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of U . S . Strategic Command . General 

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Cotton . Thank you for your decades of 

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service and willingness to serve in 

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this important position . I would like 

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to welcome your wife Marsha who is with 

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us today . Welcome Marsha . I'd also 

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like to acknowledge your son Russell 

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and daughter Brianna who I'm sure are 

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proudly watching . We are grateful for 

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their continued support of your service . 

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U . S . Strategic Command stratcom is 

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the principal command for ensuring our 

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nation's nuclear deterrent is effective , 

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safe and reliable . Today . Our nuclear 

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deterrent consists of a triad of 

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ballistic missile submarines , heavy 

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bombers and land based intercontinental 

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missiles . This triad is the bedrock 

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not only of our national defense but 

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also the security of our allies and 

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partners who depend on the U . S . 

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Nuclear umbrella . Integral to the 

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triad is a highly secure and 

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multilayered nuclear command control 

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and communications or N . C . Three 

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system which connects the president to 

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the nuclear forces successfully . 

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Maintaining this nuclear deterrent is a 

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mission fundamental to our long term 

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strategic competition with china and 

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Russia . This mission has made 

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especially clear throughout Russia's 

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assault on Ukraine . Russia has 

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conducted out of cycle nuclear 

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exercises , issued inflammatory 

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statements about tactical nuclear 

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strikes in Ukraine and continues to 

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threaten nuclear power plants in the 

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region . Vladimir Putin's behavior has 

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been reckless to a dangerous degree . 

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China has also made significant changes 

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to its nuclear approach . Not 

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constrained by the new start treaty . 

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Beijing has built hundreds of new 

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ballistic missiles and intensive a 

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stockpile of more than 1000 warheads by 

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the early 20 thirties . In the past two 

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years . We have also seen china 

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developed missile feels in hardened 

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silos throughout the country . This 

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development along with china's 

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development of air delivered weapons 

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and ballistic missile submarines in the 

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south china sea fundamentally changes 

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the nature of Beijing's nuclear 

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doctrine . We need to seriously 

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consider that we are entering a new 

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trilateral nuclear competition era . 

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The Cold War was essentially a 

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bilateral rivalry between the United 

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States and the soviet union and 

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deterrence theory and communication 

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methods were developed based on two 

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competitors . Those rules now must 

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change with the ascendancy of china and 

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its growing nuclear arsenal and General 

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Cotton . I'd like to know how you would 

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address this new deterrence dynamic 

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involving not one but two near peer 

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competitors . If confirmed , you will 

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be responsible for not only the health 

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of our triad and the n . c . three 

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system but the 150,000 military 

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personnel who operate them stratcom 

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uniformed and civilian workforce is 

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known to have the highest levels of 

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personal reliability and 

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professionalism . It will be your 

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responsibility to support them and 

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their families and ensure our nuclear 

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deterrent can operate effectively 

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around the clock . Supporting your 

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command is the national Nuclear 

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Security administration or N . N . S . 

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A . Which maintains and develops our 

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nuclear warheads . The organization has 

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over 40,000 technicians , engineers and 

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scientists working at three design 

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laboratories , one test site and four 

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production plans . N . N . S . A . Will 

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need your support as it experiences its 

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highest workload since 19 eighties in 

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managing five major warhead programs 

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while rebuilding nuclear infrastructure . 

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Finally , the 2022 nuclear posture 

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review has validated the importance of 

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modernizing the triad , the N . C . 

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Three system and the supporting 

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infrastructure at N . N . S . A . This 

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is the third historic cycle of 

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modernization since the 1960s , you 

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will be responsible for ensuring the 

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United States can deliver the 

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capabilities needed to effectively 

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deter our adversaries . Through 2070 

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general you will be undertaking 

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enormous responsibilities . Is 

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confirmed as I said earlier . The 

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United States nuclear deterrent is the 

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bedrock of our national defense . Some 

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have said that this deterrent is never 

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used but that is a misconception . It 

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is used 365 days a year . 24 hours a 

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day . You will responsible for 

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continuing to ensure that the United 

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States and its allies can deter . Not 

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one but two near pier nuclear 

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adversaries , something your 

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predecessors did not face . I look 

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forward to hearing how you would 

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prioritize and meet each of these 

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critical responsibilities . Thank you 

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again for your willingness to serve our 

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nation And I look forward to your 

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testimony . Now let me recognize 

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ranking member . Thank you mr Chairman . 

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I also want to welcome General Cotton , 

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thank him for his long service . 

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General Cotton . Your predecessor 

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appeared before this committee several 

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times over the past few years . Warning 

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of the growing strategic threats that 

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we face as a nation . I think we all 

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understand that China is massive . 

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Military investments are shifting from 

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the balance of power in the pacific 

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even as it builds the capacity to 

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extend its reach across the globe . 

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Putin's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine 

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and its reckless threats of nuclear 

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escalation remind us of some of the 

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worst days of the Cold War . We 

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effectively effectively resisting 

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china's and Russia's aggression 

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requires that we remain resolute and 

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deal with the world as as it is not as 

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we would prefer it to be . Which is 

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sometimes a mistake . I was pleased 

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that the administration's nuclear 

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posture review declined to reverse many 

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policy options that would have severely 

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damaged our nation's deterrent . 

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However , the administration's decision 

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to discard planned enhancements to our 

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forces . Even as china and Russia grow 

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their arsenals was disappointing to say 

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the least . Your predecessor , along 

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with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

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and and other senior officers , voice 

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their objection to these decisions and 

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on a bipartisan basis , we have taken 

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steps to reverse those faulty choices . 

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Moving forward . We need to accelerate 

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the work of the right size of our 

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forces to meet strategic deterrence 

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requirements of the coming decades 

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trust . You will be advocate for 

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such efforts as the next 

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uh Strat commander . Look forward to 

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your testimony . Thank you Mr Chairman , 

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thank you . Senator Inhofe . General 

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Cotton . You're recognized for your 

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opening statement . Good morning 

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Chairman , read ranking member Imhof 

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and distinguished members of the 

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committee . It's truly an honor to 

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appear before you today as a nominee to 

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be the next commander of U . S . 

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Strategic Command . I am very grateful 

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to the president Secretary of Defense 

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and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

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Staff for their trust and confidence in 

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me for this nomination . I would like 

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to recognize the current commander of 

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us strategic command . Admiral Chaz 

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Richard and his wife Lisa for their 40 

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years of selfless service to this great 

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nation . Joining me today is my wife 

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Marcia . She has been my best friend 

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and biggest champion for over 33 years . 

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A former collegiate athlete and school 

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teacher , Marcia has been a remarkable 

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advocate for the men and women and 

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their families . She is an incredible 

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source of strength and inspiration for 

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me and my family not with us today , 

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but always in our hearts is our son 

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Russell , an intel analyst and our 

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daughter Brianna , a recent university 

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of michigan law school graduate . I'm 

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so proud of my Children for the past 

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that they have taken to serve our 

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nation in their own unique ways . There 

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are two people who are no longer with 

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us but whose absence I feel more 

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strongly on days like today . That's my 

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mother , Amy and my father James . My 

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father joined the Army Air Corps in 

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1942 and fought in the pacific theater 

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before the establishment of the United 

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States Air Force and served in both the 

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korean and Vietnam wars prior to 

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retiring as a United States Air Force 

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chief master sergeant . In 1974 . My 

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mother all five ft two inches of her 

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was fierce , full of compassion and 

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kept her boys . The chief and I in line 

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my parents are the foundation of who I 

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am and I know they're looking down upon 

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Team cotton with great pride last night 

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I want to thank the men and women of 

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Air force Global Strike Command and U . 

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S . Strategic Command for their 

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continued professionalism and 

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dedication . Their dedication to this 

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mission is essential in a world where 

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we now face to near peer competitors . 

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We must deter the pacing challenge of 

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china and address the acute threats 

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presented by Russia . It is both our 

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conventional and nuclear capabilities 

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along with the crucial support from our 

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allies and partners that underpins our 

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strategic deterrence . Our nation's 

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nuclear forces continue to be safe , 

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secure , reliable and effective 

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as we bring . The B 21 raider , the 

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Columbia class ballistic missile , 

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submarine , sentinel , intercontinental 

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ballistic missile weapons system and 

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long range standoff weapon online . We 

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will continue to ensure the credibility 

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of deterrence for decades to come 

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underpinning all of this Is our nuclear 

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command control and communications 

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systems known as n . c . three . While 

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the current system is secure and 

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resilient modernization and sustainment 

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of this capability is just as important 

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as the weapons system platforms 

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themselves . If confirmed . I will use 

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my authorities to ensure that N . C . 

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Three systems continue to outpace the 

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threat we'll always build in margin . 

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We'll always have hedge the mission of 

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U . S . Strategic command is deter our 

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adversaries and employ force to 

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guarantee the security of our nation 

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and our allies . If confirmed I will 

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work with relevant agencies across the 

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U . S . Government and within deal 

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collaborate closely with civilian 

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leaders and directly with my fellow 

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combatant commanders as we monitor the 

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global threats and execute operations . 

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In accordance with the National Defense 

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strategy I commit to commanding a 

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resilient joint force capable of 

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conducting multi domain operations 

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focused on deterrent aggression and if 

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necessary defending this nation . I 

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look forward to working with Congress 

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and the members of this committee to 

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address strategic challenges of this 

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great nation . Chairman Reed ranking 

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member in hough . Distinguished members 

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of this committee . It is an honor to 

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sit before you today and I look forward 

279
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to answering your questions . Thank you 

280
00:11:36,536 --> 00:11:38,647
very much . General . I have a series 

281
00:11:38,647 --> 00:11:40,591
of questions that are standard for 

282
00:11:40,591 --> 00:11:42,258
nominees . Uh You may respond 

283
00:11:42,258 --> 00:11:44,560
appropriately . Have you adhered to a 

284
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political laws and regulations 

285
00:11:46,282 --> 00:11:48,820
governing conflicts of interest ? Have 

286
00:11:48,820 --> 00:11:50,876
you assumed any duties or taking any 

287
00:11:50,876 --> 00:11:52,931
actions that would appear to presume 

288
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the outcome of the confirmation process , 

289
00:11:55,264 --> 00:11:57,050
exercising our legislative and 

290
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oversight responsibilities . Makes it 

291
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important that this committee its 

292
00:12:01,279 --> 00:12:03,279
subcommittees and other appropriate 

293
00:12:03,279 --> 00:12:05,057
committees of Congress received 

294
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testimony briefings , reports , records 

295
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and other information from the 

296
00:12:09,001 --> 00:12:11,520
executive branch on a timely basis . Do 

297
00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:14,130
you agree if confirm to appear and 

298
00:12:14,130 --> 00:12:16,074
testify before this committee when 

299
00:12:16,074 --> 00:12:18,140
requested ? Chairman ? I do do you 

300
00:12:18,140 --> 00:12:20,307
agree when asked before this committee 

301
00:12:20,307 --> 00:12:22,307
to give your personal views even if 

302
00:12:22,307 --> 00:12:23,807
your views differ from the 

303
00:12:23,807 --> 00:12:26,930
administration . Do you agree to 

304
00:12:26,930 --> 00:12:28,830
provide records , documents and 

305
00:12:28,830 --> 00:12:30,941
electronic communications in a timely 

306
00:12:30,941 --> 00:12:33,274
manner when requested by this committee , 

307
00:12:33,274 --> 00:12:35,441
its subcommittees or other appropriate 

308
00:12:35,441 --> 00:12:37,552
committees of Congress and to consult 

309
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with the request or regarding the basis 

310
00:12:39,774 --> 00:12:42,320
for any good faith delay or denial and 

311
00:12:42,320 --> 00:12:45,080
providing such records ? Will you 

312
00:12:45,080 --> 00:12:47,136
ensure that your staff complies with 

313
00:12:47,136 --> 00:12:49,358
deadlines established by this committee 

314
00:12:49,358 --> 00:12:51,580
for the production of reports , records 

315
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and other information including timely 

316
00:12:53,747 --> 00:12:55,969
responding to hearing questions for the 

317
00:12:55,969 --> 00:12:58,160
record . Will you cooperate in 

318
00:12:58,160 --> 00:13:00,160
providing witnesses and briefers in 

319
00:13:00,160 --> 00:13:02,160
response to congressional request ? 

320
00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:04,730
Will those witnesses and briefing 

321
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briefers be protected from Reprisal for 

322
00:13:07,680 --> 00:13:10,390
their testimony or briefing ? Thank you . 

323
00:13:10,390 --> 00:13:14,380
General General uh the 2018 

324
00:13:14,390 --> 00:13:17,060
nuclear posture review recommended a 

325
00:13:17,060 --> 00:13:19,460
supplemental nuclear system to the 

326
00:13:19,460 --> 00:13:21,540
triad . A submarine launched cruise 

327
00:13:21,540 --> 00:13:24,850
missile or slipping . And the 

328
00:13:24,860 --> 00:13:28,700
2022 NPR did not pursue it . And what 

329
00:13:28,700 --> 00:13:32,020
are your views on the sub nuclear 

330
00:13:32,030 --> 00:13:35,680
submarine launched missile ? Chairman , 

331
00:13:35,680 --> 00:13:39,640
thank you for the question If confirmed . 

332
00:13:40,490 --> 00:13:44,090
My job is to be able to present 

333
00:13:44,910 --> 00:13:47,021
the decision maker . The President of 

334
00:13:47,021 --> 00:13:49,077
United States with a wide variety of 

335
00:13:49,077 --> 00:13:51,980
options to be able to meet um 

336
00:13:51,990 --> 00:13:54,950
challenges that that we have seen to be 

337
00:13:54,960 --> 00:13:58,790
warranted due to a requirement um 

338
00:13:59,600 --> 00:14:01,822
in this case I would want to be able to 

339
00:14:01,822 --> 00:14:04,040
present the maximum amount the maximum 

340
00:14:04,040 --> 00:14:07,480
capabilities that are available when it 

341
00:14:07,480 --> 00:14:10,250
comes to slip them in . I must admit 

342
00:14:10,260 --> 00:14:13,710
that I would like to be able to do like 

343
00:14:13,720 --> 00:14:16,280
my predecessors before to make an 

344
00:14:16,280 --> 00:14:19,070
assessment on that . If it meets the if 

345
00:14:19,070 --> 00:14:22,710
it is able to meet that capability gap 

346
00:14:22,720 --> 00:14:25,500
that is there . Um I'd like to be able 

347
00:14:25,500 --> 00:14:27,850
to see that and assess that . Um so I 

348
00:14:27,850 --> 00:14:31,640
can make my bed military assessment 

349
00:14:31,650 --> 00:14:33,920
on the specific weapons system itself 

350
00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:35,920
because I am not familiar with that 

351
00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:38,580
weapon system on the specifics of what 

352
00:14:38,580 --> 00:14:41,290
it can do with the capabilities . Um to 

353
00:14:41,290 --> 00:14:43,650
close the capability gap that we might 

354
00:14:43,660 --> 00:14:47,300
perceive . Uh general . As I noted in 

355
00:14:47,300 --> 00:14:49,770
my opening statement , we're now facing 

356
00:14:49,780 --> 00:14:53,300
a three way nuclear race uh 

357
00:14:53,310 --> 00:14:55,900
which alters some of the traditional 

358
00:14:55,900 --> 00:14:58,320
notions of deterrence based on the 

359
00:14:58,320 --> 00:15:01,560
bipolar world of the Cold War . Uh If 

360
00:15:01,560 --> 00:15:03,560
confirmed , Do you believe that you 

361
00:15:03,560 --> 00:15:05,560
will have the sufficient forces and 

362
00:15:05,560 --> 00:15:07,616
capability to undertake this new and 

363
00:15:07,616 --> 00:15:10,060
evolving mission ? Chairman , Thanks 

364
00:15:10,060 --> 00:15:12,810
for the question . I'd like to answer 

365
00:15:12,810 --> 00:15:15,190
that . two ways . 

366
00:15:16,580 --> 00:15:20,320
The current force that we have today . 

367
00:15:20,330 --> 00:15:23,830
Uh We're ready to to execute 

368
00:15:23,830 --> 00:15:26,200
today . What I would say is if 

369
00:15:26,200 --> 00:15:27,830
confirmed and I know this is 

370
00:15:27,830 --> 00:15:31,530
continually happening today is we must 

371
00:15:31,530 --> 00:15:35,050
evaluate what the additional risks are 

372
00:15:35,060 --> 00:15:37,240
and what the adversary is doing to 

373
00:15:37,240 --> 00:15:40,760
ensure . Uh two things first 

374
00:15:40,770 --> 00:15:43,380
uh to evaluate to make sure that the 

375
00:15:43,380 --> 00:15:46,450
nuclear strategy that we have within 

376
00:15:46,450 --> 00:15:49,640
strategic command can meet 

377
00:15:50,010 --> 00:15:53,520
the objective the national objectives 

378
00:15:53,520 --> 00:15:56,510
that are presented before us . So the 

379
00:15:56,510 --> 00:15:59,080
first thing I would do if confirmed is 

380
00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:02,450
to ensure because sir , the first 

381
00:16:02,450 --> 00:16:06,080
time Since 1945 , the first 

382
00:16:06,080 --> 00:16:08,980
time for for us as a nation , we have 

383
00:16:08,980 --> 00:16:11,780
to near peer adversaries . We have 

384
00:16:11,780 --> 00:16:15,110
always put together a nuclear 

385
00:16:15,110 --> 00:16:18,780
defense strategy that has 

386
00:16:18,780 --> 00:16:22,170
one nuclear peer , we were going to 

387
00:16:22,170 --> 00:16:24,960
have to roll up our sleeves to ensure 

388
00:16:24,970 --> 00:16:27,192
that we're doing everything we are that 

389
00:16:27,192 --> 00:16:29,850
we can strategy wise within Strategic 

390
00:16:29,860 --> 00:16:32,150
Air Command . Excuse me between 

391
00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:35,400
stratcom to ensure that that we're 

392
00:16:35,400 --> 00:16:37,456
meeting the objectives to be able to 

393
00:16:37,456 --> 00:16:40,160
have and take care of to near peers . 

394
00:16:40,170 --> 00:16:42,281
First time in history that we've ever 

395
00:16:42,281 --> 00:16:45,040
seen that . Thank you sir . Uh stratcom 

396
00:16:45,040 --> 00:16:47,096
is the joint staff lead for ensuring 

397
00:16:47,096 --> 00:16:48,984
that joint force can successfully 

398
00:16:48,984 --> 00:16:51,980
defend and prosecute electronic warfare 

399
00:16:52,030 --> 00:16:53,860
which is now referred to as 

400
00:16:53,870 --> 00:16:56,990
electromagnetic spectrum operations or 

401
00:16:57,000 --> 00:17:00,800
m so Russia has successfully used em so 

402
00:17:00,800 --> 00:17:02,970
in Ukraine and china has greatly 

403
00:17:02,970 --> 00:17:05,400
expanded their capabilities . Can you 

404
00:17:05,400 --> 00:17:07,567
tell us this view , your views on this 

405
00:17:07,567 --> 00:17:10,060
subject and if confirmed , will you 

406
00:17:10,060 --> 00:17:12,530
ensure re serious your full attention ? 

407
00:17:14,090 --> 00:17:17,220
Thank thank you chairman . Absolutely . 

408
00:17:17,230 --> 00:17:21,140
So if confirmed , um it is going to be 

409
00:17:21,140 --> 00:17:24,980
a front burner item um within uh 

410
00:17:24,990 --> 00:17:27,510
stratcom , you know , I know right now 

411
00:17:27,510 --> 00:17:29,320
that the executive D O D E M s 

412
00:17:29,320 --> 00:17:31,680
superiority strategic implementation 

413
00:17:31,680 --> 00:17:34,800
plan has been laid out um in which the 

414
00:17:34,810 --> 00:17:38,070
commander of stratcom um is going to be 

415
00:17:38,070 --> 00:17:41,710
the lead and and that the direct report , 

416
00:17:41,720 --> 00:17:45,050
the direct report um to the commander 

417
00:17:45,050 --> 00:17:48,920
of stratcom . Um That is something 

418
00:17:48,920 --> 00:17:51,820
that if confirmed , um I want to be 

419
00:17:51,820 --> 00:17:54,180
able to dive down and do a true 

420
00:17:54,180 --> 00:17:56,347
assessment of what's going on with the 

421
00:17:56,347 --> 00:17:59,210
M . S . Um I agree . Um It has 

422
00:17:59,220 --> 00:18:02,010
atrophied over the over the decades . 

423
00:18:02,020 --> 00:18:04,540
Um and and now with two near peers , 

424
00:18:04,550 --> 00:18:07,070
we're gonna have to understand how to 

425
00:18:07,070 --> 00:18:09,403
attack that and how to attack it . Well . 

426
00:18:09,403 --> 00:18:12,100
So um it is absolutely something that I 

427
00:18:12,100 --> 00:18:15,740
would uh look into . Sir . Thank you 

428
00:18:15,740 --> 00:18:18,190
very much , Senator Inhofe please . 

429
00:18:18,650 --> 00:18:22,550
Thank you Mr Chairman . I do 

430
00:18:22,550 --> 00:18:26,130
have three questions . And uh and you 

431
00:18:26,130 --> 00:18:28,400
have addressed all three of these , 

432
00:18:28,410 --> 00:18:30,632
give you a chance to elaborate a little 

433
00:18:30,632 --> 00:18:32,550
bit more . If that's your desire 

434
00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:34,393
general Cotton , we all know how 

435
00:18:34,393 --> 00:18:36,560
critical it is . We build our nation's 

436
00:18:36,560 --> 00:18:38,570
nuclear deterrent , but we're still 

437
00:18:38,570 --> 00:18:40,780
years away from fielding any new 

438
00:18:40,780 --> 00:18:43,690
systems . So in terms of your 

439
00:18:43,690 --> 00:18:46,610
priorities , how important is it that 

440
00:18:46,610 --> 00:18:49,780
we accelerate as much of the US nuclear 

441
00:18:49,780 --> 00:18:53,120
modernization plan as soon as possible . 

442
00:18:56,680 --> 00:18:59,870
Senator , thank you for the question I 

443
00:18:59,870 --> 00:19:02,050
think about it this way . So if if if 

444
00:19:02,050 --> 00:19:05,600
confirmed , I think the 

445
00:19:05,610 --> 00:19:09,570
challenge of Strategic command is 

446
00:19:09,570 --> 00:19:13,420
to ensure that we sustain 

447
00:19:13,420 --> 00:19:16,550
legacy system as we transition to the 

448
00:19:16,550 --> 00:19:19,910
modern to our modernized systems . Um 

449
00:19:19,920 --> 00:19:23,100
that's gonna be key for us um in order 

450
00:19:23,100 --> 00:19:27,060
to do that . Um it's gonna 

451
00:19:27,060 --> 00:19:30,790
take the it's going to take the full 

452
00:19:30,800 --> 00:19:33,320
power of government to be able to pull 

453
00:19:33,320 --> 00:19:35,431
that together , especially when we're 

454
00:19:35,431 --> 00:19:37,320
talking about the sentinel weapon 

455
00:19:37,320 --> 00:19:40,590
system um and the Columbia and all of 

456
00:19:40,590 --> 00:19:42,890
the five that I have under my purview 

457
00:19:42,900 --> 00:19:45,140
um as a current Joint Forces Air 

458
00:19:45,140 --> 00:19:49,040
component commander um um working 

459
00:19:49,040 --> 00:19:51,570
for the Commander of stratcom . So 

460
00:19:51,580 --> 00:19:54,510
being able to do that , sir , I think a 

461
00:19:54,520 --> 00:19:56,409
couple of key things are gonna be 

462
00:19:56,409 --> 00:19:58,680
required from us . We're gonna need 

463
00:19:58,690 --> 00:20:01,670
stable , predictable and adequate and 

464
00:20:01,670 --> 00:20:05,170
timely funding . My job , if confirmed 

465
00:20:05,170 --> 00:20:07,440
as the commander of stratcom , is to 

466
00:20:07,440 --> 00:20:09,610
ensure that we also have stable 

467
00:20:09,610 --> 00:20:11,820
requirements because what we're going 

468
00:20:11,820 --> 00:20:14,660
to see and what I think is gonna be um 

469
00:20:15,320 --> 00:20:17,620
great for us with the new modernized 

470
00:20:17,630 --> 00:20:19,790
systems is the fact that we're by 

471
00:20:19,790 --> 00:20:22,650
design building in a system that we 

472
00:20:22,650 --> 00:20:26,050
know will last for decades because 

473
00:20:26,050 --> 00:20:28,161
that's built into the system . So the 

474
00:20:28,161 --> 00:20:31,550
modularity that we will see um will be 

475
00:20:31,550 --> 00:20:34,870
able to keep pace with the threats that 

476
00:20:34,870 --> 00:20:37,060
we will see in the future . What we 

477
00:20:37,060 --> 00:20:39,227
need to do in the meantime though , is 

478
00:20:39,227 --> 00:20:42,470
to sustain the legacy system that's 

479
00:20:42,470 --> 00:20:45,140
still that is still safe , secure and 

480
00:20:45,140 --> 00:20:47,720
effective as we make that transition . 

481
00:20:47,730 --> 00:20:49,730
That's good . And I appreciate that 

482
00:20:49,730 --> 00:20:53,520
very much the um it's 

483
00:20:53,520 --> 00:20:55,464
already been mentioned a couple of 

484
00:20:55,464 --> 00:20:57,990
times , talking about the two peer to 

485
00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:00,890
peer adversaries . This is something 

486
00:21:00,890 --> 00:21:03,057
that we have not done before . This is 

487
00:21:03,057 --> 00:21:06,220
new . And uh even though you did 

488
00:21:06,230 --> 00:21:08,174
already address this , you've been 

489
00:21:08,174 --> 00:21:10,063
asked this question , even by the 

490
00:21:10,063 --> 00:21:12,063
chairman , I'd like to give you the 

491
00:21:12,063 --> 00:21:15,950
opportunity to uh expand 

492
00:21:15,950 --> 00:21:18,790
if you want to on on how we're gonna 

493
00:21:18,790 --> 00:21:21,012
handle this . What's gonna be different 

494
00:21:21,012 --> 00:21:24,200
about two adversaries ? Thank you , 

495
00:21:24,200 --> 00:21:27,390
Senator . What's different is 

496
00:21:28,380 --> 00:21:31,950
to near peers that actually 

497
00:21:32,600 --> 00:21:35,220
act differently from from a doctrines 

498
00:21:35,220 --> 00:21:39,140
perspective , we understand Russian 

499
00:21:39,150 --> 00:21:41,480
nuclear theory and nuclear doctrine 

500
00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:45,540
Minimum deterrence was what we thought 

501
00:21:45,550 --> 00:21:49,490
of when we talked of China as recent as 

502
00:21:49,500 --> 00:21:53,270
2018 we have seen 

503
00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:55,930
um the incredible expansiveness of what 

504
00:21:55,930 --> 00:21:58,208
they're doing with their nuclear force , 

505
00:21:58,208 --> 00:22:01,610
which does not , in my opinion 

506
00:22:01,910 --> 00:22:05,240
reflect minimal deterrence . They have 

507
00:22:05,240 --> 00:22:09,160
a bona fide triad now . So we're gonna 

508
00:22:09,160 --> 00:22:12,130
have to understand more deeply 

509
00:22:12,140 --> 00:22:16,110
um the chinese nuclear strategy . 

510
00:22:16,720 --> 00:22:18,831
All right , I appreciate that . Now . 

511
00:22:18,831 --> 00:22:22,130
The while the Chairman did talk about 

512
00:22:22,130 --> 00:22:24,280
this before , I wanna frame the 

513
00:22:24,280 --> 00:22:27,840
question as my last question a little 

514
00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:29,896
bit differently , General Cotton , a 

515
00:22:29,896 --> 00:22:32,940
number of the senior military officers 

516
00:22:32,940 --> 00:22:34,884
have testified to their support of 

517
00:22:34,884 --> 00:22:36,830
continuing the sea launch , cruise 

518
00:22:36,840 --> 00:22:39,460
missile program , including the 

519
00:22:39,460 --> 00:22:41,571
chairman and the Vice Chairman of the 

520
00:22:41,571 --> 00:22:43,640
Joint Chiefs , the Chief of Naval 

521
00:22:43,640 --> 00:22:46,210
Operations and the commanders of the U . 

522
00:22:46,210 --> 00:22:49,060
S . Strategic and european command . Do 

523
00:22:49,060 --> 00:22:50,880
you agree with 

524
00:22:52,180 --> 00:22:55,560
not ? Do you do you agree with these 

525
00:22:55,570 --> 00:22:57,990
leaders right now and and your 

526
00:22:57,990 --> 00:23:00,070
colleagues that we should keep this 

527
00:23:00,070 --> 00:23:02,940
program going ? And I'd like to have 

528
00:23:02,940 --> 00:23:06,170
you give it be as specific as possible 

529
00:23:06,180 --> 00:23:08,560
because we all know what the program is . 

530
00:23:08,570 --> 00:23:11,620
We've all expressed ourselves on it . 

531
00:23:11,630 --> 00:23:14,640
So I'd like to have your um your 

532
00:23:14,640 --> 00:23:17,440
thoughts on this . Yes , senator . 

533
00:23:18,230 --> 00:23:21,770
So so the chairman , the vice chairman 

534
00:23:21,770 --> 00:23:23,870
and the current Commander of US 

535
00:23:23,870 --> 00:23:26,560
Strategic Command um absolutely 

536
00:23:26,560 --> 00:23:29,190
understand where they are on the 

537
00:23:29,190 --> 00:23:31,520
endorsement of continuing 

538
00:23:32,720 --> 00:23:36,150
um from my perspective . Um I I 

539
00:23:36,150 --> 00:23:38,094
absolutely understand that they're 

540
00:23:38,094 --> 00:23:40,094
looking at the capability gap to be 

541
00:23:40,094 --> 00:23:42,510
able to do that . The only thing that's 

542
00:23:42,510 --> 00:23:44,960
different between they and I is I have 

543
00:23:44,960 --> 00:23:47,127
yet to do an assessment on the weapons 

544
00:23:47,127 --> 00:23:50,430
system itself . Um but but I absolutely 

545
00:23:50,430 --> 00:23:52,652
understand where they are on being able 

546
00:23:52,652 --> 00:23:54,930
to have a capability gap that is filled 

547
00:23:54,940 --> 00:23:58,620
um that they have seen . Um I have seen 

548
00:23:58,620 --> 00:24:01,610
that capability gap as well . Um And I 

549
00:24:01,610 --> 00:24:03,721
endorse the fact that we need to fill 

550
00:24:03,721 --> 00:24:05,990
that capability gap . Thank you . 

551
00:24:05,990 --> 00:24:08,920
General , thank you Senator Senator 

552
00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:12,050
Shaheen please . Um Good morning , 

553
00:24:12,060 --> 00:24:14,100
congratulations . General Cotton on 

554
00:24:14,100 --> 00:24:16,267
your nomination . Thank you to you and 

555
00:24:16,267 --> 00:24:18,610
your family for your long service . Um 

556
00:24:18,620 --> 00:24:20,970
I would like to begin by following up a 

557
00:24:20,970 --> 00:24:22,740
little bit on Senator Inhofe's 

558
00:24:22,740 --> 00:24:25,610
questions about the challenges with 

559
00:24:25,610 --> 00:24:27,890
modernization and you talked about a 

560
00:24:27,890 --> 00:24:30,057
dependable budget process . You talked 

561
00:24:30,057 --> 00:24:32,279
about a whole of government cooperative 

562
00:24:32,279 --> 00:24:34,850
effort . What you didn't talk about is 

563
00:24:34,850 --> 00:24:38,620
the supply chain and the challenges 

564
00:24:38,620 --> 00:24:40,790
with making sure we have the critical 

565
00:24:40,790 --> 00:24:44,500
minerals , the other um requirements to 

566
00:24:44,500 --> 00:24:46,760
modernize our nuclear arsenal . Can you 

567
00:24:46,760 --> 00:24:48,927
talk a little bit about what you think 

568
00:24:48,927 --> 00:24:51,020
those challenges are and how you see 

569
00:24:51,030 --> 00:24:54,050
the ability to impact that and what we 

570
00:24:54,050 --> 00:24:56,383
should be thinking about as a committee . 

571
00:24:57,180 --> 00:24:59,236
Thank you senator for the question . 

572
00:24:59,236 --> 00:25:02,620
Absolutely correct . Um , as we are 

573
00:25:02,620 --> 00:25:04,731
seeing the modern , the modernization 

574
00:25:04,731 --> 00:25:06,953
programs within the nuclear portfolio , 

575
00:25:06,953 --> 00:25:08,787
I would venture to say that it's 

576
00:25:08,787 --> 00:25:10,670
probably being seen across the 

577
00:25:10,670 --> 00:25:12,392
Department of Defense , but in 

578
00:25:12,392 --> 00:25:14,559
particular for the nuclear portfolio . 

579
00:25:14,559 --> 00:25:17,050
Um , even as we're seeing the industry 

580
00:25:17,050 --> 00:25:19,570
partners to Herculean efforts and work 

581
00:25:19,580 --> 00:25:22,910
um , in in in in in moving the programs 

582
00:25:22,910 --> 00:25:26,000
along at a great pace . What we are now 

583
00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,610
finding is the realities of supply 

584
00:25:28,610 --> 00:25:31,660
chain Limitations and and supply chains 

585
00:25:31,660 --> 00:25:34,360
shortfalls . Um , we had a great 

586
00:25:34,360 --> 00:25:36,590
discussion and and and a good example 

587
00:25:36,590 --> 00:25:38,920
or some components that are us made 

588
00:25:38,920 --> 00:25:41,380
components with us made sub components 

589
00:25:41,390 --> 00:25:43,900
that are still taking what would be on 

590
00:25:43,900 --> 00:25:47,430
average , maybe 10 days to 

591
00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:49,620
source , that are now taking up to 90 

592
00:25:49,620 --> 00:25:52,300
days to source . So by definition , if 

593
00:25:52,300 --> 00:25:54,630
you look at what we need to do in in 

594
00:25:54,630 --> 00:25:57,050
regards to maintaining a flow and 

595
00:25:57,050 --> 00:25:59,300
schedule to get our new modernized 

596
00:25:59,310 --> 00:26:01,320
systems online . You know , if you 

597
00:26:01,320 --> 00:26:04,370
introduce that into the flow , uh , 

598
00:26:04,380 --> 00:26:06,324
those delays right . They're gonna 

599
00:26:06,324 --> 00:26:09,210
cause me concern and I think it's gonna 

600
00:26:09,210 --> 00:26:12,300
take everyone to understand how we can 

601
00:26:12,300 --> 00:26:14,580
close the gap on supply chain 

602
00:26:14,580 --> 00:26:18,010
management and ensure that we can get 

603
00:26:18,010 --> 00:26:21,960
the that supplies to the 

604
00:26:21,970 --> 00:26:24,026
industry partners that are trying to 

605
00:26:24,026 --> 00:26:25,970
modernize this force . And are you 

606
00:26:25,970 --> 00:26:28,192
comfortable that we have the components 

607
00:26:28,192 --> 00:26:30,026
that we're going to need , being 

608
00:26:30,026 --> 00:26:32,248
manufactured within the United States , 

609
00:26:32,248 --> 00:26:34,920
the materials that we need um , being 

610
00:26:34,920 --> 00:26:37,500
produced in the United States ma'am 

611
00:26:37,510 --> 00:26:41,200
ma'am . I did until we started to see 

612
00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:44,670
the you know that kind of peek into to 

613
00:26:44,670 --> 00:26:46,790
the schedule as being problems with 

614
00:26:46,790 --> 00:26:50,050
supply chain . Thank you . Um 

615
00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:54,170
There is can you describe how 

616
00:26:54,170 --> 00:26:56,820
you analyze the difference between 

617
00:26:56,820 --> 00:26:58,930
strategic deterrence and integrated 

618
00:26:58,930 --> 00:27:01,040
deterrence and how you see that 

619
00:27:01,040 --> 00:27:03,840
affecting your role if at all in terms 

620
00:27:03,840 --> 00:27:07,210
of the mission of stratcom ? 

621
00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:09,911
Yes ma'am . Thanks for the question . 

622
00:27:09,911 --> 00:27:12,580
Um It's integral um Integrated 

623
00:27:12,580 --> 00:27:15,210
deterrence um is a whole of government 

624
00:27:15,220 --> 00:27:18,230
opportunity um In the in the way I 

625
00:27:18,230 --> 00:27:22,050
describe that is it is I remember 

626
00:27:22,060 --> 00:27:24,500
growing up and using the dime theory 

627
00:27:24,500 --> 00:27:27,280
when I was a young lieutenant but it's 

628
00:27:27,280 --> 00:27:29,391
using all instruments of power within 

629
00:27:29,391 --> 00:27:31,613
within the government the United States 

630
00:27:31,613 --> 00:27:34,540
um to afford us a deterrence factor . 

631
00:27:34,550 --> 00:27:37,720
Um That makes it so we never have to 

632
00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:39,940
get to the day where where I have to 

633
00:27:39,940 --> 00:27:42,520
execute the mission if confirmed um 

634
00:27:42,520 --> 00:27:44,830
from U . S . Strategic command . Um 

635
00:27:44,840 --> 00:27:48,650
Strategic deterrence to me um composes 

636
00:27:48,650 --> 00:27:50,650
more than just nuclear deterrence . 

637
00:27:50,650 --> 00:27:53,180
Strategic deterrence to me is has a 

638
00:27:53,180 --> 00:27:56,000
conventional and a nuclear component to 

639
00:27:56,000 --> 00:27:59,140
it . Um And it is the backstop in my 

640
00:27:59,140 --> 00:28:02,670
opinion um to ensure that we can deter 

641
00:28:02,670 --> 00:28:05,520
forces um when called upon . 

642
00:28:07,650 --> 00:28:11,200
So does the focus on integrated 

643
00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:13,790
deterrents change the role that you 

644
00:28:13,790 --> 00:28:16,800
would have confirmed as the head of 

645
00:28:16,800 --> 00:28:19,330
stratcom ma'am I don't believe so 

646
00:28:19,330 --> 00:28:21,680
because I think strategic deterrence is 

647
00:28:21,680 --> 00:28:23,920
an integral part of the overarching 

648
00:28:23,930 --> 00:28:26,650
integrated deterrence that that that we 

649
00:28:26,650 --> 00:28:30,190
all speak of . Thank you . Um one of 

650
00:28:30,190 --> 00:28:34,110
the you know , as someone who remembers 

651
00:28:34,110 --> 00:28:37,630
the Cold War very vividly and the focus 

652
00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:41,340
on the concern about nuclear 

653
00:28:41,350 --> 00:28:44,620
annihilation and the ability to 

654
00:28:44,630 --> 00:28:47,980
um destroy the world that way . 

655
00:28:47,990 --> 00:28:50,550
And there was a lot of attention to 

656
00:28:50,550 --> 00:28:54,140
that that has dissipated over the years 

657
00:28:54,140 --> 00:28:55,807
with some of the arms control 

658
00:28:55,807 --> 00:28:59,000
agreements . And but I think as we look 

659
00:28:59,000 --> 00:29:00,889
at the war in Ukraine and some of 

660
00:29:00,889 --> 00:29:03,056
Vladimir Putin's statements , there is 

661
00:29:03,056 --> 00:29:06,260
a renewed concern about what um what 

662
00:29:06,260 --> 00:29:08,770
the use of nuclear weapons would mean . 

663
00:29:09,990 --> 00:29:12,960
Are there ways in which you think are 

664
00:29:12,970 --> 00:29:16,870
um strategic command , our our 

665
00:29:16,870 --> 00:29:19,360
nuclear um triad 

666
00:29:20,780 --> 00:29:23,120
are helping to constrain what Vladimir 

667
00:29:23,120 --> 00:29:26,030
Putin does now in this war in Ukraine . 

668
00:29:27,400 --> 00:29:29,400
Senator thanks for the question . I 

669
00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:33,150
absolutely believe that our nuclear 

670
00:29:33,150 --> 00:29:35,730
deterrent force held . 

671
00:29:36,530 --> 00:29:40,360
Um we did not 

672
00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:44,040
see um Russia do anything with 

673
00:29:44,040 --> 00:29:47,180
our native or our our NATO 

674
00:29:47,180 --> 00:29:51,100
partners . Um the rhetoric may have , 

675
00:29:51,100 --> 00:29:54,680
we may have heard the rhetoric . Um but 

676
00:29:54,690 --> 00:29:57,500
I think at the end of the day , um 

677
00:29:58,070 --> 00:30:01,250
Russia and china both understand that 

678
00:30:01,250 --> 00:30:04,820
we have a strong um resilient 

679
00:30:04,830 --> 00:30:08,430
nuclear force um that is offering 

680
00:30:08,430 --> 00:30:11,250
deterrence to ourselves um and extended 

681
00:30:11,250 --> 00:30:13,810
to turns to our allies . Thank you . 

682
00:30:13,810 --> 00:30:16,410
Thank you Mr Chairman , thank you . 

683
00:30:16,420 --> 00:30:18,364
Senator Senator Fischer , please . 

684
00:30:18,364 --> 00:30:20,253
Thank you Mr Chairman , thank you 

685
00:30:20,253 --> 00:30:22,810
General for being here today and thank 

686
00:30:22,810 --> 00:30:24,699
you for being your willingness to 

687
00:30:24,699 --> 00:30:27,160
continue your service to this country . 

688
00:30:27,170 --> 00:30:29,990
Um I'd like to welcome your family as 

689
00:30:29,990 --> 00:30:33,470
well madam . It's nice to see you here 

690
00:30:33,470 --> 00:30:35,710
and I know the sacrifices that you and 

691
00:30:35,710 --> 00:30:37,654
your family make on behalf of this 

692
00:30:37,654 --> 00:30:40,280
country as well . Thank you General 

693
00:30:40,280 --> 00:30:44,160
Cotton a lot of times in this committee 

694
00:30:44,160 --> 00:30:46,216
and on the subcommittee of Strategic 

695
00:30:46,216 --> 00:30:48,320
Forces . Our main focus is on 

696
00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:51,810
modernization of our triad . Uh We also 

697
00:30:51,810 --> 00:30:54,880
try to gain a fuller 

698
00:30:54,880 --> 00:30:58,620
understanding of the future needs that 

699
00:30:58,620 --> 00:31:01,130
our military must have to provide for 

700
00:31:01,130 --> 00:31:04,700
national security . And 

701
00:31:04,700 --> 00:31:07,050
we talk about things like slick . Um 

702
00:31:07,300 --> 00:31:11,140
and um the need that commanders such as 

703
00:31:11,140 --> 00:31:13,940
yourself will have to have to provide 

704
00:31:13,940 --> 00:31:17,660
options to the president uh when or 

705
00:31:17,670 --> 00:31:21,150
if you are ever in that position , the 

706
00:31:21,150 --> 00:31:23,910
more options you can present , the 

707
00:31:23,920 --> 00:31:26,253
better for the security of this country , 

708
00:31:26,253 --> 00:31:28,142
the better for the people of this 

709
00:31:28,142 --> 00:31:31,010
country But also under the duties and 

710
00:31:31,010 --> 00:31:34,370
responsibilities of the Stratcom 

711
00:31:34,380 --> 00:31:37,620
Combatant Commander . We need to look 

712
00:31:37,620 --> 00:31:41,220
at the importance of n . c . three . We 

713
00:31:41,220 --> 00:31:43,960
have to look at the N N . S . A . Is 

714
00:31:43,970 --> 00:31:47,290
supporting infrastructure as well . So 

715
00:31:47,300 --> 00:31:50,020
general , I think that when we talk 

716
00:31:50,020 --> 00:31:53,730
about nuclear modernization um and we 

717
00:31:53,730 --> 00:31:55,900
have that focus on the triad , on the 

718
00:31:55,900 --> 00:31:59,520
weapons systems , the warheads ? Uh 

719
00:31:59,530 --> 00:32:02,600
We we shouldn't forget we should not 

720
00:32:02,600 --> 00:32:04,322
forget about N . C . Three the 

721
00:32:04,322 --> 00:32:07,020
architecture as well as the scientific 

722
00:32:07,020 --> 00:32:09,810
and production infrastructure of N N . 

723
00:32:09,810 --> 00:32:12,740
S . A . Can you talk about how 

724
00:32:12,740 --> 00:32:15,180
important these elements are to the 

725
00:32:15,180 --> 00:32:17,560
deterrent and the modernization 

726
00:32:17,560 --> 00:32:19,616
challenge that we're seeing in these 

727
00:32:19,616 --> 00:32:22,460
areas as well , senator . I'd love to , 

728
00:32:22,470 --> 00:32:24,414
you know , I'll start with N . C . 

729
00:32:24,414 --> 00:32:26,526
Three . I know there's members of the 

730
00:32:26,526 --> 00:32:28,692
committee that says it's that it's the 

731
00:32:28,692 --> 00:32:30,859
it's the fourth of the triad , right ? 

732
00:32:30,859 --> 00:32:32,970
It's the quad . I've I've heard folks 

733
00:32:32,970 --> 00:32:35,970
say that um I call it the tapestry . 

734
00:32:36,680 --> 00:32:38,847
Um in my opening statement , you heard 

735
00:32:38,847 --> 00:32:41,000
you heard me discuss and talk about ? 

736
00:32:41,010 --> 00:32:43,160
Um It is just as important as the 

737
00:32:43,160 --> 00:32:45,104
platforms that we're talking about 

738
00:32:45,104 --> 00:32:47,438
modernizing and that is absolutely true . 

739
00:32:47,438 --> 00:32:50,750
Um The good news is um it is still a 

740
00:32:50,770 --> 00:32:53,690
it's a resilient system today . Um 

741
00:32:54,930 --> 00:32:58,590
What I like um having over 36 years in 

742
00:32:58,590 --> 00:33:01,260
this business is the conversations that 

743
00:33:01,260 --> 00:33:04,030
people like yourself and others also 

744
00:33:04,030 --> 00:33:07,020
see it as just as important as 

745
00:33:07,020 --> 00:33:10,300
the as the weapons systems that we that 

746
00:33:10,300 --> 00:33:13,100
we often talk about . Um if confirmed . 

747
00:33:13,110 --> 00:33:16,600
Um I'd use my authorities um 

748
00:33:16,610 --> 00:33:20,430
at as everyone is aware the the neck 

749
00:33:20,430 --> 00:33:22,597
or the N . C . Three enterprise center 

750
00:33:22,597 --> 00:33:24,430
that is located within Strategic 

751
00:33:24,430 --> 00:33:26,730
Command . Um And the commander 

752
00:33:26,730 --> 00:33:28,563
Strategic Command having kind of 

753
00:33:28,563 --> 00:33:30,230
oversight delegated oversight 

754
00:33:30,230 --> 00:33:32,730
authorities to be able to kinda make 

755
00:33:32,730 --> 00:33:35,350
sure that we as a department are 

756
00:33:35,350 --> 00:33:37,120
looking to ensure that we are 

757
00:33:37,120 --> 00:33:39,790
modernizing with next gen technologies . 

758
00:33:39,800 --> 00:33:42,400
Um I call it N C . Two over assured 

759
00:33:42,410 --> 00:33:45,420
comms to ensure that we have um the 

760
00:33:45,420 --> 00:33:47,253
state of the art , N . C . Three 

761
00:33:47,253 --> 00:33:50,280
systems that we need for not only today , 

762
00:33:50,290 --> 00:33:53,210
not only mid term but the future and 

763
00:33:53,210 --> 00:33:55,432
that is going to be absolutely critical 

764
00:33:55,432 --> 00:33:58,110
for us because I guarantee you that I 

765
00:33:58,110 --> 00:34:01,380
want to ensure that we always outpace 

766
00:34:01,380 --> 00:34:03,560
our adversaries who are also paying 

767
00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:05,838
attention to our N . C . Three systems , 

768
00:34:07,050 --> 00:34:09,680
stratcom also has significant 

769
00:34:09,680 --> 00:34:11,230
responsibilities for the 

770
00:34:11,230 --> 00:34:13,850
electromagnetic spectrum operations . 

771
00:34:13,850 --> 00:34:16,640
Can you describe some of the challenges 

772
00:34:16,650 --> 00:34:19,650
in this mission area and what stratcom 

773
00:34:19,650 --> 00:34:21,594
is doing to help rebuild the force 

774
00:34:21,594 --> 00:34:24,170
structure and the capabilities that we 

775
00:34:24,170 --> 00:34:27,480
need ? Yes , ma'am . So so from my 

776
00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:29,480
vantage point as a joint Forces air 

777
00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:32,210
component commander , um I can only 

778
00:34:32,210 --> 00:34:35,620
give my advantage of of of what I have 

779
00:34:35,620 --> 00:34:37,842
in the Air Force side of the House . If 

780
00:34:37,842 --> 00:34:39,842
confirmed . I would like to make an 

781
00:34:39,842 --> 00:34:42,009
assessment on the entire portfolio but 

782
00:34:42,009 --> 00:34:44,231
but from our vantage point , um I think 

783
00:34:44,231 --> 00:34:46,970
we're a little behind and um um I don't 

784
00:34:46,970 --> 00:34:49,137
think I know we're behind . Um but the 

785
00:34:49,137 --> 00:34:51,303
good news is I know that we're working 

786
00:34:51,303 --> 00:34:53,860
to try to close the gap on unless not 

787
00:34:53,870 --> 00:34:56,480
paying attention to E . M . S . Um for 

788
00:34:56,490 --> 00:34:59,800
for decades . So if confirmed um that 

789
00:34:59,800 --> 00:35:02,950
would be one of the one of the things 

790
00:35:02,950 --> 00:35:05,172
that that would be on on the plate that 

791
00:35:05,172 --> 00:35:08,440
I would absolutely want to assess um 

792
00:35:08,440 --> 00:35:10,440
and be the greatest advocate that I 

793
00:35:10,440 --> 00:35:12,920
could be as the commander of stratcom 

794
00:35:12,930 --> 00:35:16,810
in ensuring that we have the the 

795
00:35:16,820 --> 00:35:20,290
not the not pace um our adversaries but 

796
00:35:20,290 --> 00:35:22,401
lead our adversaries in that domain . 

797
00:35:22,401 --> 00:35:24,860
Thank you . I was going to ask you 

798
00:35:24,870 --> 00:35:27,920
about also as as critics portray our 

799
00:35:27,920 --> 00:35:30,840
nuclear deterrence as a relic of the 

800
00:35:30,850 --> 00:35:33,610
Cold War , but I will send that to you 

801
00:35:33,610 --> 00:35:35,670
in a written question . Thank you . 

802
00:35:35,680 --> 00:35:37,736
Thank you . Senator Fischer Center . 

803
00:35:37,820 --> 00:35:39,653
Please thank you . Mr Chairman . 

804
00:35:39,653 --> 00:35:42,060
Welcome General Cotton and mrs Cotton 

805
00:35:42,310 --> 00:35:46,030
uh as um part of my responsibilities on 

806
00:35:46,030 --> 00:35:48,252
this committee to ensure the fitness of 

807
00:35:48,252 --> 00:35:50,630
nominees for appointment to senior 

808
00:35:50,630 --> 00:35:52,852
positions within the administration . I 

809
00:35:52,852 --> 00:35:54,630
asked the following two initial 

810
00:35:54,630 --> 00:35:56,852
questions of all nominees to all of the 

811
00:35:56,852 --> 00:35:59,019
committees on which I served since you 

812
00:35:59,019 --> 00:36:01,074
became a legal adult . Have you ever 

813
00:36:01,074 --> 00:36:02,963
made unwanted requests for sexual 

814
00:36:02,963 --> 00:36:05,080
favors or committed any verbal or 

815
00:36:05,080 --> 00:36:07,130
physical harassment or assault of a 

816
00:36:07,130 --> 00:36:10,290
sexual nature ? Have you ever faced 

817
00:36:10,290 --> 00:36:12,512
discipline or entered into a settlement 

818
00:36:12,512 --> 00:36:14,290
related to this kind of conduct 

819
00:36:16,320 --> 00:36:18,542
general . You've been asked a number of 

820
00:36:18,542 --> 00:36:20,709
questions about silica men . And while 

821
00:36:20,709 --> 00:36:22,598
some military leaders , including 

822
00:36:22,598 --> 00:36:24,764
Chairman Milley , have expressed their 

823
00:36:24,764 --> 00:36:27,098
support for slick . Um um several D . O . 

824
00:36:27,098 --> 00:36:28,987
D . Officials including Secretary 

825
00:36:28,987 --> 00:36:30,653
Austin , have expressed their 

826
00:36:30,653 --> 00:36:33,110
opposition to the project . I share the 

827
00:36:33,110 --> 00:36:35,610
concerns expressed by Secretary Austin 

828
00:36:35,620 --> 00:36:37,564
that the development of such a low 

829
00:36:37,564 --> 00:36:40,190
yield or tactical nuclear cruise 

830
00:36:40,190 --> 00:36:42,750
missile is unnecessary and could lead 

831
00:36:42,750 --> 00:36:46,500
to a dangerous new nuclear arms race . 

832
00:36:46,510 --> 00:36:49,050
The United States should be a leader in 

833
00:36:49,050 --> 00:36:51,420
international efforts to reduce nuclear 

834
00:36:51,420 --> 00:36:53,310
stockpiles and prevent nuclear 

835
00:36:53,310 --> 00:36:55,700
proliferation while still ensuring we 

836
00:36:55,700 --> 00:36:57,970
maintain cutting edge capabilities to 

837
00:36:57,970 --> 00:37:00,670
protect our national security . I know 

838
00:37:00,670 --> 00:37:03,570
that you testified that you will make 

839
00:37:03,570 --> 00:37:06,150
your own assessment as to circum end . 

840
00:37:06,450 --> 00:37:08,840
I do want to ask you though , do you 

841
00:37:08,840 --> 00:37:11,340
agree that the United States has a role 

842
00:37:11,340 --> 00:37:14,060
to play in preventing a new nuclear 

843
00:37:14,060 --> 00:37:16,830
arms race ? And if so if confirmed , 

844
00:37:16,830 --> 00:37:18,886
will you work with the Department of 

845
00:37:18,886 --> 00:37:20,997
State to support the strengthening of 

846
00:37:20,997 --> 00:37:23,730
diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear 

847
00:37:23,730 --> 00:37:26,400
proliferation ? Senator , thank you for 

848
00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:28,400
the for the question . I think that 

849
00:37:28,400 --> 00:37:31,920
that that we've into um what we would 

850
00:37:31,920 --> 00:37:34,750
call integrated deterrence . Right , So 

851
00:37:34,750 --> 00:37:36,806
so as we as we talk about integrated 

852
00:37:36,806 --> 00:37:39,120
deterrence , um I want to take all 

853
00:37:39,120 --> 00:37:41,287
instruments of power to to ensure that 

854
00:37:41,287 --> 00:37:45,000
we can deter . So in regards to the 

855
00:37:45,000 --> 00:37:48,170
question that you asked , um my best 

856
00:37:48,170 --> 00:37:50,281
military advice would always be to be 

857
00:37:50,281 --> 00:37:52,830
able to present the commander in chief 

858
00:37:52,830 --> 00:37:54,497
with a variety of options and 

859
00:37:54,497 --> 00:37:58,260
capabilities . Um So so that's 

860
00:37:58,270 --> 00:38:01,740
that's where I would be um if confirmed 

861
00:38:01,740 --> 00:38:04,430
as a commander of us , stratcom is to 

862
00:38:04,430 --> 00:38:08,060
be able to offer as much capability and 

863
00:38:08,060 --> 00:38:11,180
options to the commander in chief . Um 

864
00:38:11,190 --> 00:38:13,301
But I do understand the question that 

865
00:38:13,301 --> 00:38:15,412
you asked in regard to the Department 

866
00:38:15,412 --> 00:38:17,523
of State , and the answer is yes , as 

867
00:38:17,523 --> 00:38:19,690
far as integrated deterrence . I think 

868
00:38:19,690 --> 00:38:21,579
it's key to that . Well , I think 

869
00:38:21,579 --> 00:38:23,690
integrated different deterrence means 

870
00:38:23,690 --> 00:38:25,801
that we have a role to play . I would 

871
00:38:25,801 --> 00:38:27,468
say a leading role to play in 

872
00:38:27,468 --> 00:38:29,523
preventing a new nuclear arms race . 

873
00:38:29,523 --> 00:38:33,340
Would you agree with that ? So , 

874
00:38:33,340 --> 00:38:34,673
given the importance of 

875
00:38:34,673 --> 00:38:36,784
nonproliferation , nonproliferation ? 

876
00:38:36,784 --> 00:38:39,520
Are there other weapons or tactics that 

877
00:38:39,520 --> 00:38:41,560
can accomplish the same strategic 

878
00:38:41,560 --> 00:38:44,140
objectives as a command without 

879
00:38:44,140 --> 00:38:46,630
creating new nuclear weapons , 

880
00:38:47,930 --> 00:38:49,930
Ma'am ? Have confirmed that that is 

881
00:38:49,930 --> 00:38:51,874
exactly what I meant by making the 

882
00:38:51,874 --> 00:38:54,041
assessment to understand what would be 

883
00:38:54,041 --> 00:38:57,210
the the gap filler in the capability as 

884
00:38:57,210 --> 00:38:59,960
we were prepared to revamp the nuclear 

885
00:38:59,960 --> 00:39:03,420
triad or modernize the triad ? Wouldn't 

886
00:39:03,420 --> 00:39:05,642
our efforts be better utilized focusing 

887
00:39:05,642 --> 00:39:07,753
on that important mission rather than 

888
00:39:07,753 --> 00:39:10,030
diverting resources and attention to 

889
00:39:10,030 --> 00:39:13,830
sick amend Ma'am . 

890
00:39:13,840 --> 00:39:16,310
You know , I I appreciate the comedian 

891
00:39:16,310 --> 00:39:19,430
what they have done for the for the 

892
00:39:19,430 --> 00:39:21,263
overarching modernization of the 

893
00:39:21,263 --> 00:39:23,990
nuclear portfolio writ large . Um once 

894
00:39:23,990 --> 00:39:27,180
again um I think if if 

895
00:39:27,180 --> 00:39:30,850
confirmed um I still would like to to 

896
00:39:30,850 --> 00:39:34,210
be able to assess and analyze . How do 

897
00:39:34,210 --> 00:39:36,450
you broaden that portfolio to provide 

898
00:39:36,460 --> 00:39:39,070
more options for the for the President 

899
00:39:39,070 --> 00:39:41,660
of United States ? I think one of the 

900
00:39:41,660 --> 00:39:44,750
concerns about the cycle man is that 

901
00:39:44,760 --> 00:39:47,450
it's going to be a highly expensive 

902
00:39:47,450 --> 00:39:50,130
proposition . Whereas we are very clear 

903
00:39:50,130 --> 00:39:54,120
on the need to um revamp they 

904
00:39:54,120 --> 00:39:57,200
tried to modernize so they going on the 

905
00:39:57,200 --> 00:39:59,660
Ohio class ballistic missile submarine 

906
00:39:59,670 --> 00:40:02,060
originally said to be in service for 30 

907
00:40:02,060 --> 00:40:04,530
years will be extended by the navy out 

908
00:40:04,540 --> 00:40:07,160
to 42 years . These submarines will 

909
00:40:07,160 --> 00:40:10,240
begin to retire from the fleet As the 

910
00:40:10,240 --> 00:40:12,510
Columbia class comes online to replace 

911
00:40:12,510 --> 00:40:15,090
them in the late 2020s . The warheads 

912
00:40:15,090 --> 00:40:16,923
used on the submarines have also 

913
00:40:16,923 --> 00:40:19,270
undergone life extension programs of 

914
00:40:19,270 --> 00:40:21,530
their own in some cases adding an 

915
00:40:21,530 --> 00:40:24,390
estimate of 30 years to their service 

916
00:40:24,390 --> 00:40:27,460
life . What concerns do you have with 

917
00:40:27,460 --> 00:40:29,870
service life extensions as we bridge 

918
00:40:29,870 --> 00:40:32,290
the gap between aging and new 

919
00:40:32,290 --> 00:40:34,910
technologies , ma'am ? Thank you for 

920
00:40:34,910 --> 00:40:37,450
the question . Some regards with our 

921
00:40:37,450 --> 00:40:40,730
incredible partners in N . S . A . Who 

922
00:40:40,730 --> 00:40:44,430
are doing this work for us . Um I think 

923
00:40:44,430 --> 00:40:46,597
the question is we need to kind of see 

924
00:40:46,597 --> 00:40:50,570
what what aging you you really see 

925
00:40:50,580 --> 00:40:54,000
um from the asset and 

926
00:40:54,010 --> 00:40:57,890
also um does a life extension , 

927
00:40:57,900 --> 00:41:00,122
you know , solve the problem to get the 

928
00:41:00,122 --> 00:41:02,970
effects that you want um from that 

929
00:41:02,980 --> 00:41:05,540
asset . So if confirmed , I think 

930
00:41:05,540 --> 00:41:09,320
that's part of what um I would assess 

931
00:41:09,330 --> 00:41:12,490
um as being a member of the Nuclear 

932
00:41:12,490 --> 00:41:15,920
Weapons Council as well um to to be 

933
00:41:15,920 --> 00:41:18,810
able to get an assessment to see . Okay , 

934
00:41:18,810 --> 00:41:22,670
is it is it about um reuse or is it 

935
00:41:22,670 --> 00:41:26,550
about new um and and further 

936
00:41:26,560 --> 00:41:28,671
so , so that's something I would have 

937
00:41:28,671 --> 00:41:30,393
to make an assessment on uh if 

938
00:41:30,393 --> 00:41:33,330
confirmed . Thank you . I thank 

939
00:41:35,040 --> 00:41:36,651
general cotton . Welcome and 

940
00:41:36,651 --> 00:41:38,873
congratulations on your nominations and 

941
00:41:38,873 --> 00:41:41,040
continued service . You know , we hear 

942
00:41:41,040 --> 00:41:43,151
the term arms race a lot , especially 

943
00:41:43,151 --> 00:41:46,390
in the nuclear context . Um last time I 

944
00:41:46,390 --> 00:41:48,612
guess we had a major arms race in which 

945
00:41:48,612 --> 00:41:50,890
we actually contested the race was in 

946
00:41:50,890 --> 00:41:54,020
the 1980s . And uh there aren't many 

947
00:41:54,020 --> 00:41:56,340
senators around who are there then um 

948
00:41:56,350 --> 00:41:58,406
Pat Leahy and chuck Grassley maybe I 

949
00:41:58,406 --> 00:42:00,628
bet they took different views on it . I 

950
00:42:00,628 --> 00:42:02,850
know what you joe biden took on it ? He 

951
00:42:02,850 --> 00:42:04,906
continued to criticize Ronald Reagan 

952
00:42:04,906 --> 00:42:04,860
for an arms race that was going to 

953
00:42:04,860 --> 00:42:06,971
destabilize the world lead to nuclear 

954
00:42:06,971 --> 00:42:09,082
war . Of course it led to nothing but 

955
00:42:09,082 --> 00:42:11,560
victory in the Cold War uh , without 

956
00:42:11,560 --> 00:42:15,440
even firing a shot . Um Do 

957
00:42:15,440 --> 00:42:17,496
we get to decide whether there is an 

958
00:42:17,496 --> 00:42:20,120
arms race or not ? General Cotton , or 

959
00:42:20,120 --> 00:42:22,160
does the enemy get a vote on that ? 

960
00:42:23,730 --> 00:42:25,897
Thank you for the question , senator . 

961
00:42:26,220 --> 00:42:28,820
Yeah , I would answer it this way . Um 

962
00:42:28,830 --> 00:42:31,480
and it still goes back to the to the 

963
00:42:31,480 --> 00:42:33,702
options and capabilities that we should 

964
00:42:33,702 --> 00:42:35,869
be able to provide to the commander in 

965
00:42:35,869 --> 00:42:39,760
chief . So from from my best military 

966
00:42:39,760 --> 00:42:43,100
advice is to provide the capability And 

967
00:42:43,100 --> 00:42:45,830
options for for the commander in chief . 

968
00:42:45,840 --> 00:42:48,350
Um and I'd like to be able to provide 

969
00:42:48,350 --> 00:42:51,750
the most capable options that I can um 

970
00:42:51,760 --> 00:42:54,270
in this regard . Yeah , that's why I 

971
00:42:54,270 --> 00:42:56,440
said the last contested arms race we 

972
00:42:56,440 --> 00:42:58,440
faced was in the 1980s , during the 

973
00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:00,662
Reagan build up . Because we've been in 

974
00:43:00,662 --> 00:43:02,884
an arms race with China for the last 30 

975
00:43:02,884 --> 00:43:02,500
years . Unfortunately , we haven't been 

976
00:43:02,500 --> 00:43:04,278
significantly contesting it and 

977
00:43:04,278 --> 00:43:06,389
therefore China has been winning it . 

978
00:43:06,389 --> 00:43:08,530
Um in the end , whether we enter an 

979
00:43:08,530 --> 00:43:11,790
arms race is not really up to us , 

980
00:43:11,800 --> 00:43:14,022
what's up to us is whether we win it or 

981
00:43:14,022 --> 00:43:16,133
we lose it . And if you ask me , it's 

982
00:43:16,133 --> 00:43:18,244
much cheaper to win an arms race than 

983
00:43:18,244 --> 00:43:19,911
it is to lose a war . It goes 

984
00:43:19,911 --> 00:43:23,860
especially uh for nuclear weapons . Um 

985
00:43:23,870 --> 00:43:26,037
General Cotton , I want to read to you 

986
00:43:26,037 --> 00:43:27,648
a short excerpt from Winston 

987
00:43:27,648 --> 00:43:29,814
Churchill's iron curtain speech , also 

988
00:43:29,814 --> 00:43:32,780
known as the sinews of strength . Uh a 

989
00:43:32,780 --> 00:43:36,500
sinews of peace speech less than barely 

990
00:43:36,500 --> 00:43:39,050
six months after V . J . Day in Fulton 

991
00:43:39,050 --> 00:43:41,050
Missouri Churchill says from what I 

992
00:43:41,050 --> 00:43:43,106
have seen of our Russian friends and 

993
00:43:43,106 --> 00:43:45,272
allies during the war , I am convinced 

994
00:43:45,272 --> 00:43:47,494
there is nothing they admire so much as 

995
00:43:47,494 --> 00:43:49,740
strength and there's nothing for which 

996
00:43:49,740 --> 00:43:51,570
they have less respect than for 

997
00:43:51,570 --> 00:43:55,020
weakness . Especially military weakness . 

998
00:43:55,640 --> 00:43:58,100
Do you agree with Sir Winston , that 

999
00:43:58,110 --> 00:44:00,250
Russians have less , there's nothing 

1000
00:44:00,250 --> 00:44:02,361
for which they have less respect than 

1001
00:44:02,361 --> 00:44:04,694
weakness , Especially military weakness . 

1002
00:44:04,694 --> 00:44:06,917
Do you think that's true of the chinese 

1003
00:44:06,917 --> 00:44:09,028
as well ? I do think it's true of the 

1004
00:44:09,028 --> 00:44:11,250
Iranians , I think of all of our Okay , 

1005
00:44:11,250 --> 00:44:13,417
yeah , I thought so too . He continued 

1006
00:44:13,417 --> 00:44:15,780
then , to say for that reason , the old 

1007
00:44:15,780 --> 00:44:17,970
doctrine of a balance of power is 

1008
00:44:17,980 --> 00:44:21,040
unsound . We cannot afford if we can 

1009
00:44:21,040 --> 00:44:24,150
help it to work on narrow margins , 

1010
00:44:24,160 --> 00:44:27,050
offering temptations to a trial of 

1011
00:44:27,050 --> 00:44:29,450
strength . To agree with Sir Winston , 

1012
00:44:29,450 --> 00:44:32,130
that we should not offer temptations to 

1013
00:44:32,130 --> 00:44:34,297
a trial of strength to our adversaries 

1014
00:44:34,297 --> 00:44:36,130
by operating on narrow margins . 

1015
00:44:36,150 --> 00:44:38,610
Senator . I think that we always should 

1016
00:44:38,620 --> 00:44:41,490
we always should operate from a from 

1017
00:44:41,500 --> 00:44:44,790
from a power of strength . And uh , 

1018
00:44:44,800 --> 00:44:46,440
those margins would narrow 

1019
00:44:46,440 --> 00:44:49,120
significantly given china's nuclear 

1020
00:44:49,120 --> 00:44:52,070
build up if china and Russia became de 

1021
00:44:52,070 --> 00:44:54,930
facto or even day jury allies correct 

1022
00:44:55,770 --> 00:44:57,910
To near Pier allies as opposed to 

1023
00:44:57,920 --> 00:45:00,210
adversaries as opposed to one . 

1024
00:45:01,460 --> 00:45:03,627
Um there's been a lot of talk over the 

1025
00:45:03,627 --> 00:45:06,980
last year that major ground war in 

1026
00:45:06,980 --> 00:45:09,260
europe between two nation states was 

1027
00:45:09,270 --> 00:45:12,790
unthinkable . Um even after 

1028
00:45:13,540 --> 00:45:15,762
Russia invaded Ukraine , such a war was 

1029
00:45:15,770 --> 00:45:18,560
unthinkable . Obviously Vladimir Putin 

1030
00:45:18,560 --> 00:45:21,360
thought it was quite thinkable . Um Do 

1031
00:45:21,360 --> 00:45:23,249
you believe that a nuclear war is 

1032
00:45:23,249 --> 00:45:25,310
unthinkable ? Not in terms of the 

1033
00:45:25,310 --> 00:45:27,254
consequences it would have for our 

1034
00:45:27,254 --> 00:45:29,421
nation and for the world , but for the 

1035
00:45:30,490 --> 00:45:32,546
in fact whether it might happen as a 

1036
00:45:32,546 --> 00:45:35,080
nuclear war . Unthinkable senator , 

1037
00:45:36,250 --> 00:45:39,330
I think if confirmed the the role that 

1038
00:45:39,330 --> 00:45:42,940
I that I would play as commander um is 

1039
00:45:42,940 --> 00:45:45,710
to make sure that those 250,000 men and 

1040
00:45:45,710 --> 00:45:48,310
women that that are supporting 

1041
00:45:48,310 --> 00:45:50,980
strategic Air Command . Every I keep 

1042
00:45:50,980 --> 00:45:53,560
saying strategic Air command forgive me 

1043
00:45:53,570 --> 00:45:57,400
a strategic command um are 

1044
00:45:57,410 --> 00:46:00,950
prepared to do what some folks might 

1045
00:46:00,950 --> 00:46:03,100
think is the unthinkable . I think 

1046
00:46:03,100 --> 00:46:06,290
that's right . I unusual and weighty 

1047
00:46:06,290 --> 00:46:08,012
job and that I think it's your 

1048
00:46:08,490 --> 00:46:11,340
responsibility almost everyday to think 

1049
00:46:11,340 --> 00:46:13,673
what most people believe is unthinkable . 

1050
00:46:13,673 --> 00:46:16,450
Um and think about what a nuclear war 

1051
00:46:16,450 --> 00:46:18,450
would look like and how it would be 

1052
00:46:18,450 --> 00:46:20,672
fought and therefore the best way to do 

1053
00:46:20,672 --> 00:46:22,894
what we all want , which is to deter it 

1054
00:46:22,894 --> 00:46:25,061
from happening in the first place . So 

1055
00:46:25,061 --> 00:46:27,117
thank you General Cotton best wishes 

1056
00:46:27,117 --> 00:46:29,283
for you in your new role . Thank you . 

1057
00:46:29,283 --> 00:46:31,450
Senator Cotton , Senator King , please 

1058
00:46:31,450 --> 00:46:33,561
Thank you . Mr Chairman , john Cotton 

1059
00:46:33,561 --> 00:46:35,561
welcome . I'm sure you were briefed 

1060
00:46:35,561 --> 00:46:39,480
before this hearing that uh the 

1061
00:46:39,480 --> 00:46:40,480
Russians again , 

1062
00:46:47,770 --> 00:46:50,080
try it again . I'm sure you were 

1063
00:46:50,080 --> 00:46:53,000
briefed that that the chairman would 

1064
00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:55,180
ask you a series of routine questions 

1065
00:46:55,180 --> 00:46:57,291
at the beginning and you went through 

1066
00:46:57,291 --> 00:46:59,458
and answer them properly . I just want 

1067
00:46:59,458 --> 00:47:01,569
to emphasize one of those questions . 

1068
00:47:01,569 --> 00:47:03,569
Do you agree when asked before this 

1069
00:47:03,569 --> 00:47:05,791
committee to give your personal views ? 

1070
00:47:05,791 --> 00:47:07,736
Even if your views differ from the 

1071
00:47:07,736 --> 00:47:09,458
administration ? That's a very 

1072
00:47:09,458 --> 00:47:11,569
important question because we need to 

1073
00:47:11,569 --> 00:47:13,850
know what your best military advice is 

1074
00:47:13,860 --> 00:47:17,050
not colored by the views of the 

1075
00:47:17,050 --> 00:47:20,250
administration , the president . Uh , 

1076
00:47:20,260 --> 00:47:22,670
this is I just want to emphasize how 

1077
00:47:22,670 --> 00:47:24,503
important this question is . You 

1078
00:47:24,503 --> 00:47:27,340
answered it properly , but I just want 

1079
00:47:27,340 --> 00:47:29,451
to have it in the back of your head , 

1080
00:47:29,451 --> 00:47:31,618
uh , in the , in the future . And it's 

1081
00:47:31,618 --> 00:47:33,729
going to be difficult . It's not easy 

1082
00:47:33,729 --> 00:47:35,618
to , to say something that may be 

1083
00:47:35,618 --> 00:47:37,784
unacceptable to some other part of the 

1084
00:47:37,784 --> 00:47:39,951
pentagon or the administration . Uh in 

1085
00:47:39,951 --> 00:47:41,900
in looking over my notes As I made 

1086
00:47:41,900 --> 00:47:44,370
questions , I realized that all of my 

1087
00:47:44,370 --> 00:47:47,590
questions involve changes in the 

1088
00:47:47,590 --> 00:47:50,060
strategic posture . You've mentioned 

1089
00:47:50,060 --> 00:47:51,949
several times . We've gone from a 

1090
00:47:51,949 --> 00:47:54,116
bipolar world to a multipolar world in 

1091
00:47:54,116 --> 00:47:56,004
terms of our adversaries that's a 

1092
00:47:56,004 --> 00:47:58,338
strategic change . But there are others , 

1093
00:47:58,338 --> 00:48:01,650
uh , just to run down a quick list 

1094
00:48:01,660 --> 00:48:04,940
um electromagnetic spectrum and 

1095
00:48:04,940 --> 00:48:06,884
electronic warfare you've , you've 

1096
00:48:06,884 --> 00:48:08,810
touched upon . I realized there's 

1097
00:48:08,820 --> 00:48:11,110
classified information here . But I 

1098
00:48:11,110 --> 00:48:14,030
hope that you will commit to holding 

1099
00:48:14,040 --> 00:48:17,610
serious exercises on electronic warfare 

1100
00:48:17,620 --> 00:48:20,640
and notify us of of how we're doing 

1101
00:48:20,650 --> 00:48:22,428
because this is a new strategic 

1102
00:48:22,428 --> 00:48:24,480
challenge . That I'm not sure we're 

1103
00:48:24,490 --> 00:48:27,480
adequately accounted for yet . 

1104
00:48:29,420 --> 00:48:32,020
So so senator for your first question . 

1105
00:48:32,030 --> 00:48:35,910
Absolutely yes . Um My best military 

1106
00:48:35,910 --> 00:48:39,370
advice presented to the committee um 

1107
00:48:39,380 --> 00:48:42,410
for your for your second um is another . 

1108
00:48:42,410 --> 00:48:45,620
Absolutely yes . We're going to have to 

1109
00:48:45,630 --> 00:48:48,160
flush out through exercises as you 

1110
00:48:48,160 --> 00:48:50,720
mentioned uh to ensure we can find any 

1111
00:48:50,720 --> 00:48:52,720
blind spots and shortfalls and make 

1112
00:48:52,720 --> 00:48:55,380
corrections uh as warranted and as 

1113
00:48:55,380 --> 00:48:57,800
required . So I wholeheartedly agree 

1114
00:48:57,800 --> 00:49:01,660
with you . Another area of strategic 

1115
00:49:01,670 --> 00:49:03,892
change has happened in the last four or 

1116
00:49:03,892 --> 00:49:06,003
five years and that is hyper sonics . 

1117
00:49:06,003 --> 00:49:07,892
We thought of strategic forces as 

1118
00:49:07,892 --> 00:49:10,170
nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence . 

1119
00:49:10,170 --> 00:49:13,700
Hypersonic SAR are a new our new 

1120
00:49:13,700 --> 00:49:15,820
threat that r is a strategic threat 

1121
00:49:15,820 --> 00:49:18,910
particularly for example the chinese uh 

1122
00:49:18,920 --> 00:49:21,480
putting a a glide vehicle , hypersonic 

1123
00:49:21,480 --> 00:49:23,240
glide vehicle in orbit . Which 

1124
00:49:23,250 --> 00:49:25,830
radically changes things like how much 

1125
00:49:25,830 --> 00:49:28,220
time we might have to react to to an 

1126
00:49:28,220 --> 00:49:31,200
attack . Uh Do you view hypersonic c as 

1127
00:49:31,200 --> 00:49:34,320
a as a as a serious strategic challenge , 

1128
00:49:35,090 --> 00:49:37,790
Senator . I do . Um and I see it as a 

1129
00:49:37,790 --> 00:49:41,280
warning challenge . Um I think as far 

1130
00:49:41,280 --> 00:49:44,680
as when we have a conversation if 

1131
00:49:44,680 --> 00:49:48,370
confirmed um I I think uh my fellow 

1132
00:49:48,370 --> 00:49:50,800
combatant commanders uh we'll have to 

1133
00:49:50,800 --> 00:49:53,022
have a discussion and understand how to 

1134
00:49:53,022 --> 00:49:56,390
give uh kind of relook missile 

1135
00:49:56,390 --> 00:49:59,260
defense , relooked missile warning . 

1136
00:49:59,270 --> 00:50:02,450
Understand what a sensor layer looks 

1137
00:50:02,450 --> 00:50:05,060
like that can achieve those effects to 

1138
00:50:05,060 --> 00:50:07,560
give time because I need to give 

1139
00:50:07,560 --> 00:50:10,930
decision space um to to the decision 

1140
00:50:10,930 --> 00:50:13,041
maker . Well I think it's safe to say 

1141
00:50:13,041 --> 00:50:15,041
that the bullet on bullet theory of 

1142
00:50:15,041 --> 00:50:17,208
missile defense is out the window when 

1143
00:50:17,208 --> 00:50:19,097
you're talking about hypersonic . 

1144
00:50:19,097 --> 00:50:21,950
Another area is cyber uh you've you've 

1145
00:50:21,950 --> 00:50:24,117
talked about it , you've indicated how 

1146
00:50:24,117 --> 00:50:26,339
important it is , particularly with N . 

1147
00:50:26,339 --> 00:50:28,283
C . Three . Will you commit to red 

1148
00:50:28,283 --> 00:50:30,506
teaming and pen testing and hackers for 

1149
00:50:30,506 --> 00:50:32,440
hire to test the security of the 

1150
00:50:32,440 --> 00:50:34,830
systems that you're uh developing ? I 

1151
00:50:34,830 --> 00:50:36,997
don't think you really know how secure 

1152
00:50:36,997 --> 00:50:39,052
you are until somebody attacks you . 

1153
00:50:39,052 --> 00:50:40,886
And I hope it's I wanted to be a 

1154
00:50:40,886 --> 00:50:43,052
friendly attack Senator if confirmed . 

1155
00:50:43,052 --> 00:50:44,950
Um That would be one of the first 

1156
00:50:44,960 --> 00:50:47,071
directions I would give to the neck . 

1157
00:50:47,071 --> 00:50:50,530
Thank you . Uh final point again a new 

1158
00:50:50,530 --> 00:50:52,474
strategic challenge or a different 

1159
00:50:52,474 --> 00:50:54,363
strategic challenge . And I don't 

1160
00:50:54,363 --> 00:50:56,474
expect really an answer . But perhaps 

1161
00:50:56,474 --> 00:50:58,641
you could consider this for the record 

1162
00:50:58,641 --> 00:51:00,752
that is non state actors with nuclear 

1163
00:51:00,752 --> 00:51:02,950
weapons . The deterrent theory doesn't 

1164
00:51:02,950 --> 00:51:05,061
work if you don't have a capital city 

1165
00:51:05,061 --> 00:51:07,560
and if you don't care about dying and 

1166
00:51:07,570 --> 00:51:09,514
we have a proliferation of nuclear 

1167
00:51:09,514 --> 00:51:11,348
weapons and we have rogue states 

1168
00:51:11,348 --> 00:51:13,514
developing nuclear weapons and nuclear 

1169
00:51:13,514 --> 00:51:15,710
materials . The chances of those 

1170
00:51:15,710 --> 00:51:17,821
materials falling into the hands of a 

1171
00:51:17,821 --> 00:51:20,043
terrorist organization , it seems to me 

1172
00:51:20,043 --> 00:51:22,266
are increasing gradually but steadily . 

1173
00:51:22,700 --> 00:51:25,280
I hope you will uh give this some 

1174
00:51:25,280 --> 00:51:27,447
thought because it's a major strategic 

1175
00:51:27,447 --> 00:51:29,558
challenge that doesn't fit within the 

1176
00:51:29,558 --> 00:51:31,820
ambit of what has been our historic uh 

1177
00:51:31,830 --> 00:51:35,130
deterrent strategy uh for dealing with 

1178
00:51:35,140 --> 00:51:38,460
with nuclear threats , Senator , you're 

1179
00:51:38,460 --> 00:51:40,460
absolutely right and and I will get 

1180
00:51:40,460 --> 00:51:42,571
back with you if confirmed and and we 

1181
00:51:42,571 --> 00:51:44,904
can have further discussions along that . 

1182
00:51:44,904 --> 00:51:47,071
Thank you very much . Thank you . Mr . 

1183
00:51:47,071 --> 00:51:49,238
Chairman , thank you Senator King . Uh 

1184
00:51:49,238 --> 00:51:50,516
center rounds please . 

1185
00:51:55,570 --> 00:51:59,530
Thank you Mr Chairman . Good morning , 

1186
00:51:59,530 --> 00:52:01,900
General Cotton and thank you to you and 

1187
00:52:01,900 --> 00:52:03,733
to your family for your years of 

1188
00:52:03,733 --> 00:52:05,520
service to our country and your 

1189
00:52:05,520 --> 00:52:07,820
continued service in the future . Uh 

1190
00:52:07,830 --> 00:52:09,441
General Cotton , I share the 

1191
00:52:09,441 --> 00:52:12,210
perspective that the nuclear deterrent 

1192
00:52:12,220 --> 00:52:14,109
is the foundation of our national 

1193
00:52:14,109 --> 00:52:16,220
Security . In the past , I've asked 

1194
00:52:16,220 --> 00:52:18,442
other leaders in the nuclear enterprise 

1195
00:52:18,442 --> 00:52:20,570
to give their views in plain language 

1196
00:52:20,580 --> 00:52:23,830
on the importance of our nuclear triad . 

1197
00:52:23,840 --> 00:52:27,650
So that the american , you know , 

1198
00:52:27,660 --> 00:52:30,910
our american public um who really don't 

1199
00:52:30,920 --> 00:52:33,080
think about this on a regular basis , 

1200
00:52:33,090 --> 00:52:36,110
can understand why we have hundreds if 

1201
00:52:36,110 --> 00:52:38,332
not thousands of nuclear warheads . And 

1202
00:52:38,680 --> 00:52:40,970
can you explain it in such a fashion as 

1203
00:52:40,970 --> 00:52:42,803
to why it is so important to our 

1204
00:52:42,803 --> 00:52:44,748
national security that we not only 

1205
00:52:44,748 --> 00:52:47,440
maintain but accelerate the investment 

1206
00:52:47,450 --> 00:52:49,506
in the modernization of this nuclear 

1207
00:52:49,506 --> 00:52:52,770
triad turnarounds . Thank you for the 

1208
00:52:52,770 --> 00:52:56,750
question . I I think if if we were 

1209
00:52:56,750 --> 00:52:59,070
to do a perspective on talking about 

1210
00:52:59,070 --> 00:53:01,250
the three legs of the triad in 

1211
00:53:01,250 --> 00:53:04,610
particular and how it is the backstop 

1212
00:53:04,610 --> 00:53:08,480
and underpins . I think if if I was 

1213
00:53:08,490 --> 00:53:11,630
at a town hall meeting , um how I would 

1214
00:53:11,630 --> 00:53:14,910
describe that um to a local town hall 

1215
00:53:14,920 --> 00:53:17,970
is think about um 

1216
00:53:18,490 --> 00:53:22,120
the bedrock of a 

1217
00:53:22,120 --> 00:53:25,130
feature and what holds the rest of your 

1218
00:53:25,130 --> 00:53:28,190
foundation up . Um You know when we 

1219
00:53:28,190 --> 00:53:30,870
have , when we're building a home , you 

1220
00:53:30,870 --> 00:53:32,981
know you want to make sure you have a 

1221
00:53:32,981 --> 00:53:35,520
steady , you know steady property to 

1222
00:53:35,520 --> 00:53:38,630
put the foundation on um for every 

1223
00:53:38,630 --> 00:53:41,300
operational plan that the Department of 

1224
00:53:41,300 --> 00:53:44,720
Defense has . Um it relies on the fact 

1225
00:53:44,720 --> 00:53:46,940
that strategic deterrence is going to 

1226
00:53:46,940 --> 00:53:50,740
hold um to allow those other um 

1227
00:53:50,750 --> 00:53:54,560
missions to accomplish if that does not 

1228
00:53:54,560 --> 00:53:57,690
happen . Um That's when you see that 

1229
00:53:57,690 --> 00:54:01,370
deterrence fails . Um The way that we 

1230
00:54:01,370 --> 00:54:05,370
accomplish that is through our triad 

1231
00:54:05,380 --> 00:54:09,380
of having bombers um who are recall 

1232
00:54:09,380 --> 00:54:12,050
a ble if if warranted um having 

1233
00:54:12,050 --> 00:54:15,510
submarines um that can be used or 

1234
00:54:15,520 --> 00:54:18,420
having I . C . B . M . S um that are 

1235
00:54:18,420 --> 00:54:20,960
readily available um for the decision 

1236
00:54:20,960 --> 00:54:23,410
maker to do that . Our adversaries 

1237
00:54:23,410 --> 00:54:25,466
understand that and know that we can 

1238
00:54:25,466 --> 00:54:28,300
hold them at bay . That is that bedrock 

1239
00:54:28,300 --> 00:54:30,356
and foundation that is so critically 

1240
00:54:30,356 --> 00:54:32,840
important for us in this nation . I 

1241
00:54:32,850 --> 00:54:35,072
think it's sometimes we think about the 

1242
00:54:35,072 --> 00:54:37,128
fact that we have great conventional 

1243
00:54:37,128 --> 00:54:39,017
forces . But the reason why those 

1244
00:54:39,017 --> 00:54:41,239
conventional forces can be effective is 

1245
00:54:41,239 --> 00:54:43,239
because everybody knows that in the 

1246
00:54:43,239 --> 00:54:45,406
back the hammer are the nuclear forces 

1247
00:54:45,406 --> 00:54:47,406
which have been upgraded and that's 

1248
00:54:47,406 --> 00:54:49,572
what I want to talk about next uh with 

1249
00:54:49,572 --> 00:54:51,461
regard to our nuclear command and 

1250
00:54:51,461 --> 00:54:53,461
control systems ? They've got to be 

1251
00:54:53,461 --> 00:54:55,406
upgraded . We're in the process of 

1252
00:54:55,406 --> 00:54:57,628
doing that now , What do you see as one 

1253
00:54:57,628 --> 00:54:59,683
of the biggest challenges or what do 

1254
00:54:59,683 --> 00:54:59,600
you see as the biggest challenges 

1255
00:54:59,600 --> 00:55:02,060
regarding the upgrading of our current 

1256
00:55:02,070 --> 00:55:04,810
command and control structure . Thanks 

1257
00:55:04,810 --> 00:55:08,400
for the question . Um as I said in my 

1258
00:55:08,400 --> 00:55:11,690
opening comments , my opening statement 

1259
00:55:11,700 --> 00:55:14,210
articulated that it's a resilient 

1260
00:55:14,210 --> 00:55:17,260
system today . Um I think moving 

1261
00:55:17,260 --> 00:55:20,800
forward I see it as a continuance . 

1262
00:55:20,810 --> 00:55:23,280
Uh you'll never close the book on the 

1263
00:55:23,280 --> 00:55:26,740
modernization of a of a com node . 

1264
00:55:26,750 --> 00:55:29,860
Um so so as I see it 

1265
00:55:30,860 --> 00:55:32,770
that I don't know if I see as a 

1266
00:55:32,770 --> 00:55:35,960
challenge . Um but I but what we're 

1267
00:55:35,960 --> 00:55:38,710
going to be able to have to do is 

1268
00:55:40,190 --> 00:55:43,850
I say move to a system using 

1269
00:55:43,850 --> 00:55:47,360
21st century technologies that allows 

1270
00:55:47,360 --> 00:55:51,260
us to um to to have what I 

1271
00:55:51,260 --> 00:55:53,630
called N . C . Three over assured comms . 

1272
00:55:53,640 --> 00:55:57,270
Um so being able to make it so I 

1273
00:55:57,280 --> 00:56:00,740
can we can message and and get 

1274
00:56:00,740 --> 00:56:04,030
data to the war fighters in any 

1275
00:56:04,040 --> 00:56:07,590
situation . So I think that challenges 

1276
00:56:07,600 --> 00:56:11,440
um being able to to link the 

1277
00:56:11,440 --> 00:56:13,390
legacy systems with the modernized 

1278
00:56:13,400 --> 00:56:15,600
systems . But I'm I'm here to say that 

1279
00:56:15,600 --> 00:56:17,711
I'm quite pleased and the work that's 

1280
00:56:17,711 --> 00:56:20,310
being done with N . C . Three next gen 

1281
00:56:20,310 --> 00:56:23,310
if you will . Um so the team is really 

1282
00:56:23,310 --> 00:56:25,550
really getting after it and I'm pretty 

1283
00:56:25,550 --> 00:56:27,600
impressed on on the way forward on 

1284
00:56:27,600 --> 00:56:29,656
being able to close that challenge . 

1285
00:56:29,656 --> 00:56:31,822
Thank you general And one last item in 

1286
00:56:31,822 --> 00:56:33,933
that I wanted to visit with today and 

1287
00:56:33,933 --> 00:56:35,989
and that is if confirmed you will be 

1288
00:56:35,989 --> 00:56:37,933
the lead for joint electromagnetic 

1289
00:56:37,933 --> 00:56:40,430
spectrum operations . The growth of 5G . 

1290
00:56:40,430 --> 00:56:42,460
Technologies continues to add 

1291
00:56:42,460 --> 00:56:44,850
additional requests for larger parts of 

1292
00:56:44,850 --> 00:56:47,072
the band , some of which are needed for 

1293
00:56:47,072 --> 00:56:49,980
national security . Now recognizing the 

1294
00:56:49,990 --> 00:56:52,157
unclassified setting of this hearing , 

1295
00:56:52,157 --> 00:56:54,268
can you explain to this committee and 

1296
00:56:54,268 --> 00:56:56,379
perhaps to other folks out there that 

1297
00:56:56,379 --> 00:56:58,490
are wondering why it isn't being made 

1298
00:56:58,490 --> 00:57:00,490
more readily available but that the 

1299
00:57:00,490 --> 00:57:02,657
pentagon and the Department of Defense 

1300
00:57:02,657 --> 00:57:05,120
clearly is recognizing the need to 

1301
00:57:05,120 --> 00:57:07,231
protect certain areas of the spectrum 

1302
00:57:07,231 --> 00:57:09,500
for national security purposes . Can 

1303
00:57:09,500 --> 00:57:12,450
you share a little bit about the real 

1304
00:57:12,460 --> 00:57:15,850
necessity of working in in a 

1305
00:57:15,860 --> 00:57:17,582
consultive way really and in a 

1306
00:57:17,582 --> 00:57:20,410
cooperative way with the FCC and the N . 

1307
00:57:20,410 --> 00:57:23,710
T . I . A . In maintaining certain 

1308
00:57:23,710 --> 00:57:25,821
portions of the spectrum for national 

1309
00:57:25,821 --> 00:57:28,090
security purposes and how absolutely 

1310
00:57:28,090 --> 00:57:31,750
critical it is . Senator . It is 

1311
00:57:31,760 --> 00:57:35,270
it is incredibly um critical , critical 

1312
00:57:35,280 --> 00:57:37,750
that we maintain and understand and to 

1313
00:57:37,750 --> 00:57:40,810
be to be frank have others understand 

1314
00:57:40,820 --> 00:57:43,210
the necessity to protect certain bands . 

1315
00:57:43,220 --> 00:57:47,000
Um if confirmed . Um I would I would I 

1316
00:57:47,000 --> 00:57:50,660
would want to collaborate with the FCC 

1317
00:57:50,670 --> 00:57:54,140
um and others . Um So we can maybe we 

1318
00:57:54,140 --> 00:57:56,840
need a message better . Um for the for 

1319
00:57:56,840 --> 00:57:59,007
folks to understand exactly what we're 

1320
00:57:59,007 --> 00:58:00,951
what we're talking about here on a 

1321
00:58:00,951 --> 00:58:02,951
necessity and criticality of making 

1322
00:58:02,951 --> 00:58:05,007
sure that we can protect those bands 

1323
00:58:05,007 --> 00:58:07,490
that you mentioned . Thank you . Thank 

1324
00:58:07,490 --> 00:58:09,323
you . General . Thank you . Mr . 

1325
00:58:09,323 --> 00:58:11,323
Chairman . Thank you Senator rounds 

1326
00:58:11,323 --> 00:58:13,546
Senator Kaine please Thank you Mr Chair 

1327
00:58:13,546 --> 00:58:15,768
and General Cotton . Great to see you . 

1328
00:58:15,768 --> 00:58:17,934
I enjoyed our visit yesterday and um I 

1329
00:58:17,934 --> 00:58:19,823
think this has been touched on by 

1330
00:58:19,823 --> 00:58:21,879
earlier senators and their questions 

1331
00:58:21,879 --> 00:58:23,810
but I really was intrigued by the 

1332
00:58:23,810 --> 00:58:25,866
discussion we were having about this 

1333
00:58:25,866 --> 00:58:29,080
multipolar nature of the threat . So as 

1334
00:58:29,080 --> 00:58:31,750
you look at the triad we have to always 

1335
00:58:31,750 --> 00:58:33,806
recapitalize and have it be strong . 

1336
00:58:34,100 --> 00:58:36,560
But we have thought of the triad both 

1337
00:58:36,560 --> 00:58:38,727
in terms of our investment but even in 

1338
00:58:38,727 --> 00:58:40,790
terms of our theory of deterrence or 

1339
00:58:40,790 --> 00:58:43,140
our theory about what the triad means 

1340
00:58:43,140 --> 00:58:45,140
to our defense . We sort of thought 

1341
00:58:45,140 --> 00:58:47,850
about it as a triad with respect to one 

1342
00:58:47,850 --> 00:58:50,600
nuclear competitor . Okay now we have 

1343
00:58:50,610 --> 00:58:53,200
two nuclear competitors and evidence 

1344
00:58:53,200 --> 00:58:55,422
demonstrates that they are increasingly 

1345
00:58:55,422 --> 00:58:58,080
working together the U . S . Policy for 

1346
00:58:58,080 --> 00:59:00,420
decades kind of said that china and 

1347
00:59:00,420 --> 00:59:02,253
Russia would never get too close 

1348
00:59:02,253 --> 00:59:04,380
because of a history of enmity and 

1349
00:59:04,380 --> 00:59:06,713
different cultures and things like that . 

1350
00:59:06,713 --> 00:59:08,824
But they're getting closer and closer 

1351
00:59:08,824 --> 00:59:10,713
every day and often they're doing 

1352
00:59:10,713 --> 00:59:10,420
things not only just the two of them 

1353
00:59:10,420 --> 00:59:14,080
but with Iran North Korea sometimes 

1354
00:59:14,080 --> 00:59:17,510
with Turkey . So how should you be 

1355
00:59:17,510 --> 00:59:19,621
confirmed that I'm confident you will 

1356
00:59:19,621 --> 00:59:22,640
be how will you approach this analysis 

1357
00:59:22,640 --> 00:59:24,751
of the threat ? That is not simply an 

1358
00:59:24,751 --> 00:59:27,850
analysis of the capacity of individual 

1359
00:59:27,860 --> 00:59:31,360
adversaries but the fact that these 

1360
00:59:31,360 --> 00:59:35,100
adversaries are cooperating . Um and 

1361
00:59:35,100 --> 00:59:37,322
that previous deterrence doctrines were 

1362
00:59:37,322 --> 00:59:40,010
really built more around a bipolar 

1363
00:59:40,010 --> 00:59:43,130
world rather than multiple competitors . 

1364
00:59:43,610 --> 00:59:45,666
Thank you for the for the question . 

1365
00:59:45,666 --> 00:59:47,777
You're you're absolutely right and we 

1366
00:59:47,777 --> 00:59:51,060
touched upon it earlier , I think 

1367
00:59:51,060 --> 00:59:54,500
what's key and it's it's you know as we 

1368
00:59:54,500 --> 00:59:56,320
discuss it , it's it's multiple 

1369
00:59:56,320 --> 00:59:59,430
approaches to because um one um if 

1370
00:59:59,430 --> 01:00:01,680
confirmed and I know the work is being 

1371
01:00:01,680 --> 01:00:03,847
currently done within stratcom because 

1372
01:00:03,847 --> 01:00:06,930
as a J . Fac commander to stratcom um 

1373
01:00:06,930 --> 01:00:10,800
offering input to that today . Um but 

1374
01:00:10,800 --> 01:00:13,210
if confirmed , um that assessment has 

1375
01:00:13,210 --> 01:00:15,850
to continue because when we talk about , 

1376
01:00:15,860 --> 01:00:17,916
as you said as we talk about nuclear 

1377
01:00:17,916 --> 01:00:20,600
doctrine , nuclear doctrine is with 11 

1378
01:00:20,600 --> 01:00:23,610
near peer adversary . Um We are and 

1379
01:00:23,610 --> 01:00:25,850
what that will drive is then that will 

1380
01:00:25,850 --> 01:00:28,590
drive on . How do we meet national 

1381
01:00:28,590 --> 01:00:32,540
objectives based on um the 

1382
01:00:32,550 --> 01:00:35,690
strategic doctrine within the confines 

1383
01:00:35,690 --> 01:00:38,150
of strategic command . Um 

1384
01:00:39,490 --> 01:00:41,690
Then we have to then from my best 

1385
01:00:41,690 --> 01:00:45,490
military um um advice , understand what 

1386
01:00:45,490 --> 01:00:47,657
force shaping looks like in regards to 

1387
01:00:47,657 --> 01:00:49,657
how do you meet the objectives that 

1388
01:00:49,657 --> 01:00:53,050
would be given to us um from the 

1389
01:00:53,060 --> 01:00:55,900
commander in chief , that's work that 

1390
01:00:55,900 --> 01:00:58,720
has to be done . Um And I know it's 

1391
01:00:58,720 --> 01:01:01,690
being done today . Um But if confirmed , 

1392
01:01:01,700 --> 01:01:04,300
um that is one of the first things that 

1393
01:01:04,310 --> 01:01:06,570
that will dive into where I can get a 

1394
01:01:06,570 --> 01:01:09,540
better understanding to your point of 

1395
01:01:09,550 --> 01:01:11,780
what does it look like when you have 

1396
01:01:11,790 --> 01:01:14,460
two near pure adversaries that act 

1397
01:01:14,460 --> 01:01:17,420
differently um might work that might 

1398
01:01:17,420 --> 01:01:19,753
work together , might not work together , 

1399
01:01:19,753 --> 01:01:21,920
but we still need to understand um you 

1400
01:01:21,920 --> 01:01:23,976
know , how do you how do you execute 

1401
01:01:23,976 --> 01:01:26,198
against that threat ? Thank you , joe . 

1402
01:01:26,198 --> 01:01:28,420
Another thing we talked about yesterday 

1403
01:01:28,420 --> 01:01:30,364
was a bomber Task Force missions . 

1404
01:01:30,364 --> 01:01:32,476
There was just a completion of one in 

1405
01:01:32,476 --> 01:01:34,309
South com with Panama Ecuadorian 

1406
01:01:34,309 --> 01:01:36,476
partners . We've also done bomber task 

1407
01:01:36,476 --> 01:01:38,587
force missions with european allies . 

1408
01:01:38,587 --> 01:01:41,190
These are to show unity um to test 

1409
01:01:41,190 --> 01:01:44,010
interoperability . Uh talk about what 

1410
01:01:44,010 --> 01:01:47,090
those missions produce for our defense 

1411
01:01:47,090 --> 01:01:50,690
capacity . Thank you for that . Um so 

1412
01:01:50,690 --> 01:01:53,040
bomber Task Force , our bomber task 

1413
01:01:53,040 --> 01:01:55,320
forces that we currently do um on 

1414
01:01:55,320 --> 01:01:58,280
behalf of of our coke , on behalf of 

1415
01:01:58,280 --> 01:02:00,770
coke um um of which I'm the lead as the 

1416
01:02:00,770 --> 01:02:02,826
Air Force global strike Commander to 

1417
01:02:02,826 --> 01:02:04,770
present those forces to co coms um 

1418
01:02:04,770 --> 01:02:08,280
through stratcom . Um it's been 

1419
01:02:08,280 --> 01:02:11,250
incredible because what it shows it 

1420
01:02:11,250 --> 01:02:14,180
shows why we're the most powerful 

1421
01:02:14,190 --> 01:02:16,301
military on the face of the earth and 

1422
01:02:16,301 --> 01:02:18,190
that's because we have allies and 

1423
01:02:18,190 --> 01:02:22,160
partners and and what it shows is using 

1424
01:02:22,160 --> 01:02:24,670
conventional forces . What strategic 

1425
01:02:24,670 --> 01:02:27,650
deterrence is all about as well . And 

1426
01:02:27,660 --> 01:02:30,910
there is nothing more gratifying than 

1427
01:02:30,910 --> 01:02:33,370
seeing an ally or partner come up on a 

1428
01:02:33,370 --> 01:02:35,560
wing of a B 52 that's doing an 

1429
01:02:35,560 --> 01:02:38,100
integrated mission over a cocom area . 

1430
01:02:38,110 --> 01:02:41,580
And and and seeing the p a sentiment if 

1431
01:02:41,580 --> 01:02:44,010
you will , senator come back from the 

1432
01:02:44,010 --> 01:02:46,450
adversaries on how that mission went . 

1433
01:02:46,670 --> 01:02:49,320
Um so it's a win win for ourselves as 

1434
01:02:49,320 --> 01:02:51,376
well as our allies and partners that 

1435
01:02:51,376 --> 01:02:53,430
participate in those missions that 

1436
01:02:53,430 --> 01:02:56,060
we're doing constantly across across 

1437
01:02:56,060 --> 01:02:58,730
the globe . Thank you very much . I 

1438
01:02:58,730 --> 01:02:59,730
yield back . 

1439
01:03:02,740 --> 01:03:06,420
Yeah , thank you Mr Chair and thank you 

1440
01:03:06,420 --> 01:03:09,540
General Cotton for being here today as 

1441
01:03:09,540 --> 01:03:11,596
well as Marsha . Thank you very much 

1442
01:03:11,596 --> 01:03:15,340
for for joining us . Um and I I enjoyed 

1443
01:03:15,340 --> 01:03:17,396
visiting with you in the office . We 

1444
01:03:17,396 --> 01:03:19,820
covered a lot of really great topics 

1445
01:03:19,830 --> 01:03:22,420
important to the defense of our nation . 

1446
01:03:22,710 --> 01:03:25,980
And just a few questions here in this 

1447
01:03:25,980 --> 01:03:29,130
committee , the 2018 National Defense 

1448
01:03:29,130 --> 01:03:31,770
Strategy Commission had determined that 

1449
01:03:31,770 --> 01:03:34,470
the United States might struggle to win 

1450
01:03:34,480 --> 01:03:37,910
or perhaps even lose a war with China 

1451
01:03:37,910 --> 01:03:40,540
over Taiwan . This has been a big 

1452
01:03:40,540 --> 01:03:43,710
concern of ours , especially in recent 

1453
01:03:43,710 --> 01:03:45,570
months . Do you agree that the 

1454
01:03:45,570 --> 01:03:47,626
president must have flexible nuclear 

1455
01:03:47,626 --> 01:03:50,240
options to prevent conventional defeat 

1456
01:03:50,240 --> 01:03:52,600
at the hands of our adversaries in this 

1457
01:03:52,600 --> 01:03:56,490
particular scenario . Okay . And I 

1458
01:03:56,490 --> 01:03:58,710
appreciate that . And I know that a 

1459
01:03:58,710 --> 01:04:00,766
number of my colleagues have already 

1460
01:04:00,766 --> 01:04:04,100
brought up um having a nuclear 

1461
01:04:04,100 --> 01:04:07,570
deterrence uh theater nuclear forces in 

1462
01:04:07,580 --> 01:04:11,410
Asia . Um so I won't go through that 

1463
01:04:11,410 --> 01:04:13,632
again . But I just want to state that I 

1464
01:04:13,632 --> 01:04:15,743
do think it is important that we have 

1465
01:04:15,743 --> 01:04:17,910
those capabilities abroad , especially 

1466
01:04:17,910 --> 01:04:21,390
in that region considering the scenario 

1467
01:04:21,390 --> 01:04:23,890
that that we have seen through the 2018 

1468
01:04:23,900 --> 01:04:27,200
National Defense Strategy and what we 

1469
01:04:27,200 --> 01:04:30,330
see occurring just in the Daily News . 

1470
01:04:30,330 --> 01:04:33,280
So I just want to emphasize my support 

1471
01:04:33,290 --> 01:04:35,410
for making sure that that we have the 

1472
01:04:35,410 --> 01:04:37,940
capabilities necessary if we should 

1473
01:04:37,940 --> 01:04:40,350
ever need those present in the indo Pay . 

1474
01:04:40,350 --> 01:04:43,230
Com . Um Chairman Million Vice Chairman 

1475
01:04:43,230 --> 01:04:46,860
Grady also wrote in june that 

1476
01:04:46,870 --> 01:04:50,050
continued modernization and expansion 

1477
01:04:50,050 --> 01:04:52,217
of the ground based mid course defense 

1478
01:04:52,217 --> 01:04:54,330
system is critical to defend the 

1479
01:04:54,330 --> 01:04:57,600
homeland from north korean missiles . 

1480
01:04:57,610 --> 01:05:00,950
Do you agree that we must expand ? 

1481
01:05:00,960 --> 01:05:02,516
There's a lot of talk about 

1482
01:05:02,516 --> 01:05:04,750
modernization , but do you agree that 

1483
01:05:04,750 --> 01:05:07,840
we must expand , not merely modernize 

1484
01:05:07,850 --> 01:05:11,170
homeland missile defense to take um to 

1485
01:05:11,170 --> 01:05:13,281
actually make sure that we're putting 

1486
01:05:13,281 --> 01:05:15,614
in check rogue nations like North Korea . 

1487
01:05:16,190 --> 01:05:18,301
Senator thanks for the question . You 

1488
01:05:18,301 --> 01:05:21,930
know , uh I I think when we talk 

1489
01:05:21,930 --> 01:05:24,680
about missile defense , especially with 

1490
01:05:24,680 --> 01:05:27,070
the not only rogue nations but now with 

1491
01:05:27,070 --> 01:05:29,160
two adversaries um near peer 

1492
01:05:29,160 --> 01:05:32,400
adversaries um that have different um 

1493
01:05:32,410 --> 01:05:34,960
capacities and capabilities . Um I 

1494
01:05:34,960 --> 01:05:37,900
would agree that uh for the protection 

1495
01:05:37,900 --> 01:05:40,370
of the homeland um more options is 

1496
01:05:40,370 --> 01:05:42,650
better than less . Yes , more options 

1497
01:05:42,650 --> 01:05:46,580
are are better and I know that we do 

1498
01:05:46,580 --> 01:05:49,980
receive pushback every once in a while 

1499
01:05:49,980 --> 01:05:53,220
on this idea that we need to expand and 

1500
01:05:53,220 --> 01:05:57,220
modernize and it is extremely costly . 

1501
01:05:57,420 --> 01:06:00,930
And just to emphasize to our 

1502
01:06:00,940 --> 01:06:04,720
fabulous american um citizens that 

1503
01:06:04,730 --> 01:06:07,590
Jim Mattis , uh the way he phrased this 

1504
01:06:07,590 --> 01:06:11,180
in the past is America can afford 

1505
01:06:11,180 --> 01:06:14,000
survival . I think it's very important 

1506
01:06:14,000 --> 01:06:16,111
that we continue to look at ways that 

1507
01:06:16,111 --> 01:06:19,310
we can expand and modernize . Um 

1508
01:06:19,320 --> 01:06:23,120
and would you also agree 

1509
01:06:23,120 --> 01:06:26,170
that the capability to destroy hard and 

1510
01:06:26,180 --> 01:06:29,930
deeply buried targets actually enhances 

1511
01:06:29,930 --> 01:06:33,040
our deterrence by denying that our 

1512
01:06:33,040 --> 01:06:36,650
adversary um uh doesn't have 

1513
01:06:36,650 --> 01:06:39,380
sanctuary from us nuclear 

1514
01:06:39,380 --> 01:06:43,330
deterrence . Yes . And can you think 

1515
01:06:43,330 --> 01:06:45,860
of examples where we might need to look 

1516
01:06:45,860 --> 01:06:49,140
into that further ? Senator ? Thanks 

1517
01:06:49,140 --> 01:06:51,084
for the question . I think there's 

1518
01:06:51,084 --> 01:06:53,307
opportunities for us to understand what 

1519
01:06:53,307 --> 01:06:55,307
technologies are available that can 

1520
01:06:55,307 --> 01:06:57,029
give us potentially nuclear or 

1521
01:06:57,029 --> 01:06:59,730
conventional um that can get after hard 

1522
01:06:59,730 --> 01:07:02,410
and deeply buried targets and if 

1523
01:07:02,410 --> 01:07:05,580
confirmed . Um um I would love to lead 

1524
01:07:05,580 --> 01:07:08,100
the charge and be an advocate and 

1525
01:07:08,100 --> 01:07:10,300
understanding . Thank you for that . I 

1526
01:07:10,300 --> 01:07:13,370
appreciate it . And do you agree that 

1527
01:07:13,370 --> 01:07:16,590
we should sustain the B-83 bomb until 

1528
01:07:16,590 --> 01:07:19,480
we have a suitable replacement ? I 

1529
01:07:19,480 --> 01:07:21,840
think that we need to be able to have 

1530
01:07:21,850 --> 01:07:25,400
uh an opportunity to provide options 

1531
01:07:25,400 --> 01:07:27,850
and if that's taken off the table um 

1532
01:07:27,860 --> 01:07:30,027
then we no longer we no longer have an 

1533
01:07:30,027 --> 01:07:32,193
option to provide . Yeah . Thank you . 

1534
01:07:32,193 --> 01:07:34,890
Um I do appreciate that as well . And 

1535
01:07:34,890 --> 01:07:37,960
then of course the president extended 

1536
01:07:37,960 --> 01:07:40,070
news start for five years when he 

1537
01:07:40,070 --> 01:07:43,140
assumed office in your opinion in your 

1538
01:07:43,140 --> 01:07:46,090
best um military opinion are U . S . 

1539
01:07:46,090 --> 01:07:48,370
Strategic arms constraints prudent 

1540
01:07:48,380 --> 01:07:51,410
given china's nuclear breakout which is 

1541
01:07:51,420 --> 01:07:54,790
they are not party to the treaty and 

1542
01:07:54,790 --> 01:07:56,623
Russia's arsenal of nonstrategic 

1543
01:07:56,623 --> 01:07:58,734
nuclear weapons which are unaccounted 

1544
01:07:58,734 --> 01:08:01,770
for by the treaty Senator . I think 

1545
01:08:01,780 --> 01:08:04,900
whatever agreement or treaty that we 

1546
01:08:04,900 --> 01:08:07,460
could do to prevent proliferation 

1547
01:08:08,550 --> 01:08:12,100
um is good with a caveat 

1548
01:08:12,760 --> 01:08:16,510
that it incorporates every aspect 

1549
01:08:16,520 --> 01:08:19,950
of what the the sign an 

1550
01:08:19,950 --> 01:08:22,280
agreement would be . So what I mean by 

1551
01:08:22,280 --> 01:08:26,010
that are you know weapons that are 

1552
01:08:26,020 --> 01:08:29,550
currently not seen as strategic weapons 

1553
01:08:29,560 --> 01:08:31,840
um need to be added to that calculus . 

1554
01:08:31,850 --> 01:08:35,580
Um So but but any agreement or 

1555
01:08:35,580 --> 01:08:38,350
treaty that would uh prevent 

1556
01:08:38,350 --> 01:08:41,390
proliferation across the globe . I am 

1557
01:08:41,390 --> 01:08:44,280
for . Okay , thank you for your answers . 

1558
01:08:44,280 --> 01:08:46,940
And and I do appreciate the opportunity 

1559
01:08:46,940 --> 01:08:49,107
to sit down with you in the office the 

1560
01:08:49,107 --> 01:08:51,330
other day and and look forward to 

1561
01:08:51,330 --> 01:08:53,680
hearing more from you . Um I as well 

1562
01:08:53,680 --> 01:08:57,640
growing up in southwest Iowa um I also 

1563
01:08:57,640 --> 01:08:59,696
have been known to call it Strategic 

1564
01:08:59,696 --> 01:09:02,560
Air Command so with you . But thank you 

1565
01:09:02,560 --> 01:09:04,782
very much for your time today . General 

1566
01:09:04,782 --> 01:09:06,671
thank you . Senator . Thank you . 

1567
01:09:06,671 --> 01:09:08,727
Senator ernst Senator scott please ? 

1568
01:09:08,727 --> 01:09:10,830
Thank you . Chairman Reed Joe 1st . 

1569
01:09:10,830 --> 01:09:12,441
Thanks for your service . Uh 

1570
01:09:12,441 --> 01:09:14,497
congratulations on your nomination . 

1571
01:09:14,497 --> 01:09:16,830
Thank you for your willingness to serve . 

1572
01:09:16,830 --> 01:09:19,280
So , so here's what here's what informs 

1573
01:09:19,290 --> 01:09:21,123
most most of my work here on the 

1574
01:09:21,123 --> 01:09:23,290
committee . Um First United States has 

1575
01:09:23,290 --> 01:09:26,020
several enemies um who have no interest 

1576
01:09:26,020 --> 01:09:28,131
other than the harm us . Uh they want 

1577
01:09:28,131 --> 01:09:30,353
us to be weak , independent and without 

1578
01:09:30,353 --> 01:09:32,242
allies . And you talked about the 

1579
01:09:32,242 --> 01:09:34,409
importance of our allies . Chief among 

1580
01:09:34,409 --> 01:09:36,409
these enemies are China's Communist 

1581
01:09:36,409 --> 01:09:38,510
Party and Vladimir Putin's regime . 

1582
01:09:38,520 --> 01:09:40,720
Secondary enemies wake up every day 

1583
01:09:40,730 --> 01:09:43,310
plotting to harm us . They think about 

1584
01:09:43,310 --> 01:09:45,460
it all the time . Putin's invasion , 

1585
01:09:45,460 --> 01:09:47,682
brutal murdering , raping and pillaging 

1586
01:09:47,682 --> 01:09:49,849
of Ukraine is , in his own words , his 

1587
01:09:49,849 --> 01:09:51,793
fight against the United States as 

1588
01:09:51,793 --> 01:09:54,016
though anyone really needed him to hear 

1589
01:09:54,016 --> 01:09:56,182
what he's up to . Um jones secretary . 

1590
01:09:56,182 --> 01:09:58,404
She contemplates the same thing for the 

1591
01:09:58,404 --> 01:10:00,460
free and Democratic nation of Taiwan 

1592
01:10:00,930 --> 01:10:03,152
third most countries in the world where 

1593
01:10:03,152 --> 01:10:05,152
they actually like us or not , they 

1594
01:10:05,152 --> 01:10:07,263
might be jealous of us . They do want 

1595
01:10:07,263 --> 01:10:09,374
America to be powerful and capable of 

1596
01:10:09,374 --> 01:10:11,430
deterring or defeating any aggressor 

1597
01:10:11,430 --> 01:10:10,810
who tries to turn the world into their 

1598
01:10:10,810 --> 01:10:13,540
own dictatorship . Most countries know 

1599
01:10:13,540 --> 01:10:15,707
that there's really only two choices . 

1600
01:10:15,707 --> 01:10:17,929
A world where communist china Putin and 

1601
01:10:17,929 --> 01:10:19,873
the Ayatollah and maybe others are 

1602
01:10:19,873 --> 01:10:21,984
making the rules for everyone are one 

1603
01:10:21,984 --> 01:10:24,040
with a strong and independent United 

1604
01:10:24,040 --> 01:10:26,040
States that faces down . Aggressors 

1605
01:10:26,040 --> 01:10:28,151
helps those who help themselves leads 

1606
01:10:28,151 --> 01:10:30,373
alliances and promote state sovereignty 

1607
01:10:30,373 --> 01:10:32,429
and commerce . So if you would agree 

1608
01:10:32,429 --> 01:10:34,596
with that and I think most of us would 

1609
01:10:34,596 --> 01:10:36,762
agree with those . Can you explain why 

1610
01:10:36,762 --> 01:10:38,762
the United States would not want to 

1611
01:10:38,762 --> 01:10:40,707
have the most modern and expansive 

1612
01:10:40,707 --> 01:10:42,873
nuclear and strategic weapons we could 

1613
01:10:42,873 --> 01:10:46,040
have . So I do agree with that . Um 

1614
01:10:46,720 --> 01:10:49,130
and and and to be frank , I am really 

1615
01:10:49,130 --> 01:10:51,390
happy with what this committee has done 

1616
01:10:51,400 --> 01:10:53,780
um in regards to where we are on a 

1617
01:10:53,780 --> 01:10:56,920
nuclear modernization front today ? Um 

1618
01:10:58,140 --> 01:11:01,530
You know , are we late to need ? 

1619
01:11:02,840 --> 01:11:06,340
Yes . Are are we are we getting after 

1620
01:11:06,340 --> 01:11:09,900
it now ? Absolutely . Um Are we 

1621
01:11:09,910 --> 01:11:12,450
are we in a position where we can 

1622
01:11:12,460 --> 01:11:16,350
ensure that we have um um a 

1623
01:11:16,350 --> 01:11:19,910
portfolio that can that can 

1624
01:11:19,910 --> 01:11:22,580
module arise and meet the needs in the 

1625
01:11:22,580 --> 01:11:25,900
future ? I think we do senator . Um but 

1626
01:11:25,900 --> 01:11:28,340
I agree with you . Um I'm about the 

1627
01:11:28,340 --> 01:11:31,610
strong and not about the week . So um 

1628
01:11:31,610 --> 01:11:35,430
as if confirmed um that's my position . 

1629
01:11:35,430 --> 01:11:37,319
I I want to be from a position of 

1630
01:11:37,319 --> 01:11:39,208
strength , not from a position of 

1631
01:11:39,208 --> 01:11:41,790
weakness . So would you agree we ought 

1632
01:11:41,790 --> 01:11:44,012
to accelerate our nuclear modernization 

1633
01:11:44,012 --> 01:11:47,480
plan as much as we can sir . If that's 

1634
01:11:47,480 --> 01:11:51,440
possible . Let's do it after your 

1635
01:11:51,440 --> 01:11:53,662
many years of experience , you know who 

1636
01:11:53,662 --> 01:11:55,718
our enemies are and what they want , 

1637
01:11:55,718 --> 01:11:57,773
what they're capable of doing . Um , 

1638
01:11:57,773 --> 01:11:59,940
you don't live in ivory tower academic 

1639
01:11:59,940 --> 01:11:59,910
bubble where you can tease out theories 

1640
01:11:59,910 --> 01:12:02,500
of disarmament and hope it all sort of 

1641
01:12:02,500 --> 01:12:05,480
goes well . Um , so if you're confirmed , 

1642
01:12:05,490 --> 01:12:08,340
which I believe you will be and this is 

1643
01:12:08,340 --> 01:12:10,396
not a diplomatic role role . Right ? 

1644
01:12:11,430 --> 01:12:13,652
His role is not being a diplomat . Your 

1645
01:12:13,652 --> 01:12:15,486
role , your your role is to be a 

1646
01:12:15,486 --> 01:12:17,652
fighter . If confirmed . My role is to 

1647
01:12:17,652 --> 01:12:19,708
be a combatant commander . Your your 

1648
01:12:19,708 --> 01:12:21,652
goal is to scare the living out of 

1649
01:12:21,652 --> 01:12:24,040
everybody . Yes sir . 

1650
01:12:25,420 --> 01:12:27,440
Um would you agree that the US 

1651
01:12:27,440 --> 01:12:29,384
president should have a variety of 

1652
01:12:29,384 --> 01:12:31,384
strategic weapons and stockpiles so 

1653
01:12:31,384 --> 01:12:33,440
large that no enemy would even think 

1654
01:12:33,440 --> 01:12:36,760
about trying to attack America ? I 

1655
01:12:36,760 --> 01:12:38,927
think we need to have a stockpile that 

1656
01:12:38,927 --> 01:12:41,570
is credible and capable . Absolutely . 

1657
01:12:42,210 --> 01:12:45,990
And um Senator King brought this . Our 

1658
01:12:46,000 --> 01:12:48,111
king brought this up earlier . Uh , I 

1659
01:12:48,111 --> 01:12:51,470
do appreciate the more direct and 

1660
01:12:51,470 --> 01:12:53,359
honest people can be when they're 

1661
01:12:53,359 --> 01:12:55,192
testifying . Uh , I know there's 

1662
01:12:55,192 --> 01:12:57,026
probably a lot of pressure to do 

1663
01:12:57,026 --> 01:12:59,192
whatever administration , whatever the 

1664
01:12:59,192 --> 01:13:01,414
administration is wants you to do . But 

1665
01:13:01,414 --> 01:13:03,526
I do appreciate as much as you can to 

1666
01:13:03,526 --> 01:13:03,120
be direct because all of us are trying 

1667
01:13:03,120 --> 01:13:05,231
to make the best decisions we can and 

1668
01:13:05,231 --> 01:13:07,287
you're the expert . So thank you and 

1669
01:13:07,287 --> 01:13:09,231
thanks for your service . I'm glad 

1670
01:13:09,231 --> 01:13:11,398
you're gonna serve continue to serve . 

1671
01:13:11,398 --> 01:13:13,287
Thank you . Senator , thank you . 

1672
01:13:13,287 --> 01:13:15,398
Senator scott . Uh Senator Rosen when 

1673
01:13:15,398 --> 01:13:16,620
you're ready please . 

1674
01:13:29,070 --> 01:13:31,590
There it is . Thank you . MR Chairman 

1675
01:13:31,600 --> 01:13:34,810
uh appreciate that . Thank you General 

1676
01:13:34,810 --> 01:13:37,040
Cotton for testifying today for your 

1677
01:13:37,040 --> 01:13:39,100
willingness to continue to serve . 

1678
01:13:39,110 --> 01:13:41,080
Really appreciate you . And so of 

1679
01:13:41,080 --> 01:13:43,191
course I hail from the great state of 

1680
01:13:43,191 --> 01:13:45,480
Nevada and uh I want to talk a little 

1681
01:13:45,480 --> 01:13:47,647
bit about the Nevada national Security 

1682
01:13:47,647 --> 01:13:49,813
site , the infrastructure upgrades and 

1683
01:13:49,813 --> 01:13:53,280
how important of course it is uh to our 

1684
01:13:53,290 --> 01:13:57,040
nuclear mission . And um I've talked 

1685
01:13:57,040 --> 01:13:59,262
about this a lot in this committee that 

1686
01:13:59,262 --> 01:14:01,151
the Nevada national Security site 

1687
01:14:01,151 --> 01:14:03,420
oversees the stockpile stewardship 

1688
01:14:03,430 --> 01:14:06,000
program principally at Are you won a 

1689
01:14:06,000 --> 01:14:07,800
facility which is of course an 

1690
01:14:07,800 --> 01:14:10,022
underground laboratory where scientists 

1691
01:14:10,022 --> 01:14:12,630
conduct those sub critical experiments 

1692
01:14:12,640 --> 01:14:15,430
that verify the safety and reliability 

1693
01:14:15,430 --> 01:14:18,140
of our nuclear stockpile without And 

1694
01:14:18,140 --> 01:14:20,307
I'm going to repeat this again without 

1695
01:14:20,307 --> 01:14:23,620
explosive testing . And so you won a is 

1696
01:14:23,620 --> 01:14:25,950
undergoing major construction . That 

1697
01:14:25,950 --> 01:14:28,180
project is soon gonna hold the most 

1698
01:14:28,180 --> 01:14:31,930
weapons capable radiographic system in 

1699
01:14:31,940 --> 01:14:35,100
the world . However , the Nevada 

1700
01:14:35,100 --> 01:14:36,933
National Security Administration 

1701
01:14:36,933 --> 01:14:38,680
currently faces significant 

1702
01:14:38,690 --> 01:14:41,530
infrastructure delays including it our 

1703
01:14:41,530 --> 01:14:43,800
Nevada national Security site . So 

1704
01:14:43,800 --> 01:14:46,022
General Cotton is the current commander 

1705
01:14:46,022 --> 01:14:48,189
providing two of the three legs of the 

1706
01:14:48,189 --> 01:14:49,967
triad . Can you speak about the 

1707
01:14:49,967 --> 01:14:52,189
importance of the stockpile stewardship 

1708
01:14:52,189 --> 01:14:54,400
program and if confirmed how you would 

1709
01:14:54,400 --> 01:14:56,710
plan to working with your fellow 

1710
01:14:56,710 --> 01:14:59,540
Nuclear Weapons Council partners in 

1711
01:14:59,540 --> 01:15:01,260
addressing the NN essays , 

1712
01:15:01,270 --> 01:15:02,992
infrastructure , modernization 

1713
01:15:02,992 --> 01:15:05,640
challenges and unfortunate delays . 

1714
01:15:06,440 --> 01:15:08,551
Senator Rosen . Thanks thanks for the 

1715
01:15:08,551 --> 01:15:11,120
question . There's nothing more 

1716
01:15:11,120 --> 01:15:13,440
important than the relationship that we 

1717
01:15:13,440 --> 01:15:15,107
have with the D . O . E . And 

1718
01:15:15,107 --> 01:15:17,690
specifically in N . S . A . Um as we 

1719
01:15:17,690 --> 01:15:19,720
talked throughout the hearing , in 

1720
01:15:19,720 --> 01:15:23,200
regards to the modernization programs , 

1721
01:15:23,210 --> 01:15:26,680
um , they're interwoven um , that the 

1722
01:15:26,680 --> 01:15:29,120
platforms mean absolutely nothing if I 

1723
01:15:29,120 --> 01:15:31,342
don't have the assets available for the 

1724
01:15:31,342 --> 01:15:34,590
platforms . Um , so to your question on 

1725
01:15:34,600 --> 01:15:37,230
infrastructure , you're absolutely not 

1726
01:15:37,230 --> 01:15:40,320
only the Nevada locations , but all of 

1727
01:15:40,320 --> 01:15:43,960
NNS A locations um are in dire 

1728
01:15:43,960 --> 01:15:45,680
need of upgrades and in their 

1729
01:15:45,680 --> 01:15:48,170
infrastructure . Um , that dates back 

1730
01:15:48,170 --> 01:15:50,620
to Manhattan Manhattan project times . 

1731
01:15:50,630 --> 01:15:53,850
Um , we're living in a different world 

1732
01:15:53,850 --> 01:15:57,810
today . Um , as I keep saying , um , to 

1733
01:15:57,810 --> 01:15:59,760
near pure adversaries , nuclear 

1734
01:15:59,760 --> 01:16:03,520
adversaries , um , we are going to have 

1735
01:16:03,520 --> 01:16:06,780
to ensure that the infrastructure um 

1736
01:16:06,790 --> 01:16:10,480
are upgraded and are at the capacity 

1737
01:16:10,480 --> 01:16:12,720
and capability to meet the needs of the 

1738
01:16:12,720 --> 01:16:15,650
war fighter . You mentioned i as owning 

1739
01:16:15,650 --> 01:16:18,000
two legs . Um , I have modernization 

1740
01:16:18,000 --> 01:16:20,530
programs that are gonna need uh , new 

1741
01:16:20,530 --> 01:16:23,860
systems for them . Um , can't do that 

1742
01:16:23,860 --> 01:16:26,340
without the , without the incredible 

1743
01:16:26,340 --> 01:16:28,340
work of the men and women that that 

1744
01:16:28,340 --> 01:16:30,173
that make up the N . S . A . But 

1745
01:16:30,173 --> 01:16:32,229
they're going to need infrastructure 

1746
01:16:32,229 --> 01:16:34,340
that allow them to be able to do that 

1747
01:16:34,340 --> 01:16:36,451
type of work and not just bringing up 

1748
01:16:36,451 --> 01:16:38,340
to today's standards , but really 

1749
01:16:38,340 --> 01:16:40,570
preparing them for future challenges 

1750
01:16:40,570 --> 01:16:42,690
and innovation that we so desperately 

1751
01:16:42,700 --> 01:16:45,100
are going to need to compete . So thank 

1752
01:16:45,100 --> 01:16:47,540
you for that because we do have to 

1753
01:16:47,540 --> 01:16:49,429
think about the technological and 

1754
01:16:49,429 --> 01:16:51,484
advancements with those advancements 

1755
01:16:51,484 --> 01:16:53,262
also come advancements from our 

1756
01:16:53,262 --> 01:16:55,500
adversaries . So that creates increased 

1757
01:16:55,500 --> 01:16:57,860
threats as well . And so the Nuclear 

1758
01:16:57,860 --> 01:17:00,027
Command control communications systems 

1759
01:17:00,027 --> 01:17:02,193
of the United States , we know they're 

1760
01:17:02,193 --> 01:17:03,916
connected through a network of 

1761
01:17:03,916 --> 01:17:05,693
communications , different data 

1762
01:17:05,693 --> 01:17:08,250
processing systems . Uh This could 

1763
01:17:08,250 --> 01:17:10,590
possibly lead us vulnerable for cyber 

1764
01:17:10,590 --> 01:17:13,440
attacks . And in fact in 2020 april of 

1765
01:17:13,440 --> 01:17:15,450
2021 the Department of Energy's 

1766
01:17:15,450 --> 01:17:17,770
Inspector General audit concluded that 

1767
01:17:17,770 --> 01:17:20,410
cybersecurity weaknesses they really do 

1768
01:17:20,410 --> 01:17:22,410
persist throughout the department's 

1769
01:17:22,410 --> 01:17:24,521
unclassified networks including those 

1770
01:17:24,521 --> 01:17:27,920
of the National Nuclear Security 

1771
01:17:27,920 --> 01:17:30,480
Administration . So recent news , we've 

1772
01:17:30,480 --> 01:17:32,424
highlighted significant efforts by 

1773
01:17:32,424 --> 01:17:34,390
Huawei to build telecommunication 

1774
01:17:34,390 --> 01:17:36,723
structures right near our I . C . B . M . 

1775
01:17:36,723 --> 01:17:39,650
Fields , possibly uh interrupt our 

1776
01:17:39,650 --> 01:17:41,750
forces or our systems . And can you 

1777
01:17:41,750 --> 01:17:43,890
talk about these potential threats , 

1778
01:17:44,110 --> 01:17:47,810
cyber threats ? Um Maybe not directly 

1779
01:17:47,810 --> 01:17:49,830
but even nearby where some of our 

1780
01:17:49,830 --> 01:17:52,840
critical assets are located . Thank you 

1781
01:17:52,840 --> 01:17:55,290
senator for the question . So so we are 

1782
01:17:55,300 --> 01:17:59,130
um really paying attention to what 

1783
01:17:59,130 --> 01:18:03,000
we're seeing is as as a chinese are are 

1784
01:18:03,000 --> 01:18:05,790
taking advantage of some of the 

1785
01:18:05,790 --> 01:18:08,100
opportunities that they can have . Um 

1786
01:18:08,120 --> 01:18:10,460
some locations that are near near are 

1787
01:18:10,470 --> 01:18:12,692
in particularly some of our I . C . B . 

1788
01:18:12,692 --> 01:18:15,400
M . Sites . Um So we are we're we're 

1789
01:18:15,410 --> 01:18:17,940
absolutely looking into that um to your 

1790
01:18:17,940 --> 01:18:21,120
point on on cybersecurity , You know as 

1791
01:18:21,120 --> 01:18:24,330
people talk about N . C . Three um You 

1792
01:18:24,330 --> 01:18:26,710
know I think your point is well taken . 

1793
01:18:26,720 --> 01:18:30,500
It's also you know any other um 

1794
01:18:30,510 --> 01:18:34,070
support um in the 

1795
01:18:34,340 --> 01:18:38,240
in the architecture of of us the 

1796
01:18:38,250 --> 01:18:41,750
nuclear community um like N . N . S . A . 

1797
01:18:41,760 --> 01:18:43,780
To ensure that that they're that 

1798
01:18:43,780 --> 01:18:47,620
they're just as cyber safe um as uh 

1799
01:18:47,830 --> 01:18:50,700
N . C . Two platform would be . Um So 

1800
01:18:50,700 --> 01:18:53,070
if confirmed um as part of the nuke 

1801
01:18:53,070 --> 01:18:56,740
weapons council as a member um I think 

1802
01:18:56,740 --> 01:18:58,462
that is something that we will 

1803
01:18:58,462 --> 01:19:00,518
continually have to have more than a 

1804
01:19:00,518 --> 01:19:03,200
discussion about but figure out how to 

1805
01:19:03,210 --> 01:19:05,480
get to the end state in that regard . 

1806
01:19:05,490 --> 01:19:07,379
Yeah . Well there's a lot of push 

1807
01:19:07,379 --> 01:19:10,480
points and uh handoffs between agencies 

1808
01:19:10,490 --> 01:19:12,490
information between one another . I 

1809
01:19:12,490 --> 01:19:14,546
look forward to working on that with 

1810
01:19:14,546 --> 01:19:16,823
you . Thank you . Thank you . Mr Chair . 

1811
01:19:16,823 --> 01:19:19,200
Thank you Senator Thank you Senator 

1812
01:19:19,200 --> 01:19:21,560
Rosen . Uh Senator Sullivan please 

1813
01:19:21,570 --> 01:19:23,680
thank you . Mr Chairman and General 

1814
01:19:23,680 --> 01:19:25,736
Cotton . Good to see you . I enjoyed 

1815
01:19:25,736 --> 01:19:28,350
our discussion the other day . Let me 

1816
01:19:28,360 --> 01:19:31,300
uh follow up on some of the topics that 

1817
01:19:31,300 --> 01:19:34,880
we talked about first . Um 

1818
01:19:35,470 --> 01:19:37,730
If confirmed you will work closely with 

1819
01:19:37,730 --> 01:19:39,952
the U . S . Space Force Missile Defense 

1820
01:19:39,952 --> 01:19:43,320
Agency Northern Command to 

1821
01:19:43,330 --> 01:19:46,290
guarantee the security of our nation . 

1822
01:19:46,300 --> 01:19:50,020
And um as you know , Alaska has a lot 

1823
01:19:50,030 --> 01:19:53,460
of critical assets that relate to 

1824
01:19:53,470 --> 01:19:55,637
missile defense for the cornerstone of 

1825
01:19:55,637 --> 01:19:58,760
missile defense over 105th generation 

1826
01:19:58,760 --> 01:20:02,190
fighters uh world class training 

1827
01:20:02,190 --> 01:20:06,000
ranges . If confirmed . Will you commit 

1828
01:20:06,000 --> 01:20:09,150
to visiting Alaska early in your tenure 

1829
01:20:09,150 --> 01:20:11,500
to see these assets meet with the 

1830
01:20:11,500 --> 01:20:13,444
troops that are so critical to our 

1831
01:20:13,444 --> 01:20:15,778
homeland defense that you see in Alaska , 

1832
01:20:16,280 --> 01:20:19,330
Senator . Absolutely thank you . Um , 

1833
01:20:20,340 --> 01:20:22,507
you know , we had a good discussion on 

1834
01:20:22,507 --> 01:20:25,190
basing in 

1835
01:20:26,180 --> 01:20:29,770
May of 1992 . The Strategic Air Command 

1836
01:20:29,770 --> 01:20:32,720
was essentially stood down and many of 

1837
01:20:32,720 --> 01:20:36,150
our bomber bases uh , around the 

1838
01:20:36,150 --> 01:20:38,920
country around the world were closed . 

1839
01:20:38,930 --> 01:20:40,986
We've been talking about a lot about 

1840
01:20:40,986 --> 01:20:43,610
great power competition and how we need 

1841
01:20:43,610 --> 01:20:46,090
to be ready to confront to near pier 

1842
01:20:46,090 --> 01:20:48,590
nuclear capable adversaries with very 

1843
01:20:48,590 --> 01:20:51,890
large militaries . Given this reality , 

1844
01:20:51,890 --> 01:20:54,260
how should we be approaching the basing 

1845
01:20:54,260 --> 01:20:56,371
of our nuclear capable bomber fleet , 

1846
01:20:56,371 --> 01:20:59,390
particularly when the B 21 raider 

1847
01:21:00,000 --> 01:21:03,410
comes online . And again in line of 

1848
01:21:03,420 --> 01:21:05,740
some of the issues you and I discussed 

1849
01:21:05,740 --> 01:21:08,960
the other day , Senator . Thank you . I 

1850
01:21:08,960 --> 01:21:11,182
think initially when we talk about main 

1851
01:21:11,182 --> 01:21:13,349
operating bases , um , I'm comfortable 

1852
01:21:13,349 --> 01:21:15,571
where we are . The conversation that we 

1853
01:21:15,571 --> 01:21:17,682
had is how do you , you know , how do 

1854
01:21:17,682 --> 01:21:19,904
we disperse forces um , in the future , 

1855
01:21:19,904 --> 01:21:22,016
especially with with two near peers . 

1856
01:21:22,016 --> 01:21:24,730
Um , and , and , and in our discussion , 

1857
01:21:24,740 --> 01:21:26,840
we talk about the agile combat 

1858
01:21:26,840 --> 01:21:30,060
employment construct that the Air Force 

1859
01:21:30,070 --> 01:21:32,940
with the Chief of Staff General CQ 

1860
01:21:32,940 --> 01:21:34,884
Brown is leading across the United 

1861
01:21:34,884 --> 01:21:37,051
States Air Force . I say it's a little 

1862
01:21:37,051 --> 01:21:38,773
different what I call big wing 

1863
01:21:38,773 --> 01:21:40,884
airplanes . Um , as opposed to to our 

1864
01:21:40,884 --> 01:21:42,840
fighter forces , but the construct 

1865
01:21:42,850 --> 01:21:45,940
holes and , and and works as well . Um 

1866
01:21:45,950 --> 01:21:48,006
I would love to be able to make sure 

1867
01:21:48,006 --> 01:21:49,728
that we have opportunities and 

1868
01:21:49,728 --> 01:21:52,250
availability throughout the country to 

1869
01:21:52,250 --> 01:21:55,210
add dilemma to our adversaries . If you 

1870
01:21:55,210 --> 01:21:58,650
will um on where our bomber forces are 

1871
01:21:58,650 --> 01:22:00,872
in the future . Let me be a little more 

1872
01:22:00,872 --> 01:22:02,983
direct on that is , you know , Alaska 

1873
01:22:02,983 --> 01:22:05,930
is very strategically located and 

1874
01:22:06,600 --> 01:22:08,370
staging options , rotational 

1875
01:22:08,370 --> 01:22:11,140
deployments . The ability to have not 

1876
01:22:11,140 --> 01:22:14,600
just fifth gen fighters but strategic 

1877
01:22:14,610 --> 01:22:18,160
global strike assets um based in 

1878
01:22:18,160 --> 01:22:20,750
Alaska that are much closer to Russia , 

1879
01:22:20,760 --> 01:22:23,580
much closer to china as you and I have 

1880
01:22:23,580 --> 01:22:26,040
discussed , a number of Air Force flag 

1881
01:22:26,040 --> 01:22:29,890
officers have seen this as a strategic 

1882
01:22:29,900 --> 01:22:32,880
uh concept that we can take advantage 

1883
01:22:32,880 --> 01:22:35,640
of particularly with regard to great 

1884
01:22:35,640 --> 01:22:37,473
power competition . You have any 

1885
01:22:37,473 --> 01:22:39,140
thoughts on that general more 

1886
01:22:39,140 --> 01:22:41,880
specifically ? Well , I think I think 

1887
01:22:41,880 --> 01:22:44,780
the basis in in Alaska act as great 

1888
01:22:44,780 --> 01:22:47,240
staging basis for for for bomber 

1889
01:22:47,240 --> 01:22:49,296
deployments . And I think that's the 

1890
01:22:49,296 --> 01:22:52,770
question that you're asking , um the 

1891
01:22:52,780 --> 01:22:55,240
point of having a main operating base 

1892
01:22:55,250 --> 01:22:58,600
um if confirmed as commander stratcom , 

1893
01:22:58,600 --> 01:23:00,822
I'd like to make that assessment to see 

1894
01:23:00,830 --> 01:23:02,830
what , what recommendations I would 

1895
01:23:02,830 --> 01:23:05,970
make to the service . But um today I 

1896
01:23:05,970 --> 01:23:08,360
think um as we move forward , I think 

1897
01:23:08,370 --> 01:23:11,650
having it as a , as an operating a 

1898
01:23:11,650 --> 01:23:15,590
staging platform is critical for us . 

1899
01:23:15,600 --> 01:23:17,767
I mean if you recall , we talked about 

1900
01:23:17,767 --> 01:23:19,989
even , you know , ensuring that we have 

1901
01:23:19,989 --> 01:23:21,989
right , you know , runway lengths , 

1902
01:23:21,989 --> 01:23:24,310
etcetera moving forward . Great and I'm 

1903
01:23:24,310 --> 01:23:26,532
looking forward to working with you and 

1904
01:23:26,532 --> 01:23:28,699
I look forward to supporting your your 

1905
01:23:28,699 --> 01:23:30,930
confirmation . Let me um talk about 

1906
01:23:30,930 --> 01:23:33,550
another topic we had the opportunity to 

1907
01:23:33,550 --> 01:23:37,550
discuss and that's this idea of 

1908
01:23:37,550 --> 01:23:39,883
a strategic breakout as it relates to I . 

1909
01:23:39,883 --> 01:23:43,620
C . B . M . Capability with regard 

1910
01:23:43,630 --> 01:23:46,750
to china . The current stratcom 

1911
01:23:46,750 --> 01:23:49,520
commander , Admiral Richard called that 

1912
01:23:50,100 --> 01:23:53,380
the recent reports on how quickly china 

1913
01:23:53,390 --> 01:23:56,160
is developing strategic 

1914
01:23:57,400 --> 01:23:59,640
missile capabilities , I . C . B . M . 

1915
01:23:59,640 --> 01:24:01,251
Capabilities . You called it 

1916
01:24:01,251 --> 01:24:04,470
breathtaking um in your estimation , 

1917
01:24:04,470 --> 01:24:07,410
what is the greatest concern regarding 

1918
01:24:07,410 --> 01:24:10,700
this strategic breakout ? And how 

1919
01:24:10,700 --> 01:24:13,630
should we as uh Armed Services 

1920
01:24:13,630 --> 01:24:17,270
Committee , be focused on helping you 

1921
01:24:17,280 --> 01:24:20,330
counter or be ready for that ? Very 

1922
01:24:20,330 --> 01:24:22,386
significant threat . Thanks for that 

1923
01:24:22,386 --> 01:24:25,190
question . As recent as 2018 , we will 

1924
01:24:25,190 --> 01:24:27,340
describe china as having a minimal 

1925
01:24:27,340 --> 01:24:30,350
deterrence , minimal nuclear deterrence . 

1926
01:24:30,610 --> 01:24:32,221
We would have probably had a 

1927
01:24:32,221 --> 01:24:35,060
conversation stating that um it was 

1928
01:24:35,060 --> 01:24:38,110
about regional hegemony . 

1929
01:24:38,710 --> 01:24:42,130
Um today uh they're 

1930
01:24:42,130 --> 01:24:45,170
building ground based I C . B . M . 

1931
01:24:45,170 --> 01:24:48,950
Silos . Um They have the H six and 

1932
01:24:48,960 --> 01:24:51,550
nuclear capable medium bomber that has 

1933
01:24:51,550 --> 01:24:54,650
strategic capable um launch platform . 

1934
01:24:54,650 --> 01:24:56,594
And just real quick general not to 

1935
01:24:56,594 --> 01:24:59,000
interrupt but to give some context that 

1936
01:24:59,010 --> 01:25:01,550
in april of 2021 commercial satellite 

1937
01:25:01,560 --> 01:25:04,360
imagery revealed three new nuclear 

1938
01:25:04,360 --> 01:25:06,750
missile fields in western china . Each 

1939
01:25:06,760 --> 01:25:10,440
with approximately 100 and 20 missile 

1940
01:25:10,440 --> 01:25:14,140
silos . So this is incredible . Is it 

1941
01:25:14,140 --> 01:25:17,610
not in terms of the size . It is 

1942
01:25:17,610 --> 01:25:19,721
absolutely incredible and it's such a 

1943
01:25:19,721 --> 01:25:21,777
short time . Um to Admiral Richard's 

1944
01:25:21,777 --> 01:25:24,370
point . Thank you . Thank you . Mr . 

1945
01:25:24,370 --> 01:25:26,660
Chairman . Thank you . Senator Sullivan 

1946
01:25:26,670 --> 01:25:29,460
uh Senator kelly , Are you ready ? 

1947
01:25:31,490 --> 01:25:35,310
Yes . Yes thank you . Thank you . Mr 

1948
01:25:35,310 --> 01:25:38,330
Chairman General . Um 

1949
01:25:39,300 --> 01:25:42,260
Great seeing you again this week and 

1950
01:25:42,850 --> 01:25:46,080
uh congratulations on your nomination . 

1951
01:25:46,090 --> 01:25:48,150
Um you know during our meeting we 

1952
01:25:48,150 --> 01:25:50,960
briefly discussed your priorities and 

1953
01:25:50,960 --> 01:25:54,880
if confirmed um for your priorities 

1954
01:25:54,880 --> 01:25:57,210
for modernizing the nuclear triad . The 

1955
01:25:57,210 --> 01:25:59,377
long range standoff weapon . We talked 

1956
01:25:59,377 --> 01:26:01,654
a little bit about that . Or L . R . S . 

1957
01:26:01,654 --> 01:26:04,380
O . Represents one leg of the triad and 

1958
01:26:04,380 --> 01:26:07,870
replaces the aging . A . G . M . 86 

1959
01:26:07,870 --> 01:26:10,570
be air launched cruise missile . And 

1960
01:26:10,570 --> 01:26:12,810
the Senate version of the defense bill 

1961
01:26:12,810 --> 01:26:14,940
put almost a billion dollars towards 

1962
01:26:14,940 --> 01:26:18,090
continued development of the L . R . S . 

1963
01:26:18,090 --> 01:26:21,400
O . And the L . R . S . O . Is a unique 

1964
01:26:21,400 --> 01:26:23,740
component of our strategic deterrence 

1965
01:26:23,740 --> 01:26:27,050
in that it is a de escalatory weapon in 

1966
01:26:27,050 --> 01:26:30,360
mind and others opinions and 

1967
01:26:30,370 --> 01:26:33,350
when our adversaries see or maybe here 

1968
01:26:33,360 --> 01:26:35,582
that our long range bombers are on high 

1969
01:26:35,582 --> 01:26:37,638
alert . It gives them some pause and 

1970
01:26:37,638 --> 01:26:39,860
tensions can be called without a bomber 

1971
01:26:39,860 --> 01:26:42,082
ever lifting off . So general , can can 

1972
01:26:42,082 --> 01:26:44,249
I get your thoughts on the L . R . S . 

1973
01:26:44,249 --> 01:26:46,304
O . And can I get your commitment if 

1974
01:26:46,304 --> 01:26:48,193
confirmed to the continued timely 

1975
01:26:48,193 --> 01:26:50,304
development of this weapon as a vital 

1976
01:26:50,304 --> 01:26:52,249
and de escalatory component of our 

1977
01:26:52,249 --> 01:26:54,360
nuclear triad . Senator kelly . Thank 

1978
01:26:54,360 --> 01:26:56,760
you for the question . Um Bottom line 

1979
01:26:56,760 --> 01:26:59,530
up front , we absolutely need LRS . So 

1980
01:26:59,540 --> 01:27:02,130
um the good news is um the industry's 

1981
01:27:02,130 --> 01:27:05,050
partner is doing incredible work um 

1982
01:27:05,060 --> 01:27:07,210
keeping that program on time and on 

1983
01:27:07,210 --> 01:27:09,800
schedule and I'm quite pleased as the 

1984
01:27:09,810 --> 01:27:12,100
air component commander um That's 

1985
01:27:12,110 --> 01:27:14,221
that's the lead match come overseeing 

1986
01:27:14,221 --> 01:27:16,443
it now and watching it . Um seeing what 

1987
01:27:16,443 --> 01:27:19,110
that's doing so to your point um for 

1988
01:27:19,930 --> 01:27:22,080
for our long range standoff bomber 

1989
01:27:22,080 --> 01:27:25,790
capability , that leg of the triad um 

1990
01:27:25,790 --> 01:27:28,012
having a viable credible weapons system 

1991
01:27:28,012 --> 01:27:31,220
is absolutely critical . Um And the LRS , 

1992
01:27:31,220 --> 01:27:33,610
so is that that that viable critical 

1993
01:27:33,610 --> 01:27:36,580
weapon ? That is a de escalatory weapon ? 

1994
01:27:36,590 --> 01:27:38,534
Because you're absolutely right if 

1995
01:27:38,534 --> 01:27:40,590
we're generating bombers , um it can 

1996
01:27:40,590 --> 01:27:42,701
send a signal before the first bomber 

1997
01:27:42,701 --> 01:27:45,710
even lifts off any uh any trl concerns 

1998
01:27:45,710 --> 01:27:47,766
right now . Are there any any things 

1999
01:27:47,766 --> 01:27:49,988
you see that you're worried about as we 

2000
01:27:49,988 --> 01:27:52,099
as we go forward that you could share 

2001
01:27:52,099 --> 01:27:53,988
here ? I have not , I've seen the 

2002
01:27:53,988 --> 01:27:55,877
testing that's been that's that's 

2003
01:27:55,877 --> 01:27:57,821
underway has been very promising . 

2004
01:27:57,821 --> 01:27:59,710
Thank you , general . And uh also 

2005
01:27:59,710 --> 01:28:01,877
during our conversation on monday , we 

2006
01:28:01,877 --> 01:28:04,780
briefly talked about um the tanker 

2007
01:28:04,780 --> 01:28:07,670
fleet , uh we have , you know , KC 1 30 

2008
01:28:07,670 --> 01:28:11,140
fives in phoenix . And um so I know 

2009
01:28:11,140 --> 01:28:13,251
this is an issue you're familiar with 

2010
01:28:13,251 --> 01:28:15,084
as the head of the Global Strike 

2011
01:28:15,084 --> 01:28:17,140
Command . And uh my understanding is 

2012
01:28:17,140 --> 01:28:20,930
after talking to the team at the 161st 

2013
01:28:20,930 --> 01:28:22,820
aerial refueling wing which is a 

2014
01:28:22,830 --> 01:28:26,240
National guard unit . Uh is that unlike 

2015
01:28:26,250 --> 01:28:29,310
the KC 46 the KC 1 35 is not E . M . P . 

2016
01:28:29,310 --> 01:28:32,960
Hardened . Um I guess they have 

2017
01:28:32,960 --> 01:28:35,127
some kind of makeshift procedures that 

2018
01:28:35,127 --> 01:28:37,870
they could use but it is clearly not 

2019
01:28:37,880 --> 01:28:41,790
able to to handle electronic magnetic 

2020
01:28:41,790 --> 01:28:44,290
pulse um that it might might be up 

2021
01:28:44,290 --> 01:28:46,290
against depending on you know , the 

2022
01:28:46,290 --> 01:28:49,290
location and the mission . Um A small 

2023
01:28:49,290 --> 01:28:52,700
amount of KC 1 35 sit on a you know , 

2024
01:28:52,700 --> 01:28:56,000
24 hour a day , seven days a week alert 

2025
01:28:56,000 --> 01:28:58,480
for the strategic defense deterrence 

2026
01:28:58,480 --> 01:29:00,591
mission . How concerned are you about 

2027
01:29:00,591 --> 01:29:04,350
the potential vulnerabilities of this 

2028
01:29:04,360 --> 01:29:07,570
aging tanker ? So thank you for the 

2029
01:29:07,570 --> 01:29:11,320
question . Um The fleet holes 

2030
01:29:11,330 --> 01:29:13,870
so I'm confident that it can get us 

2031
01:29:13,870 --> 01:29:16,690
there . Um But I'm even more confident 

2032
01:29:16,690 --> 01:29:19,560
and and what we're seeing in um in the 

2033
01:29:19,570 --> 01:29:23,340
KC 46 that's being deployed ? Um My 

2034
01:29:23,340 --> 01:29:27,330
fellow match com commander um General 

2035
01:29:27,330 --> 01:29:30,670
Minihan from Air mobility command . Um 

2036
01:29:30,680 --> 01:29:34,060
I know is is on top of the procurement 

2037
01:29:34,070 --> 01:29:36,390
um and deliveries of the KC 46 

2038
01:29:37,890 --> 01:29:41,010
for the KC 1 35 . It's 

2039
01:29:41,010 --> 01:29:43,340
delivery , you know , it coexists with 

2040
01:29:43,340 --> 01:29:46,710
the B 52 . Um It was it was 

2041
01:29:46,720 --> 01:29:50,720
developed to tank the B 52 . Um So 

2042
01:29:50,720 --> 01:29:53,330
it is an aging weapons system . Um But 

2043
01:29:53,330 --> 01:29:55,420
senator uh it's still meeting the 

2044
01:29:55,420 --> 01:29:57,790
requirements to be able to get our our 

2045
01:29:57,790 --> 01:30:01,470
bombers as as we bring case C um 

2046
01:30:01,480 --> 01:30:04,340
46 is online . Would you 

2047
01:30:04,660 --> 01:30:08,610
agree that uh KC 1 35 squadrons 

2048
01:30:08,610 --> 01:30:10,450
that are participating in the 

2049
01:30:10,450 --> 01:30:13,150
deterrence mission should be given 

2050
01:30:13,160 --> 01:30:15,990
priority uh to be replaced with the KC 

2051
01:30:15,990 --> 01:30:18,170
46 . Sir , have confirmed what I would 

2052
01:30:18,170 --> 01:30:20,170
like to do is make an assessment to 

2053
01:30:20,170 --> 01:30:22,226
kind of figure out what are the pros 

2054
01:30:22,226 --> 01:30:24,392
and cons of of what those mission sets 

2055
01:30:24,392 --> 01:30:26,337
are doing using a legacy system as 

2056
01:30:26,337 --> 01:30:28,337
opposed to using the new modernized 

2057
01:30:28,337 --> 01:30:30,337
system . Well thank you General and 

2058
01:30:30,337 --> 01:30:32,337
thank you . Mr . Chairman thank you 

2059
01:30:32,337 --> 01:30:34,281
Senator Silva Center . Holy please 

2060
01:30:35,180 --> 01:30:37,347
thank you . Mr Chairman General . Good 

2061
01:30:37,347 --> 01:30:39,069
to see you . I appreciated our 

2062
01:30:39,069 --> 01:30:41,347
conversation the other day . Thank you . 

2063
01:30:41,347 --> 01:30:43,458
I guess it was just yesterday . Thank 

2064
01:30:43,458 --> 01:30:45,402
you for making time for me . Let's 

2065
01:30:45,402 --> 01:30:47,458
follow up if we could on a couple of 

2066
01:30:47,458 --> 01:30:49,680
things we talked about . First of all , 

2067
01:30:49,680 --> 01:30:48,920
the Admiral Richard , the current 

2068
01:30:48,930 --> 01:30:51,160
stratcom commander of course has 

2069
01:30:51,160 --> 01:30:53,216
testified and I talked about this um 

2070
01:30:53,216 --> 01:30:55,271
that the U . S . Needs to think very 

2071
01:30:55,271 --> 01:30:57,327
seriously about the requirements for 

2072
01:30:57,327 --> 01:30:59,438
deterring two major nuclear powers at 

2073
01:30:59,438 --> 01:31:01,327
the same time china and Russia of 

2074
01:31:01,327 --> 01:31:03,382
course . And you said the same thing 

2075
01:31:03,382 --> 01:31:05,493
yesterday . Which which I appreciated 

2076
01:31:05,493 --> 01:31:07,493
here's my question . If confirmed , 

2077
01:31:07,493 --> 01:31:09,660
would you commit to having stratcom do 

2078
01:31:09,660 --> 01:31:11,493
an analysis of the nuclear force 

2079
01:31:11,493 --> 01:31:13,549
requirements to deter both China and 

2080
01:31:13,549 --> 01:31:16,350
Russia now and into the 2030's senator 

2081
01:31:16,350 --> 01:31:18,239
thanks for the question . And the 

2082
01:31:18,239 --> 01:31:20,430
answer is absolutely yes . Um I think 

2083
01:31:20,430 --> 01:31:22,930
that's gonna be critical for us . I 

2084
01:31:22,930 --> 01:31:25,310
called it earlier . You know it's the 

2085
01:31:25,310 --> 01:31:28,620
strategic um doctoring within the 

2086
01:31:28,630 --> 01:31:31,000
within stratcom . Not necessarily 

2087
01:31:31,000 --> 01:31:32,722
policy . I'm talking about the 

2088
01:31:32,722 --> 01:31:34,930
strategic doctrine within within 

2089
01:31:34,930 --> 01:31:37,340
stratcom to ensure that we can we can 

2090
01:31:37,340 --> 01:31:39,740
do exactly what you asked . Um The 

2091
01:31:39,750 --> 01:31:41,650
other piece of that is then the 

2092
01:31:41,650 --> 01:31:44,710
national objectives from the President 

2093
01:31:44,710 --> 01:31:46,821
to make sure we can meet the national 

2094
01:31:46,821 --> 01:31:48,988
objectives as well . Very good . Thank 

2095
01:31:48,988 --> 01:31:48,790
you for that . I think that will be 

2096
01:31:48,790 --> 01:31:51,340
hugely hugely helpful . Um I asked 

2097
01:31:51,340 --> 01:31:53,562
Admiral Richard earlier this year about 

2098
01:31:53,562 --> 01:31:55,618
china's ability to engage in limited 

2099
01:31:55,618 --> 01:31:57,784
nuclear employment . Uh and whether or 

2100
01:31:57,784 --> 01:31:59,951
not that was growing , he said that it 

2101
01:31:59,951 --> 01:32:02,007
was and he was very emphatic on this 

2102
01:32:02,007 --> 01:32:04,229
point and he talked about how important 

2103
01:32:04,229 --> 01:32:04,120
it is the United States to maintain our 

2104
01:32:04,130 --> 01:32:07,220
own limited nuclear options if we're 

2105
01:32:07,220 --> 01:32:09,442
going to be able to deter china in what 

2106
01:32:09,442 --> 01:32:11,498
is our our pacing three theater . So 

2107
01:32:11,498 --> 01:32:13,720
let me just ask you , do you agree that 

2108
01:32:13,720 --> 01:32:15,720
we need to be concerned about china 

2109
01:32:15,720 --> 01:32:17,887
resulting resorting to limited nuclear 

2110
01:32:17,887 --> 01:32:19,942
employment in a conflict ? Let's say 

2111
01:32:19,942 --> 01:32:22,280
over Taiwan Senator , I think any near 

2112
01:32:22,280 --> 01:32:24,391
pierre nuclear adversary , we have to 

2113
01:32:24,391 --> 01:32:26,391
be concerned about that . Would you 

2114
01:32:26,391 --> 01:32:29,310
agree that having our own limited 

2115
01:32:29,320 --> 01:32:33,000
nuclear options , whether that's low 

2116
01:32:33,000 --> 01:32:35,870
yield slbM or nuclear arms , sea launch 

2117
01:32:35,870 --> 01:32:37,814
cruise missiles , that that having 

2118
01:32:37,814 --> 01:32:39,814
those maintaining those can help us 

2119
01:32:39,814 --> 01:32:42,440
deter china's limited nuclear use ? You 

2120
01:32:42,440 --> 01:32:45,150
know , as I described to the committee , 

2121
01:32:45,160 --> 01:32:47,680
um for me , it's about being able to 

2122
01:32:47,680 --> 01:32:50,450
give options to the Commander in chief . 

2123
01:32:50,460 --> 01:32:53,050
Very good . Are there other limited 

2124
01:32:53,050 --> 01:32:55,217
nuclear options that you think that we 

2125
01:32:55,217 --> 01:32:57,328
ought to be pursuing , whether that's 

2126
01:32:57,328 --> 01:32:59,439
in terms of additional capabilities . 

2127
01:32:59,439 --> 01:33:01,661
Whether that's posture changes in order 

2128
01:33:01,661 --> 01:33:03,717
to deter chinese and Russian limited 

2129
01:33:03,717 --> 01:33:05,939
nuclear use Senator . I think that goes 

2130
01:33:05,939 --> 01:33:08,380
along with that study that if confirmed 

2131
01:33:08,390 --> 01:33:10,760
um you know taking that really deep 

2132
01:33:10,760 --> 01:33:12,871
study to understand what that outcome 

2133
01:33:12,871 --> 01:33:15,038
and what because what I wanted success 

2134
01:33:15,038 --> 01:33:17,230
at the end of that . So what what that 

2135
01:33:17,230 --> 01:33:19,397
would look like . So if confirmed that 

2136
01:33:19,397 --> 01:33:21,452
would be part of that study . Okay , 

2137
01:33:21,452 --> 01:33:23,674
very good , Fair enough , fair enough . 

2138
01:33:23,674 --> 01:33:23,250
You said to me yesterday , which I 

2139
01:33:23,250 --> 01:33:25,630
appreciated , I'm gonna try to make 

2140
01:33:25,630 --> 01:33:28,560
sure I I get you quoted correctly and 

2141
01:33:28,560 --> 01:33:30,449
then we talk about it . If we can 

2142
01:33:30,449 --> 01:33:32,616
prevent china from crossing the Taiwan 

2143
01:33:32,616 --> 01:33:34,727
strait and they know that we've got a 

2144
01:33:34,727 --> 01:33:36,800
viable nuclear deterrent then it's 

2145
01:33:36,800 --> 01:33:38,578
possible that Beijing might not 

2146
01:33:38,578 --> 01:33:40,633
escalate at all . And I thought that 

2147
01:33:40,633 --> 01:33:42,744
was right on the money . I agree with 

2148
01:33:42,744 --> 01:33:44,967
that 100% and I just want to give you a 

2149
01:33:44,967 --> 01:33:44,650
chance to elaborate that on that here 

2150
01:33:44,660 --> 01:33:46,549
because it sounds to me like what 

2151
01:33:46,549 --> 01:33:48,716
you're saying is the right approach to 

2152
01:33:48,716 --> 01:33:50,882
deterring a chinese invasion of Taiwan 

2153
01:33:50,882 --> 01:33:52,993
is denial to deny them the ability to 

2154
01:33:52,993 --> 01:33:55,160
do that ? The first instance backed up 

2155
01:33:55,160 --> 01:33:57,327
by a very credible nuclear deterrent ? 

2156
01:33:57,327 --> 01:33:59,271
So am I do I have that right . And 

2157
01:33:59,271 --> 01:34:01,493
would you just , would you elaborate on 

2158
01:34:01,493 --> 01:34:01,180
why you think that's the right 

2159
01:34:01,180 --> 01:34:05,130
combination Senator ? I think that the 

2160
01:34:05,140 --> 01:34:07,960
whole reason that we have the strategic 

2161
01:34:07,970 --> 01:34:11,570
um deterrents that we have today and 

2162
01:34:11,570 --> 01:34:14,070
the triad that we have today is to 

2163
01:34:14,070 --> 01:34:17,920
ensure that um our adversaries 

2164
01:34:17,920 --> 01:34:20,970
understand that today shouldn't be the 

2165
01:34:20,970 --> 01:34:23,081
day for them . So , as we were having 

2166
01:34:23,081 --> 01:34:25,414
that conversation , that's what I meant . 

2167
01:34:25,414 --> 01:34:27,637
I think that they would understand that 

2168
01:34:27,637 --> 01:34:31,230
if you have a credible 

2169
01:34:31,240 --> 01:34:33,940
nuclear deterrent , it would make them 

2170
01:34:33,940 --> 01:34:36,940
think twice before engaging with us . 

2171
01:34:36,950 --> 01:34:39,780
And it's and those two things , the 

2172
01:34:39,790 --> 01:34:42,180
conventional denial combined with the 

2173
01:34:42,180 --> 01:34:44,291
nuclear deterrent , those things have 

2174
01:34:44,291 --> 01:34:46,513
to sit together . Is that fair to say ? 

2175
01:34:46,513 --> 01:34:48,680
I mean , they work hand in hand , they 

2176
01:34:48,680 --> 01:34:48,620
work hand in hand , conventional and 

2177
01:34:48,620 --> 01:34:50,940
nuclear works hand in hand . Yeah . Um , 

2178
01:34:50,950 --> 01:34:53,117
let me ask you this just on the on the 

2179
01:34:53,117 --> 01:34:54,672
question of our own nuclear 

2180
01:34:54,672 --> 01:34:56,728
modernization . Given the pace of of 

2181
01:34:56,728 --> 01:34:58,228
china and Russia and their 

2182
01:34:58,228 --> 01:35:00,339
modernization if confirmed , will you 

2183
01:35:00,339 --> 01:35:02,500
be looking for ways to to accelerate 

2184
01:35:02,510 --> 01:35:05,750
our nuclear modernization and identify 

2185
01:35:05,750 --> 01:35:07,861
those options for Congress so that we 

2186
01:35:07,861 --> 01:35:10,028
can work together to make sure that we 

2187
01:35:10,028 --> 01:35:11,861
push the pace like we need to if 

2188
01:35:11,861 --> 01:35:14,083
confirmed . I would do that center very 

2189
01:35:14,083 --> 01:35:16,083
good . Let me just ask you 11 final 

2190
01:35:16,083 --> 01:35:16,010
thing here in my remaining Seconds , 

2191
01:35:16,200 --> 01:35:18,470
The 2018 nuclear posture review . It 

2192
01:35:18,470 --> 01:35:20,210
highlighted the importance of 

2193
01:35:20,210 --> 01:35:22,154
conventional nuclear integration , 

2194
01:35:22,154 --> 01:35:24,377
which we were just touching on which of 

2195
01:35:24,377 --> 01:35:26,432
course is critical for strengthening 

2196
01:35:26,432 --> 01:35:28,210
conventional deterrence against 

2197
01:35:28,210 --> 01:35:30,321
adversaries who may use nuclear force 

2198
01:35:30,321 --> 01:35:32,488
for operational or course of effects . 

2199
01:35:32,488 --> 01:35:34,654
Has the department , in your view made 

2200
01:35:34,654 --> 01:35:36,877
sufficient progress on the conventional 

2201
01:35:36,877 --> 01:35:39,510
nuclear integration since the 2018 NPR ? 

2202
01:35:40,190 --> 01:35:42,290
I think it has because in the past 

2203
01:35:42,290 --> 01:35:44,457
we've probably we didn't talk about it 

2204
01:35:44,457 --> 01:35:46,623
the way we should have And I think the 

2205
01:35:46,623 --> 01:35:48,846
integration on being able to talk about 

2206
01:35:48,846 --> 01:35:50,957
going from conventional to nuclear as 

2207
01:35:50,957 --> 01:35:53,234
opposed to doing a pause X if you will . 

2208
01:35:53,234 --> 01:35:55,290
And then having that conversation um 

2209
01:35:55,290 --> 01:35:57,290
we've made leaps and bounds in that 

2210
01:35:57,290 --> 01:35:56,730
regard . Very good . Thank you . 

2211
01:35:56,730 --> 01:35:58,341
General thanks again for the 

2212
01:35:58,341 --> 01:36:00,563
conversation yesterday . Thanks to your 

2213
01:36:00,563 --> 01:36:00,100
testimony . Thank you . Mr . Chairman 

2214
01:36:00,110 --> 01:36:02,054
thank you Senator Hawley . Senator 

2215
01:36:02,054 --> 01:36:04,340
Warren please thank you . Mr . Chairman 

2216
01:36:04,340 --> 01:36:06,229
and congratulations again on your 

2217
01:36:06,229 --> 01:36:09,100
nomination , General Cotton . So if 

2218
01:36:09,100 --> 01:36:11,160
confirmed , you'll head U . S . 

2219
01:36:11,160 --> 01:36:13,327
Strategic Command which will place you 

2220
01:36:13,327 --> 01:36:15,493
in charge of our nuclear weapons . I'd 

2221
01:36:15,493 --> 01:36:17,950
like to continue the conversation that 

2222
01:36:17,960 --> 01:36:20,120
we had in my office about the 

2223
01:36:20,120 --> 01:36:23,450
importance of civilian control . Last 

2224
01:36:23,450 --> 01:36:25,880
week eight former secretaries of 

2225
01:36:25,880 --> 01:36:28,800
Defense and five former Chairman of the 

2226
01:36:28,800 --> 01:36:32,120
Joint Chiefs of Staff released an open 

2227
01:36:32,120 --> 01:36:35,160
letter calling for a recommitment to 

2228
01:36:35,160 --> 01:36:38,100
principles of civilian control , which 

2229
01:36:38,100 --> 01:36:40,267
they called . And I want to quote them 

2230
01:36:40,267 --> 01:36:42,100
here , The bedrock foundation of 

2231
01:36:42,100 --> 01:36:45,710
american democracy unquote The letter 

2232
01:36:45,720 --> 01:36:48,720
repeat , emphasizes that policy 

2233
01:36:48,720 --> 01:36:51,200
decisions are ultimately up to the 

2234
01:36:51,200 --> 01:36:54,560
president civilian political appointees 

2235
01:36:54,570 --> 01:36:57,180
and Congress . So General Cotton , can 

2236
01:36:57,180 --> 01:36:59,570
you start us out this morning by saying 

2237
01:36:59,570 --> 01:37:02,150
a word about your views on whether 

2238
01:37:02,150 --> 01:37:05,450
policy decisions including ones about 

2239
01:37:05,450 --> 01:37:07,780
nuclear programs should be made by 

2240
01:37:07,780 --> 01:37:11,660
civilians rather than generals . Policy 

2241
01:37:11,660 --> 01:37:14,540
is made by civilians ma'am . And you 

2242
01:37:14,540 --> 01:37:16,651
are committed to that firmly and I am 

2243
01:37:16,651 --> 01:37:18,510
committed to that . You know , I 

2244
01:37:18,520 --> 01:37:20,820
appreciate your emphasizing this point . 

2245
01:37:20,830 --> 01:37:23,010
It is the president's job to determine 

2246
01:37:23,010 --> 01:37:25,343
the nuclear policy of the United States . 

2247
01:37:25,343 --> 01:37:27,940
But sometimes people who are in the 

2248
01:37:27,940 --> 01:37:29,970
role that you've been nominated for 

2249
01:37:30,130 --> 01:37:32,660
seem to get confused on that . For 

2250
01:37:32,660 --> 01:37:35,730
example , your predecessor , Admiral 

2251
01:37:35,730 --> 01:37:38,640
Richard stated publicly that he thought 

2252
01:37:38,640 --> 01:37:41,110
the biden administration should adopt 

2253
01:37:41,120 --> 01:37:43,310
the trump administration's nuclear 

2254
01:37:43,310 --> 01:37:46,740
policy and then he and his 

2255
01:37:46,750 --> 01:37:49,630
office actively lobbied Congress 

2256
01:37:49,640 --> 01:37:52,430
against cuts to the nuclear spending 

2257
01:37:52,430 --> 01:37:55,220
programs contained in the biden 

2258
01:37:55,230 --> 01:37:57,900
administration's budget . The budget 

2259
01:37:57,970 --> 01:38:00,060
the president put forward and the 

2260
01:38:00,060 --> 01:38:02,970
Secretary of Defense came to this 

2261
01:38:02,970 --> 01:38:06,110
committee to defend . So General Cotton , 

2262
01:38:06,120 --> 01:38:08,400
if confirmed . Do you think it would be 

2263
01:38:08,410 --> 01:38:11,710
appropriate for you or your office to 

2264
01:38:11,710 --> 01:38:15,110
publicly lobby against the positions of 

2265
01:38:15,110 --> 01:38:17,054
the President and the Secretary of 

2266
01:38:17,054 --> 01:38:19,870
Defense ? No ma'am . And you remember 

2267
01:38:19,870 --> 01:38:21,981
we had this conversation , the caveat 

2268
01:38:21,981 --> 01:38:24,203
that that we agreed to was , you know , 

2269
01:38:24,203 --> 01:38:26,370
but I would always especially for this 

2270
01:38:26,370 --> 01:38:29,230
committee be allowed to offer my best 

2271
01:38:29,230 --> 01:38:31,820
military advice and your best military 

2272
01:38:31,820 --> 01:38:35,580
advice . But policy is done by the 

2273
01:38:35,580 --> 01:38:37,940
general's policy is not made by 

2274
01:38:37,940 --> 01:38:40,107
generals . All right , thank you . You 

2275
01:38:40,107 --> 01:38:42,162
know , we're counting on you to give 

2276
01:38:42,162 --> 01:38:43,996
your best military advice to the 

2277
01:38:43,996 --> 01:38:45,829
President to the secretary or to 

2278
01:38:45,829 --> 01:38:48,080
Congress whenever you're called on to 

2279
01:38:48,080 --> 01:38:51,340
do so . But it is wildly inappropriate 

2280
01:38:51,350 --> 01:38:53,830
to try to box in the Commander in chief 

2281
01:38:53,840 --> 01:38:56,040
on nuclear policy or to try to 

2282
01:38:56,050 --> 01:38:59,000
undermine his budget . Now one of the 

2283
01:38:59,000 --> 01:39:01,410
big ways that military leaders lobby 

2284
01:39:01,410 --> 01:39:03,243
for more spending , even when it 

2285
01:39:03,243 --> 01:39:05,299
directly contradicts the President's 

2286
01:39:05,299 --> 01:39:08,030
priorities is through so called 

2287
01:39:08,040 --> 01:39:11,640
unfunded priorities lists . These are 

2288
01:39:11,640 --> 01:39:14,520
wish lists that are required by law but 

2289
01:39:14,520 --> 01:39:17,590
have grown to be tens of billions of 

2290
01:39:17,600 --> 01:39:19,920
dollars and are being used by the 

2291
01:39:19,920 --> 01:39:22,730
services and the commands to game the 

2292
01:39:22,730 --> 01:39:24,841
budget process and I don't think they 

2293
01:39:24,841 --> 01:39:27,760
ought to exist at all . General cotton . 

2294
01:39:27,770 --> 01:39:31,660
Do you agree that your commands top 

2295
01:39:31,670 --> 01:39:34,530
priorities should actually be reflected 

2296
01:39:34,540 --> 01:39:37,040
in the budget you submit rather than in 

2297
01:39:37,040 --> 01:39:38,660
an extras list ? 

2298
01:39:40,680 --> 01:39:44,180
Senator . I think our requirements list 

2299
01:39:44,190 --> 01:39:48,110
um that we present should be 

2300
01:39:48,110 --> 01:39:50,240
included and and and and covers down 

2301
01:39:50,250 --> 01:39:53,450
and if if our budget is short um as the 

2302
01:39:53,450 --> 01:39:56,320
commander my job is to ensure that I 

2303
01:39:56,320 --> 01:39:59,300
can I can execute my mission with the 

2304
01:39:59,310 --> 01:40:01,532
with the dollars that I've been given . 

2305
01:40:01,532 --> 01:40:03,477
All right . So I wanna make sure I 

2306
01:40:03,477 --> 01:40:03,190
understand you here because you're 

2307
01:40:03,190 --> 01:40:06,180
saying your priorities should be in the 

2308
01:40:06,180 --> 01:40:08,800
budget and extras should be just that 

2309
01:40:08,810 --> 01:40:11,250
extras not your priorities . Is that 

2310
01:40:11,250 --> 01:40:13,390
right ? Um As a match com commander 

2311
01:40:13,390 --> 01:40:15,557
today my priorities are in my budget . 

2312
01:40:15,557 --> 01:40:17,723
Good . I like to hear that . Look it's 

2313
01:40:17,723 --> 01:40:20,260
no secret that both President biden and 

2314
01:40:20,260 --> 01:40:22,316
I want to reduce the role of nuclear 

2315
01:40:22,316 --> 01:40:24,630
weapons in our national security 

2316
01:40:24,630 --> 01:40:28,630
strategy , spending $364 billion 

2317
01:40:28,640 --> 01:40:30,751
just on nuclear weapons over the next 

2318
01:40:30,751 --> 01:40:34,550
10 years is unaffordable . But I think 

2319
01:40:34,560 --> 01:40:36,880
even my colleagues who disagree with me 

2320
01:40:36,890 --> 01:40:40,090
on nuclear policy would agree that we 

2321
01:40:40,090 --> 01:40:42,930
should be asking D . O . D . To write 

2322
01:40:42,940 --> 01:40:46,040
budgets that reflect their actual 

2323
01:40:46,040 --> 01:40:48,520
priorities and that's what it is I'm 

2324
01:40:48,520 --> 01:40:50,840
driving for here and want to make sure 

2325
01:40:50,840 --> 01:40:53,200
that we do . I look forward to working 

2326
01:40:53,200 --> 01:40:55,256
with you general . Thank you . Thank 

2327
01:40:55,256 --> 01:40:57,311
you . Mr . Chairman . Thank you very 

2328
01:40:57,311 --> 01:40:59,478
much . Senator Warren uh General thank 

2329
01:40:59,478 --> 01:41:01,700
you for your testimony for your service 

2330
01:41:01,700 --> 01:41:05,400
uh and we look forward to rapidly uh 

2331
01:41:05,410 --> 01:41:07,760
bringing your nomination to a 

2332
01:41:07,770 --> 01:41:09,937
successful conclusion . Thank you very 

2333
01:41:09,937 --> 01:41:12,840
much for that . I will during the hurt 

2334
01:41:12,850 --> 01:41:13,740
and the hearing .