1 00:00:02,760 --> 00:00:06,510 Good afternoon everybody . So few 2 00:00:06,510 --> 00:00:08,677 items pass along and we'll get to your 3 00:00:08,677 --> 00:00:10,843 questions as you are aware . Secretary 4 00:00:10,843 --> 00:00:12,843 Austin returned late last week from 5 00:00:12,843 --> 00:00:14,788 productive discussions in brussels 6 00:00:14,788 --> 00:00:16,677 where he participated in the NATO 7 00:00:16,677 --> 00:00:18,788 defense ministerial as well as hosted 8 00:00:18,788 --> 00:00:21,010 the sixth Ukraine defense Contact group 9 00:00:21,010 --> 00:00:23,121 meeting which featured senior defense 10 00:00:23,121 --> 00:00:25,343 leaders from nearly 50 nations who came 11 00:00:25,343 --> 00:00:27,510 together to discuss support to Ukraine 12 00:00:27,510 --> 00:00:29,732 as they fight to defend their sovereign 13 00:00:29,732 --> 00:00:31,454 territory . Additionally , the 14 00:00:31,454 --> 00:00:33,510 Department of Defense also announced 15 00:00:33,510 --> 00:00:35,621 friday the 23rd presidential drawdown 16 00:00:35,621 --> 00:00:38,380 package valued at up to $725 million to 17 00:00:38,380 --> 00:00:40,436 meet Ukraine's critical security and 18 00:00:40,436 --> 00:00:42,880 defense needs . The package consists of 19 00:00:42,880 --> 00:00:44,824 additional ammunition for the high 20 00:00:44,824 --> 00:00:46,991 mobility artillery , rocket systems or 21 00:00:46,991 --> 00:00:50,270 high mars , 155 millimeter artillery 22 00:00:50,280 --> 00:00:53,120 and precision guided rounds , 1 55 23 00:00:53,120 --> 00:00:55,630 millimeter rounds of remote anti armor 24 00:00:55,630 --> 00:00:58,290 mine systems , antitank weapons , high 25 00:00:58,290 --> 00:01:00,346 speed anti radiation missiles , more 26 00:01:00,346 --> 00:01:02,346 than 200 high mobility multipurpose 27 00:01:02,346 --> 00:01:04,660 wheeled vehicles or Humvees , medical 28 00:01:04,660 --> 00:01:06,340 supplies and other small arms 29 00:01:06,340 --> 00:01:08,730 ammunition . In total , the United 30 00:01:08,730 --> 00:01:10,674 States has committed approximately 31 00:01:10,674 --> 00:01:11,610 $17.8 billion 32 00:01:11,610 --> 00:01:16,890 February 33 00:01:17,680 --> 00:01:19,847 turning to other news Secretary Austin 34 00:01:19,847 --> 00:01:21,569 hosted his U . K . Counterpart 35 00:01:21,569 --> 00:01:23,513 Secretary of state for Defense Ben 36 00:01:23,513 --> 00:01:25,347 Wallace today in the pentagon to 37 00:01:25,347 --> 00:01:27,513 discuss the ongoing support to Ukraine 38 00:01:27,513 --> 00:01:29,402 by our two nations as well as the 39 00:01:29,402 --> 00:01:31,458 continued importance . Transatlantic 40 00:01:31,458 --> 00:01:33,624 and regional security cooperation play 41 00:01:33,624 --> 00:01:35,902 in light of Russia's attack in Ukraine . 42 00:01:36,110 --> 00:01:38,110 We will be issuing a readout of the 43 00:01:38,110 --> 00:01:40,166 meeting later today . Additionally , 44 00:01:40,166 --> 00:01:42,388 Secretary Austin will welcome Estonia's 45 00:01:42,388 --> 00:01:44,610 Minister of Defense hanno pecker to the 46 00:01:44,610 --> 00:01:46,870 pentagon today at 2 30 will also speak 47 00:01:46,870 --> 00:01:49,092 to his Colombian counterpart , Minister 48 00:01:49,092 --> 00:01:51,203 of Defense , Diego velazquez during a 49 00:01:51,203 --> 00:01:53,370 phone call later this afternoon and we 50 00:01:53,370 --> 00:01:55,426 will be issuing readouts for both of 51 00:01:55,426 --> 00:01:57,481 those engagements . And then finally 52 00:01:57,481 --> 00:01:59,592 Secretary Austin met with the Defense 53 00:01:59,592 --> 00:02:01,481 Innovation Board yesterday at the 54 00:02:01,481 --> 00:02:03,370 pentagon . During this session he 55 00:02:03,370 --> 00:02:05,314 shared a strategic overview of his 56 00:02:05,314 --> 00:02:07,537 priorities and discussed areas where he 57 00:02:07,537 --> 00:02:09,426 would like the defense innovation 58 00:02:09,426 --> 00:02:11,703 boards expertise and insight to give D . 59 00:02:11,703 --> 00:02:13,703 O . D . And edge and technology and 60 00:02:13,703 --> 00:02:15,703 innovation . Board members provided 61 00:02:15,703 --> 00:02:17,648 their feedback and ideas on how to 62 00:02:17,648 --> 00:02:19,814 catalyze innovation within the D . O . 63 00:02:19,814 --> 00:02:21,814 D . Secretary Austin emphasized the 64 00:02:21,814 --> 00:02:23,592 importance of building enduring 65 00:02:23,592 --> 00:02:25,481 advantages for the warfighter and 66 00:02:25,481 --> 00:02:27,759 catalyzing innovation in the D . O . D . 67 00:02:27,759 --> 00:02:29,870 In partnership with America's private 68 00:02:29,870 --> 00:02:31,981 sector , which is critical to U . S . 69 00:02:31,981 --> 00:02:33,926 National Security Secretary Austin 70 00:02:33,926 --> 00:02:35,870 highlighted the following areas of 71 00:02:35,870 --> 00:02:37,870 focus for the board to bring unique 72 00:02:37,870 --> 00:02:40,092 private sector insights and expertise . 73 00:02:40,092 --> 00:02:41,926 Accelerating experimentation and 74 00:02:41,926 --> 00:02:43,860 technology adoption innovation 75 00:02:46,160 --> 00:02:48,930 and science and technology strategy and 76 00:02:48,930 --> 00:02:51,152 strengthening the relationship with the 77 00:02:51,152 --> 00:02:53,152 private sector on national security 78 00:02:53,152 --> 00:02:55,263 issues . We will be issuing a readout 79 00:02:55,263 --> 00:02:57,486 on defense dot gov later today and with 80 00:02:57,486 --> 00:02:59,430 that I will go ahead and take your 81 00:02:59,430 --> 00:03:01,319 questions . We'll start with lita 82 00:03:01,319 --> 00:03:04,090 Baldor at ap thanks Pat . Um two 83 00:03:04,090 --> 00:03:07,210 questions one can you bring us up to 84 00:03:07,210 --> 00:03:11,030 date on any either ongoing 85 00:03:11,030 --> 00:03:13,400 negotiations , discussions or just 86 00:03:13,410 --> 00:03:16,100 thoughts by the pentagon regarding the 87 00:03:16,110 --> 00:03:19,100 funding of the SpaceX 88 00:03:19,100 --> 00:03:22,960 Starling . Um can you tell us 89 00:03:23,990 --> 00:03:27,620 whether or not this is still going on 90 00:03:27,620 --> 00:03:30,280 or Um I think there's some question 91 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:33,180 about musk's tweet on saturday as to 92 00:03:33,180 --> 00:03:35,291 whether or not he was actually saying 93 00:03:35,291 --> 00:03:37,347 he was going to continue to paper or 94 00:03:37,347 --> 00:03:39,980 not . Um just give us an update on that . 95 00:03:39,990 --> 00:03:42,430 And then secondly , just more broadly , 96 00:03:42,440 --> 00:03:45,930 um the airstrikes in 97 00:03:45,930 --> 00:03:48,610 Ukraine have been targeting their power , 98 00:03:48,610 --> 00:03:51,000 water supplies etcetera . Is there any 99 00:03:51,000 --> 00:03:54,200 broad pentagon thinking about what more 100 00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:56,630 can be done in order to help Ukraine 101 00:03:56,640 --> 00:04:00,280 protect its utilities as the winner 102 00:04:00,290 --> 00:04:03,950 approaches ? I think Salida so on 103 00:04:03,950 --> 00:04:07,910 Starlink and SpaceX um in regards 104 00:04:07,910 --> 00:04:10,021 to any statements that have that have 105 00:04:10,021 --> 00:04:12,188 been made by the company . Uh in terms 106 00:04:12,188 --> 00:04:14,710 of um you know their their business 107 00:04:14,710 --> 00:04:16,570 strategy or focus , I obviously 108 00:04:16,570 --> 00:04:18,860 referring to them , I can say that the 109 00:04:18,860 --> 00:04:21,390 Department of Defense does continue to 110 00:04:21,390 --> 00:04:25,250 discuss various matters with SpaceX 111 00:04:25,520 --> 00:04:29,490 um and to include uh Starlink 112 00:04:29,500 --> 00:04:31,750 but I don't have any further details to 113 00:04:31,750 --> 00:04:33,639 provide beyond what we've already 114 00:04:33,639 --> 00:04:35,750 provided in that regard . Uh in terms 115 00:04:35,760 --> 00:04:39,320 of air strikes or strikes in Russia in 116 00:04:39,320 --> 00:04:41,590 Ukraine rather . Uh and what they're 117 00:04:41,590 --> 00:04:44,260 targeting . Um we do continue to see 118 00:04:44,260 --> 00:04:46,890 them target , among other things , 119 00:04:46,900 --> 00:04:50,210 civilian infrastructure to include uh 120 00:04:50,220 --> 00:04:52,500 energy related targets , power grids , 121 00:04:52,500 --> 00:04:55,990 for example . Um And again , this is 122 00:04:55,990 --> 00:04:59,220 not something new for Russia as they 123 00:04:59,230 --> 00:05:02,650 continue to inflict damage on innocent 124 00:05:02,650 --> 00:05:05,820 civilians on civilian infrastructure uh 125 00:05:05,830 --> 00:05:07,886 as they have failed to achieve their 126 00:05:07,886 --> 00:05:09,941 strategic objectives along the front 127 00:05:09,941 --> 00:05:13,300 line uh in terms of why we think 128 00:05:13,300 --> 00:05:16,530 they're targeting those areas ? Uh I 129 00:05:16,530 --> 00:05:20,080 think obviously trying to uh inflict 130 00:05:20,090 --> 00:05:23,360 pain on the civilian society as well as 131 00:05:23,360 --> 00:05:26,090 try to have an impact on Ukrainian 132 00:05:26,090 --> 00:05:28,630 forces . Um but what we've seen so far 133 00:05:28,630 --> 00:05:30,640 is is Ukraine be very resilient and 134 00:05:30,640 --> 00:05:33,080 their ability to get things like their 135 00:05:33,080 --> 00:05:35,302 power grids back up online quickly . In 136 00:05:35,302 --> 00:05:37,524 the meantime our focus will continue to 137 00:05:37,524 --> 00:05:40,020 be on working with them to identify 138 00:05:40,020 --> 00:05:42,840 what their needs are to include things 139 00:05:42,840 --> 00:05:45,190 like air defense . And we'll work to 140 00:05:45,190 --> 00:05:47,301 try to get those capabilities to them 141 00:05:47,301 --> 00:05:49,540 as quickly as possible along with our 142 00:05:49,540 --> 00:05:51,596 international partners and allies to 143 00:05:51,596 --> 00:05:53,780 support them . Thanks , lita . Right . 144 00:05:54,110 --> 00:05:57,100 Um there are some reports that Iran has 145 00:05:57,110 --> 00:05:59,332 promised to provide Russia with surface 146 00:05:59,332 --> 00:06:01,554 to surface missiles in addition to more 147 00:06:01,554 --> 00:06:03,610 groans . Um have you seen that ? And 148 00:06:03,610 --> 00:06:05,740 have you seen Iran preparing to ship 149 00:06:05,750 --> 00:06:07,806 such missiles and that will separate 150 00:06:07,806 --> 00:06:09,917 follow up ? Yeah , Thanks eaters . So 151 00:06:09,917 --> 00:06:12,139 I've seen the press reports on that . I 152 00:06:12,139 --> 00:06:12,020 don't have any information to 153 00:06:12,020 --> 00:06:14,300 corroborate that at this time and 154 00:06:14,300 --> 00:06:16,189 separately . Um You mentioned the 155 00:06:16,189 --> 00:06:18,022 meeting with the british defense 156 00:06:18,022 --> 00:06:20,078 Minister . Um There are also reports 157 00:06:20,078 --> 00:06:22,300 that china is trying to recruit current 158 00:06:22,300 --> 00:06:25,570 and former uh Royal Air Force pilots 159 00:06:25,580 --> 00:06:28,140 train chinese pilots to evade Western 160 00:06:28,140 --> 00:06:30,140 Plains . Is that something that was 161 00:06:30,140 --> 00:06:32,307 discussed between the two of them ? Um 162 00:06:32,307 --> 00:06:34,770 So again , we'll issue a read out the 163 00:06:34,780 --> 00:06:37,060 focus of the meeting as I understand it 164 00:06:37,060 --> 00:06:40,270 was focused on Ukraine and our support 165 00:06:40,270 --> 00:06:42,590 mutual support to Ukraine in terms of 166 00:06:42,590 --> 00:06:45,440 questions about uh U . K . Citizens or 167 00:06:45,440 --> 00:06:47,551 UK pilots in china . Again , I'd have 168 00:06:47,551 --> 00:06:49,607 to refer you to the to the U K . For 169 00:06:49,607 --> 00:06:51,829 questions on that . Thank you , Laura . 170 00:06:52,080 --> 00:06:54,580 Thanks Pat . Um Lucky Martin said 171 00:06:54,580 --> 00:06:56,610 earlier today that the company is 172 00:06:56,610 --> 00:06:58,970 meeting with its supply chain to 173 00:06:58,970 --> 00:07:01,130 increase high March production to 96 174 00:07:01,140 --> 00:07:04,240 units per year . Is this enough for ? 175 00:07:04,240 --> 00:07:06,407 Do you anticipate that you will need a 176 00:07:06,407 --> 00:07:08,573 higher , even higher rate than that to 177 00:07:08,573 --> 00:07:10,920 accommodate more Ukrainian narrow needs ? 178 00:07:11,940 --> 00:07:14,960 So , you know , again , I've seen some 179 00:07:14,960 --> 00:07:17,127 press reporting on Lockheed's comments 180 00:07:17,127 --> 00:07:19,290 and certainly we welcome at any time 181 00:07:19,290 --> 00:07:22,970 industry is going to help to address uh 182 00:07:22,980 --> 00:07:25,410 not only our security needs as a nation , 183 00:07:25,410 --> 00:07:28,150 but also the needs of partners and 184 00:07:28,150 --> 00:07:30,317 allies around the world . I don't have 185 00:07:30,317 --> 00:07:32,372 any specifics to provide in terms of 186 00:07:32,372 --> 00:07:34,706 numbers , as you've heard us say before , 187 00:07:34,706 --> 00:07:36,817 we do have processes in place to look 188 00:07:36,817 --> 00:07:38,594 at our own stockpiles , our own 189 00:07:38,594 --> 00:07:40,706 readiness requirements in addition to 190 00:07:40,706 --> 00:07:42,539 working with allies and partners 191 00:07:42,539 --> 00:07:44,761 through things like uh , the the recent 192 00:07:44,761 --> 00:07:46,928 armaments director meetings to look at 193 00:07:46,928 --> 00:07:49,039 what those requirements are . So that 194 00:07:49,039 --> 00:07:50,983 will continue to be a conversation 195 00:07:50,983 --> 00:07:52,706 going forward . I think it's a 196 00:07:52,706 --> 00:07:54,817 strategic advantage that we have as a 197 00:07:54,817 --> 00:07:56,539 nation and as an international 198 00:07:56,539 --> 00:07:58,094 community and partnership , 199 00:07:58,094 --> 00:08:00,261 particularly within NATO to be able to 200 00:08:00,261 --> 00:08:02,039 work together to identify those 201 00:08:02,039 --> 00:08:03,650 requirements and quickly get 202 00:08:03,650 --> 00:08:05,761 capabilities where they're needed and 203 00:08:05,761 --> 00:08:05,570 when they're needed . Thank you . Just 204 00:08:05,570 --> 00:08:07,626 as a follow up to that . How can you 205 00:08:07,626 --> 00:08:09,626 say anything about how long it will 206 00:08:09,626 --> 00:08:11,792 take ? Lucky to ramp up to this higher 207 00:08:11,792 --> 00:08:13,903 rate you have to refer you to ? Lucky 208 00:08:13,903 --> 00:08:16,070 on that . Thank you . Let me go to Rio 209 00:08:16,070 --> 00:08:18,070 and then I'll go to the phone . You 210 00:08:18,070 --> 00:08:20,070 know , two questions on china . The 211 00:08:20,070 --> 00:08:22,014 secretary Blinken said yesterday , 212 00:08:22,014 --> 00:08:23,848 Beijing was determined to pursue 213 00:08:23,848 --> 00:08:27,350 unification with Taiwan who much 214 00:08:27,360 --> 00:08:30,430 faster a timeline . So does Secretary 215 00:08:30,440 --> 00:08:32,790 Austin agree with Secretary Blinken . 216 00:08:32,800 --> 00:08:35,400 Assessment and secondary . The U . S . 217 00:08:35,410 --> 00:08:38,820 Military has assessed that China might 218 00:08:38,820 --> 00:08:41,320 have the capability to invade Taiwan by 219 00:08:41,330 --> 00:08:45,000 2027 . Is there any change in that 220 00:08:45,010 --> 00:08:48,490 assessment ? So we continue to see 221 00:08:48,490 --> 00:08:50,546 china as the pacing threat . I don't 222 00:08:50,546 --> 00:08:53,220 have any specific uh you know any 223 00:08:53,220 --> 00:08:55,330 comment on Secretary Blinken is 224 00:08:55,330 --> 00:08:57,330 comments specific comments on those 225 00:08:57,330 --> 00:08:59,540 other than to say I think within the 226 00:08:59,540 --> 00:09:01,651 United States government we all agree 227 00:09:01,651 --> 00:09:03,540 that we need to continue to work 228 00:09:03,540 --> 00:09:05,610 closely with our allies and our 229 00:09:05,610 --> 00:09:07,721 partners in the region and throughout 230 00:09:07,721 --> 00:09:11,130 the world . Really uh to highlight uh 231 00:09:11,140 --> 00:09:14,440 the fact that china continues to um 232 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:16,760 pose a challenge . Uh and so we'll 233 00:09:16,760 --> 00:09:18,871 continue to do our part to preserve a 234 00:09:18,871 --> 00:09:20,816 free and open indo pacific again , 235 00:09:20,816 --> 00:09:22,593 working closely with allies and 236 00:09:22,593 --> 00:09:24,649 partners . But beyond that , I don't 237 00:09:24,649 --> 00:09:26,704 have anything new to provide . Thank 238 00:09:26,704 --> 00:09:28,927 you . Okay , let me go to the phone and 239 00:09:28,927 --> 00:09:28,550 I'll come right back to you , Jamie , 240 00:09:28,560 --> 00:09:30,820 let me go to jasmine R . F . A . 241 00:09:33,890 --> 00:09:36,380 Hi thank you . Um there are reports 242 00:09:36,380 --> 00:09:38,491 that the U . S . And R . K . Is gonna 243 00:09:38,491 --> 00:09:41,640 have air drills involving 2 40 aircraft 244 00:09:41,650 --> 00:09:43,706 at the end of this month , can you , 245 00:09:43,740 --> 00:09:46,660 can you provide any details and uh this 246 00:09:46,660 --> 00:09:48,670 is the first large scale joint air 247 00:09:48,670 --> 00:09:52,160 drills since 2017 . So why at this time 248 00:09:52,170 --> 00:09:55,050 is it to deter North Korea as possible ? 249 00:09:55,050 --> 00:09:56,910 Seventh nuclear test . And then 250 00:09:56,910 --> 00:09:59,021 secondly , um is there any updates on 251 00:09:59,021 --> 00:10:00,799 North Korea's ballistic missile 252 00:10:00,799 --> 00:10:02,799 submarine development ? Thank you . 253 00:10:03,240 --> 00:10:05,880 Yeah , thank you . Um on on your last 254 00:10:05,880 --> 00:10:07,880 question , Jasmine , I I don't have 255 00:10:07,880 --> 00:10:09,780 anything to provide on that . In 256 00:10:09,780 --> 00:10:11,836 regards to your question about the , 257 00:10:11,836 --> 00:10:14,050 about potential exercises . I don't 258 00:10:14,050 --> 00:10:16,680 have any announcements today about any 259 00:10:16,680 --> 00:10:19,910 specific exercises as we've said before , 260 00:10:19,910 --> 00:10:21,990 we remain focused on continuing to 261 00:10:21,990 --> 00:10:24,790 coordinate closely with our allies and 262 00:10:24,790 --> 00:10:27,300 partners to address the threats posed 263 00:10:27,310 --> 00:10:30,640 by the Dprk uh and to advance our 264 00:10:30,640 --> 00:10:32,550 shared objectives of the complete 265 00:10:32,560 --> 00:10:34,610 denuclearization of the korean 266 00:10:34,610 --> 00:10:36,666 peninsula . And so we'll continue to 267 00:10:36,666 --> 00:10:39,110 work closely with allies and partners 268 00:10:39,110 --> 00:10:41,054 throughout the region to reinforce 269 00:10:41,054 --> 00:10:43,166 regional stability and security . But 270 00:10:43,166 --> 00:10:45,110 beyond that , I don't I don't have 271 00:10:45,110 --> 00:10:47,166 anything new to announce . Thank you 272 00:10:47,166 --> 00:10:48,943 Jennie , thank you . I have two 273 00:10:48,943 --> 00:10:51,770 occasions in Korea recently , North 274 00:10:51,770 --> 00:10:55,090 korean capital series of 275 00:10:55,100 --> 00:10:58,600 provocations with ballistic missile and 276 00:10:58,610 --> 00:11:02,160 artillery fire and how those 277 00:11:02,160 --> 00:11:05,500 Korea also uh underestimate 278 00:11:05,510 --> 00:11:09,270 us missile detection and 279 00:11:09,280 --> 00:11:12,590 why doesn't the United States 280 00:11:12,600 --> 00:11:16,300 intercept North korean ? Besides how do 281 00:11:16,300 --> 00:11:19,360 you responsibly ? So just let me make 282 00:11:19,360 --> 00:11:21,249 sure I understood your your first 283 00:11:21,249 --> 00:11:24,570 question um was what again , how do you , 284 00:11:24,580 --> 00:11:28,120 are you able to detect them ? I'm sorry 285 00:11:28,130 --> 00:11:30,240 North Korea said North Korea 286 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:34,000 underestimate us . Missile detect . You 287 00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:37,450 know , detection is very low . So how 288 00:11:38,640 --> 00:11:42,100 these , secondly why doesn't the United 289 00:11:42,100 --> 00:11:42,660 States ? 290 00:11:45,520 --> 00:11:48,050 Sure , thank you . So you know , first 291 00:11:48,050 --> 00:11:50,470 of all when it comes to monitoring , 292 00:11:50,470 --> 00:11:53,910 observing the region , I'm not going to 293 00:11:53,910 --> 00:11:56,180 talk about specific intelligence but we 294 00:11:56,180 --> 00:11:59,380 certainly do maintain alongside our 295 00:11:59,390 --> 00:12:01,390 allies in the region of very robust 296 00:12:01,390 --> 00:12:03,970 indications in the morning capability . 297 00:12:03,980 --> 00:12:07,600 Um in terms of how we respond to 298 00:12:07,610 --> 00:12:10,170 individual provocations for example 299 00:12:10,170 --> 00:12:12,480 missile launches . Um you know we're 300 00:12:12,480 --> 00:12:15,440 going to maintain a whole range of 301 00:12:15,440 --> 00:12:18,560 potential responses . Um as you've seen 302 00:12:18,560 --> 00:12:21,100 in dope a calm today in the past when 303 00:12:21,100 --> 00:12:23,322 they've detected those launches , those 304 00:12:23,322 --> 00:12:24,989 launches have been determined 305 00:12:24,989 --> 00:12:27,267 ultimately not to pose any threat to U . 306 00:12:27,267 --> 00:12:29,267 S . Forces territory or that of our 307 00:12:29,267 --> 00:12:31,156 allies . But it's something we'll 308 00:12:31,156 --> 00:12:33,322 continue to work on closely or monitor 309 00:12:33,322 --> 00:12:36,150 closely . Rather what I would say is 310 00:12:36,160 --> 00:12:38,230 back to the earlier point that I was 311 00:12:38,230 --> 00:12:41,340 making is is our our primary focus is 312 00:12:41,340 --> 00:12:44,200 on preserving a free peaceful in the 313 00:12:44,200 --> 00:12:46,420 pacific the relationship between the 314 00:12:46,420 --> 00:12:48,810 United States and the Republic of Korea 315 00:12:48,810 --> 00:12:50,640 is about defense and it's about 316 00:12:50,640 --> 00:12:52,696 preserving peace . It's not meant to 317 00:12:52,696 --> 00:12:55,610 escalate , it's not meant to uh create 318 00:12:55,610 --> 00:12:58,240 more consternation or instability in 319 00:12:58,240 --> 00:13:00,650 the region . And certainly the actions 320 00:13:00,650 --> 00:13:03,430 by North Korea are doing just that . 321 00:13:03,430 --> 00:13:05,597 And so as we've said before , we would 322 00:13:05,597 --> 00:13:07,541 call on them to be willing to have 323 00:13:07,541 --> 00:13:09,960 dialogue to talk about these things 324 00:13:09,960 --> 00:13:13,730 versus potentially escalating situation . 325 00:13:14,430 --> 00:13:18,140 Strategic assets should be stationed 326 00:13:18,150 --> 00:13:21,650 at all kinds to defend South 327 00:13:21,650 --> 00:13:25,610 Korea . Well , we have more than 28,000 328 00:13:25,610 --> 00:13:27,832 U . S . Forces already stationed on the 329 00:13:27,832 --> 00:13:31,220 peninsula . I think that is a signal of 330 00:13:31,220 --> 00:13:33,170 our commitment to our defense 331 00:13:33,170 --> 00:13:34,837 relationship and our security 332 00:13:34,837 --> 00:13:36,890 cooperation with the people of the 333 00:13:36,890 --> 00:13:38,980 Republic of Korea . That's very 334 00:13:38,980 --> 00:13:42,180 longstanding and and will remain long 335 00:13:42,180 --> 00:13:44,780 standing . Uh So uh again we'll 336 00:13:44,780 --> 00:13:46,669 continue to work closely with the 337 00:13:46,669 --> 00:13:48,724 Republic of Korea or other allies in 338 00:13:48,724 --> 00:13:51,000 the region to include Japan to preserve 339 00:13:51,010 --> 00:13:53,480 peace and stability throughout the indo 340 00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:57,350 pacific . Thank you my question . 341 00:13:57,360 --> 00:13:59,582 It's a little bit of a long one today . 342 00:13:59,582 --> 00:14:01,749 Um A new Washington post investigation 343 00:14:01,749 --> 00:14:03,971 finds over 500 retired U . S . Military 344 00:14:03,971 --> 00:14:06,027 personnel and taking jobs to foreign 345 00:14:06,027 --> 00:14:08,138 governments in recent years including 346 00:14:08,138 --> 00:14:09,916 15 retired U . S . Generals and 347 00:14:09,916 --> 00:14:11,971 admirals working as paid consultants 348 00:14:11,971 --> 00:14:13,860 for the Defense Ministry of Saudi 349 00:14:13,860 --> 00:14:15,804 Arabia . Is this a concern for the 350 00:14:15,804 --> 00:14:17,693 pentagon and how does this affect 351 00:14:17,693 --> 00:14:19,804 national security ? That these former 352 00:14:19,804 --> 00:14:21,804 high ranking military officials are 353 00:14:21,804 --> 00:14:24,480 advising other countries ? So I've seen 354 00:14:24,480 --> 00:14:26,800 the article um I would highlight that 355 00:14:26,810 --> 00:14:29,160 as private US citizens . Retired 356 00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:31,271 service members are certainly free to 357 00:14:31,271 --> 00:14:33,730 seek employment at their discretion , 358 00:14:33,730 --> 00:14:36,760 but certain standards do apply . Uh And 359 00:14:36,770 --> 00:14:38,659 and the reason that is is because 360 00:14:38,659 --> 00:14:40,603 safeguarding national security and 361 00:14:40,603 --> 00:14:42,530 classified information as well as 362 00:14:42,530 --> 00:14:44,641 preventing conflicts of interest will 363 00:14:44,641 --> 00:14:46,363 always remain paramount to the 364 00:14:46,363 --> 00:14:48,530 Department of Defense . So in addition 365 00:14:48,530 --> 00:14:50,197 to the limitations on foreign 366 00:14:50,197 --> 00:14:52,860 government employment that apply to all 367 00:14:52,860 --> 00:14:55,920 military retirees , All former D . O . 368 00:14:55,920 --> 00:14:58,087 D . Personnel are subject to a variety 369 00:14:58,087 --> 00:14:59,840 of post government employment 370 00:14:59,850 --> 00:15:02,630 restrictions within law and regulations . 371 00:15:02,820 --> 00:15:05,350 And so for example they remain bound by 372 00:15:05,350 --> 00:15:07,780 laws governing non disclosure of any 373 00:15:07,780 --> 00:15:09,780 non public government information . 374 00:15:09,780 --> 00:15:12,140 This includes classified information or 375 00:15:12,140 --> 00:15:14,362 information that they may have obtained 376 00:15:14,362 --> 00:15:16,362 through their federal employment or 377 00:15:16,362 --> 00:15:18,584 other information that may be protected 378 00:15:18,584 --> 00:15:20,529 by the privacy act . Um So when it 379 00:15:20,529 --> 00:15:22,910 comes to individual cases such as the 380 00:15:22,910 --> 00:15:25,188 individuals highlighted in the article , 381 00:15:25,188 --> 00:15:27,243 it certainly refer you to them or to 382 00:15:27,243 --> 00:15:29,410 the appropriate service branch . But I 383 00:15:29,410 --> 00:15:31,466 do know that the individual military 384 00:15:31,466 --> 00:15:34,150 departments uh do do their due 385 00:15:34,150 --> 00:15:36,430 diligence in terms of weighing and 386 00:15:36,430 --> 00:15:39,110 considering their reviews of foreign 387 00:15:39,120 --> 00:15:42,540 Government employment requests . Um 388 00:15:43,400 --> 00:15:45,690 And and the final point I'd make on all 389 00:15:45,690 --> 00:15:48,490 of this is that uh just to hammer home 390 00:15:48,490 --> 00:15:50,940 the point that that there are policies , 391 00:15:50,940 --> 00:15:53,107 there are laws , there are regulations 392 00:15:53,107 --> 00:15:56,620 uh they're well established . Uh And it 393 00:15:56,620 --> 00:15:58,731 is something that D . O . D . Members 394 00:15:58,731 --> 00:16:01,320 are educated on retirees are educated 395 00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:03,542 on and you're required to follow them . 396 00:16:03,542 --> 00:16:05,709 So it's incumbent on the individual to 397 00:16:05,709 --> 00:16:07,700 know uh and to understand those 398 00:16:07,700 --> 00:16:09,880 requirements and to adhere to them . 399 00:16:09,890 --> 00:16:13,640 Thank you sir . Thanks Pat . Follow up 400 00:16:13,640 --> 00:16:17,280 on rio's question . Um on september 401 00:16:17,280 --> 00:16:21,280 7th under Secretary Colin Kahl said 402 00:16:21,290 --> 00:16:23,670 that when asked about that 2027 403 00:16:23,680 --> 00:16:26,060 timeline , he said it was he didn't 404 00:16:26,060 --> 00:16:28,210 think that that china had sped up its 405 00:16:28,210 --> 00:16:31,360 clock . Is that still the assessment 406 00:16:31,560 --> 00:16:34,840 of the Pentagon and if not what's 407 00:16:34,840 --> 00:16:37,390 changed between then and now ? Yeah , 408 00:16:37,400 --> 00:16:39,567 so , you know , so I don't wanna put a 409 00:16:39,567 --> 00:16:42,450 timeline on or speculate on when we 410 00:16:42,450 --> 00:16:45,280 think exactly china might do this other 411 00:16:45,280 --> 00:16:47,870 than to point back at the words that 412 00:16:47,880 --> 00:16:51,700 President G uh and the PRC 413 00:16:51,710 --> 00:16:55,640 have said publicly in terms of uh their 414 00:16:55,650 --> 00:16:57,594 willingness , they're , you know , 415 00:16:57,594 --> 00:16:59,817 they're they're supposed willingness to 416 00:16:59,817 --> 00:17:02,090 use force to take back Taiwan as part 417 00:17:02,090 --> 00:17:05,810 of a um you know , what they would 418 00:17:05,810 --> 00:17:09,120 call a reunification . Um so 419 00:17:09,130 --> 00:17:12,110 again , from a strategic standpoint , 420 00:17:12,120 --> 00:17:16,100 our focus is on preserving uh 421 00:17:16,110 --> 00:17:18,221 stability and security throughout the 422 00:17:18,221 --> 00:17:21,240 region . Are policy in regards to china . 423 00:17:21,250 --> 00:17:24,100 Uh and Taiwan has not changed . We 424 00:17:24,100 --> 00:17:26,830 still have the one china policy uh and 425 00:17:26,830 --> 00:17:29,010 so our focus will continue to be on 426 00:17:29,010 --> 00:17:32,510 deterring potential military action uh 427 00:17:32,510 --> 00:17:34,830 and two calling on both sides to 428 00:17:34,830 --> 00:17:36,997 resolve these issues peaceably . But I 429 00:17:36,997 --> 00:17:40,560 don't have a specific um date other 430 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:42,782 than to say , I would point back to the 431 00:17:42,782 --> 00:17:44,838 PRC and their own public comments on 432 00:17:44,838 --> 00:17:46,838 this issue . What it sounds like is 433 00:17:46,838 --> 00:17:48,949 that the building is taking seriously 434 00:17:48,949 --> 00:17:50,893 another part of what she did say , 435 00:17:50,893 --> 00:17:53,540 which is that he that he's not ruling 436 00:17:53,540 --> 00:17:57,130 out or or I 437 00:17:57,140 --> 00:17:59,960 wouldn't give up the right to take 438 00:17:59,970 --> 00:18:02,192 Taiwan back by force . And am I right , 439 00:18:02,192 --> 00:18:04,248 that that's something that was heard 440 00:18:04,248 --> 00:18:06,470 here and and taken seriously ? Well , I 441 00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:08,581 think this is why you continue to see 442 00:18:08,581 --> 00:18:10,637 us say that china remains the pacing 443 00:18:10,637 --> 00:18:12,970 challenge for the Department of Defense . 444 00:18:12,970 --> 00:18:15,680 Um , this kind of rhetoric , uh , the 445 00:18:15,680 --> 00:18:18,260 kind of coercive acts , uh , the kind 446 00:18:18,260 --> 00:18:20,204 of behavior that we've seen is not 447 00:18:20,204 --> 00:18:22,260 helpful in terms of preserving peace 448 00:18:22,260 --> 00:18:24,427 and stability in that region . So it's 449 00:18:24,427 --> 00:18:26,538 something that will continue to watch 450 00:18:26,538 --> 00:18:28,538 very closely . Uh , and again , our 451 00:18:28,538 --> 00:18:30,482 focus right now is on working with 452 00:18:30,482 --> 00:18:32,538 allies and partners to deter uh , so 453 00:18:32,538 --> 00:18:34,427 that we don't get to that point . 454 00:18:34,427 --> 00:18:36,593 Hopefully . Thank you . Let me go back 455 00:18:36,593 --> 00:18:36,440 out to the phone here and I'll come 456 00:18:36,450 --> 00:18:38,561 into the room heather from us . And I 457 00:18:39,020 --> 00:18:41,131 thanks so much . I was just wondering 458 00:18:41,131 --> 00:18:42,964 if you can give an update on the 459 00:18:42,964 --> 00:18:45,950 maritime environment over in Ukraine 460 00:18:45,950 --> 00:18:47,894 and noticed that you mentioned , I 461 00:18:47,894 --> 00:18:49,950 think in a couple of things ago that 462 00:18:49,950 --> 00:18:51,783 there's been some caliber cruise 463 00:18:51,783 --> 00:18:51,750 missiles that might be coming from 464 00:18:51,750 --> 00:18:53,750 ships . That is that something that 465 00:18:53,750 --> 00:18:55,694 we're still seeing ? Yeah . Thanks 466 00:18:55,694 --> 00:18:57,694 heather . I I really don't have any 467 00:18:57,694 --> 00:18:59,806 significant updates to provide . Um , 468 00:18:59,806 --> 00:19:02,030 in terms of the naval picture per se , 469 00:19:02,040 --> 00:19:04,800 as you highlight , we have seen Russian 470 00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:07,670 vessels employ calibers uh , in some of 471 00:19:07,670 --> 00:19:09,960 their missile strikes against Ukraine . 472 00:19:09,970 --> 00:19:12,137 But beyond that , I don't I don't have 473 00:19:12,137 --> 00:19:14,710 any uh , thing beyond that to provide . 474 00:19:14,720 --> 00:19:16,980 Thank you . Okay , let me come back to 475 00:19:16,980 --> 00:19:19,050 the room here . Yes , sir . James 476 00:19:19,050 --> 00:19:21,920 Matthews from sky news in the UK . Ben 477 00:19:21,920 --> 00:19:24,142 Wallace , the UK's Defense Secretary is 478 00:19:24,142 --> 00:19:27,210 in Washington today . Is he discussing 479 00:19:27,220 --> 00:19:29,780 the use of nuclear weapons or the 480 00:19:29,780 --> 00:19:32,410 response to the use of nuclear weapons ? 481 00:19:32,420 --> 00:19:35,840 Uh So he's here today to discuss 482 00:19:35,850 --> 00:19:39,220 the Ukraine situation and the U . S . 483 00:19:39,220 --> 00:19:41,276 And U . K . Joint efforts to support 484 00:19:41,276 --> 00:19:44,380 Ukraine as well as to again reaffirm 485 00:19:44,390 --> 00:19:47,040 the transatlantic ties and cooperation 486 00:19:47,040 --> 00:19:49,096 that our two countries share when it 487 00:19:49,096 --> 00:19:51,230 comes to issues like Russia . Again , 488 00:19:51,230 --> 00:19:53,230 we'll put a readout out later today 489 00:19:53,230 --> 00:19:55,920 detailing the meeting Britain's armed 490 00:19:55,920 --> 00:19:58,080 forces minister seemed to suggest on 491 00:19:58,080 --> 00:20:00,480 Sky News this morning that discussions 492 00:20:00,480 --> 00:20:02,690 were taking place that were beyond 493 00:20:02,690 --> 00:20:06,160 belief . Can you illuminate us as to 494 00:20:06,160 --> 00:20:08,327 what he might have meant ? I'd have to 495 00:20:08,327 --> 00:20:10,493 refer you back to the Minister for any 496 00:20:10,493 --> 00:20:12,660 comments you may have made . Thank you 497 00:20:12,660 --> 00:20:14,882 appreciate it at the back of the room . 498 00:20:14,882 --> 00:20:18,300 So I have a question that's related to 499 00:20:18,300 --> 00:20:21,350 the National Security strategy in the 500 00:20:21,350 --> 00:20:24,250 document . And of course it informs the 501 00:20:24,260 --> 00:20:26,620 National Defense strategy eventually . 502 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:28,720 And the document talks the document 503 00:20:28,720 --> 00:20:30,720 talks about constraining Russia and 504 00:20:30,720 --> 00:20:32,942 talks about americans , how the U . S . 505 00:20:32,942 --> 00:20:34,887 Is helping to make Russia's war on 506 00:20:34,887 --> 00:20:38,600 Ukraine strategic failure . So I wonder 507 00:20:38,600 --> 00:20:41,350 if you can just explore with you the 508 00:20:41,350 --> 00:20:43,406 meaning of strategic failure when it 509 00:20:43,406 --> 00:20:47,340 comes to Russia's ability to conduct 510 00:20:47,350 --> 00:20:50,710 more wars and and mainly uh project 511 00:20:50,720 --> 00:20:54,340 power in the Middle East region . Thank 512 00:20:54,340 --> 00:20:56,950 you . That's like a political science 513 00:20:56,950 --> 00:20:59,006 test question right there . I got my 514 00:20:59,006 --> 00:21:01,228 little blue booklet out and write write 515 00:21:01,228 --> 00:21:03,710 out my answer on that one . Um wow how 516 00:21:03,710 --> 00:21:05,580 much time do you have ? Um 517 00:21:07,020 --> 00:21:10,750 So uh just very briefly and again happy 518 00:21:10,750 --> 00:21:14,360 to talk more offline in more detail . 519 00:21:14,360 --> 00:21:17,570 But what I would say is that when you 520 00:21:17,570 --> 00:21:20,410 look at the situation in Ukraine and 521 00:21:20,410 --> 00:21:22,920 you look at the broader strategic issue 522 00:21:22,920 --> 00:21:26,310 of a uh country using its military 523 00:21:26,310 --> 00:21:29,090 might to essentially try to take over 524 00:21:29,090 --> 00:21:32,940 another country uh illegally and 525 00:21:32,940 --> 00:21:36,410 unprovoked or two to and you know , the 526 00:21:36,410 --> 00:21:39,650 sham referenda annex territory . Uh I 527 00:21:39,650 --> 00:21:41,706 think that the strategic question at 528 00:21:41,706 --> 00:21:44,390 issue there is can we as a 529 00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:46,511 international community allow that to 530 00:21:46,511 --> 00:21:48,567 happen ? Can the United States allow 531 00:21:48,567 --> 00:21:50,370 that kind of behavior uh to be 532 00:21:50,370 --> 00:21:52,592 acceptable ? And what precedent does it 533 00:21:52,592 --> 00:21:56,070 set if it does if it is permitted ? Uh 534 00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:58,950 And so from a strategic standpoint 535 00:21:58,960 --> 00:22:00,780 working again alongside our 536 00:22:00,780 --> 00:22:03,610 international allies and partners to 537 00:22:03,610 --> 00:22:06,400 support in this case , Ukraine and 538 00:22:06,400 --> 00:22:08,511 their fight to defend their sovereign 539 00:22:08,511 --> 00:22:10,678 territory . Uh The consequences of not 540 00:22:10,678 --> 00:22:14,000 doing so would pretend a very serious 541 00:22:14,710 --> 00:22:16,500 um national security threat , 542 00:22:16,510 --> 00:22:18,510 international security threat for a 543 00:22:18,510 --> 00:22:20,566 very long time to come . In terms of 544 00:22:20,566 --> 00:22:23,980 Russia and the Middle East . Um Again , 545 00:22:23,990 --> 00:22:26,046 you've been watching this story long 546 00:22:26,046 --> 00:22:28,212 enough to know that that Russia , like 547 00:22:28,212 --> 00:22:30,212 any nation has interests to include 548 00:22:30,212 --> 00:22:32,434 interests within the Middle East . They 549 00:22:32,434 --> 00:22:34,212 certainly share relationships , 550 00:22:34,212 --> 00:22:36,101 security relationships , economic 551 00:22:36,101 --> 00:22:38,157 relationships with other countries . 552 00:22:38,157 --> 00:22:38,050 I'd refer you to them to talk about 553 00:22:38,050 --> 00:22:40,200 their own foreign policy , but it's 554 00:22:40,200 --> 00:22:42,422 certainly something that we keep an eye 555 00:22:42,422 --> 00:22:45,230 on . Thank you . You talked about 556 00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:48,820 consequences if if the U . S . And its 557 00:22:48,820 --> 00:22:50,931 allies and international community do 558 00:22:50,931 --> 00:22:53,270 not stand up to Russia's intervention . 559 00:22:54,370 --> 00:22:57,390 I'm more interested in knowing how what 560 00:22:57,390 --> 00:22:59,660 do you think are the consequences of 561 00:22:59,670 --> 00:23:01,948 this strategic failure ? If it happens , 562 00:23:01,948 --> 00:23:04,600 will it limit Russia's ability to use 563 00:23:04,610 --> 00:23:07,420 military force in the in the future ? 564 00:23:08,460 --> 00:23:11,070 Well I I think if I understand your 565 00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:13,330 question correctly , I think the idea 566 00:23:13,330 --> 00:23:17,310 here is again uh to compel a 567 00:23:17,310 --> 00:23:20,930 nation that might think that um you 568 00:23:20,930 --> 00:23:24,430 know might through military power uh 569 00:23:24,430 --> 00:23:27,560 and taking over uh nations 570 00:23:27,570 --> 00:23:30,060 illegally , they'd be deterred from 571 00:23:30,060 --> 00:23:32,004 doing that and that it would be an 572 00:23:32,004 --> 00:23:35,310 unacceptable uh and therefore not to 573 00:23:35,310 --> 00:23:39,020 their uh strategic advantage 574 00:23:39,030 --> 00:23:41,310 or policy to do those kinds of things . 575 00:23:41,310 --> 00:23:44,260 So again I am happy to have a deeper 576 00:23:44,260 --> 00:23:47,650 discussion offline . Um But thanks , 577 00:23:47,660 --> 00:23:49,882 okay , let me go back to Barber and I'm 578 00:23:49,882 --> 00:23:51,938 gonna go to the phone to follow up a 579 00:23:51,938 --> 00:23:54,049 little bit on my colleague from Sky . 580 00:23:54,049 --> 00:23:56,216 Um The thing is that Putin to date has 581 00:23:56,220 --> 00:23:59,020 never taken nuclear weapons off the 582 00:23:59,020 --> 00:24:01,520 table . His record continues and he's 583 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:04,540 never said that it's off the table . So 584 00:24:05,820 --> 00:24:08,510 what reassurance can the pentagon give 585 00:24:08,520 --> 00:24:11,290 the american people that it is 586 00:24:11,290 --> 00:24:14,880 completely ready to deal with a nuclear 587 00:24:14,880 --> 00:24:17,690 scenario from Russia ? So we are 588 00:24:17,690 --> 00:24:20,530 completely ready . Um I will tell you 589 00:24:20,530 --> 00:24:23,110 that we continue to monitor the 590 00:24:23,110 --> 00:24:26,160 situation very closely as Secretary 591 00:24:26,160 --> 00:24:28,910 Austin and others have said this kind 592 00:24:28,910 --> 00:24:32,570 of nuclear saber rattling is reckless . 593 00:24:32,850 --> 00:24:35,660 It's irresponsible , particularly given 594 00:24:35,670 --> 00:24:39,220 the security situation in that region 595 00:24:39,220 --> 00:24:42,810 of the world and elsewhere , and so 596 00:24:42,820 --> 00:24:45,042 um it's something that will continue to 597 00:24:45,042 --> 00:24:47,320 keep a close eye on uh in the meantime , 598 00:24:47,320 --> 00:24:51,310 um We have not seen anything that would 599 00:24:51,310 --> 00:24:53,088 indicate that Russia has made a 600 00:24:53,088 --> 00:24:56,130 decision to employ nuclear weapons . Uh 601 00:24:56,140 --> 00:24:59,740 and so um you know , again others have 602 00:24:59,740 --> 00:25:01,573 communicated that there would be 603 00:25:01,573 --> 00:25:03,573 consequences , but not going to get 604 00:25:03,573 --> 00:25:05,740 into what those were other than to say 605 00:25:05,740 --> 00:25:07,907 that we stand the watch 24/7 and would 606 00:25:07,907 --> 00:25:11,430 be prepared if we had to respond very 607 00:25:11,430 --> 00:25:13,550 briefly , given the fact that NATO is 608 00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:15,560 including the US is doing a nuclear 609 00:25:15,560 --> 00:25:18,070 deterrence exercise in Europe this very 610 00:25:18,070 --> 00:25:20,540 week . When you say fully ready , are 611 00:25:20,540 --> 00:25:23,110 you fully , can you say whether the 612 00:25:23,110 --> 00:25:25,870 United States is fully planned out and 613 00:25:25,870 --> 00:25:28,910 ready with the allies in europe ? So 614 00:25:28,910 --> 00:25:31,077 I'm not going to get into hypothetical 615 00:25:31,077 --> 00:25:33,243 situations because uh you know , again 616 00:25:33,243 --> 00:25:35,330 we maintain a very robust strategic 617 00:25:35,330 --> 00:25:37,663 deterrence capability and have for many , 618 00:25:37,663 --> 00:25:40,310 many years we work very closely with 619 00:25:40,310 --> 00:25:43,790 our allies throughout the world to 620 00:25:43,790 --> 00:25:46,500 provide deterrence . Uh and I'll just 621 00:25:46,500 --> 00:25:48,333 leave it at that . But thank you 622 00:25:48,333 --> 00:25:51,190 Barbara ? Yeah , I think that uh 623 00:25:51,200 --> 00:25:53,422 there's to go back to Ukraine , there's 624 00:25:53,422 --> 00:25:55,600 been some concern up on the hill that 625 00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:58,260 with these uh the drawdowns that we're 626 00:25:58,260 --> 00:26:00,690 doing that , the US is sort of cutting 627 00:26:00,690 --> 00:26:02,801 too close to the bone and dipping too 628 00:26:02,801 --> 00:26:05,900 far into its own stock . Can you 629 00:26:05,910 --> 00:26:08,021 comment on that whether or not that's 630 00:26:08,021 --> 00:26:10,132 true or not and what the the pentagon 631 00:26:10,132 --> 00:26:12,130 is doing to make sure that doesn't 632 00:26:12,140 --> 00:26:14,196 happen that we've still maintained a 633 00:26:14,196 --> 00:26:16,290 robust supply for our own use . 634 00:26:16,300 --> 00:26:19,800 Absolutely . So , so there is 635 00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:23,730 a very um detailed 636 00:26:23,730 --> 00:26:26,880 process in terms of as we look at our 637 00:26:26,890 --> 00:26:30,230 uh security assistance to Ukraine , uh 638 00:26:30,240 --> 00:26:32,820 we weigh it against a lot of various 639 00:26:32,830 --> 00:26:35,440 factors to include our own readiness . 640 00:26:35,450 --> 00:26:37,450 Uh and so this is something that we 641 00:26:37,450 --> 00:26:39,910 constantly take into account . Uh And 642 00:26:39,910 --> 00:26:41,966 again , this is a reason why you saw 643 00:26:41,966 --> 00:26:44,560 recently a meeting with national 644 00:26:44,570 --> 00:26:47,040 armaments directors , not only NATO , 645 00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:49,000 but as part of the Ukraine contact 646 00:26:49,350 --> 00:26:52,640 group to look at how we continue to 647 00:26:52,640 --> 00:26:56,040 work together uh to not only replenish 648 00:26:56,040 --> 00:26:57,984 our own stocks as an international 649 00:26:57,984 --> 00:27:00,207 community , but also ensure that we can 650 00:27:00,207 --> 00:27:02,096 continue to support Ukraine going 651 00:27:02,096 --> 00:27:04,170 forward . I mentioned earlier that I 652 00:27:04,170 --> 00:27:06,170 think this is a strategic advantage 653 00:27:06,170 --> 00:27:08,770 because the key point here is that uh 654 00:27:08,780 --> 00:27:11,200 the United States , uh the 655 00:27:11,200 --> 00:27:13,256 international community , our allies 656 00:27:13,256 --> 00:27:15,089 and our partners are all working 657 00:27:15,089 --> 00:27:17,210 together uh as an international 658 00:27:17,210 --> 00:27:19,770 community to make sure that we can 659 00:27:19,770 --> 00:27:22,940 continue to uh meet our 660 00:27:22,940 --> 00:27:25,500 security commitments while at the same 661 00:27:25,500 --> 00:27:28,360 time supporting Ukraine uh and that 662 00:27:28,360 --> 00:27:30,740 we're doing this together as opposed to 663 00:27:30,750 --> 00:27:33,770 uh a nation like Russia , which largely 664 00:27:33,770 --> 00:27:36,300 finds itself isolated already with 665 00:27:36,300 --> 00:27:39,220 logistics and sustainment problems um 666 00:27:39,230 --> 00:27:42,920 and having to having to depend on 667 00:27:42,920 --> 00:27:45,930 countries like Iran and North Korea 668 00:27:45,940 --> 00:27:48,350 when it comes to seeking security 669 00:27:48,350 --> 00:27:50,730 assistance . Uh And so going forward . 670 00:27:50,730 --> 00:27:52,841 This is something that will obviously 671 00:27:52,841 --> 00:27:55,008 keep a very close eye on and work very 672 00:27:55,008 --> 00:27:57,063 hard to ensure because at the end of 673 00:27:57,063 --> 00:27:59,174 the day the United States military is 674 00:27:59,174 --> 00:28:01,119 going to be ready . We're going to 675 00:28:01,119 --> 00:28:03,119 ensure that we're ready to meet our 676 00:28:03,119 --> 00:28:05,341 security commitments around the world . 677 00:28:05,341 --> 00:28:07,452 Um but we're confident that we've got 678 00:28:07,452 --> 00:28:09,563 the processes and procedures in place 679 00:28:09,563 --> 00:28:11,619 to ensure that that stays the case . 680 00:28:11,619 --> 00:28:13,841 Thank you . Let me just go to the phone 681 00:28:13,841 --> 00:28:16,119 here and I'll come back to val Valerie . 682 00:28:16,119 --> 00:28:17,341 Um Louis Martinez abc 683 00:28:20,220 --> 00:28:23,230 Hey Pat , question about this incident 684 00:28:23,230 --> 00:28:27,220 off of the coast of Alaska um NORAD , 685 00:28:27,220 --> 00:28:30,850 Alaska pushed out a statement about 16 686 00:28:30,860 --> 00:28:34,570 intercepting Um some tea you 95 . 687 00:28:34,580 --> 00:28:36,636 And the Russian Defense Ministry has 688 00:28:36,636 --> 00:28:39,610 also issued a statement about this 689 00:28:39,610 --> 00:28:43,200 flight . Um what what's so significant 690 00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:45,311 about this kind of encounter ? I mean 691 00:28:45,311 --> 00:28:47,478 so many of them that happened . Um but 692 00:28:47,478 --> 00:28:49,533 what was special about this one that 693 00:28:49,533 --> 00:28:51,820 required both sides to issue statements 694 00:28:51,820 --> 00:28:54,520 were was it very close to the US . Um 695 00:28:54,530 --> 00:28:57,050 territorial waters ? Yeah , just for 696 00:28:57,050 --> 00:28:59,320 the for the benefit of of all that that 697 00:28:59,320 --> 00:29:01,750 are listening . Uh So NORAD issued a 698 00:29:01,750 --> 00:29:03,710 statement right before the press 699 00:29:03,710 --> 00:29:07,230 briefing highlighting that um NORAD 700 00:29:07,230 --> 00:29:10,260 detected tracked positively identified 701 00:29:10,260 --> 00:29:12,720 and intercepted two Russian tu 95 bear 702 00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:14,942 H bombers entering and operating within 703 00:29:14,942 --> 00:29:17,109 the Alaskan air defense identification 704 00:29:17,109 --> 00:29:19,276 zone . Uh no indication that there was 705 00:29:19,276 --> 00:29:21,490 any unsafe unprofessional behavior , 706 00:29:21,490 --> 00:29:23,840 they did not present a threat . So 707 00:29:23,850 --> 00:29:26,050 louis you know certainly uh would 708 00:29:26,050 --> 00:29:28,420 encourage you to contact NORAD , but 709 00:29:28,420 --> 00:29:30,970 this is pretty standard and routine for 710 00:29:30,970 --> 00:29:34,460 us to issue releases , I think that um , 711 00:29:34,470 --> 00:29:36,526 you know , we try to , especially in 712 00:29:36,526 --> 00:29:38,526 light of everything going on in the 713 00:29:38,526 --> 00:29:40,526 world today , try to make sure that 714 00:29:40,526 --> 00:29:42,692 we're being as transparent as possible 715 00:29:42,692 --> 00:29:44,359 when it comes to this kind of 716 00:29:44,359 --> 00:29:46,526 information so as to ensure that folks 717 00:29:46,526 --> 00:29:49,610 have the facts . Thank you . Okay . 718 00:29:50,210 --> 00:29:53,630 Um so I wanted to get back to uh , 719 00:29:53,640 --> 00:29:56,040 leaders line of questioning . Are you 720 00:29:56,040 --> 00:29:58,300 able to provide any clarity at this 721 00:29:58,300 --> 00:30:01,700 point about how much if any funding D O 722 00:30:01,700 --> 00:30:04,520 D is is providing to SpaceX for 723 00:30:04,520 --> 00:30:06,742 Starlink in Ukraine ? Because there had 724 00:30:06,742 --> 00:30:09,450 been some reporting or some confusing 725 00:30:09,460 --> 00:30:11,460 confusion , confusing reports about 726 00:30:11,460 --> 00:30:13,571 that . So , can you at least rule out 727 00:30:13,571 --> 00:30:16,500 that D O D is previously sending ? So 728 00:30:16,510 --> 00:30:18,870 as it relates to Ukraine and Starlink , 729 00:30:18,880 --> 00:30:22,030 the D O D has not funded has not paid 730 00:30:22,040 --> 00:30:24,810 SpaceX any money at this stage . Okay . 731 00:30:24,820 --> 00:30:26,980 And just a broader question on that 732 00:30:26,980 --> 00:30:29,510 same subject , do you have any concerns 733 00:30:29,510 --> 00:30:31,510 that this situation could set a bad 734 00:30:31,510 --> 00:30:34,060 precedent ? I mean , Space , Space X 735 00:30:34,060 --> 00:30:35,838 made the decision to send these 736 00:30:35,838 --> 00:30:38,200 terminals and to provide the service . 737 00:30:38,210 --> 00:30:40,660 So is the pentagon being strong armed 738 00:30:40,670 --> 00:30:43,020 into continuing funding for it ? 739 00:30:43,030 --> 00:30:45,086 Instead of going through the process 740 00:30:45,086 --> 00:30:47,252 that we've seen play out over the past 741 00:30:47,252 --> 00:30:49,252 couple of months where the Pentagon 742 00:30:49,252 --> 00:30:51,086 sources , the Ukraine Ukrainians 743 00:30:51,086 --> 00:30:53,620 requirements and then , you know , 744 00:30:53,620 --> 00:30:56,270 comes up with the capability that it 745 00:30:56,270 --> 00:30:58,990 feels as best , you know , that best 746 00:30:58,990 --> 00:31:02,040 meets those requirements . So let me 747 00:31:02,040 --> 00:31:05,000 kind of approach it from a little bit 748 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,167 of a different standpoint . So , so we 749 00:31:07,167 --> 00:31:09,440 haven't paid anything to SpaceX for 750 00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:11,551 Starlink in Ukraine to date . Right . 751 00:31:11,551 --> 00:31:13,750 So what an individual company may or 752 00:31:13,750 --> 00:31:15,917 may not do in any particular corner of 753 00:31:15,917 --> 00:31:18,194 the world , of course is uh , you know , 754 00:31:18,194 --> 00:31:20,417 incumbent on that company to decide and 755 00:31:20,417 --> 00:31:22,860 do , um , when it comes to the broader 756 00:31:22,860 --> 00:31:24,471 issue of providing satellite 757 00:31:24,471 --> 00:31:27,200 communication to Ukraine . Uh , we are 758 00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:29,860 in discussions with SpaceX as well as 759 00:31:29,860 --> 00:31:32,027 other companies to look at how best to 760 00:31:32,027 --> 00:31:34,770 provide that service . And so , um , 761 00:31:34,780 --> 00:31:37,970 what I would say is that as you well 762 00:31:37,970 --> 00:31:40,250 know , we have a process which we go 763 00:31:40,250 --> 00:31:42,417 through in terms of uh , and again , I 764 00:31:42,417 --> 00:31:44,639 don't want to speculate or say this has 765 00:31:44,639 --> 00:31:46,861 happened , but any type of service that 766 00:31:46,861 --> 00:31:48,806 the D O D is going to be funding , 767 00:31:48,806 --> 00:31:51,028 there is a process by which we would go 768 00:31:51,028 --> 00:31:52,972 through to look at contracting and 769 00:31:52,972 --> 00:31:55,194 acquisition requirements and and how we 770 00:31:55,194 --> 00:31:54,680 would do that . So again , I don't have 771 00:31:54,680 --> 00:31:57,610 anything to announce . Again , the 772 00:31:57,620 --> 00:31:59,620 bigger picture here is working with 773 00:31:59,620 --> 00:32:01,564 Ukraine in terms of what are their 774 00:32:01,564 --> 00:32:03,620 satellite communication needs . Um , 775 00:32:03,620 --> 00:32:05,610 and um , continuing to work with 776 00:32:05,610 --> 00:32:07,666 industry on exploring how best to do 777 00:32:07,666 --> 00:32:11,370 that . Thanks sir , as winter 778 00:32:11,370 --> 00:32:13,426 approaches . Looking at what are the 779 00:32:13,426 --> 00:32:15,703 main challenges that poses for Ukraine ? 780 00:32:15,703 --> 00:32:17,481 How do you see it impacting the 781 00:32:17,481 --> 00:32:19,370 fighting and there's been various 782 00:32:19,370 --> 00:32:19,000 announcements on donations of cold 783 00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:21,420 weather gear . Um , does Ukraine have , 784 00:32:21,420 --> 00:32:23,420 what it needs on that front at this 785 00:32:23,420 --> 00:32:25,531 point is more necessary ? What what's 786 00:32:25,531 --> 00:32:27,642 your assessment of that ? Yeah , well 787 00:32:27,642 --> 00:32:29,753 certainly um weather is a significant 788 00:32:29,753 --> 00:32:31,864 factor in any military operation . Um 789 00:32:31,864 --> 00:32:33,864 Winter definitely will present some 790 00:32:33,864 --> 00:32:36,620 challenges to all parties on the 791 00:32:36,620 --> 00:32:39,930 battlefield . Um I think that when you 792 00:32:39,930 --> 00:32:42,152 look at things like , you know , rain , 793 00:32:42,152 --> 00:32:46,050 snow , mud , um the impact that it 794 00:32:46,050 --> 00:32:49,180 has on the terrain , uh it definitely 795 00:32:49,180 --> 00:32:51,402 will add another level of complexity to 796 00:32:51,402 --> 00:32:55,080 already very dynamic battlefield . And 797 00:32:55,080 --> 00:32:57,960 so , uh this is why , you know , a 798 00:32:57,970 --> 00:33:00,192 major reason why you see us continue to 799 00:33:00,192 --> 00:33:02,414 work very closely with Ukraine with our 800 00:33:02,414 --> 00:33:04,620 international partners and allies to 801 00:33:04,620 --> 00:33:07,830 identify what Ukraine's needs are . Um 802 00:33:08,060 --> 00:33:10,116 Secretary Austin talked a little bit 803 00:33:10,116 --> 00:33:12,116 about this last week in brussels in 804 00:33:12,116 --> 00:33:15,460 terms of um you see Ukraine continuing 805 00:33:15,460 --> 00:33:17,510 to put pressure on Russia and that 806 00:33:17,510 --> 00:33:19,890 continues to be important as we get 807 00:33:19,890 --> 00:33:22,340 closer to the winter months . Um 808 00:33:22,350 --> 00:33:25,880 because um you know , clearly 809 00:33:25,890 --> 00:33:29,620 Russia uh is experiencing 810 00:33:29,620 --> 00:33:31,490 some significant logistics and 811 00:33:31,490 --> 00:33:33,434 sustainment challenges right now , 812 00:33:33,434 --> 00:33:35,546 those are only going to get harder as 813 00:33:35,546 --> 00:33:37,712 the winter months set in . And so time 814 00:33:37,712 --> 00:33:39,712 is certainly of the essence when it 815 00:33:39,712 --> 00:33:41,823 comes to capitalizing on that from an 816 00:33:41,823 --> 00:33:43,879 operational standpoint . In terms of 817 00:33:43,879 --> 00:33:46,060 your question about how does it affect 818 00:33:46,350 --> 00:33:49,420 um , you know , the support we provide . 819 00:33:49,420 --> 00:33:51,660 Again , this , this will be the ongoing 820 00:33:51,660 --> 00:33:54,660 conversation . Uh and I think through 821 00:33:54,660 --> 00:33:56,540 things like the contact group or 822 00:33:56,540 --> 00:33:58,707 through the bilateral discussions that 823 00:33:58,707 --> 00:34:01,760 we have with individual nations uh and 824 00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:03,760 our allies and our partners , we're 825 00:34:03,760 --> 00:34:05,871 gonna look at what it is that we need 826 00:34:05,871 --> 00:34:07,816 to get to them to help enable that 827 00:34:07,816 --> 00:34:09,704 continued forward momentum on the 828 00:34:09,704 --> 00:34:11,927 battlefield . Thanks . All right . Take 829 00:34:11,927 --> 00:34:14,149 a couple more here and we go to you sir 830 00:34:14,149 --> 00:34:16,316 and you go back to Liz . Thanks . Uh , 831 00:34:16,316 --> 00:34:18,890 does the pentagon view Iran's sale of 832 00:34:18,890 --> 00:34:20,890 large drones and cruise missiles to 833 00:34:20,890 --> 00:34:23,580 Russia and Russia's use of those as a 834 00:34:23,590 --> 00:34:25,720 violation or an abuse of the missile 835 00:34:25,720 --> 00:34:28,050 technology control regime , which 836 00:34:28,060 --> 00:34:30,740 governs large unmanned aerial systems 837 00:34:30,750 --> 00:34:33,230 and cruise missiles . And then by way 838 00:34:33,230 --> 00:34:35,119 of follow up , can you give us an 839 00:34:35,119 --> 00:34:37,341 update on the deliberations on the sale 840 00:34:37,341 --> 00:34:39,450 of Gray eagle to Ukraine . So no 841 00:34:39,450 --> 00:34:41,860 updates on the Gray Eagle's um , 842 00:34:42,370 --> 00:34:44,481 definitely provide those when we have 843 00:34:44,481 --> 00:34:47,340 something or provide you with an update 844 00:34:47,340 --> 00:34:49,980 when we have something . Um , as far as 845 00:34:49,990 --> 00:34:52,660 the violations go , I'm sorry . Can you 846 00:34:52,660 --> 00:34:55,110 asset part again . Technology control 847 00:34:55,110 --> 00:34:57,277 regime covers cruise missiles in large 848 00:34:57,277 --> 00:34:59,499 U . A . S . Is the sale by Iran and the 849 00:34:59,499 --> 00:35:02,860 use by uh Russia which of that 850 00:35:02,870 --> 00:35:05,590 technology violation or abuse . 851 00:35:05,600 --> 00:35:09,440 So I would uh , I would recommend you 852 00:35:09,440 --> 00:35:11,662 talk to the State Department . They can 853 00:35:11,662 --> 00:35:13,551 give you more details on that . I 854 00:35:13,551 --> 00:35:15,718 believe they've spoken to this issue . 855 00:35:15,718 --> 00:35:17,940 Um , certainly we've seen these Iranian 856 00:35:17,940 --> 00:35:19,829 drones that have been provided to 857 00:35:19,829 --> 00:35:22,720 Russia for use in Ukraine being used to 858 00:35:22,720 --> 00:35:25,900 strike civilian targets , which of 859 00:35:25,900 --> 00:35:27,900 course is a violation of the law of 860 00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:30,330 armed conflict . Um , so yeah , sorry , 861 00:35:30,330 --> 00:35:32,552 I don't have more for you . All right , 862 00:35:32,552 --> 00:35:34,663 let me do the last two questions like 863 00:35:34,663 --> 00:35:37,450 yesterday . Elon musk said that SpaceX 864 00:35:37,450 --> 00:35:41,070 has withdrawn its request for funding 865 00:35:41,070 --> 00:35:43,470 for the Starlink services . Can you 866 00:35:43,480 --> 00:35:45,591 confirm that that message has made it 867 00:35:45,591 --> 00:35:48,480 up to the pentagon yet ? Again , I'd 868 00:35:48,480 --> 00:35:50,880 refer you to SpaceX to talk about what 869 00:35:50,880 --> 00:35:53,102 they have or have not done . I can tell 870 00:35:53,102 --> 00:35:54,880 you that we do continue to have 871 00:35:54,880 --> 00:35:56,991 discussions with SpaceX officials and 872 00:35:56,991 --> 00:35:59,158 others in terms of providing satellite 873 00:35:59,158 --> 00:36:01,380 communications to Ukraine . But again , 874 00:36:01,380 --> 00:36:03,713 I don't have anything to announce today . 875 00:36:03,713 --> 00:36:06,880 Thanks and listen , a Swedish newspaper 876 00:36:06,880 --> 00:36:08,713 released photos and videos today 877 00:36:08,830 --> 00:36:11,840 showing that it was likely an inside 878 00:36:11,840 --> 00:36:14,370 explosion from the pipeline . Um , has 879 00:36:14,380 --> 00:36:16,324 the pentagon seen these photos and 880 00:36:16,324 --> 00:36:18,630 video ? And does it assess any anything 881 00:36:18,630 --> 00:36:22,010 differently based on them ? Um , so I 882 00:36:22,010 --> 00:36:24,290 have not personally seen the photos , 883 00:36:24,290 --> 00:36:26,568 I'm aware of seeing them on , you know , 884 00:36:26,568 --> 00:36:28,750 some imagery on on in press reports . 885 00:36:28,750 --> 00:36:30,750 What I can tell you is that Germany 886 00:36:30,750 --> 00:36:32,806 Denmark and Norway are continuing to 887 00:36:32,806 --> 00:36:34,528 lead the investigation . We're 888 00:36:34,528 --> 00:36:36,528 certainly standing by to support as 889 00:36:36,528 --> 00:36:38,639 necessary . Um , but I don't have any 890 00:36:38,639 --> 00:36:40,780 updates to provide at this point from 891 00:36:40,780 --> 00:36:43,310 here . So thank you . Okay , thank you 892 00:36:43,310 --> 00:36:44,540 very much everybody appreciate it