50,897 there'll be a seal on it that says you 876 00:31:50,897 --> 00:31:52,841 know this has been tested and it's 877 00:31:52,841 --> 00:31:54,952 secure or it's as secure as it can be 878 00:31:54,952 --> 00:31:57,119 in there gonna be patches . So I think 879 00:31:57,119 --> 00:31:59,397 I think that's really important . Okay . 880 00:31:59,840 --> 00:32:02,740 You sika or whatever whatever the name 881 00:32:02,740 --> 00:32:05,610 is is now pending in the in the 882 00:32:05,610 --> 00:32:07,832 conference committee has been passed by 883 00:32:07,832 --> 00:32:09,943 both houses . There are differences , 884 00:32:09,943 --> 00:32:12,054 There's a conference committee that's 885 00:32:12,054 --> 00:32:14,221 been set up that is underway to try to 886 00:32:14,221 --> 00:32:16,277 resolve those differences . There is 887 00:32:16,277 --> 00:32:18,670 very much a bipartisan bill . And um , 888 00:32:19,040 --> 00:32:22,350 the chips Act is all about bringing uh 889 00:32:22,360 --> 00:32:24,582 semiconductor manufacturing back to the 890 00:32:24,582 --> 00:32:26,749 US . If there's anything we've learned 891 00:32:26,749 --> 00:32:28,638 in the last six months , it's how 892 00:32:28,638 --> 00:32:31,140 dependent we are on chips and uh , you 893 00:32:31,140 --> 00:32:33,307 know , whether it's an automobile or a 894 00:32:33,307 --> 00:32:36,510 refrigerator , that's been a real 895 00:32:36,510 --> 00:32:38,960 problem in terms of the supply chain . 896 00:32:39,340 --> 00:32:42,470 So there's a big part of the of the 897 00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:45,160 this bill that involves , uh , frankly 898 00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:49,120 financial support , uh , to incentivize 899 00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:52,820 the development of new , of new uh 900 00:32:52,830 --> 00:32:55,410 chip manufacturing facilities in the US . 901 00:32:55,940 --> 00:32:58,107 And and this is a big deal . This is , 902 00:32:58,110 --> 00:33:00,332 this is , I hate to say it because it's 903 00:33:00,332 --> 00:33:02,443 been a word for so long , but this is 904 00:33:02,443 --> 00:33:04,554 basically industrial policy , this is 905 00:33:04,554 --> 00:33:06,777 the government saying we've got to work 906 00:33:06,777 --> 00:33:08,777 together with this industry because 907 00:33:08,777 --> 00:33:08,580 it's critical to the future of the 908 00:33:08,580 --> 00:33:11,620 country . Uh , it's it's a word here . 909 00:33:11,630 --> 00:33:13,797 It's not a word in china , they're all 910 00:33:13,797 --> 00:33:17,000 about deciding what the critical 911 00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:20,870 industries are and we're doing it in a , 912 00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:24,240 in a sort of um less comprehensive way . 913 00:33:24,250 --> 00:33:26,528 But I think it's it's an important way . 914 00:33:26,528 --> 00:33:28,694 And then of course , innovation , that 915 00:33:28,694 --> 00:33:31,760 is the essence of this bill to support 916 00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:33,816 R and D . There's a piece that I'm a 917 00:33:33,816 --> 00:33:36,300 little I wish was in it . There is some 918 00:33:36,300 --> 00:33:38,770 language in it that I don't think is as 919 00:33:38,770 --> 00:33:41,050 strong as it as it should be . And that 920 00:33:41,050 --> 00:33:43,600 is we ought to be cooperating and 921 00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:45,880 coordinating more with our allies . 922 00:33:45,890 --> 00:33:47,890 There's no reason that we have , we 923 00:33:47,890 --> 00:33:49,890 should be trying to develop our own 924 00:33:49,890 --> 00:33:52,180 five G or six G technology in this 925 00:33:52,180 --> 00:33:54,550 country . If Japan has a good , has a 926 00:33:54,550 --> 00:33:56,780 good piece of of of equipment or a good 927 00:33:56,790 --> 00:33:58,957 theory or a good approach , let's work 928 00:33:58,957 --> 00:34:01,123 with them or work with the Europeans , 929 00:34:01,123 --> 00:34:04,600 work with Nokia or Erickson and and we 930 00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:06,767 shouldn't we shouldn't be doing this . 931 00:34:06,767 --> 00:34:08,822 You know , there's there's we have a 932 00:34:08,822 --> 00:34:11,520 commonality of interest with with the 933 00:34:11,530 --> 00:34:13,890 the free world if you will . And and I 934 00:34:13,890 --> 00:34:16,200 believe that we ought to be doing more 935 00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:18,560 to encourage cooperation rather than 936 00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:21,060 trying to each , each country spending 937 00:34:21,060 --> 00:34:23,060 a lot of money to develop their own 938 00:34:23,060 --> 00:34:25,250 separate piece of technology . Um , so 939 00:34:25,260 --> 00:34:27,371 those are a couple of things that's , 940 00:34:27,371 --> 00:34:29,510 that's a piece and and uh , that I I 941 00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:31,687 felt should have been in the bill . We 942 00:34:31,687 --> 00:34:33,798 couldn't quite get it over the finish 943 00:34:33,798 --> 00:34:36,131 line . There was concern about security , 944 00:34:36,131 --> 00:34:38,187 but hopefully in the final product , 945 00:34:38,187 --> 00:34:37,720 there'll be something along that line 946 00:34:37,720 --> 00:34:40,450 that will support more collaboration 947 00:34:40,450 --> 00:34:42,672 cooperation among allies because I just 948 00:34:42,672 --> 00:34:44,672 think it just makes common sense in 949 00:34:44,672 --> 00:34:46,728 terms of both economics and national 950 00:34:46,728 --> 00:34:48,672 security , that would certainly be 951 00:34:48,672 --> 00:34:52,390 timely given the locations of Nokia and 952 00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:56,050 ERicsson in Finland and Sweden . Yeah , 953 00:34:56,240 --> 00:34:58,462 can I just foot stomp the semiconductor 954 00:34:58,462 --> 00:35:00,351 just you know , thank you so much 955 00:35:00,351 --> 00:35:02,573 Senator for bringing that up because it 956 00:35:02,573 --> 00:35:04,573 is the semiconductor challenge is a 957 00:35:04,573 --> 00:35:06,920 real challenge for industry . And we 958 00:35:06,930 --> 00:35:08,763 obviously support the bipartisan 959 00:35:08,763 --> 00:35:10,930 Innovation Act and it's something that 960 00:35:10,930 --> 00:35:12,874 our Ceo jim chocolate often talked 961 00:35:12,874 --> 00:35:14,819 about as a champion . So thank you 962 00:35:14,819 --> 00:35:16,930 senator for what you're doing to make 963 00:35:16,930 --> 00:35:19,440 that a reality . Absolutely . That's 964 00:35:19,440 --> 00:35:22,350 what you hired me for . 965 00:35:23,040 --> 00:35:26,780 Um We always hear about china being the 966 00:35:26,790 --> 00:35:28,901 pacing threat . I'd love to just have 967 00:35:28,901 --> 00:35:31,220 you explain that briefly ? What what 968 00:35:31,220 --> 00:35:34,110 what does that mean ? Yeah . Look for a 969 00:35:34,110 --> 00:35:36,277 lot of people the majority of the time 970 00:35:36,277 --> 00:35:38,332 that they spent focusing on national 971 00:35:38,332 --> 00:35:40,443 security , we've been involved in the 972 00:35:40,443 --> 00:35:42,666 post 9 11 era and the counter terrorism 973 00:35:42,666 --> 00:35:44,666 fight . Um and I think when we talk 974 00:35:44,666 --> 00:35:46,888 about china is the pacing threat , What 975 00:35:46,888 --> 00:35:48,943 we're talking about is being able to 976 00:35:48,943 --> 00:35:50,943 measure our capability and do a net 977 00:35:50,943 --> 00:35:53,110 assessment about where we stand in our 978 00:35:53,110 --> 00:35:56,560 ability to if it comes to that 979 00:35:57,140 --> 00:35:59,380 Prevail in a fight against China . 980 00:35:59,390 --> 00:36:01,760 There are a lot of areas where over the 981 00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:04,620 past 20 years we have not invested 982 00:36:04,620 --> 00:36:07,630 enough as a nation to be able to ensure 983 00:36:07,630 --> 00:36:09,780 that we are able to maintain the 984 00:36:09,780 --> 00:36:12,650 advantage to continue to protect our 985 00:36:12,650 --> 00:36:15,120 allies and partners in the Asia Pacific 986 00:36:15,130 --> 00:36:17,241 to ensure America's interests there . 987 00:36:17,241 --> 00:36:19,740 There are areas like electronic warfare 988 00:36:20,060 --> 00:36:22,171 as Senator King was pointing out when 989 00:36:22,171 --> 00:36:25,090 we talk about our own industrial base 990 00:36:25,090 --> 00:36:27,257 to be able to continue to maintain the 991 00:36:27,257 --> 00:36:29,423 high tech edge when we understand what 992 00:36:29,423 --> 00:36:31,479 they are up to . I think that it's a 993 00:36:31,479 --> 00:36:33,646 shift in the way that we need to think 994 00:36:33,646 --> 00:36:35,646 about things . And I think it means 995 00:36:35,646 --> 00:36:37,701 that our , that we may have to shift 996 00:36:37,701 --> 00:36:39,701 some of the investments that we are 997 00:36:39,701 --> 00:36:41,757 making in the department . But as we 998 00:36:41,757 --> 00:36:43,980 think about china , whether or not we 999 00:36:43,990 --> 00:36:46,450 actually enter into a conflict , the 1000 00:36:46,450 --> 00:36:48,672 potentiality of conflict is one that we 1001 00:36:48,672 --> 00:36:51,480 have to prepare for . Um , even though 1002 00:36:51,480 --> 00:36:54,880 we're trying to give the policymaker , 1003 00:36:54,890 --> 00:36:57,150 um , the warfighter decision advantage 1004 00:36:57,160 --> 00:36:59,530 in the moment , so much of what it 1005 00:36:59,540 --> 00:37:02,020 takes to fight that conflict takes 1006 00:37:02,030 --> 00:37:04,980 years to develop in advance . So we 1007 00:37:04,980 --> 00:37:07,360 have to start that process sooner 1008 00:37:07,360 --> 00:37:09,460 rather than later or if the conflict 1009 00:37:09,470 --> 00:37:11,526 comes and we are not ready , we will 1010 00:37:11,526 --> 00:37:13,137 find ourselves at a distinct 1011 00:37:13,137 --> 00:37:15,580 disadvantage . And we have american 1012 00:37:15,580 --> 00:37:17,690 citizens throughout the indo pacific 1013 00:37:17,690 --> 00:37:21,400 region who are potentially at risk if 1014 00:37:21,400 --> 00:37:23,678 it were to come to a conflict . And so , 1015 00:37:23,678 --> 00:37:25,844 you know , as we look at this conflict 1016 00:37:25,844 --> 00:37:28,120 between Russia and Ukraine , I think 1017 00:37:28,120 --> 00:37:31,140 that there are a lot of lessons that um , 1018 00:37:31,150 --> 00:37:34,780 that that china will observe here about 1019 00:37:34,780 --> 00:37:37,002 what this means , about what it means , 1020 00:37:37,002 --> 00:37:39,224 that the global community came together 1021 00:37:39,224 --> 00:37:41,280 and said , we are , we oppose this . 1022 00:37:41,330 --> 00:37:45,240 That you saw a global community of non 1023 00:37:45,240 --> 00:37:48,130 state hackers go against Russia , what 1024 00:37:48,130 --> 00:37:49,900 it meant in terms of economic 1025 00:37:49,900 --> 00:37:52,011 consequences , what it meant in terms 1026 00:37:52,011 --> 00:37:54,750 of diplomatic relationships , how that 1027 00:37:54,750 --> 00:37:56,750 that is reshaping the world and how 1028 00:37:56,750 --> 00:37:59,950 much harder it is to take up , take 1029 00:37:59,950 --> 00:38:02,006 territory from a group of people who 1030 00:38:02,006 --> 00:38:04,940 are determined to defend themselves and 1031 00:38:04,940 --> 00:38:08,510 their ability to govern themselves um 1032 00:38:08,520 --> 00:38:10,830 and and their way of life . And I think 1033 00:38:10,830 --> 00:38:12,719 that that is really important for 1034 00:38:12,719 --> 00:38:14,941 people to understand and to think about 1035 00:38:14,941 --> 00:38:17,163 as we size the Defense department as we 1036 00:38:17,163 --> 00:38:19,274 think about our capabilities as we go 1037 00:38:19,274 --> 00:38:21,441 through exercises , weren't we have to 1038 00:38:21,441 --> 00:38:23,274 think about those things as as a 1039 00:38:23,274 --> 00:38:25,052 measuring stick . Thank you . I 1040 00:38:25,052 --> 00:38:26,941 appreciate you taking the time to 1041 00:38:26,941 --> 00:38:29,108 explain the jargon , really appreciate 1042 00:38:29,108 --> 00:38:31,274 it . And I'm sure NPR listeners always 1043 00:38:31,274 --> 00:38:35,140 do . Um you spoke a little bit about 1044 00:38:36,420 --> 00:38:39,140 obviously how we are really focused on 1045 00:38:39,140 --> 00:38:41,196 china as this top pacing threat . Do 1046 00:38:41,196 --> 00:38:43,307 you feel like because right now there 1047 00:38:43,307 --> 00:38:45,418 is so much focus on Russia in the war 1048 00:38:45,418 --> 00:38:47,640 in Ukraine that not that we're dropping 1049 00:38:47,640 --> 00:38:49,862 the ball on that , but that potentially 1050 00:38:49,862 --> 00:38:52,084 because so many resources are allocated 1051 00:38:52,084 --> 00:38:54,362 in one direction , we could , you know , 1052 00:38:54,362 --> 00:38:53,920 it could be a challenge to continue to 1053 00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:56,087 keep up with the threat from china . I 1054 00:38:56,087 --> 00:38:58,031 think we're learning a lot in this 1055 00:38:58,031 --> 00:39:01,420 conflict as we see , you know , Russia 1056 00:39:01,430 --> 00:39:03,597 as what was perceived to be the second 1057 00:39:03,597 --> 00:39:05,597 most capable military on the planet 1058 00:39:05,597 --> 00:39:07,763 coming into this conflict and how they 1059 00:39:07,763 --> 00:39:09,930 have done . Um I think we are learning 1060 00:39:09,930 --> 00:39:12,097 some things about how that works , how 1061 00:39:12,097 --> 00:39:14,152 difficult these things are , how you 1062 00:39:14,152 --> 00:39:16,208 have to work together to integrate , 1063 00:39:16,208 --> 00:39:18,450 right , electronic warfare cyber um 1064 00:39:18,460 --> 00:39:20,990 supply lines , intelligence , pictures 1065 00:39:20,990 --> 00:39:23,250 all the rest of that . Um , you know , 1066 00:39:23,320 --> 00:39:26,650 But Russia has been at war in conflict 1067 00:39:26,650 --> 00:39:29,690 with Ukraine since 2016 . Um , China 1068 00:39:29,690 --> 00:39:31,912 has not been in a conflict . The United 1069 00:39:31,912 --> 00:39:33,968 States has the most capable and most 1070 00:39:33,968 --> 00:39:36,301 experienced military on the planet . Um , 1071 00:39:36,420 --> 00:39:40,050 so I do think that while we are looking 1072 00:39:40,050 --> 00:39:42,217 at this conflict and there is a lot of 1073 00:39:42,217 --> 00:39:45,030 focus here . Everything in the back of 1074 00:39:45,030 --> 00:39:47,310 our minds is , well , what does this 1075 00:39:47,310 --> 00:39:49,421 mean for other conflicts ? What would 1076 00:39:49,421 --> 00:39:51,450 this mean for a direct NATO Russia 1077 00:39:51,450 --> 00:39:53,506 conflict ? What does this mean for a 1078 00:39:53,506 --> 00:39:55,960 potential US china conflict ? That is 1079 00:39:55,960 --> 00:39:58,016 not to say that anyone is hoping for 1080 00:39:58,016 --> 00:40:00,127 those conflicts , but if the conflict 1081 00:40:00,127 --> 00:40:02,293 comes , we want to be ready to be able 1082 00:40:02,293 --> 00:40:04,790 to prevail . Absolutely , we've been 1083 00:40:04,790 --> 00:40:07,350 speaking a lot about governments and 1084 00:40:07,360 --> 00:40:09,582 sort of the official defense industrial 1085 00:40:09,582 --> 00:40:11,804 complex , but obviously there are a lot 1086 00:40:11,804 --> 00:40:13,860 of other elements of , of cyber um , 1087 00:40:13,860 --> 00:40:16,027 one thing I wanted to quickly ask just 1088 00:40:16,027 --> 00:40:18,193 because it came up yesterday , Senator 1089 00:40:18,193 --> 00:40:20,360 King , I was curious for your response 1090 00:40:20,360 --> 00:40:22,582 to the news that doJ is essentially not 1091 00:40:22,582 --> 00:40:24,360 going to aggressively prosecute 1092 00:40:24,360 --> 00:40:26,416 security researchers for , for doing 1093 00:40:26,510 --> 00:40:28,710 essentially worked to find 1094 00:40:28,720 --> 00:40:30,950 vulnerabilities in products . Do you 1095 00:40:30,950 --> 00:40:33,430 feel as if that's that's good news that 1096 00:40:33,440 --> 00:40:37,290 that this will kind of help to 1097 00:40:37,300 --> 00:40:41,300 secure us at home . Well , to be honest , 1098 00:40:41,300 --> 00:40:43,467 I didn't , I didn't see the story . So 1099 00:40:43,467 --> 00:40:45,300 I don't know exactly what you're 1100 00:40:45,300 --> 00:40:47,467 referring to , but if if if what we're 1101 00:40:47,467 --> 00:40:49,689 talking about is hackers for hire . I'm 1102 00:40:49,689 --> 00:40:52,440 all for it . I'm I beat on these guys 1103 00:40:52,440 --> 00:40:54,680 every time I'm in a in a in a meeting 1104 00:40:54,680 --> 00:40:58,040 about a red teaming . I think the only 1105 00:40:58,040 --> 00:41:00,800 way you can be sure that you're secure 1106 00:41:00,810 --> 00:41:03,010 is if you test it and it's better if 1107 00:41:03,010 --> 00:41:05,232 you test it with somebody outside who's 1108 00:41:05,232 --> 00:41:07,700 not , who's not in your organization 1109 00:41:07,940 --> 00:41:11,580 and uh everything from uh testing the 1110 00:41:11,580 --> 00:41:13,469 technology , but also testing the 1111 00:41:13,469 --> 00:41:15,524 people I have a friend in the energy 1112 00:41:15,524 --> 00:41:17,580 business , for example , who told me 1113 00:41:17,580 --> 00:41:19,636 that in his company , they send fake 1114 00:41:19,636 --> 00:41:21,858 phishing emails to their employees from 1115 00:41:21,858 --> 00:41:23,858 time to time . If you click on it , 1116 00:41:23,858 --> 00:41:25,969 once you get a reprimand twice you're 1117 00:41:25,969 --> 00:41:28,136 in the C E . O . S office , third time 1118 00:41:28,136 --> 00:41:31,030 you're gone . And uh so I think 1119 00:41:31,040 --> 00:41:34,570 outside uh testing and red teaming and 1120 00:41:34,580 --> 00:41:37,530 and hacking is is is absolutely 1121 00:41:37,530 --> 00:41:39,697 critical . You ask your ci , oh are we 1122 00:41:39,697 --> 00:41:41,919 secure ? Absolutely sure . Of course we 1123 00:41:41,919 --> 00:41:43,919 are , boss . Well , there's nothing 1124 00:41:43,919 --> 00:41:46,141 like having a skull and crossbones come 1125 00:41:46,141 --> 00:41:48,252 up on the boss's desk top a couple of 1126 00:41:48,252 --> 00:41:50,308 days later to to indicate that maybe 1127 00:41:50,308 --> 00:41:52,419 you're not as secure as you thought . 1128 00:41:52,419 --> 00:41:54,419 Uh and I think the only way to test 1129 00:41:54,419 --> 00:41:57,050 that is is by hacking . So if if if if 1130 00:41:57,050 --> 00:41:59,050 the Department of justice is saying 1131 00:41:59,050 --> 00:42:01,106 we're not gonna prosecute people who 1132 00:42:01,106 --> 00:42:03,328 are who are in a sense friendly hackers 1133 00:42:03,328 --> 00:42:05,610 or red Teamers , I think that's that's 1134 00:42:05,620 --> 00:42:08,200 I'm all for that . Well I'm glad I was 1135 00:42:08,200 --> 00:42:10,311 able to to share that news with you . 1136 00:42:10,311 --> 00:42:12,367 That was a big one yesterday . And I 1137 00:42:12,367 --> 00:42:14,533 just say to the senator , I think that 1138 00:42:14,533 --> 00:42:16,700 what you talked about is prevalent and 1139 00:42:16,700 --> 00:42:18,756 a lot of companies I know in our and 1140 00:42:18,756 --> 00:42:18,140 lucky martin we have what we call the 1141 00:42:18,140 --> 00:42:20,362 insider threat program . It's a part of 1142 00:42:20,362 --> 00:42:22,029 our Shields up . Look , we're 1143 00:42:22,029 --> 00:42:24,196 revisiting our , we really holding our 1144 00:42:24,196 --> 00:42:24,080 employees as accountable as they need 1145 00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:26,191 to be . As we look at to your point , 1146 00:42:26,191 --> 00:42:28,191 click once it's a problem . Picture 1147 00:42:28,191 --> 00:42:30,358 rights , it's really a problem . So we 1148 00:42:30,358 --> 00:42:32,480 were doing the same thing , 85% of 1149 00:42:32,480 --> 00:42:35,170 succession , a successful cyberattacks 1150 00:42:35,170 --> 00:42:37,300 starts with somebody clicking on a 1151 00:42:37,300 --> 00:42:40,910 phishing email or not properly , you 1152 00:42:40,910 --> 00:42:44,520 know , letting out there uh their their 1153 00:42:44,530 --> 00:42:48,400 their passwords . So this is I say 1154 00:42:48,410 --> 00:42:50,466 defense starts at the desktop and by 1155 00:42:50,466 --> 00:42:54,220 the way , let let jen easterly no king 1156 00:42:54,220 --> 00:42:56,510 said shields up . I think it's great . 1157 00:42:56,520 --> 00:42:59,130 I think that's a great motto and a and 1158 00:42:59,130 --> 00:43:02,740 a great uh label for us and that we've 1159 00:43:02,750 --> 00:43:04,417 got to get the private sector 1160 00:43:04,417 --> 00:43:06,583 understand how serious this is because 1161 00:43:06,583 --> 00:43:08,361 they're the target , 85% of the 1162 00:43:08,361 --> 00:43:10,583 critical infrastructure in this country 1163 00:43:10,583 --> 00:43:12,806 is in the private sector and they're in 1164 00:43:12,806 --> 00:43:14,972 the crosshairs , some are doing a very 1165 00:43:14,972 --> 00:43:16,917 good job . The electric really , I 1166 00:43:16,917 --> 00:43:19,139 think Through Narc is doing a very good 1167 00:43:19,139 --> 00:43:21,194 job , but but some of the others you 1168 00:43:21,194 --> 00:43:23,306 talked about the water industry . The 1169 00:43:23,306 --> 00:43:23,080 problem with the water industry , it's 1170 00:43:23,080 --> 00:43:25,247 so diverse . I think there's something 1171 00:43:25,247 --> 00:43:27,469 like 70,000 water companies in the us , 1172 00:43:27,469 --> 00:43:29,636 a lot of them are small and they don't 1173 00:43:29,636 --> 00:43:31,910 have a , you know , a cyber protection 1174 00:43:31,910 --> 00:43:34,230 director , they can't afford him . So 1175 00:43:34,500 --> 00:43:36,620 there's a , there's plenty to do and 1176 00:43:36,700 --> 00:43:40,370 and I am so glad that Cisa is being so 1177 00:43:40,370 --> 00:43:42,560 well led by gen and and the staff that 1178 00:43:42,560 --> 00:43:44,671 they have there and they're , they're 1179 00:43:44,671 --> 00:43:46,727 really moving out and developing the 1180 00:43:46,727 --> 00:43:48,560 relationships of trust that's so 1181 00:43:48,560 --> 00:43:50,504 critical with the private sector . 1182 00:43:50,504 --> 00:43:52,727 We've got to get the private sector and 1183 00:43:52,727 --> 00:43:54,893 the government into a place where they 1184 00:43:54,893 --> 00:43:57,060 trust one another and they will report 1185 00:43:57,060 --> 00:43:59,116 to one another , share information . 1186 00:43:59,116 --> 00:44:01,338 That's , that's an absolutely essential 1187 00:44:01,338 --> 00:44:03,616 part of of , of defending this country . 1188 00:44:03,890 --> 00:44:06,080 Okay . One other idea I would share to 1189 00:44:06,080 --> 00:44:08,080 piggyback off of the senators 1190 00:44:08,080 --> 00:44:09,969 discussion around the clicking on 1191 00:44:09,969 --> 00:44:12,580 emails is we have one further measure 1192 00:44:12,580 --> 00:44:14,636 that we take and I think it's really 1193 00:44:14,636 --> 00:44:16,858 important , especially with all the new 1194 00:44:16,858 --> 00:44:18,858 hackers coming to the bag , hackers 1195 00:44:18,858 --> 00:44:21,024 coming online is when you get an email 1196 00:44:21,024 --> 00:44:22,969 like that is one thing that's a to 1197 00:44:22,969 --> 00:44:25,024 click it . It's another thing to get 1198 00:44:25,024 --> 00:44:27,136 intelligence from it . And so what we 1199 00:44:27,136 --> 00:44:29,136 have is a icon where you can report 1200 00:44:29,136 --> 00:44:32,000 that and send that email to our city , 1201 00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:34,056 so to be able to take action , learn 1202 00:44:34,056 --> 00:44:36,167 from it , spread it through the , you 1203 00:44:36,167 --> 00:44:38,222 know , all of the networks we talked 1204 00:44:38,222 --> 00:44:40,278 about before so that we learn and we 1205 00:44:40,278 --> 00:44:42,333 can be more resilient being a little 1206 00:44:42,333 --> 00:44:44,611 bit paranoid is a good thing . Oh yeah , 1207 00:44:44,611 --> 00:44:46,833 I I actively over report those kinds of 1208 00:44:46,833 --> 00:44:48,833 things . Sometimes I'm like oh this 1209 00:44:48,833 --> 00:44:50,944 automated thing telling me to do some 1210 00:44:50,944 --> 00:44:53,111 kind of learning thing seems sketchy , 1211 00:44:53,111 --> 00:44:55,278 I don't want to do this , I'm going to 1212 00:44:55,278 --> 00:44:55,150 report it , make sure it's all good . 1213 00:44:55,150 --> 00:44:57,510 And then then I'll click through uh 1214 00:44:58,090 --> 00:44:59,868 within the space . Obviously in 1215 00:44:59,868 --> 00:45:01,868 addition to uh we were just talking 1216 00:45:01,868 --> 00:45:03,757 about kind of white hat hackers , 1217 00:45:03,757 --> 00:45:05,757 There's so many different non state 1218 00:45:05,757 --> 00:45:07,479 actors in this space . There's 1219 00:45:07,479 --> 00:45:09,646 surveillance companies , there's these 1220 00:45:09,646 --> 00:45:11,920 uh hackers for country in Ukraine there 1221 00:45:11,920 --> 00:45:14,031 there's just a lot going on with with 1222 00:45:14,031 --> 00:45:16,990 ransomware , bad bad actors make ai we 1223 00:45:16,990 --> 00:45:19,212 were talking a little bit earlier about 1224 00:45:19,212 --> 00:45:20,990 that and I'm curious how that's 1225 00:45:20,990 --> 00:45:23,157 affected sort of your threat landscape 1226 00:45:23,157 --> 00:45:25,434 and how you're looking at about . Yeah , 1227 00:45:25,434 --> 00:45:24,640 I think it's a real challenge cause I 1228 00:45:24,640 --> 00:45:26,751 think in the Defense Department we've 1229 00:45:26,751 --> 00:45:28,696 typically worried about the nation 1230 00:45:28,696 --> 00:45:28,480 state hackers . Um and I think that's 1231 00:45:28,480 --> 00:45:30,647 because we thought that those were the 1232 00:45:30,647 --> 00:45:32,869 most technical , the most sophisticated 1233 00:45:32,869 --> 00:45:35,091 and and the ones that have the greatest 1234 00:45:35,091 --> 00:45:37,147 impact . But I think what we've seen 1235 00:45:37,147 --> 00:45:39,258 over time with the development of the 1236 00:45:39,258 --> 00:45:41,424 non state actor , the sort of criminal 1237 00:45:41,424 --> 00:45:43,620 uh cyber market is that the 1238 00:45:43,630 --> 00:45:46,930 capabilities that were once reserved 1239 00:45:46,930 --> 00:45:49,330 for state actors are available on the 1240 00:45:49,330 --> 00:45:52,490 dark web for purchase , um which means 1241 00:45:52,490 --> 00:45:55,370 that a criminal hacker is able to 1242 00:45:55,370 --> 00:45:58,110 deliver the kind of disruptive effect 1243 00:45:58,450 --> 00:46:00,561 that could really impact the american 1244 00:46:00,561 --> 00:46:02,561 way of life as we saw with colonial 1245 00:46:02,561 --> 00:46:04,672 pipeline um that we once thought were 1246 00:46:04,672 --> 00:46:06,728 only things that nation state actors 1247 00:46:06,728 --> 00:46:08,950 could do , which really complicates our 1248 00:46:08,950 --> 00:46:11,061 business . Because when it , when you 1249 00:46:11,061 --> 00:46:13,283 go to attribution , when you talk about 1250 00:46:13,283 --> 00:46:15,506 deterrence , it's not always clear that 1251 00:46:15,506 --> 00:46:17,450 it is in fact going to be a nation 1252 00:46:17,450 --> 00:46:19,617 state hacker . And then there are some 1253 00:46:19,617 --> 00:46:21,450 countries that make themselves a 1254 00:46:21,450 --> 00:46:23,394 hospitable environment for some of 1255 00:46:23,394 --> 00:46:25,617 these criminal hackers . And how do you 1256 00:46:25,617 --> 00:46:27,839 then make decisions about how to impose 1257 00:46:27,839 --> 00:46:30,540 costs ? If you're not confident that it 1258 00:46:30,550 --> 00:46:33,900 is in fact a state actor , a criminal , 1259 00:46:33,910 --> 00:46:37,000 a criminal uh state actor pretending to 1260 00:46:37,000 --> 00:46:39,300 be a criminal . This is really a very 1261 00:46:39,300 --> 00:46:41,990 complicated um , environment and it's 1262 00:46:41,990 --> 00:46:44,046 one of these areas where and this is 1263 00:46:44,046 --> 00:46:46,101 where I will talk a little bit about 1264 00:46:46,101 --> 00:46:48,430 our offensive activity . We have um uh 1265 00:46:48,440 --> 00:46:49,996 you know , we have publicly 1266 00:46:49,996 --> 00:46:52,450 acknowledged that there are categories 1267 00:46:52,450 --> 00:46:54,672 of criminal actors who are capabilities 1268 00:46:54,672 --> 00:46:56,506 are sophisticated enough that we 1269 00:46:56,506 --> 00:46:59,240 consider them . Um the targets that we 1270 00:46:59,240 --> 00:47:01,530 might might choose to disrupt . I'm not 1271 00:47:01,530 --> 00:47:03,860 going to talk about who they probably 1272 00:47:03,860 --> 00:47:05,916 know who they are . We're coming for 1273 00:47:05,916 --> 00:47:09,550 them . Um but on this 1274 00:47:09,560 --> 00:47:11,960 we have very strong partnerships with 1275 00:47:11,960 --> 00:47:14,071 law enforcement because at the end of 1276 00:47:14,071 --> 00:47:16,016 the day , many of these people are 1277 00:47:16,016 --> 00:47:18,182 motivated by money . They're in it for 1278 00:47:18,182 --> 00:47:20,404 the ransom . Um they're not necessarily 1279 00:47:20,404 --> 00:47:22,571 in it for harming , you know , for the 1280 00:47:22,571 --> 00:47:24,682 nation state ends . And so we need to 1281 00:47:24,682 --> 00:47:26,349 sit side by side with our FBI 1282 00:47:26,349 --> 00:47:28,349 colleagues , they're welcome to sit 1283 00:47:28,349 --> 00:47:30,516 with us at Fort Meade , um and we work 1284 00:47:30,516 --> 00:47:32,682 back and forth seamlessly to determine 1285 00:47:32,682 --> 00:47:35,550 who's best able to go after the target . 1286 00:47:35,560 --> 00:47:37,449 Especially as Senator King says , 1287 00:47:37,449 --> 00:47:39,870 sometimes they are they may be located 1288 00:47:39,870 --> 00:47:41,814 in ST Petersburg , but they may be 1289 00:47:41,814 --> 00:47:43,759 using uh infrastructure inside the 1290 00:47:43,759 --> 00:47:45,981 United States for us to be able to work 1291 00:47:45,981 --> 00:47:48,970 back and forth with law enforcement 1292 00:47:48,980 --> 00:47:50,880 allows us to make sure that the 1293 00:47:50,890 --> 00:47:53,760 adversary can't find safe haven in the 1294 00:47:53,760 --> 00:47:55,927 United States , that we can share that 1295 00:47:55,927 --> 00:47:58,149 information and where it's happening in 1296 00:47:58,149 --> 00:47:59,760 the United States , then law 1297 00:47:59,760 --> 00:48:01,982 enforcement can disrupt . And and we've 1298 00:48:01,982 --> 00:48:03,871 actually seen our law enforcement 1299 00:48:03,871 --> 00:48:05,930 colleagues become very creative and 1300 00:48:05,930 --> 00:48:08,730 very innovative in their use of lawful 1301 00:48:08,730 --> 00:48:10,841 tools to be able to go after this , I 1302 00:48:10,841 --> 00:48:13,008 think you may have seen some reporting 1303 00:48:13,008 --> 00:48:15,119 on the FBI's ability to seize malware 1304 00:48:15,119 --> 00:48:17,470 that the Russian Gr you had inside the 1305 00:48:17,470 --> 00:48:20,140 United States . That's something where 1306 00:48:20,190 --> 00:48:22,023 you don't want the Department of 1307 00:48:22,023 --> 00:48:24,134 Defense on the U . S . Networks . But 1308 00:48:24,134 --> 00:48:26,357 where we are able to work hand in glove 1309 00:48:26,357 --> 00:48:28,468 with our law enforcement colleagues , 1310 00:48:28,468 --> 00:48:30,523 we can do more to protect the United 1311 00:48:30,523 --> 00:48:32,746 States and rob with the sheer number of 1312 00:48:32,746 --> 00:48:34,912 different kinds of threats coming from 1313 00:48:34,912 --> 00:48:36,634 state , non state , you know , 1314 00:48:36,634 --> 00:48:38,746 somewhere in between kind of actors . 1315 00:48:38,746 --> 00:48:38,260 How is that affecting kind of the 1316 00:48:38,260 --> 00:48:40,316 implementation of protecting against 1317 00:48:40,316 --> 00:48:42,427 them . Well , I mean , you begin with 1318 00:48:42,427 --> 00:48:44,593 the premise that you don't necessarily 1319 00:48:44,593 --> 00:48:46,538 know whether you're dealing with a 1320 00:48:46,538 --> 00:48:48,593 nation state actor or whether you're 1321 00:48:48,593 --> 00:48:48,590 dealing with a sophisticated criminal 1322 00:48:48,590 --> 00:48:51,540 groups , we often see in the cyber 1323 00:48:51,540 --> 00:48:54,710 world , many nation state adversaries 1324 00:48:54,710 --> 00:48:57,240 will disguise their behavior as 1325 00:48:57,240 --> 00:48:59,240 criminal activity . They will claim 1326 00:48:59,240 --> 00:49:01,430 this as a ransomware attack . You just 1327 00:49:01,430 --> 00:49:03,570 can't pay the ransom and get your 1328 00:49:03,570 --> 00:49:05,514 systems unlocked . They will never 1329 00:49:05,514 --> 00:49:07,737 decrypt them . They don't even have the 1330 00:49:07,737 --> 00:49:09,903 code . We've seen the Russians do that 1331 00:49:09,903 --> 00:49:12,250 on several occasions with North Korea . 1332 00:49:12,260 --> 00:49:15,330 It's a state actor who is often engaged 1333 00:49:15,330 --> 00:49:17,370 in cyber crime for the purpose of 1334 00:49:17,370 --> 00:49:19,640 generating revenue for the state of 1335 00:49:19,640 --> 00:49:22,270 North Korea . And so from our 1336 00:49:22,270 --> 00:49:24,326 perspective , when you're looking at 1337 00:49:24,326 --> 00:49:26,492 the defense , it doesn't really matter 1338 00:49:26,492 --> 00:49:29,210 whether it's a nation state adversary 1339 00:49:29,220 --> 00:49:31,590 or a very sophisticated criminal groups , 1340 00:49:32,170 --> 00:49:34,114 we can figure that out later . The 1341 00:49:34,114 --> 00:49:36,059 attribution can happen through the 1342 00:49:36,059 --> 00:49:38,170 intelligence community , nobody could 1343 00:49:38,170 --> 00:49:40,170 figure out whether they're going to 1344 00:49:40,170 --> 00:49:42,503 respond . But from a defensive strategy , 1345 00:49:42,503 --> 00:49:45,050 we've got to treat all these groups as 1346 00:49:45,060 --> 00:49:47,116 adversaries of the United States and 1347 00:49:47,116 --> 00:49:49,116 ensure that we've got collaboration 1348 00:49:49,116 --> 00:49:51,060 across the private sector and with 1349 00:49:51,060 --> 00:49:52,893 government so that we're sharing 1350 00:49:52,893 --> 00:49:54,893 information on threats so that they 1351 00:49:54,893 --> 00:49:57,560 can't use the same tactics , the same 1352 00:49:57,570 --> 00:49:59,490 techniques , the same procedures 1353 00:49:59,500 --> 00:50:02,470 against thousands of companies and not 1354 00:50:02,480 --> 00:50:05,750 be detected and be able to have that 1355 00:50:05,750 --> 00:50:08,210 tremendous offensive advantage that 1356 00:50:08,210 --> 00:50:10,270 they enjoy today . So our goal is to 1357 00:50:10,270 --> 00:50:13,780 get to a point where in order to be 1358 00:50:14,660 --> 00:50:17,840 one of us , you've got to be all of us , 1359 00:50:18,660 --> 00:50:21,980 so that you've got to be so good that 1360 00:50:21,980 --> 00:50:24,220 you're not going to distribute your 1361 00:50:24,220 --> 00:50:27,400 attacks , Nobody will detect it , 1362 00:50:28,330 --> 00:50:30,497 if anybody does , that will get shared 1363 00:50:30,497 --> 00:50:32,552 back with the government . That will 1364 00:50:32,552 --> 00:50:34,719 get shared back across your industry . 1365 00:50:34,719 --> 00:50:36,941 That will get pushed out so that we can 1366 00:50:36,941 --> 00:50:38,941 start creating something that looks 1367 00:50:38,941 --> 00:50:41,219 like herd immunity and that's the goal . 1368 00:50:41,219 --> 00:50:43,108 Yeah , it does seem like the best 1369 00:50:43,108 --> 00:50:45,108 possible goals making life harder . 1370 00:50:45,108 --> 00:50:44,870 You're never going to completely stop 1371 00:50:44,880 --> 00:50:47,850 everything . Um I there's about eight 1372 00:50:47,850 --> 00:50:50,017 minutes left . I had one more question 1373 00:50:50,017 --> 00:50:52,017 for Stephanie , but I'd love to get 1374 00:50:52,017 --> 00:50:54,128 everybody thinking about if they want 1375 00:50:54,128 --> 00:50:56,350 to ask the last couple of questions . I 1376 00:50:56,350 --> 00:50:55,830 can give the last couple of minutes to 1377 00:50:55,830 --> 00:50:58,270 the group . Um but Stephanie , there's 1378 00:50:58,270 --> 00:51:00,720 also this gray area too . I mean , we 1379 00:51:00,720 --> 00:51:02,942 hardly go through a day without hearing 1380 00:51:02,942 --> 00:51:05,770 about the nSO groups of the world about 1381 00:51:06,060 --> 00:51:08,490 Clearview , ai about companies that 1382 00:51:08,560 --> 00:51:11,110 perhaps receive a bit of scrutiny based 1383 00:51:11,110 --> 00:51:13,332 on the people that they work with , the 1384 00:51:13,332 --> 00:51:15,388 things that they do . I'm curious if 1385 00:51:15,388 --> 00:51:17,610 you feel like Lockheed kind of provides 1386 00:51:17,610 --> 00:51:19,721 an alternative to that model . Um and 1387 00:51:19,721 --> 00:51:21,832 whether or not you feel like you lock 1388 00:51:21,832 --> 00:51:23,777 it kind of demonstrates a standard 1389 00:51:23,777 --> 00:51:25,777 that's kind of above that . So what 1390 00:51:25,777 --> 00:51:27,943 I'll what I'll share is that for those 1391 00:51:27,943 --> 00:51:30,166 kinds of companies that are kind of the 1392 00:51:30,166 --> 00:51:29,770 ones you don't want to do with were 1393 00:51:29,770 --> 00:51:31,714 actually required as a part of our 1394 00:51:31,714 --> 00:51:35,260 process um to vet all of our supply 1395 00:51:35,260 --> 00:51:37,700 chain against any of those and we have 1396 00:51:37,700 --> 00:51:40,080 to certify that with every proposal 1397 00:51:40,080 --> 00:51:42,460 that we put forward to make sure that 1398 00:51:42,460 --> 00:51:45,050 we are completely protected from a 1399 00:51:45,060 --> 00:51:46,782 corporate perspective and more 1400 00:51:46,782 --> 00:51:48,838 important from the customers that we 1401 00:51:48,838 --> 00:51:51,060 serve . So I think we , I think we do a 1402 00:51:51,060 --> 00:51:53,860 good job awesome . Well , I'd love to 1403 00:51:53,870 --> 00:51:56,037 give the last minutes to the crowd . I 1404 00:51:56,037 --> 00:51:58,148 think there's a couple of mic runners 1405 00:51:58,148 --> 00:52:00,370 and I see a couple of hands here . Um , 1406 00:52:00,370 --> 00:52:02,426 are there , yep , folks are coming ? 1407 00:52:02,950 --> 00:52:05,006 Looks like I'm making you run really 1408 00:52:05,006 --> 00:52:08,860 far . We've got one right here . Does 1409 00:52:08,860 --> 00:52:12,780 so does someone have mix anybody that's 1410 00:52:12,780 --> 00:52:16,180 right here actually . 1411 00:52:17,650 --> 00:52:20,330 Thank you . Um , we've talked a lot 1412 00:52:20,330 --> 00:52:23,140 about competition with china in terms 1413 00:52:23,140 --> 00:52:25,860 of technology . Um , but I want to ask 1414 00:52:25,860 --> 00:52:28,450 about competition in terms of people 1415 00:52:28,460 --> 00:52:31,870 specifically talent retention . Um , 1416 00:52:31,880 --> 00:52:35,730 we've seen the stay rate of um , 1417 00:52:35,740 --> 00:52:38,030 immigrants with graduate degrees in 1418 00:52:38,030 --> 00:52:41,000 stem fields , uh , from china and India 1419 00:52:41,010 --> 00:52:43,580 declining over the past few years . We 1420 00:52:43,580 --> 00:52:46,370 also know that tens of thousands , 1421 00:52:46,370 --> 00:52:48,203 perhaps hundreds of thousands of 1422 00:52:48,203 --> 00:52:50,560 educated Russians are currently fleeing 1423 00:52:50,560 --> 00:52:53,380 Russia . Um , and we know that this is 1424 00:52:53,380 --> 00:52:55,950 important for our own defense purposes 1425 00:52:55,950 --> 00:52:58,330 as well as innovation here in America . 1426 00:52:58,330 --> 00:53:00,380 So I'd like to know what 1427 00:53:01,750 --> 00:53:04,160 tools or incentives we should be 1428 00:53:04,170 --> 00:53:06,720 prioritizing to strengthen talent 1429 00:53:06,720 --> 00:53:08,831 retention here in the United States . 1430 00:53:09,950 --> 00:53:11,894 This is something that we actually 1431 00:53:11,894 --> 00:53:14,061 worry a lot about in the Department of 1432 00:53:14,061 --> 00:53:15,950 Defense because we pay government 1433 00:53:15,950 --> 00:53:17,839 salaries , um , and Stephanie can 1434 00:53:17,839 --> 00:53:19,839 afford to pay our people a lot more 1435 00:53:19,839 --> 00:53:22,061 money . So retaining talent is actually 1436 00:53:22,061 --> 00:53:24,228 quite difficult and how we think about 1437 00:53:24,228 --> 00:53:26,339 uh , service requirements , retention 1438 00:53:26,339 --> 00:53:28,450 bonuses . We need to do a lot more in 1439 00:53:28,450 --> 00:53:31,220 this area to make sure that we are for 1440 00:53:31,220 --> 00:53:33,220 the people that we train that we're 1441 00:53:33,220 --> 00:53:35,164 keeping them and getting return on 1442 00:53:35,164 --> 00:53:37,331 investment for that before they go out 1443 00:53:37,331 --> 00:53:39,387 and join the uh , you know , defense 1444 00:53:39,387 --> 00:53:41,609 contractor , defense industrial base or 1445 00:53:41,609 --> 00:53:43,776 the tech community more broadly . So I 1446 00:53:43,776 --> 00:53:45,942 think there is a lot more work that we 1447 00:53:45,942 --> 00:53:45,780 need to do in this area to understand 1448 00:53:45,790 --> 00:53:47,640 where we have those retention 1449 00:53:47,640 --> 00:53:49,807 chokepoints , what kinds of incentives 1450 00:53:49,807 --> 00:53:51,980 we can offer . We do have a mission in 1451 00:53:51,980 --> 00:53:53,813 the Defense department that that 1452 00:53:53,813 --> 00:53:55,813 Stephanie can't offer , which , you 1453 00:53:55,813 --> 00:53:57,924 know , in the offensive cyber arena . 1454 00:53:57,924 --> 00:54:01,840 Um , I can partner with , but , but 1455 00:54:01,850 --> 00:54:04,072 you know , there are , there are places 1456 00:54:04,072 --> 00:54:06,294 where , you know , people will come for 1457 00:54:06,294 --> 00:54:08,128 the mission . I do though on the 1458 00:54:08,128 --> 00:54:11,300 question of uh , of talent and , and 1459 00:54:11,300 --> 00:54:14,920 stem and immigration . This is 1460 00:54:14,920 --> 00:54:16,753 something that's , that's really 1461 00:54:16,753 --> 00:54:20,200 personal to me . Um , you know , 1462 00:54:20,210 --> 00:54:23,060 in the after World War two , this 1463 00:54:23,060 --> 00:54:26,460 country was in a space race with the 1464 00:54:26,460 --> 00:54:29,280 Russians . And at that time we 1465 00:54:29,290 --> 00:54:31,512 recognized we were in a global race for 1466 00:54:31,512 --> 00:54:34,370 talent and we took the best talent that 1467 00:54:34,370 --> 00:54:36,537 we could have regardless of where they 1468 00:54:36,537 --> 00:54:38,537 were from , whether that was actual 1469 00:54:38,537 --> 00:54:41,870 nazis or people like my grandfather who 1470 00:54:41,870 --> 00:54:44,710 was a rocket scientist , um , from 1471 00:54:44,710 --> 00:54:48,500 china and my grandfather built the 1472 00:54:48,500 --> 00:54:50,667 retrograde engine on the bottom of the 1473 00:54:50,667 --> 00:54:52,778 lunar lander because it was important 1474 00:54:52,778 --> 00:54:54,833 to win that race . And so I think to 1475 00:54:54,833 --> 00:54:57,056 the question of what are we doing about 1476 00:54:57,056 --> 00:54:59,278 stem from India and china , we are in a 1477 00:54:59,278 --> 00:55:01,389 global race for talent and we need to 1478 00:55:01,389 --> 00:55:03,333 be able to say that America is the 1479 00:55:03,333 --> 00:55:05,500 place for the best people to come , to 1480 00:55:05,500 --> 00:55:07,556 be able to win that . And and and we 1481 00:55:07,556 --> 00:55:09,778 just need to get after that . And can I 1482 00:55:09,778 --> 00:55:11,833 just add to that ? I have to jump in 1483 00:55:11,833 --> 00:55:14,000 here and say you're absolutely right . 1484 00:55:14,000 --> 00:55:16,370 And and we're we are Just absolutely 1485 00:55:16,370 --> 00:55:18,592 shooting ourselves in the foot . In the 1486 00:55:18,592 --> 00:55:20,814 last year of the Obama administration , 1487 00:55:20,814 --> 00:55:22,850 there was something like 1.9 or 1.2 1488 00:55:22,910 --> 00:55:26,760 million legal immigrants . And 1489 00:55:26,980 --> 00:55:28,647 in the last year of the Trump 1490 00:55:28,647 --> 00:55:30,869 administration there was something like 1491 00:55:30,869 --> 00:55:33,370 200,000 that's a million people that we 1492 00:55:33,370 --> 00:55:35,910 could use right now in our workforce on 1493 00:55:35,910 --> 00:55:38,820 all levels including stamps . And 1494 00:55:38,830 --> 00:55:42,170 uh , this this is did you ever stop and 1495 00:55:42,170 --> 00:55:44,337 think about it . It's pretty good that 1496 00:55:44,337 --> 00:55:46,337 we're a country that people want to 1497 00:55:46,337 --> 00:55:48,170 break into . There are plenty of 1498 00:55:48,170 --> 00:55:50,170 countries in this world that people 1499 00:55:50,170 --> 00:55:52,392 want to break out of . And I understand 1500 00:55:52,392 --> 00:55:54,559 about illegal immigration , but we are 1501 00:55:54,559 --> 00:55:56,726 allowing the illegal and the issues at 1502 00:55:56,726 --> 00:55:58,726 the southern border to be conflated 1503 00:55:58,726 --> 00:56:00,948 with legal immigration , which has been 1504 00:56:00,948 --> 00:56:03,059 the lifeblood of this country and our 1505 00:56:03,059 --> 00:56:04,892 economy uh , forever , literally 1506 00:56:04,892 --> 00:56:06,948 forever . I met with the new centcom 1507 00:56:06,948 --> 00:56:09,281 and supreme commander of NATO yesterday . 1508 00:56:09,330 --> 00:56:11,970 His father was an italian immigrant and 1509 00:56:11,970 --> 00:56:14,026 they're just story after story after 1510 00:56:14,026 --> 00:56:16,260 story about nobel prizes and , and you 1511 00:56:16,260 --> 00:56:18,427 know , all of the work that immigrants 1512 00:56:18,427 --> 00:56:20,649 have contributed and we are , we are if 1513 00:56:20,649 --> 00:56:22,871 we get caught up in this anti immigrant 1514 00:56:22,871 --> 00:56:25,038 fervor , which by the way it goes back 1515 00:56:25,038 --> 00:56:27,260 to the beginning of the country , every 1516 00:56:27,260 --> 00:56:29,316 wave of immigrants wants to pull the 1517 00:56:29,316 --> 00:56:31,538 bridge up behind them . But if we are , 1518 00:56:31,538 --> 00:56:33,760 we are just absolutely compromising the 1519 00:56:33,760 --> 00:56:35,704 future of the country , immigrants 1520 00:56:35,704 --> 00:56:35,680 bring with them different cultures , 1521 00:56:35,680 --> 00:56:38,040 different ideas , different education , 1522 00:56:38,040 --> 00:56:40,450 different , different talents . And 1523 00:56:40,450 --> 00:56:42,783 they've always enriched the country and , 1524 00:56:42,783 --> 00:56:45,310 and we've got to somehow educate people 1525 00:56:45,310 --> 00:56:47,840 that immigration isn't all about the 1526 00:56:47,840 --> 00:56:49,970 texas border , it's about a lot of 1527 00:56:49,970 --> 00:56:52,137 other things and we have to figure out 1528 00:56:52,137 --> 00:56:54,820 how to do it successfully and legally 1529 00:56:54,820 --> 00:56:56,764 and secure the southern border . I 1530 00:56:56,764 --> 00:56:59,850 understand that , but uh , but I really 1531 00:56:59,850 --> 00:57:02,190 worry that all the emotion and politics 1532 00:57:02,190 --> 00:57:05,620 around immigration is choking off one 1533 00:57:05,620 --> 00:57:08,350 of the great resources that's , that's 1534 00:57:08,350 --> 00:57:10,730 made this country what it is . So I 1535 00:57:10,730 --> 00:57:11,730 went , I wanted , 1536 00:57:16,830 --> 00:57:18,719 I wanted to follow up on what you 1537 00:57:18,719 --> 00:57:22,660 shared media also , you know , we in 1538 00:57:23,030 --> 00:57:26,560 the defense industry , the skill sets 1539 00:57:26,560 --> 00:57:29,990 that we we require are largely in stem 1540 00:57:30,000 --> 00:57:33,260 and there are just not enough people , 1541 00:57:33,350 --> 00:57:35,480 young people who have an interest in 1542 00:57:35,480 --> 00:57:37,790 pursuing a career in stem in this 1543 00:57:37,790 --> 00:57:40,450 country . We have a growing , but 1544 00:57:40,450 --> 00:57:42,460 they're the least likely people to 1545 00:57:42,830 --> 00:57:44,830 major in stem , which is why I call 1546 00:57:44,830 --> 00:57:46,830 myself an accidental engineer . I'm 1547 00:57:46,830 --> 00:57:48,997 very passionate about this are women , 1548 00:57:49,130 --> 00:57:52,070 blacks and Hispanics and these are 1549 00:57:52,070 --> 00:57:54,126 growing populations in our country . 1550 00:57:54,126 --> 00:57:57,290 And so we have to start my belief as 1551 00:57:57,300 --> 00:58:01,080 early as we possibly can to let young 1552 00:58:01,080 --> 00:58:03,380 people know that stem is fun . That 1553 00:58:03,380 --> 00:58:05,930 stem is rewarding . You can , you can 1554 00:58:05,930 --> 00:58:08,170 do so much and make a difference if you 1555 00:58:08,170 --> 00:58:10,460 choose stem and whatever whatever area 1556 00:58:10,460 --> 00:58:12,127 you are . And we've got to be 1557 00:58:12,127 --> 00:58:14,238 persistent , starting in kindergarten 1558 00:58:14,238 --> 00:58:16,293 and going all the way through them . 1559 00:58:16,293 --> 00:58:18,250 And we have , we just closed the 1560 00:58:18,260 --> 00:58:20,420 application period for stem 1561 00:58:20,420 --> 00:58:22,980 scholarships . We have to , We give 200 1562 00:58:22,980 --> 00:58:25,920 stem scholarships a year to people in 1563 00:58:25,920 --> 00:58:28,142 the workforce and we don't require that 1564 00:58:28,142 --> 00:58:30,309 they come and work for Lockheed Martin 1565 00:58:30,309 --> 00:58:30,110 because we're trying to build a 1566 00:58:30,110 --> 00:58:33,050 pipeline for our industry in the us , 1567 00:58:33,050 --> 00:58:35,920 we have partnerships to my point about 1568 00:58:35,930 --> 00:58:37,930 blacks and Hispanics and women . We 1569 00:58:37,930 --> 00:58:40,152 have partnerships With minority serving 1570 00:58:40,152 --> 00:58:42,041 institutions . In fact , Lockheed 1571 00:58:42,041 --> 00:58:44,152 Martin is the number one historically 1572 00:58:44,152 --> 00:58:46,208 black college and university sponsor 1573 00:58:46,208 --> 00:58:45,810 for seven years in a row because we 1574 00:58:45,810 --> 00:58:49,230 partner with the engineering schools in 1575 00:58:49,230 --> 00:58:52,490 these colleges and we're building uh 1576 00:58:52,500 --> 00:58:54,278 partnerships and capability and 1577 00:58:54,278 --> 00:58:56,333 ultimately what comes out of that as 1578 00:58:56,333 --> 00:58:58,500 engineers for US . Engineers for you . 1579 00:58:58,500 --> 00:59:00,500 But you know , engineers across the 1580 00:59:00,500 --> 00:59:02,278 board and we have each of us in 1581 00:59:02,278 --> 00:59:04,000 industry and in government and 1582 00:59:04,000 --> 00:59:06,222 government supports these as well , has 1583 00:59:06,222 --> 00:59:08,444 to work to create more engineers and to 1584 00:59:08,444 --> 00:59:10,670 make this career as exciting to 1585 00:59:10,680 --> 00:59:12,847 understand that it's as exciting as it 1586 00:59:12,847 --> 00:59:14,902 can be and that it can literally can 1587 00:59:14,902 --> 00:59:17,013 make a difference for the world , but 1588 00:59:17,013 --> 00:59:18,958 you can also make a difference for 1589 00:59:18,958 --> 00:59:21,013 yourself and for your family and for 1590 00:59:21,013 --> 00:59:24,150 your communities perfectly timed . 1591 00:59:25,220 --> 00:59:28,030 And on that inspiring note , we are out 1592 00:59:28,030 --> 00:59:30,141 of time and I really want to thank my 1593 00:59:30,141 --> 00:59:32,141 panelists for such a great and wide 1594 00:59:32,141 --> 00:59:34,197 ranging conversation . I didn't feel 1595 00:59:34,197 --> 00:59:36,086 like an hour , felt like a couple 1596 00:59:36,086 --> 00:59:38,030 minutes , so thank you so much and 1597 00:59:38,030 --> 00:59:39,440 thanks everybody .