WEBVTT 00:00.150 --> 00:02.850 of U . S . Strategic Command . General 00:02.850 --> 00:05.017 Cotton . Thank you for your decades of 00:05.017 --> 00:07.017 service and willingness to serve in 00:07.017 --> 00:09.183 this important position . I would like 00:09.183 --> 00:11.406 to welcome your wife Marsha who is with 00:11.406 --> 00:13.930 us today . Welcome Marsha . I'd also 00:13.930 --> 00:15.986 like to acknowledge your son Russell 00:15.986 --> 00:18.550 and daughter Brianna who I'm sure are 00:18.550 --> 00:20.960 proudly watching . We are grateful for 00:20.960 --> 00:23.340 their continued support of your service . 00:23.730 --> 00:26.500 U . S . Strategic Command stratcom is 00:26.500 --> 00:28.667 the principal command for ensuring our 00:28.667 --> 00:31.050 nation's nuclear deterrent is effective , 00:31.060 --> 00:34.280 safe and reliable . Today . Our nuclear 00:34.280 --> 00:36.560 deterrent consists of a triad of 00:36.560 --> 00:39.010 ballistic missile submarines , heavy 00:39.010 --> 00:41.490 bombers and land based intercontinental 00:41.500 --> 00:44.740 missiles . This triad is the bedrock 00:44.750 --> 00:47.010 not only of our national defense but 00:47.010 --> 00:49.010 also the security of our allies and 00:49.010 --> 00:51.240 partners who depend on the U . S . 00:51.240 --> 00:53.800 Nuclear umbrella . Integral to the 00:53.800 --> 00:55.720 triad is a highly secure and 00:55.720 --> 00:58.260 multilayered nuclear command control 00:58.260 --> 01:00.800 and communications or N . C . Three 01:00.800 --> 01:03.530 system which connects the president to 01:03.530 --> 01:05.960 the nuclear forces successfully . 01:05.960 --> 01:08.190 Maintaining this nuclear deterrent is a 01:08.190 --> 01:10.246 mission fundamental to our long term 01:10.246 --> 01:13.390 strategic competition with china and 01:13.390 --> 01:15.780 Russia . This mission has made 01:15.790 --> 01:17.920 especially clear throughout Russia's 01:17.920 --> 01:20.490 assault on Ukraine . Russia has 01:20.490 --> 01:22.740 conducted out of cycle nuclear 01:22.750 --> 01:25.530 exercises , issued inflammatory 01:25.530 --> 01:28.000 statements about tactical nuclear 01:28.000 --> 01:30.380 strikes in Ukraine and continues to 01:30.380 --> 01:32.436 threaten nuclear power plants in the 01:32.436 --> 01:34.850 region . Vladimir Putin's behavior has 01:34.850 --> 01:37.470 been reckless to a dangerous degree . 01:37.480 --> 01:40.130 China has also made significant changes 01:40.130 --> 01:42.670 to its nuclear approach . Not 01:42.680 --> 01:45.750 constrained by the new start treaty . 01:45.750 --> 01:47.660 Beijing has built hundreds of new 01:47.660 --> 01:49.604 ballistic missiles and intensive a 01:49.604 --> 01:52.530 stockpile of more than 1000 warheads by 01:52.530 --> 01:55.260 the early 20 thirties . In the past two 01:55.260 --> 01:57.440 years . We have also seen china 01:57.440 --> 01:59.660 developed missile feels in hardened 01:59.660 --> 02:01.810 silos throughout the country . This 02:01.810 --> 02:03.710 development along with china's 02:03.710 --> 02:05.766 development of air delivered weapons 02:05.766 --> 02:08.470 and ballistic missile submarines in the 02:08.470 --> 02:11.420 south china sea fundamentally changes 02:11.420 --> 02:13.400 the nature of Beijing's nuclear 02:13.400 --> 02:15.900 doctrine . We need to seriously 02:15.900 --> 02:18.080 consider that we are entering a new 02:18.090 --> 02:21.090 trilateral nuclear competition era . 02:21.100 --> 02:22.822 The Cold War was essentially a 02:22.822 --> 02:24.970 bilateral rivalry between the United 02:24.970 --> 02:26.960 States and the soviet union and 02:26.960 --> 02:29.250 deterrence theory and communication 02:29.250 --> 02:31.250 methods were developed based on two 02:31.250 --> 02:33.560 competitors . Those rules now must 02:33.560 --> 02:36.020 change with the ascendancy of china and 02:36.020 --> 02:38.430 its growing nuclear arsenal and General 02:38.430 --> 02:40.652 Cotton . I'd like to know how you would 02:40.652 --> 02:42.780 address this new deterrence dynamic 02:42.780 --> 02:45.290 involving not one but two near peer 02:45.290 --> 02:48.480 competitors . If confirmed , you will 02:48.480 --> 02:50.647 be responsible for not only the health 02:50.647 --> 02:52.591 of our triad and the n . c . three 02:52.591 --> 02:55.790 system but the 150,000 military 02:55.790 --> 02:58.560 personnel who operate them stratcom 02:58.570 --> 03:00.570 uniformed and civilian workforce is 03:00.570 --> 03:02.570 known to have the highest levels of 03:02.570 --> 03:03.959 personal reliability and 03:03.959 --> 03:05.860 professionalism . It will be your 03:05.860 --> 03:08.480 responsibility to support them and 03:08.480 --> 03:10.591 their families and ensure our nuclear 03:10.591 --> 03:12.480 deterrent can operate effectively 03:12.480 --> 03:14.650 around the clock . Supporting your 03:14.650 --> 03:16.428 command is the national Nuclear 03:16.428 --> 03:18.900 Security administration or N . N . S . 03:18.900 --> 03:21.230 A . Which maintains and develops our 03:21.230 --> 03:23.720 nuclear warheads . The organization has 03:23.720 --> 03:26.770 over 40,000 technicians , engineers and 03:26.770 --> 03:28.714 scientists working at three design 03:28.714 --> 03:31.340 laboratories , one test site and four 03:31.340 --> 03:34.820 production plans . N . N . S . A . Will 03:34.820 --> 03:38.180 need your support as it experiences its 03:38.180 --> 03:41.030 highest workload since 19 eighties in 03:41.030 --> 03:43.510 managing five major warhead programs 03:43.520 --> 03:46.210 while rebuilding nuclear infrastructure . 03:46.220 --> 03:49.980 Finally , the 2022 nuclear posture 03:49.980 --> 03:52.530 review has validated the importance of 03:52.530 --> 03:54.840 modernizing the triad , the N . C . 03:54.840 --> 03:56.820 Three system and the supporting 03:56.820 --> 03:59.840 infrastructure at N . N . S . A . This 03:59.840 --> 04:01.710 is the third historic cycle of 04:01.710 --> 04:04.540 modernization since the 1960s , you 04:04.540 --> 04:06.596 will be responsible for ensuring the 04:06.596 --> 04:08.262 United States can deliver the 04:08.262 --> 04:10.207 capabilities needed to effectively 04:10.207 --> 04:13.670 deter our adversaries . Through 2070 04:13.680 --> 04:15.870 general you will be undertaking 04:15.870 --> 04:17.592 enormous responsibilities . Is 04:17.592 --> 04:20.350 confirmed as I said earlier . The 04:20.350 --> 04:22.580 United States nuclear deterrent is the 04:22.580 --> 04:25.240 bedrock of our national defense . Some 04:25.240 --> 04:27.407 have said that this deterrent is never 04:27.407 --> 04:30.140 used but that is a misconception . It 04:30.140 --> 04:33.970 is used 365 days a year . 24 hours a 04:33.970 --> 04:36.100 day . You will responsible for 04:36.100 --> 04:38.380 continuing to ensure that the United 04:38.380 --> 04:40.491 States and its allies can deter . Not 04:40.491 --> 04:43.430 one but two near pier nuclear 04:43.430 --> 04:45.150 adversaries , something your 04:45.150 --> 04:47.420 predecessors did not face . I look 04:47.420 --> 04:49.253 forward to hearing how you would 04:49.253 --> 04:51.142 prioritize and meet each of these 04:51.142 --> 04:53.253 critical responsibilities . Thank you 04:53.253 --> 04:55.476 again for your willingness to serve our 04:55.476 --> 04:57.364 nation And I look forward to your 04:57.364 --> 04:59.198 testimony . Now let me recognize 04:59.198 --> 05:01.476 ranking member . Thank you mr Chairman . 05:01.476 --> 05:03.698 I also want to welcome General Cotton , 05:03.698 --> 05:05.531 thank him for his long service . 05:05.531 --> 05:07.600 General Cotton . Your predecessor 05:07.600 --> 05:09.767 appeared before this committee several 05:09.767 --> 05:12.210 times over the past few years . Warning 05:12.220 --> 05:15.510 of the growing strategic threats that 05:15.510 --> 05:17.720 we face as a nation . I think we all 05:17.720 --> 05:20.820 understand that China is massive . 05:20.820 --> 05:23.320 Military investments are shifting from 05:23.330 --> 05:25.430 the balance of power in the pacific 05:25.430 --> 05:27.910 even as it builds the capacity to 05:27.910 --> 05:30.770 extend its reach across the globe . 05:30.780 --> 05:34.760 Putin's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine 05:34.770 --> 05:37.410 and its reckless threats of nuclear 05:37.410 --> 05:39.890 escalation remind us of some of the 05:39.890 --> 05:42.370 worst days of the Cold War . We 05:42.370 --> 05:45.290 effectively effectively resisting 05:45.300 --> 05:48.290 china's and Russia's aggression 05:48.300 --> 05:50.730 requires that we remain resolute and 05:50.730 --> 05:54.090 deal with the world as as it is not as 05:54.090 --> 05:56.510 we would prefer it to be . Which is 05:56.510 --> 05:59.870 sometimes a mistake . I was pleased 05:59.870 --> 06:01.759 that the administration's nuclear 06:01.759 --> 06:04.730 posture review declined to reverse many 06:04.740 --> 06:07.780 policy options that would have severely 06:07.780 --> 06:09.613 damaged our nation's deterrent . 06:09.613 --> 06:12.280 However , the administration's decision 06:12.290 --> 06:15.290 to discard planned enhancements to our 06:15.290 --> 06:18.190 forces . Even as china and Russia grow 06:18.190 --> 06:21.530 their arsenals was disappointing to say 06:21.540 --> 06:24.750 the least . Your predecessor , along 06:24.750 --> 06:26.861 with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 06:26.861 --> 06:28.972 and and other senior officers , voice 06:28.972 --> 06:31.230 their objection to these decisions and 06:31.230 --> 06:34.300 on a bipartisan basis , we have taken 06:34.300 --> 06:37.220 steps to reverse those faulty choices . 06:37.230 --> 06:39.760 Moving forward . We need to accelerate 06:39.760 --> 06:41.710 the work of the right size of our 06:41.720 --> 06:44.950 forces to meet strategic deterrence 06:44.960 --> 06:48.110 requirements of the coming decades 06:48.120 --> 06:51.760 trust . You will be advocate for 06:51.760 --> 06:55.410 such efforts as the next 06:55.420 --> 06:58.470 uh Strat commander . Look forward to 06:58.470 --> 07:00.748 your testimony . Thank you Mr Chairman , 07:00.748 --> 07:02.803 thank you . Senator Inhofe . General 07:02.803 --> 07:04.803 Cotton . You're recognized for your 07:04.803 --> 07:07.890 opening statement . Good morning 07:07.890 --> 07:10.300 Chairman , read ranking member Imhof 07:10.420 --> 07:12.253 and distinguished members of the 07:12.253 --> 07:14.510 committee . It's truly an honor to 07:14.520 --> 07:16.960 appear before you today as a nominee to 07:16.960 --> 07:18.810 be the next commander of U . S . 07:18.810 --> 07:21.680 Strategic Command . I am very grateful 07:21.680 --> 07:24.410 to the president Secretary of Defense 07:24.420 --> 07:26.642 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 07:26.642 --> 07:28.864 Staff for their trust and confidence in 07:28.864 --> 07:31.410 me for this nomination . I would like 07:31.410 --> 07:33.521 to recognize the current commander of 07:33.521 --> 07:35.950 us strategic command . Admiral Chaz 07:35.950 --> 07:38.620 Richard and his wife Lisa for their 40 07:38.620 --> 07:41.110 years of selfless service to this great 07:41.110 --> 07:44.140 nation . Joining me today is my wife 07:44.140 --> 07:46.510 Marcia . She has been my best friend 07:46.510 --> 07:49.340 and biggest champion for over 33 years . 07:49.350 --> 07:52.170 A former collegiate athlete and school 07:52.170 --> 07:54.460 teacher , Marcia has been a remarkable 07:54.460 --> 07:56.700 advocate for the men and women and 07:56.700 --> 07:59.150 their families . She is an incredible 07:59.150 --> 08:01.317 source of strength and inspiration for 08:01.317 --> 08:04.860 me and my family not with us today , 08:04.860 --> 08:07.150 but always in our hearts is our son 08:07.150 --> 08:09.690 Russell , an intel analyst and our 08:09.690 --> 08:12.060 daughter Brianna , a recent university 08:12.060 --> 08:14.670 of michigan law school graduate . I'm 08:14.670 --> 08:17.090 so proud of my Children for the past 08:17.090 --> 08:19.110 that they have taken to serve our 08:19.110 --> 08:22.480 nation in their own unique ways . There 08:22.480 --> 08:24.591 are two people who are no longer with 08:24.591 --> 08:26.750 us but whose absence I feel more 08:26.750 --> 08:29.450 strongly on days like today . That's my 08:29.450 --> 08:33.140 mother , Amy and my father James . My 08:33.140 --> 08:35.140 father joined the Army Air Corps in 08:35.140 --> 08:38.150 1942 and fought in the pacific theater 08:38.160 --> 08:40.327 before the establishment of the United 08:40.327 --> 08:42.549 States Air Force and served in both the 08:42.549 --> 08:44.730 korean and Vietnam wars prior to 08:44.730 --> 08:47.560 retiring as a United States Air Force 08:47.560 --> 08:51.400 chief master sergeant . In 1974 . My 08:51.400 --> 08:54.700 mother all five ft two inches of her 08:54.710 --> 08:58.010 was fierce , full of compassion and 08:58.010 --> 09:01.470 kept her boys . The chief and I in line 09:02.520 --> 09:04.687 my parents are the foundation of who I 09:04.687 --> 09:06.909 am and I know they're looking down upon 09:06.909 --> 09:10.510 Team cotton with great pride last night 09:10.510 --> 09:12.566 I want to thank the men and women of 09:12.566 --> 09:14.788 Air force Global Strike Command and U . 09:14.788 --> 09:16.566 S . Strategic Command for their 09:16.566 --> 09:18.232 continued professionalism and 09:18.232 --> 09:20.870 dedication . Their dedication to this 09:20.870 --> 09:23.110 mission is essential in a world where 09:23.110 --> 09:25.430 we now face to near peer competitors . 09:26.020 --> 09:28.420 We must deter the pacing challenge of 09:28.420 --> 09:31.140 china and address the acute threats 09:31.140 --> 09:34.080 presented by Russia . It is both our 09:34.080 --> 09:36.540 conventional and nuclear capabilities 09:36.550 --> 09:39.420 along with the crucial support from our 09:39.430 --> 09:41.840 allies and partners that underpins our 09:41.840 --> 09:44.930 strategic deterrence . Our nation's 09:44.930 --> 09:47.620 nuclear forces continue to be safe , 09:47.630 --> 09:50.040 secure , reliable and effective 09:51.710 --> 09:54.370 as we bring . The B 21 raider , the 09:54.370 --> 09:56.440 Columbia class ballistic missile , 09:56.440 --> 09:58.860 submarine , sentinel , intercontinental 09:58.860 --> 10:01.350 ballistic missile weapons system and 10:01.350 --> 10:04.280 long range standoff weapon online . We 10:04.280 --> 10:06.502 will continue to ensure the credibility 10:06.502 --> 10:08.450 of deterrence for decades to come 10:10.030 --> 10:13.040 underpinning all of this Is our nuclear 10:13.040 --> 10:14.984 command control and communications 10:14.984 --> 10:18.550 systems known as n . c . three . While 10:18.550 --> 10:20.383 the current system is secure and 10:20.383 --> 10:22.990 resilient modernization and sustainment 10:23.000 --> 10:26.510 of this capability is just as important 10:26.520 --> 10:28.298 as the weapons system platforms 10:28.298 --> 10:31.810 themselves . If confirmed . I will use 10:31.810 --> 10:34.150 my authorities to ensure that N . C . 10:34.150 --> 10:36.261 Three systems continue to outpace the 10:36.261 --> 10:39.220 threat we'll always build in margin . 10:39.230 --> 10:42.080 We'll always have hedge the mission of 10:42.080 --> 10:44.247 U . S . Strategic command is deter our 10:44.247 --> 10:46.024 adversaries and employ force to 10:46.024 --> 10:48.080 guarantee the security of our nation 10:48.080 --> 10:50.880 and our allies . If confirmed I will 10:50.880 --> 10:53.120 work with relevant agencies across the 10:53.130 --> 10:55.270 U . S . Government and within deal 10:55.280 --> 10:58.100 collaborate closely with civilian 10:58.100 --> 11:00.320 leaders and directly with my fellow 11:00.320 --> 11:02.700 combatant commanders as we monitor the 11:02.700 --> 11:04.922 global threats and execute operations . 11:04.922 --> 11:07.144 In accordance with the National Defense 11:07.144 --> 11:10.700 strategy I commit to commanding a 11:10.710 --> 11:12.543 resilient joint force capable of 11:12.543 --> 11:14.780 conducting multi domain operations 11:14.780 --> 11:16.947 focused on deterrent aggression and if 11:16.947 --> 11:19.480 necessary defending this nation . I 11:19.480 --> 11:21.591 look forward to working with Congress 11:21.591 --> 11:23.647 and the members of this committee to 11:23.647 --> 11:25.702 address strategic challenges of this 11:25.702 --> 11:27.758 great nation . Chairman Reed ranking 11:27.758 --> 11:29.980 member in hough . Distinguished members 11:29.980 --> 11:32.091 of this committee . It is an honor to 11:32.091 --> 11:34.313 sit before you today and I look forward 11:34.313 --> 11:36.536 to answering your questions . Thank you 11:36.536 --> 11:38.647 very much . General . I have a series 11:38.647 --> 11:40.591 of questions that are standard for 11:40.591 --> 11:42.258 nominees . Uh You may respond 11:42.258 --> 11:44.560 appropriately . Have you adhered to a 11:44.560 --> 11:46.282 political laws and regulations 11:46.282 --> 11:48.820 governing conflicts of interest ? Have 11:48.820 --> 11:50.876 you assumed any duties or taking any 11:50.876 --> 11:52.931 actions that would appear to presume 11:52.931 --> 11:55.264 the outcome of the confirmation process , 11:55.264 --> 11:57.050 exercising our legislative and 11:57.050 --> 11:59.390 oversight responsibilities . Makes it 11:59.390 --> 12:01.279 important that this committee its 12:01.279 --> 12:03.279 subcommittees and other appropriate 12:03.279 --> 12:05.057 committees of Congress received 12:05.057 --> 12:07.279 testimony briefings , reports , records 12:07.279 --> 12:09.001 and other information from the 12:09.001 --> 12:11.520 executive branch on a timely basis . Do 12:11.520 --> 12:14.130 you agree if confirm to appear and 12:14.130 --> 12:16.074 testify before this committee when 12:16.074 --> 12:18.140 requested ? Chairman ? I do do you 12:18.140 --> 12:20.307 agree when asked before this committee 12:20.307 --> 12:22.307 to give your personal views even if 12:22.307 --> 12:23.807 your views differ from the 12:23.807 --> 12:26.930 administration . Do you agree to 12:26.930 --> 12:28.830 provide records , documents and 12:28.830 --> 12:30.941 electronic communications in a timely 12:30.941 --> 12:33.274 manner when requested by this committee , 12:33.274 --> 12:35.441 its subcommittees or other appropriate 12:35.441 --> 12:37.552 committees of Congress and to consult 12:37.552 --> 12:39.774 with the request or regarding the basis 12:39.774 --> 12:42.320 for any good faith delay or denial and 12:42.320 --> 12:45.080 providing such records ? Will you 12:45.080 --> 12:47.136 ensure that your staff complies with 12:47.136 --> 12:49.358 deadlines established by this committee 12:49.358 --> 12:51.580 for the production of reports , records 12:51.580 --> 12:53.747 and other information including timely 12:53.747 --> 12:55.969 responding to hearing questions for the 12:55.969 --> 12:58.160 record . Will you cooperate in 12:58.160 --> 13:00.160 providing witnesses and briefers in 13:00.160 --> 13:02.160 response to congressional request ? 13:02.440 --> 13:04.730 Will those witnesses and briefing 13:04.740 --> 13:07.680 briefers be protected from Reprisal for 13:07.680 --> 13:10.390 their testimony or briefing ? Thank you . 13:10.390 --> 13:14.380 General General uh the 2018 13:14.390 --> 13:17.060 nuclear posture review recommended a 13:17.060 --> 13:19.460 supplemental nuclear system to the 13:19.460 --> 13:21.540 triad . A submarine launched cruise 13:21.540 --> 13:24.850 missile or slipping . And the 13:24.860 --> 13:28.700 2022 NPR did not pursue it . And what 13:28.700 --> 13:32.020 are your views on the sub nuclear 13:32.030 --> 13:35.680 submarine launched missile ? Chairman , 13:35.680 --> 13:39.640 thank you for the question If confirmed . 13:40.490 --> 13:44.090 My job is to be able to present 13:44.910 --> 13:47.021 the decision maker . The President of 13:47.021 --> 13:49.077 United States with a wide variety of 13:49.077 --> 13:51.980 options to be able to meet um 13:51.990 --> 13:54.950 challenges that that we have seen to be 13:54.960 --> 13:58.790 warranted due to a requirement um 13:59.600 --> 14:01.822 in this case I would want to be able to 14:01.822 --> 14:04.040 present the maximum amount the maximum 14:04.040 --> 14:07.480 capabilities that are available when it 14:07.480 --> 14:10.250 comes to slip them in . I must admit 14:10.260 --> 14:13.710 that I would like to be able to do like 14:13.720 --> 14:16.280 my predecessors before to make an 14:16.280 --> 14:19.070 assessment on that . If it meets the if 14:19.070 --> 14:22.710 it is able to meet that capability gap 14:22.720 --> 14:25.500 that is there . Um I'd like to be able 14:25.500 --> 14:27.850 to see that and assess that . Um so I 14:27.850 --> 14:31.640 can make my bed military assessment 14:31.650 --> 14:33.920 on the specific weapons system itself 14:33.920 --> 14:35.920 because I am not familiar with that 14:35.920 --> 14:38.580 weapon system on the specifics of what 14:38.580 --> 14:41.290 it can do with the capabilities . Um to 14:41.290 --> 14:43.650 close the capability gap that we might 14:43.660 --> 14:47.300 perceive . Uh general . As I noted in 14:47.300 --> 14:49.770 my opening statement , we're now facing 14:49.780 --> 14:53.300 a three way nuclear race uh 14:53.310 --> 14:55.900 which alters some of the traditional 14:55.900 --> 14:58.320 notions of deterrence based on the 14:58.320 --> 15:01.560 bipolar world of the Cold War . Uh If 15:01.560 --> 15:03.560 confirmed , Do you believe that you 15:03.560 --> 15:05.560 will have the sufficient forces and 15:05.560 --> 15:07.616 capability to undertake this new and 15:07.616 --> 15:10.060 evolving mission ? Chairman , Thanks 15:10.060 --> 15:12.810 for the question . I'd like to answer 15:12.810 --> 15:15.190 that . two ways . 15:16.580 --> 15:20.320 The current force that we have today . 15:20.330 --> 15:23.830 Uh We're ready to to execute 15:23.830 --> 15:26.200 today . What I would say is if 15:26.200 --> 15:27.830 confirmed and I know this is 15:27.830 --> 15:31.530 continually happening today is we must 15:31.530 --> 15:35.050 evaluate what the additional risks are 15:35.060 --> 15:37.240 and what the adversary is doing to 15:37.240 --> 15:40.760 ensure . Uh two things first 15:40.770 --> 15:43.380 uh to evaluate to make sure that the 15:43.380 --> 15:46.450 nuclear strategy that we have within 15:46.450 --> 15:49.640 strategic command can meet 15:50.010 --> 15:53.520 the objective the national objectives 15:53.520 --> 15:56.510 that are presented before us . So the 15:56.510 --> 15:59.080 first thing I would do if confirmed is 15:59.080 --> 16:02.450 to ensure because sir , the first 16:02.450 --> 16:06.080 time Since 1945 , the first 16:06.080 --> 16:08.980 time for for us as a nation , we have 16:08.980 --> 16:11.780 to near peer adversaries . We have 16:11.780 --> 16:15.110 always put together a nuclear 16:15.110 --> 16:18.780 defense strategy that has 16:18.780 --> 16:22.170 one nuclear peer , we were going to 16:22.170 --> 16:24.960 have to roll up our sleeves to ensure 16:24.970 --> 16:27.192 that we're doing everything we are that 16:27.192 --> 16:29.850 we can strategy wise within Strategic 16:29.860 --> 16:32.150 Air Command . Excuse me between 16:32.160 --> 16:35.400 stratcom to ensure that that we're 16:35.400 --> 16:37.456 meeting the objectives to be able to 16:37.456 --> 16:40.160 have and take care of to near peers . 16:40.170 --> 16:42.281 First time in history that we've ever 16:42.281 --> 16:45.040 seen that . Thank you sir . Uh stratcom 16:45.040 --> 16:47.096 is the joint staff lead for ensuring 16:47.096 --> 16:48.984 that joint force can successfully 16:48.984 --> 16:51.980 defend and prosecute electronic warfare 16:52.030 --> 16:53.860 which is now referred to as 16:53.870 --> 16:56.990 electromagnetic spectrum operations or 16:57.000 --> 17:00.800 m so Russia has successfully used em so 17:00.800 --> 17:02.970 in Ukraine and china has greatly 17:02.970 --> 17:05.400 expanded their capabilities . Can you 17:05.400 --> 17:07.567 tell us this view , your views on this 17:07.567 --> 17:10.060 subject and if confirmed , will you 17:10.060 --> 17:12.530 ensure re serious your full attention ? 17:14.090 --> 17:17.220 Thank thank you chairman . Absolutely . 17:17.230 --> 17:21.140 So if confirmed , um it is going to be 17:21.140 --> 17:24.980 a front burner item um within uh 17:24.990 --> 17:27.510 stratcom , you know , I know right now 17:27.510 --> 17:29.320 that the executive D O D E M s 17:29.320 --> 17:31.680 superiority strategic implementation 17:31.680 --> 17:34.800 plan has been laid out um in which the 17:34.810 --> 17:38.070 commander of stratcom um is going to be 17:38.070 --> 17:41.710 the lead and and that the direct report , 17:41.720 --> 17:45.050 the direct report um to the commander 17:45.050 --> 17:48.920 of stratcom . Um That is something 17:48.920 --> 17:51.820 that if confirmed , um I want to be 17:51.820 --> 17:54.180 able to dive down and do a true 17:54.180 --> 17:56.347 assessment of what's going on with the 17:56.347 --> 17:59.210 M . S . Um I agree . Um It has 17:59.220 --> 18:02.010 atrophied over the over the decades . 18:02.020 --> 18:04.540 Um and and now with two near peers , 18:04.550 --> 18:07.070 we're gonna have to understand how to 18:07.070 --> 18:09.403 attack that and how to attack it . Well . 18:09.403 --> 18:12.100 So um it is absolutely something that I 18:12.100 --> 18:15.740 would uh look into . Sir . Thank you 18:15.740 --> 18:18.190 very much , Senator Inhofe please . 18:18.650 --> 18:22.550 Thank you Mr Chairman . I do 18:22.550 --> 18:26.130 have three questions . And uh and you 18:26.130 --> 18:28.400 have addressed all three of these , 18:28.410 --> 18:30.632 give you a chance to elaborate a little 18:30.632 --> 18:32.550 bit more . If that's your desire 18:32.560 --> 18:34.393 general Cotton , we all know how 18:34.393 --> 18:36.560 critical it is . We build our nation's 18:36.560 --> 18:38.570 nuclear deterrent , but we're still 18:38.570 --> 18:40.780 years away from fielding any new 18:40.780 --> 18:43.690 systems . So in terms of your 18:43.690 --> 18:46.610 priorities , how important is it that 18:46.610 --> 18:49.780 we accelerate as much of the US nuclear 18:49.780 --> 18:53.120 modernization plan as soon as possible . 18:56.680 --> 18:59.870 Senator , thank you for the question I 18:59.870 --> 19:02.050 think about it this way . So if if if 19:02.050 --> 19:05.600 confirmed , I think the 19:05.610 --> 19:09.570 challenge of Strategic command is 19:09.570 --> 19:13.420 to ensure that we sustain 19:13.420 --> 19:16.550 legacy system as we transition to the 19:16.550 --> 19:19.910 modern to our modernized systems . Um 19:19.920 --> 19:23.100 that's gonna be key for us um in order 19:23.100 --> 19:27.060 to do that . Um it's gonna 19:27.060 --> 19:30.790 take the it's going to take the full 19:30.800 --> 19:33.320 power of government to be able to pull 19:33.320 --> 19:35.431 that together , especially when we're 19:35.431 --> 19:37.320 talking about the sentinel weapon 19:37.320 --> 19:40.590 system um and the Columbia and all of 19:40.590 --> 19:42.890 the five that I have under my purview 19:42.900 --> 19:45.140 um as a current Joint Forces Air 19:45.140 --> 19:49.040 component commander um um working 19:49.040 --> 19:51.570 for the Commander of stratcom . So 19:51.580 --> 19:54.510 being able to do that , sir , I think a 19:54.520 --> 19:56.409 couple of key things are gonna be 19:56.409 --> 19:58.680 required from us . We're gonna need 19:58.690 --> 20:01.670 stable , predictable and adequate and 20:01.670 --> 20:05.170 timely funding . My job , if confirmed 20:05.170 --> 20:07.440 as the commander of stratcom , is to 20:07.440 --> 20:09.610 ensure that we also have stable 20:09.610 --> 20:11.820 requirements because what we're going 20:11.820 --> 20:14.660 to see and what I think is gonna be um 20:15.320 --> 20:17.620 great for us with the new modernized 20:17.630 --> 20:19.790 systems is the fact that we're by 20:19.790 --> 20:22.650 design building in a system that we 20:22.650 --> 20:26.050 know will last for decades because 20:26.050 --> 20:28.161 that's built into the system . So the 20:28.161 --> 20:31.550 modularity that we will see um will be 20:31.550 --> 20:34.870 able to keep pace with the threats that 20:34.870 --> 20:37.060 we will see in the future . What we 20:37.060 --> 20:39.227 need to do in the meantime though , is 20:39.227 --> 20:42.470 to sustain the legacy system that's 20:42.470 --> 20:45.140 still that is still safe , secure and 20:45.140 --> 20:47.720 effective as we make that transition . 20:47.730 --> 20:49.730 That's good . And I appreciate that 20:49.730 --> 20:53.520 very much the um it's 20:53.520 --> 20:55.464 already been mentioned a couple of 20:55.464 --> 20:57.990 times , talking about the two peer to 20:58.000 --> 21:00.890 peer adversaries . This is something 21:00.890 --> 21:03.057 that we have not done before . This is 21:03.057 --> 21:06.220 new . And uh even though you did 21:06.230 --> 21:08.174 already address this , you've been 21:08.174 --> 21:10.063 asked this question , even by the 21:10.063 --> 21:12.063 chairman , I'd like to give you the 21:12.063 --> 21:15.950 opportunity to uh expand 21:15.950 --> 21:18.790 if you want to on on how we're gonna 21:18.790 --> 21:21.012 handle this . What's gonna be different 21:21.012 --> 21:24.200 about two adversaries ? Thank you , 21:24.200 --> 21:27.390 Senator . What's different is 21:28.380 --> 21:31.950 to near peers that actually 21:32.600 --> 21:35.220 act differently from from a doctrines 21:35.220 --> 21:39.140 perspective , we understand Russian 21:39.150 --> 21:41.480 nuclear theory and nuclear doctrine 21:43.000 --> 21:45.540 Minimum deterrence was what we thought 21:45.550 --> 21:49.490 of when we talked of China as recent as 21:49.500 --> 21:53.270 2018 we have seen 21:53.280 --> 21:55.930 um the incredible expansiveness of what 21:55.930 --> 21:58.208 they're doing with their nuclear force , 21:58.208 --> 22:01.610 which does not , in my opinion 22:01.910 --> 22:05.240 reflect minimal deterrence . They have 22:05.240 --> 22:09.160 a bona fide triad now . So we're gonna 22:09.160 --> 22:12.130 have to understand more deeply 22:12.140 --> 22:16.110 um the chinese nuclear strategy . 22:16.720 --> 22:18.831 All right , I appreciate that . Now . 22:18.831 --> 22:22.130 The while the Chairman did talk about 22:22.130 --> 22:24.280 this before , I wanna frame the 22:24.280 --> 22:27.840 question as my last question a little 22:27.840 --> 22:29.896 bit differently , General Cotton , a 22:29.896 --> 22:32.940 number of the senior military officers 22:32.940 --> 22:34.884 have testified to their support of 22:34.884 --> 22:36.830 continuing the sea launch , cruise 22:36.840 --> 22:39.460 missile program , including the 22:39.460 --> 22:41.571 chairman and the Vice Chairman of the 22:41.571 --> 22:43.640 Joint Chiefs , the Chief of Naval 22:43.640 --> 22:46.210 Operations and the commanders of the U . 22:46.210 --> 22:49.060 S . Strategic and european command . Do 22:49.060 --> 22:50.880 you agree with 22:52.180 --> 22:55.560 not ? Do you do you agree with these 22:55.570 --> 22:57.990 leaders right now and and your 22:57.990 --> 23:00.070 colleagues that we should keep this 23:00.070 --> 23:02.940 program going ? And I'd like to have 23:02.940 --> 23:06.170 you give it be as specific as possible 23:06.180 --> 23:08.560 because we all know what the program is . 23:08.570 --> 23:11.620 We've all expressed ourselves on it . 23:11.630 --> 23:14.640 So I'd like to have your um your 23:14.640 --> 23:17.440 thoughts on this . Yes , senator . 23:18.230 --> 23:21.770 So so the chairman , the vice chairman 23:21.770 --> 23:23.870 and the current Commander of US 23:23.870 --> 23:26.560 Strategic Command um absolutely 23:26.560 --> 23:29.190 understand where they are on the 23:29.190 --> 23:31.520 endorsement of continuing 23:32.720 --> 23:36.150 um from my perspective . Um I I 23:36.150 --> 23:38.094 absolutely understand that they're 23:38.094 --> 23:40.094 looking at the capability gap to be 23:40.094 --> 23:42.510 able to do that . The only thing that's 23:42.510 --> 23:44.960 different between they and I is I have 23:44.960 --> 23:47.127 yet to do an assessment on the weapons 23:47.127 --> 23:50.430 system itself . Um but but I absolutely 23:50.430 --> 23:52.652 understand where they are on being able 23:52.652 --> 23:54.930 to have a capability gap that is filled 23:54.940 --> 23:58.620 um that they have seen . Um I have seen 23:58.620 --> 24:01.610 that capability gap as well . Um And I 24:01.610 --> 24:03.721 endorse the fact that we need to fill 24:03.721 --> 24:05.990 that capability gap . Thank you . 24:05.990 --> 24:08.920 General , thank you Senator Senator 24:08.920 --> 24:12.050 Shaheen please . Um Good morning , 24:12.060 --> 24:14.100 congratulations . General Cotton on 24:14.100 --> 24:16.267 your nomination . Thank you to you and 24:16.267 --> 24:18.610 your family for your long service . Um 24:18.620 --> 24:20.970 I would like to begin by following up a 24:20.970 --> 24:22.740 little bit on Senator Inhofe's 24:22.740 --> 24:25.610 questions about the challenges with 24:25.610 --> 24:27.890 modernization and you talked about a 24:27.890 --> 24:30.057 dependable budget process . You talked 24:30.057 --> 24:32.279 about a whole of government cooperative 24:32.279 --> 24:34.850 effort . What you didn't talk about is 24:34.850 --> 24:38.620 the supply chain and the challenges 24:38.620 --> 24:40.790 with making sure we have the critical 24:40.790 --> 24:44.500 minerals , the other um requirements to 24:44.500 --> 24:46.760 modernize our nuclear arsenal . Can you 24:46.760 --> 24:48.927 talk a little bit about what you think 24:48.927 --> 24:51.020 those challenges are and how you see 24:51.030 --> 24:54.050 the ability to impact that and what we 24:54.050 --> 24:56.383 should be thinking about as a committee . 24:57.180 --> 24:59.236 Thank you senator for the question . 24:59.236 --> 25:02.620 Absolutely correct . Um , as we are 25:02.620 --> 25:04.731 seeing the modern , the modernization 25:04.731 --> 25:06.953 programs within the nuclear portfolio , 25:06.953 --> 25:08.787 I would venture to say that it's 25:08.787 --> 25:10.670 probably being seen across the 25:10.670 --> 25:12.392 Department of Defense , but in 25:12.392 --> 25:14.559 particular for the nuclear portfolio . 25:14.559 --> 25:17.050 Um , even as we're seeing the industry 25:17.050 --> 25:19.570 partners to Herculean efforts and work 25:19.580 --> 25:22.910 um , in in in in in moving the programs 25:22.910 --> 25:26.000 along at a great pace . What we are now 25:26.000 --> 25:28.610 finding is the realities of supply 25:28.610 --> 25:31.660 chain Limitations and and supply chains 25:31.660 --> 25:34.360 shortfalls . Um , we had a great 25:34.360 --> 25:36.590 discussion and and and a good example 25:36.590 --> 25:38.920 or some components that are us made 25:38.920 --> 25:41.380 components with us made sub components 25:41.390 --> 25:43.900 that are still taking what would be on 25:43.900 --> 25:47.430 average , maybe 10 days to 25:47.440 --> 25:49.620 source , that are now taking up to 90 25:49.620 --> 25:52.300 days to source . So by definition , if 25:52.300 --> 25:54.630 you look at what we need to do in in 25:54.630 --> 25:57.050 regards to maintaining a flow and 25:57.050 --> 25:59.300 schedule to get our new modernized 25:59.310 --> 26:01.320 systems online . You know , if you 26:01.320 --> 26:04.370 introduce that into the flow , uh , 26:04.380 --> 26:06.324 those delays right . They're gonna 26:06.324 --> 26:09.210 cause me concern and I think it's gonna 26:09.210 --> 26:12.300 take everyone to understand how we can 26:12.300 --> 26:14.580 close the gap on supply chain 26:14.580 --> 26:18.010 management and ensure that we can get 26:18.010 --> 26:21.960 the that supplies to the 26:21.970 --> 26:24.026 industry partners that are trying to 26:24.026 --> 26:25.970 modernize this force . And are you 26:25.970 --> 26:28.192 comfortable that we have the components 26:28.192 --> 26:30.026 that we're going to need , being 26:30.026 --> 26:32.248 manufactured within the United States , 26:32.248 --> 26:34.920 the materials that we need um , being 26:34.920 --> 26:37.500 produced in the United States ma'am 26:37.510 --> 26:41.200 ma'am . I did until we started to see 26:41.200 --> 26:44.670 the you know that kind of peek into to 26:44.670 --> 26:46.790 the schedule as being problems with 26:46.790 --> 26:50.050 supply chain . Thank you . Um 26:50.680 --> 26:54.170 There is can you describe how 26:54.170 --> 26:56.820 you analyze the difference between 26:56.820 --> 26:58.930 strategic deterrence and integrated 26:58.930 --> 27:01.040 deterrence and how you see that 27:01.040 --> 27:03.840 affecting your role if at all in terms 27:03.840 --> 27:07.210 of the mission of stratcom ? 27:07.800 --> 27:09.911 Yes ma'am . Thanks for the question . 27:09.911 --> 27:12.580 Um It's integral um Integrated 27:12.580 --> 27:15.210 deterrence um is a whole of government 27:15.220 --> 27:18.230 opportunity um In the in the way I 27:18.230 --> 27:22.050 describe that is it is I remember 27:22.060 --> 27:24.500 growing up and using the dime theory 27:24.500 --> 27:27.280 when I was a young lieutenant but it's 27:27.280 --> 27:29.391 using all instruments of power within 27:29.391 --> 27:31.613 within the government the United States 27:31.613 --> 27:34.540 um to afford us a deterrence factor . 27:34.550 --> 27:37.720 Um That makes it so we never have to 27:37.720 --> 27:39.940 get to the day where where I have to 27:39.940 --> 27:42.520 execute the mission if confirmed um 27:42.520 --> 27:44.830 from U . S . Strategic command . Um 27:44.840 --> 27:48.650 Strategic deterrence to me um composes 27:48.650 --> 27:50.650 more than just nuclear deterrence . 27:50.650 --> 27:53.180 Strategic deterrence to me is has a 27:53.180 --> 27:56.000 conventional and a nuclear component to 27:56.000 --> 27:59.140 it . Um And it is the backstop in my 27:59.140 --> 28:02.670 opinion um to ensure that we can deter 28:02.670 --> 28:05.520 forces um when called upon . 28:07.650 --> 28:11.200 So does the focus on integrated 28:11.200 --> 28:13.790 deterrents change the role that you 28:13.790 --> 28:16.800 would have confirmed as the head of 28:16.800 --> 28:19.330 stratcom ma'am I don't believe so 28:19.330 --> 28:21.680 because I think strategic deterrence is 28:21.680 --> 28:23.920 an integral part of the overarching 28:23.930 --> 28:26.650 integrated deterrence that that that we 28:26.650 --> 28:30.190 all speak of . Thank you . Um one of 28:30.190 --> 28:34.110 the you know , as someone who remembers 28:34.110 --> 28:37.630 the Cold War very vividly and the focus 28:37.640 --> 28:41.340 on the concern about nuclear 28:41.350 --> 28:44.620 annihilation and the ability to 28:44.630 --> 28:47.980 um destroy the world that way . 28:47.990 --> 28:50.550 And there was a lot of attention to 28:50.550 --> 28:54.140 that that has dissipated over the years 28:54.140 --> 28:55.807 with some of the arms control 28:55.807 --> 28:59.000 agreements . And but I think as we look 28:59.000 --> 29:00.889 at the war in Ukraine and some of 29:00.889 --> 29:03.056 Vladimir Putin's statements , there is 29:03.056 --> 29:06.260 a renewed concern about what um what 29:06.260 --> 29:08.770 the use of nuclear weapons would mean . 29:09.990 --> 29:12.960 Are there ways in which you think are 29:12.970 --> 29:16.870 um strategic command , our our 29:16.870 --> 29:19.360 nuclear um triad 29:20.780 --> 29:23.120 are helping to constrain what Vladimir 29:23.120 --> 29:26.030 Putin does now in this war in Ukraine . 29:27.400 --> 29:29.400 Senator thanks for the question . I 29:29.400 --> 29:33.150 absolutely believe that our nuclear 29:33.150 --> 29:35.730 deterrent force held . 29:36.530 --> 29:40.360 Um we did not 29:40.360 --> 29:44.040 see um Russia do anything with 29:44.040 --> 29:47.180 our native or our our NATO 29:47.180 --> 29:51.100 partners . Um the rhetoric may have , 29:51.100 --> 29:54.680 we may have heard the rhetoric . Um but 29:54.690 --> 29:57.500 I think at the end of the day , um 29:58.070 --> 30:01.250 Russia and china both understand that 30:01.250 --> 30:04.820 we have a strong um resilient 30:04.830 --> 30:08.430 nuclear force um that is offering 30:08.430 --> 30:11.250 deterrence to ourselves um and extended 30:11.250 --> 30:13.810 to turns to our allies . Thank you . 30:13.810 --> 30:16.410 Thank you Mr Chairman , thank you . 30:16.420 --> 30:18.364 Senator Senator Fischer , please . 30:18.364 --> 30:20.253 Thank you Mr Chairman , thank you 30:20.253 --> 30:22.810 General for being here today and thank 30:22.810 --> 30:24.699 you for being your willingness to 30:24.699 --> 30:27.160 continue your service to this country . 30:27.170 --> 30:29.990 Um I'd like to welcome your family as 30:29.990 --> 30:33.470 well madam . It's nice to see you here 30:33.470 --> 30:35.710 and I know the sacrifices that you and 30:35.710 --> 30:37.654 your family make on behalf of this 30:37.654 --> 30:40.280 country as well . Thank you General 30:40.280 --> 30:44.160 Cotton a lot of times in this committee 30:44.160 --> 30:46.216 and on the subcommittee of Strategic 30:46.216 --> 30:48.320 Forces . Our main focus is on 30:48.320 --> 30:51.810 modernization of our triad . Uh We also 30:51.810 --> 30:54.880 try to gain a fuller 30:54.880 --> 30:58.620 understanding of the future needs that 30:58.620 --> 31:01.130 our military must have to provide for 31:01.130 --> 31:04.700 national security . And 31:04.700 --> 31:07.050 we talk about things like slick . Um 31:07.300 --> 31:11.140 and um the need that commanders such as 31:11.140 --> 31:13.940 yourself will have to have to provide 31:13.940 --> 31:17.660 options to the president uh when or 31:17.670 --> 31:21.150 if you are ever in that position , the 31:21.150 --> 31:23.910 more options you can present , the 31:23.920 --> 31:26.253 better for the security of this country , 31:26.253 --> 31:28.142 the better for the people of this 31:28.142 --> 31:31.010 country But also under the duties and 31:31.010 --> 31:34.370 responsibilities of the Stratcom 31:34.380 --> 31:37.620 Combatant Commander . We need to look 31:37.620 --> 31:41.220 at the importance of n . c . three . We 31:41.220 --> 31:43.960 have to look at the N N . S . A . Is 31:43.970 --> 31:47.290 supporting infrastructure as well . So 31:47.300 --> 31:50.020 general , I think that when we talk 31:50.020 --> 31:53.730 about nuclear modernization um and we 31:53.730 --> 31:55.900 have that focus on the triad , on the 31:55.900 --> 31:59.520 weapons systems , the warheads ? Uh 31:59.530 --> 32:02.600 We we shouldn't forget we should not 32:02.600 --> 32:04.322 forget about N . C . Three the 32:04.322 --> 32:07.020 architecture as well as the scientific 32:07.020 --> 32:09.810 and production infrastructure of N N . 32:09.810 --> 32:12.740 S . A . Can you talk about how 32:12.740 --> 32:15.180 important these elements are to the 32:15.180 --> 32:17.560 deterrent and the modernization 32:17.560 --> 32:19.616 challenge that we're seeing in these 32:19.616 --> 32:22.460 areas as well , senator . I'd love to , 32:22.470 --> 32:24.414 you know , I'll start with N . C . 32:24.414 --> 32:26.526 Three . I know there's members of the 32:26.526 --> 32:28.692 committee that says it's that it's the 32:28.692 --> 32:30.859 it's the fourth of the triad , right ? 32:30.859 --> 32:32.970 It's the quad . I've I've heard folks 32:32.970 --> 32:35.970 say that um I call it the tapestry . 32:36.680 --> 32:38.847 Um in my opening statement , you heard 32:38.847 --> 32:41.000 you heard me discuss and talk about ? 32:41.010 --> 32:43.160 Um It is just as important as the 32:43.160 --> 32:45.104 platforms that we're talking about 32:45.104 --> 32:47.438 modernizing and that is absolutely true . 32:47.438 --> 32:50.750 Um The good news is um it is still a 32:50.770 --> 32:53.690 it's a resilient system today . Um 32:54.930 --> 32:58.590 What I like um having over 36 years in 32:58.590 --> 33:01.260 this business is the conversations that 33:01.260 --> 33:04.030 people like yourself and others also 33:04.030 --> 33:07.020 see it as just as important as 33:07.020 --> 33:10.300 the as the weapons systems that we that 33:10.300 --> 33:13.100 we often talk about . Um if confirmed . 33:13.110 --> 33:16.600 Um I'd use my authorities um 33:16.610 --> 33:20.430 at as everyone is aware the the neck 33:20.430 --> 33:22.597 or the N . C . Three enterprise center 33:22.597 --> 33:24.430 that is located within Strategic 33:24.430 --> 33:26.730 Command . Um And the commander 33:26.730 --> 33:28.563 Strategic Command having kind of 33:28.563 --> 33:30.230 oversight delegated oversight 33:30.230 --> 33:32.730 authorities to be able to kinda make 33:32.730 --> 33:35.350 sure that we as a department are 33:35.350 --> 33:37.120 looking to ensure that we are 33:37.120 --> 33:39.790 modernizing with next gen technologies . 33:39.800 --> 33:42.400 Um I call it N C . Two over assured 33:42.410 --> 33:45.420 comms to ensure that we have um the 33:45.420 --> 33:47.253 state of the art , N . C . Three 33:47.253 --> 33:50.280 systems that we need for not only today , 33:50.290 --> 33:53.210 not only mid term but the future and 33:53.210 --> 33:55.432 that is going to be absolutely critical 33:55.432 --> 33:58.110 for us because I guarantee you that I 33:58.110 --> 34:01.380 want to ensure that we always outpace 34:01.380 --> 34:03.560 our adversaries who are also paying 34:03.560 --> 34:05.838 attention to our N . C . Three systems , 34:07.050 --> 34:09.680 stratcom also has significant 34:09.680 --> 34:11.230 responsibilities for the 34:11.230 --> 34:13.850 electromagnetic spectrum operations . 34:13.850 --> 34:16.640 Can you describe some of the challenges 34:16.650 --> 34:19.650 in this mission area and what stratcom 34:19.650 --> 34:21.594 is doing to help rebuild the force 34:21.594 --> 34:24.170 structure and the capabilities that we 34:24.170 --> 34:27.480 need ? Yes , ma'am . So so from my 34:27.480 --> 34:29.480 vantage point as a joint Forces air 34:29.480 --> 34:32.210 component commander , um I can only 34:32.210 --> 34:35.620 give my advantage of of of what I have 34:35.620 --> 34:37.842 in the Air Force side of the House . If 34:37.842 --> 34:39.842 confirmed . I would like to make an 34:39.842 --> 34:42.009 assessment on the entire portfolio but 34:42.009 --> 34:44.231 but from our vantage point , um I think 34:44.231 --> 34:46.970 we're a little behind and um um I don't 34:46.970 --> 34:49.137 think I know we're behind . Um but the 34:49.137 --> 34:51.303 good news is I know that we're working 34:51.303 --> 34:53.860 to try to close the gap on unless not 34:53.870 --> 34:56.480 paying attention to E . M . S . Um for 34:56.490 --> 34:59.800 for decades . So if confirmed um that 34:59.800 --> 35:02.950 would be one of the one of the things 35:02.950 --> 35:05.172 that that would be on on the plate that 35:05.172 --> 35:08.440 I would absolutely want to assess um 35:08.440 --> 35:10.440 and be the greatest advocate that I 35:10.440 --> 35:12.920 could be as the commander of stratcom 35:12.930 --> 35:16.810 in ensuring that we have the the 35:16.820 --> 35:20.290 not the not pace um our adversaries but 35:20.290 --> 35:22.401 lead our adversaries in that domain . 35:22.401 --> 35:24.860 Thank you . I was going to ask you 35:24.870 --> 35:27.920 about also as as critics portray our 35:27.920 --> 35:30.840 nuclear deterrence as a relic of the 35:30.850 --> 35:33.610 Cold War , but I will send that to you 35:33.610 --> 35:35.670 in a written question . Thank you . 35:35.680 --> 35:37.736 Thank you . Senator Fischer Center . 35:37.820 --> 35:39.653 Please thank you . Mr Chairman . 35:39.653 --> 35:42.060 Welcome General Cotton and mrs Cotton 35:42.310 --> 35:46.030 uh as um part of my responsibilities on 35:46.030 --> 35:48.252 this committee to ensure the fitness of 35:48.252 --> 35:50.630 nominees for appointment to senior 35:50.630 --> 35:52.852 positions within the administration . I 35:52.852 --> 35:54.630 asked the following two initial 35:54.630 --> 35:56.852 questions of all nominees to all of the 35:56.852 --> 35:59.019 committees on which I served since you 35:59.019 --> 36:01.074 became a legal adult . Have you ever 36:01.074 --> 36:02.963 made unwanted requests for sexual 36:02.963 --> 36:05.080 favors or committed any verbal or 36:05.080 --> 36:07.130 physical harassment or assault of a 36:07.130 --> 36:10.290 sexual nature ? Have you ever faced 36:10.290 --> 36:12.512 discipline or entered into a settlement 36:12.512 --> 36:14.290 related to this kind of conduct 36:16.320 --> 36:18.542 general . You've been asked a number of 36:18.542 --> 36:20.709 questions about silica men . And while 36:20.709 --> 36:22.598 some military leaders , including 36:22.598 --> 36:24.764 Chairman Milley , have expressed their 36:24.764 --> 36:27.098 support for slick . Um um several D . O . 36:27.098 --> 36:28.987 D . Officials including Secretary 36:28.987 --> 36:30.653 Austin , have expressed their 36:30.653 --> 36:33.110 opposition to the project . I share the 36:33.110 --> 36:35.610 concerns expressed by Secretary Austin 36:35.620 --> 36:37.564 that the development of such a low 36:37.564 --> 36:40.190 yield or tactical nuclear cruise 36:40.190 --> 36:42.750 missile is unnecessary and could lead 36:42.750 --> 36:46.500 to a dangerous new nuclear arms race . 36:46.510 --> 36:49.050 The United States should be a leader in 36:49.050 --> 36:51.420 international efforts to reduce nuclear 36:51.420 --> 36:53.310 stockpiles and prevent nuclear 36:53.310 --> 36:55.700 proliferation while still ensuring we 36:55.700 --> 36:57.970 maintain cutting edge capabilities to 36:57.970 --> 37:00.670 protect our national security . I know 37:00.670 --> 37:03.570 that you testified that you will make 37:03.570 --> 37:06.150 your own assessment as to circum end . 37:06.450 --> 37:08.840 I do want to ask you though , do you 37:08.840 --> 37:11.340 agree that the United States has a role 37:11.340 --> 37:14.060 to play in preventing a new nuclear 37:14.060 --> 37:16.830 arms race ? And if so if confirmed , 37:16.830 --> 37:18.886 will you work with the Department of 37:18.886 --> 37:20.997 State to support the strengthening of 37:20.997 --> 37:23.730 diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear 37:23.730 --> 37:26.400 proliferation ? Senator , thank you for 37:26.400 --> 37:28.400 the for the question . I think that 37:28.400 --> 37:31.920 that that we've into um what we would 37:31.920 --> 37:34.750 call integrated deterrence . Right , So 37:34.750 --> 37:36.806 so as we as we talk about integrated 37:36.806 --> 37:39.120 deterrence , um I want to take all 37:39.120 --> 37:41.287 instruments of power to to ensure that 37:41.287 --> 37:45.000 we can deter . So in regards to the 37:45.000 --> 37:48.170 question that you asked , um my best 37:48.170 --> 37:50.281 military advice would always be to be 37:50.281 --> 37:52.830 able to present the commander in chief 37:52.830 --> 37:54.497 with a variety of options and 37:54.497 --> 37:58.260 capabilities . Um So so that's 37:58.270 --> 38:01.740 that's where I would be um if confirmed 38:01.740 --> 38:04.430 as a commander of us , stratcom is to 38:04.430 --> 38:08.060 be able to offer as much capability and 38:08.060 --> 38:11.180 options to the commander in chief . Um 38:11.190 --> 38:13.301 But I do understand the question that 38:13.301 --> 38:15.412 you asked in regard to the Department 38:15.412 --> 38:17.523 of State , and the answer is yes , as 38:17.523 --> 38:19.690 far as integrated deterrence . I think 38:19.690 --> 38:21.579 it's key to that . Well , I think 38:21.579 --> 38:23.690 integrated different deterrence means 38:23.690 --> 38:25.801 that we have a role to play . I would 38:25.801 --> 38:27.468 say a leading role to play in 38:27.468 --> 38:29.523 preventing a new nuclear arms race . 38:29.523 --> 38:33.340 Would you agree with that ? So , 38:33.340 --> 38:34.673 given the importance of 38:34.673 --> 38:36.784 nonproliferation , nonproliferation ? 38:36.784 --> 38:39.520 Are there other weapons or tactics that 38:39.520 --> 38:41.560 can accomplish the same strategic 38:41.560 --> 38:44.140 objectives as a command without 38:44.140 --> 38:46.630 creating new nuclear weapons , 38:47.930 --> 38:49.930 Ma'am ? Have confirmed that that is 38:49.930 --> 38:51.874 exactly what I meant by making the 38:51.874 --> 38:54.041 assessment to understand what would be 38:54.041 --> 38:57.210 the the gap filler in the capability as 38:57.210 --> 38:59.960 we were prepared to revamp the nuclear 38:59.960 --> 39:03.420 triad or modernize the triad ? Wouldn't 39:03.420 --> 39:05.642 our efforts be better utilized focusing 39:05.642 --> 39:07.753 on that important mission rather than 39:07.753 --> 39:10.030 diverting resources and attention to 39:10.030 --> 39:13.830 sick amend Ma'am . 39:13.840 --> 39:16.310 You know , I I appreciate the comedian 39:16.310 --> 39:19.430 what they have done for the for the 39:19.430 --> 39:21.263 overarching modernization of the 39:21.263 --> 39:23.990 nuclear portfolio writ large . Um once 39:23.990 --> 39:27.180 again um I think if if 39:27.180 --> 39:30.850 confirmed um I still would like to to 39:30.850 --> 39:34.210 be able to assess and analyze . How do 39:34.210 --> 39:36.450 you broaden that portfolio to provide 39:36.460 --> 39:39.070 more options for the for the President 39:39.070 --> 39:41.660 of United States ? I think one of the 39:41.660 --> 39:44.750 concerns about the cycle man is that 39:44.760 --> 39:47.450 it's going to be a highly expensive 39:47.450 --> 39:50.130 proposition . Whereas we are very clear 39:50.130 --> 39:54.120 on the need to um revamp they 39:54.120 --> 39:57.200 tried to modernize so they going on the 39:57.200 --> 39:59.660 Ohio class ballistic missile submarine 39:59.670 --> 40:02.060 originally said to be in service for 30 40:02.060 --> 40:04.530 years will be extended by the navy out 40:04.540 --> 40:07.160 to 42 years . These submarines will 40:07.160 --> 40:10.240 begin to retire from the fleet As the 40:10.240 --> 40:12.510 Columbia class comes online to replace 40:12.510 --> 40:15.090 them in the late 2020s . The warheads 40:15.090 --> 40:16.923 used on the submarines have also 40:16.923 --> 40:19.270 undergone life extension programs of 40:19.270 --> 40:21.530 their own in some cases adding an 40:21.530 --> 40:24.390 estimate of 30 years to their service 40:24.390 --> 40:27.460 life . What concerns do you have with 40:27.460 --> 40:29.870 service life extensions as we bridge 40:29.870 --> 40:32.290 the gap between aging and new 40:32.290 --> 40:34.910 technologies , ma'am ? Thank you for 40:34.910 --> 40:37.450 the question . Some regards with our 40:37.450 --> 40:40.730 incredible partners in N . S . A . Who 40:40.730 --> 40:44.430 are doing this work for us . Um I think 40:44.430 --> 40:46.597 the question is we need to kind of see 40:46.597 --> 40:50.570 what what aging you you really see 40:50.580 --> 40:54.000 um from the asset and 40:54.010 --> 40:57.890 also um does a life extension , 40:57.900 --> 41:00.122 you know , solve the problem to get the 41:00.122 --> 41:02.970 effects that you want um from that 41:02.980 --> 41:05.540 asset . So if confirmed , I think 41:05.540 --> 41:09.320 that's part of what um I would assess 41:09.330 --> 41:12.490 um as being a member of the Nuclear 41:12.490 --> 41:15.920 Weapons Council as well um to to be 41:15.920 --> 41:18.810 able to get an assessment to see . Okay , 41:18.810 --> 41:22.670 is it is it about um reuse or is it 41:22.670 --> 41:26.550 about new um and and further 41:26.560 --> 41:28.671 so , so that's something I would have 41:28.671 --> 41:30.393 to make an assessment on uh if 41:30.393 --> 41:33.330 confirmed . Thank you . I thank 41:35.040 --> 41:36.651 general cotton . Welcome and 41:36.651 --> 41:38.873 congratulations on your nominations and 41:38.873 --> 41:41.040 continued service . You know , we hear 41:41.040 --> 41:43.151 the term arms race a lot , especially 41:43.151 --> 41:46.390 in the nuclear context . Um last time I 41:46.390 --> 41:48.612 guess we had a major arms race in which 41:48.612 --> 41:50.890 we actually contested the race was in 41:50.890 --> 41:54.020 the 1980s . And uh there aren't many 41:54.020 --> 41:56.340 senators around who are there then um 41:56.350 --> 41:58.406 Pat Leahy and chuck Grassley maybe I 41:58.406 --> 42:00.628 bet they took different views on it . I 42:00.628 --> 42:02.850 know what you joe biden took on it ? He 42:02.850 --> 42:04.906 continued to criticize Ronald Reagan 42:04.906 --> 42:04.860 for an arms race that was going to 42:04.860 --> 42:06.971 destabilize the world lead to nuclear 42:06.971 --> 42:09.082 war . Of course it led to nothing but 42:09.082 --> 42:11.560 victory in the Cold War uh , without 42:11.560 --> 42:15.440 even firing a shot . Um Do 42:15.440 --> 42:17.496 we get to decide whether there is an 42:17.496 --> 42:20.120 arms race or not ? General Cotton , or 42:20.120 --> 42:22.160 does the enemy get a vote on that ? 42:23.730 --> 42:25.897 Thank you for the question , senator . 42:26.220 --> 42:28.820 Yeah , I would answer it this way . Um 42:28.830 --> 42:31.480 and it still goes back to the to the 42:31.480 --> 42:33.702 options and capabilities that we should 42:33.702 --> 42:35.869 be able to provide to the commander in 42:35.869 --> 42:39.760 chief . So from from my best military 42:39.760 --> 42:43.100 advice is to provide the capability And 42:43.100 --> 42:45.830 options for for the commander in chief . 42:45.840 --> 42:48.350 Um and I'd like to be able to provide 42:48.350 --> 42:51.750 the most capable options that I can um 42:51.760 --> 42:54.270 in this regard . Yeah , that's why I 42:54.270 --> 42:56.440 said the last contested arms race we 42:56.440 --> 42:58.440 faced was in the 1980s , during the 42:58.440 --> 43:00.662 Reagan build up . Because we've been in 43:00.662 --> 43:02.884 an arms race with China for the last 30 43:02.884 --> 43:02.500 years . Unfortunately , we haven't been 43:02.500 --> 43:04.278 significantly contesting it and 43:04.278 --> 43:06.389 therefore China has been winning it . 43:06.389 --> 43:08.530 Um in the end , whether we enter an 43:08.530 --> 43:11.790 arms race is not really up to us , 43:11.800 --> 43:14.022 what's up to us is whether we win it or 43:14.022 --> 43:16.133 we lose it . And if you ask me , it's 43:16.133 --> 43:18.244 much cheaper to win an arms race than 43:18.244 --> 43:19.911 it is to lose a war . It goes 43:19.911 --> 43:23.860 especially uh for nuclear weapons . Um 43:23.870 --> 43:26.037 General Cotton , I want to read to you 43:26.037 --> 43:27.648 a short excerpt from Winston 43:27.648 --> 43:29.814 Churchill's iron curtain speech , also 43:29.814 --> 43:32.780 known as the sinews of strength . Uh a 43:32.780 --> 43:36.500 sinews of peace speech less than barely 43:36.500 --> 43:39.050 six months after V . J . Day in Fulton 43:39.050 --> 43:41.050 Missouri Churchill says from what I 43:41.050 --> 43:43.106 have seen of our Russian friends and 43:43.106 --> 43:45.272 allies during the war , I am convinced 43:45.272 --> 43:47.494 there is nothing they admire so much as 43:47.494 --> 43:49.740 strength and there's nothing for which 43:49.740 --> 43:51.570 they have less respect than for 43:51.570 --> 43:55.020 weakness . Especially military weakness . 43:55.640 --> 43:58.100 Do you agree with Sir Winston , that 43:58.110 --> 44:00.250 Russians have less , there's nothing 44:00.250 --> 44:02.361 for which they have less respect than 44:02.361 --> 44:04.694 weakness , Especially military weakness . 44:04.694 --> 44:06.917 Do you think that's true of the chinese 44:06.917 --> 44:09.028 as well ? I do think it's true of the 44:09.028 --> 44:11.250 Iranians , I think of all of our Okay , 44:11.250 --> 44:13.417 yeah , I thought so too . He continued 44:13.417 --> 44:15.780 then , to say for that reason , the old 44:15.780 --> 44:17.970 doctrine of a balance of power is 44:17.980 --> 44:21.040 unsound . We cannot afford if we can 44:21.040 --> 44:24.150 help it to work on narrow margins , 44:24.160 --> 44:27.050 offering temptations to a trial of 44:27.050 --> 44:29.450 strength . To agree with Sir Winston , 44:29.450 --> 44:32.130 that we should not offer temptations to 44:32.130 --> 44:34.297 a trial of strength to our adversaries 44:34.297 --> 44:36.130 by operating on narrow margins . 44:36.150 --> 44:38.610 Senator . I think that we always should 44:38.620 --> 44:41.490 we always should operate from a from 44:41.500 --> 44:44.790 from a power of strength . And uh , 44:44.800 --> 44:46.440 those margins would narrow 44:46.440 --> 44:49.120 significantly given china's nuclear 44:49.120 --> 44:52.070 build up if china and Russia became de 44:52.070 --> 44:54.930 facto or even day jury allies correct 44:55.770 --> 44:57.910 To near Pier allies as opposed to 44:57.920 --> 45:00.210 adversaries as opposed to one . 45:01.460 --> 45:03.627 Um there's been a lot of talk over the 45:03.627 --> 45:06.980 last year that major ground war in 45:06.980 --> 45:09.260 europe between two nation states was 45:09.270 --> 45:12.790 unthinkable . Um even after 45:13.540 --> 45:15.762 Russia invaded Ukraine , such a war was 45:15.770 --> 45:18.560 unthinkable . Obviously Vladimir Putin 45:18.560 --> 45:21.360 thought it was quite thinkable . Um Do 45:21.360 --> 45:23.249 you believe that a nuclear war is 45:23.249 --> 45:25.310 unthinkable ? Not in terms of the 45:25.310 --> 45:27.254 consequences it would have for our 45:27.254 --> 45:29.421 nation and for the world , but for the 45:30.490 --> 45:32.546 in fact whether it might happen as a 45:32.546 --> 45:35.080 nuclear war . Unthinkable senator , 45:36.250 --> 45:39.330 I think if confirmed the the role that 45:39.330 --> 45:42.940 I that I would play as commander um is 45:42.940 --> 45:45.710 to make sure that those 250,000 men and 45:45.710 --> 45:48.310 women that that are supporting 45:48.310 --> 45:50.980 strategic Air Command . Every I keep 45:50.980 --> 45:53.560 saying strategic Air command forgive me 45:53.570 --> 45:57.400 a strategic command um are 45:57.410 --> 46:00.950 prepared to do what some folks might 46:00.950 --> 46:03.100 think is the unthinkable . I think 46:03.100 --> 46:06.290 that's right . I unusual and weighty 46:06.290 --> 46:08.012 job and that I think it's your 46:08.490 --> 46:11.340 responsibility almost everyday to think 46:11.340 --> 46:13.673 what most people believe is unthinkable . 46:13.673 --> 46:16.450 Um and think about what a nuclear war 46:16.450 --> 46:18.450 would look like and how it would be 46:18.450 --> 46:20.672 fought and therefore the best way to do 46:20.672 --> 46:22.894 what we all want , which is to deter it 46:22.894 --> 46:25.061 from happening in the first place . So 46:25.061 --> 46:27.117 thank you General Cotton best wishes 46:27.117 --> 46:29.283 for you in your new role . Thank you . 46:29.283 --> 46:31.450 Senator Cotton , Senator King , please 46:31.450 --> 46:33.561 Thank you . Mr Chairman , john Cotton 46:33.561 --> 46:35.561 welcome . I'm sure you were briefed 46:35.561 --> 46:39.480 before this hearing that uh the 46:39.480 --> 46:40.480 Russians again , 46:47.770 --> 46:50.080 try it again . I'm sure you were 46:50.080 --> 46:53.000 briefed that that the chairman would 46:53.000 --> 46:55.180 ask you a series of routine questions 46:55.180 --> 46:57.291 at the beginning and you went through 46:57.291 --> 46:59.458 and answer them properly . I just want 46:59.458 --> 47:01.569 to emphasize one of those questions . 47:01.569 --> 47:03.569 Do you agree when asked before this 47:03.569 --> 47:05.791 committee to give your personal views ? 47:05.791 --> 47:07.736 Even if your views differ from the 47:07.736 --> 47:09.458 administration ? That's a very 47:09.458 --> 47:11.569 important question because we need to 47:11.569 --> 47:13.850 know what your best military advice is 47:13.860 --> 47:17.050 not colored by the views of the 47:17.050 --> 47:20.250 administration , the president . Uh , 47:20.260 --> 47:22.670 this is I just want to emphasize how 47:22.670 --> 47:24.503 important this question is . You 47:24.503 --> 47:27.340 answered it properly , but I just want 47:27.340 --> 47:29.451 to have it in the back of your head , 47:29.451 --> 47:31.618 uh , in the , in the future . And it's 47:31.618 --> 47:33.729 going to be difficult . It's not easy 47:33.729 --> 47:35.618 to , to say something that may be 47:35.618 --> 47:37.784 unacceptable to some other part of the 47:37.784 --> 47:39.951 pentagon or the administration . Uh in 47:39.951 --> 47:41.900 in looking over my notes As I made 47:41.900 --> 47:44.370 questions , I realized that all of my 47:44.370 --> 47:47.590 questions involve changes in the 47:47.590 --> 47:50.060 strategic posture . You've mentioned 47:50.060 --> 47:51.949 several times . We've gone from a 47:51.949 --> 47:54.116 bipolar world to a multipolar world in 47:54.116 --> 47:56.004 terms of our adversaries that's a 47:56.004 --> 47:58.338 strategic change . But there are others , 47:58.338 --> 48:01.650 uh , just to run down a quick list 48:01.660 --> 48:04.940 um electromagnetic spectrum and 48:04.940 --> 48:06.884 electronic warfare you've , you've 48:06.884 --> 48:08.810 touched upon . I realized there's 48:08.820 --> 48:11.110 classified information here . But I 48:11.110 --> 48:14.030 hope that you will commit to holding 48:14.040 --> 48:17.610 serious exercises on electronic warfare 48:17.620 --> 48:20.640 and notify us of of how we're doing 48:20.650 --> 48:22.428 because this is a new strategic 48:22.428 --> 48:24.480 challenge . That I'm not sure we're 48:24.490 --> 48:27.480 adequately accounted for yet . 48:29.420 --> 48:32.020 So so senator for your first question . 48:32.030 --> 48:35.910 Absolutely yes . Um My best military 48:35.910 --> 48:39.370 advice presented to the committee um 48:39.380 --> 48:42.410 for your for your second um is another . 48:42.410 --> 48:45.620 Absolutely yes . We're going to have to 48:45.630 --> 48:48.160 flush out through exercises as you 48:48.160 --> 48:50.720 mentioned uh to ensure we can find any 48:50.720 --> 48:52.720 blind spots and shortfalls and make 48:52.720 --> 48:55.380 corrections uh as warranted and as 48:55.380 --> 48:57.800 required . So I wholeheartedly agree 48:57.800 --> 49:01.660 with you . Another area of strategic 49:01.670 --> 49:03.892 change has happened in the last four or 49:03.892 --> 49:06.003 five years and that is hyper sonics . 49:06.003 --> 49:07.892 We thought of strategic forces as 49:07.892 --> 49:10.170 nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence . 49:10.170 --> 49:13.700 Hypersonic SAR are a new our new 49:13.700 --> 49:15.820 threat that r is a strategic threat 49:15.820 --> 49:18.910 particularly for example the chinese uh 49:18.920 --> 49:21.480 putting a a glide vehicle , hypersonic 49:21.480 --> 49:23.240 glide vehicle in orbit . Which 49:23.250 --> 49:25.830 radically changes things like how much 49:25.830 --> 49:28.220 time we might have to react to to an 49:28.220 --> 49:31.200 attack . Uh Do you view hypersonic c as 49:31.200 --> 49:34.320 a as a as a serious strategic challenge , 49:35.090 --> 49:37.790 Senator . I do . Um and I see it as a 49:37.790 --> 49:41.280 warning challenge . Um I think as far 49:41.280 --> 49:44.680 as when we have a conversation if 49:44.680 --> 49:48.370 confirmed um I I think uh my fellow 49:48.370 --> 49:50.800 combatant commanders uh we'll have to 49:50.800 --> 49:53.022 have a discussion and understand how to 49:53.022 --> 49:56.390 give uh kind of relook missile 49:56.390 --> 49:59.260 defense , relooked missile warning . 49:59.270 --> 50:02.450 Understand what a sensor layer looks 50:02.450 --> 50:05.060 like that can achieve those effects to 50:05.060 --> 50:07.560 give time because I need to give 50:07.560 --> 50:10.930 decision space um to to the decision 50:10.930 --> 50:13.041 maker . Well I think it's safe to say 50:13.041 --> 50:15.041 that the bullet on bullet theory of 50:15.041 --> 50:17.208 missile defense is out the window when 50:17.208 --> 50:19.097 you're talking about hypersonic . 50:19.097 --> 50:21.950 Another area is cyber uh you've you've 50:21.950 --> 50:24.117 talked about it , you've indicated how 50:24.117 --> 50:26.339 important it is , particularly with N . 50:26.339 --> 50:28.283 C . Three . Will you commit to red 50:28.283 --> 50:30.506 teaming and pen testing and hackers for 50:30.506 --> 50:32.440 hire to test the security of the 50:32.440 --> 50:34.830 systems that you're uh developing ? I 50:34.830 --> 50:36.997 don't think you really know how secure 50:36.997 --> 50:39.052 you are until somebody attacks you . 50:39.052 --> 50:40.886 And I hope it's I wanted to be a 50:40.886 --> 50:43.052 friendly attack Senator if confirmed . 50:43.052 --> 50:44.950 Um That would be one of the first 50:44.960 --> 50:47.071 directions I would give to the neck . 50:47.071 --> 50:50.530 Thank you . Uh final point again a new 50:50.530 --> 50:52.474 strategic challenge or a different 50:52.474 --> 50:54.363 strategic challenge . And I don't 50:54.363 --> 50:56.474 expect really an answer . But perhaps 50:56.474 --> 50:58.641 you could consider this for the record 50:58.641 --> 51:00.752 that is non state actors with nuclear 51:00.752 --> 51:02.950 weapons . The deterrent theory doesn't 51:02.950 --> 51:05.061 work if you don't have a capital city 51:05.061 --> 51:07.560 and if you don't care about dying and 51:07.570 --> 51:09.514 we have a proliferation of nuclear 51:09.514 --> 51:11.348 weapons and we have rogue states 51:11.348 --> 51:13.514 developing nuclear weapons and nuclear 51:13.514 --> 51:15.710 materials . The chances of those 51:15.710 --> 51:17.821 materials falling into the hands of a 51:17.821 --> 51:20.043 terrorist organization , it seems to me 51:20.043 --> 51:22.266 are increasing gradually but steadily . 51:22.700 --> 51:25.280 I hope you will uh give this some 51:25.280 --> 51:27.447 thought because it's a major strategic 51:27.447 --> 51:29.558 challenge that doesn't fit within the 51:29.558 --> 51:31.820 ambit of what has been our historic uh 51:31.830 --> 51:35.130 deterrent strategy uh for dealing with 51:35.140 --> 51:38.460 with nuclear threats , Senator , you're 51:38.460 --> 51:40.460 absolutely right and and I will get 51:40.460 --> 51:42.571 back with you if confirmed and and we 51:42.571 --> 51:44.904 can have further discussions along that . 51:44.904 --> 51:47.071 Thank you very much . Thank you . Mr . 51:47.071 --> 51:49.238 Chairman , thank you Senator King . Uh 51:49.238 --> 51:50.516 center rounds please . 51:55.570 --> 51:59.530 Thank you Mr Chairman . Good morning , 51:59.530 --> 52:01.900 General Cotton and thank you to you and 52:01.900 --> 52:03.733 to your family for your years of 52:03.733 --> 52:05.520 service to our country and your 52:05.520 --> 52:07.820 continued service in the future . Uh 52:07.830 --> 52:09.441 General Cotton , I share the 52:09.441 --> 52:12.210 perspective that the nuclear deterrent 52:12.220 --> 52:14.109 is the foundation of our national 52:14.109 --> 52:16.220 Security . In the past , I've asked 52:16.220 --> 52:18.442 other leaders in the nuclear enterprise 52:18.442 --> 52:20.570 to give their views in plain language 52:20.580 --> 52:23.830 on the importance of our nuclear triad . 52:23.840 --> 52:27.650 So that the american , you know , 52:27.660 --> 52:30.910 our american public um who really don't 52:30.920 --> 52:33.080 think about this on a regular basis , 52:33.090 --> 52:36.110 can understand why we have hundreds if 52:36.110 --> 52:38.332 not thousands of nuclear warheads . And 52:38.680 --> 52:40.970 can you explain it in such a fashion as 52:40.970 --> 52:42.803 to why it is so important to our 52:42.803 --> 52:44.748 national security that we not only 52:44.748 --> 52:47.440 maintain but accelerate the investment 52:47.450 --> 52:49.506 in the modernization of this nuclear 52:49.506 --> 52:52.770 triad turnarounds . Thank you for the 52:52.770 --> 52:56.750 question . I I think if if we were 52:56.750 --> 52:59.070 to do a perspective on talking about 52:59.070 --> 53:01.250 the three legs of the triad in 53:01.250 --> 53:04.610 particular and how it is the backstop 53:04.610 --> 53:08.480 and underpins . I think if if I was 53:08.490 --> 53:11.630 at a town hall meeting , um how I would 53:11.630 --> 53:14.910 describe that um to a local town hall 53:14.920 --> 53:17.970 is think about um 53:18.490 --> 53:22.120 the bedrock of a 53:22.120 --> 53:25.130 feature and what holds the rest of your 53:25.130 --> 53:28.190 foundation up . Um You know when we 53:28.190 --> 53:30.870 have , when we're building a home , you 53:30.870 --> 53:32.981 know you want to make sure you have a 53:32.981 --> 53:35.520 steady , you know steady property to 53:35.520 --> 53:38.630 put the foundation on um for every 53:38.630 --> 53:41.300 operational plan that the Department of 53:41.300 --> 53:44.720 Defense has . Um it relies on the fact 53:44.720 --> 53:46.940 that strategic deterrence is going to 53:46.940 --> 53:50.740 hold um to allow those other um 53:50.750 --> 53:54.560 missions to accomplish if that does not 53:54.560 --> 53:57.690 happen . Um That's when you see that 53:57.690 --> 54:01.370 deterrence fails . Um The way that we 54:01.370 --> 54:05.370 accomplish that is through our triad 54:05.380 --> 54:09.380 of having bombers um who are recall 54:09.380 --> 54:12.050 a ble if if warranted um having 54:12.050 --> 54:15.510 submarines um that can be used or 54:15.520 --> 54:18.420 having I . C . B . M . S um that are 54:18.420 --> 54:20.960 readily available um for the decision 54:20.960 --> 54:23.410 maker to do that . Our adversaries 54:23.410 --> 54:25.466 understand that and know that we can 54:25.466 --> 54:28.300 hold them at bay . That is that bedrock 54:28.300 --> 54:30.356 and foundation that is so critically 54:30.356 --> 54:32.840 important for us in this nation . I 54:32.850 --> 54:35.072 think it's sometimes we think about the 54:35.072 --> 54:37.128 fact that we have great conventional 54:37.128 --> 54:39.017 forces . But the reason why those 54:39.017 --> 54:41.239 conventional forces can be effective is 54:41.239 --> 54:43.239 because everybody knows that in the 54:43.239 --> 54:45.406 back the hammer are the nuclear forces 54:45.406 --> 54:47.406 which have been upgraded and that's 54:47.406 --> 54:49.572 what I want to talk about next uh with 54:49.572 --> 54:51.461 regard to our nuclear command and 54:51.461 --> 54:53.461 control systems ? They've got to be 54:53.461 --> 54:55.406 upgraded . We're in the process of 54:55.406 --> 54:57.628 doing that now , What do you see as one 54:57.628 --> 54:59.683 of the biggest challenges or what do 54:59.683 --> 54:59.600 you see as the biggest challenges 54:59.600 --> 55:02.060 regarding the upgrading of our current 55:02.070 --> 55:04.810 command and control structure . Thanks 55:04.810 --> 55:08.400 for the question . Um as I said in my 55:08.400 --> 55:11.690 opening comments , my opening statement 55:11.700 --> 55:14.210 articulated that it's a resilient 55:14.210 --> 55:17.260 system today . Um I think moving 55:17.260 --> 55:20.800 forward I see it as a continuance . 55:20.810 --> 55:23.280 Uh you'll never close the book on the 55:23.280 --> 55:26.740 modernization of a of a com node . 55:26.750 --> 55:29.860 Um so so as I see it 55:30.860 --> 55:32.770 that I don't know if I see as a 55:32.770 --> 55:35.960 challenge . Um but I but what we're 55:35.960 --> 55:38.710 going to be able to have to do is 55:40.190 --> 55:43.850 I say move to a system using 55:43.850 --> 55:47.360 21st century technologies that allows 55:47.360 --> 55:51.260 us to um to to have what I 55:51.260 --> 55:53.630 called N . C . Three over assured comms . 55:53.640 --> 55:57.270 Um so being able to make it so I 55:57.280 --> 56:00.740 can we can message and and get 56:00.740 --> 56:04.030 data to the war fighters in any 56:04.040 --> 56:07.590 situation . So I think that challenges 56:07.600 --> 56:11.440 um being able to to link the 56:11.440 --> 56:13.390 legacy systems with the modernized 56:13.400 --> 56:15.600 systems . But I'm I'm here to say that 56:15.600 --> 56:17.711 I'm quite pleased and the work that's 56:17.711 --> 56:20.310 being done with N . C . Three next gen 56:20.310 --> 56:23.310 if you will . Um so the team is really 56:23.310 --> 56:25.550 really getting after it and I'm pretty 56:25.550 --> 56:27.600 impressed on on the way forward on 56:27.600 --> 56:29.656 being able to close that challenge . 56:29.656 --> 56:31.822 Thank you general And one last item in 56:31.822 --> 56:33.933 that I wanted to visit with today and 56:33.933 --> 56:35.989 and that is if confirmed you will be 56:35.989 --> 56:37.933 the lead for joint electromagnetic 56:37.933 --> 56:40.430 spectrum operations . The growth of 5G . 56:40.430 --> 56:42.460 Technologies continues to add 56:42.460 --> 56:44.850 additional requests for larger parts of 56:44.850 --> 56:47.072 the band , some of which are needed for 56:47.072 --> 56:49.980 national security . Now recognizing the 56:49.990 --> 56:52.157 unclassified setting of this hearing , 56:52.157 --> 56:54.268 can you explain to this committee and 56:54.268 --> 56:56.379 perhaps to other folks out there that 56:56.379 --> 56:58.490 are wondering why it isn't being made 56:58.490 --> 57:00.490 more readily available but that the 57:00.490 --> 57:02.657 pentagon and the Department of Defense 57:02.657 --> 57:05.120 clearly is recognizing the need to 57:05.120 --> 57:07.231 protect certain areas of the spectrum 57:07.231 --> 57:09.500 for national security purposes . Can 57:09.500 --> 57:12.450 you share a little bit about the real 57:12.460 --> 57:15.850 necessity of working in in a 57:15.860 --> 57:17.582 consultive way really and in a 57:17.582 --> 57:20.410 cooperative way with the FCC and the N . 57:20.410 --> 57:23.710 T . I . A . In maintaining certain 57:23.710 --> 57:25.821 portions of the spectrum for national 57:25.821 --> 57:28.090 security purposes and how absolutely 57:28.090 --> 57:31.750 critical it is . Senator . It is 57:31.760 --> 57:35.270 it is incredibly um critical , critical 57:35.280 --> 57:37.750 that we maintain and understand and to 57:37.750 --> 57:40.810 be to be frank have others understand 57:40.820 --> 57:43.210 the necessity to protect certain bands . 57:43.220 --> 57:47.000 Um if confirmed . Um I would I would I 57:47.000 --> 57:50.660 would want to collaborate with the FCC 57:50.670 --> 57:54.140 um and others . Um So we can maybe we 57:54.140 --> 57:56.840 need a message better . Um for the for 57:56.840 --> 57:59.007 folks to understand exactly what we're 57:59.007 --> 58:00.951 what we're talking about here on a 58:00.951 --> 58:02.951 necessity and criticality of making 58:02.951 --> 58:05.007 sure that we can protect those bands 58:05.007 --> 58:07.490 that you mentioned . Thank you . Thank 58:07.490 --> 58:09.323 you . General . Thank you . Mr . 58:09.323 --> 58:11.323 Chairman . Thank you Senator rounds 58:11.323 --> 58:13.546 Senator Kaine please Thank you Mr Chair 58:13.546 --> 58:15.768 and General Cotton . Great to see you . 58:15.768 --> 58:17.934 I enjoyed our visit yesterday and um I 58:17.934 --> 58:19.823 think this has been touched on by 58:19.823 --> 58:21.879 earlier senators and their questions 58:21.879 --> 58:23.810 but I really was intrigued by the 58:23.810 --> 58:25.866 discussion we were having about this 58:25.866 --> 58:29.080 multipolar nature of the threat . So as 58:29.080 --> 58:31.750 you look at the triad we have to always 58:31.750 --> 58:33.806 recapitalize and have it be strong . 58:34.100 --> 58:36.560 But we have thought of the triad both 58:36.560 --> 58:38.727 in terms of our investment but even in 58:38.727 --> 58:40.790 terms of our theory of deterrence or 58:40.790 --> 58:43.140 our theory about what the triad means 58:43.140 --> 58:45.140 to our defense . We sort of thought 58:45.140 --> 58:47.850 about it as a triad with respect to one 58:47.850 --> 58:50.600 nuclear competitor . Okay now we have 58:50.610 --> 58:53.200 two nuclear competitors and evidence 58:53.200 --> 58:55.422 demonstrates that they are increasingly 58:55.422 --> 58:58.080 working together the U . S . Policy for 58:58.080 --> 59:00.420 decades kind of said that china and 59:00.420 --> 59:02.253 Russia would never get too close 59:02.253 --> 59:04.380 because of a history of enmity and 59:04.380 --> 59:06.713 different cultures and things like that . 59:06.713 --> 59:08.824 But they're getting closer and closer 59:08.824 --> 59:10.713 every day and often they're doing 59:10.713 --> 59:10.420 things not only just the two of them 59:10.420 --> 59:14.080 but with Iran North Korea sometimes 59:14.080 --> 59:17.510 with Turkey . So how should you be 59:17.510 --> 59:19.621 confirmed that I'm confident you will 59:19.621 --> 59:22.640 be how will you approach this analysis 59:22.640 --> 59:24.751 of the threat ? That is not simply an 59:24.751 --> 59:27.850 analysis of the capacity of individual 59:27.860 --> 59:31.360 adversaries but the fact that these 59:31.360 --> 59:35.100 adversaries are cooperating . Um and 59:35.100 --> 59:37.322 that previous deterrence doctrines were 59:37.322 --> 59:40.010 really built more around a bipolar 59:40.010 --> 59:43.130 world rather than multiple competitors . 59:43.610 --> 59:45.666 Thank you for the for the question . 59:45.666 --> 59:47.777 You're you're absolutely right and we 59:47.777 --> 59:51.060 touched upon it earlier , I think 59:51.060 --> 59:54.500 what's key and it's it's you know as we 59:54.500 --> 59:56.320 discuss it , it's it's multiple 59:56.320 --> 59:59.430 approaches to because um one um if 59:59.430 --> 01:00:01.680 confirmed and I know the work is being 01:00:01.680 --> 01:00:03.847 currently done within stratcom because 01:00:03.847 --> 01:00:06.930 as a J . Fac commander to stratcom um 01:00:06.930 --> 01:00:10.800 offering input to that today . Um but 01:00:10.800 --> 01:00:13.210 if confirmed , um that assessment has 01:00:13.210 --> 01:00:15.850 to continue because when we talk about , 01:00:15.860 --> 01:00:17.916 as you said as we talk about nuclear 01:00:17.916 --> 01:00:20.600 doctrine , nuclear doctrine is with 11 01:00:20.600 --> 01:00:23.610 near peer adversary . Um We are and 01:00:23.610 --> 01:00:25.850 what that will drive is then that will 01:00:25.850 --> 01:00:28.590 drive on . How do we meet national 01:00:28.590 --> 01:00:32.540 objectives based on um the 01:00:32.550 --> 01:00:35.690 strategic doctrine within the confines 01:00:35.690 --> 01:00:38.150 of strategic command . Um 01:00:39.490 --> 01:00:41.690 Then we have to then from my best 01:00:41.690 --> 01:00:45.490 military um um advice , understand what 01:00:45.490 --> 01:00:47.657 force shaping looks like in regards to 01:00:47.657 --> 01:00:49.657 how do you meet the objectives that 01:00:49.657 --> 01:00:53.050 would be given to us um from the 01:00:53.060 --> 01:00:55.900 commander in chief , that's work that 01:00:55.900 --> 01:00:58.720 has to be done . Um And I know it's 01:00:58.720 --> 01:01:01.690 being done today . Um But if confirmed , 01:01:01.700 --> 01:01:04.300 um that is one of the first things that 01:01:04.310 --> 01:01:06.570 that will dive into where I can get a 01:01:06.570 --> 01:01:09.540 better understanding to your point of 01:01:09.550 --> 01:01:11.780 what does it look like when you have 01:01:11.790 --> 01:01:14.460 two near pure adversaries that act 01:01:14.460 --> 01:01:17.420 differently um might work that might 01:01:17.420 --> 01:01:19.753 work together , might not work together , 01:01:19.753 --> 01:01:21.920 but we still need to understand um you 01:01:21.920 --> 01:01:23.976 know , how do you how do you execute 01:01:23.976 --> 01:01:26.198 against that threat ? Thank you , joe . 01:01:26.198 --> 01:01:28.420 Another thing we talked about yesterday 01:01:28.420 --> 01:01:30.364 was a bomber Task Force missions . 01:01:30.364 --> 01:01:32.476 There was just a completion of one in 01:01:32.476 --> 01:01:34.309 South com with Panama Ecuadorian 01:01:34.309 --> 01:01:36.476 partners . We've also done bomber task 01:01:36.476 --> 01:01:38.587 force missions with european allies . 01:01:38.587 --> 01:01:41.190 These are to show unity um to test 01:01:41.190 --> 01:01:44.010 interoperability . Uh talk about what 01:01:44.010 --> 01:01:47.090 those missions produce for our defense 01:01:47.090 --> 01:01:50.690 capacity . Thank you for that . Um so 01:01:50.690 --> 01:01:53.040 bomber Task Force , our bomber task 01:01:53.040 --> 01:01:55.320 forces that we currently do um on 01:01:55.320 --> 01:01:58.280 behalf of of our coke , on behalf of 01:01:58.280 --> 01:02:00.770 coke um um of which I'm the lead as the 01:02:00.770 --> 01:02:02.826 Air Force global strike Commander to 01:02:02.826 --> 01:02:04.770 present those forces to co coms um 01:02:04.770 --> 01:02:08.280 through stratcom . Um it's been 01:02:08.280 --> 01:02:11.250 incredible because what it shows it 01:02:11.250 --> 01:02:14.180 shows why we're the most powerful 01:02:14.190 --> 01:02:16.301 military on the face of the earth and 01:02:16.301 --> 01:02:18.190 that's because we have allies and 01:02:18.190 --> 01:02:22.160 partners and and what it shows is using 01:02:22.160 --> 01:02:24.670 conventional forces . What strategic 01:02:24.670 --> 01:02:27.650 deterrence is all about as well . And 01:02:27.660 --> 01:02:30.910 there is nothing more gratifying than 01:02:30.910 --> 01:02:33.370 seeing an ally or partner come up on a 01:02:33.370 --> 01:02:35.560 wing of a B 52 that's doing an 01:02:35.560 --> 01:02:38.100 integrated mission over a cocom area . 01:02:38.110 --> 01:02:41.580 And and and seeing the p a sentiment if 01:02:41.580 --> 01:02:44.010 you will , senator come back from the 01:02:44.010 --> 01:02:46.450 adversaries on how that mission went . 01:02:46.670 --> 01:02:49.320 Um so it's a win win for ourselves as 01:02:49.320 --> 01:02:51.376 well as our allies and partners that 01:02:51.376 --> 01:02:53.430 participate in those missions that 01:02:53.430 --> 01:02:56.060 we're doing constantly across across 01:02:56.060 --> 01:02:58.730 the globe . Thank you very much . I 01:02:58.730 --> 01:02:59.730 yield back . 01:03:02.740 --> 01:03:06.420 Yeah , thank you Mr Chair and thank you 01:03:06.420 --> 01:03:09.540 General Cotton for being here today as 01:03:09.540 --> 01:03:11.596 well as Marsha . Thank you very much 01:03:11.596 --> 01:03:15.340 for for joining us . Um and I I enjoyed 01:03:15.340 --> 01:03:17.396 visiting with you in the office . We 01:03:17.396 --> 01:03:19.820 covered a lot of really great topics 01:03:19.830 --> 01:03:22.420 important to the defense of our nation . 01:03:22.710 --> 01:03:25.980 And just a few questions here in this 01:03:25.980 --> 01:03:29.130 committee , the 2018 National Defense 01:03:29.130 --> 01:03:31.770 Strategy Commission had determined that 01:03:31.770 --> 01:03:34.470 the United States might struggle to win 01:03:34.480 --> 01:03:37.910 or perhaps even lose a war with China 01:03:37.910 --> 01:03:40.540 over Taiwan . This has been a big 01:03:40.540 --> 01:03:43.710 concern of ours , especially in recent 01:03:43.710 --> 01:03:45.570 months . Do you agree that the 01:03:45.570 --> 01:03:47.626 president must have flexible nuclear 01:03:47.626 --> 01:03:50.240 options to prevent conventional defeat 01:03:50.240 --> 01:03:52.600 at the hands of our adversaries in this 01:03:52.600 --> 01:03:56.490 particular scenario . Okay . And I 01:03:56.490 --> 01:03:58.710 appreciate that . And I know that a 01:03:58.710 --> 01:04:00.766 number of my colleagues have already 01:04:00.766 --> 01:04:04.100 brought up um having a nuclear 01:04:04.100 --> 01:04:07.570 deterrence uh theater nuclear forces in 01:04:07.580 --> 01:04:11.410 Asia . Um so I won't go through that 01:04:11.410 --> 01:04:13.632 again . But I just want to state that I 01:04:13.632 --> 01:04:15.743 do think it is important that we have 01:04:15.743 --> 01:04:17.910 those capabilities abroad , especially 01:04:17.910 --> 01:04:21.390 in that region considering the scenario 01:04:21.390 --> 01:04:23.890 that that we have seen through the 2018 01:04:23.900 --> 01:04:27.200 National Defense Strategy and what we 01:04:27.200 --> 01:04:30.330 see occurring just in the Daily News . 01:04:30.330 --> 01:04:33.280 So I just want to emphasize my support 01:04:33.290 --> 01:04:35.410 for making sure that that we have the 01:04:35.410 --> 01:04:37.940 capabilities necessary if we should 01:04:37.940 --> 01:04:40.350 ever need those present in the indo Pay . 01:04:40.350 --> 01:04:43.230 Com . Um Chairman Million Vice Chairman 01:04:43.230 --> 01:04:46.860 Grady also wrote in june that 01:04:46.870 --> 01:04:50.050 continued modernization and expansion 01:04:50.050 --> 01:04:52.217 of the ground based mid course defense 01:04:52.217 --> 01:04:54.330 system is critical to defend the 01:04:54.330 --> 01:04:57.600 homeland from north korean missiles . 01:04:57.610 --> 01:05:00.950 Do you agree that we must expand ? 01:05:00.960 --> 01:05:02.516 There's a lot of talk about 01:05:02.516 --> 01:05:04.750 modernization , but do you agree that 01:05:04.750 --> 01:05:07.840 we must expand , not merely modernize 01:05:07.850 --> 01:05:11.170 homeland missile defense to take um to 01:05:11.170 --> 01:05:13.281 actually make sure that we're putting 01:05:13.281 --> 01:05:15.614 in check rogue nations like North Korea . 01:05:16.190 --> 01:05:18.301 Senator thanks for the question . You 01:05:18.301 --> 01:05:21.930 know , uh I I think when we talk 01:05:21.930 --> 01:05:24.680 about missile defense , especially with 01:05:24.680 --> 01:05:27.070 the not only rogue nations but now with 01:05:27.070 --> 01:05:29.160 two adversaries um near peer 01:05:29.160 --> 01:05:32.400 adversaries um that have different um 01:05:32.410 --> 01:05:34.960 capacities and capabilities . Um I 01:05:34.960 --> 01:05:37.900 would agree that uh for the protection 01:05:37.900 --> 01:05:40.370 of the homeland um more options is 01:05:40.370 --> 01:05:42.650 better than less . Yes , more options 01:05:42.650 --> 01:05:46.580 are are better and I know that we do 01:05:46.580 --> 01:05:49.980 receive pushback every once in a while 01:05:49.980 --> 01:05:53.220 on this idea that we need to expand and 01:05:53.220 --> 01:05:57.220 modernize and it is extremely costly . 01:05:57.420 --> 01:06:00.930 And just to emphasize to our 01:06:00.940 --> 01:06:04.720 fabulous american um citizens that 01:06:04.730 --> 01:06:07.590 Jim Mattis , uh the way he phrased this 01:06:07.590 --> 01:06:11.180 in the past is America can afford 01:06:11.180 --> 01:06:14.000 survival . I think it's very important 01:06:14.000 --> 01:06:16.111 that we continue to look at ways that 01:06:16.111 --> 01:06:19.310 we can expand and modernize . Um 01:06:19.320 --> 01:06:23.120 and would you also agree 01:06:23.120 --> 01:06:26.170 that the capability to destroy hard and 01:06:26.180 --> 01:06:29.930 deeply buried targets actually enhances 01:06:29.930 --> 01:06:33.040 our deterrence by denying that our 01:06:33.040 --> 01:06:36.650 adversary um uh doesn't have 01:06:36.650 --> 01:06:39.380 sanctuary from us nuclear 01:06:39.380 --> 01:06:43.330 deterrence . Yes . And can you think 01:06:43.330 --> 01:06:45.860 of examples where we might need to look 01:06:45.860 --> 01:06:49.140 into that further ? Senator ? Thanks 01:06:49.140 --> 01:06:51.084 for the question . I think there's 01:06:51.084 --> 01:06:53.307 opportunities for us to understand what 01:06:53.307 --> 01:06:55.307 technologies are available that can 01:06:55.307 --> 01:06:57.029 give us potentially nuclear or 01:06:57.029 --> 01:06:59.730 conventional um that can get after hard 01:06:59.730 --> 01:07:02.410 and deeply buried targets and if 01:07:02.410 --> 01:07:05.580 confirmed . Um um I would love to lead 01:07:05.580 --> 01:07:08.100 the charge and be an advocate and 01:07:08.100 --> 01:07:10.300 understanding . Thank you for that . I 01:07:10.300 --> 01:07:13.370 appreciate it . And do you agree that 01:07:13.370 --> 01:07:16.590 we should sustain the B-83 bomb until 01:07:16.590 --> 01:07:19.480 we have a suitable replacement ? I 01:07:19.480 --> 01:07:21.840 think that we need to be able to have 01:07:21.850 --> 01:07:25.400 uh an opportunity to provide options 01:07:25.400 --> 01:07:27.850 and if that's taken off the table um 01:07:27.860 --> 01:07:30.027 then we no longer we no longer have an 01:07:30.027 --> 01:07:32.193 option to provide . Yeah . Thank you . 01:07:32.193 --> 01:07:34.890 Um I do appreciate that as well . And 01:07:34.890 --> 01:07:37.960 then of course the president extended 01:07:37.960 --> 01:07:40.070 news start for five years when he 01:07:40.070 --> 01:07:43.140 assumed office in your opinion in your 01:07:43.140 --> 01:07:46.090 best um military opinion are U . S . 01:07:46.090 --> 01:07:48.370 Strategic arms constraints prudent 01:07:48.380 --> 01:07:51.410 given china's nuclear breakout which is 01:07:51.420 --> 01:07:54.790 they are not party to the treaty and 01:07:54.790 --> 01:07:56.623 Russia's arsenal of nonstrategic 01:07:56.623 --> 01:07:58.734 nuclear weapons which are unaccounted 01:07:58.734 --> 01:08:01.770 for by the treaty Senator . I think 01:08:01.780 --> 01:08:04.900 whatever agreement or treaty that we 01:08:04.900 --> 01:08:07.460 could do to prevent proliferation 01:08:08.550 --> 01:08:12.100 um is good with a caveat 01:08:12.760 --> 01:08:16.510 that it incorporates every aspect 01:08:16.520 --> 01:08:19.950 of what the the sign an 01:08:19.950 --> 01:08:22.280 agreement would be . So what I mean by 01:08:22.280 --> 01:08:26.010 that are you know weapons that are 01:08:26.020 --> 01:08:29.550 currently not seen as strategic weapons 01:08:29.560 --> 01:08:31.840 um need to be added to that calculus . 01:08:31.850 --> 01:08:35.580 Um So but but any agreement or 01:08:35.580 --> 01:08:38.350 treaty that would uh prevent 01:08:38.350 --> 01:08:41.390 proliferation across the globe . I am 01:08:41.390 --> 01:08:44.280 for . Okay , thank you for your answers . 01:08:44.280 --> 01:08:46.940 And and I do appreciate the opportunity 01:08:46.940 --> 01:08:49.107 to sit down with you in the office the 01:08:49.107 --> 01:08:51.330 other day and and look forward to 01:08:51.330 --> 01:08:53.680 hearing more from you . Um I as well 01:08:53.680 --> 01:08:57.640 growing up in southwest Iowa um I also 01:08:57.640 --> 01:08:59.696 have been known to call it Strategic 01:08:59.696 --> 01:09:02.560 Air Command so with you . But thank you 01:09:02.560 --> 01:09:04.782 very much for your time today . General 01:09:04.782 --> 01:09:06.671 thank you . Senator . Thank you . 01:09:06.671 --> 01:09:08.727 Senator ernst Senator scott please ? 01:09:08.727 --> 01:09:10.830 Thank you . Chairman Reed Joe 1st . 01:09:10.830 --> 01:09:12.441 Thanks for your service . Uh 01:09:12.441 --> 01:09:14.497 congratulations on your nomination . 01:09:14.497 --> 01:09:16.830 Thank you for your willingness to serve . 01:09:16.830 --> 01:09:19.280 So , so here's what here's what informs 01:09:19.290 --> 01:09:21.123 most most of my work here on the 01:09:21.123 --> 01:09:23.290 committee . Um First United States has 01:09:23.290 --> 01:09:26.020 several enemies um who have no interest 01:09:26.020 --> 01:09:28.131 other than the harm us . Uh they want 01:09:28.131 --> 01:09:30.353 us to be weak , independent and without 01:09:30.353 --> 01:09:32.242 allies . And you talked about the 01:09:32.242 --> 01:09:34.409 importance of our allies . Chief among 01:09:34.409 --> 01:09:36.409 these enemies are China's Communist 01:09:36.409 --> 01:09:38.510 Party and Vladimir Putin's regime . 01:09:38.520 --> 01:09:40.720 Secondary enemies wake up every day 01:09:40.730 --> 01:09:43.310 plotting to harm us . They think about 01:09:43.310 --> 01:09:45.460 it all the time . Putin's invasion , 01:09:45.460 --> 01:09:47.682 brutal murdering , raping and pillaging 01:09:47.682 --> 01:09:49.849 of Ukraine is , in his own words , his 01:09:49.849 --> 01:09:51.793 fight against the United States as 01:09:51.793 --> 01:09:54.016 though anyone really needed him to hear 01:09:54.016 --> 01:09:56.182 what he's up to . Um jones secretary . 01:09:56.182 --> 01:09:58.404 She contemplates the same thing for the 01:09:58.404 --> 01:10:00.460 free and Democratic nation of Taiwan 01:10:00.930 --> 01:10:03.152 third most countries in the world where 01:10:03.152 --> 01:10:05.152 they actually like us or not , they 01:10:05.152 --> 01:10:07.263 might be jealous of us . They do want 01:10:07.263 --> 01:10:09.374 America to be powerful and capable of 01:10:09.374 --> 01:10:11.430 deterring or defeating any aggressor 01:10:11.430 --> 01:10:10.810 who tries to turn the world into their 01:10:10.810 --> 01:10:13.540 own dictatorship . Most countries know 01:10:13.540 --> 01:10:15.707 that there's really only two choices . 01:10:15.707 --> 01:10:17.929 A world where communist china Putin and 01:10:17.929 --> 01:10:19.873 the Ayatollah and maybe others are 01:10:19.873 --> 01:10:21.984 making the rules for everyone are one 01:10:21.984 --> 01:10:24.040 with a strong and independent United 01:10:24.040 --> 01:10:26.040 States that faces down . Aggressors 01:10:26.040 --> 01:10:28.151 helps those who help themselves leads 01:10:28.151 --> 01:10:30.373 alliances and promote state sovereignty 01:10:30.373 --> 01:10:32.429 and commerce . So if you would agree 01:10:32.429 --> 01:10:34.596 with that and I think most of us would 01:10:34.596 --> 01:10:36.762 agree with those . Can you explain why 01:10:36.762 --> 01:10:38.762 the United States would not want to 01:10:38.762 --> 01:10:40.707 have the most modern and expansive 01:10:40.707 --> 01:10:42.873 nuclear and strategic weapons we could 01:10:42.873 --> 01:10:46.040 have . So I do agree with that . Um 01:10:46.720 --> 01:10:49.130 and and and to be frank , I am really 01:10:49.130 --> 01:10:51.390 happy with what this committee has done 01:10:51.400 --> 01:10:53.780 um in regards to where we are on a 01:10:53.780 --> 01:10:56.920 nuclear modernization front today ? Um 01:10:58.140 --> 01:11:01.530 You know , are we late to need ? 01:11:02.840 --> 01:11:06.340 Yes . Are are we are we getting after 01:11:06.340 --> 01:11:09.900 it now ? Absolutely . Um Are we 01:11:09.910 --> 01:11:12.450 are we in a position where we can 01:11:12.460 --> 01:11:16.350 ensure that we have um um a 01:11:16.350 --> 01:11:19.910 portfolio that can that can 01:11:19.910 --> 01:11:22.580 module arise and meet the needs in the 01:11:22.580 --> 01:11:25.900 future ? I think we do senator . Um but 01:11:25.900 --> 01:11:28.340 I agree with you . Um I'm about the 01:11:28.340 --> 01:11:31.610 strong and not about the week . So um 01:11:31.610 --> 01:11:35.430 as if confirmed um that's my position . 01:11:35.430 --> 01:11:37.319 I I want to be from a position of 01:11:37.319 --> 01:11:39.208 strength , not from a position of 01:11:39.208 --> 01:11:41.790 weakness . So would you agree we ought 01:11:41.790 --> 01:11:44.012 to accelerate our nuclear modernization 01:11:44.012 --> 01:11:47.480 plan as much as we can sir . If that's 01:11:47.480 --> 01:11:51.440 possible . Let's do it after your 01:11:51.440 --> 01:11:53.662 many years of experience , you know who 01:11:53.662 --> 01:11:55.718 our enemies are and what they want , 01:11:55.718 --> 01:11:57.773 what they're capable of doing . Um , 01:11:57.773 --> 01:11:59.940 you don't live in ivory tower academic 01:11:59.940 --> 01:11:59.910 bubble where you can tease out theories 01:11:59.910 --> 01:12:02.500 of disarmament and hope it all sort of 01:12:02.500 --> 01:12:05.480 goes well . Um , so if you're confirmed , 01:12:05.490 --> 01:12:08.340 which I believe you will be and this is 01:12:08.340 --> 01:12:10.396 not a diplomatic role role . Right ? 01:12:11.430 --> 01:12:13.652 His role is not being a diplomat . Your 01:12:13.652 --> 01:12:15.486 role , your your role is to be a 01:12:15.486 --> 01:12:17.652 fighter . If confirmed . My role is to 01:12:17.652 --> 01:12:19.708 be a combatant commander . Your your 01:12:19.708 --> 01:12:21.652 goal is to scare the living out of 01:12:21.652 --> 01:12:24.040 everybody . Yes sir . 01:12:25.420 --> 01:12:27.440 Um would you agree that the US 01:12:27.440 --> 01:12:29.384 president should have a variety of 01:12:29.384 --> 01:12:31.384 strategic weapons and stockpiles so 01:12:31.384 --> 01:12:33.440 large that no enemy would even think 01:12:33.440 --> 01:12:36.760 about trying to attack America ? I 01:12:36.760 --> 01:12:38.927 think we need to have a stockpile that 01:12:38.927 --> 01:12:41.570 is credible and capable . Absolutely . 01:12:42.210 --> 01:12:45.990 And um Senator King brought this . Our 01:12:46.000 --> 01:12:48.111 king brought this up earlier . Uh , I 01:12:48.111 --> 01:12:51.470 do appreciate the more direct and 01:12:51.470 --> 01:12:53.359 honest people can be when they're 01:12:53.359 --> 01:12:55.192 testifying . Uh , I know there's 01:12:55.192 --> 01:12:57.026 probably a lot of pressure to do 01:12:57.026 --> 01:12:59.192 whatever administration , whatever the 01:12:59.192 --> 01:13:01.414 administration is wants you to do . But 01:13:01.414 --> 01:13:03.526 I do appreciate as much as you can to 01:13:03.526 --> 01:13:03.120 be direct because all of us are trying 01:13:03.120 --> 01:13:05.231 to make the best decisions we can and 01:13:05.231 --> 01:13:07.287 you're the expert . So thank you and 01:13:07.287 --> 01:13:09.231 thanks for your service . I'm glad 01:13:09.231 --> 01:13:11.398 you're gonna serve continue to serve . 01:13:11.398 --> 01:13:13.287 Thank you . Senator , thank you . 01:13:13.287 --> 01:13:15.398 Senator scott . Uh Senator Rosen when 01:13:15.398 --> 01:13:16.620 you're ready please . 01:13:29.070 --> 01:13:31.590 There it is . Thank you . MR Chairman 01:13:31.600 --> 01:13:34.810 uh appreciate that . Thank you General 01:13:34.810 --> 01:13:37.040 Cotton for testifying today for your 01:13:37.040 --> 01:13:39.100 willingness to continue to serve . 01:13:39.110 --> 01:13:41.080 Really appreciate you . And so of 01:13:41.080 --> 01:13:43.191 course I hail from the great state of 01:13:43.191 --> 01:13:45.480 Nevada and uh I want to talk a little 01:13:45.480 --> 01:13:47.647 bit about the Nevada national Security 01:13:47.647 --> 01:13:49.813 site , the infrastructure upgrades and 01:13:49.813 --> 01:13:53.280 how important of course it is uh to our 01:13:53.290 --> 01:13:57.040 nuclear mission . And um I've talked 01:13:57.040 --> 01:13:59.262 about this a lot in this committee that 01:13:59.262 --> 01:14:01.151 the Nevada national Security site 01:14:01.151 --> 01:14:03.420 oversees the stockpile stewardship 01:14:03.430 --> 01:14:06.000 program principally at Are you won a 01:14:06.000 --> 01:14:07.800 facility which is of course an 01:14:07.800 --> 01:14:10.022 underground laboratory where scientists 01:14:10.022 --> 01:14:12.630 conduct those sub critical experiments 01:14:12.640 --> 01:14:15.430 that verify the safety and reliability 01:14:15.430 --> 01:14:18.140 of our nuclear stockpile without And 01:14:18.140 --> 01:14:20.307 I'm going to repeat this again without 01:14:20.307 --> 01:14:23.620 explosive testing . And so you won a is 01:14:23.620 --> 01:14:25.950 undergoing major construction . That 01:14:25.950 --> 01:14:28.180 project is soon gonna hold the most 01:14:28.180 --> 01:14:31.930 weapons capable radiographic system in 01:14:31.940 --> 01:14:35.100 the world . However , the Nevada 01:14:35.100 --> 01:14:36.933 National Security Administration 01:14:36.933 --> 01:14:38.680 currently faces significant 01:14:38.690 --> 01:14:41.530 infrastructure delays including it our 01:14:41.530 --> 01:14:43.800 Nevada national Security site . So 01:14:43.800 --> 01:14:46.022 General Cotton is the current commander 01:14:46.022 --> 01:14:48.189 providing two of the three legs of the 01:14:48.189 --> 01:14:49.967 triad . Can you speak about the 01:14:49.967 --> 01:14:52.189 importance of the stockpile stewardship 01:14:52.189 --> 01:14:54.400 program and if confirmed how you would 01:14:54.400 --> 01:14:56.710 plan to working with your fellow 01:14:56.710 --> 01:14:59.540 Nuclear Weapons Council partners in 01:14:59.540 --> 01:15:01.260 addressing the NN essays , 01:15:01.270 --> 01:15:02.992 infrastructure , modernization 01:15:02.992 --> 01:15:05.640 challenges and unfortunate delays . 01:15:06.440 --> 01:15:08.551 Senator Rosen . Thanks thanks for the 01:15:08.551 --> 01:15:11.120 question . There's nothing more 01:15:11.120 --> 01:15:13.440 important than the relationship that we 01:15:13.440 --> 01:15:15.107 have with the D . O . E . And 01:15:15.107 --> 01:15:17.690 specifically in N . S . A . Um as we 01:15:17.690 --> 01:15:19.720 talked throughout the hearing , in 01:15:19.720 --> 01:15:23.200 regards to the modernization programs , 01:15:23.210 --> 01:15:26.680 um , they're interwoven um , that the 01:15:26.680 --> 01:15:29.120 platforms mean absolutely nothing if I 01:15:29.120 --> 01:15:31.342 don't have the assets available for the 01:15:31.342 --> 01:15:34.590 platforms . Um , so to your question on 01:15:34.600 --> 01:15:37.230 infrastructure , you're absolutely not 01:15:37.230 --> 01:15:40.320 only the Nevada locations , but all of 01:15:40.320 --> 01:15:43.960 NNS A locations um are in dire 01:15:43.960 --> 01:15:45.680 need of upgrades and in their 01:15:45.680 --> 01:15:48.170 infrastructure . Um , that dates back 01:15:48.170 --> 01:15:50.620 to Manhattan Manhattan project times . 01:15:50.630 --> 01:15:53.850 Um , we're living in a different world 01:15:53.850 --> 01:15:57.810 today . Um , as I keep saying , um , to 01:15:57.810 --> 01:15:59.760 near pure adversaries , nuclear 01:15:59.760 --> 01:16:03.520 adversaries , um , we are going to have 01:16:03.520 --> 01:16:06.780 to ensure that the infrastructure um 01:16:06.790 --> 01:16:10.480 are upgraded and are at the capacity 01:16:10.480 --> 01:16:12.720 and capability to meet the needs of the 01:16:12.720 --> 01:16:15.650 war fighter . You mentioned i as owning 01:16:15.650 --> 01:16:18.000 two legs . Um , I have modernization 01:16:18.000 --> 01:16:20.530 programs that are gonna need uh , new 01:16:20.530 --> 01:16:23.860 systems for them . Um , can't do that 01:16:23.860 --> 01:16:26.340 without the , without the incredible 01:16:26.340 --> 01:16:28.340 work of the men and women that that 01:16:28.340 --> 01:16:30.173 that make up the N . S . A . But 01:16:30.173 --> 01:16:32.229 they're going to need infrastructure 01:16:32.229 --> 01:16:34.340 that allow them to be able to do that 01:16:34.340 --> 01:16:36.451 type of work and not just bringing up 01:16:36.451 --> 01:16:38.340 to today's standards , but really 01:16:38.340 --> 01:16:40.570 preparing them for future challenges 01:16:40.570 --> 01:16:42.690 and innovation that we so desperately 01:16:42.700 --> 01:16:45.100 are going to need to compete . So thank 01:16:45.100 --> 01:16:47.540 you for that because we do have to 01:16:47.540 --> 01:16:49.429 think about the technological and 01:16:49.429 --> 01:16:51.484 advancements with those advancements 01:16:51.484 --> 01:16:53.262 also come advancements from our 01:16:53.262 --> 01:16:55.500 adversaries . So that creates increased 01:16:55.500 --> 01:16:57.860 threats as well . And so the Nuclear 01:16:57.860 --> 01:17:00.027 Command control communications systems 01:17:00.027 --> 01:17:02.193 of the United States , we know they're 01:17:02.193 --> 01:17:03.916 connected through a network of 01:17:03.916 --> 01:17:05.693 communications , different data 01:17:05.693 --> 01:17:08.250 processing systems . Uh This could 01:17:08.250 --> 01:17:10.590 possibly lead us vulnerable for cyber 01:17:10.590 --> 01:17:13.440 attacks . And in fact in 2020 april of 01:17:13.440 --> 01:17:15.450 2021 the Department of Energy's 01:17:15.450 --> 01:17:17.770 Inspector General audit concluded that 01:17:17.770 --> 01:17:20.410 cybersecurity weaknesses they really do 01:17:20.410 --> 01:17:22.410 persist throughout the department's 01:17:22.410 --> 01:17:24.521 unclassified networks including those 01:17:24.521 --> 01:17:27.920 of the National Nuclear Security 01:17:27.920 --> 01:17:30.480 Administration . So recent news , we've 01:17:30.480 --> 01:17:32.424 highlighted significant efforts by 01:17:32.424 --> 01:17:34.390 Huawei to build telecommunication 01:17:34.390 --> 01:17:36.723 structures right near our I . C . B . M . 01:17:36.723 --> 01:17:39.650 Fields , possibly uh interrupt our 01:17:39.650 --> 01:17:41.750 forces or our systems . And can you 01:17:41.750 --> 01:17:43.890 talk about these potential threats , 01:17:44.110 --> 01:17:47.810 cyber threats ? Um Maybe not directly 01:17:47.810 --> 01:17:49.830 but even nearby where some of our 01:17:49.830 --> 01:17:52.840 critical assets are located . Thank you 01:17:52.840 --> 01:17:55.290 senator for the question . So so we are 01:17:55.300 --> 01:17:59.130 um really paying attention to what 01:17:59.130 --> 01:18:03.000 we're seeing is as as a chinese are are 01:18:03.000 --> 01:18:05.790 taking advantage of some of the 01:18:05.790 --> 01:18:08.100 opportunities that they can have . Um 01:18:08.120 --> 01:18:10.460 some locations that are near near are 01:18:10.470 --> 01:18:12.692 in particularly some of our I . C . B . 01:18:12.692 --> 01:18:15.400 M . Sites . Um So we are we're we're 01:18:15.410 --> 01:18:17.940 absolutely looking into that um to your 01:18:17.940 --> 01:18:21.120 point on on cybersecurity , You know as 01:18:21.120 --> 01:18:24.330 people talk about N . C . Three um You 01:18:24.330 --> 01:18:26.710 know I think your point is well taken . 01:18:26.720 --> 01:18:30.500 It's also you know any other um 01:18:30.510 --> 01:18:34.070 support um in the 01:18:34.340 --> 01:18:38.240 in the architecture of of us the 01:18:38.250 --> 01:18:41.750 nuclear community um like N . N . S . A . 01:18:41.760 --> 01:18:43.780 To ensure that that they're that 01:18:43.780 --> 01:18:47.620 they're just as cyber safe um as uh 01:18:47.830 --> 01:18:50.700 N . C . Two platform would be . Um So 01:18:50.700 --> 01:18:53.070 if confirmed um as part of the nuke 01:18:53.070 --> 01:18:56.740 weapons council as a member um I think 01:18:56.740 --> 01:18:58.462 that is something that we will 01:18:58.462 --> 01:19:00.518 continually have to have more than a 01:19:00.518 --> 01:19:03.200 discussion about but figure out how to 01:19:03.210 --> 01:19:05.480 get to the end state in that regard . 01:19:05.490 --> 01:19:07.379 Yeah . Well there's a lot of push 01:19:07.379 --> 01:19:10.480 points and uh handoffs between agencies 01:19:10.490 --> 01:19:12.490 information between one another . I 01:19:12.490 --> 01:19:14.546 look forward to working on that with 01:19:14.546 --> 01:19:16.823 you . Thank you . Thank you . Mr Chair . 01:19:16.823 --> 01:19:19.200 Thank you Senator Thank you Senator 01:19:19.200 --> 01:19:21.560 Rosen . Uh Senator Sullivan please 01:19:21.570 --> 01:19:23.680 thank you . Mr Chairman and General 01:19:23.680 --> 01:19:25.736 Cotton . Good to see you . I enjoyed 01:19:25.736 --> 01:19:28.350 our discussion the other day . Let me 01:19:28.360 --> 01:19:31.300 uh follow up on some of the topics that 01:19:31.300 --> 01:19:34.880 we talked about first . Um 01:19:35.470 --> 01:19:37.730 If confirmed you will work closely with 01:19:37.730 --> 01:19:39.952 the U . S . Space Force Missile Defense 01:19:39.952 --> 01:19:43.320 Agency Northern Command to 01:19:43.330 --> 01:19:46.290 guarantee the security of our nation . 01:19:46.300 --> 01:19:50.020 And um as you know , Alaska has a lot 01:19:50.030 --> 01:19:53.460 of critical assets that relate to 01:19:53.470 --> 01:19:55.637 missile defense for the cornerstone of 01:19:55.637 --> 01:19:58.760 missile defense over 105th generation 01:19:58.760 --> 01:20:02.190 fighters uh world class training 01:20:02.190 --> 01:20:06.000 ranges . If confirmed . Will you commit 01:20:06.000 --> 01:20:09.150 to visiting Alaska early in your tenure 01:20:09.150 --> 01:20:11.500 to see these assets meet with the 01:20:11.500 --> 01:20:13.444 troops that are so critical to our 01:20:13.444 --> 01:20:15.778 homeland defense that you see in Alaska , 01:20:16.280 --> 01:20:19.330 Senator . Absolutely thank you . Um , 01:20:20.340 --> 01:20:22.507 you know , we had a good discussion on 01:20:22.507 --> 01:20:25.190 basing in 01:20:26.180 --> 01:20:29.770 May of 1992 . The Strategic Air Command 01:20:29.770 --> 01:20:32.720 was essentially stood down and many of 01:20:32.720 --> 01:20:36.150 our bomber bases uh , around the 01:20:36.150 --> 01:20:38.920 country around the world were closed . 01:20:38.930 --> 01:20:40.986 We've been talking about a lot about 01:20:40.986 --> 01:20:43.610 great power competition and how we need 01:20:43.610 --> 01:20:46.090 to be ready to confront to near pier 01:20:46.090 --> 01:20:48.590 nuclear capable adversaries with very 01:20:48.590 --> 01:20:51.890 large militaries . Given this reality , 01:20:51.890 --> 01:20:54.260 how should we be approaching the basing 01:20:54.260 --> 01:20:56.371 of our nuclear capable bomber fleet , 01:20:56.371 --> 01:20:59.390 particularly when the B 21 raider 01:21:00.000 --> 01:21:03.410 comes online . And again in line of 01:21:03.420 --> 01:21:05.740 some of the issues you and I discussed 01:21:05.740 --> 01:21:08.960 the other day , Senator . Thank you . I 01:21:08.960 --> 01:21:11.182 think initially when we talk about main 01:21:11.182 --> 01:21:13.349 operating bases , um , I'm comfortable 01:21:13.349 --> 01:21:15.571 where we are . The conversation that we 01:21:15.571 --> 01:21:17.682 had is how do you , you know , how do 01:21:17.682 --> 01:21:19.904 we disperse forces um , in the future , 01:21:19.904 --> 01:21:22.016 especially with with two near peers . 01:21:22.016 --> 01:21:24.730 Um , and , and , and in our discussion , 01:21:24.740 --> 01:21:26.840 we talk about the agile combat 01:21:26.840 --> 01:21:30.060 employment construct that the Air Force 01:21:30.070 --> 01:21:32.940 with the Chief of Staff General CQ 01:21:32.940 --> 01:21:34.884 Brown is leading across the United 01:21:34.884 --> 01:21:37.051 States Air Force . I say it's a little 01:21:37.051 --> 01:21:38.773 different what I call big wing 01:21:38.773 --> 01:21:40.884 airplanes . Um , as opposed to to our 01:21:40.884 --> 01:21:42.840 fighter forces , but the construct 01:21:42.850 --> 01:21:45.940 holes and , and and works as well . Um 01:21:45.950 --> 01:21:48.006 I would love to be able to make sure 01:21:48.006 --> 01:21:49.728 that we have opportunities and 01:21:49.728 --> 01:21:52.250 availability throughout the country to 01:21:52.250 --> 01:21:55.210 add dilemma to our adversaries . If you 01:21:55.210 --> 01:21:58.650 will um on where our bomber forces are 01:21:58.650 --> 01:22:00.872 in the future . Let me be a little more 01:22:00.872 --> 01:22:02.983 direct on that is , you know , Alaska 01:22:02.983 --> 01:22:05.930 is very strategically located and 01:22:06.600 --> 01:22:08.370 staging options , rotational 01:22:08.370 --> 01:22:11.140 deployments . The ability to have not 01:22:11.140 --> 01:22:14.600 just fifth gen fighters but strategic 01:22:14.610 --> 01:22:18.160 global strike assets um based in 01:22:18.160 --> 01:22:20.750 Alaska that are much closer to Russia , 01:22:20.760 --> 01:22:23.580 much closer to china as you and I have 01:22:23.580 --> 01:22:26.040 discussed , a number of Air Force flag 01:22:26.040 --> 01:22:29.890 officers have seen this as a strategic 01:22:29.900 --> 01:22:32.880 uh concept that we can take advantage 01:22:32.880 --> 01:22:35.640 of particularly with regard to great 01:22:35.640 --> 01:22:37.473 power competition . You have any 01:22:37.473 --> 01:22:39.140 thoughts on that general more 01:22:39.140 --> 01:22:41.880 specifically ? Well , I think I think 01:22:41.880 --> 01:22:44.780 the basis in in Alaska act as great 01:22:44.780 --> 01:22:47.240 staging basis for for for bomber 01:22:47.240 --> 01:22:49.296 deployments . And I think that's the 01:22:49.296 --> 01:22:52.770 question that you're asking , um the 01:22:52.780 --> 01:22:55.240 point of having a main operating base 01:22:55.250 --> 01:22:58.600 um if confirmed as commander stratcom , 01:22:58.600 --> 01:23:00.822 I'd like to make that assessment to see 01:23:00.830 --> 01:23:02.830 what , what recommendations I would 01:23:02.830 --> 01:23:05.970 make to the service . But um today I 01:23:05.970 --> 01:23:08.360 think um as we move forward , I think 01:23:08.370 --> 01:23:11.650 having it as a , as an operating a 01:23:11.650 --> 01:23:15.590 staging platform is critical for us . 01:23:15.600 --> 01:23:17.767 I mean if you recall , we talked about 01:23:17.767 --> 01:23:19.989 even , you know , ensuring that we have 01:23:19.989 --> 01:23:21.989 right , you know , runway lengths , 01:23:21.989 --> 01:23:24.310 etcetera moving forward . Great and I'm 01:23:24.310 --> 01:23:26.532 looking forward to working with you and 01:23:26.532 --> 01:23:28.699 I look forward to supporting your your 01:23:28.699 --> 01:23:30.930 confirmation . Let me um talk about 01:23:30.930 --> 01:23:33.550 another topic we had the opportunity to 01:23:33.550 --> 01:23:37.550 discuss and that's this idea of 01:23:37.550 --> 01:23:39.883 a strategic breakout as it relates to I . 01:23:39.883 --> 01:23:43.620 C . B . M . Capability with regard 01:23:43.630 --> 01:23:46.750 to china . The current stratcom 01:23:46.750 --> 01:23:49.520 commander , Admiral Richard called that 01:23:50.100 --> 01:23:53.380 the recent reports on how quickly china 01:23:53.390 --> 01:23:56.160 is developing strategic 01:23:57.400 --> 01:23:59.640 missile capabilities , I . C . B . M . 01:23:59.640 --> 01:24:01.251 Capabilities . You called it 01:24:01.251 --> 01:24:04.470 breathtaking um in your estimation , 01:24:04.470 --> 01:24:07.410 what is the greatest concern regarding 01:24:07.410 --> 01:24:10.700 this strategic breakout ? And how 01:24:10.700 --> 01:24:13.630 should we as uh Armed Services 01:24:13.630 --> 01:24:17.270 Committee , be focused on helping you 01:24:17.280 --> 01:24:20.330 counter or be ready for that ? Very 01:24:20.330 --> 01:24:22.386 significant threat . Thanks for that 01:24:22.386 --> 01:24:25.190 question . As recent as 2018 , we will 01:24:25.190 --> 01:24:27.340 describe china as having a minimal 01:24:27.340 --> 01:24:30.350 deterrence , minimal nuclear deterrence . 01:24:30.610 --> 01:24:32.221 We would have probably had a 01:24:32.221 --> 01:24:35.060 conversation stating that um it was 01:24:35.060 --> 01:24:38.110 about regional hegemony . 01:24:38.710 --> 01:24:42.130 Um today uh they're 01:24:42.130 --> 01:24:45.170 building ground based I C . B . M . 01:24:45.170 --> 01:24:48.950 Silos . Um They have the H six and 01:24:48.960 --> 01:24:51.550 nuclear capable medium bomber that has 01:24:51.550 --> 01:24:54.650 strategic capable um launch platform . 01:24:54.650 --> 01:24:56.594 And just real quick general not to 01:24:56.594 --> 01:24:59.000 interrupt but to give some context that 01:24:59.010 --> 01:25:01.550 in april of 2021 commercial satellite 01:25:01.560 --> 01:25:04.360 imagery revealed three new nuclear 01:25:04.360 --> 01:25:06.750 missile fields in western china . Each 01:25:06.760 --> 01:25:10.440 with approximately 100 and 20 missile 01:25:10.440 --> 01:25:14.140 silos . So this is incredible . Is it 01:25:14.140 --> 01:25:17.610 not in terms of the size . It is 01:25:17.610 --> 01:25:19.721 absolutely incredible and it's such a 01:25:19.721 --> 01:25:21.777 short time . Um to Admiral Richard's 01:25:21.777 --> 01:25:24.370 point . Thank you . Thank you . Mr . 01:25:24.370 --> 01:25:26.660 Chairman . Thank you . Senator Sullivan 01:25:26.670 --> 01:25:29.460 uh Senator kelly , Are you ready ? 01:25:31.490 --> 01:25:35.310 Yes . Yes thank you . Thank you . Mr 01:25:35.310 --> 01:25:38.330 Chairman General . Um 01:25:39.300 --> 01:25:42.260 Great seeing you again this week and 01:25:42.850 --> 01:25:46.080 uh congratulations on your nomination . 01:25:46.090 --> 01:25:48.150 Um you know during our meeting we 01:25:48.150 --> 01:25:50.960 briefly discussed your priorities and 01:25:50.960 --> 01:25:54.880 if confirmed um for your priorities 01:25:54.880 --> 01:25:57.210 for modernizing the nuclear triad . The 01:25:57.210 --> 01:25:59.377 long range standoff weapon . We talked 01:25:59.377 --> 01:26:01.654 a little bit about that . Or L . R . S . 01:26:01.654 --> 01:26:04.380 O . Represents one leg of the triad and 01:26:04.380 --> 01:26:07.870 replaces the aging . A . G . M . 86 01:26:07.870 --> 01:26:10.570 be air launched cruise missile . And 01:26:10.570 --> 01:26:12.810 the Senate version of the defense bill 01:26:12.810 --> 01:26:14.940 put almost a billion dollars towards 01:26:14.940 --> 01:26:18.090 continued development of the L . R . S . 01:26:18.090 --> 01:26:21.400 O . And the L . R . S . O . Is a unique 01:26:21.400 --> 01:26:23.740 component of our strategic deterrence 01:26:23.740 --> 01:26:27.050 in that it is a de escalatory weapon in 01:26:27.050 --> 01:26:30.360 mind and others opinions and 01:26:30.370 --> 01:26:33.350 when our adversaries see or maybe here 01:26:33.360 --> 01:26:35.582 that our long range bombers are on high 01:26:35.582 --> 01:26:37.638 alert . It gives them some pause and 01:26:37.638 --> 01:26:39.860 tensions can be called without a bomber 01:26:39.860 --> 01:26:42.082 ever lifting off . So general , can can 01:26:42.082 --> 01:26:44.249 I get your thoughts on the L . R . S . 01:26:44.249 --> 01:26:46.304 O . And can I get your commitment if 01:26:46.304 --> 01:26:48.193 confirmed to the continued timely 01:26:48.193 --> 01:26:50.304 development of this weapon as a vital 01:26:50.304 --> 01:26:52.249 and de escalatory component of our 01:26:52.249 --> 01:26:54.360 nuclear triad . Senator kelly . Thank 01:26:54.360 --> 01:26:56.760 you for the question . Um Bottom line 01:26:56.760 --> 01:26:59.530 up front , we absolutely need LRS . So 01:26:59.540 --> 01:27:02.130 um the good news is um the industry's 01:27:02.130 --> 01:27:05.050 partner is doing incredible work um 01:27:05.060 --> 01:27:07.210 keeping that program on time and on 01:27:07.210 --> 01:27:09.800 schedule and I'm quite pleased as the 01:27:09.810 --> 01:27:12.100 air component commander um That's 01:27:12.110 --> 01:27:14.221 that's the lead match come overseeing 01:27:14.221 --> 01:27:16.443 it now and watching it . Um seeing what 01:27:16.443 --> 01:27:19.110 that's doing so to your point um for 01:27:19.930 --> 01:27:22.080 for our long range standoff bomber 01:27:22.080 --> 01:27:25.790 capability , that leg of the triad um 01:27:25.790 --> 01:27:28.012 having a viable credible weapons system 01:27:28.012 --> 01:27:31.220 is absolutely critical . Um And the LRS , 01:27:31.220 --> 01:27:33.610 so is that that that viable critical 01:27:33.610 --> 01:27:36.580 weapon ? That is a de escalatory weapon ? 01:27:36.590 --> 01:27:38.534 Because you're absolutely right if 01:27:38.534 --> 01:27:40.590 we're generating bombers , um it can 01:27:40.590 --> 01:27:42.701 send a signal before the first bomber 01:27:42.701 --> 01:27:45.710 even lifts off any uh any trl concerns 01:27:45.710 --> 01:27:47.766 right now . Are there any any things 01:27:47.766 --> 01:27:49.988 you see that you're worried about as we 01:27:49.988 --> 01:27:52.099 as we go forward that you could share 01:27:52.099 --> 01:27:53.988 here ? I have not , I've seen the 01:27:53.988 --> 01:27:55.877 testing that's been that's that's 01:27:55.877 --> 01:27:57.821 underway has been very promising . 01:27:57.821 --> 01:27:59.710 Thank you , general . And uh also 01:27:59.710 --> 01:28:01.877 during our conversation on monday , we 01:28:01.877 --> 01:28:04.780 briefly talked about um the tanker 01:28:04.780 --> 01:28:07.670 fleet , uh we have , you know , KC 1 30 01:28:07.670 --> 01:28:11.140 fives in phoenix . And um so I know 01:28:11.140 --> 01:28:13.251 this is an issue you're familiar with 01:28:13.251 --> 01:28:15.084 as the head of the Global Strike 01:28:15.084 --> 01:28:17.140 Command . And uh my understanding is 01:28:17.140 --> 01:28:20.930 after talking to the team at the 161st 01:28:20.930 --> 01:28:22.820 aerial refueling wing which is a 01:28:22.830 --> 01:28:26.240 National guard unit . Uh is that unlike 01:28:26.250 --> 01:28:29.310 the KC 46 the KC 1 35 is not E . M . P . 01:28:29.310 --> 01:28:32.960 Hardened . Um I guess they have 01:28:32.960 --> 01:28:35.127 some kind of makeshift procedures that 01:28:35.127 --> 01:28:37.870 they could use but it is clearly not 01:28:37.880 --> 01:28:41.790 able to to handle electronic magnetic 01:28:41.790 --> 01:28:44.290 pulse um that it might might be up 01:28:44.290 --> 01:28:46.290 against depending on you know , the 01:28:46.290 --> 01:28:49.290 location and the mission . Um A small 01:28:49.290 --> 01:28:52.700 amount of KC 1 35 sit on a you know , 01:28:52.700 --> 01:28:56.000 24 hour a day , seven days a week alert 01:28:56.000 --> 01:28:58.480 for the strategic defense deterrence 01:28:58.480 --> 01:29:00.591 mission . How concerned are you about 01:29:00.591 --> 01:29:04.350 the potential vulnerabilities of this 01:29:04.360 --> 01:29:07.570 aging tanker ? So thank you for the 01:29:07.570 --> 01:29:11.320 question . Um The fleet holes 01:29:11.330 --> 01:29:13.870 so I'm confident that it can get us 01:29:13.870 --> 01:29:16.690 there . Um But I'm even more confident 01:29:16.690 --> 01:29:19.560 and and what we're seeing in um in the 01:29:19.570 --> 01:29:23.340 KC 46 that's being deployed ? Um My 01:29:23.340 --> 01:29:27.330 fellow match com commander um General 01:29:27.330 --> 01:29:30.670 Minihan from Air mobility command . Um 01:29:30.680 --> 01:29:34.060 I know is is on top of the procurement 01:29:34.070 --> 01:29:36.390 um and deliveries of the KC 46 01:29:37.890 --> 01:29:41.010 for the KC 1 35 . It's 01:29:41.010 --> 01:29:43.340 delivery , you know , it coexists with 01:29:43.340 --> 01:29:46.710 the B 52 . Um It was it was 01:29:46.720 --> 01:29:50.720 developed to tank the B 52 . Um So 01:29:50.720 --> 01:29:53.330 it is an aging weapons system . Um But 01:29:53.330 --> 01:29:55.420 senator uh it's still meeting the 01:29:55.420 --> 01:29:57.790 requirements to be able to get our our 01:29:57.790 --> 01:30:01.470 bombers as as we bring case C um 01:30:01.480 --> 01:30:04.340 46 is online . Would you 01:30:04.660 --> 01:30:08.610 agree that uh KC 1 35 squadrons 01:30:08.610 --> 01:30:10.450 that are participating in the 01:30:10.450 --> 01:30:13.150 deterrence mission should be given 01:30:13.160 --> 01:30:15.990 priority uh to be replaced with the KC 01:30:15.990 --> 01:30:18.170 46 . Sir , have confirmed what I would 01:30:18.170 --> 01:30:20.170 like to do is make an assessment to 01:30:20.170 --> 01:30:22.226 kind of figure out what are the pros 01:30:22.226 --> 01:30:24.392 and cons of of what those mission sets 01:30:24.392 --> 01:30:26.337 are doing using a legacy system as 01:30:26.337 --> 01:30:28.337 opposed to using the new modernized 01:30:28.337 --> 01:30:30.337 system . Well thank you General and 01:30:30.337 --> 01:30:32.337 thank you . Mr . Chairman thank you 01:30:32.337 --> 01:30:34.281 Senator Silva Center . Holy please 01:30:35.180 --> 01:30:37.347 thank you . Mr Chairman General . Good 01:30:37.347 --> 01:30:39.069 to see you . I appreciated our 01:30:39.069 --> 01:30:41.347 conversation the other day . Thank you . 01:30:41.347 --> 01:30:43.458 I guess it was just yesterday . Thank 01:30:43.458 --> 01:30:45.402 you for making time for me . Let's 01:30:45.402 --> 01:30:47.458 follow up if we could on a couple of 01:30:47.458 --> 01:30:49.680 things we talked about . First of all , 01:30:49.680 --> 01:30:48.920 the Admiral Richard , the current 01:30:48.930 --> 01:30:51.160 stratcom commander of course has 01:30:51.160 --> 01:30:53.216 testified and I talked about this um 01:30:53.216 --> 01:30:55.271 that the U . S . Needs to think very 01:30:55.271 --> 01:30:57.327 seriously about the requirements for 01:30:57.327 --> 01:30:59.438 deterring two major nuclear powers at 01:30:59.438 --> 01:31:01.327 the same time china and Russia of 01:31:01.327 --> 01:31:03.382 course . And you said the same thing 01:31:03.382 --> 01:31:05.493 yesterday . Which which I appreciated 01:31:05.493 --> 01:31:07.493 here's my question . If confirmed , 01:31:07.493 --> 01:31:09.660 would you commit to having stratcom do 01:31:09.660 --> 01:31:11.493 an analysis of the nuclear force 01:31:11.493 --> 01:31:13.549 requirements to deter both China and 01:31:13.549 --> 01:31:16.350 Russia now and into the 2030's senator 01:31:16.350 --> 01:31:18.239 thanks for the question . And the 01:31:18.239 --> 01:31:20.430 answer is absolutely yes . Um I think 01:31:20.430 --> 01:31:22.930 that's gonna be critical for us . I 01:31:22.930 --> 01:31:25.310 called it earlier . You know it's the 01:31:25.310 --> 01:31:28.620 strategic um doctoring within the 01:31:28.630 --> 01:31:31.000 within stratcom . Not necessarily 01:31:31.000 --> 01:31:32.722 policy . I'm talking about the 01:31:32.722 --> 01:31:34.930 strategic doctrine within within 01:31:34.930 --> 01:31:37.340 stratcom to ensure that we can we can 01:31:37.340 --> 01:31:39.740 do exactly what you asked . Um The 01:31:39.750 --> 01:31:41.650 other piece of that is then the 01:31:41.650 --> 01:31:44.710 national objectives from the President 01:31:44.710 --> 01:31:46.821 to make sure we can meet the national 01:31:46.821 --> 01:31:48.988 objectives as well . Very good . Thank 01:31:48.988 --> 01:31:48.790 you for that . I think that will be 01:31:48.790 --> 01:31:51.340 hugely hugely helpful . Um I asked 01:31:51.340 --> 01:31:53.562 Admiral Richard earlier this year about 01:31:53.562 --> 01:31:55.618 china's ability to engage in limited 01:31:55.618 --> 01:31:57.784 nuclear employment . Uh and whether or 01:31:57.784 --> 01:31:59.951 not that was growing , he said that it 01:31:59.951 --> 01:32:02.007 was and he was very emphatic on this 01:32:02.007 --> 01:32:04.229 point and he talked about how important 01:32:04.229 --> 01:32:04.120 it is the United States to maintain our 01:32:04.130 --> 01:32:07.220 own limited nuclear options if we're 01:32:07.220 --> 01:32:09.442 going to be able to deter china in what 01:32:09.442 --> 01:32:11.498 is our our pacing three theater . So 01:32:11.498 --> 01:32:13.720 let me just ask you , do you agree that 01:32:13.720 --> 01:32:15.720 we need to be concerned about china 01:32:15.720 --> 01:32:17.887 resulting resorting to limited nuclear 01:32:17.887 --> 01:32:19.942 employment in a conflict ? Let's say 01:32:19.942 --> 01:32:22.280 over Taiwan Senator , I think any near 01:32:22.280 --> 01:32:24.391 pierre nuclear adversary , we have to 01:32:24.391 --> 01:32:26.391 be concerned about that . Would you 01:32:26.391 --> 01:32:29.310 agree that having our own limited 01:32:29.320 --> 01:32:33.000 nuclear options , whether that's low 01:32:33.000 --> 01:32:35.870 yield slbM or nuclear arms , sea launch 01:32:35.870 --> 01:32:37.814 cruise missiles , that that having 01:32:37.814 --> 01:32:39.814 those maintaining those can help us 01:32:39.814 --> 01:32:42.440 deter china's limited nuclear use ? You 01:32:42.440 --> 01:32:45.150 know , as I described to the committee , 01:32:45.160 --> 01:32:47.680 um for me , it's about being able to 01:32:47.680 --> 01:32:50.450 give options to the Commander in chief . 01:32:50.460 --> 01:32:53.050 Very good . Are there other limited 01:32:53.050 --> 01:32:55.217 nuclear options that you think that we 01:32:55.217 --> 01:32:57.328 ought to be pursuing , whether that's 01:32:57.328 --> 01:32:59.439 in terms of additional capabilities . 01:32:59.439 --> 01:33:01.661 Whether that's posture changes in order 01:33:01.661 --> 01:33:03.717 to deter chinese and Russian limited 01:33:03.717 --> 01:33:05.939 nuclear use Senator . I think that goes 01:33:05.939 --> 01:33:08.380 along with that study that if confirmed 01:33:08.390 --> 01:33:10.760 um you know taking that really deep 01:33:10.760 --> 01:33:12.871 study to understand what that outcome 01:33:12.871 --> 01:33:15.038 and what because what I wanted success 01:33:15.038 --> 01:33:17.230 at the end of that . So what what that 01:33:17.230 --> 01:33:19.397 would look like . So if confirmed that 01:33:19.397 --> 01:33:21.452 would be part of that study . Okay , 01:33:21.452 --> 01:33:23.674 very good , Fair enough , fair enough . 01:33:23.674 --> 01:33:23.250 You said to me yesterday , which I 01:33:23.250 --> 01:33:25.630 appreciated , I'm gonna try to make 01:33:25.630 --> 01:33:28.560 sure I I get you quoted correctly and 01:33:28.560 --> 01:33:30.449 then we talk about it . If we can 01:33:30.449 --> 01:33:32.616 prevent china from crossing the Taiwan 01:33:32.616 --> 01:33:34.727 strait and they know that we've got a 01:33:34.727 --> 01:33:36.800 viable nuclear deterrent then it's 01:33:36.800 --> 01:33:38.578 possible that Beijing might not 01:33:38.578 --> 01:33:40.633 escalate at all . And I thought that 01:33:40.633 --> 01:33:42.744 was right on the money . I agree with 01:33:42.744 --> 01:33:44.967 that 100% and I just want to give you a 01:33:44.967 --> 01:33:44.650 chance to elaborate that on that here 01:33:44.660 --> 01:33:46.549 because it sounds to me like what 01:33:46.549 --> 01:33:48.716 you're saying is the right approach to 01:33:48.716 --> 01:33:50.882 deterring a chinese invasion of Taiwan 01:33:50.882 --> 01:33:52.993 is denial to deny them the ability to 01:33:52.993 --> 01:33:55.160 do that ? The first instance backed up 01:33:55.160 --> 01:33:57.327 by a very credible nuclear deterrent ? 01:33:57.327 --> 01:33:59.271 So am I do I have that right . And 01:33:59.271 --> 01:34:01.493 would you just , would you elaborate on 01:34:01.493 --> 01:34:01.180 why you think that's the right 01:34:01.180 --> 01:34:05.130 combination Senator ? I think that the 01:34:05.140 --> 01:34:07.960 whole reason that we have the strategic 01:34:07.970 --> 01:34:11.570 um deterrents that we have today and 01:34:11.570 --> 01:34:14.070 the triad that we have today is to 01:34:14.070 --> 01:34:17.920 ensure that um our adversaries 01:34:17.920 --> 01:34:20.970 understand that today shouldn't be the 01:34:20.970 --> 01:34:23.081 day for them . So , as we were having 01:34:23.081 --> 01:34:25.414 that conversation , that's what I meant . 01:34:25.414 --> 01:34:27.637 I think that they would understand that 01:34:27.637 --> 01:34:31.230 if you have a credible 01:34:31.240 --> 01:34:33.940 nuclear deterrent , it would make them 01:34:33.940 --> 01:34:36.940 think twice before engaging with us . 01:34:36.950 --> 01:34:39.780 And it's and those two things , the 01:34:39.790 --> 01:34:42.180 conventional denial combined with the 01:34:42.180 --> 01:34:44.291 nuclear deterrent , those things have 01:34:44.291 --> 01:34:46.513 to sit together . Is that fair to say ? 01:34:46.513 --> 01:34:48.680 I mean , they work hand in hand , they 01:34:48.680 --> 01:34:48.620 work hand in hand , conventional and 01:34:48.620 --> 01:34:50.940 nuclear works hand in hand . Yeah . Um , 01:34:50.950 --> 01:34:53.117 let me ask you this just on the on the 01:34:53.117 --> 01:34:54.672 question of our own nuclear 01:34:54.672 --> 01:34:56.728 modernization . Given the pace of of 01:34:56.728 --> 01:34:58.228 china and Russia and their 01:34:58.228 --> 01:35:00.339 modernization if confirmed , will you 01:35:00.339 --> 01:35:02.500 be looking for ways to to accelerate 01:35:02.510 --> 01:35:05.750 our nuclear modernization and identify 01:35:05.750 --> 01:35:07.861 those options for Congress so that we 01:35:07.861 --> 01:35:10.028 can work together to make sure that we 01:35:10.028 --> 01:35:11.861 push the pace like we need to if 01:35:11.861 --> 01:35:14.083 confirmed . I would do that center very 01:35:14.083 --> 01:35:16.083 good . Let me just ask you 11 final 01:35:16.083 --> 01:35:16.010 thing here in my remaining Seconds , 01:35:16.200 --> 01:35:18.470 The 2018 nuclear posture review . It 01:35:18.470 --> 01:35:20.210 highlighted the importance of 01:35:20.210 --> 01:35:22.154 conventional nuclear integration , 01:35:22.154 --> 01:35:24.377 which we were just touching on which of 01:35:24.377 --> 01:35:26.432 course is critical for strengthening 01:35:26.432 --> 01:35:28.210 conventional deterrence against 01:35:28.210 --> 01:35:30.321 adversaries who may use nuclear force 01:35:30.321 --> 01:35:32.488 for operational or course of effects . 01:35:32.488 --> 01:35:34.654 Has the department , in your view made 01:35:34.654 --> 01:35:36.877 sufficient progress on the conventional 01:35:36.877 --> 01:35:39.510 nuclear integration since the 2018 NPR ? 01:35:40.190 --> 01:35:42.290 I think it has because in the past 01:35:42.290 --> 01:35:44.457 we've probably we didn't talk about it 01:35:44.457 --> 01:35:46.623 the way we should have And I think the 01:35:46.623 --> 01:35:48.846 integration on being able to talk about 01:35:48.846 --> 01:35:50.957 going from conventional to nuclear as 01:35:50.957 --> 01:35:53.234 opposed to doing a pause X if you will . 01:35:53.234 --> 01:35:55.290 And then having that conversation um 01:35:55.290 --> 01:35:57.290 we've made leaps and bounds in that 01:35:57.290 --> 01:35:56.730 regard . Very good . Thank you . 01:35:56.730 --> 01:35:58.341 General thanks again for the 01:35:58.341 --> 01:36:00.563 conversation yesterday . Thanks to your 01:36:00.563 --> 01:36:00.100 testimony . Thank you . Mr . Chairman 01:36:00.110 --> 01:36:02.054 thank you Senator Hawley . Senator 01:36:02.054 --> 01:36:04.340 Warren please thank you . Mr . Chairman 01:36:04.340 --> 01:36:06.229 and congratulations again on your 01:36:06.229 --> 01:36:09.100 nomination , General Cotton . So if 01:36:09.100 --> 01:36:11.160 confirmed , you'll head U . S . 01:36:11.160 --> 01:36:13.327 Strategic Command which will place you 01:36:13.327 --> 01:36:15.493 in charge of our nuclear weapons . I'd 01:36:15.493 --> 01:36:17.950 like to continue the conversation that 01:36:17.960 --> 01:36:20.120 we had in my office about the 01:36:20.120 --> 01:36:23.450 importance of civilian control . Last 01:36:23.450 --> 01:36:25.880 week eight former secretaries of 01:36:25.880 --> 01:36:28.800 Defense and five former Chairman of the 01:36:28.800 --> 01:36:32.120 Joint Chiefs of Staff released an open 01:36:32.120 --> 01:36:35.160 letter calling for a recommitment to 01:36:35.160 --> 01:36:38.100 principles of civilian control , which 01:36:38.100 --> 01:36:40.267 they called . And I want to quote them 01:36:40.267 --> 01:36:42.100 here , The bedrock foundation of 01:36:42.100 --> 01:36:45.710 american democracy unquote The letter 01:36:45.720 --> 01:36:48.720 repeat , emphasizes that policy 01:36:48.720 --> 01:36:51.200 decisions are ultimately up to the 01:36:51.200 --> 01:36:54.560 president civilian political appointees 01:36:54.570 --> 01:36:57.180 and Congress . So General Cotton , can 01:36:57.180 --> 01:36:59.570 you start us out this morning by saying 01:36:59.570 --> 01:37:02.150 a word about your views on whether 01:37:02.150 --> 01:37:05.450 policy decisions including ones about 01:37:05.450 --> 01:37:07.780 nuclear programs should be made by 01:37:07.780 --> 01:37:11.660 civilians rather than generals . Policy 01:37:11.660 --> 01:37:14.540 is made by civilians ma'am . And you 01:37:14.540 --> 01:37:16.651 are committed to that firmly and I am 01:37:16.651 --> 01:37:18.510 committed to that . You know , I 01:37:18.520 --> 01:37:20.820 appreciate your emphasizing this point . 01:37:20.830 --> 01:37:23.010 It is the president's job to determine 01:37:23.010 --> 01:37:25.343 the nuclear policy of the United States . 01:37:25.343 --> 01:37:27.940 But sometimes people who are in the 01:37:27.940 --> 01:37:29.970 role that you've been nominated for 01:37:30.130 --> 01:37:32.660 seem to get confused on that . For 01:37:32.660 --> 01:37:35.730 example , your predecessor , Admiral 01:37:35.730 --> 01:37:38.640 Richard stated publicly that he thought 01:37:38.640 --> 01:37:41.110 the biden administration should adopt 01:37:41.120 --> 01:37:43.310 the trump administration's nuclear 01:37:43.310 --> 01:37:46.740 policy and then he and his 01:37:46.750 --> 01:37:49.630 office actively lobbied Congress 01:37:49.640 --> 01:37:52.430 against cuts to the nuclear spending 01:37:52.430 --> 01:37:55.220 programs contained in the biden 01:37:55.230 --> 01:37:57.900 administration's budget . The budget 01:37:57.970 --> 01:38:00.060 the president put forward and the 01:38:00.060 --> 01:38:02.970 Secretary of Defense came to this 01:38:02.970 --> 01:38:06.110 committee to defend . So General Cotton , 01:38:06.120 --> 01:38:08.400 if confirmed . Do you think it would be 01:38:08.410 --> 01:38:11.710 appropriate for you or your office to 01:38:11.710 --> 01:38:15.110 publicly lobby against the positions of 01:38:15.110 --> 01:38:17.054 the President and the Secretary of 01:38:17.054 --> 01:38:19.870 Defense ? No ma'am . And you remember 01:38:19.870 --> 01:38:21.981 we had this conversation , the caveat 01:38:21.981 --> 01:38:24.203 that that we agreed to was , you know , 01:38:24.203 --> 01:38:26.370 but I would always especially for this 01:38:26.370 --> 01:38:29.230 committee be allowed to offer my best 01:38:29.230 --> 01:38:31.820 military advice and your best military 01:38:31.820 --> 01:38:35.580 advice . But policy is done by the 01:38:35.580 --> 01:38:37.940 general's policy is not made by 01:38:37.940 --> 01:38:40.107 generals . All right , thank you . You 01:38:40.107 --> 01:38:42.162 know , we're counting on you to give 01:38:42.162 --> 01:38:43.996 your best military advice to the 01:38:43.996 --> 01:38:45.829 President to the secretary or to 01:38:45.829 --> 01:38:48.080 Congress whenever you're called on to 01:38:48.080 --> 01:38:51.340 do so . But it is wildly inappropriate 01:38:51.350 --> 01:38:53.830 to try to box in the Commander in chief 01:38:53.840 --> 01:38:56.040 on nuclear policy or to try to 01:38:56.050 --> 01:38:59.000 undermine his budget . Now one of the 01:38:59.000 --> 01:39:01.410 big ways that military leaders lobby 01:39:01.410 --> 01:39:03.243 for more spending , even when it 01:39:03.243 --> 01:39:05.299 directly contradicts the President's 01:39:05.299 --> 01:39:08.030 priorities is through so called 01:39:08.040 --> 01:39:11.640 unfunded priorities lists . These are 01:39:11.640 --> 01:39:14.520 wish lists that are required by law but 01:39:14.520 --> 01:39:17.590 have grown to be tens of billions of 01:39:17.600 --> 01:39:19.920 dollars and are being used by the 01:39:19.920 --> 01:39:22.730 services and the commands to game the 01:39:22.730 --> 01:39:24.841 budget process and I don't think they 01:39:24.841 --> 01:39:27.760 ought to exist at all . General cotton . 01:39:27.770 --> 01:39:31.660 Do you agree that your commands top 01:39:31.670 --> 01:39:34.530 priorities should actually be reflected 01:39:34.540 --> 01:39:37.040 in the budget you submit rather than in 01:39:37.040 --> 01:39:38.660 an extras list ? 01:39:40.680 --> 01:39:44.180 Senator . I think our requirements list 01:39:44.190 --> 01:39:48.110 um that we present should be 01:39:48.110 --> 01:39:50.240 included and and and and covers down 01:39:50.250 --> 01:39:53.450 and if if our budget is short um as the 01:39:53.450 --> 01:39:56.320 commander my job is to ensure that I 01:39:56.320 --> 01:39:59.300 can I can execute my mission with the 01:39:59.310 --> 01:40:01.532 with the dollars that I've been given . 01:40:01.532 --> 01:40:03.477 All right . So I wanna make sure I 01:40:03.477 --> 01:40:03.190 understand you here because you're 01:40:03.190 --> 01:40:06.180 saying your priorities should be in the 01:40:06.180 --> 01:40:08.800 budget and extras should be just that 01:40:08.810 --> 01:40:11.250 extras not your priorities . Is that 01:40:11.250 --> 01:40:13.390 right ? Um As a match com commander 01:40:13.390 --> 01:40:15.557 today my priorities are in my budget . 01:40:15.557 --> 01:40:17.723 Good . I like to hear that . Look it's 01:40:17.723 --> 01:40:20.260 no secret that both President biden and 01:40:20.260 --> 01:40:22.316 I want to reduce the role of nuclear 01:40:22.316 --> 01:40:24.630 weapons in our national security 01:40:24.630 --> 01:40:28.630 strategy , spending $364 billion 01:40:28.640 --> 01:40:30.751 just on nuclear weapons over the next 01:40:30.751 --> 01:40:34.550 10 years is unaffordable . But I think 01:40:34.560 --> 01:40:36.880 even my colleagues who disagree with me 01:40:36.890 --> 01:40:40.090 on nuclear policy would agree that we 01:40:40.090 --> 01:40:42.930 should be asking D . O . D . To write 01:40:42.940 --> 01:40:46.040 budgets that reflect their actual 01:40:46.040 --> 01:40:48.520 priorities and that's what it is I'm 01:40:48.520 --> 01:40:50.840 driving for here and want to make sure 01:40:50.840 --> 01:40:53.200 that we do . I look forward to working 01:40:53.200 --> 01:40:55.256 with you general . Thank you . Thank 01:40:55.256 --> 01:40:57.311 you . Mr . Chairman . Thank you very 01:40:57.311 --> 01:40:59.478 much . Senator Warren uh General thank 01:40:59.478 --> 01:41:01.700 you for your testimony for your service 01:41:01.700 --> 01:41:05.400 uh and we look forward to rapidly uh 01:41:05.410 --> 01:41:07.760 bringing your nomination to a 01:41:07.770 --> 01:41:09.937 successful conclusion . Thank you very 01:41:09.937 --> 01:41:12.840 much for that . I will during the hurt 01:41:12.850 --> 01:41:13.740 and the hearing .