1 00:00:02,240 --> 00:00:04,240 um couple of quick housekeeping . 2 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:06,750 Before we start we've had to change the 3 00:00:06,750 --> 00:00:08,917 order of some panels today because one 4 00:00:08,917 --> 00:00:11,139 of our speakers was diverted to Houston 5 00:00:11,139 --> 00:00:13,194 texas last night . So our next panel 6 00:00:13,194 --> 00:00:15,360 will be the nuclear panel and we will 7 00:00:15,360 --> 00:00:17,527 have the conversation with jim Sciutto 8 00:00:17,527 --> 00:00:20,080 and Toria Nuland at 11 15 . So um 9 00:00:20,090 --> 00:00:22,257 adjust your expectations accordingly . 10 00:00:22,540 --> 00:00:24,596 Um Now I'm thrilled to introduce the 11 00:00:24,596 --> 00:00:26,860 next panel , talking about national 12 00:00:26,860 --> 00:00:28,916 security today , emerging challenges 13 00:00:28,916 --> 00:00:31,082 and opportunities . So I think this is 14 00:00:31,082 --> 00:00:33,138 a great way to kick off friday after 15 00:00:33,138 --> 00:00:35,249 hearing all of the challenges that we 16 00:00:35,249 --> 00:00:37,360 are facing to think about how General 17 00:00:37,360 --> 00:00:39,360 clark from Special Ops Command . Uh 18 00:00:39,360 --> 00:00:41,400 Congressman Crow from colorado and 19 00:00:41,410 --> 00:00:43,750 Senator ernst in conversation with 20 00:00:43,940 --> 00:00:46,218 Courtney kube E who's part of NBC news , 21 00:00:46,218 --> 00:00:48,329 our media partner . So please join me 22 00:00:48,329 --> 00:00:50,107 and welcome them to the stage . 23 00:00:52,690 --> 00:00:56,570 Okay thanks . So um welcome 24 00:00:56,570 --> 00:00:59,410 to day the final day of what's been a 25 00:00:59,420 --> 00:01:01,476 fascinating week filled with so many 26 00:01:01,476 --> 00:01:03,587 interesting conversations and I think 27 00:01:03,587 --> 00:01:05,753 we have another one coming up here now 28 00:01:05,753 --> 00:01:07,809 emerging threats and challenges . Um 29 00:01:07,809 --> 00:01:09,864 you know as I was as I was preparing 30 00:01:09,864 --> 00:01:12,087 for this I came to realize that this is 31 00:01:12,087 --> 00:01:14,750 a very huge subject right , so many 32 00:01:14,750 --> 00:01:17,080 possible challenges that exist right 33 00:01:17,080 --> 00:01:19,191 now and that the U . S . Is facing in 34 00:01:19,191 --> 00:01:21,191 the future . So we're gonna try and 35 00:01:21,191 --> 00:01:23,302 drill down on a couple of them here . 36 00:01:23,302 --> 00:01:25,469 The first one that I think is probably 37 00:01:25,469 --> 00:01:27,636 the most immediate right now is drones 38 00:01:27,636 --> 00:01:29,858 U . A . V . S . U . I . S . Is whatever 39 00:01:29,858 --> 00:01:31,969 you wanna call them . Everything from 40 00:01:31,969 --> 00:01:33,802 these small quad copters you can 41 00:01:33,802 --> 00:01:35,913 literally buy on amazon too much more 42 00:01:35,913 --> 00:01:38,230 advanced systems . So uh I want to 43 00:01:38,230 --> 00:01:40,760 start their senator ernst the threat 44 00:01:40,770 --> 00:01:43,150 has really evolved just in the last 45 00:01:43,160 --> 00:01:46,040 decade . From on drones . Uh the how 46 00:01:46,040 --> 00:01:48,207 they present such a challenge not just 47 00:01:48,207 --> 00:01:50,429 on a battlefield or a conflict zone but 48 00:01:50,429 --> 00:01:52,707 to a civilian population at this point . 49 00:01:52,707 --> 00:01:54,762 So how do you see that continuing to 50 00:01:54,762 --> 00:01:56,873 change in the future ? Well thank you 51 00:01:56,873 --> 00:01:59,096 Courtney . And and this is one of those 52 00:01:59,096 --> 00:02:02,060 areas that we like to 53 00:02:02,070 --> 00:02:04,540 address . Try to address through the 54 00:02:04,540 --> 00:02:06,429 emerging threats and capabilities 55 00:02:06,429 --> 00:02:08,540 subcommittee of the armed services in 56 00:02:08,540 --> 00:02:10,707 in the Senate . I'm the ranking member 57 00:02:10,707 --> 00:02:13,660 on that subcommittee . And we do see 58 00:02:13,660 --> 00:02:16,030 this as a growing problem because if 59 00:02:16,030 --> 00:02:18,330 you look at the availability of 60 00:02:18,340 --> 00:02:21,280 inexpensive drones , You find that the 61 00:02:21,280 --> 00:02:24,170 violent extremist organizations that we 62 00:02:24,170 --> 00:02:26,940 battle around the globe have easy 63 00:02:26,950 --> 00:02:29,430 access to this technology . They don't 64 00:02:29,430 --> 00:02:31,480 need to develop anything . All they 65 00:02:31,480 --> 00:02:34,070 need to do is hop on Amazon and they 66 00:02:34,070 --> 00:02:37,480 can buy a $300 drone that can be 67 00:02:37,480 --> 00:02:40,810 used against an adversary . And so it 68 00:02:40,810 --> 00:02:43,032 is a real concern but as we look to the 69 00:02:43,032 --> 00:02:45,730 future , we know that the chinese , the 70 00:02:45,730 --> 00:02:48,430 Russians um and others are putting a 71 00:02:48,430 --> 00:02:50,910 lot of money into what we call swarm 72 00:02:50,910 --> 00:02:53,790 technology . So it's not just the one 73 00:02:53,790 --> 00:02:55,846 offs that are being purchased on the 74 00:02:55,846 --> 00:02:58,140 internet but now we have near peer 75 00:02:58,140 --> 00:03:01,450 adversaries that are developing 76 00:03:01,540 --> 00:03:03,870 Swarm technology where they can use 77 00:03:03,870 --> 00:03:07,120 100-200 different drones , highly 78 00:03:07,130 --> 00:03:10,590 um highly evolved drones that can 79 00:03:10,590 --> 00:03:13,220 attack our service members on the 80 00:03:13,220 --> 00:03:17,090 battlefield perhaps disrupt a super 81 00:03:17,090 --> 00:03:19,201 Bowl game whatever it might happen to 82 00:03:19,201 --> 00:03:21,423 be . So we do have to focus not only on 83 00:03:21,423 --> 00:03:23,760 the drone technology but then anti 84 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:26,360 drone technology . And those are the 85 00:03:26,360 --> 00:03:28,527 things that we need to develop through 86 00:03:28,527 --> 00:03:31,250 ai and so forth . But it is a big 87 00:03:31,250 --> 00:03:33,417 concern that we have going forward and 88 00:03:33,417 --> 00:03:35,639 we see this technology again being used 89 00:03:35,639 --> 00:03:38,270 all over whether it's um you know 90 00:03:38,270 --> 00:03:40,381 perhaps al Shabaab that can gain that 91 00:03:40,381 --> 00:03:42,381 technology in africa where there is 92 00:03:42,381 --> 00:03:44,750 being used throughout centcom . So it 93 00:03:44,750 --> 00:03:46,950 is something that we pay attention to 94 00:03:46,950 --> 00:03:49,172 but not only pay attention to but we're 95 00:03:49,172 --> 00:03:51,506 putting resources into Congressman Crow . 96 00:03:51,506 --> 00:03:53,728 I saw you nodding your head a couple of 97 00:03:53,728 --> 00:03:55,617 times . They're both on the drone 98 00:03:55,617 --> 00:03:57,728 swarms and then also on ways that the 99 00:03:57,728 --> 00:03:59,783 US is potentially working to counter 100 00:03:59,783 --> 00:04:02,006 this threat . What do you think the U . 101 00:04:02,006 --> 00:04:04,172 S . Is doing enough to work to counter 102 00:04:04,172 --> 00:04:06,283 the threat from drones of all sizes ? 103 00:04:06,283 --> 00:04:08,506 Well good morning to all of you . Thank 104 00:04:08,506 --> 00:04:10,561 you Courtney for moderating . I hope 105 00:04:10,561 --> 00:04:12,617 you've had enough coffee for a drone 106 00:04:12,617 --> 00:04:14,860 discussion at nine a.m. Yes and no I 107 00:04:14,860 --> 00:04:18,080 mean we we have I think this recent N . 108 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:20,310 D . A . Makes some very significant 109 00:04:20,310 --> 00:04:22,477 investments in drone and counter drone 110 00:04:22,477 --> 00:04:26,030 technology . Counter U . A . S . I 111 00:04:26,040 --> 00:04:28,096 don't think we are ever doing enough 112 00:04:28,096 --> 00:04:30,207 frankly given some of the investments 113 00:04:30,207 --> 00:04:32,429 by china in particular in this area But 114 00:04:32,429 --> 00:04:34,373 we have some really big unanswered 115 00:04:34,373 --> 00:04:36,373 questions to that . We have to have 116 00:04:36,373 --> 00:04:38,540 some public debate about and it's just 117 00:04:38,540 --> 00:04:40,762 not the technology and the investment . 118 00:04:40,762 --> 00:04:40,650 But we have to have a discussion around 119 00:04:40,660 --> 00:04:42,960 what is the role of AI going to be 120 00:04:43,240 --> 00:04:45,073 because we have discussions as a 121 00:04:45,073 --> 00:04:47,270 democracy and we have , we take into 122 00:04:47,270 --> 00:04:49,270 consideration the moral and ethical 123 00:04:49,270 --> 00:04:51,270 implications of drones in ways that 124 00:04:51,270 --> 00:04:53,270 some of our adversaries do not . We 125 00:04:53,270 --> 00:04:55,492 have to think about the role of AI . We 126 00:04:55,492 --> 00:04:57,770 have to think about the whether or not , 127 00:04:57,770 --> 00:04:57,320 you know , humans will remain in the 128 00:04:57,320 --> 00:04:59,110 kill chain because some of our 129 00:04:59,110 --> 00:05:01,332 adversaries have decided that they will 130 00:05:01,332 --> 00:05:03,554 not and that the targeting will be done 131 00:05:03,554 --> 00:05:05,721 much quicker and without people making 132 00:05:05,721 --> 00:05:08,080 those decisions . Uh , and as we look 133 00:05:08,080 --> 00:05:09,913 at great power competition , our 134 00:05:09,913 --> 00:05:12,024 engagement in in dope a calm and what 135 00:05:12,024 --> 00:05:14,136 the scenarios for engagement and some 136 00:05:14,136 --> 00:05:16,780 of the war planning look like . Um that 137 00:05:16,780 --> 00:05:19,002 is an essential part of the debate that 138 00:05:19,002 --> 00:05:21,113 remains unanswered . And then we have 139 00:05:21,113 --> 00:05:23,224 to look at . I think the , what a lot 140 00:05:23,224 --> 00:05:25,169 of people have talked about is the 141 00:05:25,169 --> 00:05:25,070 tyranny of distance . Right ? Because a 142 00:05:25,070 --> 00:05:27,126 lot of the drones that we have right 143 00:05:27,126 --> 00:05:29,820 now are not capable of operating over 144 00:05:29,820 --> 00:05:33,090 the very long distances that we see in 145 00:05:33,090 --> 00:05:35,800 pay calm uh , and our logistics or 146 00:05:35,800 --> 00:05:37,522 supply chains , our ability to 147 00:05:37,522 --> 00:05:39,689 communicate , our ground based sensors 148 00:05:39,689 --> 00:05:42,820 aren't going to be as usable with with 149 00:05:42,820 --> 00:05:45,430 operating and maintaining drones as 150 00:05:45,430 --> 00:05:47,374 they are in europe , for example , 151 00:05:47,374 --> 00:05:49,541 where we have to go more towards space 152 00:05:49,541 --> 00:05:51,374 based sensors and operations and 153 00:05:51,374 --> 00:05:53,263 communications systems , but also 154 00:05:53,263 --> 00:05:55,486 looking at the contested logistics comm 155 00:05:55,486 --> 00:05:57,597 portion of this how we maintain drone 156 00:05:57,597 --> 00:05:59,490 fleets in a contested logistics 157 00:05:59,490 --> 00:06:02,670 environment in in dot com General Clark . 158 00:06:02,670 --> 00:06:04,837 You , I read an interview you did with 159 00:06:04,837 --> 00:06:06,948 Joint Forces Quarterly and you talked 160 00:06:06,948 --> 00:06:09,590 about some left of launch options 161 00:06:09,590 --> 00:06:11,757 specifically where can the U . S . B . 162 00:06:11,757 --> 00:06:14,090 Left of launch to disrupt supply chains , 163 00:06:14,090 --> 00:06:16,201 transportation and development before 164 00:06:16,201 --> 00:06:18,423 it's too late . Can you talk about some 165 00:06:18,423 --> 00:06:20,646 of the specifics of what the U . S . Is 166 00:06:20,646 --> 00:06:22,979 doing in this ? Yeah . Just first again , 167 00:06:22,979 --> 00:06:25,146 thanks to the aspen team for having us 168 00:06:25,146 --> 00:06:27,450 here today and the opportunity to be 169 00:06:27,450 --> 00:06:31,330 here First . As we 170 00:06:31,330 --> 00:06:33,552 think about this problem , I've been in 171 00:06:33,552 --> 00:06:36,740 the army for 38 years and in my entire 172 00:06:36,740 --> 00:06:39,090 time in the army on battlefields in 173 00:06:39,090 --> 00:06:42,640 Iraq and Afghanistan Syria , I never 174 00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:46,570 had to look up . I never had to 175 00:06:46,570 --> 00:06:48,550 look up because the US always 176 00:06:48,550 --> 00:06:51,610 maintained air superiority and our 177 00:06:51,610 --> 00:06:55,080 forces were protected because we had 178 00:06:55,090 --> 00:06:58,740 air cover . But now with everything 179 00:06:58,740 --> 00:07:02,720 from quad copters are very small up to 180 00:07:02,730 --> 00:07:06,710 very large unmanned aerial vehicles . 181 00:07:07,540 --> 00:07:10,270 We we won't always have that luxury . 182 00:07:11,140 --> 00:07:14,570 And as we think about this much of our 183 00:07:14,580 --> 00:07:18,320 focus to to your question , Courtney is 184 00:07:18,320 --> 00:07:22,200 about the defeat of the U . A . S . 185 00:07:22,200 --> 00:07:24,720 Or the U . A . V . S . After they've 186 00:07:24,720 --> 00:07:27,420 already launched after they've already 187 00:07:27,420 --> 00:07:29,642 taken off . How do we feed them ? But I 188 00:07:29,642 --> 00:07:31,753 think there are opportunities for our 189 00:07:31,753 --> 00:07:34,280 government , for our intel agencies uh 190 00:07:34,290 --> 00:07:37,470 and our Department of Defense is how do 191 00:07:37,470 --> 00:07:39,720 we stop those drones before they even 192 00:07:39,720 --> 00:07:42,280 launch ? And what are those supply 193 00:07:42,280 --> 00:07:44,850 change ? And what are the intel and 194 00:07:44,850 --> 00:07:46,794 what are the norms of behavior for 195 00:07:46,794 --> 00:07:48,906 countries that are going to use these 196 00:07:48,906 --> 00:07:51,239 drones ? But some as we see in business , 197 00:07:51,239 --> 00:07:53,310 they can provide great capability . 198 00:07:53,320 --> 00:07:55,800 They could move patients , they could 199 00:07:55,800 --> 00:07:58,090 move supplies around the battlefield . 200 00:07:58,090 --> 00:08:00,210 That would help . But what are those 201 00:08:00,210 --> 00:08:02,432 norms going to be in the future ? And I 202 00:08:02,432 --> 00:08:04,760 think we have to first look at 203 00:08:05,660 --> 00:08:08,230 discussing norms and authorities and 204 00:08:08,230 --> 00:08:11,190 how people are going to use them uh in 205 00:08:11,190 --> 00:08:14,650 many ways . But I also think from a U . 206 00:08:14,650 --> 00:08:17,020 S . Government is how are we going to 207 00:08:17,020 --> 00:08:19,320 prevent them ? And when when even 208 00:08:19,320 --> 00:08:21,320 discussed in this forum a couple of 209 00:08:21,320 --> 00:08:24,440 days ago when to show the importance of 210 00:08:24,440 --> 00:08:28,100 them when Russia is running out of them 211 00:08:28,100 --> 00:08:31,120 for Ukraine and they're going to Iran 212 00:08:31,130 --> 00:08:34,850 to go buy more should cause us all a 213 00:08:34,860 --> 00:08:37,940 bit of concern because you can see how 214 00:08:37,940 --> 00:08:40,600 valuable that they can be in the future 215 00:08:40,610 --> 00:08:43,580 fight . Uh , and you know , as as 216 00:08:43,590 --> 00:08:47,460 congressman cho the cost of entry uh , 217 00:08:47,470 --> 00:08:49,526 into this , particularly for some of 218 00:08:49,526 --> 00:08:52,630 the small , um , an aerial systems is 219 00:08:52,630 --> 00:08:54,940 very , very low . But I think , you 220 00:08:54,940 --> 00:08:58,860 know , for opportunities , uh we have a 221 00:08:58,870 --> 00:09:01,092 we have a great business and industrial 222 00:09:01,092 --> 00:09:03,770 base who can help us with this . And I 223 00:09:03,770 --> 00:09:05,826 think they I think this is something 224 00:09:05,826 --> 00:09:08,410 that's got to continue to go up in 225 00:09:08,410 --> 00:09:10,560 terms of our priority for the 226 00:09:10,560 --> 00:09:12,560 protection , not just of our forces 227 00:09:12,560 --> 00:09:14,782 that are for today , that's the current 228 00:09:14,782 --> 00:09:17,004 problem . But what's going to come home 229 00:09:17,004 --> 00:09:19,140 to roost ? Uh and some of these 230 00:09:19,140 --> 00:09:21,510 technologies that could be used by our 231 00:09:21,510 --> 00:09:25,190 adversaries on or near abroad or even 232 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:27,089 into our homeland . Can I , can I 233 00:09:27,089 --> 00:09:29,330 mention on the cost of entry and the 234 00:09:29,340 --> 00:09:31,229 defense industrial base ? Because 235 00:09:31,229 --> 00:09:33,229 that's such a huge part . You can't 236 00:09:33,229 --> 00:09:35,284 have this discussion without talking 237 00:09:35,284 --> 00:09:35,120 about procurement and acquisition 238 00:09:35,120 --> 00:09:37,120 reform because we have 1/20 century 239 00:09:37,130 --> 00:09:39,260 contracting system that's designed 240 00:09:39,260 --> 00:09:41,770 around large prime systems , right ? We 241 00:09:41,770 --> 00:09:44,830 put out a request for a proposal , we 242 00:09:44,830 --> 00:09:47,680 put out requirements and then We have a 243 00:09:47,690 --> 00:09:50,120 5-8 year process by which we go through 244 00:09:50,120 --> 00:09:51,842 that we go through contracting 245 00:09:51,842 --> 00:09:54,009 litigation and by the time we actually 246 00:09:54,009 --> 00:09:56,176 feel the system then it's you know , 5 247 00:09:56,176 --> 00:09:57,953 to 10 years later . And then we 248 00:09:57,953 --> 00:10:00,009 actually are locked into these large 249 00:10:00,009 --> 00:10:02,231 systems for 2030 years . Uh and and and 250 00:10:02,231 --> 00:10:04,640 meanwhile our adversaries are using 251 00:10:04,640 --> 00:10:07,090 cots stuff commercial off the shelf . 252 00:10:07,090 --> 00:10:09,370 They're using very inexpensive , very a 253 00:10:09,370 --> 00:10:11,980 treatable systems . And they recognize 254 00:10:11,980 --> 00:10:15,380 that the technological evolution of any 255 00:10:15,390 --> 00:10:19,050 system is 18-24 months As opposed to 10 256 00:10:19,050 --> 00:10:21,420 to 15 years like it used to be . Right . 257 00:10:21,420 --> 00:10:24,130 So we need radical reform on our 258 00:10:24,130 --> 00:10:26,310 contracting systems to actually keep 259 00:10:26,320 --> 00:10:28,910 pace with that vastly condensed 260 00:10:28,970 --> 00:10:32,590 technological cycle . Uh and and do 261 00:10:32,590 --> 00:10:34,312 things that are cheaper , more 262 00:10:34,312 --> 00:10:36,860 treatable uh and more replaceable . And 263 00:10:36,860 --> 00:10:38,693 you're talking about both in the 264 00:10:38,693 --> 00:10:40,804 technology , the drone technology and 265 00:10:40,804 --> 00:10:43,138 in the counter drone technology . Right ? 266 00:10:43,280 --> 00:10:46,100 And what we have to do as well because 267 00:10:46,100 --> 00:10:49,140 I I agree um interoperability will be 268 00:10:49,140 --> 00:10:51,440 very important as well . We have to 269 00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:53,617 recognize that we have many allies and 270 00:10:53,617 --> 00:10:55,783 partners as we look to the Middle East 271 00:10:55,783 --> 00:10:57,894 and with the threat that Iran poses . 272 00:10:57,894 --> 00:11:00,700 Not only are we looking at missile 273 00:11:00,700 --> 00:11:02,860 defense but now because of the drone 274 00:11:02,860 --> 00:11:05,450 threat , it is it's air defense in a 275 00:11:05,450 --> 00:11:07,450 way that we haven't had to think of 276 00:11:07,450 --> 00:11:09,339 before . So we actually do have a 277 00:11:09,339 --> 00:11:12,460 bicameral bipartisan act that would 278 00:11:12,470 --> 00:11:15,140 allow our Secretary of Defense to work 279 00:11:15,140 --> 00:11:17,362 with a number of allies and partners in 280 00:11:17,362 --> 00:11:19,740 coming up with interoperability um 281 00:11:19,740 --> 00:11:22,010 systems that are tied together as far 282 00:11:22,010 --> 00:11:24,960 as Aaron and missile defense throughout 283 00:11:24,960 --> 00:11:27,890 the Middle East and again directed at 284 00:11:27,960 --> 00:11:30,182 protecting against the threat that Iran 285 00:11:30,182 --> 00:11:33,950 poses . Uh general clark , another 286 00:11:33,950 --> 00:11:37,190 big emerging threat or challenges can 287 00:11:37,190 --> 00:11:39,980 bio um I mean we've seen just even 288 00:11:39,980 --> 00:11:42,036 recently in the last couple of years 289 00:11:42,036 --> 00:11:44,202 how something like Covid can have this 290 00:11:44,202 --> 00:11:46,313 profound effect on the entire world . 291 00:11:46,313 --> 00:11:45,580 It's still having an effect even on us 292 00:11:45,590 --> 00:11:48,460 here . Right . Socom is the 293 00:11:48,460 --> 00:11:51,360 coordinating authority for cam bio and 294 00:11:51,370 --> 00:11:53,314 and and there's this vast array of 295 00:11:53,314 --> 00:11:55,314 possible weapons . That's the thing 296 00:11:55,314 --> 00:11:57,370 that's so fascinating about both the 297 00:11:57,370 --> 00:11:57,320 drones and about the cam bio is you 298 00:11:57,320 --> 00:11:59,431 have everything from these very crude 299 00:11:59,431 --> 00:12:01,487 agents that we've seen in Syrian and 300 00:12:01,487 --> 00:12:03,598 Iraq , right ? Sarin , mustard gas to 301 00:12:03,598 --> 00:12:05,653 really sophisticated ones that state 302 00:12:05,653 --> 00:12:07,709 actors like Russia have used against 303 00:12:07,709 --> 00:12:10,920 political opponents . Where do you see 304 00:12:10,920 --> 00:12:13,830 the current threat from cam bio ? And 305 00:12:13,830 --> 00:12:16,940 how what is the U . S . Doing to 306 00:12:16,940 --> 00:12:19,107 potentially combat this when just like 307 00:12:19,107 --> 00:12:21,218 again , like the drones ? It's such a 308 00:12:21,218 --> 00:12:23,840 vast array of of danger of challenge 309 00:12:24,480 --> 00:12:26,313 Courtney . I'm glad I'm glad you 310 00:12:26,313 --> 00:12:28,650 brought this up . As you know , the 311 00:12:28,650 --> 00:12:31,100 department is charged so calm to look 312 00:12:31,100 --> 00:12:33,910 at this thread . Uh and to look at the 313 00:12:33,910 --> 00:12:36,610 actors that are proliferating this and 314 00:12:36,860 --> 00:12:40,760 you raise one In the manner . It was 315 00:12:40,760 --> 00:12:43,680 used with both chlorine and mustard 316 00:12:43,680 --> 00:12:47,200 gasses were used in 2014 , 317 00:12:47,690 --> 00:12:49,801 mainly experimental , but it was used 318 00:12:49,801 --> 00:12:53,000 by ISIS in Iraq and Syria . Uh 319 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:55,410 and through some , you know , through 320 00:12:55,410 --> 00:12:57,990 some lethal activities , took some of 321 00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:00,300 the purveyors that had used those 322 00:13:00,300 --> 00:13:02,411 weapons systems off the battlefield , 323 00:13:02,540 --> 00:13:05,150 but that just should prove to all of us 324 00:13:05,430 --> 00:13:08,500 that it's pretty simple to do it . And 325 00:13:08,510 --> 00:13:11,600 and the fact that someone uh in the 326 00:13:11,600 --> 00:13:15,390 basement in Mosul uh with a few 327 00:13:15,390 --> 00:13:17,990 lab sets can do this . And I think it's 328 00:13:17,990 --> 00:13:21,420 something that we as as a nation 329 00:13:21,430 --> 00:13:24,560 need to continue to push on the norms 330 00:13:25,040 --> 00:13:27,650 on this . But then also to continue to 331 00:13:27,650 --> 00:13:30,890 look at what those threats are uh and 332 00:13:30,890 --> 00:13:33,800 continue to combat them because we have 333 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:37,640 both non state actors like an ISIS or 334 00:13:37,640 --> 00:13:40,800 Al Qaeda who who continued to look at 335 00:13:40,800 --> 00:13:44,390 those as a use because they instill 336 00:13:44,390 --> 00:13:47,300 fear they instill fear and are 337 00:13:47,300 --> 00:13:49,670 basically a terrorist terrorist weapons 338 00:13:49,670 --> 00:13:52,790 system . So we have to we we have to 339 00:13:52,790 --> 00:13:54,734 ensure that we can protect our own 340 00:13:54,734 --> 00:13:57,650 forces that are in the proximity which 341 00:13:57,650 --> 00:13:59,830 we're taking . We're developing new 342 00:13:59,830 --> 00:14:01,870 capability to do that . But we also 343 00:14:01,870 --> 00:14:04,203 have to be aware that they can use them . 344 00:14:04,203 --> 00:14:06,000 But then I I think from a state 345 00:14:06,010 --> 00:14:09,800 perspective when as you just mentioned , 346 00:14:09,810 --> 00:14:12,340 Russia is willing to use those against 347 00:14:12,340 --> 00:14:14,470 political opponents . They're willing 348 00:14:14,470 --> 00:14:16,470 to use them on their own soil . But 349 00:14:16,470 --> 00:14:19,370 then to go in on the soil of a NATO 350 00:14:19,370 --> 00:14:22,460 ally of the U . K . And use those again 351 00:14:22,840 --> 00:14:26,290 low cost barrier into this 352 00:14:26,300 --> 00:14:30,150 arena . And as as we 353 00:14:30,150 --> 00:14:32,670 go into the future we we have to be 354 00:14:32,670 --> 00:14:35,180 prepared for that eventuality . And I 355 00:14:35,180 --> 00:14:37,560 don't think we you know we talk about 356 00:14:37,560 --> 00:14:40,270 it as much as we should and look for 357 00:14:40,270 --> 00:14:44,160 methods to continue to combat it . Yeah 358 00:14:44,170 --> 00:14:46,059 so to be clear I think one of the 359 00:14:46,059 --> 00:14:48,281 things we're talking about here is that 360 00:14:48,281 --> 00:14:50,503 there are now weapons under development 361 00:14:50,503 --> 00:14:52,448 and developed that are designed to 362 00:14:52,448 --> 00:14:54,503 target specific people . That that's 363 00:14:54,503 --> 00:14:56,503 what this is where you can actually 364 00:14:56,503 --> 00:14:58,503 take someone's D . N . A . Take you 365 00:14:58,503 --> 00:15:00,559 know their their medical profile and 366 00:15:00,559 --> 00:15:02,781 you can target a biological weapon that 367 00:15:02,781 --> 00:15:05,003 will that will kill that person or take 368 00:15:05,003 --> 00:15:07,114 them off the battlefield or make them 369 00:15:07,114 --> 00:15:08,781 inoperable . You can't have a 370 00:15:08,781 --> 00:15:10,892 discussion about this without talking 371 00:15:10,892 --> 00:15:13,640 about privacy . Uh commercial data and 372 00:15:13,640 --> 00:15:15,529 the protection of commercial data 373 00:15:15,529 --> 00:15:17,584 because expectations of privacy have 374 00:15:17,584 --> 00:15:19,696 degraded over the last 20 years . You 375 00:15:19,696 --> 00:15:21,696 know young folks actually have very 376 00:15:21,696 --> 00:15:23,862 little expectation of privacy . That's 377 00:15:23,862 --> 00:15:25,973 what the polling and the data show Uh 378 00:15:25,973 --> 00:15:28,084 and and people will very rapidly spit 379 00:15:28,084 --> 00:15:30,196 into a cup and sit into 23 and me and 380 00:15:30,196 --> 00:15:32,418 get really interesting data about their 381 00:15:32,418 --> 00:15:34,529 background and guess what their DNA . 382 00:15:34,529 --> 00:15:36,640 Is now owned by a private company and 383 00:15:36,640 --> 00:15:36,490 can be sold off without very with very 384 00:15:36,490 --> 00:15:38,310 little uh intellectual property 385 00:15:38,310 --> 00:15:40,477 protection or privacy protection . And 386 00:15:40,477 --> 00:15:42,510 we don't have legal and regulatory 387 00:15:42,510 --> 00:15:45,740 regimes to deal with that . So we have 388 00:15:45,740 --> 00:15:47,962 to have an open and public discussion . 389 00:15:47,962 --> 00:15:49,851 And this is going to have to be a 390 00:15:49,851 --> 00:15:51,907 political discussion about what does 391 00:15:51,907 --> 00:15:53,573 the protection of health care 392 00:15:53,573 --> 00:15:55,796 information D . N . A . Information and 393 00:15:55,796 --> 00:15:58,430 your data look like . Because that data 394 00:15:58,430 --> 00:16:00,560 is actually gonna be procured and 395 00:16:00,560 --> 00:16:02,616 collected by our adversaries for the 396 00:16:02,616 --> 00:16:05,950 development of these systems . And I'll 397 00:16:05,950 --> 00:16:08,510 add on as well when we look on on a 398 00:16:08,510 --> 00:16:11,580 broader level . Um who else needs to 399 00:16:11,580 --> 00:16:13,802 engage in this ? Well it can be U . S . 400 00:16:13,802 --> 00:16:15,469 D . A . U . S . Department of 401 00:16:15,469 --> 00:16:17,720 Agriculture . So not necessarily those 402 00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:20,750 specific human targets with a 403 00:16:20,760 --> 00:16:22,750 particular type of weaponized 404 00:16:22,760 --> 00:16:26,630 biological weapon . But also if we 405 00:16:26,630 --> 00:16:29,490 look at food security and what can our 406 00:16:29,490 --> 00:16:32,810 adversaries do with biological weapons 407 00:16:32,810 --> 00:16:34,920 that are directed at our animal 408 00:16:34,920 --> 00:16:38,250 agriculture at our agricultural sector , 409 00:16:38,540 --> 00:16:40,318 hoof and mouth disease , highly 410 00:16:40,318 --> 00:16:42,760 pathogenic avian influenza african , 411 00:16:42,760 --> 00:16:44,927 swine fever , all of these things have 412 00:16:44,927 --> 00:16:46,982 circulated around the globe . But if 413 00:16:46,982 --> 00:16:50,340 targeted by an adversary , we know that 414 00:16:50,350 --> 00:16:53,170 it brings about food insecurity . Food 415 00:16:53,170 --> 00:16:55,350 insecurity drives a lot of other 416 00:16:55,350 --> 00:16:57,630 insecurities around the globe . So a 417 00:16:57,630 --> 00:17:00,440 few years ago I had a big fight in the 418 00:17:00,450 --> 00:17:03,490 N . D . A . Where we were talking about 419 00:17:03,500 --> 00:17:06,160 putting in protections for our food 420 00:17:06,160 --> 00:17:08,460 sources here in the United States . But 421 00:17:08,460 --> 00:17:10,820 once you paint food security as a 422 00:17:10,820 --> 00:17:13,540 national security , it got included . 423 00:17:13,540 --> 00:17:15,670 So uh you know , there's a number of 424 00:17:15,670 --> 00:17:17,860 ways we can look at biological weapons 425 00:17:17,860 --> 00:17:20,210 and the need to make sure not only are 426 00:17:20,210 --> 00:17:22,880 we securing human beings um but then 427 00:17:22,880 --> 00:17:25,550 also the food that will sustain us . 428 00:17:25,940 --> 00:17:28,051 Yeah . Food , there was a fascinating 429 00:17:28,051 --> 00:17:30,107 panel here yesterday that dealt with 430 00:17:30,107 --> 00:17:32,273 that the food insecurity and and we're 431 00:17:32,273 --> 00:17:34,384 seeing that really play out right now 432 00:17:34,384 --> 00:17:36,329 in Ukraine with this um with grain 433 00:17:36,329 --> 00:17:38,273 getting the grain out and how it's 434 00:17:38,273 --> 00:17:40,273 causing such a ripple effect really 435 00:17:40,273 --> 00:17:42,650 around the world . But I'm so I'd like 436 00:17:42,650 --> 00:17:44,483 to expand on that a little bit . 437 00:17:44,483 --> 00:17:46,950 Starting with you senator ernst how do 438 00:17:46,950 --> 00:17:49,200 you see a future where food will be 439 00:17:49,210 --> 00:17:51,910 increasingly weaponized potentially . 440 00:17:51,920 --> 00:17:54,550 And and is there anything that the U . 441 00:17:54,550 --> 00:17:56,328 S . Or even the world can do to 442 00:17:56,328 --> 00:17:58,410 mitigate that . Absolutely . It will 443 00:17:58,410 --> 00:18:00,730 continue to be weaponized . We see this 444 00:18:00,730 --> 00:18:02,508 large in part now I think folks 445 00:18:02,508 --> 00:18:05,010 understand what's going on with Russia 446 00:18:05,010 --> 00:18:08,060 and how they are weaponizing food and 447 00:18:08,060 --> 00:18:10,920 food supply chains with Ukraine ? We 448 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:14,060 have , you know , 600 million tons of 449 00:18:14,060 --> 00:18:17,530 food in Ukraine grain stock that can't 450 00:18:17,530 --> 00:18:20,870 move out of the country . So we are 451 00:18:20,880 --> 00:18:22,880 going to see food insecurity in the 452 00:18:22,880 --> 00:18:25,047 Middle East . We'll see it in africa . 453 00:18:25,047 --> 00:18:26,880 Those are the primary areas that 454 00:18:26,880 --> 00:18:29,670 Ukraine exports to . But even as we try 455 00:18:29,670 --> 00:18:32,110 to employ our own uses here in the 456 00:18:32,110 --> 00:18:34,660 United States through U . S . A . I . D . 457 00:18:34,660 --> 00:18:37,370 It's been a real struggle to deliver 458 00:18:37,370 --> 00:18:39,740 those food supplies to those in need in 459 00:18:39,740 --> 00:18:43,650 europe and other areas . Only about 18% 460 00:18:43,700 --> 00:18:45,756 from the two packages that have been 461 00:18:45,756 --> 00:18:48,120 authorized by Congress , only 18% of 462 00:18:48,120 --> 00:18:49,953 that has actually been delivered 463 00:18:49,953 --> 00:18:52,170 forward . It's because we get in our 464 00:18:52,170 --> 00:18:54,500 own way , our bureaucracies are so 465 00:18:54,500 --> 00:18:57,550 large . We have so few contractors that 466 00:18:57,550 --> 00:19:00,790 are working on on the movements of this 467 00:19:00,790 --> 00:19:03,590 food within U . S . A . I . D . Um , so 468 00:19:03,600 --> 00:19:06,390 we have to do better . But absolutely , 469 00:19:06,390 --> 00:19:09,140 I see in the future where we need to 470 00:19:09,140 --> 00:19:11,750 streamline our processes , cargo 471 00:19:11,750 --> 00:19:15,030 preference is also a very big inhibitor 472 00:19:15,030 --> 00:19:17,810 of moving food from the United States 473 00:19:17,810 --> 00:19:20,380 to other areas . We have some solutions 474 00:19:20,390 --> 00:19:22,612 that we've proposed there , but we need 475 00:19:22,612 --> 00:19:25,190 action . Um , in a prior discussion 476 00:19:25,190 --> 00:19:27,246 this morning , we were talking about 477 00:19:27,246 --> 00:19:29,468 admiring the problem , right ? And uh , 478 00:19:29,468 --> 00:19:31,579 we've heard that that quote and thank 479 00:19:31,579 --> 00:19:34,030 you so much . Steve , we like to admire 480 00:19:34,030 --> 00:19:36,450 the problem . But folks , at what point 481 00:19:36,450 --> 00:19:40,230 do we actually get into action ? And 482 00:19:40,230 --> 00:19:42,452 that's what we've got to do . We've got 483 00:19:42,452 --> 00:19:44,508 to streamline the process because it 484 00:19:44,508 --> 00:19:46,452 all comes back to food if we can't 485 00:19:46,452 --> 00:19:48,563 sustain our human population well for 486 00:19:48,563 --> 00:19:50,563 what , then , um so we've got to do 487 00:19:50,563 --> 00:19:52,563 better and deliver where needed and 488 00:19:52,563 --> 00:19:54,760 then solve those future problems , but 489 00:19:54,770 --> 00:19:56,992 we'll continue to see food weaponized . 490 00:19:56,992 --> 00:19:59,159 Yes . And I don't think you can have a 491 00:19:59,159 --> 00:20:01,048 discussion around food insecurity 492 00:20:01,048 --> 00:20:03,270 without talking about the impact of the 493 00:20:03,270 --> 00:20:05,492 climate crisis , right ? Climate change 494 00:20:05,492 --> 00:20:07,714 and the climate crisis is both a threat 495 00:20:07,714 --> 00:20:09,881 magnifier . So it magnifies all of the 496 00:20:09,881 --> 00:20:11,937 existing threats and it's a threat . 497 00:20:11,937 --> 00:20:13,992 Multiplier is creating new threats , 498 00:20:13,992 --> 00:20:16,159 right ? You were seeing vast collapses 499 00:20:16,159 --> 00:20:18,326 worldwide and the amount of productive 500 00:20:18,326 --> 00:20:20,381 agricultural land , uh , and that at 501 00:20:20,381 --> 00:20:22,603 the same time , you're seeing increases 502 00:20:22,603 --> 00:20:24,770 in and pestilence . Um , you're seeing 503 00:20:24,770 --> 00:20:27,780 issues with , uh , you know , the 504 00:20:27,790 --> 00:20:29,970 changes in the amount of productive 505 00:20:29,970 --> 00:20:32,280 crops , you're seeing population 506 00:20:32,280 --> 00:20:34,447 displacements , refugee flows , all of 507 00:20:34,447 --> 00:20:36,669 which are stabilizers politically . And 508 00:20:36,669 --> 00:20:38,724 from a governance perspective . So , 509 00:20:38,724 --> 00:20:40,947 I'm having a broader discussion and and 510 00:20:40,947 --> 00:20:43,058 I have often said that I believe that 511 00:20:43,058 --> 00:20:45,002 now that the climate crisis is the 512 00:20:45,002 --> 00:20:47,002 largest national security threat we 513 00:20:47,002 --> 00:20:49,224 face . And that's not meant to discount 514 00:20:49,224 --> 00:20:51,350 the kind of traditional threats by 515 00:20:51,350 --> 00:20:53,072 state and non state actors and 516 00:20:53,072 --> 00:20:55,294 technological threats . But if you look 517 00:20:55,294 --> 00:20:57,294 across the board as a magnifier and 518 00:20:57,294 --> 00:20:59,406 multiply apply are the climate crisis 519 00:20:59,406 --> 00:21:01,572 is going to do that ? So , getting our 520 00:21:01,572 --> 00:21:04,480 arms around how that is changing our 521 00:21:04,480 --> 00:21:06,147 threats and how it's going to 522 00:21:06,147 --> 00:21:08,369 destabilize vast regions of the world . 523 00:21:08,369 --> 00:21:10,760 I don't think we really yet understand 524 00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:12,896 What we're going to be looking at in 525 00:21:12,896 --> 00:21:14,896 the next 10 or 15 years and what we 526 00:21:14,896 --> 00:21:16,896 need to be preparing for . I wonder 527 00:21:16,896 --> 00:21:16,230 what do you think of that general clark ? 528 00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:18,462 Because you know , when you think about 529 00:21:18,462 --> 00:21:20,573 it , the way that congressman Crow is 530 00:21:20,573 --> 00:21:20,430 laying it out , you have something like 531 00:21:20,430 --> 00:21:22,710 a climate crisis that leads to a 532 00:21:22,710 --> 00:21:24,766 migration of a population , then you 533 00:21:24,766 --> 00:21:26,821 have a vulnerable population that is 534 00:21:26,821 --> 00:21:28,932 that could be exploited by a a terror 535 00:21:28,932 --> 00:21:31,043 network or whatever . And that's sort 536 00:21:31,043 --> 00:21:33,266 of where you come in the military . But 537 00:21:33,266 --> 00:21:35,432 I'm wondering if there's a place where 538 00:21:35,432 --> 00:21:37,543 the military comes in ahead of all of 539 00:21:37,543 --> 00:21:37,270 that before you have a vulnerable 540 00:21:37,270 --> 00:21:40,670 population in Iraq 541 00:21:42,240 --> 00:21:44,160 2007 08 nine . 542 00:21:45,640 --> 00:21:48,710 And when we were fighting primarily an 543 00:21:48,710 --> 00:21:52,180 Al Qaeda based organization and during 544 00:21:52,180 --> 00:21:55,640 that time some people were laying I . E . 545 00:21:55,640 --> 00:21:57,584 D . S . You know , they improvised 546 00:21:57,584 --> 00:22:00,090 explosive devices on the road that 547 00:22:00,100 --> 00:22:02,211 could kill a U . S . Service member . 548 00:22:02,211 --> 00:22:04,810 And sometimes as we we captured these 549 00:22:04,810 --> 00:22:07,960 individuals , they would say , 550 00:22:08,340 --> 00:22:10,618 why do you like what you would ask him ? 551 00:22:10,618 --> 00:22:12,396 Why did you lay that improvised 552 00:22:12,396 --> 00:22:14,760 explosive device that could kill one of 553 00:22:14,760 --> 00:22:18,020 our one of our folks ? Well , they my 554 00:22:18,020 --> 00:22:21,930 family needed food , my family needed 555 00:22:21,940 --> 00:22:25,500 food and They would pay me a couple 556 00:22:25,500 --> 00:22:29,460 $100 to do that and 557 00:22:30,830 --> 00:22:32,941 anyone will do anything to feed their 558 00:22:32,941 --> 00:22:36,850 family . And I think as we think about 559 00:22:37,440 --> 00:22:39,800 in climate and the impacts to that and 560 00:22:39,800 --> 00:22:42,710 the food security , what we're really 561 00:22:42,710 --> 00:22:46,370 talking about is recruitment towards 562 00:22:46,370 --> 00:22:49,450 ideologies and potential radicalization 563 00:22:50,140 --> 00:22:53,340 uh that we have to be aware of and if 564 00:22:53,340 --> 00:22:54,951 you , you know that was in a 565 00:22:54,960 --> 00:22:57,490 specifically in a unique place , but I 566 00:22:57,490 --> 00:22:59,601 think as we look at the impacts today 567 00:22:59,601 --> 00:23:02,870 in Ukraine and what could be in places 568 00:23:02,870 --> 00:23:05,620 like the Suhail that are already 569 00:23:05,630 --> 00:23:09,600 already low in the food supplies are 570 00:23:09,600 --> 00:23:13,240 going to an underserved population uh 571 00:23:13,250 --> 00:23:16,960 and what that could do to a rise of 572 00:23:17,440 --> 00:23:19,970 a radical group like ISIS in that 573 00:23:19,970 --> 00:23:22,930 region where they're already government 574 00:23:22,930 --> 00:23:25,041 coups going on in places like Burkina 575 00:23:25,041 --> 00:23:28,200 Fasso , the Russians are impacting with 576 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:30,710 Wagner group in Tamale and I think 577 00:23:30,710 --> 00:23:32,877 those are the things that we look at , 578 00:23:32,877 --> 00:23:35,180 what the impact of this could be from a 579 00:23:35,180 --> 00:23:38,590 security situation to give 580 00:23:38,860 --> 00:23:42,800 radical groups a platform 581 00:23:42,800 --> 00:23:46,240 or a location from which to grow and 582 00:23:46,240 --> 00:23:49,430 the minute that they can be in a place 583 00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:53,440 and establish governance and law , 584 00:23:53,450 --> 00:23:55,450 it gives us a platform like we have 585 00:23:55,450 --> 00:23:57,506 seen in the past that could actually 586 00:23:57,506 --> 00:23:59,839 come back and attack some of our allies , 587 00:23:59,839 --> 00:24:02,650 but that could also attack back in the 588 00:24:02,650 --> 00:24:04,817 United States . And I think we have to 589 00:24:04,817 --> 00:24:07,490 be cognizant of the impacts of that , 590 00:24:07,500 --> 00:24:10,060 of that to our security situation and 591 00:24:10,060 --> 00:24:12,227 part of that , you know , Courtney , I 592 00:24:12,227 --> 00:24:14,393 think to get to your baseline question 593 00:24:14,393 --> 00:24:16,560 is to be ahead of that . Not just from 594 00:24:16,560 --> 00:24:18,930 a security situation standpoint , you 595 00:24:18,930 --> 00:24:22,090 know with us military which we are you 596 00:24:22,090 --> 00:24:24,257 know U . S . Special operations forces 597 00:24:24,257 --> 00:24:26,990 does have people in the sale but it's 598 00:24:26,990 --> 00:24:29,730 also from providing 599 00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:33,010 capabilities providing food , making 600 00:24:33,010 --> 00:24:35,820 sure we have the right the right usa I . 601 00:24:35,820 --> 00:24:39,100 D . The right Department of State . 602 00:24:39,110 --> 00:24:41,940 Uh and truthfully civilian 603 00:24:41,950 --> 00:24:43,850 government and non government 604 00:24:43,850 --> 00:24:45,961 organizations to assist in this ahead 605 00:24:45,961 --> 00:24:48,072 of time . Do you have enough ? I mean 606 00:24:48,072 --> 00:24:50,128 you mentioned someplace like Burkina 607 00:24:50,128 --> 00:24:52,017 Faso , do you have enough special 608 00:24:52,017 --> 00:24:53,961 operations forces in some of these 609 00:24:53,961 --> 00:24:56,183 countries to actually make a difference 610 00:24:56,183 --> 00:24:58,406 to actually be there ? Not just to have 611 00:24:58,406 --> 00:25:00,517 some access but actual influence with 612 00:25:00,517 --> 00:25:02,670 them . A little bit goes a long way . 613 00:25:03,440 --> 00:25:06,420 It really does . And you know the when 614 00:25:06,420 --> 00:25:09,700 when when a small special forces team 615 00:25:09,700 --> 00:25:12,430 that is in in some of the you know a 616 00:25:12,430 --> 00:25:15,330 place like Burkino faso can make a huge 617 00:25:15,330 --> 00:25:17,760 difference because they see that they 618 00:25:17,760 --> 00:25:20,660 see the actual manifestation of U . S . 619 00:25:20,660 --> 00:25:23,770 Presence there and they know it matters . 620 00:25:24,040 --> 00:25:27,310 So could there always be more . Yes 621 00:25:27,320 --> 00:25:30,940 but I put less of having a special 622 00:25:30,940 --> 00:25:34,200 forces team there as I would having a U . 623 00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:37,260 S . A . I . D . Team or Department of 624 00:25:37,260 --> 00:25:39,630 State team out and about in the 625 00:25:39,630 --> 00:25:41,686 hinterlands providing capabilities . 626 00:25:41,686 --> 00:25:44,019 I've yet to ever meet a general officer . 627 00:25:44,019 --> 00:25:46,130 Any officer who says they have enough 628 00:25:46,130 --> 00:25:48,241 forces anywhere . But you always have 629 00:25:48,241 --> 00:25:50,300 to ask can I comment on the Special 630 00:25:50,300 --> 00:25:52,356 operations forces and I know general 631 00:25:52,356 --> 00:25:54,411 clark and I have had this discussion 632 00:25:54,411 --> 00:25:56,411 running , I'm going for a couple of 633 00:25:56,411 --> 00:25:58,633 years , but quantity is one thing . But 634 00:25:58,633 --> 00:26:00,744 then what types of forces you have is 635 00:26:00,744 --> 00:26:02,967 another , You know , the the genesis of 636 00:26:02,967 --> 00:26:02,080 special operations forces and I come 637 00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:04,247 from the special operations background 638 00:26:04,247 --> 00:26:06,413 as well . I was a 75th ranger regiment 639 00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:10,340 ranger before politics . And you know , 640 00:26:10,340 --> 00:26:12,229 the genesis of special operations 641 00:26:12,229 --> 00:26:14,396 forces in America started with JFK and 642 00:26:14,396 --> 00:26:16,618 the green Berets and it was supposed to 643 00:26:16,618 --> 00:26:18,840 be a foreign Internal Defense mission . 644 00:26:18,840 --> 00:26:21,007 Right ? These are our trainers , these 645 00:26:21,007 --> 00:26:20,880 are people that engaged . They're 646 00:26:20,880 --> 00:26:23,500 really warrior diplomats , right ? And 647 00:26:23,500 --> 00:26:25,611 for generations that's what the model 648 00:26:25,611 --> 00:26:27,950 was . And then we have 20 years of 649 00:26:27,950 --> 00:26:30,100 counterterrorism and it really became 650 00:26:30,100 --> 00:26:32,211 more of a direct action strikeforce , 651 00:26:32,211 --> 00:26:34,322 right ? We really changed the culture 652 00:26:34,322 --> 00:26:36,544 and the training and the orientation of 653 00:26:36,544 --> 00:26:38,378 our special operators to be door 654 00:26:38,378 --> 00:26:40,322 kickers . So now we have an entire 655 00:26:40,322 --> 00:26:42,322 generation of these folks that that 656 00:26:42,322 --> 00:26:44,544 have have been aligned to do that . Now 657 00:26:44,544 --> 00:26:46,656 we have to reset . I think what the , 658 00:26:46,656 --> 00:26:48,600 the allies and partners engagement 659 00:26:48,600 --> 00:26:50,822 strategy , what we're , what we need to 660 00:26:50,822 --> 00:26:52,989 do going forward in the next decade is 661 00:26:52,989 --> 00:26:54,822 go back to that foreign internal 662 00:26:54,822 --> 00:26:56,711 defense mission . Go back to that 663 00:26:56,711 --> 00:26:58,822 warrior diplomat model still have the 664 00:26:58,822 --> 00:27:01,540 door kickers if we need them . But uh , 665 00:27:01,550 --> 00:27:03,328 it's a cultural change . It's a 666 00:27:03,328 --> 00:27:05,328 training change and it's a , it's a 667 00:27:05,328 --> 00:27:07,328 different type of person that we're 668 00:27:07,328 --> 00:27:09,970 gonna have to fill in these roles to 669 00:27:09,970 --> 00:27:12,650 get that job done . It's great to have 670 00:27:12,650 --> 00:27:14,817 the it's great to have the congressman 671 00:27:14,817 --> 00:27:18,440 talk about our command but but I would 672 00:27:18,450 --> 00:27:21,670 for the audience were there 673 00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:26,030 and we're what a lot of people 674 00:27:26,030 --> 00:27:27,870 here may not know with special 675 00:27:27,870 --> 00:27:30,520 operations is in about 80 different 676 00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:33,860 countries today With about 5000 people . 677 00:27:33,870 --> 00:27:36,730 And the vast majority are doing exactly 678 00:27:36,730 --> 00:27:39,140 what congressman Crow is describing . 679 00:27:39,480 --> 00:27:43,040 Its small teams and they're in africa 680 00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:44,873 there in Asia , they're in South 681 00:27:44,873 --> 00:27:47,700 America providing that for an internal 682 00:27:47,700 --> 00:27:51,600 defense and making 12 special 683 00:27:51,600 --> 00:27:54,310 forces individuals really look like 684 00:27:54,310 --> 00:27:57,730 about three or 400 individuals as 685 00:27:57,730 --> 00:27:59,952 they're working with others . So future 686 00:27:59,952 --> 00:28:02,119 socom mos will be diplomat door kicker 687 00:28:02,119 --> 00:28:04,280 about that . Right I've just created 688 00:28:04,280 --> 00:28:06,850 right here . Um Another there was 689 00:28:06,850 --> 00:28:08,850 another fascinating panel yesterday 690 00:28:08,850 --> 00:28:11,017 with General Commander of North Common 691 00:28:11,017 --> 00:28:13,183 or add and he said that the U . S . Is 692 00:28:13,183 --> 00:28:15,128 being attacked every single day in 693 00:28:15,128 --> 00:28:17,350 cyber . Which isn't surprising to a lot 694 00:28:17,350 --> 00:28:19,461 of people here . Um but that you know 695 00:28:19,461 --> 00:28:21,628 when you when you take a step back and 696 00:28:21,628 --> 00:28:23,628 think about us being attacked every 697 00:28:23,628 --> 00:28:25,739 single day in cyber . I mean that's a 698 00:28:25,739 --> 00:28:27,683 pretty striking comment . What I'm 699 00:28:27,683 --> 00:28:29,850 curious is whether to all three of you 700 00:28:29,850 --> 00:28:32,017 whether you look at cyber is more of a 701 00:28:32,017 --> 00:28:34,183 challenge or possibly an opportunity . 702 00:28:34,183 --> 00:28:36,406 You know you mentioned the distance for 703 00:28:36,406 --> 00:28:38,461 indo pay com like for instance if if 704 00:28:38,461 --> 00:28:40,660 the US were to get caught by surprise 705 00:28:40,660 --> 00:28:42,771 and and China were to invade Taiwan . 706 00:28:42,771 --> 00:28:45,050 You know , you may have 6000 miles from 707 00:28:45,050 --> 00:28:47,320 where your equipment and troops are in 708 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:49,542 some cases , but you could respond with 709 00:28:49,542 --> 00:28:53,100 cyber pretty quickly . So do you see 710 00:28:53,100 --> 00:28:55,290 cyber as more of a threat or challenge 711 00:28:55,380 --> 00:28:58,560 or opportunity ? Senator ernst I would 712 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:01,150 say it's all of the above . So yes we 713 00:29:01,150 --> 00:29:04,690 are attacked regardless of agency 714 00:29:04,690 --> 00:29:06,523 across the United States federal 715 00:29:06,523 --> 00:29:08,579 government . We are hit every single 716 00:29:08,579 --> 00:29:10,970 day thousands of times . We just know 717 00:29:10,970 --> 00:29:13,550 that to be true . And and we also see 718 00:29:13,550 --> 00:29:16,650 that at the state and local level with 719 00:29:16,650 --> 00:29:18,706 a number of our businesses , you can 720 00:29:18,706 --> 00:29:20,920 ask any of the financial institutions 721 00:29:21,040 --> 00:29:23,262 about the attacks that happened to them 722 00:29:23,262 --> 00:29:25,207 every day and we have engaged with 723 00:29:25,207 --> 00:29:27,262 those business leaders . And it goes 724 00:29:27,262 --> 00:29:29,484 back to a point that Jason made earlier 725 00:29:29,484 --> 00:29:31,860 about privacy issues . You know , it 726 00:29:31,860 --> 00:29:33,693 doesn't matter what sector we're 727 00:29:33,693 --> 00:29:35,360 looking at . Like the banking 728 00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:37,590 institutions worry about privacy . So 729 00:29:37,590 --> 00:29:39,810 how much can we engage as a federal 730 00:29:39,810 --> 00:29:41,477 government with those private 731 00:29:41,477 --> 00:29:43,588 institutions that have very sensitive 732 00:29:43,588 --> 00:29:46,130 information . But so we have those , 733 00:29:46,140 --> 00:29:48,650 those challenges out there every single 734 00:29:48,650 --> 00:29:51,010 day . But because of that challenge , 735 00:29:51,010 --> 00:29:53,177 we are the ones that have to turn them 736 00:29:53,177 --> 00:29:55,490 into opportunities . So recognize that 737 00:29:55,500 --> 00:29:57,333 challenge . Now what do we do in 738 00:29:57,333 --> 00:29:59,840 response to those challenges ? But then 739 00:29:59,840 --> 00:30:03,640 how can we also participate ? Maybe I 740 00:30:03,640 --> 00:30:05,862 can use that word , participate in that 741 00:30:05,862 --> 00:30:09,740 space as well to be disruptors of 742 00:30:09,740 --> 00:30:11,710 those that are attacking our own 743 00:30:11,710 --> 00:30:14,130 systems . So this is the challenge we 744 00:30:14,130 --> 00:30:17,260 have as members of Congress and finding 745 00:30:17,270 --> 00:30:19,860 that right and delicate balance of how 746 00:30:19,860 --> 00:30:21,638 much we can engage as a federal 747 00:30:21,638 --> 00:30:23,749 government . And at what point does a 748 00:30:23,749 --> 00:30:27,250 cyber attack become an act of war ? And 749 00:30:27,250 --> 00:30:30,010 then how do we respond to that 750 00:30:30,020 --> 00:30:32,820 threshold ? So those are all the 751 00:30:32,830 --> 00:30:35,020 discussions that we have . But we 752 00:30:35,020 --> 00:30:37,131 engage in many different ways . We've 753 00:30:37,131 --> 00:30:39,409 seen the the advent now of space force , 754 00:30:39,409 --> 00:30:41,464 which of course , if you think about 755 00:30:41,464 --> 00:30:43,631 our satellites , much of what we do on 756 00:30:43,631 --> 00:30:45,742 the Internet , we couldn't do without 757 00:30:45,742 --> 00:30:47,964 those satellite technologies in place . 758 00:30:47,964 --> 00:30:50,076 So there's a lot of things that we do 759 00:30:50,076 --> 00:30:52,187 engage in at the federal government . 760 00:30:52,187 --> 00:30:52,130 But I would have to say there are a 761 00:30:52,130 --> 00:30:54,490 number of areas that we still are 762 00:30:54,490 --> 00:30:57,020 trying to find the right balance to 763 00:30:57,020 --> 00:31:00,020 address privacy issues as well as how 764 00:31:00,020 --> 00:31:02,131 we are protecting against those cyber 765 00:31:02,131 --> 00:31:04,500 cyber threats . I've been primarily 766 00:31:04,500 --> 00:31:07,040 concerned with regard to cyber on the 767 00:31:07,040 --> 00:31:09,262 protection of our intellectual property 768 00:31:09,262 --> 00:31:11,570 and our innovation . We still have , 769 00:31:11,570 --> 00:31:13,681 you know , over 80% of the innovation 770 00:31:13,681 --> 00:31:15,903 comes out of the United States , but we 771 00:31:15,903 --> 00:31:17,903 are a free and democratic societies 772 00:31:17,903 --> 00:31:17,860 that gives us unique challenges and 773 00:31:17,860 --> 00:31:19,582 vulnerabilities with regard to 774 00:31:19,582 --> 00:31:21,582 protection of that information . We 775 00:31:21,582 --> 00:31:23,416 also approach defense innovation 776 00:31:23,416 --> 00:31:25,582 differently . Right ? Unlike china and 777 00:31:25,582 --> 00:31:27,804 others that have greater civil military 778 00:31:27,804 --> 00:31:30,027 fusion , we realize substantially on an 779 00:31:30,027 --> 00:31:32,249 independent defense industrial base for 780 00:31:32,249 --> 00:31:34,471 that innovation and I'm less , I'm less 781 00:31:34,471 --> 00:31:36,693 worried for the large prime contractors 782 00:31:36,693 --> 00:31:38,471 that have the resources and the 783 00:31:38,471 --> 00:31:40,638 capability to secure stuff . Um then I 784 00:31:40,638 --> 00:31:42,527 am our supply chain and there are 785 00:31:42,527 --> 00:31:44,582 subcontractors and their vendors and 786 00:31:44,582 --> 00:31:46,582 their supply chain because we spend 787 00:31:46,582 --> 00:31:48,749 tens of billions of dollars developing 788 00:31:48,749 --> 00:31:50,804 these innovative systems , these new 789 00:31:50,804 --> 00:31:52,860 technologies that we invest in . And 790 00:31:52,860 --> 00:31:52,530 actually by the time there are many 791 00:31:52,530 --> 00:31:54,474 examples by the time those systems 792 00:31:54,474 --> 00:31:56,641 actually get ready to be fielded , our 793 00:31:56,641 --> 00:31:58,641 adversaries have already stolen the 794 00:31:58,641 --> 00:32:00,363 intellectual property and have 795 00:32:00,363 --> 00:32:02,530 developed systems to counter them . So 796 00:32:02,530 --> 00:32:04,697 we need unified standards . We need to 797 00:32:04,697 --> 00:32:06,808 we need to raise the fence around our 798 00:32:06,808 --> 00:32:08,808 entire defense industrial base . We 799 00:32:08,808 --> 00:32:10,974 need unified standards . We need to do 800 00:32:10,974 --> 00:32:10,900 a much better job of looking 801 00:32:10,900 --> 00:32:12,733 holistically at what our defense 802 00:32:12,733 --> 00:32:14,956 industrial base includes , which by the 803 00:32:14,956 --> 00:32:17,300 way includes less traditional actors . 804 00:32:17,550 --> 00:32:19,606 Then what we would normally consider 805 00:32:19,606 --> 00:32:21,661 historically as a defense contractor 806 00:32:21,661 --> 00:32:23,328 and we need to do much better 807 00:32:23,328 --> 00:32:25,439 protecting it . General how has cyber 808 00:32:25,439 --> 00:32:27,050 changed your job ? 809 00:32:29,540 --> 00:32:32,310 As as I look at , I agree with both . 810 00:32:32,320 --> 00:32:34,600 What my esteemed colleagues up here 811 00:32:34,600 --> 00:32:37,790 said , I take cyber a bit 812 00:32:37,800 --> 00:32:41,540 differently or or add another aspect to 813 00:32:41,540 --> 00:32:45,200 it and that's how our adversaries are 814 00:32:45,200 --> 00:32:48,860 using cyber in the information space 815 00:32:49,540 --> 00:32:52,930 uh to get out there , you know , to get 816 00:32:52,930 --> 00:32:55,300 out what I would say many cases or 817 00:32:55,300 --> 00:32:59,170 false messages uh impact on , you know , 818 00:32:59,170 --> 00:33:02,520 our democratic elections uh and sowing 819 00:33:02,520 --> 00:33:04,600 seeds of misinformation and 820 00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:07,790 disinformation as a primary tool . You 821 00:33:07,790 --> 00:33:09,640 know , we've had within special 822 00:33:09,640 --> 00:33:12,940 operations , We we've had psyops forces 823 00:33:12,950 --> 00:33:16,120 to influence if you go back in the in 824 00:33:16,120 --> 00:33:18,210 the 70s and 80s before there was an 825 00:33:18,210 --> 00:33:20,840 information , it was over radio and it 826 00:33:20,840 --> 00:33:23,890 was with leaflets and billboards , the 827 00:33:23,890 --> 00:33:26,760 internet . And the ability to put that 828 00:33:27,300 --> 00:33:30,620 rapidly ah is 829 00:33:30,670 --> 00:33:33,240 today is completely different and 830 00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:36,530 changes the game uh in in in the things 831 00:33:36,530 --> 00:33:39,020 we're talking about . And so I look at 832 00:33:39,020 --> 00:33:41,600 it primarily from an information base 833 00:33:41,610 --> 00:33:43,777 and what the adversary can do and when 834 00:33:43,777 --> 00:33:46,060 when you think about what is going on 835 00:33:46,070 --> 00:33:49,960 in the Ukraine today uh and 836 00:33:49,960 --> 00:33:52,360 the food that's not getting into Africa , 837 00:33:52,940 --> 00:33:54,773 the message , if you look at the 838 00:33:54,773 --> 00:33:56,996 internet and what is happening from the 839 00:33:56,996 --> 00:34:00,060 African countries , it's us sanctions 840 00:34:01,240 --> 00:34:04,760 against Russia are causing food 841 00:34:04,760 --> 00:34:08,230 shortages in Africa . Alright . That's 842 00:34:08,230 --> 00:34:10,470 what you'll read in many cases on the 843 00:34:10,470 --> 00:34:14,010 internet . So we're being blamed for 844 00:34:14,010 --> 00:34:16,343 people in Africa not getting eat to eat , 845 00:34:16,343 --> 00:34:18,566 which goes to the previous conversation 846 00:34:18,566 --> 00:34:20,621 about food security , but we have to 847 00:34:20,621 --> 00:34:22,677 look at how we can combat what is on 848 00:34:22,677 --> 00:34:24,980 that internet and get , you know , the 849 00:34:24,980 --> 00:34:27,400 truth out about what is happening . And 850 00:34:27,400 --> 00:34:29,511 I think we have to be able to do that 851 00:34:29,511 --> 00:34:31,511 as a government a little bit faster 852 00:34:31,511 --> 00:34:33,456 than what we're doing today . So I 853 00:34:33,456 --> 00:34:35,678 think that there's another aspect as we 854 00:34:35,678 --> 00:34:38,090 look at the internet and cyber and what 855 00:34:38,090 --> 00:34:40,750 it can do . We've seen a real change in 856 00:34:40,760 --> 00:34:42,482 in the use of information as a 857 00:34:42,482 --> 00:34:44,482 deterrent even just in the past few 858 00:34:44,482 --> 00:34:46,770 months to um I'm wondering how 859 00:34:46,770 --> 00:34:50,040 effective you you see that what the U . 860 00:34:50,040 --> 00:34:52,151 S . Has been doing ? You know putting 861 00:34:52,151 --> 00:34:54,318 out declassifying all this information 862 00:34:54,318 --> 00:34:56,373 about Ukraine , Do you think is that 863 00:34:56,373 --> 00:34:58,596 effective as a deterrent ? I think it's 864 00:34:58,596 --> 00:35:00,818 I think it has been amazing and I think 865 00:35:00,818 --> 00:35:04,710 it should make us look at how we do 866 00:35:04,710 --> 00:35:07,000 this in the future and you could , you 867 00:35:07,000 --> 00:35:08,970 know , at the beginning , 868 00:35:11,420 --> 00:35:14,690 many people didn't believe it because 869 00:35:14,690 --> 00:35:16,857 of some of the things that that we had 870 00:35:16,857 --> 00:35:20,810 put out before . But and even into one , 871 00:35:20,810 --> 00:35:23,032 you know , a week before the invasion , 872 00:35:23,032 --> 00:35:25,380 as I was talking to some Ukrainian 873 00:35:25,430 --> 00:35:27,610 counterparts , they still didn't 874 00:35:27,610 --> 00:35:30,030 believe it . But I think now we have an 875 00:35:30,030 --> 00:35:33,830 opportunity to show that it's the the 876 00:35:33,840 --> 00:35:36,850 intelligence and when we can declassify 877 00:35:36,850 --> 00:35:39,072 it and there's some some things we want 878 00:35:39,072 --> 00:35:41,183 to keep secret absolutely acknowledge 879 00:35:41,183 --> 00:35:43,294 that there are things that we need to 880 00:35:43,294 --> 00:35:45,140 keep secret to protect our own 881 00:35:45,140 --> 00:35:47,362 interests . But there are things that I 882 00:35:47,362 --> 00:35:49,418 think we need to look harder at when 883 00:35:49,418 --> 00:35:52,560 and how and on the rapid basis of which 884 00:35:52,840 --> 00:35:56,150 we can call out adversary misbehavior 885 00:35:56,560 --> 00:35:59,570 and to show our american public and our 886 00:35:59,570 --> 00:36:03,320 allies what some of those behaviors 887 00:36:03,330 --> 00:36:05,108 are and what some of those real 888 00:36:05,108 --> 00:36:08,380 capabilities are today , we only have a 889 00:36:08,380 --> 00:36:10,491 few minutes left . And unless we send 890 00:36:10,491 --> 00:36:12,547 this audience out feeling completely 891 00:36:12,547 --> 00:36:14,602 depressed about all the threats that 892 00:36:14,602 --> 00:36:14,420 we've just discussed and how difficult 893 00:36:14,420 --> 00:36:16,420 they are to counter . I want to ask 894 00:36:16,420 --> 00:36:18,690 each of you based off what we just 895 00:36:18,690 --> 00:36:20,690 talked about all of these potential 896 00:36:20,690 --> 00:36:22,910 challenges . Where's the opportunity 897 00:36:23,010 --> 00:36:25,010 are there places where you see that 898 00:36:25,010 --> 00:36:27,970 it's possible that that the us having 899 00:36:27,970 --> 00:36:29,748 to take on these challenges may 900 00:36:29,748 --> 00:36:31,803 actually open up the possibility for 901 00:36:31,803 --> 00:36:34,580 advancements or technology or anything 902 00:36:34,590 --> 00:36:36,479 on any of the potential threats . 903 00:36:36,479 --> 00:36:39,600 Senator there's there is always 904 00:36:39,600 --> 00:36:42,780 opportunity and I am so thankful that 905 00:36:42,780 --> 00:36:44,891 we do live in the Great United States 906 00:36:44,891 --> 00:36:47,010 of America and I did hear this when I 907 00:36:47,010 --> 00:36:49,530 intended the NATO summit a few weeks 908 00:36:49,530 --> 00:36:52,800 ago just how encouraged other countries 909 00:36:52,800 --> 00:36:55,520 are and and how much they really value 910 00:36:55,530 --> 00:36:58,950 U . S . Partnership and I always get 911 00:36:58,950 --> 00:37:00,950 very concerned about that as I look 912 00:37:00,950 --> 00:37:03,172 around the globe . But I heard over and 913 00:37:03,172 --> 00:37:05,394 over again we are with you . If America 914 00:37:05,394 --> 00:37:07,570 is willing to lead , we are with you 915 00:37:07,580 --> 00:37:09,850 and we need you . So I think that that 916 00:37:09,850 --> 00:37:12,017 is where I see the greater opportunity 917 00:37:12,017 --> 00:37:14,017 and I shared with the group earlier 918 00:37:14,017 --> 00:37:16,183 this morning that relationships really 919 00:37:16,183 --> 00:37:18,350 matter . And I think our human capital 920 00:37:18,350 --> 00:37:20,294 is extremely important here in the 921 00:37:20,294 --> 00:37:22,294 United States and it's important to 922 00:37:22,294 --> 00:37:25,690 have presence to be places to engage 923 00:37:25,690 --> 00:37:27,730 with other leaders to exhibit 924 00:37:27,730 --> 00:37:29,890 leadership that others can look to , 925 00:37:29,900 --> 00:37:32,890 not just in times of crisis but in 926 00:37:32,890 --> 00:37:35,057 between those times of crisis and that 927 00:37:35,057 --> 00:37:37,168 they know that we can be that partner 928 00:37:37,168 --> 00:37:39,168 of choice , that they don't have to 929 00:37:39,168 --> 00:37:41,334 turn to china . So I think that is the 930 00:37:41,334 --> 00:37:43,446 great opportunity ahead of us is that 931 00:37:43,446 --> 00:37:45,501 we can really share ideas and values 932 00:37:45,501 --> 00:37:47,430 around the world and be that good 933 00:37:47,430 --> 00:37:50,170 partner for others to lean on in those 934 00:37:50,170 --> 00:37:53,530 times of crisis and collaborator in 935 00:37:53,530 --> 00:37:57,170 times that aren't so dire . Yeah , I 936 00:37:57,170 --> 00:37:59,281 mean being a free open and democratic 937 00:37:59,281 --> 00:38:01,448 society certainly has its challenges . 938 00:38:01,448 --> 00:38:03,760 Right ? And uh you know , you look at 939 00:38:03,770 --> 00:38:06,200 um you look at our adversaries and and 940 00:38:06,210 --> 00:38:08,377 you know , they can they can look long 941 00:38:08,377 --> 00:38:10,321 term , they can do things with the 942 00:38:10,321 --> 00:38:12,321 command and control economy that we 943 00:38:12,321 --> 00:38:14,432 can't do . But I still believe firmly 944 00:38:14,432 --> 00:38:16,266 and I don't believe I'm naive in 945 00:38:16,266 --> 00:38:18,432 thinking this , that the advantages of 946 00:38:18,432 --> 00:38:20,599 a free and open democratic society far 947 00:38:20,599 --> 00:38:20,580 away , that one , you know , just 948 00:38:20,580 --> 00:38:22,580 setting aside the moral and ethical 949 00:38:22,580 --> 00:38:25,330 arguments . But we have tough 950 00:38:25,330 --> 00:38:27,340 discussions . We are still the 951 00:38:27,340 --> 00:38:29,396 preferred partner around the world . 952 00:38:29,396 --> 00:38:32,920 People want to engage with us because 953 00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:35,031 their people want to engage with us . 954 00:38:35,110 --> 00:38:37,221 We had we did have a discussion , you 955 00:38:37,221 --> 00:38:39,443 know , the three of us had a discussion 956 00:38:39,443 --> 00:38:41,499 earlier about the challenges of that 957 00:38:41,499 --> 00:38:43,721 and the aspiration of the american idea 958 00:38:43,721 --> 00:38:45,666 and some of the challenges we face 959 00:38:45,666 --> 00:38:45,140 worldwide . And I don't mean to 960 00:38:45,140 --> 00:38:47,307 undersell or discount those challenges 961 00:38:47,307 --> 00:38:49,251 because they're real . But I still 962 00:38:49,251 --> 00:38:51,900 firmly believe that if we can approach 963 00:38:51,900 --> 00:38:55,660 this um with some some intention that 964 00:38:55,660 --> 00:38:57,993 we can do better and we can win the day . 965 00:38:57,993 --> 00:39:00,049 But I'm more concerned as an elected 966 00:39:00,049 --> 00:39:03,330 official in America in the year 2022 . 967 00:39:03,520 --> 00:39:05,687 That when I leave here , we'll go back 968 00:39:05,687 --> 00:39:07,798 to my district today about making the 969 00:39:07,798 --> 00:39:09,576 domestic case for international 970 00:39:09,576 --> 00:39:11,631 engagement because we do have a real 971 00:39:11,631 --> 00:39:13,687 challenge in doing that . The bottom 972 00:39:13,687 --> 00:39:15,576 line is there is isolationism and 973 00:39:15,576 --> 00:39:17,798 nationalism that's sweeping the world , 974 00:39:17,798 --> 00:39:19,798 not just the United States , it's a 975 00:39:19,798 --> 00:39:22,020 worldwide phenomenon . And gone are the 976 00:39:22,020 --> 00:39:24,242 days where we just take for granted the 977 00:39:24,242 --> 00:39:26,409 ability that , you know , policymakers 978 00:39:26,409 --> 00:39:28,631 in Dc can go and say we're gonna do X , 979 00:39:28,631 --> 00:39:30,631 y and Z And people just allow it to 980 00:39:30,631 --> 00:39:32,853 happen . We have to make the case . And 981 00:39:32,853 --> 00:39:32,310 and frankly , at the end of the Cold 982 00:39:32,310 --> 00:39:34,477 War , we had the peace dividend in the 983 00:39:34,477 --> 00:39:36,643 1990s and then 9-11 happened . Then we 984 00:39:36,643 --> 00:39:38,754 were distracted for 20 years fighting 985 00:39:38,754 --> 00:39:40,921 the global war on tariffs . So for the 986 00:39:40,921 --> 00:39:42,977 last three decades we really haven't 987 00:39:42,977 --> 00:39:45,199 been making the case in the way that we 988 00:39:45,199 --> 00:39:47,530 need to for democratic engagement , 989 00:39:47,530 --> 00:39:49,363 global engagement , why american 990 00:39:49,363 --> 00:39:51,363 leadership matters . And we have to 991 00:39:51,363 --> 00:39:53,419 figure out what that looks like . We 992 00:39:53,419 --> 00:39:55,474 have to make it domestically first . 993 00:39:55,520 --> 00:39:57,150 Yeah , wow 994 00:39:59,420 --> 00:40:01,420 hard to follow up on that one . But 995 00:40:01,420 --> 00:40:03,531 I'll go back to the african proverb . 996 00:40:03,810 --> 00:40:05,977 If you want to go fast , go alone . If 997 00:40:05,977 --> 00:40:09,280 you want to go further go together and 998 00:40:09,290 --> 00:40:11,920 our our people and pulling people 999 00:40:11,920 --> 00:40:15,680 together are are decisive 1000 00:40:15,680 --> 00:40:17,760 advantage . And using what Senator 1001 00:40:17,760 --> 00:40:20,050 Ernest was just talking about when 1002 00:40:20,050 --> 00:40:23,140 Ukraine crisis occurred . Our special 1003 00:40:23,140 --> 00:40:26,760 operators that are in Germany Hold , 1004 00:40:26,770 --> 00:40:28,826 you know , said , Hey , who wants to 1005 00:40:28,826 --> 00:40:30,992 come join this coalition . This is not 1006 00:40:30,992 --> 00:40:32,881 NATO because we don't have a NATO 1007 00:40:32,881 --> 00:40:35,048 construct against Ukraine . You know , 1008 00:40:35,048 --> 00:40:37,159 specifically for Ukraine . And within 1009 00:40:37,159 --> 00:40:40,580 within 24 hours , 17 countries came to 1010 00:40:40,580 --> 00:40:42,940 our teams and said , we want , we want 1011 00:40:42,940 --> 00:40:45,150 to help . Uh , and those were 1012 00:40:45,150 --> 00:40:46,983 relationships that were built in 1013 00:40:46,983 --> 00:40:50,480 Afghanistan and Iraq over 1014 00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:53,000 decades of door kicking , you know , 1015 00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:56,180 with diplomats to be able to 1016 00:40:56,190 --> 00:41:00,170 build real incredible capabilities to 1017 00:41:00,170 --> 00:41:02,114 share intel with the Ukrainians to 1018 00:41:02,114 --> 00:41:04,281 provide the Ukrainians training . Even 1019 00:41:04,281 --> 00:41:06,392 though we didn't have forces in . And 1020 00:41:06,392 --> 00:41:08,503 that's that's the power of the United 1021 00:41:08,503 --> 00:41:10,614 States and the opportunity to be able 1022 00:41:10,614 --> 00:41:12,337 to convene even without formal 1023 00:41:12,337 --> 00:41:14,614 construct , We only have a moment left . 1024 00:41:14,614 --> 00:41:16,559 But General Clark I'm gonna take a 1025 00:41:16,559 --> 00:41:18,670 moment of personal privilege here and 1026 00:41:18,670 --> 00:41:21,220 say that after about 40 years in 1027 00:41:21,220 --> 00:41:24,000 uniform you're what about T -40 days to 1028 00:41:24,000 --> 00:41:25,944 retirement ? I believe I went into 1029 00:41:25,944 --> 00:41:28,278 journalism . So I don't have to do math , 1030 00:41:28,278 --> 00:41:30,278 but I think it's about 40 days . So 1031 00:41:30,278 --> 00:41:32,167 what I'm wondering is I know that 1032 00:41:32,167 --> 00:41:34,222 special operators love to talk about 1033 00:41:34,222 --> 00:41:34,190 themselves , especially in front of a 1034 00:41:34,190 --> 00:41:35,412 big group of people . 1035 00:41:38,560 --> 00:41:42,560 So I'm , I'm wondering if 1036 00:41:42,560 --> 00:41:44,838 there's a , do you , is there a memory , 1037 00:41:44,838 --> 00:41:47,004 is there a story ? Was there something 1038 00:41:47,004 --> 00:41:49,004 that you were a part of ? And I can 1039 00:41:49,004 --> 00:41:51,171 imagine many , many interesting things 1040 00:41:51,171 --> 00:41:53,227 you did in your time in the military 1041 00:41:53,227 --> 00:41:57,080 that you can share here . I put on the 1042 00:41:57,080 --> 00:42:00,870 uniform of my country 42 1043 00:42:00,870 --> 00:42:03,770 years and three weeks ago when I 1044 00:42:03,770 --> 00:42:06,100 entered the milk . I wasn't , I wasn't 1045 00:42:06,100 --> 00:42:09,390 expecting applause when I , when I 1046 00:42:09,390 --> 00:42:11,446 raised my hand on the planes at West 1047 00:42:11,446 --> 00:42:13,830 Point . And truthfully I had no 1048 00:42:13,830 --> 00:42:16,610 intention beyond West Point 1049 00:42:17,040 --> 00:42:20,120 Beyond My five Year commitment to serve . 1050 00:42:20,640 --> 00:42:23,700 But I fell in love with soldiers . And 1051 00:42:23,700 --> 00:42:25,811 then since then I have fallen in love 1052 00:42:25,811 --> 00:42:27,756 with with our service members in a 1053 00:42:27,756 --> 00:42:30,950 joint force at Socom because our , our 1054 00:42:30,950 --> 00:42:33,120 men and women , those are decisive 1055 00:42:33,120 --> 00:42:36,740 advantage . They're committed , They're 1056 00:42:36,740 --> 00:42:39,820 courageous , They're brave . And they 1057 00:42:39,830 --> 00:42:43,330 do this with little fanfare and they're 1058 00:42:43,330 --> 00:42:45,497 willing as they sign up for their oath 1059 00:42:45,840 --> 00:42:48,007 to raise that right hand to give their 1060 00:42:48,007 --> 00:42:51,620 lives for everyone in this in this room . 1061 00:42:52,100 --> 00:42:55,550 And , and that's what kept me in . And 1062 00:42:55,550 --> 00:42:57,760 I could give numerous stories , 1063 00:42:58,030 --> 00:43:00,620 visiting hospital beds , 1064 00:43:01,400 --> 00:43:05,320 presiding over funerals , oh , 1065 00:43:06,170 --> 00:43:10,000 comforting a widow in 1066 00:43:10,000 --> 00:43:12,520 her time of need or a mom or a dad . 1067 00:43:12,900 --> 00:43:15,320 But I always walked away from those 1068 00:43:17,100 --> 00:43:20,310 comforted that they lifted me up . 1069 00:43:22,450 --> 00:43:24,672 They said that their sons and daughters 1070 00:43:24,672 --> 00:43:26,790 were doing what they wanted to do to 1071 00:43:26,790 --> 00:43:29,470 serve this great country . And I would 1072 00:43:29,470 --> 00:43:32,100 hope that all of us , whether you're in 1073 00:43:32,100 --> 00:43:33,767 business or whether you're in 1074 00:43:33,767 --> 00:43:35,980 government think about that each and 1075 00:43:35,980 --> 00:43:38,440 every day that we have these great 1076 00:43:38,450 --> 00:43:41,280 brave americans that are willing to lay 1077 00:43:41,280 --> 00:43:43,350 down their lives for all of us . We 1078 00:43:43,350 --> 00:43:45,420 should make sure we commit to them . 1079 00:43:45,430 --> 00:43:47,374 But we should also be able to pull 1080 00:43:47,374 --> 00:43:49,650 together for those domestic things that 1081 00:43:49,660 --> 00:43:52,250 Congressman Crow was talking about and 1082 00:43:52,250 --> 00:43:54,417 and both of our members up here served 1083 00:43:54,417 --> 00:43:56,639 in uniform . And they understand that , 1084 00:43:56,639 --> 00:43:58,830 but it's been the honor of my lifetime 1085 00:43:59,090 --> 00:44:01,870 to be able to wear this uniform . And I 1086 00:44:01,880 --> 00:44:04,213 appreciate Courtney that final question . 1087 00:44:04,213 --> 00:44:05,436 Thank you very much . 1088 00:44:09,800 --> 00:44:13,520 Thank you . Thank . Thank you all . I 1089 00:44:13,520 --> 00:44:15,687 appreciate all your time . Thank you . 1090 00:44:15,687 --> 00:44:15,430 Yes .