WEBVTT

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I'd like to call this hearing to order .

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Good morning . The committee meets

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today to receive an update on the

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radius and posture of U S Special

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Operations Command and U S Cyber

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Command . Our witnesses are Assistant

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Secretary of Defense for Special

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Operations and low intensity conflict .

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Christopher Meyer , commander of U S

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Special Operations Command , General

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Brian Fenton , and commander of U S

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Cyber Command and Director of the

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National Security Agency , General Paul

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Nakasone . On behalf of the committee ,

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I would ask our witnesses to convey our

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appreciation to the men and women you

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represent and their families for their

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service and professionalism . We live

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in a complex and dangerous global

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security environment from Russia's

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aggression in Europe to China's malign

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influence in the Indo Pacific to

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persistent threats from Iran , North

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Korea and violent extremist groups

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prevailing in this environment will

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require the tailored and often clan and

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signed capabilities that only our

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special operations and cyber forces can

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provide . The United States has been

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reducing its footprint and conflict

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zones around the world as such . The

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Special operations community is at an

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inflection point but is no less

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relevant to the future challenges we

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face as the defense department recently

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released joint concept for competing ,

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makes clear the object of our nation's

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adversaries is to win without fighting .

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The concept warns that if we do not

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adapt to the realities of long term

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competition , The United States risks

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ceding strategic influence advantage

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and leverage while preparing for a war

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that never occurs , the skills

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knowledge and perhaps most importantly ,

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the relationship with foreign partners

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that are special operations forces have

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developed over the past 20 years of

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combat , make them well positioned to

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contribute significantly to the

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strategic competition . Assistant

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Secretary , Mayor and General Fenton ,

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I look forward to an update regarding

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your efforts to focus and prepare our

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special operations forces for the

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challenges ahead particularly would ask

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that you discuss the capabilities , we

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need to build an enduring advantage

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over our competitors and what lessons

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can be drawn from the ongoing conflict

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in Ukraine . As part of this , I would

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like to know how you are shaping the

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force of the future through new

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recruiting and retention efforts

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including building a culture of

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accountability . A number of high

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profile misconduct cases have reflected

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poorly on the special operations

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community and additional efforts to

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build upon . So comes 2020 ,

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comprehensive review of culture and

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ethics seems necessary . I also want to

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hear how you are addressing the unique

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challenges faced by special operations

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family . The Office of the Asd Select

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plays a critical role in the oversight

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of it and advocacy for our Special

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Operations Forces as this service

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secretary like civilian for so come , I

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believe more must be done to assure a S

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D select has provided the necessary

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authority and resources including

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manpower to fulfill these

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responsibilities . I look forward to

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hearing more about the department's

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efforts on this front . Turning to

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cyber command , I would like to commend

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our cyber forces and the intelligence

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community for their performance over

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the past year and exposing Russia's

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activities and helping Ukraine defend

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itself against both kinetic and cyber

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attacks . Intelligence officials are

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understandably cautious about revealing

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hardwood insights on adversaries . But

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this current strategy has proven highly

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effective in strengthening the

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international community's response and

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creating dilemmas for Vladimir Putin .

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This is a great example of competing

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effectively in the information domain

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and I hope we will continue to make

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this kind of creative use of

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intelligence . Some of the tools in our

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toolbox like the Section 702 ,

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Authority from the Foreign Intelligence

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Surveillance Act or FISA are critical

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to our ability to counter adversaries .

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Malign activities . The committee would

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appreciate your views on the importance

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of section 702 of FISA which sunsets at

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the end of this year and why you

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believe it is essential that we renew

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that authority . We would like also

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know what guardrails are in place to

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give the public confidence that the

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authority is being used . Judiciously .

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General Nakasone , you have been

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working to mature the cyber force and

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advances capabilities to conduct

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offensive , offensive and supporting

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intelligence operations . It is widely

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recognized that our cyber mission

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forces are struggling with shortfalls

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and personnel numbers . We know that

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addressing this issue is your highest

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priority . The military services must

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also ensure that personnel management

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provides qualified and trained

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personnel to your command at the

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beginning of their tours . So both the

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personnel and the command can take full

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advantage of the time of their

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assignment to your force . I would also

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note that the private sector has

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realized the immense value of our cyber

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operatives and offering them very high

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compensation to leave the military .

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The services must adjust accordingly by

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providing a creative combination of

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incentives to compete for and retain

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these personnel . Finally , over the

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last decade , a recurring debate has

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been waged over whether to sustain the

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dual hat arrangement , whereby the

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commander of Cyber command also serves

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as the director of the N S A , recently ,

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an independent panel established by the

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Director of National Intelligence and

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the Secretary of Defense and led by

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former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

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Staff General Joe Dunford concluded

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that the dual hat arrangement should be

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sustained . We would welcome your

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thoughts on this issue . Thank you

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again to our witnesses for your service

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and appearance before us . Today , I

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look forward to your testimony . Now

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let me recognize the ranking member ,

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Senator worker . Thank you Mr Chairman

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for that very fine and thorough

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statement . I very much appreciate that .

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And I want to thank our witnesses for

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being with us . Once again , the United

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States faces the most complex and

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daunting set of security challenges

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since the height of the Cold War . And

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our witnesses today are on the

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frontlines of those challenges from the

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Chinese Communist Party's unprecedented

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military build up growing hegemonic

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ambitions to Russia's brazen and

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unprovoked attack on Ukraine . Our

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adversaries are testing American

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resolve our foremost adversary and

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competitive . The Chinese Communist

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Party has stressed both so calm and

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cyber common ways we never imagined a

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decade ago . Last year , General

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Nakasone said Chinese advances in cyber

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operations are unlike anything he has

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seen before . He also noted the

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People's Republic of China is a more

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difficult adversary than the Soviet

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Union because they are much more

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tolerant of risk . So this presents new

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challenges to our deterrence posture .

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Although Beijing may be our foremost

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adversary , others are not far behind

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the cyber capabilities of Russia , Iran

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and North Korea have continued to

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surprise . Many I would appreciate an

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update on D O D s work to implement a

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zero trust architecture and provide

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defensive cyber tools across the

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department and the the industrial base .

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I also look forward to discussing how

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collaborative cyber activities with our

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allies and partners such as hunt

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forward operations have helped to

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identify vulnerabilities , mitigate

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threats and strengthen our network

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defenses , military success in

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cyberspace depends on the readiness of

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our cyber mission forces . I hope to

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hear about how we can improve our cyber

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force readiness and accelerate

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development of cyber capabilities

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particularly on the offensive side .

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General Fenton is no stranger to the

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determination of the People's

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Liberation Army having served as

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commander of our Special Operations

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Forces in the Pacific and the deputy

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commander of Endo Pay . Come , his

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challenge is twofold to build a force

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capable of enhancing our deterrence and

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war fighting in the Western Pacific .

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Even as the threat environment facing

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our nation demands that SOCOM should

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remain fully engaged in the fight

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against violent Islamic terrorist

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groups across the world . From Africa

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to South Asia . His commands work is

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critical to our country's security and

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is often the first to respond to our

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nation's most pressing unforeseen

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emergencies in the 2022 national

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defense strategy , General Fenton's

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forces have been asked to assume

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significant risk . I think this

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committee will want to ensure his

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command is fully resourced to mitigate

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that risk to the degree possible . And

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I would also ask General Fenton and Mr

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Mayor , whether their authorities and

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resources in the upcoming year are

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sufficient for mission tasks . What is

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clear to me is that the role and

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importance of special Operations forces

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is only increasing as the nature and

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complexity of threats facing our nation

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increase the resources we provide to

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special operations . Command should

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reflect that reality . Our first job in

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this committee is to provide the tools

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our military needs to deter and

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if not successful there to defeat these

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threats . There's no doubt that

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continued real growth , continued real

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growth in the defense budget . Top line

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above inflation remains essential to

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our national security . This requires

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action now , not later , our

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adversaries are not waiting , neither

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should we . This committee lead

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the bipartisan charge to increase the

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defense budget in last year's cycle .

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Mr Chairman , I frankly have little

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confidence that the administration

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budget request this year will be

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sufficient . If it is not , this

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committee will again need to step up to

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ensure that our military has the

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resources , it needs to defend the

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nation . So thank you , Mr Chairman and

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thanks to our witnesses , look forward

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to hearing from . Thank you very much ,

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Senator Worker . Uh We will begin with

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Secretary Maya . So

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chairman Reed , ranking member wicker

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and distinguished members of this

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committee . Thank you providing the

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opportunity to testify in the global

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posture of our nation's Special

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operations forces or soft . I'm honored

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to appear alongside General Fenton and

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General Nakasone . E I could not ask

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for a better for better teammates in

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general Fenton and command Sergeant

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Major Shane . Shorter in ensuring your

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soft enterprise is prepared to address

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the threats facing the United States

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today and in meeting the challenges to

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come . I start with thanking Congress

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and especially this committee for your

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enduring support of the men and women

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of soft . I am particularly grateful

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for your assistance in building the

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organization . I lead special

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operations and low intensity conflict

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or Solich with dedicated and gifted

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public servants . Sitting before this

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committee last year , I testified we

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were at an inflection point in soft

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transformation to focus more on the

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pacing challenge of China and the acute

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threat posed by Russia while

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maintaining enduring capabilities to

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counter violent extremist organizations

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address Iran's destabilizing behavior

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and conduct no failed crisis response

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around the globe today , in updating

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you on this progress and the work that

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remains , I will highlight three areas

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soft , ongoing transition in support of

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the national defense strategy , the

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development of Solich and our continued

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emphasis on empowering and supporting

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our people . First , we are

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transforming the soft enterprise to

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achieve the goals of the NDS . While

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softs role in counter terrorism is

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widely understood and appreciated . My

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team and I work daily to ensure the

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value proposition of soft and

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integrated deterrence and campaigning

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against strategic competitors is

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accounted for and incorporated into the

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department's processes as it has been

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in every major military challenge this

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nation has confronted . Since world war

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two , your soft will play an essential

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role to start the deep relationship

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soft has forged with allies and

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partners over the last two decades ,

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often through shared challenges and

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sacrifice has produced an international

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soft enterprise that provides us unique

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first hand understanding the global

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operating environment . It also has

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enhanced the resilience of our allies

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and partners to resist aggression .

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Second , drawing on the resilience .

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Second , drawing on those relationships

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and our ability to reach some of the

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most difficult locations on the globe .

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Your soft formations provide unique

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access and placement that creates

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options for our nation's leaders and

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soft is adept at creating dilemmas for

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our adversaries . Here . I would

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highlight the many years of our

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investment in transforming the

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Ukrainian forces into highly capable

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force that is consistently performing

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Russia on the battlefield today ,

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representing the value that soft brings

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to the joint forces . One of my primary

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responsibilities and we continue to

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make progress , institutionalizing

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selects role as Congress has directed

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through my role , providing civilian

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leadership for the organized train and

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equip of soft . We have established

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over the last year in the department ,

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a series of recurring processes and

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delivered key outcomes for the soft

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enterprise . For example , the Special

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Operations Policy Oversight Council ,

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which I chair provides a senior level

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forum to address soft unique challenges

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across the department . We also have

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made progress on important initiatives

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to deter our adversaries and fill

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warfighting gaps , especially on a

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regular warfare and information

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operations . I am also proud that solid

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played a central role in the

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department's landmark civilian harm and

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mitigation response action plan .

14:03.130 --> 14:05.540
Finally , I would emphasize the first

14:05.540 --> 14:07.840
soft truth remains truer today than

14:07.840 --> 14:09.951
ever . Humans are more important than

14:09.951 --> 14:11.896
hardware . None of our efforts are

14:11.896 --> 14:13.896
possible without our most important

14:13.896 --> 14:16.170
resource , our people with the strong

14:16.170 --> 14:18.226
support of Congress , we continue to

14:18.226 --> 14:20.281
evolve the preservation of the force

14:20.281 --> 14:22.281
and families or positive program to

14:22.281 --> 14:24.392
address soft unique challenges and to

14:24.392 --> 14:26.650
optimize physical , psychological ,

14:26.650 --> 14:29.180
social , spiritual and now cognitive

14:29.180 --> 14:31.280
performance . We also continue to

14:31.280 --> 14:33.900
prioritize a diverse capable force by

14:33.900 --> 14:36.250
removing barriers to participation and

14:36.250 --> 14:38.300
advancement in soft and operational

14:38.300 --> 14:40.411
imperative if we are to succeed in an

14:40.411 --> 14:42.133
ever more complex geopolitical

14:42.133 --> 14:44.470
environment . Recent publicized

14:44.470 --> 14:46.359
challenges remind us that we must

14:46.359 --> 14:48.414
continue to evaluate our approach to

14:48.414 --> 14:50.526
force employment accountability , and

14:50.526 --> 14:52.692
most importantly , present and engaged

14:52.692 --> 14:54.692
leadership , a healthy soft culture

14:54.692 --> 14:56.748
that reflects our nation's values is

14:56.748 --> 14:58.880
essential to readiness and core to

14:58.880 --> 15:01.102
ensuring we remain the most lethal soft

15:01.102 --> 15:03.324
enterprise . The world has ever known .

15:03.330 --> 15:05.200
Investing in our people is the

15:05.200 --> 15:07.780
cornerstone of ensuring your soft are

15:07.780 --> 15:09.947
ready to take on our nation's toughest

15:09.947 --> 15:12.169
challenges because it is not a question

15:12.169 --> 15:14.900
of if but when the call will come . So ,

15:14.900 --> 15:17.011
Mr chairman and distinguished members

15:17.011 --> 15:19.122
of this committee , I thank you again

15:19.122 --> 15:21.178
for your partnership and support and

15:21.178 --> 15:23.511
for this opportunity to testify . Today ,

15:23.511 --> 15:25.456
I look forward to your questions .

15:25.456 --> 15:27.789
Thank you , Mr Secretary General Fenton .

15:27.789 --> 15:30.300
Please . Chairman Reed , ranking member

15:30.300 --> 15:32.467
Wicker . Could you bring that closer ?

15:32.467 --> 15:34.522
General , the microphone as close as

15:34.522 --> 15:36.689
possible ? I'll come up closer . Thank

15:36.689 --> 15:38.744
you . How's this chairman ? Chairman

15:38.744 --> 15:40.578
Reed , ranking member Wicker and

15:40.578 --> 15:42.911
distinguished members of this committee ?

15:42.911 --> 15:45.133
Thank you for the opportunity to appear

15:45.133 --> 15:47.022
before you today . I'm honored to

15:47.022 --> 15:49.133
testify alongside the honorable Chris

15:49.133 --> 15:51.356
Mayer and General Paul Nakasone and I'm

15:51.356 --> 15:53.578
equally honored to be here on behalf of

15:53.578 --> 15:55.522
the dedicated men and women of U S

15:55.522 --> 15:58.630
Special Operations Command . Joining me

15:58.630 --> 16:00.852
today is Command Sergeant Major , Shane

16:00.852 --> 16:03.360
Shorter U S SOCOM senior enlisted

16:03.360 --> 16:05.810
leader , Command Sergeant Major Shorter

16:05.810 --> 16:07.977
is representative of the incredible us

16:07.977 --> 16:10.700
SOCOM team , particularly our

16:10.700 --> 16:13.410
noncommissioned officer corps . Our non

16:13.410 --> 16:15.577
commissioned officers are the backbone

16:15.577 --> 16:17.400
of our military and a decisive

16:17.400 --> 16:19.090
advantage within your special

16:19.090 --> 16:21.690
operations community and they make us

16:21.690 --> 16:24.330
the envy of every military around the

16:24.330 --> 16:27.440
world . We are thankful for the

16:27.440 --> 16:29.773
leadership and support of this Congress ,

16:29.773 --> 16:31.840
particularly this committee , A

16:31.840 --> 16:34.080
committee with the legacies of Senators

16:34.080 --> 16:36.510
Nunn and Cohen who had the vision and

16:36.510 --> 16:39.080
determination to establish us . Socom

16:39.090 --> 16:42.550
almost 36 years ago , thank you for

16:42.550 --> 16:44.920
your decades of steadfast support ever

16:44.920 --> 16:48.570
since your special operations

16:48.570 --> 16:51.330
forces remain a national advantage as

16:51.330 --> 16:53.900
we enter a decisive era , an era where

16:53.900 --> 16:55.930
the strategic competitors such as

16:55.940 --> 16:58.990
People's Republic of China and Russia

16:59.000 --> 17:01.390
seeks to reshape the rules based

17:01.390 --> 17:04.620
international order and in response

17:04.630 --> 17:06.780
your special operations forces

17:06.790 --> 17:08.679
strengthen and sustain deterrence

17:08.679 --> 17:10.790
globally as part of the Department of

17:10.790 --> 17:12.810
Defense's approach to integrated

17:12.810 --> 17:16.070
deterrence with soft

17:16.210 --> 17:19.370
world war two origins and D N A rooted

17:19.370 --> 17:22.050
in decades of experience in strategic

17:22.050 --> 17:25.200
competition . Now , drawing upon our 20

17:25.200 --> 17:27.780
plus years of hard won combat

17:27.780 --> 17:30.120
credibility and coalition experience .

17:30.130 --> 17:33.040
Your soft , provide creative teyla

17:33.040 --> 17:35.151
rubble and asymmetric options for our

17:35.151 --> 17:37.960
nation while creating dilemmas for our

17:37.960 --> 17:40.700
competitors . And as part of the

17:40.700 --> 17:43.670
broader joint force , we campaign every

17:43.670 --> 17:46.070
day to deter and prevent aggression .

17:46.840 --> 17:49.490
Counter coercion closed warfighting

17:49.490 --> 17:51.990
gaps and tackle share challenges

17:51.990 --> 17:55.070
alongside allies and partners all in

17:55.070 --> 17:57.250
support of accelerating the Department

17:57.250 --> 18:00.470
of Defense's strategic momentum towards

18:00.470 --> 18:04.280
R N D s objectives . Yet you're soft ,

18:04.280 --> 18:06.447
also remain vigilant in protecting our

18:06.447 --> 18:08.770
homeland and U S interests from the

18:08.770 --> 18:11.060
persistent threats posed by global

18:11.060 --> 18:13.910
terrorist networks . In doing so ,

18:13.940 --> 18:16.250
you're soft work tirelessly alongside a

18:16.250 --> 18:18.600
trusted network of allies and partners

18:19.180 --> 18:21.550
U S interagency counterparts and our

18:21.550 --> 18:24.960
joint force teammates to disrupt V E O

18:24.960 --> 18:28.490
s wherever they may be . And while we

18:28.490 --> 18:31.460
campaign for integrated deterrence and

18:31.460 --> 18:34.570
counter violent extremists , your soft

18:34.570 --> 18:36.870
capability to respond to crisis

18:37.440 --> 18:39.920
represent a critical strategic hedge

18:39.930 --> 18:42.820
and advantage for our nation agile

18:42.830 --> 18:45.690
tailored modernized and capable . They

18:45.690 --> 18:47.801
enable us to undertake sensitive high

18:47.801 --> 18:50.420
risk missions crucial to safeguarding

18:50.420 --> 18:52.330
and rescuing our citizens and

18:52.330 --> 18:54.800
protecting vital national interests .

18:56.010 --> 18:58.240
Foundational to all these efforts

18:58.250 --> 19:00.417
remains our longstanding collaborative

19:00.417 --> 19:02.620
partnership with Asd Solar , Chris

19:02.620 --> 19:05.740
Mayer and his team , the oversight

19:05.750 --> 19:08.330
policy guidance and advocacy within the

19:08.330 --> 19:11.490
department provided by S D Solich are

19:11.490 --> 19:13.720
essential for the modernization

19:13.730 --> 19:16.600
readiness and well being of our soft

19:16.600 --> 19:20.310
units and their families . And together

19:20.320 --> 19:22.640
we are committed to placing people as

19:22.640 --> 19:24.870
our number one priority and we are

19:24.870 --> 19:26.981
preparing for the future by investing

19:26.981 --> 19:29.650
in them and by leveraging our nation's

19:29.650 --> 19:32.460
diverse talent to solve diverse

19:32.460 --> 19:35.840
challenges . And to those listening

19:35.840 --> 19:38.510
today who aren't considering service to

19:38.510 --> 19:41.160
our nation . No , the profound sense of

19:41.160 --> 19:44.340
calling and purpose that those of us in

19:44.350 --> 19:47.390
serving in uniform . Share we know that

19:47.390 --> 19:49.550
a deeply rewarding journey lies ahead

19:49.550 --> 19:51.890
for those who choose to join . You will

19:51.890 --> 19:54.260
be part of an incredible team of men

19:54.260 --> 19:56.038
and women tackling the toughest

19:56.038 --> 19:59.330
challenges for our nations . Just

19:59.330 --> 20:01.274
yesterday , I had the privilege of

20:01.274 --> 20:03.219
hearing from Colonel retired Paris

20:03.219 --> 20:06.150
Davis , our nation's most recent medal

20:06.150 --> 20:09.090
of honor recipient and a green beret at

20:09.090 --> 20:11.660
yesterday's ceremony to induct him into

20:11.660 --> 20:13.920
the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes . He

20:13.920 --> 20:16.700
summed up his military service and time

20:16.700 --> 20:18.811
with the green beret in three words ,

20:18.811 --> 20:21.370
purpose , opportunity , and pride .

20:22.870 --> 20:25.037
And as we speak here today , more than

20:25.037 --> 20:28.090
5000 service members of US socom are

20:28.090 --> 20:30.900
deployed And they share his sense of

20:30.900 --> 20:32.750
purpose and pride and they are

20:32.750 --> 20:34.890
defending our nation and standing

20:34.890 --> 20:36.946
shoulder to shoulder with allies and

20:36.946 --> 20:39.080
partners in over 80 countries to make

20:39.080 --> 20:42.160
our world a safer place , the courage

20:42.170 --> 20:43.837
and commitment of our special

20:43.837 --> 20:46.030
operations community . Our military

20:46.040 --> 20:49.370
inspires the CSM and me daily and we

20:49.380 --> 20:51.658
are immensely proud to serve with them .

20:51.658 --> 20:53.602
I look forward to your questions .

20:55.840 --> 20:58.062
Thank you very much . You know , Fenton

20:58.062 --> 21:00.010
General , please , Chairman Reed ,

21:00.020 --> 21:01.576
ranking member , wicker and

21:01.576 --> 21:03.853
distinguished members of the committee .

21:03.853 --> 21:06.076
I'm honored to testify beside assistant

21:06.076 --> 21:08.298
Secretary Christopher Mayer and General

21:08.298 --> 21:10.820
Brian Fenton . Joining me today is

21:10.820 --> 21:13.530
Commands are Major Cheryl Lion , the U

21:13.530 --> 21:15.641
S Cyber Command and National Security

21:15.641 --> 21:17.863
Agency , senior enlisted leader . We're

21:17.863 --> 21:19.974
honored to represent the military and

21:19.974 --> 21:22.086
civilian members of U S Cyber Command

21:22.920 --> 21:25.240
in the contested cyberspace domain U S

21:25.240 --> 21:27.184
Cyber Command acts against foreign

21:27.184 --> 21:29.300
adversaries that threaten our nation

21:29.310 --> 21:31.470
through malicious cyber activity and

21:31.470 --> 21:34.370
enables action by our federal private

21:34.380 --> 21:37.310
and allied partners . For instance , a

21:37.310 --> 21:39.143
combined U S Cyber command essay

21:39.143 --> 21:41.530
election Security Group countered

21:41.530 --> 21:43.474
malicious cyber actors and oversaw

21:43.474 --> 21:45.530
measures to enable the Department of

21:45.530 --> 21:47.530
Homeland Security and the FBI among

21:47.530 --> 21:49.641
other domestic partners to defend the

21:49.641 --> 21:52.360
recent midterm elections . The 2022

21:52.360 --> 21:55.080
election cycle proceeded from primaries

21:55.090 --> 21:57.290
to certifications without significant

21:57.290 --> 22:00.800
impacts due in part to our effort going

22:00.800 --> 22:03.440
forward success for U S Cyber Command

22:03.440 --> 22:05.440
will be measured by how effectively

22:05.440 --> 22:07.162
foreign adversarial actors are

22:07.162 --> 22:08.884
prevented from achieving their

22:08.884 --> 22:11.550
strategic objectives . Last year saw

22:11.550 --> 22:13.740
significant maturation for U S Cyber

22:13.740 --> 22:15.780
Command but our work is not done

22:17.100 --> 22:19.360
In 2023 . You must continue to focus on

22:19.360 --> 22:21.570
our people , our partners and our

22:21.570 --> 22:24.150
ability to deliver a decisive advantage .

22:24.710 --> 22:26.932
We must improve readiness , bolster our

22:26.932 --> 22:28.988
resilience and maintain a culture of

22:28.988 --> 22:30.860
continuous improvement . We will

22:30.860 --> 22:32.638
continue to deliver warfighting

22:32.638 --> 22:34.527
advantage for the joint force and

22:34.527 --> 22:36.693
partners throughout competition crisis

22:36.693 --> 22:39.120
and conflict . We are doing so by

22:39.120 --> 22:41.350
executing our service like authorities

22:41.360 --> 22:43.690
to build and sustain campaigns in and

22:43.690 --> 22:45.857
through cyberspace and the information

22:45.857 --> 22:49.280
environment . Through these efforts ,

22:49.450 --> 22:51.339
we seek to counter adversaries in

22:51.339 --> 22:54.170
competition to deter conflict and

22:54.170 --> 22:56.920
prevail against aggression , aligning

22:56.920 --> 22:59.142
efforts of both U S Cyber Command and N

22:59.142 --> 23:01.142
S A is essential to achieving these

23:01.142 --> 23:03.198
goals and is in the best interest of

23:03.198 --> 23:05.870
the nation and national security . It

23:05.870 --> 23:07.926
all starts with people , the men and

23:07.926 --> 23:09.981
women of U S Cyber Command , working

23:09.981 --> 23:12.314
with N S A and partners here and abroad .

23:12.314 --> 23:14.481
We win with people . The men and women

23:14.481 --> 23:16.537
of the United States . Cyber Command

23:16.537 --> 23:18.592
are grateful for the support of this

23:18.592 --> 23:20.648
committee and Congress that has been

23:20.648 --> 23:22.759
given to our command . I look forward

23:22.759 --> 23:25.092
to your questions . Thank you very much ,

23:25.092 --> 23:27.037
General Marcus Toney . Gentlemen ,

23:27.037 --> 23:29.259
thank you for your testimony . And as I

23:29.259 --> 23:31.426
indicated in my opening statement , Mr

23:31.426 --> 23:34.660
Secretary , um we've made progress in

23:34.670 --> 23:38.610
uh strengthening the SD Solar to act as

23:38.610 --> 23:42.330
a uh service secretary like

23:42.340 --> 23:45.480
position regarding SOCOM . Uh but

23:45.480 --> 23:48.210
there's more to do uh particular

23:48.210 --> 23:50.660
respect to personnel facilities on the

23:50.670 --> 23:53.610
aspects of your , your office . Could

23:53.610 --> 23:55.832
you comment on what more must be done ?

23:57.460 --> 23:59.620
Thank you , Chairman . And again , I

23:59.630 --> 24:01.297
would thank this committee in

24:01.297 --> 24:03.760
particular for the ongoing and very

24:03.760 --> 24:06.360
consistent support for the ASD solar

24:06.370 --> 24:08.750
position and indeed my , my staff . So

24:08.760 --> 24:11.550
uh Mr Chairman , I'd give you a quick

24:11.560 --> 24:14.600
snapshot to say that I think we have

24:14.610 --> 24:17.340
established a degree of momentum and a

24:17.350 --> 24:19.080
bit of irreversibility , which

24:19.080 --> 24:21.080
certainly wasn't the , the sense of

24:21.080 --> 24:23.136
things when I first took this role .

24:23.136 --> 24:25.191
And a lot of that has to do with the

24:25.191 --> 24:27.413
continued support of Secretary Austin ,

24:27.413 --> 24:29.413
Deputy Secretary Hicks . I think as

24:29.413 --> 24:31.636
I've testified in this committee before

24:31.636 --> 24:33.580
the best snapshot , I can give the

24:33.580 --> 24:35.524
committee is when the secretary of

24:35.524 --> 24:37.858
Defense convenes as service secretaries ,

24:37.858 --> 24:39.969
it convenes the secretary of the Army

24:39.969 --> 24:39.290
Secretary of the Air Force and

24:39.290 --> 24:41.512
Secretary of the Navy . And me as a S D

24:41.512 --> 24:43.810
solid to ensure that soft voice and

24:43.810 --> 24:45.950
perspective is in the room To your

24:45.950 --> 24:48.300
question , Mr Chairman on areas of

24:48.300 --> 24:50.522
growth , I think we do need to continue

24:50.522 --> 24:53.650
to add staff . We've added about 20 or

24:53.650 --> 24:55.980
25 people over the last two years with

24:55.980 --> 24:58.036
smart from this committee and that's

24:58.036 --> 25:00.550
against about 50 people currently . So

25:00.550 --> 25:03.580
it's a very small staff compared to the

25:03.580 --> 25:05.747
services , even with our , our limited

25:05.747 --> 25:08.250
authorities relative to them . And then

25:08.250 --> 25:10.361
I think most importantly , leadership

25:10.361 --> 25:12.380
billets , we need more ability for

25:12.390 --> 25:14.750
people in a very hierarchical defense

25:14.750 --> 25:16.972
department to be able to participate in

25:16.972 --> 25:18.694
meetings at the right level of

25:18.694 --> 25:20.750
seniority service . So I'd highlight

25:20.750 --> 25:22.528
those . Thank you very much for

25:22.528 --> 25:24.639
Secretary General Fenton . And what's

25:24.639 --> 25:26.417
the value of SOCOM in having uh

25:26.417 --> 25:28.583
properly empowered service ? Secretary

25:28.583 --> 25:31.010
like civilian like uh Secretary , Mayor ,

25:33.090 --> 25:35.257
Senator . Thank you very much for that

25:35.257 --> 25:37.257
question and I'd say on a couple of

25:37.257 --> 25:40.650
fronts , very , very , very big value .

25:40.660 --> 25:43.120
First and foremost , as Secretary Mary

25:43.120 --> 25:45.231
just mentioned , his ability to be at

25:45.231 --> 25:47.660
the service , excuse me , secretary

25:47.670 --> 25:50.460
tables with the SEC def and represent

25:50.460 --> 25:53.050
issues for the SOCOM team along the

25:53.050 --> 25:56.880
lines of people education training uh

25:56.890 --> 26:00.080
in even uh as he mentioned , where soft

26:00.080 --> 26:02.302
will be and play a big role in terms of

26:02.302 --> 26:05.210
integrating competition . Excuse me ,

26:06.060 --> 26:08.004
that's extremely important for the

26:08.004 --> 26:10.680
SOCOM enterprise . I'd say next his

26:10.680 --> 26:12.402
ability to be with the service

26:12.402 --> 26:15.120
secretaries and represent issues from

26:15.120 --> 26:18.360
SOCOM back to the services that we um

26:18.370 --> 26:20.537
that we take our folks in from is very

26:20.537 --> 26:22.426
important for us . And we're very

26:22.426 --> 26:24.510
grateful for that and certainly his

26:25.060 --> 26:27.730
direction uh in , in many ways

26:27.740 --> 26:29.851
throughout the department in terms of

26:29.851 --> 26:33.280
how SOCOM views uh not only integrated

26:33.280 --> 26:35.580
terms but crisis response and counter

26:35.590 --> 26:38.810
uh counter terrorism has been welcome

26:38.810 --> 26:40.990
guidance for me . So I'm very grateful

26:40.990 --> 26:43.212
to have a service secretary , as I told

26:43.212 --> 26:45.379
you , I think chairman , when I was at

26:45.379 --> 26:47.212
confirmation , I look forward to

26:47.212 --> 26:49.546
testifying next to my service secretary .

26:49.760 --> 26:51.980
Thank you very much , General General

26:51.980 --> 26:55.020
Marcus Sony . The issue of readiness

26:55.020 --> 26:57.187
with cyber mission force is has been a

26:57.187 --> 26:59.409
persistent issue we've discussed at the

26:59.409 --> 27:01.640
committee of numerous times . Uh The

27:01.650 --> 27:03.770
Cyber Mission Forces play a very key

27:03.770 --> 27:06.130
role and they have very demanding task .

27:06.140 --> 27:08.180
They require personnel with special

27:08.180 --> 27:11.060
aptitude training and experience . And

27:11.060 --> 27:13.116
one of the ironies of course is when

27:13.116 --> 27:15.340
you develop such a person , he or she

27:15.340 --> 27:17.340
becomes very attractive for outside

27:17.340 --> 27:19.340
employers . So you have a retention

27:19.340 --> 27:21.960
problem as well as other problems . And

27:21.960 --> 27:24.016
in some cases in the past , has been

27:24.016 --> 27:26.016
indicated that the services are not

27:26.016 --> 27:29.160
providing you the skilled and trained

27:29.160 --> 27:32.650
individuals you need uh which does not

27:33.120 --> 27:35.840
provide you with the maximum possible

27:35.850 --> 27:37.930
use . So could you comment on the

27:37.930 --> 27:39.930
President's sort of situation with

27:39.930 --> 27:41.930
respect to cyber mission forces and

27:41.930 --> 27:44.280
also any steps that we should be taken

27:44.280 --> 27:47.030
to improve their readiness chairman .

27:47.040 --> 27:49.151
As we take a look at the readiness of

27:49.151 --> 27:51.800
100 and 33 teams really comes down to

27:51.810 --> 27:53.977
three hours . It's the readiness piece

27:53.977 --> 27:55.643
of it . Uh I'm sorry , it's a

27:55.643 --> 27:57.866
recruiting piece of , it's the training

27:57.866 --> 28:00.032
piece of it and it's a retention piece

28:00.032 --> 28:02.088
of it . And so when you look at that

28:02.088 --> 28:04.254
where I see this right now is the fact

28:04.254 --> 28:06.421
that the services have done a good job

28:06.421 --> 28:08.477
of recruiting the forces that I need

28:08.477 --> 28:10.532
assigning the numbers are one of the

28:10.532 --> 28:10.310
things that we're working with right

28:10.310 --> 28:12.366
now to make sure that we have all of

28:12.366 --> 28:14.477
the folks that we need . We've worked

28:14.477 --> 28:16.699
very , very hard to get the training to

28:16.699 --> 28:18.699
a very simple and predictable level

28:18.699 --> 28:20.810
that continues to improve . The other

28:20.810 --> 28:23.032
piece that we need to work hand in hand

28:23.032 --> 28:22.920
with the services is the retention

28:22.920 --> 28:24.698
piece which you highlighted the

28:24.698 --> 28:26.920
challenge of someone that has this type

28:26.920 --> 28:29.031
of training is very , very attractive

28:29.031 --> 28:31.031
to the outside . But several of the

28:31.031 --> 28:33.253
services the marines included have made

28:33.253 --> 28:35.364
tremendous progress in this and being

28:35.364 --> 28:37.420
able to focus their marines on doing

28:37.420 --> 28:39.642
what these marines wanted to do , which

28:39.642 --> 28:41.753
is cyber operations and being able to

28:41.753 --> 28:43.920
stay within our force for long periods

28:43.920 --> 28:46.142
of time . We see a reflective retention

28:46.142 --> 28:48.309
rate that's much higher . Well , thank

28:48.309 --> 28:50.309
you very much , gentlemen . Again ,

28:50.309 --> 28:52.420
thank you for your testimony . Let me

28:52.420 --> 28:54.587
recognize Senator Worker . Thank you .

28:54.587 --> 28:57.380
First question . To General Fenton . Um

28:57.510 --> 29:01.260
and this is about the naval small craft

29:01.270 --> 29:03.214
instruction and technical training

29:03.214 --> 29:06.220
school . NAV C yachts which provides

29:06.220 --> 29:08.220
training to foreign forces on small

29:08.220 --> 29:10.900
boat operations and unmanned aerial

29:10.910 --> 29:14.000
systems . The annual operating cost is

29:14.010 --> 29:17.450
um $14.8 million and that is divided

29:17.450 --> 29:19.880
across multiple stakeholders including

29:19.880 --> 29:22.820
the Navy , so calm and our foreign

29:22.830 --> 29:26.580
partners . Um So General General

29:26.580 --> 29:28.910
Flynn , let me ask you . Um

29:30.570 --> 29:32.737
do you agree with General Richardson ,

29:32.737 --> 29:34.959
the commander of South com who said the

29:34.959 --> 29:38.250
school generates outside return on

29:38.250 --> 29:41.130
investments ? The Ukrainian troops were

29:41.130 --> 29:43.640
being trained there last year when

29:43.650 --> 29:46.610
President Putin launched his unprovoked

29:46.610 --> 29:49.190
and illegal attacks on their country .

29:49.200 --> 29:52.760
Do you agree sir ? That provides

29:52.760 --> 29:55.600
value to our combatant commanders and

29:55.600 --> 29:57.378
key foreign military partners .

29:59.860 --> 30:02.082
Senator . Thank you for that question .

30:02.082 --> 30:04.580
I I'm I am absolutely familiar with uh

30:04.590 --> 30:07.480
this Nevsky outs as you uh as you refer

30:07.480 --> 30:10.070
to . I was more familiar with it when I

30:10.070 --> 30:13.100
was in Indo as the deputy commander and

30:13.100 --> 30:15.230
there I saw value in that type of

30:15.230 --> 30:17.850
training . Um and I will say in many

30:17.860 --> 30:19.916
types of training certainly . And we

30:19.916 --> 30:21.971
thank this committee for a number of

30:21.971 --> 30:24.040
efforts at SOCOM has his disposal in

30:24.040 --> 30:27.470
terms of triple 3 , 12 02 and 1 27 echo

30:27.480 --> 30:30.350
that increase the capability of of uh

30:30.360 --> 30:32.660
of our forces and create partnerships

30:32.810 --> 30:34.700
in the way that we need those

30:34.700 --> 30:36.922
partnerships . And in so come , we call

30:36.922 --> 30:38.922
those partnerships basing items and

30:38.922 --> 30:42.470
$14.8 million is a relatively

30:42.470 --> 30:44.660
modest investment . Would you agree ?

30:46.720 --> 30:48.720
Senator , I'm not familiar with the

30:48.720 --> 30:50.831
budget . I am familiar again with the

30:50.831 --> 30:53.040
type of training that Nevsky as

30:53.040 --> 30:55.500
produces . Okay . So we've established

30:55.500 --> 30:57.333
that there is value there . So I

30:57.333 --> 30:59.860
appreciate that . Let me turn into

30:59.860 --> 31:03.300
General Nakasone . Um , tell us about ,

31:03.310 --> 31:07.030
um , cyber in support

31:07.040 --> 31:11.000
of our Ukrainian allies and the then

31:11.000 --> 31:14.900
the Russian use of cyber in , uh ,

31:14.910 --> 31:17.540
in support of their illegal um , and

31:17.540 --> 31:20.500
aggressive invasion of Ukraine .

31:22.230 --> 31:24.452
Senator . The story begins on the third

31:24.452 --> 31:27.000
of December 2021 when we deployed a

31:27.000 --> 31:29.600
hunt forward team to keep , uh that

31:29.610 --> 31:32.610
began a 70 day journey for us to ensure

31:32.610 --> 31:35.010
that Ukraine was at a much higher state

31:35.010 --> 31:37.440
of cyber readiness . As you know , we

31:37.440 --> 31:40.900
saw early attacks on uh specific

31:40.900 --> 31:42.850
Ukrainian sites with within their

31:42.850 --> 31:45.040
government . And we also saw uh

31:45.050 --> 31:47.290
continued attacks as the , as the

31:47.290 --> 31:49.512
invasion approached , what we were able

31:49.512 --> 31:51.679
to do during that time was work with a

31:51.679 --> 31:54.340
series of partners to bring the tools

31:54.340 --> 31:56.562
and technology to Ukraine that was able

31:56.562 --> 31:59.330
to assist them . As Russia conducted

31:59.330 --> 32:01.900
continued attacks . We continue today

32:01.900 --> 32:04.011
with support to a number of different

32:04.011 --> 32:06.178
combatant commands us European command

32:06.178 --> 32:08.300
on the training mission for uh for

32:08.300 --> 32:10.900
Ukraine also to U S Strategic Command .

32:10.900 --> 32:13.330
As we take a look at ensuring that our

32:13.340 --> 32:15.562
N C three network , our nuclear command

32:15.562 --> 32:17.729
and control and communications network

32:17.729 --> 32:19.840
is the top and most important network

32:19.840 --> 32:22.460
and is fully secure as we move forward ,

32:22.460 --> 32:24.720
we continue full spectrum operations

32:24.730 --> 32:26.786
with a series of partners to include

32:26.786 --> 32:28.920
Ukraine to provide them assistance as

32:28.920 --> 32:31.690
they battle the Russians . Um Well ,

32:31.700 --> 32:34.610
okay . Do you , do you expect

32:35.180 --> 32:38.700
Russia is able to intensify

32:38.710 --> 32:42.310
new capabilities in , in a

32:42.310 --> 32:45.050
spring offensive this year ? From the

32:45.050 --> 32:47.272
cyber perspective , we're watching this

32:47.272 --> 32:49.272
very carefully , Senator , they are

32:49.272 --> 32:51.494
very capable adversary . We continue to

32:51.494 --> 32:54.870
work very , very tightly with our other

32:54.870 --> 32:56.870
partners within the US . Government

32:56.870 --> 32:58.870
says the FBI to ensure that the U S

32:58.870 --> 33:00.926
critical infrastructure is protected

33:00.926 --> 33:02.870
and NATO in general to ensure that

33:02.870 --> 33:04.926
they're aware of the tradecraft that

33:04.926 --> 33:06.703
the Russians might use . Okay ,

33:06.703 --> 33:08.814
Secretary Mayor . Um What more do you

33:08.814 --> 33:11.190
need ? Um You were asked and you said

33:11.190 --> 33:13.412
you need to add staff and then you need

33:13.412 --> 33:16.320
uh more attention to the leadership

33:16.330 --> 33:20.220
billets . Um Do you , do you have what

33:20.220 --> 33:22.830
you need in terms of funding right now

33:22.840 --> 33:25.500
to do this and to deal with your

33:25.500 --> 33:28.180
enormous challenges ? Um

33:28.700 --> 33:32.570
And if we , if we give you um

33:33.080 --> 33:37.020
and the same amount you got um this ,

33:37.030 --> 33:39.600
this fiscal year with an inflation

33:39.600 --> 33:43.510
adjustment , will that be enough ? So

33:43.520 --> 33:45.800
ready member ? Speaking , just to my

33:45.800 --> 33:48.940
specific office , I think we are

33:48.940 --> 33:50.940
probably on a good path way just in

33:50.940 --> 33:52.996
terms of funding already highlighted

33:52.996 --> 33:55.218
some of the other requirements in terms

33:55.218 --> 33:57.051
of the entire Special operations

33:57.051 --> 33:59.540
enterprise . I think our priorities are

33:59.540 --> 34:02.270
represented understanding full well

34:02.270 --> 34:04.690
that the challenge with inflation means

34:04.690 --> 34:06.900
that if our budget is flat , that

34:06.910 --> 34:08.966
reduces our buying power . So that's

34:08.966 --> 34:11.132
something we'll , we'll need to keep a

34:11.132 --> 34:13.243
close eye on , sir . And yet you need

34:13.243 --> 34:15.140
additional staff and you need um

34:15.150 --> 34:17.280
increased leadership village . Yes ,

34:17.280 --> 34:19.113
sir . So I think we're on a good

34:19.113 --> 34:21.280
trajectory with the leadership billets

34:21.280 --> 34:23.391
were part of that conversation in the

34:23.391 --> 34:25.558
department . I think especially in out

34:25.558 --> 34:27.613
years , we're gonna need to add more

34:27.613 --> 34:29.502
staff to build that capability to

34:29.502 --> 34:31.613
really help this this transition I've

34:31.613 --> 34:33.780
described from counterterrorism crisis

34:33.780 --> 34:35.669
response to also include the peer

34:35.669 --> 34:37.800
competition that we've talked about .

34:37.800 --> 34:39.856
And I expect we'll talk about more ,

34:39.856 --> 34:41.967
sir . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank

34:41.967 --> 34:44.189
you , Senator Worker , Senator Greene ,

34:44.189 --> 34:46.189
please . Um Thank you gentlemen for

34:46.189 --> 34:48.022
being here this morning for your

34:48.022 --> 34:50.133
testimony and for your service to the

34:50.133 --> 34:52.189
country . I think I would start this

34:52.189 --> 34:54.189
question with you , Secretary Mayor

34:54.189 --> 34:56.300
because so common cyber com really at

34:56.300 --> 35:00.040
the nexus of D O D s efforts to address

35:00.040 --> 35:01.984
the weaponization of information ,

35:02.250 --> 35:04.730
which I think has become as much an

35:04.730 --> 35:07.390
issue for us as we're looking at our

35:07.390 --> 35:09.390
ability to be successful around the

35:09.390 --> 35:13.220
world as our military capability . So

35:13.230 --> 35:16.860
can you Secretary Mayor , talk about D

35:16.860 --> 35:20.270
O D s role in addressing that

35:20.280 --> 35:24.050
misinformation and how D O D

35:24.050 --> 35:27.440
coordinates with other um agencies and

35:27.440 --> 35:29.780
departments within government to

35:29.780 --> 35:32.600
address disinformation ? Yeah . Thank

35:32.600 --> 35:34.878
you for the question , Senator Shaheen .

35:34.878 --> 35:36.830
So I would broadly start with

35:36.830 --> 35:39.830
describing D U D information as rooted

35:39.830 --> 35:43.220
in military objectives So as we talk

35:43.220 --> 35:45.164
about how this fits into the inter

35:45.164 --> 35:47.331
agency , we have a distinct role and a

35:47.331 --> 35:49.260
value to play but not for broad

35:49.260 --> 35:51.390
messaging , not for all the work that

35:51.390 --> 35:53.557
say the state department or some other

35:53.557 --> 35:56.610
entities would do . And I think we have

35:56.610 --> 35:59.140
looked at significant components of the

35:59.140 --> 36:01.410
information operations , enterprise and

36:01.410 --> 36:03.740
really tried to tighten and target it

36:03.740 --> 36:05.962
more . So the value proposition and the

36:05.962 --> 36:08.073
measures of effectiveness are there .

36:08.073 --> 36:10.296
This is really a journey we're on . And

36:10.296 --> 36:12.518
I think it's one that the leadership of

36:12.518 --> 36:14.629
the department is very , very focused

36:14.629 --> 36:16.851
on . So I would leave you with the idea

36:16.851 --> 36:19.073
that this is much more of a priority in

36:19.073 --> 36:21.129
the context of integrated deterrence

36:21.129 --> 36:20.860
that the national defense strategy

36:20.860 --> 36:22.860
calls out because information is so

36:22.860 --> 36:25.260
critical as you said to all the aspects

36:25.260 --> 36:27.427
of success , especially as we start to

36:27.427 --> 36:29.593
think about adversaries , we're trying

36:29.593 --> 36:32.050
to determine . So as you think about

36:32.060 --> 36:35.900
our efforts to recognizing you're

36:35.900 --> 36:37.900
saying that we're trying to be more

36:37.900 --> 36:40.067
focused and how we address information

36:40.067 --> 36:43.750
at D O D , but clearly what happens at

36:43.750 --> 36:47.580
state and , and other government

36:47.580 --> 36:50.070
agencies affects what D O D does ? So ,

36:50.080 --> 36:52.700
are their policy changes ? Are there

36:52.700 --> 36:55.300
resources , is their coordination that

36:55.300 --> 36:58.220
should be done that um we should be

36:58.220 --> 37:00.500
thinking about and , and I would ask

37:00.500 --> 37:02.680
General Fenton and Sony to respond to

37:02.680 --> 37:05.830
that as well . Briefly , man , ma'am ,

37:05.830 --> 37:08.630
I think we need to invest more in the D

37:08.630 --> 37:11.180
O D Information Operations , Enterprise .

37:11.180 --> 37:13.540
It's not been one that has frequently

37:13.540 --> 37:17.180
been a focus frankly . And I think with

37:17.180 --> 37:19.291
more capability , the department will

37:19.291 --> 37:21.347
enhance our ability to coordinate an

37:21.347 --> 37:23.458
interagency standpoint . That's still

37:23.458 --> 37:25.624
very much a work in progress . Ma'am ,

37:25.624 --> 37:29.500
General Flynn , Senator , I would uh

37:30.210 --> 37:32.790
echo all of Secretary Mayor's comments .

37:32.790 --> 37:35.700
And then I add that the integrated

37:35.700 --> 37:37.644
deterrence approach , I think does

37:37.644 --> 37:39.756
demand a whole of government approach

37:39.756 --> 37:41.922
and information operations . Uh and so

37:41.922 --> 37:44.144
come is one part of that the department

37:44.144 --> 37:46.089
side . But we also coordinate with

37:46.089 --> 37:48.089
other agencies of the government to

37:48.089 --> 37:51.780
ensure that uh were integrated .

37:51.790 --> 37:54.430
And that folks know that the socom

37:54.430 --> 37:56.652
pieces of traditional military activity

37:56.652 --> 37:59.110
uh information operation space as I as

37:59.110 --> 38:00.777
I like to say is a place , we

38:00.777 --> 38:02.721
absolutely have to be as part of a

38:02.721 --> 38:04.499
military , traditional military

38:04.499 --> 38:06.410
activity and to get effects for

38:06.410 --> 38:08.570
commanders either to message and

38:08.570 --> 38:12.050
adversary uh to see misinformation and

38:12.050 --> 38:13.994
provide that to a host nation . So

38:13.994 --> 38:16.750
center , I I think our key uh message

38:16.750 --> 38:18.861
to the so called enterprise , we move

38:18.861 --> 38:21.270
forward is we remain aligned with the

38:21.270 --> 38:23.381
department . And certainly as part of

38:23.381 --> 38:25.548
the whole government approach , it's a

38:25.548 --> 38:27.214
key part for us and our state

38:27.214 --> 38:29.381
colleagues and other colleagues in the

38:29.381 --> 38:29.250
U S government are very important as we

38:29.250 --> 38:32.770
do that senator begins overseas

38:32.780 --> 38:34.891
were very familiar on how to do these

38:34.891 --> 38:36.780
operations . We've seen it in the

38:36.780 --> 38:38.891
elections . We've seen it with Russia

38:38.891 --> 38:41.002
Ukraine , we've seen it with Iran the

38:41.002 --> 38:42.947
same actors that are interfering ,

38:42.947 --> 38:42.760
interfering in our elections are the

38:42.760 --> 38:44.538
same actors are doing influence

38:44.538 --> 38:46.760
operations . We go after them . This is

38:46.760 --> 38:48.982
what , you know , persistent engagement

38:48.982 --> 38:50.816
is for U S Cyber Command and the

38:50.816 --> 38:53.038
National Security Agency , we find them

38:53.038 --> 38:54.927
and we continue to ensure that we

38:54.927 --> 38:57.149
understand exactly what they're doing .

38:57.149 --> 38:59.371
We examine their tradecraft and then we

38:59.371 --> 38:59.180
share it with a series of different

38:59.180 --> 39:00.900
partners . This is only done

39:00.900 --> 39:03.060
effectively as both the Secretary and

39:03.060 --> 39:05.171
General Fenton have indicated is with

39:05.171 --> 39:07.449
partners . So inside the United States ,

39:07.449 --> 39:09.449
sharing signatures with the FBI who

39:09.449 --> 39:11.782
share it with um social media companies ,

39:11.782 --> 39:14.004
being able to work with allied partners

39:14.004 --> 39:16.171
who have a broader understanding . But

39:16.171 --> 39:18.449
then I think it's also with , you know ,

39:18.449 --> 39:20.504
how do you bring the totality of our

39:20.504 --> 39:20.490
government against them ? Whether it's

39:20.490 --> 39:22.930
State Department Treasury FBI being

39:22.940 --> 39:25.051
able to go after them ? The one thing

39:25.051 --> 39:27.273
we've learned though in this is that uh

39:27.273 --> 39:29.273
they never go away , they're always

39:29.273 --> 39:31.051
there and you always have to be

39:31.051 --> 39:33.830
persistent . So the fiscal year 20 N D

39:33.830 --> 39:36.540
A um tried to better focus the

39:36.540 --> 39:38.540
department's efforts on information

39:38.540 --> 39:40.262
operations and established the

39:40.262 --> 39:42.096
principle information operations

39:42.096 --> 39:45.360
advisor and um asked the Secretary of

39:45.360 --> 39:47.810
Defense to conduct information

39:47.810 --> 39:49.990
operations and required a strategy and

39:49.990 --> 39:52.212
posture review that was due more than a

39:52.212 --> 39:53.990
year ago . It still hasn't been

39:53.990 --> 39:56.101
delivered by the department . Can you

39:56.101 --> 39:58.268
tell us what the status of that report

39:58.268 --> 40:00.590
is ? Secretary Mayor ? And when we

40:00.590 --> 40:04.390
could expect delivery senator . Yes ,

40:04.400 --> 40:07.230
we understand both the strategy and the

40:07.230 --> 40:09.397
posture review are overdue . They both

40:09.397 --> 40:11.563
are now in senior level coordination .

40:11.563 --> 40:13.674
So above my level , they pass through

40:13.674 --> 40:16.090
my um my review . So I would expect in

40:16.090 --> 40:18.257
a matter of weeks , they would come to

40:18.257 --> 40:19.757
you . Um I would say , and

40:19.757 --> 40:22.240
understanding the times out uh that

40:22.250 --> 40:24.361
these have helped to animate a lot of

40:24.361 --> 40:26.528
the conversations indeed action within

40:26.528 --> 40:28.750
the department to really focus down and

40:28.750 --> 40:30.861
in on posture . And then the strategy

40:30.861 --> 40:32.861
has prompted a re look at how we go

40:32.861 --> 40:35.028
about doing information operations per

40:35.028 --> 40:37.083
your your opening question , ma'am .

40:37.083 --> 40:39.306
Thank you . So I should assume we would

40:39.306 --> 40:41.306
have it by maybe the end of April .

40:41.480 --> 40:43.424
That is our intent . Yes , ma'am .

40:43.424 --> 40:45.536
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman .

40:45.536 --> 40:47.758
Thank you , Senator Hanson and Fisher ,

40:47.758 --> 40:49.591
please . Thank you , Mr Chairman

40:49.591 --> 40:51.591
General Fenton . In your nomination

40:51.591 --> 40:53.591
hearing last year , you agreed with

40:53.591 --> 40:55.702
your predecessor , General Clark that

40:55.702 --> 40:57.813
without sustained ct pressure , we're

40:57.813 --> 40:59.758
going to continue to see terrorist

40:59.758 --> 41:01.869
groups that are more able to focus on

41:01.869 --> 41:04.570
planning and preparing for external

41:04.570 --> 41:06.737
attacks . Do you still agree with that

41:06.737 --> 41:09.730
statement ? Senator , I absolutely

41:09.730 --> 41:11.952
agree with that statement and there's a

41:11.952 --> 41:14.120
direction to the SOCOM team from the

41:14.120 --> 41:16.176
Secretary of Defense to have that as

41:16.176 --> 41:18.120
one of our three main priorities ,

41:18.120 --> 41:19.842
integrate deterrence , counter

41:19.842 --> 41:21.731
terrorism , counter vo and crisis

41:21.731 --> 41:25.640
response . I remain highly concerned

41:25.650 --> 41:28.190
that we aren't seen sustained C T

41:28.190 --> 41:30.670
pressure that we need in Afghanistan ,

41:30.670 --> 41:34.000
especially with respect to Isis K . And

41:34.000 --> 41:37.130
it's my understanding that we have only

41:37.140 --> 41:40.280
had one single strike in over a

41:40.280 --> 41:42.930
year . I don't believe that that

41:42.940 --> 41:46.570
translates into sustained C T pressure

41:46.570 --> 41:50.560
against Isis K . Can you describe the

41:50.560 --> 41:54.010
challenges of conducting the over the

41:54.010 --> 41:57.270
horizon ct operations without the

41:57.270 --> 42:00.160
reliable partners on the ground without

42:00.170 --> 42:02.860
basing in neighboring countries and

42:02.860 --> 42:06.010
without reliable access to airspace ?

42:07.380 --> 42:09.380
Senator ? Thank you . Thank you for

42:09.380 --> 42:11.800
that and the opportunity to comment on

42:11.800 --> 42:14.640
the first portion of that reference

42:14.640 --> 42:17.020
Afghanistan . Um I would defer

42:17.030 --> 42:19.470
certainly general corella his team that

42:19.470 --> 42:21.500
have a more fulsome insight with a

42:21.500 --> 42:23.667
series of partners that , that I would

42:23.667 --> 42:26.300
have an additional challenges . Um and

42:26.310 --> 42:28.199
so calm being one part of a whole

42:28.199 --> 42:30.254
government team , I'm sure there are

42:30.254 --> 42:32.540
many others that would give you uh

42:32.550 --> 42:34.760
different insights and more probably

42:34.760 --> 42:36.890
some more fulsome data . But what

42:36.900 --> 42:39.220
insights do your insights sir , differ

42:39.220 --> 42:41.331
with some of theirs that they've made

42:41.331 --> 42:43.331
to this committee . Know what , but

42:43.331 --> 42:45.553
what I would tell you , Senator is that

42:45.553 --> 42:47.720
part of addressing Isis in Afghanistan

42:47.720 --> 42:49.887
is addressing it globally . And when I

42:49.887 --> 42:51.887
look at that question , I certainly

42:51.887 --> 42:53.942
view it through the sectors priority

42:53.942 --> 42:55.998
and for us defend the nation . And I

42:55.998 --> 42:58.109
think counterterrorism and V E , oh ,

42:58.109 --> 43:00.331
it's a very high priority for SOCOM and

43:00.331 --> 43:02.220
as we , as we think about it , we

43:02.220 --> 43:04.387
certainly first and foremost know that

43:04.387 --> 43:06.553
you're special operations command team

43:06.553 --> 43:08.664
in partnership with Coke . Um because

43:08.664 --> 43:10.998
ISIS is a global organization can sense ,

43:10.998 --> 43:13.164
see and strike anywhere in the globe .

43:13.164 --> 43:15.600
And in essence , many of our operations

43:15.600 --> 43:17.920
are places where we're not proximate to

43:17.920 --> 43:20.540
the target . And uh in fact , last year ,

43:20.550 --> 43:23.320
uh an operation that went off in

43:23.320 --> 43:25.710
Northwest Syria to remove ISIS number

43:25.710 --> 43:27.766
one from the battlefield , we had to

43:27.766 --> 43:30.120
fly across Syria . So we were very far

43:30.120 --> 43:32.342
from that target but our ability to see

43:32.342 --> 43:34.260
it , sense it and then strike it

43:34.270 --> 43:37.050
unquestionable . And I think we've been

43:37.050 --> 43:40.000
able to do that globally throughout

43:40.000 --> 43:42.680
this year in places that Somalia with

43:42.690 --> 43:45.260
sustained pressure on ISIS against an

43:45.270 --> 43:49.130
ops and uh communications note . And I

43:49.130 --> 43:51.960
would add also that , that global

43:51.960 --> 43:54.510
pressure uh for so calm and counsel

43:54.510 --> 43:56.621
with partnerships goes on even in the

43:56.621 --> 43:58.566
Indo Pacific . So my sense to your

43:58.566 --> 44:00.621
center is that we absolutely have to

44:00.621 --> 44:03.410
keep the pressure on isis on any of

44:03.410 --> 44:05.410
those terrorist networks . And if I

44:05.410 --> 44:07.410
think about it with a number of the

44:07.410 --> 44:09.632
operations that have occurred , and I'd

44:09.632 --> 44:11.466
be happy to talk more in a close

44:11.466 --> 44:13.299
setting . It's been an extremely

44:13.299 --> 44:15.354
challenging year for these extremist

44:15.354 --> 44:17.521
operations with a number of operations

44:17.521 --> 44:19.632
we put together to include in Syria .

44:19.632 --> 44:21.920
Well , so comes has been primarily

44:21.920 --> 44:24.142
focused on counterterrorism mission for

44:24.142 --> 44:26.710
the last 20 years . Uh the special

44:26.710 --> 44:28.580
operation forces have a lot of

44:28.580 --> 44:31.260
capability that they can bring to the

44:31.260 --> 44:33.720
Indo Pacific . You earlier mentioned

44:33.720 --> 44:36.760
your experience um there and I

44:36.770 --> 44:39.670
value your knowledge and experience .

44:39.680 --> 44:42.500
Can you provide an update on how you

44:42.500 --> 44:45.520
plan to rebalance your forces that you

44:45.520 --> 44:48.380
have to restructure training and

44:48.390 --> 44:52.080
exercises or to develop any kind of

44:52.080 --> 44:54.830
unique capabilities in order to meet

44:54.840 --> 44:57.980
the increased demand . Um , signal that

44:57.980 --> 44:59.924
we're getting from indo pay . Come

45:01.840 --> 45:04.130
Senator . Thank you very much for an

45:04.130 --> 45:06.430
opportunity to comment on that I think

45:06.430 --> 45:08.430
is we certainly , as we look at our

45:08.430 --> 45:10.597
priorities across the wind category of

45:10.597 --> 45:12.708
integrated deterrence crisis response

45:12.708 --> 45:14.430
and counterterrorism . It's an

45:14.430 --> 45:16.730
adjustment . Um I've heard it referred

45:16.730 --> 45:18.952
to in other places as a pivot , I would

45:18.952 --> 45:20.952
tell you it's an adjustment for how

45:20.952 --> 45:22.786
we're gonna address uh strategic

45:22.786 --> 45:24.841
competition and a great deterrence .

45:24.841 --> 45:26.897
It's in our D N A we've been doing ,

45:26.897 --> 45:28.563
we've , we've as your Special

45:28.563 --> 45:30.674
Operations Forces were really born to

45:30.674 --> 45:32.897
do this and ended up a com I think what

45:32.897 --> 45:34.841
it means is uh through the lens of

45:34.841 --> 45:37.150
prevention , uh deterrence and

45:37.150 --> 45:38.810
preparation , beginning with

45:38.810 --> 45:40.780
partnerships , partnerships with

45:40.790 --> 45:42.957
nations in that region that want the U

45:42.957 --> 45:44.790
S there . They want to see a U S

45:44.790 --> 45:47.710
capability and frankly , in uh in many

45:47.710 --> 45:49.821
ways , when that U S capability shows

45:49.821 --> 45:51.543
up through the lens of special

45:51.543 --> 45:54.180
operations forces were absolutely able

45:54.180 --> 45:56.510
to move a partnership toward the US and

45:56.510 --> 45:59.850
away from the PRC . I think that same

45:59.850 --> 46:01.683
type of partnership helped us in

46:01.683 --> 46:03.850
Ukraine with the training that we were

46:03.850 --> 46:05.906
doing . There is the Ukrainians from

46:05.906 --> 46:07.572
2014 and on , saw the special

46:07.572 --> 46:09.794
operations way of warfare in the way of

46:09.794 --> 46:11.850
doing business . All of that is very

46:11.850 --> 46:13.961
applicable to what we're doing and uh

46:13.961 --> 46:15.739
the Indo Pacific , but I differ

46:15.739 --> 46:18.450
certainly to uh Admiral Aquilino for a

46:18.450 --> 46:20.672
more fulsome of how he sees because I'm

46:20.672 --> 46:22.839
always in line with his requirements .

46:22.839 --> 46:24.894
And we do that through our theater ,

46:24.894 --> 46:27.172
special operations , command , artists ,

46:27.172 --> 46:29.339
special operations , command Pacific .

46:29.339 --> 46:31.339
We take lead from them at the socom

46:31.339 --> 46:33.506
Enterprise , but we are invested their

46:33.506 --> 46:35.450
Senator Fisher in a way to deter ,

46:35.450 --> 46:37.339
prepare for and then if I need to

46:37.339 --> 46:39.700
prevail in conflict . Thank you and

46:39.700 --> 46:41.700
thank all of you gentlemen for your

46:41.700 --> 46:45.120
service . Thank you . Thank you , Mr

46:45.120 --> 46:47.490
Chairman General maccioni . We've been

46:47.490 --> 46:50.050
working together on helping to develop

46:50.050 --> 46:53.010
a greater um cyber capability amongst

46:53.010 --> 46:56.300
new personnel . And we created this uh

46:56.310 --> 46:59.160
Cyber Academy for civilian workforce

46:59.170 --> 47:02.070
which should be accepting its first

47:02.070 --> 47:04.940
class in 2020 for applications in 2020

47:04.940 --> 47:07.570
for , for a class in 2025 . And we're

47:07.570 --> 47:09.810
using the universities that N S A has

47:09.810 --> 47:13.200
already um assessed as having the

47:13.210 --> 47:15.099
correct cyber capability in cyber

47:15.099 --> 47:17.040
curriculum . But in light of your

47:17.040 --> 47:19.450
testimony , I wanted to ask , um would

47:19.450 --> 47:21.172
it be helpful to you to have a

47:21.172 --> 47:24.070
dedicated cyber force training just for

47:24.070 --> 47:27.870
permanent cyber command personnel for

47:27.870 --> 47:30.100
the military side as well ? And if you

47:30.100 --> 47:32.156
did want that , what would that look

47:32.156 --> 47:34.370
like , Senator ? Uh First of all ,

47:34.370 --> 47:36.592
thank you for the work that you've done

47:36.592 --> 47:38.703
to build a greater population of , of

47:38.703 --> 47:41.340
cyber savvy folks . Uh I'm not sure

47:41.340 --> 47:43.507
that we need an academy yet . What I'm

47:43.507 --> 47:45.830
very , very , uh focused on is being

47:45.830 --> 47:48.630
able to look at the , the continued

47:48.630 --> 47:50.519
success we're gonna have with the

47:50.519 --> 47:52.686
program that , that you've worked with

47:52.686 --> 47:54.741
in New York . I'm very interested in

47:54.741 --> 47:54.380
continuing the successes that we've had

47:54.380 --> 47:56.440
across the National Guard with state

47:56.440 --> 47:58.496
partnership programs are very , very

47:58.496 --> 48:00.496
familiar with the New York National

48:00.496 --> 48:02.384
Guards work with Brazil and other

48:02.384 --> 48:04.440
National Guard Forces here . And I'm

48:04.440 --> 48:06.496
also very , very focused on ensuring

48:06.496 --> 48:08.607
that uh the ROTC and Academy programs

48:08.607 --> 48:10.829
continue to have strong growth in terms

48:10.829 --> 48:12.884
of the numbers of people that can be

48:12.884 --> 48:16.160
commissioned into our force . Thank you ,

48:16.160 --> 48:18.271
Senator Gillibrand , Senator Cotton ,

48:18.271 --> 48:21.870
please . Thank you , gentlemen .

48:21.880 --> 48:24.470
Um Mr Mayor , you acknowledge in your

48:24.470 --> 48:27.130
opening statement that the shift away

48:27.130 --> 48:29.186
from counterterrorism is the primary

48:29.186 --> 48:31.408
role of our nation's Special Operations

48:31.408 --> 48:34.740
Forces . Um But far from decreasing the

48:34.740 --> 48:36.740
need for those forces , I'd suggest

48:36.740 --> 48:38.740
that the current threat environment

48:38.740 --> 48:40.851
calls for even more capability . They

48:40.851 --> 48:42.962
need to continue our counterterrorism

48:42.962 --> 48:44.851
missions support foreign internal

48:44.851 --> 48:46.907
defense activities to bolster allies

48:46.907 --> 48:49.018
and engage in new types of operations

48:49.018 --> 48:51.129
that are going to counter Chinese and

48:51.129 --> 48:53.930
Russian aggression . Um In that

48:53.930 --> 48:55.840
operating environment , would a

48:55.840 --> 48:58.390
decrease in force size or budget seem

48:58.390 --> 49:02.290
like a reasonable step to you . So ,

49:02.300 --> 49:04.078
Senator Cotton , thanks for the

49:04.078 --> 49:06.189
question . Yeah , this is the crux of

49:06.189 --> 49:08.189
the challenge , right ? We're being

49:08.189 --> 49:10.133
asked to do more and our forces is

49:10.133 --> 49:12.250
probably static . So I would not

49:12.250 --> 49:15.100
advocate for reduction in forces . Sir .

49:15.110 --> 49:17.690
I regret that you're here today and not

49:17.690 --> 49:19.857
48 hours from now when we're gonna get

49:19.857 --> 49:22.180
the president's budget because I am

49:22.180 --> 49:24.630
troubled that you may in fact get a

49:24.630 --> 49:27.420
reduction in budget or forces you have

49:27.420 --> 49:29.642
any thoughts on what we're gonna see on

49:29.642 --> 49:31.990
Thursday , Senator , as I think , you

49:31.990 --> 49:34.212
know , I can't talk to what's likely to

49:34.212 --> 49:36.101
be in the budget . But I think as

49:36.101 --> 49:37.934
General Finn and I both said the

49:37.934 --> 49:40.250
priorities that we have identified are

49:40.250 --> 49:43.740
represented in that budget . Well ,

49:43.750 --> 49:47.030
if my fears are proven out , I think

49:47.030 --> 49:49.141
you can count on many members of this

49:49.141 --> 49:51.480
committee probably in both parties to

49:51.480 --> 49:53.369
try to make sure that our Special

49:53.369 --> 49:55.424
Operations forces have the resources

49:55.424 --> 49:57.647
they need General Fenton . Do you agree

49:57.647 --> 49:59.480
that SOCOM requirements and your

49:59.480 --> 50:01.480
relevance are , are growing in this

50:01.480 --> 50:03.591
threat environment , not decreasing ?

50:04.230 --> 50:06.341
Senator , I would agree with that . I

50:06.341 --> 50:08.820
think that the SOCOM requirements to ,

50:08.830 --> 50:11.980
to be um campaigning and competition

50:11.990 --> 50:15.810
are absolutely um important and

50:15.820 --> 50:17.598
uh and exceedingly asked for by

50:17.598 --> 50:19.820
combatant command teams where I draw my

50:19.820 --> 50:21.820
requirements from certainly in line

50:21.820 --> 50:23.653
with their theater , special ops

50:23.653 --> 50:25.653
command the T socks , but we see it

50:25.653 --> 50:27.487
because much of this begins with

50:27.487 --> 50:29.487
partnerships , partnerships that we

50:29.487 --> 50:31.770
forge through the SOCOM team uh and

50:31.770 --> 50:34.720
enable and the payoff in many ways can

50:34.720 --> 50:37.053
be looked at in the vicinity of Ukraine .

50:37.053 --> 50:39.220
So a decrease in either your budget or

50:39.220 --> 50:42.760
your personnel levels would add risk to

50:42.760 --> 50:44.649
your mission and therefore to our

50:44.649 --> 50:46.980
nation . Well , Senator , I uh no one

50:46.980 --> 50:50.090
wants to see a decrease in personnel or

50:50.090 --> 50:52.670
the budget . I would tell you that . I

50:52.670 --> 50:54.640
think it would not reflect the

50:54.640 --> 50:56.807
requirements . Number one , a decrease

50:56.807 --> 50:58.973
of that . And number two , we would be

50:58.973 --> 51:00.862
forced at some point to make hard

51:00.862 --> 51:02.973
choices because each and every time I

51:02.973 --> 51:05.084
think you'll see me give you the best

51:05.084 --> 51:07.029
special operations command for the

51:07.029 --> 51:10.340
budget . We get Mr Mayor ,

51:11.030 --> 51:13.141
we're talking about your personal . I

51:13.141 --> 51:15.197
want to return to something else you

51:15.197 --> 51:14.610
have in your opening statement cause I

51:14.610 --> 51:16.554
want to make sure we're using this

51:16.554 --> 51:18.443
personal budget the right way you

51:18.443 --> 51:17.990
talked about the need for more staff .

51:18.000 --> 51:20.111
I gotta tell you that gets my hackles

51:20.111 --> 51:22.510
up pretty quickly . Um I think we have

51:22.510 --> 51:24.860
plenty of staff in the Pentagon way too

51:24.860 --> 51:26.916
much . Frankly , I think we have too

51:26.916 --> 51:29.138
many people dressed like you and me and

51:29.138 --> 51:31.304
not enough people dressed like the men

51:31.304 --> 51:30.540
to your right and your left performing

51:30.540 --> 51:32.762
these jobs . Could you explain a little

51:32.762 --> 51:34.651
bit more about what kind of staff

51:34.651 --> 51:34.650
you're talking about and why you would

51:34.650 --> 51:37.560
need more staff ? So Senator I was

51:37.560 --> 51:39.970
referring specifically to the special

51:39.970 --> 51:42.030
operations , low intensity conflict

51:42.030 --> 51:44.920
staff that performs the title 10

51:44.920 --> 51:47.210
responsibility of the organized trained

51:47.210 --> 51:49.377
equipped for SOCOM . So , so frankly ,

51:49.377 --> 51:51.488
sir , a lot of what the staff do on a

51:51.488 --> 51:54.460
daily basis is try to articulate the

51:54.460 --> 51:56.516
soft value proposition back into the

51:56.516 --> 51:58.682
department with the services . Uh Some

51:58.682 --> 52:01.650
of my concern is that as we go from the

52:01.650 --> 52:04.090
less intense environment of

52:04.090 --> 52:06.410
counterterrorism , um or go towards a

52:06.410 --> 52:08.840
less intense environment without the

52:08.840 --> 52:10.840
intense focus on counterterrorism ,

52:10.840 --> 52:12.340
that some of what soft has

52:12.340 --> 52:14.870
traditionally been afforded will be

52:14.870 --> 52:17.140
lost in that . So , so sometimes this

52:17.140 --> 52:19.251
is just as simple as making sure that

52:19.251 --> 52:21.580
we have the soft value proposition

52:21.580 --> 52:24.060
represented in resourcing training

52:24.060 --> 52:26.840
planning . I've been frankly surprised

52:26.840 --> 52:29.062
at times of how that has been forgotten

52:29.062 --> 52:31.370
or too narrowly defined as being a

52:31.370 --> 52:33.370
counterterrorism problem . So , you

52:33.370 --> 52:35.426
know , my 40 some odd staff are very

52:35.426 --> 52:37.481
much in that business and you know ,

52:37.481 --> 52:39.203
it's the analytics , it's it's

52:39.203 --> 52:41.203
supporting special programs , other

52:41.203 --> 52:43.314
things like that , that are very uh I

52:43.314 --> 52:44.926
think akin to the soft value

52:44.926 --> 52:46.537
proposition , but don't have

52:46.537 --> 52:48.759
representation often within the broader

52:48.759 --> 52:50.870
department General Fenton . One final

52:50.870 --> 52:53.148
question you in your opening statement ,

52:53.148 --> 52:55.370
you talk about the strategic transition

52:55.370 --> 52:57.314
for the Special Operation Forces .

52:57.314 --> 52:59.426
Could you explain a little more about

52:59.426 --> 53:01.314
the role that special , that your

53:01.314 --> 53:03.481
forces , special operations forces are

53:03.481 --> 53:05.703
gonna be expected to play in the future

53:05.703 --> 53:07.814
fight ? And if so , if you can add an

53:07.814 --> 53:09.926
unclassified level , maybe help share

53:09.926 --> 53:13.080
that story , Senator . Thank you .

53:13.090 --> 53:15.720
Thank you for that . Uh I'll focus on

53:15.730 --> 53:18.560
integrated deterrence uh and where the

53:18.560 --> 53:20.782
secretary and the department have asked

53:20.782 --> 53:22.727
us to , to be aligned . And when I

53:22.727 --> 53:24.727
think about that , I think about it

53:24.727 --> 53:26.616
along three really three lenses ,

53:26.616 --> 53:28.782
prevent , prepare and then prevail . I

53:28.782 --> 53:31.004
think on the prevention side , it's all

53:31.004 --> 53:33.171
about being forward , it's about being

53:33.171 --> 53:35.180
uh deployed . Uh our , our skills ,

53:35.190 --> 53:38.880
cultural understanding language uh in a

53:38.880 --> 53:40.602
familiarity with many of these

53:40.602 --> 53:42.158
environments that come from

53:42.158 --> 53:44.870
organizations in our enterprise that

53:44.880 --> 53:47.047
know those places . Well , such as our

53:47.047 --> 53:49.047
first Special Forces Group and Indo

53:49.047 --> 53:51.102
Pacific , for instance , have a very

53:51.102 --> 53:53.350
deep familiarity with all things that

53:53.350 --> 53:55.517
go on in many of the partner nations .

53:55.517 --> 53:58.240
I think it's key to keep that certainly

53:58.240 --> 54:00.650
thick and strengthen . So part of it is

54:00.660 --> 54:02.880
being out training , advising ,

54:02.890 --> 54:04.890
assisting building capabilities and

54:04.890 --> 54:06.668
using many of the tools uh This

54:06.668 --> 54:08.557
committee gives us in the form of

54:08.557 --> 54:12.000
security cooperation . Um 12:02 and

54:12.010 --> 54:14.010
counterterrorism tools . That's ,

54:14.020 --> 54:16.020
that's a very key part . I think it

54:16.020 --> 54:18.131
also allows us an opportunity to help

54:18.131 --> 54:20.242
the joint force uh and enable them as

54:20.242 --> 54:22.464
we're out in those environments and are

54:22.464 --> 54:24.020
able to prepare through our

54:24.020 --> 54:26.242
understanding of everything from seabed

54:26.242 --> 54:28.298
all the way to space domain and then

54:28.298 --> 54:30.409
work in concert with General Nakasone

54:30.409 --> 54:32.353
and Jim Dickinson and a soft space

54:32.353 --> 54:34.353
cyber triad . I think those are all

54:34.353 --> 54:36.131
very important . Uh There is an

54:36.131 --> 54:38.076
acceleration towards that it began

54:38.076 --> 54:40.187
before , certainly under General Rich

54:40.187 --> 54:42.242
Clark and we're accelerating that in

54:42.242 --> 54:44.298
the Special operations team while we

54:44.298 --> 54:46.298
stay vigilant on the counter terror

54:46.298 --> 54:48.131
mission and certainly our crisis

54:48.131 --> 54:50.076
response duties as directed by the

54:50.076 --> 54:49.720
secretary . Thank you , gentlemen .

54:50.680 --> 54:52.736
Thank you , Senator Cotton , Senator

54:52.736 --> 54:54.513
Blumenthal . Please . Thanks Mr

54:54.513 --> 54:56.569
Chairman . Let me begin by adding an

54:56.569 --> 54:59.850
exclamation point . The

55:00.770 --> 55:04.750
point that Senator Cotton just

55:04.750 --> 55:06.528
raised about the need for ample

55:06.528 --> 55:08.417
resources devoted to our national

55:08.417 --> 55:10.528
defense . Most especially the kind of

55:10.528 --> 55:12.694
work that you are doing . I think your

55:12.694 --> 55:15.130
testimony today reinforces my hope that

55:15.130 --> 55:17.860
we will have bipartisan support for

55:17.870 --> 55:19.981
that kind of sufficient investment in

55:19.981 --> 55:23.280
our national defense . Uh I've been to

55:23.280 --> 55:26.840
Ukraine three times over the roughly

55:26.850 --> 55:30.390
last year , uh once before the

55:30.400 --> 55:33.140
invasion and had an opportunity to talk

55:33.140 --> 55:36.520
to some of the uh special

55:36.520 --> 55:39.800
forces trainers who were there working

55:39.800 --> 55:43.170
with Ukrainian personnel .

55:43.180 --> 55:46.830
Uh General Fenton , I am hoping that

55:47.600 --> 55:51.050
there has been continued training

55:51.060 --> 55:53.282
outside of Ukraine . I realized none of

55:53.282 --> 55:56.030
those special operation forces are

55:56.700 --> 55:59.900
located physically there . Now , when I

55:59.900 --> 56:02.880
was there last uh a number of weeks ago ,

56:02.890 --> 56:06.820
none were there uh at

56:06.820 --> 56:09.570
least visibly to us . Uh But I'm hoping

56:09.570 --> 56:11.237
that that training mission is

56:11.237 --> 56:13.014
continuing outside of Ukraine .

56:14.860 --> 56:17.027
Senator . Thank you for that . It , it

56:17.027 --> 56:19.027
absolutely is continuing outside of

56:19.027 --> 56:21.200
Ukraine uh in a number of locations ,

56:21.210 --> 56:23.480
bringing the capability that continues

56:23.480 --> 56:27.100
to assist Ukrainian Soft as part of the

56:27.100 --> 56:29.580
entire Ukrainian military . Uh And that

56:29.580 --> 56:31.970
training goes along a number of the

56:31.970 --> 56:33.859
lines you've seen before , uh the

56:33.859 --> 56:36.120
capability to defend themselves , uh

56:36.130 --> 56:38.074
the capability to mission plan and

56:38.074 --> 56:40.500
orient and understanding of the

56:40.500 --> 56:43.190
intelligence and uh and certainly an

56:43.190 --> 56:45.630
understanding of creating dilemmas for

56:45.630 --> 56:47.910
the Russian formation . And so the

56:47.910 --> 56:50.160
Ukrainian soft is a key part of the

56:50.160 --> 56:52.480
Ukrainian military's approach . We do

56:52.480 --> 56:54.647
that as your special operations team ,

56:54.647 --> 56:57.380
certainly under general uh cavalese

56:57.390 --> 56:59.700
direction and watch and in concert with

56:59.730 --> 57:02.000
his teammates in order that , that is

57:02.010 --> 57:04.010
integrated with the entirety of the

57:04.010 --> 57:06.066
approach that the SEC def directed .

57:06.066 --> 57:08.177
What's your assessment as to how well

57:08.177 --> 57:10.066
the Ukrainian Special forces have

57:10.066 --> 57:13.190
operated ? Senator , I think they've

57:13.200 --> 57:17.110
been superb uh from the very beginning

57:17.110 --> 57:19.690
and , and I will start the journey uh

57:20.280 --> 57:22.310
in the mid nineties when special

57:22.310 --> 57:24.532
operations special forces in particular

57:24.532 --> 57:26.690
are 10th special forces group made

57:26.690 --> 57:30.330
contact with Ukrainian uh forces

57:30.340 --> 57:32.660
after the fall of the Soviet Union .

57:32.670 --> 57:35.410
And that generational relationship ,

57:35.420 --> 57:37.587
something that's very , very important

57:37.587 --> 57:39.753
to your special operations community .

57:39.753 --> 57:43.040
My sense laid the pathway for in 2014 ,

57:43.040 --> 57:44.984
our ability to really get after it

57:44.984 --> 57:46.762
after the first invasion by the

57:46.762 --> 57:48.762
Russians . So they've done superbly

57:48.762 --> 57:50.984
well and they've been extremely willing

57:50.984 --> 57:53.790
to prepare and to fight and to learn .

57:54.340 --> 57:57.990
Yes , sir , General Jackson , I think a

57:57.990 --> 58:01.510
number of experts have

58:01.520 --> 58:05.460
been somewhat surprised that

58:05.470 --> 58:07.192
the Russians haven't been more

58:07.192 --> 58:09.359
aggressive in the cyber sphere against

58:09.359 --> 58:12.860
Ukraine in this past year .

58:12.870 --> 58:15.790
What's your assessment as to why they

58:15.790 --> 58:19.000
haven't been more aggressive ? Why

58:19.000 --> 58:20.833
they've been somewhat apparently

58:20.833 --> 58:23.700
quiescent or maybe the Ukrainians have

58:23.710 --> 58:27.490
just uh resisted and fended them off

58:27.500 --> 58:30.870
without our knowing it center . The

58:30.880 --> 58:32.769
Russians have been very active in

58:32.769 --> 58:34.991
Ukraine in terms of conducting a number

58:34.991 --> 58:36.602
of cyber attacks , including

58:36.602 --> 58:38.269
destructive , destructive and

58:38.269 --> 58:40.269
destructive destructive attacks . I

58:40.269 --> 58:40.180
think there's several pieces of the

58:40.180 --> 58:42.347
story here that are important though ,

58:42.347 --> 58:44.513
first of all , when you begin the plan

58:44.513 --> 58:46.624
and you think it's going to be a very

58:46.624 --> 58:48.680
easy invasion , perhaps you don't do

58:48.680 --> 58:50.458
enough planning with regards to

58:50.458 --> 58:52.569
enabling activities . Secondly , give

58:52.569 --> 58:54.791
full credit to the Ukrainians . Uh They

58:54.791 --> 58:56.624
did a tremendous job in terms of

58:56.624 --> 58:58.958
building their cybersecurity resilience .

58:58.958 --> 59:00.958
And the third piece is , is that um

59:00.958 --> 59:03.291
this is again for persistent engagement ,

59:03.291 --> 59:05.458
my discussion previously being able to

59:05.458 --> 59:07.569
enable an act with your partners . Uh

59:07.569 --> 59:09.402
the Russians uh have not been as

59:09.402 --> 59:11.347
successful and there's a number of

59:11.347 --> 59:13.402
reasons for that . And I would point

59:13.402 --> 59:15.402
also to the fact that we've able to

59:15.402 --> 59:17.624
been able to bring a series of partners

59:17.624 --> 59:19.791
including the private sector that have

59:19.791 --> 59:21.847
a tremendous capability and capacity

59:21.847 --> 59:23.847
against the Russians . Um I've been

59:23.847 --> 59:25.624
impressed when I have spoken to

59:25.624 --> 59:27.690
President Zelensky with his focus on

59:27.700 --> 59:31.660
Cyber . Um Do you think that there

59:31.670 --> 59:35.540
is a greatly increased danger or risk

59:35.550 --> 59:39.440
of Russians cyber attack if the counter

59:39.440 --> 59:42.270
offensive anticipated this spring by

59:42.270 --> 59:45.830
Ukraine is successful ? We're watching

59:45.830 --> 59:48.052
this very carefully . This is , this is

59:48.052 --> 59:50.274
the matter of vigilance that I spoke to

59:50.274 --> 59:52.274
earlier because by no means is , is

59:52.274 --> 59:54.108
this done in terms of the Russia

59:54.108 --> 59:56.900
Ukraine situation ? So as Russia looks

59:56.900 --> 59:59.011
at , you know , armaments coming into

59:59.011 --> 01:00:00.733
the country as Russia looks at

01:00:00.733 --> 01:00:02.956
different support , how do they react ?

01:00:02.956 --> 01:00:05.067
One of the things that we are charged

01:00:05.067 --> 01:00:07.233
with is ensuring the security of the U

01:00:07.233 --> 01:00:06.930
S critical infrastructure and key

01:00:06.930 --> 01:00:09.350
resources with our partners in DHS and

01:00:09.350 --> 01:00:11.400
FBI . And so this is something that

01:00:11.400 --> 01:00:13.567
we're working closely every single day

01:00:13.567 --> 01:00:15.830
on Senator . Thank you very much to you

01:00:15.830 --> 01:00:17.886
all and thank you for your service .

01:00:17.886 --> 01:00:20.052
Thank you , Senator Blumenthal . Thank

01:00:20.052 --> 01:00:22.330
you , Mr Chair . Thank you , gentlemen .

01:00:22.330 --> 01:00:24.163
Excuse me for being here today ,

01:00:24.163 --> 01:00:26.380
Secretary , Mayor and General Fenton .

01:00:26.390 --> 01:00:29.280
Um I really do commend your submission

01:00:29.280 --> 01:00:31.670
of the joint statement to our committee .

01:00:31.670 --> 01:00:34.590
It it reflects both alignments and

01:00:34.590 --> 01:00:37.660
oversight from civilian policy makers

01:00:37.660 --> 01:00:40.470
as well as our uniform leaders . So

01:00:40.470 --> 01:00:42.820
thank you for submitting that Secretary ,

01:00:42.820 --> 01:00:44.931
Mayor and General Fenton has outlined

01:00:44.931 --> 01:00:47.990
in your soft vision and strategy . How

01:00:47.990 --> 01:00:50.010
does the soft balance its various

01:00:50.010 --> 01:00:52.630
missions with great power competition ,

01:00:52.640 --> 01:00:55.330
counterterrorism and crisis response ,

01:00:55.330 --> 01:00:57.540
your three main missions ? Because

01:00:57.550 --> 01:00:59.494
right now we're seeing great power

01:00:59.494 --> 01:01:02.410
competition increase um ever increasing

01:01:02.410 --> 01:01:04.480
with Iran , of course , are pacing

01:01:04.480 --> 01:01:07.130
threat with China and of course with

01:01:07.140 --> 01:01:09.740
the Russian incursion and war in

01:01:09.740 --> 01:01:13.110
Ukraine . So how do you balance those

01:01:13.110 --> 01:01:16.360
missions ? And how should that um great

01:01:16.360 --> 01:01:19.930
power competition affect

01:01:19.940 --> 01:01:23.360
your mission ? Thank you , Senator .

01:01:23.360 --> 01:01:25.527
And I'll take it from a more strategic

01:01:25.527 --> 01:01:27.638
level and then ask General Finn to to

01:01:27.638 --> 01:01:29.749
speak in more detail . So I would say

01:01:29.749 --> 01:01:31.971
first and foremost , it's , it's a risk

01:01:31.971 --> 01:01:34.027
assessment and it's weighing against

01:01:34.027 --> 01:01:36.138
the requirements . So there is always

01:01:36.138 --> 01:01:38.193
more requirements from the combatant

01:01:38.193 --> 01:01:40.138
commands and then we can meet as a

01:01:40.138 --> 01:01:42.360
force and those numbers keep going up .

01:01:42.360 --> 01:01:44.416
But I think at the same time , we're

01:01:44.416 --> 01:01:46.638
very focused on the idea that while the

01:01:46.638 --> 01:01:48.749
strategic focus is of course , on the

01:01:48.749 --> 01:01:50.860
pacing challenge of the PRC and acute

01:01:50.860 --> 01:01:52.582
threat of Russia , we can't be

01:01:52.582 --> 01:01:54.650
surprised by an attack from another

01:01:54.650 --> 01:01:56.761
adversary . And I think managing that

01:01:56.761 --> 01:01:58.710
risk is many cases what the soft

01:01:58.710 --> 01:02:00.821
enterprise does very well . We are in

01:02:00.821 --> 01:02:02.932
essence the hedge against that risk .

01:02:02.932 --> 01:02:05.043
So it's a , it's a constant effort to

01:02:05.043 --> 01:02:07.670
look for areas where we can innovate to

01:02:07.670 --> 01:02:09.670
be able to do more , do things on a

01:02:09.670 --> 01:02:11.837
more sustainable fashion . And in some

01:02:11.837 --> 01:02:13.892
cases , look for where we're getting

01:02:13.892 --> 01:02:15.948
what my New England friends call too

01:02:15.948 --> 01:02:17.448
for where we're able to do

01:02:17.448 --> 01:02:19.503
counterterrorism work and have those

01:02:19.503 --> 01:02:21.503
partnerships and access . That then

01:02:21.503 --> 01:02:23.726
helps us also on the N D S priorities ,

01:02:23.726 --> 01:02:25.670
ma'am . Thank you , General Fenton

01:02:25.740 --> 01:02:27.796
Senator . Thank . Thank you for that

01:02:27.796 --> 01:02:29.796
question . I think to your point on

01:02:29.796 --> 01:02:31.907
balance and adjustment . Uh That's in

01:02:31.907 --> 01:02:34.018
uh I'm constantly focused on that and

01:02:34.018 --> 01:02:36.490
in the command , as you mentioned , the

01:02:36.500 --> 01:02:39.330
integrated deterrence crisis response

01:02:39.330 --> 01:02:41.441
and counterterrorism operations , all

01:02:41.441 --> 01:02:45.210
those extremely uh priority , extremely

01:02:45.210 --> 01:02:47.266
high priority for the socom team . I

01:02:47.266 --> 01:02:49.543
think on the integrated deterrent size ,

01:02:49.543 --> 01:02:51.710
we take our lead from the co combatant

01:02:51.710 --> 01:02:53.710
commands and their requirements for

01:02:53.710 --> 01:02:55.599
engagement in their , in their uh

01:02:55.599 --> 01:02:57.210
regions , what they need for

01:02:57.210 --> 01:02:58.821
partnerships , how they need

01:02:58.821 --> 01:03:01.043
capabilities built and uh and center in

01:03:01.043 --> 01:03:03.150
in many ways , our counterterrorism

01:03:03.160 --> 01:03:05.830
tools and the form factors that we have

01:03:05.830 --> 01:03:07.830
in terms of how we present forces ,

01:03:07.830 --> 01:03:10.340
those are equally applicable in the

01:03:10.350 --> 01:03:12.370
integrated deterrence , the

01:03:12.370 --> 01:03:14.680
requirements from the CO coms for

01:03:14.690 --> 01:03:16.746
developing a force and compete being

01:03:16.746 --> 01:03:19.260
with adversaries such as the PRC as

01:03:19.260 --> 01:03:21.316
they are for actual counterterrorism

01:03:21.316 --> 01:03:24.270
efforts that , you know , very well . I

01:03:24.270 --> 01:03:26.326
think it's a balance . Some of those

01:03:26.326 --> 01:03:28.270
tools are interchangeable , we can

01:03:28.270 --> 01:03:30.270
bring them across the spectrum very

01:03:30.270 --> 01:03:32.381
often . It is about the relationships

01:03:32.381 --> 01:03:34.492
that turn into things that we've seen

01:03:34.492 --> 01:03:36.714
in Ukraine . And we just have mentioned

01:03:36.714 --> 01:03:38.770
here soft investment early and we've

01:03:38.770 --> 01:03:41.048
seen that in many other places as well .

01:03:41.048 --> 01:03:43.159
Thank you . I appreciate that . And I

01:03:43.159 --> 01:03:45.381
know that my colleague , Senator Cotton

01:03:45.381 --> 01:03:47.492
talked about your top line and uh and

01:03:47.492 --> 01:03:49.714
strength cuts and how that would impact

01:03:49.714 --> 01:03:52.060
soft . I am very , very concerned about

01:03:52.060 --> 01:03:54.190
that and it , it doesn't matter what

01:03:54.190 --> 01:03:56.420
commander it was whether it was General

01:03:56.420 --> 01:03:59.340
Tony Thomas or Rich Clark or now you

01:03:59.340 --> 01:04:02.710
General Fenton . Um I've always brought

01:04:02.710 --> 01:04:05.010
this up in discussions and every socom

01:04:05.010 --> 01:04:07.288
commander I have visited with has said ,

01:04:07.288 --> 01:04:09.454
you know , ma'am , we're gonna make do

01:04:09.460 --> 01:04:12.230
you know we will execute the mission

01:04:12.240 --> 01:04:15.110
regardless of the budget ? I get that ,

01:04:15.120 --> 01:04:17.280
but I just need to stress to this

01:04:17.280 --> 01:04:19.980
committee how important it is that we

01:04:19.980 --> 01:04:22.202
continue to fund you at the appropriate

01:04:22.202 --> 01:04:24.560
levels . Um You give us the greatest

01:04:24.560 --> 01:04:27.820
bang for the buck um with what you do

01:04:27.820 --> 01:04:31.360
all around the globe . So um we won't

01:04:31.380 --> 01:04:34.260
question that but um I do want to dig

01:04:34.260 --> 01:04:36.730
in a little more . Uh General Fenton ,

01:04:36.730 --> 01:04:40.640
I've supported section 12 02 , regular

01:04:40.640 --> 01:04:42.696
warfare authorities that was done in

01:04:42.696 --> 01:04:46.080
the fiscal year 18 N D A . And your

01:04:46.080 --> 01:04:48.870
joint statement describes this as

01:04:48.880 --> 01:04:50.436
essential for applying soft

01:04:50.436 --> 01:04:53.650
capabilities against malign actors . So

01:04:53.650 --> 01:04:56.010
in your personal opinion , would

01:04:56.020 --> 01:04:58.640
enabling those partner forces that are

01:04:58.640 --> 01:05:02.150
responding to hostilities , enhance ,

01:05:02.160 --> 01:05:04.760
soft irregular warfare contribution to

01:05:04.760 --> 01:05:08.590
great power competition . Sen ,

01:05:08.590 --> 01:05:11.040
thank you for that . And uh I'll thank

01:05:11.040 --> 01:05:14.060
this committee for the 1202 authority

01:05:14.070 --> 01:05:16.650
that that is a very important tool in

01:05:16.650 --> 01:05:18.706
the , in the , in the arsenal of the

01:05:18.706 --> 01:05:20.928
special operations tools that we use to

01:05:20.928 --> 01:05:22.928
either develop partnerships , build

01:05:22.928 --> 01:05:25.460
capability and capacity of , of , of a

01:05:25.460 --> 01:05:27.840
nation . Uh and certainly then move

01:05:27.840 --> 01:05:30.300
forward . So , thank you very much for

01:05:30.300 --> 01:05:34.070
that . Uh It is key uh for us to engage

01:05:34.070 --> 01:05:36.014
in partnerships at that level that

01:05:36.014 --> 01:05:38.460
involve irregular warfare , our ability

01:05:38.470 --> 01:05:41.330
to operate and uh build up a capability

01:05:41.330 --> 01:05:44.290
of a nation also have it uh able to

01:05:44.290 --> 01:05:46.770
look at any malign influences coming

01:05:46.770 --> 01:05:48.770
its way and identify those and then

01:05:48.770 --> 01:05:50.881
address them and those , those forces

01:05:50.881 --> 01:05:53.103
that we work with , provide options for

01:05:53.103 --> 01:05:55.250
their national command leadership as

01:05:55.250 --> 01:05:57.583
well as dilemmas for any adversary . So ,

01:05:57.583 --> 01:06:00.320
Senator , I would say a very small

01:06:00.320 --> 01:06:02.431
investment in many ways , almost like

01:06:02.431 --> 01:06:04.653
you're special operations team . It's a

01:06:04.653 --> 01:06:06.820
very small investment , but for a very

01:06:06.820 --> 01:06:08.931
high return on , on , on the dollar .

01:06:08.931 --> 01:06:11.153
So I thank you very much . For that and

01:06:11.153 --> 01:06:13.098
happy to talk more about in closed

01:06:13.098 --> 01:06:15.153
session . Very good . Thank you very

01:06:15.153 --> 01:06:14.690
much , gentlemen . Thank you , Mr Chair .

01:06:14.700 --> 01:06:16.867
Thank you , Senator , let me recognize

01:06:16.867 --> 01:06:19.140
Senator Hirono and ask Senator King to

01:06:19.140 --> 01:06:21.084
preside while I attend the banking

01:06:21.084 --> 01:06:23.362
committee . Senator Hirono . Thank you ,

01:06:23.362 --> 01:06:25.418
Mr Chairman . Thank you all for your

01:06:25.418 --> 01:06:27.690
testimony today . And General Fenton

01:06:27.690 --> 01:06:29.690
and Secretary mayor . Thank you for

01:06:29.690 --> 01:06:31.857
meeting with me earlier , General Knox

01:06:31.857 --> 01:06:34.420
Tony . I have been deeply concerned by

01:06:34.420 --> 01:06:36.940
the state of critical infrastructure on

01:06:36.940 --> 01:06:38.760
and off military installations

01:06:38.760 --> 01:06:40.204
crumbling and out of date

01:06:40.204 --> 01:06:42.093
infrastructure lead to delays and

01:06:42.093 --> 01:06:43.760
maintenance schedules and put

01:06:43.760 --> 01:06:46.030
communities at risk for environmental

01:06:46.030 --> 01:06:49.020
disasters as we have seen in Hawaii .

01:06:49.020 --> 01:06:51.187
But it also leaves infrastructure that

01:06:51.187 --> 01:06:53.353
is critical to our national security ,

01:06:53.353 --> 01:06:57.030
but often as an after thought like

01:06:57.030 --> 01:06:58.808
wastewater treatment plants and

01:06:58.808 --> 01:07:01.390
pipelines exposed to cyber attacks ,

01:07:01.400 --> 01:07:04.100
that is why I very much appreciated

01:07:04.100 --> 01:07:05.600
President Biden's national

01:07:05.600 --> 01:07:07.640
cybersecurity strategy strategies

01:07:07.640 --> 01:07:09.307
focused on defending critical

01:07:09.307 --> 01:07:12.360
infrastructure , I E things like

01:07:12.370 --> 01:07:15.390
wastewater treatment plants and

01:07:15.400 --> 01:07:17.800
pipes . How would the Department of

01:07:17.800 --> 01:07:21.360
Defense collaborate with other federal

01:07:21.370 --> 01:07:23.910
agencies to implement the

01:07:23.910 --> 01:07:26.420
infrastructure goes outlined in the

01:07:26.420 --> 01:07:28.660
President's National cybersecurity

01:07:28.660 --> 01:07:32.410
strategy . Senator from a cybersecurity

01:07:32.410 --> 01:07:34.660
perspective . We begin first of all

01:07:34.660 --> 01:07:36.493
with the focus on D O D critical

01:07:36.493 --> 01:07:38.660
infrastructure . Two weeks ago , I was

01:07:38.660 --> 01:07:40.716
in Hawaii to see Admiral Aquilino uh

01:07:40.716 --> 01:07:42.590
and to work with him in terms of

01:07:42.600 --> 01:07:44.270
looking at the D O D critical

01:07:44.270 --> 01:07:46.437
infrastructure within the islands . Uh

01:07:46.437 --> 01:07:48.603
We work with a series of partners when

01:07:48.603 --> 01:07:50.659
requested to provide that assistance

01:07:50.659 --> 01:07:52.826
that comes as a request for assistance

01:07:52.826 --> 01:07:54.937
from other agencies to the department

01:07:54.937 --> 01:07:57.103
of which then we would be part of that

01:07:57.103 --> 01:07:59.230
assistance . Don't you think that

01:07:59.240 --> 01:08:02.270
maintaining are the physical aspects of

01:08:02.270 --> 01:08:05.790
our critical infrastructure is a very

01:08:05.790 --> 01:08:08.380
important part of your ability to do

01:08:08.380 --> 01:08:10.520
your mission ? Certainly , we need a

01:08:10.520 --> 01:08:12.464
platform upon which to operate . I

01:08:12.464 --> 01:08:14.687
agree with you , Senator . And , and so

01:08:14.687 --> 01:08:16.520
what we are focused on though is

01:08:16.520 --> 01:08:18.576
obviously the cyber elements of that

01:08:18.576 --> 01:08:20.520
and then working again through the

01:08:20.520 --> 01:08:22.520
department to assist and and answer

01:08:22.520 --> 01:08:24.798
those requests . So I think , you know ,

01:08:24.798 --> 01:08:26.909
it's all , you know , we need to look

01:08:26.909 --> 01:08:28.964
at these things in a much more total

01:08:28.964 --> 01:08:31.830
kind of an aspect . That is why it was

01:08:31.830 --> 01:08:34.670
really important for um Admiral

01:08:34.670 --> 01:08:37.130
Aquilino to ask for an assessment of

01:08:37.130 --> 01:08:39.130
the infrastructure needs across the

01:08:39.130 --> 01:08:41.186
services in Hawaii . But I would say

01:08:41.186 --> 01:08:44.080
across the country for again , you

01:08:44.080 --> 01:08:46.230
General Sony and General Fenton , the

01:08:46.230 --> 01:08:48.790
administration's India's identifies

01:08:48.790 --> 01:08:51.220
China as the pacing challenge for

01:08:51.220 --> 01:08:53.940
military and to create enduring

01:08:53.950 --> 01:08:57.320
deterrence . It is critical that we uh

01:08:57.570 --> 01:08:59.960
remain the partner of choice in the

01:08:59.970 --> 01:09:02.200
Indo Pacific Air are , which is why I

01:09:02.200 --> 01:09:04.500
have supported additional funding for

01:09:04.500 --> 01:09:06.960
exercises in the region and building on

01:09:06.960 --> 01:09:09.150
longstanding relationships like the

01:09:09.150 --> 01:09:11.360
compact of free association , which we

01:09:11.360 --> 01:09:14.520
are concluding our negotiations on

01:09:14.680 --> 01:09:17.520
what opportunities have your respective

01:09:17.520 --> 01:09:19.687
commands had for multilateral training

01:09:19.687 --> 01:09:21.940
last year , specifically in the Pacific

01:09:21.950 --> 01:09:24.230
they are . And how will you build from

01:09:24.230 --> 01:09:26.380
those going forward . This is for

01:09:26.390 --> 01:09:29.780
General Nakasone and Fenton Senator .

01:09:29.780 --> 01:09:31.891
We began with Cyber flag which is our

01:09:31.891 --> 01:09:34.640
annual uh Keystone exercise . We

01:09:34.640 --> 01:09:37.010
invited a series of partners from the

01:09:37.010 --> 01:09:39.190
Pacific that includes Korea that

01:09:39.190 --> 01:09:41.690
includes Australia that includes other

01:09:41.700 --> 01:09:44.000
nations within the Pacific that decided

01:09:44.000 --> 01:09:46.111
to come and exercise with us . That's

01:09:46.111 --> 01:09:48.222
one piece of it . The second piece is

01:09:48.222 --> 01:09:50.444
what I had spoken to previously , which

01:09:50.444 --> 01:09:52.611
is a state partnership program working

01:09:52.611 --> 01:09:54.722
very , very closely with Hawaii , the

01:09:54.722 --> 01:09:56.944
Hawaii Army National Guard , Hawaii Air

01:09:56.944 --> 01:09:59.111
Force Reserve and National Guard to be

01:09:59.111 --> 01:10:01.333
able to assist them as they take a look

01:10:01.333 --> 01:10:03.333
at Indonesia and the Philippines to

01:10:03.333 --> 01:10:05.056
countries that are um that are

01:10:05.056 --> 01:10:07.111
partnered with the state of Hawaii .

01:10:07.111 --> 01:10:09.278
And so that's an area that I think has

01:10:09.278 --> 01:10:11.444
got tremendous potential in the coming

01:10:11.444 --> 01:10:14.630
year . General , I am particularly

01:10:14.630 --> 01:10:16.980
interested in really strengthening . I

01:10:16.990 --> 01:10:19.212
agree with your area of focus general ,

01:10:19.440 --> 01:10:22.040
but also , you know , the Pacific

01:10:22.040 --> 01:10:24.260
Island nations such as Palau and

01:10:24.260 --> 01:10:27.300
Marshall Islands and Micronesia . Can

01:10:27.300 --> 01:10:29.244
you add to the response , please ?

01:10:29.244 --> 01:10:31.500
Senator I can't . I'll start with uh

01:10:31.510 --> 01:10:33.677
your special operations team out there

01:10:33.677 --> 01:10:35.343
through the theater , special

01:10:35.343 --> 01:10:38.080
operations element , sock pack .

01:10:38.090 --> 01:10:40.830
Special ops Command . Pacific is part

01:10:40.830 --> 01:10:43.500
of all the indo pay com exercise events .

01:10:43.710 --> 01:10:45.550
It's very key for us because our

01:10:45.550 --> 01:10:47.606
ability to build partners and allies

01:10:47.606 --> 01:10:49.828
along with the entire indo pay com team

01:10:49.828 --> 01:10:52.270
for your special ops is it's a pacing

01:10:52.270 --> 01:10:53.992
item . It's very important and

01:10:53.992 --> 01:10:55.937
certainly a high priority for this

01:10:55.937 --> 01:10:58.048
nation and Secretary of Defense below

01:10:58.048 --> 01:11:00.920
that , we also have our own uh either

01:11:00.920 --> 01:11:02.990
bilateral multinational special

01:11:02.990 --> 01:11:04.920
operations training events in the

01:11:04.920 --> 01:11:08.410
region or back uh in , in places around

01:11:08.410 --> 01:11:11.320
bases that we have in , in , in Conus .

01:11:11.550 --> 01:11:14.570
So our ability to be linked up with the

01:11:14.570 --> 01:11:16.570
indo pay com desired end states for

01:11:16.570 --> 01:11:18.681
partners and allies and really enable

01:11:18.681 --> 01:11:20.950
that plus what we bring in . It's in

01:11:20.950 --> 01:11:22.890
our nature and our D N A to be a

01:11:22.900 --> 01:11:25.590
partner force of choice . Uh I think is

01:11:25.590 --> 01:11:28.420
very , very impactful for uh Admiral

01:11:28.420 --> 01:11:30.600
Aquilino and end up a com I would say

01:11:30.600 --> 01:11:32.790
to your partnering anywhere is

01:11:32.790 --> 01:11:35.300
important to us . So to the island

01:11:35.300 --> 01:11:38.440
nation's whether the Oceania uh

01:11:38.450 --> 01:11:40.506
Micronesia , Melanesia , Polynesia ,

01:11:40.506 --> 01:11:42.728
your special ops team has relationships

01:11:42.728 --> 01:11:45.000
there already . Uh some of that is not

01:11:45.010 --> 01:11:47.710
an exercise , but certainly in contact

01:11:47.710 --> 01:11:49.877
or in deployments we've had throughout

01:11:49.877 --> 01:11:52.043
the years and will continue to do that

01:11:52.043 --> 01:11:54.099
and strengthen it as uh the end up a

01:11:54.099 --> 01:11:56.099
com team and commander would want ,

01:11:56.099 --> 01:11:58.099
thank you as my time is up . I just

01:11:58.099 --> 01:12:00.321
wanted to mention General Fenton that I

01:12:00.321 --> 01:12:02.377
did appreciate that in your prepared

01:12:02.377 --> 01:12:04.488
remarks . You talk about diversity of

01:12:04.488 --> 01:12:06.710
thought and background in our people as

01:12:06.710 --> 01:12:09.200
a critical enabler of the American

01:12:09.200 --> 01:12:11.470
advantage . Thank you very much and ,

01:12:11.470 --> 01:12:13.890
and you know , the focus on maintaining

01:12:13.900 --> 01:12:15.910
um that kind of diversity . I

01:12:15.920 --> 01:12:18.310
completely agree with you . Thank you ,

01:12:18.320 --> 01:12:19.320
Mr Chairman ,

01:12:23.250 --> 01:12:25.570
Senator Tuberville . Thank you ,

01:12:25.570 --> 01:12:28.930
Senator King . Um Thank all of you .

01:12:28.930 --> 01:12:30.930
For your service . Thanks for being

01:12:30.930 --> 01:12:34.610
here today . General Market , Sony .

01:12:34.620 --> 01:12:37.400
Um I like what you said in your opening .

01:12:37.410 --> 01:12:39.440
We win with people . I think that's

01:12:39.440 --> 01:12:41.607
everything that we do , especially our

01:12:41.607 --> 01:12:43.910
country , you know , in your department

01:12:44.480 --> 01:12:46.702
when you're looking to recruit people .

01:12:46.702 --> 01:12:49.060
Obviously , cyber is your

01:12:49.740 --> 01:12:52.370
purview . What other areas do you look

01:12:52.370 --> 01:12:55.220
for in young people ? Uh , information

01:12:55.220 --> 01:12:57.820
technology and what all areas do you

01:12:57.820 --> 01:12:59.820
look for in recruiting somebody for

01:12:59.820 --> 01:13:01.876
Cyber ? Look for someone that can do

01:13:01.876 --> 01:13:04.000
critical thinking senator that begins

01:13:04.000 --> 01:13:05.944
with it . There are more than just

01:13:05.944 --> 01:13:08.167
information technology majors out there

01:13:08.167 --> 01:13:10.222
that are successful in Cyber . There

01:13:10.222 --> 01:13:09.820
are linguists , there are

01:13:09.820 --> 01:13:12.880
mathematicians , there are uh you know ,

01:13:12.890 --> 01:13:14.890
um liberal arts majors , what we're

01:13:14.890 --> 01:13:16.779
looking for , someone that has an

01:13:16.779 --> 01:13:18.946
interest has a passion to do this type

01:13:18.946 --> 01:13:21.168
of work that doesn't want to leave work

01:13:21.168 --> 01:13:20.810
until they're able to get the access

01:13:20.810 --> 01:13:22.754
that's necessary for us to have an

01:13:22.754 --> 01:13:25.590
effect . Is that growing uh is , are we

01:13:25.590 --> 01:13:27.701
losing more to private sector ? How's

01:13:27.701 --> 01:13:30.060
that going ? So , first of all , in the

01:13:30.060 --> 01:13:32.116
recruiting piece , the services have

01:13:32.116 --> 01:13:34.282
tremendous success in recruiting cyber

01:13:34.282 --> 01:13:36.282
forces there . They're not having a

01:13:36.282 --> 01:13:38.116
problem filling it . I think the

01:13:38.116 --> 01:13:40.338
challenge becomes later on is there are

01:13:40.338 --> 01:13:39.880
a number of choices that young people

01:13:39.880 --> 01:13:42.960
have . And so I think we have to think

01:13:42.960 --> 01:13:45.182
a bit differently here . First of all ,

01:13:45.182 --> 01:13:47.182
maybe we need to lengthen the , you

01:13:47.182 --> 01:13:49.700
know , the obligation to become trained

01:13:49.700 --> 01:13:51.867
in Cyber because it is so attractive .

01:13:51.867 --> 01:13:53.978
Secondly , I do believe that when you

01:13:53.978 --> 01:13:56.033
come to our forces , that's the only

01:13:56.033 --> 01:13:57.922
thing that you should do for your

01:13:57.922 --> 01:13:59.867
career much in the same where I've

01:13:59.867 --> 01:14:01.922
watched special operations Forces be

01:14:01.922 --> 01:14:03.922
successful . When you come become ,

01:14:03.922 --> 01:14:03.510
when you become a special operations

01:14:03.510 --> 01:14:05.510
force operator , that's what you're

01:14:05.510 --> 01:14:07.566
doing all the time . And that's what

01:14:07.566 --> 01:14:09.788
they want to do our forces the same way

01:14:09.788 --> 01:14:11.732
as retention in your department of

01:14:11.732 --> 01:14:13.732
young people . Once they feel their

01:14:13.732 --> 01:14:15.510
duty , do we have a pretty good

01:14:15.510 --> 01:14:17.732
retention to re up ? So it's a , it's a

01:14:17.732 --> 01:14:19.788
mixed bag by service Senator . I can

01:14:19.788 --> 01:14:22.121
certainly come back to it , the numbers .

01:14:22.121 --> 01:14:21.970
But the challenge of course is that

01:14:21.970 --> 01:14:23.990
there are a lot of choices and so

01:14:23.990 --> 01:14:26.101
that's what we , we have to make sure

01:14:26.101 --> 01:14:28.530
that we're on guard for . How concerned

01:14:28.530 --> 01:14:30.697
are you about tiktok and the influence

01:14:30.697 --> 01:14:32.863
that they're having on American kids ?

01:14:32.863 --> 01:14:35.030
So tiktok concerns me for a number of

01:14:35.030 --> 01:14:37.030
different reasons . One is the data

01:14:37.030 --> 01:14:38.974
that they have . Secondly , is the

01:14:38.974 --> 01:14:41.086
algorithm and the control who has the

01:14:41.086 --> 01:14:43.419
algorithm . Third is the broad platform ,

01:14:43.419 --> 01:14:45.419
influence operations that we talked

01:14:45.419 --> 01:14:44.750
about previously . It's not only the

01:14:44.750 --> 01:14:46.972
fact that you can influence something ,

01:14:46.972 --> 01:14:49.139
but you can also , you know , turn off

01:14:49.139 --> 01:14:51.306
the message as well when you have such

01:14:51.306 --> 01:14:53.472
a large population of , of listeners .

01:14:53.472 --> 01:14:55.694
Yeah . Thank you for that general . You

01:14:55.694 --> 01:14:57.750
don't have a recruiting problem . Do

01:14:57.750 --> 01:15:01.120
you , Senator ? I'll start that we are

01:15:01.130 --> 01:15:04.910
recipients of services and I would want

01:15:04.910 --> 01:15:07.240
all to know that we're very uh

01:15:07.250 --> 01:15:09.083
integrated with their recruiting

01:15:09.083 --> 01:15:11.306
efforts . And there are some challenges

01:15:11.306 --> 01:15:13.472
out there for the services right now .

01:15:13.472 --> 01:15:15.472
Your special operations team is not

01:15:15.472 --> 01:15:17.639
having a recruiting problem . Uh We're

01:15:17.639 --> 01:15:19.861
at , uh we're at an aggregate at a very

01:15:19.861 --> 01:15:21.750
high level of recruitment and the

01:15:21.750 --> 01:15:24.210
department's got a retention number . I

01:15:24.210 --> 01:15:26.154
think that's one of the highest in

01:15:26.154 --> 01:15:28.266
decades . And we're right there along

01:15:28.266 --> 01:15:30.210
with , yeah , you require the most

01:15:30.210 --> 01:15:32.543
rigorous training standards in military ,

01:15:32.543 --> 01:15:35.640
correct ? We at center , we require

01:15:35.650 --> 01:15:38.460
very high standards and folks who want

01:15:38.460 --> 01:15:41.230
to come and be part of that journey ,

01:15:41.240 --> 01:15:44.410
who have determination , grit , uh

01:15:44.420 --> 01:15:47.170
initiative , uh willingness to see

01:15:47.170 --> 01:15:49.392
something through and frankly , what we

01:15:49.392 --> 01:15:51.448
really look for is somebody acquired

01:15:51.448 --> 01:15:53.559
professional who will do this mission

01:15:53.559 --> 01:15:55.800
uh and , and succeed and then get ready

01:15:55.800 --> 01:15:57.856
to do the next one . Would you agree

01:15:57.856 --> 01:16:01.160
that it's also the most riskiest part

01:16:01.170 --> 01:16:04.780
in our military ? Senator ? I ,

01:16:04.790 --> 01:16:06.734
there's a lot of our teammates out

01:16:06.734 --> 01:16:08.901
there across the services that do some

01:16:08.901 --> 01:16:12.500
incredible feats of , of both their

01:16:12.500 --> 01:16:15.120
mission and bravery . I'd say we're one

01:16:15.120 --> 01:16:17.910
part of what that our department has as

01:16:17.910 --> 01:16:20.990
the most incredible military formation

01:16:20.990 --> 01:16:23.140
in the history of mankind . That's

01:16:23.140 --> 01:16:25.029
pretty diplomatic way to put it .

01:16:25.029 --> 01:16:26.918
General , we do some really tough

01:16:26.918 --> 01:16:29.270
missions . Yeah , very tough . Uh You

01:16:29.270 --> 01:16:31.326
know , I think there's a lesson here

01:16:31.326 --> 01:16:33.437
for the rest of our military and it's

01:16:33.437 --> 01:16:35.659
not everybody but uh in America's youth

01:16:35.659 --> 01:16:37.603
want to serve an organization with

01:16:37.603 --> 01:16:39.740
purpose and patriotism . I mean , we

01:16:39.740 --> 01:16:42.450
all saw that growing up , uh , in light

01:16:42.460 --> 01:16:44.740
it seems people rise to standards that

01:16:44.740 --> 01:16:46.907
you set for them . I mean , I saw that

01:16:46.910 --> 01:16:49.340
in , in my former life of coaching . I

01:16:49.340 --> 01:16:51.720
mean , you set a standard and , and

01:16:51.730 --> 01:16:53.897
most of the time if you push them hard

01:16:53.897 --> 01:16:56.008
enough , no matter where they want to

01:16:56.008 --> 01:16:58.174
or not , they'll reach that standard .

01:16:58.174 --> 01:17:00.341
So I want to thank for what socom does

01:17:00.341 --> 01:17:02.341
and everything that y'all stand for

01:17:02.341 --> 01:17:04.563
because you're on the front lines every

01:17:04.563 --> 01:17:06.786
day and uh you're usually the first one

01:17:06.786 --> 01:17:09.063
to get there and the last one to leave .

01:17:09.063 --> 01:17:11.230
So thanks to your group and the people

01:17:11.230 --> 01:17:13.174
that stand up for this country and

01:17:13.174 --> 01:17:12.830
patriotism that they have for us .

01:17:12.830 --> 01:17:14.886
Thank you very much . Thank you , Mr

01:17:14.886 --> 01:17:16.941
Chairman on behalf of the chairman ,

01:17:16.941 --> 01:17:18.820
Senator Warren . Uh Thank you Mr

01:17:18.820 --> 01:17:20.940
Chairman . So , one of the primary

01:17:20.940 --> 01:17:23.550
purposes of this hearing is to evaluate

01:17:23.550 --> 01:17:26.560
your commands , budget requests . Most

01:17:26.560 --> 01:17:28.727
federal agencies have to balance their

01:17:28.727 --> 01:17:31.520
must haves against their nice to haves

01:17:31.530 --> 01:17:34.240
when it comes to requests for money and

01:17:34.240 --> 01:17:36.184
they have to account for long term

01:17:36.184 --> 01:17:38.296
costs . For example , the maintenance

01:17:38.296 --> 01:17:40.710
of fleet vehicles that they want to buy ,

01:17:40.930 --> 01:17:43.860
but not the Department of Defense D O D

01:17:43.860 --> 01:17:45.916
submits its budget for the things it

01:17:45.916 --> 01:17:48.850
wants and then it submits a second list

01:17:48.850 --> 01:17:51.380
of things that they want funded and

01:17:51.380 --> 01:17:53.602
they don't add what the long term costs

01:17:53.602 --> 01:17:56.790
will be D O D calls this second list ,

01:17:56.800 --> 01:17:59.610
unfunded priorities . I call it a wish

01:17:59.610 --> 01:18:02.720
list . Now last year , some parts of D

01:18:02.720 --> 01:18:05.660
O D stuck to their budgets and didn't

01:18:05.660 --> 01:18:08.720
put anything on a wish list but not so

01:18:08.720 --> 01:18:11.410
calm . Nope , so calm got

01:18:11.410 --> 01:18:15.000
$13.2 billion in its regular

01:18:15.000 --> 01:18:17.111
budget . Then turned around and asked

01:18:17.111 --> 01:18:21.030
for $656 million . Additionally ,

01:18:21.240 --> 01:18:24.030
now one of the items on so coms wish

01:18:24.030 --> 01:18:27.830
list last year was $8.7 million to

01:18:27.830 --> 01:18:31.320
ensure that a socom armament facility

01:18:31.330 --> 01:18:34.680
could meet blast exposure standards

01:18:34.690 --> 01:18:37.580
that protect service members from

01:18:37.580 --> 01:18:40.860
traumatic brain injury . General Fenton .

01:18:40.870 --> 01:18:42.910
Do you agree that if SOCOM needs

01:18:42.910 --> 01:18:45.850
funding for a project that will ensure

01:18:45.850 --> 01:18:47.850
that it is in compliance with basic

01:18:47.850 --> 01:18:50.640
safety standards and help protect

01:18:50.640 --> 01:18:52.970
workers from brain damage ? That

01:18:52.970 --> 01:18:55.137
project should be part of the commands

01:18:55.137 --> 01:18:59.030
budget , Senator

01:18:59.040 --> 01:19:02.530
uh put a high priority on safety . So

01:19:02.530 --> 01:19:04.752
should it be part of your budget ? Then

01:19:04.800 --> 01:19:07.150
any budget I build or reflect my

01:19:07.150 --> 01:19:09.261
priorities and priority is safety and

01:19:09.261 --> 01:19:11.372
certainly aligned with the N D s . So

01:19:11.372 --> 01:19:13.372
that means you think that something

01:19:13.372 --> 01:19:15.650
like this should be in the base budget ,

01:19:15.650 --> 01:19:17.872
Senator I put a high priority on safety

01:19:17.872 --> 01:19:20.094
and budget . But you're telling me your

01:19:20.094 --> 01:19:22.094
budget reflects your priorities and

01:19:22.094 --> 01:19:24.317
somehow this didn't even make it in the

01:19:24.317 --> 01:19:26.483
basic budget . So look , let me ask it

01:19:26.483 --> 01:19:28.650
this way . Then this armament facility

01:19:28.650 --> 01:19:30.872
improvements weren't funded last year .

01:19:30.872 --> 01:19:33.530
So are you gonna put that in your base ?

01:19:33.530 --> 01:19:35.697
Budget this year . Are you gonna count

01:19:35.697 --> 01:19:37.919
on Congress to add extra money for it ?

01:19:37.919 --> 01:19:40.197
Which it didn't do last year . Senator .

01:19:40.197 --> 01:19:42.020
The first thing I'll do is get

01:19:42.020 --> 01:19:44.570
intimately familiar with the army

01:19:44.570 --> 01:19:46.570
facility you're , you're discussing

01:19:46.570 --> 01:19:48.681
right now , six months into the job .

01:19:48.681 --> 01:19:50.626
I'm still working my way through a

01:19:50.626 --> 01:19:53.720
number of , of certainly locations in

01:19:53.720 --> 01:19:55.720
the special ops community . So I'll

01:19:55.720 --> 01:19:57.831
take that for the record and get back

01:19:57.831 --> 01:19:59.900
to you . But my budget will be uh

01:19:59.910 --> 01:20:02.150
reflective of my priorities that are

01:20:02.150 --> 01:20:04.039
aligned with the national defense

01:20:04.039 --> 01:20:06.330
strategy and safety of our uh entire

01:20:06.330 --> 01:20:08.497
force is certainly a high priority for

01:20:08.497 --> 01:20:10.608
me . Well , I appreciate that , but I

01:20:10.608 --> 01:20:12.830
just want to make another point for the

01:20:12.830 --> 01:20:14.997
record . I wasn't born yesterday . You

01:20:14.997 --> 01:20:17.219
know , I get what's happening here . So

01:20:17.219 --> 01:20:19.830
calm and other commands are gaming the

01:20:19.830 --> 01:20:22.380
system . They take costs that should be

01:20:22.380 --> 01:20:24.320
part of a base budget request ,

01:20:24.320 --> 01:20:27.590
essential programs like funding to come

01:20:27.590 --> 01:20:29.600
into compliance with brain injury

01:20:29.600 --> 01:20:32.100
prevention standards and then put them

01:20:32.100 --> 01:20:35.670
on the wish list , daring Congress not

01:20:35.680 --> 01:20:37.900
to fund them . And that way they can

01:20:37.900 --> 01:20:40.930
boost their overall budget allocation

01:20:41.260 --> 01:20:43.430
in January . I sent a letter to

01:20:43.430 --> 01:20:45.740
Secretary Austin along with Senators

01:20:45.740 --> 01:20:49.690
Braun Lee and King telling D O D not

01:20:49.690 --> 01:20:52.690
to send Congress any wish lists as part

01:20:52.690 --> 01:20:55.350
of this year's budget . So General

01:20:55.350 --> 01:20:57.183
Fenton , this is your first time

01:20:57.183 --> 01:20:59.406
submitting a budget as the commander of

01:20:59.406 --> 01:21:01.580
SOCOM . You'll be sending it over to

01:21:01.580 --> 01:21:03.691
Congress this week . So you should be

01:21:03.691 --> 01:21:06.330
right on top of this . Will you pledge

01:21:06.340 --> 01:21:09.580
not to request any unfunded priority

01:21:09.590 --> 01:21:12.490
items ? On top of your annual budget

01:21:12.490 --> 01:21:16.260
request , Senator , I will

01:21:16.260 --> 01:21:18.850
submit the budget that reflects my

01:21:18.850 --> 01:21:20.961
priority is aligned against the N D s

01:21:21.140 --> 01:21:24.880
and I will submit that and

01:21:24.890 --> 01:21:28.170
any you poll required by law that

01:21:28.170 --> 01:21:30.140
reflects facts of life changes ,

01:21:30.140 --> 01:21:32.530
accelerated capabilities and any

01:21:32.530 --> 01:21:34.850
additional nds . Let me stop you right

01:21:34.850 --> 01:21:36.906
there . I just want to be required .

01:21:37.220 --> 01:21:39.270
You need to submit a list . You are

01:21:39.270 --> 01:21:41.381
right . That is required by law , but

01:21:41.381 --> 01:21:43.603
you don't need to put anything in it or

01:21:43.603 --> 01:21:45.770
ask for any funding from it . The list

01:21:45.770 --> 01:21:47.214
from European Command and

01:21:47.214 --> 01:21:49.710
Transportation Command were blank last

01:21:49.710 --> 01:21:52.240
year . That is they lived within their

01:21:52.240 --> 01:21:54.970
budget . They did not come back for an

01:21:54.970 --> 01:21:57.090
additional bite at the apple and I'm

01:21:57.090 --> 01:21:59.500
just asking if you will agree to do the

01:21:59.500 --> 01:22:01.556
same thing . That's what budgets are

01:22:01.556 --> 01:22:03.444
about . They're about making your

01:22:03.444 --> 01:22:05.556
priorities clear . And I want to know

01:22:05.556 --> 01:22:07.611
if you're willing to live within the

01:22:07.611 --> 01:22:09.833
budget that you have from the D O D and

01:22:09.833 --> 01:22:13.410
not come back here for more . Submit a

01:22:13.410 --> 01:22:15.200
budget that is in line with my

01:22:15.200 --> 01:22:17.367
priorities in line with the N D s . Is

01:22:17.367 --> 01:22:20.270
that a yes or no senator and as

01:22:20.280 --> 01:22:23.170
requested by law and by law , I will

01:22:23.170 --> 01:22:25.392
submit to you , Paul , I will take into

01:22:25.392 --> 01:22:27.281
consideration any facts of life .

01:22:27.370 --> 01:22:29.592
That's frankly , that's not even a very

01:22:29.592 --> 01:22:31.990
artful dodge . Look , we don't let any

01:22:32.000 --> 01:22:34.056
other part of the federal government

01:22:34.056 --> 01:22:36.310
behave this way and for good reason ,

01:22:36.560 --> 01:22:38.870
the budget process is about making

01:22:38.870 --> 01:22:41.010
tough choices and setting clear

01:22:41.010 --> 01:22:43.650
priorities . Anything in the regular

01:22:43.650 --> 01:22:45.817
budget must include an analysis of the

01:22:45.817 --> 01:22:47.928
long term costs , not things that are

01:22:47.928 --> 01:22:50.150
on the wish list . I have a bipartisan

01:22:50.150 --> 01:22:52.570
bill to eliminate waste like this , but

01:22:52.570 --> 01:22:54.640
D O D could shut it down voluntarily

01:22:54.640 --> 01:22:56.770
right now and I urge you to do that .

01:22:56.780 --> 01:22:59.630
Thank you , Mr Chairman on behalf the

01:22:59.630 --> 01:23:02.290
chairman Senator rounds . Thank you ,

01:23:02.290 --> 01:23:04.640
Mr Chairman , gentlemen , first of all ,

01:23:04.640 --> 01:23:06.529
thank you for your service to our

01:23:06.529 --> 01:23:09.060
country . Um And I have to admit , I

01:23:09.060 --> 01:23:11.600
like seeing options in the budget . I

01:23:11.610 --> 01:23:13.721
like seeing alternatives . It doesn't

01:23:13.721 --> 01:23:15.666
mean that everything that's on the

01:23:15.666 --> 01:23:17.777
budget is necessarily gonna be funded

01:23:17.777 --> 01:23:19.888
by or recommended by this committee .

01:23:19.888 --> 01:23:19.710
But to see the other options out there

01:23:19.720 --> 01:23:21.960
from my perspective , I I appreciate

01:23:21.960 --> 01:23:24.127
seeing those others that sometimes may

01:23:24.127 --> 01:23:26.127
not make it all the way through the

01:23:26.127 --> 01:23:28.238
budget process . General Fenton Socom

01:23:28.238 --> 01:23:30.071
has undoubtedly been reorienting

01:23:30.071 --> 01:23:32.127
reorienting from counterterrorism to

01:23:32.127 --> 01:23:34.400
preparation for a high end near peer

01:23:34.400 --> 01:23:36.720
fight . Assume a situation in which we

01:23:36.720 --> 01:23:39.320
had to respond under article five and

01:23:39.320 --> 01:23:41.830
support our NATO allies in Europe . And

01:23:41.840 --> 01:23:44.420
China concurrently took military action

01:23:44.420 --> 01:23:47.570
to claim Taiwan . What do you assess

01:23:47.570 --> 01:23:49.990
would be so calms capability to support

01:23:50.000 --> 01:23:53.110
a two theater war concurrently in

01:23:53.110 --> 01:23:55.150
Europe and the Pacific

01:23:58.850 --> 01:24:01.640
Senator . What I can tell you now is

01:24:01.640 --> 01:24:03.696
that your special operations team is

01:24:03.696 --> 01:24:06.780
already globally deployed . Uh 5000

01:24:06.780 --> 01:24:10.030
personnel and 80 different countries uh

01:24:10.040 --> 01:24:12.490
at combatant command request . And at

01:24:12.490 --> 01:24:15.120
times that departmental request , our

01:24:15.120 --> 01:24:17.410
ability to address the integrated

01:24:17.410 --> 01:24:19.790
deterrents peace crisis response and

01:24:19.790 --> 01:24:22.920
counterterrorism . Uh We were

01:24:22.920 --> 01:24:25.290
absolutely able to do all that . We're

01:24:25.290 --> 01:24:27.890
able to do the front end competition ,

01:24:27.900 --> 01:24:30.011
integrated deterrence with training ,

01:24:30.011 --> 01:24:32.344
building capability partners and allies .

01:24:32.344 --> 01:24:34.567
And at the same time , we're also ready

01:24:34.567 --> 01:24:36.789
to prepare an environment for the joint

01:24:36.789 --> 01:24:39.011
force and prevail in conflict . I think

01:24:39.011 --> 01:24:41.340
what I'm really trying to get out is is

01:24:41.350 --> 01:24:44.800
it seems as though our policy here is

01:24:44.800 --> 01:24:47.280
not necessarily to win into two

01:24:47.280 --> 01:24:49.502
theaters and yet everything that we can

01:24:49.502 --> 01:24:53.010
do to be in a position uh to give the

01:24:53.010 --> 01:24:55.177
young men and women on the front lines

01:24:55.177 --> 01:24:57.343
every opportunity we should be talking

01:24:57.343 --> 01:25:00.000
about now before it ever happens . And

01:25:00.000 --> 01:25:02.580
I just uh with regard to a budget which

01:25:02.580 --> 01:25:04.691
you will prepare and bring in and lay

01:25:04.691 --> 01:25:07.160
out , would it be fair to say that

01:25:07.160 --> 01:25:09.160
there are other items that could be

01:25:09.160 --> 01:25:11.300
done ? Um And in the very near future

01:25:11.300 --> 01:25:13.600
that could help us do a better job of

01:25:13.600 --> 01:25:17.140
preparing for a two front uh

01:25:17.150 --> 01:25:21.030
defensive uh capacity Senator ,

01:25:21.030 --> 01:25:22.000
I um

01:25:24.770 --> 01:25:27.490
I stayed focused daily on

01:25:28.120 --> 01:25:30.320
readiness and training and providing

01:25:30.330 --> 01:25:32.386
the President's Secretary a range of

01:25:32.386 --> 01:25:34.441
options for whatever conditions they

01:25:34.441 --> 01:25:36.386
may put in front of us . Um as you

01:25:36.386 --> 01:25:38.950
describe in some level of potential to

01:25:38.950 --> 01:25:42.260
front or we stay uh trained and ready

01:25:42.260 --> 01:25:44.530
to provide options across a number of

01:25:44.530 --> 01:25:46.641
contingencies that the department has

01:25:46.641 --> 01:25:48.641
asked us to plan for along with the

01:25:48.641 --> 01:25:50.752
combatant commands at the same time .

01:25:50.752 --> 01:25:53.210
Also providing dilemmas for the

01:25:53.210 --> 01:25:55.432
adversaries , both either in integrated

01:25:55.432 --> 01:25:58.380
deterrents or in high end conflict .

01:25:58.390 --> 01:26:01.110
Thank you , General Nakase Oni . As we

01:26:01.110 --> 01:26:03.054
all know , the cyber mission force

01:26:03.054 --> 01:26:05.420
comprises elements provided by all of

01:26:05.420 --> 01:26:07.420
the services . Is there anything we

01:26:07.420 --> 01:26:10.120
should do uh to better execute this

01:26:10.120 --> 01:26:13.390
construct ? Senator , I'll be coming

01:26:13.390 --> 01:26:16.040
back to the committee under 15 0 to the

01:26:16.050 --> 01:26:18.380
N D A section that came out in the

01:26:18.380 --> 01:26:20.320
recent NBA two to talk about the

01:26:20.320 --> 01:26:22.542
shortfall . So that comes at the end of

01:26:22.542 --> 01:26:24.264
March , that will be the first

01:26:24.264 --> 01:26:26.431
indicator that I'll have to be able to

01:26:26.431 --> 01:26:28.376
communicate with the committee . I

01:26:28.376 --> 01:26:30.542
suspect between that and section 15 34

01:26:30.542 --> 01:26:32.653
which requires me to come back at the

01:26:32.653 --> 01:26:34.820
end of June with the secretary and the

01:26:34.820 --> 01:26:36.931
chairman to talk about shortfalls and

01:26:36.931 --> 01:26:38.820
readiness will be able to outline

01:26:38.820 --> 01:26:40.931
exactly what we think are the areas ,

01:26:40.931 --> 01:26:43.153
there are some and there are areas that

01:26:43.153 --> 01:26:45.264
that we can work with the services to

01:26:45.264 --> 01:26:47.320
improve . Thank you . Also general .

01:26:47.320 --> 01:26:49.542
Last year , we discussed the benefit of

01:26:49.542 --> 01:26:53.460
N S P M 13 and N S P M 21 what

01:26:53.460 --> 01:26:55.100
they provided the command to

01:26:55.100 --> 01:26:57.650
effectively conduct cyber operations .

01:26:57.930 --> 01:26:59.597
Recognizing that they're both

01:26:59.597 --> 01:27:01.430
classified in nature , but , but

01:27:01.430 --> 01:27:03.541
basically , they have streamlined and

01:27:03.541 --> 01:27:05.763
lay out a collaborative effort in which

01:27:05.763 --> 01:27:08.460
to provide accelerated timeframes for

01:27:08.470 --> 01:27:12.010
um cyber operations as you look over

01:27:12.010 --> 01:27:14.100
the years since what if anything has

01:27:14.110 --> 01:27:16.050
changed in your assessment on the

01:27:16.050 --> 01:27:17.840
impact they have had on Cyber

01:27:17.840 --> 01:27:21.170
operations , senator really very little

01:27:21.170 --> 01:27:23.790
impact . Uh If I can rewind the clock

01:27:23.790 --> 01:27:26.030
just a bit 2018 , as you recall , as

01:27:26.040 --> 01:27:28.610
you assisted with us to , to make sure

01:27:28.610 --> 01:27:30.910
that within the N D A that we saw Cyber

01:27:30.910 --> 01:27:32.966
as a traditional military activity ,

01:27:32.966 --> 01:27:35.188
that was a huge step forward for us . I

01:27:35.188 --> 01:27:36.910
would also say that the policy

01:27:36.910 --> 01:27:39.188
memorandum that you talked about their ,

01:27:39.188 --> 01:27:41.354
their foundational for what we do in a

01:27:41.354 --> 01:27:43.521
manner that is much more predictable ,

01:27:43.521 --> 01:27:45.410
both for ourselves and for policy

01:27:45.410 --> 01:27:47.743
makers . So we continue to work with it .

01:27:47.743 --> 01:27:49.910
Uh We are continuing to move forward .

01:27:49.910 --> 01:27:50.370
Thank you . Thank you , Mr Chairman .