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I'd like to call this hearing to order . 

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Good morning . The committee meets 

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today to receive an update on the 

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radius and posture of U S Special 

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Operations Command and U S Cyber 

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Command . Our witnesses are Assistant 

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Secretary of Defense for Special 

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Operations and low intensity conflict . 

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Christopher Meyer , commander of U S 

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Special Operations Command , General 

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Brian Fenton , and commander of U S 

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Cyber Command and Director of the 

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National Security Agency , General Paul 

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Nakasone . On behalf of the committee , 

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I would ask our witnesses to convey our 

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appreciation to the men and women you 

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represent and their families for their 

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service and professionalism . We live 

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in a complex and dangerous global 

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security environment from Russia's 

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aggression in Europe to China's malign 

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influence in the Indo Pacific to 

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persistent threats from Iran , North 

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Korea and violent extremist groups 

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prevailing in this environment will 

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require the tailored and often clan and 

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signed capabilities that only our 

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special operations and cyber forces can 

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provide . The United States has been 

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reducing its footprint and conflict 

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zones around the world as such . The 

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Special operations community is at an 

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inflection point but is no less 

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relevant to the future challenges we 

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face as the defense department recently 

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released joint concept for competing , 

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makes clear the object of our nation's 

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adversaries is to win without fighting . 

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The concept warns that if we do not 

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adapt to the realities of long term 

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competition , The United States risks 

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ceding strategic influence advantage 

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and leverage while preparing for a war 

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that never occurs , the skills 

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knowledge and perhaps most importantly , 

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the relationship with foreign partners 

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that are special operations forces have 

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developed over the past 20 years of 

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combat , make them well positioned to 

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contribute significantly to the 

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strategic competition . Assistant 

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Secretary , Mayor and General Fenton , 

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I look forward to an update regarding 

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your efforts to focus and prepare our 

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special operations forces for the 

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challenges ahead particularly would ask 

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that you discuss the capabilities , we 

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need to build an enduring advantage 

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over our competitors and what lessons 

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can be drawn from the ongoing conflict 

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in Ukraine . As part of this , I would 

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like to know how you are shaping the 

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force of the future through new 

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recruiting and retention efforts 

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including building a culture of 

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accountability . A number of high 

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profile misconduct cases have reflected 

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poorly on the special operations 

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community and additional efforts to 

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build upon . So comes 2020 , 

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comprehensive review of culture and 

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ethics seems necessary . I also want to 

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hear how you are addressing the unique 

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challenges faced by special operations 

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family . The Office of the Asd Select 

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plays a critical role in the oversight 

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of it and advocacy for our Special 

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Operations Forces as this service 

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secretary like civilian for so come , I 

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believe more must be done to assure a S 

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D select has provided the necessary 

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authority and resources including 

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manpower to fulfill these 

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responsibilities . I look forward to 

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hearing more about the department's 

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efforts on this front . Turning to 

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cyber command , I would like to commend 

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our cyber forces and the intelligence 

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community for their performance over 

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the past year and exposing Russia's 

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activities and helping Ukraine defend 

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itself against both kinetic and cyber 

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attacks . Intelligence officials are 

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understandably cautious about revealing 

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hardwood insights on adversaries . But 

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this current strategy has proven highly 

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effective in strengthening the 

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international community's response and 

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creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin . 

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This is a great example of competing 

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effectively in the information domain 

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and I hope we will continue to make 

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this kind of creative use of 

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intelligence . Some of the tools in our 

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toolbox like the Section 702 , 

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Authority from the Foreign Intelligence 

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Surveillance Act or FISA are critical 

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to our ability to counter adversaries . 

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Malign activities . The committee would 

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appreciate your views on the importance 

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of section 702 of FISA which sunsets at 

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the end of this year and why you 

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believe it is essential that we renew 

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that authority . We would like also 

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know what guardrails are in place to 

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give the public confidence that the 

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authority is being used . Judiciously . 

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General Nakasone , you have been 

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working to mature the cyber force and 

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advances capabilities to conduct 

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offensive , offensive and supporting 

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intelligence operations . It is widely 

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recognized that our cyber mission 

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forces are struggling with shortfalls 

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and personnel numbers . We know that 

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addressing this issue is your highest 

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priority . The military services must 

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also ensure that personnel management 

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provides qualified and trained 

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personnel to your command at the 

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beginning of their tours . So both the 

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personnel and the command can take full 

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advantage of the time of their 

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assignment to your force . I would also 

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note that the private sector has 

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realized the immense value of our cyber 

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operatives and offering them very high 

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compensation to leave the military . 

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The services must adjust accordingly by 

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providing a creative combination of 

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incentives to compete for and retain 

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these personnel . Finally , over the 

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last decade , a recurring debate has 

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been waged over whether to sustain the 

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dual hat arrangement , whereby the 

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commander of Cyber command also serves 

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as the director of the N S A , recently , 

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an independent panel established by the 

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Director of National Intelligence and 

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the Secretary of Defense and led by 

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former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

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Staff General Joe Dunford concluded 

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that the dual hat arrangement should be 

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sustained . We would welcome your 

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thoughts on this issue . Thank you 

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again to our witnesses for your service 

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and appearance before us . Today , I 

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look forward to your testimony . Now 

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let me recognize the ranking member , 

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Senator worker . Thank you Mr Chairman 

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for that very fine and thorough 

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statement . I very much appreciate that . 

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And I want to thank our witnesses for 

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being with us . Once again , the United 

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States faces the most complex and 

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daunting set of security challenges 

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since the height of the Cold War . And 

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our witnesses today are on the 

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frontlines of those challenges from the 

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Chinese Communist Party's unprecedented 

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military build up growing hegemonic 

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ambitions to Russia's brazen and 

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unprovoked attack on Ukraine . Our 

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adversaries are testing American 

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resolve our foremost adversary and 

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competitive . The Chinese Communist 

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Party has stressed both so calm and 

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cyber common ways we never imagined a 

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decade ago . Last year , General 

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Nakasone said Chinese advances in cyber 

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operations are unlike anything he has 

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seen before . He also noted the 

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People's Republic of China is a more 

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difficult adversary than the Soviet 

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Union because they are much more 

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tolerant of risk . So this presents new 

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challenges to our deterrence posture . 

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Although Beijing may be our foremost 

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adversary , others are not far behind 

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the cyber capabilities of Russia , Iran 

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and North Korea have continued to 

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surprise . Many I would appreciate an 

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update on D O D s work to implement a 

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zero trust architecture and provide 

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defensive cyber tools across the 

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department and the the industrial base . 

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I also look forward to discussing how 

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collaborative cyber activities with our 

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allies and partners such as hunt 

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forward operations have helped to 

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identify vulnerabilities , mitigate 

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threats and strengthen our network 

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defenses , military success in 

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cyberspace depends on the readiness of 

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our cyber mission forces . I hope to 

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hear about how we can improve our cyber 

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force readiness and accelerate 

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development of cyber capabilities 

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particularly on the offensive side . 

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General Fenton is no stranger to the 

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determination of the People's 

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Liberation Army having served as 

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commander of our Special Operations 

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Forces in the Pacific and the deputy 

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commander of Endo Pay . Come , his 

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challenge is twofold to build a force 

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capable of enhancing our deterrence and 

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war fighting in the Western Pacific . 

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Even as the threat environment facing 

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our nation demands that SOCOM should 

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remain fully engaged in the fight 

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against violent Islamic terrorist 

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groups across the world . From Africa 

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to South Asia . His commands work is 

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critical to our country's security and 

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is often the first to respond to our 

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nation's most pressing unforeseen 

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emergencies in the 2022 national 

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defense strategy , General Fenton's 

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forces have been asked to assume 

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significant risk . I think this 

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committee will want to ensure his 

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command is fully resourced to mitigate 

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that risk to the degree possible . And 

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I would also ask General Fenton and Mr 

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Mayor , whether their authorities and 

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resources in the upcoming year are 

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sufficient for mission tasks . What is 

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clear to me is that the role and 

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importance of special Operations forces 

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is only increasing as the nature and 

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complexity of threats facing our nation 

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increase the resources we provide to 

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special operations . Command should 

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reflect that reality . Our first job in 

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this committee is to provide the tools 

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our military needs to deter and 

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if not successful there to defeat these 

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threats . There's no doubt that 

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continued real growth , continued real 

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growth in the defense budget . Top line 

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above inflation remains essential to 

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our national security . This requires 

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action now , not later , our 

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adversaries are not waiting , neither 

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should we . This committee lead 

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the bipartisan charge to increase the 

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defense budget in last year's cycle . 

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Mr Chairman , I frankly have little 

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confidence that the administration 

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budget request this year will be 

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sufficient . If it is not , this 

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committee will again need to step up to 

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ensure that our military has the 

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resources , it needs to defend the 

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nation . So thank you , Mr Chairman and 

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thanks to our witnesses , look forward 

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to hearing from . Thank you very much , 

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Senator Worker . Uh We will begin with 

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Secretary Maya . So 

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chairman Reed , ranking member wicker 

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and distinguished members of this 

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committee . Thank you providing the 

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opportunity to testify in the global 

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posture of our nation's Special 

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operations forces or soft . I'm honored 

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to appear alongside General Fenton and 

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General Nakasone . E I could not ask 

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for a better for better teammates in 

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general Fenton and command Sergeant 

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Major Shane . Shorter in ensuring your 

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soft enterprise is prepared to address 

283
00:10:51,017 --> 00:10:53,072
the threats facing the United States 

284
00:10:53,072 --> 00:10:55,239
today and in meeting the challenges to 

285
00:10:55,239 --> 00:10:57,490
come . I start with thanking Congress 

286
00:10:57,490 --> 00:10:59,657
and especially this committee for your 

287
00:10:59,657 --> 00:11:01,768
enduring support of the men and women 

288
00:11:01,768 --> 00:11:03,860
of soft . I am particularly grateful 

289
00:11:03,860 --> 00:11:05,940
for your assistance in building the 

290
00:11:05,940 --> 00:11:07,870
organization . I lead special 

291
00:11:07,870 --> 00:11:10,130
operations and low intensity conflict 

292
00:11:10,130 --> 00:11:12,570
or Solich with dedicated and gifted 

293
00:11:12,580 --> 00:11:15,110
public servants . Sitting before this 

294
00:11:15,110 --> 00:11:17,450
committee last year , I testified we 

295
00:11:17,450 --> 00:11:19,760
were at an inflection point in soft 

296
00:11:19,760 --> 00:11:21,760
transformation to focus more on the 

297
00:11:21,760 --> 00:11:24,250
pacing challenge of China and the acute 

298
00:11:24,250 --> 00:11:26,190
threat posed by Russia while 

299
00:11:26,190 --> 00:11:28,246
maintaining enduring capabilities to 

300
00:11:28,246 --> 00:11:30,468
counter violent extremist organizations 

301
00:11:30,468 --> 00:11:33,130
address Iran's destabilizing behavior 

302
00:11:33,140 --> 00:11:35,760
and conduct no failed crisis response 

303
00:11:35,770 --> 00:11:38,300
around the globe today , in updating 

304
00:11:38,300 --> 00:11:40,467
you on this progress and the work that 

305
00:11:40,467 --> 00:11:42,633
remains , I will highlight three areas 

306
00:11:42,633 --> 00:11:44,856
soft , ongoing transition in support of 

307
00:11:44,856 --> 00:11:46,856
the national defense strategy , the 

308
00:11:46,856 --> 00:11:49,078
development of Solich and our continued 

309
00:11:49,078 --> 00:11:51,189
emphasis on empowering and supporting 

310
00:11:51,189 --> 00:11:53,390
our people . First , we are 

311
00:11:53,390 --> 00:11:55,390
transforming the soft enterprise to 

312
00:11:55,390 --> 00:11:57,620
achieve the goals of the NDS . While 

313
00:11:57,620 --> 00:11:59,564
softs role in counter terrorism is 

314
00:11:59,564 --> 00:12:01,790
widely understood and appreciated . My 

315
00:12:01,790 --> 00:12:03,790
team and I work daily to ensure the 

316
00:12:03,790 --> 00:12:05,660
value proposition of soft and 

317
00:12:05,660 --> 00:12:07,771
integrated deterrence and campaigning 

318
00:12:07,771 --> 00:12:09,604
against strategic competitors is 

319
00:12:09,604 --> 00:12:12,120
accounted for and incorporated into the 

320
00:12:12,120 --> 00:12:15,260
department's processes as it has been 

321
00:12:15,260 --> 00:12:17,427
in every major military challenge this 

322
00:12:17,427 --> 00:12:19,649
nation has confronted . Since world war 

323
00:12:19,649 --> 00:12:21,816
two , your soft will play an essential 

324
00:12:21,816 --> 00:12:24,360
role to start the deep relationship 

325
00:12:24,360 --> 00:12:26,270
soft has forged with allies and 

326
00:12:26,270 --> 00:12:28,326
partners over the last two decades , 

327
00:12:28,326 --> 00:12:30,326
often through shared challenges and 

328
00:12:30,326 --> 00:12:33,130
sacrifice has produced an international 

329
00:12:33,130 --> 00:12:35,850
soft enterprise that provides us unique 

330
00:12:35,860 --> 00:12:37,860
first hand understanding the global 

331
00:12:37,860 --> 00:12:40,110
operating environment . It also has 

332
00:12:40,110 --> 00:12:42,221
enhanced the resilience of our allies 

333
00:12:42,221 --> 00:12:44,221
and partners to resist aggression . 

334
00:12:44,221 --> 00:12:46,650
Second , drawing on the resilience . 

335
00:12:46,660 --> 00:12:48,882
Second , drawing on those relationships 

336
00:12:48,882 --> 00:12:50,938
and our ability to reach some of the 

337
00:12:50,938 --> 00:12:53,160
most difficult locations on the globe . 

338
00:12:53,160 --> 00:12:55,160
Your soft formations provide unique 

339
00:12:55,160 --> 00:12:57,049
access and placement that creates 

340
00:12:57,049 --> 00:12:59,104
options for our nation's leaders and 

341
00:12:59,104 --> 00:13:01,271
soft is adept at creating dilemmas for 

342
00:13:01,271 --> 00:13:03,104
our adversaries . Here . I would 

343
00:13:03,104 --> 00:13:04,882
highlight the many years of our 

344
00:13:04,882 --> 00:13:06,604
investment in transforming the 

345
00:13:06,604 --> 00:13:08,660
Ukrainian forces into highly capable 

346
00:13:08,660 --> 00:13:10,771
force that is consistently performing 

347
00:13:10,771 --> 00:13:12,660
Russia on the battlefield today , 

348
00:13:12,850 --> 00:13:15,072
representing the value that soft brings 

349
00:13:15,072 --> 00:13:17,294
to the joint forces . One of my primary 

350
00:13:17,294 --> 00:13:19,294
responsibilities and we continue to 

351
00:13:19,294 --> 00:13:21,239
make progress , institutionalizing 

352
00:13:21,239 --> 00:13:23,350
selects role as Congress has directed 

353
00:13:23,350 --> 00:13:25,406
through my role , providing civilian 

354
00:13:25,406 --> 00:13:27,572
leadership for the organized train and 

355
00:13:27,572 --> 00:13:29,572
equip of soft . We have established 

356
00:13:29,572 --> 00:13:31,739
over the last year in the department , 

357
00:13:31,739 --> 00:13:33,739
a series of recurring processes and 

358
00:13:33,739 --> 00:13:35,739
delivered key outcomes for the soft 

359
00:13:35,739 --> 00:13:37,906
enterprise . For example , the Special 

360
00:13:37,906 --> 00:13:40,017
Operations Policy Oversight Council , 

361
00:13:40,017 --> 00:13:42,128
which I chair provides a senior level 

362
00:13:42,128 --> 00:13:44,350
forum to address soft unique challenges 

363
00:13:44,350 --> 00:13:46,406
across the department . We also have 

364
00:13:46,406 --> 00:13:48,572
made progress on important initiatives 

365
00:13:48,572 --> 00:13:50,560
to deter our adversaries and fill 

366
00:13:50,560 --> 00:13:52,580
warfighting gaps , especially on a 

367
00:13:52,580 --> 00:13:54,358
regular warfare and information 

368
00:13:54,358 --> 00:13:56,990
operations . I am also proud that solid 

369
00:13:56,990 --> 00:13:58,601
played a central role in the 

370
00:13:58,601 --> 00:14:00,823
department's landmark civilian harm and 

371
00:14:00,823 --> 00:14:02,712
mitigation response action plan . 

372
00:14:03,130 --> 00:14:05,540
Finally , I would emphasize the first 

373
00:14:05,540 --> 00:14:07,840
soft truth remains truer today than 

374
00:14:07,840 --> 00:14:09,951
ever . Humans are more important than 

375
00:14:09,951 --> 00:14:11,896
hardware . None of our efforts are 

376
00:14:11,896 --> 00:14:13,896
possible without our most important 

377
00:14:13,896 --> 00:14:16,170
resource , our people with the strong 

378
00:14:16,170 --> 00:14:18,226
support of Congress , we continue to 

379
00:14:18,226 --> 00:14:20,281
evolve the preservation of the force 

380
00:14:20,281 --> 00:14:22,281
and families or positive program to 

381
00:14:22,281 --> 00:14:24,392
address soft unique challenges and to 

382
00:14:24,392 --> 00:14:26,650
optimize physical , psychological , 

383
00:14:26,650 --> 00:14:29,180
social , spiritual and now cognitive 

384
00:14:29,180 --> 00:14:31,280
performance . We also continue to 

385
00:14:31,280 --> 00:14:33,900
prioritize a diverse capable force by 

386
00:14:33,900 --> 00:14:36,250
removing barriers to participation and 

387
00:14:36,250 --> 00:14:38,300
advancement in soft and operational 

388
00:14:38,300 --> 00:14:40,411
imperative if we are to succeed in an 

389
00:14:40,411 --> 00:14:42,133
ever more complex geopolitical 

390
00:14:42,133 --> 00:14:44,470
environment . Recent publicized 

391
00:14:44,470 --> 00:14:46,359
challenges remind us that we must 

392
00:14:46,359 --> 00:14:48,414
continue to evaluate our approach to 

393
00:14:48,414 --> 00:14:50,526
force employment accountability , and 

394
00:14:50,526 --> 00:14:52,692
most importantly , present and engaged 

395
00:14:52,692 --> 00:14:54,692
leadership , a healthy soft culture 

396
00:14:54,692 --> 00:14:56,748
that reflects our nation's values is 

397
00:14:56,748 --> 00:14:58,880
essential to readiness and core to 

398
00:14:58,880 --> 00:15:01,102
ensuring we remain the most lethal soft 

399
00:15:01,102 --> 00:15:03,324
enterprise . The world has ever known . 

400
00:15:03,330 --> 00:15:05,200
Investing in our people is the 

401
00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:07,780
cornerstone of ensuring your soft are 

402
00:15:07,780 --> 00:15:09,947
ready to take on our nation's toughest 

403
00:15:09,947 --> 00:15:12,169
challenges because it is not a question 

404
00:15:12,169 --> 00:15:14,900
of if but when the call will come . So , 

405
00:15:14,900 --> 00:15:17,011
Mr chairman and distinguished members 

406
00:15:17,011 --> 00:15:19,122
of this committee , I thank you again 

407
00:15:19,122 --> 00:15:21,178
for your partnership and support and 

408
00:15:21,178 --> 00:15:23,511
for this opportunity to testify . Today , 

409
00:15:23,511 --> 00:15:25,456
I look forward to your questions . 

410
00:15:25,456 --> 00:15:27,789
Thank you , Mr Secretary General Fenton . 

411
00:15:27,789 --> 00:15:30,300
Please . Chairman Reed , ranking member 

412
00:15:30,300 --> 00:15:32,467
Wicker . Could you bring that closer ? 

413
00:15:32,467 --> 00:15:34,522
General , the microphone as close as 

414
00:15:34,522 --> 00:15:36,689
possible ? I'll come up closer . Thank 

415
00:15:36,689 --> 00:15:38,744
you . How's this chairman ? Chairman 

416
00:15:38,744 --> 00:15:40,578
Reed , ranking member Wicker and 

417
00:15:40,578 --> 00:15:42,911
distinguished members of this committee ? 

418
00:15:42,911 --> 00:15:45,133
Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

419
00:15:45,133 --> 00:15:47,022
before you today . I'm honored to 

420
00:15:47,022 --> 00:15:49,133
testify alongside the honorable Chris 

421
00:15:49,133 --> 00:15:51,356
Mayer and General Paul Nakasone and I'm 

422
00:15:51,356 --> 00:15:53,578
equally honored to be here on behalf of 

423
00:15:53,578 --> 00:15:55,522
the dedicated men and women of U S 

424
00:15:55,522 --> 00:15:58,630
Special Operations Command . Joining me 

425
00:15:58,630 --> 00:16:00,852
today is Command Sergeant Major , Shane 

426
00:16:00,852 --> 00:16:03,360
Shorter U S SOCOM senior enlisted 

427
00:16:03,360 --> 00:16:05,810
leader , Command Sergeant Major Shorter 

428
00:16:05,810 --> 00:16:07,977
is representative of the incredible us 

429
00:16:07,977 --> 00:16:10,700
SOCOM team , particularly our 

430
00:16:10,700 --> 00:16:13,410
noncommissioned officer corps . Our non 

431
00:16:13,410 --> 00:16:15,577
commissioned officers are the backbone 

432
00:16:15,577 --> 00:16:17,400
of our military and a decisive 

433
00:16:17,400 --> 00:16:19,090
advantage within your special 

434
00:16:19,090 --> 00:16:21,690
operations community and they make us 

435
00:16:21,690 --> 00:16:24,330
the envy of every military around the 

436
00:16:24,330 --> 00:16:27,440
world . We are thankful for the 

437
00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:29,773
leadership and support of this Congress , 

438
00:16:29,773 --> 00:16:31,840
particularly this committee , A 

439
00:16:31,840 --> 00:16:34,080
committee with the legacies of Senators 

440
00:16:34,080 --> 00:16:36,510
Nunn and Cohen who had the vision and 

441
00:16:36,510 --> 00:16:39,080
determination to establish us . Socom 

442
00:16:39,090 --> 00:16:42,550
almost 36 years ago , thank you for 

443
00:16:42,550 --> 00:16:44,920
your decades of steadfast support ever 

444
00:16:44,920 --> 00:16:48,570
since your special operations 

445
00:16:48,570 --> 00:16:51,330
forces remain a national advantage as 

446
00:16:51,330 --> 00:16:53,900
we enter a decisive era , an era where 

447
00:16:53,900 --> 00:16:55,930
the strategic competitors such as 

448
00:16:55,940 --> 00:16:58,990
People's Republic of China and Russia 

449
00:16:59,000 --> 00:17:01,390
seeks to reshape the rules based 

450
00:17:01,390 --> 00:17:04,620
international order and in response 

451
00:17:04,630 --> 00:17:06,780
your special operations forces 

452
00:17:06,790 --> 00:17:08,679
strengthen and sustain deterrence 

453
00:17:08,679 --> 00:17:10,790
globally as part of the Department of 

454
00:17:10,790 --> 00:17:12,810
Defense's approach to integrated 

455
00:17:12,810 --> 00:17:16,070
deterrence with soft 

456
00:17:16,210 --> 00:17:19,370
world war two origins and D N A rooted 

457
00:17:19,370 --> 00:17:22,050
in decades of experience in strategic 

458
00:17:22,050 --> 00:17:25,200
competition . Now , drawing upon our 20 

459
00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:27,780
plus years of hard won combat 

460
00:17:27,780 --> 00:17:30,120
credibility and coalition experience . 

461
00:17:30,130 --> 00:17:33,040
Your soft , provide creative teyla 

462
00:17:33,040 --> 00:17:35,151
rubble and asymmetric options for our 

463
00:17:35,151 --> 00:17:37,960
nation while creating dilemmas for our 

464
00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:40,700
competitors . And as part of the 

465
00:17:40,700 --> 00:17:43,670
broader joint force , we campaign every 

466
00:17:43,670 --> 00:17:46,070
day to deter and prevent aggression . 

467
00:17:46,840 --> 00:17:49,490
Counter coercion closed warfighting 

468
00:17:49,490 --> 00:17:51,990
gaps and tackle share challenges 

469
00:17:51,990 --> 00:17:55,070
alongside allies and partners all in 

470
00:17:55,070 --> 00:17:57,250
support of accelerating the Department 

471
00:17:57,250 --> 00:18:00,470
of Defense's strategic momentum towards 

472
00:18:00,470 --> 00:18:04,280
R N D s objectives . Yet you're soft , 

473
00:18:04,280 --> 00:18:06,447
also remain vigilant in protecting our 

474
00:18:06,447 --> 00:18:08,770
homeland and U S interests from the 

475
00:18:08,770 --> 00:18:11,060
persistent threats posed by global 

476
00:18:11,060 --> 00:18:13,910
terrorist networks . In doing so , 

477
00:18:13,940 --> 00:18:16,250
you're soft work tirelessly alongside a 

478
00:18:16,250 --> 00:18:18,600
trusted network of allies and partners 

479
00:18:19,180 --> 00:18:21,550
U S interagency counterparts and our 

480
00:18:21,550 --> 00:18:24,960
joint force teammates to disrupt V E O 

481
00:18:24,960 --> 00:18:28,490
s wherever they may be . And while we 

482
00:18:28,490 --> 00:18:31,460
campaign for integrated deterrence and 

483
00:18:31,460 --> 00:18:34,570
counter violent extremists , your soft 

484
00:18:34,570 --> 00:18:36,870
capability to respond to crisis 

485
00:18:37,440 --> 00:18:39,920
represent a critical strategic hedge 

486
00:18:39,930 --> 00:18:42,820
and advantage for our nation agile 

487
00:18:42,830 --> 00:18:45,690
tailored modernized and capable . They 

488
00:18:45,690 --> 00:18:47,801
enable us to undertake sensitive high 

489
00:18:47,801 --> 00:18:50,420
risk missions crucial to safeguarding 

490
00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:52,330
and rescuing our citizens and 

491
00:18:52,330 --> 00:18:54,800
protecting vital national interests . 

492
00:18:56,010 --> 00:18:58,240
Foundational to all these efforts 

493
00:18:58,250 --> 00:19:00,417
remains our longstanding collaborative 

494
00:19:00,417 --> 00:19:02,620
partnership with Asd Solar , Chris 

495
00:19:02,620 --> 00:19:05,740
Mayer and his team , the oversight 

496
00:19:05,750 --> 00:19:08,330
policy guidance and advocacy within the 

497
00:19:08,330 --> 00:19:11,490
department provided by S D Solich are 

498
00:19:11,490 --> 00:19:13,720
essential for the modernization 

499
00:19:13,730 --> 00:19:16,600
readiness and well being of our soft 

500
00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:20,310
units and their families . And together 

501
00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:22,640
we are committed to placing people as 

502
00:19:22,640 --> 00:19:24,870
our number one priority and we are 

503
00:19:24,870 --> 00:19:26,981
preparing for the future by investing 

504
00:19:26,981 --> 00:19:29,650
in them and by leveraging our nation's 

505
00:19:29,650 --> 00:19:32,460
diverse talent to solve diverse 

506
00:19:32,460 --> 00:19:35,840
challenges . And to those listening 

507
00:19:35,840 --> 00:19:38,510
today who aren't considering service to 

508
00:19:38,510 --> 00:19:41,160
our nation . No , the profound sense of 

509
00:19:41,160 --> 00:19:44,340
calling and purpose that those of us in 

510
00:19:44,350 --> 00:19:47,390
serving in uniform . Share we know that 

511
00:19:47,390 --> 00:19:49,550
a deeply rewarding journey lies ahead 

512
00:19:49,550 --> 00:19:51,890
for those who choose to join . You will 

513
00:19:51,890 --> 00:19:54,260
be part of an incredible team of men 

514
00:19:54,260 --> 00:19:56,038
and women tackling the toughest 

515
00:19:56,038 --> 00:19:59,330
challenges for our nations . Just 

516
00:19:59,330 --> 00:20:01,274
yesterday , I had the privilege of 

517
00:20:01,274 --> 00:20:03,219
hearing from Colonel retired Paris 

518
00:20:03,219 --> 00:20:06,150
Davis , our nation's most recent medal 

519
00:20:06,150 --> 00:20:09,090
of honor recipient and a green beret at 

520
00:20:09,090 --> 00:20:11,660
yesterday's ceremony to induct him into 

521
00:20:11,660 --> 00:20:13,920
the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes . He 

522
00:20:13,920 --> 00:20:16,700
summed up his military service and time 

523
00:20:16,700 --> 00:20:18,811
with the green beret in three words , 

524
00:20:18,811 --> 00:20:21,370
purpose , opportunity , and pride . 

525
00:20:22,870 --> 00:20:25,037
And as we speak here today , more than 

526
00:20:25,037 --> 00:20:28,090
5000 service members of US socom are 

527
00:20:28,090 --> 00:20:30,900
deployed And they share his sense of 

528
00:20:30,900 --> 00:20:32,750
purpose and pride and they are 

529
00:20:32,750 --> 00:20:34,890
defending our nation and standing 

530
00:20:34,890 --> 00:20:36,946
shoulder to shoulder with allies and 

531
00:20:36,946 --> 00:20:39,080
partners in over 80 countries to make 

532
00:20:39,080 --> 00:20:42,160
our world a safer place , the courage 

533
00:20:42,170 --> 00:20:43,837
and commitment of our special 

534
00:20:43,837 --> 00:20:46,030
operations community . Our military 

535
00:20:46,040 --> 00:20:49,370
inspires the CSM and me daily and we 

536
00:20:49,380 --> 00:20:51,658
are immensely proud to serve with them . 

537
00:20:51,658 --> 00:20:53,602
I look forward to your questions . 

538
00:20:55,840 --> 00:20:58,062
Thank you very much . You know , Fenton 

539
00:20:58,062 --> 00:21:00,010
General , please , Chairman Reed , 

540
00:21:00,020 --> 00:21:01,576
ranking member , wicker and 

541
00:21:01,576 --> 00:21:03,853
distinguished members of the committee . 

542
00:21:03,853 --> 00:21:06,076
I'm honored to testify beside assistant 

543
00:21:06,076 --> 00:21:08,298
Secretary Christopher Mayer and General 

544
00:21:08,298 --> 00:21:10,820
Brian Fenton . Joining me today is 

545
00:21:10,820 --> 00:21:13,530
Commands are Major Cheryl Lion , the U 

546
00:21:13,530 --> 00:21:15,641
S Cyber Command and National Security 

547
00:21:15,641 --> 00:21:17,863
Agency , senior enlisted leader . We're 

548
00:21:17,863 --> 00:21:19,974
honored to represent the military and 

549
00:21:19,974 --> 00:21:22,086
civilian members of U S Cyber Command 

550
00:21:22,920 --> 00:21:25,240
in the contested cyberspace domain U S 

551
00:21:25,240 --> 00:21:27,184
Cyber Command acts against foreign 

552
00:21:27,184 --> 00:21:29,300
adversaries that threaten our nation 

553
00:21:29,310 --> 00:21:31,470
through malicious cyber activity and 

554
00:21:31,470 --> 00:21:34,370
enables action by our federal private 

555
00:21:34,380 --> 00:21:37,310
and allied partners . For instance , a 

556
00:21:37,310 --> 00:21:39,143
combined U S Cyber command essay 

557
00:21:39,143 --> 00:21:41,530
election Security Group countered 

558
00:21:41,530 --> 00:21:43,474
malicious cyber actors and oversaw 

559
00:21:43,474 --> 00:21:45,530
measures to enable the Department of 

560
00:21:45,530 --> 00:21:47,530
Homeland Security and the FBI among 

561
00:21:47,530 --> 00:21:49,641
other domestic partners to defend the 

562
00:21:49,641 --> 00:21:52,360
recent midterm elections . The 2022 

563
00:21:52,360 --> 00:21:55,080
election cycle proceeded from primaries 

564
00:21:55,090 --> 00:21:57,290
to certifications without significant 

565
00:21:57,290 --> 00:22:00,800
impacts due in part to our effort going 

566
00:22:00,800 --> 00:22:03,440
forward success for U S Cyber Command 

567
00:22:03,440 --> 00:22:05,440
will be measured by how effectively 

568
00:22:05,440 --> 00:22:07,162
foreign adversarial actors are 

569
00:22:07,162 --> 00:22:08,884
prevented from achieving their 

570
00:22:08,884 --> 00:22:11,550
strategic objectives . Last year saw 

571
00:22:11,550 --> 00:22:13,740
significant maturation for U S Cyber 

572
00:22:13,740 --> 00:22:15,780
Command but our work is not done 

573
00:22:17,100 --> 00:22:19,360
In 2023 . You must continue to focus on 

574
00:22:19,360 --> 00:22:21,570
our people , our partners and our 

575
00:22:21,570 --> 00:22:24,150
ability to deliver a decisive advantage . 

576
00:22:24,710 --> 00:22:26,932
We must improve readiness , bolster our 

577
00:22:26,932 --> 00:22:28,988
resilience and maintain a culture of 

578
00:22:28,988 --> 00:22:30,860
continuous improvement . We will 

579
00:22:30,860 --> 00:22:32,638
continue to deliver warfighting 

580
00:22:32,638 --> 00:22:34,527
advantage for the joint force and 

581
00:22:34,527 --> 00:22:36,693
partners throughout competition crisis 

582
00:22:36,693 --> 00:22:39,120
and conflict . We are doing so by 

583
00:22:39,120 --> 00:22:41,350
executing our service like authorities 

584
00:22:41,360 --> 00:22:43,690
to build and sustain campaigns in and 

585
00:22:43,690 --> 00:22:45,857
through cyberspace and the information 

586
00:22:45,857 --> 00:22:49,280
environment . Through these efforts , 

587
00:22:49,450 --> 00:22:51,339
we seek to counter adversaries in 

588
00:22:51,339 --> 00:22:54,170
competition to deter conflict and 

589
00:22:54,170 --> 00:22:56,920
prevail against aggression , aligning 

590
00:22:56,920 --> 00:22:59,142
efforts of both U S Cyber Command and N 

591
00:22:59,142 --> 00:23:01,142
S A is essential to achieving these 

592
00:23:01,142 --> 00:23:03,198
goals and is in the best interest of 

593
00:23:03,198 --> 00:23:05,870
the nation and national security . It 

594
00:23:05,870 --> 00:23:07,926
all starts with people , the men and 

595
00:23:07,926 --> 00:23:09,981
women of U S Cyber Command , working 

596
00:23:09,981 --> 00:23:12,314
with N S A and partners here and abroad . 

597
00:23:12,314 --> 00:23:14,481
We win with people . The men and women 

598
00:23:14,481 --> 00:23:16,537
of the United States . Cyber Command 

599
00:23:16,537 --> 00:23:18,592
are grateful for the support of this 

600
00:23:18,592 --> 00:23:20,648
committee and Congress that has been 

601
00:23:20,648 --> 00:23:22,759
given to our command . I look forward 

602
00:23:22,759 --> 00:23:25,092
to your questions . Thank you very much , 

603
00:23:25,092 --> 00:23:27,037
General Marcus Toney . Gentlemen , 

604
00:23:27,037 --> 00:23:29,259
thank you for your testimony . And as I 

605
00:23:29,259 --> 00:23:31,426
indicated in my opening statement , Mr 

606
00:23:31,426 --> 00:23:34,660
Secretary , um we've made progress in 

607
00:23:34,670 --> 00:23:38,610
uh strengthening the SD Solar to act as 

608
00:23:38,610 --> 00:23:42,330
a uh service secretary like 

609
00:23:42,340 --> 00:23:45,480
position regarding SOCOM . Uh but 

610
00:23:45,480 --> 00:23:48,210
there's more to do uh particular 

611
00:23:48,210 --> 00:23:50,660
respect to personnel facilities on the 

612
00:23:50,670 --> 00:23:53,610
aspects of your , your office . Could 

613
00:23:53,610 --> 00:23:55,832
you comment on what more must be done ? 

614
00:23:57,460 --> 00:23:59,620
Thank you , Chairman . And again , I 

615
00:23:59,630 --> 00:24:01,297
would thank this committee in 

616
00:24:01,297 --> 00:24:03,760
particular for the ongoing and very 

617
00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:06,360
consistent support for the ASD solar 

618
00:24:06,370 --> 00:24:08,750
position and indeed my , my staff . So 

619
00:24:08,760 --> 00:24:11,550
uh Mr Chairman , I'd give you a quick 

620
00:24:11,560 --> 00:24:14,600
snapshot to say that I think we have 

621
00:24:14,610 --> 00:24:17,340
established a degree of momentum and a 

622
00:24:17,350 --> 00:24:19,080
bit of irreversibility , which 

623
00:24:19,080 --> 00:24:21,080
certainly wasn't the , the sense of 

624
00:24:21,080 --> 00:24:23,136
things when I first took this role . 

625
00:24:23,136 --> 00:24:25,191
And a lot of that has to do with the 

626
00:24:25,191 --> 00:24:27,413
continued support of Secretary Austin , 

627
00:24:27,413 --> 00:24:29,413
Deputy Secretary Hicks . I think as 

628
00:24:29,413 --> 00:24:31,636
I've testified in this committee before 

629
00:24:31,636 --> 00:24:33,580
the best snapshot , I can give the 

630
00:24:33,580 --> 00:24:35,524
committee is when the secretary of 

631
00:24:35,524 --> 00:24:37,858
Defense convenes as service secretaries , 

632
00:24:37,858 --> 00:24:39,969
it convenes the secretary of the Army 

633
00:24:39,969 --> 00:24:39,290
Secretary of the Air Force and 

634
00:24:39,290 --> 00:24:41,512
Secretary of the Navy . And me as a S D 

635
00:24:41,512 --> 00:24:43,810
solid to ensure that soft voice and 

636
00:24:43,810 --> 00:24:45,950
perspective is in the room To your 

637
00:24:45,950 --> 00:24:48,300
question , Mr Chairman on areas of 

638
00:24:48,300 --> 00:24:50,522
growth , I think we do need to continue 

639
00:24:50,522 --> 00:24:53,650
to add staff . We've added about 20 or 

640
00:24:53,650 --> 00:24:55,980
25 people over the last two years with 

641
00:24:55,980 --> 00:24:58,036
smart from this committee and that's 

642
00:24:58,036 --> 00:25:00,550
against about 50 people currently . So 

643
00:25:00,550 --> 00:25:03,580
it's a very small staff compared to the 

644
00:25:03,580 --> 00:25:05,747
services , even with our , our limited 

645
00:25:05,747 --> 00:25:08,250
authorities relative to them . And then 

646
00:25:08,250 --> 00:25:10,361
I think most importantly , leadership 

647
00:25:10,361 --> 00:25:12,380
billets , we need more ability for 

648
00:25:12,390 --> 00:25:14,750
people in a very hierarchical defense 

649
00:25:14,750 --> 00:25:16,972
department to be able to participate in 

650
00:25:16,972 --> 00:25:18,694
meetings at the right level of 

651
00:25:18,694 --> 00:25:20,750
seniority service . So I'd highlight 

652
00:25:20,750 --> 00:25:22,528
those . Thank you very much for 

653
00:25:22,528 --> 00:25:24,639
Secretary General Fenton . And what's 

654
00:25:24,639 --> 00:25:26,417
the value of SOCOM in having uh 

655
00:25:26,417 --> 00:25:28,583
properly empowered service ? Secretary 

656
00:25:28,583 --> 00:25:31,010
like civilian like uh Secretary , Mayor , 

657
00:25:33,090 --> 00:25:35,257
Senator . Thank you very much for that 

658
00:25:35,257 --> 00:25:37,257
question and I'd say on a couple of 

659
00:25:37,257 --> 00:25:40,650
fronts , very , very , very big value . 

660
00:25:40,660 --> 00:25:43,120
First and foremost , as Secretary Mary 

661
00:25:43,120 --> 00:25:45,231
just mentioned , his ability to be at 

662
00:25:45,231 --> 00:25:47,660
the service , excuse me , secretary 

663
00:25:47,670 --> 00:25:50,460
tables with the SEC def and represent 

664
00:25:50,460 --> 00:25:53,050
issues for the SOCOM team along the 

665
00:25:53,050 --> 00:25:56,880
lines of people education training uh 

666
00:25:56,890 --> 00:26:00,080
in even uh as he mentioned , where soft 

667
00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:02,302
will be and play a big role in terms of 

668
00:26:02,302 --> 00:26:05,210
integrating competition . Excuse me , 

669
00:26:06,060 --> 00:26:08,004
that's extremely important for the 

670
00:26:08,004 --> 00:26:10,680
SOCOM enterprise . I'd say next his 

671
00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:12,402
ability to be with the service 

672
00:26:12,402 --> 00:26:15,120
secretaries and represent issues from 

673
00:26:15,120 --> 00:26:18,360
SOCOM back to the services that we um 

674
00:26:18,370 --> 00:26:20,537
that we take our folks in from is very 

675
00:26:20,537 --> 00:26:22,426
important for us . And we're very 

676
00:26:22,426 --> 00:26:24,510
grateful for that and certainly his 

677
00:26:25,060 --> 00:26:27,730
direction uh in , in many ways 

678
00:26:27,740 --> 00:26:29,851
throughout the department in terms of 

679
00:26:29,851 --> 00:26:33,280
how SOCOM views uh not only integrated 

680
00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:35,580
terms but crisis response and counter 

681
00:26:35,590 --> 00:26:38,810
uh counter terrorism has been welcome 

682
00:26:38,810 --> 00:26:40,990
guidance for me . So I'm very grateful 

683
00:26:40,990 --> 00:26:43,212
to have a service secretary , as I told 

684
00:26:43,212 --> 00:26:45,379
you , I think chairman , when I was at 

685
00:26:45,379 --> 00:26:47,212
confirmation , I look forward to 

686
00:26:47,212 --> 00:26:49,546
testifying next to my service secretary . 

687
00:26:49,760 --> 00:26:51,980
Thank you very much , General General 

688
00:26:51,980 --> 00:26:55,020
Marcus Sony . The issue of readiness 

689
00:26:55,020 --> 00:26:57,187
with cyber mission force is has been a 

690
00:26:57,187 --> 00:26:59,409
persistent issue we've discussed at the 

691
00:26:59,409 --> 00:27:01,640
committee of numerous times . Uh The 

692
00:27:01,650 --> 00:27:03,770
Cyber Mission Forces play a very key 

693
00:27:03,770 --> 00:27:06,130
role and they have very demanding task . 

694
00:27:06,140 --> 00:27:08,180
They require personnel with special 

695
00:27:08,180 --> 00:27:11,060
aptitude training and experience . And 

696
00:27:11,060 --> 00:27:13,116
one of the ironies of course is when 

697
00:27:13,116 --> 00:27:15,340
you develop such a person , he or she 

698
00:27:15,340 --> 00:27:17,340
becomes very attractive for outside 

699
00:27:17,340 --> 00:27:19,340
employers . So you have a retention 

700
00:27:19,340 --> 00:27:21,960
problem as well as other problems . And 

701
00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:24,016
in some cases in the past , has been 

702
00:27:24,016 --> 00:27:26,016
indicated that the services are not 

703
00:27:26,016 --> 00:27:29,160
providing you the skilled and trained 

704
00:27:29,160 --> 00:27:32,650
individuals you need uh which does not 

705
00:27:33,120 --> 00:27:35,840
provide you with the maximum possible 

706
00:27:35,850 --> 00:27:37,930
use . So could you comment on the 

707
00:27:37,930 --> 00:27:39,930
President's sort of situation with 

708
00:27:39,930 --> 00:27:41,930
respect to cyber mission forces and 

709
00:27:41,930 --> 00:27:44,280
also any steps that we should be taken 

710
00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:47,030
to improve their readiness chairman . 

711
00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:49,151
As we take a look at the readiness of 

712
00:27:49,151 --> 00:27:51,800
100 and 33 teams really comes down to 

713
00:27:51,810 --> 00:27:53,977
three hours . It's the readiness piece 

714
00:27:53,977 --> 00:27:55,643
of it . Uh I'm sorry , it's a 

715
00:27:55,643 --> 00:27:57,866
recruiting piece of , it's the training 

716
00:27:57,866 --> 00:28:00,032
piece of it and it's a retention piece 

717
00:28:00,032 --> 00:28:02,088
of it . And so when you look at that 

718
00:28:02,088 --> 00:28:04,254
where I see this right now is the fact 

719
00:28:04,254 --> 00:28:06,421
that the services have done a good job 

720
00:28:06,421 --> 00:28:08,477
of recruiting the forces that I need 

721
00:28:08,477 --> 00:28:10,532
assigning the numbers are one of the 

722
00:28:10,532 --> 00:28:10,310
things that we're working with right 

723
00:28:10,310 --> 00:28:12,366
now to make sure that we have all of 

724
00:28:12,366 --> 00:28:14,477
the folks that we need . We've worked 

725
00:28:14,477 --> 00:28:16,699
very , very hard to get the training to 

726
00:28:16,699 --> 00:28:18,699
a very simple and predictable level 

727
00:28:18,699 --> 00:28:20,810
that continues to improve . The other 

728
00:28:20,810 --> 00:28:23,032
piece that we need to work hand in hand 

729
00:28:23,032 --> 00:28:22,920
with the services is the retention 

730
00:28:22,920 --> 00:28:24,698
piece which you highlighted the 

731
00:28:24,698 --> 00:28:26,920
challenge of someone that has this type 

732
00:28:26,920 --> 00:28:29,031
of training is very , very attractive 

733
00:28:29,031 --> 00:28:31,031
to the outside . But several of the 

734
00:28:31,031 --> 00:28:33,253
services the marines included have made 

735
00:28:33,253 --> 00:28:35,364
tremendous progress in this and being 

736
00:28:35,364 --> 00:28:37,420
able to focus their marines on doing 

737
00:28:37,420 --> 00:28:39,642
what these marines wanted to do , which 

738
00:28:39,642 --> 00:28:41,753
is cyber operations and being able to 

739
00:28:41,753 --> 00:28:43,920
stay within our force for long periods 

740
00:28:43,920 --> 00:28:46,142
of time . We see a reflective retention 

741
00:28:46,142 --> 00:28:48,309
rate that's much higher . Well , thank 

742
00:28:48,309 --> 00:28:50,309
you very much , gentlemen . Again , 

743
00:28:50,309 --> 00:28:52,420
thank you for your testimony . Let me 

744
00:28:52,420 --> 00:28:54,587
recognize Senator Worker . Thank you . 

745
00:28:54,587 --> 00:28:57,380
First question . To General Fenton . Um 

746
00:28:57,510 --> 00:29:01,260
and this is about the naval small craft 

747
00:29:01,270 --> 00:29:03,214
instruction and technical training 

748
00:29:03,214 --> 00:29:06,220
school . NAV C yachts which provides 

749
00:29:06,220 --> 00:29:08,220
training to foreign forces on small 

750
00:29:08,220 --> 00:29:10,900
boat operations and unmanned aerial 

751
00:29:10,910 --> 00:29:14,000
systems . The annual operating cost is 

752
00:29:14,010 --> 00:29:17,450
um $14.8 million and that is divided 

753
00:29:17,450 --> 00:29:19,880
across multiple stakeholders including 

754
00:29:19,880 --> 00:29:22,820
the Navy , so calm and our foreign 

755
00:29:22,830 --> 00:29:26,580
partners . Um So General General 

756
00:29:26,580 --> 00:29:28,910
Flynn , let me ask you . Um 

757
00:29:30,570 --> 00:29:32,737
do you agree with General Richardson , 

758
00:29:32,737 --> 00:29:34,959
the commander of South com who said the 

759
00:29:34,959 --> 00:29:38,250
school generates outside return on 

760
00:29:38,250 --> 00:29:41,130
investments ? The Ukrainian troops were 

761
00:29:41,130 --> 00:29:43,640
being trained there last year when 

762
00:29:43,650 --> 00:29:46,610
President Putin launched his unprovoked 

763
00:29:46,610 --> 00:29:49,190
and illegal attacks on their country . 

764
00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:52,760
Do you agree sir ? That provides 

765
00:29:52,760 --> 00:29:55,600
value to our combatant commanders and 

766
00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:57,378
key foreign military partners . 

767
00:29:59,860 --> 00:30:02,082
Senator . Thank you for that question . 

768
00:30:02,082 --> 00:30:04,580
I I'm I am absolutely familiar with uh 

769
00:30:04,590 --> 00:30:07,480
this Nevsky outs as you uh as you refer 

770
00:30:07,480 --> 00:30:10,070
to . I was more familiar with it when I 

771
00:30:10,070 --> 00:30:13,100
was in Indo as the deputy commander and 

772
00:30:13,100 --> 00:30:15,230
there I saw value in that type of 

773
00:30:15,230 --> 00:30:17,850
training . Um and I will say in many 

774
00:30:17,860 --> 00:30:19,916
types of training certainly . And we 

775
00:30:19,916 --> 00:30:21,971
thank this committee for a number of 

776
00:30:21,971 --> 00:30:24,040
efforts at SOCOM has his disposal in 

777
00:30:24,040 --> 00:30:27,470
terms of triple 3 , 12 02 and 1 27 echo 

778
00:30:27,480 --> 00:30:30,350
that increase the capability of of uh 

779
00:30:30,360 --> 00:30:32,660
of our forces and create partnerships 

780
00:30:32,810 --> 00:30:34,700
in the way that we need those 

781
00:30:34,700 --> 00:30:36,922
partnerships . And in so come , we call 

782
00:30:36,922 --> 00:30:38,922
those partnerships basing items and 

783
00:30:38,922 --> 00:30:42,470
$14.8 million is a relatively 

784
00:30:42,470 --> 00:30:44,660
modest investment . Would you agree ? 

785
00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:48,720
Senator , I'm not familiar with the 

786
00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:50,831
budget . I am familiar again with the 

787
00:30:50,831 --> 00:30:53,040
type of training that Nevsky as 

788
00:30:53,040 --> 00:30:55,500
produces . Okay . So we've established 

789
00:30:55,500 --> 00:30:57,333
that there is value there . So I 

790
00:30:57,333 --> 00:30:59,860
appreciate that . Let me turn into 

791
00:30:59,860 --> 00:31:03,300
General Nakasone . Um , tell us about , 

792
00:31:03,310 --> 00:31:07,030
um , cyber in support 

793
00:31:07,040 --> 00:31:11,000
of our Ukrainian allies and the then 

794
00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:14,900
the Russian use of cyber in , uh , 

795
00:31:14,910 --> 00:31:17,540
in support of their illegal um , and 

796
00:31:17,540 --> 00:31:20,500
aggressive invasion of Ukraine . 

797
00:31:22,230 --> 00:31:24,452
Senator . The story begins on the third 

798
00:31:24,452 --> 00:31:27,000
of December 2021 when we deployed a 

799
00:31:27,000 --> 00:31:29,600
hunt forward team to keep , uh that 

800
00:31:29,610 --> 00:31:32,610
began a 70 day journey for us to ensure 

801
00:31:32,610 --> 00:31:35,010
that Ukraine was at a much higher state 

802
00:31:35,010 --> 00:31:37,440
of cyber readiness . As you know , we 

803
00:31:37,440 --> 00:31:40,900
saw early attacks on uh specific 

804
00:31:40,900 --> 00:31:42,850
Ukrainian sites with within their 

805
00:31:42,850 --> 00:31:45,040
government . And we also saw uh 

806
00:31:45,050 --> 00:31:47,290
continued attacks as the , as the 

807
00:31:47,290 --> 00:31:49,512
invasion approached , what we were able 

808
00:31:49,512 --> 00:31:51,679
to do during that time was work with a 

809
00:31:51,679 --> 00:31:54,340
series of partners to bring the tools 

810
00:31:54,340 --> 00:31:56,562
and technology to Ukraine that was able 

811
00:31:56,562 --> 00:31:59,330
to assist them . As Russia conducted 

812
00:31:59,330 --> 00:32:01,900
continued attacks . We continue today 

813
00:32:01,900 --> 00:32:04,011
with support to a number of different 

814
00:32:04,011 --> 00:32:06,178
combatant commands us European command 

815
00:32:06,178 --> 00:32:08,300
on the training mission for uh for 

816
00:32:08,300 --> 00:32:10,900
Ukraine also to U S Strategic Command . 

817
00:32:10,900 --> 00:32:13,330
As we take a look at ensuring that our 

818
00:32:13,340 --> 00:32:15,562
N C three network , our nuclear command 

819
00:32:15,562 --> 00:32:17,729
and control and communications network 

820
00:32:17,729 --> 00:32:19,840
is the top and most important network 

821
00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:22,460
and is fully secure as we move forward , 

822
00:32:22,460 --> 00:32:24,720
we continue full spectrum operations 

823
00:32:24,730 --> 00:32:26,786
with a series of partners to include 

824
00:32:26,786 --> 00:32:28,920
Ukraine to provide them assistance as 

825
00:32:28,920 --> 00:32:31,690
they battle the Russians . Um Well , 

826
00:32:31,700 --> 00:32:34,610
okay . Do you , do you expect 

827
00:32:35,180 --> 00:32:38,700
Russia is able to intensify 

828
00:32:38,710 --> 00:32:42,310
new capabilities in , in a 

829
00:32:42,310 --> 00:32:45,050
spring offensive this year ? From the 

830
00:32:45,050 --> 00:32:47,272
cyber perspective , we're watching this 

831
00:32:47,272 --> 00:32:49,272
very carefully , Senator , they are 

832
00:32:49,272 --> 00:32:51,494
very capable adversary . We continue to 

833
00:32:51,494 --> 00:32:54,870
work very , very tightly with our other 

834
00:32:54,870 --> 00:32:56,870
partners within the US . Government 

835
00:32:56,870 --> 00:32:58,870
says the FBI to ensure that the U S 

836
00:32:58,870 --> 00:33:00,926
critical infrastructure is protected 

837
00:33:00,926 --> 00:33:02,870
and NATO in general to ensure that 

838
00:33:02,870 --> 00:33:04,926
they're aware of the tradecraft that 

839
00:33:04,926 --> 00:33:06,703
the Russians might use . Okay , 

840
00:33:06,703 --> 00:33:08,814
Secretary Mayor . Um What more do you 

841
00:33:08,814 --> 00:33:11,190
need ? Um You were asked and you said 

842
00:33:11,190 --> 00:33:13,412
you need to add staff and then you need 

843
00:33:13,412 --> 00:33:16,320
uh more attention to the leadership 

844
00:33:16,330 --> 00:33:20,220
billets . Um Do you , do you have what 

845
00:33:20,220 --> 00:33:22,830
you need in terms of funding right now 

846
00:33:22,840 --> 00:33:25,500
to do this and to deal with your 

847
00:33:25,500 --> 00:33:28,180
enormous challenges ? Um 

848
00:33:28,700 --> 00:33:32,570
And if we , if we give you um 

849
00:33:33,080 --> 00:33:37,020
and the same amount you got um this , 

850
00:33:37,030 --> 00:33:39,600
this fiscal year with an inflation 

851
00:33:39,600 --> 00:33:43,510
adjustment , will that be enough ? So 

852
00:33:43,520 --> 00:33:45,800
ready member ? Speaking , just to my 

853
00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:48,940
specific office , I think we are 

854
00:33:48,940 --> 00:33:50,940
probably on a good path way just in 

855
00:33:50,940 --> 00:33:52,996
terms of funding already highlighted 

856
00:33:52,996 --> 00:33:55,218
some of the other requirements in terms 

857
00:33:55,218 --> 00:33:57,051
of the entire Special operations 

858
00:33:57,051 --> 00:33:59,540
enterprise . I think our priorities are 

859
00:33:59,540 --> 00:34:02,270
represented understanding full well 

860
00:34:02,270 --> 00:34:04,690
that the challenge with inflation means 

861
00:34:04,690 --> 00:34:06,900
that if our budget is flat , that 

862
00:34:06,910 --> 00:34:08,966
reduces our buying power . So that's 

863
00:34:08,966 --> 00:34:11,132
something we'll , we'll need to keep a 

864
00:34:11,132 --> 00:34:13,243
close eye on , sir . And yet you need 

865
00:34:13,243 --> 00:34:15,140
additional staff and you need um 

866
00:34:15,150 --> 00:34:17,280
increased leadership village . Yes , 

867
00:34:17,280 --> 00:34:19,113
sir . So I think we're on a good 

868
00:34:19,113 --> 00:34:21,280
trajectory with the leadership billets 

869
00:34:21,280 --> 00:34:23,391
were part of that conversation in the 

870
00:34:23,391 --> 00:34:25,558
department . I think especially in out 

871
00:34:25,558 --> 00:34:27,613
years , we're gonna need to add more 

872
00:34:27,613 --> 00:34:29,502
staff to build that capability to 

873
00:34:29,502 --> 00:34:31,613
really help this this transition I've 

874
00:34:31,613 --> 00:34:33,780
described from counterterrorism crisis 

875
00:34:33,780 --> 00:34:35,669
response to also include the peer 

876
00:34:35,669 --> 00:34:37,800
competition that we've talked about . 

877
00:34:37,800 --> 00:34:39,856
And I expect we'll talk about more , 

878
00:34:39,856 --> 00:34:41,967
sir . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank 

879
00:34:41,967 --> 00:34:44,189
you , Senator Worker , Senator Greene , 

880
00:34:44,189 --> 00:34:46,189
please . Um Thank you gentlemen for 

881
00:34:46,189 --> 00:34:48,022
being here this morning for your 

882
00:34:48,022 --> 00:34:50,133
testimony and for your service to the 

883
00:34:50,133 --> 00:34:52,189
country . I think I would start this 

884
00:34:52,189 --> 00:34:54,189
question with you , Secretary Mayor 

885
00:34:54,189 --> 00:34:56,300
because so common cyber com really at 

886
00:34:56,300 --> 00:35:00,040
the nexus of D O D s efforts to address 

887
00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:01,984
the weaponization of information , 

888
00:35:02,250 --> 00:35:04,730
which I think has become as much an 

889
00:35:04,730 --> 00:35:07,390
issue for us as we're looking at our 

890
00:35:07,390 --> 00:35:09,390
ability to be successful around the 

891
00:35:09,390 --> 00:35:13,220
world as our military capability . So 

892
00:35:13,230 --> 00:35:16,860
can you Secretary Mayor , talk about D 

893
00:35:16,860 --> 00:35:20,270
O D s role in addressing that 

894
00:35:20,280 --> 00:35:24,050
misinformation and how D O D 

895
00:35:24,050 --> 00:35:27,440
coordinates with other um agencies and 

896
00:35:27,440 --> 00:35:29,780
departments within government to 

897
00:35:29,780 --> 00:35:32,600
address disinformation ? Yeah . Thank 

898
00:35:32,600 --> 00:35:34,878
you for the question , Senator Shaheen . 

899
00:35:34,878 --> 00:35:36,830
So I would broadly start with 

900
00:35:36,830 --> 00:35:39,830
describing D U D information as rooted 

901
00:35:39,830 --> 00:35:43,220
in military objectives So as we talk 

902
00:35:43,220 --> 00:35:45,164
about how this fits into the inter 

903
00:35:45,164 --> 00:35:47,331
agency , we have a distinct role and a 

904
00:35:47,331 --> 00:35:49,260
value to play but not for broad 

905
00:35:49,260 --> 00:35:51,390
messaging , not for all the work that 

906
00:35:51,390 --> 00:35:53,557
say the state department or some other 

907
00:35:53,557 --> 00:35:56,610
entities would do . And I think we have 

908
00:35:56,610 --> 00:35:59,140
looked at significant components of the 

909
00:35:59,140 --> 00:36:01,410
information operations , enterprise and 

910
00:36:01,410 --> 00:36:03,740
really tried to tighten and target it 

911
00:36:03,740 --> 00:36:05,962
more . So the value proposition and the 

912
00:36:05,962 --> 00:36:08,073
measures of effectiveness are there . 

913
00:36:08,073 --> 00:36:10,296
This is really a journey we're on . And 

914
00:36:10,296 --> 00:36:12,518
I think it's one that the leadership of 

915
00:36:12,518 --> 00:36:14,629
the department is very , very focused 

916
00:36:14,629 --> 00:36:16,851
on . So I would leave you with the idea 

917
00:36:16,851 --> 00:36:19,073
that this is much more of a priority in 

918
00:36:19,073 --> 00:36:21,129
the context of integrated deterrence 

919
00:36:21,129 --> 00:36:20,860
that the national defense strategy 

920
00:36:20,860 --> 00:36:22,860
calls out because information is so 

921
00:36:22,860 --> 00:36:25,260
critical as you said to all the aspects 

922
00:36:25,260 --> 00:36:27,427
of success , especially as we start to 

923
00:36:27,427 --> 00:36:29,593
think about adversaries , we're trying 

924
00:36:29,593 --> 00:36:32,050
to determine . So as you think about 

925
00:36:32,060 --> 00:36:35,900
our efforts to recognizing you're 

926
00:36:35,900 --> 00:36:37,900
saying that we're trying to be more 

927
00:36:37,900 --> 00:36:40,067
focused and how we address information 

928
00:36:40,067 --> 00:36:43,750
at D O D , but clearly what happens at 

929
00:36:43,750 --> 00:36:47,580
state and , and other government 

930
00:36:47,580 --> 00:36:50,070
agencies affects what D O D does ? So , 

931
00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:52,700
are their policy changes ? Are there 

932
00:36:52,700 --> 00:36:55,300
resources , is their coordination that 

933
00:36:55,300 --> 00:36:58,220
should be done that um we should be 

934
00:36:58,220 --> 00:37:00,500
thinking about and , and I would ask 

935
00:37:00,500 --> 00:37:02,680
General Fenton and Sony to respond to 

936
00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:05,830
that as well . Briefly , man , ma'am , 

937
00:37:05,830 --> 00:37:08,630
I think we need to invest more in the D 

938
00:37:08,630 --> 00:37:11,180
O D Information Operations , Enterprise . 

939
00:37:11,180 --> 00:37:13,540
It's not been one that has frequently 

940
00:37:13,540 --> 00:37:17,180
been a focus frankly . And I think with 

941
00:37:17,180 --> 00:37:19,291
more capability , the department will 

942
00:37:19,291 --> 00:37:21,347
enhance our ability to coordinate an 

943
00:37:21,347 --> 00:37:23,458
interagency standpoint . That's still 

944
00:37:23,458 --> 00:37:25,624
very much a work in progress . Ma'am , 

945
00:37:25,624 --> 00:37:29,500
General Flynn , Senator , I would uh 

946
00:37:30,210 --> 00:37:32,790
echo all of Secretary Mayor's comments . 

947
00:37:32,790 --> 00:37:35,700
And then I add that the integrated 

948
00:37:35,700 --> 00:37:37,644
deterrence approach , I think does 

949
00:37:37,644 --> 00:37:39,756
demand a whole of government approach 

950
00:37:39,756 --> 00:37:41,922
and information operations . Uh and so 

951
00:37:41,922 --> 00:37:44,144
come is one part of that the department 

952
00:37:44,144 --> 00:37:46,089
side . But we also coordinate with 

953
00:37:46,089 --> 00:37:48,089
other agencies of the government to 

954
00:37:48,089 --> 00:37:51,780
ensure that uh were integrated . 

955
00:37:51,790 --> 00:37:54,430
And that folks know that the socom 

956
00:37:54,430 --> 00:37:56,652
pieces of traditional military activity 

957
00:37:56,652 --> 00:37:59,110
uh information operation space as I as 

958
00:37:59,110 --> 00:38:00,777
I like to say is a place , we 

959
00:38:00,777 --> 00:38:02,721
absolutely have to be as part of a 

960
00:38:02,721 --> 00:38:04,499
military , traditional military 

961
00:38:04,499 --> 00:38:06,410
activity and to get effects for 

962
00:38:06,410 --> 00:38:08,570
commanders either to message and 

963
00:38:08,570 --> 00:38:12,050
adversary uh to see misinformation and 

964
00:38:12,050 --> 00:38:13,994
provide that to a host nation . So 

965
00:38:13,994 --> 00:38:16,750
center , I I think our key uh message 

966
00:38:16,750 --> 00:38:18,861
to the so called enterprise , we move 

967
00:38:18,861 --> 00:38:21,270
forward is we remain aligned with the 

968
00:38:21,270 --> 00:38:23,381
department . And certainly as part of 

969
00:38:23,381 --> 00:38:25,548
the whole government approach , it's a 

970
00:38:25,548 --> 00:38:27,214
key part for us and our state 

971
00:38:27,214 --> 00:38:29,381
colleagues and other colleagues in the 

972
00:38:29,381 --> 00:38:29,250
U S government are very important as we 

973
00:38:29,250 --> 00:38:32,770
do that senator begins overseas 

974
00:38:32,780 --> 00:38:34,891
were very familiar on how to do these 

975
00:38:34,891 --> 00:38:36,780
operations . We've seen it in the 

976
00:38:36,780 --> 00:38:38,891
elections . We've seen it with Russia 

977
00:38:38,891 --> 00:38:41,002
Ukraine , we've seen it with Iran the 

978
00:38:41,002 --> 00:38:42,947
same actors that are interfering , 

979
00:38:42,947 --> 00:38:42,760
interfering in our elections are the 

980
00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:44,538
same actors are doing influence 

981
00:38:44,538 --> 00:38:46,760
operations . We go after them . This is 

982
00:38:46,760 --> 00:38:48,982
what , you know , persistent engagement 

983
00:38:48,982 --> 00:38:50,816
is for U S Cyber Command and the 

984
00:38:50,816 --> 00:38:53,038
National Security Agency , we find them 

985
00:38:53,038 --> 00:38:54,927
and we continue to ensure that we 

986
00:38:54,927 --> 00:38:57,149
understand exactly what they're doing . 

987
00:38:57,149 --> 00:38:59,371
We examine their tradecraft and then we 

988
00:38:59,371 --> 00:38:59,180
share it with a series of different 

989
00:38:59,180 --> 00:39:00,900
partners . This is only done 

990
00:39:00,900 --> 00:39:03,060
effectively as both the Secretary and 

991
00:39:03,060 --> 00:39:05,171
General Fenton have indicated is with 

992
00:39:05,171 --> 00:39:07,449
partners . So inside the United States , 

993
00:39:07,449 --> 00:39:09,449
sharing signatures with the FBI who 

994
00:39:09,449 --> 00:39:11,782
share it with um social media companies , 

995
00:39:11,782 --> 00:39:14,004
being able to work with allied partners 

996
00:39:14,004 --> 00:39:16,171
who have a broader understanding . But 

997
00:39:16,171 --> 00:39:18,449
then I think it's also with , you know , 

998
00:39:18,449 --> 00:39:20,504
how do you bring the totality of our 

999
00:39:20,504 --> 00:39:20,490
government against them ? Whether it's 

1000
00:39:20,490 --> 00:39:22,930
State Department Treasury FBI being 

1001
00:39:22,940 --> 00:39:25,051
able to go after them ? The one thing 

1002
00:39:25,051 --> 00:39:27,273
we've learned though in this is that uh 

1003
00:39:27,273 --> 00:39:29,273
they never go away , they're always 

1004
00:39:29,273 --> 00:39:31,051
there and you always have to be 

1005
00:39:31,051 --> 00:39:33,830
persistent . So the fiscal year 20 N D 

1006
00:39:33,830 --> 00:39:36,540
A um tried to better focus the 

1007
00:39:36,540 --> 00:39:38,540
department's efforts on information 

1008
00:39:38,540 --> 00:39:40,262
operations and established the 

1009
00:39:40,262 --> 00:39:42,096
principle information operations 

1010
00:39:42,096 --> 00:39:45,360
advisor and um asked the Secretary of 

1011
00:39:45,360 --> 00:39:47,810
Defense to conduct information 

1012
00:39:47,810 --> 00:39:49,990
operations and required a strategy and 

1013
00:39:49,990 --> 00:39:52,212
posture review that was due more than a 

1014
00:39:52,212 --> 00:39:53,990
year ago . It still hasn't been 

1015
00:39:53,990 --> 00:39:56,101
delivered by the department . Can you 

1016
00:39:56,101 --> 00:39:58,268
tell us what the status of that report 

1017
00:39:58,268 --> 00:40:00,590
is ? Secretary Mayor ? And when we 

1018
00:40:00,590 --> 00:40:04,390
could expect delivery senator . Yes , 

1019
00:40:04,400 --> 00:40:07,230
we understand both the strategy and the 

1020
00:40:07,230 --> 00:40:09,397
posture review are overdue . They both 

1021
00:40:09,397 --> 00:40:11,563
are now in senior level coordination . 

1022
00:40:11,563 --> 00:40:13,674
So above my level , they pass through 

1023
00:40:13,674 --> 00:40:16,090
my um my review . So I would expect in 

1024
00:40:16,090 --> 00:40:18,257
a matter of weeks , they would come to 

1025
00:40:18,257 --> 00:40:19,757
you . Um I would say , and 

1026
00:40:19,757 --> 00:40:22,240
understanding the times out uh that 

1027
00:40:22,250 --> 00:40:24,361
these have helped to animate a lot of 

1028
00:40:24,361 --> 00:40:26,528
the conversations indeed action within 

1029
00:40:26,528 --> 00:40:28,750
the department to really focus down and 

1030
00:40:28,750 --> 00:40:30,861
in on posture . And then the strategy 

1031
00:40:30,861 --> 00:40:32,861
has prompted a re look at how we go 

1032
00:40:32,861 --> 00:40:35,028
about doing information operations per 

1033
00:40:35,028 --> 00:40:37,083
your your opening question , ma'am . 

1034
00:40:37,083 --> 00:40:39,306
Thank you . So I should assume we would 

1035
00:40:39,306 --> 00:40:41,306
have it by maybe the end of April . 

1036
00:40:41,480 --> 00:40:43,424
That is our intent . Yes , ma'am . 

1037
00:40:43,424 --> 00:40:45,536
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 

1038
00:40:45,536 --> 00:40:47,758
Thank you , Senator Hanson and Fisher , 

1039
00:40:47,758 --> 00:40:49,591
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman 

1040
00:40:49,591 --> 00:40:51,591
General Fenton . In your nomination 

1041
00:40:51,591 --> 00:40:53,591
hearing last year , you agreed with 

1042
00:40:53,591 --> 00:40:55,702
your predecessor , General Clark that 

1043
00:40:55,702 --> 00:40:57,813
without sustained ct pressure , we're 

1044
00:40:57,813 --> 00:40:59,758
going to continue to see terrorist 

1045
00:40:59,758 --> 00:41:01,869
groups that are more able to focus on 

1046
00:41:01,869 --> 00:41:04,570
planning and preparing for external 

1047
00:41:04,570 --> 00:41:06,737
attacks . Do you still agree with that 

1048
00:41:06,737 --> 00:41:09,730
statement ? Senator , I absolutely 

1049
00:41:09,730 --> 00:41:11,952
agree with that statement and there's a 

1050
00:41:11,952 --> 00:41:14,120
direction to the SOCOM team from the 

1051
00:41:14,120 --> 00:41:16,176
Secretary of Defense to have that as 

1052
00:41:16,176 --> 00:41:18,120
one of our three main priorities , 

1053
00:41:18,120 --> 00:41:19,842
integrate deterrence , counter 

1054
00:41:19,842 --> 00:41:21,731
terrorism , counter vo and crisis 

1055
00:41:21,731 --> 00:41:25,640
response . I remain highly concerned 

1056
00:41:25,650 --> 00:41:28,190
that we aren't seen sustained C T 

1057
00:41:28,190 --> 00:41:30,670
pressure that we need in Afghanistan , 

1058
00:41:30,670 --> 00:41:34,000
especially with respect to Isis K . And 

1059
00:41:34,000 --> 00:41:37,130
it's my understanding that we have only 

1060
00:41:37,140 --> 00:41:40,280
had one single strike in over a 

1061
00:41:40,280 --> 00:41:42,930
year . I don't believe that that 

1062
00:41:42,940 --> 00:41:46,570
translates into sustained C T pressure 

1063
00:41:46,570 --> 00:41:50,560
against Isis K . Can you describe the 

1064
00:41:50,560 --> 00:41:54,010
challenges of conducting the over the 

1065
00:41:54,010 --> 00:41:57,270
horizon ct operations without the 

1066
00:41:57,270 --> 00:42:00,160
reliable partners on the ground without 

1067
00:42:00,170 --> 00:42:02,860
basing in neighboring countries and 

1068
00:42:02,860 --> 00:42:06,010
without reliable access to airspace ? 

1069
00:42:07,380 --> 00:42:09,380
Senator ? Thank you . Thank you for 

1070
00:42:09,380 --> 00:42:11,800
that and the opportunity to comment on 

1071
00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:14,640
the first portion of that reference 

1072
00:42:14,640 --> 00:42:17,020
Afghanistan . Um I would defer 

1073
00:42:17,030 --> 00:42:19,470
certainly general corella his team that 

1074
00:42:19,470 --> 00:42:21,500
have a more fulsome insight with a 

1075
00:42:21,500 --> 00:42:23,667
series of partners that , that I would 

1076
00:42:23,667 --> 00:42:26,300
have an additional challenges . Um and 

1077
00:42:26,310 --> 00:42:28,199
so calm being one part of a whole 

1078
00:42:28,199 --> 00:42:30,254
government team , I'm sure there are 

1079
00:42:30,254 --> 00:42:32,540
many others that would give you uh 

1080
00:42:32,550 --> 00:42:34,760
different insights and more probably 

1081
00:42:34,760 --> 00:42:36,890
some more fulsome data . But what 

1082
00:42:36,900 --> 00:42:39,220
insights do your insights sir , differ 

1083
00:42:39,220 --> 00:42:41,331
with some of theirs that they've made 

1084
00:42:41,331 --> 00:42:43,331
to this committee . Know what , but 

1085
00:42:43,331 --> 00:42:45,553
what I would tell you , Senator is that 

1086
00:42:45,553 --> 00:42:47,720
part of addressing Isis in Afghanistan 

1087
00:42:47,720 --> 00:42:49,887
is addressing it globally . And when I 

1088
00:42:49,887 --> 00:42:51,887
look at that question , I certainly 

1089
00:42:51,887 --> 00:42:53,942
view it through the sectors priority 

1090
00:42:53,942 --> 00:42:55,998
and for us defend the nation . And I 

1091
00:42:55,998 --> 00:42:58,109
think counterterrorism and V E , oh , 

1092
00:42:58,109 --> 00:43:00,331
it's a very high priority for SOCOM and 

1093
00:43:00,331 --> 00:43:02,220
as we , as we think about it , we 

1094
00:43:02,220 --> 00:43:04,387
certainly first and foremost know that 

1095
00:43:04,387 --> 00:43:06,553
you're special operations command team 

1096
00:43:06,553 --> 00:43:08,664
in partnership with Coke . Um because 

1097
00:43:08,664 --> 00:43:10,998
ISIS is a global organization can sense , 

1098
00:43:10,998 --> 00:43:13,164
see and strike anywhere in the globe . 

1099
00:43:13,164 --> 00:43:15,600
And in essence , many of our operations 

1100
00:43:15,600 --> 00:43:17,920
are places where we're not proximate to 

1101
00:43:17,920 --> 00:43:20,540
the target . And uh in fact , last year , 

1102
00:43:20,550 --> 00:43:23,320
uh an operation that went off in 

1103
00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:25,710
Northwest Syria to remove ISIS number 

1104
00:43:25,710 --> 00:43:27,766
one from the battlefield , we had to 

1105
00:43:27,766 --> 00:43:30,120
fly across Syria . So we were very far 

1106
00:43:30,120 --> 00:43:32,342
from that target but our ability to see 

1107
00:43:32,342 --> 00:43:34,260
it , sense it and then strike it 

1108
00:43:34,270 --> 00:43:37,050
unquestionable . And I think we've been 

1109
00:43:37,050 --> 00:43:40,000
able to do that globally throughout 

1110
00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:42,680
this year in places that Somalia with 

1111
00:43:42,690 --> 00:43:45,260
sustained pressure on ISIS against an 

1112
00:43:45,270 --> 00:43:49,130
ops and uh communications note . And I 

1113
00:43:49,130 --> 00:43:51,960
would add also that , that global 

1114
00:43:51,960 --> 00:43:54,510
pressure uh for so calm and counsel 

1115
00:43:54,510 --> 00:43:56,621
with partnerships goes on even in the 

1116
00:43:56,621 --> 00:43:58,566
Indo Pacific . So my sense to your 

1117
00:43:58,566 --> 00:44:00,621
center is that we absolutely have to 

1118
00:44:00,621 --> 00:44:03,410
keep the pressure on isis on any of 

1119
00:44:03,410 --> 00:44:05,410
those terrorist networks . And if I 

1120
00:44:05,410 --> 00:44:07,410
think about it with a number of the 

1121
00:44:07,410 --> 00:44:09,632
operations that have occurred , and I'd 

1122
00:44:09,632 --> 00:44:11,466
be happy to talk more in a close 

1123
00:44:11,466 --> 00:44:13,299
setting . It's been an extremely 

1124
00:44:13,299 --> 00:44:15,354
challenging year for these extremist 

1125
00:44:15,354 --> 00:44:17,521
operations with a number of operations 

1126
00:44:17,521 --> 00:44:19,632
we put together to include in Syria . 

1127
00:44:19,632 --> 00:44:21,920
Well , so comes has been primarily 

1128
00:44:21,920 --> 00:44:24,142
focused on counterterrorism mission for 

1129
00:44:24,142 --> 00:44:26,710
the last 20 years . Uh the special 

1130
00:44:26,710 --> 00:44:28,580
operation forces have a lot of 

1131
00:44:28,580 --> 00:44:31,260
capability that they can bring to the 

1132
00:44:31,260 --> 00:44:33,720
Indo Pacific . You earlier mentioned 

1133
00:44:33,720 --> 00:44:36,760
your experience um there and I 

1134
00:44:36,770 --> 00:44:39,670
value your knowledge and experience . 

1135
00:44:39,680 --> 00:44:42,500
Can you provide an update on how you 

1136
00:44:42,500 --> 00:44:45,520
plan to rebalance your forces that you 

1137
00:44:45,520 --> 00:44:48,380
have to restructure training and 

1138
00:44:48,390 --> 00:44:52,080
exercises or to develop any kind of 

1139
00:44:52,080 --> 00:44:54,830
unique capabilities in order to meet 

1140
00:44:54,840 --> 00:44:57,980
the increased demand . Um , signal that 

1141
00:44:57,980 --> 00:44:59,924
we're getting from indo pay . Come 

1142
00:45:01,840 --> 00:45:04,130
Senator . Thank you very much for an 

1143
00:45:04,130 --> 00:45:06,430
opportunity to comment on that I think 

1144
00:45:06,430 --> 00:45:08,430
is we certainly , as we look at our 

1145
00:45:08,430 --> 00:45:10,597
priorities across the wind category of 

1146
00:45:10,597 --> 00:45:12,708
integrated deterrence crisis response 

1147
00:45:12,708 --> 00:45:14,430
and counterterrorism . It's an 

1148
00:45:14,430 --> 00:45:16,730
adjustment . Um I've heard it referred 

1149
00:45:16,730 --> 00:45:18,952
to in other places as a pivot , I would 

1150
00:45:18,952 --> 00:45:20,952
tell you it's an adjustment for how 

1151
00:45:20,952 --> 00:45:22,786
we're gonna address uh strategic 

1152
00:45:22,786 --> 00:45:24,841
competition and a great deterrence . 

1153
00:45:24,841 --> 00:45:26,897
It's in our D N A we've been doing , 

1154
00:45:26,897 --> 00:45:28,563
we've , we've as your Special 

1155
00:45:28,563 --> 00:45:30,674
Operations Forces were really born to 

1156
00:45:30,674 --> 00:45:32,897
do this and ended up a com I think what 

1157
00:45:32,897 --> 00:45:34,841
it means is uh through the lens of 

1158
00:45:34,841 --> 00:45:37,150
prevention , uh deterrence and 

1159
00:45:37,150 --> 00:45:38,810
preparation , beginning with 

1160
00:45:38,810 --> 00:45:40,780
partnerships , partnerships with 

1161
00:45:40,790 --> 00:45:42,957
nations in that region that want the U 

1162
00:45:42,957 --> 00:45:44,790
S there . They want to see a U S 

1163
00:45:44,790 --> 00:45:47,710
capability and frankly , in uh in many 

1164
00:45:47,710 --> 00:45:49,821
ways , when that U S capability shows 

1165
00:45:49,821 --> 00:45:51,543
up through the lens of special 

1166
00:45:51,543 --> 00:45:54,180
operations forces were absolutely able 

1167
00:45:54,180 --> 00:45:56,510
to move a partnership toward the US and 

1168
00:45:56,510 --> 00:45:59,850
away from the PRC . I think that same 

1169
00:45:59,850 --> 00:46:01,683
type of partnership helped us in 

1170
00:46:01,683 --> 00:46:03,850
Ukraine with the training that we were 

1171
00:46:03,850 --> 00:46:05,906
doing . There is the Ukrainians from 

1172
00:46:05,906 --> 00:46:07,572
2014 and on , saw the special 

1173
00:46:07,572 --> 00:46:09,794
operations way of warfare in the way of 

1174
00:46:09,794 --> 00:46:11,850
doing business . All of that is very 

1175
00:46:11,850 --> 00:46:13,961
applicable to what we're doing and uh 

1176
00:46:13,961 --> 00:46:15,739
the Indo Pacific , but I differ 

1177
00:46:15,739 --> 00:46:18,450
certainly to uh Admiral Aquilino for a 

1178
00:46:18,450 --> 00:46:20,672
more fulsome of how he sees because I'm 

1179
00:46:20,672 --> 00:46:22,839
always in line with his requirements . 

1180
00:46:22,839 --> 00:46:24,894
And we do that through our theater , 

1181
00:46:24,894 --> 00:46:27,172
special operations , command , artists , 

1182
00:46:27,172 --> 00:46:29,339
special operations , command Pacific . 

1183
00:46:29,339 --> 00:46:31,339
We take lead from them at the socom 

1184
00:46:31,339 --> 00:46:33,506
Enterprise , but we are invested their 

1185
00:46:33,506 --> 00:46:35,450
Senator Fisher in a way to deter , 

1186
00:46:35,450 --> 00:46:37,339
prepare for and then if I need to 

1187
00:46:37,339 --> 00:46:39,700
prevail in conflict . Thank you and 

1188
00:46:39,700 --> 00:46:41,700
thank all of you gentlemen for your 

1189
00:46:41,700 --> 00:46:45,120
service . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 

1190
00:46:45,120 --> 00:46:47,490
Chairman General maccioni . We've been 

1191
00:46:47,490 --> 00:46:50,050
working together on helping to develop 

1192
00:46:50,050 --> 00:46:53,010
a greater um cyber capability amongst 

1193
00:46:53,010 --> 00:46:56,300
new personnel . And we created this uh 

1194
00:46:56,310 --> 00:46:59,160
Cyber Academy for civilian workforce 

1195
00:46:59,170 --> 00:47:02,070
which should be accepting its first 

1196
00:47:02,070 --> 00:47:04,940
class in 2020 for applications in 2020 

1197
00:47:04,940 --> 00:47:07,570
for , for a class in 2025 . And we're 

1198
00:47:07,570 --> 00:47:09,810
using the universities that N S A has 

1199
00:47:09,810 --> 00:47:13,200
already um assessed as having the 

1200
00:47:13,210 --> 00:47:15,099
correct cyber capability in cyber 

1201
00:47:15,099 --> 00:47:17,040
curriculum . But in light of your 

1202
00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:19,450
testimony , I wanted to ask , um would 

1203
00:47:19,450 --> 00:47:21,172
it be helpful to you to have a 

1204
00:47:21,172 --> 00:47:24,070
dedicated cyber force training just for 

1205
00:47:24,070 --> 00:47:27,870
permanent cyber command personnel for 

1206
00:47:27,870 --> 00:47:30,100
the military side as well ? And if you 

1207
00:47:30,100 --> 00:47:32,156
did want that , what would that look 

1208
00:47:32,156 --> 00:47:34,370
like , Senator ? Uh First of all , 

1209
00:47:34,370 --> 00:47:36,592
thank you for the work that you've done 

1210
00:47:36,592 --> 00:47:38,703
to build a greater population of , of 

1211
00:47:38,703 --> 00:47:41,340
cyber savvy folks . Uh I'm not sure 

1212
00:47:41,340 --> 00:47:43,507
that we need an academy yet . What I'm 

1213
00:47:43,507 --> 00:47:45,830
very , very , uh focused on is being 

1214
00:47:45,830 --> 00:47:48,630
able to look at the , the continued 

1215
00:47:48,630 --> 00:47:50,519
success we're gonna have with the 

1216
00:47:50,519 --> 00:47:52,686
program that , that you've worked with 

1217
00:47:52,686 --> 00:47:54,741
in New York . I'm very interested in 

1218
00:47:54,741 --> 00:47:54,380
continuing the successes that we've had 

1219
00:47:54,380 --> 00:47:56,440
across the National Guard with state 

1220
00:47:56,440 --> 00:47:58,496
partnership programs are very , very 

1221
00:47:58,496 --> 00:48:00,496
familiar with the New York National 

1222
00:48:00,496 --> 00:48:02,384
Guards work with Brazil and other 

1223
00:48:02,384 --> 00:48:04,440
National Guard Forces here . And I'm 

1224
00:48:04,440 --> 00:48:06,496
also very , very focused on ensuring 

1225
00:48:06,496 --> 00:48:08,607
that uh the ROTC and Academy programs 

1226
00:48:08,607 --> 00:48:10,829
continue to have strong growth in terms 

1227
00:48:10,829 --> 00:48:12,884
of the numbers of people that can be 

1228
00:48:12,884 --> 00:48:16,160
commissioned into our force . Thank you , 

1229
00:48:16,160 --> 00:48:18,271
Senator Gillibrand , Senator Cotton , 

1230
00:48:18,271 --> 00:48:21,870
please . Thank you , gentlemen . 

1231
00:48:21,880 --> 00:48:24,470
Um Mr Mayor , you acknowledge in your 

1232
00:48:24,470 --> 00:48:27,130
opening statement that the shift away 

1233
00:48:27,130 --> 00:48:29,186
from counterterrorism is the primary 

1234
00:48:29,186 --> 00:48:31,408
role of our nation's Special Operations 

1235
00:48:31,408 --> 00:48:34,740
Forces . Um But far from decreasing the 

1236
00:48:34,740 --> 00:48:36,740
need for those forces , I'd suggest 

1237
00:48:36,740 --> 00:48:38,740
that the current threat environment 

1238
00:48:38,740 --> 00:48:40,851
calls for even more capability . They 

1239
00:48:40,851 --> 00:48:42,962
need to continue our counterterrorism 

1240
00:48:42,962 --> 00:48:44,851
missions support foreign internal 

1241
00:48:44,851 --> 00:48:46,907
defense activities to bolster allies 

1242
00:48:46,907 --> 00:48:49,018
and engage in new types of operations 

1243
00:48:49,018 --> 00:48:51,129
that are going to counter Chinese and 

1244
00:48:51,129 --> 00:48:53,930
Russian aggression . Um In that 

1245
00:48:53,930 --> 00:48:55,840
operating environment , would a 

1246
00:48:55,840 --> 00:48:58,390
decrease in force size or budget seem 

1247
00:48:58,390 --> 00:49:02,290
like a reasonable step to you . So , 

1248
00:49:02,300 --> 00:49:04,078
Senator Cotton , thanks for the 

1249
00:49:04,078 --> 00:49:06,189
question . Yeah , this is the crux of 

1250
00:49:06,189 --> 00:49:08,189
the challenge , right ? We're being 

1251
00:49:08,189 --> 00:49:10,133
asked to do more and our forces is 

1252
00:49:10,133 --> 00:49:12,250
probably static . So I would not 

1253
00:49:12,250 --> 00:49:15,100
advocate for reduction in forces . Sir . 

1254
00:49:15,110 --> 00:49:17,690
I regret that you're here today and not 

1255
00:49:17,690 --> 00:49:19,857
48 hours from now when we're gonna get 

1256
00:49:19,857 --> 00:49:22,180
the president's budget because I am 

1257
00:49:22,180 --> 00:49:24,630
troubled that you may in fact get a 

1258
00:49:24,630 --> 00:49:27,420
reduction in budget or forces you have 

1259
00:49:27,420 --> 00:49:29,642
any thoughts on what we're gonna see on 

1260
00:49:29,642 --> 00:49:31,990
Thursday , Senator , as I think , you 

1261
00:49:31,990 --> 00:49:34,212
know , I can't talk to what's likely to 

1262
00:49:34,212 --> 00:49:36,101
be in the budget . But I think as 

1263
00:49:36,101 --> 00:49:37,934
General Finn and I both said the 

1264
00:49:37,934 --> 00:49:40,250
priorities that we have identified are 

1265
00:49:40,250 --> 00:49:43,740
represented in that budget . Well , 

1266
00:49:43,750 --> 00:49:47,030
if my fears are proven out , I think 

1267
00:49:47,030 --> 00:49:49,141
you can count on many members of this 

1268
00:49:49,141 --> 00:49:51,480
committee probably in both parties to 

1269
00:49:51,480 --> 00:49:53,369
try to make sure that our Special 

1270
00:49:53,369 --> 00:49:55,424
Operations forces have the resources 

1271
00:49:55,424 --> 00:49:57,647
they need General Fenton . Do you agree 

1272
00:49:57,647 --> 00:49:59,480
that SOCOM requirements and your 

1273
00:49:59,480 --> 00:50:01,480
relevance are , are growing in this 

1274
00:50:01,480 --> 00:50:03,591
threat environment , not decreasing ? 

1275
00:50:04,230 --> 00:50:06,341
Senator , I would agree with that . I 

1276
00:50:06,341 --> 00:50:08,820
think that the SOCOM requirements to , 

1277
00:50:08,830 --> 00:50:11,980
to be um campaigning and competition 

1278
00:50:11,990 --> 00:50:15,810
are absolutely um important and 

1279
00:50:15,820 --> 00:50:17,598
uh and exceedingly asked for by 

1280
00:50:17,598 --> 00:50:19,820
combatant command teams where I draw my 

1281
00:50:19,820 --> 00:50:21,820
requirements from certainly in line 

1282
00:50:21,820 --> 00:50:23,653
with their theater , special ops 

1283
00:50:23,653 --> 00:50:25,653
command the T socks , but we see it 

1284
00:50:25,653 --> 00:50:27,487
because much of this begins with 

1285
00:50:27,487 --> 00:50:29,487
partnerships , partnerships that we 

1286
00:50:29,487 --> 00:50:31,770
forge through the SOCOM team uh and 

1287
00:50:31,770 --> 00:50:34,720
enable and the payoff in many ways can 

1288
00:50:34,720 --> 00:50:37,053
be looked at in the vicinity of Ukraine . 

1289
00:50:37,053 --> 00:50:39,220
So a decrease in either your budget or 

1290
00:50:39,220 --> 00:50:42,760
your personnel levels would add risk to 

1291
00:50:42,760 --> 00:50:44,649
your mission and therefore to our 

1292
00:50:44,649 --> 00:50:46,980
nation . Well , Senator , I uh no one 

1293
00:50:46,980 --> 00:50:50,090
wants to see a decrease in personnel or 

1294
00:50:50,090 --> 00:50:52,670
the budget . I would tell you that . I 

1295
00:50:52,670 --> 00:50:54,640
think it would not reflect the 

1296
00:50:54,640 --> 00:50:56,807
requirements . Number one , a decrease 

1297
00:50:56,807 --> 00:50:58,973
of that . And number two , we would be 

1298
00:50:58,973 --> 00:51:00,862
forced at some point to make hard 

1299
00:51:00,862 --> 00:51:02,973
choices because each and every time I 

1300
00:51:02,973 --> 00:51:05,084
think you'll see me give you the best 

1301
00:51:05,084 --> 00:51:07,029
special operations command for the 

1302
00:51:07,029 --> 00:51:10,340
budget . We get Mr Mayor , 

1303
00:51:11,030 --> 00:51:13,141
we're talking about your personal . I 

1304
00:51:13,141 --> 00:51:15,197
want to return to something else you 

1305
00:51:15,197 --> 00:51:14,610
have in your opening statement cause I 

1306
00:51:14,610 --> 00:51:16,554
want to make sure we're using this 

1307
00:51:16,554 --> 00:51:18,443
personal budget the right way you 

1308
00:51:18,443 --> 00:51:17,990
talked about the need for more staff . 

1309
00:51:18,000 --> 00:51:20,111
I gotta tell you that gets my hackles 

1310
00:51:20,111 --> 00:51:22,510
up pretty quickly . Um I think we have 

1311
00:51:22,510 --> 00:51:24,860
plenty of staff in the Pentagon way too 

1312
00:51:24,860 --> 00:51:26,916
much . Frankly , I think we have too 

1313
00:51:26,916 --> 00:51:29,138
many people dressed like you and me and 

1314
00:51:29,138 --> 00:51:31,304
not enough people dressed like the men 

1315
00:51:31,304 --> 00:51:30,540
to your right and your left performing 

1316
00:51:30,540 --> 00:51:32,762
these jobs . Could you explain a little 

1317
00:51:32,762 --> 00:51:34,651
bit more about what kind of staff 

1318
00:51:34,651 --> 00:51:34,650
you're talking about and why you would 

1319
00:51:34,650 --> 00:51:37,560
need more staff ? So Senator I was 

1320
00:51:37,560 --> 00:51:39,970
referring specifically to the special 

1321
00:51:39,970 --> 00:51:42,030
operations , low intensity conflict 

1322
00:51:42,030 --> 00:51:44,920
staff that performs the title 10 

1323
00:51:44,920 --> 00:51:47,210
responsibility of the organized trained 

1324
00:51:47,210 --> 00:51:49,377
equipped for SOCOM . So , so frankly , 

1325
00:51:49,377 --> 00:51:51,488
sir , a lot of what the staff do on a 

1326
00:51:51,488 --> 00:51:54,460
daily basis is try to articulate the 

1327
00:51:54,460 --> 00:51:56,516
soft value proposition back into the 

1328
00:51:56,516 --> 00:51:58,682
department with the services . Uh Some 

1329
00:51:58,682 --> 00:52:01,650
of my concern is that as we go from the 

1330
00:52:01,650 --> 00:52:04,090
less intense environment of 

1331
00:52:04,090 --> 00:52:06,410
counterterrorism , um or go towards a 

1332
00:52:06,410 --> 00:52:08,840
less intense environment without the 

1333
00:52:08,840 --> 00:52:10,840
intense focus on counterterrorism , 

1334
00:52:10,840 --> 00:52:12,340
that some of what soft has 

1335
00:52:12,340 --> 00:52:14,870
traditionally been afforded will be 

1336
00:52:14,870 --> 00:52:17,140
lost in that . So , so sometimes this 

1337
00:52:17,140 --> 00:52:19,251
is just as simple as making sure that 

1338
00:52:19,251 --> 00:52:21,580
we have the soft value proposition 

1339
00:52:21,580 --> 00:52:24,060
represented in resourcing training 

1340
00:52:24,060 --> 00:52:26,840
planning . I've been frankly surprised 

1341
00:52:26,840 --> 00:52:29,062
at times of how that has been forgotten 

1342
00:52:29,062 --> 00:52:31,370
or too narrowly defined as being a 

1343
00:52:31,370 --> 00:52:33,370
counterterrorism problem . So , you 

1344
00:52:33,370 --> 00:52:35,426
know , my 40 some odd staff are very 

1345
00:52:35,426 --> 00:52:37,481
much in that business and you know , 

1346
00:52:37,481 --> 00:52:39,203
it's the analytics , it's it's 

1347
00:52:39,203 --> 00:52:41,203
supporting special programs , other 

1348
00:52:41,203 --> 00:52:43,314
things like that , that are very uh I 

1349
00:52:43,314 --> 00:52:44,926
think akin to the soft value 

1350
00:52:44,926 --> 00:52:46,537
proposition , but don't have 

1351
00:52:46,537 --> 00:52:48,759
representation often within the broader 

1352
00:52:48,759 --> 00:52:50,870
department General Fenton . One final 

1353
00:52:50,870 --> 00:52:53,148
question you in your opening statement , 

1354
00:52:53,148 --> 00:52:55,370
you talk about the strategic transition 

1355
00:52:55,370 --> 00:52:57,314
for the Special Operation Forces . 

1356
00:52:57,314 --> 00:52:59,426
Could you explain a little more about 

1357
00:52:59,426 --> 00:53:01,314
the role that special , that your 

1358
00:53:01,314 --> 00:53:03,481
forces , special operations forces are 

1359
00:53:03,481 --> 00:53:05,703
gonna be expected to play in the future 

1360
00:53:05,703 --> 00:53:07,814
fight ? And if so , if you can add an 

1361
00:53:07,814 --> 00:53:09,926
unclassified level , maybe help share 

1362
00:53:09,926 --> 00:53:13,080
that story , Senator . Thank you . 

1363
00:53:13,090 --> 00:53:15,720
Thank you for that . Uh I'll focus on 

1364
00:53:15,730 --> 00:53:18,560
integrated deterrence uh and where the 

1365
00:53:18,560 --> 00:53:20,782
secretary and the department have asked 

1366
00:53:20,782 --> 00:53:22,727
us to , to be aligned . And when I 

1367
00:53:22,727 --> 00:53:24,727
think about that , I think about it 

1368
00:53:24,727 --> 00:53:26,616
along three really three lenses , 

1369
00:53:26,616 --> 00:53:28,782
prevent , prepare and then prevail . I 

1370
00:53:28,782 --> 00:53:31,004
think on the prevention side , it's all 

1371
00:53:31,004 --> 00:53:33,171
about being forward , it's about being 

1372
00:53:33,171 --> 00:53:35,180
uh deployed . Uh our , our skills , 

1373
00:53:35,190 --> 00:53:38,880
cultural understanding language uh in a 

1374
00:53:38,880 --> 00:53:40,602
familiarity with many of these 

1375
00:53:40,602 --> 00:53:42,158
environments that come from 

1376
00:53:42,158 --> 00:53:44,870
organizations in our enterprise that 

1377
00:53:44,880 --> 00:53:47,047
know those places . Well , such as our 

1378
00:53:47,047 --> 00:53:49,047
first Special Forces Group and Indo 

1379
00:53:49,047 --> 00:53:51,102
Pacific , for instance , have a very 

1380
00:53:51,102 --> 00:53:53,350
deep familiarity with all things that 

1381
00:53:53,350 --> 00:53:55,517
go on in many of the partner nations . 

1382
00:53:55,517 --> 00:53:58,240
I think it's key to keep that certainly 

1383
00:53:58,240 --> 00:54:00,650
thick and strengthen . So part of it is 

1384
00:54:00,660 --> 00:54:02,880
being out training , advising , 

1385
00:54:02,890 --> 00:54:04,890
assisting building capabilities and 

1386
00:54:04,890 --> 00:54:06,668
using many of the tools uh This 

1387
00:54:06,668 --> 00:54:08,557
committee gives us in the form of 

1388
00:54:08,557 --> 00:54:12,000
security cooperation . Um 12:02 and 

1389
00:54:12,010 --> 00:54:14,010
counterterrorism tools . That's , 

1390
00:54:14,020 --> 00:54:16,020
that's a very key part . I think it 

1391
00:54:16,020 --> 00:54:18,131
also allows us an opportunity to help 

1392
00:54:18,131 --> 00:54:20,242
the joint force uh and enable them as 

1393
00:54:20,242 --> 00:54:22,464
we're out in those environments and are 

1394
00:54:22,464 --> 00:54:24,020
able to prepare through our 

1395
00:54:24,020 --> 00:54:26,242
understanding of everything from seabed 

1396
00:54:26,242 --> 00:54:28,298
all the way to space domain and then 

1397
00:54:28,298 --> 00:54:30,409
work in concert with General Nakasone 

1398
00:54:30,409 --> 00:54:32,353
and Jim Dickinson and a soft space 

1399
00:54:32,353 --> 00:54:34,353
cyber triad . I think those are all 

1400
00:54:34,353 --> 00:54:36,131
very important . Uh There is an 

1401
00:54:36,131 --> 00:54:38,076
acceleration towards that it began 

1402
00:54:38,076 --> 00:54:40,187
before , certainly under General Rich 

1403
00:54:40,187 --> 00:54:42,242
Clark and we're accelerating that in 

1404
00:54:42,242 --> 00:54:44,298
the Special operations team while we 

1405
00:54:44,298 --> 00:54:46,298
stay vigilant on the counter terror 

1406
00:54:46,298 --> 00:54:48,131
mission and certainly our crisis 

1407
00:54:48,131 --> 00:54:50,076
response duties as directed by the 

1408
00:54:50,076 --> 00:54:49,720
secretary . Thank you , gentlemen . 

1409
00:54:50,680 --> 00:54:52,736
Thank you , Senator Cotton , Senator 

1410
00:54:52,736 --> 00:54:54,513
Blumenthal . Please . Thanks Mr 

1411
00:54:54,513 --> 00:54:56,569
Chairman . Let me begin by adding an 

1412
00:54:56,569 --> 00:54:59,850
exclamation point . The 

1413
00:55:00,770 --> 00:55:04,750
point that Senator Cotton just 

1414
00:55:04,750 --> 00:55:06,528
raised about the need for ample 

1415
00:55:06,528 --> 00:55:08,417
resources devoted to our national 

1416
00:55:08,417 --> 00:55:10,528
defense . Most especially the kind of 

1417
00:55:10,528 --> 00:55:12,694
work that you are doing . I think your 

1418
00:55:12,694 --> 00:55:15,130
testimony today reinforces my hope that 

1419
00:55:15,130 --> 00:55:17,860
we will have bipartisan support for 

1420
00:55:17,870 --> 00:55:19,981
that kind of sufficient investment in 

1421
00:55:19,981 --> 00:55:23,280
our national defense . Uh I've been to 

1422
00:55:23,280 --> 00:55:26,840
Ukraine three times over the roughly 

1423
00:55:26,850 --> 00:55:30,390
last year , uh once before the 

1424
00:55:30,400 --> 00:55:33,140
invasion and had an opportunity to talk 

1425
00:55:33,140 --> 00:55:36,520
to some of the uh special 

1426
00:55:36,520 --> 00:55:39,800
forces trainers who were there working 

1427
00:55:39,800 --> 00:55:43,170
with Ukrainian personnel . 

1428
00:55:43,180 --> 00:55:46,830
Uh General Fenton , I am hoping that 

1429
00:55:47,600 --> 00:55:51,050
there has been continued training 

1430
00:55:51,060 --> 00:55:53,282
outside of Ukraine . I realized none of 

1431
00:55:53,282 --> 00:55:56,030
those special operation forces are 

1432
00:55:56,700 --> 00:55:59,900
located physically there . Now , when I 

1433
00:55:59,900 --> 00:56:02,880
was there last uh a number of weeks ago , 

1434
00:56:02,890 --> 00:56:06,820
none were there uh at 

1435
00:56:06,820 --> 00:56:09,570
least visibly to us . Uh But I'm hoping 

1436
00:56:09,570 --> 00:56:11,237
that that training mission is 

1437
00:56:11,237 --> 00:56:13,014
continuing outside of Ukraine . 

1438
00:56:14,860 --> 00:56:17,027
Senator . Thank you for that . It , it 

1439
00:56:17,027 --> 00:56:19,027
absolutely is continuing outside of 

1440
00:56:19,027 --> 00:56:21,200
Ukraine uh in a number of locations , 

1441
00:56:21,210 --> 00:56:23,480
bringing the capability that continues 

1442
00:56:23,480 --> 00:56:27,100
to assist Ukrainian Soft as part of the 

1443
00:56:27,100 --> 00:56:29,580
entire Ukrainian military . Uh And that 

1444
00:56:29,580 --> 00:56:31,970
training goes along a number of the 

1445
00:56:31,970 --> 00:56:33,859
lines you've seen before , uh the 

1446
00:56:33,859 --> 00:56:36,120
capability to defend themselves , uh 

1447
00:56:36,130 --> 00:56:38,074
the capability to mission plan and 

1448
00:56:38,074 --> 00:56:40,500
orient and understanding of the 

1449
00:56:40,500 --> 00:56:43,190
intelligence and uh and certainly an 

1450
00:56:43,190 --> 00:56:45,630
understanding of creating dilemmas for 

1451
00:56:45,630 --> 00:56:47,910
the Russian formation . And so the 

1452
00:56:47,910 --> 00:56:50,160
Ukrainian soft is a key part of the 

1453
00:56:50,160 --> 00:56:52,480
Ukrainian military's approach . We do 

1454
00:56:52,480 --> 00:56:54,647
that as your special operations team , 

1455
00:56:54,647 --> 00:56:57,380
certainly under general uh cavalese 

1456
00:56:57,390 --> 00:56:59,700
direction and watch and in concert with 

1457
00:56:59,730 --> 00:57:02,000
his teammates in order that , that is 

1458
00:57:02,010 --> 00:57:04,010
integrated with the entirety of the 

1459
00:57:04,010 --> 00:57:06,066
approach that the SEC def directed . 

1460
00:57:06,066 --> 00:57:08,177
What's your assessment as to how well 

1461
00:57:08,177 --> 00:57:10,066
the Ukrainian Special forces have 

1462
00:57:10,066 --> 00:57:13,190
operated ? Senator , I think they've 

1463
00:57:13,200 --> 00:57:17,110
been superb uh from the very beginning 

1464
00:57:17,110 --> 00:57:19,690
and , and I will start the journey uh 

1465
00:57:20,280 --> 00:57:22,310
in the mid nineties when special 

1466
00:57:22,310 --> 00:57:24,532
operations special forces in particular 

1467
00:57:24,532 --> 00:57:26,690
are 10th special forces group made 

1468
00:57:26,690 --> 00:57:30,330
contact with Ukrainian uh forces 

1469
00:57:30,340 --> 00:57:32,660
after the fall of the Soviet Union . 

1470
00:57:32,670 --> 00:57:35,410
And that generational relationship , 

1471
00:57:35,420 --> 00:57:37,587
something that's very , very important 

1472
00:57:37,587 --> 00:57:39,753
to your special operations community . 

1473
00:57:39,753 --> 00:57:43,040
My sense laid the pathway for in 2014 , 

1474
00:57:43,040 --> 00:57:44,984
our ability to really get after it 

1475
00:57:44,984 --> 00:57:46,762
after the first invasion by the 

1476
00:57:46,762 --> 00:57:48,762
Russians . So they've done superbly 

1477
00:57:48,762 --> 00:57:50,984
well and they've been extremely willing 

1478
00:57:50,984 --> 00:57:53,790
to prepare and to fight and to learn . 

1479
00:57:54,340 --> 00:57:57,990
Yes , sir , General Jackson , I think a 

1480
00:57:57,990 --> 00:58:01,510
number of experts have 

1481
00:58:01,520 --> 00:58:05,460
been somewhat surprised that 

1482
00:58:05,470 --> 00:58:07,192
the Russians haven't been more 

1483
00:58:07,192 --> 00:58:09,359
aggressive in the cyber sphere against 

1484
00:58:09,359 --> 00:58:12,860
Ukraine in this past year . 

1485
00:58:12,870 --> 00:58:15,790
What's your assessment as to why they 

1486
00:58:15,790 --> 00:58:19,000
haven't been more aggressive ? Why 

1487
00:58:19,000 --> 00:58:20,833
they've been somewhat apparently 

1488
00:58:20,833 --> 00:58:23,700
quiescent or maybe the Ukrainians have 

1489
00:58:23,710 --> 00:58:27,490
just uh resisted and fended them off 

1490
00:58:27,500 --> 00:58:30,870
without our knowing it center . The 

1491
00:58:30,880 --> 00:58:32,769
Russians have been very active in 

1492
00:58:32,769 --> 00:58:34,991
Ukraine in terms of conducting a number 

1493
00:58:34,991 --> 00:58:36,602
of cyber attacks , including 

1494
00:58:36,602 --> 00:58:38,269
destructive , destructive and 

1495
00:58:38,269 --> 00:58:40,269
destructive destructive attacks . I 

1496
00:58:40,269 --> 00:58:40,180
think there's several pieces of the 

1497
00:58:40,180 --> 00:58:42,347
story here that are important though , 

1498
00:58:42,347 --> 00:58:44,513
first of all , when you begin the plan 

1499
00:58:44,513 --> 00:58:46,624
and you think it's going to be a very 

1500
00:58:46,624 --> 00:58:48,680
easy invasion , perhaps you don't do 

1501
00:58:48,680 --> 00:58:50,458
enough planning with regards to 

1502
00:58:50,458 --> 00:58:52,569
enabling activities . Secondly , give 

1503
00:58:52,569 --> 00:58:54,791
full credit to the Ukrainians . Uh They 

1504
00:58:54,791 --> 00:58:56,624
did a tremendous job in terms of 

1505
00:58:56,624 --> 00:58:58,958
building their cybersecurity resilience . 

1506
00:58:58,958 --> 00:59:00,958
And the third piece is , is that um 

1507
00:59:00,958 --> 00:59:03,291
this is again for persistent engagement , 

1508
00:59:03,291 --> 00:59:05,458
my discussion previously being able to 

1509
00:59:05,458 --> 00:59:07,569
enable an act with your partners . Uh 

1510
00:59:07,569 --> 00:59:09,402
the Russians uh have not been as 

1511
00:59:09,402 --> 00:59:11,347
successful and there's a number of 

1512
00:59:11,347 --> 00:59:13,402
reasons for that . And I would point 

1513
00:59:13,402 --> 00:59:15,402
also to the fact that we've able to 

1514
00:59:15,402 --> 00:59:17,624
been able to bring a series of partners 

1515
00:59:17,624 --> 00:59:19,791
including the private sector that have 

1516
00:59:19,791 --> 00:59:21,847
a tremendous capability and capacity 

1517
00:59:21,847 --> 00:59:23,847
against the Russians . Um I've been 

1518
00:59:23,847 --> 00:59:25,624
impressed when I have spoken to 

1519
00:59:25,624 --> 00:59:27,690
President Zelensky with his focus on 

1520
00:59:27,700 --> 00:59:31,660
Cyber . Um Do you think that there 

1521
00:59:31,670 --> 00:59:35,540
is a greatly increased danger or risk 

1522
00:59:35,550 --> 00:59:39,440
of Russians cyber attack if the counter 

1523
00:59:39,440 --> 00:59:42,270
offensive anticipated this spring by 

1524
00:59:42,270 --> 00:59:45,830
Ukraine is successful ? We're watching 

1525
00:59:45,830 --> 00:59:48,052
this very carefully . This is , this is 

1526
00:59:48,052 --> 00:59:50,274
the matter of vigilance that I spoke to 

1527
00:59:50,274 --> 00:59:52,274
earlier because by no means is , is 

1528
00:59:52,274 --> 00:59:54,108
this done in terms of the Russia 

1529
00:59:54,108 --> 00:59:56,900
Ukraine situation ? So as Russia looks 

1530
00:59:56,900 --> 00:59:59,011
at , you know , armaments coming into 

1531
00:59:59,011 --> 01:00:00,733
the country as Russia looks at 

1532
01:00:00,733 --> 01:00:02,956
different support , how do they react ? 

1533
01:00:02,956 --> 01:00:05,067
One of the things that we are charged 

1534
01:00:05,067 --> 01:00:07,233
with is ensuring the security of the U 

1535
01:00:07,233 --> 01:00:06,930
S critical infrastructure and key 

1536
01:00:06,930 --> 01:00:09,350
resources with our partners in DHS and 

1537
01:00:09,350 --> 01:00:11,400
FBI . And so this is something that 

1538
01:00:11,400 --> 01:00:13,567
we're working closely every single day 

1539
01:00:13,567 --> 01:00:15,830
on Senator . Thank you very much to you 

1540
01:00:15,830 --> 01:00:17,886
all and thank you for your service . 

1541
01:00:17,886 --> 01:00:20,052
Thank you , Senator Blumenthal . Thank 

1542
01:00:20,052 --> 01:00:22,330
you , Mr Chair . Thank you , gentlemen . 

1543
01:00:22,330 --> 01:00:24,163
Excuse me for being here today , 

1544
01:00:24,163 --> 01:00:26,380
Secretary , Mayor and General Fenton . 

1545
01:00:26,390 --> 01:00:29,280
Um I really do commend your submission 

1546
01:00:29,280 --> 01:00:31,670
of the joint statement to our committee . 

1547
01:00:31,670 --> 01:00:34,590
It it reflects both alignments and 

1548
01:00:34,590 --> 01:00:37,660
oversight from civilian policy makers 

1549
01:00:37,660 --> 01:00:40,470
as well as our uniform leaders . So 

1550
01:00:40,470 --> 01:00:42,820
thank you for submitting that Secretary , 

1551
01:00:42,820 --> 01:00:44,931
Mayor and General Fenton has outlined 

1552
01:00:44,931 --> 01:00:47,990
in your soft vision and strategy . How 

1553
01:00:47,990 --> 01:00:50,010
does the soft balance its various 

1554
01:00:50,010 --> 01:00:52,630
missions with great power competition , 

1555
01:00:52,640 --> 01:00:55,330
counterterrorism and crisis response , 

1556
01:00:55,330 --> 01:00:57,540
your three main missions ? Because 

1557
01:00:57,550 --> 01:00:59,494
right now we're seeing great power 

1558
01:00:59,494 --> 01:01:02,410
competition increase um ever increasing 

1559
01:01:02,410 --> 01:01:04,480
with Iran , of course , are pacing 

1560
01:01:04,480 --> 01:01:07,130
threat with China and of course with 

1561
01:01:07,140 --> 01:01:09,740
the Russian incursion and war in 

1562
01:01:09,740 --> 01:01:13,110
Ukraine . So how do you balance those 

1563
01:01:13,110 --> 01:01:16,360
missions ? And how should that um great 

1564
01:01:16,360 --> 01:01:19,930
power competition affect 

1565
01:01:19,940 --> 01:01:23,360
your mission ? Thank you , Senator . 

1566
01:01:23,360 --> 01:01:25,527
And I'll take it from a more strategic 

1567
01:01:25,527 --> 01:01:27,638
level and then ask General Finn to to 

1568
01:01:27,638 --> 01:01:29,749
speak in more detail . So I would say 

1569
01:01:29,749 --> 01:01:31,971
first and foremost , it's , it's a risk 

1570
01:01:31,971 --> 01:01:34,027
assessment and it's weighing against 

1571
01:01:34,027 --> 01:01:36,138
the requirements . So there is always 

1572
01:01:36,138 --> 01:01:38,193
more requirements from the combatant 

1573
01:01:38,193 --> 01:01:40,138
commands and then we can meet as a 

1574
01:01:40,138 --> 01:01:42,360
force and those numbers keep going up . 

1575
01:01:42,360 --> 01:01:44,416
But I think at the same time , we're 

1576
01:01:44,416 --> 01:01:46,638
very focused on the idea that while the 

1577
01:01:46,638 --> 01:01:48,749
strategic focus is of course , on the 

1578
01:01:48,749 --> 01:01:50,860
pacing challenge of the PRC and acute 

1579
01:01:50,860 --> 01:01:52,582
threat of Russia , we can't be 

1580
01:01:52,582 --> 01:01:54,650
surprised by an attack from another 

1581
01:01:54,650 --> 01:01:56,761
adversary . And I think managing that 

1582
01:01:56,761 --> 01:01:58,710
risk is many cases what the soft 

1583
01:01:58,710 --> 01:02:00,821
enterprise does very well . We are in 

1584
01:02:00,821 --> 01:02:02,932
essence the hedge against that risk . 

1585
01:02:02,932 --> 01:02:05,043
So it's a , it's a constant effort to 

1586
01:02:05,043 --> 01:02:07,670
look for areas where we can innovate to 

1587
01:02:07,670 --> 01:02:09,670
be able to do more , do things on a 

1588
01:02:09,670 --> 01:02:11,837
more sustainable fashion . And in some 

1589
01:02:11,837 --> 01:02:13,892
cases , look for where we're getting 

1590
01:02:13,892 --> 01:02:15,948
what my New England friends call too 

1591
01:02:15,948 --> 01:02:17,448
for where we're able to do 

1592
01:02:17,448 --> 01:02:19,503
counterterrorism work and have those 

1593
01:02:19,503 --> 01:02:21,503
partnerships and access . That then 

1594
01:02:21,503 --> 01:02:23,726
helps us also on the N D S priorities , 

1595
01:02:23,726 --> 01:02:25,670
ma'am . Thank you , General Fenton 

1596
01:02:25,740 --> 01:02:27,796
Senator . Thank . Thank you for that 

1597
01:02:27,796 --> 01:02:29,796
question . I think to your point on 

1598
01:02:29,796 --> 01:02:31,907
balance and adjustment . Uh That's in 

1599
01:02:31,907 --> 01:02:34,018
uh I'm constantly focused on that and 

1600
01:02:34,018 --> 01:02:36,490
in the command , as you mentioned , the 

1601
01:02:36,500 --> 01:02:39,330
integrated deterrence crisis response 

1602
01:02:39,330 --> 01:02:41,441
and counterterrorism operations , all 

1603
01:02:41,441 --> 01:02:45,210
those extremely uh priority , extremely 

1604
01:02:45,210 --> 01:02:47,266
high priority for the socom team . I 

1605
01:02:47,266 --> 01:02:49,543
think on the integrated deterrent size , 

1606
01:02:49,543 --> 01:02:51,710
we take our lead from the co combatant 

1607
01:02:51,710 --> 01:02:53,710
commands and their requirements for 

1608
01:02:53,710 --> 01:02:55,599
engagement in their , in their uh 

1609
01:02:55,599 --> 01:02:57,210
regions , what they need for 

1610
01:02:57,210 --> 01:02:58,821
partnerships , how they need 

1611
01:02:58,821 --> 01:03:01,043
capabilities built and uh and center in 

1612
01:03:01,043 --> 01:03:03,150
in many ways , our counterterrorism 

1613
01:03:03,160 --> 01:03:05,830
tools and the form factors that we have 

1614
01:03:05,830 --> 01:03:07,830
in terms of how we present forces , 

1615
01:03:07,830 --> 01:03:10,340
those are equally applicable in the 

1616
01:03:10,350 --> 01:03:12,370
integrated deterrence , the 

1617
01:03:12,370 --> 01:03:14,680
requirements from the CO coms for 

1618
01:03:14,690 --> 01:03:16,746
developing a force and compete being 

1619
01:03:16,746 --> 01:03:19,260
with adversaries such as the PRC as 

1620
01:03:19,260 --> 01:03:21,316
they are for actual counterterrorism 

1621
01:03:21,316 --> 01:03:24,270
efforts that , you know , very well . I 

1622
01:03:24,270 --> 01:03:26,326
think it's a balance . Some of those 

1623
01:03:26,326 --> 01:03:28,270
tools are interchangeable , we can 

1624
01:03:28,270 --> 01:03:30,270
bring them across the spectrum very 

1625
01:03:30,270 --> 01:03:32,381
often . It is about the relationships 

1626
01:03:32,381 --> 01:03:34,492
that turn into things that we've seen 

1627
01:03:34,492 --> 01:03:36,714
in Ukraine . And we just have mentioned 

1628
01:03:36,714 --> 01:03:38,770
here soft investment early and we've 

1629
01:03:38,770 --> 01:03:41,048
seen that in many other places as well . 

1630
01:03:41,048 --> 01:03:43,159
Thank you . I appreciate that . And I 

1631
01:03:43,159 --> 01:03:45,381
know that my colleague , Senator Cotton 

1632
01:03:45,381 --> 01:03:47,492
talked about your top line and uh and 

1633
01:03:47,492 --> 01:03:49,714
strength cuts and how that would impact 

1634
01:03:49,714 --> 01:03:52,060
soft . I am very , very concerned about 

1635
01:03:52,060 --> 01:03:54,190
that and it , it doesn't matter what 

1636
01:03:54,190 --> 01:03:56,420
commander it was whether it was General 

1637
01:03:56,420 --> 01:03:59,340
Tony Thomas or Rich Clark or now you 

1638
01:03:59,340 --> 01:04:02,710
General Fenton . Um I've always brought 

1639
01:04:02,710 --> 01:04:05,010
this up in discussions and every socom 

1640
01:04:05,010 --> 01:04:07,288
commander I have visited with has said , 

1641
01:04:07,288 --> 01:04:09,454
you know , ma'am , we're gonna make do 

1642
01:04:09,460 --> 01:04:12,230
you know we will execute the mission 

1643
01:04:12,240 --> 01:04:15,110
regardless of the budget ? I get that , 

1644
01:04:15,120 --> 01:04:17,280
but I just need to stress to this 

1645
01:04:17,280 --> 01:04:19,980
committee how important it is that we 

1646
01:04:19,980 --> 01:04:22,202
continue to fund you at the appropriate 

1647
01:04:22,202 --> 01:04:24,560
levels . Um You give us the greatest 

1648
01:04:24,560 --> 01:04:27,820
bang for the buck um with what you do 

1649
01:04:27,820 --> 01:04:31,360
all around the globe . So um we won't 

1650
01:04:31,380 --> 01:04:34,260
question that but um I do want to dig 

1651
01:04:34,260 --> 01:04:36,730
in a little more . Uh General Fenton , 

1652
01:04:36,730 --> 01:04:40,640
I've supported section 12 02 , regular 

1653
01:04:40,640 --> 01:04:42,696
warfare authorities that was done in 

1654
01:04:42,696 --> 01:04:46,080
the fiscal year 18 N D A . And your 

1655
01:04:46,080 --> 01:04:48,870
joint statement describes this as 

1656
01:04:48,880 --> 01:04:50,436
essential for applying soft 

1657
01:04:50,436 --> 01:04:53,650
capabilities against malign actors . So 

1658
01:04:53,650 --> 01:04:56,010
in your personal opinion , would 

1659
01:04:56,020 --> 01:04:58,640
enabling those partner forces that are 

1660
01:04:58,640 --> 01:05:02,150
responding to hostilities , enhance , 

1661
01:05:02,160 --> 01:05:04,760
soft irregular warfare contribution to 

1662
01:05:04,760 --> 01:05:08,590
great power competition . Sen , 

1663
01:05:08,590 --> 01:05:11,040
thank you for that . And uh I'll thank 

1664
01:05:11,040 --> 01:05:14,060
this committee for the 1202 authority 

1665
01:05:14,070 --> 01:05:16,650
that that is a very important tool in 

1666
01:05:16,650 --> 01:05:18,706
the , in the , in the arsenal of the 

1667
01:05:18,706 --> 01:05:20,928
special operations tools that we use to 

1668
01:05:20,928 --> 01:05:22,928
either develop partnerships , build 

1669
01:05:22,928 --> 01:05:25,460
capability and capacity of , of , of a 

1670
01:05:25,460 --> 01:05:27,840
nation . Uh and certainly then move 

1671
01:05:27,840 --> 01:05:30,300
forward . So , thank you very much for 

1672
01:05:30,300 --> 01:05:34,070
that . Uh It is key uh for us to engage 

1673
01:05:34,070 --> 01:05:36,014
in partnerships at that level that 

1674
01:05:36,014 --> 01:05:38,460
involve irregular warfare , our ability 

1675
01:05:38,470 --> 01:05:41,330
to operate and uh build up a capability 

1676
01:05:41,330 --> 01:05:44,290
of a nation also have it uh able to 

1677
01:05:44,290 --> 01:05:46,770
look at any malign influences coming 

1678
01:05:46,770 --> 01:05:48,770
its way and identify those and then 

1679
01:05:48,770 --> 01:05:50,881
address them and those , those forces 

1680
01:05:50,881 --> 01:05:53,103
that we work with , provide options for 

1681
01:05:53,103 --> 01:05:55,250
their national command leadership as 

1682
01:05:55,250 --> 01:05:57,583
well as dilemmas for any adversary . So , 

1683
01:05:57,583 --> 01:06:00,320
Senator , I would say a very small 

1684
01:06:00,320 --> 01:06:02,431
investment in many ways , almost like 

1685
01:06:02,431 --> 01:06:04,653
you're special operations team . It's a 

1686
01:06:04,653 --> 01:06:06,820
very small investment , but for a very 

1687
01:06:06,820 --> 01:06:08,931
high return on , on , on the dollar . 

1688
01:06:08,931 --> 01:06:11,153
So I thank you very much . For that and 

1689
01:06:11,153 --> 01:06:13,098
happy to talk more about in closed 

1690
01:06:13,098 --> 01:06:15,153
session . Very good . Thank you very 

1691
01:06:15,153 --> 01:06:14,690
much , gentlemen . Thank you , Mr Chair . 

1692
01:06:14,700 --> 01:06:16,867
Thank you , Senator , let me recognize 

1693
01:06:16,867 --> 01:06:19,140
Senator Hirono and ask Senator King to 

1694
01:06:19,140 --> 01:06:21,084
preside while I attend the banking 

1695
01:06:21,084 --> 01:06:23,362
committee . Senator Hirono . Thank you , 

1696
01:06:23,362 --> 01:06:25,418
Mr Chairman . Thank you all for your 

1697
01:06:25,418 --> 01:06:27,690
testimony today . And General Fenton 

1698
01:06:27,690 --> 01:06:29,690
and Secretary mayor . Thank you for 

1699
01:06:29,690 --> 01:06:31,857
meeting with me earlier , General Knox 

1700
01:06:31,857 --> 01:06:34,420
Tony . I have been deeply concerned by 

1701
01:06:34,420 --> 01:06:36,940
the state of critical infrastructure on 

1702
01:06:36,940 --> 01:06:38,760
and off military installations 

1703
01:06:38,760 --> 01:06:40,204
crumbling and out of date 

1704
01:06:40,204 --> 01:06:42,093
infrastructure lead to delays and 

1705
01:06:42,093 --> 01:06:43,760
maintenance schedules and put 

1706
01:06:43,760 --> 01:06:46,030
communities at risk for environmental 

1707
01:06:46,030 --> 01:06:49,020
disasters as we have seen in Hawaii . 

1708
01:06:49,020 --> 01:06:51,187
But it also leaves infrastructure that 

1709
01:06:51,187 --> 01:06:53,353
is critical to our national security , 

1710
01:06:53,353 --> 01:06:57,030
but often as an after thought like 

1711
01:06:57,030 --> 01:06:58,808
wastewater treatment plants and 

1712
01:06:58,808 --> 01:07:01,390
pipelines exposed to cyber attacks , 

1713
01:07:01,400 --> 01:07:04,100
that is why I very much appreciated 

1714
01:07:04,100 --> 01:07:05,600
President Biden's national 

1715
01:07:05,600 --> 01:07:07,640
cybersecurity strategy strategies 

1716
01:07:07,640 --> 01:07:09,307
focused on defending critical 

1717
01:07:09,307 --> 01:07:12,360
infrastructure , I E things like 

1718
01:07:12,370 --> 01:07:15,390
wastewater treatment plants and 

1719
01:07:15,400 --> 01:07:17,800
pipes . How would the Department of 

1720
01:07:17,800 --> 01:07:21,360
Defense collaborate with other federal 

1721
01:07:21,370 --> 01:07:23,910
agencies to implement the 

1722
01:07:23,910 --> 01:07:26,420
infrastructure goes outlined in the 

1723
01:07:26,420 --> 01:07:28,660
President's National cybersecurity 

1724
01:07:28,660 --> 01:07:32,410
strategy . Senator from a cybersecurity 

1725
01:07:32,410 --> 01:07:34,660
perspective . We begin first of all 

1726
01:07:34,660 --> 01:07:36,493
with the focus on D O D critical 

1727
01:07:36,493 --> 01:07:38,660
infrastructure . Two weeks ago , I was 

1728
01:07:38,660 --> 01:07:40,716
in Hawaii to see Admiral Aquilino uh 

1729
01:07:40,716 --> 01:07:42,590
and to work with him in terms of 

1730
01:07:42,600 --> 01:07:44,270
looking at the D O D critical 

1731
01:07:44,270 --> 01:07:46,437
infrastructure within the islands . Uh 

1732
01:07:46,437 --> 01:07:48,603
We work with a series of partners when 

1733
01:07:48,603 --> 01:07:50,659
requested to provide that assistance 

1734
01:07:50,659 --> 01:07:52,826
that comes as a request for assistance 

1735
01:07:52,826 --> 01:07:54,937
from other agencies to the department 

1736
01:07:54,937 --> 01:07:57,103
of which then we would be part of that 

1737
01:07:57,103 --> 01:07:59,230
assistance . Don't you think that 

1738
01:07:59,240 --> 01:08:02,270
maintaining are the physical aspects of 

1739
01:08:02,270 --> 01:08:05,790
our critical infrastructure is a very 

1740
01:08:05,790 --> 01:08:08,380
important part of your ability to do 

1741
01:08:08,380 --> 01:08:10,520
your mission ? Certainly , we need a 

1742
01:08:10,520 --> 01:08:12,464
platform upon which to operate . I 

1743
01:08:12,464 --> 01:08:14,687
agree with you , Senator . And , and so 

1744
01:08:14,687 --> 01:08:16,520
what we are focused on though is 

1745
01:08:16,520 --> 01:08:18,576
obviously the cyber elements of that 

1746
01:08:18,576 --> 01:08:20,520
and then working again through the 

1747
01:08:20,520 --> 01:08:22,520
department to assist and and answer 

1748
01:08:22,520 --> 01:08:24,798
those requests . So I think , you know , 

1749
01:08:24,798 --> 01:08:26,909
it's all , you know , we need to look 

1750
01:08:26,909 --> 01:08:28,964
at these things in a much more total 

1751
01:08:28,964 --> 01:08:31,830
kind of an aspect . That is why it was 

1752
01:08:31,830 --> 01:08:34,670
really important for um Admiral 

1753
01:08:34,670 --> 01:08:37,130
Aquilino to ask for an assessment of 

1754
01:08:37,130 --> 01:08:39,130
the infrastructure needs across the 

1755
01:08:39,130 --> 01:08:41,186
services in Hawaii . But I would say 

1756
01:08:41,186 --> 01:08:44,080
across the country for again , you 

1757
01:08:44,080 --> 01:08:46,230
General Sony and General Fenton , the 

1758
01:08:46,230 --> 01:08:48,790
administration's India's identifies 

1759
01:08:48,790 --> 01:08:51,220
China as the pacing challenge for 

1760
01:08:51,220 --> 01:08:53,940
military and to create enduring 

1761
01:08:53,950 --> 01:08:57,320
deterrence . It is critical that we uh 

1762
01:08:57,570 --> 01:08:59,960
remain the partner of choice in the 

1763
01:08:59,970 --> 01:09:02,200
Indo Pacific Air are , which is why I 

1764
01:09:02,200 --> 01:09:04,500
have supported additional funding for 

1765
01:09:04,500 --> 01:09:06,960
exercises in the region and building on 

1766
01:09:06,960 --> 01:09:09,150
longstanding relationships like the 

1767
01:09:09,150 --> 01:09:11,360
compact of free association , which we 

1768
01:09:11,360 --> 01:09:14,520
are concluding our negotiations on 

1769
01:09:14,680 --> 01:09:17,520
what opportunities have your respective 

1770
01:09:17,520 --> 01:09:19,687
commands had for multilateral training 

1771
01:09:19,687 --> 01:09:21,940
last year , specifically in the Pacific 

1772
01:09:21,950 --> 01:09:24,230
they are . And how will you build from 

1773
01:09:24,230 --> 01:09:26,380
those going forward . This is for 

1774
01:09:26,390 --> 01:09:29,780
General Nakasone and Fenton Senator . 

1775
01:09:29,780 --> 01:09:31,891
We began with Cyber flag which is our 

1776
01:09:31,891 --> 01:09:34,640
annual uh Keystone exercise . We 

1777
01:09:34,640 --> 01:09:37,010
invited a series of partners from the 

1778
01:09:37,010 --> 01:09:39,190
Pacific that includes Korea that 

1779
01:09:39,190 --> 01:09:41,690
includes Australia that includes other 

1780
01:09:41,700 --> 01:09:44,000
nations within the Pacific that decided 

1781
01:09:44,000 --> 01:09:46,111
to come and exercise with us . That's 

1782
01:09:46,111 --> 01:09:48,222
one piece of it . The second piece is 

1783
01:09:48,222 --> 01:09:50,444
what I had spoken to previously , which 

1784
01:09:50,444 --> 01:09:52,611
is a state partnership program working 

1785
01:09:52,611 --> 01:09:54,722
very , very closely with Hawaii , the 

1786
01:09:54,722 --> 01:09:56,944
Hawaii Army National Guard , Hawaii Air 

1787
01:09:56,944 --> 01:09:59,111
Force Reserve and National Guard to be 

1788
01:09:59,111 --> 01:10:01,333
able to assist them as they take a look 

1789
01:10:01,333 --> 01:10:03,333
at Indonesia and the Philippines to 

1790
01:10:03,333 --> 01:10:05,056
countries that are um that are 

1791
01:10:05,056 --> 01:10:07,111
partnered with the state of Hawaii . 

1792
01:10:07,111 --> 01:10:09,278
And so that's an area that I think has 

1793
01:10:09,278 --> 01:10:11,444
got tremendous potential in the coming 

1794
01:10:11,444 --> 01:10:14,630
year . General , I am particularly 

1795
01:10:14,630 --> 01:10:16,980
interested in really strengthening . I 

1796
01:10:16,990 --> 01:10:19,212
agree with your area of focus general , 

1797
01:10:19,440 --> 01:10:22,040
but also , you know , the Pacific 

1798
01:10:22,040 --> 01:10:24,260
Island nations such as Palau and 

1799
01:10:24,260 --> 01:10:27,300
Marshall Islands and Micronesia . Can 

1800
01:10:27,300 --> 01:10:29,244
you add to the response , please ? 

1801
01:10:29,244 --> 01:10:31,500
Senator I can't . I'll start with uh 

1802
01:10:31,510 --> 01:10:33,677
your special operations team out there 

1803
01:10:33,677 --> 01:10:35,343
through the theater , special 

1804
01:10:35,343 --> 01:10:38,080
operations element , sock pack . 

1805
01:10:38,090 --> 01:10:40,830
Special ops Command . Pacific is part 

1806
01:10:40,830 --> 01:10:43,500
of all the indo pay com exercise events . 

1807
01:10:43,710 --> 01:10:45,550
It's very key for us because our 

1808
01:10:45,550 --> 01:10:47,606
ability to build partners and allies 

1809
01:10:47,606 --> 01:10:49,828
along with the entire indo pay com team 

1810
01:10:49,828 --> 01:10:52,270
for your special ops is it's a pacing 

1811
01:10:52,270 --> 01:10:53,992
item . It's very important and 

1812
01:10:53,992 --> 01:10:55,937
certainly a high priority for this 

1813
01:10:55,937 --> 01:10:58,048
nation and Secretary of Defense below 

1814
01:10:58,048 --> 01:11:00,920
that , we also have our own uh either 

1815
01:11:00,920 --> 01:11:02,990
bilateral multinational special 

1816
01:11:02,990 --> 01:11:04,920
operations training events in the 

1817
01:11:04,920 --> 01:11:08,410
region or back uh in , in places around 

1818
01:11:08,410 --> 01:11:11,320
bases that we have in , in , in Conus . 

1819
01:11:11,550 --> 01:11:14,570
So our ability to be linked up with the 

1820
01:11:14,570 --> 01:11:16,570
indo pay com desired end states for 

1821
01:11:16,570 --> 01:11:18,681
partners and allies and really enable 

1822
01:11:18,681 --> 01:11:20,950
that plus what we bring in . It's in 

1823
01:11:20,950 --> 01:11:22,890
our nature and our D N A to be a 

1824
01:11:22,900 --> 01:11:25,590
partner force of choice . Uh I think is 

1825
01:11:25,590 --> 01:11:28,420
very , very impactful for uh Admiral 

1826
01:11:28,420 --> 01:11:30,600
Aquilino and end up a com I would say 

1827
01:11:30,600 --> 01:11:32,790
to your partnering anywhere is 

1828
01:11:32,790 --> 01:11:35,300
important to us . So to the island 

1829
01:11:35,300 --> 01:11:38,440
nation's whether the Oceania uh 

1830
01:11:38,450 --> 01:11:40,506
Micronesia , Melanesia , Polynesia , 

1831
01:11:40,506 --> 01:11:42,728
your special ops team has relationships 

1832
01:11:42,728 --> 01:11:45,000
there already . Uh some of that is not 

1833
01:11:45,010 --> 01:11:47,710
an exercise , but certainly in contact 

1834
01:11:47,710 --> 01:11:49,877
or in deployments we've had throughout 

1835
01:11:49,877 --> 01:11:52,043
the years and will continue to do that 

1836
01:11:52,043 --> 01:11:54,099
and strengthen it as uh the end up a 

1837
01:11:54,099 --> 01:11:56,099
com team and commander would want , 

1838
01:11:56,099 --> 01:11:58,099
thank you as my time is up . I just 

1839
01:11:58,099 --> 01:12:00,321
wanted to mention General Fenton that I 

1840
01:12:00,321 --> 01:12:02,377
did appreciate that in your prepared 

1841
01:12:02,377 --> 01:12:04,488
remarks . You talk about diversity of 

1842
01:12:04,488 --> 01:12:06,710
thought and background in our people as 

1843
01:12:06,710 --> 01:12:09,200
a critical enabler of the American 

1844
01:12:09,200 --> 01:12:11,470
advantage . Thank you very much and , 

1845
01:12:11,470 --> 01:12:13,890
and you know , the focus on maintaining 

1846
01:12:13,900 --> 01:12:15,910
um that kind of diversity . I 

1847
01:12:15,920 --> 01:12:18,310
completely agree with you . Thank you , 

1848
01:12:18,320 --> 01:12:19,320
Mr Chairman , 

1849
01:12:23,250 --> 01:12:25,570
Senator Tuberville . Thank you , 

1850
01:12:25,570 --> 01:12:28,930
Senator King . Um Thank all of you . 

1851
01:12:28,930 --> 01:12:30,930
For your service . Thanks for being 

1852
01:12:30,930 --> 01:12:34,610
here today . General Market , Sony . 

1853
01:12:34,620 --> 01:12:37,400
Um I like what you said in your opening . 

1854
01:12:37,410 --> 01:12:39,440
We win with people . I think that's 

1855
01:12:39,440 --> 01:12:41,607
everything that we do , especially our 

1856
01:12:41,607 --> 01:12:43,910
country , you know , in your department 

1857
01:12:44,480 --> 01:12:46,702
when you're looking to recruit people . 

1858
01:12:46,702 --> 01:12:49,060
Obviously , cyber is your 

1859
01:12:49,740 --> 01:12:52,370
purview . What other areas do you look 

1860
01:12:52,370 --> 01:12:55,220
for in young people ? Uh , information 

1861
01:12:55,220 --> 01:12:57,820
technology and what all areas do you 

1862
01:12:57,820 --> 01:12:59,820
look for in recruiting somebody for 

1863
01:12:59,820 --> 01:13:01,876
Cyber ? Look for someone that can do 

1864
01:13:01,876 --> 01:13:04,000
critical thinking senator that begins 

1865
01:13:04,000 --> 01:13:05,944
with it . There are more than just 

1866
01:13:05,944 --> 01:13:08,167
information technology majors out there 

1867
01:13:08,167 --> 01:13:10,222
that are successful in Cyber . There 

1868
01:13:10,222 --> 01:13:09,820
are linguists , there are 

1869
01:13:09,820 --> 01:13:12,880
mathematicians , there are uh you know , 

1870
01:13:12,890 --> 01:13:14,890
um liberal arts majors , what we're 

1871
01:13:14,890 --> 01:13:16,779
looking for , someone that has an 

1872
01:13:16,779 --> 01:13:18,946
interest has a passion to do this type 

1873
01:13:18,946 --> 01:13:21,168
of work that doesn't want to leave work 

1874
01:13:21,168 --> 01:13:20,810
until they're able to get the access 

1875
01:13:20,810 --> 01:13:22,754
that's necessary for us to have an 

1876
01:13:22,754 --> 01:13:25,590
effect . Is that growing uh is , are we 

1877
01:13:25,590 --> 01:13:27,701
losing more to private sector ? How's 

1878
01:13:27,701 --> 01:13:30,060
that going ? So , first of all , in the 

1879
01:13:30,060 --> 01:13:32,116
recruiting piece , the services have 

1880
01:13:32,116 --> 01:13:34,282
tremendous success in recruiting cyber 

1881
01:13:34,282 --> 01:13:36,282
forces there . They're not having a 

1882
01:13:36,282 --> 01:13:38,116
problem filling it . I think the 

1883
01:13:38,116 --> 01:13:40,338
challenge becomes later on is there are 

1884
01:13:40,338 --> 01:13:39,880
a number of choices that young people 

1885
01:13:39,880 --> 01:13:42,960
have . And so I think we have to think 

1886
01:13:42,960 --> 01:13:45,182
a bit differently here . First of all , 

1887
01:13:45,182 --> 01:13:47,182
maybe we need to lengthen the , you 

1888
01:13:47,182 --> 01:13:49,700
know , the obligation to become trained 

1889
01:13:49,700 --> 01:13:51,867
in Cyber because it is so attractive . 

1890
01:13:51,867 --> 01:13:53,978
Secondly , I do believe that when you 

1891
01:13:53,978 --> 01:13:56,033
come to our forces , that's the only 

1892
01:13:56,033 --> 01:13:57,922
thing that you should do for your 

1893
01:13:57,922 --> 01:13:59,867
career much in the same where I've 

1894
01:13:59,867 --> 01:14:01,922
watched special operations Forces be 

1895
01:14:01,922 --> 01:14:03,922
successful . When you come become , 

1896
01:14:03,922 --> 01:14:03,510
when you become a special operations 

1897
01:14:03,510 --> 01:14:05,510
force operator , that's what you're 

1898
01:14:05,510 --> 01:14:07,566
doing all the time . And that's what 

1899
01:14:07,566 --> 01:14:09,788
they want to do our forces the same way 

1900
01:14:09,788 --> 01:14:11,732
as retention in your department of 

1901
01:14:11,732 --> 01:14:13,732
young people . Once they feel their 

1902
01:14:13,732 --> 01:14:15,510
duty , do we have a pretty good 

1903
01:14:15,510 --> 01:14:17,732
retention to re up ? So it's a , it's a 

1904
01:14:17,732 --> 01:14:19,788
mixed bag by service Senator . I can 

1905
01:14:19,788 --> 01:14:22,121
certainly come back to it , the numbers . 

1906
01:14:22,121 --> 01:14:21,970
But the challenge of course is that 

1907
01:14:21,970 --> 01:14:23,990
there are a lot of choices and so 

1908
01:14:23,990 --> 01:14:26,101
that's what we , we have to make sure 

1909
01:14:26,101 --> 01:14:28,530
that we're on guard for . How concerned 

1910
01:14:28,530 --> 01:14:30,697
are you about tiktok and the influence 

1911
01:14:30,697 --> 01:14:32,863
that they're having on American kids ? 

1912
01:14:32,863 --> 01:14:35,030
So tiktok concerns me for a number of 

1913
01:14:35,030 --> 01:14:37,030
different reasons . One is the data 

1914
01:14:37,030 --> 01:14:38,974
that they have . Secondly , is the 

1915
01:14:38,974 --> 01:14:41,086
algorithm and the control who has the 

1916
01:14:41,086 --> 01:14:43,419
algorithm . Third is the broad platform , 

1917
01:14:43,419 --> 01:14:45,419
influence operations that we talked 

1918
01:14:45,419 --> 01:14:44,750
about previously . It's not only the 

1919
01:14:44,750 --> 01:14:46,972
fact that you can influence something , 

1920
01:14:46,972 --> 01:14:49,139
but you can also , you know , turn off 

1921
01:14:49,139 --> 01:14:51,306
the message as well when you have such 

1922
01:14:51,306 --> 01:14:53,472
a large population of , of listeners . 

1923
01:14:53,472 --> 01:14:55,694
Yeah . Thank you for that general . You 

1924
01:14:55,694 --> 01:14:57,750
don't have a recruiting problem . Do 

1925
01:14:57,750 --> 01:15:01,120
you , Senator ? I'll start that we are 

1926
01:15:01,130 --> 01:15:04,910
recipients of services and I would want 

1927
01:15:04,910 --> 01:15:07,240
all to know that we're very uh 

1928
01:15:07,250 --> 01:15:09,083
integrated with their recruiting 

1929
01:15:09,083 --> 01:15:11,306
efforts . And there are some challenges 

1930
01:15:11,306 --> 01:15:13,472
out there for the services right now . 

1931
01:15:13,472 --> 01:15:15,472
Your special operations team is not 

1932
01:15:15,472 --> 01:15:17,639
having a recruiting problem . Uh We're 

1933
01:15:17,639 --> 01:15:19,861
at , uh we're at an aggregate at a very 

1934
01:15:19,861 --> 01:15:21,750
high level of recruitment and the 

1935
01:15:21,750 --> 01:15:24,210
department's got a retention number . I 

1936
01:15:24,210 --> 01:15:26,154
think that's one of the highest in 

1937
01:15:26,154 --> 01:15:28,266
decades . And we're right there along 

1938
01:15:28,266 --> 01:15:30,210
with , yeah , you require the most 

1939
01:15:30,210 --> 01:15:32,543
rigorous training standards in military , 

1940
01:15:32,543 --> 01:15:35,640
correct ? We at center , we require 

1941
01:15:35,650 --> 01:15:38,460
very high standards and folks who want 

1942
01:15:38,460 --> 01:15:41,230
to come and be part of that journey , 

1943
01:15:41,240 --> 01:15:44,410
who have determination , grit , uh 

1944
01:15:44,420 --> 01:15:47,170
initiative , uh willingness to see 

1945
01:15:47,170 --> 01:15:49,392
something through and frankly , what we 

1946
01:15:49,392 --> 01:15:51,448
really look for is somebody acquired 

1947
01:15:51,448 --> 01:15:53,559
professional who will do this mission 

1948
01:15:53,559 --> 01:15:55,800
uh and , and succeed and then get ready 

1949
01:15:55,800 --> 01:15:57,856
to do the next one . Would you agree 

1950
01:15:57,856 --> 01:16:01,160
that it's also the most riskiest part 

1951
01:16:01,170 --> 01:16:04,780
in our military ? Senator ? I , 

1952
01:16:04,790 --> 01:16:06,734
there's a lot of our teammates out 

1953
01:16:06,734 --> 01:16:08,901
there across the services that do some 

1954
01:16:08,901 --> 01:16:12,500
incredible feats of , of both their 

1955
01:16:12,500 --> 01:16:15,120
mission and bravery . I'd say we're one 

1956
01:16:15,120 --> 01:16:17,910
part of what that our department has as 

1957
01:16:17,910 --> 01:16:20,990
the most incredible military formation 

1958
01:16:20,990 --> 01:16:23,140
in the history of mankind . That's 

1959
01:16:23,140 --> 01:16:25,029
pretty diplomatic way to put it . 

1960
01:16:25,029 --> 01:16:26,918
General , we do some really tough 

1961
01:16:26,918 --> 01:16:29,270
missions . Yeah , very tough . Uh You 

1962
01:16:29,270 --> 01:16:31,326
know , I think there's a lesson here 

1963
01:16:31,326 --> 01:16:33,437
for the rest of our military and it's 

1964
01:16:33,437 --> 01:16:35,659
not everybody but uh in America's youth 

1965
01:16:35,659 --> 01:16:37,603
want to serve an organization with 

1966
01:16:37,603 --> 01:16:39,740
purpose and patriotism . I mean , we 

1967
01:16:39,740 --> 01:16:42,450
all saw that growing up , uh , in light 

1968
01:16:42,460 --> 01:16:44,740
it seems people rise to standards that 

1969
01:16:44,740 --> 01:16:46,907
you set for them . I mean , I saw that 

1970
01:16:46,910 --> 01:16:49,340
in , in my former life of coaching . I 

1971
01:16:49,340 --> 01:16:51,720
mean , you set a standard and , and 

1972
01:16:51,730 --> 01:16:53,897
most of the time if you push them hard 

1973
01:16:53,897 --> 01:16:56,008
enough , no matter where they want to 

1974
01:16:56,008 --> 01:16:58,174
or not , they'll reach that standard . 

1975
01:16:58,174 --> 01:17:00,341
So I want to thank for what socom does 

1976
01:17:00,341 --> 01:17:02,341
and everything that y'all stand for 

1977
01:17:02,341 --> 01:17:04,563
because you're on the front lines every 

1978
01:17:04,563 --> 01:17:06,786
day and uh you're usually the first one 

1979
01:17:06,786 --> 01:17:09,063
to get there and the last one to leave . 

1980
01:17:09,063 --> 01:17:11,230
So thanks to your group and the people 

1981
01:17:11,230 --> 01:17:13,174
that stand up for this country and 

1982
01:17:13,174 --> 01:17:12,830
patriotism that they have for us . 

1983
01:17:12,830 --> 01:17:14,886
Thank you very much . Thank you , Mr 

1984
01:17:14,886 --> 01:17:16,941
Chairman on behalf of the chairman , 

1985
01:17:16,941 --> 01:17:18,820
Senator Warren . Uh Thank you Mr 

1986
01:17:18,820 --> 01:17:20,940
Chairman . So , one of the primary 

1987
01:17:20,940 --> 01:17:23,550
purposes of this hearing is to evaluate 

1988
01:17:23,550 --> 01:17:26,560
your commands , budget requests . Most 

1989
01:17:26,560 --> 01:17:28,727
federal agencies have to balance their 

1990
01:17:28,727 --> 01:17:31,520
must haves against their nice to haves 

1991
01:17:31,530 --> 01:17:34,240
when it comes to requests for money and 

1992
01:17:34,240 --> 01:17:36,184
they have to account for long term 

1993
01:17:36,184 --> 01:17:38,296
costs . For example , the maintenance 

1994
01:17:38,296 --> 01:17:40,710
of fleet vehicles that they want to buy , 

1995
01:17:40,930 --> 01:17:43,860
but not the Department of Defense D O D 

1996
01:17:43,860 --> 01:17:45,916
submits its budget for the things it 

1997
01:17:45,916 --> 01:17:48,850
wants and then it submits a second list 

1998
01:17:48,850 --> 01:17:51,380
of things that they want funded and 

1999
01:17:51,380 --> 01:17:53,602
they don't add what the long term costs 

2000
01:17:53,602 --> 01:17:56,790
will be D O D calls this second list , 

2001
01:17:56,800 --> 01:17:59,610
unfunded priorities . I call it a wish 

2002
01:17:59,610 --> 01:18:02,720
list . Now last year , some parts of D 

2003
01:18:02,720 --> 01:18:05,660
O D stuck to their budgets and didn't 

2004
01:18:05,660 --> 01:18:08,720
put anything on a wish list but not so 

2005
01:18:08,720 --> 01:18:11,410
calm . Nope , so calm got 

2006
01:18:11,410 --> 01:18:15,000
$13.2 billion in its regular 

2007
01:18:15,000 --> 01:18:17,111
budget . Then turned around and asked 

2008
01:18:17,111 --> 01:18:21,030
for $656 million . Additionally , 

2009
01:18:21,240 --> 01:18:24,030
now one of the items on so coms wish 

2010
01:18:24,030 --> 01:18:27,830
list last year was $8.7 million to 

2011
01:18:27,830 --> 01:18:31,320
ensure that a socom armament facility 

2012
01:18:31,330 --> 01:18:34,680
could meet blast exposure standards 

2013
01:18:34,690 --> 01:18:37,580
that protect service members from 

2014
01:18:37,580 --> 01:18:40,860
traumatic brain injury . General Fenton . 

2015
01:18:40,870 --> 01:18:42,910
Do you agree that if SOCOM needs 

2016
01:18:42,910 --> 01:18:45,850
funding for a project that will ensure 

2017
01:18:45,850 --> 01:18:47,850
that it is in compliance with basic 

2018
01:18:47,850 --> 01:18:50,640
safety standards and help protect 

2019
01:18:50,640 --> 01:18:52,970
workers from brain damage ? That 

2020
01:18:52,970 --> 01:18:55,137
project should be part of the commands 

2021
01:18:55,137 --> 01:18:59,030
budget , Senator 

2022
01:18:59,040 --> 01:19:02,530
uh put a high priority on safety . So 

2023
01:19:02,530 --> 01:19:04,752
should it be part of your budget ? Then 

2024
01:19:04,800 --> 01:19:07,150
any budget I build or reflect my 

2025
01:19:07,150 --> 01:19:09,261
priorities and priority is safety and 

2026
01:19:09,261 --> 01:19:11,372
certainly aligned with the N D s . So 

2027
01:19:11,372 --> 01:19:13,372
that means you think that something 

2028
01:19:13,372 --> 01:19:15,650
like this should be in the base budget , 

2029
01:19:15,650 --> 01:19:17,872
Senator I put a high priority on safety 

2030
01:19:17,872 --> 01:19:20,094
and budget . But you're telling me your 

2031
01:19:20,094 --> 01:19:22,094
budget reflects your priorities and 

2032
01:19:22,094 --> 01:19:24,317
somehow this didn't even make it in the 

2033
01:19:24,317 --> 01:19:26,483
basic budget . So look , let me ask it 

2034
01:19:26,483 --> 01:19:28,650
this way . Then this armament facility 

2035
01:19:28,650 --> 01:19:30,872
improvements weren't funded last year . 

2036
01:19:30,872 --> 01:19:33,530
So are you gonna put that in your base ? 

2037
01:19:33,530 --> 01:19:35,697
Budget this year . Are you gonna count 

2038
01:19:35,697 --> 01:19:37,919
on Congress to add extra money for it ? 

2039
01:19:37,919 --> 01:19:40,197
Which it didn't do last year . Senator . 

2040
01:19:40,197 --> 01:19:42,020
The first thing I'll do is get 

2041
01:19:42,020 --> 01:19:44,570
intimately familiar with the army 

2042
01:19:44,570 --> 01:19:46,570
facility you're , you're discussing 

2043
01:19:46,570 --> 01:19:48,681
right now , six months into the job . 

2044
01:19:48,681 --> 01:19:50,626
I'm still working my way through a 

2045
01:19:50,626 --> 01:19:53,720
number of , of certainly locations in 

2046
01:19:53,720 --> 01:19:55,720
the special ops community . So I'll 

2047
01:19:55,720 --> 01:19:57,831
take that for the record and get back 

2048
01:19:57,831 --> 01:19:59,900
to you . But my budget will be uh 

2049
01:19:59,910 --> 01:20:02,150
reflective of my priorities that are 

2050
01:20:02,150 --> 01:20:04,039
aligned with the national defense 

2051
01:20:04,039 --> 01:20:06,330
strategy and safety of our uh entire 

2052
01:20:06,330 --> 01:20:08,497
force is certainly a high priority for 

2053
01:20:08,497 --> 01:20:10,608
me . Well , I appreciate that , but I 

2054
01:20:10,608 --> 01:20:12,830
just want to make another point for the 

2055
01:20:12,830 --> 01:20:14,997
record . I wasn't born yesterday . You 

2056
01:20:14,997 --> 01:20:17,219
know , I get what's happening here . So 

2057
01:20:17,219 --> 01:20:19,830
calm and other commands are gaming the 

2058
01:20:19,830 --> 01:20:22,380
system . They take costs that should be 

2059
01:20:22,380 --> 01:20:24,320
part of a base budget request , 

2060
01:20:24,320 --> 01:20:27,590
essential programs like funding to come 

2061
01:20:27,590 --> 01:20:29,600
into compliance with brain injury 

2062
01:20:29,600 --> 01:20:32,100
prevention standards and then put them 

2063
01:20:32,100 --> 01:20:35,670
on the wish list , daring Congress not 

2064
01:20:35,680 --> 01:20:37,900
to fund them . And that way they can 

2065
01:20:37,900 --> 01:20:40,930
boost their overall budget allocation 

2066
01:20:41,260 --> 01:20:43,430
in January . I sent a letter to 

2067
01:20:43,430 --> 01:20:45,740
Secretary Austin along with Senators 

2068
01:20:45,740 --> 01:20:49,690
Braun Lee and King telling D O D not 

2069
01:20:49,690 --> 01:20:52,690
to send Congress any wish lists as part 

2070
01:20:52,690 --> 01:20:55,350
of this year's budget . So General 

2071
01:20:55,350 --> 01:20:57,183
Fenton , this is your first time 

2072
01:20:57,183 --> 01:20:59,406
submitting a budget as the commander of 

2073
01:20:59,406 --> 01:21:01,580
SOCOM . You'll be sending it over to 

2074
01:21:01,580 --> 01:21:03,691
Congress this week . So you should be 

2075
01:21:03,691 --> 01:21:06,330
right on top of this . Will you pledge 

2076
01:21:06,340 --> 01:21:09,580
not to request any unfunded priority 

2077
01:21:09,590 --> 01:21:12,490
items ? On top of your annual budget 

2078
01:21:12,490 --> 01:21:16,260
request , Senator , I will 

2079
01:21:16,260 --> 01:21:18,850
submit the budget that reflects my 

2080
01:21:18,850 --> 01:21:20,961
priority is aligned against the N D s 

2081
01:21:21,140 --> 01:21:24,880
and I will submit that and 

2082
01:21:24,890 --> 01:21:28,170
any you poll required by law that 

2083
01:21:28,170 --> 01:21:30,140
reflects facts of life changes , 

2084
01:21:30,140 --> 01:21:32,530
accelerated capabilities and any 

2085
01:21:32,530 --> 01:21:34,850
additional nds . Let me stop you right 

2086
01:21:34,850 --> 01:21:36,906
there . I just want to be required . 

2087
01:21:37,220 --> 01:21:39,270
You need to submit a list . You are 

2088
01:21:39,270 --> 01:21:41,381
right . That is required by law , but 

2089
01:21:41,381 --> 01:21:43,603
you don't need to put anything in it or 

2090
01:21:43,603 --> 01:21:45,770
ask for any funding from it . The list 

2091
01:21:45,770 --> 01:21:47,214
from European Command and 

2092
01:21:47,214 --> 01:21:49,710
Transportation Command were blank last 

2093
01:21:49,710 --> 01:21:52,240
year . That is they lived within their 

2094
01:21:52,240 --> 01:21:54,970
budget . They did not come back for an 

2095
01:21:54,970 --> 01:21:57,090
additional bite at the apple and I'm 

2096
01:21:57,090 --> 01:21:59,500
just asking if you will agree to do the 

2097
01:21:59,500 --> 01:22:01,556
same thing . That's what budgets are 

2098
01:22:01,556 --> 01:22:03,444
about . They're about making your 

2099
01:22:03,444 --> 01:22:05,556
priorities clear . And I want to know 

2100
01:22:05,556 --> 01:22:07,611
if you're willing to live within the 

2101
01:22:07,611 --> 01:22:09,833
budget that you have from the D O D and 

2102
01:22:09,833 --> 01:22:13,410
not come back here for more . Submit a 

2103
01:22:13,410 --> 01:22:15,200
budget that is in line with my 

2104
01:22:15,200 --> 01:22:17,367
priorities in line with the N D s . Is 

2105
01:22:17,367 --> 01:22:20,270
that a yes or no senator and as 

2106
01:22:20,280 --> 01:22:23,170
requested by law and by law , I will 

2107
01:22:23,170 --> 01:22:25,392
submit to you , Paul , I will take into 

2108
01:22:25,392 --> 01:22:27,281
consideration any facts of life . 

2109
01:22:27,370 --> 01:22:29,592
That's frankly , that's not even a very 

2110
01:22:29,592 --> 01:22:31,990
artful dodge . Look , we don't let any 

2111
01:22:32,000 --> 01:22:34,056
other part of the federal government 

2112
01:22:34,056 --> 01:22:36,310
behave this way and for good reason , 

2113
01:22:36,560 --> 01:22:38,870
the budget process is about making 

2114
01:22:38,870 --> 01:22:41,010
tough choices and setting clear 

2115
01:22:41,010 --> 01:22:43,650
priorities . Anything in the regular 

2116
01:22:43,650 --> 01:22:45,817
budget must include an analysis of the 

2117
01:22:45,817 --> 01:22:47,928
long term costs , not things that are 

2118
01:22:47,928 --> 01:22:50,150
on the wish list . I have a bipartisan 

2119
01:22:50,150 --> 01:22:52,570
bill to eliminate waste like this , but 

2120
01:22:52,570 --> 01:22:54,640
D O D could shut it down voluntarily 

2121
01:22:54,640 --> 01:22:56,770
right now and I urge you to do that . 

2122
01:22:56,780 --> 01:22:59,630
Thank you , Mr Chairman on behalf the 

2123
01:22:59,630 --> 01:23:02,290
chairman Senator rounds . Thank you , 

2124
01:23:02,290 --> 01:23:04,640
Mr Chairman , gentlemen , first of all , 

2125
01:23:04,640 --> 01:23:06,529
thank you for your service to our 

2126
01:23:06,529 --> 01:23:09,060
country . Um And I have to admit , I 

2127
01:23:09,060 --> 01:23:11,600
like seeing options in the budget . I 

2128
01:23:11,610 --> 01:23:13,721
like seeing alternatives . It doesn't 

2129
01:23:13,721 --> 01:23:15,666
mean that everything that's on the 

2130
01:23:15,666 --> 01:23:17,777
budget is necessarily gonna be funded 

2131
01:23:17,777 --> 01:23:19,888
by or recommended by this committee . 

2132
01:23:19,888 --> 01:23:19,710
But to see the other options out there 

2133
01:23:19,720 --> 01:23:21,960
from my perspective , I I appreciate 

2134
01:23:21,960 --> 01:23:24,127
seeing those others that sometimes may 

2135
01:23:24,127 --> 01:23:26,127
not make it all the way through the 

2136
01:23:26,127 --> 01:23:28,238
budget process . General Fenton Socom 

2137
01:23:28,238 --> 01:23:30,071
has undoubtedly been reorienting 

2138
01:23:30,071 --> 01:23:32,127
reorienting from counterterrorism to 

2139
01:23:32,127 --> 01:23:34,400
preparation for a high end near peer 

2140
01:23:34,400 --> 01:23:36,720
fight . Assume a situation in which we 

2141
01:23:36,720 --> 01:23:39,320
had to respond under article five and 

2142
01:23:39,320 --> 01:23:41,830
support our NATO allies in Europe . And 

2143
01:23:41,840 --> 01:23:44,420
China concurrently took military action 

2144
01:23:44,420 --> 01:23:47,570
to claim Taiwan . What do you assess 

2145
01:23:47,570 --> 01:23:49,990
would be so calms capability to support 

2146
01:23:50,000 --> 01:23:53,110
a two theater war concurrently in 

2147
01:23:53,110 --> 01:23:55,150
Europe and the Pacific 

2148
01:23:58,850 --> 01:24:01,640
Senator . What I can tell you now is 

2149
01:24:01,640 --> 01:24:03,696
that your special operations team is 

2150
01:24:03,696 --> 01:24:06,780
already globally deployed . Uh 5000 

2151
01:24:06,780 --> 01:24:10,030
personnel and 80 different countries uh 

2152
01:24:10,040 --> 01:24:12,490
at combatant command request . And at 

2153
01:24:12,490 --> 01:24:15,120
times that departmental request , our 

2154
01:24:15,120 --> 01:24:17,410
ability to address the integrated 

2155
01:24:17,410 --> 01:24:19,790
deterrents peace crisis response and 

2156
01:24:19,790 --> 01:24:22,920
counterterrorism . Uh We were 

2157
01:24:22,920 --> 01:24:25,290
absolutely able to do all that . We're 

2158
01:24:25,290 --> 01:24:27,890
able to do the front end competition , 

2159
01:24:27,900 --> 01:24:30,011
integrated deterrence with training , 

2160
01:24:30,011 --> 01:24:32,344
building capability partners and allies . 

2161
01:24:32,344 --> 01:24:34,567
And at the same time , we're also ready 

2162
01:24:34,567 --> 01:24:36,789
to prepare an environment for the joint 

2163
01:24:36,789 --> 01:24:39,011
force and prevail in conflict . I think 

2164
01:24:39,011 --> 01:24:41,340
what I'm really trying to get out is is 

2165
01:24:41,350 --> 01:24:44,800
it seems as though our policy here is 

2166
01:24:44,800 --> 01:24:47,280
not necessarily to win into two 

2167
01:24:47,280 --> 01:24:49,502
theaters and yet everything that we can 

2168
01:24:49,502 --> 01:24:53,010
do to be in a position uh to give the 

2169
01:24:53,010 --> 01:24:55,177
young men and women on the front lines 

2170
01:24:55,177 --> 01:24:57,343
every opportunity we should be talking 

2171
01:24:57,343 --> 01:25:00,000
about now before it ever happens . And 

2172
01:25:00,000 --> 01:25:02,580
I just uh with regard to a budget which 

2173
01:25:02,580 --> 01:25:04,691
you will prepare and bring in and lay 

2174
01:25:04,691 --> 01:25:07,160
out , would it be fair to say that 

2175
01:25:07,160 --> 01:25:09,160
there are other items that could be 

2176
01:25:09,160 --> 01:25:11,300
done ? Um And in the very near future 

2177
01:25:11,300 --> 01:25:13,600
that could help us do a better job of 

2178
01:25:13,600 --> 01:25:17,140
preparing for a two front uh 

2179
01:25:17,150 --> 01:25:21,030
defensive uh capacity Senator , 

2180
01:25:21,030 --> 01:25:22,000
I um 

2181
01:25:24,770 --> 01:25:27,490
I stayed focused daily on 

2182
01:25:28,120 --> 01:25:30,320
readiness and training and providing 

2183
01:25:30,330 --> 01:25:32,386
the President's Secretary a range of 

2184
01:25:32,386 --> 01:25:34,441
options for whatever conditions they 

2185
01:25:34,441 --> 01:25:36,386
may put in front of us . Um as you 

2186
01:25:36,386 --> 01:25:38,950
describe in some level of potential to 

2187
01:25:38,950 --> 01:25:42,260
front or we stay uh trained and ready 

2188
01:25:42,260 --> 01:25:44,530
to provide options across a number of 

2189
01:25:44,530 --> 01:25:46,641
contingencies that the department has 

2190
01:25:46,641 --> 01:25:48,641
asked us to plan for along with the 

2191
01:25:48,641 --> 01:25:50,752
combatant commands at the same time . 

2192
01:25:50,752 --> 01:25:53,210
Also providing dilemmas for the 

2193
01:25:53,210 --> 01:25:55,432
adversaries , both either in integrated 

2194
01:25:55,432 --> 01:25:58,380
deterrents or in high end conflict . 

2195
01:25:58,390 --> 01:26:01,110
Thank you , General Nakase Oni . As we 

2196
01:26:01,110 --> 01:26:03,054
all know , the cyber mission force 

2197
01:26:03,054 --> 01:26:05,420
comprises elements provided by all of 

2198
01:26:05,420 --> 01:26:07,420
the services . Is there anything we 

2199
01:26:07,420 --> 01:26:10,120
should do uh to better execute this 

2200
01:26:10,120 --> 01:26:13,390
construct ? Senator , I'll be coming 

2201
01:26:13,390 --> 01:26:16,040
back to the committee under 15 0 to the 

2202
01:26:16,050 --> 01:26:18,380
N D A section that came out in the 

2203
01:26:18,380 --> 01:26:20,320
recent NBA two to talk about the 

2204
01:26:20,320 --> 01:26:22,542
shortfall . So that comes at the end of 

2205
01:26:22,542 --> 01:26:24,264
March , that will be the first 

2206
01:26:24,264 --> 01:26:26,431
indicator that I'll have to be able to 

2207
01:26:26,431 --> 01:26:28,376
communicate with the committee . I 

2208
01:26:28,376 --> 01:26:30,542
suspect between that and section 15 34 

2209
01:26:30,542 --> 01:26:32,653
which requires me to come back at the 

2210
01:26:32,653 --> 01:26:34,820
end of June with the secretary and the 

2211
01:26:34,820 --> 01:26:36,931
chairman to talk about shortfalls and 

2212
01:26:36,931 --> 01:26:38,820
readiness will be able to outline 

2213
01:26:38,820 --> 01:26:40,931
exactly what we think are the areas , 

2214
01:26:40,931 --> 01:26:43,153
there are some and there are areas that 

2215
01:26:43,153 --> 01:26:45,264
that we can work with the services to 

2216
01:26:45,264 --> 01:26:47,320
improve . Thank you . Also general . 

2217
01:26:47,320 --> 01:26:49,542
Last year , we discussed the benefit of 

2218
01:26:49,542 --> 01:26:53,460
N S P M 13 and N S P M 21 what 

2219
01:26:53,460 --> 01:26:55,100
they provided the command to 

2220
01:26:55,100 --> 01:26:57,650
effectively conduct cyber operations . 

2221
01:26:57,930 --> 01:26:59,597
Recognizing that they're both 

2222
01:26:59,597 --> 01:27:01,430
classified in nature , but , but 

2223
01:27:01,430 --> 01:27:03,541
basically , they have streamlined and 

2224
01:27:03,541 --> 01:27:05,763
lay out a collaborative effort in which 

2225
01:27:05,763 --> 01:27:08,460
to provide accelerated timeframes for 

2226
01:27:08,470 --> 01:27:12,010
um cyber operations as you look over 

2227
01:27:12,010 --> 01:27:14,100
the years since what if anything has 

2228
01:27:14,110 --> 01:27:16,050
changed in your assessment on the 

2229
01:27:16,050 --> 01:27:17,840
impact they have had on Cyber 

2230
01:27:17,840 --> 01:27:21,170
operations , senator really very little 

2231
01:27:21,170 --> 01:27:23,790
impact . Uh If I can rewind the clock 

2232
01:27:23,790 --> 01:27:26,030
just a bit 2018 , as you recall , as 

2233
01:27:26,040 --> 01:27:28,610
you assisted with us to , to make sure 

2234
01:27:28,610 --> 01:27:30,910
that within the N D A that we saw Cyber 

2235
01:27:30,910 --> 01:27:32,966
as a traditional military activity , 

2236
01:27:32,966 --> 01:27:35,188
that was a huge step forward for us . I 

2237
01:27:35,188 --> 01:27:36,910
would also say that the policy 

2238
01:27:36,910 --> 01:27:39,188
memorandum that you talked about their , 

2239
01:27:39,188 --> 01:27:41,354
their foundational for what we do in a 

2240
01:27:41,354 --> 01:27:43,521
manner that is much more predictable , 

2241
01:27:43,521 --> 01:27:45,410
both for ourselves and for policy 

2242
01:27:45,410 --> 01:27:47,743
makers . So we continue to work with it . 

2243
01:27:47,743 --> 01:27:49,910
Uh We are continuing to move forward . 

2244
01:27:49,910 --> 01:27:50,370
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman .