1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:01,807 we're ready to start our next 2 00:00:01,807 --> 00:00:03,973 conversation and I'm going to turn the 3 00:00:03,973 --> 00:00:06,196 microphone over to ko ki Jackson who is 4 00:00:06,196 --> 00:00:08,362 our speaker on Tuesday morning . He is 5 00:00:08,362 --> 00:00:07,550 the senior vice president and general 6 00:00:07,550 --> 00:00:09,606 manager for meters national security 7 00:00:09,606 --> 00:00:10,960 sector . Thanks Cokie 8 00:00:17,140 --> 00:00:19,660 afternoon . Mhm 9 00:00:21,040 --> 00:00:24,080 So Mr is a not for profit corporation 10 00:00:24,080 --> 00:00:26,710 that has the mission of solving 11 00:00:26,710 --> 00:00:28,920 problems for a safer world , more 12 00:00:28,920 --> 00:00:31,330 relevant to today's discussion . Mr was 13 00:00:31,330 --> 00:00:34,100 founded in 1958 to develop the nation's 14 00:00:34,100 --> 00:00:36,900 first automated air defense system for 15 00:00:36,900 --> 00:00:39,680 the newly created North American Air 16 00:00:39,690 --> 00:00:42,640 Defense Command or NORAD . NORAD is 17 00:00:42,640 --> 00:00:44,640 integrated aligned with us Northern 18 00:00:44,640 --> 00:00:47,390 Command , which was established in 2002 19 00:00:47,420 --> 00:00:49,142 to defend the United States in 20 00:00:49,142 --> 00:00:51,710 cooperation with and in support of our 21 00:00:51,710 --> 00:00:54,760 allies , partners and civil authorities . 22 00:00:55,740 --> 00:00:58,290 I'm pleased to introduce a fireside 23 00:00:58,290 --> 00:01:00,450 chat with General Glenn Van Herk 24 00:01:00,840 --> 00:01:03,660 Commander , NORAD and North com . 25 00:01:04,240 --> 00:01:06,184 General van Herk has served in the 26 00:01:06,184 --> 00:01:08,240 United States Air Force for 35 years 27 00:01:08,240 --> 00:01:12,240 with more than 3200 flight hours as a 28 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:14,720 pilot flight examiner and weapons 29 00:01:14,720 --> 00:01:17,920 school instructor . Previously , he 30 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:20,300 served as director of the joint staff 31 00:01:20,380 --> 00:01:23,690 at the pentagon . General Van Herk will 32 00:01:23,690 --> 00:01:25,690 be in conversation today with steve 33 00:01:25,690 --> 00:01:27,968 Clemons , Founding editor of Semaphore , 34 00:01:28,050 --> 00:01:30,660 a new global news platform . General 35 00:01:31,040 --> 00:01:33,262 steve the floor is yours . Thank you so 36 00:01:33,262 --> 00:01:36,470 much . It's great to be with you . You 37 00:01:36,470 --> 00:01:38,637 know , I would tell everybody that one 38 00:01:38,637 --> 00:01:40,748 thing I'll just take off table real , 39 00:01:40,748 --> 00:01:40,440 you know real quick is you know , many 40 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:42,273 of you know , NORAD is the santa 41 00:01:42,273 --> 00:01:44,440 tracker , I know that I know that you 42 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:46,440 know the santa tracker is something 43 00:01:46,440 --> 00:01:48,662 that's getting around in the news every 44 00:01:48,662 --> 00:01:50,829 year , every christmas . But I want to 45 00:01:50,829 --> 00:01:50,510 be serious from when I started my 46 00:01:50,510 --> 00:01:53,110 career as a young guy many years ago at 47 00:01:53,110 --> 00:01:55,388 the rand corporation at the rand U . C . 48 00:01:55,388 --> 00:01:57,443 L . A Center for the study of soviet 49 00:01:57,443 --> 00:01:59,443 international behavior law . It was 50 00:01:59,443 --> 00:02:01,554 called Sib and we used to you know be 51 00:02:01,554 --> 00:02:03,721 have a facility and talking about arms 52 00:02:03,721 --> 00:02:06,054 control slick ums Glick ums I C . B . M . 53 00:02:06,054 --> 00:02:09,210 S and how important air defense and 54 00:02:09,220 --> 00:02:11,220 over the horizon radar and defenses 55 00:02:11,220 --> 00:02:13,180 were . And then the soviet union 56 00:02:13,180 --> 00:02:16,170 disappeared . Then Russia seemed to be 57 00:02:16,170 --> 00:02:18,281 a friend for a while . Then it wasn't 58 00:02:18,281 --> 00:02:20,490 all that seems to have come back now 59 00:02:20,490 --> 00:02:22,890 today and as it's come back , I'm 60 00:02:22,900 --> 00:02:26,110 really interested in what your 61 00:02:26,110 --> 00:02:28,110 dashboard looks like . And I should 62 00:02:28,110 --> 00:02:30,054 tell our audience just to make the 63 00:02:30,054 --> 00:02:32,277 point you wear to command hats , you're 64 00:02:32,277 --> 00:02:34,540 a double hatted commander with two 65 00:02:34,540 --> 00:02:36,630 separate sets of nightmares to worry 66 00:02:36,630 --> 00:02:39,260 about . So what does that strategic 67 00:02:39,260 --> 00:02:41,290 dashboard look like ? And is it 68 00:02:41,290 --> 00:02:43,650 bifurcated ? And are you when you have 69 00:02:43,650 --> 00:02:45,706 your nightmares have to have them on 70 00:02:45,706 --> 00:02:47,872 different sides of your brain ? Well , 71 00:02:47,872 --> 00:02:50,206 first of all , if I do have a nightmare , 72 00:02:50,206 --> 00:02:52,428 it is failing at tracking santa claus . 73 00:02:52,428 --> 00:02:54,650 So I can't can't have that happen . But 74 00:02:54,650 --> 00:02:56,761 uh so what what I like to tell people 75 00:02:56,761 --> 00:02:58,594 is the two commands privilege to 76 00:02:58,594 --> 00:03:00,761 command to fantastic ones are separate 77 00:03:00,761 --> 00:03:03,300 separate lines authorities . Uh bosses . 78 00:03:03,300 --> 00:03:05,690 Canadian side U . S . Side through the 79 00:03:05,690 --> 00:03:07,801 secretary on both of them through the 80 00:03:07,940 --> 00:03:09,829 chief of the Defense staff to the 81 00:03:09,829 --> 00:03:11,884 Minister . The Prime Minister on the 82 00:03:11,884 --> 00:03:14,150 NORAD side as well . But they're really 83 00:03:14,160 --> 00:03:16,740 inseparable commands And so as I go 84 00:03:16,740 --> 00:03:18,962 about my day to day business and when I 85 00:03:18,962 --> 00:03:20,962 talk here today , what you're gonna 86 00:03:20,962 --> 00:03:23,129 find is I will be wearing both hats in 87 00:03:23,129 --> 00:03:25,129 the in the span of a conversation . 88 00:03:25,129 --> 00:03:27,351 Talk about multiple roles and you won't 89 00:03:27,351 --> 00:03:29,240 even know when I'm talking as the 90 00:03:29,240 --> 00:03:31,407 commander of NORAD or the Commander of 91 00:03:31,407 --> 00:03:33,407 United States Northern Command . So 92 00:03:33,407 --> 00:03:33,260 when you're in this you're sort of 93 00:03:33,260 --> 00:03:35,790 thinking about the roles and functions 94 00:03:35,790 --> 00:03:37,790 you have . What are the up at night 95 00:03:37,790 --> 00:03:40,130 issues that you had last night about 96 00:03:40,140 --> 00:03:43,060 our safety here in aspen and around the 97 00:03:43,060 --> 00:03:45,280 country . Well I sleep pretty good at 98 00:03:45,280 --> 00:03:47,502 night steve I'll be honest with you and 99 00:03:47,502 --> 00:03:49,724 you should too . And all of you , we've 100 00:03:49,724 --> 00:03:51,836 got a fantastic strategic deterrent . 101 00:03:51,836 --> 00:03:53,947 The finest conventional forces on the 102 00:03:53,947 --> 00:03:55,947 planet . What I would tell you , it 103 00:03:55,947 --> 00:03:58,169 challenges us is the unknown . And what 104 00:03:58,169 --> 00:03:59,947 I mean by the unknown is domain 105 00:03:59,947 --> 00:04:02,113 awareness challenges . The first one I 106 00:04:02,113 --> 00:04:04,002 would tell you is undersea domain 107 00:04:04,002 --> 00:04:05,836 awareness as competitors develop 108 00:04:05,940 --> 00:04:07,990 capabilities . The challenges of 109 00:04:07,990 --> 00:04:10,290 monitoring submarines in the future 110 00:04:10,440 --> 00:04:13,090 will only grow same thing for domain 111 00:04:13,090 --> 00:04:15,150 awareness challenges for hypersonic 112 00:04:15,540 --> 00:04:17,762 missiles , hypersonic cruise missiles , 113 00:04:17,860 --> 00:04:20,120 cyber domain awareness is a significant 114 00:04:20,120 --> 00:04:23,200 challenge . So what I don't know is a 115 00:04:23,200 --> 00:04:25,367 challenge . Now the good news is we're 116 00:04:25,367 --> 00:04:27,533 working to fix this and the department 117 00:04:27,533 --> 00:04:29,700 did a fantastic job in the budget this 118 00:04:29,700 --> 00:04:31,589 year , the President's budget for 119 00:04:31,589 --> 00:04:33,644 domain awareness . There's four over 120 00:04:33,644 --> 00:04:35,867 the horizon radars in the budget . So I 121 00:04:35,867 --> 00:04:37,478 look forward to that . NORAD 122 00:04:37,478 --> 00:04:39,478 modernization minister and non just 123 00:04:39,478 --> 00:04:41,644 announced their plan with two over the 124 00:04:41,644 --> 00:04:43,811 horizon radars for the polar aspect of 125 00:04:43,811 --> 00:04:45,644 that in the budget is additional 126 00:04:45,644 --> 00:04:47,700 capability for the Navy for undersea 127 00:04:47,700 --> 00:04:47,700 domain awareness . So I'm very 128 00:04:47,700 --> 00:04:49,811 encouraged with where we're going but 129 00:04:49,811 --> 00:04:51,922 we still have some challenges to work 130 00:04:51,922 --> 00:04:55,660 on now . Just a few weeks ago . Uh an 131 00:04:55,660 --> 00:04:57,827 Air Force general named Glenn Van Herk 132 00:04:57,827 --> 00:04:59,827 made this statement . My assessment 133 00:04:59,827 --> 00:05:02,250 today is I don't have what I need as 134 00:05:02,250 --> 00:05:04,194 far as artificial intelligence and 135 00:05:04,194 --> 00:05:06,306 machine learning to give the decision 136 00:05:06,306 --> 00:05:08,306 space to the President Secretary of 137 00:05:08,306 --> 00:05:10,528 Defense , the Chief of Defense Staff in 138 00:05:10,528 --> 00:05:12,583 Canada , the Minister of Defense and 139 00:05:12,583 --> 00:05:14,694 the Prime Minister in Canada . And my 140 00:05:14,694 --> 00:05:16,694 understanding was You're asking for 141 00:05:16,694 --> 00:05:18,917 about $30 million dollars which was not 142 00:05:18,917 --> 00:05:20,972 you know a lot in defense land . But 143 00:05:20,972 --> 00:05:23,139 but do you have what you need you just 144 00:05:23,139 --> 00:05:24,694 give a compliment to the by 145 00:05:24,694 --> 00:05:26,583 administration that you feel like 146 00:05:26,583 --> 00:05:28,528 you've made progress . But when it 147 00:05:28,528 --> 00:05:30,361 comes to ai quantum new evolving 148 00:05:30,361 --> 00:05:32,417 technologies in this threat , are we 149 00:05:32,417 --> 00:05:34,583 are you where you want us to be ? No . 150 00:05:34,583 --> 00:05:36,806 The answer is definitely no steve we we 151 00:05:36,806 --> 00:05:38,917 need to go faster in developing these 152 00:05:38,917 --> 00:05:40,694 capabilities when I talk domain 153 00:05:40,694 --> 00:05:42,361 awareness . Now when you have 154 00:05:42,361 --> 00:05:44,528 information and data . The question is 155 00:05:44,528 --> 00:05:46,639 how are you going to process that and 156 00:05:46,639 --> 00:05:48,806 disseminate it in a timely manner . So 157 00:05:48,806 --> 00:05:48,530 what I'm trying to do is create 158 00:05:48,530 --> 00:05:51,080 decision space , decision space equals 159 00:05:51,080 --> 00:05:53,136 deterrence options for the president 160 00:05:53,136 --> 00:05:54,913 for the secretary for the Prime 161 00:05:54,913 --> 00:05:57,024 Minister and the Minister in Canada . 162 00:05:57,024 --> 00:05:58,969 And the way you do that is through 163 00:05:58,969 --> 00:06:01,080 analyzing that data and information . 164 00:06:01,080 --> 00:06:03,247 That domain awareness data through the 165 00:06:03,247 --> 00:06:05,413 use of machine learning and artificial 166 00:06:05,413 --> 00:06:04,990 intelligence . The machines can count 167 00:06:04,990 --> 00:06:06,823 numbers of cars and parking lots 168 00:06:06,940 --> 00:06:09,320 numbers of vehicles and weapons loading 169 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:11,590 areas and alert you to changes today . 170 00:06:11,590 --> 00:06:13,701 Often times we don't use the machines 171 00:06:13,701 --> 00:06:16,034 to analyze that data in a timely manner . 172 00:06:16,034 --> 00:06:18,201 So I do think we can go faster there . 173 00:06:18,201 --> 00:06:21,300 How do you test your team and yourself 174 00:06:21,310 --> 00:06:25,100 to get away from habits of the 175 00:06:25,100 --> 00:06:29,100 mind and practice that may not uh 176 00:06:29,110 --> 00:06:31,320 see surprises around the corner . In 177 00:06:31,320 --> 00:06:33,542 other words , I'm asking a lot of stuff 178 00:06:33,542 --> 00:06:35,653 just has inertia built in it . You do 179 00:06:35,653 --> 00:06:37,876 tomorrow a little bit like what you did 180 00:06:37,876 --> 00:06:39,876 yesterday . But my understanding is 181 00:06:39,876 --> 00:06:41,931 that one time NORAD did a simulation 182 00:06:41,931 --> 00:06:43,709 and you worried about airplanes 183 00:06:43,709 --> 00:06:46,590 becoming weapons before 9 11 2001 . But 184 00:06:46,590 --> 00:06:48,646 the rest of the defense system never 185 00:06:48,646 --> 00:06:50,780 picked that up . So I'm interested in 186 00:06:50,780 --> 00:06:53,620 how you challenge one's patterns of 187 00:06:53,620 --> 00:06:56,100 thinking and habits creatively so that 188 00:06:56,100 --> 00:06:58,322 we can be smarter about security . Will 189 00:06:58,322 --> 00:07:01,530 you embrace a diverse culture around 190 00:07:01,530 --> 00:07:03,474 you ? Different minds . People who 191 00:07:03,474 --> 00:07:05,641 think differently if you line yourself 192 00:07:05,641 --> 00:07:07,863 with the folks that look like you think 193 00:07:07,863 --> 00:07:09,919 you like , you act like you and have 194 00:07:09,919 --> 00:07:12,030 the same background , you tend to not 195 00:07:12,030 --> 00:07:14,030 get a uh , what I would say answers 196 00:07:14,030 --> 00:07:15,808 like you're talking about their 197 00:07:15,808 --> 00:07:17,697 innovative , you rely on academia 198 00:07:17,697 --> 00:07:19,474 institutions , you rely on uh , 199 00:07:19,474 --> 00:07:21,586 industry and others and you challenge 200 00:07:21,586 --> 00:07:23,586 them to think about future problems 201 00:07:23,586 --> 00:07:25,530 that we may face . Uh , you know , 202 00:07:25,530 --> 00:07:27,641 we're facing problems today . We have 203 00:07:27,641 --> 00:07:29,697 to solve those and be ready each and 204 00:07:29,697 --> 00:07:31,752 every day to defend our homeland and 205 00:07:31,752 --> 00:07:33,919 have the watch 24 7 . But we also need 206 00:07:33,919 --> 00:07:36,086 to think about the future . And that's 207 00:07:36,086 --> 00:07:38,197 what we're doing with our strategy is 208 00:07:38,197 --> 00:07:40,419 how do we position ourselves for 2030 ? 209 00:07:40,419 --> 00:07:42,530 We have a homeland defense design for 210 00:07:42,530 --> 00:07:44,530 2030 and don't think about homeland 211 00:07:44,530 --> 00:07:46,752 defense is being kinetic endgame defeat 212 00:07:46,752 --> 00:07:48,919 and shooting down cruise missiles over 213 00:07:48,919 --> 00:07:48,350 the homeland . You know , we don't want 214 00:07:48,350 --> 00:07:50,294 to put a patriot in a fad on every 215 00:07:50,294 --> 00:07:52,128 corner . But you can utilize the 216 00:07:52,128 --> 00:07:54,350 electromagnetic spectrum spectrum . You 217 00:07:54,350 --> 00:07:56,406 can utilize deception capabilities , 218 00:07:56,406 --> 00:07:58,660 resiliency and hardening to do defense 219 00:07:58,660 --> 00:08:00,882 differently in the future . I would say 220 00:08:00,882 --> 00:08:03,216 it comes down to more than just defense . 221 00:08:03,216 --> 00:08:05,327 It comes down to campaigning which is 222 00:08:05,327 --> 00:08:07,493 part of integrated deterrence and that 223 00:08:07,493 --> 00:08:09,493 the department has done a great job 224 00:08:09,493 --> 00:08:11,549 with the National Defense strategy . 225 00:08:11,549 --> 00:08:13,438 Okay . We put our strategy out in 226 00:08:13,438 --> 00:08:15,438 December of 20 which was focused on 227 00:08:15,438 --> 00:08:17,660 integrated deterrence . And so when you 228 00:08:17,660 --> 00:08:19,827 think about defense , what what I want 229 00:08:19,827 --> 00:08:21,938 to do is get way further left through 230 00:08:21,938 --> 00:08:24,104 the innovation and using that data and 231 00:08:24,104 --> 00:08:26,216 information to give the president and 232 00:08:26,216 --> 00:08:28,382 the secretary decision space to create 233 00:08:28,382 --> 00:08:31,220 those deterrence options . You know I 234 00:08:31,220 --> 00:08:33,276 just want to do this to the side but 235 00:08:33,276 --> 00:08:35,498 there's a lot of important stuff we can 236 00:08:35,498 --> 00:08:37,664 get into . But at the end of the trump 237 00:08:37,664 --> 00:08:39,776 administration and moving into the by 238 00:08:39,776 --> 00:08:41,831 administration we had a lot of media 239 00:08:41,831 --> 00:08:43,942 and and press writing about chains of 240 00:08:43,942 --> 00:08:45,998 command who had authority to do what 241 00:08:45,998 --> 00:08:48,053 did General Milley have the right to 242 00:08:48,053 --> 00:08:49,942 you know , jump into you know , a 243 00:08:49,942 --> 00:08:52,164 command by the president to potentially 244 00:08:52,164 --> 00:08:54,276 launch nuclear weapons etcetera . But 245 00:08:54,276 --> 00:08:54,250 there are a lot of questions about 246 00:08:54,250 --> 00:08:56,480 process and decision making and as I 247 00:08:56,480 --> 00:08:58,702 told you when we walked in here , I was 248 00:08:58,702 --> 00:09:00,536 an Air force brat . I grew up on 249 00:09:00,536 --> 00:09:02,647 Department of Defense installations . 250 00:09:02,647 --> 00:09:04,758 My dad was in the Air Force . I was I 251 00:09:04,758 --> 00:09:06,702 very rarely saw messed up decision 252 00:09:06,702 --> 00:09:08,758 making process but we did have it in 253 00:09:08,758 --> 00:09:10,980 this country . Has that been worked out 254 00:09:10,980 --> 00:09:14,010 where you , were you ever in a position 255 00:09:14,010 --> 00:09:16,010 yourself that you worried about how 256 00:09:16,010 --> 00:09:18,232 some of your compatriots were receiving 257 00:09:18,232 --> 00:09:21,760 command orders ? No , I haven't been in 258 00:09:21,760 --> 00:09:23,982 a situation where I was concerned about 259 00:09:23,982 --> 00:09:27,780 command orders or potential compromise 260 00:09:27,780 --> 00:09:29,947 of the chain of command . What I would 261 00:09:29,947 --> 00:09:32,200 tell you is the the way we do . Command 262 00:09:32,200 --> 00:09:34,480 orders needs to adapt and change 263 00:09:34,480 --> 00:09:36,702 because the environment is going faster 264 00:09:36,702 --> 00:09:39,250 and faster and to stay relevant as the 265 00:09:39,250 --> 00:09:41,280 information and data . Environment 266 00:09:41,280 --> 00:09:43,830 changes . We need to think and use the 267 00:09:43,830 --> 00:09:45,774 capabilities of data that I talked 268 00:09:45,774 --> 00:09:47,719 about to collaborate globally on a 269 00:09:47,719 --> 00:09:49,760 single pane of glass to make an 270 00:09:49,760 --> 00:09:51,870 assessment globally of the threat to 271 00:09:51,870 --> 00:09:53,926 create deterrence and defeat options 272 00:09:53,926 --> 00:09:56,148 globally and to analyze whether they're 273 00:09:56,148 --> 00:09:57,990 actually execute Herbal today . 274 00:09:57,990 --> 00:10:00,350 Oftentimes that takes days if not weeks 275 00:10:00,350 --> 00:10:02,572 and it comes to the pentagon even at my 276 00:10:02,572 --> 00:10:04,650 level , not globally integrated , we 277 00:10:04,650 --> 00:10:07,360 can do that much faster and give 278 00:10:07,370 --> 00:10:09,426 command orders much faster . Now you 279 00:10:09,426 --> 00:10:11,648 have to change the processes and you'll 280 00:10:11,648 --> 00:10:13,703 have to use mission command which is 281 00:10:13,703 --> 00:10:15,800 the delegation of authority uh to to 282 00:10:15,800 --> 00:10:17,900 really utilize the speed that we can 283 00:10:17,900 --> 00:10:20,233 with that and information in the future . 284 00:10:20,233 --> 00:10:22,233 Now I'm going to overstate this for 285 00:10:22,233 --> 00:10:24,344 effect but I'm going to remind you of 286 00:10:24,344 --> 00:10:26,456 something that I think you've said in 287 00:10:26,456 --> 00:10:28,622 the past that we have a big blind spot 288 00:10:28,622 --> 00:10:30,844 and how we look at regional security in 289 00:10:30,844 --> 00:10:33,011 the United States and in North America 290 00:10:33,011 --> 00:10:35,067 that that that a threat that happens 291 00:10:35,067 --> 00:10:37,660 here is is not just regional and we 292 00:10:37,660 --> 00:10:39,549 don't need just regional decision 293 00:10:39,549 --> 00:10:41,604 makers . It has global consequence , 294 00:10:41,604 --> 00:10:43,382 global impact that needs global 295 00:10:43,382 --> 00:10:45,604 response . So can you tell us what that 296 00:10:45,604 --> 00:10:47,549 means ? Can you unpack that well , 297 00:10:47,549 --> 00:10:49,438 steve there there are no regional 298 00:10:49,438 --> 00:10:51,549 problems anymore . So china is not so 299 00:10:51,549 --> 00:10:53,771 we have a lot of regional commands . We 300 00:10:53,771 --> 00:10:55,827 absolutely do and those are gaps and 301 00:10:55,827 --> 00:10:58,510 seams that can be exploited and so what 302 00:10:58,510 --> 00:11:00,454 I'm talking about is collaborating 303 00:11:00,454 --> 00:11:03,090 globally in real time across those gaps 304 00:11:03,090 --> 00:11:05,201 and seams for not only the geographic 305 00:11:05,201 --> 00:11:07,423 combatant commanders but the functional 306 00:11:07,423 --> 00:11:09,646 combat commanders . So we have a global 307 00:11:09,646 --> 00:11:11,812 picture we do need to change . I think 308 00:11:11,812 --> 00:11:15,040 how we uh do our strategies , our plans , 309 00:11:15,050 --> 00:11:17,272 the way we do global force management , 310 00:11:17,272 --> 00:11:19,106 theater , security cooperation , 311 00:11:19,106 --> 00:11:21,328 etcetera exercises . So let me tell you 312 00:11:21,328 --> 00:11:23,490 our strategies and plans for the most 313 00:11:23,490 --> 00:11:25,601 part start off with a regional crisis 314 00:11:25,601 --> 00:11:28,040 or conflict and we build them out , 315 00:11:28,050 --> 00:11:30,272 utilize the joint force from a regional 316 00:11:30,272 --> 00:11:32,420 perspective . Uh there's there are no 317 00:11:32,420 --> 00:11:34,587 regional problems anymore . China will 318 00:11:34,587 --> 00:11:36,476 be a global problem . Is a global 319 00:11:36,476 --> 00:11:38,587 problem today . And so I would rather 320 00:11:38,587 --> 00:11:40,587 start off with a global perspective 321 00:11:40,587 --> 00:11:42,587 with the secretary providing global 322 00:11:42,587 --> 00:11:44,698 risk , global resources where he will 323 00:11:44,698 --> 00:11:46,753 not accept risk globally , apply the 324 00:11:46,753 --> 00:11:48,753 joint force to that problem set and 325 00:11:48,753 --> 00:11:50,920 then create your regional plan today , 326 00:11:50,920 --> 00:11:53,142 we do it just the opposite backwards on 327 00:11:53,142 --> 00:11:55,364 global force management , the the joint 328 00:11:55,364 --> 00:11:57,760 forces not nearly large enough to do 329 00:11:57,760 --> 00:12:00,260 everything that we would like to do , 330 00:12:00,740 --> 00:12:02,580 but we need to think about force 331 00:12:02,580 --> 00:12:04,247 management and sharing forces 332 00:12:04,247 --> 00:12:06,580 differently across those gaps and seams . 333 00:12:06,580 --> 00:12:08,747 Those lines you talk about in addition 334 00:12:08,747 --> 00:12:10,747 to that , we have an opportunity to 335 00:12:10,747 --> 00:12:12,858 utilize global force management which 336 00:12:12,858 --> 00:12:15,110 today is done separately from exercises 337 00:12:15,110 --> 00:12:17,221 which is done separately from theater 338 00:12:17,221 --> 00:12:19,310 security cooperation , all of those 339 00:12:19,310 --> 00:12:22,250 activities , investments , operations 340 00:12:22,340 --> 00:12:25,070 exercises have a deterrent value when 341 00:12:25,070 --> 00:12:27,126 message properly . And so we have to 342 00:12:27,126 --> 00:12:29,126 think about those as a whole from a 343 00:12:29,126 --> 00:12:31,292 global and all domain perspective . So 344 00:12:31,292 --> 00:12:33,514 you just tested some of those seams and 345 00:12:33,514 --> 00:12:35,514 the assumptions and biases that are 346 00:12:35,514 --> 00:12:37,848 built into security . And I have to say , 347 00:12:37,848 --> 00:12:41,030 I bet if we pulled this room about what 348 00:12:41,040 --> 00:12:44,490 NORAD's chief obsession was , it would 349 00:12:44,490 --> 00:12:47,020 be over the horizon northern Hemisphere 350 00:12:47,020 --> 00:12:49,187 threats . But you've also got to worry 351 00:12:49,187 --> 00:12:51,187 about the south . Can you tell us a 352 00:12:51,187 --> 00:12:53,409 little about Operation Noble Defender , 353 00:12:53,409 --> 00:12:56,080 what you learned and and and and how 354 00:12:56,080 --> 00:12:58,302 we're prepared for for threats from the 355 00:12:58,302 --> 00:13:00,469 south as well as the north ? Well , we 356 00:13:00,469 --> 00:13:02,247 just completed a Noble Defender 357 00:13:02,247 --> 00:13:04,413 demonstrating capability to look south 358 00:13:04,413 --> 00:13:07,110 china's recent fractional orbital 359 00:13:07,110 --> 00:13:09,500 bombardment test . Which can you just 360 00:13:09,500 --> 00:13:11,920 tell me what that means in like that 361 00:13:11,920 --> 00:13:13,920 was that was the I C . B . M . They 362 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:16,260 launched orbited the so that's a 363 00:13:16,260 --> 00:13:18,427 hypersonic . It orbited the globe with 364 00:13:18,427 --> 00:13:20,260 a hypersonic that re entered the 365 00:13:20,260 --> 00:13:23,150 atmosphere at mach 19 from the south 366 00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:26,100 and flew across the pacific Ocean and 367 00:13:26,100 --> 00:13:28,044 landed in china that came from the 368 00:13:28,044 --> 00:13:30,100 south . We're challenged with having 369 00:13:30,100 --> 00:13:32,156 sensors to look to the south Today . 370 00:13:32,156 --> 00:13:34,267 Noble Defender is part of my campaign 371 00:13:34,267 --> 00:13:36,156 plan to demonstrate our readiness 372 00:13:36,156 --> 00:13:38,340 capability , our resiliency to operate 373 00:13:38,350 --> 00:13:41,150 from all axis threats that come to the 374 00:13:41,150 --> 00:13:43,261 homeland . That's what Noble defender 375 00:13:43,261 --> 00:13:45,510 is . And and what you know , given that 376 00:13:45,520 --> 00:13:47,742 experiment and what we did , you know , 377 00:13:47,742 --> 00:13:49,853 as you look at the future of what you 378 00:13:49,853 --> 00:13:52,440 need from Washington D . C . What what 379 00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:54,840 do you need to amp up , you know , the 380 00:13:54,850 --> 00:13:57,072 muscular infrastructure on that front ? 381 00:13:57,340 --> 00:13:59,451 Well , the president's budget sitting 382 00:13:59,451 --> 00:14:01,618 with Congress right now to appropriate 383 00:14:01,618 --> 00:14:03,396 funds for that . I need them to 384 00:14:03,396 --> 00:14:05,340 appropriate the funds for the over 385 00:14:05,340 --> 00:14:07,507 horizon radars to support the undersea 386 00:14:07,507 --> 00:14:09,340 domain awareness that that we're 387 00:14:09,340 --> 00:14:11,118 talking about additional arctic 388 00:14:11,118 --> 00:14:12,784 infrastructure capabilities , 389 00:14:12,784 --> 00:14:14,729 communication capabilities , those 390 00:14:14,729 --> 00:14:16,618 things . So we can compete in the 391 00:14:16,618 --> 00:14:18,784 arctic my A . O . R . Goes all the way 392 00:14:18,784 --> 00:14:20,951 from the North Pole to central America 393 00:14:20,951 --> 00:14:22,840 and we have to be able to operate 394 00:14:22,840 --> 00:14:25,007 across all of those areas . I do think 395 00:14:25,007 --> 00:14:27,229 we have opportunities to change the way 396 00:14:27,229 --> 00:14:29,284 we acquire capability . Uh , we're , 397 00:14:29,284 --> 00:14:31,396 we're an industrial age based process 398 00:14:31,396 --> 00:14:33,729 in the department built on buying ships , 399 00:14:33,729 --> 00:14:35,729 planes , airplanes , those kinds of 400 00:14:35,729 --> 00:14:37,800 things in today's digital world data 401 00:14:37,800 --> 00:14:40,100 world . Uh , we need to go faster and 402 00:14:40,100 --> 00:14:42,267 developing those . And I think you can 403 00:14:42,267 --> 00:14:44,378 accept a little more risk . Do things 404 00:14:44,378 --> 00:14:46,156 more in parallel parallel , not 405 00:14:46,156 --> 00:14:48,350 necessary ? Uh , cereal uh , and field 406 00:14:48,350 --> 00:14:50,461 things much quicker . I think there's 407 00:14:50,461 --> 00:14:52,628 opportunities . I don't mean to brag . 408 00:14:52,628 --> 00:14:54,794 But again , john does your gut feel to 409 00:14:54,794 --> 00:14:56,739 tell you that that's the direction 410 00:14:56,739 --> 00:14:58,961 we're going ? Because you know , you've 411 00:14:58,961 --> 00:15:01,072 been a very loud voice saying we need 412 00:15:01,072 --> 00:15:03,239 information dominance . We need faster 413 00:15:03,239 --> 00:15:03,220 movement . We need . And so my sense is 414 00:15:03,230 --> 00:15:05,380 you're , you're pounding both on your 415 00:15:05,390 --> 00:15:07,850 friends at the pentagon and on Congress 416 00:15:07,860 --> 00:15:09,860 to do this . Do you feel it's going 417 00:15:09,860 --> 00:15:11,749 that way . Absolutely . I'm doing 418 00:15:11,749 --> 00:15:13,971 exactly what you just said . I do think 419 00:15:13,971 --> 00:15:16,027 it's going the right direction . The 420 00:15:16,027 --> 00:15:18,082 Vice chairman , the deputy secretary 421 00:15:18,082 --> 00:15:19,804 have been very aggressive with 422 00:15:19,804 --> 00:15:21,527 providing funds for innovation 423 00:15:21,527 --> 00:15:23,193 capabilities to the combatant 424 00:15:23,193 --> 00:15:25,360 commanders . The budget has additional 425 00:15:25,360 --> 00:15:27,304 capabilities in it for joint , all 426 00:15:27,304 --> 00:15:29,416 domain command and control . That's a 427 00:15:29,416 --> 00:15:29,370 lot of what I'm talking about . But I 428 00:15:29,370 --> 00:15:31,592 do think there's other things you ask . 429 00:15:31,592 --> 00:15:33,759 What can we do in Washington , D . C . 430 00:15:33,759 --> 00:15:35,870 You know , are spread over five years 431 00:15:35,870 --> 00:15:37,870 with annual budget in the colors of 432 00:15:37,870 --> 00:15:40,037 money , very hard to move money around 433 00:15:40,037 --> 00:15:41,870 in the year of execution . And I 434 00:15:41,870 --> 00:15:43,926 totally respect Congress's oversight 435 00:15:43,926 --> 00:15:45,814 role . But you know , when you're 436 00:15:45,814 --> 00:15:48,037 updating your software every four day , 437 00:15:48,037 --> 00:15:50,203 14 days in a digital environment , you 438 00:15:50,203 --> 00:15:52,370 can adapt quickly . We have to look at 439 00:15:52,370 --> 00:15:54,537 the policies and laws that don't allow 440 00:15:54,537 --> 00:15:56,648 us to go as fast as we need to go and 441 00:15:56,648 --> 00:15:58,703 the environment we're in today . You 442 00:15:58,703 --> 00:16:00,870 know , we had on stage earlier today , 443 00:16:00,870 --> 00:16:02,981 Richard moore , who's the head of M I 444 00:16:02,981 --> 00:16:04,981 six in the UK . He made a statement 445 00:16:04,981 --> 00:16:06,981 that maybe we're hyping some of the 446 00:16:06,981 --> 00:16:09,092 threats too much that the chinese are 447 00:16:09,092 --> 00:16:11,148 not 10 ft tall . The Russians may be 448 00:16:11,148 --> 00:16:12,870 depleting themselves , which I 449 00:16:12,870 --> 00:16:15,037 understand is a perspective but from a 450 00:16:15,037 --> 00:16:16,870 from a perspective of looking at 451 00:16:16,870 --> 00:16:18,870 threats and I'm sure that you are a 452 00:16:18,870 --> 00:16:22,190 target of a lot of interest by those in 453 00:16:22,190 --> 00:16:24,246 china and Russia trying to penetrate 454 00:16:24,246 --> 00:16:26,412 your world ? What is your sense of how 455 00:16:26,412 --> 00:16:28,523 tall the chinese are and how depleted 456 00:16:28,523 --> 00:16:30,468 the Russians are . Let me just say 457 00:16:30,468 --> 00:16:32,246 first we have the most powerful 458 00:16:32,246 --> 00:16:34,246 military on the planet . There's no 459 00:16:34,246 --> 00:16:36,190 doubt about that . But the chinese 460 00:16:36,190 --> 00:16:38,357 wanted displaces and they're on a path 461 00:16:38,357 --> 00:16:40,190 to gain significant capability . 462 00:16:40,190 --> 00:16:39,930 They're modernizing their nuclear 463 00:16:39,930 --> 00:16:42,060 forces that are at a rapid rate . 464 00:16:42,070 --> 00:16:43,848 They're developing conventional 465 00:16:43,848 --> 00:16:45,959 capabilities . We see that with their 466 00:16:45,959 --> 00:16:48,126 hypersonic and so they're on a path to 467 00:16:48,126 --> 00:16:50,348 approach appear status with us . I want 468 00:16:50,348 --> 00:16:52,459 to talk about Russia . Okay . I don't 469 00:16:52,459 --> 00:16:54,840 want to say that you know Russia has 470 00:16:54,850 --> 00:16:57,370 failed . They have struggled in the 471 00:16:57,370 --> 00:16:59,710 land domain . What I would tell you is 472 00:16:59,710 --> 00:17:01,766 in their conventional capabilities , 473 00:17:01,766 --> 00:17:04,043 their long range standoff capabilities , 474 00:17:04,043 --> 00:17:05,920 There's displaying significant 475 00:17:05,920 --> 00:17:08,031 capability . That's the threat that I 476 00:17:08,031 --> 00:17:09,976 worry about to the Homeland . So I 477 00:17:09,976 --> 00:17:12,142 would not undersell Russia and I would 478 00:17:12,142 --> 00:17:14,253 not say China is 10 ft tall right now 479 00:17:14,253 --> 00:17:16,420 but they do certainly have aspirations 480 00:17:16,420 --> 00:17:18,476 to compete at a pier level with us . 481 00:17:18,640 --> 00:17:20,862 You made an interesting statement and I 482 00:17:20,862 --> 00:17:22,696 have to admit that I don't fully 483 00:17:22,696 --> 00:17:24,910 understand it but but my my sense is 484 00:17:24,910 --> 00:17:27,900 that you are worried that the Russians 485 00:17:27,910 --> 00:17:31,600 or other um origins of threats may try 486 00:17:31,600 --> 00:17:33,760 to use non traditional things . You 487 00:17:33,760 --> 00:17:35,760 know , maybe not I C . B . M . S or 488 00:17:35,760 --> 00:17:37,927 cruise missiles over the horizon . But 489 00:17:37,927 --> 00:17:40,038 other elements that were not prepared 490 00:17:40,038 --> 00:17:42,200 for to threaten our security . And it 491 00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:44,320 reminded me of something that Russia 492 00:17:44,320 --> 00:17:46,376 has been trying to animate in places 493 00:17:46,376 --> 00:17:48,542 like Latvia , you know going there and 494 00:17:48,542 --> 00:17:50,653 you know animate weaponized migration 495 00:17:50,653 --> 00:17:52,653 because it's really not in the NATO 496 00:17:52,653 --> 00:17:54,820 defense book on how to protect latvian 497 00:17:54,820 --> 00:17:56,931 political stability from migration on 498 00:17:56,931 --> 00:17:59,098 its border . But you were saying there 499 00:17:59,098 --> 00:18:01,153 are non traditional things that that 500 00:18:01,153 --> 00:18:03,320 our rivals could do that we don't have 501 00:18:03,320 --> 00:18:05,542 a playbook for . Can you share a little 502 00:18:05,542 --> 00:18:07,542 bit , you know about that with us . 503 00:18:07,542 --> 00:18:09,764 First of all , we're under attack every 504 00:18:09,764 --> 00:18:11,876 day . Let me be clear about that . In 505 00:18:11,876 --> 00:18:13,987 the information space , our strategic 506 00:18:13,987 --> 00:18:15,987 competitors , potential adversaries 507 00:18:15,987 --> 00:18:18,042 fanned the flames of internal strife 508 00:18:18,042 --> 00:18:20,098 and discord in our country to expand 509 00:18:20,098 --> 00:18:22,264 that to undermine our democracy . That 510 00:18:22,264 --> 00:18:24,320 is happening every single day in the 511 00:18:24,320 --> 00:18:26,487 cyber domain . We're under attack on a 512 00:18:26,487 --> 00:18:28,709 day to day basis . But what I'm talking 513 00:18:28,709 --> 00:18:30,876 about is cyber kind of capabilities to 514 00:18:30,876 --> 00:18:33,098 the limit our power projection to delay 515 00:18:33,098 --> 00:18:34,876 and disrupt our force flow in a 516 00:18:34,876 --> 00:18:37,153 regional crisis or to destroy our will . 517 00:18:37,153 --> 00:18:39,264 And their goal would be to think they 518 00:18:39,264 --> 00:18:41,098 could prevent us from entering a 519 00:18:41,098 --> 00:18:43,098 regional crisis . That's one if you 520 00:18:43,098 --> 00:18:46,010 look at what Covid did and the pandemic 521 00:18:46,010 --> 00:18:49,490 itself and you saw how it significantly 522 00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:51,870 had impact economically on large 523 00:18:51,870 --> 00:18:53,981 nations etcetera . You know , I worry 524 00:18:53,981 --> 00:18:56,092 in the future about the potential for 525 00:18:56,092 --> 00:18:58,710 biological pandemic type of weapons . 526 00:18:58,750 --> 00:19:00,861 Those are things that we have to look 527 00:19:00,861 --> 00:19:02,472 at and ensure that we're not 528 00:19:02,472 --> 00:19:04,639 positioning ourselves to be vulnerable 529 00:19:04,639 --> 00:19:06,694 to those kind of threats . Do Russia 530 00:19:06,694 --> 00:19:08,806 and china have their own version of a 531 00:19:08,806 --> 00:19:10,861 NORAD . I know not North american of 532 00:19:10,861 --> 00:19:13,083 course , but their own sort of facility 533 00:19:13,083 --> 00:19:15,670 that that that approximates the kind of 534 00:19:15,680 --> 00:19:18,370 security provision that you do . I 535 00:19:18,370 --> 00:19:20,426 wouldn't say they have anything like 536 00:19:20,426 --> 00:19:22,481 NORAD by by the way , our asymmetric 537 00:19:22,481 --> 00:19:24,648 advantage is our network of allies and 538 00:19:24,648 --> 00:19:26,592 partners . Okay , china and Russia 539 00:19:26,592 --> 00:19:28,537 don't have that . They do have air 540 00:19:28,537 --> 00:19:30,648 defense centers , air defense sectors 541 00:19:30,648 --> 00:19:32,537 in their countries . Uh They have 542 00:19:32,537 --> 00:19:34,703 significant integrated air and missile 543 00:19:34,703 --> 00:19:36,481 defense systems to defend their 544 00:19:36,481 --> 00:19:38,648 homeland as well . What if you can say 545 00:19:38,648 --> 00:19:40,703 this ? I'm not sure you can with the 546 00:19:40,703 --> 00:19:42,814 president's budget there , but I feel 547 00:19:42,814 --> 00:19:44,870 like you're pretty candid guy . What 548 00:19:44,870 --> 00:19:44,860 are Washington's biggest blind spots 549 00:19:44,860 --> 00:19:48,130 about the challenges you have ? Well , 550 00:19:48,140 --> 00:19:50,307 the first thing I would say is and and 551 00:19:50,307 --> 00:19:52,140 one of the reasons that I'm here 552 00:19:52,140 --> 00:19:54,196 speaking to you is understanding the 553 00:19:54,196 --> 00:19:56,196 threat to the homeland . You know , 554 00:19:56,196 --> 00:19:58,362 there's a perception out there by many 555 00:19:58,362 --> 00:20:00,251 held and for good reason for many 556 00:20:00,251 --> 00:20:02,473 decades we could project power from the 557 00:20:02,473 --> 00:20:04,584 homeland to any place at our own time 558 00:20:04,584 --> 00:20:06,640 uh and place of choosing . That's no 559 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:08,696 longer the case . You know , two big 560 00:20:08,696 --> 00:20:10,807 moats on each side . The atlantic and 561 00:20:10,807 --> 00:20:12,918 the pacific have served us well . But 562 00:20:12,918 --> 00:20:15,140 now capabilities are being developed to 563 00:20:15,140 --> 00:20:17,084 utilize those rushes . The primary 564 00:20:17,084 --> 00:20:19,196 military threat to the homeland today 565 00:20:19,196 --> 00:20:19,060 they're an acute threat . But the long 566 00:20:19,060 --> 00:20:21,490 term existential threat is the chinese 567 00:20:21,490 --> 00:20:23,490 and they're developing capabilities 568 00:20:23,490 --> 00:20:25,379 about 5 to 10 years behind Russia 569 00:20:25,379 --> 00:20:27,379 kinetically to hold our homeland at 570 00:20:27,379 --> 00:20:29,490 risk . Today . They hold the homeland 571 00:20:29,490 --> 00:20:31,546 at risk cyber and certainly in space 572 00:20:31,546 --> 00:20:33,546 capabilities and the information uh 573 00:20:33,546 --> 00:20:36,420 space as well . You wrote a piece with 574 00:20:36,430 --> 00:20:38,700 a person who is a general who's head of 575 00:20:38,700 --> 00:20:40,867 I think U . S . Transportation command 576 00:20:40,867 --> 00:20:43,089 saying fighting to get into the fight . 577 00:20:43,089 --> 00:20:45,089 And you have a lot of worry that we 578 00:20:45,089 --> 00:20:47,144 have layered a lot of barriers to be 579 00:20:47,144 --> 00:20:48,922 able to handle those threats to 580 00:20:48,922 --> 00:20:50,978 infrastructure in the homeland . How 581 00:20:50,978 --> 00:20:52,978 would you fix it ? What's the short 582 00:20:52,978 --> 00:20:55,033 form way to fix it ? Well , we're on 583 00:20:55,033 --> 00:20:57,256 our way to fixing . And the first thing 584 00:20:57,256 --> 00:20:59,089 I would say is we need to do the 585 00:20:59,089 --> 00:21:01,144 analysis and figure out what we must 586 00:21:01,144 --> 00:21:03,367 defend that could bring us to our knees 587 00:21:03,367 --> 00:21:05,533 to prevent our force flow in a time of 588 00:21:05,533 --> 00:21:07,311 crisis . So this along lines of 589 00:21:07,311 --> 00:21:09,311 colonial pipeline or other issues . 590 00:21:09,311 --> 00:21:11,478 These are the single points of failure 591 00:21:11,478 --> 00:21:13,533 or things that we would rely on in a 592 00:21:13,533 --> 00:21:15,756 time of crisis to flow the forces . The 593 00:21:15,756 --> 00:21:17,756 good news is for the last two years 594 00:21:17,756 --> 00:21:16,910 I've been in command , I've been 595 00:21:16,910 --> 00:21:18,966 talking to the department about this 596 00:21:18,966 --> 00:21:21,132 and the department has moved this ball 597 00:21:21,132 --> 00:21:23,188 way down the field and I have policy 598 00:21:23,188 --> 00:21:25,299 but it's just not D . O . D . We have 599 00:21:25,299 --> 00:21:27,354 to have a whole of nation discussion 600 00:21:27,354 --> 00:21:27,330 about the vulnerabilities . We have 601 00:21:27,530 --> 00:21:29,641 some of the challenges that we have . 602 00:21:29,641 --> 00:21:31,641 First of all , I don't believe that 603 00:21:31,641 --> 00:21:33,752 Russia or china is going to attack us 604 00:21:33,752 --> 00:21:35,697 out of the blue kinetically . That 605 00:21:35,697 --> 00:21:37,863 that's something that I don't fear . I 606 00:21:37,863 --> 00:21:39,974 don't look at . But I do believe in a 607 00:21:39,974 --> 00:21:42,141 time of crisis , they would start with 608 00:21:42,141 --> 00:21:44,197 non kinetic activities to attempt to 609 00:21:44,197 --> 00:21:46,419 disrupt us . Now , what's crucial about 610 00:21:46,419 --> 00:21:48,586 this and everybody needs to understand 611 00:21:48,586 --> 00:21:48,430 is that the vast majority of our 612 00:21:48,430 --> 00:21:50,652 critical infrastructure that we rely on 613 00:21:50,652 --> 00:21:52,690 to deploy those forces in a timely 614 00:21:52,690 --> 00:21:55,560 manner is not in D O . D or even 615 00:21:55,560 --> 00:21:58,690 federal control and for protection , it 616 00:21:58,690 --> 00:22:01,060 relies in municipalities , state , 617 00:22:01,850 --> 00:22:04,820 industry etcetera that we rely on . So 618 00:22:04,840 --> 00:22:07,007 those are unknown spots for me . And I 619 00:22:07,007 --> 00:22:08,951 heard in the prior panel there , I 620 00:22:08,951 --> 00:22:11,062 think it was Michele Flournoy talking 621 00:22:11,062 --> 00:22:14,540 about companies who are afraid to admit 622 00:22:14,540 --> 00:22:16,540 they may be vulnerable or have been 623 00:22:16,540 --> 00:22:18,596 exposed . Those are blind spots that 624 00:22:18,596 --> 00:22:20,818 we've got to fix . You know , we have a 625 00:22:20,818 --> 00:22:22,929 lot of people watching online and out 626 00:22:22,929 --> 00:22:25,207 in the cooler area on screen right now . 627 00:22:25,207 --> 00:22:27,096 Some of them are super experts on 628 00:22:27,096 --> 00:22:29,151 national security and foreign policy 629 00:22:29,151 --> 00:22:28,570 and some of them are lay people are 630 00:22:28,570 --> 00:22:30,514 just interested in knowing how the 631 00:22:30,514 --> 00:22:32,570 world is putting itself together and 632 00:22:32,570 --> 00:22:34,626 where it's going . What do you think 633 00:22:34,626 --> 00:22:36,570 are the someone so talk to the lay 634 00:22:36,570 --> 00:22:36,230 person right now , What are some of the 635 00:22:36,230 --> 00:22:38,730 most important misconceptions that they 636 00:22:38,730 --> 00:22:41,520 may have inadvertently about our 637 00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:44,110 security ? Well , I just mentioned one 638 00:22:44,120 --> 00:22:46,910 that we're a sanctuary , we're safe 639 00:22:46,910 --> 00:22:48,890 here . We can't be attacked on our 640 00:22:48,890 --> 00:22:51,001 homeland were actually being attacked 641 00:22:51,001 --> 00:22:52,779 every day in the information in 642 00:22:52,779 --> 00:22:54,950 cyberspace . I would say that's the 643 00:22:54,950 --> 00:22:56,970 first one , the misperception about 644 00:22:56,970 --> 00:22:59,750 that . And I would say just as we 645 00:22:59,750 --> 00:23:02,560 finish up soon here , um the panel 646 00:23:02,560 --> 00:23:04,727 coming up next , which I also have the 647 00:23:04,727 --> 00:23:06,782 privilege of moderating is gonna get 648 00:23:06,782 --> 00:23:08,893 into the question of what can fiction 649 00:23:08,893 --> 00:23:11,120 or what can interesting out of the box 650 00:23:11,120 --> 00:23:13,450 collaborations with , you know , games 651 00:23:13,450 --> 00:23:16,250 makers and movie production facilities 652 00:23:16,250 --> 00:23:19,920 and fiction writers due to broaden our 653 00:23:19,920 --> 00:23:21,698 mind or to change contribute to 654 00:23:21,698 --> 00:23:23,810 national security . And I asked this 655 00:23:23,810 --> 00:23:25,810 hesitantly , you know , because you 656 00:23:25,810 --> 00:23:28,850 know , my last real reflection on NORAD 657 00:23:28,860 --> 00:23:31,350 in pop culture was around 1981 and it 658 00:23:31,350 --> 00:23:33,517 was war games with Matthew broderick . 659 00:23:33,517 --> 00:23:35,294 I don't know if you let Matthew 660 00:23:35,294 --> 00:23:37,461 broderick in on the property anymore , 661 00:23:37,461 --> 00:23:39,461 but but you know , when you look at 662 00:23:39,461 --> 00:23:41,572 that and you think about fiction , is 663 00:23:41,572 --> 00:23:43,739 that a you is our next panel useful to 664 00:23:43,739 --> 00:23:46,060 you in any way at all ? Absolutely . So 665 00:23:46,070 --> 00:23:49,350 I recently wrote an article and I 666 00:23:49,350 --> 00:23:51,406 believe I testified to the same same 667 00:23:51,406 --> 00:23:54,020 thing . Innovation is something that we 668 00:23:54,020 --> 00:23:56,810 need and letting industry or academia 669 00:23:56,810 --> 00:23:58,910 as minds run wild about how to solve 670 00:23:58,910 --> 00:24:01,670 the problems that we face every day is 671 00:24:01,670 --> 00:24:03,559 good . I talked about surrounding 672 00:24:03,559 --> 00:24:05,614 yourself with people that think like 673 00:24:05,614 --> 00:24:07,726 you act like you , you don't get that 674 00:24:07,726 --> 00:24:09,892 innovation of where you're going . And 675 00:24:09,892 --> 00:24:09,740 so what you're talking about is war 676 00:24:09,740 --> 00:24:13,010 gaming innovative uh and thinking about 677 00:24:13,010 --> 00:24:15,360 the problems differently than we do 678 00:24:15,360 --> 00:24:17,582 today . I welcome that and look forward 679 00:24:17,582 --> 00:24:19,770 to that panel . And in our last minute 680 00:24:19,770 --> 00:24:21,826 I'm gonna ask you another question , 681 00:24:21,826 --> 00:24:23,992 this is sort of a non traditional part 682 00:24:23,992 --> 00:24:25,992 of security of the Homeland and the 683 00:24:25,992 --> 00:24:28,214 Northern Command . But the pentagon and 684 00:24:28,214 --> 00:24:30,590 all of its many appendages have a huge 685 00:24:30,600 --> 00:24:33,830 impact on what we do as a nation and as 686 00:24:33,830 --> 00:24:36,470 a world to deal with climate change and 687 00:24:36,470 --> 00:24:39,810 changing uh environmental factors that 688 00:24:39,810 --> 00:24:42,032 are impacting people around the world . 689 00:24:42,032 --> 00:24:43,921 And I know that the Department of 690 00:24:43,921 --> 00:24:46,143 Defense has put it out the security but 691 00:24:46,143 --> 00:24:48,143 just be interested as a security uh 692 00:24:48,143 --> 00:24:50,254 equation here as you think of climate 693 00:24:50,254 --> 00:24:52,477 in your Northern command hat , what are 694 00:24:52,477 --> 00:24:54,532 the issues for you there ? Well , it 695 00:24:54,532 --> 00:24:56,754 affects me both my Northern Command and 696 00:24:56,754 --> 00:24:59,088 NORAD had . Okay , so as climate change , 697 00:24:59,088 --> 00:25:01,199 is there anything that doesn't affect 698 00:25:01,199 --> 00:25:03,421 both hats there ? There are some things 699 00:25:03,421 --> 00:25:05,643 you're gonna put me on the spot and let 700 00:25:05,643 --> 00:25:07,699 me answer this question for you . So 701 00:25:07,699 --> 00:25:07,460 what's what's going on ? Absolutely . 702 00:25:07,460 --> 00:25:09,404 Climate change is happening . It's 703 00:25:09,404 --> 00:25:11,571 creating opportunities . It's creating 704 00:25:11,571 --> 00:25:13,571 vulnerabilities . The question is , 705 00:25:13,571 --> 00:25:15,849 what are we gonna do for both of those ? 706 00:25:15,849 --> 00:25:15,770 As the sea ice melts ? You know , 707 00:25:15,770 --> 00:25:17,826 commerce can now travel much quicker 708 00:25:17,940 --> 00:25:20,190 through the the North . You have access 709 00:25:20,190 --> 00:25:22,460 to more resources . What's happening is 710 00:25:22,530 --> 00:25:24,530 just as you see what's happening in 711 00:25:24,530 --> 00:25:26,760 Ukraine with Russia's irresponsible and 712 00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:28,871 illegal behavior is they're trying to 713 00:25:28,871 --> 00:25:30,920 change the norms and the rules that 714 00:25:30,920 --> 00:25:33,142 have existed since the end of World War 715 00:25:33,142 --> 00:25:35,364 Two and china is right on their heels . 716 00:25:35,364 --> 00:25:37,531 We're gonna see friction in the arctic 717 00:25:37,531 --> 00:25:40,790 based on resource challenges and land 718 00:25:40,790 --> 00:25:43,320 claim under seabed claims , those types 719 00:25:43,320 --> 00:25:45,210 of things . And so we have to be 720 00:25:45,210 --> 00:25:47,570 present . We have to be there to ensure 721 00:25:47,570 --> 00:25:50,040 that we have stability as we go forward 722 00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:52,096 in the arctic . I just want to thank 723 00:25:52,096 --> 00:25:54,262 you so much . You filled out much that 724 00:25:54,262 --> 00:25:56,560 we did not know about the role of NORAD 725 00:25:56,560 --> 00:25:58,727 and the Northern Command . Please give 726 00:25:58,727 --> 00:26:00,782 a round of applause to General Glenn 727 00:26:00,782 --> 00:26:02,671 Van Herk , commander of the North 728 00:26:02,671 --> 00:26:04,727 American Aerospace Defense Command , 729 00:26:04,727 --> 00:26:06,949 NORAD and commander of U . S . Northern 730 00:26:06,949 --> 00:26:09,171 Command . Thank you very much , sir . I 731 00:26:09,171 --> 00:26:08,560 really appreciate it . Thank you .